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South-North Dialogue in Korea

— *Theme Papers at Seminar Held on Occasion of
7th Anniversary of Issuance of South-North Joint Communique* —

Preface

It is already seven years since the South-North Joint Communique was issued on July 4, 1972 with a view to achieving independent and peaceful unification of the Korean peninsula.

Today, however, the south-north dialogue remains deadlocked after the two-channeled talks--South-North Coordinating Committee and South-North Red Cross Conference--were suspended unilaterally by north Korea. Prospects are still dim for early resumption of the inter-Korean dialogue.

The government of the Republic of Korea has made a series of propositions in its persistent efforts to solve the Korean question between the direct parties involved, the latest of such offers being the January 19 proposal for a dialogue between the authorities of the south and the north, and the proposal for a meeting of senior official representatives of the south and the north of Korea and the United States.

However, north Korea, irresponsive to a dialogue between the responsible authorities, had simply put forth a mere social organization, the so-called "Democratic Front for Unification of the Fatherland," thus rejecting a constructive dialogue. This intransigency of the north Koreans bespeaks they are yet to give up the daydream of conquoring the south by force of arms.

In observance of the seventh anniversary of the historic South-North Joint Communique amidst such reality of the inter-Korean relations, the Seoul side of the South-North Coordinating Committee sponsored a seminar July 3-4, 1979 at the conference room of the Coordinating Committee with a view to evaluating the prospects for, and exploring a new course of, the south-north dialogue for the sake of peaceful unification of the country.

This issue, No. 21, of the South-North Dialogue carries the full texts of the theses presented by leading scholars at the seminar. It is hoped that our readers will find them helpful to their better understanding of the south-north dialogue in Korea.

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January 19 Proposal and South-North Dialogue

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1

Seven years have already elapsed since the South-North Joint Communique, a historical milestone toward national unification, was announced on July 4, 1972, in which the south and the north of Korea solemnly pledged before the history of the nation to pursue national unification on the three basic principles of independence, peace and grand national unity.

During this almost decade-long period, however, no substantial change has taken place in the south-north relations characterized by persisting military confrontation. Of course, there were a dialogue and some contacts between the south and the north. A total of 32 rounds of talks were held in the full-dress and working-level meetings of the South-North Red Cross Conference, while there were 13 sessions of the plenary and vice co-chairmen's meetings of the South-North Coordinating Committee. But, we all know that notwithstanding these numerous meetings, not even a slightest improvement has been registered in the relations of the south and the north of Korea.

Even these barely maintained contacts between south and north Korea were terminated altogether after the 25th working-level meeting of the South-North Red Cross Conference held on December 9, 1977. North Korea had shut off the last avenue of the south-north dialogue by boycotting the 26th Red Cross working-level meeting slated for March 20, 1978 at Panmunjom.

Here, a proposal to find a way out of the deadlocked talks was

offered by President Park Chung Hee on January 19, 1979. The President sought to improve the south-north relations by proposing, at a New Year press conference, the unconditional resumption of the stalled dialogue between the direct parties involved.

North Korea could not reject the proposal. It was not in a position to ignore the extraordinary offer amidst the rising demand within and without for the resumption of the south-north dialogue.

Consequently, a contact was made between the two sides at Panmunjom on February 17, 1979, the first inter-Korean contact in fourteen months. However, it was an abnormal contact. The south was represented at the contact by the members of the Seoul side of the South-North Coordinating Committee true to the spirit of the July 4 Joint Communique, whereas it was attended from the north Korea by the representatives of the so-called "Democratic Front for Unification of the Fatherland" ("Democratic Front"). Still, as a proverb goes, "No first spoon fills a stomach," it was quite significant that the representatives of the south and the north got together again in a whatever form. Herein lied the reason why the south wanted to carry on the contacts abnormal though it may be.

However, in the north Korean position as it was made known through the contacts, there was a point which south Korea could not tolerate under any circumstances. It was their de facto rejection of the South-North Joint Communique. North Korea overtly denied the existence of the South-North Coordinating Committee governed by the express provisions of the Joint Communique and did not conceal their attempt to consider the Joint Communique itself as a "dead paper."

This posed a grave problem. For, the South-North Joint Communique is a blueprint for national unification, the observance and implementation of which were solemnly pledged by both the south and the north before the history of the nation. The Joint Communique is a document which cannot be repealed until the time of unification and which, furthermore, can never be scrapped under any unilateral and optional interpretation by north Korea.

In this paper, an attempt was made against such background to

find answers to several questions:

First, what is the true meaning of the South-North Joint Communiqué?; what are the positions of south and north Korea toward the Joint Communiqué?; and is the South-North Joint Communiqué a “dead paper” as argued by north Korea?

Second, what is the meaning of the proposal for an “unconditional dialogue” made by President Park Chung Hee in an effort to find a breakthrough in the deadlocked south-north dialogue?; and what relationship does the proposal have with the South-North Joint Communiqué?

Third, what is the standing of the south-north dialogue?; and how the inter-Korean relationship should develop in the 1980s, and what are its prospects?

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In order to pursue answers to those questions, the South-North Joint Communiqué itself should be reviewed from various angles first. This is because the Joint Communiqué was the starting point of the south-north dialogue.

In effect, efforts to solve the issue of national unification by means of direct negotiations between the south and the north of Korea were made as early as in 1948, a product of which was the “south-north political consultative conference” held at the suggestion of Kim Kiu-sic and Kim Ku. But, this conference ended without any achievements because it was a talk between a force (the north) with political power and a force (the south) without any power.¹⁾

The outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 and the resultant piling up of mutual distrust have rendered any direct negotiations between the south and the north all the more difficult.

One of the most serious aftermaths of the Korean War may well be that the increased distrust and antagonism between south and north Korea have shaken from the root the expectation that the question of peace and unification might be settled through direct

negotiations between south and north Korea.

Coming into being parallel with such psychological development was the Cold War of the 1950s and 1960s. The south and the north of Korea, which was under the strong influence of the polarized Cold War system between the United States and the Soviet Union or of the military confrontation between the United States and Communist China, were unable to enter a direct dialogue and negotiations in a state where there were changes in the U.S.-U.S.S.R. relations but none in the Sino-U.S. relationship. The inter-Korean relationship was, thus, frozen in a state of military confrontation.

A presage of a switch of this stiff inter-Korean relationship into that of a dialogue came in President Park's Liberation Day message on August 15, 1970.

In the address, President Park disclosed his willingness "to suggest epochal and more realistic measures, with a view to removing, step by step, various artificial barriers existing between the south and the north," urging north Korea to run for a competition in development, in construction and in creativity to prove which institution, democracy or Communist totalitarianism, can provide better living for the people and which society is better place to live in.²⁾

This suggestion of President Park led to the proposal of the Republic of Korea National Red Cross on August 12 the following year that "a campaign be initiated for the search of dispersed families through such means as the exchange of information on the actual condition of each of the ten million separated family members in the south and north and the use of good offices for their reunion."³⁾ The north Korean Red Cross Society accepted it and a south-north dialogue was thus begun finally on September 20, 1971 in the form of south-north Red Cross preliminary meetings.

Another factor contributing to the birth of the inter-Korean talks was the detente between the United States and Mainland China. The two countries, in hostile relations for more than 20 years, began to seek their detente and improved relationship. And, there was a shocking news that to this end U.S. President Richard

M. Nixon would visit Peking.

This Sino-U.S. approach, namely, the fall of the structure of Sino-U.S. confrontation, had resulted in the removal of the outer-cover of the inter-Korean confrontation, one of the by-products of the Sino-U.S. confrontation, and further in the initiation of the south-north dialogue.

The Shanghai Joint Communique issued between the United States and Red China in February 1972 had a message for both the south and the north of Korea that direct negotiations between them were an unavoidable course.⁴⁾ This historical document revealed a Sino-U.S. agreement on the "Koreanization of the Korean question," and was tacitly demanding that south and north Korea adapt themselves to these new conditions of the Korean question.

It was against such background that high-level and secret political talks took place between the south and the north in May 1972. At the talks, the two sides of divided Korea could reach an agreement on the frame of the agreed matters announced afterwards in the South-North Joint Communique. Typical of them were that unification should be realized in a peaceful way by all means and the two sides should stop slandering and defaming each other.⁵⁾

To put it in a conclusion, the July 4 South-North Joint Communique was born of a south-north agreement as a result of the positive efforts of south and north Korea to adapt themselves to a new environment prompted by a change in the international circumstance. A great significance of the Joint Communique can be found in that it was the first document ever agreed on between those in power in the south and the north since the establishment of their respective regimes in 1948.

What, then, are the concrete contents of the South-North Joint Communique? We shall study the contents again now that north Korea distorts their meanings.

The South-North Joint Communique declares that the two sides have reached full agreement on the following seven points in "an effort to remove the misunderstandings and mistrust and mitigate increased tensions, and further to expedite unification of the

fatherland:"

First, they agreed on the principles for unification—a principle of independence that unification shall be achieved through independent efforts without being subject to external imposition or interference; a principle of peace that unification shall be achieved through peaceful means, and not through the use of force against each other; and a principle of grand national unity that as a homogeneous people, a great national unity shall be sought transcending differences in ideas, ideologies and systems.⁶⁾ These three principles are, no doubt, the perfect basic principles for the realization of national unification.

Second, the two sides agreed on easing of tensions and restoration of mutual trust. They agreed not to slander or defame each other, not to undertake armed provocations whether on a large or small scale, and to take positive measures to prevent inadvertent military incidents.

Third, they agreed on south-north exchanges. The two sides agreed to carry out various exchanges in many fields in order to restore severed national ties, promote mutual understanding to expedite independent peaceful unification.

Fourth, they agreed to expedite the South-North Red Cross Conference. The two sides agreed to cooperate positively with each other to seek early success of the South-North Red Cross talks.

Fifth, they agreed on the installation of a direct telephone line. The two sides agreed to install a direct telephone line between Seoul and Pyongyang in order to prevent the outbreak of inadvertent military incidents and to deal directly, promptly and accurately with problems arising between the south and the north.

Sixth, they agreed on the establishment of the South-North Coordinating Committee. The two sides agreed to establish and operate the South-North Coordinating Committee in order to implement the aforementioned agreed items and solve various problems existing between the south and the north of Korea.

Seventh, they committed themselves to the faithful implementation of the agreed matters. The two sides solemnly pledged before

the whole nation that they would faithfully carry out these agreed items.

As can be seen in the above, the Joint Communiqué incorporates nearly all the fundamental principles and concrete implementation methods necessary for the improvement and solution of all the problems existing between south and north Korea as well as for the ultimate realization of national unification.

It is beyond question that if only the two sides of Korea abide by the spirit of the South-North Joint Communiqué and implement sincerely the concrete implementation methods embodied therein, national unification could be achieved easily. It was for this reason that upon the announcement of the South-North Joint Communiqué, all of the 50 million people in the south and the north supported it wholeheartedly.

Surely the advent of the Joint Communiqué contributed much to the easing of tensions between the two sides.

For at least 18 months after the issuance of the Joint Communiqué, the number of armed clashes declined markedly while the degree of military confrontation took a down-turn. The crisis of war could thus be overcome.

Mutual slandering, too, was toned down conspicuously. Slandering on each other's political leaders and systems was almost suspended. This may well be highly evaluated as it helped form a basis for the restoration of mutual trust between the two sides.

The advent of the South-North Joint Communiqué contributed much to arousing the people's concern about and stimulating their will to national unification. In fact, a sort of separate nationalism had emerged between the south and the north of Korea in the course of 20-odd years of national division. As the prospects for national unification were felt slim, there had arisen the prevalent trend of people settling down in the reality of national division. The South-North Joint Communiqué had emerged under the circumstances as a new milestone. It had invoked the conviction that national unification would be possible depending on the efforts of south and north Korea.

The South-North Joint Communiqué, of such a great significance, was naturally endorsed by the United Nations. In a consensus agreement adopted by both the Eastern and Western blocs on November 28, 1973 regarding the Korean question, the 28th General Assembly of the United Nations expressed satisfaction over the July 4 South-North Joint Communiqué embodying the three basic principles for unification, expressing the hope that south and north Korea would carry on a dialogue and realize many-sided exchanges and cooperation based on the Joint Communiqué.⁷⁾ Even in the two conflicting, pro-Seoul and pro-Pyongyang resolutions adopted simultaneously at the 30th General Assembly of the United Nations, the South-North Joint Communiqué was endorsed anew in the preambles of the respective resolutions. The pro-Seoul resolution was begun with a phrase, "Recalling the satisfaction with the Joint Communiqué issued in Seoul and Pyongyang on July 4, 1972..." while the pro-Pyongyang resolution had the premise, "In line with the spirit of the Joint Communiqué of July 4, 1972..."⁸⁾ These examples indicate that the South-North Joint Communiqué has the nature of being not only the document of agreement between south and north Korea concerning peace and unification on the Korean peninsula but also the document of agreement of the United Nations with its authority thus duly recognized by the United Nations.⁹⁾

3

Our understanding of the South-North Joint Communiqué begins with the fact that it is the document of agreement resulting from negotiations between the south and the north of Korea. This is evident in the whole text of the Joint Communiqué itself. In the not-so-lengthy Joint Communiqué, the words "the two sides" appear no fewer than nine times and the words "have agreed" seven times. It was clearly a joint paper "agreed on" between "the two sides."

Of course, there can be an argument as to whether the persons of "the two sides" who "have agreed" on the Joint Communiqué had

the due authority to sign it.¹⁰⁾ This is because Lee Hu-rak, director of the Central Intelligence Agency, of south Korea and Kim Young-joo, director of the Organization and Guidance Department of the ruling Workers' party, of north Korea signed the South-North Joint Communiqué "upholding the desires of their respective superiors." But, it is clear in view of the constitutional structure of the Republic of Korea that the "superior" of Lee Hu-rak was the President. The President of the Republic of Korea holds the power to conclude treaties including the kind of declaration stipulated in Article 71 of the Constitution of the Republic of Korea. Similarly it is certain in view of the power structure of north Korea that the "superior" of Kim Young-joo was Kim Il-sung, who has the power to conclude treaties including declarations as the "president of state" of north Korea under the provisions of Article 49 of the north Korean Constitution. Therefore, it can be interpreted that those who have the authority to conclude treaties in south and north Korea delegated their authority to their respective lower offices and had them sign the Joint Communiqué.¹¹⁾

Nevertheless, the South-North Joint Communiqué cannot be taken as a treaty.¹²⁾ of course, it is certain that the Joint Communiqué signifies an agreement between the direct parties—the south and the north of Korea. However, since the Joint Communiqué can hardly be considered to have embodied *animus contrahendi* to establish such rights and obligations as are required under the international law, it is difficult to regard the Joint Communiqué as a treaty. For this reason alone, the South-North Joint Communiqué may well lack the legal nature of a treaty or an administrative agreement.

In the light of the definition of G.G. Wilson, however, the South-North Joint Communiqué is a declaration. Wilson called the promulgation of principles adopted in an agreement between parties involved as a declaration.¹³⁾ The South-North Joint Communiqué falls into this very category. The Joint Communiqué can be considered to carry a moral and political binding force though it fails to set forth a legal obligation between the two parties involved. In this

respect, the Joint Communique represents the declaration of political and moral principles as is the case with the Joint Declaration between Franklin Roosevelt and Winston Churchill in 1941, the Universal Human Rights Declaration of 1948, and the Washington Declaration of 1954.¹⁴⁾ At least, we so accept the South-North Joint Communique.

What, then, can be our position toward the two agreed minutes born of the Joint Communique—the Agreed Minute on Installation and Operation of Direct South-North Telephone Line and the Agreed Minute on Formation and Operation of the South-North Coordinating Committee? We also regard both of them as treaties based on an agreement between the parties involved, namely, south and north Korea.¹⁵⁾ Professor Kim Myung-Ki who studied the legal status of the Agreed Minute on Installation and Operation of Direct South-North Telephone Line, says:

The Agreed Minute 1) was concluded in the form of an agreed minute rather than of a joint declaration between the two parties, 2) embodies not only concrete matters but also provisions on “amendment or supplement” and “term of validity,” 3) cannot be taken to lack animus contrahendi to receive a legal binding force since it was concluded in the course of embodying the provisions of the Joint Communique, and 4) cannot but be regarded as a treaty in view of the fact that the signatories of the Agreed Minute were the authorities of the two sides, namely, “Lee Hu-rak, director of the Central Intelligence Agency,” and “Kim Young-joo, director of the Organization and Guidance Department.” Therefore, the Agreed Minute, being an example of inter-departmental agreement, falls in the category of “simple agreement.”¹⁶⁾

As was seen above, we consider the South-North Joint Communique and the two Agreed Minutes based thereon as all having a binding force. In other words, they are interpreted to be joint documents which both south and north Korea must respect,

When we so interpret the South-North Joint Communique, it can entail a political agreement, that is, an agreement that there exist two political entities on the Korean peninsula. It can be

imagined, in particular, that if and when the South-North Coordinating Committee is formed and goes into function under the Agreed Minute on Formation and Operation of South-North Coordinating Committee, it would mean that the south and the north of Korea have entered into the initial stage of de facto peaceful coexistence. This is the point where the South-North Joint Communique and the South-North Coordinating Committee display the Janus-like bifacial elements of unification and peaceful coexistence. Still, it would be the excessive simplification of thought for anyone to attempt to exclusive idea. For, unification by peaceful means, not by war or revolutionary means that runs counter to the spirit of the South-North Joint Communique, has to go through the stage of transitory peaceful coexistence. The only problem here is how long a period should be employed for peaceful coexistence.

North Korea's interpretation of the South-North Joint Communique differs from south Korea's. In the first place, north Korea regards the Joint Communique not as the product of an inter-Korean agreement but as a result of the Republic of Korea government's submission to the unification policy of Kim Il-sung. Therefore, north Korea maintains the position that unification can be achieved only when the people of south and north Korea mount struggles, rallying around the banner of Kim Il-sung. This was made known in a commentary appearing in "*Keunroja (Workers)*," an official monthly of the Worker's Party, published shortly after the issuance of the Joint Communique. The commentary, describing the Joint Communique as the "shining victory of our Party's fatherland unification policy as presented by our Leader," argued, "When the whole people of south and north Korea mount struggles in unity under the banner of independence, grand national unity and peaceful unification as unfolded by Comrade Kim Il-sung, the sun of the nation, unparalleled patriot and respected leader, the great historical task of independent and peaceful unification of the fatherland will surely be achieved."¹⁷⁾

Moreover, on September 27, 1972 before even the first meeting of the co-chairmen of the South-North Coordinating Committee

(October 12, 1972) took place, Kim Il-sung stated in an interview with the Mainichi Shinbun of Japan, "South Korean authorities, unable to withstand the strong pressure from the south Korean people and other peoples around the world, proposed high-level secret talks between the south and the north apart from the Red Cross talks, and consequently the South-North Joint Communiqué was issued featuring the three major principles for unification of the fatherland as we set forth."¹⁸⁾ In this way, north Korea insisted that the Joint Communiqué represented the one-sided victory of Kim Il-sung's unification policy, using it as a fresh tool for its political offensive against the south.

As north Korea, as pointed out in the foregoing, realized that despite such interpretation, the South-North Joint Communiqué could be linked to the logic of peaceful coexistence between south and north Korea, Pyongyang had begun to either think light of the Joint Communiqué or come away from its frame. As it knew that the proper functioning of the South-North Coordinating Committee based on the Joint Communiqué itself would indicate that the two sides enter the initial stage of de facto peaceful coexistence, north Korea became inclined to suspending or paralyzing the function of the South-North Coordinating Committee. In this connection Kim Il-sung made the following remarks in a rally welcoming Norodom Sihanouk's visit to Pyongyang on April 16, 1973:

"If the current south-north dialogue fails to progress smoothly, we feel it would be good for people of various circles of the south and the north to get together and discuss and solve the unification issue rather than to discuss the problem only between the authorities of the two sides. In this connection, we demand that either the scope of the current project of the South-North Coordinating Committee be expanded to include the representatives of various political parties and social organizations as well as the people of various circles of the south and the north or a political negotiation conference be convened among the representatives of the various political parties and social organizations and the people of various circles of the south and the north while retaining the programs of

the South-North Coordinating Committee as they are .”¹⁹⁾

As can be seen in this quotation, Kim Il-sung, already at this time, thought of a conference of the representatives of political parties and social organizations separate from the South-North Coordinating Committee. This scheme was made known also in his speech made at a rally welcoming the visit to Pyongyang of Gustav Huask, secretary of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, on June 23, 1973. In the speech, Kim Il-sung, noting that “the south-north dialogue does not go on smoothly, posing a great difficulty in the road to unification,” stated that “the south-north talks cannot be limited only to the authorities of the two sides. They should be held on a nation-wide scale. To this end, a grand national conference should be convened among people of various circles, political parties and social organizations of the south and the north.”²⁰⁾

Why, then, does north Korea refuse to tolerate the linkage of the South-North Joint Communiqué or the South-North Coordinating Committee to the logic of peaceful coexistence? Since the answer to this question is bound to touch on the reason why north Korea denied the South-North Joint Communiqué partially and the South-North Coordinating Committee wholly in the wake of the January 19 proposal, efforts were made to discuss this answer in detail.

Officially or superficially north Korea maintains it is opposed to the logic of peaceful coexistence because it entails the logic of “two Koreas” and would consequently “perpetuate the division of the fatherland.” However, the actual reason for the opposition lied in somewhere else. North Korea rejects the idea of peaceful coexistence or the development of the inter-Korean relations into those of peaceful coexistence simply because it stands incompatible with their policy of unifying the whole Korean peninsula under communism.

Still, north Korea could not torpedo the south-north dialogue easily. For, if it does, Pyongyang is certain to come under the criticism that it had deserted the national aspiration for “unification through dialogue.” The thing that saved north Korea from this dilemma was the Kim Dae-jung incident. With this incident as an

excuse, north Korea suspended the dialogue held under the South-North Coordinating Committee in the so-called "Kim Young-joo Statement" on August 28, 1973. North Korea has instead begun to propose the conclusion of a U.S.-north Korea peace agreement with the United States as the other side in negotiations.

4

North Korea's rejection of the south-north dialogue could not be left alone.

For, efforts to prevent the recurrence of war and move toward unification by means of dialogue must be exerted continuously with perseverance. It was against this backdrop that there came the January 19 proposal.

In the January 19 proposal, President Park, noting that "it is one of the national missions imposed upon us to reintegrate the national territory and reunite the people, stated, "I urge that the authorities of south and north Korea meet each other at any time, any place and at any level, and have a dialogue to discuss directly without any conditions and openheartedly the questions of how to forestall a fratricidal war on the Korean peninsula, how to achieve prosperity of the 50 million people, and how to realize unification peacefully, namely, all the issues raised so far between the south and the north of Korea."²¹⁾

In this proposal, we can find at least three meanings. The first of them is the reaffirmation of the need for the prevention of the recurrence of war. This is one of the roots of the foreign policy of the Republic of Korea government. The government believes that no matter how urgent a paramount challenge the task of national unification may be, a war that would demand breeding between the same people, should be shunned at all costs. This may appear featureless, but is extremely important a proposition in view the military situation of the Korean question. Today's inter-Korean relations are characterized by the "Richardson process of mutually increasing hostility."²²⁾

In other words, as north Korea builds up its arms and enforces a mobilization system, south Korea copes with it by bolstering its armed forces and mobilization system. When such mutual impulsion piles up, it results in the growing possibility of eventual clashes in violence. Under the circumstances, the common endeavors of south and north Korea for the prevention of the recurrence of war emerge as a pressing need.

The second meaning is the emphasis of the need for peaceful unification. Peaceful unification of a divided nation means realization of unification in a peaceful manner. In other words, it means the elimination of the method of absorbing or annexing of one of the two sides of a divided country by the other side through violence or force of arms, and at the same time, the realization of unification through dissolution of the question of division through dialogue and negotiations between the two sides.²⁹⁾

When this principle is accepted and observed by the two sides of divided Korea, the first objective of forestalling another war can be achieved, and more positively a strong base can be laid for unification in peace.

The third meaning is the pledge to the co-prosperity of the 50 million people of the south and the north. When the country remains divided, its development and prosperity are bound to be hampered that much. Today's national tragedy is that the people and the state cannot function as ones, respectively, and that the two sides are obliged to promote expensive and separate survival and development because of their hostile confrontation. The greatest task facing the Korean nationalism of the 1980s will probably be to terminate such unfortunate state at an early date and to achieve spirit prosperity and development of the 50 million people as a unified political entity by accomplishing "national construction".

Needless to say again, the south-north dialogue should be resumed early in order to embody these three meanings.

The January 19 proposal called for unconditional talks for the fulfilment of such requirements. The north Korean response to the proposal came on January 23, 1979 in the form of a statement by the

so-called "Central Committee of the Democratic Front for Unification of the Fatherland," in which it suggested that 1) the July 4 South-North Joint Communiqué be reaffirmed, 2) all acts of slander and defamation against each other be suspended, 3) all military activities that threaten each other be ceased, 4) a whole nation conference be convened among the representatives of political parties and social organizations, patriotic people of various circles in the south and the north, and the representatives of oversea resident, and 5) prior to the convocation of a whole nation conference, a preliminary meeting be held between the working-level officials of various political parties and social organizations.²⁴⁾

How can the Pyongyang reaction of such form and contents be evaluated?

First, it must be pointed out that the reaction was made in a statement of the "Democratic Front for Unification of the Fatherland" which has no power of representation nor any actual rights despite the fact that the Seoul-side proposal ought to have been heeded to by the responsible authorities of north Korea. In other words, the Pyongyang reaction could hardly be taken as an official one.

It is true that north Korea insists that "Democratic Front" represents the Workers' Party and other political parties and social organizations of north Korea. But, even in those Communist countries maintaining their parties' supremacy over their governments, the subject in the external exercise of the power of representation is the government, not the party, Pyongyang, apparently aware of such contention, issued a statement in the name of vice president Pak Sung-chul on the night of January 25, expressing the hope that the proposal of the "Democratic Front" will be accepted.²⁵⁾ However, this, being a mere opinion expressed within itself not a direct notice to the Seoul-side authorities, could not be considered as an official answer.

Whereas it was suggested in the January 19 proposal that a dialogue be held between the authorities of the south and the north without any preconditions, north Korea proposed the holding of

political parties and social organizations with a time limit, early June, to discuss the convocation of a "whole nation conference." In other words, the north Koreans in effect rejected a dialogue between the authorities of the two sides, and, at the same time, attached a condition to the reopening of the dialogue.

Here, the spokesman of the Republic of Korea government, in a statement on January 26, called for a response from the responsible authorities of north Korea to the January 19 proposal of south Korea, emphasizing that a south-north dialogue can come to a successful fruition only when it is held between the responsible authorities of the two sides.²⁶⁾

It wasn't so difficult to understand what the north Korean response pointed to. Just like it attempted to torpedo the South-North Coordinating Committee on the excuse of a "grand national conference" in 1973, north Korea sought to destroy the South-North Coordinating Committee on the excuse, this time, of a "whole nation conference." In other words, north Korea, while feigning to respond affirmatively to the January 19 proposal, actually attempted to deactivate the South-North Coordinating Committee and further alter the South-North Joint Communiqué by way of a dialogue. This was evident in the fact that north Korea failed to discuss concretely the issue of the overall implementation of the provisions of the South-North Joint Communiqué though it asserted it reaffirms the Joint Communiqué in the statement of the "Democratic Front."

Here, the Seoul side urged the resumption of the South-North Coordinating Committee in a statement of the Seoul-side acting co-chairman of the Coordinating Committee on January 31. The Seoul side also called for the immediate restoration of the direct Seoul-Pyongyang telephone line which the Pyongyang side had severed onesidedly.²⁷⁾

It is the consensus of all those concerned about the south-north dialogue at home and abroad that the observance and implementation of the Joint Communiqué would be the decisive first step toward the resumption of the stalled inter-Korean dialogue. Surely

the South-North Joint Communiqué incorporates the concrete plan and methods for the independent and peaceful unification of the fatherland as well as the grand unity of the people. It is for this reason that both south and north Korea should base all their ideas and offers for their mutual dialogue upon this historical document.

