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The Second Term **Obama** **Administration's Policy** towards the **Korean Peninsula**

Jangho Kim · Dongsoo Kim · Hyun-Wook Kim
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Abstract

This study aims to examine the diverse factors and environmental changes that may influence the second term Obama administration's foreign policy towards Northeast Asia, and suggest policy options for the new administration of South Korea in response to the prospective United States policy. Two contrasting prospects are competing for the second term Obama administrations' foreign policy towards Northeast Asia, especially North Korea. One view, which can be called the pessimistic view, is that continuity rather than change will prevail for the next four years. Obama administration's policy towards North Korea during the first term is characterized by 'strategic patience,' which suggests that the United States waits for North Korea to display sincere efforts for denuclearization and to come back to the negotiating table. This strategy also implies that under the right conditions, the United States will pursue a comprehensive package deal including normalization of relations with the United States and economic aid in return for North Korea's complete denuclearization, but will not move first. The pessimistic view holds that the same or similar policy with 'strategic patience' will prevail for the next four years under Obama's leadership.

The other perspective is that change instead of continuity will be the key to the new Obama administration during his second term. This optimistic view is that Obama will adopt a more flexible and cooperative policy against North Korea, which focuses on negotiation and dialogues whether they are bi-lateral or multi-lateral. This perspective is based upon the negative evaluation of the 'strategic patience' strategy that it was unsuccessful in dealing with the North

Korea nuclear issue. In addition, this perspective also claims that environmental changes surrounding American foreign policy forces changes to more engagement oriented policy.

The new Obama administration's policy towards the Korean peninsula should be understood within the grand framework of the United States' over all policy towards East Asia including China. This study envisions that in the second term Obama administration, the policy towards Northeast Asia, especially China, will sustain two prolonged approach, cooperation and competition, on the basis of the rebalancing strategy toward Asia. Given that Asia is a critical area for the United States in terms of economy, military, and political interests, the Obama administration's rebalancing strategy toward Asia can be understood as its national strategy for its long-term maintenance of hegemony in the region targeting primarily China.

The second term Obama administration's policy towards North Korea is a more complex issue, and therefore, not surprisingly, there are contrasting views, as previously mentioned on this issue. Indeed both the optimistic view and the pessimistic view commonly suggest that the new Obama administration will utilize some kind of combination of the coercive policy represented by strategic patience and engagement policy characterized by negotiation and dialogue. Their real difference lies in their different emphasis. Considering diverse environmental factors, the second term Obama administration is likely to pursue more engagement-oriented policy than its first term. However, the new Obama administration will also reveal that the key to the real solution for the gridlock is up to the

will and attitude of North Korea.

As North Korea launched the rocket, Eun-Ha 3, which is believed to be easily transformed to a long-range missile, in mid-December 2012, the new Obama administration may pursue some coercive policy towards North Korea including economic sanctions and UN resolutions, etc. during the first part of 2013. In the long-term, however, the new Obama administration will attempt to find new ways to restore dialogue with North Korea. Very recently, Obama designated John Kerry as the new secretary of state replacing Hillary Clinton. Kerry is well known as an advocate of solving the North Korean nuclear issue through negotiations and dialogue, unlike Clinton, who is a supporter of the 'strategic patience' strategy. With the strong pessimism over the usefulness of the Six-Party Talks, the new Obama administration may be inclined to resume bilateral talks with North Korea, or tri-lateral dialogue including China with the expectation that China may be able to draw some significant changes in the international behavior and domestic structure of North Korea. As mentioned earlier, this attempt by the new Obama administration can only be facilitated by the will and attitude towards change by North Korea.

The newly elected Park Geun-Hye administration will face a critical challenge originating from the North. Park made it clear that she would make efforts to restore dialogue with Pyongyang, albeit with some conditions, during the campaign for the presidential election. Although prompt dialogue may not be possible due to the provocative behavior by the North, the Park administration will at-

tempt to find a momentum for dialogue in the long term, just like the new Obama administration. What is important for the Park administration is strengthening the ROK-U.S. alliance and coordinating policy with the Obama administration over the solution for the North Korean nuclear issue. Given the strong agreement for the common interest between South Korea and the United States, both the Park administration and the new Obama administration may be well aware that policy coordination between the two countries is the only way to peacefully and successfully resolve the North Korean nuclear issue. For the next four year, intense communication between the two governments will be necessary in order to have any effect on the genuine denuclearization process as well as change in North Korea itself.

Keywords: Obama Administration, North Korea, U.S. Strategy, Pivot to Asia, Rebalancing, U.S.-ROK Alliance, nuclear proliferation, Park Geun-Hye Administration



I . Introduction

With the overwhelming victory in the presidential election last November, the current president, Barack Obama, is guaranteed another four years of leading the United States. The world's eyes now have turned to the new Obama administration's foreign policy during the next four years. In particular, its policy towards Northeast Asia, including North Korea, attracts our attention. Given that Obama's explicit emphasis on the strategic importance of this region, there is no doubt that the new administration's foreign policy priority will be placed in this area as well. How will the second term Obama administration's foreign policy unfold for the next four years? In which direction will the United States move to handle the issues in Northeast Asia including North Korea? Will continuity or significant change prevail? What should South Korea's responses be to maximize its national interest? These are the key questions that we attempt to address in this study. In other words, this study aims to examine the diverse factors and environmental changes that may influence the second term Obama administration's foreign policy towards Northeast Asia and suggest policy options for the new administration of South Korea in response to the prospective United States policy.

Indeed two contrasting perspectives are competing as to the prospect for the second term Obama administration's foreign policy towards Northeast Asia, especially North Korea. One view, which can be called the pessimistic view, is that continuity rather than change will prevail for the next four years. Obama administration's policy towards North Korea during the first term is characterized

by ‘strategic patience,’ which suggests that the United States waits for North Korea to display sincere efforts for denuclearization and to come back to the negotiating table. This strategy also implies that under the right conditions, the United States will pursue a comprehensive package deal including normalization of relations with the United States and economic aid in return for North Korea’s complete denuclearization, but will not move first. The pessimistic view holds that the same or similar policy with ‘strategic patience’ will prevail for the next four years under Obama’s leadership.

The other perspective is that change instead of continuity will be the key to the new Obama administration during his second term. This optimistic view is that Obama will adopt a more flexible and cooperative policy against North Korea, which focuses on negotiation and dialogues whether they are bi-lateral or multi-lateral. This perspective is based upon the negative evaluation of the ‘strategic patience’ strategy that it was unsuccessful in dealing with the North Korea nuclear issue. In addition, this perspective also claims that environmental changes surrounding American foreign policy forces changes to more engagement oriented policy.

Which perspective will better explain and predict the second term Obama administration towards the Korean peninsula? And what should South Korea’s policy be in response to the new Obama administration’s policy toward Northeast Asia including North Korea for the next four years? In answering the questions, the rest of this study is structured as follows:

Chapter II discusses the Obama administration’s foreign poli-

cy in general, focusing on its policy towards Northeast Asia. Especially, this chapter will explore the so called ‘Pivot to Asia’ policy as the main feature of the first term Obama administrations’ foreign policy toward Northeast Asia. Chapter III will focus on the analysis of the United States-China relationship during the first Obama administration and the prospective relationship between the two great powers for the next four years. This chapter will provide a base analysis for the second term Obama administration’s policy toward Northeast Asia. Chapter IV will concentrate on the analysis on the new Obama administration’s policy towards a more specific area, the Korean peninsula. This chapter will mainly discuss the United States and South Korea relationship during the second term Obama administration. Chapter V deals with the policy towards North Korea by the new Obama administration. In the last chapter, which is the conclusion, the key findings of this study will be summarized and their implications will be discussed. Especially, the policy recommendations for the South Korean government in response to the prospective policies of the new Obama administration will also be discussed.



II. The Second Term Obama Administration's Foreign Policy

In the 2012 United States presidential election, the incumbent President Barack Obama prevailed over the Republican, Romney, and has been reelected to a second term. Following President Obama's successful reelection, the direction of United States' foreign policy in the second term Obama administration has attracted worldwide attention. In his first term, President Obama emphasized the importance of the Asia-Pacific region for United States' foreign policy and several United States' top officials announced that the United States' foreign policy priority would move to the Asian region. Thus, in the second term Obama administration, United States East Asia policy will most likely lead American foreign initiatives for the next four years.

The rebalancing strategy towards Asia has two purposes: economic revival through positive economic cooperation with regional states, especially China, and the prevention of a new regional hegemony by utilizing a deterrence strategy against China and strengthening of existing alliances. Thus, in the Obama administration's second term, the rebalancing strategy towards Asia will be positively sustained and implemented on the basis of suggested principles in his first term such as continuous strengthening of relationships with existing allies in the region, establishment of developmental partnership with China, positive participation in multilateralism in Asia, prevention of new regional hegemony, and pursue more economic interests through cooperation with regional states.

1. Obama Administration's Foreign Policy

In his first term, the Obama government's foreign policy was a mixture of liberalism and realism, but it resulted in progressive pragmatism. That is, despite his attempt to achieve ideal goals, his endeavors were not very successful due to international and domestic situations. For the first 3 years of his term, President Obama had visions on justice, peace and stability, but he faced difficult realities in international politics. He was a progressive where possible but was a pragmatist when necessary.¹ This criticism was due to his foreign policy becoming a mere damage control mechanism on specific issues, which made his foreign policy devoid of a grand strategy. Even though he was not very successful in achieving his visions, he at the same time was advocated for being somewhat efficient in protecting national interests of the enfeebled United States.

The biggest achievement of President Obama was ending two wars: Iraq in December 2012 and Afghanistan by 2014. By finishing these wars, Obama would be able to strategically rebalance his policy issues. In the initial period of the Obama administration, 140,000 United States' soldiers were residing in Iraq, but Al Qaeda moved to Pakistan afterwards. Due to the end of Iraq war, the United States could effectively focus its military and intelligence capabilities to anti-terrorist strategy, more specifically on defeating Al Qaeda.

¹-Martin S. Indyk, Kenneth G. Lieberthal, and Michael E. O'hanlon, *Bending History: Barack Obama's Foreign Policy* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2012).

After the war in Afghanistan in 2014, the United States will be able to pursue antiterrorism strategy more effectively, based upon the United States-Afghanistan strategic partnership agreement signed in last May 2012.

Another achievement is preventing the usage of nuclear weapons and proliferation. Along with the new Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) with Russia, the Obama administration will pursue additional decreases on nuclear delivery systems and nuclear arsenals like tactical nuclear weapons and non-deployed nuclear weapons. He will also pursue sanctioning Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and verifiable Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT). Concerning the Iranian nuclear program, he will pursue financial and energy sanctions along with UN sanctions, with no exclusion of military usage.

The Obama administration will most likely continue its previous foreign policy more actively during the second term. The Democratic platform in 2012 provided three policy goals for the United States global leadership: global economic development, strong military capabilities, and universal values. In order for these goals to materialize, President Obama will expand its alliances and partnerships and will utilize international institutions, to cope with diverse global challenges. Currently, the United States' economy is getting better² and the second term Obama administration's foreign

²- Unemployment rate is decreasing since November 2010, which is expected to continue due to the third quantitative easing policy of the Federal Reserve. Also, United States' exports of commodities and services have risen 33.5% since 2009.

policy is expected to evolve more actively.³

Concerning defense policies, President Obama in the TV debate on October 22, mentioned the necessity to reduce the defense budget for the decrease of financial deficit, saying that in order for the projection of military capabilities abroad, the United States needs a solid domestic economy. That is, the reduction of defense budget is needed not for political purposes but for the purpose of defense strategy. The defense budget is expected to decrease by \$500 billion in 10 years.

An important task for the next Obama government's foreign policy is to establish a United States grand strategy. Grand strategy links objectives and means of states' foreign policies. It evaluates domestic and global environments, and defines the United States' national interests within those environments. The first Obama administration's foreign policy had a pragmatic tendency rather than providing a policy vision, only providing damage control measures instead of a more macro strategy to increase national interest.

Another task is to focus on soft power. The United States domestic economic situation limits its resources which could allow the United States to enable its diplomatic policy and military capabilities. So, the United States needs to focus on soft power. Soft power means power through persuasion rather than through coercion, security through relations, public diplomacy and ideology

³- The Democratic National Committee, "Moving America Forward: 2012 Democratic National Platform," September 4, 2012 <<http://www.democrats.org/democratic-national-platform>>.

rather than strong military capabilities.⁴

As has been said, the Obama administration's foreign policy has been characterized by the combination of multi-lateral idealism and realistic pragmatism. Due to the 9.11 terror, the United States had tremendous shock and consciousness of crisis on the maintenance of hegemony position in the world, and the Bush administration took uni-lateral hegemonic strategy on the basis of the positive military intervention like war in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Obama administration, however, has tried to change its foreign policy principle to multilateralism with emphasis on cooperation among states following criticism on the United States uni-lateral offensive foreign policy from the world. Although the Obama administration's foreign policy focuses on the multilateralism and idealism, it also pursues to prevent the emergence of new hegemony rival state at the same time based on realistic pragmatism.

2. Obama Administration's East Asia Policy: Pivot to Asia

The most important homework for the Obama government is to reconstruct the United States leadership in an uncertain global landscape. At the core of this is rebalancing towards Asia. President

⁴- Richard Fontaine and Kristin M. Lord, *et al.*, *America's Path: Grand Strategy for the Next Administration* (Washington, D.C.: Center for a New American Security, 2012).

Obama's Asia policy was initiated from the initial period of the administration with a long-term purpose. Specific strategies of the Asia policy are not yet certain, but its pursuit will be determined by two elements: The Iranian nuclear program and the United States' domestic political-economic situations. If Iran develops nuclear weapons or faces military attack by the United States or Israel, the Middle East issue will have the United States' policy priority, which would make the Obama government's Asia policy to be secondary. If the United States economy cannot show its strong recovery, along with its effect on domestic political dysfunctions, this also could be another obstacle to an active Asia policy.

