

SOUTH-NORTH DIALOGUE IN KOREA



051
February
1991

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Published by
International Cultural Society of Korea
C.P.O. Box 4161
SEOUL, KOREA

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Part I

Progress of Preliminary Meetings for South-North High-Level Talks

1. Background of the Resumption of Preliminary Talks

At the sixth preliminary meeting held on January 31, 1990, South and North Korea agreed to hold the 7th meeting on March 7.

However, on February 8, one day after the seventh South-North sports meeting was held on February 7, the North suspended all the on-going dialogues unilaterally in a statement issued jointly by the northern delegations to the preliminary contacts for the South-North parliamentary talks, preliminary talks for the South-North high-level meeting, and the South-North Red Cross working-level contacts.

On March 8, Song Han-ho, the South's chief delegate to the preliminary talks for the South-North high-level meeting, in a telephone message to the North, urged the North Koreans to show sincerity toward resuming the seventh preliminary meeting at an early date. Again on April 17, Song proposed to hold the seventh preliminary meeting on May 22, expressing the hope that the proposed high-level meeting would be realized before August 15, 1990 which happens to be the 45th anniversary of national liberation.

Meanwhile, Kim Sang-hyup, president of the Republic of Korea National Red Cross (ROKNRC), too, sent a message to the North on May 7 to propose that the 11th South-North Red Cross Conference be held in mid-June to resolve the tragic situation in which many dispersed family members pass away without fulfilling their keen wish to meet their missing blood relatives.

In response to the South's repeated calls for the resumption of the dialogue, the North, in a telephone message signed by

An Byong-su, secretary general of the Committee for Peaceful Unification of the Fatherland, and addressed to National Unification Minister Hong Sung-chol, on May 7 made it express that they were not interested in the resumption of the suspended talks for the time being.

The message was in reply to the April 7th message of Prime Minister Kang Young-hoon to the North, in which the Prime Minister urged the North to agree to realize the proposed high-level talks at an early date instead of making unrealistic demands such as a “South-North government and political party leaders conference.”

The North Korean message was a sort of propaganda statement which was full of undiplomatic words and unfounded slanders and in which they one-sidedly laid down their own stand.

The contents of the North Korean telephone message could be summed up as follows:

- It was a nonsensical act for your side’s prime minister to send a reply to our prime minister in connection with a message signed by the “government and political party leaders conference.” Its contents, too, lacked sincerity and did not deserve any consideration.
- Your side’s contradictory attitude, in which your side unreasonably asserts the “concrete walls” that expressly exist are fictitious, make us question the morality and conscience of your side.
- If your side continues to shun a joint inspection of the “concrete walls” and does not dismantle them, we would be obliged to take some other proper measures.
- If the South pushes through the Team Spirit military exercises to drive the dialogue into the state of suspension and

deliberately heighten South-North confrontation by fabricating the “tunnel incident,” we won’t be able to discuss mutually the future destiny of the nation.

- For your side to call the method of “conference” unrealistic represents a self-righteous way of thinking stemming from an attempt of your government authorities to monopolize debate on unification.
- The issue of resuming the existing dialogue depends on the attitude of the South. Even if the dialogue were resumed, it would be quite meaningless if it gives a disappointment to the brethren.

This way, North Korea demanded the removal of “concrete wall,” suspension of the joint Korea-U.S. Team Spirit military exercise and a South-North political conference as de facto prerequisites to the resumption of the dialogue.

And, the fact that the North insisted that the idea of a South-North political conference was raised not as an issue between the government authorities of the two sides, and that the secretary general of the Committee for Peaceful Unification of the Fatherland anomalously stepped in matters discussed in messages between the prime ministers, indicated that they were trying to slip out of the boundary of dialogue between the government authorities.

Toward this naked intransigence of the North Koreans, a spokesman for the National Unification Board made a comment on May 8, expressing disappointment and concern about the anti-dialogue and anti-peace posture of North Korea and urging them to return to the normal inter-Korean dialogue at an early date.

The gist of the comment was as follows:

- North Korea demands the removal of our anti-tank facilities and the convocation of a South-North political conference as de facto prerequisites to resuming the existing dialogue. But, it is due to the North's closed-door policy that free travel and total opening have yet to take place.
- Nonetheless, the North makes unrealistic and nonsensical assertions simply to mislead public opinion at home and abroad while rejecting the inter-Korean dialogue, exchanges and cooperation.
- We cannot help but express disappointment and concern over such North Korean attitude especially at this time when the multi-channeled dialogue is about to be wound up successfully.
- We regret that the North rejected our side's efforts to resume the dialogue, rather than taking corresponding steps to reciprocate them, by producing unreasonable prerequisites.
- We urge North Korea to sincerely return to the normal dialogue between the South and the North at an early date. Mindful that the dialogue is the only way to resolve the issues pending between the two sides, our side shall patiently wait for the North's return to the dialogue.

Also in their May 14th telephone message signed by Paek Nam-jun, the North's chief delegate to the preliminary talks for the proposed South-North high-level meeting, North Korea rejected the early holding of the seventh preliminary meeting while trying to shift the blame for the suspension of the dialogue to the South.

However, unlike the hardline posture showed in their May 7th telephone message, the North this time showed an ambiguous attitude over the issue of resuming the preliminary talks by saying that "with respect to the time of the seventh preliminary meeting, we shall notify your side of an appro-

prate time at the soonest possible date.”

Besides, Li Song-ho, acting chairman of the Central Committee of the North Korean Red Cross, in his May 17th telephone message, turned down the South's suggestion that the 11th South-North Red Cross Conference be held in mid-June.

It was under the circumstances that President Roh Tae-woo held a summit meeting with Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev, who was then on a tour of the United States, in San Francisco on June 4 to exchange opinions on the issues of diplomatic normalization between Korea and the Soviet Union and of bringing about durable peace on the Korean peninsula.

On June 13 immediately after the Korea-USSR summit meeting, North Korea, in a telephone message, expressed a strong displeasure over the summit meeting, again showing negativism toward the resumption of the dialogue. The message was signed this time jointly by Chon Gum-chol, their chief delegate to the preparatory contacts for the South-North parliamentary talks, and Paek Nam-jun, chief delegate to the preliminary talks for the South-North high-level meeting.

However, in a telephone message sent to the South one week later on June 20, the North made a sudden aboutface and now proposed the resumption of the preliminary talks for the South-North high-level meeting.

In the message, the North denounced the Seoul-Moscow summit meeting as “flunkyistic and divisive anti-national acts,” making it clear they would continue to ask the South to “reflect on themselves” and call the South to account. But, they proposed that the seventh preliminary meeting for the high-level talks be held on June 28 and the 11th preparatory contact for the inter-Korean parliamentary meeting on July 12, respectively.

In response, the South, in a telephone message, counter-proposed on June 25 that the seventh preliminary meeting for the high-level talks be held on July 3. The North agreed to the offer, and a stage was thus set for a dialogue for the first time in five months.

2. Seventh Preliminary Meeting

The seventh preliminary meeting for the South-North high-level talks was held at Peace House in the southern sector of Panmunjom from 10 to 11 a.m. July 3, 1990. It was opened to the public.

Beginning the seventh meeting, the South's delegates — Yom Hong-chol and Kim Sam-hun — were replaced with Choi Son-ui, a Presidential secretary, and Shin Song-o, a Foreign Ministry bureau director.

In their first speech at the seventh meeting, the North showed somewhat a different posture from the past. They propagandized on the “five policies for unification of the fatherland” which were first mentioned by Kim Il-sung in one of his policy speeches, and tried to shift to the South the blame for the past suspension of the talks.

Nevertheless, they did not discuss those issues not related to the agenda of the talks, because of which the talks broke up in the past, such as their demand for the removal of so-called “concrete walls” and denouncement of the South for the legal action against Rev. Moon Ik-hwan and Lim Soo-kyong.

But, as to the issue of the order of agenda topics, the only issue that remained unsettled, the North adhered to their stand that the “issue of removing the state of political and military

confrontation” should be placed ahead of the “issue of exchanges and cooperation.”

Moreover, the North raised the issue of Korea’s entry into the United Nations additionally, asking that it be discussed and settled on a priority basis. “We should see to it that there would be no unfortunate consequence out of the issue of entry to the United Nations. To this end, we must hold the proposed high-level meeting at an early date so that it could discuss and resolve this issue,” a Pyongyang delegate maintained.

In his speech, Song Han-ho, the South’s chief delegate, stressed that both sides should make concerted efforts to realize the high-level meeting at an early date. He said that if only the proposed talks were held to discuss and resolve the issues of carrying out exchanges and cooperation and of removing the state of political and military confrontation, it would serve as a decisive momentum to improving inter-Korean relations and advancing the time of peaceful unification of the homeland.

In a bid to wind up the discussion of procedural matters at the seventh meeting and thereby realize the proposed high-level talks at an early date, the South suggested that the agenda topic of the high-level talks should be the “issues of dispelling the state of political and military confrontation and promoting multi-faceted exchanges and cooperation between the South and the North” on the condition of a bilateral agreement that the “order of the topics described does not necessarily mean the order of debate.”

As the South virtually accommodated the North Korean demand that the “issue of dispelling the state of political and military confrontation” be described ahead of the “issue of promoting exchanges and cooperation,” a demand that was the last stumbling block to the realization of the proposed meeting, all the procedural matters related to the holding of the

high-level meeting were in effect completely resolved.

With respect to the North Korean demand that the issue of entry to the United Nations be adopted as the top priority topic, the South rejected it, saying that the issue could be discussed within the frame of the adopted topics and so their demand for its priority debate amounted to raising yet another topic.

At the seventh meeting, the North produced their version of a draft agreement, the same as the one they first offered at the fifth preliminary meeting with some minor changes. A noticeable addition was that as a means of travels back and forth by the delegations to the high-level officials talks, delegates and others be flown aboard one's own plane between the Kimpo Airport in Seoul and the Sunan Airport in Pyongyang.

As working-level issues were all resolved at the seventh meeting, the two sides decided to hold working-level delegates contacts at the conference room of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission at 10 a.m. July 6 to work on the wording of the proposed agreement. It was to be attended by two delegates from each side.

The two sides also agreed to hold the eighth preliminary meeting at Tongilkak in the northern sector of Panmunjom on July 26, 1990 to sign and exchange an agreement on the holding of the proposed high-level officials talks.

3. Working-Level Delegates Contacts

a. First Contact

The first working-level delegates contact designed to adjust

the wording of a draft agreement on the holding of the South-North high-level meeting, was held from 10 a.m. to 1:35 p.m. July 6, 1990 at the conference room of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission. It took place behind the closed door.

The two sides' delegates to the working-level delegates contacts were:

The South

Shin Song-o, bureau director of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Kim Bo-hyon, deliberation officer of the Office of the Prime Minister

The North

Choe Woo-jin, bureau director of the Foreign Ministry
Choe Song-ik, department director, Secretariat of the Committee for Peaceful Unification of the Fatherland

At the first contact, the two sides reached a basic agreement on the preamble and 19 articles of a draft agreement excepting the issues of how to describe agenda topics and when the first high-level meeting should take place.

As to the issue of describing agenda topics, the North raised yet another issue despite the fact that the South earlier made a concession and agreed to make the topics the "issues of dispelling the state of political and military confrontation and of carrying out multi-pronged exchanges and cooperation between the South and the North." The North wanted that the word "cooperation" be placed ahead of "exchanges." The two sides decided to discuss this issue again at the second contact.

The two sides agreed to hold the second working-level contact on July 12, where they were to determine the times of the

first high-level meeting in Seoul and the second meeting in Pyongyang. Also at the second contact, they were to resolve the issue of describing the agenda topic, and to mutually confirm the text of the agreed-on draft agreement.

b. Second Contact

The second working-level contact of the preliminary talks for the South-North high-level meeting was held from 10 a.m. to 12:07 p.m. July 12, 1990 at the conference room of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission. The meeting took place behind the closed doors.

At this contact, the two sides resolved the last remaining issue, the issue of how to describe the agenda topic, by agreeing to describe it the way each side likes to. Therefore, for the South the topic was “the issue of dispelling the state of political and military confrontation and of carrying out multi-pronged exchanges and cooperation between the South and the North,” while for the North it was “concerning dispelling the state of political and military confrontation and carrying out multi-pronged cooperation and exchanges between the North and the South.”

Regarding the times of the first and second meetings of the South-North high-level talks, they agreed to hold the first meeting in Seoul on September 4 through 7 and the second meeting in Pyongyang on October 16 through 19.

The two sides thus decided to wind up working-level contacts on adjusting the wording of a draft agreement, and to hold the eighth preliminary meeting to exchange the agreement.

4. Eighth Preliminary Meeting

The eighth preliminary meeting for the South-North high-level talks was held at Tongilkak in the northern sector of Panmunjom from 10 to 10:48 a.m. July 26, 1990. It was opened to the public.

Prior to the meeting, working-level delegates of the two sides met at the conference room of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission to finally confirm the wording of the agreement.

At the eighth preliminary meeting the two chief delegates signed and exchanged the final agreement, setting the stage for the realization of the South-North high-level meeting one and half a years after the first preliminary meeting began. The prime ministers and other high-level officials of the two sides were thus enabled to have talks traveling back and forth between Seoul and Pyongyang for the first time since division.

Upon the exchange of the copies of the agreement, the two chief delegates made emotion-packed speeches on the conclusion of the preliminary talks.

In his speech, Song Han-ho, the South's chief delegate, said the high-level meeting would serve as an important cornerstone that would chart a decisive phase in the efforts to liquidate the history of national division and realize peaceful unification.

Song said that in order for the South and the North to proceed toward peace and unification, they should promote their relations of co-existence and co-prosperity through mutual exchanges and cooperation made on the basis of recognizing and respecting each other's system, and thereby restore and develop the national community.

To this end, Song said, the two sides should, through

dialogue and negotiations between responsible government authorities, resolutely translate relevant measures into action.

Noting that the high-level talks are in keeping with the dictate of time and national wishes, Song wished that the two sides would make sincere efforts to provide a breakthrough in the improvement of inter-Korean relations and chart the glorious future of national self-esteem and unification through national reconciliation and unity.

In fact, it won't be an exaggeration to say that the projected high-level meeting is the result of the South's northern policy and conciliatory posture toward the North.

As was expressly described in the July 7 Special Declaration, the President's address at the 43rd United Nations General Assembly, announcement of the Korean National Community Unification Formula and the Declaration for Grand National Exchanges, the South's government, especially since the birth of the Sixth Republic, has been pursuing positive and forward-looking policies to accommodate the North as a member of the national community in a march toward unification.

It was under this policy of the government that the southern delegation accommodated the North's ideas as much as possible and made much concession in the course of resolving the issue of agenda topic and working on the wording of a draft agreement.

Meanwhile, the consistent position of the South has been that in view of the reality of inter-Korean relations and the aspect of efficacy, problems pending between the two sides of Korea as well as the question of national future must be discussed and resolved always between the responsible government authorities of the South and the North.

Therefore, it was fortunate that the North, belatedly

though, had responded favorably to the holding of a high-level meeting, a dialogue between the government authorities of the two sides. The exchange of the agreement was highly significant in that it provided a momentum for the two sides to explore the new age of reconciliation and cooperation, a de facto starting point of dialogue between the two sides' government authorities.

On the other hand, Paek Nam-jun, the North's chief delegate, beclouded the festive atmosphere of the final working-level meeting. Even in his closing remarks, Paek demanded the removal of "concrete walls" and the repeal of the National Security Law. He also asserted that unless the opening of a "pan-national conference" is guaranteed, it would have an unfavorable effect on the holding of the South-North high-level meeting. Further disputing the South's northern policy, the northern chief delegate claimed that "if the South continued its activities to legalize national division, it would amount to splashing cold water upon the holding of the high-level meeting."

The text of the Agreement on Holding South-North High-Level Meeting which was signed and exchanged at the final preliminary meeting was as follows:

The southern and northern delegations to the preliminary talks for the South-North high-level meeting had eight rounds of preliminary talks and two working-level delegates contacts at Panmunjom from February 8, 1989 through July 26, 1990, and agreed as follows on the issue of holding the South-North high-level meeting with the prime ministers as chief delegates.

1. Name of the Meeting

The name of the meeting shall be South-North High-Level

Meeting (hereinafter referred to as “the meeting”)

2. Time of the Meeting

The first meeting shall be held from September 4 to September 7, 1990, and the second meeting from October 16 to October 19, 1990. The time of subsequent meetings shall be determined through mutual agreement at each time.

3. Venues of the Meeting

The meeting shall be held in Seoul and Pyongyang by turn. The first meeting shall be held in Seoul and the second meeting in Pyongyang.

4. Agenda Topic of the Meeting

The agenda topic of the meeting shall be the “issue of dispelling the state of political and military confrontation and carrying out multi-pronged exchanges and cooperation between the South and the North.”

5. Composition of Delegations

A delegation to the meeting shall comprise seven delegates with the prime minister as chief delegate. Other delegates shall be in the rank of minister or vice minister. The military delegate of a delegation shall be one or two including a chief-of-staff-level officer. The number shall be determined by each side at its convenience.

6. Attendants and Press Members for the Meeting

Attendants and press members for the meeting shall number 33 and 50, respectively, for each side.

7. Format of the Meeting

The meeting shall be either opened to the public or held behind the closed doors. The meeting shall basically be delegates

meetings. If necessary, however, exclusive prime ministers meeting and sectoral meetings may be held within the framework of the main talks.

8. Adoption of Agreement

The contents of agreement shall be prepared in writing and in duplicate. Each side shall keep one of the two copies after they were signed by the chief delegates.

9. Recording of the Meeting

The recording of the meeting shall be made in stenography, taping and/or video taping at each side's convenience.

The host side shall guarantee the other side two circuits for taping and relaying and shall scatter microwave toward the other side for television video taping.

10. Press Briefings

Press briefings shall be made at each side's convenience.

If necessary, however, the matters agreed on at the meeting may be jointly prepared and reported through mutual agreement.

11. Insignia and Facilities at Conference Site

- a. There shall be no insignia at the conference site.
- b. The host side shall not install any facilities at the conference site other than those necessary for the meeting.
- c. The host side shall guarantee the installing of communications means at the conference site and the places of other events (including lodging) so that the delegation and press corps of the other side could reach their own area instantly.

12. Guarantee of Personal Safety

- a. The host side shall deliver a memorandum guaranteeing the personal safety of the personnel of the other side

visiting its area, which shall be signed by the prime minister, to the other side at Panmunjom five days before a meeting.

- b. The host side shall guarantee the inviolability of documents, communications, office tools, photo films, recording and video tapes, reporters' notes, press releases and other items necessary for the meeting, which belong to the personnel of the other side.

13. Emblems and Identification Cards

- a. The members of a delegation shall carry with them identification cards issued by their prime minister. Each side shall use emblem for the identification of its personnel at its convenience.
- b. Press members shall wear press armbands.

14. Procedures for Travel Back and Forth between the North and the South

- a. A side shall furnish the other side with a list of the members of its delegation entering the other side's area five days before a meeting.
- b. The list shall include names, sex, positions in delegation and photos.
- c. If a change occurs in the list after the delivery of the list, it shall be notified first through telephone and a written copy of the verbal notification shall be delivered to the other side later at Panmunjom.
- d. The means of travel shall be either airplane, automobile or train. As for airplane, a delegation shall use an airplane of its own side, which shall fly directly between Seoul (Kimpo Airport) and Pyongyang (Sunan Airport).
- e. If a delegation travels by land the area of the other side for a meeting, the point of passage shall be Panmunjom. In the area of the host side, automobiles or train of the

host side shall be used.

- f. The host side shall receive the personnel of the other side by confirming their identities based on the list furnished earlier. At the time of their return, the confirmation shall be made under the same method.

15. Press Coverage

- a. The host side shall guarantee reportorial activities by the press members of the other side during their stay in its area.
- b. The two sides shall see to it that the accuracy and fairness of reports be ensured in a manner that promotes reconciliation, unity, trust and understanding.

16. Itinerary

The length of period in which a delegation will stay in the area of the other side shall be three nights and four days. However, the period may be readjusted on mutual agreement.

The host side shall notify the other side of an itinerary five days before a meeting, which shall be confirmed through mutual agreement.

17. Provision of Conveniences

- a. The host side shall provide the personnel of the other side with lodging and boarding, transportation, communications service, medical care and all other necessary conveniences.
- b. A delegation shall follow the guidance and order of the host side during their stay in the area of the host side.
- c. The host side shall guarantee pouch service twice a day for the delegation of the other side throughout their stay in its area.

18. Direct Telephone Line

The two sides shall use the direct telephone line already existing between Seoul and Pyongyang. If necessary, more lines may be installed through mutual agreement.

19. Effectuation of Agreement

The agreement shall go into effect from the time it is signed and exchanged by the two sides. An item or items of agreement may be repealed or amended through mutual agreement.

Part II

Progress of South-North High-Level Talks

1. First High-Level Meeting

a. Responsible Liaison Officials Contacts

According to what was discussed at the working-level delegates contacts of the preliminary talks for the South-North high-level meeting, the South on August 7 proposed to the North that working-level contacts be held between communications and aviation technicians in connection with the holding of the first South-North high-level meeting. The offer was made in a telephone message signed by Prime Minister Kang Young-hoon.

However, in a telephone message on the same date, August 7, the North, saying they had named Choe Bong-chun, an aide to their prime minister, as the responsible liaison official of the northern delegation to the South-North high-level meeting, suggested that working-level issues related to the high-level meeting be discussed at appropriate dates between responsible liaison officials to be accompanied by necessary working-level officials after the exchange of the names of responsible liaison officials.

In response, the South on August 8 appointed Kim Yonghwan, a permanent representative of the Secretariat of South-North Dialogue, as its responsible liaison official, and proposed that a communications and aviation working-level contact be held on August 10 with the two sides' responsible liaison officials leading communications and aviation officials. However, in a telephone message sent the following day, the North said they would inform the South of an appropriate date of such a contact after August 15.

In a telephone message signed by their responsible liaison

official, Choe Bong-chun, the North on August 21 proposed that a responsible liaison officials contact be held on August 23. The South accepted it, thus setting the stage for responsible liaison officials contacts to discuss working-level procedures for the high-level talks.

(1) First Contact

The first contact between the two sides' responsible liaison officials, designed to discuss working-level issues related to the opening of the high-level talks, was held at the conference room of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission for about 50 minutes beginning 3 p.m. August 23.

At the contact, the responsible liaison officials discussed the method of travel by the North Korean delegation as well as communications issues.

Originally, the North strongly wanted the use of airplane by their delegation. They wanted the inclusion of airplane as means of travel back and forth in the agreement on the holding of the high-level meeting. At the eighth preliminary meeting on July 26, the North even proposed to hold a working-level contact on aviation and communications issues.

At the responsible liaison officials contact, however, the North's Choe said they would come to Seoul by land as they did in the past and, therefore, they didn't need to hold any aviation working-level contacts.

On communications issues, too, the two sides agreed to use the existing direct telephone line between the Red Cross organizations of the two sides, and not to hold any separate communications working-level contact.

Meanwhile, the two responsible liaison officials agreed to meet again to discuss concrete matters related to the delivery of a memorandum on the guarantee for personal safety and to the

itinerary of the North Korean delegation. They decided to determine the time of the contact through direct telephone between the two responsible liaison officials.

(2) Second Contact

As a result of the exchange of telephone messages between the responsible liaison officials, the second contact was held at the conference room of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission from 10:30 a.m. August 28.

At the contact that lasted about one hour and 40 minutes, the South produced an itinerary for the North Korean delegation in connection with the high-level meeting and sounded out the North's response thereto.

Choe Bong-chun, the North's responsible liaison official, carefully studied it and said the North would make its final reply to the itinerary at another contact at 3 p.m. August 30.

(3) Third Contact

The third contact between the two responsible liaison officials was held for about two hours and 30 minutes from 3 p.m. August 30 at the conference room of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission.

Under the Agreement on Holding South-North High-Level Meeting, the North on this day, which happened to be five days before the opening of the meeting, delivered to the South the list of their delegation totaling 88 people — seven delegates, 33 support personnel and 48 press members. The South handed to the North a memorandum on the guarantee of personal safety, which was signed by the prime minister.

At the same time, the two sides discussed details about the northern delegation's four-day visit to Seoul based on an itinerary which the South produced at the time of the second

contact. In the discussion, the two sides reached a complete accord on all the aspects of the itinerary such as lodging, methods of movement, frequency of sessions, method of conference operation and luncheon and dinner programs.

Thus, all working-level matters related to the first South-North high-level meeting were resolved.

The list of northern delegates disclosed at the final contact and that of southern delegates made public on August 20, were as follows:

The South

Chief delegate

Kang Young-hoon, prime minister

Deputy chief delegate

Hong Sung-chol, minister, National Unification Board

Delegates

**Chung Ho-kun, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
Ministry of National Defense**

Lee Jin-sol, vice minister, Economic Planning Board

**Kim Chong-whie, presidential assistant for foreign policy
and national security**

Lee Byong-yong, special assistant to the prime minister

**Limb Dong-won, director, Foreign Policy and National
Security Institute, Ministry of Foreign Affairs**

The North

Chief delegate

Yon Hyong-muk, Administration Council prime minister

Deputy chief delegate

**Kim Kwang-jin, vice minister, People's Armed Forces
Ministry**

Delegates

An Byong-soo, secretary general, Committee for Peaceful Unification of the Fatherland

Paek Nam-jun, director, Office of Councilors, Administration Council

Kim Chong-woo, vice minister, External Economic Programs Ministry

Choe Wu-jin, roving ambassador, Foreign Ministry

Kim Young-chol, maj. general, deputy bureau director, People's Armed Forces Ministry

And, the major events contained in the itinerary, which were agreed on between the two sides at the contact, were as follows:

- Place of boarding and conference site — Intercontinental Hotel
- Operation of the meeting — Two sessions
 - First-day session (10 a.m. September 5) - Open to the public
 - Words of greetings by the South
 - Words of greerings by the North
 - Keynote speech by the South
 - Keynote speech by the North
 - Second-day session (10 a.m. September 6) - Behind the closed doors
 - General debate
 - Closing speech by the North
 - Closing speech by the South
- Vehicles — 10 sedans to be furnished to the delegates and buses to supporting personnel and press members
- Dinners
 - September 4 - Hosted by the prime minister

- September 5 - Hosted by the Seoul mayor
- September 6 - Hosted by the speaker of the National Assembly

Meanwhile, the list of the northern delegation, which the North delivered to the South at the time of the third contact, contained 88 people in all. In a telephone message to the South on September 1, however, the North's responsible liaison officer, Choe Bong-chun, informed the South that one of the reporters in the list won't come and instead three persons would be added to the list. Thus, the members of the northern delegation attending the first high-level meeting numbered 90 as agreed on between the two sides.

b. Proceeding of the Meeting

The first South-North high-level meeting was held in Seoul for four days from September 4 to 7, 1990.

Inasmuch as the meeting was to be the first of its kind ever held between the prime ministers of the two sides to comprehensively discuss various issues pending between the South and the North, much attention both at home and abroad was drawn to the passage by the 90-member northern delegation through Panmunjom at 10 a.m. September 4.

Unification Minister Hong Sung-chul and six other southern delegates were on hand at Panmunjom to greet the North Koreans. Prime Minister Kang Young-hoon met them upon their arrival at their hotel.

In the evening, the visitors from the North attended a dinner hosted by Prime Minister Kang in their honor, after which they enjoyed a cultural film.

On the morning of September 5, the first-day session was

held, which was opened to the public. At the session, remarks of greetings and keynote speeches were exchanged. In the afternoon, the northerners viewed a stage performance, followed by a dinner hosted by the Seoul mayor and their viewing of a movie.

On September 6, the second-day session was held behind the closed doors, where delegates made keynote speeches and had general debate. In the afternoon, the northern delegates paid a courtesy call on President Roh Tae-woo while support officials and press members visited the National Museum. In the evening, the National Assembly speaker hosted a dinner for them.

On September 7, the North Korean delegation returned to the North through Panmunjom around 11:40 a.m. winding up their visit to the South.

During their stay in the South, northern spokesman An Byong-su issued statements on three occasions (on passage through Panmunjom, arrival in Seoul and departure from Seoul) and had a press conference, while his southern counterpart, Hong Sung-chul, held three press interviews.

For the two sides to march toward peace and unification, it is important, most of all, for their responsible government authorities to promote dialogue based on mutual recognition and respect.

The South, therefore, wanted to use the meeting as an occasion to root the system of dialogue between the government authorities of the South and the North. The South concentrated efforts on promoting a relationship of co-existence and co-prosperity between the two through multi-pronged exchanges and cooperation as well as through confidence-building in the political and military sectors.

In the belief that a base for mutual concurrence should be

prepared at the first meeting for the improvement of inter-Korean relations, the South proposed an eight-point draft Basic Agreement to Improve Inter-Korean Relations, featuring the recognition of and respect for each other's system and suspension of destructive and subversive activities against each other.

At the same time, the South suggested that the two sides carry out forthwith those projects on which the two sides reached an accord or which can be implemented easily, beginning with small undertakings.

But, the North argued that the two sides should resolve the three principles that, it said, should be respected at the meeting as well as the alleged three-point urgent tasks on a priority basis. They showed a stiff posture by asserting that exchanges and cooperation could be promoted once political and military issues were basically resolved, such as the withdrawal of U.S. forces and nuclear weapons from Korea and arms reduction.

As in the past, North Korea rejected the idea of mutual recognition of and respect for each others' system with the excuse of their "Korea is one" policy. Also by holding fast to their demand for the priority resolution of political and military issues, the North refused to allow the meeting to register any substantial progress.

This attitude of the North made objective viewers doubt if the North didn't come to the meeting simply to escape from external pressure for reforms and openness and help facilitate their approach toward the West, as well as to provide a ground on which a united front sympathetic themselves could be formed in the South.

The meeting thus ended without any agreement due to a wide gap in essential issues. Still, the first meeting was highly significant in that the two prime ministers met for the first time

in the 45 years of division and that through the meeting a basis was provided on which the two sides could understand each other a little better.

In particular, unlike past inter-Korean meetings oriented chiefly toward propaganda, the first meeting served to open a new horizon in the method of dialogue as the two sides sincerely endeavored to broaden the areas in common where they reached an accord rather than to play up their differences.

c. First-Day Session

The first-day session was held at Grand Sheraton Ball Room of the Seoul Intercontinental Hotel for about two hours beginning 10 a.m. September 5, 1990.

At the meeting begun with the declaration of the opening of the first South-North high-level meeting by Prime Minister Kang Young-hoon, the South's chief delegate, the delegates of the two sides were introduced, followed by the exchange of chattings and words of greetings and the delivery of keynote speeches with the South being the first to make such speeches.

In his greetings, Prime Minister Kang first thanked delegates to the preliminary talks and discussed his feelings and the significance of the first meeting between the government delegates of the two sides in the history of national division.

Explaining about the South's unification policy as disclosed in the July 7 Special Declaration, Korean National Community Unification Formula and the Presidential address made at the 45th U.N. General Assembly, the South's chief delegate expected that the attending delegates would perform their duties and responsibilities sincerely so as to make the meeting a momentum to unfold a new chapter in the evolution of national history.

North Korean Prime Minister Yon Hyong-muk, too, discussed the significance and importance of the meeting. He said the two sides should make the meeting a success by all means so as to meet the expectations of the people.

Saying that his North Korean delegates would show sincerity toward the progress of the meeting, Yon made an optimism about the future of the talks.

The two chief delegates then made keynote speeches.

The South's chief delegate stressed that the two sides should unfold an era of reconciliation and cooperation if progress is to be made toward restoring and developing a national community and constructing a unified and democratic state. In this, he said, the government authorities of the two sides who have the due responsibilities and authority, must take the leading role.

Kang pointed out that the most urgent and important thing in this regard is for both the South and the North to improve relations based on a spirit of recognizing and respecting each other's social system and to build upon it a relationship of coexistence and coprosperity leading to unification. Saying that the unavoidable task to this end is to prepare a ground for mutual agreement, Chief Delegate Kang proposed an eight-point draft Basic Agreement to Improve Inter-Korean Relations as follows:

Basic Agreement to Improve Inter-Korean Relations (Draft)

Whereas the South and the North pledge to make joint efforts to improve inter-Korean relations and achieve unification by building confidence and easing tension in response to the yearning of the entire people for the unification of the divided homeland as well as national reconciliation, the two sides hereby

agree on the following basic matters:

- 1) Recognition of and respect for each other's systems pending the time of unification.
- 2) Cessation of slander and vilification against each other and non-interference in each other's internal affairs.
- 3) Resolution of mutual differences and disputes peacefully through dialogue and negotiations between the government authorities.
- 4) Cessation of attempts to subvert and overthrow each other.
- 5) Realization of free travel, multi-pronged exchanges and cooperation, and the opening of societies, and the restoration of national bonds.
- 6) Confidence-building in the military area and the realization of arms reduction.
- 7) Mutual cooperation at international scenes and the exertion of joint efforts to promote national interests and self-esteem.
- 8) Replacement of the existing armistice system with a peace system.

Prime Minister Kang said he was confident that if the two sides proceeded from such a basic agreement, the question of dispelling the state of political and military confrontation and carrying out multi-faceted exchanges and cooperation between the South and the North, an issue adopted as the agenda topic of the high-level meeting, would be easily resolved.

Also saying that one way to terminate the mechanism of confrontation between the two sides is to carry out multi-pronged exchanges and cooperation let alone free travel and the opening of societies, Kang set forth a 10-point measures to carry out multi-pronged exchanges and cooperation.

Measures to Carry out Multi-Faceted Exchanges and Cooperation (Gist)

- 1) Early realization of free visits and reunion between dispersed families, and prompt realization of hometown visits by those dispersed family members aged 60 or more.
- 2) Realization of grand national exchanges and exchange of cultural events on or around traditional holidays and other commemorative days.
- 3) Discussion and realization of measures to carry out exchanges and cooperation between the South and North Korean people by area.
- 4) Opening of door to trade and commodity exchanges.
- 5) Promotion of joint exploration of resources, joint-venture investment, joint advancement to the abroad and external cooperative projects in the economic area.
- 6) Joint exploration of tourism resources and joint implementation of tourism programs.
- 7) Restoration of railroads and roads and opening of maritime and air routes between the South and the North.
- 8) Exchange of postal matters and opening of telegraph and telephone services.
- 9) Adoption of an agreement on transit, communications and trade.
- 10) Creation of a joint economic cooperation organization headed by deputy-prime-minister-level officials.

At the same time, the South's chief delegate said that to dispel the state of confrontation between the South and the North, the two sides should launch efforts to remove mutually deep-seated distrust through confidence building. He then laid down the following 10-point proposal for exchanges and cooperation:

Measures for Building Political and Military Trust (Gist)

Building Political Confidence

- 1) Based on mutual recognition of and respect for each other's political and social system, cessation of all forms of name-calling, slander and vilification, etc. against each other.
- 2) Allowing of mutual public access to newspapers, broadcasting and publications.
- 3) Establishment of permanent liaison missions in Seoul and Pyongyang.

Building Military Confidence

- 4) Implementation of mutual visits and exchanges between military personnel.
- 5) Mutual opening and exchange of military information.
- 6) Advance notification about movement of military units and field maneuvers, and invitation of the other side for observation of maneuvers.
- 7) Installing and operation of a direct telephone line between the Defense Minister of the South and the People's Armed Forces Minister of the North.
- 8) Genuine demilitarization of the Demilitarized Zone and its peaceful use.

Prime Minister Kang proposed to promote arms reduction in the following manner after confidence-building was promoted in the political and military areas through the above measures and after a non-aggression declaration featuring the renouncement of the use of the force of arms and all sorts of violence was adopted.

**Direction of Implementing Arms Reduction
between the South and the North (Gist)**

- 1) Transformation of offensive military structure into a defensive one.
- 2) On the principle of maintaining the equal numbers of troops and weapons, reduction of forces in the same number on the basis of maintaining mutually balanced military forces.
- 3) Reduction of reserve and para-military forces parallel with the reduction of standing forces.
- 4) Implementation of on-the-spot inspections and surveillance to verify the implementation of agreed matters.
- 5) Determination of the final military strength of the two sides through mutual consultation in consideration of the need of military forces by a unified state.

Kang also suggested that once arms reductions progressed as discussed above, the existing armistice mechanism be replaced with a peace system, and that to reinforce such a system of peace, an international device to guarantee peace be arranged with the participation of those powers having stakes in the Korean peninsula.

Before concluding, Prime Minister Kang stressed that the high-level talks with the prime ministers of the two sides as chief delegates should evolve into an inter-Korean summit meeting between the top leaders of the two sides, asking for the North's affirmative response thereto.

Meanwhile, the North's Prime Minister Yon Hyong-muk produced as follows the three principles which he said should be observed by the two sides in the course of the meeting. He said that prior to the discussion of the agenda topic, the two sides needed to affirm their basic approach so that there won't be any obscure elements.

- 1) Reaffirmation and respect for the three major principles for unification — independence, peaceful unification and grand national unity — embodied in the July 4 South-North Joint Communiqué.
- 2) Placement of common national interests above either side's one-sided interests.
- 3) Desistance from committing any deeds that becloud conference atmosphere or undermine the progress of the meeting.

The North's chief delegate said that they were placing the "priority and essential significance" on removing the state of political and military confrontation, asserting that to engage in dialogue and exchanges amidst mutual distrust and political and military confrontation would only lead to deepening distrust and further aggravating confrontation. He then laid down 15-point measures to dispell the state of political and military confrontation. (For details of the measures see the contents of the keynote speech by the North's chief delegate below.)

The North asserted that confrontational relations and the state of armistice can be terminated only when a non-aggression declaration is adopted and a peace agreement signed with the United States in addition to the 15-point steps to dispel military confrontation. They contended that cooperation and exchanges in various areas could be realized on the basis of mutual trust only after the state of political and military confrontation was dissipated.

Moreover, the northern delegation argued that the urgent tasks that have to be resolved in removing the state of political confrontation were the issues of entry into the United Nations and of setting free some arrested persons, while the exigent task in removing military confrontation was the question of the joint Team Spirit military exercise. They then laid down three

issues as exigent tasks, demanding that the three questions be discussed and resolved on a priority basis at the first high-level meeting.

The fact that North Korea produced three principles and the exigent tasks from the outset of the meeting, indicated that they intended to concentrate on a united-front-style dialogue rather than on improving inter-Korean relations.

The three principles they put forth, in nature, were almost same as the prerequisites they attached to the implementation of their idea of unification under a Koryo confederation system. In other words, the principles were aimed at better facilitating their demands: the principle of “common national interests first” for thwarting the South’s entry into the United Nations, and the principle of “fostering conference atmosphere” for prompting the suspension of the Team Spirit military exercise, withdrawal of American forces from Korea, release of some arrested persons and the repeal of the National Security Law.

In particular, whereas the North produced concrete measures to dispel the state of political and military confrontation, they only vaguely alluded to the methods of exchanges and cooperation. Their stand was that they could engage in exchanges and cooperation only after political and military issues were basically resolved. They were thus negative toward working out any constructive results of the meeting.

The contents of the keynote speeches the two sides made at the first-day session were as follows:

**Keynote address by the South’s Prime Minister
Kang Young-hoon (summary)**

Delegates from the North,

Efforts must now be made to improve South-North relations as quickly as possible to usher in an era of reconciliation and cooperation, if progress is to be made toward restoring and developing a single national community and constructing a unified and democratic nation state. In this, the government authorities from both sides who have the due responsibilities and authority, must take the leading role. Should the authorities of both sides persist in confrontational and hostile attitudes, inter-Korean relations will never be improved, not to speak of achieving national amity and peaceful unification. Accordingly, to resolve friction and disunity among our homegenous people, the authorities of both sides must abandon confrontation in favor of reconciliation and adopt a spirit of cooperation in place of antagonism.

The most urgent and important thing in this regard is for both the South and the North to improve relations based on a spirit of recognizing and respecting each other's social system and to build upon it a relationship of coexistence and coprosperity leading to unification. This calls for both the South and the North to express a determination and agreement to find a common ground for ending mistrust and confrontation and managing and advancing rational relations under conditions of stability with the goal of achieving peaceful unification. This is an unavoidable task for the government authorities of both the South and the North, as well as an indispensable route toward national integration.

Based on that, the South and the North should be able to restore bonds of kinship through multifaceted exchanges and cooperation and by opening the two societies to each other. We should also be able to resolve political and military confrontation through confidence building measures and enhance national pride and self esteem by cooperating with each other on the international scene. In this spirit, I believe that this conference between high and responsible authorities representing the South and the North must reach, without fail, a basic agreement to im-

prove inter-Korean relations. Accordingly, I hereby propose the following draft agreement.

**Basic Agreement to Improve Inter-Korean Relations
(Proposal)**

Whereas the South and the North pledge to make joint efforts to improve inter-Korean relations and achieve unification by building confidence and easing tension in response to the yearning of the entire people for the unification of the divided homeland as well as national reconciliation,

Both parties hereby agree on the following basic matters:

- 1. The South and the North shall recognize and respect each other's political and social system until such time as unification is achieved;*
- 2. The South and the North shall cease all manner of slander and vilification against each other and shall not intervene in each other's internal affairs;*
- 3. The South and the North shall resolve their differences and disputes peacefully through dialogue and negotiation between the authorities of both sides;*
- 4. The South and the North shall not make any attempt to sabotage or overthrow each other;*
- 5. The South and the North shall jointly make efforts to realize free travel and multifaceted exchanges and cooperation, to open their societies to each other and to restore bonds of kinship;*
- 6. The South and the North shall build military trust and reduce arms in order to end their arms race and military confrontation;*
- 7. The South and the North shall cease unnecessary competition and confrontation on the international stage and shall*

cooperate with each other and make joint efforts to promote the interests and self esteem of the people; and

8. *The South and the North shall jointly endeavor to transform the present armistice arrangement into a system of peace and to achieve peaceful unification.*

Delegates from the North,

I have just outlined our proposal for a basic agreement to improve inter-Korean relations. It is my conviction that if and when we proceed from such a basic agreement to improve South-North relations, the questions of how to end political and military confrontation and how to implement multifaceted exchanges and cooperation, which are the principal topics on the agreed agenda of this high-level inter-Korean conference, will be easily resolved in a progressive manner.

Let me now explain our basic position on multifaceted exchanges and cooperation and our specific proposals for their implementation. As your side also knows well, the world today has arrived at a major milestone marking the close of an old era. In other words, it is putting an end to ideological and doctrinaire faceoffs and heading into an age of rapport and cooperation.

All our compatriots in the South and the North desire that the Korean peninsula will also keep in step with the world current toward amity, cooperation, openness and interchange and that the door will thus be opened for free inter-Korean travel, exchanges and cooperation, with an era of national harmony setting in. In particular, one of the most urgent tasks is to enable the 10 million members of separated families to freely visit and reunite with each other, thereby healing the wound of division. Without speedily resolving this humanitarian issue, it will not be feasible to end the deep seated mistrust and enmity between the two parts of Korea.

To end this long-standing confrontation, there is no other way but to dismantle the barriers dividing us so that we will be

able to open up ourselves to each other and carry out exchanges and cooperation, thereby building mutual trust. From such a standpoint, the most urgent task is to implement multifaceted free exchanges, as well as free inter-Korean travel and mutual opening of both societies, in an orderly fashion. We note that your side has lately shown concern about the issues of free inter-Korean travel and openness on a full scale. We think this is quite fortunate.

Since both the South and the North take similar views toward free inter-Korean travel and opening, I believe it will not be so very difficult to find a solution to the question of initiating and carrying on multifaceted exchanges and cooperation. In this spirit, I would like to put forward the following 10-point proposal for exchanges and cooperation:

Measures for Multifaceted Exchanges and Cooperation

- 1. Locate dispersed family members and relatives and enable them to freely visit and be reunited with each other at an early date;*
- 2. Realize grand inter-Korean exchanges of people during specified periods around Solnal (Lunar New Year's Day), Tano (a festival on the fifth day of the Fifth Moon), Liberation Day (August 15), Chusok (the Harvest Moon Festival), other national holidays and commemorative days and exchange cultural events featuring traditional annual folk performing arts festivals and games;*
- 3. Discuss with each other and carry out specific plans for exchanges and cooperation among compatriots in the South and the North in the political, economic, social, cultural and other fields;*
- 4. Open the door for trade as a form of exchange within one nation so that goods needed by each side can be exchanged. Assist traders on both sides in contacting each other with the*

aim of converting current indirect inter-Korean trade into direct commerce;

5. *Implement all possible forms of economic cooperation, including joint development of resources and joint manufacturing ventures and promote joint business enterprises overseas and joint programs of external cooperation;*
6. *Jointly develop tourist resources and jointly carry out tourist businesses. Create a South-North tourist route connecting Mt. Soraksan (in the South) with Mt. Kumgangsan ("The Diamond Mountains" in the North) and establish a South-North joint tourism company to develop the route. Allow foreign tourists to travel directly between the two parts of Korea;*
7. *Reconnect broken off railroads and roads between the South and the North and open inter-Korean sea and air transport services. Reconnect and restore the Seoul-Shinuiju (a city on the border with Manchuria) Railroad by August 15, 1991;*
8. *Open mail, telegraph and telephone services between the South and the North and allow anyone to use them;*
9. *Adopt an agreement on travel, communications and trade to institutionally ensure multifaceted exchanges and cooperation; and*
10. *Establish a joint economic cooperation organization co-headed by officials with the rank of deputy prime minister, as has already been agreed at South-North economic talks.*

Delegates from the North,

The 10-point proposal for exchanges and cooperation that I have just outlined is, I believe, easy to carry out. Furthermore, both sides have already agreed on several elements of it and accordingly these can be put into action promptly.

Next, let me explain our position on how to end political and military confrontation and outline our specific proposal. The South-North political and military confrontation has continued

to deepen over time because of distrust stemming from ideological rivalry, a fratricidal war and long separation. Such distrust has continued to spur political antagonism and an arms race between the two parts of Korea.

To end inter-Korean confrontation, therefore, it is necessary above all to begin efforts to build confidence by dispelling the mutual mistrust that has accumulated between us. So long as both parties are unable to trust each other and always harbor mutual suspicions, it will be impossible to resolve confrontation. This is why we have just proposed a basic agreement to improve inter-Korean relations and are especially emphasizing the need to implement exchanges and cooperation.

From such a standpoint, I put forth a specific eight-point proposal for building political and military trust as follows:

Measures for Building Political and Military Trust

Building Political Confidence

- 1. Based on mutual recognition of and respect for each other's political and social system, cease all forms of character assassination, slander and vilification and discontinue the spreading of leaflets and loudspeaker broadcasts across the Demilitarized Zone;*
- 2. Allow mutual public access to newspapers, radio, television and books and magazines so that our compatriots in the two parts of Korea can be familiarized with each others' true situation; and*
- 3. Establish a permanent liaison mission in both Seoul and Pyongyang to facilitate the improvement of South-North relations through closer consultation and contact and thus to consolidate the foundation for peace and unification.*

Building Military Confidence

- 4. Implement mutual visits and exchanges between military per-*

sonnel;

5. *Mutually disclose and exchange military information;*
6. *Notify each other in advance of the movement of military units of certain size or larger and also of military maneuverings on a certain scale or larger and invite observers from each other's side to come and observe them. More specifically, beginning on January 1, 1991, notify each other of the movement of military units and military maneuverings of brigade size or larger 45 days in advance;*
7. *Immediately establish and operate a telephone hotline between the Minister of National Defense of the Republic of Korea and the Minister of the People's Armed Forces of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea with a view to preventing an accidental armed clash and to keeping such a clash from escalating; and*
8. *Genuinely demilitarize the Demilitarized Zone and use it for peaceful purposes.*

While building political and military confidence through the measures that I have just proposed, we should also adopt a joint declaration of nonaggression that renounces the use of military force and all other forms of violence. Based on political and military trust thus established and also on a mutual promise of nonaggression, both parties should undertake arms reduction in earnest.

I believe that both the South and the North ought to implement arms reductions in the following ways:

Measures for Implementing South-North Arms Reductions

1. *Both the South and the North should transform their offensive military structure into a defensive one. As long as both sides keep their military forces organized and deployed for offensive purposes, it will hardly be possible to verify their*

commitment to peace nor to prevent another war. Accordingly, both parties should first reduce their offensive military forces. This is essential to preventing a renewal of war due to either a surprise attack or an all out attack.

- 2. Both the South and the North should agree to possess equal numbers of troops and weapons so that a balance of military power can be maintained. This is because an imbalance in military might increases the danger of renewed war. Accordingly, the side with larger armed forces should first reduce them to the level of the other side to achieve an equilibrium. Both sides should then progressively reduce their armed forces by equal numbers.*
- 3. Both the South and the North should reduce the number of their troops in accordance with reductions in their arms, while also reducing their reserve and paramilitary forces.*
- 4. Both the South and the North should allow, without fail, the other side to conduct on the spot verifications and monitoring to ensure that agreed matters regarding arms reductions are implemented. Toward that end, the South and the North should form and operate a joint verification group and permanent monitoring groups.*
- 5. The final reduced level of armed forces that both the South and the North may maintain should be determined through mutual consultation in consideration of the military capabilities needed by a unified state.*

As South-North arms reductions progress along the lines discussed above, efforts should be made to convert the existing truce arrangement into a system of peace. To reinforce such a system of peace, it is advisable to create an international safeguard for peace in which both South and North Korea and the foreign powers surrounding the Korean peninsula participate.

Delegates from the North,

I deeply hope and eagerly expect that this high-level con-

ference will be operated in such a constructive way that our differences will be effectively resolved and we will find common denominators on which to base agreements which can then be translated into action one after another. At the same time, I am delighted that this high-level conference has opened today in an earnest atmosphere and is taking the first major step toward improved inter-Korean relations. Improving South-North relations is an important task that must be accomplished without fail if a bright future is to be assured for our people and peace is to be promoted in Northeast Asia in particular and in the world at large.

I believe that this series of high-level inter-Korean talks in which the Prime Ministers of both sides are the chief delegates should evolve into a South-North summit at which the top leaders from both side will meet. It is my conviction that once an inter-Korean summit is held, progress toward the peaceful unification of our homeland will be greatly accelerated. Accordingly, I look forward to your positive response to this.

**Keynote address by the North's Prime Minister
Yon Hyong-muk (summary)**

The topic raised before us today, "Concerning dispelling the state of political and military confrontation and realizing multi-pronged cooperation and exchanges between the North and the South," incorporates broad-ranging questions which we must resolve in our approach toward unification.

In dissolving these problems, there can be various methods and differences. To resolve such difference in methodology and the resultant gap in opinions satisfactorily, there should be no difference in our basic stands toward the unification question.

We should march onward with the common objective, that is, a single unified fatherland, but never toward the road leading to the fixing of national split into "two Koreas." We are convinc-

ed that if only the two sides are firmly interested in unification, we would be able to fully surmount differences related to the methodology, and reach an accord on whatever questions.

We must confirm our common determination toward unification and also ascertain the sameness of our views of the unification question. If the two sides' views of unification differ despite their lip service to the pursuit of unification, we cannot march shoulder to shoulder toward the same objective.

We all should seek unification. But, we must understand unification not as an issue of taking over the other but as a task achieved based on mutual interests and unity in every respect. There should be no difference between the two over this point.

It is from this standpoint that prior to discussion of the agenda topic of the meeting, I feel the need to confirm the sameness of the two sides' positions so that there can be no ambiguous points between the two. I thus propose to confirm the following three points embodying such positions and opinions as the principles that have to be respected in the course of the meeting:

First, the two sides shall reaffirm and strictly abide by the three major principles for national unification — independence, peaceful unification and grand national unity, which were pronounced in the South-North Joint Communiqué of July 4, 1972.

Second, the two sides shall place national interests above their one-sided interests in the discussion of issues.

Third, the two sides shall refrain from doing what beclouds the atmosphere of talks or undermines the progress of the talks.

These three principles we have proposed will solidify our common starting point, will guarantee constructive discussions between the two, and will enable us to cooperate with each other in our march toward the single goal of unification of the fatherland. Given the lesson from the past dialogue ridden with ups and downs or our task to resolve complex and broad matters, it is essentially important to confirm these principles.

We believe that since your side, too, expressed a wish for national unification and the willingness to strive for the constructive progress of the high-level talks, there would be no difficulty in accepting those principles.

Now I shall discuss the basic issues that ought to be discussed and resolved within the framework of the agenda topic of the meeting, "Concerning the dispelling of the state of political and military confrontation and the realization of multi-faceted co-operation and exchanges between the North and the South."

As our side made express at the preliminary talks, 've are imposing an essential significance on the question of dissolving the state of political and military confrontation in discussions of the agenda topic.

The biggest internal obstacle to our pursuit of unification is our mutual distrust. Such a distrust stems from the belief and judgement that the other side tries to take over one politically or militarily. In other words, the North distrusts and guards against the South in the belief that the South, together with American troops, would invade the North or tries to unify the peninsula through a "victory over communism" by infusing the so-called "wind of freedom" into the North. Similarly, the South distrusts and guards against the North believing that the North would invade the South in the pursuit of a strategy to communize the whole peninsula.

It was this very distrust due to which political and military confrontation has always deteriorated between the North and the South in the past, and, as a result, the distrust has further deepened. If the two sides are to have an open-hearted dialogue and approach each other from the bottom of heart, we must first remove this distrust. In this, we should above all dispel political and military confrontation which remains the very root source of the distrust.

If we pose a threat to the other side amidst political and military confrontation, neither of us would trust the other. In

such an atmosphere, any dialogue or exchanges would be a mere farce designed to cover up confrontation or a mere changed form of confrontation. To play such a hide-and-seek before the people aspiring for unification of the fatherland, amounts to making mockery of the people over the unification question. Such an act would in consequence delay the resolution of problems, causing only disappointment to the people.

Of course, we believe broad exchanges in all walks of life such as economy and culture would be significant in the promotion of mutual understanding and national unity. But, such exchanges can be effectively carried out only on the basis of the removal of the state of political and military confrontation that has been the source of mutual distrust. Under today's circumstance where the two sides charge each other with posing threats of northward invasion or "southward invasion," no exchanges can be promoted on a stable basis.

Herein lies the reason why we attach a priority and essential significance to the removal of the state of political and military confrontation. As we expect from this standpoint that the two sides would discuss basically the question of removing the state of political and military confrontation within the framework of the agenda topic of this meeting, I proposed the following measures:

Measures to dispell the state of political confrontation

- 1. Suspension of mutual slander and desistance from staging political activities that encourage confrontation.*
- 2. Removal of all legal and systematic devices that run counter to national unity and unification.*
- 3. Guarantee of the freedom of publication designed to introduce the other side, and of the freedom of thought to ascribe to the ideology of the other side.*
- 4. Removal of physical barriers separating the North and the*

South.

5. *Realization of free travel back and forth and contacts between various political parties and organizations and between people of all layers and strata.*
6. *Joint advancement to and cooperation between the North and the South at international political scenes.*

These measures produce basic issues in removing the state of political confrontation and promoting national unity between the North and the South. We believe that if and when the two sides agree on these issues, we would be able to discuss more concrete matters. If any additional questions were raised, they, too, can be discussed.

In removing political confrontation, there emerge before us two issues which we must resolve urgently. One of them concerns the issue of joining the United Nations.

We understand that your side has been striving hard to gain admission to the world organization, contending that the North and the South should enter the United Nations simultaneously or the South alone should be admitted to it.

We observe that your efforts to seek simultaneous South and North Korean entry or the South's alone, do not go compatible to our joint pursuit of reconciliation and unity between the North and the South, and rather becloud the prospects of national unification.

We believe what is most reasonable is for the North and the South to resolve the issue of entry to the United Nations after the two sides were unified into a single country. We maintain that if we are to join the United Nations before unification, we should do so jointly under a single seat, not separately.

These differences over the issue of entry to the United Nations constitute a common task which we, who should jointly advance to and cooperate in international scenes, must tackle expeditiously.

In view of the urgency of the question, our side proposed at the preliminary talks that this issue be discussed on a priority basis once the high-level meeting opens.

Only a small number of dates remains before the closure of this year's United Nations General Assembly. Given these conditions, I propose that the two sides discuss the issue of dispelling political confrontation, and that at this meeting, the question of entry to the United Nations be discussed sincerely and agreed on.

Another issue we must resolve urgently in removing the state of political confrontation is the issue of visitors to North Korea such as Rev. Moon Ik-hwan, coed Lim Soo-kyong and Catholic Father Moon Kyu-hyon.

We raise the issue of these visitors to the North, whom your authorities handled according to "law," because this is by no means limited to your side's internal issue only but is related to unification and to us.

As your side, too, must have determined through investigation, they visited the North not to oppose any one nor did they engage in any acts in the North against either of the two sides. They visited the North out of their craving for unification of the nation. Even in the North, they called only for unification and behaved in favor of unification transcending the issue of system and ideology.

We think the visitors to the North should be set free at an early date. We hope that the issue of their release would be resolved at this meeting by all means.

Our measures and opinion with respect to the question of dispelling the state of political confrontation are as discussed in the foregoing.

I now shall discuss measures to dissipate the state of military confrontation.

Measures to Dispel State of Military Confrontation

• Confidence building between the North and the South

- 1. The North and the South shall restrict military training and exercises.*
 - a. All joint military exercises and training with foreign troops shall be prohibited.*
 - b. Military training and exercises at a level higher than division-class units shall be prohibited.*
 - c. All military exercises shall be prohibited in areas along the Military Demarcation Line.*
 - d. Foreign military exercises shall be prohibited in one's area.*
 - e. Planned military exercises shall be mutually notified.*
- 2. The North and the South shall turn the Demilitarized Zone along the Military Demarcation Line into a peace area.*
 - a. All military personnel and equipment deployed inside the Demilitarized Zone shall be withdrawn.*
 - b. All military facilities created inside the Demilitarized Zone shall be dismantled.*
 - c. The Demilitarized Zone shall be opened to civilians and used for peace purposes.*
- 3. The North and the South shall take safety measures to forestall inadvertent clashes and their escalation.*
 - a. A direct telephone line shall be installed and operated between the high-level military authorities of the two sides.*
 - b. All acts of military provocation against the other side in areas along the Military Demarcation Line shall be prohibited.*

• Reduction in Armed Forces of the North and the South

- 4. The North and the South shall reduce their military strength step by step.*

- a. *Reduction in military troops shall be made in three stages in three to four years after an arms reduction plan was agreed on between the two sides.*

The two sides shall reduce their respective manpower strength to the 300,000 level in the first stage, and further to the 200,000 level in the second stage. When the third-stage reduction was completed, each side shall maintain military troops not exceeding 100,000.

- b. *Military equipment, too, shall be reduced and discussed commensurate with stage-by-stage troop reduction.*
 - c. *At the first stage of reduction in regular forces, all civil military organizations and civil armed forces shall be dissolved.*
5. *The North and the South shall suspend the replacement of military equipment aimed at quality improvement.*
 - a. *Introduction of new military knowhow and equipment and the development of weapons shall be suspended.*
 - b. *New military expertise and weapons shall not be imported from the abroad.*
 6. *The North and the South shall mutually notify and verify the state of arms reduction.*
 - a. *The state of arms reduction shall be informed to the other side.*
 - b. *The state of the implementation of an arms reduction agreement shall be inspected through mutual on-the-spot inspection in each other's areas.*

- **Withdrawal of alien armed forces**

7. *The North and the South shall turn the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free zone.*
 - a. *Joint efforts shall be made to prompt the immediate withdrawal of all nuclear weapons deployed in South Korea.*
 - b. *No nuclear weapons shall be produced or purchased.*

- c. *Foreign airplanes and ships carrying nuclear weapons shall be denied access to or passage through the area of Korea.*
- 8. *The North and the South shall exert joint efforts to withdraw all foreign forces from the Korean peninsula.*
 - a. *The American forces and their equipment stationed in South Korea shall be made to withdraw completely commensurate with arms reduction in North and South Korea.*
 - b. *Commensurate with the withdrawal of American forces, U.S. military installations created in South Korea shall be abolished step by step.*

- **Arms reduction and the guarantee of peace thereafter**

- 9. *The North and the South shall take steps to implement arms reduction and guarantee peace thereafter.*
 - a. *Neutral nations' vigilance forces may be deployed inside the Demilitarized Zone along the Military Demarcation Line.*
 - b. *To discuss and resolve arms control and possible military disputes between the North and the South, a joint North-South military committee shall be created and operated, which shall be headed by chief-of-staff-level officers of the two sides.*

Our measures to dissolve military confrontation between the North and the South were as discussed in the foregoing. If and when these measures were taken, armed clashes and the danger of war would be removed from the Korean peninsula and so would be distrust between the two sides, leading to the fostering of an environment favorable to peaceful unification.

To ease tension on Korea and ensure solid peace, a non-aggression declaration, in addition to the above military measures, should be adopted between the North and the South, in which the two would vow not to invade each other. At the

same time, a peace agreement should be concluded between North Korea and the United States to put an end to the hitherto confrontational relations and the state of armistice and thereby North-South and North Korea-U.S. relations should be developed on a new basis.

In a non-aggression declaration to be concluded between the North and the South, the two sides should pledge not to invade each other by force of arms, and take substantial steps to guarantee it.

We believe that the following questions should be included as elements of such a non-aggression agreement.

They are:

First, the question of not using the force of arms against the other side.

Second, the question of peacefully resolving differences in opinion and disputes through dialogue and negotiations.

Third, the question of affirming the boundary of non-aggression.

Fourth, the question of not taking part in any foreign aggression or armed intervention against the other side.

Fifth, the question of taking basic military measures such as arms reduction in the North and the South and withdrawal of American forces as a step to firmly ensure non-aggression.

When such a non-aggression agreement is concluded, the security of each side will be more reliably assured and peace between the North and the South guaranteed more solidly. We are sure that this would serve as a momentum to facilitating the conclusion of a peace agreement between North Korea and the United States and advancing the time of independent peaceful unification of the fatherland.

The most exigent task in dissolving military confrontation and easing tension in our country today is to suspend the joint Team Spirit military exercise undergoing in South Korea. The large-scale joint Team Spirit military exercise, which has been

held for several months every year against us as a potential "enemy," brings the situation of our country to an extreme tension, affecting gravely the North-South dialogue.

As we have emphasized time and again, we have no intent of "invading the South." We have long suspended large-scale military exercises in the northern half of the Republic. There is no reason whatsoever why the South should stage the joint Team Spirit exercise and strain the situation. It was from this standpoint that we have consistently called for the suspension of the military exercise. We suggested that if the South wants to hold exercises, then it should do so with its own forces without participation by alien troops. We also urged the South to reduce the size of the exercise drastically and change its name, too.

Regrettably, however, these our efforts have ended in vain. But, we believe this question should be discussed and resolved on a priority basis at this meeting where we are supposed to discuss the question of dissolving the state of military confrontation.

We regard the issue of the joint Team Spirit exercise having the most sensible effect on situation of our country, as a highly crucial question in dispelling military confrontation, a question which is directly linked to the future destiny of this meeting.

It is from this standpoint that we, hoping that this issue would be taken care of at this meeting today, propose to your side that the joint Team Spirit military exercise be either done away with or at least suspended for two to three years to come in a sense to salvage this meeting.

If and when the state of political and military confrontation is removed, the North and the South would be enabled to realize broad cooperation and exchanges in walks of life such as economy and culture on the basis of pure mutual trust. In this connection, we think we should prepare measures to realize cooperation and exchanges in all areas.

As measures for such cooperation and exchanges, we can foresee the question of realizing economic collaboration and ex-

changes, the question of linking transportation and communications networks, the question of promoting cooperation in external economic relations, etc. in the economic area. In the cultural area, we can think of the question of realizing joint studies, joint performance and joint creation in all areas such as literature, art, education, sciences, technology, communications, health, publication and press; the question of exchanging experiences and achievements through cultural exchanges; the question of jointly advancing to international arenas; etc.

Besides, we can foresee the realization of mutual cooperation and exchanges in the humanitarian area, also.

In addition to these issues, we are willing to discuss whatever questions within the realm of the agenda topic that can contribute substantially to reconciliation, peace and unification of the nation.

The questions which we should discuss within the realm of the agenda topic are broad in scope and complex. Among them are those which are essential to peace and unification and those which are not, and those which need to be discussed urgently and those which are not.

As we have already discussed, we are attaching an essential significance to the question of dispelling the state of political and military confrontation. We think that what are the most exigent questions here are those of entry into the United Nations under a single seat, a suspending the joint Team Spirit training exercise, and of setting free those who visited the North such as Rev. Moon Ik-hwan, student Lim Soo-kyong and Father Moon Kyu-hyon.

I again cordially propose that at this first meeting, the two sides would reach an accord on these three exigent issues as well as on the three principles which both sides should respect in the entire course of the meeting.

d. Second-Day Session

The second-day session lasted about two hours behind the closed doors beginning 10 a.m. September 6, 1990.

The meeting featured the exchange of chattings, keynote speeches (the North made the speech first), discussions and closing remarks (the North made the remarks first) in that order.

In his first speech, the northern chief delegate discussed their opinion about the keynote speech made by the South and reiterated their ideas of the "three principles" and the "three-point urgent tasks."

The North's Prime Minister Yon Hyong-muk first argued that lasting peace on the Korean peninsula can be assured by the withdrawal of American troops and nuclear weapons and through arms reduction between the South and the North. He regretted that the South, while one-sidedly discussing it, tended to shelve the issue.

Second, asserting that the South's proposal contained elements oriented toward forming up the status quo or split of the nation rather than toward unification, Yon denounced the South's calls for "recognition of each other's system," "non-interference in each other's internal affairs" and "exchange of permanent liaison offices" as reflecting the South's policy to legalize the two Koreas.

Third, while emphasizing their policy of "dissolution of the state of political and military confrontation first and exchanges and cooperation later," the North asserted that the South and the North should concentrate, first of all, on the discussion of the "acute" question of dispelling political and military confrontation.

At the same time, calling for the speedy discussion and re-

solution of the “three principles” and “three-point urgent tasks” they set forth in their keynote speech, the North Koreans argued that if these ideas were settled, a new clue could be found to fresh reconciliation between the two sides and the meeting, too, could be progressed constructively in a good atmosphere.

Meanwhile, in his first speech, the South’s Prime Minister Kang Young-hoon concretely explained the purport of a Basic Agreement for Improvement of South-North Relations as well as the measures for multi-faceted exchanges, cooperation and confidence building in the military and political areas. He then rejected as “unreasonable” the North’s idea of “three principles” and “three-point urgent tasks.”

First regarding the draft Agreement for the Improvement of South-North Relations, Prime Minister Kang stressed that improvement of inter-Korean relations is an effective way to comply with the historical dictate facing the nation and a basis on which the two sides can resolve the question of dispelling the state of political and military confrontation and carrying out multi-faceted exchanges and cooperation, a question which had been agreed on between the two sides. He said he had introduced the draft agreement based on a change in perception made in consideration of past experiences in dialogue.

Pointing out that multi-faceted exchanges and cooperation are a course indispensable to opening a new age of reconciliation and cooperation between the South and the North, the South’s chief delegate stressed that the two sides’ government authorities should not spare support for the resolution of the dispersed family issue. In this connection, he proposed to hold the 11th Red Cross conference in late October, to allow hometown visits by those separated family members aged 60 or older on a priority basis, and to resume Red Cross working-level contacts to discuss the second exchange of hometown

visitors.

At the same time, Prime Minister Kang urged that to restore early a South-North economic community and better pursue national interests and prosperity, a South-North joint economic cooperation organization headed by vice-premier-level officials, whose creation was already agreed on at the South-North economic talks, should be inaugurated at an early date.

Regarding the question of dispelling the state of political and military confrontation, he stressed that confidence building should be promoted before any other thing. To this end, Kang called for the early implementation of a set of steps on which the two sides have reached an accord, such as the suspension of mutual slander and defamation, advance notification of military training, installing and operation of a direct telephone line between responsible high-ranking military officers of the two sides, and peaceful use of the Demilitarized Zone.

With respect to the "three principles" the North laid down, Prime Minister Kang said few persons would object them if there is no difference in their interpretation. He noted, however, that the South had suggested a set of concrete steps that could be easily agreed on and translated into action because in the two sides showed conflicting stands with regard to the way of practicing such principles.

The South said that the "three principles" of the North were already included in the concrete ideas the South had advanced. It said that if the North insists on the "principles," they might be included in the proposed basic agreement for the improvement of South-North relations.

In connection with the "three-point exigent issues," too, the South's chief delegate first pointed to the unreasonableness of the North's idea of "entry into the United Nations by South

and North Korea under a single seat.” He recalled that as can be seen in the course of unification between South and North Yemen and between East and West Germany, qualifications for U.N. membership has nothing to do with the unification issue involving divided countries. The prime minister said that given the role and usefulness of the United Nations, both sides could broaden the avenue of international cooperation and further uplift their national self-esteem if they join the world organization together and cooperate with each other there.

On the Team Spirit training exercise, Premier Kang emphasized that the exercise is of open and defensive nature, noting that it has been held annually since 1976, that North Korea used to be notified of the exercise plan in advance, and that the North used to be even invited to observe the exercise. He added that if the North removed the muscle of their offensive forces deployed along the truce line and renounce their belligerent policy against the South, Seoul is willing to readjust the training exercise.

Regarding the “issue of releasing some arrested persons,” the South sternly pointed out that the fact of violating the law of the land under the cloak of unification cannot be of any help to unification nor can it constitute any topic of the inter-Korean meeting. It said that if only to ensure there would be no similar persons violating the law, the North should agree to the adoption of an agreement on travel, communications and trade systematically guaranteeing free travel back and forth between the South and the North.

The two sides then entered debate. But, the North kept demanding the priority resolution of the “three principles” and “three-point urgent issues” only. The South, on the other hand, stressed that since what is in the core of principles is the question of how to translate such principles into action effec-

tively, the principles could be included in the proposed basic agreement for the improvement of South-North relations if the North was interested in their agreement.

Although the two sides failed to narrow differences in their respective basic positions, they agreed to have separate contacts on the issue of entry into the United Nations as well as to urge the resumption of the suspended Red Cross talks.

When the South said that there was no change in its stand over the issue of joining the world organization but the North could produce detailed measures, if any, to materialize their idea of "joint entry under a single seat" if the North insisted on the idea, the North offered to have "contacts between several delegates from each side so that they could explain about the plan." The South accepted the overture.

In the discussion of the issue of resuming the Red Cross talks, the South, emphasizing the urgency of the issue of dispersed family members, urged the North to agree to facilitate hometown visits by those displaced family members aged 60 or order before the close of the year, the North suggested that the issue be left to the Red Cross side.

In their respective closing remarks, the two prime ministers placed much significance to their meeting itself, stating that through the meeting they could better understand each other's positions. They both expressed the expectation that they would show more sincere manners at the future meeting so as to reap a successful outcome.

2. Second High-Level Meeting

a. Responsible Liaison Officials Contacts

In a telephone message sent to the North on October 5, the South proposed to hold a responsible liaison officials contact at Tongilkak in the northern sector of Panmunjom on October 8 to discuss working-level matters such as an itinerary for a South Korean delegation's participation in the second South-North high-level meeting.

North Korea counter-proposed that it be held on October 9, which the South accepted.

At the contact held at Tongilkak in the northern area of Panmunjom from 10 a.m. through 12:30 p.m. October 9, the South delivered a list of 90 delegation members including seven delegates, 33 support people and 50 press members. The North handed to the South a memorandum on personal safety, which was signed by Prime Minister Yon Hyong-muk.

Besides, the responsible liaison officials of the two sides discussed various issues related to the southern delegation's visit to the North for three nights and four days. The issues included procedures for conference proceeding, lodging and conference site, the method of transportation, dinner schedules and the places to be observed.

The schedules set forth by the North were generally in keeping pace with those for the first high-level meeting. But, the two sides agreed to finalize them at their another contact after the South reviewed it carefully.

The responsible liaison officials of the two sides met again at Peace House in the southern sector of Panmunjom at 3 p.m. October 12 to discuss working-level procedural issues related to

the second high-level meeting.

At the contact, the two sides reached a complete accord on the overall aspects of the southern delegation's stay in the North for four days. The two sides agreed to apply the precedents set at the first high-level meeting to miscellaneous matters such as the method of reception and the provision of conveniences.

The major schedules for the southern delegation's stay in Pyongyang, which were agreed on at the second contact, were as follows:

- Conference site: People's Cultural Palace
- Lodging: Paekhwawon Guest House (along the upper stretches of the Taedong River)
- Format and operation of the meeting: Two sessions
 - First-day session (10 a.m. October 17): To be opened to the public
 - North Korean side's remarks of greetings
 - South Korean side's remarks of greetings
 - North Korean side's keynote speech
 - South Korean side's keynote speech
 - Second-day session (10 a.m. October 18): Held behind the closed doors
 - Overall debate
 - The South's closing remarks
 - The North's closing remarks
- Method of Transportation
 - Vehicles: 10 sedans to delegates, and buses to support personnel and press corps
 - Transportation between Kaesong and Pyongyang: Use of train

◦ Dinners

- October 16: To be hosted by Prime Minister Yon Hyong-muk
- October 17: To be hosted by Choe Mun-son, chairman of the Pyongyang People's Committee
- October 18: To be hosted by Yang Hyong-sop, chairman of the Standing Committee of the Supreme People's Assembly

b. Proceeding of the Meeting

The second South-North high-level meeting was held in Pyongyang for four days from October 16 through October 19, 1990.

On October 16 the southern delegation arrived at Tongilkak in the northern sector of Panmunjom, where they were greeted by six northern delegates including An Byong-su, secretary general of the Committee for Peaceful Unification of the Fatherland. From Kaesong, they traveled to Pyongyang by train.

Prime Minister Yong Hyong-muk met the members of the southern delegation at the Guest House and hosted a dinner later in the day at the People's Cultural Palace. The dinner was preceded by viewing of an acrobatic performance.

On the morning of October 17, the first-day session was held, which was opened to the public. Remarks of greetings and keynote speeches were exchanged. In the afternoon, the members of the southern delegation visited the Students and Children's Palace and in the evening attended a dinner hosted for them by the chairman of the Pyongyang People's Committee.

On October 18, the second-day session was held in the mor-

ning behind the closed doors. The two sides made speeches and had general debate. In the afternoon, the delegates paid a courtesy call on President Kim Il-sung while support personnel and press members visited the Grand People's Study Hall and the performance of a collective gymnastics.

In the evening, the visitors from the South attended a dinner hosted at the Mokran Hall by the chairman of the Standing Committee of the Supreme People's Assembly. Winding up their visit, the members of the southern delegation left Pyongyang at 9 a.m. October 19 and arrived in Kaesong by train, from which they drove to Peace House in the southern sector of Panmunjom around 2 p.m.

During the period of the second meeting, An Byong-su, spokesman for the northern delegation, made two press conferences. Limb Dong-won, newly named spokesman for the southern delegation, issued four statements (at the times of passage through Panmunjom, arrival in Pyongyang, departure from Pyongyang and arrival in Pyongyang) and held two press interviews.

The second meeting, too, failed to register any visible results like the adoption of an agreement. However, the North behaved as if they were showing some flexibility toward the improvement of inter-Korean relations. If there was any progress, it was that as a result of such flexibility on the part of the North Koreans, the two sides could discuss what could be the matters that ought to be agreed on between the government authorities of the two sides to promote reconciliation and cooperation.

At the second meeting also, the South placed its top priority goal in laying a basic ground for the improvement of inter-Korean relations based on the recognition of and respect for the mutual entities. The South further endeavored to have the

North give up their policy to abet a revolution in the South and come forward to the road to genuine peaceful coexistence.

Needless to say, the biggest obstacle to the improvement of inter-Korean relations lies in mutual distrust.

This distrust stems mostly from a confrontational posture in which one side does not recognize the other and seeks to subvert and overthrow the other.

To improve and normalize inter-Korean relations, therefore, the two sides should recognize and respect each others' systems and thereby foster an atmosphere for mutual trust.

Here, the South produced a new version of the draft Basic Agreement for the Improvement of Inter-Korean Relations incorporating the "three principles" which the North advanced at the time of the first meeting. The South then urged the North to favorably respond to three immediate tasks if only to display their will, if any, to improve South-North relations.

The three immediate tasks the South suggested were for the North 1) to change their stand by renouncing the scheme to seek a revolution in the South, 2) to cooperate in the early realization of hometown visits by 10 million dispersed family members so as to ease their pains at an early date, and 3) to favorably respond to the call for economic exchanges and cooperation with an aim at promoting national interests and prosperity.

Moreover, as the means of systematically guaranteeing multi-pronged exchanges and cooperation between the South and the North, the South suggested the conclusion of three agreements on travel, communications and trade. It also proposed to form and operate two sub-committees to ensure the effective operation and substantial progress of the meeting.

The North, however, again discussed the "three-point

urgent issues” they raised at the first meeting, and strongly demanded the adoption of a “South-North non-aggression declaration.”

Although the South, at the second-day meeting, called for the adoption of a joint declaration for reconciliation and cooperation between the South and the North which incorporated most of the ideas contained in the North’s “non-aggression declaration,” the North insisted only in the adoption of a “non-aggression declaration.” The meeting, thus, failed to record any achievements.

But, given the fact that the North, in response to the South’s call for the recognition of mutual entities, remarked that “we do not deny the existence of different powers and systems in the South and the North” and “the two sides should recognize and respect each other’s thoughts and systems,” the North could be taken to have showed a little progressed posture at the second meeting compared with their attitude at the first meeting.

On the other hand, the North, while suggesting the parallel discussion of the issues of dispelling political and military confrontation and of realizing exchanges and cooperation, nevertheless adhered to the principle of their “agreement on a package basis” and “their simultaneous implementation.” At the same time, the North concentrated their energies on drawing an accord on the name of a non-aggression declaration, giving the impression that they were trying to turn the high-level meeting into a sort of military talks.

In particular, by stressing that their draft non-aggression declaration did not use such expressions as the “withdrawal of American forces and nuclear weapons,” the North implied that they would use a South-North non-aggression declaration in promoting a peace agreement with the United States and pro-

mpting the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Korea.

Notwithstanding the lingering difference in the basic viewpoints of the two sides, the South and the North confirmed that they shared the same views on a number of matters as they endeavored to let their respective positions be known to the other side in a sincere atmosphere. The two sides reached an accord on the need to prepare a sort of agreement containing their respective positions and ideas advanced at the second meeting. In this respect, the meeting registered a new progress.

c. First-Day Session

The first-day session was held at the People's Cultural Palace in Pyongyang from 10 a.m. to 11 a.m. October 17, 1990.

In his remarks of greetings, the North's Prime Minister Yon Hyong-muk said that the first meeting was a significant first step although the meeting was not satisfactory. He said that the two sides have not launched the joint task of laying a bridge of unification between them.

Saying that a set of encouraging developments such as the joint cheering at the Beijing Asian Games and the staging of unification soccer matches and unification concerts, have given joy to the entire people and have become a new propellant buttressing the South-North high-level meeting, Yon stressed that his side would make sincere efforts to make the Pyongyang meeting come to a successful fruition.

Meanwhile, the South's Prime Minister Kang Young-hoon said that although the two sides shared the view on the need to first strive to remove mutual distrust for the improvement of inter-Korean relations, they showed a wide difference in its method. However, he said, the achievement of the first Seoul

meeting was to prepare a base for future discussion through the full presentation of their respective positions and opinions.

At the same time, the prime minister said the government authorities of both sides should not turn a deaf ear to the pitiful sigh with which the 10 million dispersed family members spent the traditional national holiday of Chusok on October 3. He said that the government authorities should fulfill their duty to ease their pains and misfortune.

Prime Minister Kang stressed that the two sides should strive to make the meeting a success by showing sincerity toward hammering out agreement on the basis of respect for and understanding of each other as well as on the spirit of reciprocity. In this parallel, he said, the government authorities of the two sides should depart from a confrontational concept at an early date and transform their relations into the one where they can help each other.

Then the North's Prime Minister Yon Hyong-muk made a keynote speech.

Yon said a look at the ideas advanced by the two sides at the first meeting showed there were many similarities between the two sides such as the common perception that a mutual concurrence on some principles was needed prior to the discussion of the agenda topic. He pointed out, however, that a substantial difference existed in the order of the resolution of issues or in the general nature of issues.

The North unilaterally denounced the South, while asserting that in order to surmount such basic differences, the two sides should 1) establish the nation's subjectivity strictly in the resolution of the unification question, 2) maintain a unification-oriented posture, 3) harbor the same perception with regard to distrust and explore the method of its resolution, and 4) seek the nearest yet most reasonable way of settling

the unification issue.

The North charged that the South's ideas were hardly away from the realm of consolidation of the reality, arguing that in particular the words "recognition of actual entities," "recognition of systems" and "recognition of reality" were oriented toward division and represented the manifestation of a posture to recognize and fix up two Koreas. The North asserted that since inter-Korean distrust is attributable to political and military confrontation, it cannot be dissolved through "humanitarian program" or "exchanges." They went on to say that the "grand national exchanges" or "hometown visits by old parents aged 60 or older" proposed by the South were nothing more than temporary piecemeal ones.

Moreover, arguing that the difference in the ideas of the two sides derived from the difference in the two sides' unification formulas, the North rejected as unrealistic the South's Korean National Community Unification Formula calling for unification under a single system. They instead propagandized on their idea of unification under a Koryo confederation system, asserting that the two sides should choose the way to unification under a single state and a single nation with the two sides retaining their different systems and respective governments.

While showing an express negativism toward the conclusion of a Basic Agreement for the Improvement of South-North Relations suggested by the South, the North from nowhere Relations suggested by the South, the North from nowhere proposed to adopt a Declaration on South-North Non-Aggression.

North Korea insisted that the Declaration on South-North Non-Aggression would become the new norm regarding inter-Korean relations and a basic document guaranteeing a new peaceful inter-Korean relationship sans "threat of southward

invasion” or “threat of northward invasion.” They asserted that only with the premise of the adoption of the declaration, the two sides could agree on the issue of suspending slander and defamation which the two sides offered in common.

Then the North again discussed the “three-point exigent tasks” they first raised at the first meeting, making a naked attempt to turn even the high-level meeting attended by the prime ministers of both sides into a propaganda arena.

Also emphasizing that the issue of entry into the United Nations is a crucial question related to the future of inter-Korean relations and the prospects of unification, the North made an unreasonable offer suggesting that the two sides continue discussing this issue until a complete agreement is reached at the high-level meeting and working-level delegates contacts, and that the two sides agree not to apply for U.N. membership before such an agreement is made.

Regarding the Team Spirit military exercise, the North insisted that if the South cannot do away with it altogether, then it should suspend the exercise at least when the high-level meeting is in session.

With respect to the issue of some arrested persons, the North said they had ill feelings toward the South over this issue. They demanded the early release of those imprisoned for their illegal visits to Pyongyang, arguing that the issue constituted an important clue to improving inter-Korean relations.

Saying that there were some issues that had to be discussed and resolved in advance in order to make the discussion of the agenda topic more smooth, the North insisted the agenda topic should be classified into the “method of dissolving political confrontation,” “method of dissolving military confrontation” and “method of realizing multi-faceted exchanges and cooperation.” They suggested that the method of dissolving

political and military confrontation be discussed along with the method of realizing exchanges and cooperation.

Discussing the method of agreement and implementation, the North proposed that a package agreement on the agenda topic, "Issue of dissolving the state of political and military confrontation and realizing multi-faceted exchanges and cooperation between the South and the North," be adopted and be translated into action simultaneously.

Meanwhile, the South's Prime Minister Kang Young-hoon, in his keynote speech, observed that a set of major developments at home and abroad during the one month since the first high-level meeting would favorably affect the future of the high-level meeting. He said the developments included the diplomatic normalization between South Korea and the Soviet Union, promotion of diplomatic normalization between North Korea and Japan, and unification of Germany.

Kang said improvement of inter-Korean relations is most important in normalizing the abnormal relationship between the South and the North and opening the new age of reconciliation and cooperation. He then explained that the South had made steady efforts in this regard, as was made express in the July 7 Declaration in July 1988, presidential address at the 43rd United Nations General Assembly in October 1988, Korean National Community Unification Formula in September 1989, and the Declaration for Grand National Exchanges in July 1990.

Recalling that it was part of these efforts that the South produced the eight-point basic agreement for the improvement of inter-Korean relations at the time of the first high-level meeting, Prime Minister Kang side the purport of the proposed agreement is to unfold a new age of reconciliation and cooperation between the South and the North by laying down a

ground on which the two sides could agree to respect each other's systems and not to interfere in the internal affairs of the other side.

The prime minister then set forth a revised version of the draft basic agreement, a revision necessitated by the inclusion of the three-point principles the North offered at the first high-level meeting. The revision affected the preamble of the basic agreement, which was as follows:

**Preamble of Basic Agreement for the
Improvement of South-North Relations**

The South and the North,
 Respecting the wish of the entire people craving for the peaceful unification of the divided fatherland,
 Pledging to carry out dialogue in the direction of pursuing common national interests and realizing national reconciliation based on the spirit of the July 4 Joint South-North Communique, and to exert joint efforts to improve inter-Korean relations and accomplish peaceful unification through the alleviation of tension and confidence building between the South and the North,
 Hereby agreed on the following basic matters.

Of the phrases above, those underlined represent the embodiment of the three principles for the proceeding of the high-level meeting which the North suggested at the first meeting. The three principles were 1) respect for the three principles embodied in the July 4 Joint Communique, 2) top priority on common national interests, and 3) desistance from anything beclouding conference atmosphere or harming the progress of the meeting.

Meanwhile, the South denounced the North for a series of actions it took at the time of the first meeting and thereafter. It said that unless North Korea gives up a policy to engineer a revolution in the South, no smooth progress can be expected of the high-level talks nor can any reconciliation and cooperation be realized between the South and the North. The South urged the North to resolutely change their hostile policy in which they deny the system of the South.

The North had rejected as "division-oriented" the proposed basic agreement featuring the recognition of the mutual entities and non-interference in each other's internal affairs. Besides, in their so-called "exigent tasks," the North raised the issue of law violators in the South, thus committing an act of interference in the internal business of the South. During the first meeting in Seoul, moreover, their press medias one-sidedly criticized the South's ideas in their heavily biased and distorted articles.

Pointing out that these were the very deeds that serve to deepen division and heighten confrontation between the South and the North, the South asked the North to renounce their confrontational and hostile policies.

The South, emphasizing that the government authorities of the two sides have the duty and responsibilities to dispel the pains of division from the people at an early date, urged the North to provide all available support to resolving the question of 10 million dispersed family members. At the same time, the South urged that the two sides should endeavor to facilitate the uniform development of the national economy so that the people of the two sides alike could be better off. To this end, it said, the two sides should positively promote commodity exchanges and economic cooperation between them.

In this connection, the South stressed that to dispel distrust

and restore mutual trust between the South and the North, they should energize multi-pronged exchanges and cooperation while taking steps to systematically guarantee them.

To this end, the South offered 10-point Proposal on Travel between the South and the North, a nine-point Proposal on Communications between the South and the North and a 13-point Proposal on Economic Exchanges and Cooperation between the South and the North. (For details of these proposals see the keynote speech by the South's chief delegate below.)

In connection with the issue of dispelling the state of political and military confrontation, the South again emphasized the need of sincere and priority efforts on the part of both sides to promote confidence building. It pointed out that it was like turning things upside down for the North to insist that confidence building can be promoted only through arms reduction in a circumstance where mutual distrust and hostility prevail and where the danger of military clashes persist.

Also emphasizing the need of section-by-section discussions in order to progress talks on the question of realizing multi-faceted exchanges and cooperation and the issue of dissolving the state of political and military confrontation, the South proposed the establishment and operation of two councils — "Exchanges and Cooperation Council" and "Political and Military Council."

Lastly, the South called for efforts to restore and develop a national community where the two sides pursue co-existence and co-prosperity through the termination of ideological confrontation and the promotion of reconciliation and cooperation based on the recognition of the reality that there exist two systems with different ideologies and systems.

It was from this position that the South set forth three-

point immediate tasks, asking the North to show an affirmative response thereto.

The three tasks proposed can be summed up as 1) the North should renounce their policy to engineer a revolution in the South in which they deny and condemn the system of the other side in favor of the improvement of inter-Korean relations and the opening of a new age of reconciliation and cooperation, 2) the North should cooperate in the early realization of hometown visits by dispersed families so as to ease the national pains resulting from division, and 3) the North should actively respond to energizing economic exchanges and cooperation on the principle of inter-supplementarity so as to promote co-existence and co-prosperity even before peaceful unification.

The contents of the keynote speeches the two sides made at the first-day session was as follows:

**Keynote Speech by the South's Prime Minister
Kang Young-hoon (Summary)**

Northern delegates,

I would like first to explain our position on how to improve South-North relations. As you have agreed, the basic task of the South-North high-level talks is to resolve inter-Korean political and military confrontation and discuss and formulate measures to promote multi-faceted exchanges and cooperation. I believe your side, too, will not deny that to accomplish this agreed task, it is imperative to normalize the present anomalous South-North relations as quickly as possible and then to further improve the relationship so that a new era of rapport and cooperation can be opened.

Though one people, the South and the North have been embroiled in sharp ideological confrontation and a fierce fratricidal

war, this building up mutual antagonism and distrust. In consequence, anomalous relations characterized by protracted separation and confrontation have persisted between the two parts of Korea.

As you know well, we have been steadfastly endeavoring to normalize the anomalous relations as soon as possible. The year before last, we issued the July 7 Declaration, offering a six-point policy measure to promote mutual cooperation and opening. The document emphasized that the South and the North ought to end hostility and confrontation and develop a partnership for prosperity and peace.

In October 1988, as part of concrete efforts to improve inter-Korean relations and accomplish peaceful unification, President Roh Tae Woo went before the United Nations General Assembly and enunciated to the world our consistent and long-standing position that we will never use military force first against North Korea. He also proposed serious discussions on all issues raised by both sides, including institutional safeguards for durable peace and formulas for unification, exchanges and cooperation and arms reductions.

Last September, we proposed the Korean National Community Unification Formula calling for a Korean Commonwealth in which the South and the North would join on an equal footing to build a foundation for lasting peace and peaceful unification. This year, we enacted the Act Governing Inter-Korean Exchanges and Cooperation and endeavored to realize grand inter-Korean exchanges of people.

I think that in spite of such efforts, South-North confrontation has yet to be resolved, basically because the Cold War attitude of regarding the other party to dialogue as an enemy and of wanting to topple its system has not been abandoned.

Neither the South nor the North should any longer repudiate and attempt to overthrow the other's system. I am convinced that only when such a Cold War attitude is discarded as quickly as

possible, will it be possible to genuinely improve inter-Korean relations and forge a new era of rapport and cooperation promising common prosperity.

At our meeting in Seoul in September, I proposed to your side that an eight-point basic agreement to improve South-North relations be adopted. To improve and normalize South-North relations, it is essential to reach an agreement to recognize and respect each other's system and not to interfere in each other's internal affairs. Based on such an understanding, we desire to realize exchanges and cooperation, build trust, politically and militarily, implement balanced mutual arms reductions and consolidate national reconciliation and peace so that a foundation can be laid for the peaceful unification of the homeland.

A new era of South-North reconciliation and cooperation is the wish of the entire Korean people and an imperative of world history as well. The fundamental objective of our proposed eight-point basic agreement is to usher in such an era by focusing on free travel and multi-faceted exchanges and cooperation between the two parts of Korea, as well as on military confidence and arms reduction, while pursuing common national interests in the international arena and enhancing national self-esteem. I would like to consider the principles for conducting our talks, that your side proposed at our first session, to be an expression of your interest in improving inter-Korean relations. Indeed, no one would object to your three principles per se, provided that there were no differences in their interpretation. It should be recalled that I made clear our position that we could agree to incorporating your principles into the basic agreement that we proposed, if you wanted us to accept them. Accordingly, with respect for your ideas, I now propose to revise as follows the preamble to the draft Basic Agreement on Improving Inter-Korean Relations that we laid on the table previously:

*“Whereas the South and the North are committed, in response to the yearning of the entire people for the peaceful unification of the divided homeland, to pursue serious dialogue aimed at promoting common national interests and national reconciliation based on the spirit of the July 4 (1972) South-North Joint Communiqué and also to jointly endeavor to improve South-North relations and accomplish unification by easing inter-Korean tension and building mutual trust,
“the parties hereto agree as follows:”*

If only our proposed eight-point Basic Agreement on Improving Inter-Korean Relations is adopted with its preamble revised as noted above, I am confident that the groundwork will have been laid for resolving South-North political and military confrontation and implementing multi-faceted exchanges and cooperation.

Northern delegates,

In connection with the issue of laying a groundwork for improved South-North relations, I feel obliged to call your attention to certain aspects of the series of actions that your side has taken since the first round of our talks.

First of all, I deeply regret that your side has been opposed to reciprocal recognition by the South and the North of each other as a real political entities. At the first round of our talks, your side expressed the view that the provisions of our proposed basic agreement calling for reciprocal recognition of each other's system and non-interference in the internal affairs of each other stemmed from the position that there are two states on the Korean peninsula. Accordingly, your side argued, they would perpetuate the status quo and thus prolong the division of the land, rather than promote unification. Regarding our proposal to set up a permanent representative mission in Seoul and Pyongyang with a view to cementing inter-Korean relations, you

contended that such a proposal was also based on a two-state concept.

I think that such views are totally erroneous and stem from a misunderstanding or distortion of our intentions to reconcile and integrate the land which is actually divided into two halves. The stark reality is that today different political systems exist in the South and the North. Your side has also repeatedly emphasized that different ideologies and systems have long prevailed in the two parts of Korea. You have maintained that if under such conditions each side puts absolute values on its own ideology and system or tries even to impose them on the other side, conflict will ensue, further deepening the division. If such assertions by you are truthful, it necessarily follows that it is the right thing to mutually recognize each other's political system and institutions and that this is the only way not only to prevent conflict and overcome division as you maintain but also to move history onward toward peace and peaceful unification.

Accordingly, you should desist from the unreasonable assertions that our proposal is aimed at perpetuating the status quo, promoting division and bringing two states into being. Instead, your side ought to positively respond to our proposal to lay the groundwork for improving South-North relations based on reciprocal recognition of each other as real political entities.

Next, I must point out that even while emphasizing the need to end the present state of division and to start on the road to peace and unification, your side has been doing things that foment division and further put off peace and unification. For example, at the first session in Seoul, you raised what you called "urgent issues," including the demand for the release of convicted prisoners — a topic that has no place on our agenda. Furthermore, you indicated that you would refuse to discuss any topic already on the agenda until and unless the "urgent issues" were resolved. If you continue to attempt to interfere in our internal affairs by insisting on the release of convicted prisoners for

“unification’s sake,” we have a lot to say about your own internal affairs. Should we, ranking officials from the South and the North, engage in polemics over such questions, the atmosphere of our talks will only deteriorate and division and confrontation will only be aggravated.

In addition, I want to take note of the attitude that your news media have taken toward the Seoul talks. In short, your media have been engaged in a deplorable manner of reportage intended to deepen South-North division. They have played up your contentions alone, while vilifying our position. They have not reported facts as they are to the residents of the North and have indulged in unfair and biased coverage. You can not deny this.

Such attitudes on your part have stemmed from your continuous pursuit of a policy of confrontation. To improve South-North relations and move toward peaceful unification through national reconciliation and cooperation, I believe that above all else, you must decisively transform the hostile policy of repudiating our system. Should your side stick to a strategy of a “South Korean revolution” and continue to pursue the long-standing policy of confrontation, we can expect neither smooth progress in these inter-Korean high-level talks nor the resolution of South-North confrontation, to say nothing of reconciliation and cooperation.

Northern delegates,

Now let me explain our position on how to implement multi-faceted exchanges and cooperation. As you also know, the movement of people and goods between the South and the North has been completely blocked for nearly half a century because of the partitioning of the land and the division of the people. The thorough South-North separation has had few parallels throughout the world, outdoing even the examples of Germany and China.

Responsible Government authorities of both the South and the North have the duty and responsibility to resolve this separa-

tion with a view to ending the pain the division is inflicting on our people as quickly as possible. In that spirit, through my keynote address at the Seoul meeting, I emphasized that the two parts of Korea must be opened to each other by breaking down all barriers that separate them and that mutual trust must be built through increased exchanges and cooperation. I thus proposed a 10-point program of multi-faceted exchanges and cooperation.

Under the proposed program, we attach particular importance to the reunion of the 10 million dispersed family members. As you also know, the South and North Korean Red Crosses have been contacting each other over this issue for nearly two decades since the early 1970s but they have yet to resolve it.

The authorities of both the South and the North must not spare support for the resolution of the question of the 10 million separated relatives. One of the most urgent humanitarian tasks facing us is to make it possible for dispersed people to reunite with their separated parents, brothers and sisters, and wives and children. Accordingly, we proposed that people 60 years of age or older be allowed first to visit their native communities in humanitarian consideration of their increasingly severe anguish.

We also consider exchanges of goods and economic cooperation to be very important. Before division, South and North Korea were economically interwoven by complementary relations. Even today, the two parts of Korea have a great potential for mutual complementation in many economic sectors. Being one people, the South and the North should be able to rebuild complementary economic relations by exchanging products, technologies and capital according to their different needs and otherwise cooperating with each other so that we can jointly advance national interests and prosperity.

The Persian Gulf crisis is now threatening to cause a worldwide economic slump. This makes it even more urgent for the two parts of Korea to economically cooperate to promote and maintain national prosperity. Through a series of economic talks

in 1985, both sides reached agreements on many aspects of inter-Korean trade and economic cooperation. In fact, the stage has almost been set for prompt implementation of economic exchanges and cooperation.

First, humanitarian inter-Korean projects should be set in vigorous motion, with top priority given to resolving the issue of the 10 million members of dispersed families. Human rights should take precedence over what are called "class interests." Only when humanitarian enterprises are vigorously carried out, will it be possible to dispel hatred and antagonism between the South and the North and promote rapport and cooperation.

Second, South-North exchanges of goods and economic cooperation must be expeditiously realized. We must enable our compatriots in both the South and the North to escape poverty and ensure that everyone can live well. The governments of both the South and the North have the unavoidable duty and responsibility to pursue the integrated development of our national economy.

Northern delegates,

Vigorous promotion of South-North travel, trade and economic cooperation is crucial to restoring mutual trust and resolving confrontation. This is why our side so emphasizes multi-faceted exchanges and cooperation. Regrettably, however, your side insists on putting off exchanges and cooperation, arguing that such things are impossible as long as confrontation continues as now, even while acknowledging that extensive exchanges should make meaningful contributions to mutual understanding and reconciliation.

I consider it fortunate, however, that yesterday your side took the positive step of proposing working-level Red Cross contact on coming November 15.

I believe that your side must not put off or even neglect the implementation of multi-faceted exchanges any longer.

To dispel South-North distrust and restore mutual con-

fidence, it will be necessary to vigorously promote multi-faceted exchanges and cooperation, while at the same time building institutional safeguards for such activities. I emphasize that the South and the North must adopt agreements on travel, communications and economic exchanges and cooperation, as I already suggested at our first meeting. I now put forward the following specific proposals to that end:

Proposal for Inter-Korean Travel

- 1. Procedures, rules and other necessary matters to be complied with by residents of the South and the North in traveling between the two parts of Korea by land, sea or air or via a foreign country should be established.*
- 2. Inter-Korean travelers should be required to bear with them a travel permit issued by the authorities of their side and also an entry permit issued by the authorities of the other side.*
- 3. The authorities of the South and the North should designate by agreement the points of passage and travel routes for inter-Korean travel. For travel by land, Changdan and Panmunjom could first be designated as the passage points and the Seoul-Shinjuju Rail Line and the Munsan-Kaesong road be reconnected*
- 4. Inter-Korean travelers should be allowed to carry with them necessary articles for their own use during their visits to the other area and also gifts within specified limits.*
- 5. The authorities of the South and the North should furnish means of transportation to visitors to their respective areas.*
- 6. Inter-Korean travelers visiting the other area should comply with local laws, regulations and directions.*
- 7. The authorities of the South and the North should provide emergency help to visitors in their respective areas who are in distress.*
- 8. The authorities of the North and the South should guarantee*

that visitors to their respective areas will be able to engage in activities needed to fulfill the authorized purposes of their visit. They should also guarantee the visitors' personal safety and safe return home.

9. *An Inter-Korean Travel Committee should be established to discuss and adjust various matters involved in South-North travel.*
10. *Joint Liaison Offices should be set up in Seoul, Pyongyang and Panmunjom to take charge of the practical details of inter-Korean travel, to provide administrative support for travelers, to maintain South-North liaison and to deal with matters entrusted to them by the Inter-Korean Travel Committee.*

Proposal for Inter-Korean Communications

1. *Matters necessary to governing the exchange of mail and telecommunications should be specified.*
2. *The postal authorities of the South and the North should gather mail addressed to residents in the other area and hand it over to the other side. Mail thus handed over could then be delivered to the addressees through the regular local mail service.*
3. *Inter-Korean mail exchanges should in principle be conducted once a week at Panmunjom. However, different arrangements might be made by agreement between the authorities of the South and the North when deemed necessary.*
4. *The authorities of the South and the North should install facilities necessary to facilitate inter-Korean telecommunications. Initially, South-North telephone calls could be connected by manual switchboards which might be progressively automated.*
5. *Inter-Korean postage and telecommunication charges should*

- be determined through consultation between the authorities of the South and the North.*
- 6. The authorities of the South and the North should guarantee the confidentiality of inter-Korean mail and telecommunications and should not use such services for political or military purposes under any circumstance.*
 - 7. An Inter-Korean Communications Committee should be established to discuss and adjust matters involved in South-North communications and to promote the integrated development of inter-Korean communications.*
 - 8. An Inter-Korean Telecommunications Engineering Group should be established to solve technological problems involved in South-North mail and telecommunications, to promote the integrated development of communications and to deal with matters entrusted to it by the Inter-Korean Communications Committee.*
 - 9. The authorities of the South and the North should respect international agreements on postal and telecommunications services.*

Proposal for Inter-Korean Economic Exchanges and Cooperation

- 1. The authorities of the South and the North should specify matters necessary to facilitate inter-Korean trade in goods and joint economic projects.*
- 2. Each side should designate its own appropriate agencies to engage in the trade of various categories of goods or individual joint economic projects.*
- 3. The types of goods to be traded should be chosen on the principle of mutual complementarity.*
- 4. The annual quantities of various goods to be traded should be adjusted in consideration of supply and demand on both sides and the actual movement of individual products could*

then be decided on by negotiations between the parties involved.

- 5. The prices of goods traded should be determined by agreement between the parties involved in consideration of the prevailing international market prices.*
- 6. Payments for transactions should be settled through an open account. However, different settlement methods might be used depending on the circumstances.*
- 7. Settlement of payments should be handled directly by banks in the South and the North.*
- 8. The Swiss franc should be used as the currency of settlement.*
- 9. South-North trade in goods should be regarded as domestic trade within one nation and should thus be exempted from tariffs.*
- 10. The methods of transporting goods to be traded should be chosen through consultation between the parties involved in consideration of such characteristics as the weight and volume of the merchandise concerned and the cost of various types of transportation. Efforts should be made, however, to optimally utilize railroad, trucking, shipping and airfreight services.*
- 11. Various forms of inter-Korean economic cooperation, including joint development of resources and joint manufacturing ventures, should be implemented. Joint business enterprises abroad and joint overseas economic cooperation projects could also be undertaken.*
- 12. The size, method of implementation, terms and timetables for individual joint economic projects should be determined through consultation between the parties involved.*
- 13. A Combined Inter-Korean Economic Cooperation Committee, cochaired by the deputy prime ministers of both sides, should be established to realize South-North exchanges of goods and economic cooperation, to restore South-North economic links and to promote the joint development of the national economy.*

Among the above three proposals, the one for inter-Korean economic exchanges and cooperation embodies those points on which agreement was fully or almost reached at the South-North economic talks in 1985 and thus extensively incorporates your side's position.

As for our proposals for inter-Korean travel and communications, they are designed to institutionally safeguard free travel and full opening between the two parts of Korea — ideas that your side, too, advocates. In that way, they are aimed at promoting mutual understanding of the real situation on the other side and restoring national homogeneity.

It is my belief that if your side genuinely desires to dispel distrust between the two parts of Korea and to promote South-North reconciliation and cooperation, it will not be difficult at all for you to accept our proposals.

Northern delegates,

Lastly, let me explain our position on how to resolve political and military confrontation. Sincere efforts on both sides to build trust must come before South-North political and military confrontation can be resolved. So long as we continue to distrust and suspect each other, confrontation can never be ended. Tension and confrontation have long persisted between the South and the North because of mutual repudiation and distrust. The mutual distrust that has built up because of the fratricidal war and the subsequent uneasy truce has further intensified the arms race as well as ideological and political confrontation.

In view of the fact that mutual distrust and antagonism are pervasive and that the constant threat of military conflict persists, it is imperative that we first build up confidence in each other's military intentions, so that we will be able to trust each other. To argue that trust can be built only when the military forces have been unconditionally reduced is to put the cart before the horse.

From such a viewpoint, I proposed political confidence

building measures at the Seoul meeting. They ranged from the discontinuation of mutual slander and vilification to the exchange of newspapers, radio and television broadcasts and books and magazines, and the establishment of permanent representative missions in Seoul and Pyongyang. Also at that session, I proposed such military confidence building measures as exchanges of military personnel, advance notification of the movement of major military units and major military exercises, installation of a telephone hotline between top military leaders and disclosure of military information. Based on this, I outlined five basic principles for reducing arms in both the South and the North.

I keep in mind that your side also recognizes the importance of building trust and confidence. Trust, however, cannot be built one-sidedly; it is a reciprocal thing and must be based on mutual recognition of and respect for each other's system. In this regard, I urge your more positive response to the need for building trust both politically and militarily.

To expedite our discussions on ways of implementing multi-faceted exchanges and cooperation and of resolving political and military confrontation, I propose the creation of two specialized councils, one on exchanges and cooperation and the other on political and military affairs, in keeping with the agreed agenda of our talks.

Northern delegates,

Today we have gathered here to tackle the task of ending mutual distrust and confrontation among our one people and of ushering in a new era of concord and cooperation. The entire Korean people today fervently yearn for an end to ideological and political division and for reconciliation and cooperation to promote coexistence and coprosperity. This is also in line with the broad current of world history.

Your side, as well as our side, recognizes the fact that two political systems with different ideologies and institutions, exist

in the South and the North. This is a very important common perception for both the South and the North. Based on such a common perception, that is, a common recognition of realities, we must endeavor together to put an end to ideological and political confrontation, to promote rapport and cooperation and to restore and develop a single national community ensuring coexistence and coprosperity.

In that spirit, I once again urge your side to show a positive and earnest attitude toward the following three urgent propositions:

First, a new era of improved South-North relations, rapport and cooperation must be forged if we are to move ahead toward peace and peaceful unification of our homeland. To that end, your side must discard the policy of revolutionizing the South — a policy that repudiates and is hostile toward our system.

Second, the suffering that national division has caused our people must be eased as quickly as possible. To that end, your side ought to cooperate in expeditiously realizing home visits by dispersed family members.

Third, even before peaceful unification is achieved, efforts must be made to promote the coexistence and coprosperity of the South and the North, if we are to enable all our compatriots, in the South or the North, to live well. For that purpose, your side should positively respond to the need for vigorous economic exchanges and economic cooperation based on a spirit of sharing with each other — that is, on a principle of complementarity.

Over the past century, our people have suffered from numerous major national tragedies, including Japanese colonial rule, the partitioning of our land, a fratricidal war and persistent South-North political and military confrontation. The time has come for our people to put the consequences of these unfortunate historical developments behind us and begin to plan for and build a better tomorrow.

In that sense, the responsible high authorities of both the

South and the North are charged with momentous responsibilities and duties to create a new era during which the nation can take quantum jumps. Not only all our compatriots in the South and the North but also the entire world are watching the proceedings of these high-level inter-Korean talks with great concern for their success.

I ardently wish that South-North relations will move away from a climate of confrontation and into an atmosphere of rapport as quickly as possible so that the time will soon come when we wholeheartedly help each other.

I hope and expect that you will prudently consider our basic position and specific proposals.

Thank you.

Keynote Speech by the North's Prime Minister Yon Hyong-muk (Summary)

A comparison between the proposals offered by the two sides at the first meeting shows that we have both things in near common and differences.

The ideas of the two sides which were in near common were:

First, before discussing basic matters related to the agenda topics, the two sides opted to reach an accord on those principles which could serve as a common basis or a common starting point.

The three principles to be respected at the meeting, which we set forth, and the draft Agreement for Improvement of South-North Relations laid down by your side show a basic difference in composition and contents, but indicates that the two sides carry the same conception that a common basis should be prepared before the discussion of basic matters.

We believe that if we start from such a common perception, we, taking into account the two sides' ideas, would be able to work out a forward-looking and practicable agreement.

Second, ideas related to the agenda topic were classified basically into three: politics, military and multi-faceted cooperation and exchanges.

Of course, each side's ideas carry much differences. But, we believe there would be no particular difficulties in discussing basic issues related to the agenda topic inasmuch as the method of classification of the ideas was similar between the two sides.

Third, similarity can also be found in some of the items contained in each side's ideas.

Such items include the issue of suspending slander and defamation against each other, issue of mutual notification about military training exercises and installing a direct telephone line between the military authorities of the two sides, the issue of turning the Demilitarized Zone into a peace area, and some items in the measures to realize cooperation and exchanges.

These items in common are only a small fraction of the countless items suggested. At any rate, we consider it fortunate that such commonness could reduce our burden even a little bit at our future talks.

Whereas some similarity does exist in our two sides' overtures, there is also some fundamental differences which require our serious debate.

Major differences include:

First, there is a problem related to the order of the discussion of issues.

In other words, while we, who place a priority on the question of dissolving political and military confrontation, nevertheless call for parallel realization of multi-faceted cooperation and exchanges, your side, giving emphasis to the question of cooperation and exchanges, offers the issue of arms reduction as a later task.

The second difference concerns the stage of the issue of resolving military issues.

Our side regards the resolution of military questions as a

course of unification, while your side distinguishes the stage of confidence building in the military area from the phase of arms reduction.

The third is about a question related to the withdrawal of American troops and their nuclear weapons.

We believe this is an indispensable element in dissolving confrontation between the North and the South. But, your side does not consider any measure in this regard.

The fourth difference is that the ideas offered by the two sides have in part some similarity but they differ in nature as a whole.

In other words, if our ideas are strictly oriented toward unification, your side's offers, in our frank opinion, fail to depart from the policy of firming up status quo.

These differences are not an overnight occurrence but have been at issue ever since the dialogue of the 1970s.

We are faced with the duty to resolve these issues that have remained unsettled for nearly 20 years.

Unless we resolve these questions, we won't be able to expect any progress in our efforts to resolve the issue of unification of our country and our high-level meeting, too, would only repeat the path of the past dialogues which used to be suspended after debate on some trivial matters.

Therefore, the attention and efforts of both delegations should be directed toward overcoming these mutual basic differences. In this regard, I shall discuss our side's opinion.

What are important in surmounting mutual differences are:

First, we should strictly establish our subjectivity in resolving the question of national unification.

We are discussing our own nation's unification question, not the issue of unification of any other nation or country. Therefore, we must endeavor to resolve the unification question based always on our national demands and interests as well as on our national reality, and we must explore a prescription suitable to our realistic conditions.

The second thing important in surmounting the differences showed in our two sides' ideas is for both of us to maintain a unification-oriented posture.

Whether we are oriented toward unification or toward prolonging division carries a very important significance for us who are engaged in a dialogue for unification.

If there is any gap in this issue, we cannot reach any agreement over unification.

Third, what is also important is for the two sides to explore a way to surmount their mutual distrust with the same perception of such distrust.

Today, the North and the South alike recognize the need to dispel such distrust. Yet, they show a significant difference in its method.

In other words, whereas our side explores the key to its elimination in the dissolution of political and military confrontation, your side seeks it through things like the "resolution of humanitarian programs" and "exchanges."

In this connection, we feel the need for us to correctly understand the root source of mutual distrust.

The deep-rooted distrust between the North and the South is attributable in part to the unfortunate North-South relations of the past and in part to the long interruption of mutual relations. Basically, however, the distrust derives from the political and military confrontation that has been persisting historically.

If it had not been the sense of sufferage that the other side intends to take over oneself politically or militarily, and if it had not been for acute hostile confrontation between the two sides, there must have been no thick barrier of distrust between us.

Thus seen, if we are to dissolve distrust, we must eliminate political and military confrontation, its root source, so that we won't cause any threat to the other side.

The assertion that such distrust can be eliminated through "humanitarian programs" and "exchanges," amounts to a

posture not to look into the core of a problem shunning the elimination of its root source, a posture that can hardly be said to have been oriented toward dissolving distrust.

We shall attach an essential and priority significance to dissolving the state of political and military confrontation. We shall maintain the principle that commensurate with the resolution of this issue, we shall promote humanitarian projects and the issues of cooperation and exchanges.

Only when we are in this basic stand can we arrive at a concurrence on the question of dissolving distrust that has been at issue for a long period of time between the two sides.

Fourth, what is also important is that we must explore the shortest and most reasonable method in our efforts to resolve the unification issue.

The reason we are raising this issue is because a difference in the two sides' ideas stems chiefly from a difference in our respective unification ideas and, at the same time, reflects a difference in the two sides' unification formulas.

Your side's attempt to put aside the resolution of basic issues while calling for the resolution of easy matters first, to drag on the settlement of issues by producing some phases, and to protract indefinitely the parallel existence of the two Koreas by forging a Korean Commonwealth instead of a unified state, all stem from the Korean National Community Unification Formula, an unpractical idea of unifying the peninsula under a single system.

We cannot delay the resolution of the unification issue under any circumstances.

We cannot shun the settlement of exigent issues while sorting out easy or difficult things nor should we drag on the resolution of issues by artificially separating or phasing inter-related matters.

To this end, we must choose the road to achieve unification without taking over the other, that is, to unify the nation into a single state with the two systems and the two governments allow-

ed to remain as they are now, rather than the method of unification under a single system, a method premised on the obliteration of the other side.

We believe that this is the method under which we can resolve the unification question most quickly and reasonably in a way that does not disfavor either of the two sides. We think that only when two sides alike choose this road, can we find a breakthrough in the efforts to iron out the difference between the two sides' ideas.

Southern delegates,

I think that at this second meeting, we should agree on those issues which we, at the first meeting, put off for further study, and, at the same time, discuss those preliminary matters necessary for debate on basic questions.

Among the issues we agreed to continue to discuss are those which can serve as a common basis or starting point for both of us.

In this connection, our side offered that the two sides reaffirm the three major principles for national unification — independence, peaceful unification and grand national unity, as well as the three principles to be observed throughout the course of the meeting. On the other hand, your side proposed the eight-point draft agreement for the improvement of South-North relations which regulates principles for South-North relations and the general direction of the high-level meeting.

As we think that it would be good to include into a document those of the two sides' ideas which can be accepted by the two, and, going a step farther, to prepare and make public a more forward-looking and practice-oriented agreement which can manifest the common determination of the two sides toward peace and unification at home and abroad and which can reliably guarantee the common starting point, we propose, as such a historical document, the adoption and announcement of a declaration on South-North non-aggression as follows:

Declaration on South-North Non-Aggression (Draft)

The North and the South,

Starting from the same wish for dispelling tension existing on the Korean peninsula, forestalling war and realizing peace and peaceful unification of the country,

Recognizing the ideologies and systems existing in each other's sides,

Reaffirming and strictly respecting the three major principles for the unification of the fatherland — independence, peaceful unification and grand national unity — embodied in the July 4 Joint Communique, and

Pledging not to interfere in the internal affairs of each other, Hereby solemnly declare that:

- Article 1. The North and the South, as the same people, shall not use the force of arms against each other nor invade the other by force of arms under all circumstances.*
- Article 2. The North and the South shall resolve possible difference in opinion and disputes peacefully through dialogue and negotiations.*
- Article 3. The boundary of non-aggression between the North and the South shall be the Military Demarcation Line prescribed in the Korea Armistice Agreement of July 27, 1953.*
- Article 4. To firmly guarantee mutual non-aggression, the North and the South shall desist from arms race and reduce armed strength step by step.*
- Article 5. The North and the South shall install and operate a direct telephone line between the military authorities of the two sides to forestall inadvertent armed clashes and their escalation.*
- Article 6. This non-aggression declaration may be revised or*

repealed through agreement between the North and the South.

Article 7. This declaration shall go into force from the date when the North and the South, after going through necessary procedures, exchange letters of notifications to each other, and shall remain in force until the date of realization of the unification of the fatherland unless either of the two sides notify the other of its repeal.

The above draft South-North non-aggression declaration we produced, fully takes into account the principles which the two sides, your side in particular, lay down as the common starting point, and expressly describes the two sides' common determination toward peace and peaceful unification.

We are confident that this declaration represents a new norm on North-South relations which the North and the South should together respect in their march toward peace and peaceful unification, and also a basic document guaranteeing peaceful North-South relations where there is no "threat of northward aggression" or "threat of southward aggression."

This declaration must carry a greater practical significance than any other agreement that only describes general principles or direction. Therefore, if and when this is made public, it would earn a great support from both domestic and foreign people.

Since this declaration contains the important principles your side produced in the draft "Basic Agreement" and since your side, too, is interested in the conclusion of a non-aggression agreement and in the installing and operation of a direct telephone line between military authorities, we believe your side will have no particular objection to the adoption of this declaration as a common basis or starting point.

We think that if your side wants, we would be able to agree on the issue of suspending mutual slander and defamation, an

issue which both sides commonly produced in the political area, so as to make our start more fruitful.

Next, what we should take up at this meeting are what our side raised as emergency issues at the first meeting, namely, the issue of measures related to the United Nations, the issue of suspending the joint Team Spirit military training exercise and the issue of releasing those who visited the North.

Regarding the issue of the North and the South entering the United Nations under a single seat, two rounds of delegates' contacts have already been held at Panmunjom under mutual agreement.

Regrettably, however, no particular progress has been registered at the delegates contacts. Your side, while discussing this issue with us at the delegates contacts, has openly pronounced through official channels that your side would join the United Nations alone.

This cannot be a sincere attitude toward resolving problems, nor can it be taken as a reliable attitude toward the other side.

Entry into the United Nations can be fully realized if only the two sides have such a will and agree on it. It cannot but be an act of shunning responsibility for your side to call such an entry unrealistic with the excuse of the United Nations Charter and the "two entities."

If the North and the South join the U.N. under a single seat through mutual agreement, they would have nothing on which they should quarrel at international scenes. Thus, it would contribute to peace and unification of the Korean peninsula.

As we recognize that the issue of entry into United Nations is a sensitive and exigent question related to the future of inter-Korean relations and further of the unification of the fatherland, we wish to make the following proposals so that we could discuss and resolve the issue in a sincere manner and in a way that conforms to the common interests of the nation.

First, at the North-South high-level meeting and delegates

contacts the two sides shall make joint efforts to discuss and resolve the issue of entry into the United Nations in a way advantageous to the great task of unification.

Second, the two sides shall continue discussion at the high-level meeting and delegates contacts until they reach an agreement on the issue of entry to the United Nations.

Third, either of the two sides shall not join the United Nations before the two sides reach an agreement on the issue of entry to the United Nations at the North-South high-level meeting.

As I believe that your side will fully understand our sincerity toward resolving the issue of the United Nations in a way advantageous to the great task of unification of the fatherland, I hope that we would reach an agreement on the above proposals.

As I emphasized at the first meeting, suspension of the joint Team Spirit military training exercise is the most exigent task that has to be resolved by all means for our talks let alone peace in our country.

In the not too distant future, countless American forces will throng to South Korea across an ocean to make South Korea the site of a war, driving the situation of our country into a tense state.

If this really happens, our efforts for peace and unification would end in smoke overnight, a dark shade would be hung before the high-level meeting, and this good atmosphere where all the people get excited would all be shattered.

If the joint Team Spirit military exercise were forced through despite this too obvious consequence, it cannot but be taken as a deliberate act of not seeking alleviation of tension, shunning national unity and turning down dialogue.

The extremely dangerous Team Spirit military exercise, which would give the 70 million people not the joy of unification but the havoc of a nuclear war, cannot be justified by any means and should be suspended forthwith.

If your side cannot suspend the joint military exercise com-

pletely, your side should be willing to suspend it temporarily during the period of the high-level meeting for the sake of the talks.

We believe it will be good that if your side is in a situation where your side cannot resolve this issue with your side's own determination, a message be sent to the U.S. government by the two sides in the name of the North-South high-level meeting to ask for the suspension of the joint Team Spirit military exercise.

The issue of those who visited the North should be exigently resolved in pace with the atmosphere of the North-South dialogue.

To be frank, we have the expectation that with your delegation's visit to Pyongyang this time as a momentum, release of those who visited the North would be made.

This our expectation is based on talks with the top government leader of your side, as well as on the reality in which your delegates' visit to the North was realized just like Rev. Moon Ik-hwan and student Lim Soo-kyong visited Pyongyang.

Contrary to our expectation, however, those who visited the North are still in prison.

Our people who greeted the visitors to the North and saw them off with such a burning brotherly love, are deeply concerned about them and about the issue of their release.

And, that much, they harbor not so good feelings toward the attitude of your side for delaying the resolution of this issue.

Today, this issue has become an important knot that has to be untied expeditiously in North-South relations.

Now I shall discuss those issues which ought to be discussed and resolved in advance so as to make the discussion of the agenda topic smooth.

The problems that arose in connection with the discussion of the basic question is how to classify the topic, in which order they would be discussed, and under which method they would be agreed on and put into practice.

A look at the two sides' ideas shows that in the issue of dispelling the state of political and military confrontation, our side classified the issue into ideas to dissolve political confrontation and those to dissolve military confrontation, while your side produced what is called "ideas to promote confidence building in the political and military areas" within the frame of which your side raised two separate issues of promoting confidence building in the political area and of promoting confidence building in the military area.

In addition, your side laid down a so-called "direction of arms reduction between the South and the North."

In terms of order, whereas our side places the idea to dissolve political and military confrontation ahead of others, your side places ideas to implement multi-pronged exchanges and cooperation on the top.

Inasmuch as the method of classification of the ideas of the two sides is different and so is the frame and order of the discussion of the topic like this, we believe we have to put these in order before we enter any concrete discussion of issues.

Firstly the question is how to classify the ideas.

The idea of "promoting confidence building in the political and military areas" of your side fails to meet fully the requirement of the topic in terms of both expression and contents.

We cannot dissolve confrontation with confidence building alone. Besides, your side's "idea of confidence building" fails to incorporate all the issues required for the dispelling of confrontation.

For example, your side's "idea of confidence building" fails to contain such essential and basic issues as the withdrawal of alien forces, withdrawal of nuclear weapons and arms reduction between the South and the North.

However, the idea of dissolving political confrontation and the idea of dissolving military confrontation, both of which were advanced by our side, take into account all these essential mat-

ters.