Such being the case, north Korea ought to have accepted the Seoul-side proposal of January 31 to resume the South-North Coordinating Committee on the basis of the South-North Joint Communiqué.

Nevertheless, north Korea did not follow this reasonable path. By repeating its overtures to the south in a state where it virtually scrapped the key portion of the Joint Communiqué, north Korea had laid a serious roadblock to the resumption of the dialogue. This negative attitude of north Korea was well displayed in the February 5 statement of the "Democratic Front" in which north Korea denied the existence of the South-North Coordinating Committee expressly provided for in the Joint Communiqué and instead demanded the inauguration of a so-called "preparatory committee for national unification," an organization which wasn't mentioned at all in the Joint Communiqué.

The statement claimed that the South-North Coordinating Committee "had lost its *raison d'être*," claiming that the Coordinating Committee is an "extremely limited organization."²⁸⁾

Anyone who had a look at the text of the South-North Joint Communiqué would easily know how such contentions override the Joint Communiqué. As was already discussed before, Article 6 of the Joint Communiqué declares that the two sides "have agreed to establish and operate a South-North Coordinating Committee in order to implement the agreed items of the Joint Communiqué, solve various problems existing between the south and the north, and to settle the unification problem of the basis of the agreed principles for unification of the fatherland." Moreover, the Agreed Minute on Formation and Operation of South-North Coordinating Committee signed between the two sides on November 4, 1972 with a view to embodying the provision of Article 6 of the Joint Communiqué, sets forth the extensive function of the Coordinating Com-

mittee, which is to "consult about, settle and guarantee the implementation of the solution of" 1) the question of realizing an independent and peaceful unification, 2) the question of effecting wide-ranging political exchanges between political parties, social organizations and individuals in the south and the north, 3) the question of easing military confrontation between the two sides, and 4) the question of taking joint steps in overseas activities.

Rejection of South-North Coordinating Committee, a dialogue machinery with a wide-ranging function agreed upon between the south and the north, means that north Korea has no intention of respecting and implementing the South-North Joint Communiqué featuring a call for the establishment and operation of the Coordinating Committee.

It also bears testimony to the lack of any willingness on the part of north Korea to resume the suspended dialogue at an early date to meet the national aspiration.

Amidst these conflicting positions and contentions between the south and the north, an abnormal contact took place at Panmunjom on February 17, 1979. The Seoul side was represented at the contact by the Seoul-side members of the South-North Coordinating Committee while the representatives of the "Democratic Front" attended it from the Pyongyang side.

At this contact, the Seoul side made the following offers to the Pyongyang side:

- The fourth meeting of the South-North Coordinating Committee be held in Pyongyang on April 3, 1979;

- For the speedy and smooth communication of opinions between the two sides, the direct south-north telephone line of the South-North Coordinating Committee be reopened at 9 a.m. February 20, 1979; and

- To discuss the resumption of the South-North Coordinating Committee, a contact of the officers of the Coordinating Committee be held at 10 a.m. March 7, 1979 at Panmunjom.²⁹⁾

The Pyongyang side rejected these suggestions. Declaring that there does not exist any South-North Coordinating Committee in

Pyongyang,³⁰⁾ the Pyongyang side refused to agree to the reopening of the Coordinating Committee. Pyongyang's denial of the existence of the Coordinating Committee amounts to its rejection of the whole of the South-North Joint Communiqué. The prevailing theory is that a treaty or a declaration signed between two countries or two parties under the international law is inclusive as a whole. There cannot be the unilateral and arbitrary contention that some of the provisions of a treaty or a declaration are accepted while others are not. It is one of the common senses that when either of the signatories wish to amend or supplement part of a treaty or a declaration, it can be done so only through an agreement between the parties involved. This is the reason we interpret Pyongyang's denial of the South-North Coordinating Committee as its rejection of the entire South-North Joint Communiqué. Here, we feel the need to look again into the attitude of north Korea toward the south-north dialogue. Why does north Korea deny the South-North Coordinating Committee expressly provided for in the Joint Communiqué signed between the two sides as a milestone on the road toward unification?

Why does north Korea reject the offer for an unconditional discussion of all problems between the responsible authorities of the two sides and instead insist on the creation of an absurd channel of dialogue?

North Korea definitely has an eye at something else.

First, the north Koreans attempt to exploit south-north contacts for the expedition of the complete withdrawal of the U.S. military forces in Korea. They try to create a "deceptive atmosphere" internationally in which a dialogue goes on and peace takes root on the Korean peninsula, with a view to obliterating the ground for the presence of U.S. forces in south Korea.

Second, north Korea hopes to use inter-Korean contacts in paving the way to direct negotiations with the United States as well as to prompting Japan's equidistance diplomacy toward both south and north Korea. Aware that no dialogue can be had with the United States unless it is preceded by inter-Korean contacts, north

Korea came to the table of contacts at Panmunjom merely to meet this condition. In other words, Pyongyang sat with Seoul at Panmunjom with its mind at Washington. They are practicing Lenin's strategy, "To London and Paris by Way of Shanghai and Bombay." Their strategy was to carry on empty contacts while blocking any substantial progress of the dialogue, and thereby to prompt the "doves" in the United States, less familiar with the essence of the inter-Korean relations and north Korea, to advocate a dialogue between Washington and Pyongyang.

Third, north Korea may believe that it can obtain economic assistance from the United States in the event Washington-Pyongyang negotiations begin against the backdrop of inter-Korean contacts or dialogue. Most of Western economic experts believe that the north Korean economy is in a crisis because of excessive military outlays, backwardness of technology, shortage of capital and accumulated foreign debts. In fact, north Korea pushes through the Seventh Economic plan beginning 1978 largely to find a way out of the present economic difficulty. An economically troubled north Korea is thinking of introducing capital and skill from the United States.

Fourth, north Korea schemes to foment an internal disorder in south Korea, namely, alienation of the people from the government, through the abnormal contacts. This is why north Korea shuns "talks between the responsible authorities" and instead puts forth the "Democratic Front" or demands "contacts of political parties and social organizations" or "whole nation conference."

North Korea seeks to bolster its own strength while attempting to weaken the security posture of south Korea. In other words, north Korea attempts to foment, through abnormal contacts between the south and the north, an atmosphere for the expedition of the "communization of south Korea."

In fact, Professor Hwang Sung-mo described as follows the motive of north Korea's rejection of the south-north dialogue: "Why does north Korea still have to reject dialogue?..... The reason lies in the fact that the Workers' Party adopts as its basic policy the goal of

prompting a Communist revolution in south Korea. More fundamentally, however, why is that the north Korean society itself is unable to give rise to the sense of national integrity. Because of the socialistic system of north Korea being a 'base for the liberation of south Korea,' the north Korean residents' feelings about the people of south Korea cannot but be identical to those toward an enemy country until 'liberation' (unification) is realized. The distinction between 'our group' and 'other group' is being spurred at the Party's indoctrination programs. This has produced not a regime of the people but a regime for the Party. An atmosphere has been developed in which a regime represents only a 'special will.' Unless this atmosphere is rectified no approach can be guaranteed."³¹) This is the very element that impedes in south-north approach.

Meanwhile, it was announced in the Korea-U.S. Joint Communiqué of July 1, 1979 that the two countries jointly proposed a "meeting of senior official representatives of the south and the north of Korea and the United States" as a new approach to the solution of the Korean question. This latest proposal can be studied from several angles as follows:

-- The proposal can be reviewed in the linkage with the January 19 proposal, which emphasized the need for talks between the authorities of the south and the north of Korea. While explaining about the January 19 proposal, the government made it clear that the government does not adhere only to a dialogue under the South-North Coordinating Committee, stating that a dialogue can be held through another channel. This means that if a dialogue can be held and it can take place between the responsible authorities, the government would not necessarily rely only upon the single channel of the South-North Coordinating Committee.

-- In the proposed "the meeting of three authorities," the U.S.'s role should be limited to a middleman's role, that is, a part played in bringing about a dialogue between the south and the north of Korea. If the suspended south-north dialogue can be resumed through the efforts of the United States, it would be much conducive to easing of tensions on the Korean peninsula.

-- No hasty conclusion can be arrived at as to the prospects of "the meeting of three authorities" It would not be wise diplomatically to be pessimistic.

-- The proposal can be taken, in a sense, as an effort of the south Korean government to adapt itself to the atmosphere of the world community advocating the adjustment of the status quo of the Korean peninsula.

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At the moment, the south-north dialogue remains deadlocked. However, this deadlock cannot be allowed to go on. In order to move even a step closer to unification, the south-north dialogue must be resumed promptly. What, then, can be the condition of the resumption of the dialogue?

The answer is easy. All that is needed is for north Korea to agree to the offer for the resumption of the South-North Coordinating Committee provided for in the July 4 South-North Joint Communique. If Pyongyang is discontent with the composition of the Coordinating Committee, it may be reorganized and expanded through mutual agreement. The north Korean idea of enabling political parties and social organizations to take part in dialogue, too, can be realized through the reorganization and expansion of the Coordinating Committee.

To repeat it again, the South-North Joint Communique is the nation's basic document for peace and unification. Neither of the two sides of divided Korea can deviate from this important document. National problems should be solved on the basis of this basic document.

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Changes in Situations Surrounding Korea and New Development in South-North Dialogue

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1. Foreword

Turbulent changes have taken place in the international situations surrounding the Korean peninsula in the 1970s. These changing situations must have had and would have some effect on the relations between the south and the north of Korea. In this paper, attempts were made to study how the situations surrounding the Korean peninsula undergo changes and what impact such changes would have on the inter-Korean dialogue.

The power relations in Northeast Asia is switching from the polarized system formed in the course of U.S.-USSR confrontation to a four-power system among the United States, Japan, China and the Soviet Union. The four powers form among themselves a sort of equilibrium as they normalize their relations and none of the four can dominate the rest. However, the intensifying Sino-USSR confrontation, which has come in place of the bygone U.S.-USSR confrontation, makes the four-power balance somewhat fluid.

Along these changing situations, the four powers tend to recognize the status quo of "two states within a nation" on the Korean peninsula.

Meanwhile, from economic aspects apart from the issue of security, the power countries in Northeast Asia pursue cooperative relations among them, increasingly becoming interdependent. Thanks to this development, the four powers have solved all problems — the heritages of World War II — with the exception of

those of the Korean peninsula, Taiwan and the four islands near Hokkaido, Japan.

These changes foster the "Koreanization of the Korean question." This may well be a new development of the south-north dialogue. Seen from this angle, the situations surrounding the Korean peninsula move in a direction where the solution of the Korean question is sought through negotiations between the authorities of south and north Korea based on the principle of self-determination of peoples. The country which can exercise the greatest influence over the Korean question among the four is the United States, for the United States not only maintains its troops in Korea but also assumes the role of a referee or balancer in the power relations among the four. It is presumed therefore that if the United States keeps up this role, the authorities of north Korea would ultimately negotiate with south Korea.

The themes to be handled in this paper can be summarized:

First, a sort of four-power balance has been formed around the Korean peninsula. But, the Sino-Soviet disputes make the four-power relations fluid, fomenting wars by proxy or relations of frictions in peripheries.

Second, the four powers have been improving their mutual relations through diplomatic normalization between the United States and China and between Japan and China. As a result, the four powers in principle pursue a policy of maintaining the status quo of the Korean peninsula.

Third, since the oil crisis in 1973, the international economic relations have grown more interdependent. In Northeast Asia, too, the degree of economic interdependence has increased with Japan as a center, especially after China has begun to pursue a pro-West, open-door diplomacy lately.

Fourth, these situations flow in a direction where they prompt the Korean question to depart from its direct linkage with the four powers and to be solved by the two sides of Korea themselves. In other words, an atmosphere is being fostered for the "Koreanization of the Korean question."

Seen from long-term aspects, the situations surrounding Korea are conducive to the south-north dialogue. The more important the position of Korea becomes in the world community, the brighter the prospects of a dialogue become.

One thing that must be pointed out here is that the security and peace on the Korean peninsula represent one of the prerequisites to the balance among the four powers in Northeast Asia. In particular, south Korea overwhelms north Korea in terms of economy, and plays a part in the four-power relations directly or indirectly. North Korea alone opposes the maintenance of the status quo of the Korean peninsula. However, since such opposition runs counter to the flow of the situations surrounding Korea, north Korea is bound to recognize the reality at a time when it tries to seek the road to legitimacy in a way other than personality cult and revolution.

In international relations, nothing can be taken for granted. The trends given above can continue only under specific suppositive conditions. Among the conditions can be: the Sino-Soviet disputes would continue, and even if a reconciliation is made, it would be a limited one; China would continue to pursue an open-door policy; the cooperative relations among the United States, Japan and China would be kept up as they are now; Japan and other periphery countries would not develop nuclear weapons; no armed clashes would occur on the Korean peninsula and Taiwan; and, most important, the United States would live up to its security commitment to Korea, Japan and Taiwan.

If anything contrary would happen, it would endanger the four-power equilibrium and stability on the Korean peninsula. For example, if the Sino-USSR relations get improved or perilously deteriorate, it would inevitably result in heightened tensions on the Korean peninsula. What we must note here in particular is that the Vietnam situation in 1979, in nature, features the kind of a war fought by proxy between the Mainland China and the Soviet Union while the Korean War of 1950 was in nature a proxy war between the United States and the Soviet Union. Another likelihood is that a political change would take place in China, adversely affecting the

Sino-U.S. and Sino-Japan relations.

The international relations in Northeast Asia, thus, depend much on frictions among Communist countries prompted by the emergence of nationalism as well as on political changes taking place in many countries.

Suppose the above-given developments of the situations surrounding the Koean peninsula would be maintained, the south-north dialogue could be reopened depending on judgement by the north Korean leadership. In other words, the future of inter-Korean dialogue will be determined depending on how the policy makers of north Korea understand the situations surrounding Korea, the U.S.'s Korea policy and the political situation in south Korea. For this reason, the military, economic and political stability is no less important than the present situations around the Korean peninsula. This is because when the Korean question becomes Koreanized, south Korea must compete with north Korea on its own in struggles for historical continuity.

2. Sino-USSR Dispute and Four-Power Balance

Most important of the changes taking place around the Korean peninsula may well be the deteriorating Sino-USSR dispute and the birth of the four-power equilibrium formed through the split of the Communist world prompted by the feuds between the two Communist giants and through the U.S.'s improvement of relations with China and the USSR. Beginning with the turn of the 1970s, the Sino-USSR relations have turned from bad to worse. Taking advantage of this dispute, the United States has forged the "detente system" and terminated the Vietnam War. As the U.S.-USSR Cold War has gradually subsided, a new type of Cold War has replaced the old Cold War in Northeast Asia. This is the Sino-USSR dispute, which is more fiercely staged in Southeast Asia, causing a war by proxy there.

The four-power balance was formed on the base of the improvement of the Sino-U.S. and U.S.-USSR relations. Recently, this

balance has been further formalized with the Sino-U.S. rapprochement and the conclusion of the Japan-China Peace Treaty. After the United States withdrew its troops from the periphery of China upon the conclusion of the Vietnam War, the Soviet Union had begun to intensify its infiltration into the area to fill the power vacuum left by the United States. As a result, the Sino-USSR dispute gained further momentum around this peripheral country. Faced with this dangerous development, the four powers have begun to apply a power balance policy to one another, endeavoring to check the exercise of power politics by any of them. As a result, there has been formed an equilibrium among the four powers.¹⁾

The equilibrium is stable in its structure, but its internal relations are complex. For, the national strength of each of the four powers differs widely and it is a balance formed among politically heterogeneous systems. Therefore, the kind of the cultural identity or the collective treaty that characterized Europe's five-power balance in the 19th century can hardly be found in today's four powers of Northeast Asia. The four-power relationship features mutual restraint and balance resulting from the pursuit of a little different objective and strategy by each of the four. The stability of this equilibrium can be found in that a war among them is almost infeasible. But, the Sino-USSR dispute alters this balance positively. Lately, China and the Soviet Union appear moving toward normalizing their relations. Still, the likelihood is that this would end in a limited reconciliation where only state-level relations would be normalized which would rather contribute to the stability of the four-power balance. Under the circumstances, the status quo of the Korean peninsula, Taiwan and the northern islands of Japan could be maintained, with the Korean question left to the direct parties, south and north Korea.

In order to understand the changes taking place in the situations surrounding the Korean peninsula, the need exists to have a quick look at how the international order has changed historically in Northeast Asia. The international relations from the ancient years to date in Northeast Asia can be classified into the following four

stages seen from long term aspects.

First, from the Chou period of ancient China to the 1840s, the China order had reigned over the Asian continent. China acted as the suzerain state in the world while Korea and Annam (Vietnam of today) in its peripheries served the kings of China as emperors, paying tributes to them and in return having their historical continuity recognized by the emperors. The emperors of China extended their recognition to the kings of the peripheral states and thereby rationalized their unequal relations, employing a power-balance strategy to ensure the security of China. On the other hand, the peripheral states, though being in the subordinate relationship, had pursued a nationalistic road with a view to getting independent of the Chinese influence.

Second, imperialistic wars had spread to the region from the 1840s to 1945 after Britain and France, first to be modernized in Europe, expanded their influence to Northeast Asia and challenged the China order. At that time, Japan, modernized before any other countries in Asia, had begun to infiltrate the China continent in an imperialistic scheme. From this time on, China and Japan have been acting as nucleus influences in Northeast Asia, with the order in the area having been determined through the balance of the two country. It was when this balance was destroyed that the flank forces — Britain, Russia and the United States — intervened. Peripheral countries had to suffer sacrifices in their frictions with newly emerging imperialistic countries challenging China and Japan.

When Japanese imperialism extended its influence to Korea and Manchuria, it inevitably headed for a clash with China, touching off the Sino-Japanese War in 1894. Emerging victorious in the war, Japan drove the Chinese influence out of Korea and colonized Taiwan and the Pescadores. Again in 1905, Japan clashed with Russia, and winning the war, expelled the Russian influence from Manchuria and Korea. In this Russo-Japanese War, the United States assumed a mediatory role. At the same time, the Western influences like Britain, France and Germany, and Japan had gone all-out to expand their respective interests toward China. It was this

time that the United States declared an "open-door policy" toward China, endeavoring to safeguard the integrity of the China territory. In other words, the United States began to play the role of a judge in struggles among other powers.

Nevertheless, China had fallen into a sort of semi-colony of world powers, while its peripheral countries had been turned into their colonies. France, which won the Sino-French War of 1883-85, colonized Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia in Indochina. On the other hand, Japan made Korea its protectorate in 1905, and annexed it as a colony in 1910. In 1931, Japan created a satellite country, Manchuria. In 1937, Japan began to invade the mainland China and occupied Vietnam afterwards, emerging as the uncontested power in Northeast Asia. In fact, Japan attempted to place China under its control under the cloak of "Great East Asia Co-Prosperty Sphere." It was to check this Japanese machination that the United States fought Japan in World War II.

Third, after World War II until before the 1970s, an international order featuring polarization between the United States and the Soviet Union had been formed in Northeast Asia. The Red Chinese regime, born in 1949, persuaded Stalin into signing a Sino-USSR friendship and cooperation agreement, which was, of course, directed against Japan and its ally (U.S.). The Korean War that flared up in 1950 caused China and the USSR to be recognized as a single Communist sphere. As a result, the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union was further intensified. With a view to coping with the Sino-USSR alliance, the United States concluded a security agreement with Japan which had freshly emerged as one of its allies. In order to block the expansion of China, the United States signed mutual defense agreements with south Korea and Taiwan, and formed SEATO with Southeast Asian countries in 1954.

Meanwhile, after Vietnam was divided along the 17th Parallel under the Geneva Convention signed in 1954, South Vietnam was plunged into a guerrilla war. The United States, believing that Red China and the Soviet Union pulled strings behind guerrilla activities

in South Vietnam, poured its troops there in place of France in order to check the communist drive. Since the turn of the 1960s, on the other hand, China and the USSR had gradually transformed the the ideological dispute begun after the death of Stalin into clashes for national interests, even undergoing armed clashes in the border areas.

Fourth, the United States, capitalizing on the worsening Sino-USSR relations, negotiated with the two countries separately to unfold an age of detent, creating the four-power system in Northeast Asia in the 1970s. Especially after the Vietnam War, the power relations among the four powers in Northeast Asia have been reformed, influenced by the U.S.'s detente, political change in China, and the aggravating Sino-USSR dispute.

a. Sino-USSR Dispute and Four-Power Relations

The switch of the Sino-USSR relationship from alliance to antagonism has provided the United States with an opportunity to improve its relations with both of them. The experience gained in the Vietnam War had played a considerable part in the adoption of such power-balance policy by the United States. Of course, the Nixon-Kissinger diplomacy had contributed much to ending the Cold War by pursuing new relations with the Communist forces. Still the Sino-USSR dispute played a substantial role in making the Kissinger diplomacy working. It was due to this dispute that Red China and the Soviet Union responded affirmatively to the diplomatic initiative taken by the United States. As the Sino-U.S. and U.S.-USSR relations have consequently switched from confrontation to negotiations, the Sino-Japan relationship, too, has been normalized. The four powers have, thus, refit their respective bilateral relations, giving birth to the new four-power relations.

The element that played a pioneer role in refitting the four-power relationship was the "Shanghai Joint Communiqué" signed between the United States and mainland China in 1972. In the Communiqué, the two countries agreed for the first time on the

principle of "anti-power politics" in Asia and promised to strive to normalize their diplomatic relations. Red China used the communique in checking the Soviet attempt to have a control of China. Thanks to this new relationship with the United States, Red China could move its troops from the southeastern border area to the Sino-USSR border line. When the United States withdrew its forces from Southeast Asia under the Nixon Doctrine, the Chinese leadership judged that the U.S. could be used as a deterrent to Russian aggression.

Just like the Nixon Administration sought a new power balance among the five powers of the U.S., USSR, China, Japan and Western Europe, Red China had resolved to cooperate with the United States in efforts to restrain the USSR's power politics or efforts to blockade China. When the Soviet Union attempted to form an anti-Red China front on the pretext of the so-called "Asian collective security," China tried to create an anti-Soviet united front, arguing, "We cannot let a tiger (USSR) in from the back door while chasing a wolf (U.S.) away through the front door." For this reason, Red China wished that the United States will maintain strong Naval and Air Force units in Asia and will continue to maintain its political and economic influence in Japan and elsewhere in the Pacific area. This way, Red China, considering its dispute with the Soviet Union as a zero sum game, has begun to wage a fierce competition all over the world.

The diplomatic rapprochement between Japan and Red China in September 1972 has further bolstered the four-power system. When the United States secretly contacted Peking, it did not consult with Japan, one of its allies. Shocked at Washington's sudden approach to Peking, the Japanese government negotiated with China and effected diplomatic rapprochement ahead of the United States. Prime Minister Tanaka issued a joint communique with Premier Chou En-lai, in which the two countries vowed that neither of them would pursue power politics in Asia and the Pacific area. At the same time, the joint communique said Japan will respect what China would claim toward Taiwan. Japan and China

also agreed to conclude a peace and friendship agreement between the two countries. This Sino-Japanese rapprochement in such a "Japanese style" has enabled Japan to continue to carry out economic and cultural relations with Taiwan even after Japan opened diplomatic relations with mainland China and severed formal ties with Taiwan. The Tanaka-Chou communique did not touch on the U.S.-Japan security agreement or the Sino-USSR alliance treaty. But, so far as the two countries are concerned, the effect of these treaties have become meaningless now that the Sino-Japanese relation have been normalized.

Under the circumstances, the four-power balance in Northeast Asia has gradually taken shape. Although the United States and Red China were yet to normalize their diplomatic relations fully, they established "liaison offices" in each other's capital in 1973, which have in effect functioned as embassies. Japan already restored its diplomatic relationship with the Soviet Union in 1955. But, the conclusion of a Japan-USSR peace treaty has been delayed because of the issue of northern islands. For the first time after World War II, the four powers have de facto completed the normalization of their inter-state relations transcending ideologies. What is important here is that the United States, Japan and China have declared their pursuit of a power-balance policy, using the expression of "anti-power politics." This represents a general principle that they oppose the control of the rest of them by any of the four. More concretely, however, it is meant to block the expansionism of the Soviet Union. This way, the Sino-USSR dispute has become a factor contributing to the four-power balance. But, this Sino-USSR dispute, which goes on even after the birth of the four power system, has the danger of splitting this relationship.

b. Advent of Triangular Relations among U.S., Japan and Red China

As a result of Red China's pursuit of an anti-USSR and pro-Western diplomacy, triangular relations among the United States,

Japan and China have emerged in Northeast Asia. In other words, the three countries have grown even more closer with the conclusion of the Sino-Japanese peace treaty and the Sino-U.S. rapprochement in 1978. The three countries again agreed on "anti-power politics" and, at the same time, decided to solve all bilateral problems in peaceful manners only. In this respect, the triangular relations, in nature, have the traits of a sort of "security community." Meanwhile, the exclusion of the Soviet Union from this relationship points to the polarization of the four-power system.

The triangular relationship among the U.S., Japan and China has been rapidly formed after the Hua Guo-feng and Deng Xiao-ping system, that emerged in China after the death of Mao Tse-tung, has pursued the "four modernization" plan internally and externally a pro-Western open-door diplomacy. In China from 1973 to 1976, there continued a power struggle between the "four bandits" and Chou En-lai and Deng Xiao-ping, during which China was somewhat cool toward the United States and Japan. In particular, when the United States disengaged itself from Southeast Asia rapidly in the wake of the fall of South Vietnam in 1975, China was worried about the weakening influence of the United States. Here, China endeavored to block the Soviet expansionism by joining hands with Japan and ASEAN countries. In consequence, China wanted to have diplomatic relations with the United States as a strategic deterrent in its efforts to cope with the Soviet Union.

In 1974, Japan and China entered negotiations for a peace treaty. The talks broke up in September 1975, but were resumed in early 1978, ending in success in August the same year.

Beginning in 1974, China stopped accusing Japan of pursuing "militarism," while recognizing the need for a security agreement between the U.S. and Japan. However, China could not execute a decisive foreign policy due to the domestic political situations of these two countries. Besides, Japan rejected an "anti-power politics" clause advocated by China. These factors were responsible for the delay in the signing of peace agreement. Japan strove to pursue an "equidistance diplomacy" as much as possible toward China and the

Soviet Union. Despite such efforts of Japan, the Soviet Union declared a 200-mile fishery zone incorporating the four northern islands at issue in March 1977, refusing any negotiations on the islands. Moreover, the Soviets staged a large-scale Naval maneuver near Hokkaido of Japan in early 1978. This has prompted the financial circles, to call for the buildup of armament. Prime Minister Fukuda offered that if China can accept a provision that the "anti-power politics" clause is not directed against any specific third country, Japan is willing to agree to the position of China. China accepted this idea, resulting in the signing of the Japan-China Peace and Friendship Agreement in August, the ratified documents of which were exchanged in the presence of Fukuda and Deng in Tokyo in October the same year.

This agreement carries mostly symbolic meanings. In addition to the "anti-power politics" clause, the two countries agreed in the treaty to terminate the state of war and to further consolidate their economic and cultural relations through peaceful means. The two nucleus countries of Northeast Asia have thus again come to assume a central role in the solution of Asian problems for the first time after the final years of the 19th century.

The key element that had impeded in diplomatic normalization between the United States and China was the Taiwan issue.²⁾ In the solution of this problem, the expanding Soviet influence had prompted a Sino-U.S. agreement on strategic views, causing the two countries to decide to leave the Taiwan issue as it was. Originally, China demanded that the United States accept the three points which Chou En-lai set forth in 1973 with regard to the question of Taiwan, the three-point demand being that the United State, 1) sever its diplomatic ties with Taiwan, 2) repeal the defense agreement it concluded with Taiwan in 1954, and 3) withdraw its troops from Taiwan. China declared time and again that if the U.S. accepted this, it would normalize its relations with Washington in the "Japan style." Of the three items, the demand for repeal of the security agreement had posed the most difficult problem to the United States. For, the abandonment of a commitment given to a

country and its people was improper from moral aspects, and, in effect, could endanger the security of the Taiwanese. Here the United States proposed that if China officially makes the pledge that it would settle the Taiwan issue peacefully step by step and would never use the force of arms, it would be willing to accept the three-point demand. China, regarding the Taiwan issue as one of its internal problems, rejected the American proposition.