Despite all the problems in the Middle East and at home, a remarkable feature in the Obama administration's foreign policy is an emphasis of Asia-Pacific region. Since 2011, the Obama administration has continuously proclaimed that the United States would be expanding and intensifying its role in the Asia-Pacific region using terms like 'return to Asia,' 'pivot to Asia,' and 'rebalancing.' The 'pivot to Asia' strategy is part of a United States global rebalancing strategy to maintain its hegemonic position in the world with the end of wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States sluggish economic recovery from the long standing economic depression, and China's rapid economic and military growth as a regional hegemonic challenger. To be more concrete, in a November 2011 address to the Australian parliament, President Obama announced that "the United States will play a larger and long-term role in shaping this region [the Asia-Pacific] and its future."⁵ Tom Donilon who

is a National Security Advisor said that the goal of strategic turn towards the Asia-Pacific region is to promote United States' national interests by helping to shape the norms and rule of the region.⁶ And, in the article of *Foreign Policy (FP)*, Hillary Clinton, the Secretary of State, indicated that "the future of politics will be decided in Asia, not Afghanistan or Iraq, and the United States will be right at the center of the action."⁷ In addition, in address at the East-West Center on November 2011, Secretary Clinton announced that "It is becoming increasingly clear that, in the 21st century, the world's strategic and economic center of gravity will be the Asia-Pacific ... one of the most important tasks of American statecraft over the next decade will be to lock in a substantially increased investment - diplomatic, economic, strategic, and otherwise - in this region."⁸ As such, the first term Obama administration's foreign policy direction was focused on the Asia-Pacific region.

⁵- The White House Office of the Press Secretary, "Remarks By President Obama to the Australian Parliament," November 17, 2011 <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/10/11/americas_pacific_century?wp_login_redirect=0> (searched date: December 12, 2012).

⁶- Tom Donilon, "America is back in the Pacific and will uphold the Rules," *Financial Times*, November 27, 2011 <<http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/4f3febac-1761-11e1-b00e-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2HrWQMMyNa>> (searched date: December 12, 2012).

⁷- Hillary Clinton, "America's Pacific Century," *Foreign Policy*, November 2011 <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/10/11/americas_pacific_century?wp_login_redirect=0> (searched date: December 12, 2012).

⁸- Paul Ekert, "Clinton declares America's Pacific Century," *Reuters*, November 10, 2011 <<http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/11/11/us-apec-usa-clinton-idUSTRE7A A0GJ20111111>> (searched date: December 12, 2012).

There are several contents of United States' rebalancing strategy toward Asia as follows⁹:

- 1) new United States troop deployment to Australia, new United States naval deployment to Singapore, and the strengthening military cooperation with the Philippines;
- 2) notwithstanding reductions in overall United States defense budget, the United States military presence in East Asia will be strengthened and be managed more effectively with it;
- 3) join to the East Asia Summit (EAS), one of the regional major multinational organizations;
- 4) progress in negotiations to form a nine-nation Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership (TPP) Free Trade Agreement (FTA).¹⁰

Although the Obama administration suggests above several tactical adjustments focused on the Asia-Pacific region, the term of 'return to Asia' or 'pivot to Asia' is, strictly speaking, not a new foreign policy concept but an emphasis on the foreign policy priority to the Asia-Pacific region. Historically, the United States has enjoyed the hegemonic status in the Asia-Pacific region since the end

⁹- Mark E. Manyin, Stephen Daggett, Ben Dolven, Susan V. Lawrence, Michael F. Martin, Ronald O'Rourke, and Bruce Vaughn, "Pivot to the Pacific? The Obama Administration's "Rebalancing" Toward Asia," *CRS Report for Congress* (March 2012), p. 1.

¹⁰- The current nine negotiating nations are Australia, Brunei, Chile, Malaysia, New Zealand, Peru, Vietnam, and the United States.

of World War II and has made efforts to maintain its status with cooperation among regional states. For instance, under the Bush administration, the United States also emphasized the strengthening of relations with existing allies in the region, began moving toward a more flexible and sustainable troop presence in the region, concluded a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with South Korea and strengthened partnerships with India and Vietnam. Thus, the 'pivot to Asia' strategy in the Obama administration is not an adoption of new foreign policy but a declaration on the Obama administration's belief that "the center of gravity for United States' foreign policy, national security, and economic interests is shifting toward Asia."¹¹ In other words, there are several key reasons why the Obama administration emphasizes the importance of the Asia-Pacific region. First, Asia has become the United States' largest source of imports and second-largest of exports. The United States recognizes that Asia, particularly China, is expected to become more vital for the United States' economy in the future, because Asia is the most populous area and fastest growing economic region in the world.¹² Second, China's growing military capabilities and increasing of its political influence in the region can become a menace to United States' hegemonic position, so the United States should move to prevent China's ascendancy as a hegemonic challenger. Third, the United States should endeavor to prevent the creation of

¹¹-Mark E. Manyin, "Pivot to the Pacific? The Obama Administration's "Rebalancing" Toward Asia," p. 6.

¹²- *Ibid.*, p. 6.

a perception in Asia that the United States' commitment to the region will wane due to cuts in the defense budget from the federal government. That is, the rebalancing strategy towards Asia can be summarized in its two main features: First, economic revival through positive economic cooperation with regional states, especially China; second, the prevention of a new regional hegemony by the adoption of a deterrence strategy against China and strengthening of existing allies.

The rebalancing strategy towards Asia in the Obama administration's second term will be implemented with a mix of multi-lateral idealism and pragmatic realism as mentioned above. After winning the election in November 2012, President Obama nominated John F. Kerry and Chuck Hagel as the two heads for his second term national security and foreign policy. On December 1, 2012, John Kerry, the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, was nominated as the next Secretary of State and Chuck Hagel, former senator, was nominated as Secretary of Defense on January 7, 2013.

Veteran Senator Kerry, who has served in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee for the past 27 years, is recognized as a typical dove and has forged a reputation as an intelligent pro-engagement pragmatist in the United States' political community. He argues that the United States' foreign policy should be based more on active dialogue and negotiations with other countries. As for the Sino-American relationship, Kerry is likely to maintain the Obama administration's first-term policy of emphasizing checks and cooper-

ation for a stable long-term trade relationship with China and maintaining American preponderance in the Asia Pacific region. In reality, Senator Kerry voted in favor of normalizing trade relations with China, but does not support transferring clean energy technology to China and criticized Chinese companies' theft of United States' intellectual property. In a speech at the Center for American Progress in January 2011, Kerry announced that "economics is not war - we can both come out of this well ahead of where we are now... And China's rise need not disrupt the international system that we have built. In fact, China's participation can renew that system and better equip it to deal with the challenges of the 21st century."¹³ Regarding the United States-North Korea relationship, John Kerry has insisted on direct dialogue between the United States and North Korea. When he ran as the Democratic presidential candidate in 2004, he asserted that he will have two-party talks with North Korea at any time. His viewpoint against North Korea can be confirmed by the Democratic national platform in 2004. "We should maintain the Six-Party Talks, but we must also be prepared to talk directly with North Korea to negotiate a comprehensive agreement that addresses the full range of issues for ourselves and our allies."¹⁴ In addition, in an *op-ed* in the Los Angeles Times in June 2011, Kerry described

¹³- Yingzi Tan, "Kerry Tipped to replace Clinton," *China Daily USA*, September 5, 2012 <http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/2012-09/05/content_15735336.htm> (searched date: January 12, 2013).

¹⁴- The 2004 Democratic National Convention Committee, "The 2004 Democratic National Platform for America," July 27, 2004 <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/papers_pdf/29613.pdf> (searched date: January 12, 2013).

the Obama administration's policy towards North Korea as both 'measured but firm' and 'inadequate.' He indicated that "our current approach of strong sanctions and intense coordination with South Korea and Japan does not provide sufficient leverage to stabilize the situation, much less bring about a change in North Korean behavior ... The best alternative is for the United States to engage North Korea directly."¹⁵

Former Senator Chuck Hagel has a very similar standpoint on Asian countries like China and North Korea. In a November 2010 meeting with Zhang Yesui, the Chinese ambassador to the United States, he described the Sino-American relationship as "probably the most critical relationship for the 21st century." Hagel said "concentration on common interest" is the key to developing a mutually beneficial relationship between the United States and China. He added "we are far more likely to live peacefully and influence China if we are bound by strong economic ties and mutual geopolitical interests."¹⁶ During the NATO summit meeting in Chicago during May 2012, in an interview with Robert Nolan, editor at FPA, Hagel acknowledged China as one of the more formidable competitors to the United States, while downplaying any immediate

¹⁵- John Kerry, "U.S. and North Korea: The land of lousy options," *Los Angeles Times*, June 26, 2011 <<http://articles.latimes.com/2011/jun/26/opinion/la-oe-kerry-north-korea-20110626>> (searched date: January 12, 2013).

¹⁶- Don Walton, "Chuck Hagel, ambassador explore changing U.S.-Chinese relationship," *Government & Politics*, November 10, 2010 <http://journalstar.com/news/local/govt-and-politics/chuck-hagel-ambassador-explore-changing-u-s--chinese-relationship/article_e082f10c-ed52-11df-b94e-001cc4c03286.html> (searched date: January 12, 2013).

threat. "China is going to emerge and grow. It should; we should welcome that. They're going to be competitors; they are now, as are India, Brazil and other nations. That's OK. ... the Chinese have bigger problems though ... they are a communist, authoritarian, opaque government. There's no transparency ... they are a great power today, and they are going to continue to be a great power - and that's okay. But we should not cower in the wake of that, or we should not be concerned that they're going to take our place in the world."¹⁷ As for the North Korean issues, Hagel has a moderate political stance. When the George W. Bush administration was dealing with North Korea, he praised the efforts to improve the relationship between the United States and North Korea. And, in the interview with PBS in February 2003, he announced that "the last thing we want to do or should do in my opinion is try to isolate North Korea ... they are very dangerous, they are unpredictable, and they have a past behavior pattern that's a bit erratic. That is not good news for any of us. So I think we keep the emotions down and keep working the channels."¹⁸

Therefore, with these 'doves' occupying the key positions of the foreign policy team in the Obama administration's second term,

¹⁷- Robert Nolan, "Chuck Hagel, in His Own Words, on U.S. Foreign Policy Challenges," *U.S. News & World Report*, January 3, 2013 <<http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/world-report/2013/01/03/chuck-hagel-on-afghanistan-syria-and-china>> (searched date: January 12, 2013).

¹⁸- Josh Rogin, "Chuck Hagel does not like sanctions," *Foreign Policy*, December 17, 2012 <http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/12/17/chuck_hagel_does_not_like_sanctions> (searched date: January 12, 2013).

American policy towards North Korea as well as China will contain more elements of dialogue and restraints than the previous term. Furthermore, the rebalancing strategy towards Asia will be positively sustained and implemented on the basis of above suggested principles like continuous strengthening of relationship with existing allies in the region, establishment of developmental partnership with China, positive participation to multilateralism in Asia, prevention of new regional hegemony, new military deployment in Asia, pursue more economic interest through cooperation with regional states, especially China, and progress with FTAs and TPPs with regional states.



III. The Sino-American Relationship and U.S. Foreign Policy

Since the Korean War in 1950, the United States and China have increased their influence in the Korean peninsula. The United States allied with South Korea in 1953 and China allied with North Korea in 1961. During the Cold War era, both South and North Korea relied heavily on the United States and China respectively for their economic reconstruction and security after the Korean War. After the Cold War era, the Korean peninsula security environment has still maintained a bipolar structure centered on South Korea-U.S. alliance and North Korea-China alliance, and the influence of both countries, the United States and China, has been continuously retained with the North Korean nuclear issue from the 1990s and onwards. For instance, in the Six-Party Talks, the United States has played the role of the main negotiation partner against North Korea, and China has acted as a mediator between the United States and North Korea. Thus, the current security environment of the Korean peninsula is affected by whether the United States and China can cooperate or not to solve the North Korean nuclear issue. Furthermore, the degree of dependence of South Korea with the United States, North Korea with China, as well as South Korea with China in every aspect of the relationships is such that the two great powers have become the drivers of the peninsular relationship. This is why the Sino-American relationship must be taken into account in matters pertaining to the Korean peninsula and the problems that North Korea poses to South Korea as well as to the world.

With the previously unseen economic growth, both in rate and scale, during last 30 years, China's economy has eclipsed

Japan's economy and is now the second largest in the world. At the same time, China's geopolitical clout has grown constantly on the basis of a comprehensive military modernization effort, including efforts to develop extended range power projection capabilities and such advanced weapons like anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM). As China grows in economic and military power, the United States is trying to manage the relationship with China in such a way as to pursue the debilitating military rivalry and conflict with the rising power while simultaneously promoting economic cooperation with the potentially largest economic market.

1. First Term Obama Administration's Policy towards China

In 2009, President Obama entered office with the goal of cooperation with China in various global and regional issues such as the global financial crisis, nuclear nonproliferation, climate change, etc. In remarks during July 2009, President Obama announced that the partnership between the United States and China was "a prerequisite for progress on many of the most pressing global challenges."¹⁹ Secretary of State Hillary Clinton also has described

¹⁹. The White House Office of the Press Secretary, "Remarks by the President at the U.S./China Strategic and Economic Dialogue," July 27, 2009 <<http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-uschina-strategic-and-economic-dialogue>> (searched date: December 12, 2012).

as the United States attempt “to work with a rising power” - China - “to foster its rise as an active contributor to global security, stability and prosperity while also sustaining and securing American leadership in a changing world.” The United States and China have to succeed in finding “a new answer to the ancient question of what happens when an established power and a rising power meet.”