In the issue of realizing multi-pronged exchanges and cooperation, too, the idea we set forth includes the generalized form of all the 10-point itemized ideas produced by your side.

This means that if we discuss the ideas offered by our side, it would mean the discussion even of the ideas advocated by your side.

Therefore, we propose that discussion be centered on the ideas our side produced, and the topic be classified into three: an "idea to dissolve political confrontation," an "idea to dissolve military confrontation" and on "idea to realize multi-faceted cooperation and exchanges."

In the course of discussing these three issues, the issues of "promoting confidence building," "realizing multi-faceted exchanges and cooperation" and "direction of arms reduction," your side advocates could be discussed.

Next, there is the issue of order of discussion.

As for the order of discussion, we believe that it is proper to discuss the question of dissolving political and military confrontation in the first place in view of its importance and urgency.

However, it won't be reasonable to put off the discussion of the issue of exchanges and cooperation until after an agreement on the issue of dissolving political and military simply because of its importance.

Taking into account your side's wish for the priority discussion of the issue of exchanges and cooperation, we think the discussion of the idea to dissolve political and military confrontation can be made parallel with debate on the issue of realizing multi-faceted cooperation and exchanges.

Now, there is the issue of the method of agreement and implementation.

This is a highly important question related to the substantial results of the meeting.

In this connection, we regard it reasonable to prepare a com-

prehensive agreement on the agenda topic, "Concerning dissolution of the state of political and military confrontation and realization of multi-faceted cooperation and exchanges between the North and the South," and then execute it simultaneously.

The principle of package agreement and simultaneous implementation takes into account the fact that the areas to which the two sides pay preferential attention are different and that the issues to be resolved are all inter-related.

We feel we don't need to eliminate the method in which we, while working upon this principle, agree separately on and put into action those issues requiring urgent resolution on a case-by-case basis.

Southern delegates,

Our two sides have already taken the first valuable step toward dissolving the state of political and military confrontation between the North and the South, and realizing peace and peaceful unification.

Now we must make sincere efforts together in order to steer it toward a fruitful direction without being content with the start.

To us, start is important but what is more important is results.

The two sides of the North and the South should fulfill their mission and responsibilities before the nation and thereby usher in the spring of unity on this land where chilly wind of confrontation sweeps and bring about the dawn of the new morning of unification at an early date.

Before concluding my keynote speech, I would like to express the conviction that at this second meeting, more advanced results would be worked out than at the first meeting.

Thank you.

d. Second-Day Session

The second-day session was held from 10 a.m. to 12 noon

October 18, 1990 behind the closed doors.

The meeting, begun with mutual chattings, proceeded in the other of the exchange of first speeches (the South was the first to make the speech), debate and the exchange of closing remarks (the South was the first).

In his first speech, the South's chief delegate explained the justness of the three immediate tasks he raised at the first session and, while commenting on the North's keynote speech, pointed to the unreasonableness of their so-called "three-point exigent tasks." Calling for the adoption of the ideas voiced in common by the two sides in an agreement, he put forth a Joint Declaration for Reconciliation and Cooperation between the South and the North.

The South first explained the purport and background of the three immediate tasks it proposed at the first-day session.

First, the South stressed that to advance the time of peaceful unification, the two sides should improve their relations and unfold a new age of reconciliation and cooperation. It said that the improvement of inter-Korean relations is a must in opening an epochal new phase for peaceful unification let alone the dissolution of confrontation between the two sides.

The South said that the issue of dispersed families is to ease their pains at an early date, stressing that the government authorities of the two sides should positively encourage and support the resolution of such a humanitarian program. It suggested that if the North Korean situation did not allow it, then the North should at least cooperate in the priority realization of the hometown visits by those dispersed family members aged 60 or older.

Third, the South's chief delegate said it was calling for the energization of inter-Korean economic exchanges and cooperation on the principle of inter-supplementarity so as to make the

people of the South and the North alike live better. If these were realized, it would lead inter-Korean relations to the state of mutual assistance, contributing much to dissolving mutual distrust and confrontation.

Meanwhile, the South said that its policy to improve inter-Korean relations is oriented toward unification, not division, stressing that the Korean National Community unification Formula is intended to transform inter-Korean relations into those of reconciliation and cooperation on the basis of mutual recognition of and respect for the entities of the other side and ultimately to realize national cooperation, instead of being designed to turn inter-Korean relationship into the one where "one side takes over the other."

In this respect, the South welcomed as the "manifestation of a progressive posture" the North Korean statement made at the first-day session to the effect that "we do not deny the existence of separate powers and systems in the South and the North."

Reacting to the North Korean call for the adoption of a draft non-aggression declaration, the South pointed out that a non-aggression declaration has been suggested by the South since long ago. It added, however, that the idea of improving inter-Korean relations advanced by the South contained forward-looking basic measures not only to implement non-use of the force of arms and military reduction but also to open a new age of reconciliation and cooperation between the two sides.

Regarding the North Korean suggestion that the items contained in the agenda topic be agreed on "on a package basis" and implemented "simultaneously," the South said the method of a "package agreement" would lead to an unreasonable phenomenon where even easily and speedily agreeable items have to be delayed until difficult issues are resolved while a

“simltaneous implementation” may put off indefinitely the practice of agreed matters.

Touching on the “three-point exigent tasks” the North laid down, the South, first discussing the issue of their call for the suspension of the Team Spirit exercise, stressed that the two sides should begin removing the threat of surprise attack and promoting confidence building in the military area. It said that the North should endeavor to create a circumstance where such military training won’t be needed any more.

With respect to their demand for entry into the United Nations under a single seat, the South reiterated that the two sides should join the world organization together as a transitory step pending the time of unification. It said working-level delegates contacts on this issue would be no longer meaningful, adding, however, that the South was willing to affirmatively consider it if the North wanted to have delegates contacts discuss ways to encourage a unification-oriented relationship after the two sides joined the United Nations separately.

Regarding the issue of release of some arrested persons, the South sternly said this was a totally unreasonable demand. It added that if only to forestall the recurrence of such an incident, the two sides should prepare a systematic device to facilitate travel between the South and the North.

At the same time, the South welcomed the North’s expression of some affirmative views at the first-day meeting, showing the hope that such positive views would lead to a joint agreement on the opening of a new age of reconciliation and cooperation between the two sides. The South then proposed the adoption of a Joint Declaration for Reconciliation and Cooperation between the South and the North which, it said, incorporated the contents of the North’s idea of a non-aggression declaration. The proposal, the South said, was in

part to make the Pyongyang meeting more fruitful.

The text of the proposed Joint Declaration for Reconciliation and Cooperation between the South and the North was as follows:

**Joint Declaration for Reconciliation and Cooperation
between the South and the North (Draft)**

The South and the North,

To lay a foundation of peaceful unification for the improvement of South-North relations in compliance with the desire of the entire people craving for unification of the divided homeland and reconciliation of the nation,

Hereby agree that:

1. The South and the North shall reaffirm the three principles for unification — independence, peace and grand national unity — embodied in the July 4 Joint Communique, shall recognize and respect each other's systems, and shall not interfere in the internal affairs of the other side.
2. The South and the North shall expedite economic exchanges and cooperation to promote the advancement of the welfare of the entire nation and mutual development, and shall carry out personnel exchanges and cooperation in all walks of life.
3. The South and the North shall not use the force of arms against each other under all circumstances and shall not perpetrate any form of aggression or the acts of sabotage and subversion.
4. The South and the North shall peacefully resolve difference in opinion and disputes through dialogue and negotiations between the government authorities.
5. With a view to desisting from arms race and dissolving the state of armed confrontation, the South and the North shall promote confidence building in the military area and realize

arms reduction.

6. The South and the North shall establish and operate a direct telephone line between the military authorities of the two sides to forestall inadvertent armed clashes and their expansion.
7. The South and the North shall desist from committing acts of slandering or defaming each other.
8. The South and the North shall suspend unnecessary competition and confrontation at international stages and shall jointly endeavor to ensure national interests and self-esteem through mutual cooperation.

Before concluding, the South also proposed that the proposed two sectoral councils — Exchanges and Cooperation Council and Political and Military Council — meet even in between high-level meetings within the framework of the main talks, and that a direct telephone line be installed and operated between the prime ministers of the South and the North.

Meanwhile, the North's Prime Minister Yon Hyong-muk, in his speech, showed an offensive posture by disputing some parts of the South's keynote speech made at the first-day session, describing them as "deliberate distortion," "manifestation of reckless posture" and "logic comparable to a thief accusing his victim."

The North unfoundedly claimed that despite their call for the parallel discussion of politico-military and exchanges-cooperation issues, the South "sought to delay exchanges and cooperation." They also charged the South with "attempting to turn the forum of dialogue into an arena of slander and defamation by arguing that the root source of confrontation lies in some one."

Moreover, they claimed that instead of "urging the North to renounce a policy to abet a revolution in the South," the

South should first review their Constitution and National Security Law. Reacting to the South's discussion of the way North Korean press handled the meeting, they denounced it as "not a sincere dialogue posture."

Insisting that the adoption of a non-aggression declaration would serve as a basis for ensuring peace on the Korean peninsula and also the satisfactory progress of dialogue, the North asserted that the South would have no reason to oppose the declaration inasmuch as the South demanded the conclusion of a South-North non-aggression agreement in the past.

The North asserted that their idea of a non-aggression declaration contained even the principles and ideas the South suggested in its idea of a basic agreement for the improvement of South-North relations as well as in its plan to promote confidence building, while deleting the issues of the withdrawal of American forces and nuclear weapons. They contended that such being the case, the adoption of the declaration would be welcomed by the South's top leader and the leaders of the National Assembly and political parties.

The North argued that whether a non-aggression declaration would be adopted at the meeting would depend on whether one side has a proper attitude toward the issue on the Korean peninsula, an attitude which, they claimed, would serve as a yardstick judging whether one side is interested in the resolution of questions through the South-North high-level meeting.

Lastly, again touching on the so-called three exigent issues, the North said they were looking forward to the South's affirmative posture thereto.

The two sides' first speeches were followed by debate, in which the two sides exchanged opinions chiefly on the South's idea of a joint declaration for reconciliation and cooperation

between the South and the North, and the North's offer for a non-aggression declaration.

Contending that a non-aggression declaration should be adopted at the second meeting so as to forestall war and consolidate mutually trustful conditions, the North rejected the South's idea of a joint declaration, saying that the idea was good for nothing.

In reaction, the South maintained that it is necessary to minimize the danger of armed clashes through a mutual non-aggression device, but what is similarly desirable is the adoption of a joint declaration for the sake of energized exchanges and cooperation and the restoration and development of a national community.

The South also stressed that despite the fact that the conclusion of a non-aggression agreement, an important issue related to national security, has to be fully examined and to go through necessary procedures, the North had suddenly produced a draft agreement, demanding unreasonably a prompt concurrence on it.

While turning down the South's offers for a Basic Agreement for the Improvement of South-North Relations and a Joint Declaration for Reconciliation and Cooperation between the South and the North, the North Koreans seemed attached only to garnering the name of a non-aggression declaration regardless of its contents such as a full guarantee device, making it doubt if they really meant to abide by it if it were adopted.

In other words, for the South and the North to terminate their abnormal relations and improve their ties, confidence building should be promoted between them most of all and, therefore, a basic agreement featuring respect for mutual systems should be adopted. But, in a show of the case of con-

tradictoriness, the North turned it down in blind favor of their idea of a non-aggression declaration.

A non-aggression agreement is good only when it is buttressed by the determination to abide by it. So, it would be more reasonable that if the North is genuinely interested in the adoption of a non-aggression declaration, they should positively agree to the improvement of inter-Korean relations in the first place.

While expressing doubt the motive behind their unilateral offering of a draft non-aggression declaration, the South expressed the hope that each other's offers would be discussed carefully and affirmatively at subsequent meetings.

Meanwhile, as to the time of the third high-level meeting, the two sides tentatively agreed to hold it on December 11-14 and finalize it through working-level contacts.

In their respective closing remarks, the two sides remarked that there was a progress at the Pyongyang meeting in deepening mutual understanding, and that they endeavored to let the other side realize their respective basic positions and ideas more correctly and to narrow their differences and forge an agreement based on matters in common.

They also hoped that each other would make more careful reviews of each other's ideas so that there could be a big progress at the third meeting.

On the other hand, the North beclouded the conference atmosphere by discussing, even in their closing remarks, the issues of entry into the United Nations, the Team Spirit training exercise, and of release of some arrested persons, while reiterating their demand for the adoption of a non-aggression declaration.

3. Working-Level Delegates Contacts on the Issue of Entry into the United Nations

a. First Contact

At the time of the first South-North high-level meeting, the South agreed to have contacts between a few delegates from each side to listen to the North's concrete explanation about their idea of "joint entry into the United Nations under a single seat."

On September 12, 1990, the North, in a telephone message signed by Choe Bong-chun, Pyongyang's responsible liaison official, proposed to hold a responsible liaison officials contact on September 13 at Tongilkak in the northern sector of Panmunjom to discuss working-level procedural matters related to the agreement to hold delegates contacts on the U.N. issue.

The South agreed and at the responsible liaison officials contact held on September 13, the two sides agreed to hold a working-level delegates contact at the conference room of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission at Panmunjom at 10 a.m. September 18. It was to be attended by one delegate accompanied by two support officials from each side.

The agreement was confirmed through the exchange of telephone messages signed by the two sides' prime ministers on September 14.

Meanwhile, at the first South-North high-level meeting, the two sides agreed to call on their respective Red Cross authorities to resume the suspended South-North Red Cross talks as well as to hold delegates' contacts to listen to the North's explanation about their idea of entry into the United Nations under a single seat.

According to the agreement, the South on September 13 proposed to the North to hold the eighth South-North Red Cross working-level contact in the immediate future to discuss the issues of resuming the full-dress Red Cross meeting and of arranging the second exchange of hometown visitors. In a message dated on September 17, however, the North said they would send a reply thereto to the South at an appropriate time, thus in effect shunning the resolution of the dispersed family issue.

It was under the circumstances that the first working-level delegates contact was held on the issue of entry into the United Nations on September 18 at the conference room of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission at Panmunjom. It was attended by the South's delegate Limb Dong-won and the North's Choe Wu-jin, who were accompanied by two support officials respectively.

The support officials from the South were Moon Dong-sok, a Foreign Ministry director-general, and Park Yong-dok, a department director of the Secretariat of South-North Dialogue. The two North Korean support personnel were Kim Sung-ryul, a counselor of the Secretariat of the Committee for Peaceful Unification of the Fatherland, and An Tae-bong, an official of the Foreign Ministry.

At the contact that lasted about one hour and 40 minutes and that was opened to the public, the South chiefly listened to the North's explanation. From time to time, however, the South pointed to the unreasonableness and impracticability of their idea while stressing the justness of the South's stand toward the U.N. issue.

The North, emphasizing that the two sides of Korea should join the United Nations under a single seat, laid down the so-

called method of entry under a single seat as follows:

1. Issue of Application for U.N. Membership

The South and the North shall jointly apply for the membership of the United Nations under a single seat within this year.

2. Issue of Right of Representation

The right of representation shall be exercised by the South and the North by turn or jointly by the two sides.

3. Issue of Voting Right

As for the issue of voting right, the South and the North shall vote either for or against issues on which the two sides reached an accord, and otherwise shall abstain.

4. Issue of Exercise of Right to Speak

The right to speak shall be exercised by the side which has been selected as representative based on advance agreement between the two sides. If necessary, however, the other side may make supplementary speeches.

5. Name and Flag of Single Seat

The name and flag of the Korean representation under a single seat shall be Korea (KOREA in Roman letters) and the flag shall be a green Korean map against a white background in consideration of the name and flag chosen for a single inter-Korean delegation at the South-North sports talks, or they can be determined otherwise.

6. Fulfillment of Obligations

Fulfillment of obligations on matters decided on at the United Nations shall in principle be made in concert by the South and the North. In an unavoidable circumstance, however, the two sides may take measures of their own so far as such measures do

not undermine the interests of the other side.

7. Issue of U.N. Membership Fees

As to the issue of financial shares such as U.N. membership fees, the South and the North shall each shoulder half of a share, or shall share them as they do presently.

In a sense, the North's ulterior motive behind their call for delegates contacts on the U.N. issue was laid bare when they asserted that the two sides' contacts on the question itself manifested their determination toward unification and that the two sides should refrain from confronting each other at the United Nations at least until they reached a complete accord on this issue, contending that the issue was a grave question related to the fate of the South-North high-level meeting.

The South, on the other hand, pointed out that any entry into the United Nations by South and North Korea under a single seat is an irresponsible and impracticable idea which, it said, failed to conform to the relevant provisions of the United Nations Charter and ran counter to the basic norm of the international society ruled by international law and practices.

With regard to the North's assertion that the right to representation should be exercised by the two sides alternately, the southern delegate emphasized that the different policies and interests of the two sides cannot be uniformly represented internationally until the time of national unification. He said it is totally unrealistic for the North to argue that the two sides exercise the voting and speaking rights through mutual consultations in view of the the reality where no single letter is exchanged and no travel is allowed at all between the two sides today.

Retorting the North's claim that simultaneous entry into the

United Nations by the South and the North would only perpetuate division, the South's chief delegate said the northern claim was totally unfounded. He noted that whereas distrust deepened rather than mood for unification between the two Koreas which have not joined the world organization, South and North Yemen and Germany which joined the United Nations long ago were either already unified or reached the stage of unification.

The South said that it advocates the simultaneous entry into the United Nations by both sides only as a transitory step pending the time of unification. The South made it clear that simultaneous entry was to be pursued on the premise of the maintenance of unique and unification-oriented relations based on the recognition of mutual entities.

In addition, the southern delegate explained that in today's age of globalization, both sides should join the United Nations together so as to positively contribute to, and play a due role in, international cooperation and decision-making on various international issues as responsible members of the international society. He said that this would serve to expedite exchanges and cooperation between the South and the North and advance the date of peaceful unification.

In fact, the North's demand for entry into the United Nations under a single seat is based on the "logic of liberation" with which North Korea seeks to subvert and overthrow the other side in their "Korea is one" policy, that is, rejection of the existence of two systems on the Korean peninsula.

Accordingly, the North's U.N. policy was an unrealistic idea disregarding the objective and Charter of the United Nations. Their ulterior objective was to obstruct and thwart the South's bid to join the United Nations by all means with the excuse that the two sides were discussing the issue of their entry

into the world organization.

The North Koreans themselves were aware of the unreasonableness of their idea. At the first delegates contact, the North said, "How about refrain from joining the United Nations until the time of unification? We know there is no such precedence. But, a precedence is supposed to be made by some one."

Meanwhile, reminding the North that the two sides agreed at the time of the first meeting to call for the early resumption of the South-North Red Cross talks as well as to have delegates contacts on the U.N. issue, the South asked the North to agree to hold the Red Cross at an early date.

The working-level delegates of the two sides agreed to determine the time of the next contact through responsible liaison officials talks.

b. Second Contact

As the North showed an ambiguous posture toward the issue of resuming the Red Cross talks despite the progress of working-level delegates contacts on the U.N. question, the South sent a telephone message signed by the president of the Republic of Korea National Red Cross to the North on September 19, 1990, proposing again that the eighth Red Cross working-level delegates contact be held on September 24.

The North made no reply to the message. On September 22, 1990, the two sides' responsible liaison officials met at Tongilkak in the northern sector of Panmunjom.

The two sides agreed in principle to have the second working-level contact on the U.N. issue, deciding to determine its date at their further contact on September 25.

During their September 25 contact, the responsible liaison

officials of the two sides agreed to hold the second working-level contact on October 5.

The second working-level delegates contact on the U.N. issue was held at the conference room of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission at Panmunjom from 10 a.m. to 12:35 p.m. October 5.

The South emphasized that the seven-point “plan for entry into the United Nations” under a single seat” which North Korea produced at the first working-level delegates contact was an unrealistic idea which expressly ran counter to the membership regulations of the United Nations Charter.

The southern delegate explained in particular that the opinion of the International Court and the established practice is that any membership application that does not suffice the five-point requirements set in Article 4 of the U.N. Charter — 1) one state, 2) peace-loving country, 3) respect for the U.N. Charter, 4) ability to meet the obligations of the United Nations, and 5) willingness to meet obligations — cannot be recognized by the United Nations.

The South emphasized that the simultaneous entry into the United Nations by the South and the North is the only and practicable means contributory to peace and unification. He suggested that the two sides, as they join the world organization together, could make a joint declaration that 1) the joint entry is a transitory measure pending the time of unification with the two sides endeavoring to integrate their separate seats into one at an early date and 2) the two sides would closely cooperate at the United Nations while maintaining a special relationship oriented toward unification and would endeavor to promote the common interests of the nation and expedite peaceful unification.

At the same time, the southern delegate pointed out that at

the 45th U.N. General Assembly begun on September 24 a total of 105 countries' delegates spoke, and 48 delegates of the 71 who discussed the Korean question supported the South's position and not a single delegate supported the North's idea of "joint entry under a single seat."

He said this well indicated that the international community was hoping that South Korea would join the United Nations at an early date and play a due role for international peace and cooperation.

However, the North reiterated their stand that if the two Koreas have to join the United Nations before the time of unification, they should do under a single seat. They said simultaneous entry by the two sides cannot but be a divisive policy to perpetuate division.

The North Koreans tenaciously sought to delay the South's entry to the United Nations by demanding the two sides introduce to the U.N. an application for membership under a single seat or suggesting that the two sides work out a satisfactory plan through mutual agreement.

The seemingly flexible position showed by the North when their ambassador to the United Nations, Park Kil-yon, in a document submitted to the U.N. Security Council, alleged on October 1 that "our call for entry under a single seat is not something absolute," did not represent any basic policy change but was simply intended to delay the South's entry.

The South said that if the North were opposed to entry into the United Nations to the end, it had to join it alone. But, North Korea tenaciously denounced this as an "anti-unification policy" or "pursuit of confrontation."

Through the two working-level delegates contacts, all they could do was merely to reiterate their respective policies over the issue of entry to the United Nations, being unable to reap

any fruition.

The two sides decided to have another contact before the second South-North high-level meeting and determine concrete matters through discussion between responsible liaison officials.

c. Third Contact

On October 25 after the second high-level meeting was held on October 16-19, the North's responsible liaison official, Choe Bong-chun, proposed to have a contact between the two sides' responsible liaison officials to discuss the issue of having a further working-level delegates contact on the U.N. issue.

The South agreed to the offer, and a responsible liaison officials contact was held at Tongilkak at 10 a.m. October 27. At the hour-long meeting, the two sides agreed in principle to have another contact between working-level delegates in connection with the issue of entry to the United Nations. They decided to determine the date of the contact in their later contact.

Accordingly, the responsible liaison officials of the two sides had a contact at the Peace House in the southern sector of Panmunjom at 3 p.m. October 30 and agreed to hold the third working-level delegates contact on November 9.

The third working-level delegates contact on the issue of entry into the United Nations was thus held behind the closed doors at the conference room of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission at Panmunjom from 10 to 11:25 a.m. November 9.

At the meeting, the North reiterated their policy that if South and North Korea were to join the United Nations before unification, they should do so under a single seat. The North

Koreans then produced a “plan for South-North cooperation at the United Nations” featuring principles for cooperation at the world organization, plan for joint activities and the creation of a Joint South-North United Nations Council.

However, even this South-North cooperation plan was prepared under the assumption that the two sides join the United Nations under a single seat, a plan designed in effect to delay the South’s entry into the world organization by carrying on working-level delegates contacts with the excuse of discussion of the cooperation plan.

The South once again stressed that their idea of entry under a single seat is an impracticable plan carrying a number of legal problems. He noted that at the recent U.N. General Assembly, the international community had totally ignored it.

The South said that the most realistic device to ensure peace and advance the date of unification is for the South and the North to expedite exchanges and cooperation under the spirit of the U.N. Charter while contributing positively to international peace and security as responsible members of the world community. The southern delegate then proposed that the two sides make a joint declaration on their joint and separate entry into the United Nations.

In other words, the South suggested that the two sides make it clear in a joint declaration that their joint entry to the United Nations would be a transitory step pending the time of unification, that they would exert efforts at the United Nations to realize unification at an early date, and that they would closely cooperate with each other at the United Nations while maintaining a special relationship oriented toward unification.

At the same time, the South offered as follows measures to maintain and develop close consultations at the United Nations

after the two sides entered the world organization jointly.

First, the two sides shall take joint steps by closely consulting and coordinating with each other in advance on various activities such as speeches and voting on matters related to unification and 'commo interests of the nation.

Second, the two sides shall refrain from committing activities against the interests of each other, and shall in advance mutually notify, consult and coordinate on matters that may directly affect the interests of the other side.

Third, when either of the two sides requests consultation on matters other than those given above, the other side shall have the duty to comply, and shall speak and vote in difference to the position of the other side to the most possible extent.

The South also proposed that to discuss and cooperate in matters given above, a council headed by the two sides' ambassadors to the United Nations be formed and operated.

Meanwhile, the South suggested that a message signed jointly by the foreign ministers of the two sides be sent to the United Nations Secretary General asking him to reexamine the application for U.N. membership which the South and the North filed on January 19, 1949 and on February 9, 1949, respectively.

However, the North adhered to their existing position. They argued that the South should carefully review the issue of entry to the United Nations, an issue which they said is an important question related to the fate of the South-North high-level meeting. They maintained that they could not accept any idea other than a joint entry under a single seat.

Thus, no particular progress was registered at the third working-level delegates contact either.

Here, the South made it express that under the cir-

cumstances the working-level delegates contacts to discuss the issue of entry into the United Nations under a single seat was meaningless and would be no longer needed.

As to the time of the next contact, the South expressed the willingness to carry on contacts if they were meant to discuss the issue of joint and separate entry to the world organization by the South and the North. On the other hand, the North maintained the working-level delegates contacts should be continued to discuss the method of mutual cooperation, if not other issues, in the first place.

The two sides agreed to discuss and determine the issue of the time of the next contact between the responsible liaison officials of the two sides.

4. Working-Level Delegates Contacts for the Preparation of Third High-Level Meeting

a. Background

In a telephone message on November 12, the North's Prime Minister Yon Hyong-muk, saying that preliminary talks between some of the delegates of the two sides would be needed to ensure achievements of the third high-level meeting, proposed that the two sides' responsible liaison officials contacts be held to discuss working-level procedural matters related thereto.

As a result, a responsible liaison officials contact was held at Tongilkak in the northern sector of Panmunjom at 3 p.m. November 13, where the South listened to the North's ideas with respect to their proposal for "preliminary talks."

The North proposed that “preliminary talks” or “delegates contacts” be held at the interval of three to five days until the time of the third meeting at Tongilkak and Peace House at Panmunjom by turn to arrange the draft of an agreement to be adopted at the third high-level meeting.

The North also suggested that the contacts be attended by two of the delegates to the high-level meeting and the responsible liaison official from each side, and that the contacts be held behind the closed doors without any keynote speech or other expression of one’s basic positions.

Here, the South asked if this meant they won’t attend the third high-level meeting if “preliminary talks” failed to agree on every thing. The North replied that the third meeting will be held regardless of the outcome of the “preliminary talks.”

The responsible liaison officials met again at Peace House in the southern sector of Panmunjom at 10 a.m. November 17.

At the contact, the two sides agreed to hold working-level delegates contacts attended by three officials from each side to adjust an agreement to be adopted at the third South-North high-level meeting. It also agreed on a set of related procedural matters.

At the same time, the two sides confirmed that the working-level delegates contacts won’t affect the holding of the third South-North high-level meeting.

Items agreed on between the South and the North with respect to the working-level delegates contacts were as follows:

- Name of the talks: Working-Level Delegates Contacts for the Preparation of Third South-North High-Level Meeting.
- Time of the talks: First contact on November 21, the frequency of subsequent contacts to be determined at the time

- of every contact.
- Place of the talks: First contact at Tongilkak in the northern sector of Panmunjom, subsequent contacts at Peace House and Tongilkak by turn.
 - Delegates to the talks: Two high-level meeting delegates and the responsible liaison official from each side.
 - * The number of support personnel to be determined at each side's convenience but shall not exceed three.
 - Format of the talks: Behind the closed doors.
 - Press briefing: Press briefing shall be made through advance mutual agreement without any propaganda and public relations overtones.
 - Other:
 - For entry to one's area by delegates to the talks, a memorandum guaranteeing personal safety, signed by prime minister, shall be delivered.
 - The lists of delegates shall be notified to each other by November 20.

According to the agreement reached by the responsible liaison officials, the two sides notified each other of the lists of their delegates on November 20.

Southern delegates:	Northern delegates:
Lee Byong-yong	Paek Nam-jun
Lim Dong-won	Choe Wu-jin
Kim Yong-hwan	Choe Bong-chun

b. First Contact

The first working-level delegates contact was held behind

the closed doors at Tongilkak in the northern sector of Panmunjom from 10 to 11:35 a.m. November 21.

The South produced a 11-point draft Basic Agreement for the Improvement of South-North Relations as follows, emphasizing the need of its adoption. The South said it is urgent to prepare, above all, a base for basic agreements for the improvement of abnormal South-North relations.

The South and the North,

In line with the wish of the entire people craving for the peaceful unification of the divided homeland,

Reaffirming the three principles of independence, peace and grand national unity embodied in the July 4 South-North Joint Communique,

Pledging to faithfully carrying out dialogue in the direction of pursuing common national interests and realizing national reconciliation; to improve South-North relations on the basis of a foundation for mutual trust realized through the alleviation of tension, exchanges and cooperation between the South and the North; and to exert joint efforts to achieve peaceful unification,

Hereby agree on the following basic items:

Article 1. Until the time of unification, the South and the North shall respect each other's systems, shall not interfere in each other's internal affairs, shall resolve disputes peacefully through dialogue and negotiations between the government authorities of the two sides, and shall desist from slandering and defaming each other.

Article 2. The South and the North shall enable the members of the nation to better understand each other's realities. To this end, the two sides shall mutually open and exchange newspapers, radio and television programs and publications.

- Article 3.** The South and the North shall expedite economic exchanges and cooperation and carry out personnel exchanges and cooperation in all walks of life to promote the welfare and balanced development of the entire nation, and to ensure this systematically shall adopt an agreement on travel, communications and economic exchanges and cooperation.
- Article 4.** The South and the North shall promptly carry out, without any conditions, free exchange of letters, meeting and visits between dispersed families and relatives, and shall promote their reunions on their free will.
- Article 5.** The South and the North shall promote confidence building in the area of military to dissolve the state of armed confrontation, and shall realize phased arms reduction.
- Article 6.** The South and the North shall conclude a non-aggression agreement guaranteeing they would not commit any form of aggression, sabotage or subversion against each other.
- Article 7.** The South and the North shall endeavor jointly to transform the existing armistice system into a peace system.
- An international mechanism for guaranteeing peace shall be prepared to consolidate peace system between the South and the North.
- Article 8.** The South and the North shall suspend competition and confrontation, shall cooperate with each other, and shall make joint efforts for national interests and self-esteem at international scenes.
- Article 9.** The South and the North shall establish permanent liaison missions in Seoul and Pyongyang to improve South-North relations and further solidify basis for peace and unification through close mutual con-

sultations and liaison programs.

Article 10. The South and the North shall establish a South-North Exchanges and Cooperation Sub-Committee and a South-North Political and Military Sub-Committee within one month after the effectuation of the agreement.

The South-North Exchanges and Cooperation Sub-Committee shall discuss and resolve the issues of realizing exchanges and cooperation, and of adopting an agreement on travel, communications and economic exchanges and cooperation. The Political and Military Sub-Committee shall discuss and resolve the issues of promoting confidence building, establishing permanent liaison missions, and concluding a non-aggression agreement.

Article 11. This agreement shall go into force from the date the South and the North notify each other of their completion of procedural measures necessary for its effectuation.

The South in effect accommodated the North's demand for the adoption of a non-aggression declaration by making it clear in Article 6 of the Basic Agreement that the two sides shall conclude a non-aggression agreement, and Article 10 the creation of sub-committees within one month.

This indicates that both an exchanges and cooperation declaration and a non-aggression declaration are to be discussed and resolved through the sub-committees to be set up soon after the adoption of the basic agreement.

However, the North wanted that three separate documents, instead of a single agreement, be adopted. They proposed the adoption of a "joint statement on South-North high-level meeting," a "declaration on South-North non-aggression" and

a “declaration on exchanges and cooperation between the South and the North.”

The texts of the three documents the North laid down were as follows:

Joint Statement on North-South High-Level Meeting

The North and the South hereby agree on the following items in order to prepare conditions favorable to dissolving acute confrontation as well as to peaceful unification in line with the wish of the entire people craving for the unification of the split fatherland and national reconciliation:

1. The North and the South shall reaffirm and strictly abide by the three major principles for national unification embodied in the South-North Joint Communiqué of July 4, 1972.
2. The North and the South shall recognize the thoughts and systems existing in each other, and shall not enforce one's ideology and system upon the other.
3. The North and the South shall not interfere in each other's internal affairs unless they are related to the unification issue, the common task of the nation.
4. The North and the South shall place common national interests upon those of their own in the discussion of issues.
5. The North and the South shall not commit deeds that would becloud conference atmosphere or impede the progress of dialogue.
6. The North and the South shall refrain from name-calling, slander, defamation and the scattering of leaflets against each other, and stop making broadcasts over the public address system to slander each other along the Military Demarcation Line.

The North and the South hereby solemnly promise to

faithfully implement the above items.

**Declaration on Non-Aggression Between
the North and the South**

The North and the South, pledging to make joint efforts to remove the danger of war on the Korean peninsula and prepare conditions favorable to peaceful unification, hereby solemnly declare as follows:

- Article 1. The North and the South shall not use the force of arms against each other and shall not invade each other by force of arms under any circumstances.
- Article 2. The North and the South shall resolve possible difference in opinions and disputes peacefully through dialogue and negotiations.
- Article 3. The boundary of non-aggression between the North and the South shall be the Military Demarcation Line stipulated in the Korean Military Armistice Agreement of July 27, 1953.
- Article 4. The North and the South shall turn the Demilitarized Zone along the Military Demarcation Line into a peace area.
- Article 5. To firmly guarantee mutual commitment to non-aggression, the North and the South shall suspend arms race, reduce arms step by step, and suspend large-scale military training exercises.
- Article 6. The North and the South shall install and operate a direct telephone line between the military authorities of the two sides to forestall inadvertent armed clashes and their escalation.
- Article 7. Implementation of expected measures regarding the North-South non-aggression shall be guaranteed in such proper surveillance and inspection as agreed on

between the two sides.

Article 8. This non-aggression declaration may be amended or supplemented through agreement between the North and the South.

Article 9. This declaration shall go into force from the date when the North and the South sign it and its copies are exchanged, and shall remain in force until the date of unification of the fatherland unless either of the two sides notify the other of its repeal.

Declaration on Cooperation and Exchanges between the North and the South

The North and the South, pledging to positively realize multifaceted cooperation and exchanges in order to eliminate the nation's pains and loss in wealth resulting from division and to achieve the nation's common prosperity and unification of the fatherland, hereby declare as follows:

1. The North and the South shall cooperate each other to realize free travel and contacts between people in all walks of life and brethren.
2. The North and the South shall realize economic collaboration and material exchanges in order to ensure the development of national economy and promote the advancement of the wellbeing of the people.
3. The North and the South shall endeavor to link the disconnected railroads, roads and communications networks.
4. The North and the South shall jointly study and develop our nation's outstanding cultural heritage and tradition, and shall carry out joint creation, joint participation and joint performance of culture and literary works.
5. The North and the South shall cooperate in the area of sports, and shall participate in major international games

under a single team.

6. The North and the South shall exchange the results and experiences achieved in various areas such as science, technology, education, health, publication and press, and shall cooperate for joint studies and joint development.
7. The North and the South shall not compete or confront but cooperate with each other at international scenes, and shall advance to the abroad jointly.
8. The North and the South shall take legal and systematic measures to realize multi-faceted cooperation and exchanges.

The North produced a “joint declaration” and “declaration on exchanges and cooperation” with the intent of inducing an agreement on a non-aggression declaration. To be true, they made an unveiled attempt to place emphasis on the adoption of a non-aggression declaration in the discussion of their proposals or of the method of operating the talks.

The North prepared the draft non-aggression declaration alone in the form of articles while drafting the two other documents merely in items. Moreover, in an apparent bid to put a non-aggression declaration into force at an early date, the North deleted the requirement of internal procedures required for its effectuation, which appeared in their original draft laid down at the time of the second high-level meeting.

The contents of their draft plans did not show any change in their basic “united front” strategy-style posture toward the South. At the same time, they tended to shun the issue of exchanges.

Their ideas contained their persisting demand for the release of arrested persons, suspension of the Team Spirit military exercise and the repeal of the National Security Law. For instance, Item 2 of the “joint declaration” stipulated “the

two sides shall not interfere in the internal affairs of each other so long as they are not related to the unification issue;" Article 5 of the "non-aggression declaration" provided "large-scale military exercises shall be suspended;" and Item 8 of the "declaration on exchanges and cooperation" stipulated "legal and systematic measures shall be taken to realize cooperation and exchanges."

Their "declaration on exchanges and cooperation" did not mention the issue of dispersed families at all. On other matters, too, the North simply used such expressions as "shall try..." or "shall cooperate..." revealing their passive posture toward exchanges and cooperation.

The South tried to explore the possibility of inducing an agreement while sounding out the true intention of the North Koreans. However, they failed to narrow the scope of difference on the format of agreement.

Meanwhile, the North ignored the agreement initially reached at the responsible liaison officials contacts. From the beginning, the North made prepared keynote speeches and insisted that the two sides would make public their respective offers after contacts.

All these were part of their scheme to make the working-level delegates contacts themselves not a good-intentioned meeting to work out mutual agreement but a sort of propaganda arena designed to play up the issue of a non-aggression declaration.

The two sides decided to hold the second contact on November 27.

c. Second Contact

The second working-level delegates contact to prepare for

the third South-North high-level meeting was held at Peace House in the southern sector of Panmunjom for about two hours beginning 10 a.m. November 27.

Reminding the North that the draft "basic agreement" incorporated most of the North's ideas, the South stressed that the reasonable process is for the two sides to adopt the "basic agreement" first and, based thereon, inaugurate a "exchanges and cooperation sub-committee" and a "political and military sub-committee" to discuss the question of agreeing or adopting a declaration on ways to realize exchanges and cooperation as well as to dissolve the state of political and military confrontation.

But, the North turned down the idea of "basic agreement" denouncing that the offer, in its name too, was oriented toward split while ignoring, in its substance, priority and nuclear issues.

At the same time, the North, saying they were offering compromise plans while they in effect showed no change in their basic stand, made an insincere suggestion that of the three documents pending, only the two documents of "non-aggression declaration" and "declaration on exchanges and cooperation" be adopted. As for the third document, "joint statement on North-South high-level meeting," the North wanted to retain only its purport.

The South, stressing that the adoption of any non-aggression declaration would be meaningless unless the two sides first duly respect each other's entities, again pointed out that the "basic agreement" would be the starting point for the two sides to discuss and resolve effective and practicable measures to transform inter-Korean relations into those of reconciliation and cooperation.

After the contact, the North, despite the South's objection, insisted that the results of the contact be disclosed to the press

in a way convenient to each side and held a press conference to unilaterally make public what were discussed at the first and second contacts. They went so far as to denounce the South for shunning the adoption of a non-aggression declaration.

This was an act of breaking the original bilateral agreement that to hold the contacts effectively, the contacts would be held behind the closed doors at least until there is some tangible results, and that press briefing, if made, should eliminate any propaganda overtones.

The North's attempt to use the working-level delegates contacts as a propaganda arena aimed at playing up their idea of non-aggression declaration as well as to hasten its adoption, was basically designed to bring about a peace agreement with the United States leading to the withdrawal of American forces and nuclear weapons from Korea, to ease the South's public vigilance against the North, to set off confusion over the security issue in the South, and finally to obtain economic assistance from Japan.

A non-aggression declaration lacking any will power to abide by it would be nothing more than a mere scrap. The South's position is that a non-aggression agreement should be concluded after a basic inter-Korean agreement and confidence building were concluded and promoted so that the two sides would be willing to implement it fully. So, the South has no reason whatsoever to shun a non-aggression declaration.

Rather, it was incomprehensible for the North, calling for a non-aggression declaration, to reject the adoption of a "basic agreement" featuring respect for each other's systems, desistence from slanders and defamation, and mutual assistance.

The South and the North failed to narrow their basic differences. They decided to meet again on December 1.

d. Third Contact

The third working-level delegates contact was held at Tongilkak in the northern sector of Panmunjom for two hours beginning 10 a.m. December 1.

At the contact, the South stressed that the issues of exchanges and cooperation and of non-aggression should be discussed and resolved after a "basic agreement" was adopted on a preferential basis. The South made it clear that the issue of non-aggression cannot be resolved first in a circumstance where the North lacks any determination to improve inter-Korean relations.

The South said there is no reason why North Korea should reject the adoption of a "basic agreement" if they were genuinely interested in removing the state of military and political confrontation. The South then explained about the importance and justness of the adoption of a "basic agreement."

The South emphasized that the basic mission of the South-North high-level meeting is to prepare a basic frame for the improvement of South-North relations, that even a look over the history of national division shows the adoption of a "basic agreement" can no longer be put off, and that the "basic agreement" accommodated North Korean ideas progressively.

The South also said that the North Korean offer to reduce the three documents they produced to two documents did not reflect any change in essence and was not helpful to the efforts of the South and the North to work out an agreement.

Meanwhile, the South laid down a modified Basic Agreement for the Improvement of South-North Relations which accommodated part of North Korean ideas as follows:

Basic Agreement for the Improvement of South-North Relations (Revised Version)

The South and the North,

In line with the wish of the entire people craving for the peaceful unification of the divided homeland,

Reaffirming the three principles of independence, peace and grand national unity embodied in the July 4 South-North Joint Communiqué,

Pledging to faithfully carrying out dialogue in the direction of pursuing common national interests and realizing national reconciliation; to improve South-North relations on the basis of mutual trust realized through the alleviation of tension, exchanges and cooperation between the South and the North; and to exert joint efforts to achieve peaceful unification,

Hereby agree on the following basic items:

- Article 1. Until the time of unification, the South and the North shall respect each other's systems, shall not interfere in each other's internal affairs, shall resolve disputes peacefully through dialogue and negotiations between the government authorities of the two sides, and shall desist from slandering and defaming each other.
- Article 2. The South and the North shall enable the members of the nation to better understand each other's realities. To this end, the two sides shall mutually open and exchange newspapers, radio and television programs and publications.
- Article 3. The South and the North shall expedite economic exchanges and cooperation and carry out personnel exchanges and cooperation in all walks of life to promote the welfare and balanced development of the entire nation, and to ensure this systematically shall

adopt an agreement on travel, communications and economic exchanges and cooperation.

Article 4. The South and the North shall promptly carry out, without any conditions, free exchange of letters, meeting and visits between dispersed families and relatives, and shall promote their reunions on their free will.

Article 5. The South and the North shall desist from arms race, shall promote confidence building to dissolve the state of armed confrontation, and shall carry out arms reduction step by step.

Article 6. The South and the North shall adopt an agreement concerning non-aggression in which the two sides shall pledge not to use arms against each other and shall not perpetrate any form of aggression, sabotage and subversion against each other.

Article 7. The South and the North shall jointly endeavor to transform the existing armistice system into a peace system between the South and the North.

An international mechanism for guaranteeing peace shall be prepared to consolidate peace system between the South and the North.

Article 8. The South and the North shall suspend competition and confrontation, shall cooperate with each other, and shall make joint efforts for national interests and self-esteem at international scenes.

Article 9. The South and the North shall establish a South-North Exchanges and Cooperation Sub-Committee and a South-North Political and Military Sub-Committee within one month after the effectuation of the agreement.

The South-North Exchanges and Cooperation Sub-Committee shall discuss and resolve the issues of realizing exchanges and cooperation, and of

adopting an agreement on travel, communications and economic exchanges and cooperation. The Political and Military Sub-Committee shall discuss and resolve the issue of promoting confidence building and the issue of adopting an agreement on non-aggression.

Article 10. This agreement shall go into force from the date the South and the North notify each other of their completion of procedural measures necessary for its effectuation.

As was seen in the draft agreement, the phrases of “desistance from arms race” and “non-use of the force of arms,” the phrases more proper to be used in a non-aggression declaration, were newly included in the agreement. Moreover, the words “non-aggression agreement” was changed into “agreement on non-aggression,” and the issue of establishing permanent liaison offices in Article 9 of the original draft was deleted to make the revised draft consist of 10 articles.

The South expected that the North would affirmatively respond to this progressive modification. But, the North, adhering to their stand of “adoption of a non-aggression declaration first,” made it clear they won’t accept the adoption of a “basic agreement.”

The North strongly charged that there was no change at all in the South’s revised draft which, it asserted, was a phased idea intended to consolidate the status quo, an idea which “hardly departed from a division-oriented frame.”

They further implied at the postponement of the third high-level meeting until a later date by arguing, “Can the third high-level meeting be held as planned in a circumstance where there is no progress at all at the working-level delegates contacts?”

Even it is held, can it register any affirmative results?"

Even at a press conference held after the working-level delegates contact, the North, in violation of an express agreement reached at a responsible liaison officials contact, argued that "we had at no time agreed to hold the third high-level meeting regardless of the outcome of the working-level delegates contacts."

The North further interfered in the internal affairs of the South by raising an issue not related to the meeting, that was, a demand for the release of the "Chonminnyon" delegates who were arrested after they illegally attended the "three-party conference among South and North Korea and Overseas Compatriots for the creation of pan-national alliance for unification of the fatherland" held in Berlin.

Despite the three working-level contacts, the two sides failed to reach an agreement as they could not narrow the gap between the South's policy for "the adoption of a basic agreement first, and discussion and resolution of a non-aggression issue later," and the North's idea of "the adoption of a non-aggression declaration first."

The two sides decided to discuss the time of the next working-level delegates contact through responsible liaison officials. On December 5, the two sides' responsible liaison officials met but agreed to shelve the fourth working-level delegates contact due to the lack of time.

SOUTH-NORTH DIALOGUE IN KOREA



052
May
1991

SOUTH-NORTH DIALOGUE IN KOREA

Published by
International Cultural Society of Korea
C.P.O. Box 4161
SEOUL, KOREA

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Part I

Progress in South-North High-Level Talks

1. Third South-North High-Level Talks

a. Meeting of the Liaison Officers

(1) The First Meeting

On December 3, 1990, the South side sent a telephone notification in the name of Kim Yong-hwan, the liaison officer of the South's Delegation to the South-North High-Level Talks addressed to the North's liaison officer, Choi Bong-choon. The message proposed that the liaison officers of the two sides meet on December 5 from 10 a.m. in Tongil-gak, in the North's sector of Panmunjom.

On December 4, the North side replied by a telephone accepting this proposal. The liaison officers of the two sides met at Tongil-gak in the North's sector of Panmunjom on December 5 from 10 a.m. until 11:35 a.m.

At this meeting, we explained the itinerary for the stay in Seoul by the North's delegation.

The North, however, raised an issue totally unrelated to this working-level meeting, that is, the arrest of the participants in the Pan-National Alliance inauguration in Berlin, and mentioned they would decide within two or three days whether or not they would participate in the Seoul conference. They, thus, demonstrated a reluctant attitude toward holding the conference.

At this liaison meeting, the two sides agreed to hold another meeting on December 7. Both also concurred that little time remained before the Third High-Level Talks, so the working-level contacts for the Third High-Level Talks, which had been held on three previous occasions, would no longer take place prior to the opening of the talks themselves.

(2) The Second Meeting

The second meeting of the liaison officers was held on December 7 from 3 p.m. and lasted about an hour at Peace House in our sector of Panmunjom.

At this meeting, the North handed us a 90-member list of their delegation (7 delegates, 33 accompanying staff members, 50 journalists) who would enter our area, an automobile boarding plan and a room assignment plan. We handed a Memorandum of Guarantee for Personal Safety to the North.

At the same time, the liaison officers discussed specific issues dealing with the itinerary for the North delegation's stay in Seoul that we had submitted at the first liaison meeting. An agreement was reached on all issues connected with scheduling, including lodging, means of transportation, the manner in which the conference would be conducted, luncheon and dinner banquets and local inspection visits.

This completed all working-level issues related to the Third South-North High-Level Talks.

The following are the main points of the North delegation's itinerary, as decided by the two sides on this day.

- Period of stay: December 11-14, 1990 (4 days)
- Place of lodging and conference venue: Hotel Shilla
- Conference management: 2 sessions scheduled
 - First day session: December 12, 10 a.m., open session
 - South's opening statement
 - North's opening statement
 - Second day session: December 13, 10 a.m. closed session
 - North's initial statement
 - South's initial statement

- Discussion
- North's closing statement
- South's closing statement
- Vehicles: Ten automobiles will be made available to the delegation. Buses will be provided for the accompanying staff members and journalists.
- Local Inspection Sites:
 - December 12: KBS, National Theatre (Joint South-North Viewing of the 1990 Year-End Unification Music Festival)
 - December 13: Korea Exhibition Center (KOEX)
- Dinner Banquet: December 11, Hosted by Prime Minister

Unlike the itinerary plan of the First High-Level Talks, this one: 1) eliminated the North delegation's courtesy call to Chongwadae; 2) eliminated to the words of greeting of the first session; and 3) reduced the number of formal banquets from three to one. Another notable aspect of the itinerary was that the North's delegation had the opportunity to meet its artists participating in the 1990 Year-End Unification Music Festival.

Such changes signified a desire that, beginning with the Third High-Level Talks, a greater weight could be attached to the substantive talks on the basis of mutual understanding achieved through the First and Second Talks.

b. The Outline of Conference

The Third South-North High-Level Talks took place in Seoul from December 11 to 14, 1990.

On December 11, six representatives from the South side headed by Unification Minister Hong Sung-chol greeted the North's delegation as its members arrived at the Peace House

in our sector of Panmunjom. Upon arrival at their lodging site at Hotel Shilla, they were greeted directly by Prime Minister Kang Young-hoon.

In the evening, the South-North delegates participated together in a banquet hosted by Prime Minister Kang Young-hoon.

In the morning of December 12, the first session was an open session, with the opening statements made first by the hosting side and then the visiting side. In the afternoon, the North's delegation conducted a local inspection tour of KBS and attended the 1990 Year-End Unification Music Festival.

In the morning of December 13, the second session of talks began in a closed session, and in the afternoon the delegation had a local inspection tour of the Korean Exhibition Center (KOEX). The delegation attended an informal banquet in the evening.

On December 14 the North Korean delegation, having completed its schedule, returned through Panmunjom at 11:50 a.m.

During this period, the spokesman of the North Korean delegation, Ahn Byong-su, released two statements (on arrival in Seoul and just prior to departure) at press conferences. The South's delegation spokesman Lim Dong-won held three press conferences.

At the Third High-Level Talks, the South stressed again that improvements in South-North relations were both necessary and justified. We comprehensively accepted the various positions the North had put forward during the First and Second High-Level Talks and the working-level contacts in preparation for the Third Talks. We then submitted an amended draft for the "Basic Agreement on Improvements in South-North Relations."

In relation to the non-aggression declaration sought by the North, we stressed the paramount importance of guaranteeing the effectiveness of such a declaration. For this purpose, we first emphasized the necessity for a firm willingness between the two sides to uphold the terms of a nonaggression commitment. Second, it was necessary to abandon policies and attitudes that denied the other's social and political system and sought to destroy or overthrow that system. Third, we espoused the necessity to devise firm verification measures for compliance with the nonaggression declaration.

From this position, we also explained the consistent efforts of our government towards reaching an agreement on nonaggression. At the same time, we submitted an eight-point "Program on Nonaggression." This program could be decided at and resolved in a Subcommittee on Political and Military Affairs to be formed within a month after the adoption of the "Basic Agreement."

If the adoption of the Basic Agreement could be considered the starting point toward peace and reunification, we maintained the position that adoption of this basic agreement must be the first step. Immediately after the adoption of such agreement, the two sides could enter into concrete discussions on military and political affairs, including a nonaggression declaration.

The North Korean side, however, presented what it termed "three opinions on the conferences to date" which pinpointed that our side needed to pursue a new understanding on the issue of peace, to reject our "attitude of reliance on foreign powers" and to participate in the dialogue in a trustworthy and sincere manner. Thus, from the beginning of the conference, the North demonstrated a propagandistic attitude, seeking to lay all blame at our feet for unsatisfactory progress in the con-

ference.

In addition, the North brought up the three emergency issues that it had presented at the First and Second Talks and added to this the release of those who had attended the Berlin inauguration of the "Pan-National Alliance." It then demanded that our side make a firm commitment to these issues.

The North Korea also requested that the conference accept a statement it submitted titled, "Joint Declaration on North-South Nonaggression, Reconciliation and Cooperation." This was a mixture of the "Draft Nonaggression Declaration" and the "Joint Draft Declaration on Reconciliation and Cooperation" that we had presented at the Second Talks. Thus, the North revealed its position by insisting on giving a top priority to a nonaggression declaration.

The North Korean side candidly revealed its motivation for being in such a hurry to adopt a nonaggression declaration. It said: "So as to guarantee peace, a nonaggression declaration should be adopted between the South and North, and a peace accord should be ratified between the United States and North Korea. Then, the South and North should drastically reduce their military forces, and the U.S. forces should withdraw nuclear weapons from South Korea."

When the positions of the two sides diverged, the South attempted to focus on the issues from the First and Second Talks in which the two sides manifested similar positions and agreement was possible. Thus, we submitted plans for action in five areas, including the cessation of vilification and defamation of each other and a second exchange of separated family visitations between the South and the North around the Lunar New Year. North Korea, however, rejected even this proposal.

Therefore, due to the basic differences between the two positions, the Third Talks ended without yielding any visible

result other than an agreement on the date for the Fourth Talks.

However, in comparison with the first two Talks, the talks were fruitful insofar as the two sides clarified their positions. We were able to gain a broader understanding of each other, and could reaffirm our understanding on the need to continue the High-Level Talks.

On the other hand, North Korea caused a consternation in our citizens during the conference by visiting on their own the Dongkook University student association and the home of Lim Su-kyong. In undertaking these visits, the North Korean side ignored a standing bilateral agreement that the visiting side must abide by the guidelines of the hosting side.

On December 12, while the first session of the talks was under progress, North Korean journalists, without prior consultation with our side, secretly left their place of lodging. Under the pretext of gathering news items, they acted in an arbitrary manner by meeting the university students and members of Lim Su-kyong's family and by conducting political propaganda activities on behalf of North Korea's reunification policy.

In this connection, the South side formally lodged a protest through our liaison officer. We notified the other side that we could not guarantee the safety of the participants if they engaged in acts that obstructed the atmosphere of the conference, and we strongly demanded that such incidents not be allowed to repeat themselves.

We believe such unilateral actions by the North Korean side in violation of previous practices illustrated that its intention for participating in the South-North High-Level Talks had less to do with bringing substantive progress in the talks themselves than with carrying out political propaganda in connection with

its strategy for overthrowing the government in the South.

c. The First Session

The first day's open session was held from 10 a.m. until 11:49 a.m. on December 12, 1990, at the Shilla Hotel in Changchoong Dong, Seoul.

The meeting began with our Prime Minister Kang Young-hoon officially declaring the beginning of the Third South-North High-Level Talks. It was followed by informal greetings and an exchange of opening statements (our side speaking first).

In his opening statement, Prime Minister Kang pointed out that numerous contacts were taking place under the support and guarantee of the appropriate authorities on both sides. He then expressed his expectation that the South-North High-Level Talks would also serve an important role in resolving the issue of separated families.

Prime Minister Kang highly praised the efforts of both sides during the working-level contacts held prior to the Third High-Level Talks to find the common ground between the two sides to produce a statement of agreement.

Prime Minister Kang then reiterated the justification for our position that the two sides should first adopt a document of basic agreement on improvements in South-North relations.

He listed the reasons that the two sides should adopt a basic agreement on improvements in South-North relations as follows. First, this was a necessary step for the South and North to normalize relations and to move toward peace and reunification. Second, it was necessary to construct a basic framework for bringing progress to the High-Level Talks. Third, it was necessary to prepare the foundation for an effec-

tive “nonaggression” that would have the confidence of both sides.

At the same time, he argued that an effort to improve South-North relations would not, as the North was claiming, have a tendency to widen the gap in division. In fact, such improvements would lead to building a national community on which a singular state could be established.

Following this, our side submitted a revised 10-point draft basic agreement on improvements in South-North relations which comprehensively took into account the various positions that had been stated by the North Korean side. (For specific details, please refer to our opening statement below.)

Meanwhile, in response to the North’s intransigence in the name of the nonaggression declaration and in assigning a top priority to this document, our side pinpointed one by one the inconsistencies in this position and restated our position with respect to the nonaggression issue.

Our position is that a nonaggression accord should be adopted by the two sides in order to remove the danger of war from the Korean peninsula and to secure the basis for peaceful coexistence. Since proposing a South-North Mutual Nonaggression Accord in 1974, our side has worked continuously for its realization.

In essence, however, adoption of a nonaggression pact does not in itself either create trust where no trust existed before or cause existing tensions to suddenly disappear.

“Nonaggression” signifies a public commitment to abandon military aggression. Only when the parties involved make a steadfast commitment to its adherence does the concept of nonaggression take on significant meaning.

Thus, in order for “nonaggression” to be effective, the parties to the agreement must adhere to a minimal standard of

basic trust. That is, it is necessary to do away with policies and attitudes that deny the other's socio-political system and seek its destruction and overthrow.

The North Korean side, despite its avowed interest in "non-aggression," has demonstrated an attitude that runs contrary to the spirit of mutual respect which constitutes the substantive content of nonaggression.

Even during the period when the South-North Prime Ministers' Meeting was in session, the North Korean side carried out operations with respect to certain persons and groups within our society designed to further its own method of reunification. Such action represented a heightened effort on its part to create disorder within our society and destroy our socio-political system. During the same period, the North also did not hesitate to vilify and defame not only our government but also our head of state.

This inconsistency between the North's words and actions raised doubts as to whether North Korea really intended to adopt a nonaggression declaration and whether, in the event such a declaration were adopted, it would adhere to the terms of the declaration with sincerity.

Our side is not opposed to "nonaggression" *per se*. We propose to have a "nonaggression" that is based on the dismantling of the present structure of confrontation between the South and North and that is certain to be successful.

Based on this position, we specified the following three conditions as necessary for effective agreement on nonaggression:

- (1) guarantees of firm commitment by the two sides to adhere to a nonaggression pledge;
- (2) renunciation of policies and attitudes that denounce the other's socio-political system and seek its destruction and

- overthrow; and
- (3) establishment of firm guarantees to nonaggression, including free access to military information between the South and North, correction of disparities in military forces and inspection and verification measures.

We emphasized that a “Basic Agreement on Improvements in South-North Relations” would represent a test case to help establish such preconditions. We pointed out the inconsistency in the North’s position of refusing to adopt such a document while at the same time calling for a “Nonaggression Declaration.”

Furthermore, we already indicated our readiness to conduct concrete discussions on a nonaggression agreement within a Subcommittee on Exchange and Cooperation and Subcommittees on Political and Military Affairs to be established within a month after the adoption of the Basic Agreement. We also demonstrated our sincerity by submitting a copy of our plan for the South-North nonaggression discussion in the Subcommittee on Political Affairs.

Plan for South-North Nonaggression (Outline)

1. Nonuse of military force and forbidding acts of aggression.
2. Peaceful resolution of conflicts through bilateral dialogue and negotiation.
3. Area of nonaggression is defined as the areas controlled by each side in accordance with the Military Armistice Agreement.
4. Renunciation of policy lines seeking to destroy and overthrow the other side and forbidding acts aimed at causing

- overthrow or disorder.
5. Ending the arms race and establishing structures to guarantee nonaggression.
 - 1) Exchanging of military information and visiting of military personnel.
 - 2) Prior notification of military training and troop movements and exchanging observer delegations.
 - 3) Establishment and operation of a direct telephone line between the two sides' military authorities.
 - 4) Correction of disparities in military forces between the South and North.
 - 5) Adherence to the Military Armistice Agreement, making the Demilitarized Zone a buffer zone to be used in a peaceful manner.
 - 6) Exchanging and operating of on-sight verification teams and permanent inspection teams.
 6. Establishment and operation of a Joint South-North Military Committee.
 7. Establishment of international structures to guarantee nonaggression.
 8. Lack of interest in bilateral or multilateral treaties or agreements already in effect.

Our side emphasized that the adoption of the Basic Agreement would serve as the starting point for developing South-North relations in the direction of peace and reunification. Once the agreement had been adopted, it could form the basis for working out the details of nonaggression. We suggested that the two sides act within a month after adoption of the Basic Agreement to carry out concrete discussions on exchanges and cooperation, confidence building in respect to political and military affairs and on the adoption of a nonag-

gression declaration.

Following this, the North Korean Prime Minister Yon Hyong-muk delivered his keynote statement by listing what he termed “three opinions” on the talks up to that point.

His “three opinions” can be summarized as follows: first, that a new transformation was necessary in understanding the issue of peace for the nation; second, renouncing an attitude that either allowed foreign forces to interfere in the reunification issue or that sought to rely on such forces was necessary; and third, adopting a sincere and truthful attitude toward dialogue was necessary to achieve meaningful progress in the conference. In actuality, however, these were nothing more than a repetition of propagandistic slogans calling for the withdrawal of the U.S. forces, seeking to curb our Northern Policy and hoping to thwart our entry into the United Nations.

The North Korean side, at the same time, requested that our “Declaration for Reconciliation and Cooperation (Draft)” and the “North-South Declaration of Nonaggression (Draft)” be adopted as a combined document.

North-South Declaration of Nonaggression and Reconciliation-Cooperation (Draft) (Outline)

(Preamble)

1. Confirmation of Three Principles of National Reunification in the July 4th Joint Statement.
2. Mitigation of tensions, removal of the danger of war and devising a means for national reconciliation and unity.

(Content)

1. Recognition of and respect for each other’s philosophy and system, nonintervention in internal affairs, peaceful resolu-

tion of conflicts and cessation of vilification and defamation of each other.

2. Nonuse of military force, nonaggression, cessation of arms race, confidence building in military affairs and realization of step-by-step disarmament.
3. Definition of the border of nonaggression as the Military Demarcation Line used in the Military Armistice Agreement and making the Demilitarized Zone a zone of peace.
4. Establishment and operation of a direct telephone line between the military officials of the two sides.
5. Realization of free travel and contact among people and compatriots in various fields.
6. Realization of economic cooperation and exchange of commodities and exchanging of results and experiences in various fields.
7. Installation of the means of transportation and communication.
8. Cessation of competition and conflict in the international arena and cooperation and joint entry into foreign fields.
9. Establishment of subcommittees within the framework of this conference for carrying out and guaranteeing this declaration.
10. Declaration to become effective after signing and exchange and to continue in effect until the time of reunification, unless one of the parties gives a notification of abrogation.

In the opening statement on this day, the North revealed its reason for being in a hurry to push for the adoption of the “nonaggression” declaration at the conference.

Prime Minister Yon stated that our side needed to undergo a transformation in understanding the issue of peace, and he admitted candidly that the purpose of adopting a South-North

declaration of nonaggression was “to realize the removal of nuclear weapons, the withdrawal of U.S. forces from South Korea after the United States and North Korea adopt a peace accord and the large scale disarmament of the South and North.”

He further claimed that our policy of “supremacy of strength,” represented by our rapidly increasing military budget and large-scale introduction of modern weaponry, was causing a real danger of war which necessitated the adoption of a nonaggression declaration. Thus, he made clear that his intention was to halt our military modernization and planning.

At the same time, the North Korean side brought up its so-called “three emergency issues” that it had raised at the First and Second High-Level Talks. These were the issues of U.N. membership, release of persons in custody and the Team Spirit combined military exercises. To these the North added the issue of arrests of participants in the Berlin “Pan-National Alliance” inauguration by noting that such arrests went against the demands of Korean people both within the country and around the world.

The North Korean side criticized us by proclaiming that we were not moving in a direction to resolve these “three emergency issues” but instead were creating even more obstacles. It insisted that these issues had to be resolved within 1990 and even demanded that we make a firm commitment to this effect.

Concerning talks in various fields, the North proposed that once the “North-South Declaration on Nonaggression, Reconciliation and Cooperation” had been adopted, subcommittees could be organized in the areas of “Political,” “Military” and “Exchange and Cooperation” to work out agreements.

The full texts of the opening statements by the two prime ministers during the first day's session are as follows:

**Keynote address by the South's Prime Minister
Kang Young-hoon**

Prime Minister Yon Hyong-muk, delegates from the North.

At the opening of the first-day session of the third round of high-level inter-Korean talks, I welcome you from the bottom of my heart, Mr. Prime Minister, your delegation and support staff and the journalists from the North on your second visit to Seoul.

Several human exchanges and contacts have been made between the South and North since the first round of our talks were held in Seoul in September. In addition to the mutual visits by the delegations to the high-level talks, Unification Soccer Matches and Unification Concerts have been held. At Panmunjom, Red Cross working-level contacts have been held in a renewed effort to arrange home visits by separated family members. Sports talks have also been held there to discuss inter-Korean athletic exchanges and the formation of single Korean teams to participate in international sporting events.

It is a good thing that with the high-level inter-Korean talks serving as a turning point, so many South-North contacts and visits have taken place in an orderly fashion with support and guarantees provided by the authorities of both sides. I believe this has greatly contributed to easing inter-Korean tensions, improving relations between the two parts of Korea and increasing mutual understanding.

And yet, it is very frustrating that inter-Korean Red Cross working-level contacts have not been successful and accordingly no home visits by dispersed relatives have been realized. It is high time that the authorities of both sides made more positive efforts

to relieve the suffering of dispersed families. I hope and expect that our high-level talks will be able to play a major role in accelerating inter-Korean visits and contacts and solving humanitarian issues — all with the aim of closing the South-North gulf of mistrust and confrontation that has deepened over the 45 years since the partitioning of our land.

Following the second round of high-level inter-Korean talks held in Pyongyang in October, three working-level sessions were held between the South and North at Panmunjom to discuss agreed draft documents for adoption at this third round. Regrettably, the working-level sessions have not been able to come up with a concrete accord because different approaches were taken by the two sides. However, I refuse to be disappointed by that. Nor do I think the working-level contacts were totally meaningless.

Through those contacts, we have been able to learn in greater detail each other's view and positions. It has to be accepted that many difficulties are involved in resolving the adversarial and confrontational relationship that has persisted between the South and North for the past 45 years, and there are also considerable differences as to how to go about that task. I believe that the more difficulties and differences that are found, the greater efforts must be made by both sides to overcome them through even more energetic contacts and even more sincere dialogue.

The working-level inter-Korean sessions have set a valuable precedent of both sides striving together in earnest to find common denominators on which to base an agreed draft document. If we value that experience and build on it, I am confident that the desired results will be obtained.

Delegates from the North,

Let me now explain our position on how to resolve the issues that have been placed on our agenda. As your side also knows

well, we have, at the previous two rounds of our talks and again at the working level contacts, proposed in good faith that a Basic Agreement for Improving South-North Relations be adopted. We have also tirelessly explained to you why it is important and essential to improve inter-Korean relations at this critical juncture. Our position is that only if your side agrees to adopt the proposed Basic Agreement, are we willing to discuss and resolve, on the basis of it, the issue of nonaggression, along with the issue of implementing exchanges and cooperation, including inter-Korean travel, communicatins and economic exchanges and cooperation. There are just reasons, which even your side cannot refute, for our proposal to adopt a Basic Agreement for Improving South-North Relations.

First, the South and the North must reach a basic agreement to improve relations, if we are to advance toward the normalization of the current anomalous inter-Korean relationship leading to peaceful unification of the land. The South and the North have been locked in hostility and confrontation for far too long. As your side also knows well, not a single letter can be exchanged between the two parts of Korea even today. Roads and railways between South and North still remain blocked. Even the most basic humanitarian issue of home visits by dispersed relatives remains unresolved. Such abnormal inter-Korean relations persist even at this moment.

Moreover, even after these high-level talks were started in September this year, your side has continued to slander and revile our side even though you have agreed to talk peace and reconciliation with us. Even worse, your side has not ceased to slander the top leader of our side. Even while pursuing these high-level talks, your side is inciting and encouraging certain dissidents in the South to conduct illegal activities and, furthermore, is trying to justify your contacts with them.

Such an anomalous state of affairs must be remedied as quickly as possible. This is crucial to laying the groundwork for peaceful unification — the long-cherished goal of all Koreans. It can be said that we, the Prime Ministers of the South and the North, are meeting like this for the sole purpose of normalizing the anomalous inter-Korean relations and improving the South-North relationship. We can expect neither the resolution of confrontation nor the implementation of exchanges and cooperation if the authorities of both sides refuse to seek improved and normalized relations or even to express the intention to do so.

Second, in order to constructively discuss the issues of “resolving political and military confrontation and implementing multifaceted exchanges and cooperation” that constitute our agenda, it is only reasonable to first establish a clearcut framework for improving inter-Korean relations to underpin such efforts. As your side also knows, at the preliminary meetings to arrange these inter-Korean high-level talks, it was agreed to combine the issue of implementing exchanges and cooperation and that of resolving confrontation into one comprehensive unitary topic.

This means that we should treat the implementation of exchanges and cooperation and the resolution of confrontation not as two separate and different issues but as interrelated tasks that must be accomplished together to effectively improve inter-Korean relations. Accordingly, it is only logical to create a basic framework for that purpose.

In fact, the implementation of exchanges and the resolution of confrontation are the two sides of the same coin, and not two different coins. It follows, therefore, that to resolve confrontation, it is indispensable to effect exchanges and cooperation without fail and that we cannot expect to resolve confrontation without exchanges and cooperation taking place.

To elaborate, we may be able to regard the resolution of confrontation as the passive approach to peaceful unification. But the energization of exchanges and cooperation is the positive approach to that goal. Accordingly, a clearcut expression of the intentions of both sides to improve inter-Korean relations must serve as the basis for discussing and working out concrete and practical steps to implement exchanges and cooperation and resolve confrontation. This is not only logical but also conforms to the spirit of the mutual agreement.

Third, we must adopt a Basic Agreement for Improving South-North relations if we are to resolve the issue of nonaggression at the earliest possible date. Our position is that we should build an effective and trustworthy nonaggression arrangement rooted in a solid framework for bettering inter-Korean relations because such a framework is crucial to really ensuring nonaggression.

Over the past several centuries, many promises of nonaggression were made by many nations. As your side also knows well, most such promises were not kept. In view of this historical lesson, we should make a fail-safe nonaggression arrangement under which promises will not be broken.

If the South and the North promised nonaggression, but did not keep their word, it would only deepen mutual mistrust and aggravate relations, rather than strengthening peace by improving relations. We must prevent such an unfortunate outcome in advance. To that end, it is imperative for both sides to clearly express their determination to improve relations and for that determination to be clearly translated into action.

Northern delegates,

Your side is denouncing our proposals for improving South-North relations as being designed to separate the South and the North into two states. However, we must point out that your

allegation is based on an upside-down logic. We view your argument as nothing other than an excuse for avoiding improvements in South-North relations.

How is it possible to regard as "separatism" our proposals to liquidate the antiquated adversarial and confrontational pattern of inter-Korean relations and achieve a new structure of rapport and cooperation as we enter the 1990s with rising hope? To improve South-North relations is not to seek separation but to promote reconciliation between the two parts of Korea. Improving inter-Korean relations will lead not to two states but to one state based on the concept of one national community.

Our proposals call for the creation of a basic framework under which both sides will respect each other's social and political system. They also call for the opening of our two societies to each other by promoting inter-Korean trade and communication and for the energization of humanitarian projects and economic cooperation. Further, our proposals call for building mutual trust and at the same time creating a nonaggression arrangement to ensure that neither side will make any form of attack against the other. Our stance is thus oriented toward reconciliation and unification but never toward separation.

If both side refuse to respect each other, to open up to each other or even to implement humanitarian projects and economic cooperation, South-North reconciliation can only be an exceedingly remote goal. This is what would separate the South and the North. If your side is genuinely interested in reconciliation, cooperation and peaceful unification, you should cease to cling to the fallacy of "separatism" and should instead take positive steps to improve South-North relations.

I hereby present to you a revised version of the proposed Basic Agreement for Improving South-North Relations. This new version comprehensively incorporates various assertions that

your side has made at the previous two rounds of high-level talks and at subsequent working-level contacts.

**Basic Agreement for Improving South-North Relations
(Revised Proposal)**

WHEREAS the South and the North, determined to comply with the wish of the entire people for the peaceful unification of the divided homeland, reaffirm the three principles of independence, peace and grand national unity as set forth in the South-North Joint Communique of July 4, 1972,

WHEREAS both sides desire to conduct a sincere dialogue aimed at promoting common national interests and achieving national reconciliation,

WHEREAS both sides pledge to jointly endeavor to improve South-North relations based on mutual trust built by easing inter-Korean tensions and by promoting exchanges and cooperation and thus to bring about peaceful unification,

THEREFORE the parties hereto agree to the following basic matters:

- Article 1. Pending unification, the South and the North shall respect each other's political and social system, shall not interfere in the internal affairs of the other, shall peacefully resolve disputes through dialogue and negotiation between the authorities of both sides and shall cease all manner of mutual slander and vilification.*
- Article 2. The South and the North shall make it possible for citizens to understand well the real situation of the other and to that end shall mutually open access to radio and television broadcasts and exchange*

newspapers and publications in general.

- Article 3. To promote the welfare of the entire people and the balanced development of the entire land, the South and the North shall further economic exchanges and cooperation and implement human exchanges and cooperation in all fields and, to institutionally safeguard such activities, shall adopt agreements on travel, communications, and economic exchanges and cooperation.*
- Article 4. The South and the North shall promptly and unconditionally permit free correspondence, reunions and visits between family members and other relatives dispersed south and north and shall promote the reconstitution of divided families on their own free accord.*
- Article 5. The South and the North shall build military trust and implement phased reductions in arms with the aim of ending the arms race and resolving armed confrontation.*
- Article 6. The South and the North shall not use military force against each other and shall adopt a nonaggression agreement to ensure that no attempt to invade, destroy or overthrow the other side will be made.*
- Article 7. The South and the North shall make joint efforts to convert the present armistice into a South-North peace regime. To strengthen the regime, international peace safeguards shall be created.*
- Article 8. The South and the North shall cease competition and confrontation on the international stage and shall cooperate and endeavor together to promote national interests and self-esteem.*
- Article 9. The South and the North shall establish a joint sub-*

committee for South-North exchanges and cooperation and a joint subcommittee on South-North political and military affairs within one month after this Agreement has gone into effect. The subcommittee on South-North exchanges and cooperation shall discuss and resolve the questions of realizing exchanges and cooperation and of adopting agreements on travel, communications, and economic exchanges and cooperation. The subcommittee on South-North political and military affairs shall discuss and resolve the questions of building trust and of adopting a nonaggression agreement.

Article 10. This Agreement shall enter into force as of the day the South and the North notify each other of the completion of their respective procedures for bringing it into effect.

Northern delegates,

I have just presented to you a revised version of the proposed Basic Agreement for Improving South-North relations — a version that incorporates all the views that you have expressed to us thus far.

I would like to elaborate our position on nonaggression which is stated in Article 6 of the Basic Agreement. An agreement on nonaggression is a public promise not to perpetuate military invasion with a view to maintaining and guaranteeing peace. Accordingly, a promise of nonaggression is, as a rule, characterized by prior steps to prevent war based on the existing order and usually prescribes non-use of military force, nonaggression and peaceful solutions of disputes.

However, our people, divided between South and North, have maintained two different ideologies and political systems

for the past 45 years. Furthermore, we experienced the internecine Korean War and have since faced constant tensions even under an armistice arrangement. Accordingly, a South-North promise of nonaggression should basically be an effective means not only of easing military tension but also of preventing military provocations. Signing a nonaggression agreement under the present circumstances would not suddenly and magically give rise to trust which has been lacking for so long and abolish tension which has persisted for so long. A promise of nonaggression can be meaningful only when it is thoroughly kept.

The purpose of our quest for a South-North nonaggression agreement is, in a word, to eliminate the risk of war on the Korean peninsula and ensure peaceful coexistence, while paving the way for peaceful unification.

The following will be required for a South-North promise of nonaggression to be truly valuable and effective.

First, both sides must have an unwavering resolve to abide by a nonaggression agreement. As can be seen from the outcome of the German-Soviet and Japanese-Soviet nonaggression pacts in the past, no nonaggression agreement can by and of itself guarantee that there will be no war. For example, the provisions of the South-North Joint Communique of July 4, 1972, which in effect was in the nature of a nonaggression pact, have not been strictly complied with. This is because a firm determination to faithfully abide by them has been lacking.

The joint communique in question states in Paragraph 2 that the South and the North "will not slander and vilify each other with a view to easing tension and generating an atmosphere of trust, will not resort to any armed provocation, major or minor, and will take positive steps to prevent accidental military clashes." However, the promise not to slander and revile each other has been broken. Southward invasion tunnels have been

discovered at many points in the Demilitarized Zone. Sixteen members of our Presidential delegation were massacred in Burma by a terrorist bombing. A Korean Air passenger jet was blasted out of the sky, with all aboard, mostly innocent workers, killed. The July 4 South-North Joint Communique described itself as a "solemn promise before the entire people." However, it has become a scrap of waste paper because of the lack of a resolve to put it into practice.

Second, if a South-North nonaggression agreement is to be effective, it will be necessary, at the very least, to abandon the policy or inclination to repudiate and attempt to destroy or overthrow the other side's political and social system. Promising nonaggression even while repudiating the other side's body politic can only be regarded as a fraud, because from the beginning, there would not be any genuine intention to make nonaggression binding. As long as one side views the other as an object that must be overthrown or liberalized and continues to contact, encourage and support antigovernment groups and to slander the other's head of state, no agreement on nonaggression can be reached. Even if such an agreement was reached, it would not be worth the paper on which it is written.

Third, if a South-North promise of nonaggression is to be effective, it will be necessary to create solid safeguards to guarantee the observance of the nonaggression pact. Such safeguards can include the mutual disclosure of military information, the correction of military imbalances and a system of effective monitoring and verification and also an international guarantee.

Ever since our side proposed the conclusion of a nonaggression agreement in 1974, we have steadily endeavored to realize the idea. Especially since the Sixth Republic came into being, President Roh Tae-woo has taken every appropriate opportunity to emphasize the need for a South-North nonaggression pact.

For example, speaking before the 43rd General Assembly of the United Nations on October 8, 1988, President Roh proposed that a South-North summit be held to agree on nonaggression or the non-use of military force and to declare such an accord. In proposing the Korean National Community Unification Formula on September 11, 1989, he again called for an early inter-Korean summit to work out a National Community Charter which would include nonaggression provisions. In a speech delivered on the 45th anniversary of national liberation, which fell on August 15, 1990, President Roh declared that the time had come for the responsible authorities of the South and the North to discuss proposals for joint renunciation of the use of the force of arms, the conclusion of a nonaggression agreement, the conversion of the present armistice agreement into a peace treaty and the establishment of a permanent liaison mission in Seoul and Pyongyang and all other issues.

In sum, our position has always been that the South and the North should conclude a nonaggression agreement. We have no reason at all to avoid signing a nonaggression pact nor see any need to do so. Although we call for a South-North nonaggression agreement, we do not want a hollow pact which is an agreement in name only. What we tirelessly seek is a nonaggression agreement which is predicated on the establishment of workable basic relations between the South and North and the building of mutual trust and which is bolstered by a determination to abide by it and also by reliable safeguards. A noneffective promise of nonaggression would only foment mistrust and aggravate South-North relations and would only turn out to be an attempt to fool our 70 million compatriots.

Accordingly, our side has steadily studied and developed not only what should go into a nonaggression agreement but also institutional devices to ensure its enforcement without fail. To

clearly enunciate our resolve to seek a durable peace and peaceful unification, I hereby present as follows our advance proposal for a nonaggression arrangement for discussion and finalization at the proposed joint subcommittee on South-North political and military affairs after a Basic Agreement for Improving South-North Relations has been adopted.

**South-North Nonaggression Arrangement
to be Discussed at the Joint Subcommittee
on South-North Political and Military Affairs**

- 1. Being the people, the South and the North shall not use military force against each other and shall not perpetrate any form of aggression against each other.*
- 2. The South and the North shall peacefully resolve differences and disputes through dialogue and negotiation between the authorities of both sides.*
- 3. Territories subject to nonaggression shall be those that have been respectively controlled by the South and the North under the Military Armistice Agreement of July 27, 1953.*
- 4. Both sides shall abandon policies of destroying or overthrow the other side and shall desist from all activities designed to overthrow or disturb the other side's political system.*
- 5. The following measures shall be taken to end military confrontation and the arms race and to firmly guarantee nonaggression:*
 - 1) Military information shall be exchanged and mutual visits and exchanges of military personnel shall be effected.*
 - 2) Both sides shall notify the other side in advance of all maneuvers or movements by military units of certain size or larger and shall reciprocally invite observation teams*

from the other side on such occasions.

- 3) *A telephone hotline shall be installed between the military authorities of both sides to prevent accidental armed clashes and other military emergencies and avoid their escalation.*
- 4) *Military imbalances between the South and the North shall be corrected to mutually discourage armed aggression.*
- 5) *The Military Armistice Agreement shall be observed and the Demilitarized Zone shall be turned into an effective buffer zone and utilized for peaceful purposes.*
- 6) *Field verification teams and resident monitoring teams shall be exchanged in order to verify the implementation of the above safeguard measures and to prevent surprise attacks.*
6. *A South-North joint military committee shall be established to work out practical steps needed to enforce the terms of agreement on nonaggression.*
7. *International guarantees of nonaggression shall be sought.*
8. *These provisions shall not influence bilateral or multilateral treaties or agreements that both sides have already concluded.*

Northern delegates,

The South and the North should squarely face the reality that two different political systems exist on the Korean peninsula and should endeavor, pending unification, to restore and develop one national community while ensuring coexistence and coprosperity, so that our homeland will be peacefully unified in due course. We believe that the adoption of a Basic Agreement for Improving South-North Relations, based on a spirit of mutually respecting the other side as a real political entity, would certainly start ad-

vancing inter-Korean relations along the path to peaceful unification. The adoption of the proposed Basic Agreement can be said to be a touchstone to confirm whether or not both sides are resolved to keep promises of nonaggression. First of all, the proposed Basic Agreement means that both the South and the North should respect each other's political system and should not revile and slander each other. It also means that by promoting exchanges and cooperation and by building trust, new inter-Korean relations of rapport and cooperation should be developed.

Accordingly, you are contradicting yourself by avoiding the conclusion of a Basic Agreement even while insisting on a "nonaggression declaration" to renounce the use of military force. This is your own proof that the proposed nonaggression declaration is nothing but an empty slogan and a propaganda ploy.

A nonaggression pact is meaningful only when it is underpinned by a resolve to abide by it and also by solid safeguards. Therefore, if your intentions behind the proposed declaration of nonaggression are genuine, your side ought, as a matter of course, to take a conciliatory, rather than confrontational, stance, with a cooperative, rather than antagonistic, spirit and actively work together with us to improve South-North relations.

Now that your side is scrambling to improve relations with Japan, while continuing contacts with the United States, there should be no reason why you have to be reluctant to improve relations with us who are one people with you. Our position is that both sides should adopt a Basic Agreement for Improving South-North Relations as expeditiously as possible and on that basis should discuss details of a nonaggression arrangement.

To elaborate, we propose that within a month of the adoption of a Basic Agreement, a joint subcommittee on exchanges and cooperation and a joint subcommittee on political and military

affairs be created to conduct detailed discussions on how to implement exchanges and cooperation, how to establish travel and communications links, how to carry out projects for economic exchanges and cooperation, how to build political and military trust and also how to formulate a nonaggression agreement. In that context, it can be said that the proposed Basic Agreement and the nonaggression issue are inseparably interrelated because the Basic Agreement includes a provision for the adoption of a nonaggression agreement and thus provides the basis for progressively improving inter-Korean relations.

Delegates from the North,

I hope and expect that at this round of our talks, your side will clearly express concrete intentions to improve South-North relations. If you agree to improve inter-Korean relations and resolve the long-standing confrontation, I am confident that a bright future of rapport and cooperation will unfold on the Korean peninsula, which now remains the lone island of the Cold War.

It is the unanimous yearning not only of the 70 million Korean people but also of all people in the world who desire peace in Northeast Asia that South-North confrontation be ended and replaced with a new relationship of rapport and cooperation. Once again, I urge your side to agree to improve South-North relations and positively respond to our call for adopting a Basic Agreement.

**Keynote address by the North's Prime Minister
Yon Hyong-muk**

Prime Minister Kang Young-hoon and delegates of the South side,

Today when all our compatriots are sending off the first year of the significant 1990s, a year when the new, fervent trend to national unity was manifested in the north, the south and abroad, and greeting the new year with a more ardent hope for national reunification, we are holding the third north-south high-level talks.

First of all, I would like to express thanks to the delegation of the south side and the officials concerned who have received our delegation warmly and made great efforts for ensuring the talks.

I also extend thanks to the citizens of Seoul and all our fellow countrymen in the south who have welcomed our party warmly with compatriotic love and gave us inspirations and encouragement, and convey to them the greetings from their brothers in the north.

Already a hundred days have passed since we started our first talks with you in Seoul, so that the season has changed and the year is also changing.

During these days many changes have taken place around us.

Our compatriots in the north, the south and abroad had a Pan-National Rally for the first time after the August 15 liberation of the country, held a Pan-National Reunification Music Concert; the north and the south cheered Korean teams jointly at international games, and held Reunification Soccer Games at the stadiums of Pyongyang and Seoul amid the warm ovation of our compatriots.

And now the 1990 Year-End Traditional Concert for Reunification is being held here in Seoul, and artists from the north and the south are sharing their kindred feelings in the melodies of national music.

Recently our countrymen from the north, the south and abroad reaffirmed in Berlin the formation of the "Pan-National Alliance for Reunification" reflecting their desire and will for

reunification. This was another splendid success made on the road to achieving reunification in the 1990s.

The daily-mounting firm will of our nation for reunification is just turning into a nationwide reunification movement.

All this which was inconceivable in the past, powerfully demonstrates at home and abroad that no vehement cold wind of confrontation can ever check the ardent desire of our compatriots for reunification, and that the barrier of division, however tall and thick, cannot be an eternal barrier dividing our nation into two.

Our compatriots in the north and the south have already taken a big step on the road of reconciliation, unity and reunification, and are confidently looking forward to the reunification in the 1990s as an immediate reality.

Our high-level talks which have started assuming a heavy responsibility before the nation, have been an important positive factor which can never be excluded from the current of this situation which is developing favorably for national reunification.

The north-south high-level talks which have come into being after nearly 20 years, are a result of the joint efforts of our two sides to solve the reunification problem of the country peacefully through a dialogue; they have roused great expectations and interest among the people at home and abroad.

Even now we cannot forget the warm welcome the citizens of Seoul accorded to our delegation when we had come to Seoul for the first talks, extending us warm greetings in their wish for the success of the talks.

Indeed, we can say that we have made an important start in the first year of the 1990s — the years of reunification.

Delegates from the south side,

Although it is true for all the dialogues between the north and the south, our high-level talks are especially important for their

position and mission. We must also say that our responsibility is very heavy.

As a matter of fact, it will be no exaggeration even if we say that the prospects of peace and reunification which have a bearing on the destiny of the nation, depend on our talks and that the desire of our 70 million compatriots is contained in them.

These talks are not a subterfuge that may or may not be held nor a sluggish bargaining that may be held next month or next year if they are not held this month or this year.

Ours are responsible talks which should be crowned with success as early as possible and bear fruit without fail by pooling the will of both sides.

During the past talks our two sides repeatedly held serious discussions on wide-ranging issues in accordance with the agenda, and we could ascertain that we can come to an agreement on individual issues.

However, when we look back upon the whole process of the talks, the two sides have not yet settled even the first issue of the talks in spite of the two rounds of full-dress talks and several working-level contacts.

What is arousing our apprehension all the more is the prospect of the talks in view of the actual state of the talks that the opinions of one side on every issue run counter to those of the other side and of the difference of opinions on basic issues.

The issues of entering the UN as one member, of suspending the "Team Spirit" joint military exercises and of releasing the people who have visited the north, the issues to be settled immediately, are still facing us. Furthermore, we have not yet brought the divergence of our fundamental standpoints on easing the political and military confrontation and realizing multifarious cooperation and exchange closer to a common point nor narrowed down the difference in the views on such a basic and

reasonable issue as making public a nonaggression declaration.

We have not yet agreed upon how to divide the agenda involving broad contents, and how to consider them in what order of priority.

Frankly speaking, when the non-governmental persons of both sides meet once or twice they easily understand each other and reach a satisfactory agreement. However, the talks between us high-level authorities are still in a state of confrontation.

Today's reality is that the authorities, who should stand in the van in the solution of the problem of reunification, are far behind the compatriots in the reunification movement.

If we drag on the high-level talks at a snail's pace in this way without any prospect, this will certainly give great disappointment to the people at home and abroad. In particular, this will bring about serious consequences of putting the brake on the daily-increasing burning desire of the compatriots for reunification rather than keeping pace with it.

If this happens, it is evident that all the 70 million compatriots at home and abroad who have been observing the north-south talks for nearly 20 years with the alternating feelings of expectation and disappointment, will no longer trust the authorities nor pardon them.

Out of the desire not to make our talks such unsavory ones, I, at the opening of the third round of the high-level talks, will dwell on some of our views, recognizing the necessity of examining and reviewing coolly the previous talks and of finding the causes of talks being retarded and the lessons for a fresh start.

Firstly, I consider it urgent to see in a new light the question of peace in our country.

Today peace has become the most universal ideal of mankind.

For our nation who is living in the danger of war, peace is most precious and earnest.

Only when peace prevails in the country can we achieve peaceful reunification, the cherished desire of the nation, as soon as possible and save our fellow-countrymen from the disaster of war.

From this viewpoint we have constantly paid primary concern to the question of peace in the Korean peninsula and made sincere efforts to find a solution to this question.

The detailed proposal to remove military confrontation as well as the proposal for a nonaggression declaration advanced by our side in the first round of the talks clearly show our fundamental stand on the question of peace in the country and the ways to solve it.

Our peace program is clear.

We maintain the settling of the problem of peace in the country on a preferential basis and, in order to guarantee peace, insist on adopting a nonaggression declaration between the north and south, concluding a peace agreement between the DPRK and the United States, reducing the armed forces of the north and south drastically and withdrawing the nuclear weapons and US troops from south Korea.

However, it can be said that the view and attitude of your side towards the question of peace are in a contrast to ours.

The first point in question is that even though you emphasize peace in general terms, you neglect it in actually, never considering it as a realistic task whose solution brooks no delay.

Your side has not yet advanced any concrete proposal for guaranteeing peace on the Korean peninsula; during the previous first round of talks you clarified only the general direction of the disarmament.

Your consistent stand expressed in the talks is that the settlement of the military problem should be delayed because it is difficult and the humanitarian affairs and the problem of exchange

should be solved, above all else, gradually and by stages, the problems which you claim easy to deal with.

We agree to your proposal on solving the humanitarian affairs and the problem of exchange, but we can never agree on postponing the settlement of the military affairs and the problem of peace which are most urgent.

There is no reason whatsoever to delay the solution of the military question in our country where an unstable ceasefire is enforced with large armed forces opposed to each other.

The so-called north-south confrontation is essentially a political and military confrontation which has precisely become a source of mutual distrust.

The sharp confrontation and the deep-rooted distrust will never be removed, nor hopes for their elimination will be harbored, unless peace is guaranteed.

We must first have peace reign if we truly want to end the confrontation and remove the distrust.

Now that when peace is needed above anything else, if you want to leave behind the military affairs and come up with the questions of humanitarian affairs and exchange in its stead, it becomes clear that you have no intention but to oppose peace and delay the achievement of reunification into an unforeseeably long date.

We believe that such an irrational conception concerning the matter of peace in our country must be quickly corrected and that the discussion of our agenda cannot proceed smoothly until when you have your conception corrected.

Another aspect of the conception of peace is that there is a war-deterrent theory based on the superiority of strength.

That peace can be achieved through the superiority of strength is not intended towards peace but actually leads to the theory of war. It will only beget unlimited armament, intensify

mutual confrontation and distrust and increase the threat of war.

Now the world is becoming aware of this and is transferring from the era of arms race to that of disarmament.

It is, however, in only south Korea that quick arms build-ups are being pushed to achieve the "superiority of strength."

The military expenditures have sharply increased and new types of weapons are being introduced on a large scale. Public information has shown that by the end of 1995 a rapid increase of armament will be sustained there.

Considering your side's conception of peace and your military policy proceeding from it, it is quite apparent that we shall never reach any positive agreement, no matter how long we talk with you on peace. Our talks about disarmament may remain fruits through to the end of 1995.

War has become a real threat in our country; there is, in fact, no place in the world where such a great threat of war exists other than on the Korean peninsula.

A national catastrophe is looming before us and we must begin by sweeping away the catastrophe; it would be so naive simply to discuss how to conduct tourism or business, and that is a behavior quite unexpected of politicians.

Moreover, the armament-first theory, which is insisting on acquiring the superiority of strength, is an absolutely reckless and irresponsible attitude, which only adds fuel to the fires.

Genuine humanism in our country can never be shown in the realization of a few persons' visit to their home towns; it will be shown only as a result of the achievement of peace and peaceful reunification. A genuine prosperity of our nation will be achieved only with the realization of peace and peaceful reunification.

It is only in peace and peaceful reunification that we must seek genuine humanism which will diminish completely the sufferings of our divided nation and which will truly guarantee our

nation an enduring prosperity.

We must not delay the solution of the question of peace, nor lay any hindrance upon it; we must begin by adopting the non-aggression declaration on refraining from fighting each other and set to the work of discussing and solving the matters related to the elimination of military confrontation, including the matter of disarmament.

As we have explained in the second round of talks, we are not insisting on discussing the military affairs alone; we are going to discuss this matter along with the humanitarian affairs and economic exchange.

We believe that if you share this principled attitude of ours, you can hardly make any excuse to hesitate and evade the discussion of the matter of peace and the military affairs.

Secondly, we must resolutely repudiate the attitude towards allowing or relying on the outside interferences in achieving reunification.

The north and the south have already confirmed, through the July 4, 1972 Joint Statement, the three principles of national reunification that it should be achieved independently without relying on or allowing the interference of the outside forces.

As we have stressed on many occasions those who are responsible for the national reunification are none other than our nation.

No one would present the reunification of the country to us; it is not the kind of undertaking which we are to carry out by seeking any assistance from others.

As we feel the urgency of reunification and the efforts to achieve it even more than before, we must have a faith in our nation's potential, instead of relying on the outside forces, and we must pave the wide road to reunification by pooling the internal force of our nation.

However, even now when 45 years have passed since the August 15, your side has not yet abandoned the attitude of relying on the outside forces.

We feel that it is this attitude that has been throwing obstacles in the way of our dialogue.

As to the adoption of the north-south nonaggression declaration which we have been discussing since the second round of talks, we can easily say that your side objected the adoption of this document mainly because you want to keep the US troops stationed in south Korea.

If the north and the south are committed to refraining from fighting each other, US troops who are in south Korea allegedly to prevent the outbreak of war, must get withdrawn from there; their withdrawal will be all the more advantageous to the realization of peace and peaceful reunification of our country.

But you are reluctant to adopt the declaration simply on the excuse of keeping US troops. It is intolerable because your attitude is a salient expression of the attempt to rely on the outside forces.

US troops are holding the prerogative of the south Korean troops and their existence has become the basic threat to the peace on the Korean peninsula.

Even in this situation when US troops are kept in south Korea, we are going to conclude the nonaggression declaration with your side. This demonstrates our sincere desire to make a breakthrough in guaranteeing peace by any possible means, as well as our expectation for you taking a stand of independence.

But if your side ignores our sincerity and is doggedly opposed to the adoption of the nonaggression declaration simply to seek a sustained presence of US troops, it will only bring disgrace to your honor and reveal the intention that you have no desire for peace.

If we depend upon foreign forces, we cannot but be subjected to their interference, cannot but be worried about their attitude. Consequently, our talks are bound to lose independence and be restricted by external factors.

If your side does not give up its position of seeking the “protection” of American nuclear weapons and armed forces which can drive the whole nation into nuclear holocaust, it will be difficult for us to settle any problem concerning peace, let alone that of adopting the non-aggression declaration.

But if your side frees itself from such a stance to depend on outside forces, there will easily and definitely come the possibility of solving the problem of the peace of our country.

Another thing we have to point out as regards our relationship with foreign forces is that you are conducting an entreaty diplomacy in the problems of north-south relationship and reunification.

The problems of north-south relationship and reunification should all along be solved through dialogue between the two sides. The north-south high-level talks constitute an excellent means of dialogue for the settlement of these problems and provide adequate opportunities to solve our internal matters. However, instead of settling national problems between ourselves at the talks, you are entreating foreign countries for intervention and interference in an endeavour to force your will upon the other side. This cannot be regarded as a stance to solve problems reasonably, nor as a sincere and serious attitude towards the other side.

In accordance with the “north policy” your high authorities visit different countries and ask them to help you in “guiding” us towards “openness.” This cannot but be considered as an extremely impure and provocative act of forcing us to change our institutions on the strength of others. This act is a glaring

manifestation of a brazen challenge to the other side's system and a glaring manifestation of the partitionist stance of rejecting the settlement of the reunification problem through dialogue with the other side. But you must understand that your such entreaty diplomacy will only aggravate confrontation and increase distrust, that it can never affect our immutable, thoroughly independent position and the socialist system of our own type which is most superior and stable, and that your wish for any change on our part is a mere illusion.

We only wonder when this dependence on outside forces and flunkeyist way of thinking impairing national dignity and interests with disappear.

Ours is a dignified nation with the strong spirit of independence and self-respect.

Cannot our nation reunify their country by their own efforts? No, they are fully capable of reunifying their country.

In the past our country was lost to great powers and our nation underwent great sufferings because of the policy of relying on foreign forces. We must never repeat this disgraceful history.

If you have a real intention to reconcile, unite with us and reunify the country from the national standpoint you must not depend on foreign forces and go to big countries for the solution of the internal affairs of the nation, but take a sincere attitude towards the dialogue with us belonging to the same nation.

We consider this as the fundamental way to success in our talks.

Thirdly, we keenly feel that we should have a sincere and trustful attitude towards the dialogue for successful talks.

Only when dialogue is based on trust can it be successful and bear good fruits.

Dialogue based on mistrust is a deception and such a dialogue only brings misunderstanding and distrust.

If we are to have a trustful dialogue, our words of yesterday and today must not differ and our words must agree with our deeds.

We should like to stress that the trustful dialogue is of special importance particularly at our high-level talks representing the authorities.

Our trustless words and deeds may baffle these important high-level talks and produce irrecoverable consequences in the solution of the reunification question.

It is quite regrettable that we must refer to this today, not long after the high-level talks started. We say this, bearing in mind the irritating statements your side made in Tokyo, Japan.

In Pyongyang you said again and again that you "value" our expression of new attitude and our new proposals. But, later in Japan you said that "there is no change in the attitude of the north Korean side." There is obviously a question in your different statements, we must say.

You say good things to us at the dialogue and you say to others that the responsibility for no progress in the dialogue rests with us. This distortion of fact and slander brings nothing good in making our dialogue a trustful one.

As for UN membership, it is not a faithful attitude to go to another country and conduct diplomatic operations for separate UN membership even though the parties concerned still have to solve the problem. At the talks with us you appreciated the improvement of Korea-Japan relations. But your statements and conducts in Japan put brakes on the improvement of Korea-Japan relations. How can we trust you and have talks with you in the future, we wonder. If we value our talks and are to lead the talks to success we must approach the other side sincerely, observe fidelity and have trustful talks.

I have referred to some lessons we have learned from our

talks held so far and like your side to give serious consideration to this for the successful progress of our talks.

Delegates of the south side,

Two sides had prior consultations in real earnest on the documents to be submitted to the third full-dress talks through three working-level contacts at Panmunjom.

The main point at issue at these contacts was what kind of documents the third high-level talks would adopt and what the documents would contain.

In this context, at the first working-level contact we proposed to adopt three documents — “The Joint Statement of the North-South High-Level Talks,” “The North-South Declaration of Nonaggression” and “The Declaration of North-South Cooperation and Exchange,” taking into consideration the proposals and suggestions both sides advanced at the first and second high-level talks and put forward their drafts, and your side partially amended the draft “basic agreement on the improvement of north-south relations” advanced at the first high-level talks and insisted on discussing it at the third high-level talks.

At the second working-level contacts we respected your suggestion that it would be difficult to adopt three documents because there was not much time and proposed to adopt two documents — “The North-South Declaration of Nonaggression” and “The Declaration of North-South Cooperation and Exchange.”

But your side obstinately insisted on adopting only one document “The Basic Agreement on the Improvement of North-South Relations.” This difference of both sides was not eliminated even at the third working-level contact, with the result that we are having the third high-level talks today without reaching any agreement.

Though the working-level contacts did not produce any good

results, we consider that the question does not lie in the number of the documents to be adopted. In view of your opposition to our proposal to adopt the two documents of nonaggression and cooperation and exchange declarations and of the fact that you have, since long been attaching top priority to the cooperation and exchange proposal, it is clear that your side intends to avoid the adoption of the nonaggression declaration.

The adoption of the north-south nonaggression declaration is the starting-point in removing misunderstanding and mistrust, eliminating confrontation and opening a new phase for peace and peaceful reunification of our country.

Nevertheless, you are stubbornly trying to avoid this. This self-exposes that your former allegation on adopting a nonaggression declaration were empty talks and the "threat of southward invasion from the north" was a lie, and only shows that your side is not interested in preventing war.

It is illogical for your side to insist on "attaching top priority to confidence-building" while avoiding the adoption of a nonaggression declaration.

It is clear to everyone that confidence-building is not a problem to be solved before the adoption of a nonaggression declaration but its adoption is a most solid and reliable measure for confidence-building.

We cannot understand why you insist on building confidence while avoiding the adoption of a nonaggression declaration promising internally and externally solemnly not to attack or conquer the other side.

If your side even doubts our proposal to adopt a nonaggression declaration, there will be virtually no problems the north and south can solve.

We think that there is no need of stressing again the urgency of adopting a nonaggression declaration.

The question is whether to adopt it as a separate document or include it in another document. We consider that it should be adopted as a separate document in view of its importance.

But, if your side strenuously insists on adopting one document we are ready to consider a measure not to waste time because of the form of documents but to solve it as soon as possible.

Taking into consideration your proposal from this viewpoint, we propose to make one of our draft nonaggression declaration and your draft reconciliation and cooperation declaration and adopt it as a document.

We propose to name this one document "The North-South Declaration of Nonaggression, Reconciliation and Cooperation" and include the following contents in it:

**Declaration of North-South Nonaggression,
Reconciliation and Co-operation (draft)**

Reaffirming the three principles of national reunification — independence, peaceful reunification and great national unity — set out in the July 4 Joint Statement in keeping with the desire of the entire nation for peace and peaceful reunification of the country and in order to ease the tension, remove the danger of war, promote national reconciliation and unity, and create favorable environment for the reunification of the country, the north and the south solemnly declare as follows:

- 1. The north and the south shall recognize and respect each other's ideologies and social systems and refrain from interfering in the internal affairs of the other side, settle any differences and disputes between them peacefully through dialogue and negotiation and cease to abuse and slander the*

other side.

2. *The north and the south shall not use arms against the other side under any circumstances, nor shall they infringe upon the other by force of arms, and, in order to guarantee it, shall halt their arms race, build up military confidence in the other side and reduce their armed forces stage by stage.*
3. *The north and the south shall set the Military Demarcation Line established in the Agreement on the Military Armistice in Korea dated July 27, 1953 the demarcation line of nonaggression and convert the Demilitarized Zone of the Military Demarcation Line into a peace zone.*
4. *The north and the south shall install and operate direct telephone links between the military authorities of the two sides in order to prevent the outbreak and escalation of accidental armed conflicts.*
5. *The north and the south shall ensure free travels and contacts between the personages and other people from all walks of life of both sides.*
6. *The north and the south shall effect economic cooperation and exchange of goods and share information on the successes and experience and co-operate with each other in all sectors of science, technology, education, culture, public health, sports, publication and the press, for the common interests and prosperity of the nation.*
7. *The north and the south shall restore the severed network of transport and communications between the two sides.*
8. *The north and the south shall discontinue competition and confrontation, promote co-operation between them in the international arena and jointly conduct external activities.*
9. *The north and the south shall set up sub-committees under the framework of the present talks to discuss measures for the implementation and assurance of this declaration.*

10. *This declaration shall be valid from the day when the north and the south sign it and exchange its text and, it shall be valid until the reunification of the country, unless one side informs the other of its abrogation.*

The “Declaration of North-South Nonaggression, Reconciliation and Co-operation,” both in its title and contents, not only contains fairly the assertions of both sides, but also fully reflects the principled questions and practical matters which should be solved in removing misunderstanding and distrust and promoting reconciliation and unity between the north and the south and in achieving peace and peaceful reunification.

Our new proposal for adopting the “Declaration of North-South Nonaggression, Reconciliation and Co-operation” is the expression of our earnest desire to make this high-level talks fruitful by all means, so as to bring happy news to the people at home and abroad.

Considering that there is no reason for your side not to accede to our proposal for the adoption of the “Declaration of North-South Nonaggression, Reconciliation and Co-operation,” we hope that an agreement will be made on it.

Next, on the matter of establishing the councils of various branches.

At the second talks the assertions of the two sides crossed each other on the problem of the order of discussion and, in order to overcome it, we put forward the proposal of package agreement and simultaneous implementation on removing the political and military confrontation and effecting co-operation and exchange between the north and the south.

We still consider that such formula is reasonable.

We envisage an exceptional rule to treat the urgent issues separately. Under such condition, a package agreement, a

simultaneous practical plan, will place no hindrance to the solution of the problem.

As for the councils of various branches arising for the effective management of the talks, we are of the opinion that they, instead of the two branches, should consist of the three branches including the problems of cooperation and exchange, while separating political and military affairs in consideration of the importance and seriousness of the issue. Since this problem is connected with the implementation of the "declaration of nonaggression, reconciliation and cooperation between the north and the south" which we are going to adopt, we propose to set up the appropriate branches through consultations after this document is adopted.

Next, we would like to say once again about the problems associated with the entry into the United Nations, the discontinuation of the "Team Spirit" joint military exercises and the release of the visitors to the north, which we took up in the first round of talks and the solution of which we urged at the second round of talks.

These three problems are the most urgent and important political and military pending issues which await the solution at present.

So far, we gave a satisfactory explanation to the significance of the settlement of these problems and its urgency. While putting forward the various possible ways for their solution, we have awaited your favorable response with patience and efforts.

Many days have elapsed since we presented these problems. But none of these problems have yet been solved and there is no prospect of their settlement.

What makes us regret all the more in this connection is that your side is not interested in the solution of the issue, but rather aggravates difficulties.

In our view, your side still adopts the position that the north and the south should enter the United Nations separately and continues to conduct behind-the-scenes operations to realize its unilateral membership.

As we pointed out previously, we have lived without joining the United Nations for more than 40 years since the division of the country. Now that reunification is in the offing and that the measures for UN membership are being discussed at the north-south high-level talks, the insistence upon the separate or solo entry into the United Nations with utter disregard for the aspirations of fellow countrymen for reunification and high-level talks is at odds with the ideal of reunification and the ethics of talks.

Your side has said that the proposed entry into the UN with one seat is a good idea, but it is unrealistic. It is also an attempt to avoid the responsibility.

Whether it is realistic or unrealistic is related to the will and efforts of us the parties concerned. It will be proved when an application is made to the UN for joint membership.

We cannot say that it is a well-disposed attitude to evade what is quite possible to do without having to try, considering it unfeasible.

To take the issue of releasing those who visited the north as an example. Immediately after the second talks Rev. Moon Ik-hwan was released, but student Lim Su-kyong and others remain in prison.

What makes the situation more complicated recently is the repression against the delegates of the south side to the Promotion Headquarters for the Pan-National Rally, who returned after a meeting in a foreign country with the compatriots from the north and abroad.

Your side has no reason whatsoever to incriminate them.

They met the delegates from the north and abroad overtly in a

foreign country to discuss the reunification problems and reaffirm the foundation of the Pan-National Alliance for Reunification (Pomminryon). It is another event of significance which will go down in the history of our nation's reunification movement. Accordingly, their righteous behaviour deserves to be praised by all the compatriots.

Therefore, arresting them on the excuse that they went abroad and met their fellow countrymen without permission is a grave violation of human rights and an act of political repression.

Conducting diplomatic activity with foreigners in other countries to divide the country poses no problem, but meeting with fellow countrymen to discuss the reunification question abroad is a crime — in fact, this is not a legal problem, but an issue of political character.

Denouncing their dialogue with the delegates from the north and abroad as the behavior against the high-level talks and making a false charge against them is a repression on the public opinions for the reunification. At the same time, abusing the high-level talks as a means to interrupt the contact and travel of non-governmental persons is nothing but a defilement on the high-level talks.

We regard the repression on the delegates of the South Side's Promotion Headquarters for the PNR not only as an extension of the suppression to those who visited the north, but also a flat challenge to the unanimous desire of the people, internal and external, for their release.

At present, the people both at home and abroad are closely watching your approach, relating the "Team Spirit" joint military exercises with the prospect of the north-south high-level talks.

In an effort to find a solution to this problem, we have sug-

gested a flexible proposal at the last second talks to cease the "Team Spirit" exercises tentatively at least during the talks only, if you could not stop them completely, and the proposal on both sides sending a letter to the US government on behalf of the north-south high-level talks demanding the cessation of these military exercises, if it is impossible for you alone to make a decision to do this.

However, it is a great pity that your side has not taken any measure to stop the "team spirit" joint military exercises and instead made it public to launch these exercises next year, too, in agreement with the United States.

All of your negative attitudes towards the three urgent questions advanced by us show that your side is still concerned about confrontation and not reunification, wishes the aggravation of tension instead of relaxation, and tries to drag on the time infinitely, instead of solving the questions through dialogue.

Such attitudes of your side make us worry about the prospects of the relations between the north and the south and of our high-level talks.

Your side must give up the old conservative attitudes and refrain from causing difficulties in the talks and darkening the prospects for national reunification.

We consider that your side should think over the desire of the whole nation for the country's reunification and peace and the sincerity of our side which treasures these high-level talks, and show a due concern about the solutions to the three urgent questions raised.

This year has almost passed. Therefore, the questions facing us that need urgent solutions must be dealt with within this year.

We hope that in this round of the talks you will give us definite answers to the questions of taking positive measures to enter the UN with one seat, to stop the "Team Spirit" joint

military exercises and to release those who visited the north, so that we will find solutions to these three urgent questions which have been brought up for discussion at the present talks and, from the next year, concentrate our efforts on discussing the basic problems to be solved at our talks.

The delegates from the south,

At this moment when we see off the significant first year of the 1990s, all our fellow countrymen are reviewing proudly one year which has passed in their continuous efforts for reunification.

If our high-level talks are to review their work significantly, we must wind up this third round of the talks successfully.

If even this round is finished with no result, we will leave nothing but the name of the high-level talks and we cannot avoid the blame for having done nothing for reunification.

At present, attention at home and abroad is not being focused on the opening of the high-level talks itself, but on the results of the talks.

The time has already passed when an emphasis was put on only the significance of the opening of the high-level talks.

What is particularly important for us is to make this third round a fruitful talk.

We delegates of the both sides must by all means reach a good agreement in this third round of the talks, thus reviewing significantly the first year of the 1990s, the decade of reunification.

d. The Second Session

The second day's closed session took place from 10 a.m. until 12:12 p.m. on December 13, 1990 at the Shilla Hotel.

At this session, informal greetings were first exchanged,

followed by an exchange of opening statements (first by the North Korean side), discussion, and finally an exchange of closing statements (North Korean side speaking first).

North Korean Prime Minister Yon Hyung-muk criticized our side in his opening statement for allegedly avoiding the adoption of nonaggression declaration and reiterated the North's call for the adoption of the "Declaration of Nonaggression, Reconciliation and Cooperation" which they had placed on the table.

The North Korean side maintained that we had withdrawn the "Joint Declaration for Reconciliation and Cooperation" which we had submitted to the Second High Level Talks and had resubmitted the "Basic Agreement on Improvements in South-North Relations" which we had proposed at the First Talks. It alleged that our position of first adopting the Basic Agreement and then a nonaggression declaration was tantamount to an excuse for avoiding the issue of adopting the nonaggression declaration.

In response to our proposals for insuring the effectiveness of the nonaggression declaration, the North retorted that the nonaggression declaration would be a starting point for resolving the state of military conflict. The nonaggression declaration in itself, it professed, would represent a public statement before the world community that the two sides were willing to put the provisions into practice. The North, thus, rejected any accompanying structures to guarantee compliance.

The North Korean side also criticized us that, whereas its position was to resolve the issues of military and of exchange and cooperation concurrently, our side intentionally placed obstacles in the way by insisting on giving a priority to the issues of exchange. In this vein, it declared that we were responsible for the impasse in the Eighth Red Cross working

level contacts and even introduced some absurd matter regarding the participants in the 1990 Year-End Unification Music Festival.

Prime Minister Kang Young-hoon then delivered his opening statement, in which he expanded on our plan for the “Basic Agreement on Improvements in South-North Relations” and on our thinking that nonaggression could be addressed and agreed upon in subcommittees on political and military affairs.

We stressed that the Basic Agreement would be an expression of the two sides’ intention to move peacefully toward unification in an atmosphere of mutual respect and co-existence. We emphasized that a basic framework defining our fundamental thinking was necessary to transform South-North relations into a structure of reconciliation.

We asserted further that we should adopt a secure and credible nonaggression arrangement that would not fail and would not become an empty promise. From this standpoint, we emphasized the importance of adopting the Basic Agreement before the agreement document on nonaggression.

We explained that the responsible officials in the South and North were now engaged in building the structure called national reunification. The structure required a blue-print for a firm foundation so that it could be constructed properly. Normalization in South-North relations required that we first lay the proper cornerstone as a foundation. Once this was accomplished, we would be able to build on this by discussing and agreeing on matters related to exchanges, cooperation and nonaggression.

We then expressed our view on the critical comments from the North Korean side during the first day’s session under the heading of “three views.”

Here, we launched a rebuttal in which we indicated the in-

consistencies and fabrications in the North Korean attitude of supporting peace while at the same time opposing improvements in South-North relations and of criticizing the U.S. forces in Korea and our Northern Policy with phrases such as “reliance on foreign forces,” “entreaty diplomacy” and “divisionism.”

We insisted that the North Korean side needed to adopt a proper understanding of peace. During the proceedings of the High Level Talks, the North was abetting certain oppositionist figures on our side. It was employing vehement expressions to vilify and defame us. Such an attitude of the North side was the basis of mutual distrust, we emphasized.

In particular, we stated that we conducted foreign activities as a true sovereign state and that by developing friendly relations with the neighboring countries we were actively creating an environment conducive to peace and reunification. We posed how the North would be able to justify its own efforts to improve relations with the United States and Japan, if it were to brand our activities as “divisionism” and “toddyism.”

In regards to the North Korean “Declaration of Nonaggression, Reconciliation and Cooperation,” our side pointed out that, although the content of this document reflected our thinking, the two sides were fundamentally different in their starting points. We reminded the North that the “Joint Declaration on South-North Reconciliation and Cooperation” which we had submitted to the Second High-Level Talks had been rejected point blank.

Later during the discussion, the North repeatedly claimed that the adoption of a nonaggression declaration was the best method for building mutual confidence. The North characterized its “Declaration of Nonaggression, Reconciliation and Cooperation” as a compromise proposal embodying the posi-

tions submitted by both sides and demanded our signature on this document.

The South side, meanwhile, stressed that if the North was genuinely interested in an agreement on nonaggression, it should first agree to the adoption of the Basic Agreement. We then suggested that the two positions be turned over to a meeting of the working-level representatives, but the North exhibited a negative attitude even toward this idea.

Thus, in a situation where there appeared to be little chance for narrowing the gap between the two positions, our side suggested that the two sides take up those proposals from the First and Second High-Level Talks where the two positions were already relatively close, and there was a realistic chance for agreement. In particular, we advocated that action be taken in the following five categories:

1. That South and North at 12 a.m. on January 1, 1991, cease all vilification and defamation of each other.
 - 1) Cessation of verbal attacks in which particular persons are identified by name.
 - 2) Cessation of vilification and defamation through loudspeakers at the Military Demarcation Line and through all other means.
 - 3) Forbidding the distribution of propaganda leaflets in each other's territory.
2. That a priority be given to the issue of South-North separated families.
 - 1) Scheduling a second exchange of separated families on the occasion of the following year's Lunar New Year.
 - 2) Scheduling an early resumption of the South-North Red Cross Talks.

3. That South-North economic exchanges and cooperation be realized.
 - 1) Engaging in direct trade of necessary commodities in the spirit of reciprocity and from the standpoint of mutual complementarity.
 - 2) Promotion of economic cooperation, such as joint participation in projects for developing natural resources overseas.
 - 3) Joint development of tourism resources, including Mt. Sorak and Mt. Kumgang.
4. That there be confidence building measures in the military area.
 - 1) Establishing and operating a direct telephone line between the senior military authorities of the South and North.
 - 2) Giving prior notification of military exercises beyond a given scale to the other side.
5. That the two sides establish and operate a direct telephone line between the Prime Ministers of the South and North.

The North Korean side, however, rejected our recommendation. Instead, they reiterated the “Three Emergency Issues” that they had already submitted to the First High-Level Talks and claimed that the fate of the South-North High-Level Talks hinged on whether or not solutions could be found for these issues.

We made clear that the issue of releasing those who had visited the North was an internal matter related to our domestic laws. Regarding the issue of the Team Spirit exercises, we suggested that the Fifth High-Level Talks be held in Seoul during the period of the Team Spirit exercises and that we jointly

observe these exercises on that occasion.

In response to the North Korean assertion that the Team Spirit exercises produced uneasiness, we gave a rebuttal that we lived 365 days a year with the possibility of having to relive the invasion we experienced on June 25, 1950, which necessitated the Team Spirit exercises.

In the end, the gap in the position of the South and North could not be narrowed during the Third High-Level Talks, and no significant agreements ensued.

Whereas the First and Second High-Level Talks were significant in that they allowed the two sides to express their own opinions and positions and confirm those of the other side, the Third High-Level Talks were an attempt at serious negotiations and compromise aimed at narrowing the differences between the two sides.

As a result, both sides recognized the need for the adoption of a basic document, and the two sides concurred that a single agreement document be adopted. This can be seen to represent a degree of progress in the talks.

Through their closing remarks, both sides indicated that they were not disappointed in the results of the talks so far and were not pessimistic about their future. Both sides expressed a hope that good results could be achieved with continued efforts based on perseverance and a spirit of compromise.

Meanwhile, the South and North concurred that the Fourth High-Level Talks should be held in Pyongyang from February 25 to 28, 1991.

2. Postponement of the Fourth High-Level Talks

a. The North Korean Delegation's Announcement of the Postponement

On February 11, 1991, the South side sent a telephone notification in the name of Kim Yong-hwan, the liaison officer of our delegation to the South-North High-Level Talks. In this message, the South proposed that a meeting of the two liaison officers be held on February 18 at the Peace House, in our sector of Panmunjom, to discuss the itinerary and other practical issues related to the Fourth High-Level Talks scheduled to begin on February 25.

The North Korean side notified us by telephone on February 14: "A reply to your telephone notification of the 11th calling for the meeting of the liaison officers will be given at an appropriate time." This, then, signified its indefinite postponement of a meeting of the liaison officers.

At each previous conference of the High-Level Talks, the liaison officers of the two sides had met at least five days prior to the scheduled opening of the talks to exchange the lists of delegation members. Also, a guarantee of personal safety was issued at these meetings. In view of these practices observed through the Third High-Level Talks, the North Korean refusal of a meeting of the liaison officers already signaled an intent to indefinitely postpone the Fourth High-Level Talks.

Soon after the postponement of the meeting of the liaison officers, North Korea released a statement that the Fourth High-Level Talks would be postponed.

In a statement released in the name of the North Korean delegation to the South-North High-Level Talks on February

18 through Radio Pyongyang, North Korea distorted and criticized the Team Spirit combined military exercises and our state of readiness in connection with the Gulf War. The statement then concluded unilaterally that it had become impossible to hold the Fourth High-Level Talks in Pyongyang from February 25 as originally scheduled.

In the statement, the North Korea falsely claimed that our side had declared a wartime state of emergency throughout the southern part of the peninsula and was fomenting an unprecedented atmosphere of fear. The North also criticized the Team Spirit combined military exercises as bringing the peninsula dangerously close to war.

Further, the North contended that we were "avoiding dialogues and focusing on creating conflicts and a warlike atmosphere," and, thus, we were totally to blame for cancelling the Fourth High-Level Talks as scheduled.

The South's actions in the Gulf War, such as the dispatching of a medical team, were in line with the resolutions passed by the United Nations Security Council and were well within the realm of what was expected of a country that derived benefits from the international community. Contrary to the North Korean assertion, we have never declared a "wartime state of emergency."

In fact, it was the North that heightened tensions on the peninsula immediately following the start of the Gulf War by holding large-scale urban evacuation exercises throughout North Korea in preparation for a possible air attack.

In reference to Team Spirit, it is widely known that this exercise is held in public and is defensive in character. These characteristics of the Team Spirit exercise have been confirmed by observers from member nations of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission.

Talks have been held during the Team Spirit exercises on several occasions in the past. On this occasion, too, North Korea demonstrated an inconsistent attitude by continuing with the sports talks, even while canceling the High-Level Talks. It was clear, therefore, that the Team Spirit exercises could not have been the true reason for breaking off the talks.

Moreover, we saw that on the same day, February 26, that Kim Il-sung, citing our Team Spirit exercise, gave an order for the combat mobilization of the entire North Korean military, a North Korean military delegation headed by Chief of Staff Choi Kwang left the country for Cuba for the stated reason of observing the military situation in that country. This is an illustration that the North, despite its words, does not consider the Team Spirit exercise as an “act of war provocation.”

North Korea took such an action at a time when an atmosphere of reconciliation was developing between the South and North. High-level authorities such as the prime ministers of each side, sportsmen and artists were traveling back and forth to Seoul and Pyongyang, and agreeing on such projects as organizing joint South-North teams in table tennis and soccer for international events. The North’s action at such a time tells us that its intention is to utilize the South-North dialogue to accomplish its goal of spreading confusion in the South and overthrowing the Seoul government.

In response to this unilateral postponement of the conference by the North Korean side, on the same day our spokesman of the National Reunification Ministry released a statement and pointed out the falsehood of the North Korean claims and communicated a strong sense of disappointment and regret.