However, as threats from the Soviet Union had mounted, China told the U.S. on several occasions that it has no intention of settling the Taiwan question by force of arms. The United States, receiving it affirmatively, announced in December 1978 that it would enter full diplomatic relations with China on January 1, 1979. On March 1 the same year, Washington and Peking exchanged ambassadors, and by April 30, the United States pulled all the remaining 700 military advisors out of Taiwan. The U.S.-Taiwan defense agreement will remain in force until January 1, 1980 based on its provisions.

Nevertheless, the United States has resolved to sell defensive weapons to Taiwan continuously for the security of Taiwan, and to keep up the economic and cultural relations with it. The U.S. Congress, which could not directly participate in the realization of the Sino-U.S. rapprochement by the Carter Administration, passed a resolution stipulating that "it will continue to have an interest in guaranteeing the security of Taiwan, while supporting a peaceful solution."

The Sino-U.S. joint communique, issued on the occasion of their diplomatic normalization, too, declared anti-power politics. China, in particular, denounced the Soviet Union for expanding its influence in Southeast Asia in collusion with Vietnam. China recognizes the United States as a strategic partner in coping with "north pole bear." The United States, too, holds China as a strategic partner in checking the Soviet Union from expanding its influence and thereby shaking power balance in Northeast Asia. This is the same with Japan. The triangle relations among the U.S., Japan and China was completed with the Sino-U.S. rapprochement. The three

countries are, thus, taking common steps to keep the USSR from shaking the four-power balance.

The Sino-Japan peace agreement and the Sino-U.S. rapprochement have rendered the Sino-USSR alliance treaty meaningless. This is because China has signed peace and diplomatic normalization agreements with Japan and the United States, respectively, the countries which were described in the Sino-USSR treaty as potential enemies of their alliance. Under the circumstances, Communist China notified the USSR in April 1979 that it would scrap the 30-year-old Sino-USSR alliance treaty in April 1980. In this way, the four powers are restructuring their bilateral political and economic relations rather than forming a military alliance against any specific country.

c. Vietnam Situation and Proxy War between China and USSR, and Feasibility of Conciliation

The Soviet Union, having been alienated from the formation of the triangular relations among the U.S., Japan and China in Northeast Asia, has advanced to Southeast Asia where it, entering an alliance relationship with Vietnam, has embarked on the blockade of China. On the other hand, Vietnam invaded Cambodia with a backing from the Soviet Union.

To punish this, China marched into Vietnam. The Sino-USSR dispute has thus emerged as a proxy war in Southeast Asia. In the 1960s, there was a clash in Vietnam between the United States and China-USSR. In the latter half of the 1970s, a Sino-USSR confrontation flared up in the same Southeast Asian country. Beginning in June 1970, China and the USSR have been seeking negotiations of a new dimension to avoid direct clashes between them.

While the United States disengaged itself from the peripheries of China and abandoned its role as world police after the Vietnam War, the Soviet Union has speedily expanded its influence in the peripheries of China, elsewhere in Asia and Africa. Beginning with the communization of Vietnam in April 1975, a total of seven

countries have fallen into the pro-USSR sphere. Pro-Soviet regimes have been set up in Vietnam, Laos, Angola, Ethiopia, South Yemen, Afghanistan and Cambodia. In Africa, about 40,000 Cuban troops are stationed in Angola and Ethiopia in lieu of Russians.

In Asia, the Soviet Union has beefed up the Far East Fleet in the West Pacific, and increased military and economic assistance for Vietnam. In June 1978, the Russians admitted Vietnam into Comecon. In November the same year, they concluded a friendship and cooperation agreement, which provides that if either of the two countries comes under attack by a third country, the other party will promptly consult and provide all available assistance. With this guarantee secured, Vietnam occupied Cambodia, which was under the rule of the pro-Peking Pol Pot regime, in January 1979, establishing a pro-Vietnam regime there.

China, branding this as "small power politics" or as "the Cuba of Asia," raided Vietnam in February with a view to "teaching a lesson." After three-week-long military actions, China withdrew invasion forces from Vietnam, and now have peace talks with Vietnam.

Clearly the Vietnam situation has a strong tendency of a proxy war between China and the USSR. Despite its ally was invaded, the Russians did not take any action beyond oral threats to sanction China. The Soviet responds affirmatively to China's offer for negotiations, which was made after China notified the USSR of the repeal of the Sino-USSR alliance treaty. China felt the need to improve its relations with the USSR to a certain extent if only to avoid the need to bolster military forces along the Sino-USSR border and to forestall possible difficulty in the implementation of the "four modernization" programs by avoiding direct clashes with the Soviet. China also believed that a little improvement of its relations with the USSR could prevent the Russians from drifting too close to the United States with the signing of the Salt II agreement. The Soviet Union, too, is faced with the need to negotiate with China in order to ensure security along the Sino-USSR border and to prevent ex-

cessively close adherence between China and the U.S. For these reasons, it seems likely that Sino-USSR negotiations will be materialized.

However, even if a Sino-USSR conciliation would be realized, it would be on a limited state-level. Improved relations will be restricted only to some functional areas such as trade and cultural agreements. China vows it would adhere to its "orthodoxy" in the international Communist movement by carrying on ideological disputes. At the same time, China keeps demanding that in order to facilitate the solution of the problems pending between the two countries, the Russian forces now poised along the Sino-USSR border move to the rear areas. Russia rejects this. And, inasmuch as the two countries have been enlisting their peoples' rising support by denouncing each other, it appears difficult to achieve a genuine conciliation. Still, the two countries can modify a little their hitherto zero sum game and seek a way to cooperate with each other to some extent in some functional areas while continuing to be in the state of confrontation in the areas of military and ideology.

Under the circumstances, it is likely that the Sino-USSR dispute will further aggravate politically and militarily in Asia. It is said that the USSR has already obtained the right to use the Cam Ran naval base of Vietnam. Since this poses a serious threat to China's maritime route, China is expected to seek even military cooperation with the United States and Japan. Still, China and the USSR are expected to avoid any hot war between them.

The Sino-USSR confrontation will put the four-power relations in Northeast Asia on a very fluid state, but will not bring about any complete polarization of the four-power relations.

d. Maintenance of Status Quo in Peripheries

With the formalization of four-power system, the questions of the Korean peninsula, Taiwan and the four northern islands of Japan alone out of the World War II heritages, remain unsettled. Seen from a long-range viewpoint, the maintenance of status quo in

these peripheral are as may be possible so long as the four-power system is maintained. For, armed clash in those areas may destroy the four-power balance. With the exception of the Japan-USSR relations over the four islands near Hokkaido, Japan, the Korean and Taiwan problems no longer undermine the normalization of the direct relations among the four powers. In other words, until south and north Korea get reunified and until Mainland China and Taiwan ultimately find a solution by means of political approach, the maintenance of status quo, namely, "two states within a nation," may be possible.

So far as the Korean peninsula is concerned, the question of whether the prediction given above could be realized will depend on the policies the four powers takes with regard to the Korean question while it also relies on the power relations among the four powers. When the four powers normalize or improve their respective bilateral relations, the Korean question which remains detached from such bilateral ties will eventually be left to the direct parties, namely, south and north Korea. Such international situation will exercise a profound influence on the attitude each of the four powers assumes toward the Korean question.

3. Korea Policy of World Powers Surrounding Korean Peninsula

Under the four-power system, world powers pursue basically the policy of maintaining the status quo with regard to the Korean question. As was pointed out before, the four powers do not want to see something happen on the Korean peninsula that would shake the strategic interests being formed among themselves. Although the four powers differently view the power relations being restructured in Northeast Asia due to their different domestic and international situations, none of the four powers pursues the destruction of the status quo.

However, China and the Soviet Union have the obligation, under the military treaties signed with north Korea in 1961, to pro-

vide military assistance to north Korea in the event the latter comes under attack from a third party. At the same time, China and the USSR try competitively to recruit north Korea into their respective sides or at least usher it into a neutral zone. For this reason, the two countries are obliged to support north Korea's position officially. On the other hand, the United States and Japan have been supporting south Korea diplomatically. Under the circumstances, the four powers well know that it would be difficult to reach an agreement on the Korean question among them, and, at the same time, it would run counter to their respective interests and aggravate their mutual relations if the status quo of the Korean peninsula were destroyed.

Because the strategic position of each of the four powers differs from one another's, the concrete policies the four powers take toward the Korean question are a little different. China, for instance, supports the diplomatic policies of north Korea formally, but understands the position of south Korea informally.

The Soviet Union, too, endorses north Korea officially. Unofficially, however, the Russians recognize south Korea more realistically than China. Japan expands its non-political relations with north Korea while maintaining close diplomatic relations with south Korea. The United States, while supporting the foreign policies of south Korea, encourages inter-Korean talks. Among the four powers, only the United States is in a position to exercise a decisive influence both politically and militarily for the stability and peace on the Korean peninsula.

a. China

China has lately been pursuing political, economic and even military cooperation with the United States, Japan and West European countries through conventional diplomatic strategy instead of revolution and violence. For this reason, China does not want the occurrence of any event on the Korean peninsula that would undermine its relations with the United States and Japan. When Kim II-sung visited Peking in April 1975, China promised

him a support to such an extent as not to harm its ties with the U.S. and Japan.

Since north Korea serves as a buffer zone for the security of China, Peking extremely values north Korea. Moreover, after Vietnam had drifted into the pro-Soviet sphere, China had to undergo a fierce competition with the USSR for the hearts of north Korea. Herein lies the reason why China has been extending greater economic assistance to north Korea than the USSR since 1972.

Presently China carries out positively a pro-Western, open-door policy for its security and "four modernization" programs. Because of this, China, contrary to the features of the "third world theory" put forth by Deng Xiao-ping in 1974, tries to stage an anti-USSR united front in collusion with the United States of the "first world" and Japan and West Europe of the "second world." Consequently, the "third world," supposedly the center for revolution, is being treated lightly. Moreover, since the "four modernization" programs being underway domestically are closely related with the pro-Western diplomatic policy being pursued by China, both the Sino-U.S rapprochement and Sino-Japan peace treaty restrict greatly China's Korea policy. In 1978, China, while further cementing its ties with north Korea, has begun to take a little different stand over the issue of U.S. military withdrawal compared with Kim Il-sung's.

In 1977, China supported north Korea's position as it was toward the question of the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Korea. In 1978, however, it showed somewhat a modified stand. In 1977, China repeated north Korea's insistence that U.S. forces and their equipment should be pulled out of south Korea "promptly and completely."³ In May 1978 when Hua Kuo-feng visited Pyongyang, the Chinese leader said simply that U.S. forces should withdraw from Korea, dropping the words "promptly and completely." Speaking in Japan in October the same year, Deng Xiao-ping said that unless south Korea takes action first, north Korea will not cause any tense state.⁴ At the same time, it was said that Chinese leaders unofficially made some affirmative remarks on the international position of south Korea before groups of visiting U.S. senators, businessmen

and scholars, that were, south Korea can assume a positive role in maintaining a power balance in Northeast Asia.⁵⁾

From these unofficial views, it can be understood that China accepts the U.S. military presence in south Korea and the south Korean military's role in checking "power politics" by the Soviet Union.

China simply cannot apply a pressure to Kim II-sung, fearful of Pyongyang's turn to Moscow. Therefore, China rather hopes that the United States will either contact north Korea or encourage inter-Korean talks in consultation with south Korea. It seems that the Chinese leadership believe this is necessary for the alleviation of tensions on the Korean peninsula. China, highly sensitive to Russia's economic and other functional contacts with south Korea, tries to make unofficial contacts with Seoul by way of third countries or Hongkong. What must be added here is the fact that presently China, proposing talks with the authorities of Taiwan, pursues economic and other functional contacts with Taiwan based on the principle of self-determination of peoples. This is something comparable to south Korea's overture to north Korea.

b. Soviet Union

In Northeast Asia, the Soviet Union pursues a strategy to blockade the influence of China and pin north Korea down to the pro-USSR sphere. To this end, the Soviet has proposed an "Asian collective security system" and collaborates with Vietnam and other Southeast Asian countries.

The Soviet Union has massed 43 divisions or 25 percent of its entire Army divisions, up-to-date strategic weapons and aircraft along the Sino-USSR border. Since Moscow wants the maintenance of status quo of the Korean peninsula, it recognizes the existence of south and north Korea more realistically than China. Since around 1971, the Soviet Union, unlike China, has given up the position that "north Korea is the only legitimate government on the Korean peninsula."

Since the turn of the 1970s, the relations between the USSR and north Korea has begun to cool down. Originally, the USSR's pursuit of detente with the United States earned Pyongyang's grudge. But, the Soviet leadership was highly critical to the internal politics of north Korea, especially to Kim-II-sung's personality cult. Worse yet, since north Korea has been unable to pay back approximately 1billion dollars it owes to the Soviet, Moscow has scaled down its economic aid for Pyongyang.

The Soviet Union advocates the withdrawal of American forces from Korea, but does not want to see any development detrimental to the maintenance of the status quo of the Korean peninsula.⁶⁾ For, if any frictions occur or Korea is reunified, it could result in the expansion of the Chinese influence, and a unified Korea may drift toward the Chinese side. It is in its modified Korea policy that the Soviet Union allows the entry of south Koreans for non-political businesses since 1973. In 1978, it allowed in even a south Korean cabinet member, and not only international meetings but local newspapers there referred to south Korea as the "Republic of Korea." This way, the Soviet Union tries to expand its contacts with south Korea in unofficial areas as much as possible. For detente on the Korean peninsula, the Soviet Union inwardly supports inter-Korean dialogue.

c. Japan

Japan, which places emphasis on the maintenance of friendly relations with south Korea, keeps only small-scale economic and cultural ties with north Korea.

This "policy of separation of politics from economy" has recently come under attack from opposition parties and some sectors of the ruling party, who are advocating an "equidistance diplomacy" toward south and north Korea.

Following its diplomatic normalization with south Korea in 1965, the Japanese government has upheld the stand that the security of south Korea is essential to Japan's own security. When the

Carter Administration has begun to withdraw its troops from Korea, the Japanese government opposed the U.S. military pullout, arguing that a military equilibrium must be maintained on the Korean peninsula.

At the same time, the Japanese government has adhered to the position that the Korean question should be solved through inter-Korean talks. It is true that the Japanese government, from time to time, showed some moves toward "equidistance diplomacy." But, such moves, taken only to meet some domestic political requirements did not result in any substantial step.

After the Nixon-Sato communique signed in 1969 announced that the security of Korea is directly linked to Japan's, all the administrations of Japan reaffirmed this principle although the way of expression differed slightly.

On the other hand, some members of the Liberal Democratic Party, led by Rep. Tadaharu Kuno, formed the "parliamentarians' league for expedition of Japan-north Korea friendship." Again in 1972 the "Japan-north Korea trade agreement" was concluded at the private level to promote trade with north Korea. Rep. Tokuma Utsunomiya, who has bolted from the Liberal Democratic Party, has striven to improve relations with north Korea by organizing the "citizens' society for normalization of Japan-north Korean relations" in 1973.

After the fall of Vietnam in 1975, on the other hand, some members of the Liberal Democratic Party have formed the Japan-Korea Parliamentarians' League and the Japan-Korea Cooperation Council in the interest of the security and prosperity of south Korea while emphasizing the importance of the "Korea clause" of the Nixon-Sato communique.

When President Carter announced the plan to withdraw American troops from Korea in March 1977, Prime Minister Fukuda conferred with President Carter to stress that the projected troop withdrawal should be carried out in such a way as not to shake the military balance on the Korean peninsula as well as to expedite inter-Korean talks. During his talks with Carter in May 1979, Prime

Minister Ohira reaffirmed that the security of Korea is important to the security of Japan.

The Japanese government has thus been supporting south Korea's position from security aspects while expanding its economic and cultural relations with north Korea to such an extent as not to undermine its relations with south Korea. This approach to north Korea is necessary even to get the 300-million-dollar debt north Korea now owes to Japan repaid. Since the Export-Import Bank of Japan has recently paid trade insurance money to several Japanese creditor-firms, the credit of north Korea as a debtor has further fallen. It is expected that Japan will gradually expand its relations with north Korea as a means of solving such economic problems and exercising a political influence over Pyongyang to some extent. However, so long as there remains the existing political system under which political actions are taken only on the basis of the consensus of opinions, Japan can hardly be expected to take drastic and reformistic policies toward the Korean peninsula.

d. United States

Of the four powers, the one which is directly involved in the Korean question and which exercises a profound influence over it is the United States. Since its intervention in the Korean War, the United States has supported south Korea both militarily and economically. However, after the "Vietnamization" policy was announced in 1969 under the Nixon Doctrine, the United States has scaled down its military strength in Korea. In 1971, the United States pulled its Seventh Division out of Korea. In 1977, it decided to withdraw the Second Division. On the other hand, the United States provides south Korea with military equipment and knowhow to modernize the Republic of Korea Armed Forces.

The Carter Administration has repeatedly vowed that the U.S. will live up to its security commitment to Korea. But, it is true that the strategy for the fulfilment of this commitment has undergone some alteration. The strategy now calls for the phased withdrawal of

ground troops in or around 1982 and instead bolstering of Naval and Air forces in Korea. In fact, Carter's withdrawal policy was rather hastily announced with a view to forestalling a second Vietnam beforehand and enlisting support from the American people. But, the military and the Congress, fearing that the withdrawal may lead to the shaking of military equilibrium on the Korean peninsula, were critical to Carter's troop withdrawal plan. Of course, Japan joined the forces to oppose it. According to what was confirmed recently by U.S. intelligence authorities themselves, the north Korean ground forces total 41 divisions, not the 28 divisions as previously known.

On the other hand, the Soviet Union has steadily been expanding its influence in Africa and Asia. The revolution in Iran posed a serious challenge to the leadership and influence of the United States. It is against this backdrop that the Carter Administration has tentatively suspended the troop withdrawal plan.

After the consensus of opinions on the need for anti-communism had dissipated under the detente system, the Korea-U.S. relations grew a little strained in 1977-79. This was a phenomenon stemming from Carter's pursuit of a new foreign policy as well as from the American politics being staged more openly and competitively. In other words, America's internal politics spread to Korea, with the Park Tong-sun incident and the human rights policy causing some difficulties in the relations between the two traditionally friendly countries. These incidents have now been solved and President Carter's visit to Korea in June 1979 has contributed much to the establishment of fresh relations between the two nations.

The Korea-U.S. relations that were bound ideologically and sentimentally in the past are now being reshaped based on strategic interests.

Inasmuch as the influences of four powers converge on the Korean peninsula, the United States has reaffirmed the fact that the security of south Korea is directly linked to the security of Northeast Asia. Under the circumstances, the United States supports a dialogue between the authorities of south and north Korea while

assisting south Korea militarily.

Toward north Korea, the United States has shunned any official contacts, excepting Military Armistice Commission meetings held at Panmunjom. Since 1974, north Korea has been suggesting to the U.S. that a peace agreement be negotiated and signed between them. But the United States rejected any contacts with north Korea unless they are participated by south Korea. The U.S. government, however, allows private organizations, such as sports teams and press media, to visit north Korea. Officially the United States advocates cross recognition of south and north Korea among the four powers. Lately, this policy was slightly modified, and the United States has now decided that if either China or the USSR establishes relations with south Korea, it will take a corresponding action toward north Korea.

With the 1980 Presidential election drawing near, Carter had a summit meeting with President Park and jointly sponsored a meeting of senior official representatives of south and north Korea and the United States with a view to resuming the south-north dialogue which presently remains suspended.

This way, the United States has come to assume the role of balancer of the four-power relations being formed in Northeast Asia as well as of the inter-Korean relations. By seeking a political solution of the Korean question, the United States retains its influence, trying to induce north Korea into the Western world. Thus, the United States directly intervenes in the inter-Korean dialogue, having influence on dialogue as a cooperator or an accelerator.

At the same time, the United States has come to readjust its withdrawal plan so as to maintain the military balance on the Korean peninsula and expedite a dialogue between south and north Korea. The United States is also expected to take diplomatic actions through China, the USSR or the United Nations in efforts to bring north Korea back to the table of inter-Korean talks.

As was seen in the above, the four powers, though they pursue different policies toward the Korean peninsula, have common interests in that they do not want to see status quo destroyed. They

cannot reach an agreement on the Korean question simply because of the special relations they have with south and north Korea.

Among the four powers, only the United States is in a position to try a renovative policy toward the Korean peninsula.

4. Economic Interdependence and Korean Peninsula

a. Third World and Korean Peninsula

Since the 1973 oil crisis, the economies of the world countries have become more interdependent. The rapid growth of the Korean economy has enhanced the standing of south Korea in the Third World and in its relations with China and the Soviet Union. In fact, when the so-called "Group 77" demanded a "new international economic order" in the wake of the 1973 oil crisis, south Korea was excluded from such a non-aligned movement. However, owing to south Korea's economic advancement to the Middle East and the landing of the Soviet and Cuban influence on Africa, the Third World saw its nature of anti-colonialism fading and the popularity of north Korea in the non-aligned group taking a downturn.

After the U.N. General Assembly adopted two conflicting resolutions supporting the respective positions of south and north Korea in 1975, the Korean question was not debated any longer at the world organization, while many countries of the Third World, Middle East countries in particular, have expanded their economic ties with south Korea. This was a development prompted by the fact that despite the demand by radical Third World countries for the redistribution of resources and wealth, the "new international economic order" is yet to register any achievements since the U.N. Special Assembly in 1974.

As a result, a majority of the Third World countries have come to value economic ties more than ideological propaganda. In fact, when OPEC raised oil price four times in less than a year, the countries hardest hit were those destitute nations without any resources. The rising oil prices and the growing tendency of oil

stockpiling in the wake of the revolution in Iran will further deepen interdependence among countries. On the other hand, Vietnam, seemingly the champion of anti-colonialism movement, has occupied Cambodia. Here, the non-aligned movement, led by Cuba and Vietnam, has gradually been split.

The Korean economy now has growing businesses to do with some Third World countries. This may have been one of the reasons why the Colombo non-aligned foreign ministers' conference in May 1979 did not discuss the Korean question.

b. Economic Cooperation among U.S., Japan and China,
and Korean Peninsula

The development of the triangular relations among the United States, Japan and China will lead to the formation of a trade sphere or an "economic community" in the Pacific area. It should be noted that south Korea is able to take part in this economic alliance directly or indirectly.

As was discussed above, this region is the economically most active area, and the close trade partnership among the three countries will further accelerate this activeness. When trade, capital and knowhow are exchanged speedily among China with the largest population, the U.S. with the richest wealth and Japan with the highest productivity, a substantial economic zone can be formed among them.

When the economic power of "newly emerging industrial countries" like south Korea with the highest economic growth, Taiwan, Hongkong and Singapore gets linked with that of the above three powers, economic cooperation in the area will be further expedited. Of course, this cooperation will be carried out among different systems and economically unequitable countries.

Inasmuch as Japan reigns as an economic power, such cooperation can hardly be implemented by means of an official treaty or organization like EEC. Close economic cooperation in this region will be inevitable so long as China has to depend on the U.S. and

Japan for its "four modernization" programs and the above-cited "newly emerging industrial countries" maintain close relations with both the United States and Japan.

The open-door policy of China contributes to the acceleration of this phenomenon. In a trade agreement signed with Japan in February 1978 and modified in September the same year, China pledged to do some 100-billion-dollar worth of trade with Japan by the year 1990. In another trade agreement signed with the United States in April 1979, China committed itself to a 50 billion dollars worth of trade by 1985. Faced with difficulty in the repayment of foreign credits and unbalanced development among sectors, China now readjusts the "four modernization" programs. Still, it is more than apparent that China will depend much on economic cooperation with the U.S., Japan and West Europe. The economy of China is bound to react sensitively to the economic policies of Western countries.

When the economic cooperation among the U.S., Japan and China makes a headway, the economy of Korea will naturally be under its influence. As a result, all the countries of Northeast Asia will become interdependent economically. This phenomenon is expected to have a favorable impact on efforts to ease the tensions on the Korean peninsula. For, economic and other functional cooperation would lead to political cooperation in due course while the four powers would strive to avoid war or armed clashes if only to maintain economic cooperation in this area. It is noted in this connection that lately China and the Soviet Union have been inclined toward economic cooperation with south Korea, unofficially and intermittently though. Presently north Korea alone remains away from this new development. But, it is expected that Pyongyang will participate in this world of interdependence if only to solve the economic crisis it faces now.

5. Conclusion: New Development and Prospect of South-North Dialogue

To sum it up, a new development affecting the south-north dialogue is that as the four-power relations have been normalized in Northeast Asia and a power balance formed among them, the Korean question becomes Koreanized gradually. Seen from this angle, the situations surrounding the Korean peninsula are expected to spur inter-Korean talks. However, the question of whether such talks would actually take place and what would be the future of a dialogue hinges on how the north Korean regime would evaluate such situations and the internal state of south Korea.

The impact such a new development will have on the south-north dialogue, as shown in the situations surrounding the Korean peninsula discussed in the above, can be summarized as follows:

1) The fact that the four powers having stakes in the Korean peninsula have normalized their mutual relations, and maintain a sort of balance, expedites the Koreanization of the Korean question. The pursuit by the four powers of a policy of maintaining the status quo of the Korean peninsula will further bolster this trend

2) The four-power balance remains stabilized structurally. But, its internal relationship is highly fluid due to the Sino-USSR dispute. The advent of the U.S.-Japan-China triangular relationship in Northeast Asia and the USSR-Vietnam alliance in Southeast Asia have caused a proxy war between China and the USSR, replacing the U.S.-USSR confrontation of the Cold War. Under the circumstances, China and the USSR lately pursue a road to limited negotiations and conciliation.

3) Around the world, the degree of economic interdependence grows. In Northeast Asia, too, a state of economic cooperation among the U.S. Japan and China has emerged. As a result of its outwardly oriented economic development policy, south Korea has expanded its economic relationship with the Third World, China and the USSR, earning international recognition of its economic success. This trend will further be increased in the future.

4) U.S. President Carter visited Korea, during which Korea and the U.S. jointly proposed the "meeting of three authorities," and the United States reaffirmed its security commitment to Korea. President Carter also pledged that he would carefully handle the issue of U.S. troop withdrawal in consideration of the military balance on the Korean peninsula and of the progress of the south-north dialogue, and in close consultation with the Korean government. South Korea and the United States have solved their difficult relations and established a new relationship in a new dimension on the basis of mutual interests. However, the course and results of the U.S. Presidential election due in 1980 will have some effect on the future of the Korea-U.S. relationship. At the same time, the United States has permitted unofficial contacts with north Korea by private persons.

5) After visiting Peking, Seoul and Pyongyang, U.S. Secretary General Kurt Waldheim met the south Korean and north Korean ambassadors to the United Nations, assuming the role of good office for communications and dialogue between the south and the north of Korea.

These developments incorporate factors both affirmative or negative to the south-north dialogue. But, it seems that there are more affirmative factors than negative ones. The Korean question no longer serves as a bilateral issue among the four powers. The fact that the four powers prefer a policy of maintaining the status quo of the Korean peninsula represents an affirmative aspect. On the other hand, if the Sino-USSR dispute, which so aggravated as to develop into a proxy war between them replacing a proxy war between the U.S. and USSR, gets intensified further, north Korea may take some action on the Korean peninsula capitalizing on such dispute. For, if Kim Il-sung is sensible enough, it can hardly be imagined that he ever takes an action of his own accord without being promised assistance from either of China or the USSR.

At the same time, an extremely limited Sino-USSR conciliation or peaceful coexistence may serve as a stimulant in promoting contacts between south Korea and China-USSR and between north

Korea and the U.S. Other affirmative elements are the rising degree of economic interdependence and the U.S. Secretary General's assumption of a role for communications between the south and the north. It would be much conducive to the south-north dialogue if and when the United States redefines its Korea policy in a clearer manner and demonstrates it by deeds.

These prospects are feasible only on the condition that the existing situations and the domestic politics of the four powers do not change substantially. If the Sino-U.S. relations turn bad or the Sino-USSR alliance revives or a pro-USSR regime takes power in China⁷⁾ or peripheral countries develop nuclear weapons or the U.S.'s Korea policy undergoes a change or political and economic unrests occur in south Korea, the stability of the Korean peninsula and the four-power relationship would be endangered.