For the coexistence of both an established power and a rising power, the United States has encouraged China to follow international norms and laws. As part of the effort to encourage China to adhere to international norms, the Obama administration has tried to work with China in multi-lateral institutions such as the United Nations (UN), G-20, and the World Trade Organization (WTO). In the first term of the Obama presidency, the United States and China have worked together successfully in the United Nations Security Council as two of the permanent members to pass resolutions for sanctions against North Korea and Iran, even though China raised objections to the proposed sanctions led by the United States. In addition, “the Obama administration elevated the profile of the G-20 groupings of major economies, and has worked with China in that setting to address global economic challenges.”²⁰ The United States has made an effort to resolve trade disputes with China through the rules and norms of the World Trade Organization.

Although the Obama administration has tried to cooperate

²⁰-Susan V. Lawrence and David MacDonald, “U.S.-China Relations: Policy Issues,” *CRS Report for Congress* (August 2012), p. 3.

with China as a partner in the global economy in multi-lateral institutions, it has also made an effort to check the rising power, China, by increasing the United States' visibility in Asia in order to give comfort to regional countries which feel insecure about the impact of China's rise. To increase the United States' visibility in Asia, the Obama administration has worked to strengthen security alliances with Australia, Japan, South Korea, Philippines, and Thailand; developed relations with new emerging regional powers such as India, Indonesia, and Vietnam; attended to regional multi-lateral institutions like the East Asia Summit in 2011.

In short, the first term Obama administration's policy toward China can be said as a two-pronged approach: "reaffirming and strengthening cooperative ties while simultaneously establishing a strong and credible American presence across Asia to encourage constructive Chinese behavior and to provide confidence to regional leaders who wish to resist potential Chinese regional hegemony."²¹

In the second term Obama administration, the policy towards China will sustain a two-pronged approach, which is cooperation and competition on the basis of the rebalancing strategy towards Asia. To the United States, Asia is a critical region for its economy, military and political interests. As previously mentioned, the Obama administration's rebalancing strategy toward Asia can be understood as a national strategy for its long-term maintenance of hegemony

²¹- Mark E. Manyin, "Pivot to the Pacific? The Obama Administration's "Rebalancing" Toward Asia," p. 18.

in the region and are mainly targeted at China. Although the United States officially stated that the United States' 'rebalancing' strategy is not aimed at any particular country, most observers indicate that the rebalancing strategy is responses, at least in part, to China's growing economic and military influence.²² There are two main fields to the rebalancing strategy toward China: economy and military fields.

2. Economic Interdependence between the United States and China

The United States' and Chinese economies are the first and second largest in the world. Although the United States' nominal GDP (15.06 trillion U.S. dollar) is, according to IMF estimates for 2011,²³ still bigger than that of China (6.98 trillion U.S. dollar), China is closing the gap between the two economies and remains one of the world's fastest growing economies. China also became an important economic hub for Asia. With China's rapid economic growth, China's importance to the United States' economy has grown during the last 20 years. China is the United States' second largest trading partner, largest source of imports and third largest

²² *Ibid.*, p. 8.

²³ International Monetary Fund, *World Economic Outlook Database, September 2011* (Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund, 2011) <<http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2011/02/weodata/index.aspx>> (searched date: December 12, 2012).

export market (See table 1).

Table 1: Top U.S. Trade Partners (in millions of U.S. dollars)

Rank	Exports			Imports		
	Country	2010	2011	Country	2010	2011
1	Canada	249,105	280,890	China	364,944	399,362
2	Mexico	163,473	198,378	Canada	277,647	315,347
3	China	91,881	103,939	Mexico	229,908	262,864
4	Japan	60,486	65,706	Japan	120,545	128,925
5	U.K.	48,414	55,881	Germany	82,429	98,663
6	Germany	48,161	49,156	Korea	48,875	56,661
7	Korea	38,846	43,415	U.K.	49,775	51,236
8	Brazil	35,425	42,944	Saudi Arabia	31,413	47,476
9	Netherlands	34,939	42,351	Venezuela	32,707	43,256
10	Hong Kong	26,570	36,449	Taiwan	35,846	41,405

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Census Bureau, Foreign Trade Division, "Top U.S. Trade Partners," <<http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/statistics/highlights/toppartners.html>> (searched date: December 12, 2012).

Trade volume between the United States and China has expanded dramatically since China became a member of the World Trade Organization in December 2001. In 2001, according to Table 1, total trade volume between two countries was about \$503 billion, with United States imports from China totaling over \$399 billion (9.4% increase over 2010) and United States exports to China totaling \$104 billion (13% increase over 2010). Although the total trade volume has continually increased between two countries, the United States trade deficit with China has also dramatically increased from

\$34 billion in 1995 to \$295 billion in 2011 (See table 2).

Table 2: United States Trade Deficit with China

Year	U.S. Imports from China	U.S. Exports to China	U.S. Trade Deficit with China
1995	\$46 billion	\$12 billion	\$34 billion
2000	\$100 billion	\$16 billion	\$84 billion
2005	\$243 billion	\$41 billion	\$201 billion
2010	\$365 billion	\$92 billion	\$273 billion
2011	\$399 billion	\$104 billion	\$295 billion

Source: Global Trade Information Services, "US trade data," <<http://www.gtis.com/english/>> (searched date: February 11, 2013).


With increase of trade volume between United States and China and United States' trade deficit with China, trade disputes between two countries in World Trade Organization (WTO) have continuously arisen. The United States has brought 7 of 14 dispute settlement cases against China at WTO (one in 2009, three in 2010, one in 2011, and two in 2012) in the first term Obama administration. And, China has brought 4 of 7 disputes cases against the United States (two in 2009, one in 2011, and one in 2012) in the same period.

According to the data above, the second term Obama administration will take a more aggressive trade policy toward China compared to previous term even if the United States recognizes the economic importance of China because of trade volume with China. The Obama administration will bring more number of dispute settlement cases against China in WTO to intensify fair trade and to de-

crease trade deficit with China. In the State of the Union Address in January 2012, Obama announced the creation of a Trade Enforcement Unit to investigate “unfair trading practices in countries like China.” And, in the talks with Hu Jintao in Nuclear Security Summit on March 2012, Obama remarked that “there is strong mutual understanding about the potential benefits of commerce between our two nations, in accordance with the international rules and norms.” However, the Obama administration will not adhere to strict aggressive trade policy because it can lead China’s retaliation against the United States exports to, and investment in, China. Thus, the U.S. will use established high-level bi-lateral dialogues such as the Strategic & Economic Dialogue (S&ED) and the United States-China Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade (JCCT) to find a solution on trade disputes between two countries and to maintain cooperative economic ties with China.

3. Military Competition between the United States and China

The United States has long been concerned about the intensification of China’s military modernization effort. China’s military tries to modernize rapidly and continuously, and its military expenditure is steadily increasing (See table 3 & 4).

Table 3: Chinese Military Modernization Percent

Source: U.S. Department of Defense, “Military and Security Developments: Involving the People’s Republic of China 2011,” p. 43 <http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/2011_CMPR_Final.pdf> (searched date: February 12, 2013).

Table 4: China’s Military Expenditure, 2001-2010

(In billions of U.S. dollars)

01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10
39.5	45.9	49.8	55.2	62.1	72.9	84.1	92.7	110.0	114.0

Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, “Background paper on SIPRI military expenditure data, 2010,” <<http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/factsheet2010>> (searched date: February 12, 2013).

The Pentagon describes China’s military modernization as “improving the PLA’s capacity to conduct high-intensity regional military operations, including counter-intervention operations,” defined as “operationally-defined tasks designed to prevent foreign (e.g., United States) military forces from intervening in a conflict and preventing China from accomplishing its military objectives.”²⁴

²⁴ U.S. Department of Defense, “Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Development Involving the People’s Republic of China,” August 2012, p. 28

The United States is also concerned about China's vigorous assertion of sovereignty over disputed maritime territories in the South China Sea (SCS). Tensions in the SCS among regional states including China have emerged as a major security concern for the United States in the Asia-Pacific region. In July 2010, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton explicitly declared an United States' 'national interest' in the SCS. The State Department defines the United States' national interest on this issue as "the maintenance of peace and stability, respect for international law, freedom of navigation, and unimpeded lawful commerce" in the sea.²⁵ And, on August 3, 2012, the State Department criticized China's establishment of military garrison in the South China Sea, saying the moves "run counter to collaborative diplomatic efforts to resolve differences and risk further escalating tensions in the region."²⁶

The second term Obama administration will pursue a vigorous containment strategy towards China to check the increase of China's military clout and to maintain a stable security environment in the Asia-Pacific region. As part of the rebalancing strategy towards Asia, the United States will strengthen existing alliances in the region - Japan, South Korea, Australia, the Philippines, and Thailand - and expand cooperation with 'emerging partners' such

<<http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/2010-CMPR-Final.pdf>>.

²⁵- U.S. Department of State, "Patrick Ventrell, Acting Deputy Spokesperson, Office of Press Relations: Statement on the South China Sea," August 3, 2012 <<http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/08/196022.htm>> (searched date: December 12, 2012).

²⁶- *Ibid.*

as India and Vietnam in order to ensure collective capability and capacity for securing common interests. And, the Obama administration will build up its naval power in the Asia-Pacific region in order to counter China's Anti-Access/Area-Denial (A2/AD) strategy.

Although the United States' government seeks to check increasing China's clout in the Asia-Pacific region - on the basis of Chinese military modernization and increasing of military expenditure - Washington makes an effort to cooperate with China on regional security issues at the same time. In July 2011, Admiral Mike Mullen, chairman of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, mentioned that the United States and China must work together to ensure regional security. He said that "with greater military power must come greater responsibility, greater cooperation and just as important, greater transparency."²⁷ In reality, in the Six-Party Talks, the United States and China have cooperated on the North Korean nuclear issue since the early 2000s. At the beginning of the second North Korean nuclear crisis in 2002, the Bush administration refused to talk with North Korea bilaterally, which was indicative of the mood at the time - 'the axis of evil' speech by President George W. Bush - and wanted to open multi-lateral negotiation instead to solve North Korean nuclear crisis. In this situation, the United States tried to cooperate with China, which was believed to have powerful

²⁷- Voice of America, "Top US Officer Urges China-US Security Cooperation," *Voice of America*, July 9, 2011 <<http://www.voanews.com/content/top-us-officer-urges-china-us-security-cooperation-125288608/142055.html>> (searched date: January 15, 2013).

influence on North Korea. For instance, “during a stop in China en route to the inauguration of ROK president Roh Moo-Hyun in February 2003, Secretary Powell suggested that Beijing would be well-positioned to organize and host multi-lateral talks involving the United States, China, Japan, and North and South Korea. Powell developed the idea after hearing a proposal that would have Tokyo convene multi-lateral talks in Asia, and he knew that Beijing was a more appropriate host and that the United States would join only as a full participant.”²⁸

And, in the process of the Six-Party Talks, China has supported UN Security Council sanctions against North Korea initiated by the United States targeting North Korea’s missile and nuclear tests. Thomas Christensen, the American deputy assistant secretary of state, mentioned in 2008 that “China has supported an unprecedented number of key United States’ foreign policy initiatives in the United Nations Security Council, including sanctions against North Korea … We continue to consult closely with the Chinese to urge North Korea to comply with its commitments under the October 3rd ‘Second Phase Actions for the Implementation of the Joint Statement,’ including a complete and correct declaration of its nuclear programs.”²⁹

²⁸. Charles L. “Jack” Pritchard, *Failed Diplomacy: The Tragic Story of How North Korea Got the Bomb* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2007).

²⁹. Thomas J. Christensen, “Statement before the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission-Shaping China’s global choices through diplomacy,” March 18, 2008 <<http://2001-2009.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2008/03/102327.htm>> (searched date: January 15, 2013).

However, some in Washington still believe that the more effective way to disarm North Korea is the use of ‘sticks’ like strong sanctions or military pressure rather than ‘carrots’ like negotiation utilizing such apparatuses like the Six-Party Talks. Thus, the current security cooperation between the United States and China on North Korean issues can be broken by unexpected factors such as the following:

The first is the process of the Six-Party Talks. Although the cooperation between the United States and China is well established and still maintained, this cooperation has not yet reached its goal, which is North Korean denuclearization. In addition, many of experts in Northeast Asia and the United States have skepticism, criticism, and pessimism about the effectiveness of the Six-Party Talks on North Korean denuclearization. Thus, if the Six-Party Talks shows positive process and results, Sino-American security cooperation can continue. However, if the Talks unfortunately end or cannot show constructive results, the United States and China may lose a platform of security communication and cooperation.

The second is the policy of the new Obama administration towards North Korea. If President Obama and John Kerry, who has been nominated as the Secretary of State in January 2013, try to adopt an epoch-making engagement policy towards North Korea, the degree of security cooperation between the United States and China will increase dramatically. However, if Washington revives its old ‘regime change’ policies like the Bush administration, it would be more difficult to expect China’s cooperation to solve the North

Korean nuclear issue.

The final factor is the competitive nature of the future United States-China relationship. Rising concerns in the United States over 'China's rise' as a 'major,' 'great,' or even 'super' power in the Northeast Asia region and beyond have emerged in connection with debates over whether American power is in decline.³⁰ "In the United States, among strategists and scholars, there is still no basic consensus on the future (peaceful coexistence and cooperation or deadly conflict) relationship between a self-worried 'declining' superpower America and an exaggerated 'rising power' China."³¹ If the American people have a consensus that China's emergence will pose a threat to United States' preponderant position, the security cooperation will be difficult and competition between both countries will deepen.