The full text of the statement by the spokesman of the Na-

tional Reunification Ministry was as follows:

Statement by National Reunification Ministry Spokesman

The North Korean side, giving the Gulf War and the Team Spirit combined military exercise as excuses, has unilaterally announced that it has become impossible to hold, as scheduled, the Fourth South-North High-Level Talks in Pyongyang beginning on the 25th.

Today at 7:15, the North Korean delegation broadcast a statement over Radio Pyongyang to our members of the South-North High-Level Talks. In this statement, it falsely claimed that our side had used the Gulf War to "declare an emergency state of war throughout South Korea" and criticized the Team Spirit exercises as "creating a new provocation for war." With these excuses, the North unilaterally proclaimed that the Fourth High-Level Talks could not be held in Pyongyang from the 25th, as originally scheduled.

Such action by the North Korean side reveals that it still considers the High-Level Talks as nothing more than a part of its unified front strategy against the South. In response to North Korea's perennial negative attitude toward the dialogues, we join all Koreans who are eager to see the fruits of these dialogues in expressing our disappointment and regret.

Recently, the prime ministers and other high officials of the South and North visited each other for the first time. Serious discussions ensued to resolve the state of confrontation and to realize exchanges. In particular, that such high-level officials of the two sides visited the South and North soon after the current crisis in the Gulf began clearly demonstrates the extent of fabrication in the recent North Korea claim.

The North Korean side, according to a report by China's

Xinhwa News Agency, from January 25 to 27 held a large-scale urban evacuation exercise against a simulated air attack throughout the North Korean area for the first time in ten years. According to Radio Moscow, this evacuation exercise was repeated on February 3.

These facts inform us that the North Korean assertion of our side using the Gulf War to create a warlike situation is untenable and is actually a preemptive move to deflect any criticism directed against them. In fact, it is North Korea that is creating a large-scale warlike situation that heightens tensions on the peninsula.

In particular, during the Team Spirit exercises, conferences have been held on several occasions in the past, and it is a common knowledge that these exercises are defensive in character and are held openly as a regularly scheduled annual event.

Before the North Korean side attempts to block our justifiable military exercises, it should demonstrate its sincerity in helping to make these exercises unnecessary.

It has already been recognized internationally that North Korea maintains a provocative posture with large-scale deployments of heavily armed forces, which it continues to reinforce with offensive weapons, in the vicinity of the military demarcation line. The North also holds secret military exercises with these forces.

We must also point out North Korea's inconsistent attitude of continuing with the Sports Talks even while using the Team Spirit exercises as an excuse to cancel high-level talks.

We will maintain our position of going forward with the current Sports Talks in earnest so that these talks may produce successful results. With respect to the High-Level Talks as well, we strongly urge the North Korean side to return to the conference table quickly so that it may join us in the earnest desire of our 70 million countrymen to accomplish peace, reunification and na-

tional reconciliation.

b. The Resumption of the Talks and North Korea's Reaction

By breaking off the dialogue, the North Koreans met with strong criticism from domestic and world opinions for an action that went against the international trend. The Soviet Union's broadcast over Radio Moscow said: "The declaration by the North Korean side to break off the conference is not helpful toward resolving conflict and bringing an end to the Cold War."

The South and North, if they are to participate in building a world of reconciliation and cooperation, need to break out of their current relationship based on distrust and conflict as soon as possible and establish a new relationship of co-existence and co-prosperity that will take them toward peaceful reunification.

For this purpose, a dialogue between the responsible authorities of the South and North must be continued under all circumstances so that they can quickly work out the basic framework for improving South-North relations.

In a word, the South-North High-Level Talks have a mission and a responsibility to serve as the central axis for the future development of full-scale improvements in the South-North relations.

It was imperative, therefore, that the talks be brought out of their state of suspension as soon as possible. Our side sent a telephone notification in the name of Prime Minister Ro Jai-bong on April 8 to the North Korean side, which called for the resumption of the Fourth High-Level Talks.

In this notification, Prime Minister Ro reminded the North that a large number of issues demanded immediate attention of

the South and North Korean authorities for peace and reunification within the new international order. Considering the various circumstances surrounding North Korea, the Prime Minister proposed May 22-25 as the dates for resuming the Fourth High-Level Talks.

The North, however, did not respond favorably to our proposal. In fact, in a news conference on April 10 to state the North's position on the South-North dialogue, Vice Chairman Ahn Byoung-su of the Committee for Peaceful Reunification of the Fatherland made clear that he was pessimistic about the early resumption of the South-North High-Level Talks.

In this news conference, the North severely criticized us for adhering to belicose attitudes which worked against the resolution of the issues related to the dialogues and reunification. Specifically, the North listed as crucial factors the Team Spirit exercise, the possibility of our unilateral entry into the United Nations and the apprehension of those who had traveled to the North illegally. The North also labeled us as being divisionist, anti-dialogue and closed-minded.

The North Korean side, then, stated its position on the South-North dialogue and argued as follows: • there should be a private sector dialogue on reunification to be carried out side by side with the dialogue between the government authorities of the South and North; • South-North cooperation and exchange in non-governmental areas should be carried out simultaneously with cooperation and exchange in government sectors; • there must be a National Reunification Political Negotiation Conference for establishing a nationwide consensus on the method of reunification; and • there would have to be a change in our position to resume the South-North High-Level Talks.

Furthermore, the North demanded that our side, as a

minimal indication of a change in our position, take positive action on the following issues: 1) adoption of a nonaggression declaration; 2) continued bilateral consultations until agreement can be reached on the issue of entry into the United Nations; 3) the release of those arrested for traveling illegally to the North; 4) carrying out reunification dialogues in the private sector, including the initiation of a National Reunification Political Negotiation Conference; 5) abolishing our National Security Law; and 6) allowing the organization "Peommin-ryon" to establish an office in the South. These were presented as preconditions for resuming the South-North High-Level Talks.

Presenting such preconditions could be construed as revealing the North's intention not only to place all responsibility on us for the delay in the South-North High-Level Talks but also to rule out further high-level talks for the foreseeable future.

On April 11, the spokesman of the South's National Reunification Ministry released a comment which criticized the North for unilaterally declaring the postponement of the South-North High-Level Talks and for attempting to avoid further dialogues between the authorities of the two sides. We emphasized there could be no conditions for resuming the South-North High-Level Talks.

At the same time, we strongly urged that the North abandon false illusions and resume the dialogues as quickly as possible.

The following is a summary of the comment by the National Reunification Ministry spokesman:

In order for the South and North to break out of the relationship of mutual distrust and conflict as quickly as possible and to

construct a new relationship of co-existence and co-prosperity leading to peaceful reunification, it is of utmost urgency that a basic framework for improving South-North relations be established between the responsible and competent authorities of the two sides.

Therefore, the South-North High-Level Talks have the mission and the responsibility for being the engine that must pull us into a new age of reconciliation and cooperation, and these talks must not be interrupted or postponed.

The North is making a miscalculation if it believes that it can spare itself from domestic and international criticism by labeling us, who desire the dialogues, as being opposed to dialogues and unification, while describing itself as the force for unification. In fact, it is the North who is moving further and further away from the dialogues.

It is clear to everyone that the conditions for resuming the dialogues put forward by the North Korean side are no more than a thin disguise for its well-worn method of using South-North dialogue as a means in their strategy to overthrow the government in the South.

Contrary to the claims by the North Korean side, the negative factors preventing the dialogues and the resolution of the reunification issue are not the Team Spirit exercises, the nonaggression declaration or our proposed entry into the United Nations. Instead, it is the North's closed-minded inability to awake from the dream of "Revolution in South Korea" or to accept the worldwide wave of openness and reform.

Before North Korea can take an issue with our justifiable legal measures against those who have broken the law, it should first guarantee the human rights of our compatriots in the northern area and permit a pluralist political system.

In addition, the issue of entry into the United Nations relates

to the rightful exercise of our sovereignty. The North Korean claim that this must be discussed between the South and North can only become the object of ridicule in the international community.

We believe that if North Korea still refuses to enter the United Nations or has not yet made the necessary preparations for doing so, then our side should go ahead and join first to fulfill our responsibilities and duties as a member of international society.

We strongly recommend that the North relinquish its irresponsible attitude of either coming to the dialogues or breaking off the dialogues based on its own political motivation and convenience. We demand that they join us as soon as possible on the road to peace and reunification.

Our position is clear that there can be no conditions in resuming the South-North High-Level Talks.

We will continue to work with perseverance and sincerity for the quick resumption of the South-North High-Level Talks and will continue to watch for signs of change in the North Korean attitude.

c. Relevant Developments in North Korea

(1) “National Reunification Political Negotiation Conference” Proposal

In Kim Il-sung’s New Year message (January 1), North Korea proposed that: “To build a national consensus on the method for the reunification of the fatherland, we should immediately organize a National Reunification Political Negotiation Conference, in which representatives of political parties and other organizations of the North and South are brought together for determining the method of reunifying the fatherland.”

It also stated: "Because reunification must not be a case where one side absorbs the other but must be 'one nation,' 'one state,' 'two systems,' and 'two governments,' reunification must be accomplished by the federation method." The North asserted that reunification through the federation method was the "basic principle for reunification of the fatherland" which suited the present situation.

Accordingly on January 8, North Korea held what it called a "joint conference" of representatives of government, political parties and other organizations. Here, the North drafted a letter to our government authorities, leaders of political parties and representatives of various organizations. At the same time, Prime Minister Yon Hyong-muk sent to our Prime Minister Ro Jai-bong a telephone notification that these letters would be sent to our side on January 8.

On January 9, our side responded to the North in the name of Prime Minister Ro Jai-bong that the "National Reunification Political Negotiation Conference" was a part of a strategy that viewed us as the enemy and sought to spread revolution in the South. We then demanded that the North desist from taking any more actions that would heighten tension and destroy the atmosphere of dialogue and exchange between the South and North.

The content of Prime Minister Ro Jai-bong's telephone notification is as follows:

I received your telephone notification of January 8.

First, I very much regret that your side, using the title of the so-called "joint conference," is attempting to conduct a propaganda campaign by letters against various sectors in our society.

Currently, the High-Level Talks are being conducted between the South and North with prime ministers of each side serving as the chief delegate. Artists and sportsmen are visiting Seoul and Pyongyang to open the paths of exchange. The atmosphere of reconciliation and cooperation is being fostered as never before.

Your most recent request to send letters, however, is most disappointing because it is an act intended to wreck this favorable atmosphere and to return to a position of avoiding the regular dialogues between the South and North.

Our opinion about the "National Unification Political Negotiation Conference" that you want to propose through the letters, contains nothing new and is another version of the "joint conference" or "negotiation conference" you have proposed in the past.

We repeatedly expressed our position on this matter. By now, the whole world knows that the "Political Negotiation Conference" you propose arises from a thinking which ignores the realities in South-North relations and seeks a hostile strategy of revolution toward our side.

In particular, in the event that such a "Political Negotiation Conference" is held, your side wants to go as far as making the final decision on the method of reunification.

The method of reunification, which will decide the fate of our nation, cannot and must not be decided in a discussion where only certain persons, political parties and organizations participate.

The method of reunification must be discussed and resolved through the will of the nation as a whole by the responsible and competent authorities on both sides who are the lawful representative organs of the people. Only under such circumstances can the effectiveness of such a method be guaranteed.

The world is now truly amidst a wave of openness and reform

and is headed toward an age of reconciliation and cooperation.

The Korean peninsula, where we live, is the only region on earth today that continues to ignore this age of reconciliation and cooperation, mired instead in conflict and struggle.

We must no longer be tied down by the cold war mentality of conflict and opposition. We must escape from this as soon as possible to effect practical measures for peace and reunification through national reconciliation and improve South-North relations.

We can bring about a turning point in peaceful reunification by continuing the ongoing South-North High-Level Talks to resolve the state of political and military conflict and to bring about exchange and cooperation.

Your side, however, far from showing interest or sincerity in establishing a basic framework to improve South-North relations, is displaying an antiquated attitude of reiterating a timeworn position based on impure political motives.

You must cease actions that deepen the distrust between the South and North and immediately renounce your desire to effect revolution in the South.

From this standpoint, my advice to you is that from this year the North disengage itself from acts that damage the hard-won atmosphere of dialogue and exchange established between the South and North.

I hope that you will cease your useless propaganda campaign and resume the discussion of various issues between the South and North in a reasonable and normal manner so that you may be a participant in the effort to promote prosperity and happiness to all our people.

North Korea, however, on January 9 publicized by radio the contents of the letter that it had attempted to deliver to us.

It also made public the list of people to whom the letter was addressed. The list included our government and political party leaders and 27 others, most of whom were involved with organizations engaged in anti-government activities.

In the letter, North Korea cited Kim Il-sung's New Year address and proposed that representatives of governments, political parties and organizations from the South and North attend a National Reunification Political Negotiation Conference to be held on August 15 of this year. Participants from the South and North should be equal in status and number, regardless of whether they were from the government, the private sector, the opposition parties or the anti-establishment organizations. Also, the number of people represented by the organizations should have no bearing on their right to equal status at this conference.

The North also stressed that for this conference, the South and North should carry out bilateral and multilateral contacts and discussions involving political parties and factions as well as the representatives from the various fields and levels of society.

This meant, finally, that North Korea was giving a clear signal of its intention to devalue the importance of the South-North High-Level Talks while at the same time to intensify its unified front campaign.

Actually, the "National Reunification Political Negotiation Conference" that North Korea put forward is another version of the mass-meeting style joint conferences that it has persistently pushed for since 1948. Its purpose is the establishment of a unified front through multilateral private sector contacts.

North Korea itself has defined the political negotiation conference as "a revolutionary negotiating policy capable of

gathering the unified energies of the people in various sectors of society to block divisionist activities and of pursuing the class position in resolving the issue of reunification.”

Whenever the North has a need to stir up confusion in our society or to prevent progress in the talks between the government authorities, it has brought up the idea of a joint conference. Only the name and form have changed slightly, as can be seen from the past proposals of “All-National Rally,” “Great National Conference,” “Joint South-North 100 Politicians’ Conference” and now the “National Reunification Negotiation Conference.”

This proposal for a “National Reunification Negotiation Conference” is also intended to take advantage of our domestic political trends so that reunification can be utilized as a political issue to create contradictions and frictions within our pluralist society and to intensify confusion in our domestic political arena.

In relation to this, North Korea has made it clear that the reason for proposing this conference is to build a national consensus on the federation reunification scheme.

The method of reunification, based on the will of our people, must be the subject of consultations between the two government authorities. It is unreasonable to request that this be discussed and decided by representatives of a few select organizations who have no representational authority.

Particularly, North Korea is under a system where no political party or organization can exist with its own distinctive voice or policy, other than the Workers’ Party.

In other words, any political party or organization in North Korea, which does not guarantee a pluralist political system, can be no more than a propaganda tool that carries on a struggle for the Workers’ Party platform and policies. Thus, for

North Korea to speak about a negotiation conference of political parties and organizations cannot be interpreted as an attitude for resolving South-North relations in a normal manner.

In response to North Korea broadcasting the contents of its letter to the South for some impure purposes, on January 9 the spokesman of the National Reunification Ministry issued a comment that such action represented an outdated intention of the North to build a unified front strategy and demanded that North Korea devote its full energy for the purpose of making substantive progress in the dialogues which already exist.

The content of the National Reunification Ministry spokesman is as follows:

A Comment by the National Reunification Ministry Spokesman

Today the North Korean side, even though we had notified them by telephone requesting the cessation of their useless propaganda campaign, went ahead and made public the contents of the letters they had attempted to send to our people in various sectors of society.

This is highly regrettable, as it represents a clear demonstration of the North's intention to destroy the atmosphere of dialogue and exchange that has been budding between the South and North and to continue an out-dated attempt at a unified-front strategy.

As we all know, the "National Unification Political Negotiation Conference" that North Korea has brought up now is nothing more than a new version of the "joint-meeting" method which they have repeatedly advocated for decades. In essence, it

is a fraudulent mass rally grounded on a policy of inciting revolution in the South.

It is the consistent policy of our government that the method of reunification and other major issues between the South and North should be discussed by the responsible and competent authorities of the two sides through the will of the nation as a whole.

From this standpoint, it is fortunate that the High-Level Talks, with prime ministers from each side acting as the head of delegation, have been held on three occasions between the South and North. These talks are preparing a new ground for peace and reunification.

Despite the progress being made in the talks mentioned above, the fact that the North Korean side has again regurgitated its timeworn mass-rally method can only be understood to contain a political motivation.

Particularly, it is ridiculous for the North to demand that representatives of our government attend the "National Unification Political Negotiation Conference" with the opposition parties when its political parties and organizations are fronts that only support and praise the policies of the Workers' Party and are incapable of any individual action. Such demand can only be seen as an attempt to make fools of our people.

We emphasize that before the North Korean side can speak of a "Political Negotiation Conference," it should take steps toward democratic reforms in guaranteeing a pluralist political system and freedoms of speech, association and assembly.

This is a time for the South and North to work together for reconciliation and cooperation and to quickly remove distrust and conflict so that we can build a new relationship in which the two sides can give and receive assistance from each other.

If the North Korean side truly wants peace and reunification,

it should immediately cease this rash behavior that exacerbates South-North relations and return to a realistic and normal attitude to devote its full energy toward producing fruitful results in the ongoing dialogues.

(2) The North Korean Campaign by Letters against the South
Following its proposal for a National Reunification Political Negotiation Conference, North Korea used this as a basis for launching a false peace and political offensive against the South.

First, on February 8, the North sent a letter signed jointly by the members of the Workers' Party, Social Democratic Party, Chondo-gyo and Chung-woo Dang. Addressed to our three opposition parties, Democratic Party, Minjung Party and the Party for Peace and Democracy, the letter urged contacts between political parties in the South and North.

In it, North Korea emphasized that if representatives of the South and North could sit down together for talks, the group would be able to find the way to save the Korean people from the danger of war and to arrive at a common and practical method of reunification. The North called for contacts and dialogues with the political parties without regard to formalities.

At the same time, the North invited representatives of Democratic Party, Minjung Party and the Party for Peace and Democracy to visit Pyongyang at any time in February and March convenient for them.

Also in this letter, North Korea characterized our government and its party as "forces that do not wish peace and reunification." Using phrases such as "South-North relations have returned to the original point of conflict" and "tensions have intensified to their ultimate point," North Korea made it

appear as if some serious level of tension had been created.

That North Korea chose to ignore our government and ruling party in conducting such a campaign with the opposition parties can be understood from the context of its timing to coincide with the elections in the South. Also, the campaign is directed at a scheme to push for a unified front by dealing with the issues of peace and reunification through consultations with these political parties, thereby isolating our government and ruling party.

Further, the fact that the North chose to publicize a distorted picture of the situation on the Korean peninsula just prior to the Fourth South-North High-Level Talks represented a preliminary step in devaluing or suspending the South-North High-Level Talks, while placing the blame on our side for such a development.

To the North Korean scheme, the spokesman of the National Reunification Ministry pinpointed the impure political motives behind North Korea's propaganda campaign by letters to our three opposition parties. We also warned North Korea that it should stop treating the citizens of our country as fools and that it should take steps toward a more democratic system in its own country by guaranteeing the people freedom and human rights.

On March 5, after having suspended the South-North High-Level Talks, North Korea relayed a telephone message that on March 7 it would deliver letters from three organizations, the Korea General Union of Professions, Korea Union of Agricultural Workers' and Korea Students Committee to our National Council of Workers, National Union of Agricultural Associations, National Council of University Student Representatives and National Council of Youth Organization Representatives.

In response, Kim Sang-hyup, President of the South Korean Red Cross Society, refused to receive the letters on the grounds that they were likely to cause needless problems or political dispute between the South and North. Again, however, North Korea unilaterally made public the contents of the letters by radio broadcast on March 7.

The contents advocated meetings of labor, farmer student and youth representatives in the South and North for discussing ways to save the nation from the danger of war and of deciding on a method to reunify the fatherland.

North Korea's letters to the four organizations on our side were another aspect of North's deliberate political and psychological offensive based on Kim Il-sung's New Year Address. The North's aim was to capitalize on our domestic political situation just before the local elections and to encourage and incite anti-government organizations. By doing so, North Korea hoped to bring about an atmosphere that would ensure the success of the "August 15 Pan-National Rally."

The North, in spite of our repeated demands that it stop such a propaganda battle aimed at the South, sent us another telephone notification on March 19 which worsened South-North relations even further.

The message stated that letters would be sent on March 21 from three North Korean organizations, the Korean General Union of Culture and Arts, Korea Professional Union of Education and Culture Workers and Korea Women's Democratic Union. The letters were to be addressed to Korean General Association of National Arts, National Union of Teachers, Korean League of Women's Associations and Korean Women's Association in the South. North Korea aired the contents of these letters on the radio on March 20.

Again on April 11, North's Korea General Union of Profes-

sions broadcasted a letter on the radio to our National Council of Labor Unions and the Korean General League of Labor Unions, inviting them to attend the May Day celebrations in Pyongyang on May 1 and proposing preparatory contacts between the representatives of the two sides. This was another exhibition of North's attitude to intensify its efforts to hold contacts with our people.

North Korea has, thus, shown a duplicitous attitude of using the Team Spirit exercise and other issues to suspend the dialogues between the government authorities of the South and North while at the same time advocating dialogues with selected persons and organizations. Such an attitude of North Korea negates the fervent dream of our people to improve relations between the South and North.

Part II

Progress in South-North Sports Talks

1. Background

During the Beijing Asian Games, an atmosphere of national reconciliation and unity sprang up between the South and North, as demonstrated by the joining of the cheering sections of the two sides. In this context, the sports ministers of the two sides met in Beijing on September 23, 1990.

Here, the two sides agreed in principle to hold the South-North Unification Soccer Matches. They also agreed to hold South-North sports talks at the earliest convenient time to discuss the formation of joint teams for major international events such as the Barcelona Olympics and the issue of bilateral South-North exchanges in the field of sport.

As a result, an exciting opportunity was created for the first time in the 45-year history of the division of Korea for the athletes of the South and North to exchange visits to Seoul and Pyongyang and to hold soccer matches.

From our side, Minister of Sports Chung Dong-sung led a delegation of 76 persons, including soccer players and journalists, to Pyongyang for the South-North Unification Soccer Match held there from October 9 to 13, 1990.

On October 12, during the period of the Pyongyang match, Minister Chung and Chairman Kim Yu-soon of the North Korean National Sports Committee held the second meeting at the Koryo Hotel. They reaffirmed their intention to hold the South-North Sports Talks at the earliest convenient time and decided that making the South-North soccer matches a regularly scheduled event would be reached by mutual agreement during the upcoming Seoul match.

Immediately following this (October 21-25, 1990), Chairman Kim led a North Korean delegation of 78 persons to

Seoul. The sports ministers of the two sides held the third meeting at the Sheraton Walker Hill Hotel on October 24, 1990.

Here, the two sides determined the agenda for the Sports Talks and agreed to hold the first meeting on November 29 at Tongil-gak, in the northern sector of Panmunjom. This was announced in a joint statement issued on October 25.

The complete text of this statement follows:

Joint Statement

Sports Minister Chung Dong-sung of the South and Chairman of the National Sports Committee Kim Yu-soon of the North, and concurrently Chairman of the National Olympic Committee, at a meeting in Seoul on October 24, 1990, decided as follows on ways to implement the points agreed on in Pyongyang on October 12, 1990.

1. The First South-North Sports Talks shall be held at 10 a.m. on November 29, 1990, at Tongil-gak in the northern sector of Panmunjom.
2. The delegation from each side shall in principle be composed of the same members as those who attended the South-North sports talks in forming a joint team for the 11th Asian Games in Beijing, but specific delegate lists shall be announced at a later date.
3. The agenda shall consist of the issues of forming the joint teams for the 41st World Table Tennis Championships in Chiba, the 25th Olympic Games in Barcelona and the 3rd Winter Asian Games in Samjiyon.
4. The issues of making the South-North Unification Soccer Matches a regularly scheduled event and other South-North

sports exchanges shall be agreed upon and decided at the above South-North Sports Talks.

In accordance with the above joint statement, the two sides notified each other on November 27 by telephone the names of those who would attend the First South-North Sports Talks on November 29.

The names were virtually the same as those who had attended the talks on a joint team for the Beijing Asian Games, except that our side substituted delegate Kim Sa-heung for delegate Cho Young-seung and the North Korean side substituted delegates Kim Jung-shik and Kim Young-suk for delegates Kim Sae-jin and Huh Hyuk-pil.

The delegate list is below.

The South

Chief Delegate Chang Choong-shik
Vice Chairman, Korea Olympic Committee
(KOC)

Delegates Lee Hak-rae, Standing Member, KOC
Im Tae-soon, Member, KOC
Kim Sa-heung, Member, KOC
Pak Soo-jang, Member, KOC

The North

Chief Delegate Kim Hyoung-jin,
Vice Chairman, North Korean Olympic
Committee (NKOC)

Delegates Chang Woong, Secretary-General, NKOC
Kim Jung-shik, Member, NKOC
Kim Sang-bu, Member, NKOC
Kim Young-suk, Member, NKOC

2. The First Talks

The First South-North Sports Talks were held in an open session on November 29, 1990, from 10 a.m. to 12:17 p.m. at Tongil-gak in the northern sector of Panmunjom.

As we approached the table, our side recognized the contributions made to national reconciliation and unity by the Unification Soccer Matches and emphasized the need for a step-by-step application of this experience to regularize exchanges in other sporting events, thus expanding the scope of South-North contacts. This would also provide a practical foundation for forming the joint teams for international sports events.

The North Korean side, in an attempt to conduct the conference in line with its "One Korea Policy," including the two sides sharing a single seat in the U.N. General Assembly, adopted the position that, on the one hand, considered the formation of joint teams for international sports events as an already accomplished fact, while on the other hand, strictly avoided further bilateral sports exchanges.

The North Korean side stressed in its opening statement: "The conference became possible after establishing the fact that two sides will participate in international sporting events as a joint team." Thus, the South-North Sports Talks were being held based on an already established fact of having formed the joint teams. The North then proposed that we agree to certain principles to facilitate the discussion on forming such joint teams.

The North proposed the following three principles that: 1) the joint teams are to be realized on the principle that such teams would prevent the South and North from com-

peting against each other in international sports events and would, thereby, facilitate national reconciliation, unity and unification; 2) the South and North are to adopt the principle that they shall participate in all international events as a joint team; and 3) the South and North shall not forfeit their membership in the joint teams in midstream but shall continue such participation until the fatherland is reunified.

The North also submitted the following draft documents: "An Agreement for the Formation and Participation of Joint Teams," "An Agreement to Participate as a South-North Joint Team in the 41st World Table Tennis Championships," "An Agreement to Participate in the Asian Regional Preliminaries for the 25th Olympic Soccer Games as a Joint Team," and "An Agreement to Participate in the 6th World Junior Soccer Championship as a Joint Team." The North also submitted draft letters to be sent jointly by the South and North to the International Olympic Committee, FIFA and Asian Football League and the World Table Tennis Federation.

Concerning the issues of bilateral sports exchanges, including making the South-North Soccer Matches a regularly scheduled event, however, the North Korean side insisted that it was not a priority issue and should be agreed upon after the issue of joint teams was settled.

The North went on to say that anything that did not benefit the cause of unification must be amended. Thus, it substantially excluded items concerning trials for choosing the team members and joint practice sessions. It also retreated on the issue of who should head the teams by calling for joint team leaders. In this way, it demonstrated a hardline stance that reneged on agreements that had already been made at the talks on a joint team for the 11th Asian Games in Beijing.

In response, the South side stressed that these Sports Talks

held particular significance in that they had come as a precious result of exchanges and cooperation in the field of sports and were being held amidst especially favorable domestic and international circumstances. We then proposed that the agenda include: 1) issues concerning the realization of South-North sports exchanges, including making the South-North Soccer Matches a regularly scheduled event; and 2) issues related to forming the joint teams for participation in international events.

We said, however, that the order of this agenda did not necessarily specify the order in which the two items should be discussed, and the two should be discussed concurrently.

Thus, in regards to item one, we submitted concrete plans for holding the South-North Unification Soccer Matches and other goodwill matches in various sports events, participating in major sporting events sponsored by each other, holding training sessions in each other's facilities, sponsoring academic conferences jointly in the field of sports, exchanging sports technology and information and exchanging visits by sports journalists.

For item two, we proposed that the matters agreed upon in relation to the formation of a joint team for the Beijing Asian Games be applied with only minor modifications and that the two sides discuss issues related to the particular characteristics of each event.

Practically speaking, the issues of regularizing the South-North Unification Soccer Matches and forming a joint team for the 41st World Table Tennis Championships demanded priority, and so we submitted draft agreements on these two items.

Our draft agreement for regularly scheduled Unification Soccer Matches proposed the formation and operation of a

joint committee for the matches. The rest of the content mostly followed the practices established during the exchange of matches in October 1990. The draft agreement concerning the 41st World Table Tennis Championships included all items decided upon by the two sides in the talks preceding the Beijing Asian Games.

Even before the discussion could begin, however, the North Korean side stated that, although it did not oppose regularly scheduled Unification Soccer Matches, the purpose and nature of the current talks were such that this issue should not be given a high priority. They persisted in avoiding this issue while insisting on an agreement on a pro forma joint team. Thus, no progress was made in the talks.

This attitude by the North Korean side in the talks even created a concern on the South side that its intention in agreeing to the South-North Sports Talks had been to deny our side the right to participate in the future international sports events.

For the next meeting date, our side, as the host, proposed that because the 3rd South-North High-Level Talks and the 1990 Year-End Unification Traditional Music Festival were scheduled for December, and each side should have ample time to study each other's proposals, the next meeting should be slated for January 15, 1991. North Korea, however, insisted that the next meeting be held in December, making it impossible to fix a date. Finally, it was decided that during December our side would notify the North Korean side of the date for the next meeting.

3. The Second Talks

Even though it had been decided at the end of the first

meeting that our side would notify the North Korea during December for the date of the next conference, the North on December 10 sent us a telephone message in the name of South-North Sports Talks chief delegate Kim Hyung-jin. The message disclosed that a quick action was necessary to form the joint teams for the 41st World Table Tennis Championships and other international events, and suggested December 10 as the date for the next meeting.

Our chief delegate Chang Choong-shik responded with a telephone message on December 18, saying, "The suggestion is unrealistic and contributes nothing to national reconciliation and unity, and we cannot talk about forming the unified teams while at the same time excluding other sports exchanges." He then proposed January 15, 1991, as the date of the talks which would allow sufficient time for preparation so as to prevent the entire Korean people from experiencing further disappointment.

On January 8, 1991, the North Korean side sent us a telephone message in which it first absurdly criticized us for purposely delaying the talks, but then agreed to our proposal to hold the next talks on January 15.

It was through such a process that the Second South-North Sports Talks were held on January 15, beginning at 10 a.m. and lasting for about two hours, at Peace House in our sector of Panmunjom.

Our sides chiefly adhered to the position that the joint team for international events should be formed on the basis of bilateral sports exchanges. To give new impetus to the progress of the talks, however, we adopted a flexible position, accepting in large measure the North Korean position.

First, our side conceded the order in which the outstanding issues between the two sides would be discussed. This was done in view of the fact that the 41st World Table Tennis

Championships were fast approaching, and sending the joint teams to this event would become impossible if a stalemate should occur between our position that the South-North sports exchanges be discussed side by side with the issue of unified teams and the North Korean position that priority be given to the issue of joint teams.

Thus, we recognized that resolving the issue of the joint teams should be given the first priority and substantially accepted the North Korean position that the order of discussion should be: 1) the formation of joint teams for the 41st World Table Tennis Championships and the 6th World Junior Soccer Championship; 2) the regularization of the South-North Unification Soccer Matches; and 3) the issues related to general South-North sports exchanges and cooperation and other issues applicable to participating in international events as a joint team.

Accordingly, our side submitted a slightly revised version of the draft agreement submitted during the First Sports Talks on forming a joint team for the 41st World Table Tennis Championships and a new draft agreement on forming a joint team for the 6th World Junior Soccer Championship. We then requested that concrete discussions be focused on these items.

Our new draft agreement on the formation of a joint South-North team for the 6th World Junior Soccer Championship was also based on the items that the South and North had agreed on during the talks at the Beijing Asian Games, and its contents were identical to the draft agreement on a joint team to the 41st World Table Tennis Championships that we had submitted during the First Sports Talks.

In addition, our language for the new drafts reflected the North Korean position that, despite an agreement to the contrary during the talks for a joint team to the Beijing Asian

Games, the two sides would avoid holding the joint training sessions for the purpose of choosing the members for a joint team and that the joint training sessions would be held only for strengthening the team.

We also stated that if a basic agreement could be reached at the Second Talks for the formation of joint teams for participation in the World Table Tennis Championships and the World Junior Soccer Championship, then working-level contacts should be made for ironing out the language of the specific agreement. These agreements should then be finalized and signed at a Third Sports Talks meeting.

In relation to the North Korean draft agreement on the Asian regional preliminaries for the soccer tournament of the 25th Olympic Games, however, we stated clearly that this should be addressed in the context of discussions for participation as a joint team in the Barcelona Olympics as a whole.

In contrast, the North Korean side, on the basis on its "one Korea policy," held to its position that the issue of participation in international sports events should be resolved first and insisted that the agenda for the talks be limited to item three of the joint agreement reached during the South-North Unification Soccer Match in Seoul.

Thus, the North continued to reiterate its position that the issue of scheduling the Unification Soccer Matches as a regular event should be discussed only after an agreement had been reached on a joint team participation in international sports events.

Eventually, the North Korean side agreed to our proposal that we first discuss the formation of joint teams for the 41st World Table Tennis Championships and the 6th World Junior Soccer Championship. It consented to compare the two draft agreements, thereby signaling a possibility of making progress

in the talks.

At first glance, the new North Korean draft agreement for sending a joint team to the 41st World Table Tennis Championships seemed as if it accepted most of the items in the draft agreement we had submitted during the First Talks.

The North Korean side, however, rejected items that had been decided in discussions for a joint team to the Beijing Asian Games. The rejected items included the core issues of selecting team members, forming the team and training team members. The North held to its position that South-North sports exchanges should be avoided at all cost.

Thus, the North Korean side condemned trials as creating a sense of conflict between the South and North. With regard to traveling between the South and North to hold team training sessions, the North suggested that the two sides train separately in the South and North and then train together for a month at the venue of the international event. It opposed the idea that the teams be headed by a single person and insisted they be headed jointly by the two sides.

It is common sense that sports events must be managed in the spirit of competition and that team members should be selected for their ability to achieve the highest overall competence.

Also, sports events are nothing more than venues in which athletes compete according to their ability, and they should not be considered as conflicts or battles.

We believe that the North Korean side failed to demonstrate proper sportsman-like attitude when it, citing illogically that trials would weaken the athletes, called for haphazard agreements between the South and North in selecting the team members.

With regards to the issue of whether the teams would be

managed by one or two heads, it is clear that the team leader should be in a position to direct and lead the team members in a systematic manner. Having two team leaders would disrupt the chain of command and significantly detract from the strength of the team members.

Furthermore, we believe that a joint leadership of teams would be inconsistent with the original purpose of establishing a South-North team. No precedent can be found for such an arrangement in the history of sports relations.

In this way, during the talks the North Korean side ignored items the South and North had agreed on previously, and it continued to take unreasonable positions. It further attempted to bring the talks to an early adjournment by saying that it was necessary to study the differences between the two positions.

North Korea also proposed that the date to form a joint team for the World Table Tennis Championships be delayed until late March. As for the next session of the talks, in contrast to its stated position that quick action was necessary, it proposed January 30 as the date.

The above North Korean proposal can be seen as a reflection of its intention to give priority to the formation of a joint team for the 41st World Table Tennis Championships but also to reduce the time for trials and joint training sessions, thus avoiding the possibility of bilateral sports exchanges.

It may be said progress was made in that the two sides held concrete discussions on an agreement relating to the formation of a joint team for the 41st World Table Tennis Championships. The Second Sports Talks ended without notable result, however, because of the North Korean reluctance. The two sides agreed to hold the third talks on January 30 at Tongil-gak in the northern sector of Panmunjom.

4. The Third Talks

The Third South-North Sports Talks began at 10 a.m. on January 30, 1991, at Tongil-gak in the North's sector of Panmunjom. The talks lasted two and a half hours.

Before these talks commenced, the North Korean side displayed an insensitive attitude. Contrary to the usual practice, it failed to have a guide meet our delegation as we crossed the Military Demarcation Line, and no one greeted us at the entrance of Tongil-gak.

Further, North Korean chief delegate Kim Hyung-jin, in his opening statement from a prepared text, referred to our Team Spirit combined military exercises and criticized us by alleging that a policy of confrontation could not coexist with the formation of South-North joint teams. "Your Olympic Committee will need to exert the appropriate level of energies for reconciliation and unity," he said. Thus, the North's willingness to go through with the formation of joint teams was cast in doubt.

Also, with respect to the issues related to the formation of joint teams, the North totally ignored items that had been agreed on previously in talks to send a joint team to the 11th Asian Games in Beijing and continued to maintain its previous positions that team members should be chosen by agreement, that there would be no traveling to each other's facilities for training sessions and that the teams would be headed jointly.

In addition, the only draft statements submitted by the North Korean side were "An Agreement on the Formation and Operation of a Working-Level Committee for a Joint Table Tennis Team" and "An Agreement to Send a Letter to the International Table Tennis League." The North stated that issues

regarding the 6th World Junior Soccer Championship should be settled after the discussion on the table tennis issues had been completely finalized. Thus, it revealed its position of wanting to avoid the issue of soccer all together.

Our side, meanwhile, based on the position that the formation of joint teams would contribute substantively to South-North sports exchanges, submitted a draft compromise on the points of contention between the two sides.

That is, we stressed once more that the points agreed upon in the talks for the 11th Asian Games in Beijing should continue to be respected as the basis for the formation of joint teams for future international events. We also proposed, however, that because little time remained before the 41st World Table Tennis Championships and the 6th World Junior Soccer Championship and because it would be relatively easy to evaluate athletes' abilities we adopt exceptional measures in order to reach a comprehensive agreement.

Thus, we suggested that the athletes to the 41st World Table Tennis Championships be chosen by agreement within the bilateral structure formed to organize the joint team for this event. The athletes to the 6th World Junior Soccer Championship would be chosen by the bilateral structure formed to organize the joint team for this event on the basis of evaluation matches to be played in public in Seoul and Pyongyang.

With regard to the issue of the team leader, because it was highly likely that both the table tennis and the soccer teams would contain the same number of athletes from the South and North, we suggested that each side take one of the two team leader positions.

Based on the above position, our side submitted a partially amended draft agreement, together with the draft agreements on the formation and operation of working-level committees

for the table tennis and soccer tournaments and on the letters to the International Olympic Committee, the World Table Tennis Federation, FIFA and the Asian Football Federation.

Despite this far-reaching compromise on our part, however, the North Korean side opposed traveling to each side's territory to hold training sessions by asserting that it would create a mental and physical burden. It also continued to call for the joint leadership of all teams. Finally, the Third Talks also adjourned without producing any result.

Even to set a date for the Fourth Talks, the North manifested an insensitive attitude. To our proposal that February 12 be set as the date, it responded that the talks should be resumed on that very afternoon. Finally, it informed us that we should contact the North by telephone whenever we were prepared to change our position. Thus, the North avoided an agreement to set a date for the next meeting.

Also, although we had requested that in the interest of making progress in the talks neither side should introduce issues outside the realm of sports, the North Korean chief delegate, Kim Hyung-jin, again criticized the Team Spirit exercises at a news conference. He continued that the North's position was more reasonable and was its "final offer" and that further meetings would be meaningless unless the South side modified our position. He, thus, appeared to suggest that the talks were breaking down.

5. The Fourth Talks

After the Third Talks ended with the uncompromising attitude on the North Korean side, our chief delegate Chang

Choong-shik sent a telephone message on February 8, 1991 to the North Korean chief delegate Kim Hyung-jin that the next meeting should take place on February 12.

In this telephone message, our side pinpointed the compromises we had offered on several issues, such as the order of the discussion. We emphasized that in order to insure the success of the talks so that the joint teams could be dispatched to the 41st World Table Tennis Championships and the 6th World Junior Soccer Championship, we were prepared to present a forward-looking plan that fully took into account the North Korean position.

In response, the North Korean chief delegate Kim Hyung-jin notified us on February 11 with the preconditions that the training sessions of the joint table tennis team be held in Japan and that a joint leadership be adopted for the team. He also said, however, that his delegation would appear at Panmunjom on February 12.

Thus, the Fourth South-North Sports Talks took place on February 12 at Peace House in our sector of Panmunjom.

All the delegates from the two sides met from 10 a.m. At 2 p.m., working-level contacts were held to finalize the wording of the documents, and at a 5 p.m. plenary session the documents were signed and exchanged. Through these meetings, a total resolution was achieved on issues related to the formation of joint teams.

In the morning meeting, our side first accepted the North Korean stand that a priority should be given to the formation of a joint team for the 41st World Table Tennis Championships. On the issue of the training sessions, we proposed that if it is difficult for the athletes to travel to both sides, then Seoul could be designated the venue for the training.

In response to this the North Korean side, even while plac-

ing all blame on our side for the lack of progress in the talks, demonstrated a number of positive changes in their position regarding the formation of joint teams.

Regarding the selection process for the soccer team, the North accepted our plan in which the athletes from the South and the North would be mixed together for trial matches that would form the basis for a selection process by mutual agreement. The North only revised the date of these matches from the end of April to the beginning of May.

On the issue of the team leadership, the North insisted that the joint team leaders be adopted, but it agreed to accept on a one-time-only basis our proposal that the North Korean side take the leadership position for the table tennis team and our side for the soccer team. It also agreed to our draft agreements on the formation and operation of working-level committees for the joint teams.

Our side then agreed to the North Korean proposal to train the joint team for the 41st World Table Tennis Championships in Japan. Thus, for the first time in the history of Korean division, South-North joint teams for table tennis and soccer were created.

On this day the two sides signed and exchanged four agreements as follows: 1) the formation of a joint team for the 41st World Table Tennis Championships; 2) the formation and operation of a working-level committee for the joint team to the 41st World Table Tennis Championships; 3) the formation of a South-North joint team for the 6th World Junior Soccer Championship; and 4) the formation and operation of a working level committee for the joint team to the 6th World Junior Soccer Championship.

At the same time, an agreement was reached on the wording of the letters to the International Olympic Committee, the

World Table Tennis Federation, FIFA and the Asian Football Federation.

The two sides decided that notification would be given later by telephone for the date of the Fifth South-North Sports Talks. Concerning the working-level committees for the joint teams, they would hold their first meeting on February 21 for the table tennis team and on February 22 for the soccer team.

The fact that the discussions on this issue of sending joint teams to international athletic events first began 28 years ago made this a historic agreement between the South and North. In addition, the substantive exchange established between the South and North in the field of sports, may be significant in clearing the way for a greater personal contact between the two sides.

The full text of the agreements on forming the joint table tennis and soccer teams that were signed and exchanged between the two sides on this day are as follows:

**Agreement on the Formation of
Joint South-North Team for Participation in
the 41st World Table Tennis Championships**

The Republic of Korea Olympic Committee and the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea Olympic Committee, in the spirit of national reconciliation and sportsmanship, have agreed to the following matters in the hope that forming a joint South-North team for participation in the 41st World Table Tennis Championships will demonstrate the unity among sportsmen of the South and North at home and abroad and will lead to further opportunities for fostering exchanges and cooperation in the field of sports.

1. Name of the Team

The name of the team in our language shall be “Koria” and in English shall be “Korea” (abbreviation: KOR)

2. Team Flag

- a. This shall be a light blue map of our country emblazoned on a white field.
- b. The map shall display the Korean peninsula and Cheju Island as a symbolic representation of the whole. Other islands, including Tok-do, Mara-do, and Maan-do, shall not be shown.

3. Team Anthem

This shall be “Arirang” which was sung in our country during the 1920s.

4. Selection of Athletes

The joint team management structure shall discuss this matter and make the selection.

5. Formation of the Team

- a. Formation shall be completed by early March, 1991.
- b. The relevant regulations of the International Table Tennis Association and the 41st World Table Tennis Championships Organizing Committee shall be observed.
- c. The position of the team leader shall be assumed by the North.
- d. Matters regarding other team officials shall be discussed and decided by the joint team management structure.

6. Training of Athletes

- a. Training shall be conducted at the event venue.

- b. The size of the joint team that will participate in the training as well as the time, place, method and expenses for the training shall be discussed and decided by the joint team management structure.
- c. The training shall commence from the time of the team formation to the time of participation in the event.

7. Team Expenses

In principle, team expenses shall be born jointly by the South and North. Details on the matter shall be discussed and decided by the joint team management structure.

8. The Joint Team Management Structure

- a. A “Joint Table Tennis Team Working-Level Committee,” referred hereafter as the “Working-Level Committee,” shall be organized to discuss and manage matters related to the formation of the joint table tennis team and its participation in events.
- b. The Working-Level Committee shall be formed within ten days after the signing of the basic agreement on the formation and participation of a joint team.
- d. The Working-Level Committee shall be composed of five representatives from each side, and the South and North shall each appoint a joint chairman.
- d. The Working-Level Committee shall meet whenever appropriate at Panmunjom.
- e. The Working-Level Committee shall discuss and decide the following matters related to:
 - 1) athlete selection and training;
 - 2) team composition and management;
 - 3) team uniforms and other items needed for participation; and

- 4) other items in the formation and participation of the joint team.
 - f. An agreement on the formation and operation of the Working-Level Committee shall be drawn up separately.
9. This agreement shall take effect on the day it is signed.

**Agreement on the Formation of
Joint South-North Team for Participation
in the 6th World Junior Soccer Championship**

The Republic of Korea Olympic Committee and the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea Olympic Committee, in the spirit of national reconciliation and sportsmanship, have agreed to the following matters in the hope that forming a joint South-North team for participation in the 6th World Junior Soccer Championship will demonstrate the unity among sportsmen of the South and North at home and abroad and will lead to further opportunities for fostering exchanges and cooperation in the field of sports.

1. Name of the Team

The name of the team in our language shall be “Koria” and in English shall be “Korea” (abbreviation: KOR)

2. Team Flag

- a. This shall be a light blue map of our country emblazoned on a white field.
- b. The map shall display the Korean peninsula and Cheju Island as a symbolic representation of the whole. Other islands, including Tok-do, Mara-do, and Maan-do, shall

not be shown.

3 Team Anthem

This shall be “Arirang” which was sung in our country during the 1920s.

4. Selection of Athletes

- a. The joint team management structure shall discuss and decide on this matter on the basis of evaluation matches.
- b. Such evaluation matches shall be completed between late April and early May and shall be conducted in public.
- c. These evaluation matches shall in principle be held once each in the site in the South and North, such as Seoul and Pyongyang.
- d. Expenses for holding the evaluation matches shall be discussed and decided by the joint team management structure.

5. Formation of the Team

- a. This shall be completed no later than early May, 1991.
- b. The relevant regulations of FIFA and the 6th World Junior Soccer Championship shall be observed.
- c. The position of the team leader shall be assumed by the South.
- d. Matters regarding other team officials shall be discussed and decided by the joint team management structure.

6. Training of Athletes

- a. The South and North shall take turns in hosting the training sessions.
- b. The size of the team that will participate in the training sessions as well as time, place, method and expenses

related to the training shall be discussed and decided by the joint team management structure.

- c. The training shall commence from the time of the team formation to the time of participation in the championship event.

7. Team Expenses

In principle, team expenses shall be born jointly by the South and North. Details on this matter shall be discussed and decided by the joint team management structure.

8. Guarantees of Personal Safety

The personal safety of the athletes and related officials participating in the evaluation matches and the training sessions shall be guaranteed by means of a “Pledge to Guarantee Personal Safety” to be exchanged between the pertinent authorities of the South and North.

9. The Joint Team Management Structure

- a. A “Joint Soccer Team Working-Level Committee,” referred hereafter as the “Working-Level Committee,” shall be organized to discuss and manage matters related to the formation, of the joint soccer team and its participation in events.
- b. The Working-Level Committee shall be established within ten days after the signing of the basic agreement on the formation and participation of a joint team.
- c. The Working-Level Committee shall be composed of five representatives from each side, and the South and North shall each appoint a joint chairman.
- d. The Working-Level Committee shall meet whenever appropriate at Panmunjom.

- e. The Working Level Committee shall discuss and decide the following related to:
 - 1) athlete selection and training;
 - 2) team composition and management;
 - 3) team travel to the South and North;
 - 4) team uniforms and other items needed for participation; and
 - 5) other items in the formation and participation of the joint team.
- f. An agreement on the formation and operation of the Working-Level Committee shall be drawn up separately.

10. This agreement shall take effect on the day it is signed.

6. The Working-Level Committee Meetings

a. Working-Level Committee for the Joint Table Tennis Team

(1) The First Meeting

The first closed meeting of the working-level committee for the joint team to the 41st World Table Tennis Championships took place on February 21 from 10 a.m. until 12:20 p.m. at Tongil-gak in the northern sector of Panmunjom.

In attendance were five delegates from each side whose names had been exchanged on February 18.

The list of delegates to the joint table tennis team working committee is as follows:

The South

- Chairman** Park Sung-in
Vice President, Korea Table Tennis Association (KTTA)
- Members** Kim Chang-jae, Managing Director, KTTA
Park Soo-jang, Board Member, KTTA
Park Do-chun, Board Member, KTTA
Pang Kwang-il, Board Member, KTTA

The North

- Chairman** Chang Woong
Secretary, North Korean Olympic Committee (NOKC)
- Members** Kim Sang-bu, Member, NOKC
Kim Hui-jin
Secretary, North Korean Table Tennis Association (NKTTA)
Kang Young-sam, Member, NKTTA
Pak Si-nam, Member, NKTTA

Prior to the meeting, committee members from the two sides introduced themselves and exchanged letters of appointment.

Then, in accordance with the agreement reached at the South-North Sports Talks, the two sides expressed their opinions on a number of issues related to the formation of a joint team and began concrete discussions. The issues were as follows:

- (1) the selection and training of athletes;
- (2) the formation and management of the team;
- (3) uniforms and other articles necessary for participation;

- (4) participation in the meetings during the period of the Championships;
- (5) other issues related to the formation of a joint team and its participation in the Championships.

At this meeting, the two sides reached a basic agreement on most issues, and they decided that at their second meeting they would discuss the wording of an agreement document from the results of this meeting.

At this first meeting, the two sides disagreed on two issues. The first of these was the time and place for ceremonies to inaugurate and dissolve the team, and the second was the means of team transportation, involving the manner in which the team would depart and return home.

The South's position was that, in view of the purpose of forming a joint team and of deciding on the meaning of the "team inauguration," it would be against common sense and against national sentiment to hold the inauguration and dissolution ceremonies in a third country. Thus, we recommended that these ceremonies be held in Seoul and Pyongyang. The North Korean side, however, insisted that these ceremonies be held in Japan, the venue of the event.

Meanwhile, the two sides decided to submit a request to the World Table Tennis Federation that the 21 persons (11 men, 10 women) already selected by the table tennis associations of the South and North be accepted as the total members of the South-North team.

In addition, it was decided that at the second meeting our side would submit a taped recording and sheet music of the team anthem and that the North Korean side would submit the team flag for final approval.

Both sides agreed that the second meeting would be held on

February 27 at Peace House in our sector of Panmunjom.

(2) The Second Meeting

The second meeting of the Table Tennis Working Committee was held on February 27 from 10 a.m. at Peace House in our sector of Panmunjom.

At this meeting each side submitted its amended draft agreements, based on the results of the first meeting. Concrete discussions were then conducted from these items.

Concerning the issue of where to hold the team inauguration and dissolution ceremonies, a point of contention during the first meeting, it was agreed that these ceremonies would be eliminated entirely and replaced by a joint welcoming ceremony at the event venue. Also, there would be a joint cheering section for the two sides. An agreement on this point meant that all outstanding issues had been resolved in connection with the formation of a joint team.

Two committee members from each side then held working-level contacts to draft the final wording of the documents. At 5 p.m., the full committee was called back into session for the signing of the documents.

On this day, the two sides also agreed on the wording for a letter and on sending an entry application to the World Table Tennis Federation.

The main points of agreement between the two sides were as follows:

1. Athlete Selection

- ° Participating athletes shall be those with automatic participation rights according to the quotas set by the World Table Tennis Association and with individual rankings in

this association.

Athlete selection was agreed on by the two sides as follows:

Event	Assigned Athletes
Women's Team Competition (4 persons)	South 2, North 2
Men's Team Competition (5 persons)	South 2, North 3
Individual Singles	All participants
Individual Doubles, Mixed Doubles	One from each side in each pair

2. Team Membeship

- Team Size: 28 persons from the South and North (56 total)
 - Team leader (North side), Head Coach (South side), Manager, Advisers, Coaches, Athletes (22 persons) and other officials.
- Team Inauguration and Dissolution Ceremonies shall be eliminated and shall be substituted by a joint welcoming ceremony at the event venue.
- In case an athlete is unable to participate, the appropriate committee shall select a substitute.

3. Submission of Entry Application

- Submission method: The South and North shall each submit an entry application.
- Submission date: Each application shall be sent out on or before March 15.

4. Athlete Training

- Training Period: March 26-April 23, 1991
 - * Arrival at the venue by March 25
- Training Venue: Venue of Event (Japan)

5. Team Flag and Anthem, Uniforms, and Training Wear

- Team Flag and Uniforms: shall be provided by the North
- Team Anthem, Training Wear: shall be provided by the South
- The team emblem shall be displayed on all uniforms, training wear and other articles.
- Training wear shall display the team emblem across the chest above the word “Koria” in Korean script and the word “Korea” in English across the back.

On this day, the two sides also finalized the list of participating athletes. It was decided that physical data on the athletes and other administrative matters would be handled through the Panmunjom liaison officer.

Accordingly, the first liaison officers' meeting was held on March 6 from 10 a.m. in the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission conference room. The two sides exchanged the lists of athletes' names written in Chinese characters and in English and the measurements of each athlete for the uniforms. Both sides also exchanged the entry forms and the letters written in English to be sent to the appropriate international organizations.

At the second liaison officers' meeting on March 20, the two sides exchanged articles for the trip according to the previous agreement.

We provided the North with 1,368 items in twelve categories, including training wear and competition footwear. The

North provided us with the uniforms that were dark blue at the top and light grey at the bottom, as well as neckties and shoes.

Team members from the South and North departed Seoul and Pyongyang on March 25 and joined each other at the event venue in Japan to begin approximately one month of joint training. Thus, historic preparations were completed for a joint team.

b. Joint Soccer Team Working-Level Committee

(1) The First Meeting

The first meeting of the working-level committee for a Joint South-North Team to the 6th World Junior Soccer Championship was held on February 22 from 10 a.m. to 1 p.m. in Peace House in our sector of Panmunjom.

Participants from our side in this meeting were five members headed by Vice-President Oh Wan-kon of the Korean Football Association (KFA). The North Korean participants were five members headed by Kim Sae-jin, a member of the North Korean Olympic Committee (NKOC).

The full list of the participants from both sides is:

The South

Chairman Oh Wan-kon, Vice President, KFA
 Members Yu Kap, Managing Director, KFA
 Im Tae-soon, Board Member, KFA
 Lee Nak-won, Board Member, KFA
 Oh Ji-chul, Board Member, KFA

The North

Chairman Kim Sae-jin, Member, NKOC

Members Kim Jung-shik, Member, NKOC
 Li Myung-sung
 Vice Chairman, North Korea Football Association (NKFA)
 Kim Kwang-ho, Member, NKFA
 Yoon Yoon-heung, Member, NKFA

Prior to the formal opening of the meeting, the two joint chairmen exchanged credential letters issued by the president of each side's National Olympic Committee.

Then, the two sides submitted draft agreements for the joint team working-level committee and conducted concrete discussions on issues: 1) related to athlete selection and training; and 2) related to the formation and management of the team.

The two sides reached a basic agreement on the method and venues for trial matches, numbers of participants and on the period and venue of training sessions.

Differences of opinion existed on the number of journalists who would be allowed to cover the trial matches and training sessions and on the specific date for the trial matches. These items were tabled for the second meeting of the committee.

Also, since the entry applications had to be submitted to FIFA no later than February 28, it was decided that a joint entry application would be drawn up and signed by both sides at the second meeting.

At this first meeting, the two sides also consented to hold trial matches in public once each in Seoul and Pyongyang, to complete athlete selection by May 8 and to begin team training on May 10.

The two sides agreed to hold the second committee meeting on February 26 at Tongil-gak in the North's sector of Panmun-

jom.

(2) The Second Meeting

The second meeting of the Joint Soccer Team Working-Level Committee was held on February 26 from 10 a.m. at Tongil-gak in the North's sector of Panmunjom. At this meeting, the two sides continued concrete discussions on the basis of the results of the first meeting.

The two sides disagreed over the precise scheduling of the trial matches and the question of how many journalists would be permitted to cover the trial matches and training sessions. In the end, however, a compromise solution was reached, and all issues on the formation of a joint soccer team were resolved.

Thus, it was decided that for the trial matches a total of 140 persons for a period of 5 days each time and for the training sessions a total 78 persons for a period of 6 days each time would travel between the South and the North. The number of participants in the Championship was decided at 62.

The two sides also finalized the wording on the joint team's entry application to the Asian Football Association and FIFA.

From 3 p.m., two members from each side held working-level contacts to finalize the wording for the agreements. At 5 p.m., the full committee was convened so that the two joint chairmen could sign the agreements.

The main points of agreement on this day between the South and North were as follows:

1. Trial Matches

- First Match: May 4, Seoul
- Second Match: May 8, Pyongyang
- Persons to travel between the South and North: 70 per-

sons from each side

- Athletes: 18
- Officials: 7
- Working level personnel: 5
- Support personnel: 15
- Journalists: 25
- Athlete selection: to be completed by May 8
- Television broadcasts of the matches shall be covered by the host side providing the image and sound in the manner requested by the other side.

2. Training Sessions

- Participating Members: 36 persons from each side (Team leader: South side, Assistant leader: North)
- Schedule:
 - May 10-14: Pyongyang
 - May 16-20: Seoul
 - May 22-26: Toulon, France
 - May 27-June 4 Participate in Toulon International Junior Soccer Tournament
 - June 6-13: Acclimatization training in Portugal

3. The Team

- Team Membership: 62 persons (31 from each side)
 - Athletes: 18 (9 from each side)
 - Team Leader; South 1
 - Assistant Team Leader: North 1
 - Manager: North 1
 - Coach: South 1
 - South and North shall each provide five officials for administrative affairs, public relations, publicity, medical affairs, and interpreting.

— Support personnel: 30 persons (15 from each side)

4. Submission of Entry Application

- The application will be submitted to FIFA and the Asian Football Association by February 28.
- Notification will also be given on the joint team's name, flag, anthem, uniform and stocking color (red and white).
- Athlete List: will be submitted jointly by the Football Association of the South and North by June 4, 1991.

5. Team Inauguration and Dissolution Ceremonies

- Inauguration: in Seoul, following the trial match
- Dissolution: in Pyongyang, following the team's return

6. Departure and Return of the Team

- Departure: from Seoul, by airplane
- Return: to Pyongyang, by airplane

7. Uniforms and Other Articles

- Team Flag and Uniform: to be prepared by the North side
- Team Anthem, Training Wear, and Sporting Articles: to be prepared by the South side
- Uniforms, training wear, and all other articles shall carry the emblem of the joint team.
- Training wear shall display the joint team emblem over the word "Koria" in Korean script across the chest and the word "Korea" in English across the back.

A meeting of the two liaison officers was held in the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission conference room in

Panmunjom on March 8 from 10 a.m.

On this day, the South side submitted to the North the forms for the measurements of the athletes, sample uniforms (2 sets of red and white) and a list of items to be discussed by the liaison officers.

The North side, however, replied that "Today's meeting is only for the purpose of listening to the South's proposals" and said that it would reply to these proposals at a later date. No further progress was made on this day.

The liaison officers met again on April 1 at 10 a.m. in the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission conference room at Panmunjom. Our side turned over to the North a list of uniform and sporting items. The North side, in turn, gave us a team flag and commemorative pennants.

At a meeting of the liaison officers on April 10, certain changes were instituted in the schedule for trial matches and training sessions that had been agreed to at the February 26 meeting of the Joint Soccer Team Working-Level Committee. The changes involved the period of travel for the trial matches which was reduced from 5 days to 4 days. Also, it was decided that the joint team would not participate in the Toulon International Junior Soccer Tournament as a part of its training.

**SOUTH-NORTH
DIALOGUE
IN KOREA**

No. 53
December
1991

SOUTH-NORTH DIALOGUE IN KOREA

Published by
International Cultural Society of Korea
C.P.O. Box 4161
SEOUL, KOREA

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Part I

The Fourth South-North High-Level Meeting

1. Developments after the Third Meeting

a. A Call for the Resumption of the Meeting and Reactions from the North

On the February 11, 1991, the South proposed to the North that a responsible liaison officers' contact be held on February 18 at the Peace House in the southern sector of Panmunjom to discuss itineraries and other working-level matters related to the Fourth South-North High-Level Meeting to be held in Pyongyang from February 25. The proposal was conveyed in a telephone message signed by the South's Chief Liaison Officer Kim Yong-hwan.

However, on February 14 North Korea in effect postponed the responsible liaison officers' contact indefinitely by sending a telephone message, "We will reply to your February 11th telephone message calling for a responsible liaison officers' contact at an appropriate time."

Subsequently in a statement issued by the North's delegation to the high-level talks, which was released in a Radio Pyongyang broadcast on February 18, North Korea unilaterally announced the indefinite postponement of the fourth high-level meeting originally slated for February 25 in Pyongyang while denouncing the South for the Team Spirit joint military training exercise and the military alert over the Gulf War.

Reacting to the North's unilateral postponement, the South, expressing strong disappointment and regret, pointed out the unreasonableness of the postponement in a statement issued on the same day, February 18, by the spokesman of the National Unification Board.

Stressing that the suspension of the dialogue cannot be

allowed any longer if only to dispel the state of mutual distrust and confrontation, Prime Minister Ro Jai-bong, in a telephone message to the North on April 8, proposed that the fourth meeting be held from May 22 to 25.

In Pyongyang, An Byong-su, vice chairman of the North's Committee for Peaceful Unification of the Fatherland and concurrently a spokesman for the northern delegation to the South-North high-level talks, held a press conference on the night of April 10 and reacted negatively to the resumption of the high-level meeting. He was disputing the South's dialogue posture while condemning the Team Spirit exercise and the efforts to join the United Nations, renewing his call for a political conference for national unification, setting forth de facto preconditions to the resumption of the talks by demanding the repeal of the National Security Law and allowing of the formation of the southern headquarters of the "Pomminnyon," an organization of North Koreans and dissidents in the South and abroad.

On April 11, the South, in a comment by the spokesman of the National Unification Board, pinpointed the unreasonableness of the North Korean attitude which, on the heels of their unilateral postponement of the fourth high-level meeting, was to shun all dialogues between government authorities. The South strongly urged the North to return to the dialogue table at an early date, stressing that there can be no preconditions whatsoever to the resumption of the high-level talks.

However, disputing President Roh Tae-woo's instructions conveyed at a unification-related ministers' meeting on June 16 to the effect that the process leading to German unification should be studied to better prepare for unification, North Korea, in a statement issued by the spokesman of the North's delegation to the high-level talks on June 26, charged the South with pursuing "unification through absorption," and they thus

reacted negatively to the resumption of the high-level meeting.

In the statement, the North made slanderous remarks against the South, branding the South's dialogue efforts as being anti-unification and anti-dialogue. As preconditions to the resumption of the talks, the North again demanded the repeal of the South's anti-Communist policy and the National Security Law, the release of illegal visitors to the North and the suspension of the Team Spirit military training exercise.

In reaction, the South, in a comment by the spokesman of the National Unification Board on June 27, indicated the absurdity of the North's preconditions to the resumption of the meeting, and urged the North to return to the talks at an early date without the preconditions.

Meanwhile, as progress in the inter-Korean dialogue emerged as a de facto must for the North's planned rapprochement with Japan and improvement of relations with the United States, and faced with the need to present their "peace-oriented image" to the international community with their forthcoming entry into the United Nations in September, North Korea, in a telephone message signed by Administration Council Prime Minister Yon Hyong-muk on July 11, agreed to resume the fourth high-level meeting without demanding the preconditions they had previously imposed.

In the telephone message, the North suggested that the fourth meeting be held in Pyongyang from August 27 through August 30.

In response, Prime Minister Chung Won-shik sent a telephone message to the North on July 13 to accept the North Korean suggestion. In the same message, Prime Minister Chung offered to hold a responsible liaison officers' contact on July 19, explaining that advance working-level preparations should be undertaken to make the fourth meeting fruitful.

A responsible liaison officers' contact was thus held at Tongil-gak in the northern sector of Panmunjom from 10 a.m. through 11:15 a.m. on July 19 to discuss the working-level matters related to making advance preparation for the fourth inter-Korean high-level meeting.

At the meeting, the South proposed working-level delegates' contacts to ensure a productive and successful fourth meeting through advance negotiations. It reasoned that advance talks were necessary in view of the tremendous changes that had taken place in the internal and external arenas after the high-level talks were suspended, such as the decision by both to join the United Nations. But, the North Korean responsible liaison officer wanted to discuss the issue at the next contact.

Also at the contact, the North again raised the issue of illegal visitors to the North and disputed the South's unification efforts, charging the South with pursuing a policy of "unification through absorption" and emphasizing the "justness" of its confederation idea.

Meanwhile, in a statement on the so-called '91 pan-national conference and youth-student unification festival, the North asserted on July 25 that if the South's government obstruct the programs, the planned resumption of the high-level meeting would be considered. The statement was allegedly adopted at an expanded emergency meeting of the Democratic Front for Unification of the Fatherland.

At the second responsible liaison officers' contact held at the Peace House from 10 a.m. through 10:50 a.m. on July 29, the two sides agreed to hold working-level delegates contacts to discuss matters for the fourth high-level meeting. Two delegates and three attendants from each side were to attend the meeting, and the first contact was scheduled at the Peace House at 10 a.m. August 2, respectively.

Both the South and the North submitted the list of their two delegates to the working-level delegates' meeting on August 1 and August 2, respectively.

The lists of the delegates to the working-level delegates' contacts were as follows:

The South:

Song Han-ho, vice minister, National Unification Board
Im Dong-won, director, Foreign Policy and National
Security Institute

The North:

Baek Nam-jun, director, Secretariat of Committee for
Peaceful Unification of the Fatherland
Choe Wu-jin, ambassador at large, Foreign Ministry

***b. Working-Level Delegates' Contacts to Prepare for
the Fourth Meeting***

(1) First Working-Level Delegates' Contact

The first working-level delegates' meeting to prepare for the fourth high-level meeting was held behind the closed doors at the Peace House from 10 a.m. to 11:00 a.m. on August 5.

The North, whose delegates were first to make the remarks, maintained that the fourth high-level meeting should adopt a "declaration on non-aggression between the North and the South" and an "agreement on reconciliation, cooperation and exchanges between the North and the South." They then produced a draft of a "Declaration on Non-Aggression between the North and the South" as follows:

A Declaration on Non-Aggression between the North and the South (Draft)

The North and the South,

Reaffirming and strictly abiding by the three major principles — independence, peaceful unification and grand national unity — for the unification of the fatherland embodied in the July 4th Joint Communique, and

Confirming to exert joint efforts to dispel the state of tension and prevent war on the Korean peninsula, and to realize peace and peaceful unification of the nation,

Hereby solemnly pledge as follows:

- Article 1. The North and the South, as a single nation, shall not use the force of arms against each other and shall not invade each other by force of arms under any circumstances.
- Article 2. The North and the South shall resolve possible differences in opinions and problems of disputes peacefully through dialogue and negotiations.
- Article 3. The boundary of non-aggression between the North and the South shall be the military demarcation line regulated under the Military Armistice Agreement of July 23, 1953.
- Article 4. To guarantee non-aggression, the North and the South shall suspend arms race and realize phased arms reduction.
- Article 5. The North and the South shall, through mutual agreements, jointly advance recommendations to other countries on their cooperation in implementing non-aggression.
- Article 6. The North and the South shall install and operate a direct telephone line between the military authorities

of the two sides to forestall inadvertent armed clashes and their escalation.

Article 7. The North and the South shall form and operate a joint North-South military committee of five military personnel (three general-level officers and two colonels) from each side and chaired by full generals or lieutenant generals to take the necessary measures for implementing items of consensus regarding non-aggression, which shall be.

Article 8. This non-aggression declaration may be amended or supplemented through agreement between the North and the South.

Article 9. This declaration shall go into force when the North and the South, having gone through the procedures necessary for effectuation, exchange written notification. Unless one notifies the other of its cancellation, the declaration shall remain in force until the unification of the fatherland is realized.

Yon Hyong-muk
Prime Minister
Administration Council
Democratic People's Republic of
Korea,
Chief Delegate
The North's Delegation to
North-South High-Level Meeting

Chung Won-shik
Prime Minister
Republic of Korea,
Chief Delegate
The South's Delegation to
South-North High-Level Meeting

Date: August , 1991

In addition, the North asserted that the fourth high-level meeting should take up the issue of withdrawing American nuclear weapons from South Korea as well as the question of

adopting a joint declaration on non-nuclearization of the Korean peninsula, which were the issues raised first by the North Korean Foreign Ministry in a July 30th statement.

At the August 5 meeting, the South produced an epochal proposal of three agreements for adoption at the fourth meeting. The offer represented a sweeping modification of the proposal submitted at the third high-level meeting when the South suggested that a basic agreement on the improvement of inter-Korean relations be adopted at the high-level meeting, and that two subcommittees be formed within one month after the meeting to discuss and resolve the issues of "non-aggression" and an agreement on travel, communications and trade.

The South maintained that a basic inter-Korean agreement should be prepared if only to facilitate the adoption of a mutually reliable and workable non-aggression declaration.

At the meeting, the South suggested that the two sides take up and discuss all three draft agreements worked out by the South and the two draft documents of the North. But, no progress was recorded because the North only wanted to discuss and adopt their draft of non-aggression declaration without even producing the draft of their idea on "agreement on reconciliation, cooperation and exchanges between the North and the South."

The first working-level delegates' work adjourned after the two sides agreed to hold the second working-level delegates' meeting at Tongil-gak at 10 a.m. on August 10.

(2) Second Working-Level Delegates' Contact

The second working-level delegates' contact to prepare for the fourth South-North high-level meeting was held behind the closed doors at Tongil-gak from 10 a.m. to 12 noon on August 10.

At the meeting, the South produced three draft agreements, suggesting that the two sides carry on debates with emphasis on the contents of their draft agreements. The three drafts the South set forth were a revised version of the "Basic Agreement for the Improvement of South-North Relations," a draft "Agreement on Non-Aggression between the South and the North," and a draft "Agreement on Travel, Communications, Trade and Economic Cooperation between the South and the North."

The revised version of the "Basic Agreement for the Improvement of South-North Relations" was in substance the draft of "Basic Agreement" which the South offered at the third high-level meeting with the supplementary description that the inter-Korean relations should be a "special relationship to be formed in a process leading to unification" and the additional provision that "the two sides shall establish their permanent liaison missions in Seoul and Pyongyang for mutual consultations and liaison."

The draft of "Agreement on Non-Aggression between the South and the North" was the "Idea on South-North Non-Aggression to be Discussed at Political-Military Committee" which the South first presented at the third high-level meeting and which was reworked into the form of an agreement, while the draft of "Agreement on Travel, Communications, Trade and Economic Cooperation between the South and the North" was the "Proposal for Travel, Communications and Trade" which the Seoul first suggested at the second high-level meeting and which was reworked into the form of an agreement.

The text of the three draft agreements set forth by the South was as follows:

A Basic Agreement for the Improvement of South-North Relations (Revised Draft)

The South and the North,

Reaffirming the three principles for unification — independence, peace and grand national unity — embodied in the July 4th South-North Joint Communiqué in accordance with the wishes of all the people for peaceful unification of the divided homeland; and

Pledging to exert joint efforts to faithfully carry out the dialogue in the direction of the nation's common interests and realizing national reconciliation, to improve mutual relations and institutionalize peace based on confidence-building through the alleviation of tension and exchanges and cooperation, to accomplish peaceful unification cognizant of the fact that the bilateral relations are a special relationship formed on a tentative basis pending unification,

Have agreed on the following basic items:

- Article 1. Pending the time of unification, the South and the North shall respect each other's system, shall not interfere in each other's internal affairs, shall resolve disputes peacefully through dialogue and negotiations between government authorities, and shall desist from slanders and defamation against each other.
- Article 2. The South and the North shall enable the people from both sides to recognize each other's true conditions, and shall, to this end, open and exchange newspapers, radio and television programs, and publications.
- Article 3. The South and the North shall expedite economic and personnel exchanges and cooperation in order to

enhance the well-being of all the people and promote balanced development. To institutionally guarantee this, an agreement on travel, communications, trade and economic cooperation shall be adopted.

- Article 4. The South and the North shall promptly carry out free exchange of letters, meeting and visits without any conditions between the dispersed families and relatives, and shall promote their reunion based on their free will.
- Article 5. The South and the North shall promote confidence building in the military area and carry out phased arms reduction in order to do away with arms race and to eliminate arms confrontation.
- Article 6. The South and the North shall adopt an agreement on non-aggression guaranteeing that they shall not use the force of arms and shall not commit any act of aggression, destruction or subversion.
- Article 7. The South and the North shall jointly strive to transform the existing armistice system into a peace mechanism between the South and the North.
A mechanism to internationally guarantee peace shall be prepared to consolidate the peace system between the South and the North.
- Article 8. The South and the North shall desist from competition and confrontation and shall cooperate with each other in international arenas, and shall jointly exert efforts for national interests and self-esteem.
- Article 9. The South and the North shall establish permanent liaison missions in Seoul and Pyongyang for mutual consultations and liaison.
- Article 10. The South and the North shall establish a South-North exchanges and cooperation sub-committee and

a South-North political and military sub-committee within the framework of the high-level meeting within a month after the effectuation of this agreement to produce concrete measures for implementation.

Article 11. This agreement shall go into force when the South and the North exchange the written copies after going through the necessary procedures for effectuation.

Date: October , 1991

Chung Won-shik
Prime Minister
Republic of Korea

Yon Hyong-muk
Prime Minister
Administration Council
Democratic People's Republic of
Korea

**An Agreement on Non-Aggression between
the South and the North (Draft)**

The South and the North,

With a view to alleviating the state of tension and consolidating peace between the South and the North through the cessation of all aggressive acts, direct or indirect, and its guarantee, and thereby contributing to peaceful unification,

Have agreed on the following:

- Article 1. The South and the North shall not use the force of arms against each other and shall not invade the other by military force.
- Article 2. The South and the North shall give up all policies to destroy and subvert each other, and shall not commit any acts to subvert or destabilize each other's system.

- Article 3. The South and the North shall peacefully resolve differences in opinions and disputes that may occur between them through dialogue and negotiations.
- Article 4. The areas of non-aggression between the South and the North shall be those under their respective jurisdiction specified in the Military Armistice Agreement of July 27, 1953.
- Article 5. The South and the North shall take the following steps to dissolve the state of military confrontation and arms race and to guarantee the implementation of non-aggression.
- (1) Military information shall be exchanged with each other and mutual visits and exchanges between military personnel shall be conducted.
 - (2) Movement of or field maneuvers involving all the units larger than a specified size shall require a mutual notification in advance, and teams of observers shall be exchanged by invitation.
 - (3) A direct telephone line shall be installed and operated between military authorities to prevent military contingencies like inadvertent armed clashes and their escalation.
 - (4) The Demilitarized Zone shall be turned into a genuine buffer zone for peaceful purposes.
 - (5) To discourage mutual armed aggression, military imbalance between the two sides shall be rectified, and the issue of arms reduction shall be discussed.
 - (6) To verify the implementation of these measures, on-the-spot inspection and permanent surveillance posting system shall be operated.
 - (7) To prepare various steps necessary for the im-

plementation of the above measures, a South-North military committee shall be formed and operated within 90 days after the effectuation of this agreement.

Matters necessary for formation and operation of a South-North military committee shall be determined separately.

- Article 6. The South and the North shall take measures to internationally guarantee the contents of this agreement.
- Article 7. The South and the North shall respect the existing Military Armistice Agreement until a peace system is prepared in the future between the South and the North on the basis of the firm implementation of non-aggression and its international guarantee.
- Article 8. This agreement shall not affect those bilateral or multilateral treaties or agreements which the two sides have already concluded and which remain in force.
- Article 9. This agreement may be amended under mutual consent.
- Article 10. This agreement shall go into force when the two sides, having gone through the procedures necessary for its effectuation, mutually exchange the written copies.

Date: October , 1991

Chung Won-shik
Prime Minister
Republic of Korea

Yon Hyong-muk
Prime Minister
Administration Council
Democratic People's Republic of
Korea

**An Agreement on Travel, Communications, Trade
and Economic Cooperation between
the South and the North (Draft)**

The South and the North,

With a view to restoring mutual trust and national homogeneity by institutionally guaranteeing personnel exchanges and cooperation in various areas and to contributing to peaceful unification through the enhancement of common national well-being.

Have agreed as follows:

Chapter 1. Travel

- Article 1. The South and the North shall guarantee the residents of the two sides to travel freely back and forth.
- Article 2. The South and the North shall open inland; maritime and air routes necessary for travel, and designate the points of passage.
For inland routes, Changdan and Panmunjom shall initially be the points of passage, and the railroad between Seoul and Shinuiju and the road between Munsan and Kaesong shall be connected.
- Article 3. Anyone visiting an area on either side shall carry inter-Korean travel certificates issued by one's own authorities.
The authorities posted at the points of passage shall check the identity of, inspect the belongings of, and quarantine the persons from the other side coming for a visit.
- Article 4. Anyone visiting the area of either side may carry goods for use during the visit and gifts that do not exceed a specified limitation in amount.

- Article 5. The South and the North shall in principle furnish transportation to the persons from one side visiting the other side. However, if it is necessary, they may allow in the other side's transportation means under decision made at a South-North Travel Committee.
- Article 6. Anyone visiting the area of the other side shall abide by the rules and guidance of the side one is visiting.
- Article 7. The South and the North shall furnish emergency relief measures to the persons who may become involved in accidents while visiting an area.
- Article 8. The South and the North shall guarantee the persons visiting an area the activities necessary for visiting purpose, and shall guarantee personal safety and safe return.
- Article 9. The South and the North may forcibly deport any persons who while visiting an area engage in criminal activities.
- Article 10. The frequency of visits to either side shall in principle be limited to twice a year, each visit not to exceed 60 days.

Chapter 2. Communications

- Article 11. The South and the North shall guarantee their citizens free access to inter-Korean communications.
- Article 12. Postal matters shall be exchanged between the South and the North once a week at Panmunjom. If it is necessary, the place and frequency of exchanges may be determined separately.
- Article 13. The exchange of tele-communications shall be done through mutual switchboards, and shall be automated gradually.
- Article 14. The details regarding the method of handling, fares

and the exact calculation of fares of postal service and tele-communications between the South and the North shall be determined separately.

Article 15. The South and the North shall guarantee the confidentiality of postal and tele-communications exchanges between the citizens, and shall not use them for political and military purposes.

Article 16. If any problems arise between the South and the North, they shall be resolved by international agreements on post and tele-communications.

Chapter 3. Trade and Economic Cooperation

Article 17. The South and the North shall support and guarantee commodity trade and economic cooperation.

Article 18. Parties to commodity trade or economic cooperation between the South and the North shall be those who have obtained permission from their respective authorities for item or project.

Article 19. Items for trade shall be determined under the principle of inter-supplementation.

Article 20. The volume of trade shall be determined by item through negotiations between trading parties.

Article 21. The prices of trade materials shall be determined through an agreement reached between trading parties in consideration of international market prices.

Article 22. The method of transactions shall be clearing settlement. However, depending on situations, other methods may be used.

Article 23. Settlement work shall be directly undertaken by the banks designated by the South and the North.

Article 24. The currency of settlement shall be Swiss francs. If it is necessary, the currencies of the third country may

- be used.
- Article 25. Commodity trade between the two sides shall be promoted as intra-national trade and shall not be subjected to the imposition of tariffs.
- Article 26. The method of transporting trade commodities shall be determined through negotiations between the trading parties in consideration of the nature, weight and transportation cost of the trading goods involved. However, railroad, automobiles, vessels and airplanes shall be used reasonably.
- Article 27. The South and the North shall conduct various economic cooperation such as joint exploration of resources and joint-venture investment. Joint advancement abroad and joint external cooperation projects shall be promoted in the economic sectors.
- Article 28. The size, method, conditions and time of economic cooperation projects shall be determined through negotiations between the parties involved.

Chapte 4. Organizations for Consultations and Implementation

- Article 29. The South and the North shall establish and operate a South-North travel committee, a South-North communications committee and a South-North trade and economic cooperation committee within 90 days after the effectuation of this agreement to discuss and resolve the issue of faithful implementation of matters agreed upon previously and various other issues concomittant with their implementation.
- Article 30. Matters necessary for the formation and operation of each committee shall be determined separately.

Chapter 5. Amendment and Effectuation

Article 31. This agreement may be amended through mutual consent.

Article 32. This agreement shall go into force when the two sides, having respectively untaken procedures necessary for the effectuation, exchange the written copies of the agreement.

Date: October , 1991

Chung Won-shik
Prime Minister
Republic of Korea

Yon Hyong-muk
Prime Minister
Administration Council
Democratic People's Republic of
Korea

Meanwhile, the North produced its draft of "Declaration on Non-Aggression between the North and the South" without any change which was presented at the first meeting. It then offered a draft of "Agreement on Reconciliation, Cooperation and Exchanges between the North and the South" as follows without a clause of effectuation, asserting that the issue of non-aggression is pivotal and, therefore, should be tackled on a preferential basis.

An Agreement on Reconciliation, Cooperation and Exchanges between the North and the South (Draft)

The North and the South,

With a view to desisting from confrontation and competition and to realizing reconciliation, cooperation and exchanges in all the areas such as politics, economy and culture from a desire to

expedite the unification of the country under the three major principles — independence, peaceful unification and grand national unification — declared in the July 4th Joint Communiqué.

Have agreed as follows:

1. The North and the South shall mutually recognize and respect each other's ideologies and system and shall not interfere in each other's internal affairs.
2. The North and the South shall not slander and defame each other and shall suspend propaganda activities along the Military Demarcation Line.
3. The North and the South shall allow people from various strata of life and compatriots to travel and establish contacts freely.
4. The North and the South shall remove all the statutory and systematic mechanisms that run counter to national unity and unification.
5. The North and the South shall realize economic cooperation and material exchanges to promote the unified development of national economy and the advancement of people's well-being.
6. The North and the South shall exchange achievements and experiences and shall cooperate with each other in the areas of science, technology, education, literature and art, health, sports, publication and press.
7. The North and the South shall link disconnected railroads, roads and communications networks, and shall open maritime and air routes.
8. The North and the South shall realize mutual cooperation and exchanges in the humanitarian area.
9. The North and the South shall cooperate with, instead of competing with or being antagonistic to, each other in the international stage to which they shall advance jointly.

10. To ensure the implementation of this agreement, the North and the South shall establish a political sub-committee and a cooperation and exchanges sub-committee within three months after the signing of this agreement.

Yon Hyong-muk
 Prime Minister
 Administration Council
 Democratic People's Republic of
 Korea,
 Chief Delegate
 The North's Delegation to
 North-South High-Level Meeting

Chung Won-shik
 Prime Minister
 Republic of Korea,
 Chief Delegate
 The South's Delegation to
 South-North High-Level Meeting

Date: August , 1991

Moreover, the North maintained that the two sides should enter into the discussions of the contents of the suggested agreements after deciding on the number and names of the draft agreements to be addressed. It also insisted that the upcoming high-level talks should only adopt those agreements which are of a principled and declarational nature, while those of concrete and implementational ones should be taken up at the "sub-committees" yet to be formed. Thus, it was clear that at the high-level talks the North was interested only in formalistic and declarative agreements.

In reaction, the South suggested that the discussions follow the order of 1) a comparative debate on the contents of the two versions of agreements, 2) determination of the number and names of the agreements to be addressed, and 3) adjustment of the wording of the agreements. The South stressed that the "agreements" for adoption at the high-level meetings should always include substantive matters to improve inter-Korean

relations.

Furthermore, at the second contact, the North requested that the South refrain from arresting Miss Park Song-hui when she returned home from an illegal visit to the North as a representative of the Chondaehyop, a student activist organization.

The two sides agreed to hold the third working-level delegates' meeting at the Peace House at 10 a.m. on August 16.

(3) Third Working-Level Delegates' Contact

The third working-level delegates' meeting was held behind the closed doors at the Peace House from 10 a.m. through 11:40 a.m. on August 16.

At the third meeting, too, the North insisted that the name and the number of the agreements to be addressed be determined first before discussing the contents.

Its insistence was that the agreements for discussion should be two selected from the draft accords suggested by both sides, namely, a "non-aggression agreement" and another incorporating items found in common in others. As for the discussion, the North asserted that the high-level talks should agree only on principle and directional matters while concrete and practical questions could be discussed at the "sub-committees." It argued that the talks should simply adopt the two draft agreements North Korea has produced as they were.

On the other hand, the South emphasized that it is more important for the South and the North to discuss the contents on which they could agree, while the names and the number of the documents for agreement should be determined from the contents.

The South made it clear that the two sides cannot repeat a declaratory agreement like the July 4, 1972 Joint Communiqué. It, then, set forth 10-point items which should be included by all

means in the future inter-Korean agreements though they were not in any of the North-proposed draft agreements. The 10 items were:

(1) Mutual opening and exchanges of newspapers, radio and television programs, and publications.

(2) Exchanging letters, meetings, visits and reunions between the dispersed families freely.

(3) Establishment of a peace mechanism between the South and the North.

(4) Establishment of permanent liaison missions in Seoul and Pyongyang.

(5) Suspension of destructive and subversive activities against each other's system.

(6) Practical steps to ensure the fulfillment of "non-aggression."

(7) Respect for the present Military Armistice Agreement.

(8) A "non-aggression agreement" having no effect on the existing agreements and treaties the two sides have signed with the third countries.

(9) Concrete implementation measures for travel, communications and economic cooperation between the South and the North.

(10) The composition and operation of a travel committee, a communications committee and a trade and economic cooperation committee.

The South requested the North to declare its position over these 10-point items, suggesting that the two sides narrow differences, if any, of their position over these items. The North, however, adhered to their position that at the high-level

meetings the two sides agree only on those items held in common with respect to principled and directional matters while concrete and practical issues should be relegated to the "sub-committees." Thus the three working-level delegates' meetings ended without any tangible achievements.

In a statement issued on August 14 at the end of the three working-level delegates' meetings designed to prepare for the fourth South-North high-level meeting, Song Han-ho, the South's chief delegate to the working-level delegates' contacts, expressed a determination to make the fourth high-level meeting a more productive and fruitful conference based on the results of the working-level delegates' meetings.

c. Further Postponement of the Fourth Meeting

On August 17, the South, in a telephone message signed by Prime Minister Chung Won-shik, notified the North of the list of its delegates to the fourth South-North high-level meeting set for Pyongyang on August 22-25. The delegates listed were:

Chief delegate:

Chung Won-shik, Prime Minister

Deputy chief delegate:

Kim Chong-whi, Presidential Assistant for Foreign Policy and National Security

Delegates:

Song Ung-sop, First Deputy Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Ministry of National Defense

Song Han-ho, Vice Minister, National Unification Board

Kang Hyon-wuk, Vice Minister, Economic Planning Board

Im Dong-won, Director, Foreign Policy and National

Security Institute, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Lee Dong-bok, Special Assistant to Prime Minister

In a telephone message signed by the liaison officer for the high-level talks on August 18, North Korea proposed to hold a liaison officers' meeting on August 20 to discuss working-level matters related to the fourth high-level talks. The South agreed to the suggestion in a telephone message on August 19.

At the liaison officers meeting held at Tongil-gak from 10 a.m. on August 20, the North suddenly refused to hold the meeting in Pyongyang using the outbreak of cholera in some areas of the South as an excuse. They suggested that the meeting be held at Panmunjom instead.

It was noteworthy that the sudden aboutface came a day after the coup d'état in the Soviet Union on August 19.

The two sides held further meetings at the Peace House and Tongil-gak in Panmunjom on August 21 and 22 to discuss the question of holding the fourth meeting. But, the North simply renewed their refusal to meet in Pyongyang.

The South maintained that it was utterly incomprehensible in this day and age of modern medicine and science to cancel a scheduled meeting for cholera. Noting that most of the member nations set to attend the Asian regional meeting of the Group 77 slated for September 7-12 in Pyongyang were known to be stricken by cholera, the South pointed out that it was unreasonable to prohibit southern delegates, the same compatriots, from attending the fourth high-level meeting, while allowing delegates from cholera stricken areas to the Group 77 meeting.

The South stated that there was a dual purpose behind the original agreement to hold the high-level meetings with delegates traveling back and forth to Seoul and Pyongyang. In

this respect, he said that the good tradition maintained until the third high-level meeting should be respected also in the days ahead.

The South further stressed that one way to prepare a foundation for national unification is for both the South and the North to faithfully carry out what has already been agreed on.

On August 23, a day after the coup d'etat failed in the Soviet Union, the North, at the fourth liaison officers' meeting, proposed that if the time of the fourth high-level meeting could be postponed until October 22-25, the meeting may be held in Pyongyang.

The South accepted the North's offer, and the fourth South-North high-level meeting was now scheduled in Pyongyang on October 22-25, about 10 months after the third meeting which was held in December 1990.

1990 OCT 23
SOUTH SOUTH-NORTH HIGH-LEVEL MEETING

2. Proceeding of the Fourth High-Level Meeting

a. Liaison Officers' Contacts

In a telephone message sent to the South on October 12, which was signed by Choe Bong-chun, liaison officer of the North's delegation to the South-North high-level meeting, North Korea proposed that liaison officers' meeting be held on October 14 to discuss the itinerary of the fourth high-level meeting. The South accepted the offer and liaison officers meeting took place and working-level procedural matters related to the high-level meeting were discussed.

(1) The First Contact

The first meeting between the liaison officers of the two sides was held for about 50 minutes from 10 a.m. on October 14 at Tongil-gak.

At the meeting, the two sides decided to hold the fourth high-level meeting in Pyongyang for four days from October 22 to 25 as scheduled, and discussed the itinerary of the South's delegation during its stay in the North.

The two sides decided to have another liaison officers' meeting at 10 a.m. on October 17 at the Peace House to exchange the list of South's delegates and the North's memorandum on guaranteeing the personal safety of the visiting delegates. The second meeting was to determine the lodging and other detailed itinerary items for the South's delegation.

(2) The Second Contact

The second meeting of the liaison officers was held for about 50 minutes from 10 a.m. on October 17 at the Peace House.

The South delivered a list of its delegation (a total of 90 persons including seven delegates, 33 support personnel and 50 press members) to the North, while the North handed to the South a memorandum on guaranteeing the personal safety of the visiting delegation members, which was signed by Prime Minister Yon Hyong-muk.

In addition, the two sides agreed on the site of the meeting, lodging and other major itinerary concerns as follows:

- o Place of meeting: People's Cultural Palace
- o Lodging: Baekhwawon Guest House
- o Itinerary for the visiting delegation

October 22, Tuesday

8:30 a.m. — Passage through Panmunjom

- 12:40 a.m. — Arrival in Pyongyang
- 4 p.m. — Advance observation of the conference site
- 7 p.m. — Dinner hosted by the Administration Council
Prime Minister (Mokran Hall)

October 23, Wednesday

- 10 a.m. — First-day session (open to the public)
- 2:30 p.m. — Visiting the outdoor movie set
- 5:30 p.m. — Viewing music and dance performances
(Mansudae Art Theater)

October 24, Thursday

- 10 a.m. — Second-day session (behind the closed doors)
- 10: 30 a.m. — Viewing Kwangbok and Chongchun
Streets and subway (press members)
- 3:30 p.m. — Visiting the Mankyongdae Student-
Children's Palace and viewing student performances
- 5:20 p.m. — Visiting the First Pyongyang Department
Stores
- 7:30 p.m. — Dinner hosted by chairman of the Standing
Council of Supreme People's Assembly

October 25, Friday

- 9 a.m. — Departure from Pyongyang
- 1:10 p.m. — Passage through Panmunjom

b. Outline of Conference Proceeding

The fourth South-North high-level meeting was held in Pyongyang for four days from October 22 to 25, 1991.

In a statement issued on passing through Panmunjom at 8:30 a.m. on October 22, Lee Dong-bok, spokesman for the South's

delegation to the South-North high-level meeting, strongly urged the North to "have a clear perception of the issues concerning the nation's future and abandon an unrealistic policy to instigate a revolution in the South" and to "unconditionally accept nuclear surveillance by an international organization and stop the development of nuclear weapons."

Lee said that the South, in its part, would display both patience and sincerity at the meeting to reach a basic agreement necessary for the normalization of inter-Korean relations.

After issuing the statement, the South's delegation arrived at Tongil-gak where they were welcomed by An Byong-su, vice chairman of the Committee for Peaceful Unification of the Fatherland, and five other North Korean delegates to the meeting. From Kaesong, they traveled to Pyongyang by a special train.

On arrival in Pyongyang, spokesman Lee Dong-bok issued a statement that his delegation "would exert all efforts and be sincere in attempting to understand and compromise in order to produce good results." He expected the North Korean delegation to "display sincerity and cooperation so that our visit to Pyongyang would go down in the 20-year history of the South-North dialogue as a significant milestone."

In the afternoon, the South's delegates inspected the People's Cultural Palace where the high-level meeting was scheduled. In the evening, a dinner was hosted by North Korean Prime Minister Yon Hyong-muk at the Mokran Hall.

In his speech at the dinner, Prime Minister Yon Hyong-muk said, "Our two delegations are still at the starting point, having been unable to achieve even the smallest gain and having lost too much time, simply because we could not travel back and forth or meet for nearly a year." He then stressed an achievement of results, saying, "Our delegates should speed up the pace

toward progress in the meeting and hammer out agreements to make up for the lost time and to set forth a good souvenir before our people."

The South's Prime Minister Chung Won-shik, in his dinner speech, mentioned the sweeping changes, such as the collapse of the Cold War and detente between the East and the West, around the world in the past few years. Explaining that the South's economic and diplomatic cooperation with the East European bloc, including China and the Soviet Union, has been promoted due to its successful northern policy, Prime Minister Chung stressed that today's suffocating reality where the South and the North with the people of the same blood wasting national potentials amidst abnormal relations at this juncture in time when the whole world is marching onward hand in hand transcending differences in ideologies, cannot be allowed to go on any further.

Prime Minister Chung went on to say that the two sides "should become partners oriented toward national prosperity and unification and energize multi-pronged exchanges and cooperation based on the earlier achievements between the South and the North such as those in the economic, cultural and sports areas and the joint entry into the United Nations as well as on the economic development and experiences of the South which has emerged as the world's 13th largest trading country and as the world's 15th largest economic power." He emphasized that "to ease tension and consolidate peace on the Korean peninsula along with such efforts, the South and the North should agree on non-aggression based on mutual respect and confidence-building while the present armistice system should be transformed into a peace mechanism."

Prime Minister Chung made it clear that "the kind of homeland unification we pursue is not a so-called 'unification

through absorption' in which neither the South nor the North wins or loses, but a democratic and peaceful unification in which both sides win together." He expressed a sincere hope that "at this Pyongyang meeting, a basic agreement will be realized for the improvement of inter-Korean relations so that we could give the news of rejoicing and hope to our whole people."

The first-day session was held on the morning of October 23. At the meeting which was opened to the public, keynote speeches were delivered by the hosting side and then by the visiting sides.

The South offered a comprehensive draft agreement, "Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression, Exchanges and Cooperation between the South and the North," while urging the North to stop developing the nuclear weapons and agree to nuclear inspection.

The North produced two pieces of draft, "Declaration on Non-Nuclearization of the Korean Peninsula" and "Declaration on Non-Aggression, Reconciliation, Cooperation and Exchanges." They then demanded the withdrawal of nuclear weapons from the Korean peninsula and asked the South to desist from seeking "unification through absorption."

In the afternoon, delegates visited the outdoor movie set of the North Korean Art Motion Picture Company. In the evening, they saw a music and dance performance by the Pyongyang performers at the Mansudae Art Theater.

In addition, the South and the North held two rounds of working-level delegates' meeting on the evening of October 23 to discuss the name and contents of a single agreement for adoption. The meeting was based on a first-day session in which an "agreement in a single document" was adopted. At the meeting, the two sides reached a four-point agreement on the format,

title and contents of an agreement to be adopted, and on the convening of delegates' contacts.

The South, stressing that basic items indispensable to the improvement of inter-Korean relations should be included in an agreement, proposed to discuss the contents of the agreement at the delegates' meetings at Panmunjom. On the other hand, North Korea maintained that among the ideas advanced by the two sides, conflicting views should be shelved and only concordant views should be documented into a single agreement for adoption.

Reacting to the North Korean assertions that the issue of nuclear weapons in the South should be addressed before the nuclear inspection of North Korea and that the South-North high-level meeting should take up this issue, the South stated that only when North Korea accepts nuclear surveillance first can basic conditions be met for a debate on nuclear questions and further on nuclear issues on the Korean peninsula as a whole.

In connection with the issue of "unification through absorption" which the North had raised, the South made it clear that South Korea has neither such an intention nor had ever used such a phrase.

The two sides reworked mutually agreed-on matters from the results of the previous day's working-level delegates' meeting, which they announced jointly after the high-level meeting adjourned. The agreement contained five items of consensus including the format, title and contents of an agreement to be adopted, holding of delegates contacts at Panmunjom, and the time of the fifth high-level meeting from December 10 to 13.

Later in the day, the visiting delegates toured the Mankyongdae Student-Children's Palace and the First Pyongyang Department Stores. In the evening, a dinner was hosted by

Yang Hyong-sop, chairman of the Standing Council of the North Korean Supreme People's Assembly, at the People's Cultural Palace.

In a dinner speech, Paek In-jun, Vice Chairman of the Standing Council, who was acting for Yang Hyong-sop then on an overseas tour, asked the southern delegates to cooperate positively in arranging meetings between North and South Korean politicians to discuss reconciliation, unity and unification.

"If it achieves reconciliation, unity and unification, we will meet with any one bilaterally or multilaterally and at any time regardless of the format of the meetings and dialogues," Paek said.

The South's Prime Minister Chung Won-shik, in his dinner speech, said, "For the South and the North to realize a completely unified country, they should first accept the reality of the two conflicting systems existing on the Korean peninsula on the road toward unification." Based on such acceptance, Chung said, the two sides should respect each other and live together peacefully, nurturing a base on which the two can merge into one. Prime Minister Chung stressed, "To this end, we wish to inaugurate a 'Korean Commonwealth' as an interim step toward a complete unification."

Furthermore, Prime Minister Chung remarked that despite the fact that "the position of the South is for the South and the North to discuss and resolve the present and future issues of the nation on an equal footing in a stable and orderly manner, North Korea unfoundedly complains that the South is pursuing 'unification through absorption.'" Asserting that the charge stemmed from the misunderstanding of the South's unification policy, Chung expressly stated that the South does not seek such a policy because "we believe a 'unification through absorp-

tion' does not serve any purpose for the nation's future."

Regarding the issue of the dispersed families, Prime Minister Chung stressed that man's rights should stand above the interests of any regime or class and that meeting between the dispersed families is one of the most important humanitarian projects which should transcend politics. He asked for the North's sincere cooperation on this issue, stressing that the heart-breaking reality of the elderly dispersed family members passing away without realizing their cherished dream of meeting their family members should not be allowed to continue any further.

In a statement on departure from Pyongyang by the southern delegation on the morning of October 25, Lee Dong-bok, spokesman of the South's delegation, said, "Our delegation is pleased and feel fortunate that the fourth high-level meeting registered a big success by agreeing to adopt a single agreement on "reconciliation, non-aggression, exchanges and cooperation," an appropriate topic for the high-level talks. He added that although the two sides failed to reach a complete agreement due to some differences on the contents of the proposed agreement, the South and the North laid a valuable stepping stone for a prosperous unified homeland at the Pyongyang meeting.

On the afternoon of October 25, the South's delegation ended their four-day visit to Pyongyang returning home through Panmunjom.

Upon arrival at Panmunjom, Spokesman Lee Dong-bok avered that the meeting in Pyongyang achieved an accord on adopting a single document of agreement. Lee said that at the meeting the South urged the North to renounce their policy of revolution in the South, to agree to a nuclear surveillance by an international agency, and to be sincere in resolving the question

of the dispersed family members.

At the fourth high-level meeting held in the wake of the rapid changes in internal and external situations, the South made positive and forward-looking efforts to provide a breakthrough in the year-long stalemate of the talks and to normalize inter-Korean relations at an early date. Although the two sides failed to reach a complete agreement on the concrete contents of the proposed accord, it was a fruitful meeting in which they agreed on the title and the general outline of the contents of an agreement to be adopted as well as on the continuation of the delegates' contacts.

North Korea, in its part, showed a somewhat flexible posture at the Pyongyang meeting unlike at the three earlier meetings due apparently to their policy need to hammer out at least a superficial agreement to normalize relations with Japan and to improve ties with the United States and to heed the advice from Beijing to improve inter-Korean relations.

c. First-Day Session

The first-day session of the fourth South-North high-level meeting was held at the People's Cultural Palace in Pyongyang from 10 a.m. to 12:25 p.m. on October 23, 1991.

At the session, held ten months after the third meeting in December 1990, there were some casual talks and keynote speeches first by the North's chief delegate and then by the South's.

The North's Prime Minister Yon Hyong-muk, who spoke first, emphasized the need for a grand national unity, asserting that the failure to register any progress at the previous three meetings was due primarily to the deep-rooted sense of competition arising from the different ideologies and systems which the

two sides exhibited. In this connection, Yon cited Kim Il-sung's August 1 statement which called for a grand unity among the Korean people, and charged the South with abetting confrontation.

In particular, he showed a strong abhorrence to words like "inducement of changes" or "integration through absorption," denouncing these phrases because they "revealed the South's pursuit of confrontation." Also branding the principle of market economy as a jungle law, Premier Yon warned that if this principle were applied to inter-Korean relations, the North would be obliged to cope with it, in which case, a "clash would be unavoidable."

Asserting that the issue of peace and military should be resolved on a priority basis, Yon repeated his stereotypic demand for the dissolution of the United Nations Command, withdrawal of the U.S. forces and the conclusion of a peace agreement with the United States. He further produced as an "emergency agendum" a nine-point draft, "Declaration for Non-Nuclearization of the Korean Peninsula," claiming that the question of non-nuclearization is a sweeping measure for peace and most exigent.

In addition, North Korea, denouncing the South for urging it to accept nuclear inspection, maintained it would agree to simultaneous nuclear inspection of both Koreas if and when nuclear weapons in the South were withdrawn completely.

As for the issue of agenda, the North offered an alleged principle and a method to adopt the agreement. They suggested that those items of consensus or bearing similarity in the draft agreements set forth by both should be documented into two agreements — "Non-Aggression Declaration" and "Basic Agreement on Reconciliation, Cooperation and Exchanges." They asserted that the discussion and acceptance of the two proposed

draft agreements should be done at the fourth high-level meeting without regard to the order of debate so that they could be adopted and signed simultaneously at the meeting.

With such argument, the North proposed a nine-point draft, "Declaration for Non-Aggression between the North and the South," and an 11-point draft, "Basic Agreement on Reconciliation, Cooperation and Exchanges between the North and the South."

Meanwhile, the North argued that if the South could not accept the two separate draft agreement, they were willing to merge them into one, and thus produced a 21-point integrated version comprising a preamble, non-aggression, reconciliation, cooperation and exchanges between the North and the South, and amendment and effectuation.

Lastly, persisting on the suspension of the Team Spirit military exercise and the release of imprisoned illegal visitors to the North, the North asked that the next year's Team Spirit military exercise be suspended and the matters related to the annual exercise be discussed at a Joint South-North military committee to be formed and that the illegal visitors to the North be set free before the fifth high-level meeting. The North specifically requested the arrest warrants issued against Park Song-hee and Song Yong-sung be withdrawn and the safe return home of the two students be guaranteed and that the South's delegates take the pair with them when they return home after the meeting.

On the other hand, the South's Prime Minister Chung Won-shik, in his keynote speech, discussed the changing situations both at home and abroad. He pointed out that the avenue of exchanges and cooperation has been widened due to energetic and expanded personnel and material exchanges between the South and the North. Moreover, he said, as the South and the North

had joined the United Nations together, both Koreas have been enabled to forge a relationship of co-existence and co-prosperity, providing a momentum for peaceful unification.

Prime Minister Chung, in particular, remarked that as President Roh Tae-woo suggested in his address before the United Nations General Assembly on October 2, 1990, the two sides should establish a positive mutual relationship and thereby shorten the time of consolidation for peace and unification. To this end, he mentioned that the two sides should exert practical efforts to convert the existing military armistice system into a peace system, to promote actual arms reduction based on confidence building in the military area, and to realize free personnel, material and information exchanges.

The South stressed that to realize peace, the two sides should make efforts to respect each other's systems, to renounce any hostile policies against each other, and to dispel mutual distrust and to promote confidence building, and such effort should institutionalize peace. It then urged the North to give up their scheme to set off a revolution in the South, suspend their development of nuclear weapons, and accept international surveillance of all of their nuclear materials and facilities.

To dispel the North's concern about the alleged unification through absorption, the South's prime minister stressed that the basis of the South's unification policy is not to achieve "unification through absorption" but to accomplish peaceful unification via the stage of "Korean Commonwealth" while restoring and developing the national community through co-existence and co-prosperity of the South and the North.

In connection with the agenda topics, the South presented a comprehensive single draft agreement which consisted of a preamble and 15 articles and which integrated the three previous proposals into one with a view to injecting a fresh

vitality into the South-North high-level meeting and to providing a break-through in the effort to reach an agreement.

The South said that its single draft agreement was a comprehensive one which modified the three separate draft agreements it set forth earlier, which were, a "Basic Agreement," "Agreement on Non-Aggression" and "Agreement on Travel, Communications and Trade." The South elaborated on the title of the comprehensive draft agreement which reflected the North Korean emphasis on the inclusion of the words, "reconciliation" and "non-aggression." Furthermore, the contents of the agreement were reworked to coincide some items of the North Korean draft agreement, while major concerns omitted in the draft from the North and some clauses guaranteeing its implementation were newly inserted into the draft version.

The South then urged the North to be sincere at the high-level meeting in seeking a breakthrough in an effort to resolve the dispersed family issue. It pinpointed that the resolution of the dispersed family issue, which has been sought steadily in the past, represents a priority task in healing the national pains and bruises caused by the division, a symbol of mutual trust, and an elementary step to improve inter-Korean relations.

At the session, the two sides reached an agreement to adopt a single document.

Following are the excerpts from the keynote speeches made by the two sides at the first-day session.

Keynote Speech by the South's Chief Delegate (Excerpts)

Northern delegates,

At the start of the fourth round of inter-Korean high-level

talks, I wish to look back on the previous rounds and point out several problems. The records of the past talks indicate, among other things, that the two sides took different approaches to resolving issues. I believe that the reason was differences in the perception about what should be done first to move toward peace and unification.

In a speech before the 46th General Assembly of the United Nations on September 24, President Roh Tae-woo emphasized that now that an era of peaceful coexistence is dawning, the South and the North must forge a positive relationship conducive to durable peace and early unification. To that end, he called for replacing the Korean War Armistice Agreement with a peace treaty, for substantive arms reductions following military confidence-building measures, and for free exchanges of people, goods and information. I would like to elaborate on the tasks of achieving peace and unification as outlined by President Roh.

First, the issue of peace.

The South and the North have remained in the grip of enmity and confrontation for the past 46 years, due especially to the fratricidal Korean War which caused numerous innocent lives throughout the land to be sacrificed. Even today, 1.7 million densely-deployed troops are pitted against each other across the armistice line, in an extraordinary state of tension.

On the other hand, the Cold War structure that has forced the division and other enormous sacrifices on us has crumbled and all mankind has started advancing toward a peaceful world. Having suffered great national ordeals in the past and still continuing to face a grim situation, the Korean people no less acutely realize the importance of peace than any others. Accordingly, it is high time for our people not only to join this march forward but to take the lead.

With firm faith in the prospects for lasting peace, both the

South and the North must make joint endeavors to end military confrontation, and ease tension. For starters, both Koreas ought to respect each other and abandon policies that antagonize each other. Genuine peace cannot take hold as long as each continues to attempt to destroy, overthrow or "liberate" the other. This is why our side has been calling all along for creating a basic framework for improving South-North relations based on mutual respect for each other's political and social system. To build peace, it is also necessary to remove the causes of mutual mistrust and develop confidence in each other. As long as one side cannot trust the other, it will be difficult to dispel counterproductive confrontation and move toward genuine peace. The quickest way to build trust between the South and the North will be by promoting contacts, dialogue, exchanges and cooperation in all fields so that each will be able to progressively know and better understand the realities on the other side.

In that way, mutual respect for each other's political and social system can be fostered and mutual trust cultivated. Only through this process will we be able to construct a solid foundation for enduring peace. We very much doubt, however, that your side has so far really made any such efforts to achieve peace. We even doubt that your side has a desire for peace. This is so because following the third round of inter-Korean high-level talks, you one-sidedly suspended official dialogue and have persisted in antagonizing our Government, slandering and reviling it on every possible occasion. Your side has also repeatedly incited and encouraged certain groups in the South to mount antigovernment activities, while insistently demanding that convicted prisoners be set free.

Furthermore, your side continues to date to refuse to meet your obligation to open your nuclear facilities to international inspection under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty which you

signed six long years ago. This is intensifying international denouncement of the fact that you are secretly developing nuclear weapons. Your nuclear arms development is not only newly heightening inter-Korean tension but poses a grave threat to peace in Northeast Asia in particular and in the world in general. Your side must discontinue nuclear weapons development and unconditionally accept international nuclear inspections. I make it clear that until then, none of your peace proposals can be accepted at its face value.

The time has come for the two parts of Korea to take tangible steps to end military and political confrontation, to defuse tension and to promote peace. Further on that basis, measures must be taken to institutionalize peace. To that end, both the South and the North should agree to an effective nonaggression arrangement and then replace the current armistice agreement with a peace regime, while removing the causes of military distrust and earnestly carrying out substantive arms reductions.

In connection with the issue of institutionalizing peace, I consider it very fortunate that your side has joined the United Nations along with us. This was a very appropriate move because faith in the authority and competence of the U.N. as a global organization dedicated to world peace and well-being is now growing day by day, with all mankind placing ever greater expectations in its increasingly more effective role.

The U.N. Charter bans the use of armed force to settle disputes and authorizes collective action to eliminate threats to peace and put down breaches of the peace. I sincerely hope that the fact that both Koreas have accepted obligations as U.N. member states pursuant to the spirit and letter of the U.N. Charter is tantamount to a declaration of nonaggression, meaning also that your side is not going to cling any further to a policy of fomenting revolution in the South.

By becoming full-fledged members of the U.N., the Korean people have taken the most realistic and decisive first step toward peace on the Korean peninsula. We have thus taken up a proud position from which to contribute more actively to world peace and well-being. Accordingly, the South and the North should make even more sincere efforts to secure lasting peace and make conditions ripen for peaceful unification until unity is finally realized.

Second, the issue of unification.

This year marks the 46th anniversary of the division of the land into the South and the North. An old Korean proverb says, "Even rivers and mountains change in 10 years." Indeed, many things have changed in both parts of Korea during their long separation. Not only ideologies and political and social systems but also lifestyles, customs, language and even the ways of thinking have become different and still continue to diversify. This is a truly heart-rending situation.

On the other hand, the Cold War structure that has divided our people and partitioned our land has collapsed at its foundation. Germany, which was divided like us, has been unified. Over are the days when external factors hampered our unification. The South and the North have recently taken separate seats in the United Nations. This, however, is only an interim phase that we must go through on our way to unification. Our U.N. membership, by providing a forum for us to work together on the international stage, must be turned into a catalyst for bringing the day of unification closer.

The unification of our homeland will be achieved in the not so very distant future only if our 70 million compatriots are reconciled with each other and help one another with a firm determination to unite the country on our own. I think the time has come for both the South and the North to take concrete steps in earnest

to restore the national community. First of all, the door must be opened for free inter-Korean exchanges of people, goods and information. It is especially urgent to promote extensive exchanges and cooperation in the economic, scientific and technological fields with a view to accelerating development in both parts of the land and enabling our compatriots in the South and the North to equitably share the benefits.

Over a long history of five millenniums, the Korean people have lived in a single national community based on one ancestry, one language, one culture and one homeland. This national community still serves as the fundamental bond between our divided people and will be the motive power for unification. Genuine unification will not be possible without bringing our 5,000-year-old common national cultural heritage and traditions back to life by restoring and developing the national community. We should be able to achieve unification by forming a common sphere of daily activity and a single ethnic society through efforts to reconcile the differences that have developed in the South and the North.

To that end, there is a need for a transitional arrangement to enable the South and the North to associate, reconcile and cooperate with each other in a spirit of peaceful coexistence, while developing the basis for national integration.

The ultimate genuine unification that our people pursue should result in one people, one nation, one system and one government. A unified homeland should be a single state, a democratic state guaranteeing public welfare, in which all citizens will be able to master their destiny and enjoy freedom, human rights, well-being and prosperity. This is not only the desire of the entire 70 million people but it is also in conformity with the current of world history that is upholding freedom and human dignity as universal values.

And yet, it has been shown recently that your side misunderstands our sincere efforts to secure lasting peace and restore national homogeneity. You are even denouncing our efforts as attempts at "unification by absorption." I make it clear that we are not at all thinking of "unification by absorption" but that the basic goal of our unification policy is far different. As enunciated in our Korean National Community Unification Formula, our unification policy is aimed at creating a Korean Commonwealth as a transitional arrangement pending unification and then completing the peaceful unification of the land through democratic methods and procedures. When we proposed the establishment of a Council of Presidents, a Council of Ministers and a Council of Representative as the governing bodies of the Korean Commonwealth, we called for their composition with equal numbers from both the South and the North. This was intended to promote coexistence and coprosperity and accelerate the homogenization and integration of the two societies. All these clearly show our basic position that we do not seek "unification by absorption."

As you know well, in our July 7 (1988) Declaration, we already announced a willingness to develop a South-North partnership for prosperity. At the inter-Korean high-level talks also, we have repeatedly emphasized the need to improve South-North relations based on mutual recognition and respect. We hope that your side will take the future of our people into serious consideration and will boldly shift to policies which recognize the real situation on this peninsula, which promote freedom, human rights and democracy so that the North can develop into a splendid society and which promote a partnership with us for the restoration and development of the national community. We are prepared to gladly cooperate with you in such self-help efforts.

In this connection, we think that you have begun to recognize the reality of inter-Korean relations to some extent since you have

recently mentioned peaceful coexistence between the two different systems in the South and the North in proposing "one people, one state, two systems, two governments." However, your idea of "two systems, two governments" should only be a transitional arrangement designed to restore national homogeneity and pave the way for peaceful and democratic unification.

I sincerely hope that your side will clearly express a determination to work toward a completely unified democratic nation-state which is so yearned for by the entire people and will join us in breaking open a path to peace and unification with a spirit of reconciliation and cooperation.

Northern delegates,

Next, I would like to clarify our position on the questions of resolving political and military confrontation between the South and the North and of implementing exchanges and cooperation, both of which are on the agreed agenda of this series of high-level meetings. At the previous three rounds of inter-Korean high-level talks, I believe we have sufficiently explained why a basic agreement for improving inter-Korean relations is necessary and why the proposed accord should be adopted on a priority basis.

Needless to say, South-North confrontation has yet to be resolved because relations between the responsible authorities of the two parts of Korea have not been improved, while unwarranted policies of antagonization and rivalry have continued to be pursued, wasting national energies and resources. Accordingly, signing a basic agreement for improving inter-Korean relations would serve as the catalyst for breaking down the wall of distrust and confrontation that has been built up and reinforced over the 46 years of division. It would also provide a basic framework for bringing the South and the North together in their efforts as one people to promote coexistence and coprosperity leading to peace and unification.

If the South and the North can agree on such a basic framework, we should be able to promptly proceed to a discussion and settlement of the issues of resolving political and military confrontation and of implementing exchanges and cooperation. This should serve to replace mistrust and confrontation now besetting inter-Korean relations with reconciliation and cooperation. At our previous meetings, we already repeatedly proposed that following the adoption of a basic agreement for improving inter-Korean relations at a plenary session, two subcommittees be set up to discuss and resolve the issues of nonaggression and of free travel, trade and communications. We also put forth concrete and detailed steps to that end.

Your side, however, took little interest in improving inter-Korean relations or implementing exchanges and cooperation and insisted that a declaration of nonaggression be adopted at a plenary session on a priority basis. Subsequently, differences emerged over the procedural question of whether the issues of nonaggression and of free travel, trade and communications should be discussed at subcommittees or at a plenary session, and also over the technical question of how many separate agreements should be adopted. Because of those differences, our talks could not move forward any further, to the disappointment of the entire people who were closely watching them.

In view of the shifting domestic and international situation that is increasingly urgently calling for speedy improvements in inter-Korean relations, as well as of the support and expectation of the entire people for successful dialogue, I believe our talks must not be let to mark time any longer. If both the South and the North genuinely desire to resolve confrontation and carry out exchanges and cooperation, we must not stall our talks merely because of differences over procedure and format. We must work out a compromise acceptable to both parties.

In this regard, at the recent working-level contact that preceded this fourth meeting, we withdrew our earlier proposal to discuss the issues of nonaggression and of free travel, trade and communications at a subcommittee level and proposed newly that these issues be discussed and resolved at plenary sessions, along with the proposed basic agreement for improving inter-Korean relations. It was a pity that no final compromise was reached at the working-level contact due to a shortage of time. And yet, I think it was meaningful that new proposals were presented and discussed on that occasion.

Taking a further step in the same direction, I propose at this meeting today that our three earlier proposals be combined into one comprehensive document for consideration and adoption. This new proposal of ours is an epoch-making one in that it largely accommodates your proposal at the third round of inter-Korean high-level talks and also your views expressed at the working-level contact that preceded this fourth round. I am confident that our forward-looking move will breathe new life into the inter-Korean high-level talks, leading to a breakthrough to an accord. I hereby present our draft of an Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, and Exchanges and Cooperation, as follows.

**Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, and Exchanges
and Cooperation between the Republic of Korea and
the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (proposal)**

WHEREAS in keeping with the yearning of the entire people for the peaceful unification of the divided homeland, the Republic of Korea and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea reaffirm the three unification principles of independence, peace and grand national unity stated in the July 4 (1972) South-North Joint Communiqué;

WHEREAS both parties are determined to carry on sincere dialogue aimed at promoting common national interests and national reconciliation;

WHEREAS both are resolved to improve their relations and institutionalize peace on the basis of mutual trust built by easing tension and implementing exchanges and cooperation;

WHEREAS both recognize that their relations constitute a special provisional relationship pending unification; and

WHEREAS both pledge to exert joint efforts to achieve peaceful unification,

THEREFORE, the parties hereto agree on the following basic matters:

- Article 1. Pending unification, the South and the North shall respect each other's political and social system, shall not slander and vilify each other and shall not interfere in the internal affairs of the other.*
- Article 2. Both parties shall make it possible for citizens to understand well the real situation of the other and to that end shall mutually open access to radio and television broadcasts and exchange newspapers and publications in general.*
- Article 3. Both parties shall promptly and unconditionally permit free correspondence, reunions and visits between family members and other relatives dispersed south and north and shall promote the reconstitution of divided families on their own free accord.*
- Article 4. Both parties shall not use armed force against each other and shall not attempt in any manner to invade, overthrow or destroy the other. The areas of both parties subject to nonaggression shall be those which have been under the jurisdiction of each side respectively in accordance with the Military Armistice*

Agreement of July 27, 1953.

Article 5. Differences of opinion and disputes arising between the two parties shall be peacefully resolved through dialogue and negotiations between the authorities of both sides.

Article 6. Both parties shall cease the arms race and shall implement phased arms reductions following military confidence-building measures designed to resolve armed confrontation. In order to firmly ensure the cessation of the arms race and the enforcement of nonaggression, both parties shall take the following steps;

- 1) Military information shall be exchanged and mutual visits and exchanges of military personnel shall be effected.*
- 2) Both sides shall notify the other in advance of all maneuvers or movements by military units of certain size or larger and shall reciprocally invite observation teams from the other side on such occasions.*
- 3) A telephone hotline shall be installed between the military authorities of both sides to prevent accidental armed clashes and other military emergencies and avoid their escalation.*
- 4) The Demilitarized Zone shall be turned into an effective buffer zone and utilized for peaceful purposes.*
- 5) Military imbalances between the South and the North shall be corrected and arms reductions negotiated to mutually discourage armed aggression.*
- 6) Field verification teams and resident monitoring*

teams shall be exchanged in order to ascertain the implementation of the above safeguard measures.

7) A South-North joint military committee shall be established within six (6) months of the effective date of this agreement to enforce the above-listed provisions.

Article 7. Both parties shall make joint efforts to replace the current Armistice Agreement with a peace regime and shall observe the Armistice Agreement until such time as a peace regime is in place.

Article 8. To promote the welfare of the entire people and the balanced development of the entire land, both parties shall further exchanges and cooperation in all fields, including the economy, transportation, postal and telecommunications services, scholarship, education, culture, the arts, journalism, sports, health, technology, religion and the environment.

Article 9. Both parties shall guarantee and support free travel, communications and trade, and economic cooperation. To that end, both parties shall take the following steps;

1) Roads, railroads, and sea and air routes needed for travel shall be created and the points of passage designated. For land transportation, Changdan and Panmunjom shall be designated as the passage points in the initial phase and the Seoul-Shinuiju rail line and the Munsan-Kaesong highway shall be reconnected.

2) Inter-Korean travelers visiting the other area should comply with local laws, regulations and directions.

- 3) *Both parties shall guarantee that visitors to their respective areas will be able to engage in activities to fulfill the authorized purposes of their visit. They shall also guarantee the visitors' personal safety and safe return home.*
- 4) *A mail exchange station shall be established in Panmunjom and telecommunications links shall be opened between switchboards in the two areas of Korea. These services should be progressively expanded and developed.*
- 5) *The confidentiality of mail and telecommunications between citizens in the two areas shall be guaranteed and such services shall not be used for political and military purposes.*
- 6) *Problems arising in connection with inter-Korean mail and telecommunications shall be settled pursuant to the relevant international conventions.*
- 7) *Trade in goods and economic cooperation shall be carried out by agreement between persons who have obtained permission from the authorities in their respective areas regarding specific products or projects.*
- 8) *Inter-Korea trade in goods shall be regarded as domestic commerce and shall not be subject to import duties. Payments for goods traded shall in principle be settled through an open account.*
- 9) *When deemed necessary to carry out joint development of resources, joint manufacturing ventures, joint business activities abroad, joint foreign assistance projects and other forms of economic cooperation, both parties may take*

measures to guarantee the movement of capital and to protect capital invested in their respective areas.