Therefore, if the present situation of Northeast Asia continues without any substantial change and south Korea's domestic stability persists, north Korea will ultimately agree to inter-Korean talks. When north Korea becomes able to ensure economic development and people's welfare without recourse to the force of arms or revolution, and to guarantee the continuity of its regime by taking part in the interdependent Western world externally, Pyongyang, recognizing the reality of the Korean peninsula as it is, will agree to talks with south Korea.

For the past 30 years, the south and the north of Korea have been pursuing conflicting unification policies,⁸⁾ during the course of which both sides have well grasped each other's intention and strategy. Unless, therefore, these intentions and strategies are modified, no productive dialogue can be expected. Since north Korea alone rejects the reality of the Korean peninsula, the south-north dialogue will come to a fruition only when north Korea recognizes it as it is.

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Negotiations with Communists and South-North Dialogue

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1. Meaning and Type of Negotiations

In a broad sense, negotiations mean a form of reciprocal actions in which individuals, groups or states (governments) negotiate and compromise on conflicting yet common interests. Negotiations can be made only when there exists the tacit understanding that parties or countries involved may find common interests by means of negotiations. The parties involved would begin mutual contacts only on the judgement that negotiations would be in their favor.

According to Fred Ikle who has analyzed the act of negotiations, negotiations can, by their objective, be classified into the following four categories in general:¹⁾

First, there is a negotiation held for the purpose of extending the term of an existing agreement. Falling on this category are talks to, say, prolong the term of a tariff agreement or the lease of oversea military bases.

Second, there is a negotiation aimed at normalizing specific circumstances or the relations between states. This type of negotiation includes truce talks intended to end the state of war or talks to establish normal diplomatic relations between countries without diplomatic ties. Examples of this type were the negotiations held among the United Nations Command, Red China and north Korea to negotiate truce of the Korean War, and the Korea-Japan normalization talks that dragged on for about 10 years.

Third, there is a negotiation for redistribution. This is the kind of talks which a state on the offensive holds with a defensive state to demand new relations of distribution. In this case, the demand of

the offensive state exacts the sacrifice of interests from the state on the defensive. Demands made in such talks include cession of territory, imposition of reparations, or readjustment of political influence. In general, these are the kind of demands a victor country imposes upon a loser country after war. In negotiations for redistribution, the adjustment of conflicting interests carries a greater weight than common interests. In the event the demand of the state on the offensive is denied, there, in the worst case, may break out a military clash between the countries involved.

Fourth, there is a negotiation aimed at instituting a new system or organization. This is called a negotiation for reformation or creation. In this case, negotiations are held to set forth new relations, duties or responsibilities between the two states involved. In such talks, a tacit understanding can be reached as to their common interests although there is no guarantee for the balanced distribution of interests.

Negotiations held in international politics are either in the form of one of the four categories given above or a kind aimed at seeking multiple objectives. However, the general trend is that the countries involved attempt to obtain secondary effects through negotiations in addition to these surface objectives. In fact, there are many incidences in which they negotiate for hidden gains rather than surface objectives, such as tapping of information on the other side or reaping of propaganda effect.

In some cases, negotiations are held simply to maintain the avenue of exchange of opinions. The Munich Pact signed between Hitler and Chamberlain was a classic example of exploitation of negotiations as a means of deception.

“Negotiation process” covers whole steps ranging from the objectives the countries involved pursue in negotiation to the results of negotiation. In a narrow sense, however, the negotiation process is a course of talks held intermingled among five elements: 1) an objective to induce a party to negotiation and cause it to remain at the table of such negotiation, 2) a course involving exchange of opinions, 3) the results deriving from the course of negotiation, which

are supposed to have an effect on the countries involved, 4) the background of inter-relations and cultural tradition of the countries involved, and 5) particular circumstantial conditions where negotiation takes place.

In such complex negotiation process, those which lead negotiation are "negotiators." However, negotiation process does not necessarily depend only upon the personality, ability and capability of negotiators. In effect, negotiators must behave under various restrictions, which makes negotiation process all the more complex.

First, the internal political situation of the countries involved has something to do with negotiation process. Of course, there is the method of handling negotiation confidentially, keeping the contents of negotiation secret as is the case with secret diplomacy. But, this is an exception. Factors of internal politics are bound to have a considerable effect on negotiation process, though the degree of such effect varies depending on the nature of the political system of the countries involved.

Second, in international negotiation process, there are no effective "rules" that can control acts of the countries involved. In labor-management negotiations over, say, labor disputes, an authority called government may intervene or such negotiations may proceed within a specific rule. In inter-country negotiations, however, there exists no rule with a binding force, making such negotiation process complicated.

In international negotiations, norms rather than rules carry a heavy weight. However, under today's circumstances where each country has a different cultural tradition and where countries are scattered in terms of ideology, there cannot be a uniform norm which all the countries can observe. A mode which can be used in negotiations among Western diplomats cannot be applied to negotiations with the representatives of Communist countries.

2. Communist's View and Style of Negotiations

Everyone knows it is difficult to have negotiation with the Com-

munists. With the polarizatton of the post-World War II world into the Eastern and Western blocs, the West had negotiations with the Communist bloc even under the Cold War system. After the end of the Korean War, in particular, the United States had carried on ambassador-level talks with Communist China in Warsaw for nearly 20 years. Also in the final stage of the Vietnam War, the United States had peace talks with North Vietnam and the Vietcong in Paris. Many books have been written on the experience or analysis of negotiations held with the Communists.

The diplomatic activities of the Communists, often referred to as "revolutionary diplomatic type," are the products of the political value system and ethics of totalitarian states. In other words, there is the kind of "diplomatic style" and negotiation type based upon their tenacious attachment to the creation of a new world order on communism by means of the destruction of the existing international political order. Inasmuch as their primary and ultimate objective is to destroy the maintenance of the status quo of the world, the Communists strongly believe that abnormal diplomacy and negotiation style alone serve the purpose of achieving their objective.

Under this method, they often use violent or insulting words or vicious propaganda as the instrument of their diplomatic offensive. This practice is not only aimed at gaining a mere propaganda effect but also intended to throw the other side into bewilderment and off its balance in such abnormal diplomatic acts and thereby steer negotiation toward a direction in their favor.

Fundamentally, the Communists' negotiatory acts are based upon their unique view of negotiation.

First, to the Communists, negotiation is simply another form of revolutionary struggles with non-Communist forces. Therefore, any agreement concluded between the Party and outside (non-Communist) forces is no more than a barrier helpful to the future removal of such forces or intended to keep such forces from destroying the Party. Thus seen, an agreement or treaty which the Communists sign with outside forces cannot have any meaning. The agreement under which a Communist Party joins a coalition govern-

ment is motivated by this conviction. So long as they deny fundamental agreement with non-Communist forces, there can be no contradiction or discrepancy between their friendly agreement with an outside group on the surface and their use of violence against it. Both are simply different tactics incorporated in a comprehensive strategy designed to remove the other side.

Second, there is the recognition that objective conditions can be created for the conclusion of an agreement or treaty between a Communist Party and its enemy only when there emerges a circumstance in which neither of the two sides can achieve its objective by means of violence. In other words, an agreement or treaty does not mean the abandonment of struggles or the use of violence, but indicates that struggles are carried on in another form. It was upon this view of negotiation that North Vietnam concluded the Peace Agreement with the United States and succeeded in occupying South Vietnam in three years.

Third, the Communists are convinced that the other side would surely violate agreement, that is, it would not abide by the provisions of agreement as it promised it would. Therefore, they believe that even if an agreement or treaty is reached through negotiation with an outside group, it would not reduce the threat of destruction of a Communist Party, and understand that the other side, too, believe so. So, the Communists are convinced that any agreement or treaty can be nothing more than the legalized version of a transitory "state of deadlocked strength" between the two sides.

This Communist view of negotiation has been formed in the course of the Communists' struggles for power, and reflects the experience they gained in their power struggles with non-Communist forces. The prototype of this recognition can be witnessed in the Bolshevik revolutionary struggles in the Soviet Union. In effect, this is a unique recognition which has many in common in other Communist countries' view of recognition, though it varies a little. One thing that can be found in all the Communist parties is that even before their seizure of power, the Communist parties tend to distinguish all things from their dualistic idea, namely, the Party

and the other world. Before their seizure of power, the outside world is a hostile world that has to be conquered. And, even after the seizure of power, the outside world is regarded as a world where counter-revolutionary forces infiltrate or dwell.

It was from this dualistic idea that the Communists have found out a series of rules considered indispensable to the enforcement of their political actions, strategy and tactics. Such rules reflected the experience gained in the course of revolutionary struggles by Communist parties, and, at the same time, the systematization of the principle of conducts presented in Marxism-Leninism. Nathan Leites once called this Operational Code.²⁾

This Operational Code, which had guided the revolutionary strategy and tactics of the Soviet Communist Party before and after its seizure of power, was applied to Stalin's diplomatic strategy toward the West, and can be regarded to have been used also in the Soviet's negotiatory activities in the Cold War. Under the Khrushchev era, the Soviet Union began to show flexibility in its diplomacy toward the West as the polarization system gave way to "peaceful coexistence." Still, it could hardly be held that Russia's diplomatic style had gone away completely from the influence of ideological colors. It may well be believed that the Bolshevik Operational Code, embodying the doctrinal belief of Lenin and Stalin, still serves as the basis of the Communist strategy and tactics, especially those in the underdeveloped areas, not to speak of the Soviet diplomacy.

In particular, those Operational Codes that can be discussed in linkage with the negotiation style of the Communists are as follows:

— *Determinism* —

All future events are either unavoidable or infeasible. There can be nothing in their midway. All the things politically important can be explained from the rules of the Marxism-Leninism. There can be no casual or accidental incidents and events. The one which knows such rules best and which can apply them most effectively is the

“party.” Only under the guidance of the “party,” can the rightful path of conducts be produced, while only the “party” can properly cope with and solve the problems raised by the history. One thing unpredictable is when a world-wide Communist revolution would succeed. But, the “party” does not need to be disappointed. All it should do is to do its best in shortening the “path to victory.”³⁾

The Communists at conference table, convinced of the accuracy of the “rules” of Marxism-Leninism, believe that the “rules” provide them with a rightful road. But, since it cannot be predicted when the “decisive time” would come, they have to carefully watch objective circumstances and should be able to seize and exploit opportunities created by such circumstances.

— *Attitude toward Past and Future* —

The kind of the past which the Communists value is only the one that was recorded in “party history.” The past other than this is merely “a bunch of records on senility and death.” At the same time, the “party history” is an illumination light indispensable to seeing through not only the past but also the future.⁴⁾ At the Sino-U.S. ambassadorial talks held in Warsaw, Chinese negotiators not only got soaked with the China thought, the traditional ideas of China, but often showed fierce emotional reactions, a product of deep-rooted grudge against unequitable conditions in the West coupled with Marxism and Mao Tse-tung-ism. It would be much conducive to understanding the negotiation “style” of the Communists if one knows which past they hate most and which past they value with the highest care. It may be safely concluded that Stalin’s feelings toward the West were formed at the time when the West encircled the Soviet immediately after the Bolshevik Revolution.

— *Negotiations as Life or Death Venue* —

The Communists regard the relations between themselves and their enemy as an extreme condition of “destruction” or “conquor.”

In a theory of two great blocs, Stalin believed that the world had been split into two blocs, and that struggles for the control of world economy would determine the fate of capitalism and communism of the whole world.⁵⁾

Because they emphasize the danger of the destruction of the Communist Party by enemy, the Soviet Communist Party had set the basic objective of its external policies in destroying the capitalistic bloc from within. The common goal of the world's Communist parties is to fan antagonism and friction among capitalistic countries and to maintain a strength much superior to enemy's in order to coper with all the outside forces intent of destroying the "party." The radical Bolshevik Operational Code insists that there can be only tensions and never any co-existence between the Communist and non-Communist worlds.

When they come to conference table with such a radical attitude, Communist negotiators are bound to view the other side in negotiations as the other party in confrontation, thus arming themselves with a militant posture. Taking negotiations as a battle scene where their life or death is determined, the Communists aim to bring to its knees and destroy the other side through complete victory. Negotiations thus become a sort of diplomatic guerrilla warfare all kinds of tricks and schemes are employed. In particular, negotiations with capitalistic states are considered as the venue of ideological confrontation with socialism and therefore as part of their revolutionary struggles.

— *Goals and Means* —

The Communists are kind of being who employ double moral standards. Anything that promotes the intrests of the Communist Party is right and necessary. However, anything that serves the promotion of imperialism or capitalism is wrong. This is clearly a double morality, under which any policy that adds to the power of the "party" is proper and rightful.⁶⁾

The policies of the "party" cannot be influenced by ethical con-

sideration or sentiments. The “party” must conduct only on the basis of cool calculation of gains. When the “party” is obliged to disclose its position toward some problems within or without the “party,” it does not need to be bound by truth. All it has to consider is the impact what the position or statement it is going to hold or make will have. Depending on some situation, falsehood may bring much more favorable results. In other words, the “party” leadership does not need to be concerned about its remarks made in public or about the consistence of the statement it makes. It needs only to pay due attention to the effect of the remarks or statement it is going to make.

Reflecting this double morality, the Communists carry on negotiations while distinguishing the long-range objective and immediate benefits of negotiations. In other words, they amalgamate ideology and national interests, but prepare their foreign policies under the far-reaching goal of achieving complete elimination or purge of imperialism. Even in negotiations, they value future and potential long-term developments more than the current international relations and the problems pending between the countries concerned under the long-term objective of extinguishing imperialism. They choose a line of conducts that can maximize their long-term gains, even at the cost of immediate benefits. In this strategy, they concentrate efforts on obtaining a concession that is important from a long-term standpoint while minimizing tactical and immediate gains.

— *Careful Calculation* —

As far as the Communists are concerned, it can hardly be imagined that they try to achieve their goal in the light of the other side’s position and goal through free and unofficial contacts with the other side in negotiations. It is emphasized that they come to conference table with a fully adjusted position based on a careful pre-calculation. Depending on situation, they replace the original posture with another (this, too, was carefully studied beforehand),

In one word, they are required to negotiate with others with a clear-cut position and counter-offers.⁷⁾

At the same time, they believe that they can prepare a strategy to overwhelm enemy only when they grasp the picture of specific problems and prepare measures to cope with them from the overall point of view. Policies of the Communists must always be based on the forecast of future. When they prepare some policy goals, they cannot consider only various factors or the existing relations between forces involved but have to keep in mind the possibility of future changes, that today's strongman degenerates into weak of tomorrow or vice versa. In other words, policy goals must be prepared in consideration of the possibility of exploiting future forces.

— *Perseverance and Flexibility* —

Kenneth Young cites as something contrasting between the U.S. and Chinese representatives at the Warsaw talks, the difference in the two sides' sense of time.⁸⁾ The U.S. side appeared somewhat impatient whereas the Chinese could wait indefinitely. The American negotiations were in the case of "consuming" time, while the Chinese were in the position of "utilizing" time. Similarly, whereas the idea of the U.S. side was bound by the concept of time such as "year," the Chinese side had the sense of far-reaching or indefinite time, that was, "age." The Chinese considered "struggles with imperialism" as historical struggles requiring a long time.

This posture may derive from an idea characteristic of the Chinese. But, it also can be the manifestation of the "perseverance and tenacity" the Communists emphasize. The Communists are convinced that time and victory are on their side. In the course of history, they can fall back but they don't need to be impatient. To show one's impatience or worry amounts to displaying one's weak point. Impatience, tenacity and composure alone lead negotiations to a success.

The Bolshevik Operational Code demands that though tenacity

is important, the Communists must be sensitive to changes taking place in surrounding environment. This means they have to be flexible. They don't need to be opposed blindly to changes in strategy or tactics. For, in the selection of political means, there shouldn't be any case of one being caught in one's own trap.

To have such flexibility, all decisions must be integrated. Only in this way, they can display flexible reactions promptly to changing situations around them. Because they thus emphasize perseverance and, at the same time, value flexibility, the negotiations style of the Communists shows both stiffness and elasticity.

3. North Korea's Revolutionary Diplomacy and Features of Dialogue Posture

The countries divided in the wake of World War II include Germany, Austria, China, Korea and Vietnam. With the exception of Austria and Germany, the remaining three divided countries experienced the tragedy of fratricidal wars -- protracted wars between Communist and non-Communist forces. The fact that the three Asian countries had undergone fratricidal conflicts is of an important significance when we discuss the negotiation tactics of the Communists. This indicates that the negotiation attitude of the Communist parties of divided countries is unusually combative and shows the strong tendency to abide strictly by the Bolshevik code of conducts. It is understandable why their view of negotiations has to be more rigid.

The negotiation attitude of the Communists as shown through the Panmunjom talks, Warsaw U.S.-China meetings, and Paris Peace talks in which the Communists of divided countries directly took part, had several things in common.

First, throughout these three separate negotiations, the Communists placed a heavy weight on the goal of destroying or weakening the "hostile force" in their respective divided countries. In the case of the Panmunjom talks, north Korea demanded the withdrawal of foreign troops, insisting on the inclusion of this

withdrawal issue in the scope of negotiations.

At the Paris peace talks also, the United States assumed the position that military problems should be settled first with the political issue to be solved by the Vietnamese people themselves afterwards, whereas the Vietcong adhered to the simultaneous solution of both military and political questions. In its 10-point formula for peace, the Vietcong placed the offer for the establishment of a coalition government, a proposal aimed at bringing down the anti-Communist Saigon government.⁹⁾

Also at the Warsaw meetings, China insisted on the discussion of the question of "easing tensions in the area of the Taiwan Strait," which was, in effect, aimed at gaining the complete withdrawal of American forces from Taiwan.

Second, the Communists employed all available means of pressure, including violence, in the course of negotiations. At the time of the Panmunjom talks, the Communists suddenly brought armed Chinese troops into the area of the conference site, attempting to pose a threat to United Nations Command negotiators psychologically. After the talks were interrupted and the U.N. Command lodged a strong protest, the Communists made a public apology. At the Warsaw conference also, the Communists began shelling Jinmon Island, attempting to apply a high-toned pressure to the United States by heightening tensions along the Taiwan Strait. The North Vietnamese were no exception. In January 1968 when chances for peace negotiations were high because of the U.S.'s cessation of bombing of North Vietnam, Hanoi staged the tet offensive, using it as a momentum to put the U.S. on the defensive in negotiations.

Third, the Communists used a tactic in which they, posing conditions unacceptable to the other side, waited for a time when the other side grew weary and conceded to their demand. At the Paris peace talks, the conditions put forth by the Vietcong were unacceptable to the United States. Their conditions were in effect, a time table for the collapse of the Thieu regime, establishment of a coalition government and unification with North Vietnam. On the

other hand, the U.S. proposal was aimed at bringing about ceasefire, maintaining the Thieu regime, restoring the DMZ and maintaining an anti-Communist, pro-Western Vietnam for good. The 10-point peace formula of the Vietcong was demanding the U.S.'s disguised surrender to the political goal it was pursuing in a "revolutionary war."

Amidst these two conflicting formulas, anti-war sentiments built up in the United States, which served as an unending pressure to American negotiators, weakening America's position further. The Paris peace talks dragged on for four years before the Vietnamization programs of the United States ended in failure and as a result the U.S. made a substantial concession, yielding to the Vietcong demand.'

The same can be said of the Warsaw conference. At the off-and-on talks begun in 1953, China had persistently demanded the abandonment of Taiwan by the United States. This was a one-sided demand that did not allow any counter-proposal. When the United States demanded that China give up the use of the force of arms against Taiwan, China countered it with a demand that the U.S. depart from Taiwan. When the United States demanded the release of those American civilians held in captivity in China, the Chinese countered it with a demand that all the Chinese and Chinese-Americans serving prison terms in the United States be freed and allowed to return to Mainland China.

Kenneth Young understood this diplomatic style of the Communists in the concept of "adversary negotiation."¹⁰ But it can be held that the Communists of the divided countries in Asia have adhered to the typical revolutionary diplomatic style. Whereas China showed some flexibility by combining pragmatic diplomacy with revolutionary one, north Korea has been persisting in a rigid revolutionary diplomatic style.

The recent attempt of north Korea to approach the United States may be taken as a move to free itself from international isolation and ride the tide of new international flow. In substance, however, no markable alteration can be seen in the diplomacy of

north Korea.

The attitude of north Korea toward the south-north dialogue is nothing more than the extension of this revolutionary diplomatic style. In other words, it can be assumed that the north Korean attitude toward the inter-Korean talks and its unification strategy and tactics are based fundamentally on the Bolshevik Operational Code.

The strategy of north Korea is focused on gaining withdrawal of U.S. forces from Korea and on facilitating revolutionary struggles by "people," while its tactics mean the conditions to realize the strategy, that are, superficial easing of tensions, transitory maintenance of status quo, and the overcoming of international isolation. The so-called "eight-point formula for peaceful unification" made public at the fifth convention of the fourth Supreme People's Assembly, laid down offers for trade and economic cooperation and exchanges, confederation system and political negotiations (lately renamed as "whole nation conference") between the south and the north -- the conditions, incorporating both strategy and tactics of north Korea, intended to achieve the strategic goal, namely, the withdrawal of American forces.

In the analysis of the north Korean attitude and intention as shown in the year-long south-north dialogue held after the issuance of the South-North Joint Communiqué on July 4, 1972, and at the south-north contacts in the wake of the January 19 proposal this year, the frame of reference must be found in the Bolshevik Operational Code, from which the inference of north Korea's diplomatic activities can be induced.

Among the principles of conducts incorporated in the Bolshevik Operational Code those that shed light on the nature of north Korea's attitude toward dialogue include 1) the danger of being exploited, 2) advance and retreat, 3) isolation and contacts, and 4) deception.¹¹⁾

As is pointed out by many people, the fear of north Korea that progress of the south-north dialogue may fan the erosion of its totalitarian system can be cited as the reason for north Korea's one-sided rejection of the inter-Korean talks. North Korea, a rigidly

closed society, must have reviewed seriously the possibility that the shuttle talks between the south and the north may bring about negative results. In other words, north Korea had arrived at the judgement that the south-north dialogue, contrary to its original intention, was being "exploited" by south Korea and functions in a direction in its disfavor.

In a speech titled "Task of Party in Diplomatic Policies," Stalin contended, "We cannot allow ourselves to be dragged into disputes by war fanatics accustomed to let others do dirty works." He also said that "British bourgeoisie does not want to smear its hands with dirt in war," emphasizing that if the Party is left to be exploited by outside forces, it would invite the total destruction of the Party.¹²⁾ Stalin was arguing that if and when the Party fails to forestall such event, it would cause the Party to lose its authority and degrade itself.

A Communist party is supposed to launch revolutionary struggles at every opportunity for a move forward. Still, it is desirable for the Communists to concentrate their energies upon activities for small advances rather than for impracticable grand advances. They would also need rest between advances. In particular, the action guideline of the Communists demands that when a Party contemplates an advance, it shouldn't indulge in adventurism, and that it shouldn't take any actions that may lead to the loss of what it has already gained simply for the sake of an uncertain future goal.

The Communist Party, thus, recognizes the need for retreat while emphasizing the need for march forward. A plan for advance should always include a preparation for retreat. If a previous experience was a mistaken case and it turns out to be dangerous and wasteful to keep up the experience, the advance must be stopped instinctively. Efforts must be concentrated upon the creation of a new condition for another advance taking advantage of the previous experience.

North Korea took the July 4 Joint Communique as a good opportunity to translate into action its conventional unification strategy and tactics, looking forward to an "advance." It is believed that con-

trary to its expectation, north Korea judged that it cannot reap the expected results and may rather suffer damages in the inter-Korean talks. It can be held that subsequently north Korea switched the direction of advance in favor of a diplomatic offensive for the isolation of south Korea from the rest of the world community, attempting to create conditions for a new advance.

As for the relations between the Party and people, the Bolshevik Operational Code emphasizes the need for both isolation and contacts between them. In other words, the Party must maintain a clear borderline away from the masses, while contacts with the masses are necessary if the Party wants to pursue an express policy line.

At the international level, however, Communist countries did not value contacts with non-Communist countries much. Contacts with the Western World were made only on the initiative of the West

North Korea is a system that highly values isolation more than any other Communist countries. This was the result of its efforts to thoroughly block any outside infiltration into its system. Seen from Bolshevik ideas, Communist parties are always prone to infiltration by rebellious elements from within and without. Therefore, the Parties shouldn't allow any room for infiltration by such elements.

North Korea, which pursued so tight an isolationism in the past as to restrict contacts even with East European countries, has attempted to make some contacts with the outside world since the beginning of a turbulent era of the 1970s on a limited basis though probably because it felt the need to overcome the restriction of conducts or loss resulting from its isolation from the rest of the world. Still, the objective of contacts was clearly limited. The objective was to sound out the attitude and intention of hostile countries for reflection in its policies. It was for this reason that north Korea showed the kind of diplomacy wandering between isolation and contacts since the turn of the 1970s. Still, it was an instable balance basically inclined toward isolation.

The Communists are convinced that enemies always deceive them. They, therefore, first distrust enemy's words. A Bolshevik

faith argues, "All public statement of outside groups are intended for deceiving." The same Bolshevik faith, holding that masses can be deceived easily, demands that efforts be made continuously to remove the mask of the enemy so as to eliminate the danger of the masses being deceived.

Since they believe that their enemies deceive them always, it is considered necessary and natural for them to deceive the enemies. And, since the masses can easily be deceived by the enemy, the Party cannot explain frankly to the masses about things. This means the Party, too, have to deceive the masses. There cannot be any difference between the deceiving the masses and the enemy of the Party.

President Park's January 19 proposal carries many implications. If north Korea accepted it, the proposal could have led even to summit-level talks. But, the rejection of it indicates that north Korea is not interested in contacts with south Korea. Reacting to the January 19 proposal, north Korea responded to it in the name of the "Democratic Front for Unification of the Fatherland" while denying the existence of the South-North Coordinating Committee. As a counter-offer the January 19 proposal, north Korea demanded a "whole nation conference." North Korea was attempting to exploit the January 19 proposal as a means of a strategy to achieve its short-term objective, namely, the withdrawal of American forces from Korea. North Korea believes that from a long-term standpoint, pullout of the U.S. forces from south Korea will be an irresistible course of times, and that, therefore, all it can do now is to put forth conditions unacceptable to south Korea and thereby earn time.

4. Nature and Prospects of South-North Dialogue

The South-north dialogue held largely through the South-North Coordinating Committee in the early 1970s was a series of contacts designed for the two sides of Korea to sound out each other's intention and capability for use in readjusting their respective strategies. It was not the kind of negotiations with specific and

concrete subjects.

The two sides' basic positions and methods of approach as shown in the short-lived dialogue were much contrasting and conflicting. Whereas north Korea demanded the prior solution of the state of military confrontation as well as the realization of unification in a political approach by means of conference between political parties and social organizations in the south and the north of Korea, south Korea advocated the method of "functional approach" as referred to in the theory of international integration. The position of south Korea was that the two sides tackle practicable and easy problems like economic and humanitarian exchanges first, putting aside political and military questions for solution at a later time. This means that when exchanges in practicable areas take place, having a spill-over effect on other fields, then the two sides can discuss more delicate political problems based thereon.

These two conflicting stands persist to date. There are no chances in the foreseeable future for north Korea to switch its position in favor of the method of functional approach. Similarly, it cannot be expected that south Korea would change its stand and agree to the prior solution of questions of political nature. The only alternative the two sides can find under the circumstances is to 1) wait indefinitely until the other side agrees to its formula, or 2) mix part of the other side's formula into its own method.

The inter-Korean talks feature elements, the kind of which can hardly be found in other examples of negotiations. They were a method of contacts not comparable to the Vietnam peace talks. Their nature differed even from that of East-West German contacts. The decisive factor behind the diplomatic normalization between East and West Germany was the coercive pressure applied by the Soviet Union and the rest of the East European bloc which favored a detente with West Germany in view of its strategic location, its economic and military strength, and the centripetal role it can assume in trade with the East European bloc. But, so far as north Korea is concerned, there do not exist any outside forces that can apply a similar pressure.