As mentioned above, in short, the second term Obama administration will take a two-pronged approach towards China; cooperation and competition. The Obama administration simultaneously regards China as cooperative partner and a competitive adversary or rival in both the economic and military fields. This two-pronged ap-

³⁰- See David P. Calleo, "Unipolar Illusions," *Survival*, Vol. 49, No. 3 (Autumn 2007); Richard N. Haass, "The Age of Nonpolarity: What Will Follow U.S. Dominance," *Foreign Affairs* (May/June 2008).

³¹- Zhongying Pang, "The Six-Party Process, Regional Security Mechanisms, and China-U.S. Cooperation: Toward a Regional Security Mechanism for a New Northeast Asia?," *The Brookings Institution-CNAPS Visiting Fellows Working Paper*, March 2009, p. 28 <http://www.brookings.edu/~media/research/files/papers/2009/3/northeast%20asia%20pang/03_northeast_asia_pang.pdf> (searched date: January 15, 2013).

proach can be confirmed through several remarks by President Obama. In the talks with Hu Jintao in the Nuclear Security Summit in March 2012, Obama remarked that “in all of these issues, I think cooperation and coordination between the United States and China is very important,” Obama said, “not only to the interest of our two countries but to the interest of the world.”³² In the Presidential debate on October 22, 2012, Obama said that “China is both an adversary, but also a potential partner in the international community if it’s following the rules.”³³

4. Conclusion


The second Obama government’s China policy will be a two-track approach with engagement and pressure. In the third TV debate, president Obama mentioned that China is an adversary but can be a potential partner if it observes rules in international society. The United States will pursue a partnership with China on issues like easing tensions on the Korean peninsula, preventing Iranian nuclear proliferation, climate change, etc., but will pressure China on

³². The White House, “Remarks by President Obama and President Hu Jintao of the People’s Republic of China before Bilateral Meeting,” March 26, 2012 <<http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/texttrans/2012/03/201203262745.html#axzz2HrUIMqlr>> (searched date: December 12, 2012).

³³. Charles Riley, “Debate: Is China a friend or foe?,” *CNN Money*, October 23, 2012 <<http://money.cnn.com/2012/10/23/news/economy/china-election-debate/index.html>> (searched date: December 12, 2012).

issues like currency, export subsidy, intellectual property, human rights, etc. President Obama's China policy in the beginning was a favorable one, but has moved to a more hard-line one. In 2009, the United States emphasized a cooperative relationship with China by creating the United States-China Strategic Economic Dialogue and by proposing 'strategic reassurance' in his 2009 visit to Beijing. But Chinese aggressive response made President Obama move to a more hard-line policy.

However, in its policy towards China, as China grows in economic and military power, the Obama administration will continuously try to maintain a two-pronged approach towards China in such a way as to pursue the debilitating military rivalry and conflict with the rise of power while simultaneously promoting economic cooperation with its one of the largest trading partners. To be more concrete, the United States will take a dual strategy against China in the economy and military fields. In the economy side, the United States will take both a competitive strategy to establish fair trade practices with China and cooperative stance to avoid retaliation from China which has the second largest economic market in the world. In the security field, the Obama administration will adopt a competitive deterrence strategy in order to prevent the increase of China's clout in the region. At the same time, the United States will pursue cooperation with China in the security field to solve regional security issues like the North Korean nuclear weapons program.



IV. The Second Term Obama Administration's Policy towards the Korean Peninsula and the U.S.-ROK Alliance

1. Prospects and Tasks of the U.S.-ROK Alliance

Currently, the U.S.-ROK alliance is in its best condition, and the Obama administration will continue to pursue this status. Also due to the United States rebalancing policy to Asia, the U.S.-ROK alliance will become more important with purposes like complementing the estranged United States-Japan alliance, balancing against the rising China, decreasing Chinese influence in the Korean peninsula, etc.

There exist several important issues to solve between the United States and South Korea. The first is to develop the comprehensive strategic alliance. The two countries had a summit meeting in 2009 to make the alliance become more comprehensive. However, ever since there have been little progress to fill in the contents of the alliance. There should be institutionalization of the alliance for the next four years of the Obama and Park Geun Hye administrations. The second is to develop continuously how the United States and South Korea can deter North Korean threats. After the 2010 military provocations of North Korea, the two countries established the Extended Deterrence Policy Committee to develop measures to deter the North Korean threat. As the United States extended nuclear deterrence seems insufficient to deter North Korean threats, the two countries are now discussing how to deter them with non-nuclear measures. The third issue is the special measures agreement (SMA). The two countries should begin negotiating on defense budget sharing in 2013, and it is highly possible that the United

States would request more defense burden from the South Korean government. The fourth is how to construct a military command structure after the War-time Operational Control (OPCON) transfer in 2015. The United States and South Korea plan to discuss this issue from February 2013 until the end of March.

Recently the South Korean Ministry of Defense and United States' Secretary of Defense agreed on the Defense 2030 plan,³⁴ which would prepare important substance of the alliance targeting the year 2030. This would include making common strategic objectives and threat perceptions of the two countries within the framework of the alliance. At least this is a good beginning for the completion of the alliance transformation towards a true comprehensive strategic alliance. But this plan, which is a pivotal part of the alliance rebuilding, should be discussed within a bigger framework like a 2+2 meeting.

(1) Developing Substance to a Comprehensive Strategic Alliance

The two allies are given a task of working to give substance to what was agreed on at the 2009 summit meeting. It was a colossal achievement to upgrade the alliance relationship of the two to be a comprehensive strategic alliance, but until now the alliance between the two has yet to see a tangible progress made by such alli-

³⁴- *Yonhap News*, January 3, 2013.

ance transformation.

Generally speaking, two factors consist of an alliance: attitudinal factor and behavioral factor.³⁵ Attitudinal factor includes the objectives of the alliance and threat perception; behavioral factors include practical factors that are required to manage the alliance relationship, such as military command structure, burden-sharing of defense costs and military base relocation.

To form an alliance, work needs to be done regarding the attitudinal and behavioral factors. For attitudinal factors, the allies must define their national interests. Based on the defined interests, each ally must set strategic objectives that would maximize the national interests and create common strategic objectives among the allies through negotiations within the framework of the alliance. Once the common strategic objective is set, behavioral factors, such as how the military command structure should be organized or where the military base should be located, must be determined in order to operate the objective practically.

In the case of the U.S.-Japan alliance, since the mid-1990s, the two allies have begun aligning their strategic objective through 2+2 Meetings, which also served as a momentum for pursuing alliance transformation. Key terms of an agreement have been documented as a roadmap for the alliance transformation and the two allies begun their work on the behavioral factors of the alliance.

³⁵-Ole Holsti, P. Terrence Hopmann, and John Sullivan, *Unity and Disintegration in International Alliances: Comparative Studies* (New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1973).

Efforts were made to have national objectives of the each of the two nations aligned, which included a list of countries of concern, such as North Korea and China, and regional and global issues that interest the alliance. Based on such understanding, the two allies have agreed on specific operational issues including the relocation of Futenma Air Base.

The ROK-U.S. alliance should refine their comprehensive strategic alliance relationship announced through the 2009 Joint Vision Statement. The two allies need to form a roadmap regarding alliance transformation and the issue should be discussed at a 2+2 Meeting level, which has begun since the current Lee administration. For instance, the two nations should align their common strategic objectives, which must include the North Korean issue. Sensitive issues such as issues regarding China should be approached with prudence. Regional and global objectives and threats of the alliance should be specified and an operational plan should be established based on the specified objectives and threats. In particular, issues regarding the new command structure and military base management in the post-2015 OPCON transfer era should be discussed.

New plans such as ‘Strategic Alliance 2015,’ ‘Guidelines for U.S.-ROK Defense Cooperation,’ and ‘Strategic Planning Guidance’ are currently under discussion between defenses heads of the two allies have been focusing on the area of defense. The ROK-U.S. alliance must be treated from a more comprehensive security policy perspective. In the second term Obama administration, the two allies should take advantage of the newly created 2+2 meeting to for-

mulate the roadmap of the ROK-U.S. alliance from a macro perspective.³⁶

(2) *Developing Deterrence Measures against North Korean Threats*

The newly created Extended Deterrence Policy Committee (EDPC) needs to reinforce nuclear and non-nuclear deterrence capability. The EDPC created at the 42nd Security Consultative Meeting has three key issues to consider.³⁷

First, reinforcement plans to strengthen the nuclear deterrence capability is needed, which has recently been under scrutiny for its diminishing power between South Korea and the United States. Although the Nuclear Posture Review suggests to decrease the nuclear deterrence capability of United States and to replace it with reinforcing more conventional military force and ballistic missile defense capability, the extended nuclear deterrence capability still plays a significant role in the Korean peninsula.

The sinking of the ROK's Cheonan ship implies that the United States' nuclear deterrence capability is still valid in creating an environment in which South Korea responds against North Korea's attack with conventional weapons. As long as North Korea

³⁶- Mark Manyin, *et al.*, "U.S.-South Korea Relations," *CRS Report for Congress* (November 2010).

³⁷- Cheon Seong Whun, "The Significance of Forming a ROK-US Extended Deterrence Policy Committee," (KINU Online Series CO 10-39, 2010.11.2).

possesses the nuclear deterrence capability, North Korea would likely to continue traditional attacks relying on this capability. On the other hand, to respond to such attack is no easy matter for South Korea without such nuclear deterrence capability. Thus, the extended nuclear deterrence of the United States, which would replace a tactical nuclear weapon pulled out from South Korea is very important for South Korea's defense efforts against North Korea's attacks with conventional weapons.

With the downscaling of United States' nuclear deterrence capability, the Nuclear Posture Review's exception to use nuclear weapons offers an unrealistic view to a real world situation. In explaining the exception to its negative security assurance, "the United States nuclear weapons continue to play a deterrence role in an attack with conventional, chemical or biological weapons against the United States or its allies or partners." However, in case of North Korea's provocations, such as the Cheonan incident, the chances of the United States to retaliate with a nuclear weapon are very slim. As far as the current situations in the Korean peninsula and nuclear security order of East Asia are concerned, the United States' possibility of using its nuclear weapons in this region seems unrealistic. South Korea and the United States should discuss ways to ensure that nuclear weapons of the United States provide a more realistic and credible military options to deter a wide range of threats.

Second, in order to promptly respond to diverse security threats such as North Korea's asymmetric threats, development of non-nuclear deterrence capability should be encouraged. In fact, the

two allies have agreed to strengthen cooperation on the Korea Air and Missile Defense (KAMD) system and the United State Regional Missile Defense (MD) system. The EDPC should discuss means to promote cooperation on information-sharing and operational means on the missile defense against nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction of North Korea.

The objective of the KAMD is to defend against mid- and short-range North Korean ballistic missiles, such as its Rodong and Scud missiles. Thus, it provides a lower-tier defense with a defense altitude of up to 100 km using Patriot missiles such as the PAC-3. On the other hand, the objectives of the United States regional MD system is to defend against missiles such as North Korea's Scud, Rodong and ICBM types and provide full-range defense with lower, mid and high-tiers.

South Korea has deferred the decision to join the MD system given the sensitivity with China, costs and criticisms that the United States regional MD system is unnecessary in defending the Korean peninsula. However, as the United States' MD system includes low-tier defense, the cooperation on the information-sharing and operational means would be helpful through the mutual cooperation between the two allies.

Third, the imbalance between nuclear deterrence capability and non-nuclear deterrence capability poses some issues. The EDPC should determine precisely to what extent the non-nuclear deterrence capability would supplement the existing nuclear deterrence capability and to address the imbalance issue between the two capabilities.

(3) Preparing for the Increased United States' Cost-Sharing Request

South Korea should prepare for any issues regarding cost sharing of the United States defense costs, which has been raised by the United States Congress following a recent fiscal crunch. The Defense Strategic Guidance, an important document on the United States' Asia policy, issued early in 2012, outlined a reduction in defense spending in a budget-constrained environment of the United States. The guidance placed a highest priority in the Asia-Pacific region. The emphasis implies the United States' willingness to balance its trade deficit through strengthening trade policy in the Asia Pacific region, as well as to regain a strategic dominance it once had.

Such implications of the guidance are discomfiting to American allies such as South Korea. With the scheduled OPCON transfer in 2015, South Korea should strive to maintain its leading position in the ROK-U.S. Forces. Yet the United States revealed that it would not engage in two overlapping conflicts. In other words, South Korea's pressure to its own defense is increased in the future while the United States will reduce its military presence in the Asia-Pacific region, which will inevitably lead to South Korea's increased share of United States' defense costs. The previous Special Measures Agreement (SMA) concluded between South Korea and United States is valid until 2013 and negotiation on the 6th SMA is expected to begin in 2013. The next leader of South Korea is

given a crucial task of strategically planning for cost sharing of the United States' defense costs under Washington's policy of Rebalancing to Asia.

(4) The U.S.-ROK Command Structure after the OPCON Transfer in 2015

As the war-time OPCON is scheduled to be transferred to South Korea in 2015, the two countries need to think about the military command structure afterwards. Current plans to replace the CFC with the Alliance Military Coordination Center (AMCC) have been reviewed as inefficient to cope with the North Korean threat. That is, many experienced United States military officers expressed concerns over the efficient role of AMCC as it would not allow swift coordination between the ROK Army and USFK. In June 2012, there was a media report that USFK CIC James Thurman had expressed concerns over this issue.³⁸ As a result, in the 44th SCM held in October 24, 2012, the two countries agreed to do research on what would be a better alternative to AMCC within the framework of Strategic 2015.

The major agenda is to coordinate between the ROK Army's OPCON operation and maintenance of efficient combined force operation. If current combined forces command system is to be maintained, the possible option is to allow the ROK commander to

³⁸- *Chosun Daily*, June 14, 2012.

be in charge of the Combined Forces Command, but this is not plausible because OPCON transfer should entail dissolution of the CFC. Thus, so-called mini-CFC should be an alternative, with some changes in the forms, size and roles of the new command structure.