10) To implement the above provisions, an Inter-Korean Travel Committee, an Inter-Korean Communications Committee and an Inter-Korean Trade and Economic Cooperation Committee shall be created within six (6) months of the effective date of this agreement.

Article 10. Both parties shall cease competition and confrontation on the international stage and shall cooperate and endeavor together to promote national interests and esteem.

Article 11. To help improve South-North relations and further consolidate the foundations for peace and unification through close consultation and liaison, both parties shall establish resident liaison missions in Seoul and Pyongyang within six (6) months of the effective date of this agreement.

Article 12. Both parties shall establish an Inter-Korean Political and Military Subcommittee and an Inter-Korean Exchanges and Cooperation Subcommittee within one (1) month of the effective date of this agreement to discuss and work out concrete steps to enforce and ensure the observance of this agreement.

Article 13. This agreement shall not influence bilateral or multilateral treaties or agreements that each side has already concluded.

Article 14. This agreement may be revised by agreement between both parties.

Article 15. This agreement shall enter into force as of the day both parties exchange instruments of ratification

following the completion of their respective procedures for bringing it into effect within one (1) month of its signing.

Date: October , 1991

Chung Won-shik
Prime Minister
Republic of Korea

Yon Hyong-muk
Prime Minister
Administration Council
Democratic People's Republic of
Korea

Northern delegates,

Even while suffering all manner of ordeals and adversities since the turn of the 20th century, our people have kept alive a strong yearning to perfect a democratic nation-state. There cannot be a difference between the South and the North over the goal of constructing a powerful nation, a prestigious nation, a nation in which all citizens live well. We must pool our people's capabilities and wisdom with the aim of coming together in a free, prosperous and unified homeland.

To that end, it is important to continuously implement those matters that have already been initiated following agreements reached through past South-North dialogues or that have been nearly agreed to between both sides. Above all, I am always saddened by the fact that the humanitarian issue, namely, the issue of families divided by the truce line, is yet to be solved.

It is already 20 years since the South-North Red Cross Conference was started. And yet, the Red Cross talks have, truly regrettably, been stalled for nearly six years, although the Red Cross spirit dictates that such a humanitarian issue must be solved without fail, no matter what difficulties may be involved. It is real-

ly a national tragedy and shame that not a single letter can be exchanged across the armistice line even between parents and children, even though they live in the same land. This is in stark contrast with the fact that most countries in the world are now increasing interaction and cooperation, rising above differences in political system and ideology.

Enabling dispersed blood relatives to reunite is the most urgent of the tasks of healing all national wounds and scars due to the territorial division. This would be a clear sign of restored mutual trust, a crucial initial step in mending inter-Korean relations. I hope that your side will turn attention to the issue of separated families and urge your Red Cross to expeditiously resume the suspended inter-Korean Red Cross conference. I also urge your side to work with us at these high-level talks to achieve a breakthrough in this matter.

Keynote Speech by the North's Chief Delegate (Excerpts)

There are various subjective and objective reasons that the high-level talks have failed to make progress and to narrow mutual differences. They include some sources of instability like the joint Team Spirit military exercise and misunderstood positions and posture toward the talks.

But, fundamental among these causes is the deep-rooted sense of confrontation arising from their different ideologies and systems from which one attempts to compete with the other.

If anyone regards all meetings, dialogue, travels back and forth, and exchanges as a form of confrontation in winning over the other side, and handles the other side only in the light of confrontation, there can be nothing but frictions and clashes, and no genuine reconciliation and agreement can ever be expected.

To pursue confrontation in ideologies and systems is the

manifestation of an encroachment mentality in whatever form such a pursuit takes; in other words, a mentality to enforce one's ideology and system upon the other. At the same time, this is a grave act of dividing our nation into two nations and two states because of the different systems, of regarding a part of our brethren as heretic or of persecuting them simply because they ascribe to different ideologies and political opinions and of destroying the nation in the end.

To us who must accomplish the grand national task of peace and unification jointly we cannot tolerate such divisive activities under any circumstances.

It was from this standpoint that from the very outset of the South-North dialogue, we have insisted on the grand principle of the unification of the fatherland that the North and the South, instead of remaining pitted against each other, should promote a grand national unity transcending differences in ideologies and system, and we, together with your authorities, made it public through the July 4th Joint Communiqué.

It is our consistent position that the two sides should promote reconciliation and unity instead of pursuing confrontation. This is entirely spelled out in the fatherland unification policy of the government of the Republic.

The fact that we now sit face to face with your side and hold a high-level meeting is an opportunity to explore the road to peace and unification of the country with your authorities. Similarly the reason for our incessant efforts to have meetings at a private level with various political parties, factions and people from many social strata is because we desire harmony and unity with them.

Therefore, people who really want to unification should have no reason to oppose such a lofty idea of grand national unity. Unless opposed to unification, no person should be alienated from our idea of grand national unity or regard it as a threat or fear it.

The words, "international trend" or "wave" which your side tends to use lately or the imprudent remarks about "inducing changes" in the North, only reveal a seditious political attempt to enforce some sort of "change" upon us by making most of today's unusual international climate in your confrontational policy.

But, confrontation is neither today's trend nor wave.

If (your side) regards the unification issue as a question of competition of ideologies and systems between the North and the South and thereby continue to pursue only confrontation to achieve the wild dream of so-called "victory over communism" or "unification through absorption," such a posture would be going against the trend of times and the wishes of the nation, leading to abandonment by the rest of the compatriots.

Along the road to the common grand national task of unification, can there be any need for a competition or for talking about a victory or a failure between the same people?

If both the North and the South, though their ideologies and systems are different, are in a position to explore the road to unification together, they should be open-hearted and fair-minded if they truly care about the nation, value the spirit of mutual respect and unity instead of indulging in competition and aim to achieve the common national victory of unification instead of seeking an individual victory.

If some persons, even though they are accustomed to "market economy," believe that the North and the South should compete with each other for their survival and that the law of jungle should apply even to the inter-Korean relations, it would be a grave and tragic miscalculation.

Of course, we do not believe in "market economy." But, if the law of jungle were forced upon us in North-South relations, we would have no choice but to cope with it which may lead to an unavoidable clash.

We are opposed to such a confrontation and call for a grand unity as a single nation because the entire nation's interests are important and, above all, peace and unification are valuable.

To compete with different ideologies and systems within the same nation in disregard of the grand task of unification is not desirable for the South, the North nor the whole nation.

As we have consistently maintained, the issue of peace on the Korean peninsula is the most urgent question which the North and the South must tackle with great concern.

Nothing is more important or essential than peace to our people who have already experienced war and who have lived under the danger of a nuclear war which may break out at time in an unstable environment of neither peace nor war.

Only when the issue of peace is resolved quickly can our nation be saved from the danger of a nuclear war, can we promote mutual reconciliation and unity, and can we explore a shortcut to independent and peaceful unification of the country, a paramount duty facing the nation.

We often hear the phrases, "confidence building" should be promoted first and inter-Korean relations should be "normalized" or "improved." The resolution of these issues, too, is entirely dependent on the settlement of the peace issue.

What confidence building can be promote when we both carry daggers in our bosom, and what normalization or improvement of relations can we discuss when a grave state where we point guns at each other is left unchecked?

Resolution of the peace issue is the best means of promoting confidence building between the North and the South and the shortest way to normalizing or improving North-South relations. Peace will benefit all of us but confrontation and war will destroy everything. Herein lies the reason that we attach a great significance to the resolution of peace and military issues.

Situations within and without today present an unprecedentedly high possibility of resolving the nation's peace issue.

Not only the North and the South but people from various strata outside have also raised their voices for peace, calling for the non-nuclearization of the Korean peninsula, for the adoption of the North-South non-aggression declaration and for the realization of arms reduction.

A new environment today of detente and peace, too, made the United Nation's membership of the North and the South possible and has created a prospect for resolving the issue of peace on the Korean peninsula.

To transform the state of hostility on the Korean peninsula into a viable peace from the new relations between North Korea and the United Nations, has emerged as a more mature issue.

To this end, the United Nations Command in South Korea should be dissolved; the American forces stationed in South Korea under the banner of the United Nations should withdraw; and a peace agreement should be concluded between North Korea and the United States.

Now that the North and the South have joined the United Nations, peace efforts are all the more urgent for both sides.

At this critical juncture when the Soviet Union and the United States offered plans to dismantle the tactical nuclear weapons and both sides responded positively, we should no longer turn deaf ears to the issue of non-nuclearization of the Korean peninsula nor delay the resolution of this question.

In this context, we recognize the crucial need for the North and the South to adopt a "declaration on non-nuclearization of the Korean peninsula," and we submit, as an emergency proposal, the following draft declaration to the high-level meeting.

**A Declaration on Non-Nuclearization of Korean Peninsula
(Draft)**

With a view to fundamentally dispelling the danger of a nuclear war on the Korean peninsula, to contributing to the peace of our country and the security of Asia and the world, and to preparing conditions favorable to peaceful unification of our country, the North and the South hereby declare as follows:

- Article 1. The North and the South shall not test, produce, introduce or possess nuclear weapons.*
- Article 2. The North and the South shall prohibit the placement of nuclear weapons on the Korean peninsula and its territories, and shall prohibit the passage in the territorial airspace or waters or the landing and calls by the airplanes and vessels that carry or may carry nuclear weapons.*
- Article 3. The North and the South shall not conclude any agreement with other countries which would allow the deployment and the storage of nuclear weapons in their areas or receive the provision of "nuclear umbrella."*
- Article 4. The North and the South shall not conduct any military exercises on the Korean peninsula and its territories in which nuclear weapons and equipment are mobilized or in which a nuclear war is simulated.*
- Article 5. The North and the South shall exert joint efforts to withdraw American nuclear weapons and American troops from the southern part of the Korean peninsula and close down nuclear bases.*
- Article 6. The North and the South shall jointly ascertain the total and complete withdrawal of American nuclear weapons and the closure of nuclear bases in the*

southern part of the Korean peninsula, shall fulfill the obligation of simultaneous nuclear surveillance based on the international treaty obligation and shall promulgate a declaration on the non-nuclearization of the Korean peninsula at home and abroad.

Article 7. The North and the South shall take external steps to ensure that the United States and nuclear-weapons-possessing countries around the Korean peninsula will not pose nuclear threats to our country and will respect non-nuclearization of the Korean peninsula.

Article 8. The North and the South shall both establish an organization to carry out this declaration expeditiously after the issuance of the declaration.

Article 9. This declaration shall go into force when the North and the South exchange copies of the document after they go through the necessary procedures for implementation.

Yon Hyong-muk
Prime Minister
Administration Council
Democratic People's Republic of
Korea,
Chief Delegate
The North's Delegation to
North-South High-Level Meeting

Chung Won-shik
Prime Minister
Republic of Korea,
Chief Delegate
The South's Delegation to
South-North High-Level Meeting

Date: , 1991

Non-nuclearization of the Korean peninsula should begin with the complete withdrawal of American nuclear weapons from South Korea which should be the main impetus for non-nuclearization.

As to the issue of nuclear surveillance of the North, we will agree to the simultaneous surveillance of the North and the South at any time pursuant to international agreements if and when the total and complete withdrawal of American nuclear weapons from South Korea is confirmed.

We recognize that such undertaking will be the most realistic and reasonable way of attaining non-nuclearization on the Korean peninsula and eliminating the danger of nuclear war.

If the adoption of separate documents on a North-South non-aggression declaration and an agreement on reconciliation, cooperation and exchanges is unacceptable, then we could incorporate the two into one.

From this position, we produce the draft of a single integrated document as follows:

A Declaration on Non-Aggression, Reconciliation, Cooperation and Exchanges (Draft)

Pledging, based on the reaffirmation of the three major principles for the unification of the fatherland as declared in the July 4th Joint Communique in accordance with the wishes of all the people for peaceful unification of the divided fatherland, to exert joint efforts to forestall encroachment and clashes by force of arms, to ensure the alleviation of tension and peace, to desist from confrontation and competition in all walks of life such as politics, economy and culture, to promote national reconciliation, unity and common development, to recognize that the bilateral relations are not those between two countries and to attain peaceful unification, the North and the South hereby make a declaration as follows:

1. Non-Aggression between the North and the South

- Article 1. The North and the South shall not use the force of arms against each other and shall not invade each other by force of arms.*
- Article 2. The North and the South shall resolve differences in opinions and problems of disputes peacefully through dialogue and negotiations.*
- Article 3. The boundary of non-aggression between the North and the South shall be the military demarcation line regulated under the Military Armistice Agreement of July 27, 1953.*
- Article 4. The North and the South shall suspend arms race and realize arms reduction to guarantee non-aggression.*
- Article 5. The North and the South shall install and operate a direct telephone line between the military authorities of the two sides in order to forestall inadvertent armed clashes and their escalation.*
- Article 6. The North and the South shall form and operate a joint North-South military committee within two months after the issuance of this declaration to discuss and resolve measures to carry out a non-aggression agreement and dissolve the state of military confrontation.*
- Article 7. The North and the South shall explore external measures to maintain non-aggression.*

2. North-South Reconciliation

- Article 8. The North and the South shall mutually recognize and respect the ideologies and systems existing on each side.*
- Article 9. The North and the South shall not interfere in each other's internal affairs.*

- Article 10. The North and the South shall desist from slandering and defaming each other.*
- Article 11. The North and the South shall not commit any acts to destroy and subvert each other.*
- Article 12. The North and the South shall realize travels back and forth and contacts between people of various layers and strata and overseas compatriots freely.*
- Article 13. The North and the South shall establish and operate a North-South political sub-committee within two months after the issuance of this declaration to discuss and to arrive at concrete measures to promote reciliation.*

3. North-South Cooperation and Exchanges

- Article 14. The North and the South shall realize economic cooperation and exchanges to promote the integrated development of national economy and to advance the well-being of all the people.*
- Article 15. The North and the South shall exchange achievements and experiences and shall cooperate with each other in the areas of science, technology, education, literature and art, health, sports, publication and press.*
- Article 16. The North and the South shall repair disrupted railroads and roads, shall open maritime and air routes and connect communications networks.*
- Article 17. The North and the South shall take measures to realize mutual cooperation and exchanges in the humanitarian area and alleviate pains of the dispersed families and relatives.*
- Article 18. The North and the South shall cooperate, without confrontating against and competing, with each*

other in the international stage to which they shall advance jointly.

Article 19. The North and the South shall establish and operate a North-South cooperation and exchanges sub-committee within two months after the issuance of this declaration to discuss and attain concrete steps related to the implementation of this declaration.

4. Amendment and Effectuation

Article 20. This declaration may be amended or supplemented under mutual consent.

Article 21. This declaration shall go into force when the North and the South, after following the necessary procedures for effectuation, exchanged copies of the documents.

Yon Hyong-muk
Prime Minister
Administration Council
Democratic People's Republic of
Korea,
Chief Delegate
The North's Delegation to
North-South High-Level Meeting

Chung Won-shik
Prime Minister
Republic of Korea,
Chief Delegate
The South's Delegation to
South-North High-Level Meeting

Date: October , 1991

Before concluding, we propose the following three matters:

First, to forestall the suspension of the North-South high-level meeting and to ensure its smooth progress, no joint Team Spirit military exercise shall be conducted next year. Other issues shall be discussed at a joint North-South military committee to be formed in the future.

Second, persons who have been arrested and imprisoned for visiting the North or contacting persons in the North shall be set free no later than the next fifth high-level meeting for North-South reconciliation.

Third, the arrest warrant issued against the students Park Sung-hee and Song Yong-sung who are in the North as Chon-daehyop representatives shall be cancelled. Their immediate safe return shall be guaranteed.

In this connection, it is requested that when Prime Minister Chung returns home after this high-level meeting, he would take these students back with him safely after their arrest warrant has been withdrawn.

Under the first-day session's decision to adopt an "agreement in the form of a single document," the two sides consented to hold working-level delegates' meetings to discuss and resolve the title and contents of a single agreement. As delegates to the proposed meetings, the South named Song Han-ho, Vice Minister of the National Unification Board, Im Dong-won, director of the Foreign Policy and National Security Institute, and Lee Dong-bok, Special Assistant to the Prime Minister. The North's delegates named to the meetings were Paek Nam-jun, director of the Secretariat of the Committee for Peaceful Unification of the Fatherland, Choe Wu-jin, Ambassador at large of the Foreign Ministry, and Kim Yong-chol, Deputy Bureau Director of the People's Armed Forces Ministry.

Two rounds of working-level delegates' meetings were held from 6:15 p.m. on October 23 to 1:05 a.m. on October 24 at the conference room of the Paekhwawon Guest House where the southern delegation were housed. At the meetings, the two sides agreed on the title, composition and structure of a single agree-

ment, but failed to narrow the divergent opinion on the contents of an agreement.

***Matters agreed on at the working-level delegates' meetings:**

(1) The South and the North shall adopt an agreement in the form of a single document as a method of resolving proposed topics.

(2) The South and the North shall title the agreement, "Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression, Exchanges and Cooperation."

(3) The South and the North shall arrive at a single agreement in the order of a preamble, South-North reconciliation, South-North non-aggression, South-North exchanges and cooperation and effectuation.

(4) The South and the North shall discuss and arrive at the contents of a single agreement through working-level delegates' meetings to be held at Panmunjom after the fourth high-level meeting.

d. Second-Day Session

The second-day session of the fourth high-level meeting took place from 10 a.m. to 12:15 p.m. on October 24. The meeting, started with delegates' casual talks, featured exchange of chief delegates' first remarks (the South's chief delegate made the speech first), mutual discussion and the exchange of closing remarks (the South's chief delegate made the remark first). In his first speech, the South's chief delegate proposed to formally adopt what were agreed on at the previous day's working-level delegates' meetings and to have the spokesmen of the two sides announce the matters of consensus jointly. He also suggested

that Panmunjom working meetings be held at the earliest possible date.

Also in the speech, the chief South's delegate reported his delegation's reactions to the issues raised by the North in the keynote speech from the first-day session as follows.

First, he made it clear that the position of the Seoul government toward nuclear issues in connection with a "declaration for non-nuclearization of the Korean peninsula" was to:

- (1) Pursue a nuclear-weapon-free world in the long run;
 - (2) Limit the use of nuclear power for peaceful purposes only;
- and
- (3) Abide by the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the Nuclear Safety Measures Agreement of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and accept the IAEA's nuclear safety inspection of all nuclear facilities and materials in its possession.

The South also stressed that North Korea, before discussing the issue of non-nuclearization, should renounce the development of nuclear weapons, and wholly accept an international surveillance. It then urged the North to promote the discussion of not only conventional arms reduction but also of nuclear weapons on the Korean peninsula for inter-Korean confidence building in the military area.

The delegation from the South explained that the Team Spirit military exercise is a training designed to forestall the recurrence of war and ensure national security in the face of military threats from the North. Noting that the Team Spirit exercise will be rendered unnecessary once confidence building is restored between the South and the North and military threat is removed, the South emphasized that the North should redeploy

to the rear those military units massed in the forward area in an offensive move instead of demanding the suspension of the Team Spirit exercise.

Regarding the question of the North's demand for the release of those under arrest for their illegal visits to the North, the South stressed that any country has laws designed to safeguard its security and order and that any person who violates such law must be legally sanctioned. Therefore, the North has no ground or right to interfere in this question.

Making it clear that the two illegal student visitors — Park Song-hee and Song Yong-sung, the citizens of the Republic of Korea, will be dealt with according to the statute of the Republic of Korea, the delegation from the South asked the North not to repeat the improper act of beclouding the climate of the high-level talks or rendering the progress of the talks difficult over the issue that has nothing to do with the essential aspects of the talks.

Meanwhile, the South proposed, as the most critical issues pending between the South and the North, the resumption of the stalled South-North Red Cross conference to discuss the expedient realization of hometown visits by the dispersed elderly people aged 70 or older, the transformation of indirect inter-Korean trade into direct one and the development of joint tourism resources including the Sorak and Kumgang mountain areas.

North Korea, in their first speech, asserted that the keynote speeches of the two sides at the first-day session revealed a series of discrepancies.

Touching on the question of "converting the Military Armistice Agreement to a peace agreement" set forth by President Roh Tae-woo as one of the three proposals in his address before the United Nations General Assembly, the North indicated that

this was an issue which has to be handled by North Korea and the United States, both signatories of the armistice agreement.

For the issue of "arms reduction through confidence building," the North insisted that since "confidence building" has no effect on forestalling the recurrence of war, the two sides should enter directly into arms reduction. Also on the question of "personnel, material and information exchanges," the North said the issue did not deserve any discussion since they were no state-to-state exchanges.

On the issue of nuclear inspection, the North claimed that since the essence of the nuclear issue rested with the deployment of nuclear weapons and the enforcement of nuclear war games in South Korea, withdrawing nuclear weapons from the South is urgent in marking the Korean peninsula a non-nuclear zone. The North insisted that it would agree to nuclear surveillance only when nuclear weapons were withdrawn completely from South Korea.

For the issue of alleged unification through absorption, the North asserted that the remarks to induce reforms, openness or changes in the North stemmed from the concept of unification through absorption. It insisted that if the South was not interested in unification through absorption, it should seek a realistic unification policy instead of paying lip service, and should take the path to unification "not through taking over or being taken over" on the basis of "a single nation and a single state, and two governments and two systems."

In connection with an agreement for adoption, the North claimed that the ideas of exchanges and cooperation envisaged in the South's draft agreement relegated inter-Korean relations to a state-to-state relationship, solidifying division. The North also charged the South for failing to mention a disarmament issue and espousing only the issue of confidence building while

it was calling for non-aggression.

During the debate that followed the first speeches by the two delegations, North Korea kept trumpeting the need for and the justness of a "Declaration of Non-Nuclearization of the Korean Peninsula."

In reaction, the South stated that only when North Korea accepts nuclear inspection, which is an international obligation, can it have the same conditions as the South. It also asserted that only when confidence-building is promoted first in the military area can the nuclear issue be negotiated along with that of arms reduction. The delegate from the South mentioned that China, the Soviet Union and all the rest of the world know and are concerned about North Korea's development of nuclear weapons.

Meanwhile, North Korea countered that those items advanced in common by the two sides in their draft agreements should be integrated into a single agreement, tabling conflicting items for later discussion. The South, however, while stressing that basic matters indispensable to the improvement of inter-Korean relations should be included in an agreement, urged the discussion of the contents and wording of the clauses that would be included in an agreement at delegates' meetings at Panmunjom.

At the end of the second-day session, the two sides reaffirmed the items of consensus at the previous day's working-level delegates' meeting and resolved to hold the fifth high-level meeting in Seoul on December 10. They agreed to make public the following joint statement.

The South and the North discussed the issues of dispelling the state of political and military confrontation and carrying out exchanges and cooperation between the South and the North, and

agreed as follows:

1. The South and the North consented to adopt a single-document agreement to dissolve the state of political and military confrontation and to realize exchanges and cooperation between the South and the North.
2. The South and the North approved the title of the agreement "Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression, Exchanges and Cooperation between the South and the North."
3. The South and the North agreed to arrange sub-titled contents of the agreement in the order of a preamble, South-North reconciliation, South-North non-aggression, South-North exchanges and cooperation, amendments and effectuation.
4. The South and the North agreed to hold delegates' meetings at the Peace House and Tongil-gak at Panmunjom by turn to rework the contents and wording of the agreement.
5. The South and the North agreed to hold the fifth South-North high-level meeting in Seoul from December 10 to 13.

In Pyongyang
October 24, 1991

Part II

The South-North Sports Talks

1. Fielding of Single Inter-Korean Sports Delegations

At the 41st World Table Tennis Championships and the Sixth World Junior Soccer Championships in which single inter-Korean delegations took part for the first time after the national division, Korean athletes won in the women's group division at the table tennis games and advanced to the quarterfinal matches in soccer. The fielding of the single Korean teams was negotiated through four rounds of South-North sports talks and some working-level committee meetings from November 1990 to February 1991.

The feat was achieved by reconciliatory efforts of single-minded determination shown by the South and the North. It served to manifest the outstanding character of the Korean people at the international arenas and to provide a momentum for broadening the avenue for traveling and other personnel exchanges between the South and the North as well as for the realization of actual sports exchanges.

The itineraries for the single inter-Korean delegation to the 41st World Table Tennis Championships held in the Chiba Prefecture of Japan from April 24 to May 6, 1991, and the sixth soccer championships held in Porto, Portugal for 17 days from June 15, 1991, were as follows:

Major Itineraries for the Single Inter-Korean Delegation to the 41st World Table Tennis Championships

Date	Major Schedule
March 25	Separate arrival by the South and North Korean athletes at Narita Airport, Japan o Meeting of South and North Korean athletes and

	officials
March 26- April 20	Training in Japan
April 24- April 30	Group division matches o Korean women emerge victorious
May 2-May 6	Individual competition o Korean women emerge as runners-up in the single's division, Korean men advance to the semifinals in the single's division
May 7	Dinner in Tokyo hosted by the Joint Cheerleading Team of Korean residents in Japan
May 9	Return home

* Delegation members — 56 (17 officials and 11 athletes, 28 members each from the South and the North)

Delegation head: Kim Hyong-jin, Vice Chairman, North Korean State Olympic Committee

General manager: Kim Chang-je, Managing Director of the Republic of Korea Table Tennis Association

Major Itineraries for the Single Inter-Korean Delegation to the Sixth World Junior Soccer Championships

Date	Major Schedule
May 6	North Korean team enters Seoul via Panmunjom
May 8	First evaluation match o At 3 p.m. at the Olympic Stadium at Chamsil
May 9	North Korean team returns to the North via Panmunjom

May 10	South Korean team enters the North via Panmunjom
May 12	Second evaluation match o At 3 p.m. at the Nungrado May 1st Stadium in Pyongyang
May 14-16	Intensive training in Pyongyang
May 17	Inter-Korean Delegation moves to Seoul
May 18-20	Intensive training in Seoul
May 21	Delegation formally established at a ceremony, departs for Portugal
May 22-June 13	Intensive training in Portugal
June 14	The Sixth World Junior Soccer Championships opens
June 15-20	Preliminaries o June 15 — with Argentina o June 17 — with Ireland o June 20 — with Portugal
June 22	Quarterfinal match o With Brazil
June 27	Departs from Portugal
June 28	Delegation disbanded in a ceremony in Pyongyang
June 29	South Korean team returns home via Panmunjom

* Delegation members — 62 (22 officials and nine athletes, 31 members from each side)

Delegation head — Chang Chung-shik, Vice Chairman of the Republic of Korea Olympic Committee

Manager — An Se-wuk, Manager of the North Korean national soccer team

2. A Call for the Resumption of the South-North Sports Talks

On July 23, 1991 in the wake of the fielding of the single inter-Korean delegations to two international games, Chang Chung-shik, the South's chief delegate to the South-North sports talks, proposed in a telephone message to the North that the fifth South-North sports meeting be held on August 6 to discuss the issue of forming single inter-Korean teams for the 1992 Barcelona Olympics and other major international games, and also to discuss and resolve the question of inter-Korean sports exchanges and cooperation such as holding the "unification soccer matches."

In reaction, the North, while using the "1991 pan-national conference" and other propaganda as pretexts that had nothing to do with the sports talks, counter-proposed on July 31 that the fifth sports meeting be held on August 17.

Public expectations for the fifth sports meeting were higher than at any other time in the past as it was to take place amidst the public excitement over a single Korean team to the 1992 Barcelona Olympics and the institutionalization of inter-Korean sports exchanges such as the "unification soccer matches."

But, on August 12, five days before the planned fifth sports meeting, the North suddenly and unilaterally postponed the fifth sports meeting indefinitely using North Korean judoist Yi Chang-su's defection to the South as an excuse.

Notwithstanding the fact that the judoist's defection had nothing to do with the sports talks, North Korea vehemently denounced the South by using words such as "premeditated provocation" and "defection operation." They emphasized that unless the South repatriated Yi Chang-su to the North, they

could not hold the sports meeting as scheduled.

The South-North sports talks, thus stopped after fielding single delegations to several international games. The reason for the North's shelving of the sports talks appears to be that they were reconsidering the single inter-Korean teams for major international games because of external pressure to open the North's society and other ill effects that arose in the course of forming and fielding single teams to the world table tennis and soccer games.

On October 14, 1991, Kim Chong-yol, President of the Republic of Korea Olympic Committee, sent a telephone message to Kim Yu-sun, Chairman of the North Korean Olympic Committee, to propose that the fifth sports meeting be held at Tongil-gak at 10 a.m. on November 5 to form a single delegation to the Barcelona Olympic which was only nine months away. He noted in the message that the inter-Korean sports talks had not been held for eight months after the fourth meeting last February 12.

In reaction, the North, in a telephone message on October 30, asserted again that judoist Yi Chang-su should be returned to the North, showing an unchanged negative attitude toward the issue of resuming the sports talks.

Part III

The South-North Red Cross Talks

1. The Eighth Red Cross Working-Level Delegates' Contact

The South-North Red Cross working-level delegates' contact designed to discuss the issues of holding the 11th South-North Red Cross meeting and of promoting the second exchange of the dispersed family hometown visitors and art troupes, failed to register progress after the seventh meeting due to the North's persistence in staging the revolutionary opera, "Flower-Peddling Girl," in the South.

At the first South-North high-level meeting held around this time in 1990, the South, emphasizing the urgency of the issue of the separated families, called for the realization of the hometown visits by those dispersed family members aged 60 or older, if not by others, before the end of 1990. The North responded affirmatively by saying, "Let us delegate the question to the Red cross for review."

Thus, the eighth South-North Red Cross working-level delegates' meeting was held at the conference room of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission at Panmunjom.

The delegates to the meeting from the South were: Song Young-dae, chief delegate, a member of the Disaster Relief Council of the Republic of Korea National Red Cross (ROKNRC); Lee Jun-hee, a ROKNRC consultant for social services; and Lee Byong-wung, a ROKNRC manager for planning and management. From the North were: Pak Yong-su, chief delegate, a standing member of the Central Committee of the North Korean Red Cross (NKRC); Kim Kwang-su, a member of the NKRC Central Committee; and Chong Dok-ki, a responsible guidance member of the NKRC Central Committee.

At the meeting held for the first time in 11 months after the

seventh contact, the South urged the North to reconsider the latter's position on the issues of "resuming the full-pledged Red Cross meeting," "of withdrawing its insistence on staging one of its revolutionary operas in the South" and "of arranging a meeting between the separated elderly persons over 60." But, the North stuck to its stand, and asked the South's agreement to stage the revolutionary opera. No progress was thus recorded at the meeting.

Stressing that the inherent stand of the Red Cross workers should be to respect the wishes of the separated people, the South placed a priority on the discussion and resolution of the issue of the hometown visits by those separated family members aged 60 or older under the Red Cross supervision even before the conclusion of the Red Cross talks. On the other hand, the North argued that the dispersed family members cannot be categorized by age nor can their issue be an agenda topic of the working-level delegates' meeting. If it requires discussion, the North said, it is something that ought to be taken up at the full-pledged Red Cross talks.

The South also asked the North to replace the revolutionary opera the latter want to stage in the South with a nationalistic one or a traditional performance, pointing out that the revolutionary opera designed to convey an ideological message to the viewers, would only offend the South and was not compatible with the purport of the exchange of the hometown visitors.

North Korea, however, asserted that its firm policy was to stage the "Flower-Peddling Girl" in Seoul, and this policy would remain unchanged.

Faced with the North's intransigent posture toward the revolutionary opera, the South suggested that if North Korea cannot alter the contents of the performance, and if the issue of art performance constitutes a stumbling block in the exchange

of hometown visitors' groups, the issue can be turned over to the area of culture and art exchanges, separate from the project of exchanging hometown visitors.

But, North Korea rejected even this, insisting that to carry out art performances simultaneously with the exchange of hometown visitors had been already agreed to.

On the issue of holding the 11th full-pledged meeting, the South wanted to schedule the time of the meeting regardless of whether or not the exchange of the hometown visitors is realized. The North, however, turned it down, mentioning that the two sides agreed on the "exchange of hometown visitors and art troupes first and the resumption of the full-pledged Red Cross talks later."

The North's attitude displayed at the eighth working-level meeting seemed dually motivated, that was, to veil their basically passive posture toward the exchange of the hometown visitors by sticking to the revolutionary opera issue while attempting to create confusion in the South.

In other words, the North's policy was apparently to foment a split in the South over the issue of the revolutionary opera by further abetting some students' call for the acceptance of the opera.

For the issue of holding the next meeting, the South wanted to meet the following week. But, the North disagreed, arguing that no meeting would be meaningful unless the "Flower-Peddling Girl" is accepted.

2. The Adoption of Resolution by the National Assembly for the Meeting of the Dispersed Families in the South and the North

Since no consensus could be reached on resolving the

dispersed family issue following the eighth working-level meeting in November 1990, the National Assembly of the Republic of Korea on February 8, 1991 unanimously adopted a resolution calling for the early settlement of the issue. The resolution suggested that the parliaments of the two sides advise their respective Red Cross societies to arrange the meeting between the separated families at the earliest possible date, and if this is not feasible immediately, then they should promptly embark on a project to discover the fate of the separated people first.

It also urged both parliaments to take all possible steps and provide all the support they can to help facilitate the early resumption of the suspended South-North Red Cross conference.

The full text of the resolution adopted by the National Assembly was as follows:

**Resolution for Discovering the Fate of
the Dispersed Families in the South and the North**

The National Assembly of the Republic of Korea regards the settlement of the dispersed family issue as a national task that cannot be put off any longer at this juncture in our national history when we must terminate the chapter of enmity, confrontation and division and replace it with that of reconciliation, cooperation and unification. We, the members of the National Assembly, intend to share the pains of the 10 million dispersed family members in the South and the North.

Even though sufferings from the division are harsh, the reality in the South and the North is that people live without knowing the fate of their parents and brothers who are a short distance

away, which cannot but be a national tragedy and a disgrace transcending the realm of the pains of the 10 million dispersed family members.

The National Assembly of the Republic of Korea has expected that the South-North Red Cross talks held since the early 1970s would deliver results. However, except for a single-round exchange of the dispersed family hometown visitors in 1985, the Red Cross talks had undergone repeated suspension and stalemate, giving a tremendous disappointment and more pain to the 10 million dispersed family members in the South and the North who wanted to know the fate of their missing relatives.

With the lapse of nearly half a century since the national division, the children at the time of the separation have now become adults and their parents are in their twilight years who are one by one passing away. In view of this reality, resolving the issue of those families dispersed in the South and the North must be the priority task, for the solution demands immediate attention.

Here, the National Assembly of the Republic of Korea, aware that one of its duties is to endeavor to alleviate the pains of the 10 million separated family members in the South and the North, resolves that:

- 1. The National Assembly of the Republic of Korea again emphasizes that meeting between the dispersed families in the South and the North should be realized at the earliest possible date. If it is too difficult to achieve this, we propose to the Supreme People's Assembly of North Korea that the parliaments of the two sides advise their respective Red Cross societies to embark on a project to discover even the fate of the dispersed families as soon as possible.*
- 2. The National Assembly of the Republic of Korea urges the Supreme People's Assembly of North Korea that the parliaments of the two sides should take all possible measures*

and furnish support to facilitate the early resumption of the suspended South-North Red Cross talks.

February 8, 1991

National Assembly
Republic of Korea

On February 13 following the adoption of the resolution, Speaker Park Jun-kyu of the National Assembly tried to send a telephone message of the resolution to his North Korean counterpart, Yang Hyong-sop, Chairman of the Supreme People's Assembly, to inform him of the step taken by the National Assembly.

However, the North refused to receive the message, and thus the efforts of the National Assembly to help facilitate early meeting between the separated families were undertaken in vain.

3. A Renewed Call for the Resumption of the South-North Red Cross Talks

Since the North made no response whatsoever to the National Assembly's adoption of a resolution for the early settlement of the dispersed family issue, Kim Sang-hyop, President of the Republic of Korea National Red Cross (ROKNRC), in a telephone message on April 2, 1991, proposed to the North that the 11th South-North Red Cross meeting, set to take place in Pyongyang, be held in early May at the latest.

Kim also stressed that there should be a breakthrough in the

effort to resolve the dispersed family issue before August 2, 1991, which would mark the 20th anniversary of the proposal for the campaign to search for the separated families.

As the North remained silent for more than a month, ROKNRC President Kim Sang-hyop sent another telephone message on May 10 to ask for the North's affirmative response, emphasizing the urgency of the dispersed family issue and the need to hold the 11th Red Cross meeting.

Still, North has not responded to the South's repeated offers.

This year marks the 20th anniversary of the South's proposal for the South-North Red Cross talks. But, the North has turned only a deaf ear to the South's sincere efforts to resolve the urgent humanitarian question.

Seen from the standpoint of either humanitarianism or national reconciliation, the issue of the meeting and travels for the dispersed families is a highly exigent question which neither side can put off any longer for whatever reason and condition. With the pains and scars of the dispersed families left unhealed, no progress can ever take place in the improvement of inter-Korean relations or national reconciliation.

At this juncture in history, moreover, when the universal trend is toward more openness and expanding exchanges to attain the common goal of mankind's liberty and prosperity and away from the age of persecution and closedness for ideologies, it is a shame for the Korean people alone to artificially suspend the man's most fundamental affection, love for one's relatives.

It was against this backdrop that Kang Young-hoon, ROKNRC President, issued a statement on the 20th anniversary of the South-North Red Cross conference on August 12 to emphasize once again the exigency of the dispersed family issue, proposing, in this connection, to the North that the 11th Red Cross meeting be held in Pyongyang as planned.

The text of the statement by the ROKNRC President on the 20th anniversary of the South-North Red Cross talks was as follows:

**A Statement by the Republic of Korea National
Red Cross President on the 20th Anniversary
of the South-North Red Cross Conference**

Today marks the 20th anniversary of the proposal made on August 12, 1971, by Choi Doo-sun, then President of the Republic of Korea National Red Cross, to Son Sung-pil, Chairman of the North Korean Red Cross, to call for a campaign to search for the dispersed families in the South and the North.

On this significant day, I first would like to urge the North Korean Red Cross to unconditionally agree to the early resumption of the suspended South-North Red Cross conference.

To look back, the initiation of the South-North Red Cross talks was a humanitarian beacon that served to raise the dream of finding the missing families among the 10 million dispersed family members who, separated in the South and the North, had endured the pain of family dispersion as their unsurmountable destiny. It was also a historical feat that implanted the will to unify the country among all the Korean people who have resigned themselves to the national division.

Despite the heightened nationwide expectations at first, the course of the South-North Red Cross talks has been a succession of frustration characterized by suspension and stalemate.

It is a widely known fact that the early-stage South-North Red Cross talks held in Seoul and Pyongyang by turns beginning in August 1972 had been suspended after the seventh meeting in July of the following year without registering any hoped-for achievements.

After many turns and twists for 11 years, the South-North Red Cross talks were resumed in May 1985. In addition, in September of the same year, small groups of dispersed family hometown visitors were exchanged between the South and the North for the first time after the national division, enabling an extremely limited number of people to have emotional meetings with their family members and relatives from their old hometowns. The occasion made it seem that the long-cherished wish of the 10 million dispersed family members in the South and the North could be finally fulfilled before long.

Regrettably, however, the 10th Red Cross meeting held in December of the same year ended again in a stalemate. It is truly lamentable that for six years to date, nothing has been achieved.

The dispersed families in unison have been patiently waiting for the time when they could visit their hometowns and meet their missing families. But, the waiting still continues unfulfilled even 20 years later. Thus, the pains of the dispersed families caused by the national division persist without relief for over half a century.

Today the whole world is getting smaller and closer. The world is becoming more open and expanding exchanges at an unprecedented pace in pursuit of the common goal of prosperity and well-being for the whole mankind transcending differences between people and countries.

It is encouraging from the national point of view that fortunately the South and the North, too, have lately been expanding the scope of contacts and exchanges by holding the South-North high-level meeting and fielding single inter-Korean delegations to the international games.

Under these conditions at home and abroad, we Red Cross workers must not hesitate or falter any longer over the issue of the dispersed families in the South and the North if only to fulfill our entrusted humanitarian mission and, going a step farther, to con-

tribute to peaceful unification of the homeland.

We must pull our energies in reconnecting the humanitarian ties as soon as feasible so that the separated families and relatives in the South and the North could visit their hometowns at any time and could live together at any place.

In this context, I courteously propose to the North Korean Red Cross that the 11th South-North Red Cross full-pledged meeting, which has not been held since the 10th full-pledged meeting in Seoul in December 1985, be held as scheduled in Pyongyang.

August 12, 1991

Kang Young-hoon
President
Republic of Korea National Red Cross

As the North continued to turn a deaf ear to the South's incessant efforts to resolve the dispersed family issue, Kang Young-hoon, ROKNRC President, sent a telephone message to the North to ask for a change in their negative attitude toward the dispersed family question. The message was dispatched on September 20, 1991, which marked the sixth anniversary of the exchange of the dispersed family hometown visitors.

In the message, the ROKNRC President, while noting the pathetic situation of the elderly dispersed family members who pass away without realizing their long-cherished wish of meeting their missing families, stressed that the two sides should facilitate meeting of the missing families even for once at an early date.

Meanwhile, in a comment appearing in the September 23 issue of the *Rodong Shinmun*, North Korea, which had maintained silence over the South's consistent efforts to resume the

Red Cross talks, showed an utterly insincere posture of betraying the wishes of the 10 million dispersed family members by denouncing the South's telephone message as "not deserving even the slightest consideration." The North insisted that its revolutionary opera, "Flower-Peddling Girl," should be staged in Seoul as it suggested earlier.

Part IV

Major Developments in Inter-Korean Relations

1. The Proposal for the "Grand March for Unification"

a. A Statement in Support of the "Grand March for Unification"

In a statement addressed to the North, Deputy Prime Minister and National Unification Minister Choi Ho-joong on July 15, 1991, proposed that a "Grand March for Unification" be staged under the co-sponsorship of the South and the North in commemoration of the August 15 Liberation Day. He then suggested that a working-level meeting be held at Panmunjom some time between July 26 and 30 to discuss the support for the march.

Deputy Prime Minister Choi also urged that on this Chusok holiday falling on September 22, people aged 70 or older among the 61,355 persons who applied for the visits to the North in response to the Seoul government's declaration of the "grand national exchanges" last year should be allowed to visit their hometowns.

About 2,000 people from various levels and strata of life in the South and the North and also from Korean communities abroad were to participate in the "Grand March for Unification." In the course of marching across the country from August 15 through August 31, a host of programs were planned such as the Liberation Day commemoration ceremony, unification prayer services, symposiums on unification issues, and a festival for unification culture.

Following Deputy Prime Minister Choi's statement, the Seoul government presented its position on the "Grand March for Unification" as well as the concrete contents of the march.

Inasmuch as the march was promoted as a private program

with the arrangement, support and guarantee from government authorities, the government stressed that it would be good for the two sides to organize their "preparatory committees for the march" by July 25 at the latest.

As for the South, the government requested that the South-North exchange promotion offices in all walks of life and relevant social organizations like the Central Council for National Unification jointly inaugurate a "Preparatory Committee for the Grand March for Unification" and organize the march in close cooperation with the government authorities concerned.

The government claimed that since the proposed march incorporated the past North Korean call for a "symposium between the politicians, scholars and journalists of the South and the North," there is no reason why North Korea should reject it. But, it hoped that if the North could not accept the offer in its entirety, the North would accept it on a selective basis. The government added that if and when the North had some constructive suggestions in connection with the march, the South was willing to accommodate it.

Also in connection with its suggestion for allowing the elderly dispersed persons over 70 to freely travel back and forth during the Chusok holiday season, the government expected the North to provide the necessary support and conveniences to these visitors for humanitarian considerations. It pledged that if similar requests were made by the North, the South would furnish all the necessary support and cooperation.

b. Background and the Significance of the Proposal

The Seoul government's proposal for the "Grand March for Unification" was significant in that 1) it was made at President

Roh Tae-woo's instructions to stage "joint South-North Liberation Day commemoration programs," and in that the offer was aimed at 2) helping steadily to restore and develop the severed national community in keeping pace with the changing environment for unification policies, 3) providing a momentum for personnel travel between the South and the North by accommodating North Korean overtures in a forward-looking manner, and 4) implanting orderly and genuine private exchanges between the South and the North.

A Measure Pursuant to President Roh's Determination to Realize Exchanges with the North

President Roh Tae-woo on July 6, 1991, instructed the administration to seek steps to stage extensive joint inter-Korean Liberation Day programs on the occasion of this year's 46th anniversary of the National Liberation. The presidential instructions came in his remarks at Vancouver, Canada, where he made a stopover on his way from the visits to the United States and Canada.

In the instructions, the President told the officials to study positive ways for the South and the North to jointly sponsor such programs by accommodating the North's ideas such as an "inter-Korean pilgrimage to the land" and "seminar on unification issues."

The presidential instructions stemmed from his determination to provide a breakthrough in the strained inter-Korean relations on the basis of the world community's support for and concurrence on the South's unification efforts.

Again on July 12, President Roh, in his opening address before the meeting of the Advisory Council on Democratic Peaceful Unification, stressed, "The South and the North,

springing from one nation, should carry out programs to restore their national homogeneity, starting with more feasible ones." He then stressed again that it would be a good thing for the compatriots and the youths of the South and the North to jointly observe the Liberation Day programs around August 15 of this year.

Accordingly, the government proposed the support for the "Grand March for Unification" to embody the presidential determination to realize inter-Korean exchanges in its basic policy to expedite efforts to quicken the time of durable peace and unification through positively sponsoring joint programs between South and North Korean residents for national reconciliation.

Taking Positive Steps to Promote Reconciliation in Pace with the Changing Unification Environment

Since the turn of the 1990s, there have been many changes at home and abroad in Korea's unification environment.

In the Soviet Union and East Europe, communism collapsed and they underwent transformation into a liberal and open system. Divided East and West Germanies were unified on October 3, 1990.

The international order of confrontation, polarized between the United States and the Soviet Union, had come to an end with the Malta Declaration of December 3, 1990, and a new world order of reconciliation and openness commenced.

Amidst these changes in international environment, a consensus has been reached on making a meaningful progress in the inter-Korean dialogue and on improving South-North relations on the Korean peninsula.

With a view to positively coping with the changing unifica-

tion environment and developing it into a momentum for unification, the government of the South has established diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and East European nations on the strength of its successful Nordpolitik. It also energized economic cooperation with China, improving their overall bilateral relations.

In the conviction that the South and the North should move toward unification while pursuing co-existence and co-prosperity through reconciliation and cooperation, the Seoul government made the July 7th Special Presidential Declaration and other efforts to realize exchanges and cooperation between the South and the North.

The government has laid a legal and institutional basis for active personnel exchanges by legislating the Law on South-North Exchanges and Cooperation and the Law on South-North Cooperation Fund. Last year, the government declared a period for the "grand national exchanges," proposing that the North guarantee the residents of the South and the North to travel freely back and forth to each side during the period.

Due to these efforts of the Seoul government, a South-North high-level meeting has been held with the prime ministers of the two sides as chief delegates. The meeting had four rounds of talks on the agenda question of "dissolving the state of political and military confrontation and carrying out multi-pronged exchanges and cooperation between the South and the North." In addition, the two sides fielded single delegations to the international table tennis and soccer games for the first time since the national division.

Moreover, "unification soccer matches" and "traditional music concerts" were held in Seoul and Pyongyang with musicians and athletes traveling back and forth between the South and the North. On the other hand, a group of the South's legis-

lators attended an Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) meeting held in Pyongyang. Thus, inter-Korean exchanges, though limited, became quite brisk.

In May 1991, meanwhile, North Korea, in a change in its hitherto policy, said it would join the United Nations together with the South, submitting its written membership application to the United Nations in July. Further, the North has begun talks with Japan to normalize its relations while positively seeking ways to improve ties with the United States.

Convinced these various changing situations are providing a rare momentum for the two sides of Korea to enter an age of peaceful coexistence, the Seoul government has emphasized the need to urgently embark on the task to widening the avenue of mutual trust and understanding and to restore the national homogeneity so as to prepare for unification in earnest.

In view of the reality of strained inter-Korean relations that have persisted for some 40 years, no national integration can ever be promoted without the restoration and development of the national community first. Therefore, it behooves the residents of the South and the North to take positive steps to promote national reconciliation whereby they, above all, can meet, better understand and mutually trust each other being of one race.

Thus seen, the proposal for the "Grand March for Unification" was significant in that it was intended for the South and the North to pledge joint efforts to restore the national community through a series of joint programs geared to promote national reconciliation, thereby unfolding a new history of national self-esteem, and also in that it was to seek concrete efforts to solidify the base for peaceful unification in pace with the new international order of reconciliation and openness.

A Steady Accommodation of North Korean Proposals and Providing Momentum for Travel

While having a dialogue with the South's government through the South-North high-level meeting and others, North Korea has also been trying to carry on meetings like a pan-national conference and a youth-student unification festival with dissidents in the South.

These meetings sought by the North were, in nature, obviously political gatherings linked to some dissident organizations in the South. But, the Seoul government tried to accommodate the North's ideas through the "Grand March for Unification" in a policy to provide a momentum for travels back and forth between the two sides and thereby foster a sense of being one with the other and restore and develop the national community.

Here, the government sought to have the two sides co-sponsor this year's Liberation Day ceremonies on August 15 under government authorities' support and guarantee by steadily accommodating the North Korean ideas of a "cross-country pilgrimage" or a "grand symposium of politicians, scholars and journalists."

The proposal for the "Grand March for Unification," therefore, embodied the South's intention to provide a momentum for dialogue, exchanges and cooperation based on an accommodative stand that it would consider North Korean overtures in a forward-looking manner to unilaterally resolve the question of unification.

Travels and other personnel exchanges between the South and the North constitute a shortcut to promoting mutual trust and understanding and to linking the severed national bond, and, at the same time, a necessity that the two sides must go

through for achieving unification.

Nonetheless, an abnormal relationship persists between the South and the North where many people live unaware of the fate of their families in each other's areas, and unable to undertake mutual visits.

The proposal for the "Grand March for Unification" was a part of the South's unilateral efforts to resolve the state of mutual non-contact and find, by all means, a means to broaden personnel travels between the two sides.

It was the manifestation of such an intention that the Seoul government last year proclaimed a period for the "grand national exchanges," proposing that the two sides allow all those wishing to visit the other side to do so freely during the specified period, and again suggested this year that people aged 70 or older among those who applied for the visits last year be permitted to freely visit their missing families.

Establishing Orderly Exchanges with Government Support and Guarantee

The firm position of the Seoul government is that inter-Korean personnel exchanges should always be realized based on the respect for each other's orders and systems and in a way that contributes to the improvement of South-North relations and the achievement of peaceful unification.

But, the programs North Korea advocated, such as a pan-national conference and a youth-student unification festival, were ostensibly to commemorate the Liberation Day and to promote national reconciliation. In reality, however, they were political events aimed at forging a united front with some dissident organizations in the South to the exclusion of the Seoul government.

If the North's proposed programs were truly to celebrate the Liberation Day and to promote national reconciliation, they ought to be realized in an orderly manner through talks between the proper representative offices charged with the task of promoting exchanges, and they should not be biased political programs where the other side is denounced as the target of destruction and which are for some specific social organizations only. At the same time, such events can properly take root only when supported and guaranteed by the government authorities of both sides.

Personnel exchanges between the South and the North are an exigent task. But, any exchanges that stem from the seditious aim to slander and subvert the other, would only result in abetting mutual distrust and aggravating inter-Korean relations.

The Seoul government's position is to support and guarantee those purely motivated personnel exchanges for a large number of people and intended to promote mutual understanding and reconciliation. It was under this purport that the "Grand March for Unification" was proposed.

The "Grand March for Unification" the South had proposed was significant in that it, rather than being a one-shot program, was geared to provide a momentum for the two sides to carry on personnel exchanges with support and guarantee from their respective government authorities and further to pave the way to orderly private exchanges between the South and the North.

c. Details of the Proposed March

The proposed "Grand March for Unification" comprised a host of programs for the participants as they march across the South and the North for 17 days from August 15 to August 31.

The march was set to begin on August 15 at Panmunjom,

where 1,000 people including some overseas Korean residents from both South and the North were to attend the opening ceremony and another event to commemorate the Liberation Day. Immediately after the ceremonies, the attendees would march off to the North to travel across the country. On August 20, they would observe a “unification prayer service” at Mt. Paekdu.

Thereafter, they would continue the trans-country march in the South. After holding another “unification prayer service” at Mt. Halla on August 28, they would return to Panmunjom on August 31, where the closing ceremony and concurrently a “unification cultural festival” would be held.

On August 17 and 24 during the march, “unification symposiums” would be held in Pyongyang and Seoul, respectively, with about 50 South and North Korean participants and some overseas residents.

Detailed schedules of the “Grand March for Unification” were as follows:

a. Commemorative Liberation Day Ceremony

- o Time: August 15
- o Place: An appropriate place in the joint security area of Panmunjom
- o Participants: All taking part in the march
- o Contents: Commemorative speeches, pledge of oath by march participants

b. Grand Cross-Country March

- o Period: August 15-31 (16 nights, 17 days)

- Northern area: August 15-23 (eight nights, nine days)
- Southern area: August 23-31 (eight nights, nine days)
- o Participants: 1,000 persons each from the South and the North (2,000 persons in all)
 - Grand symposiums on unification issue to be attended by 50 persons
 - Persons representing social organizations — 400
 - Regular citizens including students — 250
 - Overseas residents — 100
 - Press members — 100
 - Support personnel — 100
- o Routes of March
 - (The North) Panmunjom → Kaesong → Pyongyang → Mt. Paekdu → Panmunjom
 - (The South) Panmunjom → Seoul → Taejon → Taegu → Pusan → Mt. Halla → Mokpo → Kwangju → Chonju → Taejon → Seoul → Panmunjom

c. Grand Symposiums on Unification Issue

- o Time and Place
 - First symposium: August 17, Pyongyang
 - Second symposium: August 24, Seoul
- o Symposium participants: 50 politicians, scholars, journalists and overseas residents each from the South and the North (100 persons in all)

d. Unification Prayer Services

- o Time and Place
 - First service: August 20, Mt. Paektu
 - Second service: August 28, Mt. Halla

- o Participants: All taking part in the march

e. Unification Cultural Festival

- o Time: August 31
- o Place: An appropriate place at the joint security area of Panmunjom
- o Participants: All taking part in the march
- o Contents: A festival of local cuisine and folk art performances

d. Domestic Reactions

As President Roh Tae-woo on July 6 suggested the joint inter-Korean Liberation Day ceremony, the government announced on July 15 the proposal for the "Grand March for Unification," which the major newspapers in the South welcomed, observing that "the offers were intended first to provide a momentum for the South and the North to transform their confrontational stance into reconciliatory posture while respecting each other's systems."

Expressing the doubt that the North would accept the proposed grand march involving travels back and forth by a large number of persons, newspapers urged the North to respond positively to the idea so that the proposal would not remain just a suggestion.

Meanwhile, the representatives of the Central Council for National Unification and 87 other offices and organizations related to the promotion of private inter-Korean exchanges issued a joint resolution on July 17 in support of the proposed grand march. The resolution stated that it would inaugurate a "Preparatory Committee for the Grand March for Unification"

by July 25, expressing the hope that North Korea would take a corresponding measure.

e. Reactions from North Korea and Related Follow-up Measures

On July 16, a day after the National Unification Minister's statement, North Korea, in a statement released in the name of Yun Ki-bok, Vice Chairman of the Committee for Peaceful Unification of the Fatherland, in effect, rejected the proposed march by denouncing the idea of the grand march.

To express their intention of carrying through their pet ideas of a "pan-national conference" and a "grand youth-student festival," the North urged the South to support and cooperate in these programs. They also demanded that the South set free those arrested for undertaking events unauthorized in the South.

At the same time, North Korea proposed that a preparatory meeting be held in Seoul on July 25 to discuss the issue of jointly hosting a Liberation Day festival on August 15.

On July 17, a day after the release of Yun Ki-bok's statement, the Seoul government noted in a comment made by the spokesman of the National Unification Board that the North had made incomprehensible demands, such as the release of incarcerated persons, in connection with the proposed grand march. The comment, however, said that the government was paying due attention to the North Korean call for the joint Liberation Day commemoration programs and would carefully review the North Korean offer.

The comment further welcomed the support for the proposed "Grand March for Unification" expressed on July 16 by the representatives of the 88 offices and organizations related to the

promotion of private inter-Korean exchanges. The government mentioned that in deference to the wishes of those in all levels and stratas of life, it would do all it could to carry out the proposed march by all means, expressing the hope that the occasion would serve as an impetus to bring about a breakthrough in the realization of national reconciliation and peaceful unification.

In the meantime, the representatives of the offices and organizations related to private inter-Korean exchanges formally inaugurated the Preparatory Committee for the Grand March for Unification on July 19. A day earlier, they resolved to organize such a committee, expressing their total support for the grand march.

Kim Chang-shik, President of the Central Council for National Unification, was chosen as chairman of the preparatory committee. Seven persons were also selected as members of the preparatory committee at the meeting with North Korea to prepare for the march. The seven delegates were:

- Chief delegate: Han Yang-soo, secretary general,
Central Council for National Unification
- Delegate: Cho Dong-young, secretary general,
Committee for Promotion of Meetings be-
tween 10 Million Dispersed Family Members
- Delegate: Chung Sok-hong, consultant, National
Unification Board
- Delegate: Kim Kum-rae, secretary general, Council of
Korean Women's Organizations
- Delegate: Choe Chang-hoon, director, Secretariat of the
Committee for Promotion of Inter-Korean
Student Exchanges
- Delegate: Park Sok-kyun, spokesman, Preparatory
Committee for the Grand March for Unifica-

tion
 Delegate: Suh Young-kyo, director of planning,
 Preparatory Committee for the Grand March
 for Unification.

On July 20, Kim Chang-shik, chairman of the Preparatory Committee for the Grand March for Unification, sent a telephone message to Yun Ki-bok, Vice Chairman of the North's Committee for Peaceful Unification of the Fatherland, in which he expressed the hope that the North would discuss the question of promoting joint programs with the South to celebrate the Liberation Day on August 15. In this regard, he proposed a preparatory meeting at 10 a.m. on July 26 at the Peace House at Panmunjom.

In the message, Kim Chang-shik suggested that seven delegates, two representing the government authorities and five private ones, from each side attend the preparatory meeting. He then sent the list of the South's seven delegates to the North.

North Korea, in a statement issued by the spokesman of the Committee for Peaceful Unification of the Fatherland on July 22, again showed negative attitude toward the South's proposal, imposing improper conditions for the preparatory meeting, such as the release of those arrested in connection with Pomminnyon and Chondaehyop cases, repeal of the National Security Law, and support for a pan-national conference.

Despite the crystal-clear fact that the Liberation Day ceremonies were not political gathering intended to slander and offend each other but to promote respect for each other, North Korea argued it would hold a pan-national conference with specific organizations from the South they hand-picked. They went so far as to demand the release of certain prisoners and insisted on taking part only in political events aimed at

discrediting the South in breach of the spirit of mutual respect.

In a telephone message to the North on July 23, Kim Chang-shik, chairman of the preparatory committee, pointed out that the Liberation Day ceremonies, which should not be political events geared to slander each other, should be promoted in the spirit of mutual respect. He urged that "if your side is truly interested in the joint sponsorship of the Liberation Day programs, your side should now affirmatively respond to our proposal to hold the preparatory meeting at Panmunjom on July 26."

But, the preparatory meeting failed to take place on July 26 as the North refused even to send a reply, much less show any reaction.

Yet, in a bid to successfully bring off the co-sponsorship of the Liberation Day programs, the South dispatched two more telephone messages on July 27 and August 2 to the North to continue to press for the preparatory meeting.

In the August 2 message to Yun Ki-bok, Vice Chairman of the Committee for Peaceful Unification of the Fatherland, Kim Chang-shik, Chairman of the Preparatory Committee for the Grand March for Unification, urged the North to agree to the grand march if only to achieve a breakthrough in the extensive personnel travels between the South and the North on a private level. He also expressed a regret over the fact that North Korea acted to abet confrontation and frictions between the people of the same race by linking the politically motivated meetings which some specific organizations planned to stage around the Liberation Day to the "Grand March for Unification."

The South's Chairman said in the message that he expected to meet the North Korean delegates at the preparatory meeting before August 10, stating he would leave the decision of the time and place of the preparatory meeting to the North.

Due to the North's intransigence, however, no preparatory meeting took place and the proposed "Grand March for Unification" failed to materialize.

In a statement on August 14, Kim Chang-shik, Chairman of the Preparatory Committee, expressed a regret over the failure of the proposed grand march due to the North's non-cooperation. He said, "We expect that even after the Liberation Day on August 15, North Korea will affirmatively respond to inter-Korean events like a 'symposium on unification issues' at an appropriate time in line with the people's concern and expectations to pave the way for private-level meetings and exchanges." He, thus, manifested his intention to put all his energy into bringing about private exchanges with the North to help promote national reconciliation.

2. An Attempt to Hold a Pan-National Conference and Related Developments

While turning a deaf ear to the South's call for the "Grand March for Unification," North Korea tried to enforce the pan-national conference they have been promoting.

On July 10, four days after President Roh Tae-woo called for the joint inter-Korean sponsorship of the Liberation Day ceremonies, North Korea sent a telephone message to the South's Deputy Prime Minister and concurrent National Unification Minister. The message was signed by Yun Ki-bok, Chairman of the North Korea's headquarter of Pomminnyon or Pan-National Alliance for Unification of the Fatherland.

In the message, Yun asserted that North had decided to hold a pan-national conference in Seoul from August 12 to 18, and to

hold the preparatory meeting in Seoul for this conference. He then unilaterally informed the South that five delegates from the North led by Chon Kum-chol, Vice Chairman of the Chonmin-nyon's North Korean headquarter, and 10 press members would pass through Panmunjom at 10 a.m. on July 17 to the South to attend the preparatory meeting.

In a telephone message to the North on July 11, the Seoul government told the North that it could not allow the latter's unilateral participation in a meeting not agreed to by the two sides. The South made it clear that "all inter-Korean joint programs should be instituted through mutual agreement which always respects each other's orders and systems."

Also in the message, the government proposed that if the events mentioned by the North were truly aimed at celebrating the Liberation Day of August 15, then the two sides could discuss the matter at the inter-Korean working-level delegates' meetings after the South formally announced on July 15 the measures to hold the Liberation Day ceremonies under the joint inter-Korean sponsorship.

On July 20, the North's Yun Ki-bok, in a telephone message, displayed negative attitude toward the "Grand March for Unification" which the South proposed on July 15. He asserted that "if the South were interested in jointly sponsoring the Liberation Day programs, the South should instead support the successful staging of a pan-national conference." Showing unabated adherence to the idea of the pan-national conference, the North claimed that it would again send seven delegates to the preparatory meeting on July 24 in the South and demanded that the South set free all dissident prisoners before the preparatory talks.

Meanwhile, in the telephone messages sent to the National Unification and Home Affairs Ministers of the South on July 19

in the names of Yo Yon-ku, Chairman of the so-called North Korean Committee for Struggles to Secure Release of Lim Soo-kyong, and Chong Jun-ku, Chairman of the Committee for Measures to Rescue Reverend Moon Ik-hwan, the North claimed that they had decided to send a youth-student consolation team and another consolation team comprising people from all walks of life to the South from July 25 through August 20 to console Reverend Moon Ik-hwan and coed Lim Soo-kyong.

The North's abrupt notice to dispatch the so-called consolation teams to the South stemmed from their intention to encourage the South's dissident organizations in linkage with the pan-national conference and further to ignore or subvert the South's statutory order.

On July 20, the government, in a comment by the spokesman of the National Unification Board, made it clear that "Reverend Moon Ik-hwan and Lim Soo-kyong are law violators now under legal sanction, and that even if those planning to meet them were South Koreans, a meeting between the prisoners and a group of people cannot be tolerated under the law especially when such a meeting is politically designed to praise and encourage the participants to violate the law."

In the comment, the government also pointed out that the attempt by the North to visit the prisoners, who have expressly violated the law, at a time when the fourth South-North high-level meeting was approaching, amounted to an act of splashing cold water on the Koreans craving for inter-Korean reconciliation and cooperation.

"We expect North Korea to agree to our proposal for the 'Grand March for Unification' under the joint inter-Korean sponsorship on the occasion of the Liberation Day of August 15 in the interests of national reconciliation and the restoration of homogeneity," the spokesman said.

However, North Korea, while turning a deaf ear to the South's call for the grand march, insisted on staging a pan-national conference in its area only to undermine a climate for national reconciliation and pose yet another obstacle to the restoration of national homogeneity.

Appendices

1. The Text of President Roh Tae-woo's Address at the U.N. General Assembly on September 24, 1991

Mr. President, Mr. Secretary-General, distinguished delegates,

Three years ago, I had the pleasure of reporting to you from this very rostrum the refreshing and heart-warming scenes of the Seoul Olympic Games. Those athletes from across the world gave us an inspiring vision of global harmony, transcending the divisions of race, religion, and ideology.

Soon thereafter, revolutionary changes swept across the world. As we look around today and take stock of the changes, we may truly recognize the progress made toward the Olympic ideal of "one peaceful world."

Today, I am proud to stand here once more, this time as President of a Membre State. To me, this itself represents a significant expression of the new tide of history.

It was forty three years ago that the Republic of Korea first applied formally to become a member of the United Nations. If you consider the decades of patience we have had to endure, you will perhaps understand the enthusiasm displayed by the Korean people on this occasion.

To those who have supported and encouraged our admission to this august body and to those who have acted and spoken on our behalf during all the years that we had no seat here, I offer the heart-felt gratitude of the Korean people.

Today, the Cold War system, which had prevented our entry to the United Nations, has become a relic of the past.

From the workers of the Solidarity Movement in Gdansk, who raised the banner of reform in Poland to the courageous Government in Budapest; from those freedom-inspired crowds who filled Prague's Vaclavske Plaza to those former East Germans who tore down the Berlin Wall — not only did they free themselves, but they opened the road toward a genuine world peace.

In removing the physical walls which denied them liberty, they also brought down the barriers which divided mankind into hostile camps forcing confrontation and rivalry. It was, unquestionably, the Soviet reforms that touched off these great changes. But these changes have also been inspired by the achievements of those nations which attained prosperity on the strength of freedom and individual values. I share a deep sense of satisfaction over this outcome with those who have aspired for a truly harmonious world, and I pay tribute to the courage of those who made into reality what had been considered impossible in the past.

Mr. President,

I offer my congratulations on your election as President of the 46th Session of the General Assembly, and express my confidence that this Session under your leadership will produce fruitful and rewarding achievements.

Mr. President,

I regard it no less significant that along with the Republic of Korea, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) has also become a member of this Organization.

As our North Korean brothers join us in the journey toward peace and unification, I extend hearty congratulations to them on their entry.

The Republic of Korea has long pursued parallel membership of both Koreas in the United Nations in the belief that it is the most realistic approach to the attainment of peace and unification on the Korean peninsula. For a continuation of wasteful confrontation, refusing to recognize each other, will only prolong the painful tragedy of national division.

For this reason, the entry of both South and North Korea into the United Nations marks an important turning-point in inter-Korean relations since the division of our land in 1945.

As responsible members of the international community, the two Koreas are now both bound by the United Nations Charter to carry out the duties incumbent on all members for the maintenance of world

peace.

Now that the delegates of South and North Korea have taken their seats together in this hall of peace, we are convinced that a new chapter of reconciliation and cooperation will open on the Korean peninsula.

The Korean people may live under two separate systems, but we have never forgotten that we are one nation.

Imperfect as it may be, the separate membership of the two Koreas in the United Nations is an important interim step on the road to national unification.

It has taken more than forty years for us to move the short distance from the observer's to a member's seat. It took the two Germanies seventeen years to combine their UN seats. I sincerely hope that it will not take as long for the two Korean seats to become one.

In this hall of peace, the two Koreas will open a new avenue of dialogue and cooperation that will lead to our national unity.

The Cold War system that brought on the tragedy of territorial division in Korea has itself collapsed. Now, we will seek to achieve national unification: peacefully — without the use of military force; independently — on the basis of self-determination; and democratically — according to the free will of the Korean people.

I earnestly hope that all the members of the United Nations will encourage and support Korean efforts to join the human progress toward a more peaceful world by achieving their national unity.

Mr. President and distinguished delegates,

The world is undergoing epochal changes.

Systems that oppressed freedom and human dignity are being dismantled and the tragedies stemming from dogmatic ideologies are coming to an end everywhere.

Around the world nations are seeking to chart their own destinies.

What is truly momentous about this process is that history is being advanced not by the forces of bloody revolution but by the power of reason and free spirit. But, the great change has only just begun.

This epic change brings enormous opportunities and is the source

of hope for all mankind. Even so, we must travel a long and tortuous road before we can successfully mold the current process into a new order of world peace.

The recent Soviet political crisis is a clear demonstration of this fact.

The entire world spent those three stressful days in a state of shock and dismay. However, the courageous citizens of Moscow braved the crisis, and placed flowers in the muzzles of tank guns. Indeed, their victory is the victory of all freedom- and peace-loving peoples of the world. Once again, the world has been reminded that indeed "peace is indivisible."

We have to recognize that any attempt at reform, however minor, is bound to require an element of sacrifice and pain. In the cases of the Soviet Union and the Eastern European countries, we know they are currently engaged in thorough-going reforms of their political, economic and social foundations. In moving away from a system of strict control that pervaded every aspect of their lives for decades, the difficulties and costs of creating new structures must be truly enormous.

We all know that throughout the Cold War period, the nations of the world spent an exorbitant amount of resources on national security and military preparedness. Now, the success of current reforms promises to bring benefits the world over in the form of peace; and we will enjoy this "peace dividend" for a long time to come.

As the benefits of peace are shared, it is only fair that the burdens and sacrifices should also be shared.

Consequently, I call upon all the well-to-do nations to extend active support and assistance to the countries which used to have centrally planned economic systems, in their transition to democracy and free market economies.

Due to the imperatives of the Cold War, the Korean people have had to sustain enormous sacrifices throughout the postwar period. Accordingly, we yearn for a world of peace, perhaps more than any nation on earth.

As a nation that has risen only a generation ago from the ashes of war, and as a recently democratized nation that is growing in prosperity, the Republic of Korea feels a special affinity toward the emerging democracies, and understands from experience the acute imperative that these nations are facing in common: to achieve democratic and economic development in tandem.

Korea is neither a wealthy nor an advanced country. But, we are prepared to extend support to the reform efforts not only in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union but in all parts of the world, and to offer them cooperation to the best of our ability.

Mr. President,

In my speech before the 43rd Session of the General Assembly, I declared that a durable peace would arrive in our world the day we "beat swords into ploughshares" on the Korean peninsula. I said this because our own land was visited by untold trials and tribulations stemming from the international imperatives of the Twentieth Century, and because the yoke was still upon us.

However, the external climate surrounding the Korean peninsula has undergone significant changes over the past years.

Even before the onset of worldwide reform movements, we took the initiative of going beyond the limits of the Cold War. Subsequently, we established diplomatic relations with the Central and Eastern European countries as well as the Soviet Union. We also opened mutual exchanges and cooperative relations with neighboring China.

For the previous half century, Korea's relations with these countries had been officially severed, and in practice were often confrontational. However, with our new friendships and cooperation we sense the on-rush of the waves of contemporary history. Indeed, we have discovered the power of reconciliation.

We are firmly convinced that the day of peace and unification is also coming to our land, in spite of territorial division and the ever present military threat.

With the entry of the two Koreas to the United Nations, we have embarked on a new phase of coexistence. Now, it is our task to build

on this foundation a positive relationship, which will soon bring peace, stability and national unity.

To this end, I propose that the two Korean Governments agree on and specifically carry out the following three measures:

First, the two Koreas should replace the fragile armistice with a permanent peace structure.

Even at this very moment, a total of 1.7 million heavily armed soldiers confront each other on the Korean peninsula, concentrated along the 250-kilometer-long Demilitarized Zone.

It might come as a surprise to some of you, but we have been living under this unstable condition of neither peace nor war for the last four decades.

In light of these precarious realities, I believe the two Koreas should conclude a peace treaty, thus renouncing the use of force against each other, and proceeding to normalize bilateral relations in all areas.

My second proposal is that, in order to reduce the threat of war on the Korean peninsula, the two sides should seek to bring about realistic arms reductions beginning with measures designed to build mutual confidence.

In order to remove military confrontation on the Korean peninsula, it is imperative that South and North Korea agree upon a number of military confidence-building measures, including the exchange of military information, the advance notification of field exercises as well as troop movements, and the exchange of permanent observer teams to prevent surprise attacks.

Above all, the development of nuclear weapons on the Korean peninsula will present a threat not only to the peace of Northeast Asia but also to the peace of the whole world.

Atomic energy must never be used for destructive military purposes, but must only be used for peaceful purposes of promoting the well-being of all mankind. Since the DPRK is a signatory to the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, it should immediately abandon the development of nuclear weapons, and submit, unconditionally, all of

its nuclear-related materials and facilities to international inspection.

Once the DPRK abandons its development of nuclear weapons and as confidence-building measures are implemented between South and North Korea, I am prepared to take up discussions with North Korea not only on the reduction of conventional forces but also on the nuclear issues on the Korean peninsula.

Finally, and on a more humanitarian plane, the two Koreas should bring an end to the period of disassociation, and open a new era of free exchange of products, information and people.

On our Peninsula today, there are over ten million Koreans who live separated from their families and loved ones as a result of the territorial division in 1945 and of the Korean War. They are denied even the most basic humanitarian right of knowing whether or not their parents, brothers and sisters are still alive, let alone exchanging letters or telephone calls. I do not believe we can talk meaningfully about improving inter-Korean relations or mutual confidence-building without first resolving this urgent humanitarian problem.

Just as it is a universal practice among all civilized nations, so must the two Koreas open doors toward each other and guarantee free travel, communication and trade.

We must promote substantive relations by resolving, through dialogue and negotiations, issues of mutual interest including inter-Korean exchanges and cooperation as well as political and military issues.

Next month, for the first time since the two Koreas became members of this Organization, the two Government delegations will meet for a fourth round of the South-North High-Level Talks. I sincerely hope that the Talks will produce an agreement on the basic principles governing inter-Korean relations.

Recently, some limited exchanges between the two Koreas have taken place in such areas as sports, culture, and trade. Small as they are, we value this progress.

For our part, we will do our best to promote a relationship of common prosperity in which the two Koreas offer each other assistance

for mutual development.

The Republic of Korea is prepared to actively pursue economic cooperation with the DPRK in all areas, including trade, tourism, joint exploration of underground resources and establishment of joint venture plants.

Please bear in mind that the Korean people have been living as a single national community for over 1300 years. Therefore, once exchanges and cooperation begin, conditions for a political integration of the two parts of Korea will ripen very quickly, given our historical homogeneity.

I do not believe that the Korean peninsula should be left as the only land remaining divided by the Cold War. At a time when all the divisive barriers are collapsing, the unification of the Korean peninsula must be a matter of time and the natural course of history. A unified Korea will be a land of freedom and happiness for all inhabitants, and will become a nation devoted to the promotion of world peace and the well-being of all mankind.

Mr. President,

The Korean people desire to see peace prevail not only on the Korean peninsula but in all regions of dispute as well.

I am gratified to note that there are real signs of progress in peace-making efforts in many areas of the world, including the Middle East, Cambodia, Angola, Western Sahara, and Central America. I am highly encouraged to see the United Nations play leading roles in these areas, and I wish to pay my respects to the Honorable Secretary-General, Javier Perez de Cuellar, for his devoted efforts.

Along with efforts to prevent regional disputes and to remove their root causes, we should strengthen the enforcement of collective security measures.

The recent war in the Gulf region confirmed that the United Nations is the only independent global body capable of asserting and giving force to the rule of law in today's international community. Our faith that peace and justice will prevail throughout the world under a new international order was bolstered when countries put aside their

differences and joined the UN action in a coalition.

Members of this body will of course recall that the Republic of Korea was able to survive and preserve its integrity thanks to the very first collective security action on the part of the United Nations. Now as a member, we will participate more actively in all UN endeavors toward the peaceful settlement of disputes as well as the enforcement of international justice.

Peace can be built only when a common conviction prevails that nations do not threaten each other and that we may in fact live in tranquility. We shall never win faith in peace so long as we let our safety hinge on the might of formidable weapons that can reduce this world to ashes in an instant.

Confrontations that brought about the "balance of terror" have now disappeared.

We welcome the signing in July of the START treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union. We hope that it will accelerate arms control negotiations around the world.

The Republic of Korea fully supports a complete elimination of all chemical weapons, and will readily join an international convention as soon as it emerges.

In this connection, I believe that the countries of Northeast Asia should now take a fresh look at, and approaches toward, the questions of tension reduction and arms control in this region.

Mr. President,

It is said that peace is more than the absence of war. To ensure real and lasting peace, we must remove the underlying sources of conflict.

Just as the world is passing beyond ideological divisiveness, we must remove all barriers of discrimination; race, color, religion, national origin.

I therefore welcome the positive efforts in South Africa to build a united, democratic and discrimination-free society.

Mr. President,

The Independent Commission on International Development Issues concluded in its final report that where poverty reigns there can

be no peace.

Because the Korean people underwent similar experiences, we feel compassion toward the poverty-stricken countries and have a deep understanding of the problems they are presently facing; poverty, hunger, underdevelopment, foreign debts.

Since the Republic of Korea made the transition from an underdeveloped to newly industrializing country within the span of one generation, we may have become a model for those developing countries, with a message that they, too, can succeed given time and national resolve.

Thirty years ago, my country was a poor agrarian society with a per capita GNP of under \$100. Today, Korea has become a country with the 13th largest trade volume and 15th largest GNP in the world. Korea's rapid development is due largely to the advantages of free market economics and the openness of democratic societies.

The vast global market served as the seedbed of development for an industrious people and innovative businesses. The Korean people have continued their efforts for further progress. Many countries around the world as well as the United Nations itself rendered assistance in the process of Korea's development, and became our partners for common prosperity.

Today, the Republic of Korea lies at a midway stage between the advanced and the developing countries. As such, we hope to return the benefits we received from around the world by playing an active role in solving the global North-South problem. In addition to sharing our experience and knowhow with the developing countries, we seek to play the role of a bridge between the advanced and the developing world by promoting global exchanges and cooperation and by facilitating the flow of commodities, capital and information.

The advanced countries should actively extend assistance to the developing countries with a view to mitigating the latter's difficulties.

These measures by themselves cannot fundamentally solve the North-South problem, and so we encourage the advanced countries to move forward with the horizontal specialization of industries among

nations by speeding up the process of readjusting their domestic industrial structures. In addition, they should refrain from monopolizing information and technology.

In order to assist the economic growth of the developing countries, global markets should be opened wider and the expansion of trade should be encouraged. Tendencies toward protectionism and mutually exclusive regional economic blocs should be discouraged.

The international community should adopt a more positive posture toward the solution of these critical problems within the framework of the United Nations system. In addition, we should jointly meet such new and serious global challenges as drug trafficking, terrorism and environmental damage.

Mr. President,

A new century is almost upon us. The Twentieth Century has seen a great number of achievements, certainly much more than was achieved in previous millennia. At the same time, however, this century has also been a period of unspeakable trials and tribulations brought on by wars, confrontations, inequities, and irrationality.

With the Twenty-first Century near at hand, the human race is embarking on a new era of peace and reason. The irresistible waves of history today are those propelled by freedom, democracy, and respect for human dignity and individual values.

A new era is upon us in which mutual respect prevails among nations and where conflicts are resolved by peaceful means. Revolutionary advancements in science and technology, particularly in the fields of transportation, information and communication, have transformed the world into a global village in which mankind can pursue common prosperity as neighbors.

Ever since the beginning of history, the human race has aspired for a realization of a "peaceful community" on this turbulent planet. That aspiration is no longer a dream but a realistic goal that we can attain. As partners for peace and common prosperity, all the nations on earth should now open their societies and broaden the avenues of exchange and cooperation to build this peaceful community.

As the pivotal organization for world peace, I believe the United Nations is fully capable of fulfilling this historic task by faithfully carrying out the letter and spirit of the Charter.

As a full-fledged member of this world body, the Republic of Korea now proudly joins the world of nations in our common task of realizing the long-held dreams of all mankind.

We may ask for your help and understanding with our own problems, but we also care deeply for the welfare of other peoples.

We renew our commitment to the United Nations and will march forward hand in hand with all nations in the cause of this Organization.

Henceforth, the Republic of Korea will play a leading role in building a world that will be a blessing to our prosperity — a world that will be freer, safer and happier; above all, a world of peace.

Thank you.

2. A Chronology of Major Events Related to the South-North Dialogue (September 1990-November 1991)

«1990»

September 4-7—The first South-North high-level meeting held in Seoul.

September 11—Yun Ki-bok, chairman of the North's preparatory committee for a pan-national conference, attempts to send a telephone message addressed to the South's headquarter for the promotion of a pan-national conference.

September 12—The Republic of Korea National Red Cross (ROKNRC) President refuses to receive the North Korean message signed by Yun Ki-bok.

September 13—Yi Song-ho, Acting Chairman of the North Korean Red Cross (NKRC), sends a consolation message to the South in

connection with flooding.

- September 13—The ROKNRC President sends a telephone message to the North, proposing the eighth South-North Red Cross working-level meeting to discuss the second exchange of hometown visitors, etc.
- September 17—Yi Song-ho, Acting NKRC Chairman, sends a telephone message to the South, informing the South they would send a reply at an appropriate time to the South's call for the resumption of the stalled Red Cross talks.
- September 18—The first South-North working-level delegates' meeting to discuss the issue of entry into the United Nations held at the conference room of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission at Panmunjom.
- September 19—The Chairman of the North's preparatory committee for a "Pan-national Unification Music Concert" sends a letter to the Federation of Korean National Artists in connection with the invitation to the concert slated for October 18 in Pyongyang.
- September 19—The ROKNRC President again calls for holding the eighth South-North working-level delegates' meeting as soon as possible.
- September 21—The Spokesman of the North's delegation to the South-North high-level meeting expresses regret over the South's plan to join the United Nations alone.
- September 30—The Republic of Korea and the Soviet Union establish ambassadorial diplomatic relations.
—The Foreign Ministers of the two countries sign a normalization agreement at the United Nations.
- October 5—The second working-level delegates' meeting to discuss the issue of entry into the United Nations held at the conference room of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission at Panmunjom.
- October 9—A South's soccer team enters the North via Beijing to take part in an inter-Korean unification soccer match. Period of stay in North Korea — October 9-13.

- October 12—A liaison officers' meeting to discuss the schedules for the second South-North high-level meeting held at the Peace House, Panmunjom.
- October 14—Seventeen participants to the Pan-national Unification Concert enter the North via Panmunjom. Period of stay in the North — October 14-24.
- October 16-19—The second South-North high-level meeting takes place in Pyongyang.
- October 20—The 84th Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) meeting held in Uruguay on October 15-20 decides to hold the next IPU meeting in Pyongyang.
- October 21—A North's soccer delegation enters Seoul via Panmunjom to take part in a South-North unification soccer match in Seoul on October 23. Period of stay in the South — October 21-25.
- November 5—The ROKNRC President sends a telephone message to the North, counterproposing the time of the eighth South-North working-level delegates' meeting.
- November 8—The National Unification Board authorizes a plan for the Seoul Traditional Music Concert (representative: Hwang Byong-ki) to contact North Koreans over an invitation of the North Korean musicians to the '90 Year-End Unification Traditional Music Concert slated for December 8-13.
- November 8—The eighth South-North Red Cross working-level delegates' meeting held at the conference room of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission at Panmunjom.
- November 9—The third working-level delegates' meeting to discuss the issue of entry into the United Nations held at the conference room of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission at Panmunjom.
- November 12—Yon Hyong-muk, the North's Administration Council Prime Minister, sends a telephone message to the South, proposing a preliminary meeting to prepare for the third South-North high-level meeting be held on November 16.

- November 13—A contact between the liaison officers for the South-North high-level meeting held at Tongil-gak, Panmunjom, to listen to the North's opinions.
- November 17—Liaison officers for the South-North high-level meeting, in their meeting at the Peace House, agree to hold working-level delegates' meetings.
- November 21—The first working-level delegates' meeting to prepare for the third South-North high-level meeting takes place at Tongil-gak, Panmunjom.
- November 27—The second working-level delegates contact to prepare for the third South-North high-level meeting takes place at the Peace House, Panmunjom.
- November 29—The first South-North sports meeting on the issues of inter-Korean sports exchanges and fielding single inter-Korean teams to major international sports events held at Tongil-gak, Panmunjom.
- December 1—The third working-level delegates' meeting to prepare for the third South-North high-level meeting held at Tongil-gak, Panmunjom.
- December 5—Liaison officers from both sides have a meeting at Tongil-gak, Panmunjom to discuss the itineraries for the North's delegation to the third high-level meeting in the South.
- December 7—Liaison officers have a contact at the Peace House, Panmunjom and agree on the itineraries for the North's delegation to the third high-level meeting in Seoul.
- December 8-13—Thirty-three North Korean musicians participating in the '90 Year-End Unification Traditional Music Concert enter Seoul via Panmunjom on December 8 and hold joint performances.
- December 10—North Korea sends a telephone message to the South to propose that the second South-North sports meeting be held on December 20.
- December 11-14—The third South-North high-level meeting takes place in Seoul.

- December 13-17—President Roh Tae-woo visits the Soviet Union.
 December 18—The South sends a telephone message to the North to counterpropose the time of the second South-North sports meeting.

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- January 1—The North's Kim Il-sung, in his New Year's message, calls for a political conference for national unification.
 January 8—Yon Hyong-muk, the North's Administration Council Prime Minister, sends a telephone message to the South in connection with a letter from the "joint conference" of the government, political parties and social organizations of the North.
 January 9—Prime Minister Ro Jai-bong of the South sends a telephone message to the North, informing them that the South would not receive the letter from the "joint conference."
 January 15—The second South-North sports meeting takes place at the Peace House, Panmunjom.
 January 30—The permanent Korean Trade Mission opens in Beijing.
 —The third South-North sports meeting held at Tongil-gak, Panmunjom.
 February 8—Park Jun-kyu, Speaker of the National Assembly, sends a message to the chairman of the Standing Committee, Supreme People's Assembly, requesting that South Korean delegates be allowed to attend the Pyongyang IPU meeting.
 February 8—The North's Workers' (Communist) Party, Social Democratic Party and Chondokyo-chongwu Party send letters to the Party for Peace and Democracy, Democratic Party and the Minjung (Masses) Party of the South.
 February 11—The South's liaison officer for the South-North high-level meeting sends a telephone message to the North to propose that a liaison officers' meeting be held on February 18 to prepare for the fourth high-level meeting.
 February 12—Fourth South-North sports meeting held at the Peace House, Panmunjom.

- The two sides agree on the formation of single inter-Korean delegations to the 41st World Table Tennis Championships and the Sixth World Junior Soccer Games.
- February 14—The North Korean liaison officer for the South-North high-level meeting sends a telephone message to the South to announce the indefinite postponement of the liaison officers meeting.
- February 18—The North's delegation to the South-North high-level meeting announces the indefinite postponement of the fourth South-North high-level meeting.
- February 18—The Spokesman of the National Unification Board issues a statement urging the North to hold the fourth South-North high-level meeting as scheduled.
- March 25-May 9—A single inter-Korean delegation participates in the 41st World Table Tennis Championships.
- April 8—Prime Minister Ro Jai-bong sends a telephone message to the North calling for holding the fourth South-North high-level meeting soon.
- April 10—An Byong-su, Spokesman of the North's delegation to the South-North high-level meeting, in a press conference, sets forth preconditions for holding the fourth high-level meeting.
- April 11—The spokesman of the National Unification Board releases a comment in connection with An Byong-su's press conference. —The spokesman urges the North to return to the table of high-level talks promptly without any preconditions.
- May 6-June 28—A single inter-Korean delegation formed and participates in the Sixth World Junior Soccer Games.
- May 27—The North Korean Foreign Ministry announces its decision to join the United Nations.
- June 26—The Spokesman of the North's delegation to the South-North high-level meeting issues a statement to denounce the instructions of President Roh Tae-woo at a unification-related ministers' meeting to study the "case of German unification."
- July 6—President Roh, during a stopover in Vancouver, instructs the

- administration to stage joint inter-Korean ceremonies to commemorate the Liberation Day of August 15.
- July 11—Yon Hyong-muk, the North's Administration Council Prime Minister, sends a telephone message to the South, now proposing to hold the fourth South-North high-level meeting on August 27-30.
- July 12—President Roh addresses the opening ceremony of the Advisory Council on Democracy and Peaceful Unification meeting.
- July 13—Prime Minister Chung Won-shik sends a telephone message to the North, notifying an acceptance of the North's proposal to hold the fourth high-level meeting. Prime Minister Chung also suggested the holding of liaison officers meetings.
- July 15—Deputy Prime Minister and National Unification Minister Choi Ho-joong issues a statement to promote the "Grand March for Unification."
- July 19—Liaison officers for the high-level meeting meet at Tongil-gak, Panmunjom.
- July 23—Chang Chung-shik, the South's senior delegate to the South-North sports talks, sends a telephone message to the North to propose that a South-North sports meeting be held on August 6.
- July 25—The North's "Democratic Front for Unification of the Fatherland" issues a statement to denounce the South in connection with a pan-national conference.
- July 29—Liaison officers for the South-North high-level meeting meet at the Peace House, Panmunjom.
- July 30—The North Korean Foreign Ministry issues a statement proposing the adoption of a joint declaration on non-nuclearization of the Korean peninsula.
- July 31—North Korea counterproposes the South-North sports meeting on August 17.
- August 1—The South notifies the North of the list of its two delegates to the working-level delegates' meeting for the South-North high-level meeting.
- Delegates: Song Han-ho, Vice Minister, National Unification

Board; Im Dong-won, Director, Foreign Service and National Security Institute.

August 2—The North notifies the South of the list of its two delegates to the working-level delegates' meeting.

—Delegates: Paek Nam-jun, Director, Secretariat, Committee for Peaceful Unification of the Fatherland; Choe Wu-jin, Ambassador at large, Foreign Ministry.

August 5—The first working-level delegates' meeting to prepare for the fourth South-North high-level meeting held at the Peace House, Panmunjom.

August 7—Chang Chung-shik, chief delegate to the South-North sports talks, agrees to the North's counterproposal for a sports meeting on August 17.

August 10—The second working-level delegates' meeting to prepare for the fourth high-level meeting held at Tongil-gak, Panmunjom.

August 12—Kang Young-hoon, ROKNRC President, issues a statement on the 20th anniversary of the South's proposal for the South-North Red Cross talks.

August 12—North Korea informs the South that it would indefinitely postpone the South-North sports meeting using of the defection of judoist Yi Chang-soo to the South as an excuse.

August 16—The third working-level delegates' meeting to prepare for the fourth South-North high-level meeting held at the Peace House, Panmunjom.

August 17—The list of seven South Korean delegates to the fourth South-North high-level meeting notified to North Korea.

—Chief delegate: Chung Won-shik, Prime Minister

—Delegates: Kim Chong-whi, Presidential Assistant for foreign policy and national security; Song Eung-sop, First Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Ministry of National Defense; Song Han-ho, Vice Minister, National Unification Board; Kang Hyon-wuk, Vice Minister, Economic Planning Board; Im Dong-won, Director, Foreign Policy and National Security Institute; Lee

- Dong-bok, Special Assistant to the Prime Minister.
- August 20—Liaison officers meet at Tongil-gak, Panmunjom.
—North Korea demands the change of place for the fourth high-level meeting from Pyongyang to Panmunjom using the outbreak of cholera in the South as an excuse.
- August 21—Liaison officers meet at the Peace House, Panmunjom.
- August 22—Liaison officers meet at Tongil-gak, Panmunjom.
- August 23—Liaison officers meet at the Peace House, Panmunjom.
—The two sides agree to hold the fourth South-North high-level meeting in Pyongyang on October 22-25.
- September 7-12—A South Korean delegation headed by the Vice Foreign Minister enters Pyongyang by way of China and attends a Group 77 Asian regional ministerial meeting there.
- September 17—South and North Korea join the United Nations.
- September 20—Kang Young-hoon, ROKNRC President, sends a telephone message to the North, calling for the resumption of the Red Cross talks.
- September 24—President Roh Tae-woo addresses the United Nations General Assembly.
- October 2—Yon Hyong-muk, the North's Administration Council Prime Minister, addresses the U.N. General Assembly.
- October 4-13—Kim Il-sung visits China.
- October 14—Liaison officers meet at Tongil-gak, Panmunjom, to discuss the itinerary of the southern delegation to the fourth high-level meeting.
- October 14—Kim Chong-yol, president of the Republic of Korea Olympic Committee, sends a telephone message to the North, proposing to hold the fifth South-North sports meeting as planned.
- October 17—Liaison officers meet for the fourth high-level meeting at the Peace House, Panmunjom.
- October 22-25—The fourth South-North high-level meeting held in Pyongyang.
- October 30—Kim Yu-sun, President of the North Korean Olympic

Committee, sends a telephone message to the South, refusing to hold the fifth South-North sports meeting.

November 8—President Roh Tae-woo announces “Declaration for Non-Nuclearization and Consolidation of Peace on the Korean Peninsula.”

November 9—South and North Korean women delegates meet at the conference room of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission at Panmunjom in connection with a Seoul seminar on “Asian Peace and Women’s Role.”

November 11—The first delegates’ meeting for the South-North high-level meeting at Tongil-gak, Panmunjom.

November 15—The second delegates’ meeting for the South-North high-level meeting held at the Peace House, Panmunjom.

November 20—The third delegates meeting for the South-North high-level meeting held at Tongil-gak, Panmunjom.

SOUTH-NORTH DIALOGUE IN KOREA



No. 54
May
1992

SOUTH-NORTH DIALOGUE IN KOREA

Published by

***Office of the South-North Dialogue,
National Unification Board***

C.P.O. Box 4161

Seoul, Korea

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Part I

Fifth South-North High-Level Meeting

1. Delegates Contacts to Prepare for Fifth High-Level Meeting

A series of South-North delegates contacts were held at Panmunjom to adjust the contents of an inter-Korean agreement to be adopted at the fifth South-North high-level meeting. The contacts were based on an accord contained in the joint announcement issued at the end of the fourth high-level meeting held in Pyongyang October 22-25, 1991.

With regard to the time of the Panmunjom delegates contacts, North Korea's Administration Council Premier Yon Hyong-muk, in a telephone message to Prime Minister Chung Won-shik on November 5, 1991, proposed that the first delegates contact, tentatively scheduled for November 7 at the fourth Pyongyang meeting, be postponed until November 11. Yon argued in the message that in a circumstance under which Toksuri military training was conducted in the South, the atmosphere was not ripe for the Panmunjom delegates contact.

In response, Prime Minister Chung, in a telephone message to the North on November 7, stressed it was incomprehensible for the North to link the '91 Toksuri training to the time of the delegates contact. Chung said that the Toksuri training was a small-scale defensive training against an irregular warfare which, he said, had been held openly for 30 years. He said that, therefore, there was nothing to dispute about the training.

However, in the expectation that the delegates contact would lay a substantial and productive base for a draft agreement, the South accepted the North's offer of November 11 as the date of the first contact. The South then notified the North of the list of the southern delegates to the first contact.

The two sides' delegates to the first delegates contact were :

The South :

Song Han-ho, vice minister, National Unification Board

Lim Dong-won, director, Foreign Policy and National
Security Institute

Lee Dong-bok, special assistant to the Prime Minister

The North :

Paek Nam-jun, director, Secretariat, Committee for Peaceful
Unification of the Fatherland

Choe Wu-jin, roving ambassador, Foreign Ministry

Kim Yong-chol, deputy bureau director, People's Armed
Forces Ministry

a. First Contact

As the two sides agreed on the name of the proposed basic South-Norht accord, "Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-aggression and Exchanges and Cooperation between the South and the North," and its substantial contents at the fourth high-level meeting, the first delegates contact was held at Tongilkak in the northern sector of Panmunjom on November 11, 1991 to adjust the contents and wording of the single inter-Korean agreement.

The South produced a slightly modified version of the "(draft) Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-aggression and Exchanges and Cooperation between the South and the North," which it first set forth at the fourth meeting. It stressed that the basic items essential to the improvement of South-North relations should be contained in the agreement to be adopted.

The South's version featured the re-itemization of the draft agreement in a way that befits its subtitles like preamble, South-North reconciliation, South-North non-aggression, South-North

exchanges and cooperation, amendment and effectuation.

Also to make it compatible with the provisions of the North's version, the South increased the number of the articles of its draft agreement from 15 to 26, reducing that of the practical measures designed to buttress the three proposed agreements on travel, communications and trade from 10 to five.

The South's version also called for the creation of three subcommittees as consultative bodies under the South-North high-level talks to discuss concrete ways to implement and respect a basic South-North agreement to be adopted. The three bodies suggested here were a South-North political subcommittee, a South-North military subcommittee and a South-North exchanges and cooperation subcommittee.

It also provided for the establishment of five implementation organizations of an executive nature—permanent liaison missions, a South-North military commission, a South-North travel commission, a South-North communications commission, and a South-North trade and economic cooperation commission.

In addition, the South, in a bid to promote an arms reduction, proposed the inclusion in a basic accord of the priority elimination of surprise attack potentials including such mass-destruction arsenals as nuclear, chemical and biological weapons.

In the keynote speech, the South urged the North to unconditionally accept international inspection of their nuclear facilities and materials, and to take measures to reciprocate President Roh Tae-woo's November 8 declaration of a nuclear-free Korean peninsula.

Meanwhile, North Korea produced their comprehensive version of an agreement without any change, which they first offered at the fourth high-level meeting, sticking to their previous position that a rather declarative agreement be prepared with those items that appear in the two sides' versions in common.

The North then showed a negative response to those substantial issues on which the two sides fundamentally differed. The issues included those of opening the press to each other, change of the truce system into an inter-Korean peace mechanism, creation of permanent liaison missions, measures to guarantee the implementation of non-aggression, establishment of travel, communications and economic exchanges and cooperation committees, and relations of the proposed basic agreement with the treaties existing in the two sides.

In the end, the two sides, at the first delegates contact, laid down their respective versions of the proposed agreement prepared under a form agreed on at the fourth meeting, and ascertained their item-by-item differences in the course of debate on the versions. The South and the North decided to make necessary adjustment to the contents of the two versions at the next contact.

b. Second Contact

The second delegates contact was held at Peace House in the southern sector of Panmunjom on November 15.

Commenting on the South's version laid down at the first contact, North Korea denounced "as being split-oriented" the provisions of Article 1 providing for the recognition of the reality of inter-Korean relations and those of Article 9 on the creation of permanent liaison missions.

They also claimed that such detailed matters as the provisions of Article 14 on confidence building in the military area didn't need to be included in the proposed agreement since they have to be discussed concretely at a military subcommittee in the future.

Moreover, they argued that Article 17 calling for the change of the armistice system into a peace mechanism would only pose

an obstacle to the adoption of a single agreement, while asserting the clause of Article 24 regulating the relations of the proposed agreement with the existing treaties of the two sides stemmed from an attempt to place treaties with foreign countries above the proposed inter-Korean agreement.

The North further rejected the inclusion of a clause about opening of newspapers and radio and television programs to each other in the sector of political “reconciliation,” asserting that the clause carried a scheme to achieve unification through the absorption of the North into the South.

They then produced a modified draft version prepared by partially revising some inessential parts of the draft they first set forth at the first contact.

The revised parts included the addition of a new article on “mutual cooperation in international arenas” in the sector of “reconciliation,” a call for the creation of “subcommittees” within the frame of the high-level meeting within one month of the effectuation of the agreement, a clause about the creation of a “military subcommittee” as suggested by the South and the deletion of the provision calling for taking “steps externally to respect non-aggression.”

At the second contact, the two sides tried to reach a compromise over the two versions both sides laid down at the first contact.

The South again emphasized that substantial matters that can serve as a base for improving inter-Korean relations and promoting peace and unification should be included in the sector of “South-North reconciliation” by all means. The South said that without reconciliation no workable non-aggression nor any smooth exchanges and cooperation can ever be expected.

The South’s delegation maintained that therefore Article 5 on the mutual opening of the press, Article 6 on the resolution of the dispersed family issue, Article 7 on the change of the armis-

tice system into a peace mechanism, and Article 8 on cooperation at international scenes, ought to be categorized into the sector of “South-North reconciliation” because they are not limited only to the issues of mere exchanges, cooperation and non-aggression, but are essential and fundamental clauses needed in speeding up inter-Korean reconciliation.

The South pointed out that if the two sides agreed on a mere declarative agreement lacking any essential and fundamental clauses required for the realization of reconciliation, non-aggression, exchanges and cooperation, then improved inter-Korean relations cannot be guaranteed and the relations of distrust and confrontation will continue.

Even at the second contact, the South and the North failed to narrow their difference over the substantial clauses of the proposed agreement.

c. Third Contact

The third delegates contact was held at Tongilkak in the northern sector of Panmunjom on November 20. At the contact, the South, in a forward-looking posture, offered a revised version of the proposed agreement in consideration of the North’s position.

Firstly the South deleted from a preamble the part that “the two sides note that they, as United Nations member nations, have accepted all the obligations prescribed in the United Nations Charter,” and prefixed the phrase “being not relations between a country and a country,” as the North maintained, to a clause regulating the nature of inter-Korean relations as “special relations formed tentatively in the course of pursuing unification.”

In addition, the South deleted the phrase “on the basis of recognizing the reality of inter-Korean relations” in Article 1 and instead used in its place the clause “the South and the North

shall mutually respect the system of each other.” The South also re-categorized the clause of mutual opening of press and publications into the area of “exchanges and cooperation” instead of that of “reconciliation,” and deleted the words “between authorities” from the provisions of peaceful resolution of disputes. In this way, the South exerted positive efforts to resolve the issue of a proposed agreement.

In particular, the South urged the North to positively respond to the ideas of creating permanent liaison missions and joint committees on travel, communications and trade. It noted that the North’s passive posture toward major issues over which the two sides show a fundamental difference, tends to make objective watchers doubt whether the North really has any intent to respect the proposed agreement.

Meanwhile, the North offered to replace the phrase of Article 1 of their version, “...shall recognize and respect each other’s ideology and system,” with “...shall recognize and respect the system that exists in each other’s area.”

As to the question of changing the truce system into a peace mechanism, the North offered to revise the clause “the North and the South shall jointly endeavor to transform the armistice into a durable peace” and put the clause into the area of “non-aggression.” They further argued that the phrase about the guarantee of the implementation of non-aggression should be “...in order to firmly ensure non-aggression, the North and the South shall suspend arms race and shall realize arms reduction simultaneously with the promotion of confidence building in the military area.”

In connection with the issue of dispersed families, the North adjusted a relevant clause to make it read, “The North and the South shall realize mutual cooperation and exchanges in the humanitarian area, and shall take measures to realize free travels, meeting, exchange of letters and reunion between dispersed fami-

lies of their own free will.”

However, the North said they couldn't accept the idea of mutual opening of television programs and publications, and maintained the issue of creating permanent liaison missions was not necessary because the idea was based on the “recognition of two states.” They further said the provisions governing the relations of the proposed agreement with the existing treaties in the two sides were not needed because the clauses were intended to “place the relations with other countries above national interests.”

On the proposed creation of three committees on travel, communications and trade, the North asserted that the three committees, along with implementation bodies in other areas like military, science and technology, could be established in the stage of concrete implementation after the creation of three subcommittees they proposed.

At the third contact, the two sides continued to differ on such basic matters as the issues of guaranteeing the implementation of non-aggression, forging a peace mechanism, and governing relations between the proposed agreement and their existing treaties. However, the two sides neared a substantial accord in other issues.

d. Fourth Contact

The fourth delegates contact designed to adjust the contents and wording of the proposed basic agreement was held at Peace House in the southern sector of Panmunjom on November 26.

At the contact, the South newly laid down a forward-oriented draft agreement that substantially took into account the position and demand of the North.

Firstly, the South re-categorized the clause of the dispersed family issue into the area of exchanges and cooperation instead

of the area of reconciliation as in the past, deleted the words “without any conditions,” and added the phrase “...shall take steps on the issue of resolving other humanitarian problems.”

In addition, the South integrated the independent clause of “opening and exchange of press and publications” into the clause “...shall implement mutual exchanges and cooperation in many areas.”

And, taking into account the North’s contention that the “permanent liaison missions” reminded them of missions of a German style, the South offered to change their name into “permanent liaison offices.” The South also modified the clause of “transformation of an armistice system into a peace mechanism” to make them read “state of armistice” and “state of peace” instead of “armistice system” and “peace mechanism.”

The clause of “guarantee of travel, communications, trade and economic cooperation” was changed to “...the South and the North shall guarantee free travels and contacts between their people,” while the two separate clauses of “promotion of material exchanges” and “implementation of economic cooperation programs” was integrated into a single clause.

The word “trade” was changed to “economic exchanges” in consideration of the North’s assertion that the word “trade” gave the impression of inter-country dealing. The name of a proposed “South-North trade and economic cooperation commission” was changed to “South-North economic exchanges and cooperation commission.”

While explaining its position again on those major issues on which the two sides showed a fundamental difference, the South emphasized the question of “transforming the state of armistice into that of peace” should be classified as part of the area of reconciliation with the specific description that the issue should be discussed and resolved between the South and the North, and

that “the two sides should continue to respect the Military Armistice Agreement.”

With respect to the issue of taking “measures to ensure the implementation of non-aggression,” the South maintained that since any immediate and package arms reduction is unrealistic and infeasible in view of the high barrier of distrust existing between the South and the North, steps to promote confidence building should be taken by all means in order to facilitate arms reduction. The South said that clauses calling for the least necessary devices to ensure the efficacy of the proposed agreement, that is organizations to facilitate travel, communications and economic exchanges and cooperation, should be specified in the agreement.

In the meantime, the North argued that various provisions designed to ensure the efficacy of a basic agreement were too concrete to be included in the agreement, and should, therefore, be taken up at subcommittees instead. They adhered to their stand that a basic agreement should be prepared with the items that appeared in the two sides’ versions in common and on the basis chiefly of their own version.

On the issue of changing the truce system into a peace mechanism, in particular, the North maintained that the South was not qualified to discuss the issue since the South was not a party to the Armistice Agreement.

But, the South rejected the northern assertion, saying that no resolution of the Korean question can be expected unless there is a change in such a basic thinking on the part of the North Koreans. The southern delegates emphasized that the South and the North are the very subjects of and parties to the task of preserving peace on the Korean peninsula.

North Korea rejected the South’s idea of setting up permanent liaison offices in Seoul and Pyongyang, whose name was changed in deference of the northern position. They then expressed

the view that liaison offices could be set up in their respective areas of Panmunjom.

Through their four delegates contacts at Panmunjom to fix the contents and wording of a basic agreement to be adopted, the two sides could narrow their differences on the preamble and many other articles to a substantial extent.

The areas where the two sides reached a near accord included the respect for each other's system, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, suspension of slander and defamation of each other, stoppage of any subversive schemes against each other, mutual cooperation in international arenas, and the establishment of a South-North political subcommittee in the area of "South-North reconciliation."

In the field of "South-North non-aggression," the two sides almost arrived at an accord on non-use of force of arms against each other, peaceful resolution of disputes, installing of a hotline between the top military authorities, and the establishment of a South-North military subcommittee.

In the area of "South-North exchanges and cooperation," the South and the North neared an agreement on mutual exchanges and cooperation in many areas, resolution of the dispersed family issue, opening of land, sea and air routes, exchange of postal matters and tele-communications, implementation of economic exchanges and cooperation, and the establishment of a South-North exchanges and cooperation subcommittee.

But, despite the South's positive efforts made at the four delegates contacts to iron out mutual differences on a basic agreement to be adopted, the two sides failed to narrow their different views on a set of major questions such as transforming the armistice system into a peace mechanism, the method of resolving disputes peacefully, measures to ensure the implementation of non-aggression, establishment of implementation bodies for the trans-

lation of basic agreement into action, opening of newspapers and television programs and other exchanges, and the relations of a basic agreement with the existing treaties in the two sides.

Consequently, the two sides had no choice but to have the fifth South-North high-level meeting without winding up the adjustment of the contents and wording of a proposed agreement through the delegates contacts.

2. Proceeding of Fifth High-Level Meeting

a. Responsible Liaison Officials Contacts

In a telephone message signed by the responsible liaison official of the southern delegation to the South-North high-level meeting, the South proposed to the North on November 30, 1991 that a responsible liaison officials contact be held between the two sides at Tongilkak in the northern sector of Panmunjom on December 2 to discuss itineraries of the northern delegation and other matters related to the fifth South-North high-level meeting set to be held in Seoul beginning December 10.

North Korea agreed to the suggestion and the stage was thus set for two responsible liaison officials contacts between the South and the North.

The first contact lasted for about 40 minutes at Tongilkak in the northern sector of Panmunjom from 3 p.m. December 2.

At the contact, the two sides discussed the itineraries of the North Korean delegation to visit Seoul and agreed to follow past practices with regard to various working-level issues such as the procedure of conference proceeding.

The second contact was held for about one hour beginning 3 p.m. December 5 at Peace House in the southern sector of Pan-

munjom.

At the contact, the two sides exchanged the list of the North Korean delegation comprising seven delegates, 33 support personnel and 50 press members and the South's memorandum guaranteeing the personal safety of the North Koreans during their stay in the South.

The two sides agreed on the lodging and itineraries of the northern delegation and the site of the meeting as follows:

- Period of North Korean delegation's visit to the South:
December 10–13, 1991
- Lodging and conference site: Sheraton Walker-Hill Hotel in Seoul
- Itineraries of the northern delegation:
 - December 10, Tuesday
 - 10 : 00–Passage through Panmunjom
 - 12 : 30–Arrival in Seoul (hotel)
 - 16 : 00–Advance observation of conference site
 - 19 : 00–Dinner hosted by the Prime Minister at Hotel Shilla
 - December 11, Wednesday
 - 10 : 00–First-day session (open to the public)
 - 14 : 30–Visit to Seoul Tower at Namsan Hill, Lotte World at Chamshil, etc.
 - 16 : 30–Viewing of art performance at National Theater
 - December 12, Thursday
 - 10 : 00–Second-day session (behind the closed doors)
 - 14 : 00–Visit to Samsung Electronics Co. plant
 - 19 : 00–Dinner hosted by National Assembly speaker at Hyatte Hotel
 - December 13, Friday
 - 09 : 00–Departure from the hotel
 - 11 : 00–Passage through Panmunjom

b. Overview of Conference Proceeding

The fifth South-North high-level meeting was held in Seoul for four days from December 10 through 13, 1991.

An Byong-su, spokesman for the North Korean delegation to the South-North high-level meeting, said in an arrival statement upon his delegation's arrival in Seoul that the fifth meeting would be highly significant as it would serve as a yardstick determining the future of the high-level meeting.

Expressing the hope that an "agreement on reconciliation, non-aggression and exchanges and cooperation between the South and the North" which had been discussed between the two sides, would be finally reached and initialed at the Seoul meeting, An said his delegation hoped to discuss a fair and just means of resolving the nuclear issue of the Korean peninsula in a way that serves national interests.

Later in the day, the North Korean delegates made an advance observation of the conference site. In the evening, they attended a dinner hosted by Prime Minister Chung Won-shik at Hotel Shilla.

In his dinner speech, Prime Minister Chung stressed that national efforts to fill up the crack of division have to be made expeditiously without any momentary falter.

"At this fifth high-level meeting, national will and wishes should be able to be put to the bowl of an 'Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression and Exchanges and Cooperation' based on the achievement made at the fourth meeting so as to lay a groundwork for the charter of unification," Chung said.

He stressed that to this end, the proposed agreement should contain substantial matters rather than being a mere declarative one.

Prime Minister Chung also said that by doing all they could

to make the fifth meeting highly fruitful, the two sides should be able to give a news of hope to the people, a news that a great work has finally been launched in earnest to change the age of frictions into an age of reconciliation, the age of confrontation into an age of cooperation, and an age of division into an age of unification.

The North's Administration Council Premier Yon Hyong-muk, in his dinner speech, emphasized that "the most pressing task facing us now is the question of peace." He noted in this connection that the North had proposed a Declaration of Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and a non-aggression agreement.

Yon maintained that for the North to be able to sign a nuclear safeguards agreement, the beginning of the withdrawal of American nuclear weapons from South Korean should be affirmed first. He added that the Team Spirit military exercise only serves to strain the situation and, therefore, cannot be justified in any way.

Premier Yon said that at the fifth meeting "the two sides should exhibit the good virtue of compromissary spirit so as to adopt a historical document in the interests of national peace and reconciliation."

At the first-day session held on the morning of December 11, the two chief delegates delivered keynote speeches.

In his speech, the South's Prime Minister Chung evaluated the performance of the four delegates contacts designed to adjust the contents and wording of the proposed basic agreement, and urged the North to recognize the principle of resolution of problems between the direct parties, the South and the North, and agree to establishing an institutional mechanism to ensure the implementation of the agreement to be adopted.

He also explained the South's position on the major issues

over which the two sides showed wide difference. He then newly set forth a “(draft) Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression and Exchanges and Cooperation between the South and the North” which consisted of a preamble and 28 articles and which was prepared by adjusting the previous version of the South in consideration of the North’s views displayed at the delegates contacts.

Reminding the North of President Roh Tae-woo’s November 8 “Declaration of Non-nuclear Korean Peninsula and Peace Initiatives” intended to resolve the nuclear issue of the Korean peninsula on the South’s initiative, the prime minister strongly called upon the North to take corresponding measures to reciprocate it.

In this connection, the South proposed as an emergency offer a “Joint Declaration of Denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, etc.” composed of a preamble and five articles.

The South also proposed that after an agreement was reached on the discard of nuclear reprocessing facilities between the two sides, the South and the North conduct simultaneous inspections of those nuclear facilities selected by each other.

The North’s Premier Yon Hyong-muk, in his keynote speech, tried to shift the blame for the failure of the four delegates contacts to hammer out a proposed agreement to the southern side, asserting that the failure was due to the South’s obstinacy. He charged the South with driving the situation to a further tension.

With regard to the nuclear issue, the North again demanded the withdrawal of U.S. military nuclear arms from Korea, and re-introduced a draft declaration of making the Korean peninsula a nuclear-free zone.

Also asserting that the two sides failed to agree on major issues because of their different postures toward the issues of peace

and unification, the North laid down a draft “Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression and Cooperation and Exchanges between the North and the South” consisting of a preamble and 26 articles.

The two sides agreed to have a delegates contact to resolve their difference on major questions at issue. They decided to use the same delegates as those for the past Panmunjom contacts.

The delegates contact lasted from 5 p.m. through 6 : 45 p.m. the same day but failed to completely iron out differences on major issues.

In the meantime, some North Korean press members accompanying their delegation observed subways and the Seoul Tower on the Namsan Hill in the morning. And those North Korean delegates who did not participate in the delegates contact visited the Lotte World at Chamshil and viewed an art performance at the National Theater.

On the morning of December 12, the second-day session was held behind the closed doors as scheduled.

After Prime Minister Chung Won-shik declared the opening of the session, the two sides adjourned the meeting soon after they decided to have another delegates contact to carry on discussion of some major issues which the first contact could not resolve completely a day before.

At the second delegates contact that lasted from 10 : 45 a.m. through 6 p.m. to adjust the contents and wording of a proposed basic agreement, the two sides reached a complete accord on the Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression and Exchanges and Cooperation between the South and the North consisting of a preamble and 25 articles. The South and the North also agreed on a joint announcement featuring a decision to discuss the nuclear issue of the Korean peninsula through delegates contacts at Panmunjom within December.

Those North Korean delegates who did not participate in the delegates contact visited the Samsung Electronics Co.'s Suwon plant in the afternoon and in the evening attended a dinner hosted by National Assembly Speaker Park Jun-kyu.

In his table speech, Speaker Park expressed his feeling that with the complete establishment of a basic South-North agreement, the most emotional and significant day after national liberation would be coming very shortly. He emphasized that both sides should see to it that "this good beginning be made to come to full fruition for a better tomorrow."

The North's Administration Council Premier Yon Hyong-muk, in his dinner speech, observed that the South-North high-level meeting had finally reached a state where an express fruition can be expected. "It really is a matter of rejoice that we have been able to reach an accord at the fifth high-level meeting and to produce before the nation a joint agreement," Yon said.

On December 13, the third-day session was held to adopt and initial the Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression and Exchanges and Cooperation which was agreed on at a delegates contact on the previous day. At the session, a three-point joint announcement was also made, which said, among other things, that the sixth South-North high-level meeting would be held in Pyongyang on February 18-21, 1992.

Closing remarks were then exchanged with the North being the first to make the remarks before the fifth high-level meeting came to a close. Meanwhile, President Roh Tae-woo hosted a luncheon for both sides' delegations on December 13 and the North Korean delegation returned to the North via Panmunjom later in the day.

c. First-Day Session

The first-day session of the fifth South-North high-level meeting was held at the Mukunghwa Hall of the Sheraton Walker-Hill Hotel's Convention Center from 10 a.m. to 12 : 11 p.m. December 11, Wednesday, 1991.

Begun with an opening declaration by Prime Minister Chung Won-shik, the fifth high-level meeting, open to the public, proceeded in the order of chatting and the exchange of keynote speeches. The South's chief delegate was the first to deliver the speech.

65 Prime Minister Chung, in the speech, expressed regret over the failure of the four delegates contacts to iron out difference on major issues and to wind up adjusting the contents and wording of the proposed agreement before the fifth meeting although the contacts registered some significant achievements.

The South pointed out that the failure was due to the fact that North Korea showed the contradictoriness of claiming to respect each other's system on one hand while rejecting, in reality, the principle of resolving problems between the direct parties, the South and the North. It said the North was also to be blamed because they, merely emphasizing the need for the principle and declarative agreements, were not interested in taking practical measures to ensure the implementation of the proposed basic agreement.

The South's prime minister emphasized that now that the North recognized the need of respecting each other's systems and agreed to promote reconciliation, non-aggression, exchanges and cooperation between the two sides of Korea, they should naturally respect the principle of resolving problems between the direct parties, the South and the North of Korea, and should agree to preparing an institutional apparatus to ensue their implementation.

The southern premier said that to make the proposed basic agreement ready to be signed, the major issues over which the two sides differed, must be resolved by all means. He then explained the South's position toward 1) the issue of changing the state of armistice into the state of peace, 2) the issue of how to peacefully resolve disputes, 3) the issue of taking steps to ensure the implementation of non-aggression, 4) the issue of establishing implementation bodies to facilitate the translation of the agreement into action, 5) the issue of mutual opening of newspapers, radio and television programs and publications, 6) the issue of relations between the proposed agreement and the existing treaties in both sides, and 7) the issue of realizing free travels back and forth and contacts between people of various strata.

Here, the South newly offered a draft "Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression and Exchanges and Cooperation between the South and the North" which consisted of a preamble and 28 articles and which was prepared by partially revising a previous version in consideration of the North Korean position expressed at the times of the fourth high-level meeting and the four subsequent delegates contacts.

The revised portions included the one about the exchange of permanent missions, which was changed from "...creation of permanent liaison offices in Seoul and Pyongyang..." to "...the South and the North shall establish permanent liaison offices at Panmunjom and shall positively seek to move them to Seoul and Pyongyang..."

The proposed boundary line of non-aggression was also modified to make it "on land the military demarcation line stipulated in the Military Armistice Agreement, and in sea the areas both sides have had under their respective jurisdiction since the effectuation of the Military Armistice Agreement."

In addition, the seven-point measures to ensure the imple-

mentation of non-aggression was changed into five separate articles on confidence-building in the military area, arms reduction, on-site verification, installing of hotline, and creation and operation of a South-North military commission.

The South, also pointing out that a serious factor of uncertainty threatening the very survival of the nation has been hanging over the nation, said the root cause of the factor stems from the North rejecting international nuclear inspection in its clandestine development of nuclear arms.

Prime Minister Chung stressed that now that North Korea has joined the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), it is an unavoidable and unconditional treaty obligation for the North to sign a nuclear safeguards agreement and accept nuclear inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency.

He said North Korea should reciprocate President Roh Tae-woo's November 8 "Declaration of Nuclear-free Korean Peninsula and Peace Initiatives" which he said was announced in a bid to resolve the nuclear issue of the Korean peninsula on the South's initiatives and bring about a lasting peace on the land.

Moreover, the South pointed out that North Korea should accept nuclear inspection at an early date and give up developing nuclear arms and thereby join in a march toward peace and unification. It then set forth as an emergency proposal a "(draft) Joint Declaration of Non-nuclear Korean Peninsula" consisting of a preamble and five articles. The South made it clear that even U.S. military installations can be subject to simultaneous mutual inspections.

The South proposed that after an agreement was reached on the abandonment of nuclear reprocessing facilities between the two sides of Korea, simultaneous inspections be made of military and civilian facilities of each other's choice as one of the pilot measures to make the Korean peninsula nuclear-free. It said

the sites to be inspected could be the Suncheon airport and Yongbyon nuclear facilities in the North and the Kunsan air base and other military and civilian facilities selected by North Korea.

The South hoped that such pilot inspections could be made before January 31, 1992, suggesting that the contents and method of inspection could be discussed and determined by the experts of the two sides at an early date.

Lastly, the South emphasized that the kind of a basic agreement which could be respected by both sides under all circumstances and which could be used as a milestone in a road toward peaceful unification between the South and the North, should be adopted at the Seoul meeting without fail.

In the meantime, North Korea's Administration Council Premier Yon Hyong-muk, in his keynote speech, tried to shift to the South the blame for the failure of the four Panmunjom delegates contacts to iron out differences on the proposed basic agreement.

He argued that the failure was because of the South's insistence on a series of clauses unacceptable to the North.

While explaining their position toward the major issues over which the two sides substantially differed, Yon claimed that the principal thing needed for the adoption of the agreement is for the South to agree to a non-aggression declaration, effect arms reduction and give up its "split-oriented and alien-dependent" posture.

However, expressing their willingness to compromise over the questions at issue, Yon produced a "(draft) Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression and Exchanges and Cooperation" which consisted of a preamble and 26 articles and which was prepared by partially modifying their draft first set forth during the Panmunjom delegates contacts.

In the area of South-North reconciliation, the North added

a clause, “creation and operation of liaison offices at Panmunjom.” And, at the urging of the South that the sea boundary of non-aggression should be made clear, the North inserted a clause, “the sea areas which the two sides have had under their respective jurisdictional control,” into the area of South-North non-aggression.

In addition, they added the clause of “cooperation and exchanges in the field of publication and press such as newspapers, radio and television programs, and publications” to the provisions of Article 17 in the area of exchanges and cooperation. The North also newly set up the clauses of the establishment of a South-North joint economic cooperation commission and a South-North joint military commission.