That the south-north dialogue was a unique method of contacts indicates that its future is unpredictable that much. And, even if the south-north dialogue is resumed on some momentum, it is quite questionable whether the actual topics would be the same as those of the 1970s. But, one thing certain is that north Korea will adhere to its policy of viewing south-north contacts or dialogue or negotiation as the extension of its revolutionary diplomacy or struggles, though such fundamental posture may show some flexibility depending on circumstances.

It is believed that north Korea agreed to a south-north dialogue in the early 1970s in the belief that its domestic system is tight enough and that international circumstances moved in a direction in its favor. However, it is assumed that north Korea torpedoed the dialogue after it grew sceptical about the invulnerability of its domestic system in the course of the dialogue and after finding that international developments -- one of them the advocacy of simultaneous entry of south and north Korea into the United Nations -- were not necessarily in its favor.

Subsequently, north Korea seems to be seeking a policy switch with a view to solving a series of chronic economic problems -- backwardness of its economic system, deepening unbalance among industries prompted by priority placed on heavy industries directly linked to munition industry, stiffness characteristic of centrally planned economy, and lack of creativity. It appears that north Korea, sensitive to widening economic gap, is concentrating its energies on further solidifying its economic system and domestic political order.

In the international environment as well, the Sino-U.S. rapprochement and the conclusion of the Sino-Japan friendship treaty are expected to have an effect on north Korea. If only to escape from diplomatic difficulties, north Korea is in a position to continue to pursue a equidistance policy toward China and the USSR and a diplomatic approach toward the United States.

There is no reason, however, why north Korea should take the current international environment as threatening.

So far as the inter-Korean relations are concerned, north Korea prefers isolation to contacts. The reason is that north Korea believes it is yet to build a thorough and strong boundary between itself and the environment. In other words, Pyongyang sees the danger that an internal crisis may flare up if it comes in contacts with south Korea. Moreover, in a circumstance in which the "bamboo curtain" has been removed with China's opening of its door to the Western world, north Korea has to be wary of possible infiltration by outside forces. It is believed that for this reason, north Korea's isolation will be further tightened.

In conclusion, no internal and external conditions are ripe as yet to induce north Korea out of isolation into contacts. The January 19 proposal was south Korea's another initiative aimed at inducing north Korea into contacts. Had the proposal succeeded, it would have brought about a second contact between the south and the north, a contact not for sounding out something but for concrete political negotiations. The inference that north Korea was not in a position to enter political talks with the south can be induced from Pyongyang's rejection of the proposal. Although interpretation may differ depending on one's viewpoint, the January 19 proposal could, in a sense, had a room for the evolution of resultant talks into a summit-level contact. It cannot but be concluded that north Korea rejected such summitry.

The July 4 South-North Joint Communiqué calls for the realization of unification through independent efforts without being subject to external imposition or interference. Nonetheless, the inter-Korean relations cannot be discussed away from dual interrelations -- international and regional interrelations and inter-Korean interrelations. This is comparable basically to the inter-German relations. A clue to the solution of the East and West German relations could be found in the settlement of the USSR-West German and West Germany-East European relations. If the 1960s was an era when the Cold War dissipated in Europe, the situation of Northeast Asia began to show a basically new development since the turn of the 1970s as was the case with Europe in the 1960s. In the 1980s the

inter-state order of Asia will feature a more matured detente realized in closer cooperation among the United States, China and Japan.

Seen even from a standpoint of "inter-Korean interrelationship," a condition is being fostered which makes it meaningless for north Korea to follow an outright and crude method of revolutionary diplomacy, and which, depending on situations, obliges north Korea to show a flexibility by modifying its strategy, tactics and organization. North Korea will face the need to choose a new political means and adapt itself to new conditions as Lenin once said, "If the enemy walks zigzag, we, too, have to walk zigzag to approach the enemy."

Of course, the south and the north of Korea will not feel in the same manner and from the same angle the changes taking place in international and regional interrelationship or inter-Korean interrelationship. For, the two sides feel the reality from different angles. So long as north Korea feels the reality through the eye of "ideology," the method of feeling the reality between the south and the north is bound to differ. However, it may be held that the two sides' recognition of the reality has been narrowed much through the first contact of the early 1970s, compared with the 1950s and 1960s. The two sides should keep up efforts to maintain this trend.

Inasmuch as the Communists are, in nature, over-sensitive to infiltration of outside forces and, therefore, isolationistic, the likelihood is that future south-north contacts would begin on the initiative of south Korea. It would be necessary for south Korea to maintain the posture of knocking the door of north Korea. And, with the conviction that times and objective conditions develop in the south's favor, south Korea should open the door to dialogue with concrete proposal. It is desirable to recognize and prepare for the fact that dialogue or negotiations with north Korea will be political negotiations from the beginning, and that exchanges will be made possible only through negotiations.

The meeting of senior official Representatives of the south and the north of Korea and the United States conference proposed in the

Korea-U.S. Joint Communiqué of July 1, 1979, designed to bring the south-north dialogue up to a new dimension, could serve as a momentum for substantial negotiations and discussion. However, since the respective goals of the three authorities are conflicting and complex, the proposed conference, even if realized, could hardly have a smooth sailing. In connection with the proposal for the meeting of senior official Representatives of the south and the north of Korea and the United States, the lesson of the Paris peace talks over the Vietnam War cannot be overlooked. And, close cooperation and common steps between south Korea and the United States will be important more than any other things in the implementation of the meeting of senior official Representatives of the south and the north of Korea and the United States.

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South-North Dialogue and Peaceful Unification of Korean Peninsula

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1. Consolidation of Peace and South-North Dialogue

a. Meaning of Consolidation of Peace

One important thing that has to be explained in connection with the consolidation of peace between the south and the north of Korea is that peace consolidation will by no means perpetuate national division.

The policy for the consolidation of peace based on the principle of national coexistence may bring about the internal lack of understanding and external misunderstanding. This is the very point north Korea has been exploiting for its propaganda.

North Korea maintains that peaceful coexistence is one of the patterns of existence between the states of different peoples, criticizing that insistence on the coexistence between the same people amounts to an act of denying unification.

This sort of criticism, of course, is without foundation. Apart from such distorted interpretation, it is true that there lacks the general understanding that coexistence is the only method of broadening the avenue of reunity or coherence rather than perpetuating national division.

Here, it is proposed that the words "consolidation of peace" be used so far as the inter-Korean relations are concerned instead of the words "peaceful coexistence" which have already become a universal propaganda phrase. For, the nuance of "peaceful coexistence"

differs depending on the stand of the countries using the words.

Even in the same country of the Soviet Union, the meaning of "peaceful coexistence" used by Lenin differed from that of the same words used by Khrushchev. The former was meant to be a method of maintaining the Bolshevik regime, and the latter to be an intention of pursuing a competitive coexistence with the United States. And, China uses the words in the sense of normalizing state relations with countries with different political systems and ideologies, based on the "five principles" it has laid down.

If it can be recognized from this standpoint that the historical times and conditions when and where the words were used were too different for the words to be handled merely as an expression usable only between the states of different peoples as north Korea insists, and that the meaning of the words differs depending on the goal of the party using the words, there can be no reason why the words "peaceful coexistence" shouldn't be used in the inter-Korean relations.

Still, it is considered proper to use the expression "consolidation of peace" that gives a more realistic sense to our situation or policy instead of the words "peaceful coexistence" that have become a trite phrase in the world of propaganda.

Let us, then, study what the phrase "consolidation of peace" means.

First, consolidation of peace means the establishment of stable relations between the south and the north of Korea, in which the entity of the nation can be preserved without damages.

Second, since consolidation of peace would facilitate active contacts between the two sides on a national level, it can in no way perpetualize national division. Consolidation of peace is not itself an objective. It is the base and means that would make possible dialogue, exchanges and cooperation through which the entity of the nation can be preserved and national integrity and unification can be brought about.

The extent of consolidation of peace and the degree of exchanges and cooperation on a national level should be considered to

be in direct proportion. Without the consolidation of peace, no national harmony would be achievable and there would sprout only the will to conquer within the nation.

Third, consolidation of peace does not mean the stagnation of the will to national unification. The inter-Korean relations within the framework of consolidation of peace do not indicate in any way the state of suspended relationship, but point to the pursuit of national cooperation for the sake of competitive coexistence, peace and prosperity by means of exchanges and cooperation.

If the two sides of divided Korea conclude a non-aggression agreement or something like rapprochement treaty and abide by them in a sincere manner, the south and the north would be able to eliminate the danger of military clashes and engage in exchanges and cooperation in all other fields.

These conditions by no means represent any perpetuation of national division or the stagnation of the inter-Korean relations. Instead, there exists even the possibility that exchanges and cooperation facilitated thereby would lead to heated competition for coexistence.

Therefore, the party which opposes the consolidation of peace must be the one which is afraid of the exposure of its weak points in such competition for coexistence. Thus seen, exchanges and cooperation based on the consolidation of peace mean the embodiment of national will toward national unification, and not the suspension of the south-north relations but the de facto termination of national division.

b. Consolidation of Peace and Prevention of War

As was pointed out before, consolidation of peace is not itself objective but a means. The most important objective of the consolidation of peace lies in the prevention of the recurrence of war.

As we have already experienced in the Korean War of 1950, a war within a nation destroys its entity and makes it impossible for the people to form the sense of national identity. If there were no

fratricidal war caused by a north Korean aggression that time, there must be no need today to discuss the issue of consolidation of peace. And, if north Korea had repented for its anti-national provocation of a war and strove for national harmony and prosperity, the importance of consolidation of peace would not have been high as it is today.

Contrary, north Korea did not show any sincere response to a series of peace-oriented proposals we have made since 1970. Instead, the north Koreans have gone all-out to prepare for war, digging, for instance, invasion tunnels beneath the truce line at a time when we were traveling back and forth across the line for a dialogue with the north.

A report of the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, noting that the recent military buildup by north Korea has raised a skepticism about its intention, has said north Korea has produced or imported various offensive weapons. It reported that north Korea is capable of launching offensive for 30 to 90 days without being resupplied by China or the USSR depending on the extent of such offensive.

The report also said most of north Korea's combat divisions have been deployed for offensive actions within 100 miles from the Military Demarcation Line. Their military strength and the number of troops pose a serious problem. But, what is more important is the fact that their forces have been poised against the south. Two tunnels, able to allow the passage of 3,000 to 5,000 troops per hour, have been discovered. Many more tunnels are believed to have been dug, but no more tunnels have been uncovered because they do not use explosives now.¹⁾

Under the circumstances, consolidation of peace is the most important prerequisite to the prevention of war. It is not that we want to forestall a war because we are in a disadvantageous position in view of our capital city of Seoul, with an eight million population including 40 to 50 percent of the country's total college graduates, being in less than three minutes' flight distance and well within Frog missile's range.²⁾

Our interest is not in which side -- the south or the north -- would

be in a disadvantageous position in the event of a war, but in how we can forestall a war itself. We must remove once and for good the danger of war because a war, as discussed in the above, would destroy the entity of our nation and deny the chance for national harmony no matter whether it is won or lost.

This can be done by 1) forestalling war through an agreement between the south and the north, 2) eliminating the actual danger of north Korean attacks through the buildup of our own defense capability.

The issue of bolstering our defense capability shall not be discussed here in view of the nature of the theme of this paper.

The road to consolidating peace in a south-north agreement is to conclude a non-aggression agreement between the two sides. The proposal for "conclusion of a south-north non-aggression agreement" made by President Park on January 18, 1974 called on the south and the north to "pledge before the world that they will not invade each other under whatever circumstance and to refrain from meddling in one another's internal affairs." The proposal also suggested that "under all circumstances, the existing Military Armistice Agreement should remain in force."

What is emphasized in this proposal is the will to peace rather than peace agreement itself. Making the proposal, the President said, "Signing of a sheet of paper for an agreement or such by no means guarantees peace. The question is whether there is a clear-cut willingness to preserve peace and not to provoke war against each other. If there is such a will, no war will ever break out even without any agreement."³⁾

However, as was pointed out before, north Korea has deployed its entire armed forces for offensive actions, seeking to unleash actions taking advantage of a loophole and confusion that may develop in connection with the withdrawal of American troops from Korea.

If peace is to take root between the south and the north of Korea, a mutual non-aggression agreement should be concluded in the first place, and, once signed, it should be abided by faithfully.

This would be the beginning of the institutionalization of a consolidated peace. Dialogue, exchanges and cooperation must be carried out only on the basis of such a durable peace.

It is also important, to this end, that the world powers having stakes in the Korean peninsula should not attempt, as was seen in the course of normalization of East and West Germany, to exploit the confrontation between the south and the north of Korea for their policy objectives. Despite their knowledge that tensions on the Korean peninsula and north Korea's warlike posture pose the most serious threat to the overall structure of peace in the region, China and the Soviet Union are unable today to exercise their influence over north Korea in the interest of peace.

It is believed under the circumstances that if war is to be forestalled and peace consolidated on the Korean peninsula for the sake of overall peace in this region, peace-oriented efforts of the direct parties -- south and north Korea -- and world powers' endeavors for the maintenance and systematization of peace should be carried out in mutual harmony. Stability in Europe could be realized in an atmosphere where a series of policies and efforts such as Brandt's "Eastern Policy," U.S.-USSR detente and the pan-Europe security conference of 1975 could be implemented smoothly and where no countries concerned exploited or interpreted these measures malignantly.

Seen from this example, it can be known that the Sino-USSR confrontation, though it prompted a development for a power balance in this region in a manner advantageous to the West, serves as a factor detrimental to ultimate peace.

Under whatever circumstances, the consolidation of peace between the south and the north of Korea should be realized through independent and subjective efforts and will of south and north Korea themselves. One's allies ought to be cooperators in war and friendly observers in peace. If a peace is realized without the due expression of opinions of the direct parties involved, it would often wind up in a peace in name only.

Another reason why we have to forestall war is that in the event

of war, there may be unexpected participants while the cooperation from allies could be less or more than expected. Neither of these two cases would be desirable. Such would bring about a misfortune, undermining in consequence the nation's independent development. Only in a state where peace is consolidated and stable can the danger of national misfortune be removed and the opportunity for independent development be ensured.

Thus seen, it would be further desirable if the independent basis for the consolidation of peace can be prepared through the conclusion of a non-aggression agreement; if stability of the whole Korean peninsula can be ensured by replacing the parties to the Military Armistice Agreement with the direct parties involved;⁴⁾ and if an international measure like the Northeast Asian version of the pan-Europe security conference⁵⁾ can be taken on the basis of stability of the Korean peninsula.

2. Exchanges, Cooperation and South-North Dialogue

As was pointed out in the foregoing, exchanges and cooperation between the south and the north of Korea represent a method of restoring and developing the sense of national identity and homogeneity within the framework of a consolidated peace.

And, a south-north dialogue represents a function to set off and develop exchanges and cooperation, as well as to manage them and adjust opinions of the two sides. This function will begin to work in a condition where the state of war comes to an end and where there is no danger of its recurrence, and will continue to remain in force as long as such stability persists.

Therefore, the kind of exchanges and cooperation that can be prepared by means of an inter-Korean dialogue cannot be achieved from the outset unless the parties involved denounce war and show a positive attitude toward national harmony. The direct parties should be able to feel a substantial meaning here. Even if they have conflicting interests, they must cooperate with each other with patience and sincerity in the spirit of grand national unity.

Seen from this point of view, there can be no way but to implement exchanges and cooperation step by step beginning with humanitarian and nationally fundamental matters in simple and elementary areas. The unavoidability of step-by-step and gradual exchanges and cooperation is all the more so because the south and the north have been in a state of different systems and ideas in the past 30-odd years and because there needs a preparatory step for mutual understanding.

Good-looking but good-for-nothing proposals lacking such practical conditions bespeak themselves that they are ill-founded and fictitious.

If and when a common national area is formed through exchanges and cooperation and this area gets expanded and developed, the question of territorial and political integration cannot be anything serious so far as the nation is concerned. At this stage, therefore, territorial integration and political singularization will be realized easily.

And, in the event a common national area is created and expanded between the south and the north through exchanges and cooperation, any party that would sever such relationships because it is a little in its disfavor and resort to the force of arms again will be branded as the nation's traitor. Therefore, if and when exchanges and cooperation are practiced and instituted between the two sides, it would mean a de facto national unification.

When exchanges and cooperation become thus institutionalized by way of dialogue, peace will take root, giving rise to a coexistent competition in the name of exchanges and cooperation. Therefore, the promotion of exchanges and cooperation cannot in any way bring about the perpetuation of division or a roadblock to the development of national unification.

At the same time, it cannot be overlooked that the pursuit of peaceful unification by means of exchanges and cooperation would broaden national autonomy. It is not that consolidation of peace between south and north Korea is unavoidable due to the policy of world powers to maintain the status quo, but a consolidated peace

will obliterate the *raison d'être* of the influence of world powers over the Korean peninsula, serving as the ground for retreat of world powers.

The consolidation of peace, achieved through the institutionalization of exchanges and cooperation, will consequently enrich the base for national unification and expand the national sphere of self-reliance and autonomy, a development which should wind up in a contribution to international cooperation and peace. It is important that we enlist support for the expanded independence and autonomy from the world community as well as from the world powers having stakes in the Korean peninsula. Herein lies the significance of the Special Foreign Policy Regarding Peace and Unification of June 23, 1973.

This declaration is intended to "improve substantially conditions for unification of the fatherland."⁶⁾ For, in the event both south and north Korea participate in international organizations separately or jointly and contribute to international cooperation and easing of tensions, peace on the Korean peninsula will take firmer root. This, if realized, would serve as a key to stability in this region, while international concerns would contribute to stability on the Korean peninsula.

North Korea insists that simultaneous entry of south and north Korea into the United Nations would bring about the perpetuation of national division.

It is a well-known fact that this claim is without any ground in view of the reality or the Charter of the United Nations. No provisions of the U.N. Charter prevent member countries from integrating themselves into a single country. In effect, Egypt and Syria were merged into the United Arab Republic in 1956.

The U.N. Charter does not keep member countries from merging or becoming divided. What the U.N. Charter prohibits is the use of the force of arms or threats. When threatened with the force of arms or invaded, the member countries can bring such case to the U.N. Security Council, while other member countries are supposed to extend assistance to the countries invaded. If there is any reason

why north Korea opposes simultaneous admission to the world organization, it must be that north Korea considers the clause banning the use of the force of arms as an obstacle to the execution of its strategy against south Korea.

It must be for this same reason that north Korea denounces our June 23 Declaration most viciously when it attacks our unification policy.⁷⁾

Our policy of opening our doors to Communist countries has shaken from the root the north Koreans' daydream of isolating south Korea from the rest of the world community. Communist countries are yet to show any official reaction to open-door policy. But, the truth is that various exchanges are taking place with them, though the Soviet Union, for one, says it is admitting south Korean participant in international meetings held there to "fulfill its obligation to international organizations."⁸⁾

The proposal for the creation of a "consultative body for expedition of economic cooperation between the south and the north" made by President Park on June 23, 1978⁹⁾ may well be taken to emphasize again the importance of exchanges and cooperation. The proposition was designed "for the two sides to strive together to promote the welfare and co-prosperity of the south and north Korean compatriots while cementing steadily one by one the base for peaceful unification."

The proposal said, "In the world community today, the main flow is to solve problems through dialogue between states, and a prevailing trend of countries is to seek and broaden the avenue of mutual exchanges and cooperation for substantial economic development transcending political ideas or systems." stating that "considering the future of the history of the nation, it is proposed that a 'consultative organ for expedition of economic cooperation between the south and the north' attended by private economic representatives of the two sides be formed with a view to paving the way to, and implementing effectively, trade, technical cooperation and capital cooperation first between the south and the north...if necessary, we are willing to hold a pertinent cabinet ministers'

meeting.”

The proposal manifested the willingness to engage in exchanges and cooperation by establishing simultaneously a private-level body and a governmental-level organization for economic exchanges between the two sides. It is believed that the proposal was made with a view to preparing a momentum for actual national reunity.

However, this sincere proposal has failed to enlist a corresponding reaction from north Korea. Despite their economic difficulties,¹⁰ the north Koreans did not turn their attention to the solution of problems through cooperation based on national conciliation. This was because they couldn't let it be known that they are not on the same footing with the south in terms of economy.

Stressing that “there can be no reason why they should oppose the solution of the Korean question in a south-north dialogue,” President Park, from a standpoint of brotherly love, made the following epochal proposal on January 19, 1979 to reopen the door to a dialogue in spite of the fact that north Korea had rejected many reasonable proposals for the reunification of the national peacefully:

“I urge that the authorities of south and north Korea meet and have a dialogue at any time, any place and at any level to discuss unconditionally and openheartedly various issues of how to forestall another fratricidal war on the Korean peninsula, to realize the prosperity of the 50 million people, and how to achieve unification peacefully, that are, the questions raised so far by the south and the north of Korea in all the areas.”¹¹

North Korea could not shun this comprehensive proposal. This was all the more so because the proposition came on the heels of the conclusion of the Sino-Japan friendship and peace treaty in the latter half of 1978, the diplomatic rapprochement between the U.S. and China on January 1, 1979, and Deng Xiao-ping's visit to the United States toward the end of January 1979.

On January 23, 1979, the so-called “Democratic Front for Unification of the Fatherland” proposed a “whole nation conference.” This organization, charged with the united front strategy of the north Korean Workers' (Communist) Party, has the sole

mission of setting off a "people's democratic revolution" in south Korea. And, the proposed "whole nation conference" is based, of course, on the theory of denying the existence of the legitimate government of the Republic of Korea.

Thus seen, north Korea was in fact negative toward our January 19 proposal calling for "talks between the authorities of the two sides." And, not totally unexpectedly the road to the dialogue was again blocked after several "abnormal contacts."

It appears that the north Koreans will not return to the dialogue in a sincere manner until they wait and see the process of U.S. military withdrawal and the results of their efforts for contacts with the United States, and determine, based thereon, they have no choice but to attend a dialogue. It can be judged that the way to their contacts with the U.S. has been paved beginning in non-political areas. It is yet to be known where these initial contacts will bring the overall Washington-Pyongyang relationship to. At a stage where it is uncertain how their contacts with the U.S. can be used for their strategy for the communization of south Korea, north Korea would try to avoid such a development in which it comes to a dialogue and thus adds to, without any rewards, the validity of south Korea's policy of consolidating peace.

Under the circumstances, the attitude of the U.S. and other allies toward north Korea becomes important as an element influencing Pyongyang' response to our call for inter-Korean talks.

3. Path to Independent and Peaceful Unification

The south and the north of Korea have been using the same words "peaceful unification" with regard to the issue of national unification. However, as is the case with "dialogue" or "national unification," it is well known that though the two sides use the same words "peaceful unification," its meaning differs strikingly.

Especially, the words "peaceful unification" are being used from basically different standpoints between the two sides. One of the basic reasons for the deadlock of the south-north dialogue may well

be the conflicting ideas of the definition of the words "peaceful unification."

The substance of the words "peaceful unification" as used by south and north Korea shall be analyzed in the following.

a. North Korea's Version of "Independent and Peaceful Unification"

The latest remarks north Korea made on the issue of independent and peaceful unification were the ones uttered in Kim Il-sung's commemorative speech made on September 9, 1978 on the occasion of the 30th anniversary of the establishment of the north Korean regime, part of which was read:

"The issue of unification of Korea should be solved peacefully through dialogue in a way that will meet the people's demand.... We do not want to enforce our socialistic system and Communist ideology upon south Korea.... If any of the south Korean political parties wants to come the northern half of the Republic for negotiations, we shall welcome it...." Here, he tried to conceal the true colors of his united front strategy. But, in a later part of the same speech, Kim Il-sung argued, "If south Korean authorities truly wish to dialogue and collaborate with us, they must replace their nation-splitting policy with a unification policy and their anti-Communist policy with a policy for coalition with communism."

What is evident here is that they did not think of giving up their communism, but were demanding that the south yield to communism. In this way, north Korea regards "dialogue" merely as a process of submission to communism. We can see here that they squarely contradict us in terms of the meaning of "dialogue." Of course, their demand for the replacement of anti-communism with a policy for coalition with communism was to cater to the taste of some people who somewhat feel like resisting the word "anti-communism."

Kim Il-sung, then, said, "The basic guarantee of independent and peaceful unification of the fatherland is the grand unity of the

people," adding, "In order to achieve a grand national unity and to unify the fatherland peacefully, the 'democratization' of the south Korean society must be realized....Unless the south Korean society is 'democratized,' no national unity can be realized nor can the path to peaceful unification of the fatherland be pursued. In order to 'democratize' the south Korean society, the Yushin Constitution should be repealed and the Anti-Communist Law, National Security Law and other bad, fascist laws must be withdrawn."

These remarks show expressly that the words "peaceful unification" mentioned here refer to a development in which a political force wanting the north Korean Communist system to reign all over the Korean peninsula seizes power in the south and a collaboration is perpetrated with this political force.

Kim Il-sung went on to say in the speech, "The 'Unification Revolutionary Party' and other underground political parties should be allowed to engage in activities legally, and Korean people's organizations and patriotic people abroad who are struggling for the 'democratization' of the south Korean society as well as for independent and peaceful unification of the fatherland must be allowed to enter south Korea at his own will and engage in political activities freely.... The south Korean people should form a broadly united front with democratic forces within and without transcending differences in ideas, faiths and partisan interests and fight the fascist dictatorial forces with a united and organized strength, thereby 'democratizing' the south Korean society and advancing the time of independent and peaceful unification of the fatherland without fail."

He was demanding, needless to say, that all forces opposed to the incumbent government, in particular the "Unification Revolutionary Party," a bogus body, and all other pro-Communist parties, be allowed to engage in their activities legally. Capitalizing on our efforts to preserve basically a liberal democratic system although we withhold part of Western freedom in order to cope effectively with the aggressive design of north Korea, Kim Il-sung has been attempting to make most of this liberal democratic system of the south

for his schemes against the south, seeking to achieve a so-called people's democratic revolution in south Korea.

In the same speech, Kim Il-sung also said, "The United States must abandon its aggressive design to keep up its colonial control of south Korea in a two-Korea policy and to take over whole Korea, and should withdraw American forces from Korea completely at an early date... We have already proposed negotiations with the United States and strive to realize them... We shall talk with the United States at any time if it gives up its mistaken policy of dividing our country into two Koreas in favor of a rightful posture for the realization of unification of Korea."¹² Here, we can see that their term "independent" unification does not mean an independence with independent efforts on a national level, but indicates that the United States connive at or support the kind of unification it pursues.

And, north Korea demands the severance of the Korea-U.S. security ties by withdrawing U.S. forces, appealing that the United States open relations with north Korea and thereby modify its policy of "supporting south Korea one-sidedly."

Thus seen, north Korea wants to see before "dialogue" opens that the south Korean political system is changed into a system which can permit itself to yield to the north Korean system. They, then, seek to annex south Korea in the name of "peaceful unification" through "dialogue."

In the following we shall study briefly various formulas which north Korea has put forth for the solution of the unification issue in the name of "peaceful unification" from time to time since it formed the so-called "Democratic Front for Unification of the Fatherland" on June 28, 1949.

Their first "peaceful unification" formula could be the trusteeship plan which was raised at the Joint U.S.-USSR Commission which, consisting of the representatives of the U.S. and Russian occupation forces in south and north Korea, was operated in 1946 and 47, an idea that was supported by the Communist Party and other leftist forces only. But here, only those laid down after the establishment of their regime shall be discussed.

As they were forming the "Democratic Front," the north Koreans offered a 6-point formula for "peaceful unification," calling for 1) unification by the Korean people themselves, 2) immediate withdrawal of American forces and the U.N. Commission in Korea, 3) establishment of a Korean republic through simultaneous elections in south and north Korea on September 15, 1949, 4) discontinuation of persecution of "democratic" political parties and social organizations in south Korea in order to guarantee free elections, 5) preparation of an election committee among "democratic political parties and social organizations interested in peaceful unification" in south and north Korea, which shall give instructions to the existing governments of south and north Korea as to the election, and 6) integration of the armed forces in south and north Korea.¹³⁾

The clause "discontinuation of persecution of 'democratic' political parties and social organizations in south Korea" stemmed from the fiction that south Korea persecuted political parties where there was no persecution whatsoever in north Korea. Similarly, the clause "preparation of an election committee among 'democratic political parties and social organizations interested in peaceful unification' in south and north Korea meant that they wanted to hold an election in a state where those political parties interested in "peaceful unification," namely, the Communist Party and other pro-Communist parties and social organizations, hold a de facto control of both south and north Korea even before election.