2. U.S.-ROK Alliance and China

Another challenging task for South Korea is to find a balance between its alliance with the United States and its diplomatic relationship with China. Chronic political dilemma at the government transition period is how to address the balance issue between the ROK-U.S. alliance and China. A serious reflection is necessary on how to approach the sensitive issue of the relations with China, which is a fast-growing economy and plays a key role in dealing with North Korea. New General Secretary Xi Jinping mentioned that the new foreign policy of China would be centered on a 'new type of relationship between major powers (新型大國關係),' which means that China would seek an equal relationship with the United States. His foreign policy tendency implies that the United States-China rivalry would become more competitive than ever before.³⁹

First, South Korea should rid itself of ideological bias. Even today in the domestic political arena, the political elite and the pub-

³⁹-For more detailed explanation, refer to Sukhee Han, "Analysis of Xi Jinping Government's Foreign Policy," *National Strategy*, Vol. 18, No. 4 (Winter 2012), pp. 39-43 (In Korean).

lic still display a strong tendency to view every issue from a dichotomous perspective of the concepts of 'progressive' and 'conservative.' In this context, one of the key political issues at the time of turnover is a debate between a pro-China policy and a pro-American policy. However, foreign policy must be pursued strictly based on the idea of national interest, free from ideologies. It is important that when employing a certain policy, one must not ask what kind of ideology is behind this policy, but what strategy should this policy be pursued with. Thinking outside the box of ideologies between the United States and China, one must realize the first important step is found at home.

Second, South Korea should pursue diversification of relationship with China that stems from a solid foundation of the ROK-U.S. alliance. The ROK-U.S. alliance is the most crucial mechanism for the national security of South Korea. As seen during the Cheonan and Yeonpyeong incidents, the crucial role of the alliance comes to the fore at moments of crisis. While China criticizes the ROK-U.S. alliance as a by-product of the Cold War, it is reluctant to break away from its North Korea-China framework during the North Korea provocations. This shows that at moments of crisis, China must take into consideration North Korea, its long-standing ally, in the similar manner to South Korea in regard to the United States. This invites an interpretation that China also acknowledges Korea's emphasis on the ROK-U.S. alliance in pursuing foreign policy.

In addition, the United States supports the reunification of the

Korean peninsula on the principles of democracy and market economy, while China's stance is ambiguous on the issue. China's such an equivocal stance stems from its concern that a unified Korea will become a friendly nation to the United States. Also, China considers North Korea as an important buffer state *vis-à-vis* the United States. Chinese formula for the unification of the Korean peninsula is 'independent and peaceful unification.' That is, the unification should be achieved devoid influences of China and the United States. This is unrealistic perspective in the current context of Northeast Asia, and we should persuade China that unified Korea is not anti-China but helpful to the interests of China.

So, South Korea should take diplomatic relations with China seriously. China has become a powerful force to be reckoned with in terms of economy and its relations with North Korea economically and politically. South Korea needs to diversify its diplomatic relations with different actors. In the case of Singapore's foreign policy, Singapore pursues its security concern through its relations with the United States, while maximizing its economic interests through its relations with the ASEAN and China. Likewise, Korea needs to strengthen cooperative ties with China on strategic areas while rooted in the ROK-U.S. alliance.

Third, through strengthening the ROK-U.S. alliance South Korea should prepare for China's possible aggressive foreign policy in near future. As seen in China's policy initiatives like the 12th Five-Year Plan and the Outline (綱要) passed by the both government and the parliament (兩會) in 2011, the next president in line,

Xi Jinping will continue to emphasize on the domestic issues, such as continued economic growth and boost domestic demands and spending. Nevertheless, on the foreign policy front, the Chinese government is expected to initiate its overall foreign policy posture of 'new type of great power relations.' a way to posit China as a great power which requires a more equal relationship with other great powers. The reason China displays an aggressive posture on certain key issues is because of the inevitability that the national interests of China spread outside of its border as the economic strength of China increases. Such tendency is expected to grow further and affects issues related to the Korean peninsula.

Such intensiveness in foreign policy of China would be backed by its sustainable economic growth. The total production amount of the Chinese manufacturing sector recorded US\$ 1,600 billion in 2010, being on the traces of the United States which recorded just 100 billion dollars more than China. Some forecast that the China's GDP will outpace that of the United States by 2020. In this context, it is expected that the Chinese foreign policy in a post-2020 era will be transformed to be more aggressive on the principle of 'make a difference when necessary (有所作为).' The International Monetary Fund (IMF) predicts that China's real economic output, calculated by the purchasing power parity (PPP) estimates will outflank the United States by 2016. Thus, South Korea should keep in mind the political changes following the rise of Chinese economy in the global arena and should prepare accordingly through solidifying the ROK-U.S. alliance.

Fourth, South Korea needs to establish its position on specific issues between the ROK-U.S. alliance and the ROK-China relationship. After South Korea and the United States have elevated the long-standing alliance to a comprehensive strategic alliance since 2009, the two allies have yet to give substance on some key issues. Likewise, South Korea and China have been able to formulate a strategic cooperative relationship since 2008 but the specifics on what strategic relationship on which areas remains to be discussed. South Korea should promptly establish its positions *vis-à-vis* the United States and China to perform a strategic balancing act between China and the United States.

Lastly, South Korea must find a strategic commonality through the expansion of the Six-Party Talks. Between the ROK-U.S. and ROK-China relations, South Korea must exercise its different national interests and strategies with flexibility. To this end, various regional cooperative mechanisms can be useful. The recently popular form of a three-party minilateralism plays an important role in advancing mutual interests of Korea and China. South Korea needs to develop a security cooperative mechanism that encompasses Northeast Asia, and this can be attainable through the expansion and development of the existing Six-Party framework. The six-party dialogue is the only existing regional security cooperative channel in the Northeast Asia; the members of the Six-Party Talks are finding a common denominator of the different national interests of the members through dealing with the North Korea issues. South Korea must be careful that its national interests do not

fall into a standstill between the two superpowers of China and the United States, and must look for ways to coexist the ROK-U.S. alliance and the strategic relationship of ROK-China. South Korea has aligned its objective of the Six-Party Talks to be a denuclearization of North Korea but this objective needs to be reevaluated. In other words, South Korea should take a step aside from only focusing on the North Korea nuclear issues to create a common understanding and policy objectives in dealing with the North Korea issues and to prevent the Korean peninsula from becoming a battlefield of diplomatic conflicts between China and the United States.


3. Conclusion

The major transformation of the ROK-U.S. alliance has a historical significance, as the Joint Vision for Alliance of ROK-U.S. in 2009 embraced by the two leaders has served to broaden alliance roles and functions beyond the peninsula to an unprecedented degree. The Joint Vision for Alliance of ROK-U.S. plays an important role in leading and solving various challenges the North East Asia faces today. The fact that the 20 year-old stagnating alliance since the Cold War could be transformed alone is a brilliant feat in the history of alliance. Taking the ROK-U.S. alliance to be a global alliance was a win-win strategy for both South Korea and the United States. From the perspective of the United States, the ROK-U.S. alliance is an important instrument with which the United States can solve

diverse global issues. In a time when the U.S.-Japan alliance is sluggish, the ROK-U.S. alliance presents an opportunity for the United States to restore the strategic importance in the Asia Pacific.

But there remain a lot of issues to solve. With the beginning of the second Obama government, the United States policy to Asia will be very active. This will be economic, diplomatic and military policies. The problem is that, even though it is a little bit in the upside mood, the American economy is in a distressful condition, and this would limit the capabilities of the United States to actively pursue its policies towards Asia. The United States will require more burdens from its allies, and South Korea is one of the key targets. The year 2013 is an important year of change in Northeast Asia. With many countries' leadership changes, South Korea should focus on a new diplomatic paradigm. We should remove the Cold War-based parochial ideologies. We should have security policy based upon our national interests. And, we should pursue our interests and goals by strategic diplomacy.

Washington's commitment to a robust relationship with South Korea most likely would mean that the second term Obama administration will adopt an engagement policy towards North Korea. The new South Korean government's policy towards North Korea will emphasize dialogue and cooperation with the North. Thus, the new Obama administration, which puts great emphasis on the robust U.S.-ROK alliance and policy coordination between two countries about North Korean policy, will keep stance with the new South Korean administration.



V. Policy towards North Korea: Continuity or Change

North Korean nuclear weapons program has been the one of the most vexing and persistent problems in United States' foreign policy in the post-Cold War era. Although negotiations over North Korea's nuclear weapons program have consumed the past three administrations (Clinton, Bush, and Obama administrations), there is no sign of being solved. With the North Korean nuclear issue, the Korean peninsula has become an arena of strategic and economic competition among regional powers. United States' policy towards North Korea is linked closely with the United States security, political and economic interests in Asia. The United States has the obligation to protect its alliance partners such as South Korea and Japan from North Korea's attack. Thus, the United States has maintained the largest military bases in South Korea and Japan with tens of thousands of American troops to obligate the military alliance. And, the maintenance of stable and peaceful security environment in the Korean peninsula helps to guarantee American economic interest as well as regional states' economic interests. In addition, "negotiations and diplomacy surrounding North Korea's nuclear weapons program influence U.S. relations with all the major power in the region and have become a particularly complicating factor for Sino-U.S. ties."⁴⁰

⁴⁰-Emma Chanlett-Avery and Ian E. Rinehart, "North Korea: U.S. Relations, Nuclear Diplomacy, and Internal Situation," *CRS Report for Congress* (June 2012), p. 4.

1. The First Term Obama Administration's Policy towards North Korea

Since his inauguration, President Obama indicated that the United States will take an engagement policy against 'rogue' governments including North Korea. However, with North Korea's a series of military provocations, the Obama administration's policy toward North Korea moderated as a strict engagement policy known as 'strategic patience,' which waits for North Korea to come back to negotiating table until it displays a sincere effort to denuclearize. The main contents of 'strategic patience' strategy are as follow: First, the United States should insist to Pyongyang that it should commit to steps toward denuclearization and improve relation with Seoul to return to the Six-Party Talks. Second, the United States should convince China to take tougher line to North Korea until North Korea makes an sincere effort to denuclearize. Third, the United States will apply pressure on North Korea through arms interdictions and sanctions.⁴¹ Obama administration suggested that, under the right conditions, the United States pursues a comprehensive package deal for North Korea's complete denuclearization in return for normalization of relations and economic aid. The Obama administration's policy toward North Korea known as 'strategic patience' was closely coordinated with regional alliances such as South Korea and Japan and other Six-Party Talks member states like China and Russia.

⁴¹- *Ibid.*, p. 5.

With the successful reelection of President Obama in November, there are now two prospects for the second term Obama administration's policy towards North Korea; that the United States will either maintain a hard-line policy of 'strategic patience' like his first-term's policy, or adopt a more flexible and cooperative policy which focuses on unconditional talks and fulfills positive bi-lateral talks between the United States and North Korea. It is likely that the second term Obama administration's policy toward North Korea will combine 'dialogue and pressure' based on 'strategic patience' and the flexibility of new policies towards North Korea will be decided by North Korea's response and its will to denuclearize.

(1) The Relationship with China

As growing China's power to G2, the Sino-American relationship has been both cooperation and competition in the economic, military, and political fields, and this twofold pattern has been maintained as well throughout the first term Obama administration. The newly established Obama administration in January 2013 has a critical juncture that the United States should reframe relationship with China under the newly inaugurated Xi Jinping leadership. By the way, if the second term Obama administration has a conflictual situation with North Korea caused by adaptation of hard-line policy like Bush administration, the United States can have confrontational relationship with China which has been a military alliance with North Korea. To Obama administration, the establishment of con-

flictual relationship with China's new leadership will be too much burden to carry out the rebalancing strategy toward Asia. Thus, the United States will take an engagement policy approach towards North Korea emphasizing lasting talks and improving relations with the North to avoid rival competition with the new Chinese leadership caused by adopting a hard-line policy toward North Korea. And, to find a solution to the North Korean nuclear issue, the Obama administration will continuously keep a cooperative stance with China giving an important role like moderator in the negotiation process.

(2) The Will of North Korea on Denuclearization

More importantly, however, the new Obama administration's North Korean policy direction will be decided by the response and the will of North Korea on denuclearization. That is, the prerequisite of Obama administration's flexible engagement policy toward North Korea is the positive effort of the North on denuclearization. In reality, on April 13, 2012, North Korea launched a long-range ballistic missile it referred to as an 'earth observation satellite.' All surrounding countries of the Korean peninsula expressed concerns on the North Korean missile launch and the United States halted engagement efforts with North Korea. The Obama administration suspended 'the February 29, 2012, United States-North Korea agreements,' in which the United States promised to provide food assistance. Although the 2.29 Agreement called as 'Lead Day

Agreement' could open the door to resumption of Six-Party Talks which diplomatic efforts to solve North Korean nuclear weapons program, North Korean missile launching had completely defeated the all member states of Six-Party Talks. With a halt of the 2.29 Agreement, the Obama administration also suspended another effort for improvement of relations with North Korea which is the American missions to search North Korean territory for the remains of missing American soldiers from the Korean War-era. Above case indicates that if North Korea does not show its will on denuclearization or effort to improve relationship with the United States, the second term Obama administration will not take flexible engagement policy toward North Korea but adhere to the strict strategic patience strategy.

2. Foreign Policy toward the North in the Second Term Obama Administration

There are a few things to consider before delving into what exactly America's North Korea policy will be. Firstly, towards an antagonistic relationship, Washington has had a tendency to use the dual strategy of sanctions and compensations - Washington prefers a two-pronged approach called 'stick and carrot' to North Korea. United States' foreign policy towards the North interlocks between the conservative republicans that prefer containment and the progressive democrats that prefer engagement. The conservatives have

an understanding that the North has not changed and also that the willingness on the part of the North Koreans to adopt reforms and open-door policy has been weak. Whereas the progressives are recognizing that the North is willing to change and, therefore, it is the right thing to give some space and time to adapt and change. Mutual consent between them controls the options of the United States' foreign policy towards the North.

