Table of Contents
Acknowledgment --- vi
Abstract --- viii
I. INTRODUCTION --- 1
II. HYPOTHESIS & METHODOLOGY --- 11
III. LITERATURE REVIEW --- 19
A. Theoretical Background of Economic Engagement --- 19
III. OVERVIEW OF ENGAGEMENT POLICY TOWARD THE DPRK --- 28
A. U.S. Engagement Policy --- 28
1. Clinton Administration (1994-2000) --- 28
2. Bush's First Term (2001-2004) --- 31
3. Bush's Second Term (2004-2009) --- 36
4. Obama's Administration (2009-present) --- 41
B. South Korea's Engagement Policy --- 42
1. Unconditional Engagement (1998-2007) --- 42
2. Conditional Engagement (2008-present) --- 49
IV. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF POLICY FAILURES --- 60
A. Inconsistent U.S. Policy Failures --- 60
1. Inconsistent U.S. Policy --- 60
a. Exaggeration of Danger for U.S. Internal Politics --- 60
b. U.S. Hard Line Policy --- 66
c. U.S. Lack of Coordinated Policy --- 75
2. South Korea's Consistent Policy --- 81
a. High Exit Cost --- 81
(1). High Levels of Asset Specificity --- 86
(2). Inflated Political Symbolism of Engagement Policy --- 92
(3). Deep Fear of Insecure North Korea --- 104
B. Common Causes of Policy Failures --- 111
1. North Korea's Lack of Cooperation --- 111
a. North Korea's Regime Survival Strategy --- 111
b. North Korea's High Cost of Transformation --- 119
2. Lack of Coordination among Engaging States --- 124
VI. Conclusion --- 131
A. Summaries of Findings --- 131
B. Policy Prescriptions --- 136
References --- 143
Abstract in Korean --- 187