They reclassified “free travels back and forth and contacts between people from all walks of life,” originally categorized as one falling under the area of reconciliation, into an item in the sector of exchanges and cooperation .

Meanwhile, with regard to the nuclear issue, North Korea claimed it was not fair to unilaterally demand nuclear inspections of the North only while leaving aside the issue of American nuclear weapons “deployed in the South.” The North reiterated its demand that U.S. military nuclear arms should be the first to be withdrawn from Korea.

In addition, the North said President Roh’s November 9 declaration of nuclear-free Korean peninsula represented a step forward, which it said paved the way to discussions to resolve the nuclear issue. The North then laid down as an emergency issue a “(draft) declaration of non-nuclear Korean peninsula,” which they first set forth at the time of the fourth high-level meeting.

At the same time, the North said they were willing to supplement the contents of the South’s version of “non-nuclear declara-

tion,” suggesting that the contents of the two versions be combined into a joint declaration.

On the other hand, the North again raised issues not related with the meeting. They asserted that the issue of suspending the Team Spirit military exercise should be discussed at a South-North joint military commission to be formed upon the adoption of a basic agreement.

The North further demanded that the Team Spirit exercise be suspended in 1992 and that those arrested for their illegal visits to North Korea be set free before the close of 1991.

As the two sides decided to have a delegates contact to adjust the contents of a proposed agreement, the first delegates contact was held behind the closed doors at the lounge of the southern delegation near the conference site from 5 to 6:45 p.m. December 11.

The contact was attended from the South by Delegates Song Han-ho, Lim Dong-won and Lee Dong-bok, and the northern delegates were Paek Nam-jun, Choe Wu-jin and Kim Yong-chol. The delegates tried to hammer out a compromise plan, but failed to narrow their differences on some controversial issues like the question of taking measures to guarantee the implementation of non-aggression.

Keynote speech of the South

Now allow me to present our draft Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression and Exchanges and Cooperation between the South and the North which has been newly prepared based on the views exchanged between the two sides following the fourth round of our talks:

*Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression and Exchanges
and Cooperation between the South and the North (Draft)*

WHEREAS in keeping with the yearning of the entire people for the peaceful unification of the divided land, the South and the North reaffirm the unification principles enunciated in the July 4 (1972) South-North Joint Communiqué ;

WHEREAS both parties are determined to resolve political and military confrontation and achieve national reconciliation ;

WHEREAS both are resolved to prevent aggression by armed force and armed clashes and to ease tension and ensure peace ;

WHEREAS both desire to promote multi-faceted exchanges and cooperation to advance common national interests and prosperity ;

WHEREAS both recognize that their relations constitute a special provisional relationship geared to unification ; and

WHEREAS both pledge to exert joint efforts to achieve peaceful unification,

THEREFORE, the parties hereto agree as follows :

South-North Reconciliation

Article 1 : The South and the North shall respect each other's political and social system.

Article 2 : Both parties shall not interfere in each other's internal affairs.

Article 3 : Both parties shall not slander and vilify each other.

Article 4 : Both parties shall not attempt in any manner to sabotage and subvert the other.

Article 5 : Both parties shall endeavor to transform the present armistice regime into a firm state of peace between the South and the North and shall abide by the present Military Armistice Agreement (of July 27, 1953) until such time as such a state of peace has hold.

Article 6 : Both parties shall cease confrontation on the international stage and shall cooperate and endeavor together to promote national interests

and esteem.

Article 7: To ensure close consultations and liaison between the South and the North, resident liaison offices shall be established at Panmunjom within two (2) months of the effective date of this Agreement. Both parties shall take active steps to establish similar offices in Seoul and Pyongyang in the future.

Article 8: A South-North Political Subcommittee shall be established within the framework of the Inter-Korean High-Level Talks within one (1) month of the effective date of this Agreement with a view to discussing concrete measures to ensure the implementation and observance of the accords on South-North reconciliation.

South-North Nonaggression

Article 9: Both parties shall not use armed force against each other and shall not make armed aggression against each other.

Article 10: Differences of opinion and disputes arising between the two parties shall be peacefully resolved through dialogue and negotiations pursuant to the terms of the Charter of the United Nations.

Article 11: The South-North demarcation line for nonaggression shall be identical with the Military Demarcation Line specified in the Military Armistice Agreement of July 27, 1953. The nonaggression sea zones shall be identical with the waters that have been under the jurisdiction of each party respectively since the said Military Armistice Agreement entered into force.

Article 12: To firmly ensure nonaggression and help carry out arms reductions, both parties shall take military confidence building measures, including the mutual advance notification of major military exercises and major movements of military units, exchanges of observation teams at military exercises and the peaceful utilization of the Demilitarized Zone.

Article 13: To mutually discourage armed aggression, both parties shall, first of all, eliminate weapons of mass destruction and surprise attack capabilities, shall correct military imbalances between the South and

the North and shall progressively reduce armaments.

Article 14 : To ensure military confidence building and arms reductions, both parties shall exchange military information, shall effect on-the-spot verifications and shall exchange resident monitoring teams.

Article 15 : A telephone hotline shall be installed between the military authorities of both sides to prevent accidental armed clashes and other military emergencies and avoid their escalation.

Article 16 : To enforce the provisions of Articles 12 through 15, both parties shall establish a South-North Military Committee within six (6) months of the effective date of this Agreement.

Article 17 : A South-North Military Subcommittee shall be established within the framework of the Inter-Korean High-Level Talks within one (1) month of the effective date of this Agreement in order to discuss concrete measures to ensure the implementation and observance of accords on South-North nonaggression and also various additional military matters involved in resolving military confrontation.

South-North Exchanges and Cooperation

Article 18 : Both parties shall mutually open access to and exchange radio and television broadcasts and newspapers and publications in general, and shall carry out exchanges and cooperation in various other fields, including education, culture, the arts, religion, health, the environment, sports, science and technology.

Article 19 : Both parties shall promptly permit free correspondence, reunions and visits between family members and other relatives dispersed south and north, shall promote the reconstitution of divided families on their own and shall take measures to resolve other humanitarian issues.

Article 20 : Both parties shall guarantee residents of their respective areas free inter-Korean travel and contacts.

Article 21 : South-North land, sea and air transport routes shall be created and the points of passage designated. In the initial phase, the Seoul-Shinuiju railroad and the Munsan-Kaesong highway shall be reconnected.

Article 22 : Both parties shall establish and link facilities needed for South-North postal and telecommunications services and shall guarantee the confidentiality of inter-Korean mail and telecommunications.

Article 23 : To promote a balanced development of the national economy and the welfare of the entire people, both parties shall carry out trade in goods as a kind of domestic commerce, the joint development of resources, joint investment in industrial projects, joint business enterprises abroad and other forms of economic exchanges and cooperation.

Article 24 : To implement the provisions of Articles 20 through 23, a South-North Travel Committee, a South-North Communications Committee and a South-North Economic Exchanges and Cooperation Committee shall be created within six (6) months of the effective date of this Agreement.

Article 25 : A South-North Exchanges and Cooperation Subcommittee shall be established within the framework of the Inter-Korean High-Level Talks within one (1) month of the effective date of this Agreement with a view to discussing concrete measures to ensure the implementation and observance of the accords on South-North exchanges and cooperation.

Amendments and Effectuation

Article 26 : This Agreement shall not affect bilateral or multilateral treaties and agreements that each party has signed and that are now in force.

Article 27 : This Agreement may be amended by concurrence between both parties.

Article 28 : This Agreement shall enter into force as of the day both parties exchange instruments of ratification following its signing and the subsequent completion of their respective procedures for bringing it into effect.

December 1991

*Chung Won-shik
Prime Minister
Republic of Korea*

*Yon Hyong-muk
Premier
Administration Council
Democratic People's Republic of
Korea*

I have just finished expounding our draft agreement newly revised based on views exchanged between representatives of both sides at Panmunjom. To help you better understand it, I will now explain the newly revised points in our draft.

First, in Article 7, we have changed the original provision calling for the establishment of resident liaison offices in Seoul and Pyongyang. Our new version provides that resident liaison offices shall be established at Panmunjom, with the future establishment of such offices in Seoul and Pyongyang to be actively pursued. This represents a major concession on our part to facilitate accord, as we have accommodated your consistent opposition to such offices in Seoul and Pyongyang and accepted your choice of Panmunjom as the site for them. In line with this, we now propose that resident liaison offices be created within two months of the effective date of the proposed inter-Korean agreement, rather than within six months of that date as originally proposed.

Second, in Article 11 that defines the nonaggression demarcation line, we have deleted the term, "territory," to which you have objected all along. In step with your assertions, our new version calls for using the military demarcation line prescribed in the Military Armistice Agreement for marking land, with the waters that have been under the jurisdiction of each side respectively under the Armistice Agreement serving as the nonaggression sea zones. In that way, we have accepted your proposal to use the South-North demarcation line that is being maintained currently for the nonaggression line. I believe you will have no objection.

Third, on the safeguards for nonaggression prescribed in Articles 12 through 16, we have taken your views into consideration and have eliminated seven detailed items and instead created five independent clauses on military confidence building, arms reductions, on-the-spot verifications, the installation of a telephone hotline, and the establishment of a South-North Military Committee. This is how the number of articles has increased from the 24 in our original draft agreement to 28 in the new version.

As I have just explained, we have made concessions by accepting your proposals regarding three major points. I hope and expect that your

side will affirmatively respond to our new draft agreement.

Even while all nations are now scrapping nuclear weapons with the goal of shaping a nuclear-free world, you are pushing ahead with nuclear weapons development. This runs totally counter to the current of the times and imperils not only the survival of our people but also the peace of Northeast Asia and the world at large.

From that perspective, I strongly urge your side to accept nuclear inspection, give up nuclear weapons development as quickly as possible and join us on a path to peace and unification. Accordingly, I urgently propose the following Joint Declaration for a Non-Nuclear Korean Peninsula :

***Joint Declaration for a Non-Nuclear Korean Peninsula
(Draft)***

The South and the North will strive to create an environment favorable to the peaceful reunification of the homeland and to contribute to peace in Asia and throughout the world by securing a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula and eliminating chemical and biological weapons from our land.

The South and the North will abide by the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and conclude a Nuclear Safeguard Agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency and accept full-scope international inspection of all nuclear-related facilities and materials in their respective areas.

In addition to discharging their existing international obligations, the South and the North declare as follows :

1. The South and the North will use nuclear energy solely for peaceful purposes, and not manufacture, possess, store, deploy or use nuclear weapons.

2. The South and the North will not possess nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment facilities.

3. The South and the North will actively participate in international efforts for total elimination of chemical and biological weapons and abide by international agreements in this area.

4. Separately from IAEA inspection of their nuclear facilities and materials, the South and the North will implement inspections of any military and any civilian facility, material and site in the South and the North, in a manner to be agreed upon by both sides, in order to confirm compliance with the above items. These facilities and sites will be selected by the inspecting side, respectively.

5. The South and the North will discuss and decide on details of the implementation of Item 4 by procedures to be established through agreement between the two sides.

December 1991

Chung Won-shik
Prime Minister
Republic of Korea

Yon Hyong-muk
Premier, Administration Council
Democratic People's
Republic of Korea

The main thrust of the above urgent proposal is that separately from submitting their nuclear facilities and materials to IAEA inspection as an unconditional duty under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, the South and the North should agree to inspections of any military or civilian facility, material and site in each other's area that either party considers necessary to inspect, in a manner to be agreed upon by both sides.

This means that if desired by your side, we are prepared to include U.S. military installations and bases in the South on the list of facilities for inspection so that you can verify whether or not nuclear weapons are deployed here.

In order for the South and the North to agree to our proposal for denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, I believe it imperative to build mutual trust. In this context, I propose that once the South and the North agree to scrap nuclear fuel reprocessing facilities, simultaneous inspections be conducted of military and civilian facilities in both areas that are selected by the other party as a pilot project. We wish to choose Suncheon Airfield

and facilities in Yonbyon for pilot inspection. Your side may choose Kunsan Airbase or other military and civilian facilities for the pilot inspection project.

We hope that it will be possible to conduct such pilot inspections by January 31, 1992. If your side agrees to our offer, we propose that experts from both sides meet as quickly as possible to discuss and determine what should be inspected and how.

Whether or not your side is going to accept this epochal proposal will be the litmus test as to whether or not you are genuinely concerned about the nuclear issue on which the life or death of our people hinges. I must forthrightly point out that your side will have to take responsibility for all developments that will result from your continuing to ignore our dedicated peace efforts and the advice from all peace-loving nations of the world.

Keynote Speech of the North

The draft "Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula" which we put forward as an urgent proposal at the 4th session of the talks is precisely the basic document that envisaged such discussion.

Therefore, I remind your side of the draft declaration at today's session and propose your side to discuss the matter.

Declaration on the Denuclearization of Korean Peninsula (Draft)

In order to remove the danger of nuclear war from the Korean peninsula once and for all, to contribute to the peace of our country and to the security of Asia and the rest of the world and to create favourable preconditions for the peaceful reunification of the country, the north and the south declare as follows :

Article 1 : The north and the south do not test, manufacture, introduce, possess and use nuclear arms.

- Article 2 : The north and the south prohibit the deployment of nuclear weapons on the Korean peninsula and in its territory and the passage, landing and call of aircraft and warships which are or might be loaded with nuclear weapons through or in its airspace or territorial waters.*
- Article 3 : The north and the south do not conclude any agreement with foreign countries, which allows the deployment and stockpile of nuclear weapons in their regions and which accepts the offer of a “nuclear umbrella.”*
- Article 4 : The north and the south do not conduct any war exercise under the simulated conditions of a nuclear war in which nuclear weapons and equipment are mobilized on the Korean peninsula and in its territory.*
- Article 5 : The north and the south make joint efforts to withdraw US nuclear weapons deployed and US troops stationed in the south of the Korean peninsula and to dismantle nuclear bases.*
- Article 6 : The north and the south jointly verify the total and complete withdrawal of US nuclear weapons and the removal of nuclear bases in the south of the Korean peninsula, discharge the duty of simultaneous nuclear inspection as required by the international treaty, and publish at home and abroad the declaration on the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.*
- Article 7 : The north and the south take an external measure so that the United States and the nuclear-possessing nations around the Korean peninsula may not pose a nuclear threat against our country but respect the status of the denuclearized Korean peninsula.*
- Article 8 : The north and the south form a joint organization to carry into effect this declaration in a short span of time after the publication of the declaration.*
- Article 9 : This declaration will take effect as from the day when the north and the south exchange its texts after going through the necessary formalities.*

Yon Hyong Muk
Head
North Side's Delegation
North-South
High-Level Talks
Premier, DPRK
Administration Council

Chung Won Sik
Chief Delegate
South Side's Delegation
South-North
High-Level Talks
Prime Minister of ROK

We are attaching great importance to this 5th talks. We expect that, even though there are difficult issues to be disputed, we would reach a consensus of views through the sincere efforts of both sides and to sign the "Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, and Cooperation and Exchange between the North and the South." We believe that you are of the same opinion on this point.

The success in these talks, however, which both of us are expecting cannot be achieved through the effort of, or concession by, any one side.

As for our attitude, we are willing to bring our opinions closer to yours on such discordant problems as those of presentation of the text of the agreement, of the position and the order of arrangement of provisions in it and of its contents, and all other problems. In particular, we are also ready to negotiate with you on such important matters at issue as those of changing the situation of armistice into that of peace, of military confidence-building, of establishment of liaison office, of freeing the activities of newspapers, broadcasting, televisions and publications and realizing exchange in this field, of the correlations between the expected agreement and the existing treaties and agreements and of the installation of the joint commission as an organ executing the agreed items.

Believing that you will show a proper attitude toward this sincerity of ours, I have the honor of offering the following new draft agreement which accepted the contents of your draft agreement by a large margin.

*Agreement on Reconciliation Nonaggression, and Cooperation
and Exchange between the North and the South (Draft)*

In accordance with the will of all the fellow countrymen who are

desirous of the peaceful reunification of the divided country,

On the basis of the reaffirmation of the three principles of national reunification laid down in the July 4 Joint Statement,

The north and the south,

Pledging themselves to remove the political and military confrontation for the promotion of the national reconciliation and unity, for the prevention of the encroachment and conflicts by the armed forces, for the realization of detente and for the maintenance of peace, to realize many-sided cooperation and exchange for the promotion of the common interests and prosperity of the nation, and to make concerted efforts to achieve peaceful reunification in recognition of the fact that the relationship between both sides is not the one between countries but a special one formed temporarily in the process of advancing towards reunification,

Have agreed as follows :

1. North-South Reconciliation

Article 1 : The north and the south shall recognize and respect the social system that exists on the other side.

Article 2 : The north and the south shall refrain from interfering in the internal affairs of the other side.

Article 3 : The north and the south shall cease to abuse and slander the other side.

Article 4 : The north and the south shall refrain from all acts aimed at destroying and overthrowing the other side.

Article 5 : The north and the south shall discontinue confrontation and competition, cooperate with each other and make concerted efforts for national dignity and interests in the international arena.

Article 6 : The north and the south shall set up and operate a liaison office at Panmunjom within 6 months after the publication of this agreement in order to ensure close contacts and prompt consultation with each other.

Article 7 : The north and the south shall form a north-south political subco-

mmittee within the frame of the full-dress talks in one month after the publication of this agreement in order to discuss the measures for putting into effect the agreement on north-south reconciliation.

2. North-South Nonaggression

Article 8 : The north and the south shall not use arms against the other side, nor shall they infringe upon the other by force of arms.

Article 9 : The north and the south shall settle any differences and disputes between them peacefully through dialogue and negotiation.

Article 10 : The north and the south shall designate as the demarcation line of nonaggression the Military Demarcation Line which was laid down in the Agreement on the Military Armistice in Korea dated July 27, 1953 and the area which has so far been within the jurisdiction of both sides.

Article 11 : The north and the south shall halt their arms race, create military confidence-building and carry out simultaneous disarmament in order to firmly guarantee nonaggression.

Article 12 : The north and the south shall, for the present, install and operate direct telephone links between the military authorities of both sides in order to prevent the outbreak and escalation of accidental armed conflicts.

Article 13 : In order to implement the agreement on nonaggression the north and the south shall set up and operate a north-south joint military committee within 6 months after the publication of this agreement.

Article 14 : The north and the south shall make united efforts to convert armistice into a durable peace.

Article 15 : In order to discuss concrete measures for the implementation of the agreement on nonaggression and for the removal of military confrontation, the north and the south shall form a north-south military subcommittee within the frame of the full-dress talks in one month after the publication of this agreement.

3. North-South Cooperation and Exchange

Article 16 : For the coordinated development of the national economy and for the promotion of the well-being of the whole nation the north and the south shall effect economic cooperation and exchange, such as the joint development of natural resources, joint investment and the exchange of materials, as the exchange within the nation.

Article 17 : The north and the south shall effect cooperation and exchange in various fields, such as science, technology, literature and art, public health, sports and the mass media including newspapers, radio, TV and publications.

Article 18 : The north and the south shall effect free travels and contacts between the public figures of various circles and other fellow countrymen.

Article 19 : The north and the south shall effect cooperation and exchange in the humanitarian sphere and take steps for the free travels, meetings and correspondence of the separated families and relatives and their reunion based on their free will.

Article 20 : The north and the south shall connect the severed railways and roads and open sea and air routes.

Article 21 : The north and the south shall install and connect the facilities necessary for the exchange of mail and telecommunication and ensure secrecy in this sphere of exchange.

Article 22 : The north and the south shall cooperate with each other in economic, cultural and many other fields in the international arena and jointly conduct external activities.

Article 23 : For the implementation of the agreement on effecting cooperation and exchange in various fields, such as economy and culture, the north and the south shall form a north-south joint economic cooperation committee and other departmental joint committees within 6 months after the publication of this agreement.

Article 24 : In order to discuss the measures for the implementation of the agreement on north-south cooperation and exchange the north and the south shall establish a north-south cooperation and exchange subco-

mmittee within the frame of the full-dress talks in one month after the publication of this agreement.

4. Amendments and Effectuation

Article 25 : This agreement can be amended and supplemented by mutual consent.

Article 26 : This agreement shall become effective as from the day when the north and the south exchange its text after they respectively go through necessary formalities.

Yon Hyong Muk

Premier

DPRK Administration Council

Head, North Side's Delegation

North-South High-Level Talks

Chung Won Sik

Prime Minister, ROK

Chief Delegate

South Side's Delegation

South-North High-Level Talks

December 1991

The proposed draft agreement of our side proceeds from our utmost magnanimity.

It reflects our sincere stand to bring forth a historic agreement this time and to live up to the expectations of the Korean people at home and abroad.

Frankly speaking, we had a mind to add some points of our principled stand to the draft agreement even though its adoption would be delayed and to continue to debate with your side.

However, we have put this aside, and set out another concessive proposal, broadly taking in your suggestions.

I hope that your side will take this into good consideration and show a positive response to our side's new draft agreement.

d. Second-Day Session

The second-day session was held behind closed doors at the Mukunghwa Hall of the Convention Center, Walker-Hill Hotel in Seoul on December 12, Thursday.

Following some chatting, the South's Prime Minister Chung declared the meeting in session. The meeting, omitting any speeches and debate, was soon adjourned to allow the resumption of the delegates contact.

The second delegates contact, following the first contact the day before, was held behind the closed doors from 10:45 a.m. to 6 p.m. December 12 to adjust the contents and wording of the proposed basic agreement.

Through the marathon negotiations, the two delegations reached an accord on the contents of the Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression and Exchanges and Cooperation, and, together with it, a Joint Announcement.

The accord reached between the two sides through their two delegates contacts on the controversial issues over which they showed a wide difference before was as follows:

① The issue of changing the state of armistice into the state of peace.

Whereas the South maintained that the issue of consolidating peace on the Korean peninsula ought to be discussed and resolved between the two direct parties involved, the North stuck to the so-called concept of a tripartite conference, asserting that a non-aggression declaration should be signed with South Korea but a peace agreement with the United States.

At the South's urging, however, the North came to clearly define both the South and the North as direct parties to the peace issue of the Korean peninsula by agreeing to make the clause of Article 5 "...shall endeavor together to transform the present

state of armistice into a solid state of peace between the South and the North...”

Also responding to the South’s suggestion that the respect for the existing Armistice Agreement pending the time of the realization of the state of peace should be specified in the basic agreement, the North agreed to use the description “respect for the Military Armistice Agreement.”

② The issue of establishing permanent liaison offices.

At the fifth high-level meeting, the South offered to change its name from “permanent liaison missions” to “permanent liaison offices” and suggested they be established in Seoul and Pyongyang. The North, however, rejected the idea, asserting it stemmed from the concept of two Koreas.

The South then modified its stand and proposed to locate them at Panmunjom in the initial stage with the two sides trying later to move them to Seoul and Pyongyang. In the end, it was agreed that they should be named as “South and North liaison offices” and opened only at Panmunjom. (To be set up within three months of the effectuation of the agreement.)

③ The issue of resolving disputes peacefully.

The South wanted to use the phrase, “according to the United Nations Charter,” as a common inter-Korean base for the resolution of disputes, but accepted the North Korean demand for its deletion.

④ The issue of boundaries of non-aggression.

According to the South’s urging that boundaries for non-aggression should be drawn clearly, the two sides agreed to use “the military demarcation line stipulated in the Military Armistice Commission and the sea zones the two sides have had under their respective jurisdiction,” thus denying any room for possible change in the boundaries.

⑤ The issue of taking measures to ensure the implementa-

tion of non-aggression.

It was agreed that the concrete contents of confidence-building in the military area and the method of realizing arms reduction should not be described as separate articles, but they should be included in the function of a South-North joint military commission to be formed.

The South proposed for and gained the ideas of advance notification of major troop movements and military training exercises, peaceful use of the Demilitarized Zone, exchange of military personnel and military information, elimination of the mass-destruction weapons and ability to launch surprise attacks, realization of phased military reduction, and on-site verification.

⑥ The issue of mutual opening and exchanges of press media and publications.

Taking the position that the opening and exchanges of newspapers, radio and television programs, and publications should be realized in the first place in order to restore the homogeneity of the South and the North, the South proposed to take up this issue in the area of South-North reconciliation. Taking into account the North's position, however, the South deleted "mutual opening" and agreed to handle the issue as part of exchanges and cooperation in the area of "the press and publications such as newspapers, radio, television and publication items."

⑦ The issue of establishing joint committees on travel, communications and economic exchanges and cooperation.

The South called for the creation of three implementation bodies to facilitate travel, communications and economic exchanges and cooperation. But, the North stressed this was an issue that ought to be taken up at the proposed South-North joint exchanges and cooperation subcommittee.

The South charged that the North's shunning of these committees stemmed from their scheme to put aside exchanges and

cooperation in favor of priority resolution of political and military issues.

In the end, the North accepted the South's offer to form the three sectoral committees within three months of the effectuation of the basic agreement.

⑧ Relations of basic agreement with the existing treaties in the two sides.

It was agreed that this clause should be deleted in the belief that there was no need to use the clause since general practices of international law could do. In its closing remarks, however, the South made it clear that the proposed basic agreement won't have any effect on the existing treaties.

e. Third-Day Session

The third-day session of the fifth high-level meeting was held from 9 to 10 : 25 a.m. December 13, Friday. It was opened to the public.

At the session, the two sides read the text of the Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-aggression and Exchanges and Cooperation between the South and the North as agreed upon at the two delegates contacts, formally adopting and initialing it.

The two sides issued a joint announcement stipulating that the sixth high-level meeting would be held in Pyongyang February 18-21, 1992, and that delegates contacts would be held during the rest of December to discuss the nuclear issue of the Korean peninsula.

The text of the joint announcement was as follows :

South-North Joint Announcement

1. The South and the North initialed the Agreement on Reconcilia-

tion, Non-Aggression and Exchanges and Cooperation between the South and the North on December 13, 1991, and decided to take at an early date steps needed respectively in effectuating the agreement.

2. The South and the North, sharing the view that there should be no nuclear weapons on the Korean peninsula, decided to hold delegates contacts at Panmunjom within the month of December to discuss nuclear issues.

3. The South and the North agreed to hold the Sixth South-North High-Level Meeting in Pyongyang in February 18-21, 1992.

Seoul, December 1991

Then closing remarks were made by the two premiers with the North first to make them to wind up the fifth meeting.

The North's Administration Council Premier Yon Hyong-muk, in his closing remarks, welcomed the adoption of the basic agreement at the Seoul meeting as "the most valuable achievement ever made between the South and North Korean authorities since the issuance of the July 4, 1972 Joint Communique." He stressed that at the delegates contacts set to be held at Panmunjom within December to discuss nuclear issues the two sides should be able to work out a "joint non-nuclear paper."

The South's Prime Minister Chung Won-shik said in his closing remarks that "it is highly significant that the South and the North, after much meandering, have arrived at such a wonderful fruition in one year and three months after the South-North High-Level meeting began."

He said that now the Korean people, by pooling their national potentials and wisdom, have made a gigantic step toward consolidating peace on the land and building a unified state where freedom, human rights and individual happiness can be ensured.

Prime Minister Chung said that to make "the agreement

a solid promise to broaden the avenue of the nation's peace and unification," the South and the North should go through necessary procedures, respectively, and exchange the signed copies of the agreement to put it into force along with the agreements on the establishment and operation of three subcommittees at the sixth high-level meeting so that the two sides could enter a full-fledged state of reconciliation, non-aggression and exchanges and cooperation.

Lastly, the southern premier stressed once again that the recently adopted basic agreement cannot have any effect on the existing treaties which the two sides have concluded with third countries, respectively. He expressed the hope that the nuclear issue of the Korean peninsula would be resolved early at the delegates contacts to be held shortly at Panmunjom.

The text of the Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression and Exchanges and Cooperation between the South and the North was as follows :

*Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-aggression and Exchanges
and Cooperation between the South and the North*

The South and the North, in keeping with the yearning of the entire Korean people for the peaceful unification of the divided land : reaffirming the principles of unification set forth in the July 4 (1972) South-North Joint Communiqué ; determined to remove the state of political and military confrontation and achieve national reconciliation ; also determined to avoid armed aggression and hostilities, reduce tension and ensure the peace ; expressing the desire to realize multi-faceted exchanges and cooperation to advance common national interests and prosperity ; recognizing that their relations, not being a relationship between states, constitute a special interim relationship stemming from the process towards unification ; pledging to exert joint efforts to achieve peaceful unification ; hereby have agreed as follows :

Chapter I

South-North Reconciliation

Article 1 : The South and the North shall recognize and respect each other's system.

Article 2 : The two sides shall not interfere in each other's internal affairs.

Article 3 : The two sides shall not slander or vilify each other.

Article 4 : The two sides shall not attempt any actions of sabotage or subversion against each other.

Article 5 : The two sides shall endeavor together to transform the present state of armistice into a solid state of peace between the South and the North and shall abide by the present Military Armistice Agreement (of July 27, 1953) until such a state of peace has been realized.

Article 6 : The two sides shall cease to compete or confront each other in the international arena and shall cooperate and endeavor together to promote national prestige and interests.

Article 7 : To ensure close consultations and liaison between the two sides, South-North Liaison Offices shall be established at Panmunjom within three (3) months after the coming into force of this Agreement.

Article 8 : A South-North Political Committee shall be established within the framework of the South-North High-Level Talks within one (1) month of the coming into force of this Agreement with a view to discussing concrete measures to ensure the implementation and observance of the accords on South-North reconciliation.

Chapter II

South-North Non-Aggression

Article 9 : The two sides shall not use force against each other and shall not undertake armed aggression against each other.

Article 10 : Differences of views and disputes arising between the two sides shall be resolved peacefully through dialogue and negotiation.

Article 11 : The South-North demarcation line and areas for non-aggression

shall be identical with the Military Demarcation Line specified in the Military Armistice Agreement of July 27, 1953 and the areas that have been under the jurisdiction of each sides until the present time.

Article 12 : To implement and guarantee non-aggression, the two sides shall set up a South-North Joint Military Commission within three (3) months of the coming into force of this Agreement. In the said Commission, the two sides shall discuss and carry out steps to build military confidence and realize arms reduction, including the mutual notification and control of major movements of military units and major military exercises, the peaceful utilization of the Demilitarized Zone, exchanges of military personnel and information, phased reductions in armaments including the elimination of weapons of mass destruction and attack capabilities, and verifications thereof.

Article 13 : A telephone hotline shall be installed between the military authorities of the two sides to prevent accidental armed clashes and their escalation.

Article 14 : A South-North Military Committee shall be established within the framework of the South-North High-Level Talks within one (1) month of the coming into force of this Agreement in order to discuss concrete measures to ensure the implementation and observance of the accords on non-aggression and to remove military confrontation.

Chapter III

South-North Exchanges and Cooperation

Article 15 : To promote an integrated and balanced development of the national economy and the welfare of the entire people, the two sides shall engage in economic exchanges and cooperation, including the joint development of resources, the trade of goods as domestic commerce and joint ventures.

Article 16 : The two sides shall carry out exchanges and cooperation in various fields such as science and technology, education, literature and the arts, health, sports, environment, and publishing and journalism inc-

- cluding newspapers, radio and television broadcasts and publications.*
- Article 17: The two sides shall promote free intra-Korean travel and contacts for the residents of their respective areas.*
- Article 18: The two sides shall permit free correspondence, reunions and visits between dispersed family members and other relatives and shall promote the voluntary reunion of divided families and shall take measures to resolve other humanitarian issues.*
- Article 19: The two sides shall reconnect railroads and roads that have been cut off and shall open South-North sea and air transport routes.*
- Article 20: The two sides shall establish and link facilities needed for South-North postal and telecommunications services and shall guarantee the confidentiality of intra-Korean mail telecommunications.*
- Article 21: The two sides shall cooperate in the international arena in the economic, cultural and various other fields and carry out joint undertakings abroad.*
- Article 22: To implement accords on exchanges and cooperation in the economic, cultural and various other fields, the two sides shall establish joint commissions for specific sectors, including a Joint South-North Economic Exchanges and Cooperation Commission, within three (3) months of the coming into force of this Agreement.*
- Article 23: A South-North Exchanges and Cooperation Committee shall be established within the framework of the South-North High-Level Talks within one (1) month of the coming into force of this Agreement with a view to discussing concrete measures to ensure the implementation and observance of the accords on South-North exchanges and cooperation.*

Chapter IV

Amendments and Effectuation

- Article 24: This Agreement may be amended or supplemented by concurrence between the two sides.*
- Article 25: This Agreement shall enter into force as of the day the two*

sides exchange appropriate instruments following the completion of their respective procedures for bringing it into effect.

December 13, 1991

*Chung Won-shik
Prime Minister
Republic of Korea
Chief Delegate
South Delegation
South-North High-Level Talks*

*Yon Hyong-muk
Premier, Administration Council
Democratic People's Republic of Korea
Head, North Delegation
North-South High-Level Talks*

Part II

Delegates Contacts to Discuss Nuclear Issue of the Korean Peninsula

At the fifth South-North high-level meeting, the two sides of Korea shared the view that “there should be no nuclear arms on the Korean peninsula” and agreed to hold delegates contacts at Panmunjom within December to discuss the nuclear issue of the Korean peninsula.

Under the agreement of the fifth high-level meeting, the South, in a telephone message signed by Prime Minister Chung Won-shik, proposed to the North on December 17, 1991 to hold the first delegates contact to discuss the nuclear issue of the Korean peninsula at Tongilkak in the northern sector of Panmunjom at 10 a.m. December 23, Monday. On December 18, however, North Korea counterproposed that the first delegates contact to discuss the issue of “nuclear-free zone” at Tongilkak at 10 a.m. December 26, Thursday.

Reacting to the North Korean reply, the South pointed out in a telephone message on December 20 that the North’s remarks about “delegates contacts to discuss the issue of nuclear-free zone” veered from the earlier inter-Korean agreement to have delegates contacts to “discuss the nuclear issue,” but accepted the North Korean offer to hold the first delegates contact on December 26.

In the same message, the South notified the North of the list of its delegates. The North made public the name of their delegates in a radio broadcast on December 25. The lists of the two sides’ delegates to the Panmunjom contacts to discuss the nuclear issue of the Korean peninsula were as follows:

The South:

- Lim Dong-won, a delegate to the high-level meeting
- Lee Dong-bok, a delegate to the high-level meeting
- Kim Chae-sop, Chong Wa Dae
- Pon Ki-moon, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
- Park Yong-ok, Ministry of National Defense

The North:

Choe Wu-jin, a delegate to the high-level meeting
Kim Yong-chol, a delegate to the high-level meeting
Kim Su-gil, Foreign Ministry
Choe han-chun, Disarmament and Peace Institute
Choe Yong-kwan, People's Armed Forces Ministry

1. First Contact

The first delegates contact to discuss the nuclear issue of the Korean peninsula was held at Tongilgak in the northern sector of Panmunjom on December 26, 1991.

The South first noted that the Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression and Exchanges and Cooperation between the South and the North initialed at the fifth South-North high-level meeting, provided a historical turning point in putting an end to an age of enmity and confrontation that persisted for 46 years, and instead unfolded an age of reconciliation and cooperation. It said that to embody the precious agreement, the nuclear issue of the Korean Peninsula should be resolved at an early date.

And, noting that North Korea had been under international criticism for producing nuclear materials and constructing a nuclear reprocessing plant for the purpose of developing nuclear weapons, the South urged the North to promptly conclude a nuclear safeguards agreement concomitant to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and unconditionally accept international nuclear inspections.

The southern delegation said that the South, in its part, completely realized its non-nuclear policy through President Roh Tae-woo's November 8 Declaration of Nuclear-free Korean Peninsula and Peace Initiatives and his December 18 Declaration of Nuclear-free Korean Peninsula.

In particular, the South emphasized that the North's signing of a nuclear safeguards accord represented a treaty obligation concomitant to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which, it said, should precede all other steps and which should mark the beginning of, and should be a must in, the resolution of the nuclear issue of the Korean peninsula.

The South also explained the purport and features of the draft joint declaration of nuclear-free Korean peninsula first laid down at the fifth high-level meeting as an emergency agenda bill.

Emphasizing that the nuclear issue is the most exigent question facing the two sides as it is directly linked to the nation's survival, whose resolution cannot be delayed any longer, the South urged that:

First, since the North could sign the nuclear safeguards agreement at any time because it had already agreed on the contents of such an agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency, North Korea should sign the safeguards agreement by January 15, 1992 at the latest in view of its urgency and ratify and effectuate it soon thereafter.

Second, the North should accept the joint declaration of nuclear-free Korean peninsula as proposed by the South, and thereby make it clear that they would not possess nuclear reprocessing and uranium-enrichment facilities.

Third, concrete methods of implementing pilot inter-Korean nuclear inspections suggested by the South at the fifth high-level meeting should be agreed on at the soonest possible date so that the inspections could be carried out by January 31, 1992.

In reaction, the North asserted that the issue of signing a nuclear safeguards agreement is a question that ought to be settled by North Korea with the International Atomic Energy Agency. They said that as was announced in a statement by their foreign ministry on December 22, 1991, they would resolve this

issue on their own before long. The North claimed that the South's call for its signing by January 15, 1992 constituted an act of interfering in their internal affairs.

The North said that the issue of removing chemical and biological weapons is a question that cannot be handled in a joint declaration of denuclearization but at a joint military commission to be formed.

Asserting that a complete accord should be reached at the delegates contacts to make the Korean peninsula nuclear-free and such an accord should be formally adopted in the form of a joint declaration at the sixth high-level meeting, the North produced a draft joint declaration of denuclearization prepared by partially changing the South's version set forth earlier.

The North's draft joint declaration featured some additions to, and deleted or modified clauses of, the "declaration of a nuclear-free zone" they proposed earlier. The deleted clauses included 1) prohibition of passage or call of airplanes or vessels carrying nuclear weapons, 2) prohibition of the conclusion of any nuclear-umbrella agreement, 3) joint efforts to realize the withdrawal of American nuclear weapons and U.S. forces from Korea and the closure of nuclear bases, and 4) promotion of external measures to respect a nuclear-free zone. The newly added or modified clauses were 1) use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes only, 2) non-possession of nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment facilities, 3) verification of the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, and 4) creation and operation of a South-North joint nuclear control commission to ensure the implementation of the joint declaration.

In particular, the North's willingness not to possess nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment facilities expressed in their draft declaration of a nuclear-free zone, helped lay a common base for the resolution of the nuclear issue of the Korean peninsula

at the first delegates contact.

The two sides agreed to review each other's draft version laid down at the first contact and enter into concrete adjustment of the contents and wording based thereon at the second contact.

2. Second Contact

The second delegates contact was held at Peace House in Panmunjom on December 28.

The South first urged the North to sign a nuclear safeguards agreement and accept resultant nuclear inspections early as suggested at the first contact. It also asked the North to favorably respond to the ideas of mutual inter-Korean nuclear inspections as well as pilot nuclear inspections.

In connection with the issue of the North's signing of a nuclear safeguards accord, which was made urgent agenda question, the South called on the North to translate into action early their promise made at the first contact that "we will resolve the issue on our own in the not too distant future."

As for pilot nuclear inspections, the South stressed that to help dispel mutual distrust, mutual nuclear inspections should be conducted before the end of January 1992 on a pilot basis even before inter-Korean inspections are made under the proposed declaration of denuclearization.

The South also affirmatively evaluated the North's inclusion of a clause about non-possession of nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment facilities in their version of a joint declaration of denuclearization. It then set forth a version of its own, "(draft) Joint Declaration of Denuclearization of Korean Peninsula," which incorporated part of the North Korean ideas in its preamble and articles.

The South, explaining about the points of similarity or difference between the two sides' versions, called for entry into item-by-item review of the draft versions and adjustment of wording.

On the other hand, North Korea, saying that the second contact should serve as a turning point in the resolution of the nuclear issue of the Korean peninsula, stressed that substantial efforts should be made to complete the adjustment of wording of the proposed declaration at the delegates contacts so that the declaration could be adopted at the sixth high-level meeting. It agreed to the South's call for entry into the adjustment of the contents and wording.

In the subsequent debate, the two sides reached an accord on the preamble, peaceful use of nuclear energy (Item 2), non-possession of nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment facilities (Item 3) and creation of a joint nuclear control commission within one month of the effectuation of a joint declaration. On the remaining items on which the two sides differed, they decided to make further review of them and resolve them at the third contact.

3. Third Contact

The third delegates contact was held at Tongilkak in the northern sector of Panmunjom from 10 a.m. through 5:35 p.m. December 31.

Adopting a positive policy to facilitate the smooth implementation of the just-adopted Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression and Exchanges and Cooperation between the South and the North and to resolve the nuclear issue at an early date, the South strove positively to bring about a resolution to the nuclear issue at the third contact.

While affirmatively appraising the two earlier contacts, the South explained its position toward the clauses on which the two sides failed to agree on at the second contact, calling for the North's concurrence on them.

Regarding the word "introduction" in Item 1, the South said that since the meaning of "introduction" was included in the concept of "possession, stockpiling and deployment," the word, if used, would be a duplicate and may give rise to an unnecessary misunderstanding. It suggested, therefore, that it was desirable to eliminate the word "introduction."

On the issue of the targets of mutual inspections in Item 4, the South said it was willing to change the phrase "...all military and civilian facilities..." into "...nuclear-related facilities, places and materials..." However, the South stressed that the phrase "...selected by the other side..." should be retained by all means, noting that the phrase was a central clause in the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Agreement. The use of the phrase is needed even to dissolve the distrust accumulated that far between the two sides.

The South also said that the North's signing of a nuclear safeguards agreement (Item 6 of the South's version) was needed to dispel international suspicion and even to ensure the solid implementation of the basic agreement.

With regard to the issue of suspending "simulated nuclear attack military exercise" (Item 5 of the North's version), the South said the question was rather an issue that ought to be taken up at a South-North joint military commission.

About the issue of effectuation, the South said it was willing to agree to the North Korean idea that the proposed joint declaration would take effect from the date of the exchange of its signed copies under the assumption that it would be made to go into force together with the basic South-North agreement at the sixth high-level meeting.

Expressing the optimism that the issue of the joint declaration could be resolved at the third contact, the North presented its stand toward the matters of mutual difference. On Item 1, the North said they rather wanted to add “production” separate from “manufacture” while expressing the willingness to compromise over the word “introduction.”

On the question of mutual inspections, the North asserted that only general and principle matters should be contained in the proposed declaration since detailed matters about inspections would be handled by a joint nuclear control commission to be set up. They then suggested a modified clause in this regard, which read “... in order to verify the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, the North and the South shall inspect relevant objects in a procedure and method to be agreed on between the two sides.”

The North also asserted that since the issue of accepting international nuclear inspections is a one-sided matter that applies only to themselves, the clause should be deleted since they would resolve the issue on their own as disclosed in their Foreign Ministry statement of December 22.

After thus exchanging opinions over seven hours at the third contact punctuated with no fewer than six adjournments, the South and the North arrived at an agreement as follows:

On the issue of the prohibition of production and use of nuclear weapons in Item 1, the words “manufacture” and “production” were both used as the North’s compromise offer suggested, while the word “receipt” instead of “introduction” was adopted as suggested by the South.

Regarding the issue of the objects of mutual inspections, the South wanted to use the phrase “... selected by the other side.” But, the North asserted that if the phrase were adopted, it would result in observing unnecessary facilities. In the end, the two sides

compromised and decided to use the phrase, "... into those objects selected by the other side and agreed on between the two sides and under a procedure and method to be determined by a South-North joint nuclear control commission."

And, it was agreed that both the issue of the North's acceptance of international inspections in Item 6 and the North's idea of suspension of war games under simulated nuclear attacks in Item 5 should be deleted.

With respect to the procedure of effectuation, the South agreed to the North's idea. But, it stressed that the joint declaration on the nuclear issue should take effect together with the basic South-North agreement at the sixth high-level meeting in the procedural order of initialing → signing by the prime ministers → internal process necessary for effectuation → exchange of signed copies and effectuation at the sixth high-level meeting.

Initially the North rejected the offer, saying they would rather like to sign it at the sixth meeting and put it into force within one week thereafter. In the end, they agreed to the South's plan.

The North suggested adding the phrase "(the declaration) may be revised or supplemented under mutual agreement" to the provisions of Item 7 on the procedure of effectuation. At the insistence of the South that the phrase in nature should not be included in a declaration, it was agreed that the phrase in a joint announcement should be included instead.

The South and the North thus reached an accord on and initialed the "Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula" after three delegates contacts begun on December 26. The texts of the joint declaration and a related announcement were as follows:

*Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of
The Korean Peninsula*

The South and the North, desiring to eliminate the danger of nuclear

war through denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, and thus to create an environment and conditions favorable for peace and peaceful unification of our country and contribute to peace and security in Asia and the world, declare as follows;

1. The South and the North shall not test, manufacture, produce, receive, possess, store, deploy or use nuclear weapons.

2. The South and the North shall use nuclear energy solely for peaceful purposes.

3. The South and the North shall not possess nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment facilities.

4. The South and the North, in order to verify the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, shall conduct inspection of the objects selected by the other side and agreed upon between the two sides, in accordance with procedures and methods to be determined by the South-North Joint Nuclear Control Commission.

5. The South and the North, in order to implement this joint declaration, shall establish and operate a South-North Joint Nuclear Control Commission within one month of the effectuation of this joint declaration.

6. This joint declaration shall enter into force on the day on which the South and the North exchange notifications of completion of the formalities for the entry into force of the present declaration.

January 20, 1992

*Chung Won-shik
Prime Minister
Republic of Korea
Chief Delegate
South Delegation
South-North High-Level Talks*

*Yon Hyong-muk
Premier
Administration Council
Democratic People's
Republic of Korea
Head
North Delegation
North-South High-Level Talks*

South-North Joint Announcement

Three rounds of South-North delegates contacts were held at Panmunjom from December 26 to 31, 1991 to discuss nuclear issues.

Out of a sense of common mission to dispel the danger of nuclear war from a nuclear-free Korean peninsula and to foster conditions and an environment favorable to peace and peaceful unification of the fatherland, the two sides' delegates completed the adjustment of wording in a sincere debate on and discussion of the draft "Joint Declaration of Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula," and initialed it.

In this connection, the following were agreed on:

1. The South and the North shall see to it that the Joint Declaration of Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula will be put into force at the sixth South-North high-level meeting on February 19, 1992 after going through procedures necessary for its effectuation.

2. As an advance measure to this end, the South and the North shall exchange the copies of the Joint Declaration signed by the prime ministers of both sides at Panmunjom twice on January 14 and January 21, 1992.

3. The South and the North agreed that the Joint Declaration of Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula may be revised or supplemented through mutual agreement.

Part III

Delegates Contacts to Discuss The Issue of Forming and Operating Subcommittees of South-North High-Level Meeting

Through the fifth high-level meeting in December 1991 and the subsequent delegates contacts held at Panmunjom to discuss the nuclear issue of the Korean peninsula, the two sides shared the view that they would hold delegates contacts at Panmunjom to wind up concrete discussions on the question of forming and operating the three subcommittees on politics, military and exchanges and cooperation for their effectuation, along with that of the basic South-North agreement, at the sixth high-level meeting.

Under the accord, Prime Minister Chung Won-shik, in a telephone message to the North on January 15, 1992, proposed delegates contacts, which the North accepted on January 21. The stage was thus set for three delegates contacts at Panmunjom. The lists of delegates to the contacts were:

The South:

Lim Dong-won, vice minister, National Unification Board
Lee Dong-bok, special assistant to the Prime Minister

The North:

Choe Wu-jin, roving ambassador, Foreign Ministry
Kim Yong-chol, deputy bureau director, People's Armed
Forces Ministry

1. First Contact

The first delegates contact to discuss the formation and operation of the subcommittees of the high-level meeting was held at Peace House in the southern sector of Panmunjom on January 23 (Thursday), 1992.

Firstly the South set forth the three (draft) agreements—
Agreement on the Formation and Operation of South-North Poli-

tical Subcommittee, Agreement on the Formation and Operation of South-North Military Subcommittee and Agreement on the Formation and Operation of South-North Exchanges and Cooperation Subcommittee.

The South's versions of the agreements consisted each of a preamble, composition, operation, amendment and effectuation.

The South offered to form the political and military subcommittees with seven members each including a chairman, but proposed to classify the exchanges and cooperation subcommittee into a first subcommittee (non-economy) and a second subcommittee (economy) inasmuch as the subcommittee was to cover broad areas, and to form the subcommittee with 14 members including a chairman and an alternate chairman.

The South's versions provided that each subcommittee may create a working-level council to discuss detailed matters.

The function of the subcommittees was to discuss concrete steps to implement and respect those clauses of the basic South-North agreement that fall under their respective areas, and also to handle the issue of forming and operating joint commissions and those matters delegated by the high-level meeting.

Each subcommittee was to meet in Seoul, Pyongyang or at Panmunjom or another place of mutual agreement once or more a month, or at any time if need be. The subcommittees were also to have necessary persons attend their meetings through mutual consent.

The South suggested that matters agreed on at the subcommittees take effect with signing by the two sides' prime ministers.

Meanwhile, on the issue of forming and operating political, military and exchanges and cooperation subcommittees, North Korea, instead of offering three separate agreements, proposed a single (draft) "Agreement on the Formation and Operation of the Subcommittees of the North-South High-Level Meeting."

According to the North Korean version, a subcommittee was to be formed with five members including a chairman who should in principle be one of the delegates to the high-level meeting. And, support personnel should be five to six for each side. The northern version also said the function of the subcommittees was to discuss concrete ways to implement the basic South-North agreement and thereby adopt auxiliary agreements as well as an agreement on the formation and operation of joint commissions.

It also stipulated that subcommittee meetings should be held at Peace House and Tongilkak at Panmunjom by turn and at some other places of mutual agreement. They suggested that the final agreements of the subcommittees would be made with signing of them by both chief delegates to the high-level meeting.

The North's version that provided for a complex and time-consuming procedure for effectuation, requiring subcommittee decisions to be discussed again at the high-level meeting to the exclusion of any clause of casual subcommittee meetings, seemed to reflect their intent to operate the subcommittees at their own convenience and to reduce the function of the organizations.

On the other hand, regarding the exigent issue of the North's nuclear arms development, the South emphasized that an agreement on the formation and operation of a joint nuclear control commission should be adopted at the delegates contacts since the joint commission's activities should begin soon after the sixth high-level meeting. The South further wanted to discuss the question of establishing and operating South-North liaison offices.

But, the North showed a negative response to these ideas. They argued that a joint nuclear control commission should be formed through Panmunjom delegates contacts following the sixth high-level meeting. As for the creation of liaison offices, the North said the issue could be discussed at a political subcommittee after it was formed.

2. Second Contact

The second delegates contact over the issue of forming and operating subcommittees was held at Tongilkak in the northern sector of Panmunjom on January 29.

At the second contact, the South set forth the following compromise ideas prepared by modifying parts of the draft agreement produced by the North at the first contact.

The three separate draft agreements were merged into a single one while the South-North exchanges and cooperation subcommittee was left as it was instead of being divided into a first subcommittee and a second subcommittee. Like other subcommittees, the exchange and cooperation subcommittee, too, was to be formed with seven members.

Some delegates to the high-level meeting were in principle to be made subcommittee chairmen, and the proposed working-level council was renamed as "subcommission."

As for the places of subcommittee meetings, Seoul and Pyongyang suggested at the first contact were deleted and instead Panmunjom and other sites of mutual agreement were offered. And, agreements of subcommittees were to be effectuated with signing by the prime ministers at a high-level meeting, and subcommittee agreements could, through mutual agreement, also be put into force through the exchange of signed copies of agreements.

Meanwhile, the North again laid down almost without any change a (draft) agreement which they set forth initially at the first contact, and mutual difference was aired on the following several items.

Whereas the South offered seven the number of the members of a subcommittee, the North insisted on five. While the South maintained that the creation of a subcommission should be envisioned in an agreement since such a body would be needed to

handle working-level matters, the North asserted that if necessary the issue could be settled through members' contacts.

Moreover, the South said that since subcommittees were to handle various professional matters, experts in respective areas would have to be made to attend subcommittee meetings. But, the North asserted experts could be included among support personnel set to accompany delegates.

Though these issues remained to be settled, the two sides neared an accord on nearly all basic items. It was thus expected that the adjustment of wording and initialing could take place at the third contact.

In the meantime, the South, reminding the North of the fact that the two sides agreed to form and operate a joint nuclear control commission before March 19, 1992 as was the case with subcommittees, proposed that the third contact take up the issue of forming and operating a nuclear control commission, as well, since it would take a considerable time for the two sides to agree on the contents of an agreement on the commission, procedure of effectuation and composition of the commission.

The South also urged the North that even before the inauguration of a joint nuclear control commission, pilot inspections should be conducted if only to dispel misgivings on nuclear issues and to restore mutual trust.

The North, however, rejected the idea, giving the impression that they were trying to delay the resolution of the nuclear issue as much as possible. They contended that the delegates contacts were not fit to discuss the issue of a joint nuclear control commission. The North argued that there would be no problem in inaugurating the commission within one month of the effectuation of a non-nuclear joint declaration, and that pilot inspections, whether they be overall inspections or pilot ones, were an issue that ought to be resolved at a nuclear control commission after it was set

up.

3. Third Contact

The third delegates contact to discuss matters related to the formation and operation of subcommittees of the South-North high-level meeting was held at Peace House in the southern sector of Panmunjom on February 7.

Firstly, the disputed number of a subcommittee was set at seven as the South suggested. On the issue of attendance of experts, the South deleted the clause by accepting the northern idea that experts could be included in the six support personnel set to attend a meeting from each side.

The South also dropped the idea of subcommissions under the assumption that subcommissions could be replaced with contacts between members or chairmen. But, the South reminded the North that the subcommissions could be set up under the provisions of Article 6 (amendment and supplement).

The two sides settled all the items over which the two sides had differed and thus initialed the Agreement on the Formation and Operation of Subcommittees of South-North High-Level Meeting.

The agreement which was finally agreed on at the third contact, could be rated as the first fruition toward putting into action the Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression and Exchanges and Cooperation adopted in December 1991. The two sides thereby made a smooth first step toward implementing the basic inter-Korean agreement.

With the adoption and initialing of the Agreement on the Formation and Operation of Subcommittees of South-North High-Level Meeting, the projected three subcommittees were set to go

into activities immediately upon its effectuation at the sixth high-level meeting. Each subcommittee would discuss and resolve one by one the issues of taking steps to ensure the implementation of the basic agreement in their respective areas, of working out auxiliary agreements and of inaugurating joint commissions.

The text of the agreement initialed by the two sides on that date was as follows:

*Agreement on the Formation and Operation of Subcommittees
of the South-North High-Level Talks*

The South and the North, in order to discuss concrete ways to implement and abide by the Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-aggression, and Exchanges and Cooperation between the South and the North, have agreed to create as follows a South-North Political Subcommittee, a South-North Military Subcommittee and a South-North Exchanges and Cooperation Subcommittee within the framework of the South-North High-Level Talks:

Article 1: Each Subcommittee shall be composed as follows;

- 1. Each Subcommittee shall comprise one (1) chairman and six (6) members from each side. The chairmen shall be members of the delegations to the South-North High-Level Talks.*
- 2. Both parties shall notify the other side in advance if and when they wish to replace the chairman or members of any of the Subcommittees.*
- 3. Each side may have a staff of six (6) and its size may be readjusted by concurrence between the two sides.*

Article 2: Each Subcommittee shall have the following functions;

- 1. Each Subcommittee shall discuss concrete measures to implement and abide by the pertinent provisions of the Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-aggression, and Exchanges and Cooperation between the South and the North.*

2. *Each Subcommittee shall draw up protocols based on its discussions of concrete measures to implement the pertinent provisions of the Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-aggression, and Exchanges and Cooperation between the South and the North.*
3. *Each Subcommittee shall draw up an agreement on the creation of a South-North Joint Committee in the pertinent field. An agreement on the establishment of South-North Liaison Offices shall be drawn up by the South-North Political Subcommittee.*

Article 3: Each Subcommittee shall be operated as follows;

1. *Each Subcommittee shall in principle meet once a month. However, it may meet as often as needed when both sides concur.*
2. *Each Subcommittee shall in principle meet alternately in the Peace House in the southern sector of Panmunjom and in Tong-ilgak (the Unification Pavilion) in the northern sector. However, it may meet at another place agreed to by both sides.*
3. *Meeting of each Subcommittee shall be jointly presided over by its chairmen, one from each side.*
4. *Each Subcommittee shall in principle meet behind closed doors. However, such meetings may be open to the public when both sides agree.*
5. *Such administrative matters as the guarantee of the safety of personnel who will travel to the area of the other side to attend meetings of each Subcommittee, the provisions for them and the recording of the proceedings of meetings shall comply with past practices.*
6. *Other matters necessary to operate each Subcommittee shall be discussed and decided at the pertinent Subcommittee.*

Article 4: The chairmen of each Subcommittee shall report the results of the discussion at its meetings to the South-North High-Level Talks.

Article 5: An agreement reached at meetings of each Subcommittee shall enter into force the day the Prime Ministers of both sides sign the agreed document at the South-North High-Level Talks. Depending on circumstances, an important agreement between the two sides shall enter into force

Article 5: An agreement reached at meetings of each Subcommittee shall enter into force the day the Prime Ministers of both sides sign the agreed document at the South-North High-Level Talks. Depending on circumstances, an important agreement between the two sides shall enter into force the day appropriate instruments are exchanged after the Prime Ministers of the two sides have signed it and the procedures necessary to bring it into effect are completed. Furthermore, when both sides agree, an agreement reached at a Subcommittee may be brought into force through the signing and exchanging of the agreed document by the Prime Ministers of both sides. In such a case, the fact must be reported to the South-North High-Level Talks.

Article 6: This Agreement may be amended or supplemented by concurrence between both sides.

Article 7: This Agreement shall enter into force the day it is signed and exchanged between the two sides.

February 19, 1992

Chung Won-shik
Prime Minister
Chief Delegate
South Delegation
South-North High-Level
Talks

Yon Hyong-muk
Premier, Administration Council
Democratic People's
Republic of Korea
Head, North Delegation
North-South High-Level Talks

Part IV

Sixth South-North High-Level Meeting

1. Liaison Officials Contacts

In a telephone message signed by Choe Bong-chun, their responsible liaison official of the South-North high-level meeting, North Korea on February 8, 1992 proposed to the South to hold a liaison officials contact on February 10 (Monday) to discuss working-level matters related to the sixth high-level meeting set to be held in Pyongyang. The South counterproposed that the contact be held on February 11 (Tuesday).

The first responsible liaison officials contact was held at Peace House in the southern sector of Panmunjom from 3 to 4:15 p.m. February 11 (Tuesday) between Kim Yong-hwan from the South and Choe Bong-chun from the North.

At the contact, the two liaison officials discussed working-level matters related to the sixth meeting such as the itineraries of the southern delegation set to visit Pyongyang to attend the sixth high-level meeting, the method of operating the first- and second-day sessions, and ceremonies to mark the effectuation of the Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression and Exchanges and Cooperation between the South and the North, Joint Declaration of Non-Nuclear Korean Peninsula, and the Agreement on the Formation and Operation of Subcommittees of the South-North High-Level Meeting.

The second contact between the two responsible liaison officials was held at Tongilkak in the northern sector of Panmunjom from 3 to 4:10 p.m. February 13 (Thursday).

At the contact, the two sides exchanged a list of the South's delegation and the North's written guarantee of the personal safety of southern delegation members during their stay in the North. They agreed to meet again on February 14 to discuss and wind up detailed matters.

The two sides agreed on the conference site, the place of lodging and itineraries as follows:

○ Conference site : People's Cultural Palace

○ Lodge : Baekhwawon Guest House

○ Itineraries for southern delegation:

February 18, Tuesday

08:20 - Passage through Panmunjom

12:40 - Arrival in Pyongyang

16:00 - Advance observation of conference site

19:00 - Dinner hosted by Administration Council Premier
(Mokrankwan)

February 19, Wednesday

10:00 - First-day session

15:30 - Visit to People's Grand Study Hall

* At the North's urging on the same date (February 19), observation of a group gymnastics at Pyongyang Gymnasium

February 20, Thursday

10:00 - Second-day session

Visit to Pyongyang Maternity Hospital (press members)

16:40 - Viewing of acrobatics performance (Acrobatics Theater along Kwangbok Street)

19:30 - Dinner hosted by chairman of the Standing Committee, Supreme People's Assembly (Okryukwan)

February 21, Friday

09:00 - Departure from Pyongyang

13:10 - Passage through Panmunjom

At the third responsible liaison officials contact held at Peace House in the southern sector of Panmunjom for one hour from 10 a.m. February 14 (Friday), the two sides wound up discussion of working-level matters related to the sixth high-level meeting

by agreeing on the method of conference operation and also on holding separate delegates contacts during the sixth high-level meeting.

At the third contact, the two sides agreed that the first-day session should proceed in the order of remarks of greetings from the northern side, a ceremony marking the effectuation of agreements, and remarks of greetings from the southern side. It was also agreed that upon the adjournment of the first-day session, there would be a separate delegates contact to discuss the issue of forming and operating a joint nuclear control commission in the afternoon.

They agreed that at the second-day session, they would make keynote speeches in the presence of press members, but decided to hold a subsequent debate behind the closed doors.

2. Proceeding of Sixth High-Level Meeting

a. Overview of Conference Proceeding

The sixth South-North high-level meeting was held in Pyongyang for four days from February 18 through 21, 1992.

In a statement issued on the passage by his delegation through Panmunjom on the way to Pyongyang at 8:20 a.m. February 18, Lee Dong-bok, spokesman for the southern delegation, said their travel to Pyongyang was a road toward effectuating the historical Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression and Exchanges and Cooperation between the South and the North, and the Joint Declaration of Denuclearization of Korean Peninsula, and also toward signing and effectuating the Agreement on the Formation and Operation of Subcommittees.

“We expect that in the age of agreements thus established,

dispersed families would be able to meet each other and visit their missing hometowns, and exchanges and cooperation would take place in all walks of life amidst alleviated tension and solidified peace between the South and the North,” Lee said.

The spokesman also urged the North Korean authorities to respond favorably at the Pyongyang meeting toward taking solid implementation measures to realize the nuclear-free Korean peninsula. “We hope that at the meeting the two sides will not only put historical documents into force but also will display solid intention of faithfully implementing the agreements,” he said.

After issuing the statement, the southern delegation arrived at Tongilkak where they were greeted by An Byong-su, vice chairman of the Committee for Peaceful Unification of the Fatherland along with all other North Korean delegates to the high-level meeting except Premier Yon Hyong-muk. At Kaesong, they took a special train to proceed to Pyongyang.

On arrival at Baekhwawon Guest House where they were staying during their visit to Pyongyang, Spokesman Lee Dong-bok, in his statement on arrival in Pyongyang, said that at the meeting “an age of co-prosperity and co-existence will be unfolded where the South and the North will dispel the state of political and military confrontation, ease tension and ensure peace, and will promote common national interests and prosperity through multi-prolonged exchanges and cooperation on the basis of peaceful co-existence characterized by the respect for mutual systems and non-interference in each other’s internal affairs.”

Lee said he expects a decisive turning point will be provided at the meeting in basically resolving the nuclear issue, and urged the North to accept nuclear inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency, and agree to the early inauguration of a joint nuclear control commission, to the resultant simultaneous mutual nuclear inspections, and to prior pilot inspections.

In the afternoon, the southern delegates visited the People's Cultural Palace where the high-level meeting was to take place. In the evening, they attended a dinner hosted by Administration Council Premier Yon Hyong-muk.

In his dinner speech, Premier Yon maintained that the two sides "should faithfully implement the great North-South agreement and the joint declaration of non-nuclearization which were hammered out along the road toward unification of the fatherland, and thereby should solidify peace and throw open the door to unification at an early date."

The South's Prime Minister Chung Won-shik, in his table speech, said that with the planned effectuation of the agreements, "we have been enabled to bury the shade of division that hung over this land into the past history and make a first step toward a new age of reconciliation and cooperation." He stressed that only through the flawless implementation of the agreements realized through the responsible authorities of the two sides embodying the wish of the nation, can a grand march be made toward genuine reconciliation, cooperation and peaceful unification.

He said that the key to translating the agreements into action lies in the promotion of mutual confidence building and realization of broad exchanges and cooperation along with the dissipation of political and military confrontation between the two sides. Chung then called for the resolution of a humanitarian issue by stressing, "We must turn our ears to the pathetic outcries of 10 million people dispersed in the South and the North. We should realize hometown visits by at least aged persons."

In addition, he said, the two sides should invigorate economic exchanges and cooperation to upgrade the quality of the lives of the whole Korean people. To institutionally back this up, organization to implement the agreements, like joint commissions, should be inaugurated at an early date, he said.

The first-day session of the sixth high-level meeting was held at the People's Cultural Palace on the morning of February 19. It was opened to the public. The session proceeded in the order of the host side's remarks of greetings from the North, a ceremony to put the agreements into force and the visitors' remarks of greetings from the southern delegation.

Following Premier Yon's greetings in which he described the effectuation of the basic South-North agreement as the "most epochal" event since the July 4, 1972 joint communique, a ceremony was held to mark the effectuation of the basic agreement. Then there were greetings from Prime Minister Chung, who, affirming once again the historic effectuation of the three agreements, said the South and the North were now enabled to make a forceful first step toward an age of reconciliation and cooperation. "The task that remains now is to carry them out faithfully," he said.

In the afternoon, the southern delegates observed the People's Grand Study Hall. Later in the day, they viewed youths' group gymnastics at the Pyongyang Gymnasium at a surprise suggestion from Premier Yon and on the southern delegation's acceptance of the offer. In the evening, the first delegates contact was held to discuss the formation and operation of a proposed joint nuclear control commission.

On the morning of February 20, the second-day session was held in the presence of the press, where keynote speeches were exchanged. The southern chief delegate was the first to give the speech.

The South's Prime Minister Chung Won-shik said in the speech, "We are now at a juncture where we, from the viewpoint of national history, have to set a direction of what we should do in the future to attain the national wish for solid peace and peaceful unification." He then pointed to the historical significance and nature of the Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression

and Exchanges and Cooperation between the South and the North.

Discussing the future stand of the South-North high-level meeting, Chung said, "If the high-level meeting has so far given birth to this agreement, it should in the future ensure and coordinate the smooth implementation of the provisions of the agreement so as to dissolve the state of political and military confrontation and substantially resolve the issue of carrying out multi-pronged exchanges and cooperation."

The South's prime minister also stressed that the "life of an agreement lies in its implementation." He urged the North to affirmatively respond to the resolution of the dispersed family issue if only to make it an occasion to manifest the will to implement the basic agreement.

Emphasizing the need to resolve the nuclear issue that remains to be one of exigent questions, Chung urged the North to accept overall international nuclear inspections and pilot inter-Korean inspections, and agree to the early inauguration of a South-North joint nuclear control commission.

Meanwhile, Premier Yon, saying he was disclosing their basic position toward implementing the basic agreement and expediting independent and peaceful unification, asserted that the three principles of unification embodied in the July 4, 1972 Joint Communiqué — independence, peaceful unification and grand national unity — should be the basis for the interpretation and implementation of the basic agreement. He then drew a unilateral interpretation, claiming that the word "independence" referred to withdrawal of American forces from Korea, "peace" to arms reduction, and "grand national unity" to repeal of the National Security Law and the release of the arrested illegal visitors to the North.

Also asserting that the task of the high-level meeting is to promote subcommittees and joint commissions to facilitate the implementation of the basic agreement, and to rightly set impleme-

ntation measures, he once again produced their old-fashioned demand for “package agreement and simultaneous implementation,” an idea already regarded as unrealistic.

At the same time, the North Korean premier proposed that the South and the North take common steps against Japan over some issues like the question of “comfort women” and Japan’s alleged nuclear arms development.

After the meeting, the spokesmen for the two sides announced the six-point Joint Announcement on Sixth South-North High-Level Meeting setting the time of the seventh high-level meeting (May 5-8, 1992 in Seoul) and matters related to the formation of the proposed three subcommittees and a joint nuclear control commission.

Thereafter, the southern delegates called on President Kim Il-sung at the Presidential Palace where they conferred with Kim over a luncheon.

Soon after he exchanged greetings with the southern delegates, Kim from nowhere read a prepared statement, saying, “Since President Roh issued a special statement yesterday on the effectuation of the basic agreement, I, too, will issue a statement.”

In the afternoon, the delegates from the South viewed an acrobatics performance at the Acrobatics Gymnasium along the Kwangbok Street in Pyongyang. In the evening, they attended a dinner hosted by Yang Hyong-sop, chairman of the North’s Supreme People’s Assembly.

In his table speech, Chairman Yang described the effectuation of the basic inter-Korean agreement as “an epochal event that provides a bright prospect for expediting the unification of the fatherland and a great contribution to the great task of achieving peace.” He then repeated the northern demand for the release of the arrested illegal visitors to the North, repeal of the National Security Law and determination of the method of unification.

Prime Minister Chung, in his dinner speech, renewed the significance of the adoption of the basic agreement, stressing that the remaining thing to do now is to faithfully carry out what the agreement dictates.

Calling again for the North's sincere response toward the resolution of the nuclear issue, Chung said, "Just like the moon turns to be a full moon with the due lapse of time, let us redouble our efforts to see our sincerity and efforts turn into the full moon of national unification at an early date."

In a statement issued at the time of the southern delegation's departure from Pyongyang on the morning of February 21 after completing its visit there, Lee Dong-bok, spokesman for the delegation, said the remaining task was to faithfully implement and respect the agreements that went into force at the sixth high-level meeting. He again urged the North to show a sincere attitude toward the resolution of the nuclear issue of the Korean peninsula and the dispersed family question.

On the afternoon of February 21, the southern delegation returned to Panmunjom winding up its four-day visit to Pyongyang.

In an arrival statement at Panmunjom, Spokesman Lee Dong-bok said that "the South and the North have now entered a new relationship of reconciliation and cooperation." He said that through various subcommittee meetings set to begin the following month, the authorities of the two sides would make full-fledged efforts to solidify and institutionalize peace, reconciliation and cooperation. He called for the North's affirmative response in this regard.

b. First-Day Session

The first-day session of the sixth high-level meeting was

held at the People's Cultural Palace from 10 to 11:10 a.m. February 19. Opened to the public, the meeting proceeded in the order of the remarks of greetings from the North, a ceremony marking the effectuation of the agreements, and the remarks of greetings from the South.

The North's Administration Council Premier Yon Hyong-muk, in his remarks, described the Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression and Exchanges and Cooperation between the South and the North, and the Joint Declaration of Denuclearization of Korean Peninsula as a common national platform to advance the time of unification. He described the agreements as the first "epochal event" after the adoption of the July 4, 1972 Joint Communiqué and a "historical advancement gained on the road to unification."

Premier Yon said, "The effectuation of these agreements provides a bright prospect for the future of the nation pursuing independent peaceful unification while promising our new achievements." He said it also is a significant international event that transcends the boundary of the nation.

The ceremony marking the effectuation of the agreements proceeded in the order of the exchange of letters of notification informing each other of the completion of their respective internal process necessary for the effectuation of the Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression and Exchanges and Cooperation between the South and the North and the Joint Declaration of Denuclearization of Korean Peninsula, and the signing and exchange of the copies of the Agreement on the Formation and Operation of Subcommittees of the South-North High-Level Meeting.

The South's written notification was conveyed by Prime Minister Chung to his North Korean counterpart, Premier Yon. The notification on the basic agreement read, "I hereby notify that all the process necessary for the effectuation of the Agreement

on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression and Exchanges and Cooperation signed in Seoul between the South and the North on December 13, 1991 has been completed as President Roh Tae-woo, the head of state of the Republic of Korea, has approved it.”

The notification on the Joint Declaration of Denuclearization of Korean peninsula read, “I hereby notify that all the process necessary for the effectuation of the Joint Declaration of Denuclearization of Korean Peninsula adopted and signed between the South and the North on January 20 has been completed as President Roh Tae-woo, the head of state of the Republic of Korea, has approved it.”

The North’s notifications were expressed by Premier Yon to Prime Minister Chung. Their notification on the basic agreement read, “I hereby notify that the process necessary for the effectuation of the Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression and Exchanges and Cooperation between the North and the South which was adopted at the fifth North-South high-level meeting and deliberated by a joint session between the Central People’s Committee of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the Standing Conference of the Supreme People’s Assembly has been completed as President Kim Il-sung, the head of state of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, has approved it.”

Their notification on the joint declaration read, “I hereby notify that the process necessary for the effectuation of the Joint Declaration of Denuclearization of Korean Peninsula which was adopted between the North and the South on January 20, 1992 and deliberated by a joint session of the Central People’s Committee of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the Standing Conference of the Supreme People’s Assembly has been completed as President Kim Il-sung, the head of state of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, has approved it”.

Following the ceremony that marked the effectuation of

the agreements, the South's Prime Minister Chung offered remarks of greetings. In the speech, Chung, affirming the historical effectuation of the three agreements, said that redoubled efforts should be made between the government authorities of the two sides to solidify peace and institutionalize reconciliation and cooperation.

The South's Prime Minister stressed that the precious basic agreement, reached between the South and the North after much meandering, must be carried out faithfully under all circumstances. In particular, he urged the North to take sincere steps toward the formation of a joint nuclear control commission and resultant simultaneous nuclear inspections.

Following the first-day session, the first delegates contact to discuss the formation and operation of a South-North joint nuclear control commission was held from 8 to 11:20 p.m. February 19 at the Baekhwawon Guest House where the southern delegates were staying.

At the contact attended by Lim Dong-won and Gong Ro-myung from the South and Choe Wu-jin and Kim Yong-chol from the North, the South set forth a draft "Agreement on the Formation and Operation of a South-North Joint Nuclear Control Commission," explaining about its stand toward the question and calling for a debate on the issue with emphasis placed on the draft.

However, the North, showing an insincere attitude, asserted, without laying down any of its version of the draft agreement, that discussion of the issue should be postponed until the following second delegates contact. In the end, debate went on with the South explaining each article of its version of the agreement and the North posing some questions.

The two sides discussed the issues of when the seventh high-level meeting should open, when the notification of the chairmen and members of the proposed subcommittees should be made to each other, when the first meetings of the subcommittees should

take place and when a delegates contact should open to discuss the issue of forming and operating a joint nuclear control commission. They decided to adopt a six-point joint announcement on the results of the talks.

c. Second-Day Session

The second-day session of the sixth high-level meeting was held at the People's Cultural Palace from 9 a.m. February 20, where the two sides exchanged keynote speeches with the South being the first to deliver it, followed by discussions behind the closed doors.

Prime Minister Chung Won-shik said in the speech that the Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression and Exchanges and Cooperation between the South and the North constituted a basic frame of future inter-Korean relations, which, he said, carried the following significant features :

Firstly, the basic agreement was the first official document ever adopted between the responsible government authorities of the two sides since national division through independent efforts based on the principle of resolution between the direct parties involved.

Secondly, the basic agreement was intended to put an end to enmity and confrontation and to unfold an age of reconciliation and cooperation between the South and the North.

Thirdly, the basic agreement was intended to dispel the state of tension between the South and the North and consolidate peace on the land.

Fourthly, the basic agreement was intended to build a national community through co-existence and co-prosperity by invigorating exchanges and cooperation in economy and all other walks of life.

Fifthly, the basic agreement was intended not only to lay a foundation for peaceful unification but also to expedite peaceful unification.

The South said the basic agreement was not a mere declaration containing principled and directional matters regarding the question of improving inter-Korean relations, but it was a document that guaranteed the feasibility of its implementation. Vowing again that the South would faithfully carry the agreement out, Chung urged the North to do the same.

In particular, stressing that the easiest way of manifesting a will to implement the agreement lied in the resolution of the dispersed family issue, Prime Minister Chung said the family issue was the very humanitarian question that ought to be resolved expeditiously as a symbol of inter-Korean reconciliation and the improvement of South-North relations. He suggested that even before the formation and operation of a subcommittee in the area, hometown visits between senile dispersed family members aged 70 or older be realized on a priority basis timed with the effectuation of the basic agreement.

While stressing that the duties the high-level meeting should perform in the future should be mutually confirmed and the standing of the meeting itself should be established, the South stated that the duties and function of the high-level meeting should be to guarantee the faithful implementation of and respect for the basic agreement, and to guide the activities of the subcommittees and joint commissions, reviewing, confirming and putting into effect the decisions of these organizations.

The South said that other duties of the high-level meeting should be to coordinate and handle those issues on which the two sides differed at these organizations, to discuss and decide on new issues assigned to itself, and discuss and resolve other matters that newly arise between the South and the North.

With regard to the operation of the high-level meeting, the South proposed that the issues of forming delegations and selecting the place of accommodation for a visiting delegation should be resolved based on theretofore practices, and that the sessions of the high-level meeting be classified into four regular sessions per year and casual sessions that could be held whenever the need of such a meeting arises.

The South further said that the important and exigent task that ought to be resolved by all means in order to embody the South-North agreement was to remove the danger of nuclear war from the Korean peninsula. In this connection, it said, the North should ratify the nuclear safeguards agreement, which they had delayed, and set forth a concrete time schedule at the soonest possible time for overall international nuclear inspections.

Moreover, the South proposed that even before the projected South-North joint nuclear control commission is formed, details about mutual inspections are worked out, and inter-Korean nuclear inspections are made based thereon, pilot inspections be conducted to display respective wills to implement the Joint Declaration of Denuclearization of Korean Peninsula. It also urged that to allow the joint nuclear control commission to go into full-fledged activities in the next one month as stipulated by the Joint Declaration, the two sides should move fast to adopt an agreement on the formation and operation of the commission.

Following the southern prime minister's keynote speech, the North's Administration Council Premier Yon Hyong-muk said in his speech that the basic South-North agreement, in its significance, matched the historical July 4, 1972 Joint Communique. "In contents, the basic agreement, which, being inclusive and practical, contains various items needed to guarantee peace and create conditions favorable to peaceful unification, is an epochal event and great national feat that would bring about spring on this land

and a bright future of unification,” Yon said.

Asserting that the yardstick for resolving various issues related to the interpretation of the basic agreement and the issue of its implementation, should be the three major principles for unification— independence, peaceful unification and grand national unity—as specified in the July 4 Joint Communique, the northern premier claimed that in connection with the principle of independence, American forces should be withdrawn from Korea and joint Korea-U.S. military exercises should be suspended.

He argued that in connection with the principle of peaceful unification, each side should cease to build up their armed forces, realize arms reduction at an early date, and make the Korean peninsula nuclear-free. On the principle of grand national unity, Premier Yon said that political and statutory obstacles to the realization of national reconciliation and unity should be removed and the arrested illegal visitors to the North released.

As basic items to which the South-North high-level meeting should pay attention in the days to come, the North argued that the two sides should positively promote the projects of subcommittees. In this context, it said, the high-level meeting should adjust disputes arising over the interpretation, the method of execution, and over the clauses of the basic agreement, ensure horizontal linkage among the subcommittees, coordinate their decisions, and finally review, confirm and ratify the decisions of the subcommittees.

With regard to the programs of the proposed joint commissions, Premier Yon said the high-level meeting should also adjust the projects of the joint commissions, expedite the implementation of their decisions, and explore ways to resolve the issues that arise in the course of operating the commissions or of carrying out their agreements.

The North said that the principle of package agreement

and simultaneous implementation is the most reasonable method of ensuring the execution of agreed matters. Hower, it said, the two sides may agree on and resolve issues on a case-by-case basis over those matters to which a priority was given through mutual agreement and which retains independence in terms of discussion and execution.

They also suggested that the high-level meeting be enabled to directly discuss and resolve important issues that arise within the frame of the basic agreement and require quick resolution without going through subcommittees.

Over the issues of Japan's exploitation of "comfort women" and "nuclear arms development," the North proposed that the two sides hold delegates contacts early to discuss joint steps to cope with the questions, and also adopt a joint resolution against Japan.

The keynote speeches were followed by debate behind the closed doors.

Reacting to the South's call made in the keynote speech for the North's early ratification of the nuclear safeguards agreement, the North said the issue was a matter which the North would resolve on its own with the International Atomic Energy Agency, asserting that the South, therefore, should not step in this matters any longer. They said that the ratification issue would be deliberated by the Standing Council of the Supreme People's Assembly on February 18 and by the third session of the ninth Supreme People's Assembly slated for April. The North thus unveiled an attempt to delay nuclear inspections by the IAEA.

On the South's proposal for pilot inter-Korean nuclear inspections prior to the inauguration and operation of the joint nuclear control commission, the North asserted that since the joint nuclear control commission was supposed to be formed by March 18, it would be better to work out details about mutual inspections

at the commission and then carry out inspections based on agreed-on rules and procedures. The North, thus, made it clear that they were trying to delay not only inspections by the IAEA but also inter-Korean nuclear inspections.

Meanwhile, the South disclosed its stand on the North's emergency proposal for joint inter-Korean steps against the issues of Japan's exploitation of "comfort women" during World War II and its alleged nuclear armament move.

On the question of "comfort women," the South said that since it had already taken due steps on this issue on its own, it didn't feel the need to take any joint steps although it was fully willing to cooperate in it from international aspects if North Korea raises this issue to Japan. It noted that at the time of the Korea-Japan summit meeting in early 1991, President Roh Tae-woo formally raised this question and Japanese Prime Minister Miyazawa promised due measures over the issue.

As for the issue of Japan's "nuclear arms development," the South said that since Japan has already joined the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and regularly undergoes nuclear inspections by the IAEA, this could not be any emergency issue requiring joint measures of the two sides.

As the South and the North wound up the sixth high-level meeting, they issued the six-point Joint Announcement on the Sixth South-North High-Level Meeting on such matters as the time of the seventh high-level meeting, the time of the notification on the members of the three proposed subcommittees and the time of their first meetings, and the time of the second delegates contact to discuss the formation and operation of the projected South-North joint nuclear control commission.

The text of the joint announcement was as follows :

At the sixth South-North high-level meeting held in Pyongyang on

February 19, 1992, the South and the North effectuated the Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-aggression and Exchanges and Cooperation between the South and the North and the Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, and signed and effectuated the Agreement on the Formation and Operation of Subcommittees of the South-North High-Level Meeting.

As the South and the North pledged at the historic meeting to faithfully implement the South-North agreement and the joint declaration of denuclearization, they agreed as follows :

1. The South and the North have agreed to notify each other of their respective lists of the chairmen and members of the South-North Political Subcommittee, South-North Military Subcommittee and South-North Exchanges and Cooperation Subcommittee on March 6, 1992.

2. The South and the North have agreed to hold the first meeting of the South-North Political Subcommittee on March 9, 1992 at Peace House in the southern sector of Panmunjom.

3. The South and the North have agreed to hold the first meeting of the South-North Military Subcommittee on March 13, 1992 at Tongilkak in the northern sector of Panmunjom.

4. The South and the North have agreed to hold the first meeting of the South-North Exchanges and Cooperation Subcommittee on March 18, 1992 at Peace House in the southern sector of Panmunjom.

5. The South and the North have agreed to hold the second delegates contact to discuss the formation and operation of a South-North Joint Nuclear Control Commission on February 27, 1992 at Tongilkak in the northern sector of Panmunjom following the first contact held on February 19, 1992.

6. The South and the North have agreed to hold the seventh South-North high-level meeting in Seoul in May 5 through 8, 1992.

Pyongyang, February 20, 1992

The following was the gist of the keynote speeches made by the two sides at the meeting :

The Gist of the South's Keynote Speech

Northern delegates,

If the Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression and Exchanges and Cooperation between the South and the North is to definitely end longstanding intra-Korean confrontation and open a new age of reconciliation and cooperation, I think it is time to deeply reflect on its significance from the standpoint of our national history. This is crucial to identifying the right direction along which we must advance to achieve durable peace and peaceful unification in response to the wishes of the entire Korean people.

I would like our two sides to jointly confirm that the South-North agreement that has just entered into force represents the basic framework within which new intra-Korean relations must evolve and that this pact has the following historical significance and character:

First, its foremost historical significance lies in the fact that it is a product of independent South-North efforts based on the principle that intra-Korean issues must be settled by Koreans themselves. Nobody else can bring peace or unification to us. Even if others try to give us peace and unification, this will not translate into our own peace and unification.

It is entirely up to us, the South and the North, to secure lasting peace on this land and to sufficiently improve intra-Korean relations so that unification will be achieved on the principles of independence, peace and democracy. We have already established a precedent that shows that all issues on the Korean Peninsula can be resolved through direct discussions between us.

In particular, the South-North basic agreement is of immeasurable value in that it represents the first official pact concluded between the responsible government authorities on both sides since the land was divided. This has given us the confidence that we can resolve issues on our own. This confidence will give new impetus to developing intra-Korean relations in the coming days.

Second, the objective of the South-North basic agreement is to end

longstanding intra-Korean enmity and confrontation and to introduce a new era of concord and cooperation. The Korean Peninsula has been fraught with tensions threatening to erupt into war, as hostility and confrontation has persisted between the South and the North for nearly a half century. The barrier of division has continued to grow taller. One cause of this frightful situation has been the fact that both the South and the North have refused to recognize each other as a real political entity, regarding each other as something that must be destroyed.

This is why the South-North basic agreement provides that both parties shall recognize and respect the other's political system, shall not interfere in each other's internal affairs and shall not attempt to destroy or overthrow each other. Further, it provides that South-North relations must develop into a partnership based on a spirit of concord. Now that the Cold War that used to pit the East against the West has faded into history and a new world order characterized by reconciliation and cooperation is emerging, there is no reason that the South and the North must remain the only Cold War holdouts. In this context, the South-North basic agreement accurately reflects the yearning of our people and the imperatives of the times by providing for the transformation of the existing intra-Korean relations into those of concord and cooperation.

Third, the South-North basic agreement is also aimed at resolving intra-Korean tension and establishing enduring peace on this land. Without durable peace between the South and the North, it will not be possible to open a new era of concord and cooperation and to move forward toward peaceful unification. By endorsing the South-North basic agreement, both sides have pledged not to invade the other by armed force and to abide by the existing Armistice Agreement. We have also promised to peacefully resolve differences and disputes through dialogue and negotiations. Furthermore, both the South and the North have undertaken to make joint efforts to transform the present truce into a solid peace structure, to build military trust and further to reduce arms. This means that the South-North basic agreement represents the framework for converting the present precarious state into a rock-solid state of peace.

In this connection, both the South and the North have further strengthened their determination to achieve durable peace by putting into effect the Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, thus formally declaring before the Korean people and the world that both of us will not possess or use nuclear weapons.

Fourth, yet another objective of the South-North basic agreement is to build a single national community through promoting peaceful coexistence and mutual prosperity by expanding exchanges and cooperation in the economic and all other fields. The quickest way to deepen mutual understanding and trust and restore national homogeneity is through free exchanges of people, goods and information. It must be emphasized that there exists a great potential for South-North trade and economic cooperation.

If we steadily build on the complementarity of our two economies, we will be able to greatly foster balanced development of our land, thereby dramatically advancing the welfare of the entire people. Businessmen from the South and the North have already begun negotiations for economic exchanges and cooperation. Accordingly, we must throw open the doors wide to enable such activities to grow increasingly fruitful.

If we push both the resolution of intra-Korean political and military issues and the implementation of exchanges and cooperation like the two wheels of a cart, our relations will be improved rapidly, leading to steady development of common national spheres of activity in all fields.

Fifth, the ultimate purpose of the South-North basic agreement is not only to build foundations for peaceful unification but also to bring the day of peaceful unification closer. The preamble of the pact expressly states that both parties recognize that "their relations, not being a relationship between states, constitute a special interim relationship stemming from the process towards unification." It says further that both parties "pledge to exert joint efforts to achieve peaceful unification." This means that the South-North basic agreement is aimed not merely at securing peace and achieving reconciliation and cooperation but also at attaining peaceful unification through such efforts.

The greatest wish of our 70 million people in the South and the North is the peaceful unification of our homeland. In response, the authorities of both the South and the North have just fashioned a basic framework for securing lasting peace and realizing reconciliation and cooperation in an interim stage toward peaceful unification. Without durable peace underpinned by reconciliation and cooperation, there cannot be peaceful unification.

Hence President Roh Tae-woo declared, in proposing the Korean National Community Unification Formula, that a unified homeland must be a single national community in which every citizen is the master of his own destiny, that is to say, a democratic country that guarantees everyone freedom, human rights and the right to pursue happiness. From the standpoint of the yearning of the entire Korean people and the current of national history, it goes without saying that a unified homeland should be a truly and fully democratic society in which human dignity and worth are valued like nothing else.

If and when our people become one and build an affluent country while upholding national interests and self-esteem, we will become a leading member of the international community in shaping a better world order and in contributing to world peace and well-being. Both the South and the North must assume such a broad perspective on the future of our people in implementing the South-North basic agreement with the goal of laying the groundwork for peaceful unification.

As discussed above, I believe that both the South-North basic agreement and the Joint Declaration of Denuclearization have truly profound historical significance. Both documents incorporate the spirit of the three basic principles of unification described in the July 4 (1972) South-North Joint Communique. They also embody the shared understanding that progressive approaches should be taken to peaceful unification by moving through an interim stage featuring reconciliation, the establishment of durable peace and expanding exchanges and cooperation. By wisely overcoming the challenges of the present historic transition and building upon the precious accords that have just entered into force, I do not doubt that we

will be able to stand tall as one developed and prosperous nation in the fast approaching 21st century.

Northern delegates,

Now that both the South-North basic agreement and the Joint Declaration of Denuclearization have entered into force, domestic and international attention is focused on whether or not those accords will be implemented as they should. The life of an agreement resides in its implementation. An agreement that is not implemented is not even worth the paper on which it is written. Moreover, an ignored agreement merely deepens distrust on both sides. It is better not to have signed such an accord in the first place.

South-North agreements represent joint promises that the authorities of both sides have made before the 70 million Korean people and the world at large. Moreover, the accords that have just gone into effect carry profound historical significance. Accordingly, we must take utmost care to implement them to the letter.

That is why the South-North basic agreement is not a mere statement of broad principles but is composed of specific provisions to thoroughly ensure its implementation, especially by prescribing institutional devices for carrying out the agreed terms. By abiding by and implementing this pact in good faith, we must avoid past follies. To that end, both sides must, first of all, reflect once more on the spirit of the basic agreement and take a respectful attitude toward it,

Our side issued the Special Declaration in the Interest of National Self-Esteem, Unification and Prosperity on July 7, 1988, and proposed the Korean National Community Unification Formula on September 11, 1989. In these documents, we emphasized that the South and the North must cease to regard each other only as an adversary or a rival and instead embark together on a path of cooperation as members of one ethnic family in order to promote prosperity for both. We have since repeatedly stressed this position.

Furthermore, we have actually taken concrete steps to advance the goal of completing a single national community through expanding excha-

nges and cooperation between the two areas of Korea based on mutual trust and respect. For example, following the July 7 Special Declaration, our side discontinued anti-North broadcasts in keeping with its spirit. Other measures have also been taken to create a better environment for South-North reconciliation. We have drawn up plans to establish road, railroad, telecommunications and postal links between the two parts of Korea in order to be better prepared for intra-Korean exchanges and cooperation in the economic, scientific, technological, athletic, cultural, journalistic and other fields.

The nature of South-North confrontation is such that it will not be feasible to end it overnight. It can only be resolved progressively when both sides act on their own initiatives to devise and implement measures one after another to promote concord and cooperation. I take this opportunity to make clear once more that in keeping with the spirit of the South-North basic agreement, our side will faithfully carry out agreed things under any circumstance. We expect you to act likewise in equal good faith.

Now is the time to end idle talk and get down to the real business of fulfilling our promises. It is my conviction that if we, the delegates, keep alive the spirit of compromise that has just led to the effectuation of this basic agreement and continue to meticulously endeavor to satisfy the wishes of our people, it will be possible to implement our accords just as intended, no matter what difficulties may lie ahead.

My view is that the easiest way for both parties to show to the whole world a tangible symbol of our determination to carry out the South-North basic agreement is by solving the issue of separated families. Solving this most urgent humanitarian issue would be a hallmark of South-North reconciliation and improved relations.

And yet, the South-North Red Cross talks that were begun 20 years ago to resolve humanitarian issues have gotten nowhere as yet. To be honest, this prolonged deadlock over the issue of dispersed families is leading many compatriots in both the South and the North to suspect that all other South-North accords may also remain in limbo indefinitely. This truly chagrins us.

Accordingly, we ought, first of all, to permit at least people aged 70 or older to visit their loved ones in the other area of Korea with the aim of alleviating their acute sorrow. This would doubtlessly enhance both domestic and international confidence that the South-North basic agreement will be implemented as intended. Moreover, the entire Korean people would see with their own eyes that the land is indeed advancing into an era of South-North reconciliation and cooperation.

Northern delegates,

Today, the South and the North have entered into a new relationship characterized by a spirit of reconciliation and cooperation, casting aside their past enmity and confrontation. We are about to run together along the path to a single national community conducive to greater development and prosperity, and eventually to full unification. To that end, both the South and the North must reflect once again on the historic mission given to us, the delegates to the South-North High-Level Talks. We must then mutually reaffirm the duties that our talks must discharge in the coming days and jointly redefine our role accordingly.

In this regard, I think it is safe to say that we have just successfully accomplished our first-phase tasks by putting the South-North basic agreement into effect and by adopting the agreement on the formation of three committees within the framework of our talks.

And yet, the mere fact that the South-North basic agreement has entered into force and the said three committees are going to be established will not automatically resolve the whole range of problems involved in ending political and military confrontation and implementing multifaceted exchanges and cooperation that the South-North High-Level Talks are mandated to solve.

The key to smooth implementation of our accords lies in how appropriately we, the delegates, conduct our talks. This is indeed the second-phase task of these high-level talks. If we can say we have served as the midwife for the birth of the South-North basic agreement, we must now build a solid bridge to peaceful unification through ensuring, by making alterations when necessary, that the terms of the agreement will be carried out without

a hitch. In this context, I believe that our talks must tackle the following tasks from now on, if we are to decisively resolve intra-Korean political and military confrontation and carry out multifaceted exchanges and cooperation:

1. To ensure that the South-North basic agreement will be faithfully implemented and abided by;

2. To guide the three planned committees, and to examine, finalize and put into effect the suggestions that they work out;

3. To adjust and resolve differences between the said committees and the planned joint commissions and to discuss and decide matters to be referred to those committees and commissions; and

4. To discuss and resolve new issues that might arise between the South and the North.

In this connection, I think it advisable to hold our future talks regularly four times a year, with the understanding that extraordinary sessions may additionally be convened as occasion demands, while the composition of the delegations and the site of each meeting will continue to be determined through discussions at preparatory working-level contacts or simply according to past practices.

Now I would like to explain our views on how to operate the planned committees and commissions. Now that the agreement on the formation of committees within the framework of these talks has just entered into force, they are expected to go into operation within a month from now, with their main duty to be the drafting of various protocols on the implementation of the South-North basic agreement. They will also discuss and work out plans, on a priority basis, to establish South-North Liaison Offices in Panmunjom, as well as joint commissions on military affairs, economic exchanges and cooperation and the like so that these implementing organizations will be able to come into being within three months from now as scheduled.

If these various consultative and implementing bodies are to function smoothly and briskly, I believe it is imperative for both sides to make their best efforts to translate the spirit and letter of this agreement into

action. I hope and expect that these organizations will ensure that the terms of reconciliation, nonaggression, exchanges and cooperation will be carried out in a balanced and orderly fashion.

The Gist of the North's Keynote Speech

Delegates of the South side,

It may well be said that the North-South high-level talks which was held six times including the current session since its inception has done a great deal of work and achieved excellent results living up to the aspiration and expectation of the nation and, by so doing, has creditably carried out its duties of the first stage.

With the effectuation of the basic agreements we are confronted with more important tasks to ensure their successful implementation.

The high-level talks does not conclude its work by the current session, but is going over to the stage of solving the practical, concrete problems with the enlarged setup for different sectors.

In this connection, I would like to express our views on the principal tasks the North-South high-level talks should carry out in future.

First, it must positively promote the work of subcommittees.

Helping the subcommittees function in an active manner is essential for the smooth fulfilment of the agreements.

The smooth implemenation of the agreements mainly depends on how the subcommittees function, and in future our main efforts should be directed to ensuring the smooth running of the subcommittees.

For this purpose, the high-level talks must give answers to and arbitrate properly in the main disputes which may arise in interpreting the text of the agreements and with regards to the way of their implementation so that the concrete practical way of implementation of the agreements consistent with their spirit be perfected as early as possible.

The high-level talks must ensure lateral coordination of the subcommittees, properly readjust the provisions of the agreement lest there be overlapping or the void and finally examine, confirm and endorse the provisions

of the agreement.

The pending issue confronting us is when the subcommittees are to be called and start their work.

As for this, according to the provision of the agreement reached between the two sides, the subcommittees are to be formed within one month from the day the agreement comes into force. So, we propose that three different subcommittees be formed by March 10 and the opposite side be notified of this and that these subcommittees hold their first meeting at intervals of several days beginning in mid-March in the order of the political, military and the cooperation and exchange subcommittees.

Secondly, the joint committee should be run well.

The joint committee is an executive body for the implementation of the North-South agreement through which the matters that have been agreed upon and finalized in the subcommittees are put into practice.

Therefore, the proper running of the joint committee is important for making the provisions of the agreement be implemented in time and prove their worth actually.

The high-level talks must regularly look into the affairs of the joint committee and positively help it so that the agreements reached between the both sides be fulfilled correctly.

In order to settle the questions which may crop up in the running of the joint committee and in the fulfilment of the provisions of the agreement, appropriate measures should be taken in time in the framework of the high-level talks or of the subcommittees.

At the same time, the joint nuclear control committee should be formed as is envisaged in the denuclearization declaration, and due attention be paid to helping it to fulfil its function satisfactorily.

Thirdly, it is necessary to lay down the proper general procedures for agreement and its translation into practice.

How to finalize the agreement on the questions discussed in the subcommittees and what procedure to follow to implement it is an important matter which is decisive of success of our talks.

In this connection we already proposed the general principle of pac-

kage agreement and its simultaneous implementation at the second and third session of the talks.

Even now we consider that the principle of package agreement and its simultaneous implementation is a most reasonable way for the smooth implementation of the agreement.

Your former proposal that agreement should be reached and then implemented case by case may appear at first glance to be the shortcut to the solution of the question. But it will rather delay the solution of the question since the sectors and problems which the both sides preferentially are interested in and want to tackle differ from each other.

Moreover, since all provisions of the agreement are closely linked with each other, even in case an agreement is reached concerning one question, it is quite irrational and impossible in practice to implement the agreement immediately.

Of course, we have no objection to the suggestion that the questions of primary concern to the both sides and the questions which can be discussed and agreed upon comparatively independently of other questions should be considered case by case and implemented immediately.

Fourthly, the high-level talks must discuss and solve the important questions to be settled urgently which may arise within the framework of the North-South agreement.

The questions which can be scarcely foreseen at present may crop up in the course of implementing the North-South agreement.

Allowing for this, the provision providing for amendment is laid down in the North-South agreement.

The high-level talks must discuss and solve the important, pressing questions which may arise between the North and the South, bypassing the subcommittees, and foresee the amendment of the agreement, if it is necessary.

To this end, the North-South high-level talks should continue to develop in depth its work and accomplish its mission.

Part V

Delegates Contacts to Discuss The Issue of Forming and Operating South-North Joint Nuclear Control Commission

1. First Contact

The first delegates contact to discuss the issue of forming and operating a South-North Joint Nuclear Control Commission pursuant to the Joint Declaration of Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula was held at the Baekhwawon Guest House in Pyongyang during the sixth South-North high-level meeting.

In the course of discussions to adopt the Joint Declaration of Denuclearization and throughout the delegates contacts prior to the sixth high-level meeting on the formation of subcommittees, the South called for the early discussion of the issue of forming a joint nuclear control commission. But, no delegates contacts on this issue had ever been held due to the North's passive posture until the first contact took place during the sixth high-level meeting.

The first contact, held soon after the first-day session of the sixth meeting was adjourned, was attended from the southern side by Lim Dong-won and Gong Ro-myong and from the North Choe Wu-jin and Kim Yong-chol. The South produced a draft agreement on the formation and operation of the joint nuclear control commission, presenting its position toward the commission and inviting the North to join in its discussion.

In item-by-item explanation, the South, regarding Article 1 (composition), suggested that the commission, like subcommittees, be composed of seven members from each side including a chairman with the rank of vice minister. As for its function in Article 2, the South offered eight separate duties including the selection of the targets of inspection like nuclear facilities and materials and the procedure and method of inspection. Regarding Article 3 (operation), the South suggested that commission meetings be classified into regular meetings and special ones with regular meetings taking place in every three months.

In a bid to forestall the North's possible indefinite postponement of nuclear inspection, the South suggested in Article 4 that inspection rules be adopted within one month of the first regular meeting of the commission.

The South's version also provided in Article 5 (effectuation) that the agreement would go into force with signing by the prime ministers and that pilot inspections be conducted into two installations and places selected by each other within one month of the effectuation of the agreement.

North Korea, meanwhile, said they would produce their own at the next contact, and offered several opinions as follows.

The North made remarks that differed from the one made at the time of the adoption of the *Joint Declaration of Denuclearization*. They argued that although the South declared the non-existence of nuclear arms on its land, they would have to directly verify it before they could believe this. Also asserting that matters aimed at faithfully implementing the *Joint Declaration of Denuclearization* should be included in an agreement, the North called for total inspections instead of pilot inspections, saying that inspection of a couple of places won't be enough to dispel misgivings.

The first delegates contact proceeded in the form of exchanging opinions on the South's version because of the North's insincere posture in which they even failed to produce any of their version. The two sides agreed to hold the second contact at Panmunjom on February 27.

2. Second Contact

The second delegates contact to discuss the formation and operation of a South-North joint nuclear control commission was held at Tongilkak in the northern sector of Panmunjom on Feb-

ruary 27.

From the outset, the North complained that the South's version produced at the first contact did not involve U.S. military nuclear weapons and installations in the South in the list of targets of nuclear inspections.

The North also argued that the South's version was focused only on the issue of inspections rather than dealing duly with overall matters related to the implementation of the Joint Declaration of Denuclearization. They reiterated the logic of a nuclear-free zone by claiming that the South's draft missed the issue of how to cope jointly with external nuclear threats and the issue of international guarantee of the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.

North Korea then set forth their own version of a draft agreement on the formation and operation of a South-North joint nuclear control commission.

The draft agreement laid down by the North gave the strong impression that the North was trying to delay the issue of nuclear inspections, a delay which has invited misgivings and keen concern from within and without.

The North insisted that inspections could be made only after separate agreements were reached on the execution of each of the three items of the Joint Declaration of Denuclearization—Item 1 (prohibition of testing, manufacture, production, receipt, possession, stockpiling and use of nuclear weapons), Item 2 (peaceful use of nuclear energy) and Item 3 (non-possession of nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment facilities). They thus made the adoption of these separate agreements a sort of prerequisite to the preparation of inspection rules.

And, as against the South's call that inspection rules necessary for mutual inter-Korean nuclear inspections should be prepared within one month of the first regular meeting of the nuclear

control commission, the North's version simply said that inspections may be made within 20 days after the adoption of separate agreements for the implementation of the Joint Declaration and rules on inspection. The North thus failed to give any specific time ceiling for the adoption of inspection rules.

Moreover, the North, showing insincere attitude, insisted that a joint nuclear control commission should discuss ways to jointly cope with nuclear threats from outside and secure international guarantee of the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. This was the renewal of their assertion which the North formally withdrew at the time of delegates contacts held toward the close of last year to discuss the adoption of the joint declaration of denuclearization.

The North was thus raising again the issue of a nuclear-free zone focused on the prohibition of nuclear umbrella and of the introduction of nuclear weapons as linked to their demand for the withdrawal of American forces from Korea and the suspension of joint South Korea-U.S. military training exercises.

North Korea further rejected the South's proposal to conduct pilot inspections of a couple of places within one month of the effectuation of the Agreement on the Formation and Operation of South-North Joint Nuclear Control Commission so as to dispel early the suspicion of the nuclear arms development by North Korea. The North asserted that the issue of inspections was a business that fell on the function of a joint nuclear control commission.

And, the North insisted that the delegates contacts were intended to discuss the implementation of the Joint Declaration of Denuclearization whereas the South said they were to discuss the formation and operation of a joint nuclear control commission.

At the second contact, the North produced their version of a draft agreement for the first time, enabling the two sides to

exchange their opinions on the versions produced. They decided to have a third contact to carry on their discussion.

3. Third Contact

South and North Korea held the third delegates contact at Peace House in the southern sector of Panmunjom on March 3 to continue their discussion on a proposed agreement on the formation of a South-North joint nuclear control commission.

Taking the position that a joint nuclear control commission should under all circumstances be inaugurated by March 18 as stipulated in Item 5 of the Joint Declaration of Denuclearization if only to facilitate early nuclear inspection of North Korea, the South offered a modified draft agreement prepared in consideration of the North's version.

The South deleted clauses about the establishment of a working-level committee and about listening to experts' opinions, while resetting the number of support persons of commission at six from each side. The South also changed the frequency of the regular meetings of the commission from three months to two.

In connection with the issue of inspections, the South, taking into account the position of the North, suggested that rules on mutual inspections be adopted within one month of the first regular meeting of a joint control commission and inspections be made within 20 days after the adoption of inspection rules. The South again stressed the need for pilot inspections so as to remove early suspicion about the North's nuclear arms development.

The South also presented its opinions about the North's draft agreement set forth at the time of the second contact.

First, the South pointed out that the North's assertion that

inspection rules could be prepared only after separate agreements were adopted on the implementation of the Joint Declaration of Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, amounted to an attempt to delay nuclear inspections.

The South stressed that the Joint Declaration sets forth obligations to be respected by the South and the North, and contains both sides' pledges to abide by such obligations. The South said what the two sides should do under the declaration is to carry out what they pledged to do, pointing out that when mutual inspections are conducted pursuant to the inspection rules to be prepared by the joint control commission, it could be known whether or not the provisions of Items 1, 2 and 3 of the joint declaration are observed. If either side's implementation were found unsatisfactory, then it could be discussed and resolved at the joint control commission.

Second, with respect to the North's call for joint measures to resist external nuclear threats and to ensure international guarantee among nuclear powers surrounding the Korean peninsula, the South maintained that the Joint Declaration of Denuclearization was meant for both sides to implement the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula on their own regardless of the alleged nuclear threats from outside or international guarantee.

The South said such a demand was unrealistic and meaningless, noting that North Korea first raised the issue during the delegates contacts on the adoption of the joint declaration but later withdrew it by themselves.

Third, North Korea opposed inspections based on reciprocity. They were insisting that they would have to inspect all suspected nuclear areas of the South while allowing only one or two places of their own to be inspected. The South pointed out that this ran counter to the theretofore respected unwritten rules.

The South said that since nuclear inspections are mandatory

in nature with the will of an inspecting party being respected, mutual inspections should be made on a fair and equal basis. It stressed that if the principle of reciprocity were not properly maintained, there could be a lot of problems with the decision on the size of inspection teams and the time and procedure of inspection.

Moreover, the South told the North that if the projected joint nuclear control commission could not be inaugurated within a prescribed period due to the undue demand for the adoption of separate agreements to ensure the implementation of the Joint Declaration of Denuclearization or if mutual nuclear inspections could not be made at an early date, it might cause serious problems in inter-Korean relations.

However, North Korea stressed the need for the adoption of separate agreements to implement the joint declaration, reasoning that the joint declaration provides for only a basic direction. They thus made the adoption of separate agreements as a de facto prerequisite to the planned preparation of rules on inspection.

The North also adhered to their claim that the issue of joint inter-Korean steps to cope with the outside nuclear threats and to ensure international guarantee of the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula should be included in the function of the joint nuclear control commission.

Besides, the North rejected the South's suggestion that rules on inspections be prepared within one month of the first regular meeting of the joint nuclear control commission and that pilot inspections be conducted into the same numbers of objects within one month of the effectuation of an agreement on the formation of the nuclear control commission. North Korea asserted that these were part of the business of the nuclear control commission.

At the contact, the North rather tried to shift the blame for a delay in the adoption of an agreement on the nuclear control

commission to the South, complaining that the South was “placing an artificial obstacle in the way of the inauguration of the joint nuclear control commission” and “shunning nuclear inspections.”

Meanwhile, the two sides neared an accord on the considerable part of the provisions of a draft agreement on the formation of the joint nuclear control commission. On substantial matters, however, the two sides continued to differ. They decided to carry on their discussions at the next contact.

4. Fourth Contact

The South and the North held the fourth delegates contact at Tongilkak in the northern sector of Panmunjom on March 4 to discuss the issue of forming and operating a South-North joint nuclear control commission.

Also at the contact, the South urged the North to agree on setting a time ceiling for the adoption of inspection rules as well as on pilot inspections. It stressed that the North should show sincerity toward adopting an agreement on the formation of a joint nuclear control commission so that the commission could be formed by March 18.

The North, however, kept urging the adoption of separate agreements to ensure the implementation of the Joint Declaration of Denuclearization, trying to make it a prerequisite to the preparation of rules on inspections. They also made an unveiled attempt to delay mutual inter-Korean nuclear inspections by insisting that the phrase “within the soonest possible time” should be used in place of a time limit for the adoption of inspection rules. In another show of their negativism, the North refused to discuss the question of pilot inspection with the excuse that the issue should rather be handled by a nuclear control commission to be set up. Thus

no progress was made over essential matters.

With regard to the North's insistence on the inclusion of a phrase about international guarantee of the Korean peninsula's denuclearization, the South noted that North Korea already withdrew this issue during contacts to discuss the joint declaration toward the close of 1991. It said that the North's raising again of an issue which they had withdrawn could not but be taken as an attempt to delay nuclear inspections.

The South made it clear that an agreement on inspection rules should be adopted within the agreed-on deadline (within one month of the first regular meeting of a joint nuclear control commission) for the adoption of inspection rules if only to dispel misgivings and distrust the North incur from the rest of the international community.

As no complete agreement was reached at the contact, the two sides decided to hold the fifth delegates contact on March 6 to continue their negotiations on disputed items.

5. Fifth Contact

The fifth delegates contact to discuss the formation and operation of a South-North joint nuclear control commission was held at Peace House in the southern sector of Panmunjom on the morning of March 6.

At the contact, the two sides resumed item-by-item debate on the two versions of a draft agreement. They were near an accord on some contents, but still differed on basic items.

On Article 1, the North accepted the South's offer of making seven the number of commission members from each side. Regarding Article 2, the North deleted the clauses about joint inter-Korean steps against outside nuclear threats and the issue of interna-

tional guarantee of Korea's denuclearization. Nevertheless, they asserted they would raise this issue either at a nuclear control commission, military subcommittee or at a high-level meeting in the future.

On the frequency of commission meetings in Article 3, the South proposed that "a commission meeting may be held at any time when an either party requests it," but the North insisted that "a meeting may be held at any time through mutual agreement." A decision on this clause was therefore withheld.

On the essential question of a time ceiling for the adoption of rules on inspections in Article 4, the South maintained the position that "inspections rules should be prepared within one month of the first meeting of the joint nuclear control commission and inspections should begin within 20 days thereafter."

North Korea, however, held fast to the idea that "inspection rules shall be prepared at an early date and inspections shall begin within 20 days of the adoption of rules on inspection." The North maintained that if the two sides could not reach an accord, it would be better to delete Article 4 altogether.

Regarding procedures for the effectuation of agreed items in Article 5, the North insisted that "major agreed matters should go through procedures necessary for effectuation." But, the South said no procedures for effectuation were necessary.

In connection with pilot inspections in Article 6, the South again urged the North to accept pilot inspections, whereas the North insisted on overall inspections instead of pilot inspections, asserting that the two sides should be enabled to inspect all suspected places in each other's areas without being bound by the principle of the same number.

Especially on the clause of Article 4 (time ceiling for the adoption of inspection rules) on which the two sides differed widely, the South urged the North to produce a modified version

setting forth a time ceiling, pointing out that if there were no time ceiling, the projected joint nuclear commission might fail to operate properly. It went on to stress that if the North could not lay down a time ceiling, then they should agree to “pilot inspections within one month.”

But, the North seemed to attempt to put off indefinitely the preparation of inspection rules, asserting that it was rather the function of the joint nuclear control commission to prepare inspection rules and, therefore, the time ceiling for the preparation of such rules could not be set at delegates contacts. Thus no progress was made on substantial issues at the fifth contact neither.

6. Sixth Contact

The sixth delegates contact to discuss the formation and operation of a South-North joint nuclear control commission was held at Tongilkak in the northern sector of Panmujom on March 10.

In a speech at the contact, the South said that the insincere posture the North showed throughout the five past contacts only added to the suspicion of the North trying to shun or delay nuclear inspections as long as possible. The South stressed that if the North should reject early nuclear inspections and, no joint nuclear control commission could be formed, it would lead to the non-implementation of the Joint Declaration of Denuclearization, posing a serious problem to overall inter-Korean relations.

The South then appraised the performance of delegates contacts, and laid down its position.

First, the South pointed out that the North’s attitude toward the delegates contacts was insincere without breaking away from the frame of confrontational ideas.

The South noted that the North rejected the South's proposal from the time of the discussion of the Joint Declaration of Denuclearization that an agreement on the formation of a joint nuclear control commission should be reached before the sixth high-level meeting in February so that it could be signed and put into effect at the sixth meeting. It pointed out that at the time of the first delegates contact in Pyongyang, the North did not produce even its version of the proposed agreement.

As a way of showing another evidence of their insincerity, the South said that the North raised again the issue of "joint steps against external nuclear threats" which the North itself withdrew at the time of the discussion of the Joint Declaration; their insistence on the adoption of "separate agreements to ensure implementation of the Joint Declaration" as a de facto prerequisite to nuclear inspections; and attempts to shift to the South the blame for the delay in the adoption of an agreement on the formation of a joint nuclear control commission and to make unsettled ideas of their own fait accompli.

Second, as to the North's claim that the issue of setting a time ceiling for the adoption of rules on inspection cannot be the business of the delegates contacts, the South maintained that since an Agreement on the Formation and Operation of South-North Joint Nuclear Control Commission is to be signed by the prime ministers of the two sides, the delegates contacts had entire responsibility and competence to clearly define the duties and function of the joint commission.

Third, with regard to the North's idea advanced at the time of the fifth contact that "an agreement be prepared with the matters agreed on thus far or the time of the first meeting of the joint commission should be set regardless of any agreement," the South said it couldn't but question the attempt of the North to adopt an ambiguous agreement with the exclusion of the issue of inspec-

tion, a pivotal item of the proposed agreement.

Faced with persisting rejection by the North of any time ceiling for the adoption of inspection rules, the South said it was willing to make a concession and allow up to two months' time ceiling. The South then urged the North to set forth a time ceiling which it thinks proper for nuclear inspections.

Meanwhile, the North, in their speech, offered to delete Article 4 (time ceiling for the adoption of inspection rules) and, while producing a draft agreement consisting only of those items on which the two sides neared an accord, insisted that the proposed joint nuclear control commission could fully function even on such a simplified agreement. The North also wanted to leave unsettled items to the joint commission to be formed.

At the sixth contact, the North made it clear that they were not interested in setting forth any time ceiling for the preparation of inspection rules, and insisted that unsettled items should be left to the joint commission. The North thus held fast to their policy of delaying nuclear inspections. Unable to make any progress in essential items, the two sides decided to have the seventh contact on March 14.

7. Seventh Contact

The seventh delegates contact to discuss the issue of forming and operating a joint nuclear control commission was held at Peace House in the southern sector of Panmunjom on March 14.

Through the six delegates contacts at Panmunjom, the two sides could near an accord on such basic items as the composition, function and operation of the proposed nuclear control commission, while the North withdrew their demand that the agreement

include clauses calling for joint inter-Korean steps against outside nuclear threats and ensure international guarantee of Korea's de-nuclearization. But, there still remained differences on several items including the issue of the time ceiling for the adoption of rules on inspections.

The South, while firmly holding to the basic principle of prompting North Korea to accept nuclear inspections at an early date, continued to negotiate with the North in a bid to work out an agreement at the seventh contact.

In fact, if the issue of forming the commission kept dragging on, it would delay the formation of the projected nuclear control commission designed primarily to facilitate nuclear inspections of North Korea, a delay which would only give a good excuse to the North Koreans trying to shun nuclear inspections. The South also feared that if the nuclear control commission could not be formed within the designated period of time, a projected institutional device to urge the North to accept nuclear inspections would dissipate.

Under the circumstances, the two sides went ahead with discussions at the contact after deciding to exclude the issue of setting the time ceiling for the adoption of inspection rules from the clauses of an Agreement on the Formation and Operation of Joint Nuclear Control Commission and to include it instead in a joint announcement to be adopted.

In the discussion of a draft joint announcement, the two sides agreed on the time of signing by the prime ministers and of the exchange of signed copies, on the time of the first meeting of the joint nuclear control commission, and on the time of the notification of the lists of commission members to each other. But, they differed on how to describe the time ceiling for the adoption of inspection rules and on whether a joint announcement should include a clause about pilot nuclear inspections.

The South, true to the provisions of Item 4 of the Joint Declaration of Denuclearization, made a compromise proposal that “the nuclear control commission shall discuss and resolve the issue of adopting inspection rules before any other discussion” and that “mutual inspections shall be conducted within two months of the first meeting of the nuclear control commission.” On the issue of pilot inspections, the South suggested that this question should be handled as soon as the joint commission was inaugurated.

The North, however, offered to make the clause at issue read “(the delegates contacts) decided to advise the two sides to make joint efforts to adopt an agreement necessary for the verification of the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, including that of nuclear weapons and nuclear bases, in a period of about two months after the first meeting of the joint nuclear control commission.” The North refused to use the clause of pilot inspections (Article 6 of the South’s version).

In the end, the two sides agreed to make the clause “(the two sides) shall jointly endeavor to adopt documents necessary for the verification of the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula during a period of two months after the first meeting of the joint nuclear control commission, and understood that inspections shall be conducted within 20 days of the adoption of such documents.” The two sides thus settled the controversial issue of setting the time ceiling for the adoption of inspection rules.

The two sides also adjusted the items which were yet to be decided on among those of the draft Agreement on the Formation and Operation of South-North Joint Nuclear Control Commission. The adjusted clause about the frequency of commission meetings was “meetings may be held at any time through mutual agreement.” The clause about the procedure for the effectuation of agreed items additionally contained the phrase “...depending

on situations, important documents agreed on between the two sides may take effect from the date of the exchange of signed copies after they went through procedures necessary for effectuation.”

About the contents of the joint statement made public separately through mutual agreement, the North was led to agree to a specific time ceiling instead of the phrase “...at the soonest possible date...” as they adhered to earlier, thus enabling the South to push through its basic policy of getting the North to accept nuclear inspections at an early date.

The South’s demand to specify a time ceiling for the adoption of inspection rules in the agreement on the joint commission, was intended to prompt the North to withdraw the unreasonable prerequisites they had set, to neutralize, through the setting of a specific time ceiling, the North’s inspection-delaying tactics, and to require the North to accept nuclear inspections early.

As the time frame of nuclear inspections was set at the contact, a resolution to the nuclear issue of the Korean peninsula has become possible owing largely to the projected inauguration of a joint nuclear control commission.

Copies of the agreement on the joint commission, signed by the prime ministers of the two sides, were exchanged twice on March 17 and 19. Simultaneously with the effectuation of the agreement on March 19, the first meeting of the joint commission was held to begin discussing in earnest the issue of adopting rules on mutual inter-Korean inspections.

The primary task of the joint nuclear control commission was to work out effective rules on inspections. The South intends to resolve the issue of nuclear inspections speedily within the institutional frame of the joint nuclear control commission and thereby dispel suspicion and concern at home and abroad about North Korea’s nuclear arms development.

The texts of the Agreement on the Formation and Operation of the South-North Joint Nuclear Control Commission and the Joint Statement were as follows :

*Agreement on the Formation and Operation of South-North
Joint Nuclear Control Commission*

The South and the North have agreed to form and operate the South-North Joint Nuclear Control Commission (hereinafter referred to as "Joint Nuclear Control Commission") as follows with a view to implementing the Joint Declaration of Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

Article 1. The Joint Nuclear Control Commission shall be formed as follows :

- (1) The Joint Nuclear Control Commission shall be formed with seven persons including a chairman and a vice chairman from each side. Of them one or two persons shall be active military servicemen.*
- (2) In the event of the reshuffle of the members of the Joint Nuclear Control Commission, it shall be notified to the other side in advance.*
- (3) Support personnel to the Joint Nuclear Control Commission shall be six. If necessary, the number may be adjusted through mutual agreement.*

Article 2. The Joint Nuclear Control Commission shall discuss and execute the following items :

- (1) The issue of adopting and handling auxiliary documents and related matters in accordance with the discussion of the question of implementing the Joint Declaration of Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.*
- (2) Matters related to the exchange of information (including information on nuclear facilities and nuclear materials and suspected nuclear weapons and nuclear installations) necessary for the verification of the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.*
- (3) Matters related to the formation and operation of inspection teams for the verification of the denuclearization fo the Korean peninsula.*

- (4) *Matters related to the selection of the targets of inspection (including nuclear facilities and nuclear materials and suspected nuclear weapons and nuclear installations) and the procedure and method of inspection, which are necessary for the verification of the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.*
- (5) *Matters related to the equipment usable in nuclear inspections.*
- (6) *Matters related to rectification measures based on the outcome of nuclear inspections.*
- (7) *Matters related to the resolution of disputes arising from the implementation of the Joint Declaration of Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula or from inspection programs.*

Article 3. The Joint Nuclear Control Commission shall be operated as follows :

- (1) *The Joint Nuclear Control Commission shall in principle meet in every two months, and may meet at any time through mutual agreement.*
- (2) *Meetings of the Joint Nuclear Control Commission shall in principle be held at Peace House in the southern area of Panmunjom and at Tongilkak in the northern area by turn. They may also be held at other places of mutual agreement.*
- (3) *Meetings of the Joint Nuclear Control Commission shall be operated jointly by the chairmen of the two sides. They shall be held in principle behind the closed doors.*
- (4) *Working-level matters such as the guarantee of personal safety for those traveling to the area of the other side to attend Joint Nuclear Control Commission meetings, provision of conveniences to them, and recording of minutes shall be in accordance with past practices.*
- (5) *Other necessary matters related to the operation of the Joint Nuclear Control Commission shall be discussed and determined between the two sides at the Joint Nuclear Control Commission.*

Article 4. Matters decided at the Joint Nuclear Control Commission shall take effect from the date of the signing of the documents of agreement

by the prime ministers of the two sides.

Depending on situations, major documents of agreement shall take effect from the date of the exchange of the copies of the agreement signed by the prime ministers of the two sides after they went through the procedure necessary for its effectuation.

Article 5. This agreement may be revised or supplemented through mutual agreement.

Article 6. This agreement shall take effect from the date of the exchange of signed copies of the agreement.