Secondly, it is the American global and East Asian strategy. The fundamentals of global strategy could be summarized to expand liberal democracy and the market economy, to counter proliferate WMD and terrorism, to maintain the United States' hegemony, and to increase economic profits. This United States' global strategy is connected to its East Asian goals which are to contain or deter China's expansion, to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula, and to increase economic profits. And, also the East Asian strategy is connected to American strategy towards the Korean peninsula by maintaining and strengthening the U.S.-ROK relationship, and solving the North Korean nuclear and missile problems. This strategy towards the Korean peninsula was readily visible in the first Obama administration, and these goals will continue in his second term. In other words, Washington's foreign policy towards the Korean peninsula should be understood by the line drawn from the United States' East Asian strategy.

The United States' foreign policy towards North Korea is also an extension of the United States' global - East Asian - Korean strategies. In other words, North Korean issues themselves including

the nuclear and missile problems are at the core of Washington's foreign policy towards the North, and also should be considered and managed within the upper strategies of the Sino-American relationship, U.S.-ROK alliance, and so on. Therefore, to look in to the second term Obama's policy towards North Korea, it is necessary not only to understand North Korea's atmosphere, but to consider the United States' policy options and the core variables of the United States' East Asian and Korean strategies such as China's policy towards the North and South Korea's policy towards both China and North Korea.

(1) Obama's Policy Options

The United States is not afraid to use force when it comes to eliminating or shutting down a group or a country against American interests including the United States-led order. The beginnings of the United States-led wars of terrorism are generally related to the rise of a new regional hegemony and *status quo*. Related to the North's development of WMD including nuclear and inter-continental ballistic missiles, it is difficult to determine whether force should be applied. Washington applied economic sanctions rather than force related to the India and Pakistan's nuclear issues in the past. It would certainly be difficult for the United States to use the military option in the North Korean case without considering a total war with the North due to China's explicit and implicit support of the North. Although it is not completely excluded, the possibility

of using the military against a 'rogue state' is not high. Washington considered a surgical strike toward the North's Youngbyun nuclear plant before, but considering the current North Korean nuclear capability, this option seems to be insufficiently. Except for a total provocation or sudden change of the North, using forces in the Korean peninsula by the United States is extremely limited.

If the use of military forces is excluded, Washington can choose one of options among patience and disregard, engagement, and sanction and containment. Containment could be an option when Pyongyang continues to develop its nuclear program and the U.S.-DPRK relation worsens extremely. If the United States' containment makes steady progress, North's strong opposition against it can exacerbated the already fragile peace in the Korean peninsula and an armed conflict can be followed. Economic sanction against Pyongyang is an option - Washington is currently applying it with hopes that it would damage the North Korean regime.

If there is tangible progress related to the North Korean nuclear issue, Washington's economic sanctions would be lifted with further additional incentives. Although with a series of nuclear tests and local provocations against the South, the United States' policy towards the North has tilted towards containment and 'strategic patience,' the option of various types of engagement can be chosen by Washington, however. And, the biggest flaw of the disregard-option is that the resolution of the problem is not the goal. As long as Pyongyang does not cross the United States' red line, there is much room for improvement of U.S.-DPRK relationship. Then, the

United States would pursue the engagement policy toward Pyongyang step by step and expand economic support, social and cultural exchange, and the governmental and non-governmental contacts between the two.

(2) Status Quo: The Launch of Eunha-3

The North's successful launch of a rocket supposedly carrying a satellite into orbit on December 12 is the latest act in a string of provocations not only to South Korea but to the world. On the 15th, Pyongyang proclaimed that it finally has the intercontinental ballistic missile technology to strike the continental United States. The North failed in the launch of the Eunha-3 in April 2009, just after the Obama administration took office, and, in April 2012, the Eunha-3 exploded in midair after the launch. Now, with the launch of the same Eunha-3 rocket, Pyongyang demonstrated that it had confidence in the rocket capabilities, production facilities, and preparations. The launch is likely to have an impact on the Obama administration's 'pivot to Asia' as it begins its second term in office.

Since the launch of the Taepodong-1 rocket in August 1998, relations between Pyongyang and Washington over the missile issue have come in three different types. The difference in outcomes resulted from the response from Washington. Clinton's approach was on resolving matters through the 'Perry process' and a joint communique whereas Bush's sanctions were followed by the launch of seven Taepodong-2s and other missiles with its first nuclear test in an

extremely tense test of nerves that eventually gave way to negotiations. And, under the Obama administration's first term, sanctions from Washington alternated with the second nuclear test and three rockets launches from Pyongyang.

As a result, the North Korea policy aimed at blocking the proliferation of WMDs was an utter failure and additional sanctions at the UN level were of no avail. Now, it does not really make sense anymore to simply suggest going back to the Six-Party Talks and the September 19 Joint Statement. As the Obama administration enters its second term, the latest success of Pyongyang's launch could be the occasion for a bold change in approach in which it tries for a more fundamental resolution of the issue by pushing for change in the North and finish the nuclear and missile negotiations left over from the former administration.

Even though various interests related to the issues of the Korean Peninsula are at stake in light of the growing importance of the Asia-Pacific region, the nonproliferation issue is the most urgent task for Washington. The rise of Beijing's national power, conservatism of Japan, confrontation between Tokyo and Beijing, confrontation between the two Koreas, and launch of a new and young regime in Pyongyang has all increased uncertainty and makes the American strategic calculations in the region and understanding of the issues more complex. Seeking solutions to these issues has become more complicated than ever. This is because the resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue, arguably the most urgent problem for the United States, is interlinked with clarifying the newly estab-

lished New Order in East Asia.

Washington has understood the nuclear and missile development of the North as a challenge to the United States. As Iran in the Middle East, North Korea in Asia has gone head to head with the ‘nuclear-free world’ policy of the United States. The North Korean nuclear problem is not only a factor in the Peninsula’s instability, but it is related to WMD’s proliferation worldwide and can be developed into further nuclear terror elsewhere and could also translate into the expansion of Beijing’s influence. That is, why the North’s nuclear and missile issues cannot but hold the first rank in the strategy under any administration in Washington. Furthermore, it was Obama himself who advocated a nuclear-free world and established the Nuclear Security Summit.

Therefore, in the second term Obama administration, there is no doubt that the abandonment of its nuclear and missile development will continue to be demanded to Pyongyang from Washington. The first Obama administration’s firm stance of ‘not buying the same horse three times’ will continue. Without Pyongyang’s fulfillment of the preconditions in denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula and the resumption of the Six-Party Talk, it will be difficult to realize. Sanctions based on strategic patience against the North and the pressure to carry out the 2.29 Agreement will continue. President Obama will not be in a hurry, because he has secured his four years already. In the end, the way in which Washington chooses to resolve the North Korean nuclear problem depends on Pyongyang’s attitude.

Considering the U.S.-DPRK relationship so far, the latest

rocket launch has a meaningful implication. The success of the multistage rocket upped the ante for negotiations as it brought into focus the threat of Pyongyang achieving long-range nuclear capability. The Obama administration clearly stated through the State Department on December 12 that the latest rocket launch made it all the more difficult for the United States to resume the talks, because North Korea “has gone in the opposite direction and flagrantly violated UN Security Council resolutions.” The latest launch now provides Washington with its first confirmation that a rogue state, or one of the so-called the ‘axis of evil,’ has the capability to strike its own mainland with a nuclear weapon.

Therefore, Washington should constantly demand to change Pyongyang’s attitude and show its will of denuclearization by strengthening the U.S.-ROK alliance under the policy of strategic patience for the short term. With respect to the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, Washington has the road map of complete disarmament of the North’s nuclear weapons, then security guarantees and provision of economic aid to Pyongyang. Washington also stresses that compensation to North’s wrong behaviors will not be given and that it should show responsible behaviors to raise its neighbors’ confidence in order for any compensation to come their way. Pyongyang’s recent missile launch will, in the short term, empower this position. However, this is likely to last only for the short-term. The Obama administration is in a favorable position to initiative a long-term policy towards the North which will seek to resolve the problem of proliferation as opposed to containing it.

3. South Korea-United States Cooperation on North Korean Issues

South Korea and the United States have been firmly cooperating on North Korea issues. However, the two allies have proceeded with difficulty in establishing a consistent policy and solution to the current issues of North Korea. The allies are given a task to prepare a concrete solution at a working-level: specific solutions to possible scenarios of North Korea should be prepared. For instance, appropriate and detailed cooperation responses should be prepared for a different situation: when North Korea performs another nuclear test, should the United States and South Korea ignore it as before or should they go out to a dialogue with the North?; Based upon the previous lessons, the repetitions of dialogue did not solve the problem, then what should be Plan B?

During a 2009 press conference, the President Obama mentioned ‘another path’ available for North Korea to choose. It is a ‘path that leads to peace and economic opportunity for the people of North Korea, including full integration into the community of nations.’ However, it has yet to see how this translates into a policy in the future. In addition to North Korea’s continued provocations, the current political instability within North Korea adds more pressure to a situation in which negotiation results would not be so rosy even if rewards were given to North Korea. The allies should prepare specific cooperation plans in this regard.

In fact, the Obama administration has shown inconsistency

in dealing with North Korea in the past. In the beginning, the United States placed greater importance on dialogues with North Korea. In a speech at the Asia Society on February 13, 2009 the Secretary of State Hillary Clinton expressed the willingness to talk with the reclusive nation both directly and indirectly, by saying, “if North Korea is genuinely prepared to completely and verifiably eliminate their nuclear weapons program, the Obama administration will be willing to normalize bi-lateral relations, replace the peninsula’s long-standing armistice agreements with a permanent peace treaty, and assist in meeting the energy and other economic needs of the North Korean people.” Continuing in the mood, North Korea responded in January 2009 through its Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson that the United States should abandon its anti-North Korea policy as well as to remove threats with nuclear weapons as a prerequisite for returning to the table. However, with apparent unresponsiveness from the United States, North Korea went ahead with the launch of a Taepodong-2 missile. The UN Security Council issued the presidential statement, which renewed sanctions efforts anticipated under UN Security Council Resolution 1718, as well as agreed on including North Korea as a country on the sanction list. In response to UN Security Council criticism of its recent rocket launch, North Korea announced that it would pull out of the Six-Party Talks, break the previous agreements, halt the disablement of the Yongbyon complex and undertake ‘thorough preparation’ to restore to its original status. On May 25, North Korea conducted its second underground nuclear test. On June 13, North Korea an-

nounced that it would commence uranium enrichment.

The American response to the North Korean nuclear issue has turned into that of a ‘strategic patience.’ Strategic patience is first mentioned by Stephen Bosworth, the United States’ Special Envoy for North Korean Policy, after he visited Pyongyang on December 8, 2009. In the situations in which North Korea carried out the launch of long-range missiles, the second nuclear test, and the sinking of the Cheonan, the United States would exercise strategic patience until North Korea shows a sign of sincere willingness to abandon its nuclear weapons program. In other words, the apparent lack of sufficient progress to move forward underscored lingering doubts about the North Korean will to pursue denuclearization via negotiations and it prompted the United States to resort to economic sanctions and military deterrence as a means to change the behavior of North Korea should North Korea continue to defy the international community.

However, strategic patience had two policy weaknesses: First, prolonged pursuit of strategic patience will halt any dialogues and bargain with North Korea, which would make denuclearization of the Korean peninsula a more difficult task to achieve. Second, the lack of dialogue with North Korea would lead the North to engage stronger provocative actions, which would bring insecurity that the United States would be unable to ignore or tolerate. In fact, the sinking of the Cheonan, shelling of Yeonpyeong Island and the unveiling of its uranium enrichment facility in November 2010 prompted the debates within the United States government to modify the policy

of strategic patience against North Korea. Since the U.S.-China summit talk in January 2011, the United States has shown a tendency to detach itself from the existing policy of strategic patience against North Korea. In other words, although the United States has maintained the keynote of its strategic patience policy, the United States has also sought to initiate dialogue with North Korea in an attempt to reflect the current political situation at home and to prevent North Korea from engaging another provocative action. However, such climate of tolerance has begun to be clouded by the failed satellite launch early this year, another successful launch of long-range rocket and the uncertainty of a possible third nuclear test in the near future.

It is true that such inconsistency in the United States' policy against the North Korea issues have led to some dissonance between South Korea and the United States in dealing with North Korea. Since the summit talk with China, the United States maintained that the biggest obstacles to the resumption of talks were the Cheonan and Yeonpyeong issues, which should be dealt separated from the Six-Party Talk frame and are not a direct precondition to the resumption of the talks. In fact, James Steinberg, the Deputy Secretary of State reiterated the above and mentioned that a pre-condition directly related to the resumption of the Six-Party Talks is for North Korea to demonstrate that it is sincerely prepared to step back from provocations and to engage in a meaningful dialogue that will lead to concrete steps to deal with its nuclear program. During his daily press briefing on April 18, 2011, March Toner, Acting Deputy

Department Spokesman said, “I never said that [North Korea] had to apologize for the Cheonan incident.” On the other hand, South Korean government made a public announcement that North Korea’s apology in regard to the Cheonan sinking and Yeonpyeong shelling is an essential factor in the resumption of the Six-Party Talks and maintained that without resolving this issue, dialogues between the two Koreas cannot be held.