Besides, this clause had a precondition, which was, "in south Korea, 'anti-people' political parties, organizations and personages, and those who persecuted the people's elections held in south Korea in 1948 should be excluded from the formation of a new government, while the national defense forces of south Korea which took part in the persecution of the partisan movement should be dissolved."¹⁴⁾

Here, it can be known clearly that the "peaceful unification" formula of the "Democratic Front" called for elimination of those political parties, organizations and officials which either par-

anticipated in the Republic of Korea government established through the general elections on May 30, 1948 and recognized by the United Nations as the "only legitimate government," from the establishment of a unified government they were proposing.

This idea served as the basis of all other overtures north Korea had made thereafter. For instance, on June 7, 1950, merely 18 days before their southward aggression, they produced another "peaceful unification" plan in a "message of appeal" signed by the same "Democratic Front," which proposed:

-- General elections shall be held throughout Korea on August 5-8, 1950, to establish a unified supreme legislative organ, which shall convene on August 15, 1950 in Seoul.

-- A conference of representatives from all political parties and social organizations throughout Korea shall be called on June 15-17, 1950, in either Haeju or Kaesong, which shall discuss conditions necessary for peaceful unifications of the fatherland and procedures governing the holding of general elections.

-- The conference shall specifically exclude "national traitors" like Syngman Rhee, Yi Pom-sok, Kim Song-su, Shin Song-mo, Cho Pyong-ok, Chae Pyung-dock, Paek Song-uk, Yun Chi-yong and Shin Hung-u, as well as the Korea National Party and the Democratic National Party among the political parties and social organizations of south Korea. The U.N Korea Commission shall not be allowed to interfere in the business of national unification.¹⁵

This proposal was a mere smokescreen laid down with their Korean War invasion only 18 days away. Nevertheless, they tried to alienate key south Korean leaders from the rest of the people by demanding the exclusion of such political figures from south-north negotiations. They also called for the elimination of the principal and legitimate authorities and leaders of the south from what they call "inter-Korean negotiations."

A broader and more politically motivated "peaceful unification" formula came in Kim Il-sung's national liberation day message made public on August 14, 1960. This one embodied a scheme to crush south Korea from within taking advantage of the social unrest

in the wake of the April 19 Student Uprising.

It was in this message that north Korea first offered a confederation system, which north Korea has reiterated at every opportunity to date. The proposal said:

“The only way to remedy the present state of south Korea and ultimately solve the Korean question is to drive American forces out of Korea and unify the country peacefully. Peaceful unification of our fatherland should be solved independently without any outside interference by means of free general elections held in the south and the north on a ‘democratic basis’. If south Korea cannot accept free south-north elections yet, an interim measure must be taken. As such a step, we propose a confederation system of south and north Korea.

“Under the confederation system we propose, the present political systems of south and north Korea shall be left as they are while the independent activities of the government of the “Democratic People’s Republic of Korea” and the government of the “Republic of Korea” shall be guaranteed. A ‘Supreme National Committee’ organized by representatives of the two governments would be established to coordinate uniformly such common state functions as cultural and economic development of south and north Korea.”

As can be seen here, Kim Il-sung’s confederation system in effect was a “Supreme National Committee” formed between the representatives of the two government, whose function was to “coordinate economic and development of south and north Korea uniformly.” One interesting thing was that this idea of confederation showed nothing different from the South-North Coordinating Committee established under the South-North Joint Communiqué of 1972.

Explaining about economic exchanges, Kim Il-sung contended: “Nobody can oppose economic exchanges and cooperation between the south and the north if they are concerned about the pitiful state of millions of unemployed people and begging children in south Korea and care for the future fate of the south Korean com-

patriots. If the south Korean authorities cannot accept even our plan for the confederation system, we propose the establishment of a pure 'economic committee' between the representatives of the business circles of south and north Korea so that the two sides can trade materials and cooperate and assist with each other in economic construction... There is no reason why the same Korean people get together and discuss problems. Why do the people of the northern half have to discuss our country's problem with American bastards at Panmunjom on our land... American bastards should go away, and the Korean question should be discussed between the Korean people..."

Although they gave the excuse of caring for "destitute and starving south Korean compatriots," their proposal for an "economic committee" formed between the representatives of the business circles for economic exchanges and cooperation, used words similar to those made in our proposal of June 23, 1978 for the creation of a "consultative body for expedition of economic cooperation between the south and the north." In twenty years since, they have withdrawn their words whereas the south has come to use them. This may well be the case of reversion.

Until the latter half of the 1950s, East Germany laid down a state federal system as an interim measure pending unification of East and West Germany. On February 3, 1957, specifically, Ulbricht offered to form a whole German committee organized between the same number of representatives of East and West Germany for the peaceful solution of the German question.¹⁶⁾

An East Germany as such does not use the words "Deutsche Nation" today after revising its Constitution in 1974. It now has gone so far as to call itself "Socialistische Nation" to distinguish itself from the capitalistic nation of West Germany. In other words, West Germany still adheres to the stand of "two states in one nation" whereas East Germany has shrunk itself into the position of "two states in two nations."

Judging from this experience, the day must be not too far off when north Korea will have to abandon even the words "confeder-

ation system.”

Meanwhile, north Korea continues to pursue the “united front” strategy based on the so-called “five principles for peaceful unification” announced on June 23, 1973.

The major contents of the “five principles” were firstly the urging of “dissolution of the state of military confrontation between the south and the north.” Implicit in this clause was an attempt to prompt the complete withdrawal of American forces from south Korea and thereafter maintain a military strength superior to the south’s, against the backdrop of the pullout of the U.S. Seventh Division in 1971, and the conclusion of the Vietnam Peace Agreement in late January 1973 under which the whole U.S. forces were to withdraw from Indochina in six months.

On the other hand, when some of the tunnels they dug around the time of the south-north dialogue were uncovered, the north Koreans argued “they were dug as a passage through which patriotic people would be taken to the north for refuge in the event a people’s uprising flares up in south Korea”¹⁷ or “the tunnels have nothing to do with us... Since they were discovered in the south Korean sector, they are the ones dug by south Korea.”¹⁸ Thus seen, it is apparent that their call for “easing of the state of military confrontation and tensions” is nothing more than an attempt to lock up an inferior military strength of south Korea possibly resulting from a U.S. military withdrawal.

Secondly, the principles called for “many-sided collaboration and exchanges in various fields such as politics, military, diplomacy, economy and culture between the south and the north in order to expedite unification of the country.” Anyone knows that collaboration of politics, military and diplomacy of whatever form can hardly be realized unless it is preceded by a substantial progress toward national unification. Exchanges and collaboration in the areas of economy and culture are practicable at the initial stage of the inter-Korean cooperation. However, north Korea was demanding a “simultaneous and comprehensive collaboration” in all fields, opposing the south’s idea of gradual exchanges and cooperation and

thus driving the dialogue into disrapture.

Moreover, south Korea invited north Korea to take part in various cultural and sports events held in Seoul, but only in vain. When a south Korean delegation attended the Universiade held in Moscow in August 1973, north Korea boycotted it altogether.¹⁹⁾

While reporting the so-called "eight-point peaceful unification formula" to a "Supreme People's Assembly" session on April 12, 1971, Ho Tam, north Korea's foreign minister, proposed a confederation system, and said, "If south Korean authorities cannot accept this interim step (confederation system), they should at least allow, as a humanitarian gesture, the parents, children, relatives, and friends long separated between the south and the north to the change their information and see each other." However, once the South-North Red Cross Conference got underway and the south Korean side put forth concrete steps for the reunion of dispersed families, north Korea took a contradictory position saying, "Since our humanitarian problems have stemmed from the division of the fatherland, they would be settled automatically once unification of the fatherland is realized. The Red Cross should exert all available efforts to this end."²⁰ With these remarks, north Korea torpedoed the humanitarian project.

Thirdly, they demanded the "convocation of a grand national conference." He was urging that a grand national conference should be formed between workers, working farmers, working intellectuals, youthful students and soldiers of the northern half and people of various circles and the representatives of various political parties and social organizations of south Korea, which represent south Korea's workers, farmers, youthful students, intellectuals, military servicemen, national capitalists and petit bourgeoisie.

One thing obvious here is that Kim Il-sung lays down the criterion for the formation of a south Korean delegation, the members of which, according to him, should be selected in accordance with his view of class. This means that depending on the demand of north Korea, some sectors of the nation cannot send their delegates to what they call a "grand national conference." This was

comparable to the Soviet demand made at the Joint U.S.-Soviet Commission that those who opposed trusteeship in 1946 and 47 should be excluded from the discussion of national independence.

At the third vice co-chairmen's meeting of the South-North Coordinating Committee held on January 30, 1974, Pyongyang-side vice co-chairman Ryu Jang-shik proposed a plan to "expand and reorganize the South-North Coordinating Committee," which was in effect designed to alter the Coordinating Committee into "grand national conference." He said that a "grand national conference" or "south-north political conference" should be formed with more than five representatives of the authorities of the two sides, five to 20 representatives of each of 60 to 70 political parties and social organizations from each side, and the same number of representatives of various circles from each side, who would add up to 350 to 1,500.²¹⁾

No sensible men can believe that a meeting of so many delegates can ever effectively discuss the sensitive unification issue of Korea.

Fourthly, they suggested the institution of the "south-north confederation system." But, this, too, was hardly practicable all the more because they were insisting that the system should be realized through the convocation of a "grand national conference." Even if the proposed confederation system can be discussed irrespective of a "grand national conference," there was no chance for such discussion because north Korea failed to produce any concrete measures for such a system in a period from 1960 to 1973 when they reiterated the proposal. This indicates that north Korea put forth the idea of confederation system merely for propaganda's sake.

Lastly, north Korea suggested that south and north Korea join the United Nations under the single title of "Confederation Republic of Koryo." This offer was insincere because they one-sidedly hand-picked the title, and, above all, stems from the fiction that any simultaneous entry by south and north Korea would perpetuate national division.

As can be seen here, north Korea's version of "peaceful unification" means nothing but the realization of a unification based on

its "peaceful unification formula" calling for a Communist revolution called "people's democratic revolution" in south Korea first and then realization of unification through collaboration between north Korea and a pro-Communist regime born of such a revolution in the south.

b. Path to Genuine Peaceful Unification

It is believed, as was discussed in the foregoing, that since north Korea's "peaceful unification" is based on its policy of "revolution in south Korea," exchanges and cooperation through a genuine inter-Korean dialogue will hardly be realized unless north Korea modifies its policy.

Now, we shall discuss the path to a genuine peaceful unification which can serve the future of the nation.

Our concept of peaceful unification was made clear in the "Three Principles for Peaceful Unification" made public by President Park on August 15, 1974. To describe it in other words, the path to our unification is first, peaceful unification; second, independent unification; and third, democratic unification.²²⁾

As for peaceful unification, President Park stated in his August 15 Declaration of 1970 that "no matter how urgent and important national unification may be, we must avoid war that would demand the bleeding of the same people, and no matter how rugged the path to unification may be, we must solve it peacefully by demonstrating steady patience and maximum good sense."

No matter how good a justification there may be, a unification by means of bleeding between the same people can never be justified. Fratricidal conflicts which may be contemplated by the north Korean Communists in the name of "national unification" or "national liberation" must be forestalled under all circumstances.

In the case of the second principle -- independent unification, a unification fitting this principle can be achieved most safely only in a peaceful manner, as was pointed out in the preceding chapter. In view of the geo-political location of the Korean peninsula, any at-

tempt for unification by force of arms or armed clashes would surely invite intervention by world powers. Today north Korea is in an alliance with China and the Soviet Union. We don't need to decline good-intentioned advice or mediation by our allies. But, a genuine national development can be ensured only when unification is achieved independently without any intervention by third parties as much as possible.

Concerning the third principle -- democratic unification, there can be, to be frank, only two paths to our unification under the given situation: a unification under the leadership of south Korea and a unification under the leadership of north Korea. National development and happiness can be best guaranteed only when a unification is achieved under one of the two systems that can better ensure the happiness of the people.

Of course, the present situation of the Republic of Korea is not perfectly ideal. But, a national unification under the political, social and economic system based on the principle of ever-prospering liberal democracy is the only way to guarantee the development and happiness of our future and contribute to peace of Asia and the world.

Conquer of the whole Korean peninsula under Kim Il-sung's autocratic totalitarianism will only bring darkness to the nation's future and will eventually obliterate the national being.

The fact that Germany was unified by autocratic Prussia in the mid-19th century touched off World War II, shows us under which system Korea should be unified for the sake of national development and promotion of national happiness.

Thus seen, a genuine peaceful unification of the nation can be achieved only when all the members of the nation are allowed to choose one of the two systems freely and peacefully through elections following a stage where national homogeneity is restored and developed by means of exchanges and cooperation facilitated by a consolidated peace and dialogue between the south and the north of Korea. The reality of the present stage of the inter-Korean relationship is such that to make this possible, the recurrence of war must be

forestalled above all.

Now, we shall discuss the issue of how to interpret the meeting of senior official representatives of the south and the north of Korea and the United States recently proposed jointly by the Republic of Korea and the United States.

The "meeting of three authorities" must be explained from two angles:

First, from our standpoint, the proposed meeting can be taken as the extension of talks between the authorities of south and north Korea, which we have been urging consistently.

How, then, can the proposal be explained from the angle of the United States?

First, it bears an important historical significance that the United States has emerged as a co-sponsor with us over the issue of Korean unification. The invariable principle of the United States in its Korea policy so far has been to declare its military commitment to the security of south Korea. This is the first time the U.S. has ever emerged as a third party in the question of inter-Korean relations aimed at easing tensions on the Korean peninsula.

Of course, the communique, which contained the proposal, stipulated that the United States entered on the stage in order to participate in the Korean question together with us. At any rate, the U.S.'s appearance in the inter-Korean relations heralds the advent of a new dimension of the Korean question.

Why then has the United States decided to make the debut at this time?

As for the timing, it should be remembered that U.N. Secretary General Kurt Waldheim has come to play a role or step in the Korean question. As is well known, south Korea has been placed under the exclusive influence of the United States ever since the end of World War II. This is probably why it was the first time the U.N. Secretary General visited Korea despite the fact that the United Nations Command was established in connection with the Korean War, that is, the first U.N. forces formed with the mission of fighting in the Korean War after the inauguration of the United

Nations. The fact that no U.N. Secretary General had visited Korea where the U.N. Flag was fluttering for nearly 30 years after the U.N. Command was activated under a Security Council resolution on July 7, 1950 indicates that the Korean question has in effect been left to the United States.

Seen from such basic stand of the United States over the Korean peninsula, the intervention of the U.N. Secretary General under the circumstances cannot but be taken as a heretical development. Ending the explanation about the timing of the U.S.'s appearance in the scene of the Korean question around here, we shall now look into its domestic motivation as well as its linkage to foreign policies.

As for the domestic motivation, the most important issue facing the U.S. government with regard to its Korea policy is the question of U.S. military withdrawal from Korea. Because of this withdrawal issue, the U.S. government has become involved in heated controversies within and without. The Carter Administration believes it would be in its disfavor if the withdrawal question continues to remain as a political issue at home and abroad. The Carter Administration, therefore, believes that the withdrawal issue can be buried wholly by the "meeting of three authorities" proposition. About the troop withdrawal plan, some sectors of the United States support it while others oppose.

Few persons can dispute the fact that the "meeting of three authorities" has been proposed with a view to easing tensions on the Korean peninsula and helping achieve unification of Korea. In other words, seen from the standpoint of Carter who faces election next year, the "meeting of three authorities" overture which can terminate and bury the controversial withdrawal issue emerges as quite a wonder drug.

So far as the United States is concerned, therefore, the fact that the "meeting of three authorities" has been proposed jointly with south Korea meets its primary objective. To the United States, it is considered not so important whether the proposed meeting would actually take place or how it would be operated. If the "meeting of three authorities" is opened and goes on smoothly, it would pri-

marily be the business of south and north Korea. And, if it fails to get off the ground, north Korea is to be blamed first, and then the responsibility may be shifted to south Korea. Therefore, The United States has already gained two thirds of its objective by the fact that it has proposed the conference.

Next, American policy makers might have expected that the "meeting of three authorities" proposal could remind the American people of the image of the Camp David meeting last year, giving to the American people a lingering impression of Carter as an able trouble shooter.

We have seen in the above the impact the "meeting of three authorities" offer would have on the domestic policies of the United States. Externally, on the other hand, it can be believed that the U.S. wants to ease tensions on the Korean peninsula as an extension of its rapprochement with China. At the same time, the United States might have believed that it doesn't necessarily serve the U.S. interests to leave north Korea where it is beyond its reach.

At the same time, if the "meeting of three authorities" takes place, it would foster a condition conducive to the implementation of the withdrawal plan as scheduled, since it could remove the ground for any opposition to the pullout plan.

How, then, will north Korea react to the proposal for the "meeting of three authorities"? It would be extremely difficult to predict Pyongyang's reaction. Still, we can imagine what north Korea could think in connection with the offer. Earlier north Korea had come up with a sort of a tripartite meeting.

Originally, the idea of a tripartite conference was offered by the United States as a counter-proposal to north Korea's offer for the conclusion of a peace agreement between itself and the United States. Against this idea of a tripartite conference, there was a north Korean version of a tripartite meeting. As Ho Tam stated at a non-aligned foreign ministers' conference held in New York in 1977, Pyongyang's idea was that the U.S. and north Korea first enter talks, and in due course of time south Korea could be invited to take part in the meeting. It seems that apart from the method, the fact that

the United States has emerged as a party in a dialogue over the Korean question has brought a big dilemma to north Korea.

Thus seen, it appears north Korea is in a position difficult to reject the proposal altogether. If north Korea accepts the offer, it will do so on the excuse that its version of a tripartite meeting has been accepted by the United States. North Korea may also believe that if the "meeting of three authorities" would be not in conformity with its strategy, it may try to alter the direction of the meeting in its favor by manipulating its topics.

All in all, it is considered important that at this meeting, as in other occasions, we try to discover the possibility of laying an elementary base for cementing the consolidation of peace from a far-reaching point of view.

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Part One

Road to Peaceful Unification

(34th National Liberation Day)

1. President Park Again Calls for Talks Between South and North Korean Authorities

President Park Chung Hee, in his commemorative address delivered on the occasion of the 34th anniversary of national liberation on August 15, 1979, declared, "We want peace... No matter how ardent our aspiration for national unification may be, we do not want unification by means of war or violence." The President then said, "I would like to take this occasion to call upon north Korea again to come forward to the table of the South-North Red Cross Conference and to accept our offer either for talks between the responsible authorities of the south and the north of Korea or for a three authorities meeting. I make it quite clear that the door to the talks is always kept wide open."

Today, our people, who had no sooner rejoiced over national liberation than the tragedies of national division and the 1950 fratricidal war befell them, still suffer from the division of the fatherland as well as from tensions between south and north Korea.

Despite our untiring efforts to ease the sufferings of the more than 10 million dispersed family members who are impatient for the day of their reunion, the south-north Red Cross talks, based on humanitarianism, remain suspended over a protracted period due to north Korea's insincerity. Moreover, the north Koreans have unilaterally broken up the meetings of the South-North Coordinating Committee directed toward peaceful unification of the country.

North Korea has been deliberately feeding tensions on the Korean peninsula on one hand by digging invasion tunnels beneath the truce line and perpetrating other overt acts of provocation. On the other hand, it is attempting to isolate south Korea from the rest of the world community in a deceptive propaganda campaign. The north Koreans who have rejected the call for a dialogue between the

responsible authorities of the two sides of divided Korea and severed all channels of inter-Korean talks, now ridiculously demand a negotiation directly with the United States.

Internally, the north Korean Communists fabricated the Korean history in a way that could better serve their cause and have deepened national heterogeneity in the areas of language, religion, art and culture, not to speak of ideas and political system.

In other words, due to the remodeling of all the customs and systems as well as the life style in line with Kim Il-sung's monolithic ideas, our historical and traditional traits are being obliterated one by one in north Korea. They have rewritten the national history in the light of the materialistic conception of history and forcibly linked all things to their dogmatism, thereby attempting to destroy completely the national and traditional consciousness existing between the south and the north.

President Park's renewed call for a dialogue between the responsible authorities of the two sides, made against the backdrop of this deplorable reality, was highly significant. It represented the reaffirmation of the road to peaceful unification the Republic of Korea has been pursuing. The proposal further manifested south Korea's invariable determination to solve the Korean question based on the principles of national independence and conciliation.

The following are extracts of President's Park's 34th Liberation Day address on the issue of the south-north dialogue:

"... However, one deplorable fact remaining still untangled is that our people and land are still divided.

"The north Korean Communists, who defy the tradition of our ethnic culture and obstruct the people's prosperity and happiness, are continuing a reckless military buildup to fulfill the daydream of communizing the south by force of arms. Even at this very moment, they are digging invasion tunnels along the truce line.

"Recently, our military and police forces intercepted and sank a north Korean armed espionage ship which infiltrated

deep into the southern coastal sea under the guise of a fishing boat.

“They are dreaming of repeating the tremendous national crime they committed during the Korean War.

“We, who already called for the resumption of the south-north dialogue many times in the past, proposed a dialogue between the responsible authorities of the south and the north early this year, and recently offered, together with the United States, a “three-authorities meeting.” But, they get off the subject while demanding a so-called peace agreement with the United States.

“If so, I would like to ask them a question. When the north Korean Communists provoked the aggressive war in 1950, did they attack the United States instead of the Republic of Korea?

“It was because of their unprovoked armed attack on our Republic of Korea that the bloody Korean War flared up and the state of a precarious ceasefire persists between the south and the north for almost a generation.

“If north Korea refuses to have a dialogue and negotiate with us at this juncture when efforts should be exerted to change the instable truce into a system for durable peace and further to promote peaceful unification of the fatherland through exchanges and cooperation between the south and the north, I am obliged to ask again with whom else they intend to discuss and solve the issue pending between the direct parties—south and north Korea.

“What are they afraid of—why on earth they keep rejecting our humanitarian calls for the realization of divided families and for economic exchanges intended to enhance the wellbeing and prosperity of all the compatriots both south and north?

“If they refuse to hold a dialogue despite their cry for peaceful unification, we cannot help but conclude that they are actually exposing their hidden intention of pursuing unification by force of arms.

“Nevertheless, we want peace. No matter how ardent our aspiration for national unification may be, we do not want

unification by means of war or violence.

“This is why there need a dialogue above all and broad-ranging exchanges and cooperation facilitates through dialogue between south and north Korea.

“It was out of our deep devotion to the cause of dialogue that a few days ago, on the eighth anniversary of our proposal for the South-North Red Cross Conference, we again proposed to reopen the long suspended talks for the sake of the reunion of divided families.

“I would like to take this occasion to call upon north Korea again to come forward to the table of the South-North Red Cross Conference and to accept our offer either for talks between the responsible authorities of the south and the north of Korea or for a “three authorities meeting”. I make it quite clear that the door to the talks is always kept wide open.

“We hope that a meaningful dialogue in any form will come into being between the responsible authorities of the two sides, and thus tension will be eased and peace will take root on this land.

“I am firmly convinced that not only that the main current of international relations is on the side of peace but that our formidable national strength will crush the north Koreans’ military adventurism and ultimately open a way to peaceful unification.

“We will keep marching forward with unflagging endurance, refurbishing our national strength to ensure self-reliance, independence and self-defense based on an ever-converging consensus of national purpose and on complete preparedness for national defense...”

(6th Anniversary of June 23 Special Foreign Policy Statement)

2. Foreign Ministry Vows Efforts to Explore Dialogue Between Authorities of South and North Korea

In a statement issued on June 23, 1979 on the occasion of the sixth anniversary of the Special Statement Regarding Foreign Policy for Peace and Unification, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs emphasized that although north Korea persists in a negative attitude toward the south-north dialogue, the Republic of Korea will explore, with patience and imagination, every possible way for convening a dialogue between the representatives of the authorities of south and north Korea. The text of the statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is as follows: — Editor —

Statement by Spokesman for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the Occasion of the Sixth Anniversary of the June 23 Special Statement Regarding Foreign Policy for Peace and Unification.

It has been six years since the June 23rd Special Statement Regarding Foreign Policy for Peace and Unification was announced.

The primary objectives of the June 23rd Statement were to reiterate the basic spirit and principle of our foreign policy for peace, to consolidate peace on the Korean peninsula, to resume the south-north dialogue to expedite peaceful unification, and to open the nation's door to Communist-bloc countries on the principle of reciprocity.

Since the declaration of this new foreign policy on June 23, 1973, we have exerted positive efforts to embody the policy goals envisaged therein, registering many achievements in conse-

quence.

Firstly, our existing relations of friendship and cooperation with friendly countries have been further deepened in political, economic, social and cultural fields.

Secondly, a number of countries belonging to the sphere of the non-aligned movement have come to understand the purport of the June 23 Special Foreign Policy and thus the relations between the Republic of Korea and those non-aligned countries have been remarkably improved and strengthened in the fields of diplomacy, economy and culture.

Thirdly, even in our relations with East European countries, contacts have come to take place, gradually though, emerging from a state of complete discontinuance. As a result, relations have begun to be forged in non-political areas such as indirect trade, sports, cultural activities and international meetings. It is expected that such practical contacts will continue to be made in the days to come.

It is regrettable, however, that contrary to these achievements, there has been no progress in the questions of resuming the south-north dialogue and effecting south-north exchange indispensable to easing of tensions on the Korean peninsula and peaceful unification, due to the unreasonable posture of north Korea.

Notwithstanding the fact that the new proposal set forth by President Park Chung Hee on January 19, 1979 provided a rare impetus to resume the south-north dialogue, the door to the inter-Korean talks remains closed due to the unchanging intransigency on the part of the north Koreans shunning a dialogue between the authorities of the two sides. As a consequence, tensions still persist on the Korean peninsula.

In a statement issued on March 28, 1979 following the three-round south-north contacts held at Panmunjom, our delegation made our position known clearly that the door to talks between the representatives of the authorities of south and north Korea pursuant to the contents of our January 19 Proposal will always

remain open.

U.N. Secretary General Kurt Waldheim as well as many peace-loving nations wish that resumption of the south-north dialogue will be realized at an early date as we promote now. Although north Korea persists in a negative attitude toward the south-north dialogue, the Republic of Korea will explore, with patience and imagination, every possible way for convening a dialogue between the representatives of the authorities of south and north Korea.

On the occasion of the sixth anniversary of the June 23rd Special Statement, we once again wish to reaffirm our determination to effectively pursue all policy objectives enunciated in the Statement. We also expect that the international community will continue to support our sincere and unflinching pursuit of peace-oriented foreign policy and peaceful unification of the country.

The gist of the June 23rd Statement, in which the open-door policy was declared toward all the Communist countries with different ideas and systems, was as follows:

1. The peaceful unification of the fatherland is the supreme task of the Korean people. We will continue to exert every effort to accomplish this task.
2. Peace must be maintained in the Korean peninsula by all means. The south and the north should neither interfere with each other's internal affairs nor commit aggression against each other.
3. We will continue to make efforts with sincerity and patience to secure concrete results from the South-North Dialogue based on the spirit of the South-North Joint Communiqué dated 4th July 1972.
4. We shall not oppose north Korea's participation with us in international organizations, if it is conducive to the easing of tension and the furtherance of international cooperation.
5. We shall not object to our admittance into the United Nations

together with north Korea, if the majority of the member-states of the United Nations so wish, provided that it does not cause hindrance to our national unification. Even before our admittance into the United Nations as a member, we shall not be opposed to north Korea also being invited at the time of the U.N. General Assembly's deliberation of the "Korean question" in which the representative of the Republic of Korea is invited to participate.