March 18, 1992

Chung Won-shik

Prime Minister

Republic of Korea

Chief Delegate

The South's Delegation

South-North High-Level Meeting

Yon Hyong-muk

Premier, Administration Council

Democratic People's Republic of Korea

Head, the North's Delegation

North-South High-Level Meeting

Joint Announcement on South-North

Delegates Contacts to Discuss Issue of the Formation and Operation of South-North Joint Nuclear Control Commission

Seven South-North delegates contacts were held from February 19 through March 14, 1992 to discuss the formation and operation of South-North Joint Nuclear Control Commission pursuant to the Joint Declaration of Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

The two sides' delegates sincerely discussed a draft Agreement on the Formation and Operation of South-North Joint Nuclear Control Commission, completed the adjusting of its wording, and initialed it.

In this connection, the two sides agreed on the following items:

1. The South and the North shall exchange the copies of the Agreement

on the Formation and Operation of South-North Joint Nuclear Control Commission signed by the two sides' prime ministers at Panmunjom twice on March 17 and March 19, 1992.

2. *The South and the North shall mutually notify the list of the members of the South-North Joint Nuclear Control Commission on March 18, 1992.*
3. *The first meeting of the South-North Joint Nuclear Control Commission shall be held at Tongilkak in the northern sector of Panmunjom on March 19, 1992.*
4. *The South and the North shall jointly endeavor to adopt a document necessary for the verification of the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula in a period of about two months after the first meeting of the South-North Joint Nuclear Control Commission, and have reached the understanding that inspections shall begin within 20 days of the adoption of such document.*

Panmunjom, March 14, 1992

Appendices

1. President Roh Tae-woo's Declaration of Non-Nuclear Korean Peninsula Peace Initiatives, November 8, 1991

My fellow Koreans,

This morning, I am going to announce an important decision to help build a durable structure of peace on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia.

In the process of removing the legacies of the Cold War and in efforts to build a world of peace, many courageous and previously unimagined initiatives are being taken around the world today.

Not only have the former adversaries joined hands but they vow friendship and cooperation for a better future for all mankind. What is more, epoch-making measures are being taken to reduce all weapons of mass destruction, which threaten to destroy human civilization in an instant.

Both the United States and the Soviet Union are in the process of reducing and dismantling nuclear weapons on a large scale, and international negotiations are currently under way in Geneva to completely eliminate chemical weapons, which could inflict indiscriminate killing on a massive scale.

Looking at these global waves of reconciliation and cooperation, there are those who mistakenly believe that threats of confrontation have disappeared from our own land also. Unfortunately, however, a situation that is unique in the world and is quite inconsistent with the tides of history persists on the Korean Peninsula.

At a time when reduction and destruction of nuclear weapons are being carried out worldwide, North Korea shows no sign of giving up its efforts to build nuclear weapons, while reneging on its professed duties as a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. It has been well documented that North Korea also manufactures, and has a stockpile of, chemical-biological weapons.

As is well known, there has been a tragic fratricidal war in

Korea and, subsequently, intense military confrontation and arms race ensued on the Korean Peninsula for almost four decades. Under these circumstances, North Korea's development of nuclear weapons has to be a matter of grave concern, and it will escalate the Korean question into an entirely new dimension. Indeed, nuclear weapons in North Korean hands would be so dangerous and destabilizing that they would not only threaten the very survival of our nation, but could in an instant shatter the peace in Northeast Asia and the world.

It is for these reasons that the gravely worried international community joins us in our concerted efforts to deter North Korea from developing nuclear weapons.

In my address to the United Nations General Assembly last September, I made it clear that I was prepared to discuss with North Korea on the nuclear issues on the Korean Peninsula as soon as North Korea would sign the nuclear safeguards agreement, renounce the development of nuclear weapons, and agree on inter-Korean military confidence-building measures.

And yet, rather than positively respond to my proposals North Korea continues to evade its international duties on account of groundless charges and excuses.

In an effort to initiate the resolution of nuclear issues on the Korean Peninsula and in my earnest desire to bring about a durable structure of peace on our land, I have come to an important decision and have determined to take steps to carry it out.

Reaffirming our commitment to the cause of peace and in order to eliminate from our land all chemical-biological weapons and to secure a non-nuclear Korean Peninsula, I declare the following to be our policy :

First, the Republic of Korea will use nuclear energy solely for peaceful purposes, and will not manufacture, possess, store, deploy or use nuclear weapons.

Second, the Republic of Korea will continue to submit to comprehensive international inspection all nuclear-related facilities and

materials on its territory in compliance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and with the nuclear safeguards agreement it has concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency under the Treaty, and will not possess nuclear fuel reprocessing and enrichment facilities.

Third, the Republic of Korea aspires for a world of peace free of nuclear weapons as well as all weapons of indiscriminate killing ; and we will actively participate in international efforts toward a total elimination of chemical-biological weapons and observe all international agreements thereon.

We will faithfully carry out this non-nuclear, no chemical-biological weapons policy.

Now, there can be no reason or justification for North Korea to develop nuclear weapons or evade international inspection of its nuclear facilities.

I strongly call upon North Korean authorities to immediately take steps corresponding to my declaration today.

Just as the Republic of Korea has done, North Korea also should renounce unequivocally the possession of nuclear reprocessing and enrichment facilities.

As soon as North Korea takes these steps, beginning with the signing of the nuclear safeguards agreement, we will initiate bilateral discussions on other military-security issues, including the nuclear issue, and seek to resolve them through South-North High-Level Talks.

Any and all issues pertaining to the Korean Peninsula should be resolved through direct inter-Korean negotiations in a spirit of self-reliance.

Consequently, I call upon North Korea in the name of seventy million fellow Koreans to immediately abandon the attempt to develop nuclear weapons so that together we may open a new era of peace on the Korean Peninsula, having secured a land free of nuclear weapons.

My fellow Koreans,

Prior to the enunciation of our policy today, the Government has very carefully examined its possible impact on the national security. My decision is based on a firm assessment that our national security will continue to remain solid.

It is sincerely hoped that North Korea will accurately evaluate current international realities and decide to join us in our common efforts to eliminate the sources of national tragedy and to achieve national harmony and peaceful unification.

2. President Roh Tae-woo's Announcement on a Nuclear-free Korean Peninsula, December 18, 1991

My fellow Koreans,

Last week, South and North Korea agreed on a detailed accord in an effort to end the half-century old Cold War on the Korean Peninsula and to open a new era of peace.

The Accord, which was signed at the conclusion of the Fifth South-North High-Level Talks, consists of important measures that are necessary to end national division and rivalry on the basis of mutual trust, to build a structure of peace on our land, and to promote national reconciliation and common prosperity through exchanges and cooperation.

The Republic of Korea fully supports this Accord, for we believe that the development of an inter-Korean relationship based on peaceful coexistence and common prosperity is an essential step towards the goal of national unification.

Together with the parallel entry of South and North Korea into the United Nations in September, the signing of the South-North Korean Accord last week is an epic milestone on our road to the resolution of the Korean question and the attainment of national unity.

South and north Korea should now march together toward peace and unification.

The tasks and courses of action which lie ahead of the two Koreas are clear.

It is now incumbent on the two Korean governments to implement faithfully the contents of the Accord step by step so that national reconciliation, peace and common prosperity which are aspirations shared by all Koreans, may soon be realized.

The Republic of Korea pledges to do its utmost in transforming the relationship with the North from one of rivalry to partnership, exchanges and cooperation. In addition, we will seek a speedy resolution of political and military issues between South and North Korea.

The Cold War brought upon our nation untold sorrows and tragedies. The sacrifices and tribulations this nation suffered from division, war and rivalry have been truly enormous and unbearable.

Now, the two Koreas have produced a charter of peace that will end a dark period in their history and bring forth a new era of reconciliation and cooperation. I firmly believe that this charter will mark a momentous turning-point on the road to building a new nation in which 70 million Koreans together shall forge a glorious future.

Fellow Koreans,

Before we proceed with the implementation of the widely supported inter-Korean Accord, however, there is an important issue that must be resolved at the earliest possible date. It is the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula.

On the eighth of November, I enunciated the Non-nuclear Korean Peninsula Peace Initiative, noting that the development of nuclear weapons by North Korea was an extremely dangerous venture which posed serious threats not only to the peace and survival of the Korean people, but also to regional and global stability.

It was for these reasons that I made a public pledge specifically declaring that South Korea would not manufacture, possess, store, deploy or use nuclear weapons, and that we would also renounce the right to build nuclear reprocessing facilities, which could very well have been justified on grounds of economic necessity.

In order to remove any obstacles to nuclear inspections of North Korea, the Government, in consultation with the U.S. Government, has proposed during the recent High-Level Talks to conduct simultaneous nuclear inspections of facilities in the South and North, including the U.S. military bases in South Korea.

To open the military bases of a nuclear superpower to international inspection is a truly exceptional precedent, but we have reached this decision for the sole purpose of a peaceful and smooth resolution of the Korean Peninsula nuclear issue.

It is gratifying to note that last week at the High-Level Talks South and North Korea jointly recognized that there should be no nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula. On this common ground, I sincerely hope that a definitive agreement on nuclear issues will emerge from the Panmunjom working-level conference later this month.

So that we may come to an early resolution of the nuclear issue, I take this opportunity to make one thing emphatically clear to you, my fellow Koreans, as well as to North Korea and the world at large.

As I speak, there do not exist any nuclear weapons whatsoever, anywhere in the Republic of Korea.

Clearly, then, the non-nuclear policy enunciated in my November 8th Declaration has now been fulfilled insofar as the Republic of Korea is concerned.

My fellow Koreans,

I want to emphasize the following to the North Korean authorities :

Since the Republic of Korea is now completely nuclear-free and since we have agreed to the simultaneous nuclear inspections proposal, there is no reason or excuse for North Korea to develop nuclear weapons or refuse nuclear inspection.

North Korea must forthwith conclude and ratify a nuclear safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency, shut down all uncler reprocessing and enrichment facilities, and submit

unconditionally to international inspection.

It is now North Korea's responsibility to demonstrate to the Korean people and the world that a genuine peace is indeed emerging on the Korean Peninsula, by resolving the nuclear issue on the basis of the letter and spirit of the South-North Accord.

Obviously, we cannot successfully build peace and national reconciliation without first resolving the nuclear question.

For this reason, the entire international community is currently searching for ways to deter North Korea's development of nuclear weapons, having recognized it as a significant threat to the peace of this region and as a grave danger that will potentially accelerate the proliferation of nuclear weapons globally.

I believe that the North Korean authorities are well aware of the central issues. Therefore, I hope and expect that the forthcoming Panmunjom conference will yield an agreement which meets the legitimate demands of South Korea and the international community.

North Korea must immediately abandon the development of nuclear weapons. It is an imperative duty that cannot and should not be delayed.

I sincerely hope that an agreement guaranteeing a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula will emerge by the end of this month so that with the New Year South and North Korea together will usher in a new era of reconciliation, cooperation, peace and common prosperity.

Thank you.

3. President Roh Tae-woo's Special Statement on the Effectuation of the Basic South-North Agree- ment, February 19, 1992

My fellow Koreans at home and abroad,

Today, the "Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression and Exchanges and Cooperation between the South and the North" and

the "Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula" begin to take effect formally. This means that South and North Korea, which have had to live with incessant confrontation and antagonism for half a century, will now put an end to the unfortunate history of division and proceed together along a path to co-prosperity and unification.

We have exerted every effort to transcend the barriers of ideology and system so that South and North Korea may enjoy mutual development within one national community. Our efforts have now begun to bear fruit, and it gives us great satisfaction that we have attained such a valuable progress through our own, independent efforts.

Now, it is incumbent on both South and North Korea to faithfully carry out the terms of the basic agreement. No pledge will have meaning unless it is faithfully translated into action without fail. In fact, empty pledges often breed distrust and discord. So, the South and the North should promote reconciliation, exchanges and cooperation as well as uphold the terms of nonaggression on the basis of mutual trust. I would like to emphasize once again that this is the only shortcut to the attainment of a structure of peace on the Korean Peninsula and, eventually, national unification.

The Government of the Republic of Korea hereby solemnly declares that it will do its utmost to faithfully carry out the terms of both the "basic agreement" and the "joint declaration." I call upon the North Korean leader to issue a corresponding public pledge, declaring that North Korea, too, will faithfully implement and abide by the terms of the basic agreement and the joint declaration.

Once again, I urge North Korea to clear itself of the suspicions and misgivings about its development of nuclear weapons by promptly fulfilling its domestic and international obligations under the pertinent treaties and agreements. Gravely concerned, the entire Korean people are closely watching all related developments on this vital issue, because North Korea's nuclear development will certainly threaten not merely the safety of the Korean people but the stability of the Nor-

theast Asian region as well. North Korea's failure to take the necessary steps would result in a deterioration of the inter-Korean relations and invite strong criticism from the international community. Consequently, by promptly removing this dangerous stumbling-block, North Korea should make its own contribution toward opening a new era of reconciliation and cooperation under the new inter-Korean agreement.

My fellow Koreans,

This is a day of new hope to all of us, at home and abroad. We all eagerly aspire that our hope will soon become a reality. We should now draw our strengths together to bring about a national unification so that in the 21st century the entire Korean people may step up on the international stage as a unified nation. This is the earnest desire of all our 70 million compatriots living at home and abroad. Indeed, it is a historic task, the completion of which will determine the destiny of our posterity.

It is our generation's duty before history to successfully carry out this national task. We must build a unified country ; a country strong enough to determine its own future— a democratic and prosperous country free of military conflict. As we mark a day that has opened a new chapter in our history, we should all renew our resolve to usher in a new era of glory for the Korean people everywhere.

Thank you.

4. President Kim Il-sung's Statement, February 20, 1992

Today I take it a pleasure to meet the members of the two delegations who have successfully completed the sixth North-South high-level meeting.

I am satisfied with, and highly evaluate, the joint efforts you made to bring about the recent effectuation of the North-South Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression and Cooperation and Ex-

changes and the Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

It is an epochal event that serves as a milestone in our pursuit of peace and unification of the nation that we see the North-South Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Agression, and Cooperation and Exchanges, and the Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula take effect.

With the effectuation of the North-South agreement and the joint declaration, the North and the South have been enabled to depart from the past marked with distrust and confrontation and to provide a new turning point for reconciliation. We have also come to see the danger of war dissipate, looking forward to the bright prospects of peace and peaceful unification of the nation.

The fact that the North and the South pledged not to fight each other and to move toward unification in reconciliation and cooperation, clearly proves that any foreign forces or any difference in ideologies and systems cannot divide our people who have succeeded to the same blood vein for thousands of years.

Now all the Korean people in the North, the South and the abroad enthusiastically support and welcome the results of your meeting, regarding them as a common national achievement and a historical victory of the national thoughts.

With the sixth North-South high-level meeting as a momentum, our people have made a really significant first step toward independent peaceful unification of the fatherland.

This step should not stop here, but must lead to tomorrow's unification without fail.

To this end, we must, above all, strictly adhere to an independent position.

Our national split, caused by outside forces, should be brought to an end with our people's own efforts under all circumstances.

If either of the two sides relies on alien power and allows alien forces' interference under this state of national division into the North and the South, it cannot be a proper posture for unification. Rather,

it will be a posture for confrontation.

In such a posture, we cannot properly translate South-North agreements into action nor can we have a reliable dialogue for the good results of which we must be responsible.

Now that we have pledged ourselves to mutual reconciliation, we must now give up the idea of confrontation and stand up for ourselves, developing our independent national potentials instead of depending on alien forces.

The North and the South should also turn their special attention to the resolution of the peace issue, and take substantial measures to ensure peace of the country.

Under the condition of an agreement on non-aggression, the North and the South should suspend arms race and realize military reduction.

Herein lie the most reliable guarantee of non-aggression and the way of completely dispelling the suspicion of northward aggression or "southward aggression."

Now there is no need for the presence of alien troops in the country nor is there any reason why foreign military installations should exist here in our fatherland.

I think now is the time for us to make a decision on this issue.

The nuclear issue of the Korean peninsula, too, should be resolved.

For now, we have no way of knowing whether nuclear arms still exist in South Korea or whether they have all been removed.

In this situation, there is no way of dissipating our anxious fear of the nuclear threats to which we have been subject for some 30 years.

To speak about ourselves, we, as we have already made it clear, have no nuclear arms, nor do we produce them, nor do we need to produce them.

We have no intent to stage any nuclear confrontation with the large countries around us. Moreover, it is just unthinkable that we develop nuclear weapons that can annihilate the same Korean

race.

Few persons would doubt this.

To promote the grand unity of the nation constitutes the basic spirit of the North-South agreement.

For the North and the South to reconcile with each other and promote unification, they should somehow transcend the difference in their ideologies and systems to realize grand national unity.

To reject each other as a heretic simply because of a difference in thoughts and ideologies would only cause a further split of the nation.

All the Korean people should put our common national interests before all other things and should unite with one another based on love of our fatherland and independent national spirit.

We must realize the kind of politics which can dismantle the barrier of thoughts and systems and which can propel the nation toward a broad grand national unity and care of the country and people.

The agreements that took effect at the sixth North-South high-level meeting are pledges made by the responsible authorities of the North and the South before the nation.

The government of our Republic will exert all available efforts to facilitate the implementation of the historical agreements, regarding them as a lofty fruition reaped in the course of promoting independent peaceful unification of the fatherland.

We are confident that if the North and the South solidly stand by the principles of independence, peaceful unification and grand national unity, and build up their mutual confidence through concrete practices, we would be able to give our posterity a chance to jubilate in the days to come and to achieve unification during the rest of the 1990s to the whole people's wish.

Lastly, I expect that the North and the South will pave more sincerely the way to peace and unification of the country and that you members of both delegations will reach greater achievements in the future.

SOUTH-NORTH DIALOGUE IN KOREA



No. 55

July

1992

SOUTH-NORTH DIALOGUE IN KOREA

Published by

***Office of the South-North Dialogue,
National Unification Board***

C.P.O. Box 4161

Seoul, Korea

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Part I

Seventh South-North High-Level Meeting

1. Liaison Officials Contacts

On April 24, 1992, the South proposed to the North to hold a responsible liaison officials contact at Panmunjom on April 28 to discuss working-level issues related to the seventh South-North high-level meeting slated for May 5 in Seoul. The suggestion was made in a telephone message sent in the name of Kim Yonghwan, the South's responsible liaison official of the South-North high-level talks.

North Korea agreed to the contacts and two rounds of contacts ensued.

At the first contact on April 28, the two sides discussed working-level issues such as itineraries for the North Korean delegation during their stay in Seoul. At the second contact on May 1, the two sides exchanged the list of the North Korean delegation members (seven delegates, 33 support personnel and 50 press members) and the South's memorandum on the guarantee of personal safety of the North Koreans during their visit to the South.

The two sides agreed on lodging, conference site and major itineraries as follows :

- Lodging and conference site : Hotel Shilla (Seoul)

- Itineraries of the northern delegation :

- May 5, Tuesday

- 10 : 00—Passage through Panmunjom

- 11 : 40—Arrival at hotel

- 16 : 00—Advance observation of conference site

- 19 : 00—Dinner hosted by the Prime Minister
at Hotel Lotte

- May 6, Wednesday

- 10 : 00—First-day session

Afternoon—Visit to Kia Motors Corp.

17:00—Viewing of special performance at National Theater

May 7, Thursday

10:00—Second-day session

*Tour for press members

(Intra-city bus tour: Pukak Skyway)

Afternoon—Visit to Yong-in Natural Farm

19:00—Dinner hosted by the Seoul Mayor at Hotel Hyatt

May 8, Friday

09:40—Departure from hotel

11:00—Passage through Panmunjom

The lists of the two sides' delegations to the seventh high-level meeting were as follows:

The South:

Chief Delegate:

Chung Won-shik, Prime Minister

Deputy Chief Delegate:

Kim Chong-whi, senior presidential secretary for foreign policy and national

Delegates:

Song Eung-sop, first vice chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Ministry of National Defense

Lim Dong-won, vice minister, National Unification Board

Gong Ro-myung, director, Foreign Affairs and National Security Institute

Lee Dong-bok, special assistant to the Prime Minister

Park Yong-ok, arms control officer, Ministry of National Defense

The North :

Chief Delegate :

Yon Hyong-muk, Premier, Administration Council

Deputy Chief Delegate :

Kim Gwang-jin, vice marshal and vice minister, People's Armed Forces Ministry

Delegates :

An Byong-Su, vice chairman, Committee for Peaceful Unification of the Fatherland.

Paek Nam-jun, director, Secretariat, Committee for Peaceful Unification of the Fatherland

Kim Jong-wu, vice minister, External Economic Projects Ministry

Choe Wu-jin, roving ambassador, Foreign Ministry

Kim Yong-chol, major general and deputy bureau director, People's Armed Forces Ministry

* In addition, each delegation included 33 support personnel and 50 press members.

2. Proceeding of Seventh High-Level Meeting

a. Overview of Conference Proceeding

The seventh South-North high-level meeting was held in Seoul from May 5 through May 8, 1992.

In an arrival statement, An Byong-su, spokesman for the North Korean delegation to the high-level meeting, which had arrived in Seoul by way of Panmunjom, said his delegation would do all they could at the Seoul meeting to give birth to auxiliary agreements and implementation bodies. "Both delegations should endeavor to bring about practicable results at this meeting which is taking place in the stage of implementation," An said.

In the afternoon, Lee Dong-bok, spokesman for the sou-

thern delegation, and An Byong-su met to discuss the overall aspects of the seventh high-level meeting, while the North's responsible liaison official inspected the conference site.

In the evening, a dinner was held at the Hotel Lotte. It was hosted by Prime Minister Chung Won-shik.

In his table speech, Prime Minister Chung said, "I hope we could reaffirm the two sides' intent of carrying out or respecting the basic South-North agreement by all means by signing and putting into force those agreements on respective implementation organizations during this seventh meeting so that such implementation bodies could be inaugurated within specified times."

Emphasizing that "the dispersed family issue is an exigent task that cannot be put off any longer in view of the age and sufferings of dispersed family members," Chung urged the North to show a sincere response to this question as a token of South-North reconciliation.

In his speech, the North's Administration Council Premier Yon Hyong-muk, while stressing that the root spirit of the basic South-North agreement is the principle of independence, again called for joint South-North steps against Japan over the question of "comfort women," an issue which the North first raised at the time of the sixth meeting.

On the morning of May 6, the first-day session was held in the presence of press members, where the two sides exchanged keynote speeches with the South being the first to make it.

In the speech, the South urged that the two sides, in the spirit of faithfully carrying out and respecting the basic agreement, make it a paramount task to sign and put into effect agreements on the formation and operation of South-North liaison offices and joint commissions set to be created within three months of the effectuation of the basic agreement. The South said that to this end, the two sides should exert multi-pronged efforts to hammer out agreements not only through official talks but also through

delegates' and chairmen's contacts.

Moreover, emphasizing that some measures should be worked out early for the resolution of the dispersed family issue, the South suggested that groups of visitors be exchanged between the two sides in mid-August to celebrate the Liberation Day.

The North shared the view that agreements on the formation of implementation organizations, the time of whose inauguration was specified in the basic agreement, must be signed and put into force within the prescribed time. The North then proposed the exchange of aged parents hometown visitors and art troupe members on the occasion of the Liberation Day of August 15, thus providing a clue to the resolution of the issues of implementation bodies and the exchange of hometown visitors.

Based on these common perceptions, a series of contacts were held from the afternoon of May 6 through the morning of May 7 to agree on draft agreements on the creation of liaison offices and joint commissions and complete the adjustment of wording of an agreement of the seventh high-level meeting featuring the exchange of hometown visitors and art performers. The closed-door contacts held included those between delegates to the high-level meeting, between chairmen of the political, military and exchanges-cooperation subcommittees, and between the chairmen of the joint nuclear control commission.

On the afternoon of May 6, the members of the North Korean delegation visited the Kia Motors Corp. in Kwangmyong. In the evening, they viewed a Kangkangsullae performed by the National Dancing Co. at the National Theater.

On the morning of May 7, the second-day session was held in the presence of the press, where the agreements on the formation and operation of South and North liaison offices and joint commissions, worked out through delegates' and subcommittee chairmen's contacts, were signed and put into force. An agreement of the seventh high-level meeting was also announced.

In the afternoon, the North Korean delegation members viewed a film at the Hotel Shilla, and in the evening attended a dinner hosted by the Seoul mayor at the Hotel Hyatt.

In his dinner speech, Mayor Lee Hae-won emphasized the importance of implementing the basic South-North agreement, saying, "Now the only remaining task is for the South and the North to translate the basic agreement into action in earnest through implementation organizations like joint commissions."

Mayor Lee said that Seoul and Pyongyang, distanced only by about three hours' drive, alike could boast their pride as the world's leading cities if only they exchange and share the city construction achievements and experiences they have achieved and thereby further cultivate themselves as a groundwork for the co-prosperity of the nation.

In his speech, Premier Yon said, "The South and the North have progressed their basic work to provide a breakthrough in the barriers of political and military confrontation and realize reconciliation and cooperation to a substantial extent by charting a new progress at the seventh high-level meeting." In particular, he said, the two sides, by agreeing on the exchange of aged parents hometown visitors and art performers, have come to give yet another great rejoice to the nation.

On the other hand, Yon said a discussion forum should be prepared at an early date for the participation of persons from all layers and strata so as to explore ways to unify the homeland. He thus again brought up the issue of multipolarizing dialogue conduits he first mentioned in his keynote speech at the first-day session.

In his departure statement on May 8, northern spokesman An Byong-su said the seventh meeting was a fruitful one where he said the two sides agreed on the exchange of hometown visitors and art performers and cast a bright prospect for overall programs of the high-level meeting.

The northern spokesman also said that his delegation regretted the failure to resolve the issues of nuclear development, adoption of auxiliary agreements, creation of a reconciliation commission and the repatriation of Lee In-mo.

On the morning of May 8, the northern delegation returned to the North through Panmunjom winding up their four-day visit to Seoul.

The seventh meeting was highly significant in that it could serve as a yardstick to weigh the future of inter-Korean relations inasmuch as it was the first meeting ever to take place after the effectuation of the basic agreement and the joint declaration of denuclearization.

A notable achievement of the meeting was that it provided institutional devices to unfold an age of reconciliation and cooperation by signing and effectuating agreements on the formation and operation of implementation bodies the time of whose creation was specified in the basic agreement.

Thus the phased implementation of the basic agreement was made possible, namely, preparation of a basic frame (February 1992) → formation of implementation bodies (May '92) → adoption of auxiliary agreements (September '92) → promotion of concrete implementation programs (after September '92).

In particular, the agreement made at the meeting on the exchange of aged parents hometown visitors and art performers was a result of the South's consistent efforts to seek the solution of the dispersed family issue. The agreement was much significant in that it, though a small feat, provided a breakthrough in the efforts to resolve the dispersed family question.

b. First-Day Session

The first-day session of the seventh high-level meeting was held at the Dynasty Hall of the Hotel Shilla in Seoul from 10

a.m. to 12 : 10 p.m. May 6 (Wednesday), 1992. It was opened to the press.

Preceded by the exchange of chattings, the session began with an opening declaration made by Prime Minister Chung Won-shik. There was a keynote speech by the South.

After expressing regret over the failure to wind up the issue of creating implementation organizations before the opening of the seventh meeting, the South presented its position with respect to various problems that arose in the course of subcommittee meetings.

Pointing out that the North laid a stumbling block to the substantial progress of subcommittee business by linking the issue of adopting auxiliary agreements to the question of inaugurating implementation bodies, the South emphasized that implementation organizations, the time of whose inauguration was specified in the basic South-North agreement, must be created within the specified period by all means.

The South said that those clauses of draft auxiliary agreements on which the two sides agree could be prepared first as agreed matters, and those yet to be agreed on could continue to be discussed for their adoption one by one. But, all clauses adopted should in nature be concrete and practicable, it said.

Moreover, the South said that given the results of the meetings of subcommittees and the Joint Nuclear Control Commission held in the past two months, the need was felt of the common perception of the following three items between the two sides in order to facilitate easier agreements at future meetings.

The South said that the first concerned the question of the three principles of unification envisaged in the July 4, 1972, Joint Communique.

The South emphasized that the "principle of independence," one of the three principles, was meant for the South and the North to resolve national problems between the direct parties

involved, namely, the South and the North, under the spirit of national self-determination. It said that the two sides, true to this spirit, should begin with respecting each other's statutory order.

The South said that the "principle of peace" was meant for the two sides to resolve national problems in a peaceful manner through dialogue and negotiations without resorting to the force of arms or other violent means. It added that if and when the basic agreement and the joint declaration of de-nuclearization were carried out faithfully, the state of armistice between the two sides could be turned into a solid state of peace.

The "principle of grand national unity" was intended to realize grand unity based on national reconciliation. This, the South said, could be realized only when the creativity of individual members of the nation is respected, multiple opinions allowed, and basic human rights and freedom guaranteed.

Secondly, the South said there needed common perception of the functions and roles of the high-level talks, subcommittees and joint commissions, and of future direction of their operation. It then defined their respective functions and roles as follows :

The high-level talks would oversee the activities of each subcommittees and joint commissions ; adjust and handle matters of difference ; review, confirm and effectuate what were agreed on at subcommittees ; discuss and determine matters to be delegated to subcommittees ; and discuss and resolve other issues pending between the South and the North.

The subcommittees should continue functioning even after joint commissions were inaugurated, handling those implementation measures falling on the relevant areas of the basic agreement which were yet to be agreed on or those matters that were raised newly ; discussing items delegated from the high-level talks ; and revising or supplementing auxiliary agreements.

The joint commissions, being implementation bodies within

the framework of the high-level talks, were to perform the function of implementing what were agreed on at the high-level talks under the guidance, coordination and delegated authority of the chief delegates of the two sides. The South added that more joint commissions could be formed in the future depending on their need.

Thirdly, regarding the method of agreement and implementation of the contents of the basic South-North agreement, the South called for the preparation of concrete measures for the two sides to carry out or respect each article of the basic agreement. It stressed that it is unrealistic to try to implement them in an "comprehensive and uniform" approach under the principle of "package agreement and simultaneous implementation." They should rather be carried out steadily one by one under the principle of "case-by-case agreement and prompt implementation."

Meanwhile, the South stressed that the North's promotion of some political events such as a "pan-national conference," "great unification festival among youths and students in the South, North and abroad" and "convocation of a pan-national political conference" around the Liberation Day of August 15 without any consultation with the government authorities of the South, was an act of running counter to the spirit of the basic South-North agreement and fomenting a new tension in inter-Korean relations. It then urged the North to halt them forthwith.

Regarding the dispersed family question, the South urged that the government authorities of the two sides should prepare concrete implementation measures at an early date so that Red Cross organizations could carry them out. The South reminded the North of the need of the exchange of aged dispersed family visitors, a project which the South called for repeatedly.

Pointing out that the key to the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula lied in the realization of mutual inter-Korean inspections, the South emphasized that mutual inspections should be realized around early June by all means as earlier agreed on

between the two sides. It strongly asked the North to be more sincere and positive toward preparing rules for mutual inspections as well as toward carrying out inspections.

Lastly, the South proposed that the two sides exchange groups of Liberation Day commemorative visitors on the occasion of the Liberation Day of this year, the first festive day to be observed after the effectuation of the basic South-North agreement.

The South said that the period of visits could be about ten days around the Liberation Day of August 15 and each visitors group could comprise some 300 persons from various walks of life such as dispersed family members, politicians, businessmen, writers and artists, sportsmen, professors, students and press members. In each other's areas, the visitors could take part in Liberation Day commemorative programs taking place in each other's areas such as ceremonies, cultural events, seminars and sports events, while dispersed family members could meet their missing ones.

In the meantime, the North while reviewing in a keynote speech the process of mutual negotiations after the sixth high-level meeting, argued that the preparation of auxiliary agreements on a priority basis was most important among the duties of the subcommittees. They reasoned that without auxiliary rules, joint commissions, even if they were formed, could not be operated.

Reacting to the South's call for the reresolution of the nuclear issue, the North insisted that the South laid an artificial obstacle to the programs of the subcommittees with the excuse of nuclear inspections, and thereby delayed the implementation of the basic agreement.

The North further raised the issues of the South's relations with the United States, National Security Law, singularization of the conduits of dialogues and anti-Communist system, asserting that the South should strictly be independent of others. It said that from such a position the South should readjust its relations with the U.S. and withdraw American forces from Korea.

The North argued that the South should repeal the National Security Law instead of trying to retain it under the excuse of respecting the statutory order of the other side. Asserting that the unification issue is a national and political question, the North demanded that the South pave the way for broad political forces of various political parties and all stratas and layers as well as individual people to taking part in the sacred task of unification instead of attempting to justify the singularization of the conduits for dialogues.

In addition, the North, while denouncing the South for linking the principle of grand national unity to the issues of “democracy” and “human rights questions,” asserted that the South should give up its anti-Communist system, a legacy of ideological confrontation, in the interests of grand national unity.

The North then presented its position with respect to some pending issues like the proposed adoption of auxiliary agreements and creation of joint commissions, liaison offices and joint nuclear control commission.

They maintained that auxiliary agreements should be a single agreements by area and that its contents could not include those technical working-level matters that belong to the business of joint commissions. The North thus unveiled an attempt to make auxiliary agreements declarative and principled only rather than concrete and substantial.

Arguing that unnecessarily too many joint commissions might bring about confusion in the implementation of agreements, the North claimed it was reasonable to produce only a single joint political commission in the area of reconciliation. They suggested, however, that the name of a commission could be a reconciliation commission.

As to the issue of setting up liaison offices, the North said that since the two sides had already made elementary debate on this question its contents could be adjusted at a time when the

questions of auxiliary agreements and joint commissions would be taken up.

In connection with a joint nuclear control commission, the North argued that since the purpose of a denuclearization agreement was to basically eliminate nuclear threats, an auxiliary document to be prepared by a joint nuclear control commission for the implementation of the joint declaration should cover not only rules on inspections but also all the provisions of the joint declaration. They also maintained that the nuclear weapons and nuclear bases of the U.S. forces in Korea should always be included in nuclear inspections.

Lastly, while demanding, as special events linked to the implementation of the basic agreement, the repatriation of Lee In-mo and the release of Rev. Moon Ik-hwan and Lim Su-kyong, both imprisoned for their illegal visits to the North, the North proposed that the two sides advise their respective Red Cross organizations to undertake the exchange of 100 aged parents visitors and 70 art performers on the occasion of the Liberation Day of August 15.

Judging from what they said in the keynote speech, it seemed the North was responding affirmatively to the South's position that papers regarding implementation bodies, the time of whose creation was specified in the basic agreement, must be signed and put into force at the seventh high-level meeting.

However, by asserting that even if agreements on the creation of implementation organizations took effect, no joint commissions could be operated prior to the adoption of auxiliary agreements, the North showed no change from their past attempt to make the adoption of auxiliary agreement a de facto prerequisite to the inauguration of implementation bodies and thereby delay the enforcement of the basic South-North agreement.

Moreover, the North seemed adopting a double-faced policy of pursuing their existing strategy against the South in parallel

with the inter-korean dialogue.

For instance, the North, in the keynote speech, repeated their past demands such as withdrawal of American forces from Korea, repeal of the National Security Law, private-level talks, the South's renouncement of an anti-Communist system, repatriation of Lee In-mo and release of arrested illegal visitors, while proposing the exchange of aged parents visitors and art performers regardless of the progress of the business of the Exchanges and Cooperation Subcommittee as a special project designed to enable the people to physically feel the implementation of the basic agreement.

The North's proposal for the exchange of aged parents visitors came on heels of criticisms at home and abroad that the North did not show any sincerity toward the dispersed family issue even after the effectuation of the basic agreement. Their offer, in fact, represented an agreement to the South's repeated call for the pilot project of the exchange of aged dispersed family visitors.

On the nuclear issue, the North concentrated on making propaganda tirades in which they tried to shift blame to the other side making it appear as if the root source of the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula lied in the nuclear weapons and bases of the U.S. forces. They thus had clearly been trying to delay or shun mutual nuclear inspections between the South and the North.

Before adjourning the first-day session, the two sides agreed to have separate delegates contacts to discuss the formation and operation of implementation bodies later in the day.

On the afternoon of May 6, a delegates contact was held to discuss items to be jointly announced by the seventh high-level meeting and to agree to have chairmen's contacts by subcommittee. The delegates contact was attended by Lim Dong-won and Lee Dong-bok from the South and Choe Wu-jin and An Byong-su from the North.

Through contacts of chairmen of the three subcommittees

and the Joint Nuclear Control Commission held from the afternoon of May 6 through the early morning of May 7, the two sides agreed on and initialed the Agreement to Establish South-North Liaison Offices, Agreement to Establish a South-North Joint Military Commission and the Agreement to Establish South-North Joint Exchanges and Cooperation Commissions. On the morning of May 7, the two sides adjusted the wording of the Joint Statement by the Delegations to the Seventh South-North High-Level Meeting.

The gist of the two sides' keynote speeches exchanged at the first-day session was as follows :

The Gist of the South's Keynote Speech

Northern delegates,

As I have watched the meetings of our committees and the Joint Nuclear Control Commission over the last two months or so, I have come to be acutely aware of the need for both sides to increase common perceptions regarding the implementation of the intra-Korean basic agreement.

First, there is the issue of the three principles of national unification embodied in the July 4 (1972) South-North Joint Communiqué which is cited in the preamble of the South-North basic agreement.

The competence of both the South and the North to represent their respective areas is based on their own intrinsic legal orders. Accordingly, the South and the North must respect, first of all, each other's legal order, if both are to be faithful to the principle of independence.

The principle of peace means that intra-Korean issues must be solved by peaceful means through dialogue and exchanges, excluding the use of armed force or other forms of violence. The issue of peace in Korea is inextricably interwoven with enmity and distrust that have been built up through a fratricidal war and the consequent four decades of political and military confrontation. Accordingly, it cannot be solved until and unless trust is built between the South and the North.

It is crucial, therefore, to build mutual trust by faithfully observing and implementing all the clauses of the intra-Korean basic agreement and the Joint Declaration of Denuclearization.

The principle of grand national unity means that the 70-million Korean people must unite with a spirit of reconciliation in order to move the unification process forward.

Grand national unity in the genuine sense of the words can be achieved only when both the South and the North respect private initiatives and guarantee basic human rights and freedom.

Second, both the South and the North must build common perceptions of the functions, roles and future course of our committees and joint commissions.

Third, both the South and the North should have common perceptions of the modes of reaching implementing accords for the existing and future intra-Korean agreements and also of how to carry them out.

Accordingly, we must agree to adopt the principle of "accords on a case-by-case basis and their prompt implementation" so that we can make steady headway by implementing the agreed provisions one after another.

Northern delegates,

The expectations and hopes of the entire Korean people for improvement of South-North relations have greatly risen since the intra-Korean basic agreement was signed and brought into force at the sixth round of these talks. Turning a blind eye to that, however, your side is attempting again this year to organize for the coming Liberation Day (August 15) political shows that you call a Pan-national Rally, a unification festival of students and youths in the South, the North and abroad, and a pan-national political conference.

My view is that the political shows that you are attempting to stage run counter to the spirit of the intra-Korean basic agreement and will thus create new tensions between the two areas of Korea. I believe you must promptly cancel such schemes.

The most urgent of the many tasks now pending between the South

and the North is to solve the issue of dispersed families.

I believe that you will readily agree to our proposal to adopt the necessary concrete measures for family reunions and entrust the Red Crosses with their implementation, if you are genuinely determined to carry out the South-North basic agreement and are not to betray the yearning of the entire Korean people for an era of South-North reconciliation and cooperation.

I should like to remind you that to provide a powerful impetus to South-North exchanges and cooperation and set the pace for the implementation of the South-North basic agreement, we have proposed on every possible occasion that exchanges of senior citizens' home visits be carried out for starters.

The key to the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula lies in South-North mutual nuclear inspection. Both sides, therefore, must carry out mutual inspections during early June through thoroughgoing procedures as they have already agreed.

In that context, I strongly urge your side to cooperate, in earnest and with a sense of urgency, to work out rules for mutual inspections and to carry out such inspections. I solicitously propose that Liberation Day visitors' groups be exchanged around August 15 this year to celebrate the first anniversary of liberation since the South-North basic agreement entered into force. I believe it will be a good idea for each side to organize a group of about 300, including members of separated families, politicians, business executives, artists, athletes, professors, students and journalists to visit the other area for about 10 days.

These visitors' groups can participate not only in the Liberation Day ceremonies but also in diverse other events, such as cultural programs, academic conferences and athletic meets held in each other's area to commemorate the national liberation of 1945.

The Gist of the North's Keynote Speech

Delegates of the south side,

The sixth round of the north-south high-level talks gave our nation a hope of bright future, but people suspect a lot why, today when good agreements have come into effect, your side is delaying their implementation openly.

Summing up the work of subcommittees held up to now, we cannot but suspect whether your side tries to turn its back on the agreements.

In connection with this, we should like to state first our relations to the United States.

One of the main messages of the North-South Agreement is the spirit of national independence to solve our problem independently by the joint efforts of the nation without depending on foreign forces.

Your side also admits this.

Then who is the foreign forces that pose a problem for us ?

As is clear to everyone, they are the United States, the only foreign forces which station their troops in south Korea and interfere in our internal affairs.

The spirit and principle of independence contained in the North-South Agreement and the non-aggression declaration present on the order of the day as an unavoidable and undelayable natural duty the readjustment of the relations to the US and the withdrawal of the US troops from south Korea.

Under these conditions, even if your side is unable to withdraw right away all the US troops, it should at least make clear such will and attitude.

Secondly, I would like to point out the question of your "National Security Law."

The main obstacle in encouraging the spirit of reconciliation and cooperation is the "National Security Law" which provides for us as an "anti-national organization" and breaks off business relations and contacts with the north.

It is recognized by all the south Korean people and known by your authorities that the "law" is incompatible with spirit of reconciliation and cooperation confirmed by us.

Under such condition, it is as clear as daylight that the "National

Security Law”, a remain of the old era, can not continue to exist.

Thirdly, what I would like to mention is a matter of how to view the position and role to be played by political parties and groupings and the people of all walks of life in the solution of the reunification issue.

We recongnize that all members of our nation, including the authorities of the north and the south, as well as the party in power or out of power, the pro-government people or the non-governmental people, are the driving force of national reunification, and that the reunification issue can be settled only by the united might of the nation, its master and its role.

The attempt to hold dialogue on reunification through “unified channel” and to eliminate and prevent all parties, groups and people from the discussion of and negotiation on this matter can never be supported by anyone.

From this point of view, we consider that your side should not try to justify the “unified channel of dialogue” with your incongruous logic but should open the way for broad political forces of different parties, groups and the people of all strata in conformity with the new, actual situation of antagonism and confrontation turning into reconciliation, cooperation and exchange, so that they can contribute to the cause of reunification.

In addition, your side is extremely distorting the ideal of national unity by forcibly linking the principle of national unity we have agreed upon with “democracy” and “human rights” which have nothing to do with the national problem.

The national unity and “democracy” and “human rights” you are advertizing are of different conception.

Delegates of the south side !

We should make our debate of the matters concerning the implementation of the agreement really fruitful. And we must show our high-level talks taking now concrete action and convince our fellow-countrymen in the north and south that the north-south agreement is being implemented. For this purpose, we propose to take some special measures.

One of them is that we must realize the home-return of Mr. Li In Mo, who is already well known.

Furthermore, I think the problem of releasing Rev. Moon Ik Hwan, Rim Su Gyong and other visitors to the north should be solved at an early date, as we have repeatedly urged.

Next, what I would like to propose as a special issue is to exchange visits of old parents and art groups.

I suggest that the visiting group of old parents shall be consisted of 100 persons, and the artist group be consisted of 70 persons, and that their visit shall be made on the occasion of August 15, day of national liberati on. The detailed practical matters concerning this can be settled by the Red Cross organizations of both sides.

c. Second-Day Session

The second-day session of the seventh South-North high-level meeting was held at Dynasty Hall of the Hotel Shilla from 10 : 10 a.m. through 11 : 30 a.m. May 7 (Thursday). The session, opened to the press, proceeded in the order of signing and effectuating agreements on implementation organizations, reading a joint statement, and the exchange of closing remarks.

At the session, the two sides signed and put into effect the Agreement to Establish a South-North Joint Military Commission, Agreement to Establish South-North Joint Commissions for Exchanges and Cooperation and the Agreement to Establish South-North Liaison Offices, and announced a Joint Statement by the Delegations to the Seventh South-North High-Level Meeting.

They were followed by the exchange of closing remarks with the North first to make them.

In his closing remarks, North Korea's Administration Council Premier Yon Hyong-muk described the progress made at the seventh high-level meeting as "yet another encouraging development that has enabled the nation to look forward to the horizon of unification in the 1990s." He then called for the early adoption of an Agreement to Establish a South-North Joint Reconciliation

Commission and auxiliary agreements to be prepared by respective joint commissions.

Prime Minister Chung Won-shik, in his closing remarks, said that at the seventh meeting the two sides prepared an institutional device to consolidate an age of reconciliation and cooperation by agreeing on and putting into force the agreements to establish liaison offices, a joint military commission, a joint economic exchanges and cooperation commission and a joint socio-cultural exchanges and cooperation commission.

In this connection, the South stressed that the joint commissions and liaison offices should perform the role of translating into action those matters agreed on at the high-level meeting under the guidance and adjustment of both sides' senior delegates and within the framework of the high-level talks.

The South stressed that the fact that independence does not mean the closedness from the rest of the international community would become self-evident "once we recall what consequence did our forefathers' closed-door policy bring to our national history." It said that to build genuine peace, the whole people of the South and the North should build up mutual trust through exchanges and cooperation and realize reconciliation beginning with one's minds.

The south emphasized that grand national unity should be explored by broadening things in common for the unity of the entire Korea people, and can never be realized through political agitation directed toward a small number of people.

Speaking highly of the decision made at the seventh meeting to realize dispersed families hometown visits on the occasion of the Liberation Day of August 15, the South expressed the hope that with the decision as momentum, the dispersed family question would be resolved completely.

Before concluding its closing remarks, the South urged that

now that the two sides have agreed on the creation of implementation bodies following the effectuation of the basic agreement, the North now should fulfill its obligations for the resolution of the mutual nuclear inspection issue, which it said was the most basic and urgent task for the consolidation of peace on the Korean peninsula.

The full texts of the agreements to establish joint commissions and a joint statement which the two sides signed and effectuated or made at the second-day session, May 7, were as follows :

Agreement to Establish a South-North Joint Military Commission

The South and the North, in order to achieve and guarantee nonaggression and to discuss and carry out steps to build military confidence and realize arms reduction in accordance with the provisions of Article 12 of the Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, and Exchanges and Cooperation Between the South and the North, have agreed to establish and operate the South-North Joint Military Commission (hereinafter referred to as the Joint Military Commission) as follows :

Article 1

The Joint Military Commission shall be organized as follows :

1) The Joint Military Commission shall be composed of seven members, including a chairman and a vice chairman from each side.

2) The chairman shall be of vice-ministerial or higher rank and the ranks of the vice chairman and members shall be determined by each side at its own discretion.

3) Both parties shall notify the other side in advance if and when a member or members of the Joint Military Commission are to be replaced.

4) Each side shall have a staff of 15. When necessary, the size of

the staffs may be readjusted by concurrence of both parties.

5) Each side of the Joint Military Commission shall have working-level consultative group(s), if necessary, to ensure the smooth operation of the Joint Military Commission.

Article 2

The Joint Military Commission shall discuss and act on the following matters :

1) Concrete and practical measures to implement, abide by and guarantee the nonaggression provisions of the basic agreement.

2) Preparation and implementation of an agreement designed to achieve, abide by and guarantee nonaggression.

3) Implementation of agreed measures to dissolve military confrontation.

4) Supervision and verification of the implementation of measures mentioned above.

Article 3

The Joint Military Commission shall be operated as follows :

1) The Joint Military Commission shall in principle meet once every three months, providing, however, that it may meet at anytime by concurrence between both parties.

2) The Joint Military Commission shall meet in Panmunjom, Seoul, Pyongyang or at any other place agreed to by both parties.

3) Meetings of the Joint Military Commission shall be jointly presided over by the chairmen from both sides.

4) The Meetings of the Joint Military Commission shall in principle be held behind closed doors, providing, however, that open meetings may be held by concurrence between both parties.

5) Guarantees of personal safety and provision of the necessary services for the personnel traveling from the other area to attend meetings of

the Joint Military Commission, and such administrative matters as the recording of proceeding of meetings shall comply with past practices.

6) Other matters necessary to operate the Joint Military Commission shall be decided by consultation between both sides of the Commission.

Article 4

Accords reached at the Joint Military Commission shall enter into force as of the day when the cochairmen of both sides sign the agreed documents. Depending on the situation, an important document agreed to by both sides shall enter into force as of the day when the appropriate instruments are exchanged after the procedures needed to bring it into force have been completed following its signature by the cochairmen of both sides. If and when an agreement reached by a working-level consultative group has been put into effect through an exchange of the text signed by the cochairmen of both sides, the said agreement shall be reported to a meeting of the Joint Military Commission.

Article 5

This agreement may be revised or supplemented by concurrence between both parties.

Article 6

This agreement shall enter into force as of the day its text is exchanged after it has been signed by both sides.

May 7, 1992

Chung Won-shik
Prime Minister
Republic of Korea

Yon Hyong-muk
Premier, Administration Council
Democratic People's Republic of Korea

Chief Delegate
South Delegation
South-North High-Level Talks

Head, North Delegation
North-South High-Level Talks

*Agreement to Establish South-North Joint
Commissions for Exchanges and Cooperation*

The South and the North, in order to implement accords on exchanges and cooperation in various fields pursuant to Article 22 of the Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, and Exchanges and Cooperation between the South and the North, have agreed to organize and operate South-North Joint Commissions for Exchanges and Cooperation as follows.

Article 1

South-North Joint Commissions for Exchanges and Cooperation shall be organized as follows :

1. The South and the North shall organize a South-North Joint Commission for Economic Exchanges and Cooperation and a South-North Joint Commission for Social and Cultural Exchanges and Cooperation in order to realize exchanges and cooperation in various fields.

2. Each South-North Joint Commission for Exchanges and Cooperation shall be composed of a Chairman, a Vice Chairman and seven other members from each side.

3. Subject to agreement between both sides, the Chairman of each Joint Commission, one from each side, shall be of ministerial or vice-ministerial rank. Each side may determine the ranks of its Vice Chairman and other members at its own discretion.

4. Both sides shall notify the other in advance if and when they are to replace its Chairman, Vice Chairman or other members of a Joint

Commission.

5. Each Commission shall have a support staff of 15 from each side ; the staff size may be readjusted as needed by concurrence between both sides.

6. When necessary, both sides may organize and operate working-level consultative groups to facilitate the work of the South-North Joint Commissions for Exchanges and Cooperation.

Article 2

Each South-North Joint Commission for Exchanges and Cooperation shall perform the following functions :

1. It shall implement relevant protocols.

2. When necessary, it may draw up detailed accords on the implementation of relevant protocols.

3. It shall discuss and carry out other details involved in the implementation of relevant protocols.

4. It shall oversee and coordinate its working-level consultative groups.

Article 3

Each South-North Commission for Exchanges and Cooperation shall be operated as follows :

1. In principle, it shall meet once every quarter ; however, it may convene as often as necessary by concurrence between both sides.

2. It may meet in Panmunjom, Seoul, Pyongyang or any other place agreed to by both sides.

3. Its meetings shall be jointly presided over by the Chairman from each side.

4. Each Joint Commission shall, in principle, meet behind closed doors ; however, its meetings may be open to the public when both sides agree.

5. *Each Joint Commission may have people engaged in (intra-Korean) exchanges and cooperation and pertinent experts attend its meetings when both sides agree.*

6. *Past practices shall apply to such administrative matters as the guarantee of the safety of, and the provision of the necessary services for, the personnel traveling to the other area to attend meetings of the Joint Commission and recording of proceedings of their meetings.*

7. *Other matters necessary to operate each Commission shall be decided by consultation within each Commission.*

Article 4

An agreement reached at meetings of each Joint Commission shall take effect as of the day its Cochairmen sign and exchange its text. Depending on the situation, an important document agreed to by both sides shall enter into force as of the day its text is exchanged after the Prime Ministers of both sides have signed it and each side's procedures needed to bring it into force have been completed. If and when an agreement reached at a joint working-level consultative group has been put into effect through an exchange of the text signed by the Cochairmen of the relevant Joint Commission, that fact shall be reported to a relevant Joint Commission meeting.

Article 5

This Agreement may be amended or supplemented by concurrence between the two sides.

Article 6

This Agreement shall enter into force as of the day its text is exchanged after it has been signed by both sides.

May 7, 1992

Chung Won-shik
Prime Minister
Republic of Korea

Yon Hyong-muk
Premier, Administration Council
Democratic People's Republic of Korea

Chief Delegate
South Delegation
South-North High-Level Talks

Head, North Delegation
North-South High-Level Talks

Ageement to Establish South-North Liaison Offices

The South and the North, in order to help improve their relations and advance the day of unification by close liaison and consultation pursuant to Article 7 of the Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, and Exchanges and Cooperation between the South and the North, have agreed to establish and operate South-North Liaison Offices (hereinafter referred to as the "Liaison Offices") as follows :

Article 1

The Liaison Office of the South shall be called the Southern Liaison Office and the Liaison Office of the North the Northern Liaison Office.

Article 2

The South and the North shall each establish its Liaison Office in its own sector of the Joint Security Area in Panmunjom.

Article 3

A Liaison Office shall be composed of the following personnel :

- 1. A Liaison Office shall be staffed by one Director, one Deputy Director and the necessary number of Liaison Officers.*
- 2. The Director of a Liaison Office shall have the rank of director*

general of a bureau of the national government.

3. If and when the Director, the Deputy Director or Liaison Officers of a Liaison Office are to be replaced, each party shall notify the other.

4. In the future, the necessary departments may be created in the Liaison Offices by concurrence between the two parties.

Article 4

The Liaison Officers shall perform the following functions :

1. Various liaison assignments entrusted to them by the South and the North as needed ; They may also act on private requests for liaison work ;

2. Working-level consultations on entrusted matters related to the implementation of South-North accords ;

3. The provision of guidance and assistance for various South-North travel and contacts ; and

4. The establishment and operation of the necessary number of telephone lines between the two Liaison Offices.

Article 5

The Liaison Offices shall be operated as follows :

1. Both sides shall communicate with and contact each other as needed ; communication between the personnel of the Liaison Offices shall be effected by personal contact or telephone.

2. Meetings between the Directors of the Liaison Offices shall be held as occasion requires.

3. Both parties shall guarantee the personal safety and the inviolability of the personal effects of the personnel of the Liaison Office of the other side who travel between the two areas.

4. The working hours of the Liaison Offices shall be from 9 a.m. to 4 p.m. on weekdays and from 9 a.m. 12 noon on Saturdays. Depending on the circumstances, the working days and hours may be readjusted by

concurrence between both sides. The Liaison Offices shall be closed on Sundays and also on national holidays and other non-working days designated by either side by notifying the other side.

Article 6

This Agreement may be amended or supplemented by concurrence between both parties.

Article 7

This Agreement shall enter into force on the day its text is signed by both parties and exchanged.

May 7, 1992

*Chung Won-shik
Prime Minister
Republic of Korea*

*Yon Hyong-muk
Premier, Administration Council
Democratic People's Republic of Korea*

*Chief Delegate
South delegation
South-North High-Level Talks*

*Head, North delegation
North-South High-Level Talks*

Joint Statement by the Delegations to the Seventh Round of South-North High-Level Talks.

South and North Korea held the Seventh Round of High-Level Talks in Seoul from May 6 to 7, 1992.

Both sides sincerely discussed how to obtain better results in the meetings of the committees to the High-Level Talks.

At this meeting, the two Koreas signed and effectuated agreements on the establishment of the Joint Military Commission, the Joint Commis-

sions for Exchanges and Cooperation, and the South-North Liaison Offices.

Both sides reaffirmed their efforts to abide by the South-North basic agreement and agreed on the following :

1. Regarding the establishment of a body to implement Chapter I on reconciliation of the Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression and Exchanges and Cooperation Between the South and the North, both sides have agreed :

a) To form a Joint Reconciliation Commission to carry out peace-making activities between the South and the North ;

b) To set up as many working-level consultative groups as necessary under the joint commission ; and

c) To draw up a protocol on reconciliation before the Eighth Round of High-Level Talks to activate the Joint Reconciliation Commission.

2. South and North Korea will form a Joint Military Commission, a Joint Commission for Economic Exchanges and Cooperation and a Joint Commission for Social and Cultural Exchanges and Cooperation on May 18, 1992, and will notify each other of the names of the commission members.

3. Each side will begin operation of a Liaison Office in its own sector of Panmunjom on May 18, 1992, upon notifying each other of the names of the director, deputy director and other liaison officers.

4. A protocol on nonaggression will be drawn up by September 1, 1992, and on exchanges and cooperation by September 5, 1992.

5. The South and the North will have their Red Cross Societies arrange exchange visits of 100 aged members of dispersed families, 70 performers, and 70 newsmen and support personnel to celebrate the 47th anniversary of liberation from Japanese rule as a first symbolic step in the implementation of the historic South-North basic agreement.

6. The Committees and the Joint Nuclear Control Commission will hold their next meetings as follows :

a) The fourth meeting of the Joint Nuclear Control Commission will be held at Peace House in the southern sector of Panmunjom on Tues-

day, May 12, 1992.

b) The fourth meeting of the Political Committee will be held at Tong-ilgak in the northern sector of Panmunjom on Tuesday, May 19, 1992.

c) The fourth meeting of the Military Committee will be held at Peace House in the southern sector of Panmunjom on Monday, May 25, 1992.

d) The fourth meeting of the Exchanges and Cooperation Committee will be held at Tong-ilgak in the northern sector of Panmunjom on Saturday, May 30, 1992.

7. The Eighth Round of South-North High-Level Talks will take place in Pyongyang, September 15-18, 1992.

Part II

South-North Political Subcommittee

The first meeting of the South-North Political Subcommittee was set to be held at Peace House in Panmunjom on March 9. Under the joint statement of the sixth South-North high-level meeting, the political subcommittee was supposed to discuss concrete ways to implement and abide by the South-North agreement on reconciliation. The lists of the two sides' subcommittee members were mutually notified on March 6.

The South:

Chairman:

Lee Dong-bok, special assistant to the Prime Minister

Members:

Min Byong-sok, secretary, Presidential Secretariat

Kim Dal-sul, advisory member, National Unification Board

Choi Kyu-hwak, deliberations officer, Office of the Prime
Minister

Kang Kun-tak, deliberations officer, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs

Shin Kwang-ok, deliberations officer, Ministry of Justice

Shin Jong, major general, Ministry of National Defense

The North:

Chairman:

Paek Nam-jun, director, Secretariat, Committee for Peaceful
Unification of the Fatherland

Members:

Kim Wan-su, roving ambassador, Foreign Ministry

Cho Sang-ho, deputy director, Secretariat of the Central Com-
mittee, Democratic Front for the Reunification
of Fatherland

Choe Song-ik, department chief, Secretariat, Committee for
Peaceful Unification of the Fatherland

Chong Yong-chun, councilor, Secretariat, Committee for Peace-

ful Unification of the Fatherland
Sim Tae-jin, senior deliberations officer, Secretariat, Administration Council
Cho Song-dae, department chief, North Korean Central Broadcasting Commission

1. First Meeting

The first meeting of the South-North Political Subcommittee was held at Peace House in the southern sector of Panmunjom on March 9, 1992. The closed-door session was attended by seven members from each side, who included Lee Dong-bok, the South's chairman, and Paek Nam-jun, northern chairman.

In his first speech, Lee Dong-bok, while emphasizing the significance of the basic South-North agreement, explained the South's position with respect to the three unification principles of the July 4, 1972 South-North Joint Communiqué, which were reaffirmed in the preamble of the basic agreement.

On the principle of "independence," Lee said this principle was meant for the two sides to resolve all issues related to unification between themselves without any interference by alien forces based on the principles of national self-determination and of resolution of problems between the direct parties involved.

Regarding the principle of "peace," the southern chairman said the principle was meant that the two sides would desist from committing acts of attacking or subverting each other by force of arms or other means of violence. Under the principle, the two sides, as direct parties involved, were also supposed to transform the existing state of armistice into a state of peace as stipulated by the provisions of Article 5 of the basic South-North agreement, he said.

Chairman Lee said that the principle of “grand national unity” was meant for the two sides to promote national reconciliation and unity on the basis of guaranteeing democracy and basic human rights.

As three principles for the attainment of inter-Korean reconciliation, a task to be discussed and resolved at the political subcommittee, the South set forth 1) the principle of respecting each other’s system and statutory order, 2) the principle of resolving problems between the direct parties, the South and the North, and 3) the principle of reciprocity between the two sides.

The South also stressed that the reasonable method of implementing the reconciliation-related clauses of the basic South-North agreement was to extract concrete implementation tasks from the various articles of Chapter I in the area of reconciliation and to adopt and carry out auxiliary agreements one by one based on discussion of such implementation tasks. The South then presented its position and opinions on concrete article-by-article implementation measures.

The South said that a number of articles of the basic agreement clearly indicated that they were based on the principle of peaceful coexistence, which it said the two sides should faithfully implement and respect as they were in keeping also with the spirit of the United Nations Charter. The southern chairman said the clauses were Article 1 on respect for mutual systems, Article 2 on non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, Article 3 on stoppage of mutual slanders and defamation and Article 4 on prohibition of destructive and subversive acts along with two articles in the area of non-aggression, namely Article 10 on peaceful resolution of disputes and Article 11 on the boundary of non-aggression.

The South stressed that in order to prepare auxiliary agreements for the implementation of Articles 1 through 4, a number

of tasks should be discussed and resolved first. It said such tasks should include the issue of respecting each other's political, economic, social and cultural systems as well as the statutory order on which they are based; the issue of establishing a "special relationship formed between the two sides in the process of pursuing unification rather than their being country-to-country relations;" issue of setting the object of mutual non-interference; issue of defining the concept of slanders and defamation and devising concrete method of implementation; issue of priority suspension of slanders against each other's head of state, specific persons and systems; and the question of taking measures necessary for the abandonment and rejection of all acts of violence and fundamentally uprooting all subversive policies and acts.

Noting that these issues were closely related to legal and institutional matters, the South proposed the creation of a South-North joint legal commission to lay conditions for the resolution of these matters.

The southern side said there should be a separate auxiliary agreement for the implementation of Article 5 on the transformation of the state of armistice into the state of peace and the respect for the existing Military Armistice Agreement in view of their nature, and another auxiliary agreement for Article 6 on the suspension of confrontation and mutual cooperation at international arenas.

Emphasizing that Article 7 on the creation and operation of South and North liaison offices was an issue which ought to be discussed and resolved speedily inasmuch as the deadline (within three months of the effectuation of the basic agreement) for their opening was specified in the basic South-North agreement, the South produced a draft agreement on the establishment and operation of South and North liaison offices, asking the North to discuss it on a priority basis.

The draft agreement featured that the names of the liaison offices shall be "Seoul-Side Office of South-North Liaison Office" and "Pyongyang-Side Office of South-North Liaison Office," respectively; that to facilitate the institutionalization of political confidence building, the southern office shall be set up in the northern sector of Panmunjom and the northern office in the southern sector; that each office shall be manned by a vice-minister- or assistant-minister-level chief, a vice chief, five liaison officials and some other necessary personnel; that their function shall include various liaison and consultative programs, operation of direct telephone lines, various conveniences and procedural matters, related to inter-Korean travels and contacts; and that the execution of various matters delegated by subcommittees and joint commissions.

The South suggested that each liaison office shall comprise liaison officials rooms, travel and contact information room, dispersed family meeting hall, postal exchange room, and a telephone switchboard, and that two liaison office heads meet regularly once a week.

Also pointing out that international suspicion is rising about possible development of nuclear weapons by North Korea, the South called for the North's sincere efforts to dispel such a suspicion, emphasizing that inter-Korean reconciliation and cooperation could hardly be expected unless the issue of inter-Korean nuclear inspections is resolved.

In the meantime, North Korea asserted that since the issue of inter-Korean reconciliation, along with that of South-North non-aggression, constitutes the nucleus of the basic South-North agreement, matters to be taken up at the Political Subcommittee would be pivotal questions that would determine the future of the basic agreement.

The North then set forth a draft agreement on inter-Korean reconciliation, which was rather declarative and comprehensive,

lacking practicability, and demanded its adoption. Their draft agreement was entitled, "Auxiliary Agreement (Draft) for the Implementation of and Respect for Chapter I 'North-South Reconciliation' of the Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression and Exchanges and Cooperation between the North and the South."

Moreover, even before the start of discussions of concrete implementation measures, the North insisted that a joint political commission should be set up by all means as an implementation body in the area of reconciliation, an organization which was not mentioned in any part of the basic agreement. In their one-sided urging, the North put forth an "Agreement (Draft) on the Formation and Operation of North-South Joint Political Commission."

The North also proposed an "Agreement (Draft) on the Establishment and Operation of Panmunjom North and South Liaison Offices" describing their function as the execution of overall liaison programs for political parties, organizations and individual personages, which, according to them, were supposed to replace the existing Red Cross liaison offices. The northern members demanded their three draft agreements be adopted and put into practice on a package basis.

During ensuing debate, the South pointed out that the North's demand for the adoption of their draft agreements as a prerequisite to the progress of the political subcommittee ran counter to the express provisions of the basis agreement. The South noted that as stipulated in the Agreement on Formation and Operation of Subcommittees, subcommittees ought to prepare auxiliary agreements based on the discussion of concrete implementation measures and to form and operate relevant joint commissions.

The South further suggested that a subcommittee members contact be held around March 17 to discuss the issue of opening liaison offices on a priority basis.

However, the North, while criticizing the South for not producing a draft auxiliary agreement on implementation measures in the area of reconciliation, rejected a members contact, arguing that any contact designed to discuss only the opening of liaison offices was not acceptable.

2. Second Meeting

The second meeting of the South-North Political Subcommittee was held behind the closed doors at Tongilkak in the northern sector of Panmun³jom on March 27, 1992.

The South pointed out that North's demand for the adoption of a single package auxiliary agreement did not conform the purport of the preamble and Article 2 of the Agreement on Formation and Operation of Subcommittees which provides that auxiliary agreements be adopted based on the results of discussions of concrete implementation measures.

Moreover, the South emphasized that the North's plan to include in an auxiliary agreement those clauses which they withdrew in the course of discussing the basic agreement constituted a square violation of the basic agreement.

Also concerning the North Korean call for the creation of a South-North joint political commission alone under the political subcommittee, the South let it be known that there was no such an agreement in the area of reconciliatin of the basic South-North agreement. In particular, the South emphasized that the North's remarks made at the first meeting to the effect that a poltical commission should serve as an outer organization of the high-level talks, ran counter to the contents of their own keynote speech made at the sixth high-level meeting.

The South also said that the North's call for "package agree-

ment and simultaneous implementation” was unrealistic, saying that implementation measures should be taken based on the principle of “case-by-case agreement and prompt implementation” in view of the particularity, urgency and easiness of each clauses.

At the same time, the South set forth 19 separate tasks prepared by making more concrete the major tasks which the South produced at the first meeting for discussion and implementation in the area of reconciliation of the basic South-North agreement. The 19 tasks were:

Those related to Article 1 “recognition of and respect for systems” and Article 2 “non-interference in internal affairs” of the basic agreement, which included recognition of the government representation of each other; recognition of and respect for each other’s political, economic, social and cultural systems; respect for each other’s statutory orders; concrete establishment of inter-Korean relations as “interim special relationship;” non-interference in each other’s diplomatic policies and relations with third countries; and the formation and operation of a South-North joint legal commission.

The tasks related to Article 3 “suspension of slanders and defamation,” which included suspension of name-calling personal attacks against each other’s highest authorities; fact-finding survey and remedial measures against slanders and defamation against each other; and fact-finding surveys and necessary measures against propaganda activities through public address system broadcasting and visual items along the Military Demarcation Line.

Those related to Article 4 “suspension of destructive and subversive activities,” which included fundamental measures taken to prohibit all destructive and subversive activities against each other; suspension of subversive activities against each other’s systems taking advantage of anti-government organizations in each other’s side; the issue of not ensuring the organization of, suppor-

ting and defending a illegal organization in each other's areas for the purpose of destroying each other's systems and statutory order; and suspension of the joining and support of international terrorist activities and the abidance by the international convention on terrorism.

Those tasks related to Article 5 "change into the state of peace" between the South and the North, which included change of the existing state of armistice into a solid state of peace between the South and the North; and the issue of not attempting to change the armistice agreement until a change into a solid state of peace was instituted (normalization of the Military Armistice Commission and Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission and demilitarization of the Demilitarized Zone).

Those related to Article 6 "cooperation at international arenas," which included suspension of mutual slanders and defamation at international arenas like international organizations and conferences; creation of negotiations conduits in areas where both sides maintain diplomatic missions; regularization of discussions between South and North Korean representatives in areas where United Nations agencies are posted; and promotion of joint projects through international organizations like the U.N. Development Program (UNDP) and the Economic and Social Commission of Asia and Pacific (ESCAP).

Also regarding the issue of establishing and operating South-North liaison offices, the South suggested that the liaison offices be set up in each other's areas as a token of the age of inter-Koeran reconciliation and cooperation, and that they comprise various offices such as dispersed families' meeting centers and postal exchange rooms in preparation for likely surge in personnel and postal exchanges as well as in various inter-Korean meetings and contacts.

Lastly, the South again called for separate subcommittee

members contacts to discuss the issue of establishing and operating South and North liaison offices which were set to be established by May 19.

In contrast, the northern chairman, in his speech, suggested that an auxiliary agreement and another on the formation and operation of joint commissions be adopted and put into force at the seventh South-North high-level meeting set for May 5. The North also reiterated their stand favoring the priority adoption of a single auxiliary agreement.

The North insisted that debate should be carried on in the order of the adoption of an auxiliary agreement, formation of joint commissions and establishment of liaison offices. They said there should be but one joint commission, namely, political commission.

Sticking to their demand for the adoption of a single auxiliary agreement and the establishment of a single political commission, the northern members asserted these issues must be adopted and put into effect by all means at the seventh high-level meeting.

In response, the South stressed that auxiliary agreements might be adopted on a case-by-case basis if some agreement could be reached based on discussions of concrete measures to implement the basic South-North agreement. It made it express that there should be the flexibility to form multiple joint commissions if they were deemed necessary depending on the auxiliary agreements adopted.

The South again urged the North to discuss the issue of opening the proposed South and North liaison offices in the first place inasmuch as the deadline for their creation was specified in the basic agreement, as well as the draft 23-article single auxiliary agreement produced by the North and the 19-item discussion tasks suggested by the South.

The North, however, said they couldn't agree to separate subcommittee members contacts unless the issue of auxiliary ag-

reement was taken up on a priority basis.

3. Third Meeting

The third meeting of the South-North Political subcommittee was held behind the closed doors at Peace House in Panmunjom on April 23, 1992.

In a move to provide a breakthrough in the stalemated talks, the South newly proposed five draft agreements embodying the 19 tasks first laid down during the second subcommittee meeting. The five draft agreements were:

- Agreement on Recognition of and Respect for Mutual Systems and Non-Interference in Internal Affairs between the South and the North (Draft)

- Agreement on Suspension of Slanders and Defamation between the South and the North (Draft)

- Agreement on Prohibition of Destructive and Subversive Activities between the South and the North (Draft)

- Agreement on Transformation of State of Armistice into State of Peace between the South and the North (Draft)

- Agreement on Cooperation at International Arenas between the South and the North (Draft)

Moreover, the South proposed to hold a separate subcommittee members contacts to discuss first the issue of opening the projected South and North liaison offices, the deadline for whose creation was specified in the basic agreement. ,

In particular, the South, while pointing out that the “August 15 Conference” which the North has been promoting ran counter to the spirit of the basic South-North agreement, urged the North to call off the conference forthwith and dismantle organizations like Pomminryon.

However, the North held fast to the position that they could discuss the creation of liaison offices only after the questions of adopting auxiliary agreements and forming joint commissions were resolved.

Besides, the North Koreans asserted that the “August 15 Pan-National Conference” was an event that had been promoted by a voluntary organization having nothing to do with government authorities. They said that the conference was not an issue the government authorities could meddle in.

a. Members Contacts

Lee Dong-bok, the South’s chairman of the Political Subcommittee, proposed to the North on April 27 to hold subcommittee members contacts on April 29 to discuss the issue of South and North liaison offices. The offer was made in a telephone message addressed to his North Korean counterpart, Paek Nam-jun.

The North accepted the proposal on April 28, and thus the first members contact was set to be held on April 29 at the conference room of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission at Panmunjom.

As the North changed its demand for the priority adoption of auxiliary agreements and responded affirmatively to the South’s call for the discussion first of the issue of creating the proposed liaison offices, the two sides discussed pending issues in the order of an agreement on the creation of South and North liaison offices, auxiliary agreements and an agreement on the creation and operation of joint commissions.

The South initially planned to wind up debate on the draft agreement on liaison offices. But, the two sides could only confirm differences in their draft versions (places of liaison offices, their names, facilities they would have, their function, etc.), deciding

to leave the issue to the seventh high-level meeting.

The two sides then discussed the issues of auxiliary agreements and joint commissions. But, all they could do was to reaffirm their mutual differences over the matters.

Part III

South-North Military Subcommittee

The first meeting of the South-North Military Subcommittee was set to be held at Tongilkak in Panmunjom on March 13. Under the joint statement of the sixth South-North high-level meeting, the military subcommittee was supposed to discuss concrete measures to implement and respect the South-North agreement on non-aggression as well as to dissolve the state of military confrontation. The lists of the two sides subcommittee members were mutually notified on March 6.

The South:

Chairman:

Park Yong-ok, arms control officer, Ministry of National Defense

Members:

Kim Hi-sang, secretary, Presidential Secretariat

Im Tae-sun, advisory member, National Unification Board

Lee Yong-ho, colonel, Ministry of National Defense

Kim Young-jin, colonel, Ministry of National Defense

Cho Sang-hoon, deliberations officer, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Chae Jun-sok, judgement officer, Ministry of National Defense

The North:

Chairman:

Kim Yong-chol, deputy bureau director, People's Armed Forces Ministry

Members:

Pak Yong-su, major general, North Korean People's Army

Pak Song-gon, colonel, North Korean People's Army

Li Gil-chong, colonel, North Korean People's Army

Kim Min-hyon, colonel, North Korean People's Army

Pak Rim-su, colonel, North Korean People's Army

1. First Meeting

The first meeting of the South-North Military Subcommittee was held behind the closed doors at Tongilkak in the northern sector of Panmunjom on March 13, 1992.

At the outset of the meeting, the South set forth three principles which it said the two sides should abide by in the course of discussions. The three principles were:

First, the two sides should respect for the principle of resolution between the direct parties involved and thereby resolve all inter-Korean issues between the direct parties—the South and the North—under the principle of national self-determination.

Second, the two sides, under the principle of balanced promotion, should abandon the manner of favoring some specific areas only or adhering to infeasible “package agreement and simultaneous implementation.”

Third, the two sides, under the principle of ensuring practicability, desist from setting forth contents of declarative and abstract nature and instead concretely lay down the ways and means of implementation in auxiliary agreements.

The South also explained its position toward concrete measures the two sides should discuss and resolve at the Military Subcommittee in the area of non-aggression.

The South emphasized that auxiliary agreements for the implementation of the provisions of Articles 9 through 14 in the area of non-aggression, should be prepared based on the results of discussions of concrete measures for their implementation as governed in the provisions of Paragraph 2, Article 22 of the Agree-

ment on Formation and Operation of Subcommittees.

In connection with Article 9 “non-use of the force of arms” and “non-aggression,” Article 10 “peaceful resolution of disputes,” and Article 13 “installing of direct telephone line between military authorities,” the South maintained that the military subcommittee should work out steps to prevent inadvertent armed clashes in border areas and forestall their escalation.

The South then put forth a draft agreement on the formation and operation of a South-North Joint Military Commission featuring that the commission be formed with seven members including a chairman and a vice chairman from each side and that the commission regularly meet once a month.

In addition, the South produced a draft agreement on the installing and operating of direct telephone between the military authorities of the South and the North in a bid to resolve the issue of hotline, an issue which was crucial for the prevention of inadvertent armed clashes and which could be agreed on and implemented easily.

It suggested that a direct telephone line be installed between the offices of the defense minister of the South and the people’s armed forces minister of the North within 50 days of the effectuation of the agreement.

Moreover, the South said that a South-North joint military Subcommittee should be formed at an early date as provided for in Article 12 of the basic agreement. It emphasized that the two sides should thereby guarantee the respect for and implementation of non-aggression by preparing and putting into action agreements for confidence building in the military area, and by discussing and implementing the questions of removing mass destruction weapons and offensive ability and carrying out and verifying phased arms reduction.

Meanwhile, as a task the military subcommittee should ca-

rry out in the area of non-aggression, North Korea set forth an "Auxiliary Agreement (Draft) for Chapter II, 'Implementation of and Respect for Non-Aggression between the South and the North,' of Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression and Exchanges and Cooperation between the South and the North." It also produced as an auxiliary paper a draft agreement on the creation of a North-South joint military commission.

By insisting that an auxiliary agreement for the implementation of and respect for non-aggression should be put into force at the seventh South-North high-level meeting, the North attempted to set a deadline for the adoption of their comprehensive and single auxiliary draft agreement.

The North's draft auxiliary agreement showed their unveiled attempt to handle the issue of dissolving military confrontation with an aim at undermining the Korea-U.S. security cooperative system. Paragraph 6, Article 1 of the auxiliary agreement provided, "Neither side shall join a foreign country's use of the force of arms and aggressive acts against each other nor shall offer one's land, sea and sky to such a country."

The draft agreement also said in Paragraph 2, Article 3 that "the joint military commission shall discuss and resolve all issues related to dissolving the state of military confrontation." But, this was a function that deviated from the duties set for the joint military commission in Article 12 of the basic agreement.

Article 5 of the northern draft agreement stipulated that the hotline between the military authorities would be operated in the form of exchanging telephone messages. But, this was a far cry from the purport of the hotline prescribed in the basic agreement, that was, its use as an emergency communications means to prevent inadvertent armed clashes and their escalation.

Meanwhile, the draft agreement the North offered for the formation and operation of a South-North joint military commis-

sion provided for seven commission members from each side including a chairman and a vice chairman. It also said the commission chairmen should be officials with the rank of chief-of-staff level (vice minister) and there would be about three regular commission meetings a year.

With their draft agreement stipulating that the proposed joint military commission would discuss and promote measures to translate the provisions of an auxiliary agreement into action, the North showed an attempt to have the military subcommittee merely prepare a comprehensive auxiliary agreement only, with matters related to its implementation left to a joint military commission.

In this way, the South wanted to take up first the easily agreeable issue of military hotline and the creation of a proposed joint military commission whose deadline has been set, while the North demanded the adoption of yet another declarative agreement embodying their own interpretation of the basic agreement and wanted to leave matters for concrete implementation measures to a joint commission. No progress was thus recorded at the first meeting of the military subcommittee.

2. Second Meeting

The second meeting of the military subcommittee was held at Peace House on March 31, 1992. It also was a closed-door session.

The South suggested that necessary auxiliary agreements be adopted based on the results of discussions of implementation measures in each sector of the non-aggression area. It stressed, however, that such adoption should be made on a step-by-step basis depending on their urgency and importance.

The South said that the North's attempt to make the resolution of an auxiliary agreement a prerequisite to the inauguration of a joint military commission was a breach of an agreed matter. It pointed out that the proposed military commission, unlike other joint commissions, was an organization for both consultation and implementation.

As for the priority order of the matters to be taken up at the military subcommittee, the South emphasized that 1) a South-North joint military commission ought to be inaugurated within a prescribed time as the commission was supposed to be inaugurated within three months of the effectuation of the basic agreement, 2) the issue of a military hotline should be resolved on a priority basis as an urgent device to prevent inadvertent armed clashes, and rules on its operation be made in a separate auxiliary agreement in keeping with the purport of the basic agreement, and 3) other agreed matters in the area of non-aggression be covered in auxiliary agreements to be adopted step by step in the foreseeable future.

Besides, as concrete measures to implement and abide by other provisions of non-aggression-related articles of the basic agreement, the South set forth seven-point discussion tasks.

The seven tasks were the question of setting the definition of major terms; the question of taking emergency steps and post-factum handling in case inadvertent armed clashes occurred; the question of making mutual notification and taking proper measures in the event of the violation of each other's areas; the question of emergency refuge and rescue in unexpected incidents; the question of assistance for the normalization of Military Armistice Agreement organizations; the question of ensuring safe passage in case each other's transportation means enter or pass through one's area for peaceful purposes; and other questions related to concrete implementation of programs in the area of non-aggression.

At the same time, noting that the time of the seventh South-North high-level meeting was only about a month away, the South proposed that a separate subcommittee members contacts be held to have substantial talks on the formation of a joint military commission and the installing of a military hotline instead of idling away times over debate on principle matters.

In the meantime, the North sought to make the adoption of an auxiliary agreement a prerequisite to the inauguration of a joint military commission, while sticking to their earlier position that the two sides carry on discussions based on their version of a draft agreement and adopt a comprehensive single auxiliary agreement on a priority basis.

The North's contention was that a draft agreement on the formation of a joint military commission should be discussed after the two sides examined and agreed on an auxiliary agreement by item, and that the issue of a military hotline could be discussed at the time the relevant clause (Article 5) of an auxiliary agreement is studied.

Also arguing that the question of "basically guaranteeing the implementation of non-aggression" lied in the withdrawal of American forces from Korea and also in arms reduction between the South and the North, the North insisted that the South's call for the installing of a hotline between the two sides and the like were in fact secondary matters.

Reacting to the South's proposal for separate subcommittee members contacts to discuss the formation of a joint military commission and a military hotline, the North rejected the offer, asserting that they couldn't agree to separate contacts unless their version of a single draft auxiliary agreement was discussed first.

3. Third Meeting

The third meeting of the South-North Military Subcommittee was held at Tongilkak in Panmunjom from 10 a.m. to 4:30 p.m. April 30, 1992 (Thursday). It was opened to the press.

The South proposed a “(Draft) Agreement on Nonuse of the Force of Arms and Prevention of Inadvertent Armed Clashes for the Implementation and Abidance by Non-Aggression between the South and the North” which incorporated the discussion tasks set forth at the time of the second meeting. The South suggested that debate on a draft agreement on the formation of a joint military commission be completed first including the adjustment of wording.

Contrasting their past demand for the priority discussion of an auxiliary agreement, the North agreed to discuss the issue of a military commission first, prompting the two sides to enter into debate on the commission issue. The two sides neared accords on most clauses of a draft agreement, but failed to narrow differences on the following matters, deciding to leave the unsettled items to the seventh high-level meeting.

First regarding the function of the joint military commission, the South said the commission should perform the duties specified in Article 12 of the basic agreement, while the North insisted that the commission should be enabled to handle overall implementation matters in the area of non-aggression.

On the issue of effectuation, the South suggested that matters agreed on at the joint commission be put into effect with chairmen’s signing except for important agreed-on items which could be effectuated with prime ministers’ signing. The North, however, wanted that all the matters agreed on at the commission be put into force with chairmen’s signing.

The two sides reviewed the issue of an auxiliary agreement over a long period of time. But, all they could do was to reaffirm their differences. The two sides decided to continue to discuss the issue at the time of the seventh high-level meeting.

Part IV

South-North Exchanges and Cooperation Subcommittee

The first meeting of the South-North Exchanges and Cooperation Subcommittee was scheduled to be held at Peace House in Panmunjom on March 18. Under the joint statement of the sixth South-North high-level meeting, the exchanges and cooperation subcommittee was supposed to discuss concrete ways to implement and abide by the South-North agreement on exchanges and cooperation. The lists of the two sides' subcommittee members were mutually notified on March 6.

The South:

Chairman:

Lim Dong-won, vice minister, National Unification Board

Members:

Kim In-ho, assistant minister, Economic Planning Board

Song Young-ho, advisory member, National Unification Board

Park Un-suh, secretary, Presidential Secretariat

Yu Duk-hwan, assistant minister, Ministry of Trade and Industry

Shin Hyon-wung, bureau director, Ministry of Culture

Park Su-chang, deliberations officer, Office of the Prime Minister

The North:

Chairman:

Kim Jong-wu, vice minister, External Economic Project Ministry, Administration Council

Members:

Son Jong-chol, deputy director, Trade and Economy Research Institute

Kim Chae-song, department head, Secretariat, Administration Council

Kim I-sun, bureau director, Culture and Arts Ministry

Ryu Chang-sik, deputy bureau director, State Planning Commission

Jong Dok-gi, department head, Secretariat, Committee for Peaceful Unification of the Fatherland

Kim Sung-guk, deputy editor-in-chief, Rodong Chongnyon-sa Co.

1. First Meeting

The first meeting of the South-North Exchanges and Cooperation Subcommittee was held at Peace House in the southern area of Panmunjom on March 18, 1992. It was opened to the press.

The South first laid down the four principles to observe in the course of discussions and implementation of projects at the exchanges and cooperation subcommittee. The four principles were to 1) carry out exchanges and cooperation in the position of reciprocity, 2) promote unification-oriented exchanges and cooperation, 3) carry out exchanges and cooperation only upon the preparation of institutional devices, and 4) carry out urgent and important projects first (case-by-case agreement, prompt implementation).

The South also laid down as follows the basis and method of preparing an auxiliary agreement for concrete implementation measures in the area of Chapter 3 “exchanges and cooperation (Articles 15~21)” of the basic agreement.

Noting that articles in the area of exchanges and cooperation could in nature be categorized into the four sectors of dispersed families, travel and communications, economy and socio-culture, the South suggested that there would be four auxiliary agreements, the four being :

–Auxiliary Agreement on Meeting between Families and

Relatives Dispersed in the South and the North, and Resolution of Other Humanitarian Issues

–Auxiliary Agreement on Travels and Communications between the South and the North

–Auxiliary Agreement on Exchanges and Cooperation in, the Economic Area between the South and the North

–Auxiliary Agreement on Exchanges and Cooperation in the Social and Cultural Area between the South and the North

The South said that there should be as many joint commissions as the number of auxiliary agreements, namely, the four joint commissions of humanitarian matters, travels and communications, economic exchanges and cooperation, and social exchanges and cooperation.

–Agreement on the Formation and Operation of Joint Exchanges and Cooperation Commissions by Area between the South and the North.

The South further drew a distinct line over the function and nature of the subcommittee, stating that the duty of the subcommittee will not be completed with the adoption of an agreement on the formation and operation of joint commissions. The subcommittee should rather continue to exist even after the seventh high-level meeting so that it would prepare implementation measures within the framework of the high-level talks.

Meanwhile, the South proposed that 400 to 500 aged dispersed family members be allowed to visit their hometowns around the Dano holiday (which was to fall on June 5) from each side as a pilot project even before the adoption of an auxiliary agreement on dispersed families in view of the urgency of the dispersed family issue. It said that as for the method of the exchange, the

two sides could follow the precedent set at the time of the first exchange of dispersed family hometown visitors in 1985.

The North, on the other hand, put forth a single comprehensive draft agreement, "Auxiliary Agreement for the Implementation and Abidance by Chapter 3 North-South Cooperation and Exchanges of the Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression and Cooperation and Exchanges between the North and the South."

The North argued that the auxiliary agreement should be adopted first, followed by the adoption of an agreement on the formation and operation of a cooperation and exchanges joint commission between the North and the South.

The North said that the issue of hometown visits by aged dispersed families could be discussed only after the adoption of an auxiliary agreement and formation of a joint commission. They asserted that such an issue ought to be left to the Red Cross organizations.

Under the conception that both sides would jointly endeavor to see to it that an auxiliary agreement and an agreement on the formation and operation of a joint commission be signed and take effect at the seventh high-level meeting, the South and the North agreed to have subcommittee members contacts to review the two sides' versions of the agreements regardless of their numbers.

a. First Members Contact

The first members contact of the South-North Exchanges and Cooperation Subcommittee was held behind the closed doors at the conference room of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission at Panmunjom on March 25.

The lists of the two sides' delegates to the members contact were as follows :

The South :

Kim In-ho, director, International Economic Policy Coordination Office, Economic Planning Board

Song Young-dae, advisory member, National Unification Board

Shin Hyon-wung, director, Culture Policy Bureau, Ministry of Culture

The North :

Son Jong-chol, deputy director, Trade and Economic Institute

Kim Chae-song, department head, Secretariat, Administration Council

Kim Sung-kuk, deputy editor-in-chief, Rodong-Chongnyong-sa Co.

At the contact, the South, in connection with the method of discussions, suggested that the two sides iron out mutual differences through overall debate and then discuss their detailed contents.

The South stressed that the numerical order of the articles of the basic agreement did not necessarily mean their order of discussion, and that, therefore, those clauses of similar nature should be discussed at the same time regardless of their numerical order. It urged the North to concretely set forth its idea to resolve the clause of Article 18 (dispersed family issue) of the basic agreement between government authorities.

In response, the North produced a revised draft of an auxiliary agreement prepared by partially supplementing the draft they first put forth at the time of the first subcommittee meeting. They demanded the discussion of exchanges- and cooperation-related articles of the basic agreement beginning with Article 15, asserting

that the duty of the members contact was to discuss the contents of an auxiliary agreement. On the other hand, the North refused to produce any idea to resolve the dispersed family issue between the authorities of the two sides.

The revised draft of an auxiliary agreement offered by the North included Article 1 "economic exchanges and cooperation," Article 2 "cooperation and exchanges in the areas of science and technology," Article 4 "question of dispersed families," Article 5 "linking of roads and railroads," Article 6 "postal and telecommunications exchanges," and Article 8 "formation and operation of joint commission." The North's version incorporated some of the clauses of the South's draft agreement.

b. Second Members Contact

The second members contact of the Exchanges and Cooperation Subcommittee was held behind the closed doors at the conference room of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission at Panmunjom on April 2.

At the contact, the South, while emphasizing that the session should be centered on substantial discussions, affirmatively spoke of the North's presentation of a revised draft auxiliary agreement during the first members contact of March 25. The South then disclosed its views about some of the contents.

It said that although there were 10 more articles in the North's version than the initial draft, the revised draft as a whole was not sufficient in terms of concreteness and practicability. The South went on to say that even though there was some progress as some measures for governmental guarantee and the areas of cooperation were specified in the socio-culture areas, the issue of dispersed families rather regressed from the initial draft.

In connection with the method of the meeting such as the

order of discussions, the South suggested that debate be made in the order of humanitarian issues, travel and communications, economy, socio-culture and pilot projects. It also called for the completion of debate on an auxiliary agreement before a second subcommittee meeting.

The South then produced a revised draft auxiliary agreement covering the three areas of economy, socio-culture and travel-communications (excepting a draft in the humanitarian area).

The revised draft featured a reduction of the number of articles from the original 26 to 20 in the economic area, from the 30 to 11 in the socio-cultural area, and from the 23 to 17 in the travel-communications area.

The North said many clauses of the South's version were almost in accord with their idea. However, they disputed the clause about exchanges and cooperation to be carried out only with approval from the government authorities, as well as those calling for the creation of economic missions in Seoul and Pyongyang and an economic counseling office at Panmunjom.

The North also shunned debate on the issue of exchanging aged dispersed families hometown visitors which the South proposed at the time of the first contact. They simply said the issue could be discussed at the time of discussion of an auxiliary agreement.

c. Third Members Contact

The third members contact of the Exchanges and Cooperation Subcommittee was held at Panmunjom on April 10, 1992. The session took place behind the closed doors at the conference room of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission.

At the contact, the North set forth a new revised draft auxiliary agreement which incorporated part of the South's version

produced at the second members contact. The two sides checked those in common and differences between the two sides' versions and exchanged opinions on them, nearing an accord on the following matters.

The items on which they neared an agreement in the area of economic exchanges and cooperation were those on the fixing of the prices of commodities to be exchanged in consideration of international market prices; assessment of no tariffs on commodity exchanges which should be regarded as intra-national deals; direct transportation of exchanging commodities along inland or sea routes; discussion and fixing of investment guarantee, prevention of double taxation, and dispute arbitration procedures; and method of settlement.

The items on which the two sides neared an accord also included exchange of achievements, experiences, information and materials; and protection of copyrights of drama, music, arts, etc. in the socio-cultural area; and guarantee of personal safety and safe return home; opening of sea, land and air routes; and emergency rescue measures in accidents in the travel and communications area.

However, the two sides failed to near any accord on economic cooperation and some other clauses.

The South suggested that exchange items and their amounts be determined under the principle of inter-complementarity and depending on one's demand and supply situation. But, the North insisted on paid or barter trade between manufactured goods or between raw materials.

Moreover, whereas the South maintained that government authorities' permission would be necessary for responsible economic activities, the North denounced it, charging that such an idea stemmed from a political aim to discriminately authorize the busi-

ness of only those catering to the taste of government authorities.

The South said the creation of economic offices in Seoul and Pyongyang would be needed to energize inter-Korean economic exchanges. But, the North rejected the idea, arguing that the establishment of offices of the nature of country-to-country trade missions represented an anti-unification “two Koreas” policy.

2. Second Meeting

The second meeting of the South-North Exchanges and Cooperation Subcommittee was held at Tongilkak in the northern sector of Panmunjom on April 18. It was opened to the press.

The South set forth three issues as tasks to resolve at the meeting. The three were the question of adjusting mutual differences regarding an auxiliary agreement, the question of forming and operating a joint commission, and the question of carrying out pilot projects. It then disclosed its position toward these issues.

On adjustment of the contents of an auxiliary agreement, the South said that authorities' authorization in the area of economic exchanges and cooperation was intended to ensure the trustworthiness of transactions and protect good-intentioned dealers; that the principle of exchange of “manufactured items versus manufacture items or raw materials versus raw materials” was not proper in view of the existing structure of commodities of the two sides; and that the idea of economic offices in each other's areas would be shelved for later discussion in view of the North's opposition but at least an economic counseling office should be set up at Panmunjom.

In the socio-cultural area, the South said its version set forth details to ensure the concreteness and practicability of exchanges and cooperation, whereas the North's was rather declarative

lacking practicability.

In the travel and communications area, the South said the issues of collection of postal matters, method of distribution, and kinds and fares of postal and telecommunications services to be handled could be discussed at a joint commission, and suggested that the North's expression, "travels by persons in all layers and stratas" be changed into "travels by members of the nation" as used in Article 17 of the basic agreement.

The South pointed out that the North's demand for the removal of statutory and institutional devices in connection with inter-Korean travels violated the spirit of the basic South-North agreement that provided for the respect for each other's systems and non-interference in each other's internal affairs.

Also stressing that a joint commission was supposed to be an implementation body, the South said that the discussion and resolution of problems that arise in the implementation of exchanges and cooperation other than the adoption of an auxiliary agreement fell under the business of a subcommittee which is a consultative body.

The South suggested that a joint commission should meet around four times a year, and that matters agreed on at a joint commission could take effect with commission chairmen's signature as proposed by the North, adding, however, that such agreed-on matters should be reported to the high-level meeting.

The South again called for an exchange of aged dispersed family hometown visitors as a token of national reconciliation or as a pilot project of exchanges and cooperation.

The South then produced a second revised draft auxiliary agreement on the four areas of economy, socio-culture, travel-communications, and dispersed families, which reflected the South's position given above.

In response, the North said an economic counseling office

could be created through discussion at a joint commission if such a need arises after the implementation of economic exchanges and cooperation. But, it still denounced the South's idea of having government authorities authorize economic exchange and cooperation project as part of the South's "conduit singularization" policy.

They also demanded the repeal of the South's statutory and institutional devices such as the National Security Law as a prerequisite to free travels back and forth. On the other hand, the North repeated that the issue of dispersed families was a business of the Red Cross, and therefore they were opposed to its discussion between government authorities.

3. Third Meeting

The third meeting of the Exchanges and Cooperation Subcommittee was held behind the closed doors at Peace House in the southern area of the truce village on April 27.

The two sides produced revised versions of an auxiliary agreement and made discussions on a case-by-case basis.

In the area of economic exchanges and cooperation, the South stressed that government authorities' authorization of projects was indispensable to open-account transactions and was also needed for the protection of good-intentioned dealers and even for the resolution of disputes. But, the North held fast to their opposition to it, calling the idea an attempt to singularize the conduit of economic deals with the North.

Regarding the issue of the North's demand for the repeal of statutory and institutional measures, the South let it be known that such a demand breached the spirit of the basic South-North agreement which provides for respect for each other's systems.

The South said that if any legal problems pop up in the future in connection with exchanges and cooperation, it ought to be handled based on the principle of reciprocity at a South-North joint legal commission whose creation was suggested by the South at the Political Subcommittee.

But, the North said that since the measures were to constitute obstacles to free travels, they should naturally be removed and therefore be handled at the Exchanges and Cooperation Subcommittee.

Reacting to the North's assertion that to reconnect land and air routes, the state of military confrontation should be dissolved in the first place, the South pointed out that their attempt to attach a prerequisite to travels and communications exchanges by demanding the dissolution of military confrontation ahead of such exchanges, ran counter to the spirit of the basic agreement.

Recalling that the basic agreement, in its Article 18, regulates that the dispersed family issue should be resolved at the level of government authorities, the South emphasized it was not proper for the North to distort the interpretation of the article and demand the unconditional delegation of the issue to the Red Cross.

But, the South, taking into account the North's contention, showed flexibility by suggesting that the two sides' government authorities discuss and decide on concrete measures on the dispersed family issue with their implementation delegated to Red Cross organizations.

Reminding the North of the international Red Cross principle that the Red Cross societies of all countries should assume the role of government supporters in humanitarian projects but should maintain their self-rule, the South maintained that its idea was in keeping with the Red Cross principle.

In reaction, the North asserted that it was not right for the government authorities to meddle in Red Cross activities, and that

since the creation of a meeting center and the exchange of hometown visitors constituted concrete matters rather than the issues of principle, they should be taken up by the Red Cross.

Meanwhile, the North shunned substantial debate on the South-proposed exchange of aged dispersed families hometown visitors by demanding the repatriation to the North of Lee In-mo, a self-styled North Korean correspondent caught as a guerrilla fighter during the Korean War and spent decades in prison for refusing to change allegiance.

The two sides also discussed the issue of creating a joint commission within a specified period, but differed on the number of commission members, its function and whether to report the results of its discussions to higher places. They decided to continue to discuss the issues through subcommittee members contacts.

a. Fourth Members Contact

The fourth contact of the Exchanges and Cooperation Subcommittee was held behind the closed doors at the conference room of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission at Panmunjom on April 28.

The two sides first entered discussions to adjust the contents of a draft agreement on the creation of a joint commission, nearing an accord on most articles. The agreed-on matters included:

Co-chairmen shall be a minister- or vice-minister-level official and there shall be 15 support personnel from each side. Working-level councils shall be formed and operated under the commission if need be.

The function of a joint commission shall include:

– Implementation of an auxiliary agreement prepared by the South-North Exchanges and Cooperation Subcommittee.

– Preparation, discussion and implementation of details for

the implementation of an auxiliary agreement.

–Coordination of the activities of working-level councils.

The operation of joint commission meetings:

–Meetings shall in principle be held once every quarter.

Special meetings may be held at any time if necessary.

–The place of meetings shall be Panmunjom, Seoul, Pyongyang or other places of mutual agreement.

–Meetings shall be operated jointly by both sides' chairmen.

–Meetings shall in principle be held behind the closed doors, but may be opened to the public through mutual agreement.

–Persons directly involved in exchanges or cooperation or relevant experts may attend meetings through mutual agreement.

–Working-level matters such as the guarantee of personal safety, furnishing of conveniences, conference minutes, etc. shall be made in accordance with precedents.

The two sides also decided to have the chairmen of the subcommittee discuss during the seventh high-level meeting those on which the two sides differed, such as the number of joint commission members, whether to report on the outcome of conference, and procedures for the effectuation of matters agreed on at commissions.

Meanwhile, following the discussion of a draft agreement on the formation and operation of a joint commission, the South set forth a single auxiliary agreement containing the four separate draft auxiliary agreements it suggested earlier. It urged the North to take corresponding steps.

Part V

South-North Joint Nuclear Control Commission

Amid the emergence of an issue related to North Korea's nuclear arms development as a grave factor threatening peace on the Korean peninsula, the South and the North held three contacts between delegates to the high-level talks at Panmunjom in December 1991 where the Joint Declaration of Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula was adopted and initialed. The joint declaration was put into force at the sixth high-level meeting on February 19, 1992.

Afterwards, seven delegates contacts were held to discuss the creation of a South-North joint nuclear control commission pursuant to the provisions of the joint declaration's Article 5 calling for the creation of a joint nuclear control commission within one month of the effectuation of the joint declaration.

At the seventh delegates contact on March 14, the two sides agreed on the Agreement to Establish a South-North Joint Nuclear Control Commission and issued a joint announcement.

Under the announcement, the two sides mutually notified of the lists of their chairmen, vice chairmen and members of the joint commission on March 18. The lists were as follows:

The South :

Chairman:

Gong Ro-myong, director, Foreign Service and National Security Institute

Vice chairman:

Pan Ki-mun, special assistant to the Foreign Minister

Members:

Chong Dae-kyu, advisory member, National Unification Board

Pyon Jong-kyu, secretary, Presidential Secretariat

Lee Pu-jik, brig. general, Ministry of National Defense

Lee Sung-koo, deliberations officer, Ministry of Science and

Technology
Hong Sok-bom, deliberations officer, Office of the Prime
Minister

The North:

Chairman:

Choe Wu-jin, roving ambassador, Foreign Ministry

Vice chairman:

Pak Gwang-won, maj. general, North Korean People's Army

Members:

Kim Gyong-chun, bureau director, Atomic Power Industry Ministry

Chang Jang-chon, research member, Foreign Ministry

Kim Su-gil, research member, Foreign Ministry

Choe Yong-gwan, colonel, North Korean People's Army

Kim Man-gil, councillor, Secretariat, Committee for Peaceful
Unification of the Fatherland

Meanwhile, in connection with the South's call made at the first meetings of the political and military subcommittees for the North's sincerity toward the nuclear issue, the North's Premier Yon Hyong-muk sent a telephone message to Prime Minister Chung Won-shik on March 17 in which he denounced the South for delaying the implementation of the basic agreement with the excuse of the nuclear issue, and thus tried to shift blame for the deadlock of the various subcommittees to the South.

In reaction, Lee Dong-bok, spokesman for the southern delegation to the high-level talks, said, "Our delegation's position over what Premier Yon mentioned shall be expressed at the future meetings of the subcommittees and commissions."

1. First Meeting

The first meeting of the South-North Joint Nuclear Control Commission was held behind the closed doors at Tongilkak in the northern sector of Panmunjom on March 19, 1992.

At the meeting, the South stressed that nuclear inspection rules should be prepared by May 18 and mutual inspections conducted by early June as agreed on during the seventh delegates contact held on March 14 to discuss the creation of the joint nuclear control commission. The South then produced a draft Rules on Mutual South-North Nuclear Inspections and formats for the exchange of information and for the preparation of inspection plans as appendices.

The South proposed that even before the preparation of nuclear inspection rules, nuclear-related information be exchanged mutually to facilitate smooth inspections and prior visits be made to each other's nuclear facilities and places.

In response, the North set forth a draft Agreement on Implementation of the Joint Declaration of Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula which dilated on Articles 1 through 4 of the joint declaration and contained clauses on prohibition of joining nuclear threats, conspiracy and activities, as well as on international guarantee of the Korean peninsula's denuclearization. They then produced as an appendix a draft Inspection Rules for Verification of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

Moreover, the North rejected the South's suggestion for pilot inspections and the mutual inspections of the same numbers of suspected places. The North's idea was that overall inspections should be made simultaneously of their Yongbyon and all U.S. military installations in the South under the principle of so-called "simultaneous elimination of suspicions."

In reaction, the South reminded the North that through

the seven rounds of delegates contacts on the question of an agreement on the implementation of the joint declaration, the South maintained there was no need of separate implementation agreement since all that was needed was verification through mutual inspections because Articles 1 to 3 of the joint declaration themselves were obligatory clauses of an implementation nature. The South said that since the North accepted the idea and agreed to work out a document, not an agreement, necessary for the verification of denuclearization, the North should withdraw its draft implementation agreement.

Regarding the number of places to be inspected, the South pointed out that the principle of “simultaneous elimination of suspicions” ran counter to the theretofore inter-Korean practices of the principle of reciprocity as well as to international practices.

Despite a mutual agreement made at the first meeting to the contrary, the North set forth a draft comprehensive agreement for the implementation of the joint declaration at the first meeting while trying to handle inspection rules as an auxiliary to the draft agreement, thus attempting to make the adoption of an agreement for the implementation of the joint communique as a prerequisite to the preparation of inspection rules.

Besides, by again bringing up the issues of outside nuclear threats and international guarantee of nuclear-free status, which they already withdrew in the course of discussing the creation of a nuclear control commission, the North, in a show of insincerity, tried to delay mutual nuclear inspections between the two sides.

2. Second Meeting

The second meeting of the South-North Joint Nuclear Cont-

rol Commission was held at Peace House, Panmunjom on April 1, 1992.

At the meeting, the South said that the draft agreement on the implementation of the joint declaration, which the North laid down at the first meeting, was a totally meaningless paper produced for agreement's sake only and therefore was none but a means of delaying the adoption of inspection rules. It also charged that the North's fresh introduction of the issues of nuclear threats from outside and international guarantee, which they earlier withdrew, stemmed from an attempt to lay an artificial obstacle to the resolution of the nuclear issue.

The South further criticized that the North's proposed inspection rules provided excessive details for the inspection of non-existent nuclear weapons and bases in the two sides' areas while putting aside the procedures and method for the inspection of nuclear facilities and materials for later preparation. The North thereby displayed a scheme to delay mutual nuclear inspections indefinitely.

Emphasizing that the most effective way to dispel the nuclear suspicion was none but to make special inspections, the South urged the North to enter debate on inspection rules which it said was the top priority task facing the joint nuclear control commission.

In reaction, the North charged that the draft inspection rules the South produced at the time of the first meeting were intended to obtain "ulterior objectives" through inspections. "It was with some ulterior purposes that the South suggested special inspections of military installations," the North said.

Maintaining that the adoption of both implementation and verification measures in a comprehensive document was essential and unavoidable, the North adhered to their call for the priority adoption of an agreement on the implementation of the joint dec-

laration.

As for inspection rules, the North emphasized the need of the inspections of nuclear weapons and bases while being strongly negative toward the South's idea of "inspection of the same number of places" and "special inspections of military installations."

Meanwhile, while nuclear negotiations were going on between the South and the North, North Korea, at the third session of the ninth Supreme People's Assembly on April 9, ratified and effectuated the nuclear safeguards agreements it had signed with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)

North Korea, which joined the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in December 1985, had put off until January 30, 1992, six years later, their conclusion of the safeguards agreement despite the fact that the agreement was supposed to be signed within six months of one's joining of the NPT.

3. Third Meeting

The third meeting of the South-North Joint Nuclear Control Commission was held at Tongilkak in the northern sector of Panmunjom on April 21, 1992.

At the meeting, the South, while pointing out that there was not enough time left before the deadline (around May 19) for the preparation of inspection rules, urged the North to withdraw their draft Agreement on Implementation of Joint Declaration of Denuclearization and instead agree to discuss inspection rules forthwith.

With the urging, the South set forth a revised draft of inspection rules which incorporated part of the draft offered by the North at the time of the first meeting on March 19 and which readjusted such matters as the title of inspection rules, exchange of informa-

tion, method of inspection procedures, guarantee of the personal safety and activities of inspection teams and furnishing of conveniences.

However, the North reiterated their demand that their draft Agreement on Implementation of Joint Declaration of Denuclearization and its appendix, namely, inspection rules, should be adopted on a package basis. Their draft inspection rules showed no changes from their earlier offer except that they incorporated extremely small part of procedural matters of the South's draft.

The North, while rejecting the South's call for inspection based on the "principle of reciprocity," insisted on one-sided overall inspections under the so-called principle of "simultaneous dissolution of suspicions." They also turned down the South's idea of special inspections.

Moreover, North Korea kept raising issues beyond the frame of the joint denuclearization declaration such as joint measures against nuclear threats from outside, an idea that stemmed from the logic of "nuclear-free zone" and sought to make the adoption of an agreement on the implementation of denuclearization declaration as a prerequisite to signing inspection rules. They thereby blocked the start of substantial debate on inspection rules.

Regarding the time of the fourth meeting, the South suggested that the meeting be held on April 24 or 28 before the seventh high-level meeting slated for May 5-8 so that inspection rules could be worked out at an early date, but the North wanted to make it May 12, reasoning that they were busy preparing for the seventh meeting. The two sides agreed to decide the time of the fourth meeting during the seventh meeting.

Meanwhile, on May 6 during the seventh meeting period, the two sides' chairmen of the joint nuclear control commission met at Hotel Shilla to share the view that a document (inspection rules) necessary for the verification of denuclearization be prepared

by the end of May as agreed on between the two sides in March and that mutual inspections be conducted in June.

4. Fourth Meeting

The fourth meeting of the nuclear control commission was held at Peace House in Panmunjom on May 12, 1992.

In connection with the North Korean demand that the words “nuclear weapons” and “nuclear bases” should be specified in inspection rules, the South produced a revised draft agreement which provided that only on the condition that reciprocity, that was, military bases versus military bases, was respected, can the existence of nuclear weapons, nuclear blast detonator or nuclear arms launch or delivery means, be inspected if they were on the list of inspection objects or of information to be exchanged.

The South again urged the North to withdraw their draft agreement on the implementation of the denuclearization declaration and agree to conduct comprehensive and thorough nuclear inspections under the special inspection system if only to dispel suspicions at home and abroad. The South suggested that commission members contacts be held to adjust the wording of the draft inspection rules advanced by both sides.

The North, however, held fast to their policy of rejecting the special inspection system in favor of the “principle of simultaneous elimination of suspicions.” They proposed to hold commission members contacts to discuss inspection rules on the condition that both implementation agreement and inspection rules would be taken up on a package basis.

The two sides thus agreed to hold a commission members contact at Panmunjom on May 15 to enter first into the discussion of those items which the two sides offered in common in their

respective versions of inspection rules. The contact was set to be attended by three members of the nuclear control commission from each side. It was also agreed to hold the fifth meeting of the nuclear control commission on May 27 at Tongilkak.

a. First Members Contact

The first members contact of the South-North Joint Nuclear Control Commission was held at the conference room of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission on May 15.

The contact was attended from the South by Pan Ki-mun, special assistant to the Foreign Minister; Chong Tae-kyu, an advisory member of the National Unification Board; and Lee Sung-kyu, a deliberations official of the Ministry of Science and Technology, and from the North by Pak Gwang-won, major general of the North Korean People's Army; Chang Jang-chon, a research official of the Foreign Ministry; and Kim Su-gil, a research official of the Foreign Ministry.

The South, while reiterating that inspection rules be prepared by the time of the fifth meeting of the nuclear control commission, urged that discussion be made to adjust the wording with emphasis on the South's draft inspection rules.

However, the North showed an insincere stand demanding that both draft implementation agreement and inspection rules be discussed on a package basis notwithstanding the agreement made at the fourth commission meeting to discuss inspection rules first.

At the contact, the two sides began debate on inspection rules advanced by both sides for the first time. However, no substantial talks could be made even on the title and composition of the contents of rules.

b. Second Members Contact

The second commission members contact was held at the conference room of the supervisory commission on the morning of May 20, 1992.

The South, noting that the composition of the contents of the draft inspection rules set forth by the two sides at the first contact differed, proposed that inspection rules be discussed in the order of paragraphs 2 through 7 of Article 2 (function), Agreement to Establish South-North Joint Nuclear Control Commission.

Moreover, recalling that North Korea had admitted to the production of plutonium and that Hans Blix, director-general of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), said a so-called radiochemical laboratory the North had been building was in fact nuclear reprocessing facilities, the South stressed that these represented violation of the denuclearization joint communique. In this connection, the South urged the North to make an acceptable explanation and promptly halt the construction of the reprocessing facilities.

However, despite the agreement made at the fourth meeting, North Korea adhered to their call for the package discussion of both the draft implementation agreement and inspection rules, making it impossible for the two sides to enter into the discussion of inspection rules.

c. Third Members Contact

The third members contact of the joint nuclear control commission was held at the conference room of the supervisory commission at Panmunjom on May 23, 1992.

At the contact, the North agreed to discuss inspection rules. But, they demanded that the inspection of nuclear materials and facilities be distinguished from that of nuclear weapons and bases

in separate chapters, arguing that concrete debate can begin only after the composition of the clauses of inspection rules was resolved.

Besides, the North kept rejecting the principle of symmetrical reciprocity and special inspections and instead reiterating their demand for the principle of “simultaneous dissolution of suspicions.” They further stuck to the policy that both an implementation agreement and inspection rules should be taken up simultaneously.

In reaction, the South suggested that inspection procedures and method be regulated depending on the kind of inspection (routine and special inspections). It emphasized that special inspections were a system indispensable to the satisfactory implementation of the joint denuclearization declaration.

The two sides thus failed to narrow opinions through three members contacts before the fifth control commission meeting.

5. Fifth Meeting

The fifth meeting of the South-North Joint Nuclear Control Commission was held at Tongilkak in the northern sector of Panmunjom on May 27, 1992.

The South stressed that since the deadline (the end of May) for the preparation of inspection rules was only a few days away, the two sides should first discuss rules on mutual nuclear inspections as they agreed earlier.

In a bid to provide a breakthrough in the deadlocked talks, the South offered a progressive idea that once inspections rules were discussed and initialed, the South could lay down a document comparable to an implementation agreement for discussion.

But, the North simply repeated their demand that an imple-

mentation agreement and inspection rules be discussed and put into effect on a package basis on the condition that the South would produce its version of a draft implementation agreement.

Regarding the North's call for the preparation of a separate chapter for nuclear weapons and bases, the South said such a separate chapter would be an unrealistic and undue provisions since it would give the impression that nuclear weapons exist in both South and North Korea. It stressed that there was no need to create a separate chapter for nuclear weapons and nuclear bases.

The South maintained that in order to verify one's fulfillment of non-deployment and non-storage of nuclear weapons, it would be unavoidable to inspect places where nuclear weapons could exist, namely, military installations with such suspicion. But, the North rejected any inspection of military installations.

The South further stated that although the North was undergoing an inspection from the International Atomic Energy Agency, international inspection alone could not completely dissolve the nuclear issue. Therefore, the South said, there could hardly be any substantial progress in inter-Korean relations unless mutual inspections were conducted between the two sides.

On the other hand, North Korea repeated its past position with respect to major matters at issue. They refused to discuss the contents of inspection rules with the excuse that an implementation agreement and inspection rules should be taken up simultaneously.

The South proposed to hold the sixth commission meeting on May 29 so that inspection rules could be prepared within the prescribed period. North Korea wanted to make it June 16 on the ground that they were undergoing an IAEA inspection. The two sides decided to make contacts through the South and North liaison offices.

**SOUTH-NORTH
DIALOGUE
IN KOREA**

No. 56
October
1992

SOUTH-NORTH DIALOGUE IN KOREA

Published by
***Office of the South-North Dialogue,
National Unification Board***

C.P.O. Box 4161
Seoul, Korea

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Part I

Eighth South-North High-Level Meeting

1. Liaison Officials Contacts

In a telephone message on September 5, 1992, North Korea proposed to hold a liaison officials contact on September 7 to discuss working-level issues related to the eighth South-North high-level meeting set to take place in Pyongyang. The message was signed by Choe Bong-chun, senior liaison official of the North Korean delegation to the high-level talks. The South agreed to the offer and two rounds of liaison officials contacts ensued.

At the first liaison officials contact held on September 7 at Tongilkak in the northern sector of Panmunjom, the two sides discussed working-level matters such as the itinerary of the South Korean delegation during their stay in Pyongyang.

At the second contact held on September 10 at Peace House in the southern area of Panmunjom, the list of the South's delegation—seven delegates, 33 support people and 50 press members—was exchanged with the North's memorandum guaranteeing the personal safety of South Korean delegation members during their stay in the North.

It was also decided that the first-day session of the eighth high-level meeting would be opened to the press as in the past, while the form, time and method of the second-day session would be determined based on the results of the first-day session and other conditions.

Besides, the two sides agreed on the conference site, lodging and major itineraries as follows :

- Conference site : People's Cultural Palace
- Lodging : Paekhwawon Guest House
- Major itineraries of the southern delegation :

September 15, Tuesday

09: 30—Passage through Panmunjom

10: 00—Departure from Tongilkak (Expressway)

12: 00—Arrival at lodging place (Paekhwawon)

16: 00—Advance observation of conference site

19: 00—Dinner hosted by Administration Council premier (People's Cultural Palace)

September 16, Wednesday

10: 00—First-day session (open to the press)

15: 00—Observation of First Pyongyang Higher Middle School

17: 00—Viewing of music and dance performance (Tongpyongyang Theater)

September 17, Thursday

Second-day session

Observation (one place among West Sea Lock Gate, Mt. Taesong resort, Mankyongdae resort)

19: 00—Dinner hosted by Supreme People's Assembly chairman (Mokrankwan)

September 18, Friday

10: 00—Departure from Pyongyang (Expressway)

12: 30—Passage through Panmunjom

○ Lists of the two delegations :

The South :

Chief Delegate :

Chung Won-shik, Prime Minister

Deputy Chief Delegate :

Song Eung-sop, first vice chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Ministry of National Defense

Delegates :

Lim Dong-won, vice minister, National Unification Board

Han Kap-soo, vice minister, Economic planning Board

Gong Ro-myung, director, Foreign Affairs and National Security Institute

Lee Dong-bok, special assistant to the Prime Minister

Park Yong-ok, arms control officer, Ministry of National Defense

The North :

Chief Delegate :

Yon Hyong-muk, Administration Council Premier

Deputy Chief Delegate :

Kim Gwang-jin, vice minister, People's Armed Forces Ministry

Delegates :

An Byong-su, vice chairman, Committee for Peaceful Unification of the Fatherland.

Paek Nam-jun, director, Secretariat, Committee for Peaceful Unification of the Fatherland

Kim Jong-u, vice minister, External Economic Projects Ministry

Choe U-jin, roving ambassador, Foreign Ministry

Kim Yong-chol, deputy bureau director, People's Armed Forces Ministry

* In addition, each delegation included 33 support personnel and 50 press members.

2. Overview of Conference Proceeding

The eighth South-North high-level meeting was held in Pyongyang for four days from September 15 through 18, 1992.

In a statement on passage through Panmunjom, Lee Dong-bok, spokesman for the southern delegation to the high-level talks, stressed that at the Pyongyang meeting, his delegation would do all it could to completely resolve the question of auxiliary agree-

ments so that they could be signed and put into force at the Pyongyang meeting. Lee also said the South would strongly urge the North to agree to settle the nuclear issue and the question of dispersed families such as the proposed exchange of aged dispersed family hometown visitors.

At Tongilkak where they reached escorted by the North's roving ambassador Choe U-jin, the southern delegates were greeted by all the northern delegates excepting Premier Yon Hyong-muk. They then headed for Pyongyang by expressway starting from Kae-song.

After the South's delegation arrived at the Paekhwawon Guest House where they were greeted by the North's Administration Council Premier Yon Hyong-muk, Spokesman Lee Dong-bok, in an arrival statement, said the southern delegation expected that the issue of auxiliary agreements would be resolved so that the basic South-North agreement could be put on the full track of implementation to unfold a full age of South-North reconciliation and cooperation.

Lee said that the Pyongyang meeting should become an occasion to reaffirm the mutual will toward the joint denuclearization declaration and to find a breakthrough in the resolution of the nuclear issue. The spokesman also emphasized again that the North could no longer turn a deaf ear to the pathetic sentiments of dispersed families now that both government authorities had pledged to take steps to resolve the dispersed family issue.

For two and half an hours beginning 3 p.m. the same day, Delegates Lim Dong-won and Lee Dong-bok of the South and the North's Delegates An Byong-su and Paek Nam-jun held a delegates contact at the conference room of the Paekhwawon Guest House where the southern delegation were staying, on various issues including the question of adopting auxiliary agreements. The two sides neared an accord that they would do their utmost to adopt three auxiliary agreements on reconciliation, nonaggression,

and exchanges and cooperation.

In the evening, subcommittees of the high-level talks had their respective chairmen's contacts to agree to hold negotiations on the unsettled contents of the proposed supplementary accords on reconciliation and non-aggression.

Also in the afternoon, an advance observation was made of the conference site. In the evening, Administration Council Premier Yon hosted a dinner at the People's Cultural Palace.

Premier Yon, in his table speech, said, "Despite the raging wind and wave that swept the world, our Republic, without being swayed, stoutly moves along the single path of *juche* and socialism. of our style we ourselves have chosen. This is the great image of our Republic." By thus trying to keep aloof from changes in the international order such as the Seoul-Beijing diplomatic normalization and the sweeping change in East Europe, Yon asserted, "The meeting this time should be held independently with independent opinions. No outside influence of any sort should be allowed as in the past," he said.

On the other hand, Yon emphasized his willingness to resolve the question of auxiliary agreements by expressing the expectation that "through the early resolution of the task of preparing auxiliary agreements in many areas and the promulgation of the activation of joint commissions before to the whole world, the meeting could substantially contribute to peace and unification of the fatherland."

In his dinner speech, the South's Prime Minister Chung Won-shik called for the early resolution of the dispersed family issue such as the unconditional implementation of the projected exchange of aged dispersed family parents hometown visitors. "The issue of separated families should be fundamentally resolved in the first place in order to open an age of reconciliation and cooperation befitting to the spirit of the basic South-North agreement."

Chung also said that the reality of inter-Korean relations

was such that no actual progress could ever be expected in South-North relations without the settlement of the nuclear question. Touching on the recent diplomatic normalization between South Korea and China, Chung emphasized that “The South and the North should now become partners who assist each other in the interests of common national interests.”

Also recalling that at the Barcelona Olympics the South and the North won 12 and four gold medals, respectively, including Hwang Young-jo’s gold in marathon, and thereby manifested the nation’s outstandingness before the world, the Prime Minister stressed that “we all should endeavor to create a new historical chapter of unification of the homeland by using such national determination and potentials as a propellant for the promotion of peaceful unification.”

According to an agreement reached at delegates’ contacts, the two sides had contacts between the chairmen of the political and military subcommittees to carry on discussion of the contents of auxiliary agreements. The two sides, at the contacts, agreed on three articles including the one on “prohibition of inventing and spreading falsehood” in the area of reconciliation, and on four articles including “non-use of the force of arms” in the nonaggression area.

They decided to continue to discuss those items that remained unsettled even at the subcommittee chairmen’s contacts, upon the adjournment of the first-day session on September 16.