Taken into consideration these differences, upon the beginning of new governments both in South Korea and the United States, they have a grave responsibility to pursue an unwavering policy against North Korea based on their past experiences of dealing with North Korea. With Park Geun Hye as the next President of South Korea, the U.S.-ROK alliance seems to be as solid as before. The most important element of the U.S.-ROK alliance, which is the North Korea policy, does not seem to be in tension with the United States. Her North Korea policy is called the ‘Trust Process.’ South Korea would take measures to improve mutual trust with North Korea by way of humanitarian economic aid to the North, reunion of separated families, etc. After the buildup of mutual trust and gradual progress of denuclearization, it would be possible to build the Korean Peninsula economic community. But at the same time, the Park administration would emphasize solid security readiness *vis-à-vis* North Korea.

President Obama’s North Korea policy is still uncertain, but based upon Secretary John Kerry’s previous tendencies, the United States would also emphasize a dialogue with the North. When John

Kerry was running for President in 2004, he argued that he would talk with the North, and he would prevent North Korean nuclear development through various diplomatic tools including the 6-party process. But he is also very firm on the North Korean military provocations and nuclear test, so most likely he would take a two-track approach to the North. One concern is that, if the United States pursues an active dialogue with the North, there is a possibility that the South would be excluded from the dialogue. So, the future homework for the South is to take active coordination with the United States and prevent the South from being excluded from the United States-North Korea dialogue as happened during the Clinton administration.

Concerning the United States-ROK alliance, Park Geun Hye mentioned that she would deepen and develop the comprehensive strategic alliance, but at the same time develop relations with China too. There must be a more refined discussion on how to make the contents of the comprehensive strategic alliance. But the new administration should be cautious about how to balance between the United States and China. Also, she mentioned that the OPCON transfer will be undertaken as scheduled, and will form a new command structure. It will be a new combined structure with South Korea taking a leading role. There should be more discussions between the United States and ROK on how to make this new command structure.

4. Conclusion

Viewed in the long term period, the future basis of a second Obama administration's North Korea policy can be compressed into the 'new engagement.' The policy should include reasonable, gradual, and convergent contents agreed upon by the Republicans and Democrats as a lesson of the two parties' outcomes about the North Korea policy from the Clinton administration to the first Obama administration. The 'new engagement' policy should emphasize dialogue more patiently with Pyongyang setting it apart from the disregard, pressures and sanctions driven policy towards the North and make an attempt at converting North Korea into a normal country.

In this regard, the multi-lateral approach, such as the Six-Party Talk, is likely to be highly useful as a basic settlement mechanism for the nuclear issue in the second term Obama administration. The Six-Party Talk has exposed its limitations including the difficulty of consensus derived from the characteristics of the multi-lateral talks, long-term deadlock due to the absence of the North, and China's 'shielding North Korea'⁴² or opaqueness of the negotiation success. Consequently, the United States is expected to also consider the various forms of mini-lateral approaches. Particularly, the tri-lateral dialogues of ROK-U.S.-China by the next Park Geun-hye ad-

⁴²-Dong Ryul Lee, "China's Policy and Influence on the North Korea Nuclear Issue: Denuclearization and/or Stabilization of the Korean Peninsula?," *The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis*, Vol. 22, No. 2 (June 2010), pp. 170-173.

ministration is expected to be able to exert the driving force because it is configured by a practical understanding of the parties about the nuclear issue.

It can be assumed that the Six-Party Talk is one of the useful alternatives for Washington so far. To president Obama, the Six-Party Talks still has some advantages.⁴³ Within it, minilateral approaches like tri-lateral, four-party, and five-party talks or meetings are always possible. In it, Washington can have its substantial initiative and carry an essential role, also. It is more favorable than bi-lateral dialogue between Washington and Pyongyang in that it is capable of uplifting international capacities to give meaning to pressure and sanctions against Pyongyang by using Beijing's influence on Pyongyang, minimizing the damage of the United States' pride and dignity, strengthening the sanction, and justifying the need for China and Russia to participate in the sanctions. Above all, considering that Washington's faced with economic and financial problems, it is appealing in that the responsibility of compensation for the North's denuclearization can be spread to other participants. The Six-Party Talks is still usefulness for solving and managing Pyongyang's nuclear problem, even if it has a few limitations.

In this sense, the United States will coordinate its stance with other participants in several minilateral structures including the Six-party Talks and improve its relationship with the North. Bi-lateral

⁴³-Yongsoon Kim, "Preparing for Institution-Building of Six-Party Talks in Northeast Asia," *East and West Studies*, Vol. 22, No. 2 (December 2010), pp. 290-294.

meetings always remain as a possibility, of course. Washington, in a multi-lateral or mini-lateral frame, will continue to negotiate with Pyongyang under the principles that participants should jointly assume the responsibilities of compensation for the North's denuclearization; Pyongyang should show responsible behaviors for denuclearizing; and material compensation should be given by stages of the denuclearization.

The new foreign policy of 'new engagement' towards the North and a new road map for the solution of the nuclear problem will most likely be presented during the second term Obama administration. With the considerations of the 'pivot to Asia' strategy, consequent American policy options, China's and the South's stances toward the North, as well as the political appointments in Washington, the stage is set for a bolder move to the resolution of the nuclear problem. Washington will most likely bring up more assertive and realistic bargaining chips than ever.

Thus, in its policy towards North Korea, the Obama administration will adopt a 'dialogue and pressure' strategy based on 'strategic patience' due to the relationship with China and South Korea. The Obama administration will try to avoid a conflictual relationship with China, so it is likely to maintain a cooperative stance with China regarding the North Korean nuclear issue. And, South Korea's new government will also take a more flexible policy towards North Korea compared to the Lee Myung-bak administration's hard-line policy. The Obama administration emphasized policy coordination and robust alliance relationship with South

Korea and this will naturally keep pace with South Korea's new policy toward North Korea. However, the second term Obama administration's policy toward North Korea will be decided by North Korea's response or the will about the denuclearization even if the United States put stress on the relationship with China and South Korea and opt for a more conciliatory policy.



VI. Conclusion

The new Obama administration's policy towards the Korean peninsula should be understood within the grand framework of the United States' over all policy towards East Asia including China. This study envisions that in the second term Obama administration, the policy towards Northeast Asia, especially China, will sustain two prolonged approach, cooperation and competition, on the basis of the rebalancing strategy toward Asia. Given that Asia is a critical area for the United States in terms of economy, military, and political interests, the Obama administration's rebalancing strategy toward Asia can be understood as its national strategy for its long-term maintenance of hegemony in the region targeting primarily China.

Within this framework, the second term Obama administration will maintain strong a U.S.-ROK alliance, because it is an important instrument with which the United States can solve diverse issues in this region. Especially when the U.S.-Japan alliance is sluggish, the U.S.-ROK alliance is believed to present an opportunity for the United States to restore its strategic prominence in the Asia Pacific. Yet there remain some issues to be solved in the U.S.-ROK alliance. Although the United States' economy is gradually improving, it is still under pressure for governmental financial downsizing to a great extent, and this would limit the capabilities of the United States to actively pursue its policy goals in this area. The United States will require more burdens from its allies like South Korea. Despite these financial issues, the overall U.S.-ROK alliance will be strengthened during the next four years, especially given that Park Geun-Hye was elected as the new president of South

Korea.

The second term Obama administration's policy towards North Korea is a more complex issue, and therefore, not surprisingly, there are contrasting views, as previously mentioned on this issue. Indeed both the optimistic view and the pessimistic view commonly suggest that the new Obama administration will utilize some kind of combination of the coercive policy represented by strategic patience and engagement policy characterized by negotiation and dialogue. Their real difference lies in their different emphasis. Considering diverse environmental factors, the second term Obama administration is likely to pursue more engagement-oriented policy than its first term. However, the new Obama administration will also reveal that the key to the real solution for the gridlock is up to the will and attitude of North Korea.

As North Korea launched the rocket, Eun-Ha 3, which is believed to be easily transformed to a long-range missile, in mid-December 2012, the new Obama administration may pursue some coercive policy towards North Korea including economic sanctions and UN resolutions, etc. during the first part of 2013. In the long-term, however, the new Obama administration will attempt to find new ways to restore dialogue with North Korea. Very recently, Obama designated John Kerry as the new secretary of state replacing Hillary Clinton. Kerry is well known as an advocate of solving the North Korean nuclear issue through negotiations and dialogue, unlike Clinton, who is a supporter of the 'strategic patience' strategy. With the strong pessimism over the usefulness of the Six-Party

Talks, the new Obama administration may be inclined to resume bilateral talks with North Korea, or tri-lateral dialogue including China with the expectation that China may be able to draw some significant changes in the international behavior and domestic structure of North Korea. As mentioned earlier, this attempt by the new Obama administration can only be facilitated by the will and attitude toward change by North Korea.

The newly elected Park Geun-Hye administration will face a critical challenge originating from the North. Park made it clear that she would make effort to restore dialogue with Pyongyang, albeit with some conditions, during the campaigns for the presidential election. Although prompt dialogue may not be possible due to the provocative behavior by the North, the Park administration will attempt to find a momentum for dialogue in the long term, just like the new Obama administration. What is important for the Park administration is strengthening the ROK-U.S. alliance and coordinating policy with the Obama administration over the solution for North Korean nuclear issue. Given the strong agreement for the common interest between South Korea and the United States, both the Park administration and the new Obama administration may be well aware that policy coordination between the two countries is the only way to peacefully and successfully resolve the North Korea nuclear issue. For the next four year, intense communication between the two governments will be necessary in order to have any effect on the genuine denuclearization process as well as change in North Korea itself.

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연구총서

2010-01	북한 핵 보유 고수 전략의 도전과 대응	박형중 외	9,500원
2010-02	탈사회주의 경제이행 국가의 권력구조 유형과 개혁 경로: 포스트-김정일 체제에 대한 시사점	최진욱, 김진하	8,000원
2010-03	북한 개방화와 인권개선 방안연구	김국신, 김연수, 서보혁	7,000원
2010-04	북한의 체제위기와 사회갈등	조한범, 양문수, 조대엽	7,500원
2010-05	오바마 행정부 출범 이후 동북아전략 환경의 변화와 한국의 동북아 4국 통일외교전략	배정호 외	12,500원
2010-06	북한주민 인권의식 실태연구	이금순, 전현준	8,500원
2010-07	라진·선봉지역 물류분야 남북 협력방안 연구	김영운, 추원서, 임을출	8,000원
2010-08	민족공동체 통일방안의 새로운 접근과 추진방안: 3대 공동체 통일구상 중심	박종철 외	11,500원
2010-09	통일한국의 정치체제	허문영 외	6,000원
2010-10	북한 핵에 대한 억지방향 연구	홍우택	5,000원
2010-11	북한의 포스트 김정일체제 전망	정영태 외	11,000원
2010-12	북한 주민의 의식과 정체성: 자아의 독립, 국가의 그늘, 욕망의 부상	조정아 외	17,000원
2010-13	북·중 경제관계와 남북경협에 대한 파급효과 비교분석	최수영	7,500원
2010-14	East Asian Community Building: Issue Areas and Perspectives of Regional Countries	김규륜 외	10,000원
2010-15(I)	신아시아 외교와 새로운 평화의 모색 I	김규륜 외	13,000원
2010-15(II)	신아시아 외교와 새로운 평화의 모색 II	김규륜 외	13,000원
2011-01	제2차 핵안보정상회의와 북한 핵문제	전성훈	14,500원
2011-02	북한군의 기강 해이에 관한 연구	이교덕 외	11,000원
2011-03	통일 진입과정에서의 북한 재건 방향	최진욱, 김진하	5,500원
2011-04	북한의 부문별 조직실태 및 조직문화 변화 종합연구	정영태	16,000원
2011-05	북한형사재판제도 연구: 특징과 실태	이규창, 정광진	8,000원
2011-06	북한주민의 삶의 질: 실태와 인식	김수암 외	12,000원
2011-07	한반도 평화와 북한 비핵화: 협력적 위협감축(CTR)의 적용방안	박종철 외	10,000원
2011-08	대북한 핵협상 전략구상방향	홍우택 외	6,000원
2011-09	중국의 부상에 대한 북한의 인식과 대응	허문영, 마민호	10,000원
2011-10	북한 핵의 국제정치와 한국의 대북 핵전략	배정호 외	11,000원
2011-11	평화통일을 위한 통일외교 전략	박영호 외	13,500원
2011-12(I)	중국의 G2 부상과 한반도 평화통일 추진전략 제1부	황병덕 외	15,500원
2011-12(II)	중국의 G2 부상과 한반도 평화통일 추진전략 제2부	황병덕 외	13,500원
2011-12(III)	중국의 G2 부상과 한반도 평화통일 추진전략 제3부	황병덕 외	18,000원
2012-01	미국의 對韓 핵우산정책에 관한 연구	전성훈	14,000원
2012-02	북한부패와 인권의 상관성	김수암 외	11,000원
2012-03	보호책임(R2P) 이행에 관한 연구	이규창 외	11,000원

2012-04	EC/EU사태분석을 통한 남북 및 동북아공동체 추진방안: 유럽공동체 형성기를 중심으로	손기웅 외	14,000원
2012-05	김정은체제의 권력엘리트 연구	이교덕 외	13,000원
2012-06	독재정권의 성격과 정치변동: 북한 관련 시사점	박형중 외	11,000원
2012-07	북방삼각관계 변화와 지속: 북한의 균형화 전략을 중심으로	허문영, 유동원, 심승우	10,000원
2012-08	북한 핵문제의 전망과 대응책: 정책결정모델(Decision Making Model)을 이용한 전략 분석	홍우택	8,000원
2012-09	중국의 한반도 관련 정책연구기관 및 전문가 현황분석	전병곤, 양갑용	6,000원
2012-10	2000년대 대북정책 평가와 정책대안: '동시병행 선순환 모델'의 원칙과 과제	박종철 외	12,500원
2012-11	리더십교체기의 동북아 4국의 국내정치 및 대외정책 변화와 한국의 통일외교 전략	배정호 외	11,500원
2012-12	김정은 정권의 정책전망: 정권 초기의 권력구조와 리더십에 대한 분석을 중심으로	최진욱, 한기범, 장용석	7,500원
2012-13	신정부 '국가전략 DMZ 평화적 이용'	손기웅 외	8,000원