6. The Republic of Korea will open its door to all the nations of the world on the basis of the principles of reciprocity and equality. At the same time, we urge those countries whose ideologies and social institutions are different from ours to open their doors likewise to us.
7. Peace and good-neighborliness are the firm basis of the foreign policy of the Republic of Korea. It is reaffirmed that we will continue to further strengthen the ties of friendship existing between our friendly nations and our country.

The June 23rd Special Foreign Policy Statement for Peace and Unification, reflecting the flexible and elastic posture with regard to external programs, is the foreign policy of the Republic of Korea specially designed for peace and unification.

The June 23rd Statement has been recognized as a policy best fitting today's flow of international situations characterized by the shift from isolation and confrontation to the pursuit of detente and by the transition from an age of polarization to an age of multi-polarization.

It was in the spirit of this foreign policy statement that the Republic of Korea has thrown the door of dialogue wide open to north Korea, setting forth a series of various formulas intended to advance the time of peaceful unification.

These overtures, all realistic and concrete and all aimed at facilitating peaceful unification of the country, include the January 19 Proposal for a dialogue between the authorities of south and north Korea, proposal for the establishment of a private body for

the expedition of economic cooperation between the two sides, offer for assistance of foods to north Korea, and the proposal for an exchange of exhibitions of ancient artifacts and archaeological materials between the south and the north.

Nonetheless, north Korea adheres to an unreasonable attitude whereby it rejects these propositions for peaceful exchanges and even suspended the south-north dialogue unilaterally while repeating propaganda demands such as the call for negotiations with the United States.

Under the circumstances, the Republic of Korea government reaffirmed the spirit of the June 23rd Special Foreign Policy Statement Regarding Peace and Unification, vowing to explore, with patience and creativeness, ways to open a dialogue between the representatives of the authorities of south and north Korea.

Part Two

Proposal for “Three Authorities Meeting”

1. Background of Proposal for “Three Authorities Meeting”

Ever since the north Koreans unilaterally suspended the south-north dialogue on August 28, 1973, the government of the Republic of Korea has made incessant and many-sided efforts to bring north Korea back to the table of talks so as to ease tension and consolidate peace on the Korean peninsula, facilitating peaceful unification of the nation.

The efforts of south Korea represent its volition to materialize the invariable wish of the 50 million people of the south and the north for a peaceful unification of their fatherland, and, at the same time, are in conformity with the developments of the situation of the world powers having stakes in the Korean peninsula as well as that of the world community as a whole.

For about one year after the issuance of the South-North Joint Communiqué on July 4, 1972, the two sides of divided Korea were engaged in a dialogue on two channels — the South-North Red Cross Conference and the South-North Coordinating Committee, drawing wholehearted support and keen concern from within and without.

Due to north Korea's boycott of the talks in August 1973, however, the inter-Korean dialogue has been deadlocked, only giving rise to tension on the Korean peninsula, a development which prompted the acute need for a renewed dialogue in order to forestall the recurrence of an internecine tragedy.

Here, President Park Chung Hee proposed to north Korea on January 19, 1979 that the authorities of the south and the north unconditionally have a dialogue at any time, any place and at any level to resume the stalled dialogue and discuss openheartedly the question of peaceful unification of the fatherland. This was another manifestation of the Republic of Korea government efforts directed toward realizing peaceful unification under the present conditions of the Korean peninsula.

Notwithstanding, no responsible authorities of north Korea showed any official reaction to the proposition. North Korea simply put forth a mere social organization, "Democratic Front for Unification of the Fatherland," a vanguard setup of the north Korean Workers' (Communist) Party, in its demand for a "whole nation conference" in response to the January 19 proposal. The north Korean idea was that the two sides hold "negotiations between the representatives of all political parties and social organizations as well as individuals from all walks of life in the south and the north," namely, a sort of public rally, to discuss the delicate political issue of national unification. North Korea thus rejects the just proposal for a dialogue between the responsible authorities of the two sides.

As a result, the three-round contacts held at Panmunjom early 1979 between the delegates of the north Korean "Democratic Front" and the Seoul side members of the South-North Coordinating Committee ended in mere abnormal contacts without any progress due to the north Koreans' insincerity.

In the course of the Panmunjom contacts, north Korea did not bother to conceal its underlying intention of exploiting the south-north dialogue for the accomplishment of its avowed goal of subverting the Republic of Korea.

The basic stand of the north Koreans is to seek a dialogue not to solve various issues pending between the two sides through openhearted talks, but simply as a means of effecting their old-fashioned "united front" strategy to foment unrests and splits in the Republic of Korea.

Moreover, north Korea endeavors to prompt the withdrawal of American forces from Korea and promote a direct dialogue with the United States in an attempt to facilitate a "people's revolution" in south Korea.

Even during the short-lived south-north dialogue, north Korea insisted that 1) a peace agreement should be concluded directly with the United States over the head of the Republic of Korea so as to facilitate the departure of the U.S. forces from Korea, whom it regards as a fundamental obstacle to the communization of the

whole Korean peninsula, and 2) a conference between all the political parties and social organizations of south and north Korea should be held, arguing that “the unification issue cannot be the monopoly of “regimes” or “authorities.”

These are fictitious demands ignoring the reality, and point only to their de facto rejection of a south-north dialogue directed toward achieving peaceful unification of the nation.

It was due to this very policy of the north Koreans to communize south Korea and boycott a dialogue that the efforts of the Republic of Korea to resume the suspended dialogue have failed to come to any fruition.

The persistent position of south Korea is that in order to facilitate a constructive and effective dialogue between the south and the north, north Korea must abandon such an anachronistic scheme and come to the table of “talks between the representatives of the responsible authorities of south and north Korea” who can implement under their responsibility what would have been agreed on at such meeting.

However, north Korea rejects the solution of the Korean question between the direct parties, namely, the south and the north of Korea, by demanding, outwardly, the conclusion of a peace agreement with the United States. They also turn their deaf ears to the proposal for a dialogue between the authorities of the south and the north by insisting, inwardly, on contacts between political parties and social organizations and a “whole nation conference.”

It was under the circumstances that a historic Korea-U.S. summit meeting was held where a meeting of senior official representatives of south and north Korea and the United States was proposed.

2. Substance and Significance of Proposal for “Three Authorities Meeting”

In a joint communique issued on July 1, 1979 at the end of their summit meeting, President and U.S. President Jimmy Carter pro-

vided a fresh momentum to solve the Korean question by jointly proposing the holding of a “meeting of senior official representatives of the south and the north of Korea and the United States” as a new approach to easing tension on the Korean peninsula and resuming the deadlocked south-north dialogue. The contents of the proposal were as follows:

***Joint Communique Between the Presidents of
Korea and the United States***

(Article 10)

The two Presidents agreed on the priority need to continue the search for means to reduce tensions on the Korean peninsula. President Park explained in the recent efforts of the Republic of Korea government, beginning with his initiative of January 19, 1979, to resume productive dialogue with north Korean authorities. President Carter assured President Park of United States support for these efforts and expressed the hope that meetings between the responsible authorities of the South and the North of Korea would become possible.

(Article 11)

In view of the importance of this issue for peace and stability on the Korean peninsula and in the region, and as a testament to the personal commitment of the two Presidents to seek honorable means to promote dialogue and reduce tensions, President Park and President Carter have decided jointly to propose the convening of a meeting of senior official representatives of the South and the North of Korea and the United States to seek means to promote dialogue and reduce tensions in the area. In order to promote this effort and to prepare for the meeting which it is hoped can be arranged, the two Presidents have directed the Foreign Minister and the Secretary of State to com-

municate jointly with the Foreign Minister of north Korea in this regard in an appropriate manner.

(Article 12)

The two Presidents agreed that any arrangement that would reduce tension and establish lasting peace leading ultimately to the peaceful unification of the Korean people should result from dialogue between the two responsible authorities of both the South and the North of Korea. President Park noted the consistency with which the Republic of Korea has pursued efforts at dialogue and the reduction of tensions as exemplified in the policies which he announced on June 23, 1973.

(Article 13)

President Carter stated that if and when north Korea's principal allies are prepared to expand relationships with the Republic of Korea, the United States is prepared to take similar steps with north Korea. President Carter also noted that unilateral steps toward north Korea which are not reciprocated toward the Republic of Korea by north Korea's principal allies do not improve stability or promote peace in the area.

(Article 14)

The two Presidents shared the view that the admission of both the South and the North of Korea to the United Nations as an interim measure pending their eventual unification would provide authorities of both Korean parties with broader opportunities for dialogue aimed at the resolution of their differences.

As can be seen in the Joint Communique, the Presidents of Korea and the United States agreed on the need to continue the search for means to reduce tensions on the Korean peninsula, and as a testament to such a resolution, jointly proposed a "three authorities meeting" to promote the resumption of the inter-Korean dialogue as well as to ease tensions on the Korean peninsula.

What, then, are the significance and nature of the proposal for a three authorities meeting?

First, the proposal is significant in that it is a proposition aimed at providing a breakthrough in the deadlock of the south-north dialogue caused by north Korea.

In view of the fact that the overture came at a time when the inter-Korean talks were at a complete standstill following north Korea's unilateral and abrupt boycott of the two-channeled dialogue and when north Korea shuns talks between the authorities of the two sides for one reason and another, the offer for a "three authorities meeting" could become a new impetus to realize a dialogue between the two sides' authorities.

Even though the representatives of the United States are supposed to attend the proposed meeting, the United States would, at such meeting, play the role of a mere helper in efforts to realize inter-Korean talks. Therefore, once a "three authorities meeting" would take place as proposed, it could amount to laying the groundwork for a meeting between the authorities of south and north Korea.

The proposal for a "three authorities meeting" was buttressed by the firm determination and confidence of the Republic of Korea that it would explore whatever means available for durable peace on the Korean peninsula on the strength of a sharply grown national capability achieved in the past 15 years under the leadership of President Park.

Second, the proposal for a "three authorities meeting" is part of the positive efforts to realize a south-north dialogue, representing the spirit that the Korean question should be solved between the direct parties, namely, the authorities of the two sides of divided Korea.

It is a forward-looking proposition embodying the basic position of the Republic of Korea that the only path to peaceful unification lies in a dialogue between the two sides, and that a dialogue should take place between the responsible authorities of the south and the north.

This is why the two countries of Korea and the United States shared the view in the joint communique that the direct parties to the Korean question are south and north Korea, with the United States pledging that it won't promote any improved relations onesidedly with north Korea.

Although the offer for a "three authorities meeting" was made in the form of a joint proposal between Korea and the United States, the overture was in effect made on the initiative of the Republic of Korea in line with its policy to pursue independent and peaceful unification, an idea which lurks beneath all the propositions south Korea has set forth as means of approach to unification ever since the south-north dialogue was begun in the early 1970s.

In other words, the main role is supposed to be played at the proposed "three authorities meeting" by the south and the north of Korea, with the United States taking part in its only as south Korea's cooperator helping the meeting get off the ground.

Therefore, the proposal for a "three authorities meeting" duly reflects the basic principle that the "Korean question must be solved by the direct parties — south and north Korea."

In the sense that the two sides of Korea would assume a key role in a three authorities meeting and the United States takes part in it only as a "cooperator," the proposed meeting basically differs in nature from the Paris peace talks where the United States and North Vietnam were principal negotiations with South Vietnam playing only a supporting role or from the recent Middle East peace talks where the United States was an equidistant mediator for Egypt and Israel. The suggested meeting is also different fundamental from the idea of a so-called tripartite meeting which was advocated by some sectors early in the year.

Moreover, the offer for a "three authorities meeting" is in complete conformity with south Korea's consistent policy in that it aims to expedite inter-Korean talks and ease tensions on the Korean peninsula. The fact that south Korea pursues the same objective can be well known in a series of its proposals and policy declarations based thereon, which include the Idea of Peaceful Unification made

public by President Park on August 15, 1970, July 4 South-North Joint Communique, June 23 Special Foreign Policy Statement for Peace and Unification, Three Basic Principles for Peaceful Unification of 1974, and the proposal for a dialogue between the authorities of the south and the north made on January 19, 1979.

Third, the two countries of Korea and the United States, by making the joint proposal, have displayed a firm unity as traditional allies as well as their immovable commitment to the efforts to ease tensions on the Korean peninsula.

The joint proposal can be taken to indicate that Korea and the United States, upon reaffirmation of their unchanging relationship of alliance, shared the view on the situation surrounding the Korean peninsula as well as that of the world as a whole and vowed to take joint steps to insure peace and security on the Korean peninsula through their close cooperation in politics, economy and all other fields.

In this viewpoint, the proposal may well represent the enriched efforts of the Republic of Korea to surmount, with patience and creativeness, the trials and difficulties lying ahead in the road to unification. It can also be taken to symbolize the common expectation of Korea and the United States that north Korea and its allies, who have so far dismissed sincere and realistic offers, would take corresponding endeavors for peace and stability in this part of the world.

If the proposed three authorities meeting is realized, it can serve as an opportunity to induce China, the Soviet Union and other Communist countries into taking corresponding measures toward south Korea on the principle of diplomatic reciprocity with regard to the inter-Korean relations, and also to foster international conditions conducive to simultaneously entry of both south and north Korea into the United Nations.

In view of the historical fact that the division of the Korean peninsula was imposed upon the Korean people by world powers against their will, it is more than natural for peace-loving nations of the world to strive to bring about lasting peace on the Korean penin-

sula.

In fact the proposal for a three authorities meeting is being supported by the whole people beyond political affiliation. Externally too, the overture is being received affirmatively by Western and many of non-aligned countries as an effective means to resume the stalled inter-Korean dialogue and bring about durable peace on the Korean peninsula.

3. Negative Response from North Korea and Its Underlying Motive

Around the time the Joint Communiqué of the Korea-U.S. summit was issued, the governments of the Republic of Korea and the United States formally conveyed to north Korea the proposal for a meeting of senior official representatives of the south and the north of Korea and the United States ("three authorities meeting") by way of the government of Indonesia where both south and north Korea maintain diplomatic missions. At the same time, the two proposing countries urged north Korea to accept the offer through some diplomatic channels.

At first, north Korea did not mention about the proposal. It only denounced the Korea-U.S. summit meeting and its joint communiqué in unfounded accusations before it voiced a negative response in a statement issued by a spokesman for the foreign ministry on July 10, ten days after the overture was offered.

In the statement broadcast by Radio Pyongyang at 10 a.m. July 10, north Korea reiterated the past position it had upheld with regard to the south-north dialogue, arguing that the "proposal for a three authorities meeting did not come from a sincere policy to solve the Korean question."

The gist of the Pyongyang statement relating to the proposal was:

"First, all political, economic and cultural issues incidental to the solution of the question of national unification are the in-

ternal national problems which ought to be solved between the south and the north without any external interference. If the United States steps in this area, it would be an act of interference in the internal affairs of the Korean people.

“Second, the question of getting American forces withdrawn from south Korea and replacing the Military Armistice Agreement with a peace agreement is an issue that ought to be settled in talks between north Korea and the United States, the de facto direct parties to the Armistice Agreement.

“Third, an exclusive meeting should first take place between north Korea and the United States. If and when some problems relating to south Korea occur in the course of such meeting, the authorities of south Korea would be allowed to take part as an “observer” if the United States so request.

“Fourth, the United States cannot interfere in such an important internal problem as the issue of national unification. We are prepared to have a broad-avenued dialogue on this question between authorities and the representatives of all political parties, social organization and oversea residents’ communities at any time.”

This north Korean statement was meant to indicate that 1) north Korea, not in a position to ignore the offer altogether, attempted to minimize the political effect of the joint Korea-U.S. proposal by having a mere spokesman for the foreign ministry make an official response thereto, 2) north Korea held fast to the consistent position that the issue of unification is one thing and military problems are another, and 3) north Korea showed somewhat a more rigid stance on the question of south Korea’s representation, by insisting that south Korea would be allowed in a north Korea-U.S. meeting only when some issues concerned with south Korea pop up and when the United States requests south Korea’s participation.

A perusal look at the north Korean contention can shed light on the following aspects.

First, north Korea argued in the statement that the “question of

getting American forces withdrawn from south Korea and replacing the Military Armistice Agreement with a peace agreement is an issue that ought to be settled in talks between north Korea and the United States, the de facto direct parties to the Armistice Agreement.”

North Korea, thus, commits the unreasonableness of separating the question of replacing the truce agreement from the issue of national unification. In its absurd contention that it cannot discuss the issue of peace with south Korea – a party which is pitted against the north across the truce line – on the perfunctory ground that south Korea is not a signatory of the Armistice Agreement, north Korea disregards the stark fact that the major defending force during the Korean War was the Armed Forces of the Republic of Korea and that the direct party responsible for the maintenance and supervision of the 155-mile truce line today is the south Korean forces as well.

Moreover, north Korea has launched a time-worn propaganda campaign with a view to spreading the false impression that “unification of Korea is being hampered militarily by the United States.” By insisting on a peace agreement with the United States, north Korea tries to play up the American presence in Korea as an “opponent to peace” while deliberately dismissing the fact that the actual party to the hostilities was the United Nations forces comprising the contingents of the United States and 15 other countries which, under a United Nations resolution, participated in the war as a peace crusade to punish the aggressors.

This maneuver amounts only to showing their self-admittance that they merely seek the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Korea without any interest in the pursuit of lasting peace in this part of the world.

In other words, a peace agreement which north Korea wants to conclude with the United States is aimed not at consolidating peace on the Korean peninsula but at prompting U.S. military withdrawal from Korea and thereby paving the way to their renewed aggression against the south.

North Korea put forth the idea of a peace agreement with the

United States first on March 25, 1974 in a reaction to the proposal for the conclusion of a south-north non-aggression agreement made by President Park in his New Year press conference on January 18, 1974.

In a report before the third session of the fifth "Supreme People's Council," north Korea's foreign minister Hoh Tam, rejecting the proposed south-north non-aggression agreement, offered the conclusion of a peace agreement between the United States and north Korea, contending that the direct parties to the truce talks were the U.S. and north Korea.

Making the proposal, north Korea called for 1) removal of factors contributory to armed clashes through conclusions of a non-aggression agreement between the U.S. and north Korea, 2) ban on the introduction of all weapons, operational equipment and military materials into the Korean peninsula, 3) dissolution of the United Nations Command and simultaneous and immediate withdrawal of the American forces in Korea, and 4) creation of no foreign military bases on the Korean peninsula after the withdrawal of foreign troops.

At all available opportunities thereafter, including the 1974 and 1975 U.N. General Assemblies where the Korean question was taken up, Fifth Non-Aligned Summit Meeting held in Colombo in August 1976, and the Non-Aligned Foreign Ministers' Conference held in Belgrade in July 1978, north Korea was insisting that the actual parties to the Amistice Agreement are the United States and north Korea.

As the ground of their demand for a peace agreement with the United States over the head of south Korea, a direct party of the Korean question, the north Koreans argued that 1) *the U.S. government should be held responsible for the tension and war crisis in Korea today, and 2) in order to eliminate tensions and factors detrimental to independent unification and to prepare conditions for the independent solution of the Korean question among the Korean people, negotiations should be held for a peace agreement with the United States which, they said, is maintaining troops in Korea and is*

one of the signatories of the Armistice Agreement. (A report by Hoh Tam at third session of the Fifth "Supreme People's Council" of north Korea, March 25, 1974.)

As can be seen here, north Korea insists on a peace agreement with the United States in a scheme to undermine the military cooperative system between Korea and the U.S., to shake the military balance between south and north Korea through early materialization of the withdrawal of the U.N. forces and American troops in Korea, and to create conditions conducive to communi-zation of south Korea by force.

More specifically, north Korea, through such negotiations with the United States, attempts to 1) isolate south Korea by driving a wedge into the relations between south Korea and the United States, 2) deny the legitimacy of the Republic of Korea and undermine its international standing, 3) cover up its provocation of the Korean War by describing the U.S. as a direct party to the war, and 4) uplift the international status of north Korea externally and internally fur-ther consolidate the one-man dictatorial system of Kim Il-sung.

All in all, the north Korean demand for a peace agreement with the United States, designed only to serve its external propaga-nda programs, lacks any validity.

Also in the statement issued by a spokesman for the north Korean foreign ministry on July 10, 1979 in response to the joint Korea-U.S. proposal for a "three authorities meeting," north Korea claimed that all problems raised between the south and the north with regard to the question of national unification are "the nation's internal problems which should be solved in a south-north dialogue without any interference by outside forces."

It is noted, however, that north Korea, laying such a claim, was the very party which has unilaterally torpedoed the existing machinery for a dialogue, South-North Coordinating Committee, established in a mutual agreement for the purpose of solving the in-ternal problems of the nation.

Moreover, they are holding fast to the contradictory assertion that the issue of national unification should be discussed and solved

by the representatives of political parties and social organizations, despite the obvious fact that such an important political question should naturally be tackled between the responsible authorities of the two sides so as, for one, to guarantee properly the execution of any agreement thereon.

It seems, however, that the real reason for their negative response to the proposal was the fear that if they would accept it, it would obliterate the logic in which they "denied" the existence of the Republic of Korea and pursued a Communist revolution in south Korea, and that if they enter substantial contacts with the Western world, it would lead to the shaking, from within, of the closed society of north Korea.

In consequence, north Korea, unable to rectify its stiffness and locking itself up, keeps averting its face from the changes and mood for peace taking place around the Korean peninsula as characterized by the expanding exchanges between the U.S. and Mainland China and between Japan and Mainland China.

It is more than natural and reasonable to say that the subject of the solution of all issues relating to the Korean question, including the question of replacing the Armistice Agreement with a peace agreement, is the south and the north of Korea, and that in order to hammer out an executable agreement, there should be a dialogue between the responsible authorities of the two sides.

It was on this very spirit that the heroes of the Korean question can be none but south and north Korea that the government of the Republic of Korea emphasizes the need for a dialogue between the authorities of south and north Korea in the January 19 proposal and again in the proposition for a three authorities meeting. And, the fact that the latest offer for a three authorities meeting was so designed as to make the authorities of south and north Korea as the principal role players and the United States only as a cooperator for south Korea, proves that the proposal is highly reasonable.

In the meantime, upon the report of a negative response by north Korea to the proposed three authorities meeting, a spokesman for the Republic of Korea Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in a statement

issued on July 10, again urged north Korea to accept the proposal for a three authorities meeting in conformity with the national aspirations. The full text of the statement is as follows:

***Statement by Spokesman for
Ministry of Foreign Affairs***

On July 1, the governments of the Republic of Korea and the United States jointly proposed to north Korea the convening of a meeting of senior official representatives of the south and the north of Korea and the United States to seek means to promote dialogue and reduce tensions on the Korean peninsula.

This epochal joint initiative reflects the firm determination of both the Republic of Korea and the United States to bring about the reduction of tensions and the establishment of durable peace on the Korean peninsula.

It is to be regretted, notwithstanding, that the north Korean authorities, in a statement of its foreign ministry spokesman on July 10, showed a negative response to the constructive proposal made jointly by the governments of the Republic of Korea and the United States.

The joint Korea-U.S. proposal made on July 1 as well as our proposal made on January 19 remain open and valid for the north Korean authorities to respond to it positively in the future. We wish to urge the north Korean authorities to desist from indulging in the use of stereotyped languages such as "splittism" and the like.

We also call upon the north Korean authorities to agree to our joint proposal in consideration of the reality in the Korean peninsula and in compliance with national aspiration for easing tensions and preserving peace on the Korean peninsula.

4. Difference Between "Three Authorities Meeting" and "Tripartite Talks"

Efforts to explore means to bring about durable peace on the

Korean peninsula through discussions and agreement between the authorities of south and north Korea have been made ever since President Park's declaration of "Idea for Peaceful Unification" on August 15, 1970.

A substantial stride was made in this regard when the two sides of divided Korea issued on July 4, 1972 the South-North Joint Communiqué agreeing on the three principles for national unification— independence, peace and grand national unity, and carried out the South-North Red Cross Conference and the programs of the South-North Coordinating Committee, traveling back and forth between Seoul and Pyongyang.

However, after north Korea neutralized the efforts for the solution of the Korean question between the direct parties by unilaterally declaring the suspension of the south-north dialogue on August 28, 1973 and, on the other hand, called for direct negotiations with the United States on March 25, 1974, there have arisen the ideas of "four-party talks," "six-party talks" and "tripartite talks" as a means to solve the Korean issue.

Here, a need arises to make clear the nature of these ideas by studying the background and contents of the suggested talks.

a. "Four-Party Talks" and "Six-Party Talks"

The ideas of "four-party talks" and "six-party talks" were first raised in a speech given by the then U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger before the 30th U.N. General Assembly on September 22, 1975. Part of the speech read:

"The Republic of Korea and the United States have stated their general readiness to meet with representatives of the other side and with other members of the Security Council to discuss termination of the U.N. Command while preserving the Armistice Agreement.

"Today I can be more specific. The United States and the Republic of Korea, looking forward to the time when a lasting

solution of the Korean problem can be achieved, are herewith proposing to the parties of the armistice the convening of a conference to discuss ways to preserve the Armistice Agreement.

“At such a meeting, we would also be prepared to explore other measures to reduce tension on the Korean peninsula, including the possibility of a larger conference to negotiate a more fundamental arrangement.” (Hapdong News Agency, U.N. Headquarters, September 22, 1975)

The “parties of the armistice” mentioned here refer to the four parties—south Korea, the United States, Mainland China and north Korea, while a “larger conference” points to “six-party talks” among the four given above plus Japan and the Soviet Union.

Again in his key Asia policy speeches made at the Downtown Rotary Club and the Chamber of Commerce in Seattle, Washington, on July 22, 1976, Secretary Kissinger proposed that the representatives of the U.S., Mainland China and the south and the north of Korea meet at the U.N. General Assembly in the autumn of the same year to hold a “four-party conference” for the solution of the Korean question.

Recalling, in the speeches, the fact that north Korea is demanding unconditional dissolution of the United Nations Command which signed the Armistice Agreement along with north Korea and Mainland China as well as the repeal of the Armistice Agreement itself and withdrawal of the U.S. forces in Korea, and is even calling for negotiations directly with the United States for the solution of the issues of peace and security on the Korean peninsula over the head of south Korea which represents the two thirds of the whole population of the Korean peninsula, Secretary Kissinger made it clear that the United States cannot accept such north Korean offers which, he said, were designed not to promote peace but to isolate south Korea, an ally of the United States, to prompt one-sided withdrawal of American forces from Korea, and to scrap an existing agreement.

The U.S. Secretary of State then stated that in its policy toward

Korea, the United States 1) urges the resumption of a sincere dialogue between south and north Korea, 2) is willing to take preparation for corresponding actions toward north Korea if the allies of north Korea prepare for the improvement of their relations with south Korea, 3) will continue to support the offer to keep the doors to the United Nations open so that both south and north Korea can join the world organization as full members without any biased view on the substantial unification of the Korean peninsula, and 4) is prepared to negotiate for a new base for the existing Armistice Agreement or a new durable system that can substitute for the truce agreement in a whatever form that can be accepted by all the parties concerned.

Commenting on this proposition for “four-party talks,” Foreign Minister Park Tong-jin, in a statement on July 23, 1976, said that the proposal should be considered seriously for the easing of tensions on the Korean peninsula and promotion of peaceful unification of Korea. Saying that the Korean government was consulted on the proposal beforehand, Minister Park expressed the hope that Mainland China and north Korea will accept it and materialize the proposed “four-party talks” at an early date.

The new proposal featured 1) south and north Korea first hold a preliminary meeting to discuss the site, scope and topics of “four-party talks,” and the U.S. and Mainland China may attend such preliminary meeting as observers, 2) if a preliminary meeting comes to fruition, the U.S., Mainland China and the south and the north of Korea would formally hold “four-party talks,” and 3) in order to guarantee the results and agreement of such meetings, an expanded international meeting can be held with the additional participation of the Soviet Union and Japan. It was, in fact, a three-stage peace formula aimed at solving the Korean question through negotiations.

With regard to this proposal, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea, disclosing that the offer was fully consulted with the Korean government in advance, said the idea is in accord with the stand of the government. The Ministry urged north Korea to show an affirmative response to the proposal.

b. Rise of Idea of "Tripartite Talks"

The idea of "tripartite talks" on the Korean question first emerged on March 30, 1978 when the Japanese newspaper "Mainichi Shinbun," quoting a diplomatic source in East Europe, reported that President Tito of Yugoslavia had proposed a "tripartite meeting" for the solution of the Korean question.

