Table of Contents

Acknowledgment --- vi
Abstract --- viii
I. INTRODUCTION --- 1
II. HYPOTHESIS & METHODOLOGY --- 11
III. LITERATURE REVIEW --- 19
  A. Theoretical Background of Economic Engagement --- 19
III. OVERVIEW OF ENGAGEMENT POLICY TOWARD THE DPRK --- 28
  A. U.S. Engagement Policy --- 28
    1. Clinton Administration (1994-2000) --- 28
    2. Bush's First Term (2001-2004) --- 31
    3. Bush's Second Term (2004-2009) --- 36
    4. Obama's Administration (2009-present) --- 41
  B. South Korea's Engagement Policy --- 42
    1. Unconditional Engagement (1998-2007) --- 42
    2. Conditional Engagement (2008-present) --- 49
IV. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF POLICY FAILURES --- 60
  A. Inconsistent U.S. Policy Failures --- 60
    1. Inconsistent U.S. Policy --- 60
      a. Exaggeration of Danger for U.S. Internal Politics --- 60
      b. U.S. Hard Line Policy --- 66
      c. U.S. Lack of Coordinated Policy --- 75
    2. South Korea's Consistent Policy --- 81
      a. High Exit Cost --- 81
        (1). High Levels of Asset Specificity --- 86
        (2). Inflated Political Symbolism of Engagement Policy --- 92
        (3). Deep Fear of Insecure North Korea --- 104
  B. Common Causes of Policy Failures --- 111
    1. North Korea's Lack of Cooperation --- 111
      a. North Korea's Regime Survival Strategy --- 111
      b. North Korea's High Cost of Transformation --- 119
    2. Lack of Coordination among Engaging States --- 124
VI. Conclusion --- 131
  A. Summaries of Findings --- 131
  B. Policy Prescriptions --- 136
    References --- 143
    Abstract in Korean --- 187

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