On the morning of September 16, the first-day session was held. At the session opened to the press, the hosting (the North) and visiting (the South) sides exchanged keynote speeches in that order.

In the afternoon, the southern delegation members visited Pyongyang First Higher Middle School and then viewed a music and dance performance at the Tongpyongyang Theater.

In the evening, contacts between the chairment of the politi-

cal, military and exchanges and cooperation subcommittees and the Joint Nuclear Control Commission were held as agreed on at the first-day session.

At the contact of the Political Subcommittee chairmen, the two sides agreed on the wording of the Agreement on the Formation and Operation of a South-North Joint Reconciliation Commission. But, they failed to adopt an auxiliary agreement in the area of reconciliation due to difference on some clauses.

The Military Subcommittee chairmen's contact, on the other hand, reached a complete accord on an auxiliary agreement in the nonaggression area after deciding to refer some disputed matters such as "prohibition of arms buildup in areas along the Military Demarcation Line" to the Joint Military Commission.

At the contact of the Exchanges and Cooperation Subcommittee chairmen, also, an auxiliary agreement in the area of exchanges and cooperation was adopted after they decided to refer the issue of removing "statutory and institutional devices" to a legal affairs council of the South-North Joint Reconciliation Commission.

Before agreeing on the supplementary accord, the chairmen also decided to revise the clause on the issue of concluding business deals between parties to exchanges or cooperation to make it read, "...through the direct conclusion of contracts and going through necessary procedures."

The Joint Nuclear Control Commission chairmen's contact took up the issue of adopting rules on mutual inter-Korean nuclear inspections. But, the two sides failed to narrow their opinions on such key matters as those on whether to include military bases in the sites to be inspected and whether to employ the special inspection system.

A second-day session was originally slated for the morning of September 17. But, the session was put off until afternoon according to the results of the first-day session and chairmen's contacts.

Instead, southern delegates visited the West Sea Lock Gate at Nampo, Pyongannam-do.

Prior to the visit to the lock gate, the Political Subcommittee chairmen met to discuss some unsettled clauses of an auxiliary agreement in the area of reconciliation. They finally reached a complete accord on the supplementary agreement after deciding to include in the accord a proviso that unsettled clauses would be discussed at the Political Subcommittee in the future.

Besides, southern delegates Lim Dong-won and Lee Dong-bok and the North's An Byong-su and Paek Nam-jun met in a separate contact to discuss the times and places of the ninth prime ministers meeting and the first meetings of various joint commissions. They agreed to adopt the results of their discussion in the form of the agreement of the eighth high-level meeting.

On the afternoon of September 17, the second-day session was held. The session opened to the press proceeded in the order of the exchange of greetings ; reading, signing and effectuating the Agreement on the Formation and Operation of South-North Joint Reconciliation Commission and three auxiliary agreements by area ; and the exchange of closing remarks. Upon the adjournment of the meeting, both sides' spokesmen held a press conference to jointly announce the Agreement of the Eighth South-North High-Level Meeting.

In the evening, a dinner hosted by Yang Hyong-sop, chairman of the North's Supreme People's Assembly was held at Mok-rankwan.

Chairman Yang, in his table speech, said that the adoption and effectuation of the three auxiliary agreements and the inauguration of the joint reconciliation commission served as another momentum to paving the way to unification in the 1990s.

Stressing, however, that "statutory and institutional obstacles" should be removed in order to foster a genuine atmosphere for unification, Yang called for a national unification political confe-

rence to facilitate a unification under the confederation system.

In his dinner speech, Prime Minister Chung Won-shik observed that the South-North high-level talks finally reached an agreement at the eighth meeting on the implementation of the South-North Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression and Exchanges and Cooperation.

The South's prime minister said what remained to be done was for the South and the North to reconcile with each other based on trust, to realize prosperity for the whole Korean people through exchanges and cooperation, and to solidify the substantial base for peaceful unification.

Touching on worldwide changes and efforts of all countries to cope with them, Prime Minister Chung said, "We cannot turn a deaf ear to the great changes taking place in the human cultural history with the approach of a new century."

He said that by meeting such changes with a fresh awakening and determination, "we all should exert greater efforts so that we could leave to our posterity the myth that we have accomplished national prosperity and the great task of unification with our own efforts."

On the morning of September 18, the South's Spokesman Lee Dong-bok, in a statement issued on the southern delegation's departure from Pyongyang, said, "The eighth meeting was highly significant in that it registered an epochal progress along a road toward peace and unification. Now the task left to us is to faithfully translate the matters agreed on with difficulty into action true to the spirit of the basic South-North agreement."

Pointing out that there still were some issues that remained unsettled before the concrete implementation of the basic South-North agreement, Lee urged the North to agree to early inter-Korean nuclear inspections and the realization of the proposed exchange of aged dispersed family parents visitors.

In the afternoon, the southern delegation returned to Pan-

munjom winding up their four-day visit to Pyongyang.

In an arrival statement issued at Panmunjom, Spokesman Lee said, "At the recent meeting, the South and the North signed and effectuated auxiliary agreements in the three areas of reconciliation, nonaggression and exchanges and cooperation, and also the Agreement on the Formation and Operation of Joint Reconciliation Commission. With their effectuation, the four joint commissions of reconciliation, military, economic exchanges and cooperation and social and cultural exchanges and cooperation have been enabled to go into full-fledged operation beginning November 5."

He also observed that by preparing institutional devices for the realization of reconciliation, nonaggression and exchanges and cooperation, the two sides would unfold a new phase in the course of achieving unification.

The eighth South-North high-level meeting registered a significant achievement as it completed ground-leveling work for the concrete implementation of the basic agreement by adopting the three auxiliary agreements on reconciliation, military and exchanges and cooperation, and by inaugurating the Joint Reconciliation Commission.

In other words, as the phased implementation of the basic South-North agreement, namely, the preparation of a framework for improved inter-Korean relations (effectuation of the basic agreement and inauguration of three subcommittees) → formation of implementation organizations (creation of South and North liaison offices and inauguration of the four joint commissions) → adoption of the auxiliary agreements → full-fledged operation of joint commissions and promotion of concrete implementation programs, has been made possible, inter-Korean relations have been enabled to enter the track of full implementation of reconciliation and cooperation.

Regarding the projected exchange of aged parents home-

town visitors agreed on at the seventh high-level meeting, the South stressed that the exchange should be made without any conditions, suggesting strongly that a new date of the exchange be determined. Regrettably, however, the question failed to be settled as the North stuck to the position that the exchange could be made only when the South did not raise the nuclear issue and repatriated Li In-mo.

In connection with Li In-mo's case, the South offered a sincere method of resolution. The South said he could be repatriated to the North if the North agreed to the regular exchanges of aged dispersed family hometown visitors, to create a dispersed family meeting center at Panmunjom, and to send back to the South the fishermen of Tongjin-ho seized by the North.

Nonetheless, the three auxiliary agreements adopted at the eighth high-level meeting was another fruition of the South Korean government's efforts to improve inter-Korean relations especially after the birth of the Sixth Republic. Other feats scored in such efforts included the announcement of the Korean National Community Unification Formula, the successful implementation of the northern policy, joint entry by South and North Korea into the United Nations, and the adoption of the basic South-North agreement and the joint denuclearization declaration.

The nation has now come to lay a solid groundwork for setting a stage for a South-North Commonwealth oriented toward peaceful unification.

3. First-Day Session : Exchange of Keynote Speeches

The first-day session was held at the People's Cultural Palace from 10 a.m. to 12 noon September 6. The session, opened to the press, proceeded in the order of the declaration of session opening, the North's keynote speech and the South's keynote speech.

In his keynote speech, the North's Administration Council Premier Yon Hyong-muk said that the achievements of the high-level meeting entrusted with the important duty of coping with the changing international environment were not satisfactory. Yon asserted that after the fall of the cold war mechanism, the United States has been enforcing a "new world order" of its style upon the world while Japan was seeking to nuclearly arm itself and become a military power.

The North said it regretted that at the Political Subcommittee the two sides simply repeated pros and cons over mistaken contentions made by distorting the basic spirit of the South-North agreement. Premier Yon then argued that the spirit of the basic South-North agreement is the spirit of independence. He asserted that the basic nature of South-North relations lied in a special relationship characterized by non-internationalism, forward-orientedness and temporariness. He said that "Korea is one" and that since inter-Korean relations are an intra-national relationship, there cannot be two states.

Contending that factors blocking the progress of the high-level talks lied in the outside of conference table, Yon raised the questions of the South's stand over the nuclear issue, suspending joint Korea-U.S. military exercises, and the issue of pan-national conference.

He said that at the eighth meeting, the two sides should adopt all the proposed auxiliary agreements and form a joint reconciliation commission to fully operate the four joint commissions so as to complete all ground-leveling work for the phase of implementation.

Regarding the operation of subcommittees, the northern premier suggested that subcommittees suspend their activities for the time being and could resume their business once there arises the need to revise or supplement auxiliary agreements or other issues to tend.

Also in connection with the method of making agreement and implementing agreed-on matters at joint commissions, the North, recalling they had earlier called for “package agreement” and “simultaneous implementation,” said, however, that those issues whose priority implementation is urged by both sides or whose urgency is recognized by both could be undertaken in an implementation order to be determined through consultation between the two sides, with the remainder being carried out in yearly and quarterly implementation plans.

Concerning the issue of implementing the joint denuclearization declaration, the North insisted on inspections based on the principle of dispelling all suspected sites at the same time. The North made it clear they were still opposed to the South’s ideas of adopting the principle of same mutual numbers, making military bases subject to inspection and conducting special inspections.

Moreover, the North called for the repatriation of Li In-mo and the release of illegal visitors to the North such as Lim Su-kyong. Premier Yon said that the North’s position was that the exchange of aged dispersed family hometown visitors and art troupes be realized expeditiously once the South withdrew its position over the nuclear issue and the question of repatriating Li In-mo was resolved .

Before concluding, Yon said that at the meeting the two sides should discuss the issue of jointly coping with Japan and adopt an agreement on joint actions against Japan. He then produced a draft Agreement on Liquidation of Japan’s Past and Jointly Coping with Japan’s Nuclear Threat and Dispatch of Troops to the Abroad.

The South’s Prime Minister Chung, in his keynote speech, said the basic South-North agreement is the basic framework for the normalization of inter-Korean relations and also a milestone in a road to peace and unification, while the joint denuclearization

declaration has provided a momentum for the Korean people to come away from nuclear fear and to cement peace. He said that national self-esteem, unification and prosperity would depend on whether the two sides faithfully implement the basic agreement and the denuclearization declaration.

The South pointed out that both sides should feel responsible for the failure to settle the issue of auxiliary agreements, to realize the exchange of aged dispersed family hometown visitors and even to prepare rules for mutual inter-Korean nuclear inspections despite the fact that both sides exerted much efforts to implement agreed-on matters upon the inauguration of the subcommittees and the Joint Nuclear Control Commission.

Regarding the issue of adopting auxiliary agreements, Prime Minister Chung said the supplementary accords should contain concrete and practical contents.

Stressing that neither side should attempt to enforce the kind of contents not acceptable to the other side or newly raise issues that run counter to the spirit and framework of the basic South-North agreement, Chung said that the three auxiliary agreements should be adopted at the eighth high-level meeting by agreeing initially on easily agreeable matters among the measures to implement the basic agreement.

In connection with the projected exchange of aged dispersed family parents visitors, the South's Prime Minister made it express that the South's position was that the exchange should be carried out without any prerequisites. He proposed that the two sides agree on a new date of the exchange and let the Red Cross resume their working-level contacts to prepare for the exchange.

With respect to the nuclear issue, Prime Minister Chung emphasized that if the North dispelled nuclear arms misgivings by accepting mutual inter-Korean nuclear inspections at an early date, then substantial cooperation could be promoted between the two sides to lay a solid groundwork for the acceleration of the

development of South-North relations.

Furthermore, the South said that at the eighth meeting, the two sides should settle the issue of auxiliary agreements and pave the way to the full operation of various joint commissions. It urged that the two sides should do their utmost to adopt the three supplementary accords at the meeting even if some unsettled clauses would have to be left unsettled.

Prime Minister Chung also said that it was highly regrettable that some unwelcome things, a kind seen in the past age of confrontation, continued to occur even today when the basic South-North agreement was in force. Pointing out that the recently uncovered espionage incident posed an anxiety to the future of inter-Korean relations, Chung emphasized there should be no recurrence of similar incidents for the sake of the development of South-North relations since, he said, the act of slandering or subverting the other side obviously runs counter to inter-Korean reconciliation.

Lastly the southern prime minister emphasized that the two sides should sign and effectuate auxiliary agreements by area at the eighth high-level meeting so as to put into proper function all the joint commissions and also to provide a breakthrough in the resolution of other issues pending between the South and the North. He said that if and when the nuclear issue were resolved and when the joint commissions implement concrete projects one by one, inter-Korean relations would face an epochal turning point.

The following are excerpts from the two sides' keynote speeches made at the first-day session :

Excerpts from the South's Keynote Speech

Northern delegates,

Since the various South-North Committees and the Joint Nuclear Control Commission were brought into being in March of this year, the South and the North have exerted much effort to carry out already-reached

accords. Full meetings of the South-North committees, meetings of the co-chairmen and working-level meetings have been convened on a total of 41 occasions to work out protocols on the implementation of various sectors of the South-North Basic Agreement by agreed deadlines. Meanwhile, the Joint Nuclear Control Commission has met 11 times to draw up rules for the promised mutual nuclear inspections. In addition, working-level South-North Red Cross talks have been held eight times to work out a program to exchange home visits by elderly members of separated families.

And yet, the drafting of the protocols remains unfinished even at this moment when this Eighth Round is opened. The family reunion program also is put on hold, even though both sides agreed to carry it out without any precondition as the first tangible exchange project following the effectuation of the South-North Basic Agreement. Moreover, the joint pledge to initiate mutual nuclear inspections by June at the latest still remains unfulfilled, because we have not been able even to draw up inspection rules.

All members of both the southern and northern delegations to these talks should feel an acute sense of responsibility for the fact that the accords we have signed before our 70 million compatriots and the entire world are not yet properly complied with.

Now let me turn to our position on the outcome of the meetings of the various South-North committees. By now, the South and the North have not only agreed on the format of the proposed protocols but have also virtually worked out differences on most of the substance, except for a number of disputed points.

I believe that the protocols that we must prepare should contain concrete and practicable steps to ensure the implementation of the South-North Basic Agreement. This is because we must not waste our time by continuing to adopt agreed documents merely for appearance sake. Nor is it advisable for either party to propose things that the other side cannot possibly accept or newly raise issues that fall outside the spirit and domain of the South-North Basic Agreement.

Therefore, we, the delegates from both sides, must all renew our

sense of mission and responsibility and regain the single-mindedness with which we signed the South-North Basic Agreement if we are to amicably overcome all remaining differences over the protocols so that we will be able to live up to the expectations of the entire Korean people.

Next, I want to explain our position on the South-North family reunion program.

I thought it was very fortunate that at the previous Seventh Round of these talks, it was agreed to exchange home visits of elderly members of dispersed families, and performing art troupes as well, during the Liberation Day season this year. Not only the 10 million members of separated families but also all our compatriots applauded and welcomed this.

And yet, your side has subsequently raised political issues totally unrelated to the practical matters involved in the proposed family reunion program, insisting that their solution must be a precondition for the program. Your side has persisted in the position that the program will have to be aborted, unless the precondition is met. And indeed it has been.

I emphasize once again our firm position that the program to exchange home visits by elderly members of dispersed families must be carried out without fail and without any precondition. Your side has also declared that you do not intend to attach any strings to the family reunion program. Accordingly, at this Eighth Round, we must reaffirm the principle that the program must be carried out without any precondition. We should also fix a new date for the program and agree to have working-level Red Cross talks resumed to carry it out.

I will now turn to our position on the outcome of meetings of the Joint Nuclear Control Commission. Needless to say, the South and the North must thoroughly comply with the Joint Declaration of Denuclearization, as well as the South-North Basic Agreement. Mutual inspections prescribed in that joint declaration are an obligation on both sides that must be discharged as a matter of course. It is not an optional provision.

If you expeditiously accept mutual inspections, thereby fully removing doubts and suspicions about your nuclear program, it will be much easier for your side to successfully pursue your foreign policy goals. It goes

without saying that the resolution of the nuclear issue will also accelerate substantive South-North cooperation.

Northern delegates,

During this Eighth Round, the South and the North must resolve the issue of protocols so that the various joint commissions that were already formed as of May 19 can begin to really function.

In order to open a new road to South-North reconciliation and cooperation, both sides must start from the recognition that there is bound to be differences at this point.

From such a basic standpoint, I will now make the following proposal intended to achieve smooth and amicable solution of the protocol issue.

My proposal is that we prepare and adopt initial protocols containing those points which have been found easy for both sides to agree on through previous intra-Korean discussions on ways to implement the South-North Basic Agreement.

Accordingly, we believe that it is desirable to iron out the protocols on the various chapters of the South-North Basic Agreement.

Accordingly, both sides should do their best to adopt all the three protocols at this round of talks.

In keeping with the new trend of the times toward reconciliation and cooperation, the South and the North have brought into effect the South-North Basic Agreement and the Joint Declaration of Denuclearization. Accordingly, we must adopt a new way of thinking and a new attitude, discarding those of the era of confrontation, if we are to implement those accords.

As we have already promised to each other, we must activate the various joint commissions at the earliest possible date in order to begin implementing the South-North Basic Agreement in earnest.

Accordingly, the top priority task for this Eighth Round is to work out and adopt the necessary protocols. Looking forward to your favorable response, I think it is advisable to have working-level meetings held as soon as this session today is over with the aim of successfully settling the protocol issue. I also propose that the suggested working-level meetings

be followed up by meetings of the cochairmen of the various South-North committees and the Joint Nuclear Control Commission.

Excerpts from the North's Keynote Speech

The eighth high-level meeting should conclude the ground-leveling work of the implementation stage by making an overall review of what had been discussed so far, resolving what remain unsettled in the proposed auxiliary agreements, by adopting all the auxiliary agreements by area and by creating a joint reconciliation commission so that the four area-by-area joint commissions could fully carry out their respective programs.

Now I would like to discuss our opinions with respect to these issues.

The first is the question of concluding auxiliary agreements.

There are still many unsettled clauses in an auxiliary agreement in the area of reconciliation, and there are one, two or several unsettled points also in the auxiliary agreements on nonaggression and on exchanges and cooperation.

As such being the case, our position is that although it may be difficult, we should complete discussion of auxiliary agreements by all means and adopt and effectuate them at the high-level meeting.

The second is the issue of whether to keep subcommittees operating continuously.

The subcommittees could suspend their business for the time being, and could resume operation once there arises the need to revise or supplement auxiliary agreements or other needs through mutual agreement under the Agreement on the Formation and Operation of Subcommittees.

The third is the method of agreements and their implementation at joint commissions.

In this connection, we at past meetings offered the principle of package agreement and simultaneous implementation.

The principle of package agreement and simultaneous implementation is a just principle under which issues could be resolved most fairly in a circumstance where the two sides' priority areas are different.

But, the principle of package agreement and simultaneous impleme-

ntation we advocate does not mean that we should wait until all issues are agreed on for their implementation at the same time.

Our position is that even before all things are agreed on, those matters which both sides alike demand prior resolution or those which both sides recognize their urgency could be implemented in an order to be discussed.

As a method of carrying out agreed matters, we propose that implementation plans be worked out on a yearly or quarterly basis and things be implemented based thereon.

The fourth is the question of implementing the joint denuclearization declaration.

One of the most acute questions pending between the South and the North at this juncture is how to carry out the denuclearization declaration.

Now what remain to be a difference between the North and the South in connection with the implementation of the denuclearization agreement are an implementation agreement and the contents of inspection rules. Of them, the pressing task is how to handle the contents of inspection rules which the two sides decided to tackle first.

The so-called "principle of the same mutual numbers" does not fit to the reality of our nation where mutual difference is serious over nuclear suspicion.

Your side's contention that even the same number of ordinary military installations of our side should be inspected by mixing general military installations with nuclear bases, runs counter to common senses.

Your side also raises what is called "special inspections" whereby North-South inspections are conducted not through mutual agreements but abruptly at one side's demand. But, this only serves to block smooth inspections between the North and the South, and is prone to lead to unexpected disputes in a situation like our nation where military confrontation remains acute.

Along with the discussion of inspection rules, an implementation agreement on the denuclearization declaration should be discussed so that measures to implement all the clauses of the joint declaration could be

thoroughly prepared.

4. Second-Day Session : Adoption and Effectuation of Three Auxiliary Agreements and Agreement on Formation and Operation of Joint Reconciliation Commission

The second-day session was held at the People's Cultural Palace at 4 : 40 p.m. September 17. The session which was opened to the press proceeded through 6 : 30 p.m. in the order of the exchange of greetings between the two prime ministers, signing and effectuation of the Agreement on Formation and Operation of South-North Joint Reconciliation Commission and the auxiliary agreements on reconciliation, military, and exchanges and cooperation, and the exchange of closing remarks.

In his words of greetings, the South's Prime Minister Chung Won-shik said that through the adoption of the auxiliary agreements at the eighth meeting, inter-Korean relations have now entered the stage of full-fledged implementation. He stressed that the two sides should continue to hold the high-level talks regularly so as to ensure the smooth implementation of hitherto agreed-on items and adjust any differences between the two sides.

Prime Minister Chung said that the subcommittees should basically continue to carry out their function of discussing unsettled matters, needs to revise or supplement auxiliary agreements and reviewing those matters delegated from the high-level talks. He said that the joint commissions should promptly translate into action those items among the clauses of the auxiliary agreements which can be implemented without any separate discussions.

At the same time, the South called for the early implementation of mutual inter-Korean nuclear inspections and the resolution

of the dispersed family issue such as the realization of the proposed exchange of aged dispersed family hometown visitors.

Regarding the issues of taking joint actions toward Japan over such matters as “comfort women,” distortion of historical facts and nuclear armament, the southern prime minister said these issues do not warrant any fresh joint measures. He disclosed the view that the Joint Social Exchanges and Cooperation Commission could arrange an academic forum between South and North Korean scholars to jointly study overall aspects of the nation’s modern history in connection with the question of distorted historical facts.

In his speech, the North’s Yon Hyong-muk said that by adopting agreements at the eighth meeting, the two sides completed a preparatory work for the overall implementation of inter-Korean agreements.

In particular, the North asserted that the South should not make the issue of inter-Korean nuclear inspections as a prerequisite to the improvement of inter-Korean relations while again demanding the repatriation of Li In-mo. If only these questions were resolved, Yon said, the North would agree to the resumption of Red Cross talks for the realization of the exchange of aged dispersed family hometown visitors.

In addition, the North again raised the question of taking joint measures against Japan.

Following the exchange of words of greetings, the new agreements were read jointly by the two sides’ chairmen of each subcommittee, which then were signed and the signed documents were exchanged to put them into force. The agreements effectuated were the Agreement on the Formation and Operation of the South-North Joint Reconciliation Commission, the Auxiliary Agreement for the Implementation and Respect for Chapter I—South-North Reconciliation of the Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggre-

ssion and Exchanges and Cooperation between the South and the North ; the Auxiliary Agreement for the Implementation and Respect for Chapter II—South-North Nonaggression of the Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression and Exchanges and Cooperation between the South and the North ; and the Auxiliary Agreement for the Implementation and Respect for Chapter III—South-North Exchanges and Cooperation of the Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression and Exchanges and Cooperation between the South and the North.

In closing remarks, Prime Minister Chung Won-shik observed that an epochal achievement was registered at the eighth meeting as the basic South-North agreement entered the stage of implementation through the signing and effectuation of the three auxiliary agreements and the Agreement on the Formation and Operation of Joint Reconciliation Commission.

Chung said that both sides' delegates should now march onward toward making the basic agreement a literal beacon for peace and unification, emphasizing that no excuse should be employed in delaying or shunning the implementation of the basic agreement.

The South then expressed regret over the failure to resolve some acute pending issues such as the nuclear question and the proposed exchange of aged dispersed family hometown visitors. The South said it hopes these issues would be settled at an early date.

In his closing remarks, the North's Administration Council Premier Yon Hyong-muk described the results of the eighth high-level meeting as an epochal progress achieved along the road to unification. He said that now that the two sides reaffirmed the three unification principles of democracy, peaceful unification and grand national unity and that the South-North agreement was adopted as an action code, the two sides should resolve questions

in the manner of placing national interests above all other things.

Upon the close of the meeting, the two sides jointly announced the time of the ninth high-level meeting, the time of the notification of the members of the South-North Joint Reconciliation Commission, and the times of the first meetings of the various joint commissions.

The texts of the agreements signed and effectuated at the meeting and the agreement of the eighth high-level meeting were as follows :

*Protocol on the Compliance with and Implementation of
Chapter I, Reconciliation, of the Agreement on
Reconciliation, Nonaggression and Exchanges and Cooperation
Between the South and the North*

*Signed and Entered into Force
on September 17, 1992*

The South and the North,

As a result of concrete negotiations to ensure compliance with and implementation of Chapter I, Reconciliation, of the Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, and Exchanges and Cooperation Between the South and the North,

Have agreed as follows :

**CHAPTER I
RECOGNITION OF EACH OTHER'S SYSTEMS**

Article 1 : The South and the North shall recognize and respect each other's political, economic, social and cultural systems.

Article 2 : The South and the North shall guarantee the freedom to disseminate information about the truth of the other's political, economic, social and cultural systems and institutions.

Article 3: The South and the North shall recognize and respect the authority and competence of the other's authorities.

Article 4: The South and the North shall have a working level legal group discuss and resolve issues of revising or scrapping legal and institutional devices that infringe on the Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-aggression, and Exchanges and Cooperation Between the South and the North.

Chapter II

NONINTERFERENCE IN EACH OTHER'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS

Article 5: The South and the North shall not interfere in the legal system and policies of the other side.

Article 6: The South and the North shall not interfere in the external relations of the other side.

Article 7: The South and the North may request the other side to redress any matter that infringes on the Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, and Exchanges and Cooperation.

Chapter III

CESSATION OF VILIFICATION AND SLANDER

Article 8: The South and the North shall not slander or vilify the other side through the news media, leaflets or other means.

Article 9: The South and the North shall not revile specific persons of the other side.

Article 10: The South and the North shall not vilify and slander the authorities of the other side.

Article 11: The South and the North shall not distort facts about the other side nor fabricate and disseminate false facts.

Article 12: The South and the North shall not regard as slander or vilification objective and factual media coverage of the other side.

Article 13: The South and the North shall not vilify or slander

the other side within the Demilitarized Zone through broadcasts, billboards or any other means.

Article 14 : The South and the North shall not vilify or slander the other side at mass meetings or events.

Chapter IV

PROHIBITION AGAINST SABOTAGE AND SUBVERSION

Article 15 : The South and the North shall not attempt any acts of sabotage or subversion against the other in any form, direct or indirect, violent or nonviolent, including acts of terror, abduction, recruitment, murder or injury.

Article 16 : The South and the North shall not resort to propaganda or agitation aimed at sabotaging or subverting the other side.

Article 17 : The South and the North shall not organize, support or protect any terrorist organization in its own area, the area of the other side, or overseas, intended to sabotage or subvert the political or legal system of the other side.

Chapter V

TRANSFORMATION OF STATE OF ARMISTICE INTO STATE OF PEACE

Article 18 : The South and the North, in order to transform the present state of armistice into a solid state of peace between the South and the North, shall sincerely comply with and implement the Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, and Exchanges and Cooperation and the Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

Article 19 : The South and the North shall adopt appropriate measures in order to transform the present state of armistice into a solid state of peace between the South and the North.

Article 20 : The South and the North shall sincerely abide by the Military Armistice Agreement until a solid state of peace has been established

between the South and the North.

Chapter VI

COOPERATION IN THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA

Article 21 : The South and the North shall not vilify and slander each other in the international arena, including at international meetings, and shall closely cooperate with each other in order to maintain the dignity of the Korean people.

Article 22 : The South and the North shall consult with each other on matters affecting national interests and take the necessary joint measures.

Article 23 : The South and the North, in order to promote the common interests of the Korean people, shall maintain close contacts between their diplomatic missions overseas in areas where both sides have diplomatic missions.

Article 24 : The South and the North shall champion and protect the ethnic rights of overseas Koreans and shall endeavor to promote reconciliation and unity among them.

Chapter VII

IMPLEMENTATION MECHANISMS

Article 25 : The South and the North, to implement Chapter I, South-North Reconciliation, of the Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression and Exchanges and Cooperation Between the South and the North, shall organize and operate the South-North Joint Reconciliation Commission. An agreement to establish the South-North Joint Reconciliation Commission shall be separately adopted.

Article 26 : The South-North Joint Reconciliation Commission shall have a working-level legal group and a working-level group for cessation of slander and vilification. It may form additional working-level groups with concurrence of both sides. Accords concerning organization and operation of the working-level groups shall be adopted by the South-North Joint

Reconciliation Commission.

Chapter VIII
AMENDMENTS AND EFFECTUATION

Article 27: This Protocol may be amended or supplemented by agreement between the two sides.

Article 28: This Protocol shall enter into force the day it is signed and exchanged by the sides.

SUPPLEMENTARY NOTE

The following provisions proposed by the North but not included in this Protocol shall be further discussed in the South-North Political Committee :

1) The North and the South shall endeavor to affiliate with international organizations under a single name for a single seat ;

2) The North and the South shall endeavor to participate in political events including international meetings as a single delegation representing the entire Korean people ;

3) The North and the South shall not side with nor cooperate with attempts by a third country in the international arena to undermine the interests of the other side ; and

4) The North and the South shall have the working-level legal group discuss and resolve the issue of revising or abolishing treaties or agreements signed by either side with other countries which run counter to the unity and interests of the Korean people.

DATE : September 17, 1992

*Chung Won-shik
Prime Minister
Republic of Korea
and
Chief Delegate to the
South-North High-Level Talks*

*Yon Hyong-muk
Premier
The Administration Council
Democratic People's
Republic of Korea, and
Chief Delegate to the
South-North High-Level Talks*

***Protocol on the Compliance with and Implementation of
Chapter II, Nonaggression, of the Agreement on Reconciliation,
Nonaggression and Exchanges and Cooperation
Between the South and the North***

***Signed and Entered into Force
on September 17, 1992***

The South and the North,

*As a result of concrete negotiations to resolve military confrontation
as well as to comply with and implement Chapter II, Nonaggression, of
the Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, and Exchanges and Co-
operation Between the South and the North,*

Have agreed as follows :

***CHAPTER I
NONUSE OF MILITARY POWER***

Article 1

*The South and the North shall prohibit the use of military power,
including shooting, bombarding, bombing and other forms of attack and
destruction, against the people, property, vehicles and civil and military
ships and airplanes on the otehr side of its jurisdiction including the Demili-
tarized Zone. Neither side shall resort to armed provocation that inflicts*

damage to the other side.

Article 2

The South and the North shall not infiltrate into or attack by military force the administrative region of the other side or even temporarily occupy part or whole of the area of the other side. Under no circumstances, shall the South and the North infiltrate a regular or irregular force into the administrative region of the other side with any means or method whatsoever.

Article 3

The South and the North shall not engage in hostile acts against citizens from the other side, who are visiting in accordance with an agreement between the two sides, or their belongings or transportation vehicles nor block their way.

In addition, the issues of the nonreinforcement of military power along the Demilitarized Zone, suspension of scouting activities against the other side, and nonblocking of territorial waters and air space of the other side—all proposed by the North—and the issue of guaranteeing the security of Seoul and Pyongyang—proposed by Seoul—shall continue to be discussed in the South-North Joint Military Commission.

CHAPTER II

PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES AND PREVENTION OF ACCIDENTAL ARMED CLASHES

Article 4

The South and the North, upon detection of any sign of deliberate armed aggression from the other side, shall immediately notify the other side and demand clarification and shall adopt necessary measures so as

to prevent it from escalating into an armed clash.

The South and the North, upon the discovery of any unintentional armed clash or aggression due to misunderstanding, misperception, mistake or unavoidable accident, shall immediately notify the other side in accordance with the signals agreed to by both sides, and shall adopt precautionary measures to prevent such incidents.

Article 5

When an armed group, an individual, a vehicle, a civil or military ship or airplane has violated the administrative region of the other side due to natural calamity, navigational error or other unavoidable cause, the trespassing side shall immediately notify each other thereof through the other side of the incident along with the fact that it has no aggressive intent and shall abide by instructions of the other side. The other side shall immediately confirm the incident, guarantee the safety of the persons and equipment concerned and take measures to repatriate them.

Repatriation shall be completed within a month in principle but may be further delayed.

Article 6

In the event of an outbreak of a dispute such as accidental aggression or armed clash between the South and the North, the military authorities of both sides shall immediately have the hostile acts of the armed group of its own side stopped, and shall immediately notify each other thereof through the military hotline or other available means of communications.

Article 7

The South and the North shall discuss and resolve all military disputes and confrontation through a mechanism agreed to by the military authorities of both sides.

Article 8

The South and the North, whenever either side has violated this Protocol on the compliance with and implementation of the nonaggression chapter of the Basic Agreement, shall conduct a joint investigation to determine the cause of and responsibility for the violation and shall adopt measures to prevent the recurrence of such an incident.

Chapter III

DEMARICATION LINE AND AREAS OF NONAGGRESSION

Article 9

The South-North demarcation line and areas for nonaggression shall be identical with the Military Demarcation Line specified in the Military Armistice Agreement and the areas that have been under the jurisdiction of each sides until the present time.

Article 10

The South-North sea nonaggression demarcation line shall continue to be discussed. Until the sea nonaggression demarcation line has been finalized, the sea nonaggression zones shall be identical with those that have been under the jurisdiction of each side until the present time.

Article 11

The air nonaggression demarcation line and zone shall be the skies over the land and sea demarcation lines.

Chapter IV
**ESTABLISHMENT AND OPERATION OF MILITARY
HOTLINES**

Article 12

The South and the North, in order to prevent the outbreak or an escalation of any armed clash, shall establish and operate direct military hotlines between the Minister of National Defense in the South and the Minister of the People's Armed Forces in the North.

Article 13

The direct military hotlines shall use means of communication agreed to by both sides to send the texts of messages over telex, facsimile or telephone. If necessary, the military authorities of both sides may directly converse with each other over the telephone.

Article 14

Technical and practical matters concerning the establishment and operation of the hotlines shall be discussed and resolved by a working-level communications group, composed of five members from each side, as soon as possible following the coming into force of the Protocol.

Article 15

The South and the North shall open the military hotlines within 50 days of the effectuation of the Protocol.

Chapter V
MECHANISMS FOR CONSULTATION AND IMPLEMENTATION

Article 16

The South-North Joint Military Commission shall carry out its duties and functions as provided in Article 12 of the Basic Agreement and Article 2 of the Agreement to Establish a South-North Joint Military Commission.

Article 17

The South-North Joint Military Commission shall discuss and adopt concrete measures on issues both sides recognize need to be resolved to effectively comply with and implement the nonaggression chapter of the Basic Agreement and remove the military confrontation between the South and the North.

Chapter VI

AMENDMENTS AND EFFECTUATION

Article 18

This Protocol may be amended or supplemented by agreement between the two sides.

Article 19

This Protocol shall enter into force on the day it is signed and exchanged by the two sides.

DATE : September 17, 1992

*Chung Won-shik
Prime Minister
Republic of Korea
and
Chief Delegate to the
South-North High-Level Talks*

*Yon Hyong-muk
Premier
The Administration Council
Democratic People's
Republic of Korea, and
Chief Delegate to the
South-North High-Level Talks*

***Protocol on the Compliance with and Implementation of
Chapter III, South-North Exchanges and Cooperation, of
the Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression and
Exchanges and Cooperation Between the South and the North***

***Signed and Entered into Force
on September 17, 1992***

The South and the North,

As the result of discussions on concrete measures to ensure the compliance with and implementation of Chapter III, South-North Exchanges and Cooperation; of the Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression and Exchanges and Cooperation between the South and the North,

Have agreed as follows :

***CHAPTER I
ECONOMIC EXCHANGES AND COOPERATION***

Article 1

The South and the North shall engage in economic exchanges and cooperation, including joint development of resources, exchanges of goods as domestic commerce, and joint investment in order to promote unified and balanced development of the national economy and the welfare of the entire people.

1. *The South and the North shall carry out exchanges of goods and projects of economic cooperation for the joint development of such resources as coal, minerals and seafood and in such other fields as manufacturing, agriculture, construction, banking and finance, and tourism.*

2. *The South and the North shall determine the objectives and forms of such projects of economic cooperation as the joint development of resources and joint ventures and investment and the types and quantities of goods to be exchanged through consultations in the Joint Commission for Economic Exchanges and Cooperation.*

3. *Such practical matters as the scale of such projects of economic cooperation as the joint development of resources and joint ventures and investment and the quantity and terms of trade of each product to be traded shall be determined through discussions between the parties from the two sides directly involved in exchanges and cooperation.*

4. *Parties directly involved in South-North economic cooperation and exchanges of goods shall be trading houses, companies or business firms which have been registered as juridical persons or public economic agencies, providing, however, that depending on the situation, individuals may also be involved.*

5. *The South and the North shall have exchanges of goods and projects of economic cooperation carried out under contracts signed by parties directly involved after the contracts have gone through their respective required procedures.*

6. *The prices of goods to be exchanged shall be determined through consultations between the parties directly involved in consideration of international market prices.*

7. *South-North exchanges of goods shall be carried out on the principle of reciprocity and complementarity.*

8. *In principle, payments for goods exchanged between the South and the North shall be settled through an open account, providing, however, that when necessary other methods of settlement may be used by agreement between both sides.*

9. *The South and the North shall determine by mutual concurrence*

matters necessary to the settlement of payments and capital movement, including the designation of banks to handle open accounts and the selection of currencies for settlement.

10. The South and the North shall not impose tariff on goods exchanged and shall discuss and take measures to develop South-North economic relations into domestic links.

11. In order to smoothly carry out economic exchanges and cooperation, the South and the North shall exchange various data and information, including industrial standards, and will inform the other side of relevant laws and regulations that the parties directly involve must comply with.

12. The South and the North shall determine, through mutual consultation, the procedures for guaranteeing investment, avoiding double taxation and arbitrating disputes and other matters necessary to smoothly carry out economic exchanges and cooperation.

13. The South and the North shall guarantee free economic activities and essential services to personnel from the other side who participate in economic exchanges and cooperation in their own areas.

Article 2

The South and the North shall carry out exchanges and cooperation in the fields of science, technology and the environment.

1. The South and the North shall carry out exchanges of information and data in the fields of science, technology and the environment, joint research and studies by relevant public agencies, other organizations and individuals, and technological cooperation and exchanges of engineers and experts in the industrial sector, and shall work out joint measures to protect the environment.

2. The South and the North shall take measures worked out by mutual concurrence to protect patents, trademarks and other scientific and technological rights of the other side.

Article 3

The South and the North shall reconnect railroads and roads that have been severed and shall open sea and air routes.

1. Initially, the South and the North shall open sea routes between the ports of Inchon, Pusan and Pohang (in the South) and the ports of Nampo, Wonsan and Chongjin (in the North).

2. As the scale of South-North exchanges and cooperation expands and as military confrontation is resolved, the South and the North shall open additional sea routes, connect the Seoul-Shinuiju Railroad, the Munsan-Kaesong Highway and other land routes and shall open an air route between the Kimpo Airport and the Sunan Airport.

3. When necessary to allow exchanges of people and goods even before regular transportation routes are established, the South and the North may open temporary routes.

4. The South and the North shall exchange information and conduct technological cooperation necessary to ensure the smooth opening and administration of land, sea and air routes.

5. Goods to be exchanged between the South and the North shall be transported directly along the land, sea and air routes that have been opened by mutual concurrence.

6. The South and the North shall extend emergency assistance to the means of transportation from the other side that have fallen into distress in their respective areas.

7. The South and the North shall respect the relevant international agreements governing the establishment and administration of transportation routes.

8. The South and the North shall determine, through discussions in the Joint Commission for Economic Exchanges and Cooperation such other practical matters involved in the opening and administration of transportation routes as the entry and exit procedures for the means of transport and their crews that operate between the South and the North, the modes of operating means of transportation and the selection of points of passage.

Article 4

The South and the North shall install and connect facilities necessary to exchange mail and telecommunications and shall guarantee their confidentiality.

1. The South and the North shall exchange and connect mail and telecommunications services through Panmunjom at an early date and shall exchange information and conduct technological cooperation necessary to exchange mail and telecommunications.

2. In exchanging mail and telecommunications, the South and the North shall guarantee priority to official and humanitarian activities and shall progressively expand the scope of such services.

3. The South and the North shall guarantee the confidentiality of mail and telecommunications exchanged and shall not use them for a political or military purposes under any circumstances.

4. The South and the North shall respect the relevant international agreements governing exchanges of mail and telecommunications.

5. Such other practical matters as the kinds and fees of mail and telecommunications exchanged between the South and the North and the methods of collecting and delivering mail shall be determined through consultations in the Joint Commission for Economic Exchanges and Cooperation.

Article 5

The South and the North shall cooperate with each other in various sectors of the international economy and shall promote their joint presence abroad.

1. The South and the North shall cooperate with each other in various international events and international organizations in the economic field.

2. The South and the North shall discuss and carry out measures to promote their joint presence abroad in the economic field.

Article 6

The South and the North shall support and guarantee exchanges and cooperation in the economic field.

Article 7

The South and the North shall decide the issue of creating agencies needed to carry out exchanges and cooperation in the economic field and other relevant practical matters through consultations in the Joint Commission for Economic Exchanges and Cooperation.

Article 8

The South-North Joint Commission for Economic Exchanges and Cooperation shall implement Chapter I, Economic Exchanges and Cooperation, of this Protocol and shall discuss and carry out details involved therein.

Chapter II

SOCIAL AND CULTURAL EXCHANGES AD COOPERATION

Article 9

The South and the North shall carry out exchanges and cooperation in such various fields as education, literature, the arts, health, athletics, and publishing and journalism, including newspapers, other publications, radio and television

1. The South and the North shall exchange information and data about such various fields as education, literature, the arts, health, athletics, publishing and journalism, including those about achievements, experience and research, and publications, media reports, and catalogues thereof.

2. The South and the North shall carry out multifaceted cooperation, especially technological cooperation, in such various fields as education,

literature, the arts, health, athletics, publishing and journalism.

3. The South and the North shall promote contacts and exchanges between public agencies, other organizations and individuals in such various fields as education, literature, health, athletics, publishing and journalism through cross-country group tours and the invitation and dispatch of delegations and observers.

4. The South and the North shall carry out joint research and surveys, joint publication projects and joint events in such various fields as education, literature, the arts, health, athletics, publishing and journalism and shall also exchange exhibitions of works of art, cultural relics, and books and other publications.

5. The South and the North shall take measures worked out by mutual concurrence to protect various copyrights of the other side.

Article 10

The South and the North shall allow free visits and contacts between their citizens.

1. The South and the North shall take joint measures to enable all their citizens to freely travel to the other area as they wish.

2. Citizens wishing to travel between the two areas may use any of the land, sea and air routes established between the South and the North as they see fit and may also use international air routes depending on the situation.

3. The South and the North shall allow free activities of citizens visiting their areas and shall guarantee their personal safety and safe return home.

4. The South and the North shall take measures to ensure that citizens visiting the other area will travel to and from and contact residents there without breaching law and order in the area visited.

5. Citizens traveling between the South and the North shall bear the necessary certificates with them and may carry goods with them within the scope agreed to by both sides.

6. *The South and the North shall provide services necessary to enable visitors from the other side to travel between the two areas and accomplish their purposes of visit.*

7. *The South and the North shall furnish emergency assistance to visitors from the other side they fall into distress.*

8. *The South and the North shall establish, through consultations in the Joint Commission for Social and Cultural Exchanges and Cooperation, procedures and other practical matters needed to allow free visits and contacts between their citizens.*

Article 11

The South and the North shall cooperate on the international stage in the social and cultural fields and promote a joint international presence.

1. *The South and the North shall cooperate with each other in international events and international organizations in the social and cultural fields.*

2. *The South and the North shall discuss and take measures to promote their joint presence abroad in the social and cultural fields.*

Article 12

The South and the North shall support and guarantee exchanges and cooperation in the social and cultural fields.

Article 13

The South and the North shall settle, through consultations in the Joint Commission for Social and Cultural Exchanges, the issue of creating agencies needed to carry out exchanges and cooperation in the social and cultural fields and other relevant practical issues.

Article 14

The South-North Joint Commission for Social and Cultural Exchanges and Cooperation shall implement Chapter II, Social and Cultural Exchanges and Cooperation, of this Protocol and discuss and carry out relevant details involved therein.

Chapter III

THE SOLUTION OF HUMANITARIAN ISSUES

Article 15

The South and the North shall allow free correspondence, free reunions and free visits between immediate members of dispersed families and other dispersed relatives and their free travel to and from the other area and the reconstitution of dispersed families of their own free volition and shall take measures to solve other humanitarian issues.

1. The scope of dispersed families and relatives shall be defined through discussions between the Red Crosses of the two sides.

2. The South and the North shall allow immediate members of dispersed families and other dispersed relatives to travel freely to and from the other area and freely visit each other in accordance with travel procedures worked out by agreement between the two sides.

3. The South and the North shall have the Red Crosses of the two sides discuss and resolve the issue of establishing reunion centers for dispersed immediate members of families and other relatives.

4. The South and the North shall discuss and take measures to allow the reconstitution of dispersed families, including immediate and more distant relatives, of their own free volition.

5. With a humanitarian spirit and a sense of compatriotic kinship, the South and the North shall help each other in case of a natural or other disaster in the other area and shall assist in the disposition of the personal effects of deceased immediate members of dispersed families and

other deceased dispersed relatives and the transfer of their remains.

Article 16

The South and the North shall actively cooperate with each other to have the Red Crosses of both sides resume at an early date their talks that were already in progress.

Article 17

The South and the North shall respect agreements reached by the Red Crosses of both sides to alleviate the misfortune and suffering of dispersed immediate members of families and other dispersed relatives and shall support and guarantee the smooth implementation of such accords.

Article 18

The Red Crosses of the two sides shall implement Chapter III, The Solution of Humanitarian Issues, of this Protocol and shall discuss and carry out details involved therein.

Chapter IV

AMENDMENTS AND EFFECTUATION

Article 19

This Protocol may be amended or supplemented by agreement between the two sides.

Article 20

This Protocol shall enter into force the day it is signed and exchanged by the two sides.

DATE : September 17,

*Chung Won-shik
Prime Minister
Republic of Korea
and
Chief Delegate to the
South-North High-Level Talks*

*Yon Hyong-muk
Premier
The Administration Council
Democratic People's
Republic of Korea, and
Chief Delegate to the
South-North High-Level Talks*

**AGREEMENT TO ESTABLISH A
SOUTH-NORTH JOINT RECONCILIATION COMMISSION**

The South and the North,

In order to implement the provisions of Chapter I on Reconciliation of the Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, and Exchanges and Cooperation Between the South and the North,

Have agreed to establish and operate the South-North Joint Reconciliation Commission as follows :

Article 1

The Joint Reconciliation Commission shall be organized as follows :

1) The Joint Reconciliation Commission shall be composed of seven members, including a chairman and a vice chairman, from each side.

2) The chairman shall be of ministerial or vice-ministerial rank and the ranks of the vice chairman and members shall be determined by each side at its own discretion.

3) Both sides shall notify the other side in advance if and when a member or members of the Joint Reconciliation Commission are to be replaced

4) Each side shall have a staff of 15. When necessary, the size of the staffs may be readjusted by concurrence of both sides.

5) Each side of the Joint Reconciliation Commission shall have a working-level legal affairs group and a working-level group for suspension

of slander and vilification to ensure the smooth operation of the Joint Reconciliation Commission. If necessary, each side may have other working-level group(s) by concurrence of both sides. Agreement(s) concerning the organization and operation of the working-level groups shall be adopted by the South-North Joint Reconciliation Commission.

Article 2

The Joint Reconciliation Commission shall discuss and act on the following matters :

1) The Joint Reconciliation Commission shall implement the Protocol on the Compliance with and Implementation of Chapter I, South-North Reconciliation, of the Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, and Exchanges and Cooperation Between the South and the North (hereinafter referred to as the Protocol).

2) The Joint Reconciliation Commission may prepare appendices or memoranda of understanding, if necessary to implement the Protocol.

3) The Joint Reconciliation Commission shall oversee and coordinate activities of its working groups.

Article 3

The Joint Reconciliation Commission shall be operated as follows :

1) The Joint Reconciliation Commission shall in principle meet once every three months, providing, however, that it may meet at any time by concurrence between both sides.

2) The Joint Reconciliation Commission shall meet in Panmunjom, Seoul, Pyongyang or at any other place agreed to by both sides.

3) The meetings of the Joint Reconciliation Commission shall be jointly presided over by the chairmen from both sides.

4) The meetings of the Joint Reconciliation Commission shall in principle be held behind closed doors, providing, however, that open meetings may be held by concurrence between both sides.

5) *The Joint Reconciliation Commission may have appropriate specialists, if necessary, participate in its meetings by concurrence between both sides.*

6) *Guarantee of personal safety and provision of the necessary services for the personnel traveling from the other area to attend meetings of the Joint Reconciliation Commission, and such administrative matters as the recording of proceeding of meetings shall comply with past practices.*

7) *Other matters necessary to operate the Joint Reconciliation Commission shall be decided by consultation between both sides of the Commission.*

Article 4

An accord reached at the Joint Reconciliation Commission shall enter into force as of the day when the cochairmen of both sides sign the agreed document at a meeting of the Joint Reconciliation Commission. Depending on the situation, an accord may be put into effect through an exchange of the text signed by the cochairmen of both sides, providing, however, that the said accord shall be reported to a meeting of the Joint Reconciliation Committee. An important document agreed to by both sides shall enter into force as of the day when the appropriate instruments are exchanged after the due procedures needed to bring it into force have been completed following its signature by the cochairmen of both sides.

Article 5

This agreement may be revised or supplemented by concurrence between both sides.

Article 6

This agreement shall enter into force as of the day its text is excha-

nged after it has been signed by both sides.

September 17, 1992

*Chung Won-shik
Prime Minister
Republic of Korea
and
Chief Delegate to the
South-North High-Level Talks*

*Yon Hyong-muk
Premier
Administration Council
Democratic People's
Republic of Korea, and
Chief Delegate to the
South-North High-Level Talks*

*Joint Communique Issued Following
The Eighth Round of South-North
High-Level Talks*

September 17, 1992

Pyongyang

*The Eighth Round of South-North High-Level Talks was held in
Pyongyang from September 16 to 17, 1992.*

*At the talks, the two sides earnestly discussed issues arising in connec-
tion with the implementation of South-North accords.*

*This was followed by the adoption and effectuation of the following
documents : (a) an Agreement to Establish a South-North Joint Reconcilia-
tion Commission ; (b) a Protocol on the Compliance with and Implementa-
tion of Chapter I, South-North Reconciliation, of the Agreement on Reconcili-
ation, Nonaggression and Exchanges and Cooperation Between the South
and the North ; (c) a Protocol on the Compliance with and Implementation
of Chapter II, South-North Nonaggression, of the Agreement on Reconcilia-
tion, Nonaggression and Exchanges and Cooperation Between the South
and the North ; and (d) a Protocol on the Compliance with and Implemen-
tation of Chapter III, South-North Exchanges and Cooperation, of the Ag-*

reement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression and Exchanges and Cooperation.

Reaffirming that both sides are determined to endeavor together to faithfully implement mutual accords, they agreed on the following points:

1. The South-North Joint Reconciliation Commission shall be formed on October 15, Thursday, 1992 and at the same time the roster of the members from each side shall be exchanged.

2. The first meetings of the various joint commissions shall be convened as follows:

(i) The South-North Joint Reconciliation Commission shall meet on Thursday, November 5, 1992 at Tong-ilgak (Unification Pavilion) in the northern sector of Panmunjom.

(ii) The South-North Joint Military Commission shall meet on Thursday, November 12, 1992 at Peace House in the southern sector of Panmunjom.

(iii) The South-North Joint Commission for Economic Exchanges and Cooperation shall meet on Thursday, November 19, 1992 at Tong-ilgak in the northern sector of Panmunjom.

(iv) The South-North Joint Commission for Social and Cultural Exchanges shall meet on Thursday, November 26, 1992 at Peace House in the southern sector of panmunjom.

3. The Ninth Round of South-North High-Level Talks shall be held in Seoul from Monday, December 21 to Thursday, December 24, 1992.

Part II

**Subcommittees of South-North
High-Level Meeting**

1. Political Subcommittee

Under an agreement made at the seventh high-level meeting to prepare an auxiliary agreement in the area of reconciliation and inaugurate a South-North Joint Reconciliation Commission before the eighth high-level meeting opens, the two sides held four Political Subcommittee meetings, three chairmen's contacts and four members contacts to discuss the adoption of an auxiliary agreement in the reconciliation area and an agreement on the formation and operation of a joint reconciliation commission.

The South and the North tried to compromise on the agreements as the South offered three revised versions of draft accords and the North produced two. The two sides thereby reached an accord on the name of an auxiliary agreement and the preamble, the titles of seven chapters and the contents of seven articles, thus preparing a basis for the adoption of an auxiliary agreement in the area of reconciliation and the Agreement on the Formation and Operation of Joint Reconciliation Commission at the eighth high-level meeting.

a. Fourth Meeting

The fourth meeting of the Political Subcommittee was held at Tongilkak in the northern sector of Panmunjom on May 19.

At the meeting, the South, while maintaining that the Political Subcommittee may prepare as many auxiliary agreements on specific issues as required, produced a draft Agreement on Implementation of and Respect for South-North Reconciliation, which was prepared by re-editing into a single agreement the five draft auxiliary accords first produced at the time of the third meeting.

The South also set forth a draft Agreement on the Forma-

tion and Operation of South-North Joint Reconciliation Commission on the condition that the joint commission issue should be discussed and resolved only after the auxiliary agreements were settled.

In reaction, the North, contending that auxiliary agreements should be a single accord containing broad matters rather than any concrete substances, offered a revised draft version containing parts of the South's version produced at the third meeting.

The meeting failed to register any progress mainly because the North did not change its insistence on the principle of package agreement and simultaneous implementation.

b. Fifth Meeting

The fifth meeting of the Political Subcommittee was held at Peace House in the southern sector of Panmunjom on June 9.

At the meeting, the South explained about the purport and justness of the draft auxiliary agreement it offered at the fourth meeting. The South pointed out that the North's revised version was no more than mere another form of the basic South-North agreement instead of containing concrete implementation measures.

Meanwhile, the North offered another revised version which was chaptered the way the South's version was, but its contents showed no change.

The two sides carried out article-by-article discussions of Chapter 2 based largely on the South's draft version. But they neared an accord only on the title of the agreement and its preamble while showing a wide difference on Chapter 1 "General Rules" and Chapter 2 "Recognition of and Respect for Systems and Non-Interference in Internal Affairs."

Also on this day, the two sides agreed to exchange the texts of each other's ordinances and to exchange the lists of each other's laws needed at the following meeting.

The South also called for the respect for the existing Military Armistice Agreement as envisioned in the basic South-North agreement until a device to substitute for the armistice accord is worked out at the Political Subcommittee.

In this connection, the South urged the North to promptly agree to normalize the Military Armistice Commission that had been paralyzed since March 1991 and to agree to convene a meeting of the Armistice Commission to look into the infiltration of armed agents into the southern sector of the Demilitarized Zone on May 22, 1992.

c. Sixth Meeting

The sixth meeting of the Political Subcommittee was held at Tongilkak in the northern sector of Panmunjom on July 2.

At the meeting, the South produced a new draft version of the proposed auxiliary agreement, which was revised to accommodate the North's ideas offered at the fifth meeting.

The revised version featured the division of Chapter 2 "Recognition of and Respect for Systems and Non-Interference in Internal Affairs" into Chapter 2 "Recognition of and Respect for Systems" and Chapter 3 "Non-Interference in Internal Affairs," and the creation of a separate chapter on "Implementation Organization." The South then suggested that the two sides discuss the contents of the draft supplementary accord based on the South's version.

Contending that it was up to the South's attitude whether the projected auxiliary accord could be adopted and a joint reconciliation commission inaugurated before the eighth high-level

meeting and whether the agreed-on exchange of dispersed family hometown visitors and art troupes could be realized as planned, the North demanded that the South clarify its stand toward the issue of mutual inter-Korean nuclear inspections and South-North relations.

In response, the South said that the consistent position of the South was that no substantial progress could be expected in inter-Korean relations unless misgivings about the North's nuclear arms development were dispelled. It added, however, that the resolution of the nuclear issue was not prerequisite to the adoption of an auxiliary agreement.

Here, the North agreed to the discussion of an auxiliary accord with the remarks that "we understand that the South had disclosed its position that the nuclear issue is not a prerequisite to the implementation of agreements."

The two sides discussed their respective versions of the draft agreement. But, all they could do was to agree on the title of the proposed agreement and a preamble, on which they neared an accord at the time of the fifth meeting. No progress was recorded in the discussion of Chapter 2 "Recognition of and Respect for System" and other clauses due to mutual difference.

Meanwhile, the South handed to the North the list of 11 North Korean laws including the Socialist Constitution of the North, Criminal Law and the Criminal Procedure Law as agreed on at the fifth meeting. The North said they would deliver the list of South Korean laws they need at the next meeting.

The two sides agreed to have a separate chairmen's contact at Peace House on July 10 to carry on the discussion of the contents of the proposed agreement. The contact was to be attended by two subcommittee members from each side.

1) Chairmen's Contact

A contact between the chairmen of the Political Subcommittee was held at Peace House in the southern sector of Panmunjom on July 10.

It was attended by Chairman Lee Dong-bok and members Kim Dal-sul, an advisory member of the National Unification Board, and Kang Keun-tak, a Foreign Ministry deliberation officer, from the South and Chairman Paek Nam-jun and members Choe Song-ik, department director of the Committee for Peaceful Unification of the Fatherland, and Chong Yong-chun, a councilor of the Committee for Peaceful Unification of the Fatherland, from the North.

At the contact, the South offered a revised version of a draft auxiliary agreement which featured the deletion of those items among the clauses related to the stoppage of mutual slanders and defamation which were overlapping. The South then suggested that the two sides begin discussing them beginning Chapter 3 "Non-Interference in Internal Affairs" since an overall review was made of clauses through Chapter 2 "Recognition of and Respect for Systems" at the sixth meeting of the Political Subcommittee.

North Korea, however, demanded that prior to the discussion of the clauses of the proposed agreement, the South make clear its stand over linkage, if any, between the nuclear issue and the implementation of South-North agreements. They denounced Prime Minister Chung Won-shik's message to the North on July 7 was a "machination designed to pose new obstacles to the implementation of South-North agreements as well as to the repatriation of Li In-mo."

Asserting that the agreed-on exchange of aged dispersed family hometown visitors may be aborted, the North asked the South about the method and procedures for the repatriation of Li In-mo.

In reaction, the South said that the nuclear issue was not a prerequisite to the implementation of South-North agreements. Over the issue of Li In-mo, the South said that since Prime Minister Chung Won-shik disclosed the method of its solution in his July 7 message to the North, the North's Premier Yon Hyong-muk should send an official message to the South to show its stand.

The two sides then exchanged opinions on the contents of an auxiliary agreement. They reached an accord on the titles of the various chapters of the agreement and several other items but failed to narrow difference over essential matters.

The titles of the chapters agreed on at the contact were "Recognition of and Respect for Systems," "Non-Interference in Internal Affairs," "Stoppage of Slanders and Defamation," "Prohibition of Sabotage and Subversive Activities," "Change of the State of Armistice into the State of Peace," "Cooperation at International Stages," "Implementation Organization," and "Amendment and Effectuation." However, the general rules offered by the South could not be agreed on due to the North's rejection.

The two sides also agreed on the clause of "Prohibition of name-calling slanders against specific persons of each other," and also on the clause on "amendment and effectuation." In addition, they neared an accord on the clause of "suspension of slanders and defamation, and mutual cooperation at international stages," and on the inauguration of a "joint reconciliation commission."

As they showed a wide discrepancy over general rules and some other clauses, the two sides decided to hold a subcommittee members contact on July 18 to carry on their discussion.

2) *Members Contact*

As delegated by the chairmen's contact, Political Subcommittee members contacts were held four times on July 18, July

30, August 5 and August 19 at the conference room of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission at Panmunjom to have substantial debate on the proposed auxiliary agreement.

The contacts were attended by Kim Dal-sul, an advisory member to the National Unification Board; Kang Keun-tak, a Foreign Ministry deliberations officer; and Shin Kwang-ok, a Justice Ministry deliberations officer (Shin was replaced with Kim Kak-young at the fourth contact), from the South. Representing the North at the contacts were Cho Sang-ho, deputy bureau director of the Democratic Front for Unification of the Fatherland; Choe Song-ik, deputy bureau director of Secretariat, Committee for Peaceful Unification of the Fatherland; and Chong Yong-chun, a councilor at the Committee for Peaceful Unification of the Fatherland.

In their overall review of the proposed draft agreement through the four contacts, the two sides additionally agreed on four clauses, "Implementation of and Respect for Basic South-North Agreement and Joint Denuclearization Declaration with a View to Changing the Existing State of Armistice into the Solid State of Peace," "Stoppage of Slanders and Defamation at International Stages," "Consultations between Overseas Missions" and "Promotion of Rights and Interests of Overseas Residents."

But, the two sides failed to narrow differences over the clauses of "recognition of the rights and competence of each other's governments" and "change of the state of armistice into the state of peace based on the principles of resolution between direct parties involved" which were among those offered by the South, and the North-suggested "removal of statutory and institutional obstacles," "recognition of and respect for thoughts," "amendment to or repeal of treaties and agreements signed with other states," "non-joining in third countries' acts of interference in each other" and "entry into international organizations under single seats."

The South maintained that the clause of “recognition of the rights and competence of each other’s governments” should be included in an auxiliary agreement because of the need to make it clear that the government of the Republic of Korea as the political entity controlling and ruling the south of the Military Demarcation Line on the Korean peninsula and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea government as the political entity controlling and ruling the north of the Military Demarcation Line are the implementation subjects of the basic South-North agreement.

The South also emphasized that since the Korean question can, in a genuine sense, be resolved only when problems are tackled between the South and the North, the direct parties to the Korean question, it is important to “resolve the issue of changing the state of armistice into the state of peace under the principle of resolution between direct parties.”

The South also pointed to the unreasonableness of the North-offered clauses based on the concept of “Korea is One.”

Regarding the clause of “removal of statutory and institutional devices opposed to each other,” the South maintained that inasmuch as improvement of inter-Korean relations should begin with recognition of each other’s systems as realities and respect for all the statutory orders of the other side, the North’s demand for such an elimination could not help but be taken as an attempt to jeopardize the implementation of the basic South-North agreement.

The South proposed that such a problem could be discussed along with the issue of improving each other’s laws and systems on the principle of reciprocity at a legal affairs council to be established.

About the question of “recognition of and respect for thoughts,” the South said that the attempt of the North to include a “thoughts” clause, which was expressly excluded from the basic

South-North agreement, in the auxiliary agreement, was in breach of the agreed matters envisaged in the basic agreement and also constituted an act that went beyond the frame of the subcommittee duty.

Concerning the clause of “amendment to and repeal of treaties and agreements signed with other countries,” the South said this clause was contradictory to the spirit of the basic agreement in which the two sides agreed not to interfere in each other’s internal affairs.

If the two sides would seek to revise or repeal the treaties and agreements signed with many countries around the world, the South said, it would be an act of destroying the international legal order with the two sides hardly being able to escape international criticism.

With respect to the clause of “non-joining in acts of third countries to interfere in each other,” the South maintained that such a clause would work to restrict even those rights and obligation which the two sides would naturally exercise as member countries of the United Nations. Besides, the South said, the clause is prone to infringe upon the sovereignty of each other’s government as it provides a room for possible interference in each other’s diplomatic policies or conducts.

Rejecting the clause of “joining of international organizations under single seats,” the South said that now that the two sides have joined even the United Nations under separate seats, the clause was an unrealistic rule that disregarded the reality of inter-Korean relations.

Further on the North Korean assertion that South and North Korea should take joint steps to facilitate the conclusion of a peace agreement between the U.S. and North Korea, the South pointed out that such a claim squarely violates the spirit of Article 5 of the basic agreement because the very parties responsible for

changing the Armistice Agreement into a peace agreement are none but the South and the North of Korea.

Meanwhile, on the method of preparing an auxiliary agreement, the two sides showed a wide difference. The South maintained that the supplementary accord should contain concrete implementation measures while the North insisted it can include only broad comprehensive contents with concrete implementation steps to be turned over to a joint commission.

As the four subcommittee members contacts failed to iron out differences over controversial matters, the two sides decided to hold the seventh subcommittee meeting on August 28 to continue the discussion.

Meanwhile, at the first members contact held on July 18, the North handed to the South a list of 57 South Korean laws including the Republic of Korea Constitution, the texts of which they wanted to have.

d. Seventh Meeting

The South and the North held the seven meeting of the Political Subcommittee at Peace House, Panmunjom, on August 28 to continue to have debate on the issue of adopting an auxiliary agreement in the area of reconciliation.

At the meeting, the South produced another revised version of the proposed agreement, which, consisting of 32 articles in nine chapters, was prepared by deleting the clause "regular consultations between permanent missions in New York, etc." and another clause from the original version composed of 34 articles in nine chapters and by accommodating the term "public organizations" as advocated by the North.

As the North offered its version of a draft agreement on the Formation and Operation of a Joint Reconciliation Commis-

sion for the first time during the meeting, the South suggested that the two sides discuss and settle the northern version together with the South's version furnished at the fourth subcommittee members contact. But, no substantial debate on the versions was held as the North insisted on the prior discussion of the contents of a draft auxiliary agreement.

The two sides concentrated their discussion on such controversial clauses as general rules containing a clause of "special relationship," question of removing statutory and institutional devices in connection with unification, issue of whether to include private press medias in the organizations subject to the stoppage of slanders and defamation, and the issue of changing the Armistice Agreement into a peace agreement. But, they failed to narrow differences.

In the meantime, the South handed to the North a second list of 67 North Korean laws including the one on the establishment of the Ministry of State Security, asking for their texts.

Following the meeting, the two sides had a separate exclusive chairmen's contact in a bid to adjust their mutual positions with respect to the method of adopting auxiliary agreements in various areas and also to find a solution to controversial clauses of an auxiliary agreement in the area of reconciliation. But, they failed to reach any accord and decided to carry on negotiations through chairmen's contacts.

1) Chairmen's Contact

The two sides held a Political Subcommittee chairmen's contacts at Tongilkak in Panmunjom's northern area on September 4 and at Peace House in the southern sector of Panmunjom on September 8 to continue their debate on an auxiliary agreement in the area of reconciliation.

The North, demanding the package adoption of auxiliary

agreements in three areas, asserted that any inauguration of a joint reconciliation commission would be meaningless unless an auxiliary accord in the area of reconciliation was resolved.

In response, the South said it also felt the need of the package settlement of the three auxiliary accords. But, the South suggested that those items agreed on by the subcommittee be adopted as auxiliary agreements with unsettled controversial matters to be discussed further for adoption later as additional supplementary accords. The South also said it had no objection to the North's call for the inauguration of a joint reconciliation commission following the adoption of auxiliary agreements.

The two chairmen sought to hammer out a compromise for the settlement of an auxiliary agreement, but failed to reach an accord due to their conflicting positions.

The clauses on which a wide discrepancy was showed included the North's ideas of "removal of statutory and institutional devices opposed to each other," "recognition of and respect for thoughts," "amendment to and repeal of treaties and agreements with other countries," "exceptions to non-interference in each other's internal and external affairs," "non-joining in acts of other countries to interfere in each other," "joining of international organizations under single seats," and "joint steps between South and North Korea toward changing the Armistice Agreement into a peace agreement," and the South-offered "regulating of the concept of special relationship," "recognition of and respect for each other's governments," "non-interference in relations with third countries," and "change of the state of armistice into the state of peace based on the principle of resolution of problems between direct parties."

As the two sides failed to resolve these controversial items, they wound up the chairmen's contacts after deciding to continue to discuss them at the eight South-North high-level meeting.

2. Military Subcommittee

Under the agreement reached at the seventh high-level meeting to prepare an auxiliary agreement in the area of nonaggression by September 1, the two sides tried to hammer out an auxiliary agreement on nonaggression through five subcommittee meetings, one chairmen's contact and three subcommittee members contacts.

The South offered six separate revised versions of the proposed supplementary accord after it first set forth a draft Agreement on Non-use of the Force of Arms and the Prevention of Inadvertent Armed Clashes for the Implementation of and Respect for Non-Aggression at the fourth subcommittee meeting. The North, too, produced their revised versions on four occasions.

The two sides agreed on the title of the auxiliary accord, its preamble, the titles of chapters and nine articles, and neared an accord on many other clauses, thus making it possible to adopt the auxiliary agreement in the area of nonaggression at the eighth South-North high-level meeting.

a. Fourth Meeting

The fourth meeting of the Military Subcommittee was held at Peace House in the southern area of Panmunjom behind closed doors on May 25.

Regarding the issue of adopting an auxiliary agreement in the area of nonaggression by September 1 as agreed at the seventh high-level meeting, the South emphasized that since a supplementary accord should contain concrete steps necessary for the implementation of and respect for the basic agreement, the proposed agreement cannot merely repeat the clauses of a basic law like North Korea's version but should be prepared concretely on matters that require separate supplementary accords of priority actions.

The South said that an auxiliary agreement should involve concrete action guidelines of a kind that is fair and easily implemented in consideration of the military realities existing in the two sides of Korea. The South pointed out that like those of the North's version, unfair items which demand only one side's abidance or unrealistic clauses that call for a fundamental change in both sides' existing military defense systems can hardly be agreed on and implemented.

The South then produced a revised version of a draft Agreement on Non-Use of the Force of Arms and the Prevention of Inadvertent Armed Clashes for the Implementation of and Respect for Nonaggression between the South and the North, which consisted of 22 articles in seven chapters and which was prepared by integrating the draft Agreement on Installing and Operating Direct Telephone Line between the Military Authorities of the South and the North which was first offered at the first meeting on March 13 into the draft Agreement on Non-Use of the Force of Arms and Prevention of Inadvertent Armed Clashes for the Implementation of and Respect for Nonaggression between the South and the North suggested at the third meeting on April 30.

Besides, regarding the incident in which North Korean armed troops infiltrated the southern area to engage in hostile acts on May 22, the South pointed out that the infiltration was in express violation of Article 5 "Respect for Military Armistice Agreement" and Article 9 "Non-Use of the Force of Arms and Nonaggression" of the basic South-North agreement.

Expressing regret over the incident, the South urged the North to take proper steps to prevent the recurrence of similar incidents and thoroughly investigate the intrusion through the Military Armistice Commission.

On the other hand, North Korea stuck to their previous intent to adopt a comprehensive and declarative auxiliary accord

lacking any practicability by insisting that an auxiliary agreement to be adopted by the Military Subcommittee should be a comprehensive single one, distinguished from concrete implementation rules or detailed agreements to be prepared by a joint commission.

The North put forth a draft Auxiliary Agreement for the Implementation of, Respect for and Guarantee of ‘Chapter 2 North-South Nonaggression’ of the Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, and Cooperation and Exchanges between the North and the South,” which was prepared by partially revising the draft auxiliary accord they introduced at the first meeting.

On the incident of armed troops’ infiltration on May 22, the North said that their armed forces “couldn’t have done such an act in violation of the unification policy of the government and the party.” They then said they were “cordially suggesting that since the incident was something outside the frame of the Military Subcommittee, the incident would not be discussed any further at the Military Subcommittee today.”

The two sides exchanged opinions on the structure and problematic points of each draft versions, and decided to carry on discussions at the next meeting.

b. Fifth Meeting

The fifth meeting of the Military Subcommittee was held at Tongilkak, Panmunjom, on June 19. It took place behind closed doors.

Initially at the meeting, the South urged the North to agree to hold a Military Armistice Commission meeting to look into the infiltration by North Korean armed troops on May 22, and also to show sincerity toward removing suspicion at home and abroad inasmuch as much problematic matters were unveiled in the North’s nuclear facilities as a result of inspections by the Inter-

national Atomic Energy Agency.

The South, while again emphasizing its view of the nature of an auxiliary agreement, said that the Military Subcommittee should continue in the future to discuss concrete ways of implementing and respecting for nonaggression so as to prepare additional auxiliary agreements.

The South also expressed its opinions about the revised draft of an auxiliary agreement the North produced at the fourth meeting, and explained about the purport of the South's version.

In reaction to the South's raising of the infiltration incident and the nuclear question, the North claimed that the infiltration incident had nothing to do with their policy demand and tried to shift blame to the South by insisting that a delay in the business of the Joint Nuclear Control Commission was due to "the lack of sincerity toward adopting an implementation agreement on the part of the South."

They further asserted that it was made clear through inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency that North Korea does not possess any nuclear reprocessing facilities.

The two sides began to make general discussion of the two sides' versions of a draft agreement after the North set forth a version of its own which consisted of 22 articles in six chapters. However, no substantial progress was registered before the adjournment of the meeting because of conflicting positions over the order of discussion. The South wanted to first discuss the contents of the nonaggression area of the basic agreement and then itemize chapters and determine their titles based on such discussion, while the North insisted on the initial determining of chapters and their titles.

c. Sixth Meeting

The sixth meeting of the Military Subcommittee was held at Peace House, Panmunjom, on July 16.

Regarding the issue of preparing an auxiliary agreement, the South first emphasized that since the basic South-North agreement calls for the preparation of institutional devices on the three aspects of the renouncement of political intent of waging war, control of excessive military strength and the elimination of possible inadvertent armed clashes with a view to forestalling war and aggression, an auxiliary agreement should basically handle measures to forestall a war that may flare up through use of the force of arms or inadvertent armed clashes.

Moreover, in a bid to provide a breakthrough in substantial debate, the South newly offered a draft *Auxiliary Agreement on the Implementation of and Respect for Agreement on Nonaggression between the South and North*, which was prepared by refitting the previous version into 25 articles in six chapters and structural items such as the title, preamble and chapter titles.

Meanwhile, North Korea, while raising the issue of the South's position over the nuclear question and the joint Korea-U.S. Focus Lens military training, tried to shift the blams for a delay in the adoption of an auxiliary accord to the South.

In reaction, the South made clear its position that the Focus Lens exercise need not have been discussed since it was a defensive command post exercise held annually since long before, and that since the root source of the nuclear issue lied in the North suspected of having been developing nuclear arms, a substantial progress in inter-Korean relations could be expected only when mutual inspections were conducted without allowing any havens in parallel with inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency.

The two sides had general debate on a draft auxiliary accord and reached an agreement on the title of an accord in the nonagg-

ression area, preamble and chapter titles “Peaceful Resolution of Disputes,” “Boundary and Regions of Nonaggression,” “Installing and Operating of Military Direct Telephone Line” and “Amendment and Effectuation.”

After the adjournment of the meeting, the two chairmen had an exclusive contact to discuss the method of concluding the proposed auxiliary accord. As the North suggested that the next meeting be held on September 5 on the premise that it was in effect impossible to work out the accord before the deadline, the two sides decided to have the eighth Military Subcommittee meeting on September 5.

d. Eighth Meeting

The eighth Military Subcommittee meeting was held at Tongilkak in the northern area of Panmunjom on September 5.

The South offered another revised version after discussing the clauses which had to be restructured to make them in line with already agreed-on items as well as ideas to handle disputed items so as to ensure the smooth conclusion of an auxiliary agreement.

Through the meeting and a subsequent exclusive chairmen’s contact, the two sides discussed unsettled chapter titles and all the clauses of an auxiliary accord, arriving at the accord that the title of Chapter 5 should be “Consultation and Implementation Organization.” They thus agreed on all the titles of the six chapters and nine articles as they additionally agreed on the articles of “suspension of hostile acts and notification in the event of emergency dispute,” “additional implementation of and respect for non-aggression” and “function of the Joint Military Commission.”

The two sides also agreed that the South-proposed “security measures for the capital area” and “the right to pursue” and the

North's ideas of "prohibition of arms buildup in areas along the Military Demarcation Line," "prohibition of reconnaissance activities" and "prohibition of blockade" would be referred to the Joint Military Commission.

The South further suggested that among the remaining unsettled items, the South's suggestion for "non-effect of the auxiliary agreement on international agreements" and the North's idea of "non-joining in the use of the force of arms by foreign countries" be either deleted simultaneously or resolved through compromise plans.

The two sides thus decided to continue to discuss at the eighth high-level meeting those unresolved items as "discussion and resolution of all disputes in the military area at the joint commission," "among the boundaries of nonaggression, the boundary zone in the West Sea and air nonaggression boundary" and "promotion of consultations on the nonaggression boundary issue at the joint commission."

3. Exchanges and Cooperation Subcommittee

According to an agreement reached at the seventh high-level meeting to prepare an auxiliary agreement in the area of exchanges and cooperation by September 5, the two sides carried on discussions to adopt the auxiliary accord through four subcommittee meetings, one chairmen's contact and two members contacts.

After they introduced their respective initial draft versions of the proposed agreement at the first meeting on March 18, the two sides offered a number of revised versions—six by the South and five by the North—as they endeavored to arrive at an agreement.

In the talks, the North raised some issues that were not

related to the discussion of an auxiliary agreement in the area of exchanges and cooperation. They included the question of the South's position over the nuclear issue, the issue of joint steps between the two sides against Japan's distortion of historical facts, and their demand for the repatriation of Li In-mo. The South reiterated its consistent stand over these issues while urging the North to indulge in the discussion of the proposed auxiliary accord.

The Exchanges and Cooperation Subcommittee, thus, showed a relatively smooth progress, agreeing on the title, preamble and chapter titles of the supplementary accord in the exchanges and cooperation area. The two sides reached a complete accord on all the articles before the eighth high-level meeting with the sole exception of the issue of referring to a legal affairs council of the South-North Joint Reconciliation Commission the North's idea of eliminating statutory and institutional devices.

a. Fourth Meeting

The fourth meeting of the South-North Exchanges and Cooperation Subcommittee was held at Tongilkak in the northern sector of Panmunjom on May 30.

The two sides respectively set forth revised versions of the proposed accord and carried out debate on such clauses as "government authorities' authorization of parties to economic exchanges and cooperation," "removal of statutory and institutional devices," "elimination of state of military confrontation" and "dispersed family question" as well as the question of whether to create a separate chapter on travel and communications matters.

On the issue of government authorities' authorization of parties to economic exchanges and cooperation, the South emphasized that such authorization is necessary because in the case of

open-account settlement, for instance, exchanges ought to be balanced and also because government authorities' intervention is a must if only to adjust demand and supply in material exchanges. Besides, the South said, international practices were that overseas investments exceeding a specific ceiling have to be approved by a government.

The North, on the other hand, insisted that government authorities' authorization was not necessary. They argued that banks would better know the fund situation and industrial capabilities of would-be partners and that open-account settlement could be handled by banks under their responsibility.

Regarding the issue of removing statutory and institutional devices, the South maintained that such a measure would not be needed since if any legal problems occur to obstruct exchanges and cooperation, it could be referred to the Joint Reconciliation Commission. But, the North asserted it was alright that both sides recognize each other's systems but those legal and institutional barriers that run counter to the basic South-North agreement should be done away with.

On the issue of travels, the South pointed out that if only free travels and exchanges were realized by land, sea and air, it would be much helpful to the removal of the state of military confrontation. North Korea, on the other hand, maintained that sea routes should be opened in the first place because, they said, it was impossible to link air and land routes unless so-called concrete walls and explosives were removed first.

With respect to the dispersed family issue, the South said that even in view of the precedent in which the two sides' authorities agreed on the exchange of hometown visitors and delegated its implementation to Red Cross organizations, the two sides' government authorities should first prepare concrete steps to resolve the dispersed family question under the provisions of Article 18

of the basic South-North agreement, with the Red Cross entrusted with the task of its implementation.

The North, meanwhile, insisted that for government authorities to discuss the dispersed family issue was an act of ignoring the competence of the Red Cross authorities. They also said the proposed exchange of aged dispersed family parents visitors was an exceptional project.

About the structure of an auxiliary agreement, the South said it was proper to include in such an accord matters on travel and communications as a separate chapter in addition to those chapters on economy and socio-culture. But, North Korea rejected the creation of a separate chapter on travel and communications, arguing that since the two sides agreed on two joint commissions, there should be the same number of chapters.

In connection with the project to exchange aged parents visitors and art troupes, the South suggested that to enable all the 100 visitors to meet their missing families, only 30 reserve candidate visitors as offered by the North were not enough and therefore candidate visitors to be selected should be increased to twice as many as actual visitors.

The South also suggested that if there were dispersed families among art troupe members, journalists and support people who would accompany hometown visitors, they, too, be given chances to meet their missing families and relatives.

b. Fifth Meeting

The fifth meeting of the Exchanges and Cooperation Subcommittee was held at Peace House, Panmunjom, on June 26.

After producing a revised version of a draft auxiliary agreement which was prepared by reclassifying the sector of "travel and communications" into chapter of economy and socio-culture and which consisted of 43 paragraphs in 17 articles and four chap-

ters, the South urged the North to speed up the preparation of the supplementary accord so that a joint commission could be put into operation at an early date.

However, the North showed a passive attitude toward discussing the contents of an auxiliary agreement by again raising the issues of the South's posture toward the nuclear question, joint steps between the two Koreas against Japan's distortion of historical facts and the issue of Li-In-mo's repatriation.

In response, the South's Chairman Lim Dong-won reiterated his side's basic position that 1) all the agreed on matters reached between the South and the North such as the basic agreement and the denuclearization declaration should be implemented and respected under all circumstances, 2) the important thing the two sides should do at the present stage was to prepare auxiliary agreements and conduct mutual inter-Korean nuclear inspections, 3) no substantial progress in inter-Korean relations can ever be expected unless the nuclear issue is resolved, and 4) humanitarian projects like the exchange of aged parents visitors should be promoted unconditionally without being linked to other issues.

Reacting to the North's call for joint actions against Japan's fabrication of protectorate and annexation agreements, the South said that since the nullification of the Korea-Japan annexation and other related treaties was confirmed in Article 2 of the Korea-Japan Basic Treaty, it was needless to discuss the issue again at the Exchanges and Cooperation Subcommittee. It was desirable, the South said, that newly found materials be exchanged and seminars be held between the two sides for joint study programs among related scholars and experts.

Against the North's demand for the repatriation of Li In-mo, the South said that since not only Li In-mo but all the 10 million dispersed family members were suffering from the pains of family division and since a proposed auxiliary agreement in

the reconciliation area contains a clause on “reunion” between dispersed families, the exigent thing was to conclude an auxiliary accord at an early date.

c. Sixth Meeting

The sixth meeting of the Exchanges and Cooperation Subcommittee was held at Tongilkak in the northern area of Panmunjom on July 28.

At the meeting, the two sides agreed on the title, preamble and some chapter titles of an auxiliary agreement and neared an accord on one of the four unsettled items—the issue of opening transportation routes, thus making it possible for members contacts to adjust wording of the proposed agreement.

The South offered the readjusted title, preamble and chapter titles of the agreement, and the North, too, produced a revised version featuring the change of some 30 articles, enabling the two sides to enter substantial debate on the contents of the accord. Consequently, the two sides agreed on the title and preamble of the agreement and the titles of its chapters 1 and 2.

Moreover, the two sides concentrated on discussing 1) the issue of government authorities’ authorization of parties to exchanges and cooperation, 2) the issue of removing legal and institutional devices, 3) the question of removing the state of military confrontation and linking transportation routes, and 4) humanitarian projects. The South and the North agreed to open two sea routes and a temporary land route initially, and more land and sea routes in the future depending on the progress of the situation.

Meanwhile, the North again demanded the repatriation of Li In-mo as a prerequisite to the exchange of aged dispersed family parents visitors and art troupes. The South, recalling that the North did not attach any precondition when the two sides agreed on

the exchange of aged parents visitors at the time of the seventh high-level meeting, emphasized that the proposed exchange should be carried out unconditionally on the agreed-on time.

1) Members Contact

Subcommittee members contacts were held twice on August 10 and 21 at the conference room of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission at Panmunjom. The contacts were attended by Song Young-dae, an advisory member to the National Unification Board ; Kim Tae-yon, director of the International Economic Policy Coordination Office, Economic Planning Board ; and Shin Hyon-wung, director-general of the Culture Ministry, from the South. Attending the contacts from the North were Son Jung-chol, deputy director of the Trade and Economic Institute ; Kim Chae-song, department head of the Administration Council Secretariat ; and Kim Sung-guk, deputy editor-in-chief of the Rodong-Chongnyonsa Co.

Sharing the view that the auxiliary agreement at issue should be prepared by September 5 as originally agreed on, the two sides carried out discussion, adjusting the wording of those clauses contained in common in the two sides' versions, and deciding to carry on debate on mutual differences.

At the first members contact, the two sides agreed on 10 paragraphs in six articles as follows :

Agreed-on Articles

Implementation of exchanges and cooperation in the area of economy ; implementation of exchanges and cooperation in the areas of science, technology and environment ; linking of transportation routes ; guarantee of the confidentiality of postal and tele-communications services ; and cooperation in the area of international economy and joint advancement to abroad.

Agreed-on Paragraphs

Prices of the commodities to be exchanged ; prohibition of the imposition of tariffs ; guarantee of free economic activities and conveniences ; protection of science and technology rights ; technical cooperation for the opening of transportation routes ; shipping of goods to be exchanged ; respect for international conventions related to the opening of transportation routes ; respect for international conventions related to postal and telecommunications services ; international cooperation in the economic area ; and discussion and promotion of joint overseas advancement in the economic area.

At the second contact, the two sides agreed on the title of Chapter 3 and on seven articles and three paragraphs.

Agreed-on Articles

Implementation of exchanges and cooperation in the socio-cultural area ; realization of free travels and contacts ; cooperation and joint overseas advancement in the socio-cultural area ; guarantee of support for exchanges and cooperation in the socio-cultural area ; seeking of steps to resolve humanitarian questions ; and amendment, supplementation and effectuation.

Agreed-on Paragraphs

Protection of copyrights ; emergency relief of travellers ; and international cooperation in the socio-cultural area.

Meanwhile, the South, expressing regret over the de facto failure to exchange aged hometown visitors, urged the North once again to withdraw the prerequisites they attached to the exchange so that the projected exchange could be realized speedily.

d. Seventh Meeting

The two sides held the seventh meeting of the Exchanges and Cooperation Subcommittee and subcommittee chairmen's exclusive contact in succession at Peace House in the southern sector of Panmunjom on September 3 to continue to discuss the contents of the proposed auxiliary agreement.

The South suggested that the two sides review those items on which they neared an accord and those which either of the two alone proposed and then discuss those matters over which the two sides differed. The North, while claiming that the South had delayed debate on an auxiliary agreement with the excuse of the nuclear question, nevertheless produced a new revised version and agreed to discuss the contents of the proposed supplementary accord.

As a result of their discussion of unsettled items of a draft auxiliary agreement, the two sides reached an accord on 30 paragraph in five additional articles. The newly agreed-on articles were "creation of an organization in the economic area," "discussion and implementation of detailed matters agreed on in the area of economy," "creation of an organization in the social area," "discussion and implementation of detailed matters agreed on in the social area" and "respect for agreement reached by Red Cross organizations."

Meanwhile, at the exclusive chairmen's contact held in the wake of the subcommittee meeting, the two sides discussed ways to resolve major controversial items and agreed on the following items :

Agreed-on Paragraphs

Implementation of economic cooperation projects ; scope and forms of economic cooperation projects ; details of economic cooperation projects ;

principles of reciprocity and supplying of each other's wants in the exchange of materials ; method of settlement ; designation of banks for open-account settlement ; notification of materials and related laws and regulations ; guarantee of investment and prevention of double taxation ; exchanges in the area of science and technology ; linking of sea routes ; opening of temporary transportation routes ; linking of transportation routes such as sea and air routes ; emergency relief measures ; discussion of working-level matters over the opening of transportation routes ; linking of postal and telecommunications services through Panmunjom ; guarantee of the confidentiality of postal and telecommunications services ; discussion of working-level matters on postal and telecommunications services ; exchange of materials in the social area ; implementation of multi-pronged cooperation such as technical cooperation ; personnel exchanges in the socio-cultural area ; holding of joint events in the socio-cultural area ; transportation means for personnel exchanges ; respect for legal orders by traveling people ; possession of certificates ; furnishing of conveniences to travelers ; discussion of working-level matters for travel and contacts ; joint overseas advancement in the socio-cultural area ; and handling by Red Cross organizations of the discussion and implementation of matters like free travels by dispersed families, reunion between dispersed families and disposal of personal effects belonging to deceased persons.

1) Chairmen's Contact

A contact between the South's Chairman Lim Dong-won and the North's Chairman Kim Jong-u was held at Tongilkak, Panmunjom, on the afternoon of September 7.

The two chairmen discussed the contents of the proposed supplementary accord and adjusted the wording of agreed-on items, reaching an agreement on all the articles with the exception of the sole issue of "removing statutory and institutional devices."

Agreed-on Articles

Resumption of Red Cross talks at the soonest possible date; and Red Cross organizations to take charge of the discussion and implementation of detailed matters related to the resolution of humanitarian questions.

Agreed-on Paragraphs

Parties to economic cooperation and material exchanges, implementation of commodity exchanges and economic cooperation covered in contracts signed by parties after they went through necessary procedures of one's side; guarantee of the priority of public and humanitarian projects in postal and telecommunications exchanges; steps to ensure free travels by the members of the nation; and discussion and resolution of the scope of dispersed families and the issue of creating a meeting center.

The Exchanges and Cooperation Subcommittee had thus reached a complete accord on and adjusted the wording of an auxiliary agreement in the area of exchanges and cooperation which consisted of 50 paragraphs in 20 articles and four chapters.

Regarding the only unsettled item, "the issue of removing statutory and institutional devices," which the North raised, the North Koreans insisted that they were willing to delete the item if only the same item was governed in the auxiliary agreement of the Political Subcommittee. The North asserted that otherwise the item should be contained in the auxiliary agreement in the area of exchanges and cooperation under all circumstances.

The two sides agreed that they would finally wind up the issue at the eighth high-level meeting before signing and effectuating the auxiliary agreement in the area of exchanges and cooperation.

Part III

**South-North Joint Nuclear Control
Commission**

Following the effectuation of the Joint Declaration of Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula made at the sixth South-North high-level meeting, the South-North Joint Nuclear Control Commission, a consultative and implementation organization of the Joint Declaration, was inaugurated on March 19.

At the seventh delegates contact held on March 14 to discuss the issue of forming and operating a joint nuclear control commission, the two sides agreed to prepare rules on mutual inter-Korean nuclear inspections by the end of May at the latest and conduct mutual inspections within 20 days thereafter.

Under the agreement, eight commission meetings, one commission chairmen's contact and three commission members contacts were held since the first commission meeting was held on March 19.

However, North Korea, while again raising the theory of a nuclear-free zone, an idea which they had already withdrawn in the course of the meetings and contacts, demanded the priority discussion of an implementation agreement, rejecting any substantial debate on inspection rules.

Even at the fifth meeting held on May 27, the North held fast to the stand, thus making it impossible to adopt inspection rules by the agreed-on deadline.

In a telephone message to the North's Administration Council Premier Yon Hyong-muk on June 1, Prime Minister Chung Wonshik expressed a regret over the failure to adopt inspection regulations within the deadline agreed on between the two sides, and called for the North's sincere and reasonable posture toward preparing inspection rules.

Lee Dong-bok, the South's spokesman for the high-level talks, too, in a statement on June 2, emphasized that North Korea should know that without the fundamental resolution of the nuclear

issue, it would be not easy for the North to resolve any of the problems the North was currently faced with at home and abroad

In reaction, the North tried to shift the blame for the failure to the South. They asserted that talks on inspection rules could not progress because the South refused to produce a draft version of an agreement on the implementation of the denuclearization declaration, rejected inspection of nuclear arms and bases, and demanded special and military installations inspections. The assertions were made in a statement issued by Choe U-jin, the North's chairman of the Joint Nuclear Control Commission on May 30, and also in a telephone message sent to the South by Administration Council Premier Yon Hyong-muk on June 4.

Only at the eighth commission meeting on August 31, did North Korea agree to discuss inspection rules on the condition that an implementation agreement be debated. Still, they did not show any change in their policy over substantial matters.

Even at a commission members contact held after the basic agreement entered an implementation stage following the eighth South-North high-level meeting, the North did not show any sincerity toward adopting inspection rules.

In the course of commission meetings and contacts, the two sides showed a wide difference in their basic perception of the issue of nuclear on the Korean peninsula and in the contents of inspection rules.

As for the nuclear issue, the South had carried out talks with an eye primarily at preparing rules on mutual inspections and conducting inspections based thereon. The South was in the belief that the mission of the South-North Joint Nuclear Control Commission is to verify the implementation of the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.

But, North Korea, while demanding the priority discussion

of an implementation agreement, raised again the concept of a nuclear-free area characterized by calls for joint actions against external nuclear threat and an international guarantee for the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, the issues which they had previously withdrawn. The North had in this way delayed the preparation of inspection rules and the implementation of inspections based thereon.

By asserting that the root source of the nuclear question on the Korean peninsula lied in the nuclear weapons and based of the U.S. forces in Korea, North Korea stuck to a position totally irrelevant to the rising misgivings in the world community about the North's nuclear arms development.

In particular, North Korea simply reiterated the argument that as a result of interim inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), any suspicion about their nuclear development had been completely dispelled and that the remaining task was to conduct inspections of nuclear weapons and bases in the South.

In reaction, the South let it be known that there were no nuclear weapons or bases in the South as clarified by President Roh Tae-woo in his declaration on the non-existence of nuclear weapons and also in U.S. President George Bush's announcement of the complete withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons from overseas bases.

The South emphasized that the IAEA's interim inspections failed to remove suspicion about the North's nuclear arms development, and that misgivings continued to exist about a number of matters such as those of whether there are experimental plutonium reprocessing facilities in the North, if the North put into operation a 5Mwe atomic reactor and whether the North had concealed extracted plutonium.

Moreover, the South emphasized that apart from inspec-

tions by the IAEA which it said are an obligation of a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), inter-Korean nuclear inspections should be carried out at an early date inasmuch as the two sides agreed on the joint denuclearization declaration, and that unless mutual inspections were conducted, there could be no substantial progress in inter-Korean relations such as economic cooperation projects.

Second, the South and the North differed in such issues related to inspection rules as whether to adopt the principle of reciprocity and whether to include military bases in the list of areas subject to inspections. They also failed to reach an accord on the issue of conducting special inspections.

The South suggested that the same maximum numbers of the sites subject to inspections in the South and the North be determined based on reciprocity and that inspections be conducted depending on one's need within the given maximum number. It also maintained that all suspected nuclear sites should be inspected regardless of whether they are civilian or military facilities in a sense that no havens should be allowed in nuclear inspections.

However, North Korea argued that under the principle of resolving all suspected matters at the same time, the South could look into the nuclear facilities of the Yongbyon area while the North would inspect all nuclear facilities, nuclear weapons and nuclear bases in the South at the same time. They went so far as to claim that since suspicion about the North's nuclear arms development was completely dispelled through inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency, inter-Korean nuclear inspections should now be focused on looking into nuclear weapons and bases in the South.

Whereas the South maintained that since nuclear facilities can exist anywhere in civilian and military areas, even military facilities, once suspected of having been linked to nuclear arms,

should naturally be made subject to inspection, the North insisted that since ordinary military facilities are one thing and nuclear facilities are another, no military facilities could be included in those areas to be inspected.

With respect to the issue of special inspections, the South said that in view of the general practices of disarmament or of the basic spirit of the joint denuclearization declaration designed to perpetually ensure the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, special inspections whereby either side can inspect the places it designates at any time would be indispensable to mutual inter-Korean nuclear inspections.

However, North Korea rejected special inspections, the key to the verification of denuclearization, on the ground of the provisions of Article 4 of the denuclearization declaration, which provides "inspections shall be conducted into places which the other side selects and on which both sides agree." North Korea thus sought to make mutual nuclear inspections a perfunctory procedure only.

Meanwhile, after the fifth Joint Nuclear Control Commission meeting, three rounds (May 15-June 5, July 11-21, August 31-September 12) of interim inspections were conducted into North Korean nuclear facilities by the International Atomic Energy Agency.

1. Sixth Meeting

The sixth meeting of the South-North Joint Nuclear Control Commission was held at Peace House in the southern sector of Panmunjom on June 30, 1992.

The South regretted at the meeting that inspection rules could not be prepared even by a time when the first round of

inspections ought to have been completed.

The South then emphasized that the failure was because the North stuck to unreasonable demands while trying to make it appear as if the root source of the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula lied in the southern side. The failure was also due to the North's rejection of the principle of reciprocity and special inspection in disregard of the basic spirit of the denuclearization declaration.

The South stressed that as a result of inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency, suspicion about the North's nuclear arms development has increased rather than having been dispelled as the North claimed. Stressing once again the need of inter-Korean inspections, the South recalled that of the 35 IAEA board member countries, 22 nations called for mutual South-North inspections in parallel with IAEA inspections.

In particular, the South said that as it was determined that what the North claimed was a "radio chemical laboratory" would become a nuclear reprocessing facility once it is completed, the facility was in express breach of the provisions of Item 3 of the denuclearization declaration that "the South and the North shall not possess nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment facilities." The South strongly demanded the stoppage of its construction and the abandonment of it.

The South stressed that for thorough and effective mutual inter-Korean nuclear inspections, all the places, whether military or civilian, where nuclear materials or facilities are reported to exist or suspected of having been nuclearly related, should be included in the sites to be inspected without allowing any havens.

Pointing again to the need of the special inspection system, a sure method of removing misgivings about nuclear arms development, the South said it was incomprehensible for the North to reject special inspections in inter-Korean inspections while accep-

ting special probes under the Convention on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.

In reaction, the North asserted that any suspicion about nuclear arms development has been removed as a result of IAEA inspections, arguing that the remaining task now was none but to inspect U.S. military installations in South Korea.

The North also demanded that the South explain about its statement that no substantial progress could be expected in inter-Korean relations without the resolution of the nuclear issue through mutual inspections. Here, the South reiterated its basic stand first disclosed at the fifth meeting of the Exchanges and Cooperation Subcommittee on June 26.

Meanwhile, the South suggested that for the progress of the discussion of inspection rules, it was willing to produce a draft implementation agreement if the North agreed to the prior discussion and initialing of mutual inspection rules followed by the discussion and package adoption of an implementation agreement. But, the North insisted that the South should first put forth a draft implementation agreement.

Regarding draft inspection rules, the North set forth a “revised” draft Agreement on the Formation and Operation of South-North Joint Nuclear Control Commission featuring re-edited contents of Paragraphs (2) through (7) of Article 2. But, the revision was no more than the recompiling of their previous version.

2. Seventh Meeting

The seventh meeting of the South-North Joint Nuclear Commission was held at Tongilkak at Panmunjom on July 21. Of the southern delegates, Vice Chairman Pan Ki-mun, special assistant to the foreign minister, was replaced by Vice Chairman Chung

Tae-ik, Foreign Ministry director-general for European affairs.

At the meeting, the South produced a draft Agreement on the Implementation of Joint Declaration of Denuclearization of the Korean peninsula consisting of a preamble and six articles, with the remarks that there was no change in its position that an agreement on the implementation of denuclearization declaration was not necessary for the implementation of the declaration, but it was putting forth a draft version in an effort to provide a turning point in the discussion of inspection rules.

The South stressed that it was offering the draft on the condition that the two sides would begin discussing an implementation agreement only after inspection rules were discussed and initialed first.

At the same time, the South offered a revised version of inspection rules, which was prepared by refitting the structure of inspection rules in the order of Paragraphs (2) through (7) of Article 2 of Agreement on the Formation and Operation of South-North Joint Nuclear Control Commission. The new revised draft consisted of a preamble and 28 articles in seven chapters.

The South emphasized that mutual inter-Korean nuclear inspections should be carried out by all means separate from IAEA inspections. It then urged the North to promptly stop building and discard the alleged radio-chemical laboratory as pointed out at the sixth meeting and clarify other nuclear-related misgivings by expressly explaining, say, about where they kept the nuclear fuel after it was used in their 5Mwe atomic reactor.

Meanwhile, North Korea, while arguing that all suspicions about their nuclear arms development were removed through two interim inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency, simply repeated their previous assertion that the only remaining thing to do now was to inspect U.S. military installations in the South.

In the question of selecting the sites to be inspected, the North reiterated their call for the principle of dissolving all suspicions at the same time while rejecting the South's ideas of inspections based on the principle of reciprocity and the method of special inspections.

By continuing to raise issues not related to the question of adopting inspection rules, such as some demands in connection with U.S. President George Bush's declaration on July 2, 1992 of the withdrawal of the U.S.'s tactical nuclear weapons from its overseas installations, North Korea tended in effect to delay debate on inspection rules.

Meanwhile, whereas the South wanted to have commission meetings once every week to speed up preparing inspection rules, North Korea insisted they be held once in two months, thus making it clear that they were not interested in adopting inspection rules at least before the eighth high-level meeting slated for September 15–18.

3. Eighth Meeting

The eighth meeting of the Joint Nuclear Control Commission was held at Peace House, Panmunjom, on August 31.

Emphasizing that mutual inter-Korean nuclear inspections cannot substitute for IAEA inspections because they were an obligatory duty regulated by the joint denuclearization declaration, the South urged the North to agree to the South's suggestion that an implementation agreement be discussed after inspection rules were first discussed and initialed for their simultaneous adoption and effectuation.

With regard to the contents of inspection rules, the South once again emphasized the need of the inspection of the same

numbers of sites between the two sides based on reciprocity, inspection of military installations and special inspections.

The North offered a revised version of inspection rules and agreed to their priority discussion on the condition that “an implementation agreement would be discussed when the need arises.”

The two sides failed to make substantial discussion of item-by-item inspection rules due to their difference over basic matters with respect to mutual nuclear inspections. but, the two sides agreed on the titles of the seven chapters of inspection rules as follows :

Chapter I: Exchange of Information for the Verification of Denuclearization

Chapter II: Formation and Operation of Inspection Teams to Verify Denuclearization

Chapter III: Selection of Sites Subject to Inspection for the Verification of Denuclearization

Chapter IV: Procedures for and Method of Inspection for the Verification of Denuclearization

Chapter V: Measures for Rectification Based on Nuclear Inspections and the Resolution of Disputes

Chapter VI: Guarantee of Personal Safety and Furnishing of Conveniences

Chapter VII: Amendment, Effectuation and Others

The two sides decided to continue to discuss inspection rules through commission members contacts.

a. First Members Contact

The First contact between members of the Joint Nuclear Control Commission was held at the conference room of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission at Panmunjom on the mor-

ning of September 19 to carry on debate on the contents of mutual nuclear inspections.

The contact was attended by Chung Tae-ik, Foreign Ministry's director-general for European affairs; Chong Dae-kyu, an advisory member of the National Unification Board; and Lee Seung-koo, a deliberations officer of the Ministry of Science and Technology from the South, and Pak Gwang-won, major general of the People's Army; Kim Gyong-chun, director-general of the Atomic Energy Industry Ministry; and Kim Su-gil, a Foreign Ministry Researcher, from the North.

At the contact, the South provided a table of comparison between the two sides' draft versions, suggesting that the two sides make a article-by-article review of inspection rules based thereon.

The two sides thus had the first substantial debate on the title of the proposed inspection rules, preamble and the articles of Chapter I "Exchange of Information for the Verification of Denuclearization."

The debate showed they might near an accord in the areas of nuclear materials and facilities among the items subject to the exchange of information.

In the areas of nuclear weapons and nuclear bases, however, the two sides widely differed. The South's position was that if and when one side claims there exist suspicion of the existence of nuclear weapons, nuclear bases, nuclear detonators, and nuclear arms launching and delivery means, the other side should furnish information on such matters or places suspected. On the other hand, the North asserted that both sides should furnish information on the nuclear weapons and bases which existed or exist in their areas to each other within 10 days of the adoption of inspection rules.

b. Second Commission Members Contact

The second members contact of the eighth Joint Nuclear Control Commission meeting was held at the conference room of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission at Panmunjom on September 30. At the contact, the two sides discussed Chapter II "Formation and Operation of Inspection Teams" of mutual nuclear inspection rules.

Regarding the issue of forming and operating inspection teams, the South suggested that the two sides exchange the lists of 50 inspectors within ten days after the effectuation of inspection rules, and inspection teams be formed among 20 of the listed persons.

But, the North wanted that a 15-member inspection team be formed for the inspection of nuclear weapons or nuclear bases, and a five-member team for nuclear materials or facilities. They also insisted that for simultaneous overall inspections, a number of inspection teams should be operated at the same time depending on the number and size of sites to be inspected.

Also by insisting that the list of inspection team members should be exchanged 10 days before inspection and one side should reshuffle team members if the other side asks for it, the North tended to shun special inspections the South advocated.

The North showed a passive attitude in article-by-article debate on inspection rules, arguing that President Roh's address at the United Nations General Assembly on September 23 and the annual Korea-U.S. Security Consultative Conference slated for October posed obstacles to the business of the Joint Nuclear Control Commission.

The two sides decided to hold the next members contact on October 14 to carry on debate on inspection rules.

Part V

**South-North Red Cross Working-
Level Delegates Contacts**

In accordance with an agreement made at the seventh high-level meeting to exchange aged dispersed family hometown visitors and art troupes between the two sides around the National Liberation Day of August 15, the two sides' Red Cross delegates resumed their contacts for the first time in one year and seven months after they last met on November 8, 1990, to discuss working-level matters related to the exchange of visitors through eight rounds of contacts.

The South exerted sincere efforts to ensure smooth discussion, offering a draft agreement on the exchange at the first contact, which was prepared based on the agreement made during the seventh meeting as well as on the precedents set in the first exchange of hometown visitors in 1985. Two draft amendments thereto were produced thereafter.

North Korea, however, had delayed the discussion of working-level procedures by raising, beginning at the first contact, the nuclear and Li In-mo issues that had nothing to do with the proposed exchange. From the fourth contact on, the North made clear that they were raising these two issues as prerequisites to the exchange of hometown visitors in direct contravention of the statement made by An Byong-su, the North's spokesman, at the time of the seventh high-level meeting that "we plan to promote the exchange of hometown visitors and art troupes unconditionally without any prerequisites."

Beginning the sixth contact, moreover, the North added the suspension of the Focus Lens training exercise to the list of their prerequisites to the realization of the exchange.

If the exchange of aged dispersed family hometown visitors were to be materialized smoothly on the agreed-on date of August 25, discussion of working-level matters ought to have been completed at least 30 days before the exchange to allow a preparatory

period, which should be immediately followed by the exchange of the lists of visitors.

At the seventh contact on July 25, one day before the planned exchange of visitors' lists, the South, emphasizing that the resolution of working-level matters could not be delayed any longer, urged the North to agree to settle working-level procedures without any preconditions and realize the exchange of aged dispersed family parents visitors as scheduled.

However, the North refused to discuss working-level issues by again raising their three-point prerequisites. They rather tried to shift the blame for the failed exchange to the South as they charged the South with laying obstacles to the exchange or attempting to postpone the exchange until a later date.

Moreover, the North in effect beclouded the realization of the exchange around August 25 as agreed on by proposing to hold the next contact on August 7, mere 18 days before the originally agreed-on time of the exchange, in an apparent bid to shun their responsibility for the failure to materialize the exchange.

At the final eighth contact held on August 7, the South strongly urged the North to agree to realize the exchange of visitors without any conditions. But, the North continued to stick to their prerequisites, refusing even to discuss working-level issues and thus putting off the projected exchange indefinitely.

The lists of the delegates, and the times of, to the Red Cross working-level delegates contacts to discuss the exchange of aged dispersed family visitors and art troupes were as follows :

Lists of Delegates

The South :

Lee Byong-wung, secretary-general, Republic of Korea National Red Cross (ROKNRC)

Lee Jun-koo, ROKNRC conference steering member
Lee Jong-yong, ROKNRC advisory member on dispersed family issue

The North :

Pak Yong-su, standing member, Central Committee, North Korean Red Cross (NKRC)

Kim Gwang-su, NKRC Central Committee member

Sin Won-chol, NKRC Central Committee responsible guidance member

Red Cross Working-Level Delegates Contacts Held at Conference Room of Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission

First contact, June 5

Second contact, June 12

Third contact, June 22

Fourth contact, July 8

Fifth contact, July 14

Sixth contact, July 20

Seventh contact, July 25

Eighth contact, August 7

1. First Contact

At the first delegates contact held on June 5, the South expressed the expectation that the planned exchange of aged dispersed family visitors, though it involved a small number of visitors of 100 from each side, could serve as a significant milestone along the road toward resolving the dispersed family question.

The South said it hoped that the project would be carried out smoothly based on the Red Cross humanitarian spirit, thereby contributing to the improvement of inter-Korean relations. The

South then emphasized the following three points in connection with the projected exchange of visiting groups.

First, the South suggested that the number of candidate visitors be set at 200, twice as many as the agreed-on number of visitors. The South explained that this was to enable all the visitors to meet their missing families or relatives. It noted that during the first exchange of hometown visitors in 1985, a considerable number of visitors were unable to meet their missing ones because their whereabouts were not located.

Second, the South suggested that dispersed family members, if any, among visiting art troupe members, press members and support people be given opportunities to meet their missing families and relatives so that as many people as possible could meet their blood relatives.

Third, the South suggested that depending on wishes of meeting families, they be allowed to share rooms or walk around together during the visits and to visit their homes and ancestral tombs if they were located in the Seoul and Pyongyang areas.

With these suggestions, the South produced as follows a draft Agreement Regarding Exchange of South-North Aged Dispersed Family Parents Visitors and Art Troupes prepared based on the agreed-on matters of the seventh high-level meeting and the agreement adopted in the 1985 exchange of hometown visitors and in consideration of the contents discussed at the eight rounds of working-level delegates contacts held since 1989 to discuss a second exchange of visitors.

*Agreement Regarding South-North Aged Dispersed Family
Parents Visitors and Art Troupes (Draft)*

*The Republic of Korea National Red Cross and the Democratic
People's Republic of Korea Red Cross held ___ rounds of working-level*

delegates contacts from June 5 to June ___ to discuss concrete measures to implement the agreement made at the Seventh South-North High-Level Meeting held in Seoul on May 6-7 to exchange aged dispersed family parents visitors and art troupes on the occasion of the 47th anniversary of national liberation, and agreed as follows :

1. Name of Visiting Groups

The name of the visiting groups shall be “South-North Aged Dispersed Family Parents Visitors and Art Troupes.”

2. Composition and Size of Visiting Groups

a. The size of each visiting group shall be 241 persons including a group leader, which shall be composed of as follows :

(1) Members of an aged parents visitors group shall be 100.

(2) Members of an art troupe shall be 70.

(3) Press members shall be 30.

(4) Support people shall be 40.

b. A group of aged dispersed family parents visitors shall be selected and formed at mutual conveniences chiefly among those aged 50 or older.

3. Method of Exchange

Visiting groups shall be exchanged simultaneously.

4. Period of Visiting

The visiting period shall be three nights and four days from August 18, Tuesday, to August 21, Friday, 1992.

5. Places of Visits

The visiting places shall be Seoul and Pyongyang.

6. Arrangement and Scope of Meeting

a. The two sides shall find the whereabouts of the missing families and relatives of aged dispersed family parents visitors, facilitate their meeting and furnish necessary conveniences in accordance with the Red Cross hu-

manitarian spirits.

b. Meeting even between dispersed family members among art troupe members, press members and support personnel, and their missing families and relatives shall be arranged.

c. The scope of meeting shall primarily be the family members at the time of separation and those family members born thereafter. As for relatives, they shall include up to third cousins on the father's side and first cousins on the mother's and wife's side. Depending on the visitors' wishes, other relatives may be included.

7. Method of Meeting

a. Meeting shall be made in the method of joint meeting and individual meeting.

b. Persons who meet may share rooms and walk around together during the visits.

c. Depending on the wishes of visitors, visits to homes and ancestral tombs in the Seoul and Pyongyang areas only may be permitted.

8. Place and Frequency of Art Troupe Performances

a. The place of performances shall be the places complete with equipment, which the hosting side offers with sincerity.

b. The frequency of performances shall be two.

9. Nature of Performances

a. The contents of performances shall be mainly songs and dances of a nature that won't offend the other side.

b. During performances, moderators shall introduce only the titles of performing pieces.

10. Exchange of Scripts and Advance Check of Performance Sites

a. Scripts shall be exchanged three days before the visits

b. To check in advance items necessary for performance such as setting changes, sound, lighting and effects, two Red Cross officials and

three performance technicians shall make advance inspection of performance sites from August 9 to August 11 (two nights and three days), 1992.

11. Duration of Performances

Performances shall be about 120 minutes.

12. Coverage of Performances

The hosting side shall broadcast the performances of the other side's art troupe through television and radio.

13. Guarantee of Personal Safety

Memoranda guaranteeing the personal safety of visitors shall be exchanged seven days before visits.

14. Transportation and Communications

a. For the transporting of the members, equipment and other necessary items of a visiting group, which enter into one's area across Panmunjom, the hosting side's vehicles shall be used.

b. During the visits, pouches shall be operated between Seoul and Pyongyang twice a day.

c. For liaison and press purposes during the visits, the existing direct South-North telephone circuits shall be used. If necessary, additional circuits shall be installed through mutual agreement.

15. Press Activities

The hosting side shall guarantee press coverage by the press members of the visiting side at the scenes of family meetings and art troupe performances, and shall provide various conveniences for press coverage.

16. Place of Passage and Passage Procedures

The place of passage shall be Panmunjom, and passage procedures shall be in accordance with past practices.

17. Notification of Visitors' Lists and Replies

a. The list of aged parents visitors and dispersed family members among art troupe and press members and support personnel shall be notified to the other side 30 days before the visits. As for the list of aged parents visitors, the lists of 200 persons including candidate visitors with the priority order attached thereto shall be exchanged.

b. The lists of visitors shall contain the name, sex, age, hometowns and relationship with the persons to be met with pictures attached thereto.

The section for the persons to be met in the lists shall be itemized with columns for the name, sex, age, hometown, time of separation, and other information that could be of help in locating a missing family member or members.

c. The side which received the lists shall notify the other sides of the list of those who could meet their missing families or relatives not later than 15 days before visits.

d. The finally determined lists of aged parents visitors, art troupe members, press members and support personnel shall be notified to the other sides seven days before visits.

18. Insignia and Certificates for Visitors

a. Members of aged parents visitors groups, art troupes and support personnel shall wear a Red Cross insignia marked with the side to which the wearer belongs.

b. Press members shall wear armbands in addition to the insignia of the visiting groups. Other matters shall be in accordance with the practices of the South-North Red Cross Conference.

c. Visitors shall carry identification cards issued by the president (chairman) of the Red Cross of a side they belong to.

19. Itineraries

The two sides shall designate one of their respective working-level delegates for discussion of itineraries ten days before visits, and shall exchange the table of itineraries seven days before visits.

20. *Others*

a. *During visits to the area of the other side, visitors shall follow the guidance and rules of the other side.*

b. *Conveniences for visiting group members such as lodging and boarding, transportations and communications, shall be furnished by the hosting side.*

c. *The hosting side shall make provisions so that the visiting troupe can rehearse at the performance site prior to the formal presentation.*

d. *Auxiliary workers for setting up the stages, ordinary lighting equipment and other needs related to the performances shall be provided by the hosting side.*

e. *Performance programs shall be distributed at performance sites by the side presenting performance.*

DATE : _____, 1992

Lee Byong-wung, chief delegate	Chief, NKRC North-South
ROKNRC South-North Red Cross	Red Cross Working-Level
Working-Level Delegates Contacts	Delegates Contacts

North Korea, in its part, offered a draft Agreement on the Exchange of Aged Parents Visitors and Art Troupes as follows, saying that if aged parents visitors and art troupes were exchanged around the Liberation Day, it could give all the Korean People bright prospects for the implementation of the historical South-North agreement.

*Agreement on the Exchange of Aged parents Visitors
Groups and Art Troupes (Draft)*

Delegates of North and South Korean Red Cross organizations have discussed the question of exchanging aged parents visitors and art troupes on the occasion of the 47th anniversary of August 15 Liberation and hereby

agree as follows :

1. Name and Composition of Visiting Groups, Time of Visits and Method of Exchange

a. The name of visiting groups shall be called in a way convenient to each side. The North shall call it Aged Parents Visitors Group and Art Troupe.

b. A visiting group shall be led by a deputy-chief-level official of the Red Cross organization and shall consist of 240 persons—100 aged parents visitors, 70 art troupe members, 40 press members and 30 support personnel (including the team head).

c. The visiting places of the visiting groups shall be Pyongyang and Seoul.

d. The time of the visits and the period of stay in each other's areas shall be three nights and four days from August 25 to 28, 1992.

e. The method of the exchange of the visiting groups shall be that of simultaneous exchange.

2. Exchange of Aged Parents Visitors Groups

a. The members of the aged parents visitors groups shall comprise those aged 50 or older whose hometowns are in the North and the South.

b. Those who committed such crimes as causing loss to human lives, robbery and theft in the other's areas shall be excluded from the scope of visiting.

c. The scope of meeting shall be the family members at the time of separation and their children. As for relatives, they shall be up to third cousins on the father's side, first cousins on the mother's and wife's side, and other relatives whom visitors wish to meet.

d. The lists of aged parents visitors shall be exchanged in the following procedures :

—The two sides shall initially notify each other of the list of 100 aged parents visitors 30 days before the exchange of visiting groups.

–The two sides shall notify each other of the results of search for the families and relatives of aged parents visitors 20 days before the exchange of visiting groups.

–If there were any persons among those aged parents visitors listed initially whose families or relatives couldn't be located, the two sides shall, depending on needs, notify each other of the list of 30 additional aged parents 19 days before the exchange of visiting groups.

–The two sides shall notify each other of the results of search for the families and relatives of aged parents visitors listed additionally 15 days before the exchange of visiting groups.

–The two sides shall finally determine the lists of aged parents visitors and notify each other of them 12 days before the exchange of visiting groups.

e. The list of aged parents visitors handed to the other side shall contain the picture, name, sex, age and birth place of each visitor, names of their parents, and their organization, position and address prior to their separation.

Items for the persons to be met shall include their name, sex, age and birth place, their relations with visitors, their address and occupation at the time of separation, with other necessary contents added thereto.

f. Meeting between aged parents visitors and their families and relatives in the other side's area shall be made in a family atmosphere on a family or relatives basis without the interference by any third person.

3. Exchange of Art Troupes

a. The contents of art performances shall be those that are national in nature, sound and do not slander or defame the other side.

b. The form of art performance shall be songs and dances.

c. An art troupe shall present four performances in the other side's area, and the duration of each performance shall be one and half an hours to two hours.

d. To ensure successful art performances, the hosting side shall furnish to the other side a place complete with performing facilities.

e. Stage settings, technical materials, lighting equipment, etc. may be carried by the performing side or these of the hosting side may be used.

f. To get familiarized with performing sites and facilities, an advance team of two Red Cross officials and three experts shall be sent to each other's areas. The period of the dispatch of the advance teams shall be two nights and three days from August 16 to August 18, 1992. Working-level matters related to the dispatch of advance teams shall be made same as those made during the first exchange of visiting groups.

g. During performances, moderators may, together with greetings, introduce the contents of repertoires under the principle that they do not slander each other.

h. To introduce the contents of performance, the performing side shall carry posters on art performance and performance programs, post them in downtown areas and distribute them to viewers.

The hosting side, at the request of the performing side, shall furnish the service of technical personnel and other persons.

i. The two sides shall notify each other of performance programs five days before visits, and may discuss it if the other side raises some opinions.

4. Press Coverage and Activities

a. Press coverage and activities by those press members who accompany visiting groups shall be conducted in a way that prohibits the slander and defamation of the other side and that contributes to the promotion of national reconciliation and unity.

b. The hosting side shall guarantee all conveniences so that the press members of the other side would be able to freely cover the activities of art troupes and hometown visitors.

5. Personal Safety and Guarantee of Conveniences

a. Relevant authorities' statements guaranteeing the personal safety of aged parents visitors, art troupe members and their families and relatives, and safe return of all of them, shall be issued, and the original copy of

which shall be exchanged three days before the exchange of visiting groups through Panmunjom liaison offices.

b. All conveniences for visiting groups such as lodging, boarding, transportation and medical service, shall be guaranteed by the hosting side for free of charge from the moment they cross the Military Demarcation Line at Panmunjom.

c. During the stay of visiting groups in the other side's areas, pouch service shall be guaranteed by the hosting side once a day.

d. To guarantee communications during the stay of visiting groups in the other side's areas, the direct telephone lines presently existing between the two Red Cross organizations shall be used.

6. Passage through Military Demarcation Line and Other Procedures

a. The point of passage by visiting groups through the Military Demarcation Line shall be Panmunjom, and passage procedures shall be same as those during the first exchange of visiting groups.

b. During visits by visiting groups to the area of the other side, they shall follow guidance and rules of the other side.

c. The members of visiting groups shall carry identification cards issued by the central organization of one's Red Cross and shall use a Red Cross badge. Press members shall additionally use press armbands.

d. The lists of art troupe members, support personnel and press members who shall visit the areas of the other side shall be handed to each other's sides five days before visits through the liaison offices at Panmunjom.

The lists shall contain the name, sex and positions at visiting groups with their pictures attached thereto.

e. Discussion of itineraries in connection with visiting groups' stay in the other's area shall be made three days before visits.

June _____, 1992

Panmunjom
Pak Yong-su, chief
Northern Delegation to North-South Red Cross
Working-Level Delegates Contacts

At the June 5 contact, the North raised the nuclear issue and the question of repatriation of Li In-mo, asserting that the issues were “related to the success of the exchange of aged parents visitors.” They maintained that depending on the South’s posture toward these questions, the exchange of aged parents visitors may be called off.

2. Second Contact

At the second contact, the North again discussed latest inter-Korean relations related to the nuclear issue and the question of Li In-mo’s repatriation. But, the South called for the discussion of working-level procedural matters, true to the inherent duty of the Red Cross working-level delegates contacts.

The two sides began discussing procedural matters on the exchange of visitors with emphasis on the South’s draft version of an agreement. They agreed to exchange groups of aged dispersed family parents visitors for three nights and four days from August 25 through August 28. In this connection, the two sides decided to exchange advance inspection teams on August 16-18.

The South and the North also reached an accord on the television and radio coverage of art performances, but showed difference over the number of visiting groups, whether to allow dispersed family members among support personnel to meet their missing families, whether to exclude ex-criminals from visiting groups, method of meeting, and the frequency of performances.

3. Third Contact

In an effort to ensure more effective proceeding of the delegates contacts, the South produced a revised version of an Agreement on the Exchange of South-North Aged Dispersed Family Visitors and Art Troupes, based on the contents of discussion made at the first and second contacts. With the production, the South called for the early resolution of working-level procedural matters.