학술회의총서

2010-01	이명박 정부 2년 대북정책 성과 및 향후 추진방향		8,000원
2010-02	독일 통일 20년과 한반도 통일비전		6,000원
2010-03	분단관리에서 통일대비로		5,500원
2010-04	독일 통일 20년과 한국의 통일대비		7,000원
2011-01	한반도 통일비전과 국제협력		4,000원
2011-02	북한인권 실상과 효율적 개입방안		8,500원
2012-01	The Outlook for the North Korean Situation & Prospects for U.S.-ROK Cooperation After the Death of Kim Jong-il		6,000원
2012-02	김정은 체제의 북한 인권문제와 국제협력		19,000원
2012-03	해외 이주·난민 지원제도의 시사점		13,000원

협동연구총서

2010-14-01	북한정보체계 실태조사(총괄보고서)	황병덕 외	12,000원
2010-14-02	북한정보체계 실태조사(上)	황병덕 외	14,000원
2010-14-03	북한정보체계 실태조사(下)	황병덕 외	13,000원
2010-15-01	이명박 정부 외교안보통일정책의 세부 실천방안 (총괄보고서)	여인곤 외	9,000원
2010-15-02	이명박 정부 외교안보통일정책의 추진환경 및 전략과 실천방안	박영호 외	9,500원
2010-15-03	이명박 정부 대북통일정책의 세부실천방안	허문영 외	7,000원
2010-15-04	이명박 정부 외교정책의 세부실천방안(1): 협력 네트워크 외교 분야	남궁영 외	7,500원
2010-15-05	이명박 정부 외교정책의 세부 실천방안(2): 포괄적 실리외교 분야	전재성 외	9,500원
2010-15-06	이명박 정부 안보정책의 세부 실천방안	이수훈 외	7,500원

2010-16-01	북한의 정상국가화 지원방안 연구(총괄보고서)	이교덕 외	7,000원
010-16-02	북한의 정치부문 정상국가화 지원방안	전현준 외	7,500원
2010-16-03	북한 시장 진화에 관한 복잡계 시뮬레이션	조정아 외	14,000원
2010-16-04	북한의 정상국가화를 위한 국제사회의 지원방안	민병원 외	7,500원
2011-14-01	북한정보관리체계 개선방안(총괄보고서)	황병덕 외	14,500원
2011-14-02	북한정보관리체계 개선방안(상)	황병덕 외	13,000원
2011-14-03	북한정보관리체계 개선방안(중)	황병덕 외	12,000원
2011-14-04	북한정보관리체계 개선방안(하)	황병덕 외	13,500원
2011-15-01	북한 경제발전을 위한 국제협력 프로그램 연구: 국제사회의 경험 분석(총괄보고서)	임강택 외	11,000원
2011-15-02	부패의 개념과 실태 및 반부패 개혁	박형중 외	10,000원
2011-15-03	체제전환국의 시장-민주제도 건설 지원	박영호 외	13,000원
2011-15-04	국제사회의 개발지원전략과 협력체계 연구	장형수 외	9,500원
2011-15-05	수원국의 역량발전을 위한 개발협력전략과 사례연구	이종무 외	9,500원
2011-15-06	인프라 개발을 위한 국제협력 사례와 시사점	이상준 외	9,000원
2012-11-01	북한 경제발전을 위한 국제협력 프로그램 실행방안(총괄보고서)	임강택 외	11,000원
2012-11-02	북한 부패실태와 반부패 전략	박형중 외	10,000원
2012-11-03	북한 경제발전을 위한 국제협력 체계 구축 및 개발지원전략 수립 방안	장형수 외	8,000원
2012-11-04	북한의 역량발전을 위한 국제협력 방안	이종무 외	8,000원
2012-11-05	북한의 인프라 개발을 위한 국제사회 협력 프로그램 추진방안	이상준 외	8,000원
2012-12-01	한반도 통일 공공외교 추진전략(I) - 공공외교의 이론적 조명과 한반도 주변4국의 對한국 통일 공공외교(총괄보고서)	황병덕 외	13,500원
2012-12-02	공공외교의 이론적 조명과 주변4국의 한반도통일 공공외교 분석틀	김규륜 외	8,500원
2012-12-03	미국의 對한국 통일 공공외교 실태	박영호 외	9,500원
2012-12-04	중국의 對한국 통일 공공외교 실태	이교덕 외	7,500원
2012-12-05	일본의 對한국 통일 공공외교 실태	이진원 외	8,000원
2012-12-06	러시아의 對한국 통일 공공외교 실태	여인곤 외	7,500원

논총

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통일정책연구, 제19권 2호 (2010)	10,000원
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<i>International Journal of Korean Unification Studies</i> , Vol. 21, No. 1 (2012)	10,000원

통일정책연구, 제21권 2호 (2012)	10,000원
<i>International Journal of Korean Unification Studies</i> , Vol. 21, No. 2 (2012)	10,000원

북한인권백서

북한인권백서 2010	박영호 외	10,000원
<i>White Paper on Human Rights in North Korea 2010</i>	박영호 외	20,000원
북한인권백서 2011	김국신 외	17,500원
<i>White Paper on Human Rights in North Korea 2011</i>	김국신 외	17,500원
북한인권백서 2012	김수암 외	19,500원
<i>White Paper on Human Rights in North Korea 2012</i>	손기웅 외	23,500원

기타

2010	김정일 현지지도 동향 1994-2009	15,000원
2010	21세기 러시아의 국가전략과 한-러 전략적 동반자관계	10,500원
2010	Russian National Strategy and R.O.K.-Russian Strategic Partnership in the 21st Century	13,500원
2010	NPT 체제와 핵안보	13,000원
2010	Nuclear Security 2012: Challenges of Proliferation and Implication for the Korean Peninsula	15,000원
2010	통일 환경 평가(통일대계 연구 2010-01)	박종철 외 18,000원
2010	통일비전 개발(통일대계 연구 2010-02)	조민 외 12,000원
2010	독일의 평화통일과 통일독일 20년 발전상(통일대계 연구 2010-03)	황병덕 외 16,000원
2010	사회주의 체제전환 이후 발전상과 한반도통일-중국, 베트남 및 중동부 유럽 국가들의 사회주의 체제전환 중심(통일대계 연구 2010-04)	황병덕 외 15,000원
2010	전환기의 북한과 통일담론(통일대계 연구 2010-05)	배정호 편저 11,000원
2010	한반도 통일과 주변 4국(통일대계 연구 2010-06)	최진욱 편저 11,000원
2010	Korean Unification and the Neighboring Powers(통일대계 연구 2010-07)	최진욱 편저 13,000원
2011	통일대비를 위한 북한변화 전략(통일대계연구 2011-01-1)	박형중 외 17,000원
2011	북한변화를 위한 한-중 협력방안(통일대계연구 2011-01-2)	임강택 외 6,500원
2011	남북 친화력 확대 방안(통일대계연구 2011-02)	조민 외 6,000원
2011	통일대비를 위한 국내과제(통일대계연구 2011-03)	박종철 외 13,000원
2011	통일외교 과제와 전략(통일대계연구 2011-04)	최진욱 외 13,000원
2011	US-China Relations and Korean Unification(Grand Plan for Korean Unification 2011-05)	최진욱 편저 12,000원
2011	통일 비용-편익 연구의 새로운 접근: 포괄적 연구요소의 도입과 대안의 모색 (통일 비용-편익 종합연구 11-01)	김규륜 외 19,000원
2011	체제전환 비용-편익 사례연구(통일 비용-편익 종합연구 11-02)	조한범 외 10,500원
2011	통일 비용-편익 추계를 위한 북한 공식경제부문의 실태연구 (통일 비용-편익 종합연구 11-03)	임강택 외 9,500원
2011	2011년 통일예측시계구축	박영호, 김형기 8,000원

2011	한반도 통일과 동북아 4국의 입장과 역할	배정호 외	6,500원
2011	Korean Unification and the Positions and Roles of the Four Neighboring Powers	배정호 편	8,000원
2011	중국의 부상에 따른 동북아 전략환경의 변화와 한반도	배정호 편	12,000원
2011	2011 Unification Clock: When will We See a Unified Korea?	Park Young-Ho, Kim Hyeong Ki	4,000원
2011	알기쉬운 통일교육 12주제	허문영 외	35,000원
2012	탈북자 관련 국제조약 및 법령	이규창 외	19,500원
2012	북한인권 이해의 새로운 지평	북한인권연구센터 편	20,500원
2012	알기쉬운 통일교육: 해외한인용	허문영 외	30,000원
2012	통일대비를 위한 대북통일정책 모색(통일대계연구 12-01)	박형중 외	15,000원
2012	통일한국에 대한 국제적 우려해소와 편약: 지역 및 주변국 차원 (통일대계연구 12-02)	박종철 외	14,000원
2012	Korean Unification and a New East Asian Order (Grand Plan for Korean Unification 12-03)	최진욱 편저	6,000원
2012	Korean Peninsula Division/Unification: From the International Perspective	Kim Kyuryoon, Park Jae-Jeok	13,000원
2012	중국의 국내정치 및 대외정책과 주요 국가들의 대중국 전략	배정호, 구재희 편	22,000원
2012	China's Domestic Politics and Foreign Policies and Major Countries' Strategies toward China	Bae Jung-Ho, Ku Jae H.	22,500원

연례정세보고서

2010	통일환경 및 남북한 관계 전망: 2010~2011	7,000원
2011	통일환경 및 남북한 관계 전망: 2011~2012	6,000원

통일정세분석

비매품

2010-01	2010년 북한 신년 공동사설 분석	임강택 외
2010-02	북한 최고인민회의 제12기 제2차 회의 결과 분석	최수영
2010-03	김정일 방중과 중국의 전략외교	배정호, 박영호, 전병곤
2010-04	2010상반기 북한정세 분석 보고서	정영태, 이교덕, 최수영, 임순희, 조정아
2010-05	독일통일 20주년 조망: 독일통일이 한반도 통일에 주는 시사점	황병덕
2010-06	야로슬라블 한-러 정상회담 결과 분석	여인곤
2010-07	북한 3대 세습 후계구도 분석 및 정책변화 전망	김진하
2011-01	2011년 북한 신년 공동사설 분석	최진욱 외
2011-02	미·중 정상회담의 의미와 한국의 전략적 고려사항	배정호 외
2011-03	2011년 미·중 정상회담 평가: 동북아 및 한반도에의 함의	황병덕 외
2011-04	2009년 헌법 개정 이후 북한 노동법제 동향	이규창
2011-05	최근 북한 주민의 의식변화와 정책적 시사점	임순희
2011-06	최고인민회의 제12기 제4차 회의 결과 분석	임강택, 최진욱
2011-07	중동 민주화 혁명과 한반도 전략적 함의	배정호, 박영호, 박재적, 이기현

2011-08	북한의 여성권·아동권 관련 법 제정 동향	임순희, 김수암, 이규창
2011-09	상반기 북한정세 분석 보고서	최진욱 외
2012-01	2012년 북한 신년 공동사설 분석	최진욱 외
2012-02	북한의 아동교육권 실태와 관련 법령 제정 동향	임순희, 조정아, 이규창
2012-03	북한 미사일 발사에 대한 국제사회의 대응	배정호 외
2012-04	제4차 당대표자회와 제12기 제5차 최고인민회의 분석	박형중 외
2012-05	최근 국제사회의 북한인권 논의동향	이금순, 한동호

KINU 정책연구시리즈		비매품
2010-01	한반도 녹색성장을 위한 남북한 산림협력 법적 개선방안 예비연구	이규창
2010-02	2010년 통일예측시계	박영호 외
2010-03	북한 경제개발계획 수립방안 연구: 베트남 사례를 중심으로	임강택 외
2010-04(III)	접경지역의 평화시대 조성을 통한 남북교류 활성화 방안(III): 정책제안	손기웅 외
2010-04(IV)	접경지역의 평화시대 조성을 통한 남북교류 활성화 방안(IV): 2010년 「코리아 접경포럼」 자료집	손기웅 외
2011-01	재스민혁명의 분석과 북한에 대한 시사점	박종철 외
2011-02	창지투(長吉圖) 선도구와 북한나선특별시, 러시아 극동지역 간 경제협력 과제	림금숙
2011-03	6자회담과 남북관계: 전망과 대책	박종철 외
2011-04	보호책임(R2P)의 이론 및 실행, 그리고 한반도예외의 함의: 리비아 및 코트디부아르 사태를 중심으로	조정현
2011-05	남북러 가스관 사업의 효과, 쟁점, 과제	이윤식
2011-06	DMZ 총람: 개요, 정치·군사적 현황	손기웅 외
2011-07	DMZ 평화적 이용의 국가적 의미	손기웅 외
2012-01	통일재원 마련 및 통일외지 결집 관련 국민의 인식	김규륜, 김형기
2012-02	2012년 상반기, 북한 정책동향 분석: 북한 매체의 논조를 중심으로	박형중 외
2012-03	러시아의 극동개발과 북한 노동자	이영형

북한인권: 국제사회 동향과 북한의 대응		비매품
2010	북한인권: 국제사회 동향과 북한의 대응, 제5권 1호	김국신, 김영윤, 전현준, 이금순, 이규창
2010	북한인권: 국제사회 동향과 북한의 대응, 제5권 2호	김국신, 전현준, 이금순, 이규창
2011	북한인권: 국제사회 동향과 북한의 대응, 제6권 1호	김수암, 전현준, 이규창
2011	북한인권: 국제사회 동향과 북한의 대응, 제6권 2호	김수암, 김국신, 이규창
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