However, the North demanded the South's withdrawal of its nuclear policy, arguing that a serious situation that could lead to scrapping the exchange of aged parents visitors had been fomented.

In reaction, the South recalled the remarks made by An Byong-su, spokesman for the northern delegation to the South-North high-level meeting, at the time of the seventh high-level meeting to the effect that "we plan to make an exchange of aged parents visitors unconditionally without any prerequisites."

The South urged the North to agree to discuss working-level procedural matters related to the proposed exchange, true to the basic duty of the working-level delegates, instead of posing difficulties to the talks by raising issues that had nothing to do with working-level delegates contacts.

But, the North contended that it was meaningless to have Red Cross working-level delegates contacts unless the South expressly explained its position over the nuclear issue and the question of implementing agreed-on items. They thus refused even to determine the time of the next contact.

4. Fourth Contact

In the belief that only when working-level matters were reso-

lved early, could the projected exchange of aged parents visitors be made smoothly on the agreed-on date, the South, in a telephone message, proposed to hold the fourth delegates contact on July 3.

The North, while asking for the South's disclosure of a "forward-oriented" posture over the nuclear question as a prerequisite, counterproposed that the fourth contact be held on July 8. Thus the Red Cross working-level delegates contact was resumed.

The South called for a sincere conference posture on the part of North Korea, stressing that to materialize the projected exchange of aged parents visitors on August 25-28 as the two sides had agreed on, the working-level delegates contacts should be completed by July 15 if only to implement procedural matters such as the exchange of the lists of visitors smoothly.

In particular, the South expressed regret over the North's boycott of substantial discussion at the third contact over the question of Li In-mo, making it express that the exchange of aged parents visitors could not be linked to other issues. The South urged the North to enter substantial discussion with emphasis on the South's draft agreement.

On the other hand, the North did not conceal their attempt to use the purely humanitarian project for their political purpose by arguing that unless the South withdrew its nuclear policy and repatriated Li In-mo first, the projected exchange of aged parents visitors could be aborted.

On Prime Minister Chung Won-shik's July 7 message to the North that Li In-mo's case could be reviewed together with the issues of dispersed families' return and the repatriation of kidnaped people, North Korea said the message was a sort of provocation against the North, which, they asserted, made the future of the visitors exchange more cloudy.

5. Fifth Contact

At the fifth contact held on July 14 the South offered its second revised version of a draft agreement on the exchange with a view to facilitating the early resolution of working-level procedural issues.

In the revised version, the South, in an effort to materialize the exchange by all means, withdrew its ideas of arranging family reunion even for those dispersed family members among visiting art troupe and press members and support personnel and also the suggestion that aged parents visitors be allowed to visit their family homes and ancestral tombs if there were in the Seoul and Pyongyang areas.

But, the South urged the North to agree to make the number of initial candidate visitors 200 so that the entire visitors could meet their missing families in view of the basic purport of the planned exchange of visitors.

The South also asked the North to withdraw their ideas of excluding ex-criminals from the list of visitors, and of banning press members from writing "slanderous" articles and establishing the principle of promoting national reconciliation and unity.

The North said they were yet to hear satisfactory replies from the South on the nuclear and Li In-mo issues, arguing that unless these issues were resolved, the time of the planned exchange may be reset or the exchange project itself could be cancelled.

6. Sixth Contact

At the sixth contact, the South stressed that all working-level procedural matters related to the planned exchange of aged parents visitors should be resolved and an agreement drafted at

the contact because there was not enough time left. The South suggested that the several working-level matters which remained unsettled be resolved on a package basis based on the agreement made at the seventh high-level meeting and the precedents set at the time of the first exchange of hometown visitors in 1985.

But, the North not only kept raising the nuclear and Li In-mo issues but also freshly took up the question of the joint Korea-U.S. Focus Lens training exercise (August 19-30, 1992) making it yet another prerequisite to the exchange of aged parents visitors.

Meanwhile, with regards to the working-level procedural issues, North Korea suggested that the total number of each side's visiting group be set at 241 on the condition that 130 candidate aged parents visitors be included in the initial list, that each art troupe present two performances, and twice-a-day pouch service be made during the visiting period.

The South's new version of a draft agreement prepared based on the contents of the discussions made theretofore was as follows:

*Agreement Regarding South-North Aged Dispersed Family
Parents Visitors and Art Troupes (Draft)*

As the Seventh South-North High-Level Meeting held in Seoul on May 6-7 to exchange aged dispersed family parents visitors and art troupes on the occasion of the 47th anniversary of National Liberation, South and North Korean Red Cross organization delegates had _____ working-level delegates contacts from June 5 to _____ to discuss concrete measures to implement it, and agreed as follows:

1. Name of Visiting Groups

The name of the visiting groups shall be "South-North Aged Dispersed Family Parents Visitors and Art Troupes."

2. Composition and Size of Visiting Groups

a. The size of each visiting group shall be 241 persons with a respective Red Cross vice president as group leader, which shall be composed of as follows:

(1) Members of an aged parents visitors group shall be 100.

(2) Members of an art troupe shall be 70.

(3) Press members shall be 30.

(4) Support people shall be 40.

b. A group of aged dispersed family parents visitors shall be selected and formed at mutual conveniences chiefly among those aged 50 or older.

3. Method of Exchange

Visiting groups shall be exchanged simultaneously.

4. Period of Visiting

The visiting period shall be three nights and four days from August 25, Tuesday, to August 28, Friday, 1992.

5. Places of Visits

The visiting places shall be Seoul and Pyongyang.

6. Arrangement and Scope of Meeting

a. The two sides shall locate the whereabouts of the missing families and relatives of aged dispersed family parents visitors, facilitate their meeting and furnish necessary conveniences in accordance with the Red Cross humanitarian spirits.

b. The scope of meeting shall primarily be the family members at the time of separation and those family members born thereafter. As for relatives, they shall include up to third cousins on the father's side and first cousins on the mother's and wife's side. Depending on the visitors' wishes, other relatives may be included.

7. Method of Meeting

Meeting shall be made in the form of joint and individual meeting. Depending on their wishes, meeting persons may take dinner and observations together.

8. Place and Frequency of Art Troupes

a. The place of performance shall be furnished by the hosting side, which should be performing sites complete with facilities.

b. The frequency of performance shall be two.

9. Nature of Performances

a. The contents of performances shall be mainly songs and dances of a nature that won't offend the other side.

b. During performances, moderators shall extend greetings to an extent that does not offend the other side, and introduce pieces of performance.

10. Exchange of Scripts and Advance Check of Performance Sites

a. scripts shall be notified to the other side five days before the visits.

b. To check in advance items necessary for performance such as setting changes, sound, lighting and effects, two Red Cross officials and three performance technicians shall make advance inspection of performance sites from August 16 to August 18, 1992 (two nights and three days).

11. Duration of Performances

Each performance shall last about 120 minutes.

12. Coverage of Performances

The hosting side shall broadcast the performances of the other side's art troupe through television and radio.

13. Guarantee of Personal Safety

Both sides' authorities shall issue statements guaranteeing the personal safety of visitors, the original copy of which shall be exchanged seven days before visits.

14. Transportation and Communications

a. For the transporting of the members, equipment and other necessary items of a visiting group, the hosting side's vehicles shall be used.

b. During the visits, pouches shall be operated between Seoul and Pyongyang twice a day.

c. For liaison and press purposes during the visits, the existing direct South-North telephone circuits shall be used. If necessary, additional circuits shall be installed through mutual agreement.

15. Press Activities

The hosting side shall guarantee free press coverage by the press members of the visiting side of the aged parents group and art troupe, and shall provide various conveniences for press coverage.

16. Place of Passage and Passage Procedures

The place of passage shall be Panmunjom, and passage procedures shall be in accordance with past practices.

17. Notification of Visitors' Lists and Replies

a. The two sides shall respectively notify the other of the list of 130 aged dispersed family parents visitors 30 days before the exchange of visiting groups.

b. The lists of visitors shall contain the name, sex, age, hometowns and the name of their parents, with pictures attached thereto.

The section for the persons to be met in the lists shall be itemized with columns for the name, sex, age and hometown of the persons to be met, time of separation, address at the time of separation, and relations with visitors, with other information that could be of help to family search.

c. *The side which received the lists shall notify the other sides of the results of its family search not later than 15 days before visits.*

In the form of reply, the section for visitors shall contain the list numbers and name notified from the other side, and the section for persons to be met shall include the name, sex, age, hometown, time of separation, address at the time of separation and relations with visitors.

d. *The finally determined lists of visiting groups shall be notified to the other sides seven days before visits.*

18. Insignia and Certificates for Visitors

Members of visiting groups shall carry identification cards issued by the president (chairman) of the Red Cross to which they belong and wear a Red Cross insignia marked with the side to which the wearer belongs.

Press members shall additionally wear press armbands.

19. Itineraries

The two sides shall designate one of their respective working-level delegates for discussion of itineraries ten days before visits, and shall exchange the table of itineraries seven days before visits.

20. Others

a. *During visits to the area of the other side, visitors shall follow the guidance and rules of the other side.*

b. *All conveniences for visiting group members such as lodging and boarding, transportations, communications and medicine shall be furnished by the hosting side.*

c. *The hosting side shall make provisions so that the visiting troupe can rehearse at the performance site prior to the formal presentation.*

d. *Auxiliary workers for setting up the stages, ordinary lighting equipment and other needs related to the performances shall be provided by the hosting side.*

e. *Performance programs shall be distributed at performance sites by the side presenting performance.*

July _____, 1992

Panmunjom
Lee Byong-wung, chief, the South's Delegation
South-North Red Cross Working-Level Delegates Contacts

7. Seventh Contact

At the seventh working-level delegates contact held on July 25, the North, without any mention about working-level procedural matters, simply discussed the nuclear issue, the case of Li In-mo and the question of Focus Lens training, making it clear time and again that visitors groups could be exchanged only when these issues were settled as they demanded.

The South urged the North to agree to discuss procedural issues without raising issues that had nothing to do with the exchange of visiting groups. But, the North, shunning any debate on procedural matters, said they were looking forward to the southern authorities' affirmative response to their prerequisites. They suggested that another contact be held on August 9.

The South stressed that even though another contact was to be held, the two sides should either cut short the period for preparatory work in order to keep the originally set time of the exchange or if the time of the exchange were to be put off until a later date, the exact new time be determined at the contact. But, the North refused to comply, suggesting that such matters be discussed at the next contact.

At the contact it was made express that the objection the North had raised to several procedural matters was a mere excuse to shun an agreement on the exchange of visiting groups. In fact, by demanding the South's one-sided concession over their prerequisites, the North showed they were not interested in the realization of the exchange of visiting groups.

8. Eighth Contact

At the contact, the South expressed the regret that working-level delegates contact was still going on without resolving procedural matters that date, ten days after July 26 when the lists of visiting group members were originally supposed to be exchanged. The South asked the North not to stick to unreasonable prerequisites any further and instead show sincerity, belatedly though, toward resolving working-level procedural matters, true to the inherent duty of Red Cross working-level delegates.

The South emphasized that the North's ideas of excluding ex-criminals from the list of visitors, establishing a principle for press activities, and plastering of art performance posters in downtown areas, ran counter to the basic purport of the exchange of aged dispersed family parents visitors and even did not fit to the precedents set in the 1985 exchange of hometown visitors.

It also said that the act of posing an obstacle to the resolution of procedural matters over these issues itself was in breach of the Memorandum of Understanding made at the seventh high-level meeting to the effect that "miscellaneous things shall be in accordance with the precedents set in the first exchange of hometown visitors and art troupes in 1985."

The South said that if the North were genuinely interested in realizing the exchange of aged dispersed family parents visitors and art troupes, they should agree to resolve all matters and prepare an agreement at the contact.

On the other hand, the North continued to raise the issues of nuclear problems, Li In-mo and Focus Lens training exercise as prerequisites to the exchange of visiting groups.

Regarding the question of procedural matters, the North maintained that the exclusion of ex-criminals from visits and the

establishment of the principle of press activities should be realized by all means in view of the purpose of the exchange of visiting groups.

At the eighth contact, too, the North shunned debate on working-level issues and simply reiterated their preconditions, thus unveiling an attempt to torpedo the agreed-on exchange of visiting groups.

The South said that the attitude of the North evading the discussion of working-level procedural issues and adhering only to their prerequisites could not but be taken as a firm policy to jeopardize the planned exchange of visitors. The South then made clear again its stand over the three-point prerequisites the North was demanding.

Emphasizing that if the North stuck to their prerequisites leading to the cancellation of the exchange, the blame for scrapping a South-North agreement would go entirely to the North, the South urged the North to return to inherent Red Cross posture and cooperate in successfully staging the exchange of visiting groups.

No headway was registered at the contact, too, with the two sides failing even to agree on the time of a next contact. Thus the exchange of South-North aged dispersed family parents visitors and art troupes agreed on at the seventh South-North high-level meeting was put off indefinitely.

In a comment on August 7, Vice National Unification Minister Lim Dong-won expressed regret over the indefinite postponement of the exchange of visitor. He urged the North to withdraw unreasonable prerequisites at an early date and agree to the realization of the exchange of visiting groups in a sincere and inherent humanitarian manner.

Kang Young-hoon, president of the Republic of Korea Na-

tional Red Cross, also, issued a statement on August 8, asking North Korea to renounce their old-fashioned manner of using humanitarian issues for their political propaganda and instead agree to realize the exchange of visiting groups at an early date, faithful to the embodiment of Red Cross ideas.

At the eighth high-level meeting held in Pyongyang, the South again called for the materialization of the exchange of aged parents visitors. But, the North held fast to their policy of linking the exchange to the nuclear issue and Li In-mo's repatriation. The projected exchange of aged parents was thus put off indefinitely.

SOUTH-NORTH DIALOGUE IN KOREA



No. 57

April

1993

SOUTH-NORTH DIALOGUE IN KOREA

Published by

***Office of the South-North Dialogue,
National Unification Board***

C.P.O. Box 4161

Seoul, Korea

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Part I

South-North Developments after the Eighth High-Level Meeting

At the Eighth High-Level Talks held in Pyongyang in September 1992, the South and the North agreed to translate into action a set of concrete projects to usher in an age of South-North reconciliation and cooperation. To this end, the two sides decided to put into full-fledged operation all the South-North joint commissions—reconciliation, military, economic and socio-cultural—within the month of November. They also decided to hold the Ninth High-Level Meeting in Seoul on December 21-24.

The two sides further shared the view that they would continue to discuss the dispersed family question at delegate contacts to be made at Panmunjom at a later time, and would resolve the issue of simultaneous mutual nuclear inspections between the South and the North at an early date through the Joint Nuclear Control Commission.

Following the Eighth High-Level Meeting, therefore, it was incumbent upon the South and the North to faithfully carry out or observe these agreed items.

However, North Korea freely and openly violated the agreements.

North Korea refused to conduct an agreed exchange of visits by aged parents from dispersed families by attaching unreasonable demands to the exchange. It also rejected the South's proposal to hold the 11th South-North Red Cross Conference at an early date pursuant to the provisions of the Auxiliary Agreement in the Area of South-North Exchanges and Cooperation.

Moreover, North Korea unilaterally sabotaged the first meetings of area-by-area South-North joint commissions set to be held at a week's interval beginning November 5, 1992. It failed to implement the agreement to install a military hotline by November 6, 1992 and even went so far as to indefinitely postpone the Ninth High-Level Meeting originally slated for December 21, 1992 in Seoul.

In addition, the uncovering in October 1992 of the espionage case of the South Korean Chosun (Korea) Workers' Party indicates that North Korea had perpetrated subversive operations in the South to overthrow the South's system, which is in total breach of the spirit of the South-North agreement.

North Korea continued to slander and defame the South in violation of the provisions of the basic and auxiliary agreements. Capitalizing on the 14th presidential election being held in the South, North Korea mobilized all of its propaganda media to intensify propaganda and agitation programs against the South in an attempt to fan political confusion and division.

Meanwhile, North Korea refused to take any steps to clear the widespread suspicions about their nuclear arms development. Mutual inter-Korean nuclear inspections ought to have been conducted at an early date, if only to carry out or ensure compliance with the agreements envisioned in the Joint Declaration of Denuclearization. During the meetings of the South-North Joint Nuclear Control Commission, however, the North only impeded in the preparation of rules on mutual inspections.

In addition, South Korea and the United States let it be known during their 24th Annual Security Consultative Meeting in October 1992 that they would prepare for the '93 Team Spirit military exercise if there were no progress in South-North relations, especially in mutual inter-Korean nuclear inspections. Nevertheless, North Korea vehemently denounced the resumption of the annual exercise and boycotted the South-North dialogue, purportedly because of the military maneuver.

In a statement issued by its delegation to the high-level meeting on January 29, 1993, North Korea declared it would suspend participation in the Joint Nuclear Control Commission and all other channels for inter-Korean dialogue.

The South urged the North to faithfully carry out the matters

agreed on between the two sides, emphasizing that such matters should be respected under all circumstances and that the resumed Team Spirit exercise could not be an obstacle to the South-North dialogue.

The South suggested that the '93 Team Spirit could be resolved if North Korea accepted mutual inter-Korean nuclear inspections and thereby cleared the suspicions about nuclear arms development. North Korea, however, persisted in boycotting the dialogue.

Thus, South-North relations are trapped in a deadlock. The South and the North were unable to put the Basic South-North Agreement into effect or even to engage in a long-term dialogue.

1. Contacts between Delegates to the High-Level Meeting to Discuss the Dispersed Family Issue

At the Eighth High-Level Meeting, the South and the North neared agreement on holding contacts between two delegates from each side at the high-level talks to discuss the exchange of visits by aged parents of dispersed families and by art troupes, which had been deferred.

Accordingly, contact between the delegates was made twice at Panmunjom, on October 1 and October 5, 1992, to discuss the dispersed family issue behind closed doors.

The contacts occurred between Delegates Lim Dong-won and Lee Dong-bok from the South, and by Delegates An Byong-su and Kim Jong-u from the North.

During these contacts, the South proposed that the exchange of visitors among dispersed aged parents be made regularly and that a reunion center and a postal exchange office be established at Panmunjom.

However, the North maintained that the exchange of aged parents could be realized only when the South retracted its assertion that “no substantial progress can be expected between the South and the North without the resolution of the nuclear question.”

Regarding the issue of a reunion center at Panmunjom, the North asserted that since the question of a reunion center must be linked to the repatriation of Li In-mo, a North Korean guerrilla fighter captured in the South during the Korean War, the delegates should discuss only matters related to the Li In-mo issue and the creation of a reunion center at Panmunjom.

Considering that the Li In-mo issue should be addressed together with the question of other dispersed families based on the principle of reciprocity, the South indicated it could repatriate Li In-mo to the North only when the North agreed to regular exchanges of dispersed family visitors to their hometowns, the establishment of a family reunion center and a postal exchange office at Panmunjom, and to repatriation to the South of the 12 fishermen from the Tongjin-ho abducted by the North in 1987.

The North in effect turned down this proposal by insisting that the South withdraw the demand for regular exchanges of dispersed family visits to their hometowns. The North suggested instead that the two sides simultaneously address only the questions of Li In-mo's repatriation and the reunion center at Panmunjom.

North Korea made it clear that it could not repatriate the Tongjin-ho fishermen. If the South agreed to the simultaneous settlement of the repatriation of Li In-mo and the creation of a reunion center at Panmunjom, North Korea indicated it would allow about 50 dispersed family members to meet at the reunion center at a time, once or twice a year.

Due to these differences, the contacts between the delegates to the high-level talks were broken off as the two sides failed to

reach agreement or to decide on a time for the next contact.

2. North Korea's Boycott of the South-North Dialogue

a. Suspension of Working-Level Communications Contact to Install a Military Hotline

Article 15 of the Auxiliary Agreement in the Area of South-North Non-Aggression stipulates that a direct telephone line between the military authorities of the two sides should be installed within 50 days of the date of effect of the agreement.

The South, accordingly, proposed over the telephone on October 7, 1992 that a South-North working-level communications contact be held in Panmunjom on October 12 to discuss the laying of a military hotline.

On October 9, North Korea counter-proposed over the telephone that the working-level communications contact be held on October 28. The South agreed and the contact took place at Panmunjom on October 28 to discuss matters related to the installation of a military hotline.

At the contact, North Korea, while deferring debate on the installation and operation of a military hotline, made an issue of the South's decision to hold the '93 Team Spirit military exercise. Asserting that it would be meaningless to install a military hotline when Team Spirit is pressed forward, the North wanted to hold the next communications contact on November 17 so that they could have time to watch the issue of resuming the Team Spirit military exercise unfold.

On the other hand, the South maintained that the military hotline should be installed by the November 6 deadline inasmuch as the auxiliary agreement calls for its installation in 50 days after

the date of effect of the agreement. The South strongly urged that the discussion on the hotline continue, and that the two sides should have their next contact on October 30 or November 2.

However, North Korea persistently condemned the Team Spirit maneuver, refusing even to determine the time of the next contact, which caused the communications discussions to end without success.

In a telephone message on October 30, the South again proposed that the second communications contact be held on November 4 so that a military hotline could be opened before the deadline, November 6, pursuant to the South-North agreement. On November 3, however, North Korea replied that it could not agree to the second contact, asserting that an artificial obstacle was laid to the communications working-level contacts by the Toksuri and Hwarang military exercises, in addition to Team Spirit, in the South.

The working-level communications contacts thus came to be suspended, and the two sides failed to install the direct South-North military hot line intended to be in operation within 50 days from when an auxiliary agreement takes effect.

b. North Korea's Rejection of the 11th South-North Red Cross Meeting

The South-North Red Cross talks designed to resolve the dispersed family issue date back over 20 years. Since being launched in 1971, the meetings were suspended after the 10th full-dress meeting of 1985.

To break the deadlock in the talks, the South managed to get the North to agree under Article 18 of the basic South-North agreement to take steps to dissolve the dispersed family issue. Further, in Chapter 3 of the Auxiliary Agreement on South-North Exchanges and Cooperation, the South and the North agreed to

explore means of allowing free exchanges of letters, visits and meetings between dispersed family members and relatives; to freely arrange reunions for them; and to settle other humanitarian questions. Through Article 16, the two sides agreed to positively cooperate in resuming the suspended Red Cross talks at an early date.

Under the agreements, the South, with the full operation of the various South-North joint commissions created to put into practice each area covered in the auxiliary agreements, sought to provide early opportunities for people suffering from the pain of family dispersion during the 47 years since national division to learn the fates of their missing relatives and arrange both exchanges of letters and visits and permanent reunions.

On October 29, about one and half a months after the Eighth High-Level Meeting took place, Kang Young-hoon, president of the Republic of Korea National Red Cross, proposed in a telephone message to Li Song-ho, acting chairman of the North's Red Cross Central Committee, that the 11th South-North Red Cross meeting be held in Pyongyang in November.

At that time, Kang stressed that "a full-dress Red Cross meeting should be resumed at an early date if only to embody the spirit of agreement made between the responsible authorities from the two sides." He said the resumption of the Red Cross talks was indispensable to the genuine improvement of South-North relations.

Kang maintained that the full-dress meeting should not be delayed any longer, noting that the two sides agreed long before on the opening and operation of the 11th full-dress meeting and commenting that there should be no obstacle to holding it if only the two sides could reach agreement on the time.

North Korea, on the other hand, asserted over the telephone on November 3 that "since matters envisaged in the auxiliary agreements are supposed to be discussed and undertaken at joint

commissions, a relevant joint commission should discuss the issue of resuming the Red Cross talks.” The North thus unveiled an attempt to postpone the resumption of the Red Cross meeting until after the joint commissions were put into operation.

Moreover, making an issue of the South’s military exercises, which had nothing to do with the dispersed family question or resumption of the Red Cross talks, North Korea insisted that “if the Red Cross talks were to be resumed, the South should suspend the Hwarang and Toksuri exercises and call off the decision to resume the Team Spirit military maneuver.”

Because of the North’s intransigence, the Red Cross talks failed to resume to date, April 1993, seven months after the auxiliary agreement calling for their resumption was put into effect.

c. Failure to Hold Joint Commission Meetings

During the Eighth High-Level Meeting, the South and the North agreed on and jointly announced the times of the meetings of the sector-specific South-North joint commissions, as well as the adoption and entrance into force of the various auxiliary agreements.

A South-North Joint Reconciliation Commission meeting was to be held at Tongilkak in the northern sector of Panmunjom on November 5, 1992; the South-North Joint Reconciliation Commission meeting on November 12 at the Peace House in the southern area of Panmunjom; the South-North Joint Economic Exchanges and Cooperation Commission meeting on November 19 at Tongilkak; and a South-North Joint Social and Cultural Exchanges and Cooperation Commission meeting on November 26 at the Peace House, respectively.

Later, however, North Korea attempted to shun these agreed meetings of the joint commissions by linking them to the Team Spirit exercise. In a message addressed to Prime Minister Hyon

Soong-jong on October 13, 1992, the North's Administration Council Premier Yon Hyong-muk maintained that "progress in North-South relations and the implementation of the Joint Denuclearization Declaration depends entirely on whether or not the Team Spirit military exercise is withdrawn."

Yon contended in the message that "the attempt to resume the Team Spirit exercise on the grounds of the nuclear issue is an act destructive to the South-North dialogue that rejects the implementation of the North-South Agreement or the Joint Denuclearization Declaration."

The South responded through a message by Prime Minister Hyon to the North on October 21 stressing that the Team Spirit military exercise was a routine defensive training exercise and that if the issue of the Team Spirit exercise were to be discussed, the Joint Military Commission should be called into session pursuant to the provisions of Article 12 of the Basic Agreement.

The South also said that the issue of whether to resume the Team Spirit exercise was subject to how well nuclear suspicions about the North are cleared. The South emphasized that if the North did not show sincerity toward the resolution of the nuclear issue, including the question of mutual inter-Korean nuclear inspections, the South was obliged to resume the Team Spirit exercise in order to prepare against the threat from the North.

Notwithstanding the clear indications by the South that the resumption of the Team Spirit exercise depended entirely on the North's posture toward the nuclear issue, the North tried to sabotage the already agreed meetings of the joint commissions citing as an excuse Team Spirit, without displaying any sincerity toward resolving the nuclear issue.

Finally on October 27, North Korea, in a decision allegedly adopted at a joint session between the government, political parties and social organizations, announced it would "freeze the high-level

meeting, joint commissions and all other dialogues and contacts with the South Korean authorities, in light of the continuing Team Spirit exercises.”

In a telephone message to Prime Minister Hyon on October 31, the North's Administration Council Premier Yon demanded that the South cancel the Hwarang and Toksuri exercises slated for November and the entire '93 Team Spirit maneuver and then notify the North of the cancellation by November 2.

The North also insisted in the message that “for the South to attempt to stage a fuss of large-scale military exercises when the North-South joint commission meetings are to take place constitutes an intolerable challenge to the other side of the dialogue and is a blatant attempt to undermine the North-South dialogue.” It also claimed that “it is totally up to the South whether or not the meetings of the North-South Joint Reconciliation Commission and other commissions are to be held as planned.”

The North's assertion that they could agree to the meetings of the sector-specific joint commissions only when the South called off the routine military exercises of Hwarang and Toksuri was apparently designed to shift the blame for the failure of the joint commission meetings to the South, in line with a policy not to attend the meetings set to take place in November.

In a telephone message to the North's Administration Council Premier Yon, Prime Minister Hyon responded that it was unreasonable for the North to link the South's routine defensive military exercises to the meetings of the sector-specific joint commissions. He then urged the North to retract its inconsistent demand and agree to hold the joint commission meetings as scheduled.

Nonetheless, the North declared on November 3 that it would not attend the first meetings of the sector-specific joint commissions because of the South's decision to hold the Hwarang,

Toksuri and Team Spirit military exercises. The declaration was made in a joint statement by the northern chairmen of the Joint Reconciliation, Military, Economic, and Social and Cultural Commissions.

Thus the first meetings of the joint commissions, which the two sides agreed to hold in November 1992 during the Eighth High-Level Meeting, failed to take place.

In a statement addressed to the North on November 4, Deputy Prime Minister and National Unification Minister Choi Young-choul expressed regret over the failure to hold the joint commission meetings on the agreed dates, again urging the North to agree to hold the meetings. The North, however, remained firmly opposed to the meetings.

The following is a statement issued by the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of National Unification, Choi Young-choul:

Since the various intra-Korean protocols were put into effect at the Eighth Round of South-North High-Level Talks last September, the South and the North have been making preparations to promote national reconciliation and build peace and prosperity together. Moreover, it was agreed also to activate in earnest the South-North Joint Reconciliation and Military Commissions and the Joint Commissions for Economic and Social and Cultural Exchanges and Cooperation one after another beginning on November 5 in order to carry out concrete projects to usher in an age of intra-Korean reconciliation and cooperation. Accordingly, the entire Korean people are now expecting, with a new hope for peace and unification, that the South-North Basic Agreement and other intra-Korean accords will be implemented meticulously and in good faith.

At such a critical juncture in national history, North Korea has unilaterally declared that it will not attend the first meetings of the Joint Commissions in light of the routine defensive military exercises annually held in our area. The North's arbitrary abrogation of South-North accords

not only runs counter to the current of the times toward reconciliation and cooperation but also trashes the trust and support of the entire 70-million people. This is really shocking and dismaying.

Team Spirit and other defensive military exercises that we routinely hold are perfectly in line with military training conducted by every nation as part of its right to defend itself. There is no justification whatsoever for North Korea to take issue with this.

We have repeatedly and amply made it clear to the North that we cannot possibly discontinue military exercises because our national security is threatened by its suspected nuclear arms development and other moves. In particular, we have made clear that we will make preparations to resume Team Spirit exercises unless suspicions that the North is developing nuclear weapons are dispelled by implementing South-North mutual inspections agreed to in the Joint Declaration of Denuclearization. We have no choice but to resume Team Spirit maneuvers as long as the North does not cease its military threat, including the development of nuclear arms.

And yet, the North Korea has persisted in its unreasonable demand that we cancel military training programs. Finally, it has aborted already-scheduled intra-Korean meetings by linking its demand with South-North talks. This is an unforgivable move that betrays the expectations of the entire people.

It is only proper and logical to peacefully resolve all issues raised by each part of Korea through dialogue between the authorities of both sides. Accordingly, South-North dialogue must be maintained under all circumstances. And yet, the North is using an unconvincing excuse to openly interfere with our internal affairs and boycott dialogue. This can only be regarded as baring its intention to perpetuate mistrust and confrontation between the South and the North.

The North's rejection of meetings already agreed to between the authorities of both sides by attaching an unjustifiable precondition means that it is sticking with the residues of the Cold War. This is not a positive approach to implementing the South-North Basic Agreement.

In this connection, we cannot but express grave concern about the recent series of moves by the North that makes it doubly doubtful that

it has any intention to carry out the agreement. For example, irrefutable evidence has established beyond doubt that the recently-uncovered Korean Workers Party of the South is an espionage-subversion network engineered by the North with the aim of throwing our society into chaos and sabotaging and overthrowing our political system.

This is an eloquent testimony to the fact that until today, even after the South-North Basic Agreement and the related protocols entered into force, the North has been pursuing a stratagem of deception at the conference table in order to continue its scheme to cause a revolution in the South. All the same, the North is using all manner of subterfuge to avoid its responsibilities. It is merely repeating its hackneyed tactic of blaming the victim by fabricating stories.

It goes without saying that South-North reconciliation must begin with mutual recognition and respect and ceasing to treat the other side as a target for sabotage and subversion. Should the North truly desire intra-Korean reconciliation, we emphasize once again that the North ought to reflect upon the Workers Party of the South affair, frankly acknowledge and apologize and take measures to guarantee that such an affair will not be repeated.

Neither the South nor the North can afford to waste any more national energy. Both sides must take a broad perspective on the future of the Korean people and expeditiously take positive steps to translate the accords on reconciliation, nonaggression and exchanges and cooperation into reality.

The Korean people will once again be pushed away into the backwaters of world history, should we remain unable to discard the confrontation-era mind-set and attitude at a time when the world order is being rapidly remolded. The North must now cast aside its wild dream of overthrowing the South and start on the path of openness and reform with a fresh frame of mind and a changed posture. In that way, it must join in the endeavors to build a new era of hope, peace and unification.

What is most important at this crucial moment is to unconditionally and faithfully keep the promises already made jointly by the South and the North before the entire people. Once again, we strongly urge the North to allow all the Joint Commissions to meet as already agreed to. We urge

also the early implementation of South-North mutual nuclear inspections and the program to exchange home visits by elderly members of dispersed families, both as already agreed to.

We sternly warn that the North must take the responsibility for all the consequences, if South-North relations deteriorate because it continues to refuse to accept our rightful demands and persist only in its unreasonable demands.

d. Indefinite Postponement of the Ninth High-Level Meeting

After boycotting the first meetings of the South-North joint commissions, the North revealed intent not to attend even the ninth South-North High-Level Meeting, which the two sides had already agreed to hold on December 21-24.

With the afore-mentioned decision adopted at a joint meeting of the government, political parties and social organizations on October 27, 1992, the North let it be known that if the Team Spirit military exercises were pushed through, they would in the future freeze all dialogue and contact with the South Korean authorities, including the meetings of the joint commissions as well as the high-level talks.

Even at the Joint Nuclear Control Commission meetings held in October and November, the North unreasonably demanded repeatedly that the South retract its decision to hold the Team Spirit exercise, turning a deaf ear to the issue of adopting mutual inspection rules for which the meetings were convened. The northern delegates maintained that unless the Team Spirit exercise was cancelled, all dialogue with the South Korean authorities would be suspended.

In a telephone message sent on December 4 by An Byong-su, the North's spokesman for the South-North high-level meetings, the North said that "steps should be taken to facilitate holding

the Ninth North-South High-Level Meeting as scheduled and begin operation of the joint commissions at an early date." The message asserted that if the South retracted the decision to hold the '93 Team Spirit exercise by December 15, the joint commissions could be put into operation within the year and the Ninth High-Level Meeting could be held on the agreed date.

The South was deeply concerned that such a position on the part of North Korea constituted an act of renunciation of the agreed matters between the two sides, an act which could revert inter-Korean relations back to a state of distrust and confrontation instead of reconciliation and cooperation.

In this connection, Gong Ro-myung, the South's spokesman for the South-North high-level meeting, sent a telephone message to the North on December 10 in which he said in essence that "the holding of the Ninth High-Level Meeting and other matters agreed on between the two sides should be unconditionally carried out and respected under all circumstances." He stated that since the Team Spirit exercise was a defensive maneuver designed to ensure peace, the training exercise could not be a reason for the suspension of the South-North dialogue.

Moreover, through the senior liaison official of the high-level meeting, the South proposed that contact be held at Panmunjom between senior liaison officials on December 14 to discuss the itinerary and other working-level procedural matters related to the Ninth High-Level Meeting.

Also at the 12th South-North Joint Nuclear Control Commission meeting held on the same date, December 10, the South pointed out again that if the North favorably responded to the preparation of inspection rules and if mutual inspections of nuclear facilities could be conducted by December 20 prior to the Ninth High-Level Meeting, the issue of the resumption of the Team Spirit exercise could be resolved.

Despite such sincere efforts by the South, North Korea notified the South on December 11 that “contact between senior liaison officials can be held only after the South retracts its decision to resume the Team Spirit exercise.” The North thus in effect postponed the proposed senior liaison officials’ contact indefinitely. Taking it one step farther on December 12, the North, in a joint telephone message signed by the northern chairmen of the four joint commissions, informed the South that it had decided not to hold the Ninth High-Level Meeting.

Regarding the indefinite postponement of the Ninth High-Level Meeting, Prime Minister Hyon expressed regret to the North’s new Administration Council Premier Kang Song-san and urged him to abide by inter-Korean agreements.

The following is the text of a telephone message from Prime Minister Hyun Soong-jong sent to Premier Kang Song-san of North Korea:

First of all, I must express my deep regret that because of your unreasonable stance, the Ninth Round of South-North High-Level Talks, scheduled for today by agreement between both sides, has been aborted.

Looking back, the highest authorities of both sides put into effect on February 19 this year the two historic documents—the South-North Basic Agreement (short for the Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression and Exchanges and Cooperation Between the South and the North) and the Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. In that way, the groundwork was laid for South-North reconciliation and cooperation.

We thus pledged to do away with the mistrust and confrontation that had continued to build up between the South and the North, to restore mutual trust and national bonds and to move forward hand in hand toward peace and unification—the long-cherished goals of the entire people.

Last September, the Eighth Round of South-North High-Level Talks adopted and put into force a series of protocols for implementing the South-

North Basic Agreement and agreed to activate the various intra-Korean joint commissions to take charge of carrying out the protocols so that South-North reconciliation and cooperation could be translated into reality. At the same time, the two Koreas agreed also to exchange home visits of elderly members of dispersed families, to resume the intra-Korean Red Cross talks at the earliest possible date and to install a South-North military hot line by November 6.

But your stance in recent weeks that runs counter to the expectations of the 70 million Korean people has been utterly disappointing. It is now gravely doubtful if your side really intends to comply with and carry out the South-North accords. On November 3, your cochairmen of the intra-Korean joint commissions unilaterally declared, in a joint statement, that your side would boycott the initial meetings of the joint commissions to be held at a week's interval, using as a pretext our annual routine military exercises code-named Hwarang and Foal Eagle.

Your side has also frustrated the agreed family reunion program by attaching unreasonable conditions to it. You also refused to reopen Red Cross talks and discontinued working-level communications talks on the installation of a military hot line. To add insult to injury, you have finally taken the arbitrary decision even to abort the Ninth Round of South-North High-Level Talks using our annual Team Spirit military training program as the excuse, despite our repeated warnings not to do so.

It is essential, above all, for both sides to keep promises in intra-Korean confrontation and distrust are to be dispelled and an era of reconciliation and cooperation is to be opened. The agreement to hold the Ninth Round of South-North High-Level Talks represents not only an accord between the authorities of both sides but also a solemn pledge before the entire 70 million Korean people. And yet, you have unilaterally scuttled even the agreement to hold a meeting. Nothing can justify your act. Our people in the South and the North will not condone this, either.

Your side is all abuzz trying to shift the responsibility for the abortion of the high-level talks to our side by denouncing Team Spirit. But Team Spirit cannot be an excuse for refusing to talk to us. This is obvious in

light of Article 12 of the South-North Basic Agreement, which says, "To implement and guarantee nonaggression, the two sides shall set up a South-North Joint Military Commission within three (3) months of the coming into force of this Agreement. In the said Commission, the two sides shall discuss and carry out steps to build military confidence and realize arms reduction, including the mutual notification and control of major movements of military units and major military exercises....."

The South and the North must strive to resolve all issues between them through dialogue and negotiations. This is the fundamental spirit of the South-North Basic Agreement.

As your side also knows, the South and the North agreed, through the Joint Declaration of Denuclearization, to conduct mutual inspections to verify denuclearization of the Koeran Peninsula. And yet nearly a year has passed in vain since the joint declaration. Moreover, the specific accord announced by representatives of the two sides in a joint communique on March 14 to initiate mutual nuclear inspections by the end of June has gone unhonored for six months. It has not been possible even to seriously discuss inspection regulations.

Your side has been insisting that a "protocol on the implementation" of the Joint Declaration of Denuclearization must be worked out first—a protocol intended to make the Korean Peninsula a "nuclear-free zone." In discussing mutual inspection rules, your side has kept repeating nonsensical arguments, thereby baring your intention to avoid bilateral nuclear inspection. This has amplified the suspicions that your side is pressing ahead with nuclear arms development.

I should like to make it clear that the adoption of regulations to ensure effective and reliable mutual nuclear inspections and their actual implementation as soon as possible as specified in the Joint Declaration of Denuclearization remains a prerequisite to any substantial progress in intra-Korean relations.

Furthermore, it should be pointed out that even following the coming into force of the South-North Basic Agreement, which declared before the entire Korean people and the world the opening of a new era of reconciliation, peaceful coexistence and cooperation, your side has not discarded

the posture of confrontation against the South.

For example, the case of the Korean Workers Party in the South shocked us beyond description as it was clear that it was designed by your side to stir up controversy and overthrow the legitimate government of the South. Indeed, the double-crossing scheme to undermine a partner, with whom you openly promised reconciliation and cooperation, deserves the criticism of the entire 70 million Korean people. Instead of vainly trying to cover it up, your side should waste no time in frankly admitting your guilt, apologizing to the people, and promising never again to resort to such a destructive and subversive scheme.

Irrespective of repeated warnings, you not only have not stopped vilification and slander against our side in outright violation of the Basic Agreement and related protocols but you stepped up propaganda to stir up confusion and chaos in the South during the 14th Presidential election campaign. Your side spared no efforts to vilify and slander one of the candidates, while, on the other hand, vigorously supporting another in defiance of the Basic Agreement which bans interference in the internal affairs of the other side. Such acts not only fundamentally violate the Basic Agreement but run counter to the ardent desire of the entire Korean people for the opening of an era of reconciliation and cooperation.

Your side should waste no time in realizing that any attempt to shake the foundation of liberal democracy in the South through reckless and subversive propaganda and agitation is anachronistic behavior that can no longer hold water. This is a time when every country in the world is earnestly endeavoring to tear down the barriers of Cold War confrontation and mistrust in favor of national prosperity through reconciliation and cooperation.

Furthermore, we have a number of problems that must be overcome to realize peaceful unification—the ardent desire of the entire Korean people. These problems must be solved as soon as possible through the South-North High-Level Talks and joint commissions. We must not overlook the fact that only through strenuous efforts on our part to sincerely comply with all intra-Korean accords, including the Basic Agreement and the Joint Declaration of Denuclearization, and through effectively coping with the rapid

changes in the international community can we expect the Korean people to have a rosy future.

We must unconditionally abide by the Basic Agreement, the Joint Declaration of Denuclearization and all the other intra-Korean accords. Now is high time to act, not debate. I say that your side must now stop repeating arguments that do not hold water. I urge you to step forward for sincere and earnest dialogue, by correctly grasping the earnest desire of the Korean people and the flow of world history.

Your side must adopt measures to promptly normalize the South-North High-Level Talks and joint commissions which have been disrupted due to your unilateral decision. You should also take practical measures to implement such projects already agreed to by both sides as exchanges of elderly members of dispersed family, resumption of South-North Red Cross meetings, and the installation of military hotlines.

I expect that your side will positively respond to our call in keeping with the ardent wish of the Korean people as well as for the sake of their bright future. It is my wish, too, that our relations be improved markedly with your participation in the South-North High-Level Talks as the head of the North Korean delegation.

e. Boycott by North Korea of All South-North Talks

Following the indefinite postponement of the Ninth High-Level Meeting under the excuse of the '93 Team Spirit military exercise, the North even suspended the on-going Joint Nuclear Control Commission meetings in a total boycott of the South-North dialogue.

Notice of the total boycott of the South-North dialogue by North Korea was made in a North Korean Foreign Ministry statement on January 27, 1993, one day after the South announced that "since the North's nuclear issue remained unsettled, the '93 Team Spirit exercise will proceed" and informed the North thereof through South-North liaison offices.

On January 29, 1993, the North, in a statement by its delegation to the high-level meeting, denounced the resumption of the Team Spirit exercise, reiterating that “we have no intention to reopen any of the deadlocked dialogues between the South and North Korean authorities.”

Meanwhile, the South, in a statement by the spokesman for its delegation to the South-North high-level meeting, urged the North on February 2, 1993 to normalize all the deadlocked dialogues between the South and North Korean authorities.

The following is a statement issued by Gong Ro-myung, spokesman for the southern delegation to the South-North High-Level Talks:

After boycotting both the first meeting of the various South-North joint commissions and the ninth round of South-North High-Level Talks which had already been agreed to, North Korea, through a statement released on January 29 by the northern delegation to the talks, said it had no intention to resume any channel of dialogue between the authorities of the two sides, including the South-North Joint Nuclear Control Commission.

It is truly regrettable that North Korea has thus not only arbitrarily abrogated intra-Korean accords but has even refused dialogue, thereby once again letting down the entire Korean people at a time when an era of reconciliation and cooperation appeared imminent.

In Keeping with the letter and spirit of the South-North Basic Agreement (short for the Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression and Exchanges and Cooperation Between the South and the North), which provides for peaceful solution of differences and disputes through dialogue and negotiations, all intra-Korean issues ought to be resolved through dialogue between the responsible authorities of the two sides. And yet, the North has even closed its door on dialogue under an unreasonable pretext. This can only be construed as meaning that the North wants to delay the implementation of the South-North Basic Agreement and the resolution of the nuclear

issue. That pact and the Joint Declaration of Denuclearization are historic documents embodying the yearning of the 70 million Korean people for peace and peaceful unification and must not, therefore, be contravened or ignored under any circumstances.

Alleging that Team Spirit, our annual, routine defensive military exercise, is intended as a rehearsal for nuclear war, the North uses our plan to conduct Team Spirit '93 as an excuse for refusing to resume dialogue. This is nothing but a propaganda ploy to conceal its pursuit of nuclear arms development and to shift the blame for the discontinuation of dialogue on our side.

As is widely known, the South and the North had promised to draw up regulations governing mutual nuclear inspections by the end of May last year at the latest and to conduct the first of such inspections during last June. And yet, the North persisted in dragging its feet at the subsequent meetings of the Joint Nuclear Control Commission intended to work out rules for mutual nuclear inspections by insisting that what it called the protocol on implementing the denuclearization declaration must be discussed first and that the proposed protocol must include a provision for making the Korean Peninsula a "nuclear-free zone," even though it had retracted this proposal in the course of adopting that declaration.

Furthermore, since the ninth meeting of the Joint Nuclear Control Commission on October 22 last year, the North has bared its intention of refusing mutual nuclear inspections by shunning even discussion of inspection rules, revealing its lack of any serious interest in solving the nuclear issue. In consequence, the suspicions of the Korean people and the world about North Korea's nuclear program still remain unresolved.

We repeatedly emphasized that without clearing up the Suspicion that the North is pursuing nuclear weapons development, there can be no substantive progress in intra-Korean relations. We made it clear also that the issue of Team Spirit '93 could be solved as a matter of course if meaningful progress were made toward solving the nuclear issue, say, by conducting mutual nuclear inspections by December 21, the day the ninth South-North High-Level Talks had been scheduled to take place, after finalizing mutual inspection rules.

All the same, the North continued to refuse to solve the nuclear issue and even deadlocked the Joint Nuclear Control Commission. Consequently, on January 26 this year, we announced the decision to resume Team Spirit this spring, since this military training program is vital to preserving national security. At the same time, we invited North Korea and other interested countries to observe Team Spirit '93 in order to increase the transparency of the routine exercises by allowing them to verify their purely defensive nature.

Solving the North Korean nuclear issue is the most urgent requirement for the peace and security not only of the entire Korean people but also of Northeast Asia at large. Our firm position is that there can be no excuse or subterfuge for delaying this task. Instead of persistence in preposterous claims, the North must agree to resume working-level discussions to iron out rules for mutual nuclear inspections and to hold a full meeting of the Joint Nuclear Control Commission to initial an agreed draft thus drawn up. In that way, the North must take action to resolve the nuclear issue itself.

In the recent past, the South and the North held a series of high-level talks that led to the adoption and effectuation of the South-North Basic Agreement to govern intra-Korean relations and also a number of protocols on implementing that pact. Further, various joint commissions were formed to enforce the protocols. In this way, all the necessary preparations to translate the accords into action were completed. We have now come to a critical juncture at which we must step up efforts to promote national reconciliation and prosperity by carrying out projects designed to develop intra-Korean relations with an eye toward a unified Korea.

The North is desperately trying to impute the blame for the suspension of intra-Korean dialogue to the South. But we cannot afford to waste precious time on hackneyed propaganda ploys that only run counter to the current of national history. All South-North accords must be abided by under all circumstances. All clogged channels of dialogue between the authorities of the two sides must be immediately reopened without any conditions.

We earnestly hope and expect that the North will promptly return to the conference table in response to the imperatives of national history and the yearning of the Korean people for peaceful unification.

On the occasion of the first anniversary of the entrance into effect of the South-North Basic Agreement and the Joint Denuclearization Declaration, the South's Prime Minister issued a statement on February 19, 1993, calling for the unconditional resumption of the suspended South-North dialogue and the early implementation of mutual nuclear inspections in order to resolve the North's nuclear issue at an early date.

Prime Minister Hyun Soong-jong noted that due to failures in solving urgent issues between them, South and North Korea have not been able to make headway toward reconciliation and cooperation even though it has been a full year since the two sides put into effect the Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression and Exchanges and Cooperation (South-North Basic Agreement) and the Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

He recalled in a statement that the two accords were enthusiastically welcomed by the entire peninsula when they entered into force exactly a year ago because they promised a clean departure from the 47-year-long intra-Korean mistrust and confrontation in favor of a new movement toward reconciliation and cooperation leading to peaceful unification. This, he said, gave the Korean people the confidence that South-North differences would be resolved peacefully and without outside intervention and that Korea would be able to more actively adapt to the changing world and help shape a new international order. This prospect had boosted national prestige, he said.

The intra-Korean pacts, the Prime Minister said, demonstrated the determination of the Korean people to put the long history of national trials and tribulations behind them and usher

in a glorious new era in the approaching 21st century. He noted that following the effectuation of the two major accords, the necessary protocols were adopted to implement the South-North Basic Agreement, various South-North joint commissions were formed to administer the protocols and South-North Liaison Offices were set up in Panmunjom to facilitate communication and interaction between the two parts of Korea. In addition, a Joint Nuclear Control Commission was organized to implement the Joint Declaration of Denuclearization that promised to free the Korean people from threat of nuclear arms.

And yet, Prime Minister Hyun said the actual implementation of the accords has been delayed because of unresolved south-Norht disputes. To elaborate, the yearning of separated families for reunions has remained frustrated. Furthermore, there has been a major incident that dashed the hope that trust could be built up between the two areas of Korea as a result of the provisions of the Basic Agreement that each side will not attempt to sabotage or subvert the other.

Most importantly, the Prime Minister said, doubts about the survival of the Korean people have been intensified because suspicions about North Korea's nuclear development program have remained unresolved. Tensions caused by the nuclear issue are threatening to derail South-North relations from the agreed path of reconciliation and peaceful solution of intra-Korean questions. Even South-North dialogue has been discontinued, Prime Minister Hyun said.

He said that the South and the North must faithfully keep the promises they have made together so that they can win international trust and confidence in their ability to solve intra-Korean issues themselves and properly cope with on-going changes in the world. In this shrinking world, the Prime Minister said, regional problems, and even domestic problems, can hardly remain

localized and tend to flare into global concerns. If the two Koreas fail to resolve issues between them on their own, he said, they may end up leaving their fate in the hands of others as in the early days of the 20th century.

The Prime Minister said, "We consider the present South-North impasse to be only a temporary affair. We will make all possible efforts to get the Basic Agreement and other accords between the two sides steadily implemented at the earliest possible date.

"All our citizens should renew their confidence in the belief that if we persevere in our determined efforts to unify the land, we will achieve that goal. We should not be disappointed or feel frustrated by the temporary deadlock of roadblock but instead should tirelessly endeavor to develop South-North relations and bring the day of unification closer...

"The North Korean authorities must also correctly grasp the currents of change in today's world and must actively join in our endeavors to improve South-North relations and create a new era of national unification."

3. The Espionage Ring and North Korea's Violation of the South-North Agreement

On October 6, 1992, the Agency for National Security Planning (NSP) announced that North Korean espionage agents had infiltrated the South to engage in extensive espionage activities to win over people in various walks of life and to organize a South Korean Chosun (Korea) Workers' Party for the purpose of undermining the Republic of Korea.

Announcing the outcome of its investigation, the NSP said it had confirmed that North Korea had sneaked into the South

about 10 agents led by Li Son-sil, a woman aged about 70 years, who was a candidate member of the Workers' (Communist) Party Politburo who ranked 22nd in the party hierarchy. Other infiltrators included some persons ranking as high as cabinet minister.

The NSP stated that through clandestine operations in the South for about ten years, the agents had created an operational base in the South, using the now-defunct Minjung (Masses) Party as a political tool, and formed the Central Regional Party of the South Korean Chosun (Korea) Workers' Party by winning over about 400 people in various sectors, such as politics, academia, the media, and cultural and workers circles.

In a statement on October 7, Deputy Prime Minister and National Unification Minister Choi Young-choul indicated that the espionage case jeopardized the Basic South-North Agreement. He urged the North to admit to and apologize for the spy case and to take steps to prevent the recurrence of a similar incident.

*Statement by Choi Young-Choul
Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of National Unification
Concerning the Formation of the Korean Workers Party in the
South*

October 7, 1992

The South and the North put into force the Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression and Exchanges and Cooperation Between the South and the North, and the Joint Declaration of Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula on February 19, 1992 and a series of Protocols to implement them on September 17, 1992. Furthermore, the South-North High-Level Talks have been Conducted to resolve pending issues through dialogue between the responsible authorities of both sides. These measures no doubt

represented major steps toward improvement of relations between the South and the North in line with the ardent desire of the entire Korean people.

For both sides to sincerely develop relations with each other based on the achievements of the South-North High-Level Talks is of course the right path to preserve the dignity and promote the security and prosperity of the Korean people in line with the fast changing world situation. Therefore, it behooves the North to renounce its basic policy of communizing the whole Korean Peninsula in accordance with the Basic Agreement, endeavor to further improve ties with the South and implement measures to facilitate unification.

In contrast, however, the North has spared no efforts to breach the security of the South and seek the downfall of the legitimate government by dispatching subversive agents even while the High-Level Talks were going on and even after the Basic Agreement and the protocols to implement it had been put into force. Such subversive activities constitute an outright violation of Article 4 of the Basic Agreement that stipulates "The two sides shall not attempt any actions of sabotage or subversion against each other," Article 15 of the Protocol to implement Chapter I. Reconciliation, of the Basic Agreement that reads "The South and the North shall not attempt any acts of sabotage or subversion against the other in any form, direct or indirect, violent or nonviolent, including acts of terror, abduction, recruitment, murder or injury," and Article 17 of the same protocol that stipulates "The South and the North shall not organize, support or protect any terrorist organization in its own area, the area of the other side, or overseas, intended to sabotage or subvert the political or legal system of the other side."

The very fact that the North has continued subversive activities against the South, including vilification of specific persons, recruitment of espionage agents, and so forth, seeking to capitalize on the forthcoming Presidential election in the South, while, at the same time, it has been discussing measures to improve relations through dialogue, betrays its desire to set back the clock to the days of outright confrontation, contrary to the spirit of the Basic Agreement.

It is our firm position that all accords between the South and the

North, including the Basic Agreement, should be honored and sincerely implemented. In view of the current international situation and the reality of relations between the South and the North, it is sheer nonsense to dream of returning to the days of conformation: any such attempt would only waste national energy, undermine the dignity of the Korean people and impede unification.

In accordance with Article 7 of the protocol to implement Chapter I, Reconciliation, of the Basic Agreement that reads "The South and the North may request the other side to redress any matter that infringes on the Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, and Exchanges and Cooperation," the South shall demand through the appropriate South North joint commission a clarification, an admission of guilt, an apology and measures to prevent the recurrence of the anachronistic incident.

The Government will continue to take the necessary step-by-step measures to promote an improvement in the relations between the South and the North in line with the spirit of the Basic Agreement. However, we should like to make it clear that we will never tolerate a repetition of such an incident and shall strictly and resolutely deal with any attempt to undermine relations between the South and the North and impede efforts to speed unification.

We urge the North to do away with its outmoded idea of confrontation—a vestige of the Cold War—as soon as possible, and help realize exchanges of visits by elderly members of dispersed families and give top priority to promoting the freedom and welfare of the entire Korean people, including the 20 million brethren in the North.

We also urge the North to correctly discern the current international trends, accept them, and join in our efforts to realize unification through reconciliation, openness, and cooperation and in this way help enhance the stature of the Korean people in the international community

However, the North, in a statement released on October 8 by the Committee for Peaceful Unification of the Fatherland, asserted that the spy case was contrived by the South.

Lee Dong-bok, chairman from the South of the Political Subcommittee of the South-North High-Level Meeting, in a telephone message to his North Korean counterpart on October 9, proposed that the Political Subcommittee be called to emergency session on October 13 to have the North admit to and apologize for the subversion and espionage incident and also to seek out measures to prevent the recurrence of such a case.

Lee noted in the message that the North's dispatch of espionage agents to the South, its espionage instructions, and recruitment of supporters for subversive activities, represented an act of fundamental renunciation of the spirit of the South-North Basic Agreement and apposed the efforts to improve South-North relations and realize unification.

In response, the North claimed in a telephone message to the South on October 12 that the incident was a complete fabrication which it insisted had nothing to do with the North. The North then rejected the South's proposal to call a meeting of the Political Subcommittee, asserting that the case could not be discussed at the Political Subcommittee or even at the yet to be formed Joint Reconciliation Commission.

Again on October 13, the North sent a message signed by Administration Council Premier Yon Hyong-muk to Prime Minister Hyon Soong-jong asserting that the case of the South Korean Chosun (Korea) Workers' Party was a "typical political fabrication" wrought by the South.

Prime Minister Hyon responded to the North Korean claim with a message to the North on October 21. He expressed surprise and concern over the fact that the North, unaware of the seriousness of the incident, contended that it was a "political fabrication." Hyon pointed out that the North Korean assertion could not be anything but a reckless attempt to distort an obvious truth.

In the message, the Prime Minister noted that North Korea

had repeatedly attempted to shift the blame to Seoul for many of the violent provocations they perpetrated against the South by calling them fabrications. He said that such violations included — in addition to the North's all-out invasion that ignited the Korean War — an attempted raid on Chong Wa Dae on January 21, 1969, an abortive attempt to assassinate the President on August 15, 1974, the bombing of a South Korean diplomatic delegation in Rangoon, Burma on October 9, 1983, the mid-air bombing of a Korean Air passenger plane on November 29, 1987, and several instances of tunnel construction across the Military Demarcation Line.

Prime Minister Hyon said that the truth of the espionage ring had clearly come to light through some 1,500 pieces of espionage equipment and supplies seized from the people involved, which, he said, included weapons, radios and poison ampules.

The South's Prime Minister took note of the fact that the North Korean espionage ring represented a grave violation of a number of clauses in the inter-Korean agreements: Article 4 of the Basic Agreement which prohibits sabotage and subversive activities against each other; Article 15 of the Auxiliary Agreement in the Area of Reconciliation which prohibits all forms of sabotage and subversive activities, such as terrorism, recruitment of converts, abduction, killing and the like; and Article 17 of the Auxiliary Agreement which prohibits the formation, support or protection of terrorist organizations in each party's territory, that of the other, or abroad.

Expressing regret over the North's rejection of the South's proposal to call an emergency meeting of the South-North Political Subcommittee to look into the matter of the espionage ring, Prime Minister Hyon made it clear that the South would sternly call the North to account until Pyongyang admitted to and apologized for the case and took steps to prevent the recurrence of similar

incidents.

Meanwhile, North Korea continued to slander and defame the South even after the Basic Agreement took effect. The mud-slinging campaign peaked during the 14th Presidential election in the South.

Throughout the election period, North Korea indulged in activities tantamount to interference in the South's internal affairs by maliciously slandering a specific candidate while instigating support for another.

The North's meddling splashed cold water upon the wish of the Korean people for the dawning of an age of reconciliation and cooperation. Accordingly, Prime Minister Hyon lodged a strong protest with the North in a message dated December 21.

4. Birth of a New Government in the South and Permission for Li In-Mo's Visit to North Korea

In his inaugural address on February 25, 1993, President Kim Young-sam pledged to do all he could to promote national reconciliation and unification. He also emphasized, however, the need for a national consensus on unification, instead of the sentimentalism over "unification first."

President Kim offered to the North's President Kim Il-sung to meet him at any time at any place to discuss genuine reconciliation and unification between South and North Korea.

The President emphasized that the world was moving toward an age of peace and cooperation instead of confrontation, and that no ideology or thought could bring to the people greater happiness than seeing the nation as one. Proclaiming that Korea would be reunified before the close of this century, President Kim called on the people, at home and abroad, to come together to

open an age of a proud Korean mindful of its role and fulfilling its obligations in the world community.

Accordingly, the new government strives to improve inter-Korean relations based on policies of “national wellbeing” and “co-existence and co-prosperity.” In this respect, it is endeavoring to resolve the dispersed family issue as a top humanitarian priority.

Acting on a decision by President Kim, the government revealed in an announcement by Vice Unification Minister Song Young-dae on March 11 that it would allow Li In-mo, a North Korean guerrilla fighter captured in the South during the Korean War, to visit the North despite the strain in South-North relations. Song said the decision was part of the efforts of the government to resolve the dispersed family issue expeditiously and improve South-North relations in terms of national wellbeing.

The vice minister said that Li In-mo’s visit to the North would be allowed under the Law on South-North Exchanges and Cooperation. He said that the time, the method and procedures of Li’s visit to the North would be discussed with North Korea at an early date through South and North liaison offices, in accordance with Li’s personal wishes.

Contact between South and North liaison officials took place at Panmunjom on March 16 to discuss working-level matters related to Li’s visit to the North, where the two sides agreed that Li would cross into the North via the conference room of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission at Paumunjom at 11 a. m. on March 19. Li’s visit to the North took place on March 19 as planned.

Authorization for Li’s visit to the North was based on a courageous political decision by the government, which was trying to improve South-North relations for national reconciliation. It was a decision made purely for humanitarian considerations with no conditions attached that took into account Li’s health condition

and the identification of the whereabouts of Li's family in the North.

By allowing Li to visit the North, the Seoul government has shown by deed that humanitarian issues are matters of the greatest importance that cannot be delayed, whatever the reason, and to which no conditions can be attached.

In fact, reunions between separated blood relatives are a humane dictate which no persons can or should block. North Korea should not turn a deaf ear to the South's call for the early resolution of the dispersed family issue any longer but should take corresponding measures.

In addition, the North should allow the South's permission for Li's visit to the North to stand as a cornerstone in the improvement of overall South-North relations and the restoration of confidence between the two sides.

Part II

North Korean Nuclear Issue

1. Progress by the South-North Joint Nuclear Control Commission

a. Ninth Meeting

At the eighth meeting of the Joint Nuclear Control Commission held on August 31, 1992, the North modified its insistence on holding priority discussions on an agreement on the implementation of the denuclearization declaration and agreed to hold debate on rules for inspection under the condition that "an implementation agreement shall be discussed when necessary." The two sides were thus able to begin substantive discussion of rules for mutual nuclear inspections.

To facilitate in-depth debate on the inspection rules, the two sides made three contacts between members of the Joint Nuclear Control Commission at Panmunjom on September 19 and 30 and October 14 after the eighth commission meeting.

The contacts were attended by commission members Chong Tae-ik, Chong Tae-kyu and Lee Sung-koo from the South. The North Korean attendees were Pak Gwang-won, Kim Gyong-chun and Kim Su-gil.

Through the three member contacts, the two sides discussed Part I, "Exchange of Information for the Verification of Denuclearization," and Part II, "Composition and Operation of Inspection Teams," of a draft of the Regulations on Inspections. However, no progress was made due to mutual differences.

At the third contact on October 14, North Korea suddenly made an issue of the Team Spirit military exercise in the South. In a speech entitled "Position and Posture Related to Debate on Inspection Rules," the North denounced the announcement made at the annual South Korea-U.S. Security Consultative Meeting early in October 1992 stating that "if there is no significant progress in South-North relations, especially in mutual nuclear inspections,

preparatory measures for the Team Spirit military exercise shall continue.” The North Korean members contended that since the Team Spirit exercise was a nuclear war rehearsal, the South should first respond on whether or not it would conduct the Team Spirit exercise.

Meanwhile, the two sides decided to hold the fourth members contact on October 29.

On October 16, two days after the third member contact, Choe U-jin, northern chairman of the South-North Joint Nuclear Control Commission, sent a telephone message to his southern counterpart, Gong Ro-myung, proposing that the ninth meeting of the Nuclear Control Commission be held on October 23 for “more constructive negotiations toward resolving the nuclear question.”

The South’s Chairman Gong counter-proposed on October 19 that it would be more instructive to make contact exclusively between the commission chairmen, rather than holding the ninth meeting of the commission, for more constructive negotiations to resolve the nuclear question. He proposed that contact take place between the chairmen of the Joint Nuclear Control Commission on October 22.

On October 20, the North insisted that the ninth meeting should be held instead of a chairmen’s contact, renewing its offer to hold the ninth meeting on October 22. The South accepted, and the ninth meeting of the Joint Nuclear Control Commission was held at Tongilkak in Panmunjom on October 22, 1992.

At the meeting, the North again denounced the agreement reached at the 24th South Korea-U. S. Security Consultative Meeting to proceed with the preparatory for the ’93 Team Spirit exercise unless there was meaningful progress in inter-Korean relations, especially in the area of mutual South-North nuclear inspections.

North Korea then suggested a three-point proposal, demanding that the two sides agree on it prior to the discussion of inspection rules, as follows: 1) the South announce withdrawal of the decision to resume the Team Spirit military exercise by the end of November; 2) no military exercises be conducted with equipment related to foreign nuclear weapons; and 3) the two sides discuss inspection rules and an implementation agreement, on the premise that the decision to resume the Team Spirit exercise is reversed, and endeavor to realize mutual nuclear inspections at an early date.

In response, the South reminded the North of the South's basic position, as revealed in Prime Minister Hyon's October 21 message to the North. The Prime Minister made it clear that the resumption of the Team Spirit military exercise hinged entirely on whether suspicions about the North's nuclear weapons development could be removed. The South said that suspending the Team Spirit exercise could be considered if rules for inspection were established and effective mutual inspections conducted before the close of 1992.

The South also emphasized that no haven should be allowed in mutual inter-Korean inspections and that the two sides should adopt comprehensive inspection rules, inclusive of the "special inspection" system based on the "16 principles for verification" which were adopted by the 1988 United Nations General Assembly.

At the ninth meeting called by the North, supposedly for a constructive discussion, no real progress was made in the debate on the nuclear issue because of the North's focus on the Team Spirit question.

The two sides agreed to hold the tenth meeting of the commission on November 10 and the fourth contact between the members, as agreed at the third member contact, on October 29 as

planned.

At the fourth member contact as well, the North only demanded the withdrawal of the South's decision to resume the '93 Team Spirit exercise, repeating a decision allegedly reached at a joint meeting of the North's government, political parties and social organizations on October 27 that "if the Team Spirit exercise is pushed through, the North will freeze all dialogue and contact with the South Korean authorities, including the high-level meeting."

The South, in reaction, urged the North to begin discussing the details of the inspection rules, emphasizing again that the issue of whether to hold the '93 Team Spirit exercise depended on whether or not mutual South-North nuclear inspections were realized.

The two sides discussed part of inspection rules. No significant progress was made, however, because of the North's rejection of a "special inspection" system designed to ensure clarity regarding the process of denuclearization.

b. Tenth Meeting

Despite the fact that the two sides agreed at the ninth commission meeting to hold the 10th meeting on November 10, North Korea, in a telephone message on November 6, suddenly proposed that the 10th meeting be postponed until November 18, when the Toksuri training exercise would be over, contending that no commission meeting could be held in a circumstance where the Toksuri military exercise was being conducted in the South. The 10th meeting of the Joint Nuclear Control Commission was thus held at the Peace House in Panmunjom on November 18.

At the 10th meeting as well, the North persisted only in demanding the withdrawal of the decision to hold the '93 Team Spirit military exercise, which resulted in failure to achieve any

progress in the discussion of the nuclear issue, including the adoption of inspection rules.

The South reaffirmed that only if inspection rules adopted by the end of November and mutual nuclear inspections conducted by the middle of December, at the latest, could the issue of suspending the '93 Team Spirit exercise be resolved. At the same time, the South emphasized the importance of allowing no sanctuary free from nuclear inspections, for which there would need to be a special inspection system.

The North, turning a deaf ear to the debate on inspection rules, repeatedly argued that if the South proceeded with the Team Spirit exercise, the North would suspend all South-North dialogue, including the Joint Nuclear Control Commission.

With regard to a future contact, the South proposed, in order to effectively promote the debate on inspection rules, that more member contacts be held before the 11th commission meeting was to take place in November based on the outcome of previous members' contacts to settle the issue of inspection rules.

The North, however, insisted that the 11th commission meeting be held rather than a member contact so as to hear the South's reply to its demands for the suspension of the Team Spirit exercise. The North reasoned that it was meaningless to hold member contacts when the Team Spirit exercise remained in place.

c. Eleventh Meeting

At the 11th meeting of the Joint Nuclear Control Commission held at Tongilkak in Panmunjom on November 27, the South emphasized that to resolve the nuclear issue between the South and the North and to promote substantial improvement of bilateral relations, 1) it was necessary to inspect military installations that arouse suspicion with respect to denuclearization, and 2) special inspection system was indispensable to conducting steady, timely

inspections.

The South reiterated that if only inspection rules envisaging inspections of military installations and a special inspection system were prepared and if mutual inspections began before the Ninth South-North High-Level Meeting scheduled for December 21 could the question of the '93 Team Spirit exercise be resolved.

However, the North criticized the South for stubbornly pursuing a special inspection system and inspection of military installations, claiming it was responsible for the delay in conducting mutual inspections. They also denounced that the South's intent to resume the Team Spirit military exercise unless mutual inspections were held prior to the Ninth South-North High-Level Meeting, which they claimed translated into negative behavior in the dialogue subservient to the U. S.'s Asia strategy.

Regarding the timing of the next meeting, the South suggested that commission member contacts be made beginning November 30 to reach an overall accord on the rules for inspection and an implementation agreement. It also suggested that the 12th commission meeting be held around December 10 to initial the agreed documents.

The North argued it was meaningless to have member contacts at a time when the Team Spirit exercise was about to be pressed through, insisting they could agree to members, contacts to discuss inspection rules only when the Team Spirit exercise was cancelled. The meeting thus adjourned without a set time for the next member contact or commission meeting.

Meanwhile, the North's commission chairman, Choe U-jin, in a telephone message to the South on December 1, proposed that the 12th meeting be held on December 8, as he denounced the South for refusing to withdraw its decision to resume the Team Spirit exercise and for "laying an obstacle to the discussion on inspection rules."

In response, the South's commission chairman, Gong Ro-Myung, suggested that members' contacts be held several times beginning December 4 to resolve the matters of inspection rules and implementation agreement. On that basis, he wooped that the 12th commission meeting be held on December 10.

On December 3, the North said it could agree only to holding the 12th meeting on December 10 and rejected the offer to have members' contacts prior to the commission meeting. They proposed that at the 12th meeting, the two sides discuss holding members' contacts and suspending the Team Spirit military exercise.

The South stressed that the first round of mutual inspections should be conducted by December 21 at the latest and that consequently the December 10 meeting should discuss rules on mutual nuclear inspections.

d. Twelfth Meeting

At the 12th meeting held at Tongilkak in Panmunjom on December 10, the South reaffirmed its stance that if the first round of mutual inspections were held before the Ninth High-Level Meeting slated for December 21, the question of the '93 Team Spirit exercise could be resolved. It also urged the North to agree to resume promptly contacts between members of the commission to discuss and work out rules on reliable and effective mutual inter-Korean inspections.

The North, meanwhile, asserted that if the South was interested in holding the Ninth High-Level Meeting and achieving progress in the overall South-North dialogue, it should reverse its policy of linking mutual inspections to the resumption of the Team Spirit exercise.

The North then specifically demanded that the South
1) withdraw its decision to resume the Team Spirit exercise by

December 15 and announce the withdrawal at home and abroad, 2) unconditionally and expeditiously accept overall inspections of American nuclear weapons and bases in South Korea, and 3) clarify the truth of the South's "nuclear weapons development" and its stance toward the Joint Denuclearization Declaration.

In particular, the North made blatant attempts to delay or evade mutual South-North inspections by making an absurd assertion that one of the reasons the South was proceeding with the Team Spirit military exercise was to "cover up and deflect inspections on its own nuclear weapons development, which it has clandestinely been conducting since the 1960s."

The South maintained that it was contradictory for the North to assert that the Team Spirit Exercise and the South-North dialogue were compatible. The South said it was due to the North's unreasonable, one-sided demands that the adoption of rules on mutual inter-Korean inspections had been delayed. It pointed out that the North sought to adopt an unnecessary agreement on implementation and adhered to an unreasonable draft of inspection rules.

The South further said that the North raised the absurd issue of "nuclear weapons development" by the South as another obstacle to the operation of the commission in order to justify its nuclear arms development. It said that if only to clear away nuclear suspicions on it, the North should make a political decision to agree to the early adoption of inspection rules and to conduct mutual nuclear inspections with the South.

At the 12th commission meeting as well, the North strongly demanded that the South withdraw its decision to resume the Team Spirit exercise, prompting the two sides to engage in a heated debate regarding linkage between the Team Spirit exercise and mutual nuclear inspections. The two sides were thus unable to discuss inspection rules.

Regarding the next contact, the South urged that member contacts resume forthwith for a debate on inspection rules so that they may be adopted expeditiously. However, North Korea insisted on a commission meeting. As a result, the two sides agreed to hold both member contact and the 13th commission meeting on December 14 and 17, respectively.

e. Contact between Members

Contact between the members of the South-North Joint Nuclear Control Commission was made at the conference room of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission at Panmunjom on December 14.

At the outset of the contact, the North insisted that the South first reply to the three-point demand it had presented at the 12th commission meeting, calling on the South to: 1) call off the Team Spirit exercise and announce its cancellation at home and abroad, 2) unconditionally accept overall inspection of U. S. military installations in the South, and 3) clarify its "nuclear weapons development."

In response, the South stressed that the two sides should begin discussing inspection regulations, reminding the North that the basic purpose of that contact was to discuss inspection rules.

North Korea agreed to discuss inspection rules but only on the premise that the South would reply to their three-point demand at the 13th meeting.

In the discussion on inspection rules, the North asserted that the draft rules offered by the South were intended to deflect inspection of U. S. military installations. They also expressed opposition to the ideas of "inspection of military facilities" and "special inspections."

Elaborating on its suggestion of the inspections of military installations, the South said such inspections were not meant to

examine all ordinary military bases, only those suspected of being involved with nuclear activities. But, the North denounced the idea as a contemptuous and unreasonable demand motivated by a desire to inspect all ordinary military bases.

The North refused to conduct any further contact, asserting it would agree to further contact only when notified by the South of a decision to call off the Team Spirit exercise, or if the South agreed to discuss the cancellation of the Team Spirit exercise at the 13th meeting of the Joint Nuclear Control Commission

f. Thirteenth Meeting

The 13th meeting of the Joint Nuclear Control Commission was held at Tongilkak in Panmunjom on December 17.

At the meeting, the South emphasized that North Korea's threat to suspend the South-North dialogue on the grounds of the Team Spirit exercise was unacceptable and served only to destroy the agreements reached between the government authorities of South and North Korea.

The South said that despite the fact that the South-North Basic Agreement contains provisions on the "movement of large military units and large-scale military exercises" in Article 12, North Korea, rejected a meeting of the Joint Military Commission to discuss such matters and insisted that Team Spirit was a nuclear war rehearsal, an attitude which contradicted mutually agreed matters.

The South also said that all suspected places should be inspected without sanctuary, under the principle of reciprocity, assuring balanced inspections between the two sides. It emphasized that a special inspection system that facilitates timely ongoing inspections was indispensable to effective mutual nuclear inspections.

On the other hand, North Korea asserted that it was unrea-

sonable to link mutual nuclear inspections to the Team Spirit exercise, claiming it “had accepted inspections from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) because the South had agreed to suspend the Team Spirit exercise.” The North also claimed that the South’s assertion that the South-North dialogue could be held in tandem with the Team Spirit exercise was a dangerous statement intended to throw all Koreans into the havoc of a nuclear war.

North Korea went on to argue that since the joint denuclearization declaration was based on the real existence of “nuclear weapons and nuclear bases in the South and not in the North, and that nuclear suspicion exists in the North alone,” it was unreasonable for the South to insist on “inspections of military installations and special inspections.”

The North further claimed that the South had secured a tremendous nuclear technical manpower, asserting that in the South technical development had already entered the stage of nuclear weapons production. It then asked the South to “stop developing nuclear weapons forthwith and disclose the truth of its nuclear arms development at home and abroad.”

Regarding the next contact, the South hoped to carry on member contacts to prepare nuclear inspection rules at an early date, whereas the North insisted only on the 14th meeting without any member contacts in their continuous offensive over the Team Spirit issue.

g. Contact between the Chairmen

Following the 13th commission meeting on December 17, 1992, the two sides exchanged telephone messages six times with respect to a next meeting. However, no contact took place for a some time, as the South advocated member contact in advance while the North favored holding the 14th meeting before any mem-

bers contact.

On January 18, 1993, the South, in a telephone message signed by Chairman Gong Ro-myung, again proposed that "member contact be made to bring about progress in the debate on inspection rules and that commission meetings be held based thereon in a constructive manner." The South then proposed that contact between the chairmen be held at Panmunjom on January 25 to allow a breakthrough in the discussion of inspection rules and to discuss future programs for the Joint Nuclear Control Commission.

In response, the North said in a telephone message signed by Chairman Choe U-jin that they would agree to the chairmen's contact on the condition that the key agenda topic of contact be the issue of calling off the resumption of the Team Spirit military exercise.

At the commission chairmen's contact held at Panmunjom on January 25, the South stressed that since the question of the Team Spirit exercise was a matter that should be discussed at the South-North Joint Military Commission under the provisions of Article 12 of the basic South-North agreement, it was not proper for the Joint Nuclear Control Commission to discuss the issue for being a "nuclear war rehearsal."

The South said that the North's policy of suspending the South-North dialogue under the excuse of the Team Spirit training exercise could hardly be justified in view of the spirit of the basic South-North agreement. This is all the more so because inter-Korean talks were often held in the past even during the Team Spirit training period.

Moreover, the South referred to the joint statement made at the 24th Korea-U. S. Annual Security Consultative Meeting stating that "if there is no significant progress on the issue of mutual inter-Korean nuclear inspections, etc., preparatory steps for the

'93 Team Spirit training exercise shall proceed," which the South made clear could not be used as an excuse to refuse to discuss the inspection rules. The statement was made in expectation of progress in the debate on inspection rules, the South said.

With respect to the details of the draft inspection rules offered by Seoul, the South saw no reason why the North should reject part of the draft which it did. The South said its draft rules envision, among other matters, 1) inspections guaranteed for all suspect sites without sanctuary, 2) a special inspection system that facilitates steady and timely inspections, and 3) "inspections of military installations" mentioned in the draft that refer, not to inspections of all ordinary military bases, but only to those facilities prone to suspicion in connection with denuclearization.

The South then called on the North to accept both the principle of inspections without sanctuary and the special inspection system in accordance with international norms and practices, such as the "16-point principle adopted by the United Nations for verification." It urged the North to make a political decision to resolve the nuclear issue based thereon.

The North asserted that the Team Spirit military exercise was in breach of the South-North Basic Agreement, the Joint Declaration of Denuclearization, the Agreement on the Formation and Operation of the Joint Nuclear Control Commission and other agreements. It argued that if the Team Spirit exercise had been suspended, mutual inter-Korean nuclear inspections could have been realized by now.

With regard to the details of the draft nuclear inspection rules, the North said that the issue of inspections of military installations could not be simply tossed to the Joint Nuclear Control Commission but that it was a task for the Joint Military Commission to deal with during the verification of military reduction. They also insisted that the idea of special inspections violated

Article 4 of the Joint Declaration of Denuclearization.

As North Korea showed no sincerity toward resolving the nuclear issue, the South notified the North that the '93 Team Spirit exercise had become unavoidable. The North responded that if the Team Spirit exercise were conducted, it would lead to the break-up of even the Joint Nuclear Control Commission meetings.

The commission thus failed to make any progress in working out rules on mutual nuclear inspections despite its 13 commission meetings, eight member contacts and the chairmen's contact since March 1992.

2. Major Differences over the Rules on Mutual Nuclear Inspections

The major differences emerged between the two sides at the Joint Nuclear Control Commission with respect to the proposed regulations on mutual nuclear inspections can be summed up as follows:

a. Question of Whether to Adopt an Agreement on the Implementation of the Joint Declaration of Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula

Asserting that there was need for a separate practical measure to ensure the implementation of the Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, North Korea produced a draft "agreement on implementation," demanding that the two sides adopt the draft agreement together with the draft Inspection Rules which the North offered as an appendix to its agreement on implementation.

The agreement on implementation offered by North Korea

consisted of the contents of Articles 1, 2 and 3 of the joint denuclearization declaration and North Korean contentions related to their idea of a nuclear-free zone such as “joint actions against external nuclear threats” and “joint actions for the defense of denuclearization” which North Korea had withdrawn at the adoption of the joint denuclearization declaration.

These demands by North Korea were designed in effect to bring about a basic change in the South Korea-U. S. security cooperative system by engineering the withdrawal of U. S. forces from Korea, the folding of the nuclear umbrella, and the permanent suspension of the Team Spirit military exercise.

No separate agreement on the implementation of the joint denuclearization declaration was necessary insofar as the joint declaration expressly obligated, in Articles 1, 2 and 3, the two sides to carry it out. Such obligations should have been assumed from February 29, 1992, when the joint declaration went into force.

If rules on nuclear inspections were adopted, then an agreement on implementation could be separately discussed and adopted in view of the North’s proposal. Even in this event, however, demands by the North for “joint actions against external nuclear threats” or “international guarantee of denuclearization” remained unacceptable because they were irrelevant to the joint denuclearization declaration.

b. Principle of Inspection: “Principle of Reciprocity” versus “Principle of Simultaneous Dissolution of Suspicions”

North Korea maintains that it can not accept the principle of reciprocity in mutual inspections because the degree of concern and suspicion regarding nuclear development is different in the South and the North.

According to the North, differences stem from the fact that the South’s suspicion toward the North involve suspected nuclear

weapons development and the nuclear facilities at Yongbyon, while the North's suspicion lie in whether or not there are nuclear weapons and bases at the American military installations in the South. This creates different degrees of suspicions, which should make the targets of inspection asymmetric, they said.

The North insists that to dissolve mutual suspicions simultaneously, the South could inspect one place in the North, the Yongbyon site, while the North inspects all the American military installations in the South.

Since the proposed mutual inter-Korean nuclear inspections were designed to ensure the perpetual denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, the North's contention that "the two sides should remove existing suspicions through a single round of simultaneous general inspections" is unacceptable.

The North has unilaterally concluded that "the North Korean area suspected by the South is none other than the Yongbyon area." Yongbyon, however, is not the only place which the South suspects in connection with possible nuclear arms development by the North. The areas suspected of housing nuclear facilities number about 20 and include Pyongsan, Pakchon, Sunchon and Taechon, in addition to Yongbyon. Further, there are a number of military bases suspected of holding nuclear detonation devices and nuclear arms launching tools. Under the principle of identical numbers, therefore, the North should offer the same maximum number of their facilities to be inspected as those sought from the South.

Meanwhile, "reciprocity" is a universal principle common in international disarmament treaties and one that has been faithfully maintained in inter-Korean relations.

It is not reasonable for North Korea to emphasize the importance of the principle of "reciprocity" in other areas while rejecting this principle only in the question of inspection rules.

c. Targets of Inspection: Whether to Include Suspect Military Installations

North Korea insists on "asymmetric inspections," in which it argues that it should be allowed to inspect all the American military bases in the South while the South inspects only (the civilian facilities of) Yongbyon.

In contrast, the position of the South is that, commensurate with its demand to inspect all U. S. military installations in the South, the North should accept inspections of all suspected facilities in its territory, including military bases.

It is incomprehensible that the North should seek to inspect military installations of the South, while preventing the South from inspecting theirs.

No suspect facilities, even military installations, can be exempt from inter-Korean inspections since Article 2 of the Agreement on the Formation and Operation of the South-North Joint Nuclear Control Commission includes in the list of areas subject to mutual inspections all suspect nuclear facilities and other facilities believed to house nuclear materials and nuclear weapons specified by the other side.

d. Method of Inspection: Whether to Adopt a Special Inspection System

The South emphasizes that along with routine inspections, special inspections should be employed to completely dispel nuclear suspicions. The South has suggested that either side be able to designate a suspect area of the other side at any time and inspect it with 24-hour advance notice to the other side.

Special inspections are needed because routine inspections typically focus on periodic nuclear activities, such as possible changes in the status of nuclear materials and the operation of nuclear

facilities. Sensitive items, such as nuclear weapons, nuclear detonation devices, and equipment and facilities necessary for nuclear weapons could be hidden in anticipation of routine inspections.

North Korea maintains that it cannot accept a special inspection system because the idea runs counter to Article 4 of the joint denuclearization declaration, which calls for “inspections of objects which one side chooses and both sides agree on.”

However, the provision for “inspections of objects which one side chooses and both sides agree on” defines the positive concept that in order to effectively embody the purpose and spirit of the joint declaration, the other side should agree when one side selects a target for inspection.

In other words, since the basic spirit of the joint denuclearization declaration is to achieve permanent denuclearization of the Korean peninsula by allowing for thorough verification of the implementation of the joint declaration through mutual South-North nuclear inspections, the special inspection system would be in accord with this basic spirit.

3. International Nuclear Inspections of North Korea

a. Ad Hoc Inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency

At the time of the adoption of the Joint Declaration of Denuclearization on December 31, 1991, North Korea agreed to sign and ratify a Nuclear Safeguards Agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). On January 7, 1992, North Korea, in a statement by the spokesman from the Foreign Ministry, repeated that it would sign a nuclear guarantee (safeguards) agreement in the near future and accept IAEA inspections at a time agreed with the IAEA.

As pledged, North Korea signed the Nuclear Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA on January 30, 1992, which was ratified by the Supreme People's Assembly on April 9 and presented to the IAEA on May 4 in order to enter into force.

On May 4, North Korea forwarded an initial report to the IAEA containing a list of nuclear materials and facilities to be inspected.

North Korea underwent the first IAEA ad hoc inspection from May 25 to June 5, 1992, and five more ad hoc inspections followed since then until February 1993.

The six ad hoc inspections by the IAEA of North Korea's nuclear facilities took place as follows:

- *First ad hoc inspection: May 25-June 5, 1992*
- *Second ad hoc inspection: July 7-30, 1992*
- *Third ad hoc inspection: September 1-11, 1992*
- *Fourth ad hoc inspection: November 2-14, 1992*
- *Fifth ad hoc inspection: December 14-20, 1992*
- *Sixth ad hoc inspection: January 26-February 6, 1993*

Through the North's initial report and the subsequent ad hoc inspections by the IAEA, access was obtained to some of the North's nuclear facilities. Suspicions regarding nuclear arms development by the North has increased rather than decreased.

Deep concerns were aroused in the South and in the rest of the world community about the existence of a radio-chemical laboratory under construction in the Yongbyon area as well as about the plutonium extracted by the North, raw material for nuclear bombs.

North Korea claimed that the radio-chemical laboratory was an experimental facility designed to supply nuclear fuel by extracting plutonium from the spent fuel of their atomic reactor for power generation.

They also insisted that since the plutonium extracted was in the amount of mere grams, far smaller than the 7 to 8kg needed to produce a nuclear bomb, the plutonium they produced could not have been intended for use in nuclear arms development.

The IAEA, however, concluded that the radio-chemical laboratory, once completed, should be regarded as a nuclear reprocessing facility. The IAEA pointed out that the laboratory was too large to be an experimental facility and that the North opted not to build a pilot plant, which would normally be needed for the construction of a laboratory of that size.

If the laboratory becomes a nuclear reprocessing plant as indicated by the IAEA, then it would be an express violation of Article 3 of the joint denuclearization declaration, which states, "The South and the North shall not possess nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment facilities."

To determine the exact amount of plutonium North Korea had produced, the IAEA asked the North whether the nuclear fuel in its second atomic reactor now in operation had ever been replaced and requested a portion of the nuclear fuel bar from its atomic reactors in order to assess the extent of nuclear fuel burning.

In response, the North said it had not replaced the nuclear fuel bars in the second atomic reactor since it went into operation in 1987. The North also rejected the IAEA's request for a portion of the fuel bar, claiming that the robot that handled fuel bars was out of order.

Suspicions about the North's nuclear arms development escalated as time passed by. In particular, it was suspected that there could be other nuclear processing facilities in the North deliberately omitted from its initial report, and that nuclear materials might have been secretly transferred to other places than those reported.

North Korea added to the suspicions by refusing IAEA ins-

pections of two of its undeclared facilities which were suspected of storing nuclear waste created during the extracting of plutonium.

The IAEA requested a visit of the two undeclared facilities during its sixth ad hoc inspection of North Korea begun on January 26, 1993. North Korea rejected the request, claiming they were military facilities completely unrelated to nuclear development.

b. IAEA Decision to Conduct Special Inspections

On February 9, 1993, the International Atomic Energy Agency sent a message to North Korea, asking Pyongyang to accept special inspections of the undeclared facilities at issue in Yongbyon and informing it that if it refused to comply, a special IAEA Board of Governors meeting would again call for the acceptance of a special inspection and would refer the issue to the U. N. Security Council.

In response, the North's official newspaper Rodong Sinmun asserted in its February 13 issue, "for the United States and some other countries to raise the recent fuss for the so-called special inspections constitutes a provocative act of infringement of the sovereignty of our country. We have no other nuclear-related sites than those reported to the International Atomic Energy Agency."

North Korean Ambassador to Russia Son Song-pil claimed on February 15 that the two facilities which the IAEA sought to inspect were military facilities. He threatened that if the IAEA tried to force special inspections, North Korea could scrap the nuclear inspection agreement it had concluded with the IAEA.

In a statement on February 16, the IAEA reiterated the need for special inspections, disclosing that in the report submitted by North Korea to the IAEA in April 1992 with respect to its nuclear facilities and stocks of nuclear materials contained a grave digression from fact.

Choe U-jin, the North's chairman of the South-North Joint Nuclear Control Commission, said in a statement on February 19 that "the International Atomic Energy Agency has raised the issue of special inspections against us under pressure from the United States, which is trying to disarm us by expanding inspections even to military installations completely unrelated to nuclear activities." He went on to argue that if such special inspections were decided on, it could result in "grave consequences."

Again on February 21, North Korea's Atomic Energy Industry Ministry complained that the IAEA was making unreasonable demands for special inspections of even military sites not related in any way to nuclear activities. It stated that North Korea was being forced to consider self-defense measures because some IAEA staff were acting as legal agents spying on a potential enemy country.

Meanwhile, the IAEA postponed until a later date a special IAEA Board of Governors meeting originally slated for February 18 after North Korea offered to explain the inconsistencies found between its initial report and the results of IAEA inspections.

However, the explanation offered by Choe Hak-gun, the North's minister for atomic energy, before the IAEA on February 23 was unconvincing and failed to resolve the situation.

Consequently, the IAEA on February 25 adopted a resolution calling on North Korea to accept nuclear inspections. Nevertheless, the IAEA allowed the discussion of the timing of the inspections to lapse for one month in an effort to give North Korea another opportunity to clarify the inconsistencies.

The resolution asked the North to "furnish all necessary assistance to fulfill its obligations pursuant to the nuclear safeguards agreement, and to allow inspections of the two facilities at issue." The IAEA told the North to report on the results of the steps taken at a special IAEA Board of Governors meeting to

be convened within one month of the adoption of the resolution.

The text of the IAEA resolution asking North Korea to accept special nuclear inspections read as follows:

Draft resolution submitted jointly

by Argentine, Australia, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Ecuador, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Norway, Paraguay, Romania, the Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America

The Board of Governors,

(a) Having considered the Report of the Director General and the statements by the Representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on the Implementation of the Safeguards Agreement between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the International Atomic Energy Agency,

(b) Taking account of the rights and obligations under the Safeguards Agreement between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the International Atomic Energy Agency (INFCIRC/403),

(c) Taking serious note of the significant inconsistencies between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's declarations and the Secretariat's findings resulting from ad hoc inspections and sample analysis which remain unresolved despite extensive discussions,

(d) Noting that on February 9, 1993 the Director General, acting on the basis of Articles 73(b) and 77 concerning special inspections, has formally requested the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to grant access to specific additional information and to two locations,

(e) Recalling that at its December 1992 session, the Board reiterated the need for full and effective implementation of the Safeguards Agreement voluntarily entered into by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and

had called for full cooperation on the part of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's authorities.

1. Calls for full and prompt implementation of the Safeguards Agreement between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the International Atomic Energy Agency;

2. Stresses that it is essential to verify the correctness and assess the completeness of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's Initial Report;

3. Supports the actions already taken by the Director General in this regard;

4. Calls upon the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea urgently to extend full cooperation to the International Atomic Energy Agency to enable the Agency fully to discharge its responsibilities under the Safeguards Agreement and to respond positively and without delay to the Director General's request of February 9, 1993 for access to additional information and two additional sites;

5. Decides that access to additional information and two additional sites, referred to in paragraph 4, is essential and urgent in order to resolve differences and to ensure verification of compliance with INFCIRC/403;

6. Requests the Director General to transmit this Resolution to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, to continue dialogue with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea with a view toward urgent resolution of the issues above, and to report again to the Board of Governors on the matter not later than one month from the date of adoption of this resolution at a further meeting of the Board of Governors to be convened for this purpose;

7. Decides to remain seized of the matter, and to consider further measures as provided for in the Safeguards Agreement between the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

4. Announcement by North Korea of Withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and Reactions at Home and Abroad

When the IAEA took firm steps to dispel suspicions about North Korea's nuclear development by adopting a resolution calling for special inspections, North Korea declared through the Central Radio of Pyongyang on March 12 that it was withdrawing from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

The announced withdrawal by the North from the NPT was in keeping with its decision to reject the "special inspections" called for by the IAEA, which only added to the suspicion that North Korea was developing nuclear arms.

The North claimed that "withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is an appropriate self-defense measure taken against the U. S.'s nuclear war schemes and unreasonable conduct by some members of the Secretariat of the International Atomic Energy Agency against our Republic." North Korea let it be known that their stance would not change until the United States ceased to pose a nuclear threat to North Korea and the IAEA Secretariat returned to the principles of impartiality and fairness.

On March 12, North Korea, in messages from Foreign Minister Kim Yong-nam, formally notified the chairman of the U. N. Security Council and the foreign ministers of all the NPT member nations of their withdrawal from the NPT.

The following is the text of the letter addressed to Terence Christopher O'BRIEN, president of the U. N. Security Council, by Kim Young Nam, North Korean Minister for Foreign Affairs:

Pyongyang, March 12, 1993

I would like, upon authorization to inform the Security Council of the United Nations that the Government of the Democratic People's Repu-

blic of Korea decided on March 12, 1993 to withdraw from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), in accordance with paragraph 1 of the Article of the NPT in connection with the extraordinary situation prevailing in the DPRK, which jeopardizes its supreme interests.

The United States together with South Korea has resumed the "Team Spirit joint military exercises a nuclear war rehearsal threatening the DPRK, and instigated some officials of the IAEA Secretariat and certain member States to adopt an unjust "resolution" at the meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors on February 25, 1993 demanding us to open our military sites that have no relevance at all to the nuclear activities, in violation of the IAEA Statute, the Safeguards Agreement and the agreement the IAEA had reached with the DPRK.

This is an undisguised strong-arm act designed to disarm the DPRK and strangle our socialist system which jeopardizes its supreme interests.

If such act were tolerated, it would only set a precedent for helping to legitimize the nuclear threats against the non-nuclear-weapon State Parties and interference in their internal affairs to say nothing of our country falling a victim to a superpower.

I hope that the Security Council of the United Nations will take note of the decision of the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to withdraw from the NPT until the US nuclear threats and the unjust conduct of the IAEA against the DPRK will be recognized to have been removed.

In a statement directed to North Korea on March 12, the Seoul government urged the North to reverse its withdrawal from the NPT forthwith, accept the nuclear inspections specified in an IAEA Board of Governors resolution adopted on February 25, and agree early to mutual inter-Korean inspections under the Joint Declaration of Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

Also in the statement, the Seoul government stressed that "North Korea's decision to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty constituted a grave challenge to the global nuclear

non-proliferation regime and seriously jeopardized their credibility in all South-North agreements such as the Basic Agreement, joint denuclearization declaration and the auxiliary agreements.” The South added that the unconvincing reasons offered for its withdrawal from the NPT only served to deepen suspicions about the North’s nuclear weapons development.

The following is the text of the statement issued by the South’s government spokesman, Minister of Information On In-hwan, on North Korea’s withdrawal from the NPT.

North Korea announced that it has decided to withdraw from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). This is a serious challenge to the global system for preventing nuclear proliferation. It will also have a grave impact on the credibility of all existing accords between South and North Korea, including the South-North Basic Agreement, the Joint Declaration of Denuclearization and the protocols on the implementation of the Basic Agreement.

The North’s professed reasons for pulling out of the NPT convince no one. This only heightens the suspicion that it is developing nuclear weapons.

Pyongyang’s abandonment of its obligations as a signatory to the NPT poses a grave threat not only to the stability of the Korean Peninsula but also the peace and security of the world. North Korea will be held solely responsible for the consequent rise in South-North tension and probable international sanctions against it.

The Government urges the North to immediately retract its announced decision to withdraw from the NPT, to allow the International Atomic Energy Agency to Conduct inspections according to the resolution passed by the Board of Governors of the IAEA on February 25 and to agree to expeditiously conduct South-North mutual nuclear inspections under the Joint Declaration of Denuclearization.

The Government is fully prepared to promptly and resolutely deal with any provocation by North Korea following its withdrawal from the

NPT.

South Korean newspapers also expressed concern about North Korea's withdrawal from the NPT, urging the North to renounce nuclear development at an early date and accept nuclear inspections by returning to the nuclear non-proliferation regime. They emphasized that the international community should do all it could to this end.

In a March 13 editorial entitled "There Really Are Nuclear Arms in North Korea," the Chosun Ilbo suggested that before North Korea produces nuclear arms, the United Nations Security Council should explore multi-faceted countermeasures, such as positive intervention by the U.N. Security Council.

The Seoul Shinmun, in an editorial entitled "The North's Withdrawal from the NPT, Another Iraq?" urged on the same day, March 13, that North Korea abandon nuclear development and open all facilities to inspection so as not to become another Iraq.

In another editorial, "North Korea's Challenge to the World," on March 13, the Dong-A Ilbo said that North Korea's intent to depart from the control of the International Atomic Energy Agency amounted to an open announcement of either current possession of nuclear arms or intent to develop them. The newspaper stated that North Korea should reverse its decision to withdraw from the NPT and urged the world community to employ all peaceful means to apply pressure on North Korea to accept special inspections.

The Hankook Ilbo on March 16 urged the Seoul government to: 1) unconditionally oppose North Korea's nuclear development and accept no compromise over the issue, 2) hold off business exchanges and cooperation with North Korea and any support for North Korea through third countries until the nuclear question is resolved, and 3) try to revise the joint denuclearization declara-

tion to allow uranium enrichment and nuclear reprocessing facilities for peaceful uses.

The Kyunghyang Shinmun and the Joong-Ang Daily News suggested on March 16 that to resolve the nuclear question, the Seoul government should closely cooperate and pursue joint measures with allies like the United States, Japan and Russia, and international organizations such as the IAEA and the U.N. Security Council. They pressed the government, in particular, to mount diplomatic efforts to have China dissuade North Korea.

The Hankyoreh Shinmun said on March 15 that the South Korea government is sandwiched between North Korea's adventurism and the U.S.'s high-handed pressure. "What we should do under the circumstances is to actively cope with the situation by obtaining North Korea's return to the fold and U.S.'s promise of restraint," said the newspaper, adding that to persuade North Korea, all channels of dialogue between the South and the North should be mobilized.

Major countries, like the United States, Japan and Russia also expressed concern and astonishment at the North's withdrawal from the NPT and urged Pyongyang to reverse the withdrawal decision and accept special IAEA inspections.

On March 12, a spokesman from the U. S. State Department stressed that although Pyongyang announced its withdrawal from the NPT, it remains bound to the NPT as a member country for the next 90 days under the NPT's provisions and requested that the North to accept special IAEA inspections within the 90 days.

On March 15, U. S. President Bill Clinton expressed great concern at a press conference about North Korea's rejection of IAEA inspections and withdrawal from NPT. Clinton expressed the hope that the North would reverse its decision to depart from the NPT and allow IAEA inspectors to visit North Korea.

The Foreign Ministry of Russia, also, issued a statement

on March 12, indicating that North Korea's decision was beyond comprehension and would result in increased suspicions about their possession of nuclear weapons. The Russian ministry expressed hope that North Korean authorities would return to the NPT at an early date.

China reaffirmed on March 13 that there was no change in its support for the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, but expressed concerns that excessive pressure on North Korea at that moment could aggravate the situation. In a statement of a Foreign Ministry spokesman, China expressed hope that the issue of North Korea's withdrawal from the NPT would be properly resolved through negotiation.

Meanwhile, in an emergency Board of Governors meeting on March 18, the IAEA adopted a resolution urging North Korea to accept special IAEA inspections and decided to discuss the nuclear issue again after observing the North's attitude until March 31.

At the special IAEA Board of Governors meeting held on March 31, it was noted that North Korea showed no change in its position. The meeting resolved to report the North Korean nuclear question to the U.N. Security Council and General Assembly. The nuclear issue of North was thus referred to the United Nations.

In a resolution, the IAEA: 1) declared North Korea to be in non-compliance with its safeguards agreement, 2) urged North Korea to furnish additional information without delay and accept special IAEA inspections of its two undeclared facilities, and 3) announced it would report to the U.N. Security Council and General Assembly North Korea's non-compliance with the agreement and the North Korea's blockage of IAEA inspections.

The text adopted by the IAEA Special Board of Governors reads as follows:

Draft resolution submitted jointly by

Argentina, Australia, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Ecuador, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Norway, Paraguay, Romania, the Russian Federation, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America

The Board of Governors,

(a) Recalling its Resolution (GOV/2636) of 25 February 1993 and Resolution (GOV/2638) of 18 March 1993.

(b) Noting that there has been no positive response from the DPRK by the end of March,

(c) Having considered the Report of the Director General (GOV/2643) and, in particular, the conclusions in paragraph 12, that the DPRK is in non-compliance with the terms of its Safeguards Agreement with the Agency and,

(d) Taking account of the rights and obligations under that Agreement.

1. Finds, based on the Report of the Director General, that the DPRK is in non-compliance with its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement with the Agency;

2. Further finds, pursuant to Article 19 of the Agreement, that the Agency is not able to verify that there has been no diversion of nuclear material required to be safeguarded under the terms of the Safeguards Agreement to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;

3. Calls upon the DPRK to remedy forthwith its non-compliance, including by granting without further delay access to specific additional information and to two locations as set out in the Director General's request to the DPRK of 9 February 1993;

4. Decides, as required by Article XIII C. of the Statute and in accordance with Article 19 of the Agreement, to report the DPRK's non-compliance and the Agency's inability to verify non-diversion of nuclear material required to be safeguarded, to all Members of the Agency and to the Security

Council and General Assembly of the United Nations;

5. Requests the Director General to make the report referred to in paragraph 4 above on behalf of the Board;

6. Requests the Director General to continue his efforts and dialogue to implement fully the Agreement and to keep the Board informed of any significant developments;

7. Decides to remain seized of the matter.

Appendices

1. Inaugural Address by President Kim Young-Sam

Together on the Road to a "New Korea"

My 70 million fellow Koreans at home and abroad, President Roh Tae Woo, other former Presidents and distinguished guests,

Today, we gather here to open a new era of democracy under civilian government, the climax of our long and tireless pursuit. We have had to wait for this moment for 30 long years. At last, we have established a government by the people and of the people of this land. The Government that is coming into being today has its foundation in the burning desire and great sacrifices of the people for democracy.

Standing before our National Assembly, I am deeply moved. For this has long been the scene of my difficult and passionate struggle for democracy. The Korean people truly are a great people and I extend my deep gratitude to you. May the glory of our nation be with you forever. Today, I join you all in paying tribute to those who nobly sacrificed themselves in the struggle for democracy and thus cannot be with us today.

Fellow citizens,

As I assume the presidency, I am acutely aware of our historic mission to build a new homeland. The spirit of renewal is now rising in this land. In the past, the Korean people have enjoyed luxuriant summers, but have also suffered withering winters. Today, this spirit of national advancement represents the hope of a new spring.

This new season demands that we make a fresh start with renewed determination, Deep in my heart, I have a vision of a "New Korea." The "New Korea" will be a freer and more mature democratic society. Justice will flow like a river throughout this land. This "New Korea" will be a sharing community, working and living together in harmony. A higher quality of life will flourish and the dignity of the individual will be upheld. The divided Korean people will become one and live in peace in a unified land.

The "New Korea" will stand tall and proud on the center stage of a new and civilized world, making a vital contribution to global peace and progress. The "New Korea" will inspire all to work enthusiastically and will make our children proud to be Korean. Let us all share in this vision. We are a people who have already worked a miracle, rising from the ashes of a savage war that followed devastation by colonial rule. Now we must build again and move forward to face the challenges of the future.

My fellow citizens,

We must realize, however, that as we face these challenges conditions are not necessary favorable. In this post-Cold War world that is moving headlong into intense economic and technological competition, old enemies are being transformed into new friends and old rules and practices no longer apply. If we fail to adapt to the changing times, we will only become bogged down at the threshold of the developed world. If we do not charge forward, we will only be left behind. This is a grave matter of national survival.

It is at this time that we should be building our strength to create a "New Korea" and yet, we seem to have become debilitated. We are sick with what has been termed the Korean disease.

Our industriousness and ingenuity—long the envy of the world—seem to be evaporating. Our society faces decay if our values continue to erode. The Korean people seem to have lost confidence in themselves. This is the heart of our problem.

If we are in a crisis, it is not due to challenges from the outside. It is due to a feeling of defeatism that comes from within. We cannot let things go on like this. We must renew ourselves.

We must shake off our frustration and lethargy and break through to establish a new era of courage and hope. We must replace bigotry and inertia with open-mindedness and vitality, strife and confrontation with dialogue and cooperation, and mistrust with trust. We must stop considering narrow self-interests and build a society which sees us not only live together but also truly care about each other. These goals are the very root of the change and reform I advocate. It is not only our institutions but also our way of thinking and behaving that must be changed. If we hide from change and reform, we will be forsaken by history.

Fellow citizens,

The reforms we need must begin with three essential tasks:

First, misconduct and corruption must be rooted out.

Second, the economy must be revitalized.

Third, national discipline must be enhanced.

Misconduct and corruption are the most terrifying enemies attacking the foundations of our society. There cannot and will not be any sanctuary for those who oppose the fight against corruption. No sanctuary at all. We will stamp out all manner of improprieties and graft. Immediate reform will start at the very top. Yet, it will not be possible, however, to completely weed out corruption unless each and every citizen strives to achieve this goal. My fellow citizens, a truly honorable society will only be realized with the

full commitment of all of you.

Next, we must restore economic vitality. To that end, the Government will do away with unwarranted controls and protection and instead guarantee self-regulation and fair competition. Private initiative and creativity will thus be allowed to flourish.

The Administration will be the first to tighten its belt. Our citizens must also conserve more and save more. Extravagance and wastefulness must be eliminated.

Workers must work harder. Businesses must make bold technological innovations to be winners in the international marketplace. Only when the Government and the people, and labor and business work together with enthusiasm will it be possible to turn our economy around. This is my vision of a new Korean economy.

Fellow citizens,

We have grown lax and we must restore national discipline. When power is grabbed by foul means, governmental legitimacy is lost and law and order is bound to break down. This gives currency to the immoral notion that the end justifies the means. There must be an end to the dark political night.

Respect for authority must be reestablished wherever necessary. Freedom must serve society. As the freedom fighter Park Bum once said the true meaning of freedom is in using that freedom to plant a flower in the park rather than pick a flower from the park. Ethics, which have been so flouted must be made to prevail. To this end, education must henceforth cultivate wholesome character and unwavering democratic belief, as well as equipping our young people for the future with knowledge and skill in science and technology. This is my vision of new education.

Fellow citizens,

The Government that serves you from today will be a different kind of Government. Chong Wa Dae (the presidential office and residence) will work tirelessly to protect the lives and property of the people and to promote security and prosperity for our nation. Chong Wa Dae will be your good neighbor. I will be with you where you work and will be by your side in good times and bad. We will share joy and pain because the more that joy is shared the greater it becomes and the more that pain is shared the lesser it becomes.

The nature of our politics must also change. Politics should not serve the politicians, rather it must bring hope and happiness to the people. Politics must address our citizens' grievances; it must reflect their spoken and unspoken wishes. When our Government and our politics are reformed, so too will a genuine stability through change and reform take root in this land.

Fellow citizens,

Let us throw open the door to a new era based on justice and reconciliation. In the past, we have been divided from within by class strife, regional animosities, generational differences and ideological conflict. We must break down these barriers within our own society.

We must resolve all legitimate grievances and remove resentment. Too many of you have been denied your place in the sun and we must assist you in joining the mainstream of society. Those who have more should give more. Those who are powerful should yield more. Let us not demand our share too greedily. We must give greater consideration to the larger common good. When we make the rice cake larger, so too must everyone's share become bigger.

My 70 million fellow Koreans at home and abroad,

This I pledge: I will do my very best to fulfill the people's call and the historic mandate for national reconciliation and unification. Yet, at this juncture, regarding unification, we must acknowledge that what is needed is not emotionalism but a reasoned national consensus on achieving this crucial goal.

To President Kim Il-sung I say this:

We must be genuinely willing to cooperate with each other. The world is moving away from confrontation and into an era of peace and cooperation. We see cooperation expanding among different peoples and countries and yet, none of these nations can have more reasons to care and share than we do—for we are members of the same ethnic family. No ideology or political belief can bring greater happiness than national kinship.

If, President Kim, you really care about the Korean people and desire genuine reconciliation and unification between our brethren in the South and North. We can meet at any time and in any place to discuss this dream. It could be at the foot of Mt. Hallasan in the warm spring or on the shores of Chonji Lake atop Mt. Paektusan in summer. Let us open our hearts and discuss the future of the Korean people. In this spirit, I truly believe that we, as one people, will be able to resolve the issues that divide us.

To our five million fellow Koreans overseas who live in many parts of the world but who hold fast to their pride in their national heritage. I say this:

Your motherland will be unified before the present century is over and will eventually become a land of freedom and peace. Let all of us, at home and abroad, join forces to open an era

in which the proud Korean people will play a major international role and discharge their obligations to the global community.

Fellow citizens,

No-one else will bring us this “New Koreans.” Only we can build it together. Today, many “New Koreans” are here. Workers who labor with sweat on their brow, farmers who venture to grow new kinds of crops, students who strive to expand their knowledge, scientists who explore new frontiers, businessmen who scout the world for new markets, small industrialists who have succeeded in developing new products, members of the armed services who defend the country day and night, and public officials who diligently work for our people. They are the key builders and leaders of the “New Korea”—those who consistently strive to do their best whatever they pursue.

Especially to our young people, I say this: Now is the time for you to look out into the world and look to the future, to cast off your apathy and fully commit yourselves, to move from unproductive criticism to creative new solutions. The future is yours. The “New Korea” will be yours.

Fellow citizens,

Let us all have a vision and hope for the future. Let us create a “New Korea.” Neither the President alone nor the Administration alone can build this “New Korea.” There should be no “us” and “them” in the endeavor to achieve this goal. There should be only “us.” We must work together as one.

Our “New Korea” cannot be achieved overnight. It will take patience and time. It will take sweat and tears. It will be a painful task. Yet, when we all share the pain, we will realize our dream. And we must.

Let us start again with hope and vision. Let us all march forward. Let no one fall behind.

Thank you.

February 25, 1993
President Kim Young Sam

2. New Year's Message by Kim Il-Sung

Dear comrades, compatriot brothers and sisters,

We have let go one significant year that would eternally shine in the history of the fatherland, and are greeting the hopeful new year of 1993.

As I greet the new year, I extend my enthusiastic felicitations and warm greetings to the whole people of the northern half of the Republic, brothers in the southern area, and all the overseas compatriots including our brethren in Japan.

I also offer my New Year's greetings to the progressive people and friends around the world who follow the path of self-reliance, peace and socialism.

1992 was a year of our proud victory and glory, in which our party and people, solidly united into oneness, surmounted difficulties and trials and forcefully demonstrated the justness and invincibility of our great socialistic achievements.

In the past year, imperialists and reactionaries tenaciously schemed to isolate and strangle our Republic, the bulwark of socialism, and to obliterate our great socialistic achievements. But, they could not stand in the way of our people's march onward.

Our people are not the kind of people who would abandon their revolutionary belief and principles in submission to whatever pressures or threats nor are they the type who give up their path in favor of another because of some wind that sweeps.

The more challenges our people are faced with, the higher they carry the revolutionary banner of "juche" in their march forward and the stronger they become in staging struggles to register shiny achievements in socialistic construction.

By so doing, we could be more faithful to our historical duties and could reward for the faith and expectations of the peoples of the world.

Through difficult and rewarding struggles in the last year, our people have become more disciplined, the unity of the party and people has further been solidified, and the foundation for our self-reliant national economy, on which we can survive with our own strength under whatever harsh conditions, has been concretely cemented.

We have come to possess a greater strength either ideologically or materially, and to look forward to a greater victory ahead.

I extend my deep appreciation to our working class, farmers, intellectuals, the members of the People's Army and all other people who, displaying unbounded loyalty and devotion to the party and revolution, contributed to strengthening our socialist fortification and to steering our great "juche" revolutionary tasks to victory.

This year is a significant year marking the 40th anniversary of the great fatherland liberation war.

In the fatherland liberation war, our people and People's Army, rallying solidly around the party, heroically fought by exhibiting indefatigable fighting spirit and the unrivaled spirit of sacrifice and thus crushed armed invasion by imperialism, honorably safeguarded the freedom and independence of the fatherland, and displayed our people's revolutionary spirit to the whole world.

Today's situation requires us to continue to struggle forcefully with the same spirit and determination which our people displayed in the difficult days of the harsh havoc of the war. It is an honorable task facing our party and people to smash all challenges and schemes of impediment by imperialists and reactionaries and thereby support, hold fast to and further shine our socialism.

All party members and workers, carrying firmly the slogan "let our whole party, whole people and whole armed forces get united in oneness and accomplish the great task of socialism to the end," should forcefully expedite socialistic construction by dis-

playing the spirit of self-reliance and regeneration, and should further nurture the superiority of our country's socialism.

Our country's socialism is a socialism that is centered on the masses of people and that embodies the "juche" thought. In our country, the entire people, being the genuine masters of the state and society, equally enjoy the most lofty and happy lives in all walks of life such as politics, economy and culture. Our society is the most economically stable society where the people's political rights are strictly guaranteed legally and socially and where there are no social evils whatsoever that infringe on and trample down the dignity of the people.

In our country where the state is wholly responsible for the people's lives, the people know no concerns in terms of foods, garments and dwelling. Moreover, every person has a job suitable to one's talent and ability, engaging in creative labor activities. No single unemployed or no single vagrant beggar can be found.

In our country, people are free of disease and enjoy long life expectancy thanks to the free medical treatment system. Owing to the enforcement of the most advanced free compulsory educational system, all people learn to the full and develop themselves ceaselessly throughout their lives. It is the important feature and essential superiority of our society that all the members of the society form one large family, sharing pains and rejoice together while helping and guiding one another.

The dignified and happy lives our people lead can hardly be even thought of in an exploitation class society. Such lives are a kind which can be guaranteed only in socialist societies. Away from socialism, there can be no happiness of today or tomorrow's hope among our people. Socialism is the very synonym of our people's lives and life line.

This load alone, that is, to protect, hold fast to and shine our socialism which we have secured through bloody struggles

in many stages of time, is a road to our people's glorious lives and victory.

In the construction of socialism, our party's revolutionary principles and path are firm and remain unchanged. It is because of the consistent maintenance of our party's revolutionary "juche" principles and policies that our socialistic achievements have moved onward toward a victorious path without experiencing any failure or frustration amid this difficult and complex environment.

We should continue to firmly keep the principles of "juche in thoughts, juche in politics, self-reliance in economy and self-defense in national defense" whose justness and survivorship were expressly proved in the mist of historical trials, and should more emphatically enforce the three great revolutions of thought, technology and culture by firmly holding fast to the total policy of socialistic construction.

Integration of political ideology among the masses of our people is the very source of our strength and the decisive guarantor of our all victories. History shows that when the integration of political ideology among the masses of people is strengthened and thereby an ideological fortification becomes strong, can socialism have an indefatigable strength. We must forcefully stage an ideological revolution so as to strongly arm all party members and workers with the "juche" thought, and further bolster unity among the party and the masses of people in oneness.

To make come true our people's wish that they all could take boiled rice and beet soup, wear silk garments and live in tile-roofed houses, is the important goal of our socialistic construction. We should forcefully accelerate socialistic construction this year to further solidify the groundwork for our economic self-reliance and improve speedily the material cultural lives of our people.

The core on which we should concentrate our efforts in economic construction is the coal, electricity and metallic indust-

ries. In particular, it is important to firmly advance the coal industry. Only when coal production is expanded can the crucial power problem be resolved and production be normalized in the metallic industry and many other areas of our people's economy. We must concentrate investment on the coal industry and other priority sectors of the people's economy and assure them all other necessary conditions so that production boost could arise beginning with these areas.

In the light industrial area, technology should be boldly renovated and positive steps taken to ensure the full operation of facilities. We should thereby use the already prepared production potentials effectively and channel much state-level strength into them to drastically expand the production of people's consumption goods.

In the transportation and shipping area, the material and technological foundation for railroads should be further strengthened, and the party's policy to renovate transportation should be strictly pushed through so as to smoothly ensure the transportation demand of the people's economy.

In the agricultural sector this year, the requirement of the "juche" method of farming should be strictly enforced and other struggles to increase agricultural production should be staged forcefully. The key to drastically boosting agricultural production through the enforcement of the "juche" method of farming in a circumstance where irrigation and seed problems have been resolved, lies in supplying enough fertilizer to the rural areas. The chemical industrial and other relevant sectors should guarantee the timely production of chemical fertilizer necessary for this year's farming.

We must launch a sweeping housing development program in both urban and rural areas, which will include 30,000 housing units to be built in Pyongyang this year.

We must wage a cultural revolution more forcefully to register new developments in all the areas of cultural construction such as science, education, health, literature and art, and sports. Our intellectuals, with the pride of being the revolutionary combatants of the party, should contribute positively to the socialistic cultural construction by displaying their creative talents and wisdom to the full, and thereby recompense the party and people for their high expectations from them.

We should pour our strength into strengthening the country's defense ability in preparation against the enemy's aggressive provocation. We must thoroughly push through the policy of turning the whole military members into cadres, modernizing the whole military, arming the entire people and turning the whole land into fortifications, and thereby strengthen our revolutionary armed forces and further solidify the total people's defense system. The officers and men of the People's Army, members of the Workers and Peasants Red Guards and the members of the Red Youth Guards should prepare themselves strongly both politico-ideologically and military-technologically so that they could reliably safeguard the security of the fatherland and the great achievements of socialism.

In revolution and construction, success depends on how we could organize and mobilize the people's revolutionary zeal and creativity. All guidance workers should invoke the masses' struggles and achievements on the strength of political programs undertaken as the Chongsan-ri spirit and Chongsan-ri method and the business system of Tae-an, all of which our party had invented, dictate, and should flawlessly work out operations and organizational programs to carry through the road and policies of the party. All workers should work combatively with a deep sense of revolution and should help the revolutionary air overflow in the whole society where people live and struggle heroically.

Our party and the government of the Republic have staged relentless struggles to realize unification of the fatherland always under the principle of national self-reliance.

In the past 20 years after our party embodied the idea of self-reliant national unification and, based thereon, set forth the three great principles of self-reliance, peaceful unification and grand national unify, a movement for unification of the fatherland has ceaselessly been expanded and developed on a nation-wide scale. In the course, the North-South dialogue has developed to a step higher stage, culminating in the realization of an epochal progress, that was, the adoption and effectuation of the Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression, and Exchanges and Cooperation between the North and the South and the Joint Declaration of Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

Obstruction by the South Korean authorities of the implementation of the North-South agreement with unreasonable excuses and resumption of the provocative joint Team Spirit military exercise today when all the people have become to look forward to unification with hope and expectations, constitutes an anti-national act of denying the principle of self-reliant national unification and of seeking to realize an ulterior objective by resorting to the strength of external forces.

The unification our people hope for is a unification to realize the self-reliance of the nation, not a unification for the people to live subjugated to others. If we chose to live subjugated to others, we needed not stage the difficult national liberation struggles over a long period of time nor was it necessary for us to fight against aliens aggression and interference braving all sorts of tribulations from the time of national liberation to date.

The principle of national self-reliance is an uncompromising basic principle of unification of the fatherland. For any one to speak of dialogue or unification while rejecting this principle,

represents an act of making mockery of the people, an act which can never be tolerated.

Our party and the government of the Republic will continue in the future to strive to realize unification of the fatherland under the confederation method based on one nation, one state, two systems and two governments and under the principle of national self-reliance.

We will sit face to face, without caring their past, with any ones if they come forward in a sincere manner to genuinely discuss the question of unification of the fatherland from the approach of national self-reliance, and open-heartedly discuss with them the question of national unification and work together with them to accomplish the great task of unification of the fatherland.

The question of Korean unification is a national issue that should be resolved with our people as the subject, and, at the same time, is an international question over which relevant countries should feel the sense of responsibility and cooperate.

To resolve the Korean question, a product of the Cold War, relevant countries should boldly renounce the old policies of the Cold War age.

Clinging to the one-sided policy of the Cold War age while applying military threat and economic pressure to us, cannot be the manner of dispelling Cold War legacies. It only amounts to going against the flow of times.

Only when relevant countries assume the attitude of trying to fairly resolve the Korean question in conformity with the dictate of times and the principle of international justice, would they be enabled to fulfill their respective responsibilities and obligations involved in the Korean question. This will also have a favorable effect on improving relations between our country and these nations.

Obstacles and difficulties still lie ahead along the road to

unification of the fatherland. But, the great fatherland unification task of our people who march onward under the principle of national self-reliance, will come to a victory by all means.

The present international situation is complex. But, there is no change in our Republic government's self-reliant external policies. The government of our Republic will continue to carry through the external policies of self-reliance, peace and goodwill.

In a whatever complex situation, we will firmly retain our self-reliance and will be faithful to revolutionary principles and international obligation. In order to realize the whole world's self-reliance, we will exert all efforts we can to develop friendly cooperative relations with the peoples of many world countries including socialist and non-aligned nations.

Our great revolutionary tasks are just and our country's socialism centered on the masses of people will be ever victorious.

As long as there is the "juche" thought that brightly shines our path ahead, there is a correct guidance by the party that steers our people toward victory, and there are a united people who loyally respect the party guidance, no strength whatsoever would be able to block the future of us who move forward carrying high the banner of socialism in the East.

Let us all solidly rally around the Central Committee of the party and forcefully march onward toward a new victory.