The report said that the Yugoslav President had suggested that "tripartite talks" be held among the south and the north of Korea and the United States so as to solve the Korean question in the German style, adding that President Tito expressed his willingness to assume the role of a bridge linking Washington and Pyongyang.

The newspaper said that originally President Tito, during his talks with U.S. President Jimmy Carter on March 7 the same year, conveyed to the American President the position of Kim Il-sung hoping for exclusive contacts with the United States. But, it said, President Carter told President Tito that the United States cannot accept any contacts with Pyongyang without the participation of south Korea.

Here, the paper said, President Tito put forth the idea of "tripartite talks" among south and north Korea and the United States, and with President Carter's affirmative reaction thereto, promised that he would persuade Kim Il-sung who was insisting on the exclusion of south Korea from any talks on the Korean question. The newspaper report added that subsequently President Tito explained about this plan to a visiting north Korean mission.

In the wake of President Tito's visit to the U.S., Romanian President Nicolae Ceausescu flew into Washington while China's Hua Kuo-feng was set to visit Pyongyang, which foreign press reports described as having something to do with the proposed "tripartite talks" on the Korean question. This way, various speculations went about through foreign wire services without south Korea's knowledge.

Here, the government of the Republic of Korea felt the need to make its position clear as to this issue. In a statement issued by its

spokesman on April 6, 1978, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated, "The basic policy and position of our government with regard to the issue of south-north unification are based on the Three Major Principles for Peaceful Unification made public on August 15, 1974. Since there is no change in the Principles, it is apparent that no formula to the contrary can be considered." The Ministry emphasized that the Korean question must be solved in a south-north dialogue followed by a kind of four-party talks among the south and the north of Korea, the U.S. and Mainland China, adding that there can be no disposition of the Korean question without south Korea's participation and agreement.

A summit meeting between U.S. President Jimmy Carter and his Romanian counterpart, Ceausescu, was held on April 13, 1978, where the two Presidents were learned to have seriously discussed the possibility of solving the Korean question by means of the proposed talks, seemingly giving an added muscle to the idea of "tripartite talks."

Under the circumstances, the government, pointing out that the idea of "tripartite talks" was still at an elementary stage without anything known about the details of its contents, said it would carefully act on it as soon as various elements such as north Korean and U.S. reactions thereto are made known. In effect, the government was implying that it would affirmatively respond to the idea only when its contents turn out to be in accord with the Three Major Principles for Peaceful Unification.

Meanwhile, north Korea which had been trying, since the Carter Administration's inauguration, to negotiate with the United States through the good offices of Pakistan President Ali Bhuto, Yugoslav President Tito and Romanian President Ceausescu, made a sudden aboutface timed with Hua Kuo-feng's visit to Pyongyang on May 7, 1978, taking a hardline policy toward the U.S. apparently to cater to the taste of the visiting Chinese leader.

In what was called "important news," Kim Il-sung asserted that 1) the United States was backing down from its announced plan to withdraw American ground troops from Korea, 2) American im-

perialism does not give up its "two Korea" policy, 3) if the United States is interested in peace, it should first come in contacts with north Korea, and 4) the United States should not support the incumbent south Korean government. In this hardened policy allegation, north Korea allied itself with China in turning down, indirectly though, the proposed "tripartite talks."

On the other hand, Foreign Minister Park Tong-jin of the Republic of Korea, in a press conference on May 11, 1978, showed a flexible stand toward the idea of "tripartite talks" by saying that if the proposed talks can be found to be truly constructive in the solution of the Korean question, the government may review it flexibly taking into account such merit. Minister Park added, however, that chances for the materialization of the idea appear slim in view of the reported rejection of it by north Korea.

During their meeting on February 20, 1979, Foreign Minister Park and U.S. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance discussed the issue of holding a Korea-U.S. summit conference along with other matters of common concern, such as the question of U.S. troop withdrawal and the south-north dialogue. As a result, the historic Korea-U.S. summit meeting took place in Seoul on July 1, 1979.

Meanwhile, U.N. Secretary General Kurt Waldheim visited both Seoul and Pyongyang for five days beginning May 2, 1979 to discuss his own version of "tripartite talks" among himself and the representatives of south and north Korea.

On June 27, 1979, a couple of days before President Carter's visit to Seoul, Foreign Minister Park, in an interview with KBS-TV, said, "If it is conducive to facilitating a dialogue between the representatives of the authorities of south and north Korea, which we pursue now, a proper formula may be explored additionally depending on situations. When we, in our judgement, consider that new conditions are being fostered, a new method may be introduced to cope with the new development."

Discussing the idea of "tripartite talks," the Foreign Minister said, "In easing tensions on the Korean peninsula and exploring a new system for peace, the subject should always be the south and the

north of Korea.”

“If this principle can be guaranteed, we would flexibly respond to talks on the Korean question whether they be tripartite, four-party or six-party ones,” he said, emphasizing the fact that the government assumes a flexible position for the resumption of the inter-Korean dialogue.

This government stance was fully reflected in the proposal for the convening of a “meeting of senior official representatives of the south and the north of Korea and the United States (three authorities meeting).”

c. “Three Authorities Meeting” and “Tripartite Talks”

It should be noted that a “three authorities meeting” is one thing and the idea of “tripartite talks” is another.

As was seen in the above, south Korea was never involved directly in the suggestion of “tripartite talks.” It was an idea that arose at the summit meetings between the U.S. and Yugoslavia and between the U.S. and Czechoslovakia. And, details about the offer, such as the object, purpose, contents and manner of the proposed talks, were never made known. Moreover the idea stemmed not from the direct parties to the Korean question, namely, south and north Korea, but from some leaders of East European countries. In other words, the idea originated in a unilateral conception void of the position and view of the Republic of Korea.

In contrast, the proposal for a three authorities meeting, as is expressly defined in the provisions of the Korea-U.S. Joint Communiqué, fully reflects the stand of the Republic of Korea. The substantial difference between the two formulas is that unlike the idea of “tripartite talks,” the proposal for a three authorities meeting was prepared on the initiative of south Korea.

Specifically, the offer for a three authorities meeting provides, making itself different from the idea of “tripartite talks,” that 1) the Korean question must be solved by the direct parties, south and north Korea, 2) easing of tensions on the Korean peninsula would be

promoted, and due support would be extended to the January 19 proposal for a dialogue between the authorities of the south and the north Korea, 3) the United States ascertains that it will not hold any exclusive meeting with north Korea, and 4) materialization of a “three authorities meeting” would deny north Korea any ground for its persistent deceptive peace offensive toward the United States.

Along with the proposal for a “three authorities meeting,” the Republic of Korea makes it clear that the South-North Coordinating Committee, offer for a dialogue between the authorities of the two sides or “four-party or six party talks” remains valid and open so that north Korea could choose one of the formulas it prefers for the resumption of the inter-Korean talks.

Nevertheless, north Korea has chosen none of them and simply insists on direct negotiations with the United States in pursuit of the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Korea while indulging in a slanderous and defamatory propaganda against south Korea.

(The following are the editorial comments of some major newspapers of Korea on the proposal of a three authorities meeting and north Korea's rejection of the offer)—Editor

Hidden Motive Behind Rejection of Three Authorities Meeting

The Kyunghyang Daily News (July 11, 1979)

The rejection by north Korea of the proposal for a three authorities meeting shows us once again what is the ultimate objective of its strategy toward south Korea. A statement of the foreign

ministry of north Korea argued that the Korean question cannot be intervened by the United States because it is an internal problem of the Korean people, and that a peace agreement should be negotiated directly with the United States.

This is a stereotyped allegation of the north Koreans, an assertion that has been repeated countless times since they unilaterally suspended the south-north dialogue. This was the same insistence they aired many times through their propaganda machineries in the wake of the January 19 proposal of President Park Chung Hee. The underlying intention of north Korea, to put it in short, is that it will not have any dialogue with the authorities of south Korea and instead will negotiate directly with the United States.

But, this policy constitutes a serious challenge to, and a violation of, the spirit of the existing South-North Joint Communiqué of July 4, 1972, which, declaring the three major principles for unification, expressly stipulates that national unification should be achieved under the three principles, "independence," "peace" and "grand national unity." North Korea's call for negotiations with a third party, not a direct party to the Korean question, is an unreasonable and absurd demand that runs counter to the principle of "independence."

North Korea insists at every opportunity that direct negotiations should be held with the United States in order to replace the present Armistice Agreement with a peace agreement. We are well aware that this is part of the typical "united front" strategy of the Communists intent of isolating south Korea from the rest of the world community and fomenting splits within ourselves.

The Korea-U.S. Joint Communiqué ruled out any exclusive contacts between the United States and north Korea. Nevertheless, the north Koreans attempt to exploit the offer for a three authorities meeting for their wicked scheme.

North Korea attempts to adopt the so-called Hanoi-style strategy which the Communist side used in the Vietnam peace talks with the United States. But, Kim Il-sung should know that today's reality of the Korean peninsula quite differs from that of Vietnam at the time

of the war there.

Their call for negotiations with the United States over the head of south Korea represents their attempt to drive American forces out of Korea on the pretext of facilitating a peace agreement and thereby remove that they consider is the biggest obstacle to their military actions to communize south Korea.

It is in this tactics that north Korea shuns talks with the south whereas they insist that the Korean question is an internal problem of the Korean people. Similarly, their adherence to a "whole nation conference" or a meeting of representatives of political parties and social organizations stems from the same tactics. In this strategy, they try to handle the issue of national unification separate from the question of replacing the Armistice Agreement with a peace treaty.

This posture of north Korea represented a conditional rejection of the proposal for a three authorities meeting. Such a cautious refusal, needless to say, has been motivated by an attempt to escape international censure for its rejection of the just proposal. The refusal of the proposition well testifies that north Korea is not interested in consolidating peace on the Korean peninsula.

The fact that the north Korean reaction came ten days after the offer was made indicates the north Koreans were initially at a loss as to how to respond to the proposal. They knew that if they accepted, it would turn upside down the logic of their refusal of dialogue with the south. If they rejected, it could manifest before the world that there were no changes in their hardline strategy toward the south.

At any rate, one thing that is clear by now is that unification cannot be achieved by means of force or violence. It would be a daydream if north Korea still believes that it can solve the Korean question not in a dialogue but in military actions.

Even though north Korea rejected the offer for a three authorities meeting, we must strive with patience and sincerity to bring them back to the forum of talks. In the end, the north Koreans would be obliged to respond affirmatively to the proposed three authorities meeting if only to solve their own internal problems.

Responsibility of Kim Il-sung

The Dong-A Ilbo (July 11, 1979)

In a statement of a foreign ministry spokesman, north Korea rejected the convocation of a three authorities meeting ten days after it was jointly proposed by the Republic of Korea and the United States. The statement argued that any internal question of the Korean nation should be solved at a "whole nation conference" attended by the representatives of all the political parties and social organizations of the south and the north of Korea, while the question of bringing about a durable peace, it insisted, must be settled through negotiations between north Korea and the United States for the withdrawal of American forces from Korea and for the replacement of the Armistice Agreement with a peace treaty. North Korea asserted that it is willing to "allow south Korea to attend such north Korea-U.S. talks as an observer." On the other hand, north Korea denounced as an "act of perpetuating the national division" the ideas of cross recognition of south and north Korea and of simultaneous entry of the two sides into the United Nations.

This negative response of north Korea constitutes only the repetition of its basic strategy, that is, to communize the whole Korean peninsula through the "Vietnamization" of Korea.

The Kim Il-sung regime turned down the south's offer for dialogue twice so far this year, the two propositions being the offer for talks between the authorities of the two sides made in January and the overture for a three authorities meeting set forth last June. In the past, the north Koreans shut down the operation of the South-North Coordinating Committee born of the July 4 South-North Joint Communique, and turned their back on the Red Cross project for searching for dispersed families. They have gone so far as to sever the direct south-north telephone line.

By sealing all the channels of the south-north dialogue and rejecting even the fresh offer for a three authorities meeting, Kim Il-sung

has chosen one of the two options, that is, he has given up the pursuit of a path to peaceful coexistence in favor of the machination of communizing south Korea in the Vietnam style.

Kim Il-sung knew that if he had chosen the other, he had to relax tension in his internal system. The relaxing of a system cemented by Kim Il-sung's one-man idolization means the shaking of the foundation of the deification of a living soul. To Kim Il-sung, therefore, acceptance of peaceful coexistence indicates the crumbling of the base of his own power. It is for this reason that Kim Il-sung has resolved to stick to the policy of taking over the south under the "Vietnam method." This is an attempt to lock the door inside and sustain Kim Il-sung's one-man dictatorship, mobilizing the people under the slogan "liberation of south Korea."

However, the rejection of peaceful coexistence and deliberate fomenting of tensions demand sacrifice of the 54 million people both south and north excluding Kim Il-sung himself, of course.

The tensions Kim Il-sung foments lead to arms race between the south and the north, which in turn causes the people of south and north Korea to suffer from the excessive burden of military outlays, driving them into the horrors of war.

The pains the north Korean people suffer are beyond description. Their plight is great all the more because north Korea lags far behind the south in terms of economy coupled with the fact that the number of the north Korean population is less than half the population of south Korea.

We believe that the time has come for Kim Il-sung to make a bold decision with courage not only for durable peace on the Korean peninsula but also for the wellbeing of the north Korean people. We wish to urge Kim Il-sung to accept the proposed three authorities meeting.

Unfortunately, north Korea has rejected the proposal. We are of the opinion, however, that the United States should exert untiring efforts to persuade north Korea through the Soviet Union and Red China. In preparation for contingency, the United States should also provide more military assistance to Korea.

Rejection of Three Authorities Meeting by North Korea

Seoul Shinmun (July 11, 1979)

The issue of whether north Korea would accept the joint Korea-U.S. proposal for a three authorities meeting had drawn keen attention from within and without all the more because the north Korean reaction could serve as a test determining its option between peace and aggressive policy.

But, in the statement of a spokesman for Pyongyang's ministry of foreign affairs, north Korea on July 10 turned down the proposition. The reason it gave for the refusal was that the issues of getting U.S. forces withdrawn from Korea and replacing the Armistice Agreement with a peace treaty fall into the business between north Korea and the United States, while the question of national unification is supposed to be solved between south and north Korea. This was the mere repetition of their past contention aimed at rationalizing their aggressive design against the south.

As was made clear in the joint communique of the Korea-U.S. summitry in which the proposal was offered, the suggested three authorities meeting was geared to discuss the issues of reinvigorating the south-north dialogue and easing tensions on the Korean peninsula. Had the south-north dialogue not been suspended, there should have been no need to make the offer for three authorities meeting. In other words, the meeting was suggested as a means of spurring the inter-Korean talks because north Korea has unilaterally suspended the dialogue.

Therefore, the issue of U.S. military withdrawal or that of a so-called peace agreement which Pyongyang gave as a reason for its refusal of the proposal has nothing to do with the proposed meeting. It was, thus, an opposition raised only for opposition's sake.

As was discussed in the foregoing, a three authorities meeting was proposed based on the south's consistent principle that the unification and other problems pending between the two sides

should be discussed and solved by the direct parties—the south and the north of Korea. The joint communique, too, made it clear that the Korean question must be settled through inter-Korean talks.

If north Korea is truly interested in peace on the Korean peninsula and peaceful unification of the nation, it should either agree to resume the stalled south-north dialogue or accept the proposed three authorities meeting through which it can openheartedly search for effective ways of solving the Korean question.

The north Koreans' rejection of the proposal can be taken to indicate that they are resolved to oppose peaceful inter-Korean relations or peaceful unification and instead pursue an aggressive policy with the intent of bringing the whole Korean peninsula under communism. Their insistence on the withdrawal of American forces from Korea and conclusion, to this end, of a U.S.—north Korea peace agreement can be none but a scheme to facilitate conditions for their domination of the whole peninsula.

On the other hand, north Korea advocates a so-called whole nation conference in disregard of the call for a dialogue between the authorities of the two sides in an apparent attempt to subvert the system of south Korea in a “united front” strategy.

We again urge the north Koreans to abandon their aggressive design against the south and agree to either the resumption of the inter-Korean talks or the proposed three authorities meeting. The door to a dialogue between the responsible authorities remains always open.

North Korean Rejection of Three Authorities Meeting

Shin-A Ilbo (July 11, 1979)

North Korea was known to have formally rejected the recent joint Korea-U.S. proposal for a three authorities meeting. In a statement issued in the name of a spokesman for the foreign ministry, north Korea reportedly alleged that it is turning the proposal down

because it contradicts its own policy to solve the Korean question in independent efforts.

At the same time, north Korea simply reiterated its position by insisting on a whole nation conference and demanding that a negotiation be held between itself and north Korea to discuss the question of replacing the existing Armistice Agreement with a peace agreement. North Korea says that south Korea may be allowed to attend as an observer such an exclusive U.S. — north Korea meeting midway if and when the United States so requests.

Lying beneath these demands is their wicked scheme to first materialize an exclusive meeting with the United States on the excuse of negotiations for the replacement of the Armistice Agreement with a peace treaty, and to obtain, through such talks, their goal of causing U.S. forces to leave Korea.

In other words, the fact that north Korea which rejected the proposal for a south-north non-aggression agreement as well as the recent call for a three authorities meeting, demands the conclusion of a peace agreement directly with the United States, shows that north Korea actually seeks to undermine the traditional friendly relations existing between south Korea and the United States, to pave the way to the withdrawal of American forces from Korea, and to prompt the isolation of south Korea from the rest of the world community.

This absurd policy of north Korea seems to derive from its basically mistaken recognition of the subject responsible for peace on the Korean peninsula. Looking back over the Korean War, the north Koreans provoked the war against the Republic of Korea and its people, not against the United States and its citizens. This means that if there needs a peace agreement, it should naturally be discussed and signed with south Korea, the party against which they fought during the war. Ridiculously, however, north Korea seeks to talk with the United States about peace on the Korean peninsula over the head of south Korea.

The United States has made it clear that it would not negotiate with north Korea without the participation of south Korea, saying it well knows what the underlying motive is of the north Korean in-

sistence.

In its rejection of the latest offer for a three authorities meeting, north Korea has in effect let it be known that all it wants to do is to strain the relations between south Korea and the United States and help create conditions for their renewed southward invasion without any interest in peace or alleviation of tensions on the Korean peninsula.

All these necessitate us to maintain a keener vigilance against the aggressive scheme of the north Korean Communists.

Reaction from North Korea

Joong-Ang Ilbo (July 11, 1979)

Amidst various speculations as to the north Korean attitude toward the proposed three authorities meeting, no clear-cut reaction has come from north Korea thus far to the proposal made jointly by the Republic of Korea and the United States.

According to a north Korean radio broadcast monitored in Tokyo, north Korea was said to have issued a statement in the name of a spokesman for the foreign ministry expressing a seemingly negative response to the proposal. Still, the truth of the north Korean posture is yet to be known.

Asserting that the "proposal for a three authorities meeting did not stem from a genuine policy to solve the Korean question," the statement reportedly only repeated its past position that the issue of disposing of the truce agreement must be solved in talks with the United States, and that of national unification in a "grand national conference." The statement, thus, disputed the wisdom of the proposed three authorities meeting. Still, it is premature to conclude that they turned it down altogether.

However, in view of a series of slanderous remarks made by some key north Korea officials in the wake of the proposal as well as the repulsive statement by a foreign ministry spokesman, it seems north

Korea is inclined toward a negativism.

Commenting on this unclear attitude of north Korea, the United States showed a cautious reaction, saying, "such is a scheme to earn time," or "north Korea would accept it in the long run." We see no need to jump on any hasty conclusion as to the north Korean reaction.

From the beginning, we foresaw that north Korea would not readily accept the offer. We thought that even if it would, it would attach some conditions thereto or make a counter-offer.

Some Japanese newspapers printed a speculative report alleging that north Korea would accept the proposal on the condition that the United States would guarantee the supply of oil north Korea needs.

At any rate, we cannot overlook some contentions north Korea laid down as reasons for its rejection of the proposal.

First, they asserted that the question of replacing the Armistice Agreement with a peace agreement must be discussed in an exclusive meeting between themselves and the United States. North Korea asserts that south Korea may be allowed in as an observer at such meeting only at times its participation is necessary. This contention, seemingly based on the perfunctory fact that the signatories of the truce agreement are the United States, north Korea and Red China, can hardly be a realistic approach to the solution of the Korean question.

They cannot be unaware who are the mutually hostile parties on the Korean peninsula and who are the subjects responsible for guaranteeing the efficacy of an agreement when it is signed.

They argue that since the issue of national unification is an internal question of the nation, the United States cannot step in. But, as was made clear in the joint communique of the recent Korea-U.S. summit meeting, the proposed three authorities meeting was not intended to discuss the unification issue.

The joint communique expressly stated that the two countries proposed a three authorities meeting as a means of expediting inter-Korean talks and easing tensions on the Korean peninsula, and that

any steps toward achieving unification should be taken only through dialogue between the authorities of the south and the north of Korea.

This way, north Korea's negative response to the proposal stands illogical and unrealistic, and only shows that it is not interested in dialogue and in the alleviation of tension.

North Korea is urged to stop repeating such demand lacking reason, and show an affirmative response to the proposal, aware of the fact that the overture embodies the two proposing countries' sincerity and flexibility for the sake of dialogue and easing of tension.

Repulsive Reaction to Three Authorities Meeting

Chosun Ilbo (July 11, 1979)

In the Korea-U.S. joint communique made public on last July 1, the Presidents of the two countries proposed a meeting of senior official representatives of the south and the north of Korea and the United States, drawing keen international concerns and giving rise to various speculations as to the reaction north Korea would show.

The proposal for a three authorities meeting was made with a view to promoting an inter-Korean dialogue and easing tensions on the Korean peninsula. This proposal was directly conveyed to the north Korean foreign ministry by way of a third country.

On July 10, a spokesman for the Pyongyang foreign ministry issued a statement rejecting the offer. The statement asserted that 1) north Korea turns it down because the "proposal did not stem from a sincere position to solve the Korean issue," 2) north Korea hopes to have an exclusive meeting with the United States, but if some need arises for south Korea's participation in the course of such U.S. north Korea meeting, south Korea would be allowed in as an "observer" if the United States so requests, 3) a U.S.-north Korea meeting should discuss only the issue of U.S. military withdrawal

and replacement of the existing Military Armistice Agreement with a peace agreement, and 4) the question of national unification is an internal issue of the Korean people, where the United States cannot interfere, and which should be solved through a grand national conference attended by all the political parties and social organizations of the south and the north.

Most of these contentions have been made repeatedly in the past, and lately before and after U.S. President Jimmy Carter's visit here were emphasized on numerous occasions such as public rallies or editorial comments by official newspapers. The statement of a foreign ministry spokesman was a mere repetition of these arguments plus the rejection of the proposed three authorities meeting. At the same time, north Korea in effect reaffirmed in the statement that there is no change in their policies toward the issue of national unification, toward the United States, and toward the question of inter-Korean talks. And, the possibility of the convening of a three authorities meeting has become almost nil.

Of course, it is totally up to north Korea itself whether or not it would accept the proposal for a three authorities meeting. Nobody would demand it of them or beg them for it.

But, the north Koreans, who have boycotted the South-North Coordinating Committee born of the 1972 South-North Joint Communiqué and lately turned down the offer for a three authorities meeting, persistently demand the convocation of a grand national conference or a whole nation conference supposed to be attended by the representatives of all the political parties and social organizations in the south and the north.

Despite their signing of an agreement on the operation of the Coordinating Committee which would, among others, guarantee the implementation of exchanges between political parties, social organizations and individual personages between the two sides, they unilaterally declare that the Coordinating Committee no longer exists.

Kim Il-sung has made it clear time and again that the primary objective north Korea pursues is to render the south of the truce line

militarily vulnerable by getting U.S. forces withdrawn from the south and thereby create conditions for "liberation of south Korea." But, histories does not flow in a direction he hopes for.

There will be no way to materialize his daydream to drive American forces out of Korea and take over the south in a war called "revolution in south Korea" with help from the Soviet Union and Communist China. The relations among the United States, Soviet Union and Red China, which north Korea watches with a keen concern, are drifting in a direction quite opposite from Pyongyang wants it to. However, Kim Il-sung is so prepossessed with the illusion that he is unable to tell what is possible from what is not.

No matter whatever propaganda and schemes the strategists of north Korea may perpetrate, the U.S. forces in Korea will not leave Korea simply because they demand it. At no time will the United States enter any exclusive talks with north Korea without consultations with south Korea. At the same time, no peace agreement can be signed without the participation of the Republic of Korea with up to 70 percent of the whole Korean people under its control. China and the Soviet Union will not endanger their relations with the United States merely in favor of Kim Il-sung's daydream nor can they apply any substantial pressure upon the Republic of Korea. Similarly, it is nothing more than an illusory thinking for north Korea to expect that its propagandistic appeal to non-aligned forces would help solve the Korean question is a way it wishes.

What does north Korea, ignorant of these situations, attempt to gain by sticking to such an anachronistic and cold-war-type strategy?

Negative Response from Pyongyang

Hankook Ilbo (July 12, 1979)

In a statement issued on July 10 in the name of a spokesman for its foreign ministry, north Korea showed a negative response to the

convocation of a three authorities meeting proposed in the July 1 Korea-U.S. joint communique.

Repeating its past position, north Korea insisted that 1) the U.S. and north Korea hold an exclusive meeting to discuss the question of replacing the existing Armistice Agreement with a peace treaty, in the course of which south Korea may be allowed in as an "observer" depending on situations, and 2) the issue of national unification must be solved through "broad negotiations" between the authorities and all the political parties and social organizations of the south and the north without any interference by the United States.

This insistence of north Korea renders the chance slim for the convocation of a meeting of senior official representatives of the south and the north of Korea and the United States which the Republic of Korea and the United States proposed in their recent summit meeting with a view to expediting inter-Korean talks and easing tensions on the Korean peninsula.

The refusal of the proposed meeting and the previous January 19 proposal for a dialogue between the responsible authorities of the two sides of divided Korea shows that north Korea still adheres to the aggressive policy to communize the whole Korean peninsula after getting U.S. forces withdrawal from Korea without paying any attention to the invariable wish of the Korean people for durable peace in this region. At the same time, north Korea seems attempting to deliberately dismiss the new developments taking place in Northeast Asia such as the trend of the United States, Japan and Mainland China seeking closer relations among themselves. It remains to be seen whether this is an attitude north Korea has assumed with its relations with the Soviet Union in mind.

However, some suggestive sign had emerged from north Korea, a sign that, as can be seen in the June 27 remarks of Hoh Tam, north Korean foreign minister, north Korea may not rule out the proposed three authorities meeting for good. In fact, the Communists have the records of altering their tactical policies depending on changes in environmental conditions. In this connection, we feel the need to

maintain an unending vigilance against future tactics of the north Koreans.

In the recent reaction, north Korea has shown once again how tenaciously it adheres to the policy of “ideology first” as well as to the maintenance of its “face” in the competition for historical continuity. Of course, such obstinacy is far from having anything to do with practical measures such as the improvement of the pitiful state of the life in the north or the overcoming of the economic crisis with which north Korea is faced now.

It is utterly unrealistic and illogical for north Korea to attempt to discuss and solve the issue of bringing about a durable peace separate from the question of national unification. They seem to try to isolate south Korea from the rest of the world community. But, it would be ridiculous and illusory to attempt to discredit south Korea which stands much superior to north Korea in terms of population and economic strength.

What is problematic is not the rhetoric but the obstinate strategic scheme embodied in the July 10 statement of north Korea. It is urged that Pyongyang shows a sincerity before it is too late for the sake of an approach toward lasting peace and the restoration of a great national family in conformity with the invariable wish of the absolute majority of the 50 million people.

Part Three

South-North Dialogue

(South-North Coordinating Committee)

1. “Path to Peaceful Unification Lies in Resumption of South-North Dialogue”

— *Seoul Urged Pyongyang to Accept Offer for Three Authorities Meeting* —

Min Kwan-shik, Acting Seoul side Co-chairman of the South-North Coordinating Committee, in a statement issued on July 4, 1979 on the occasion of the seventh anniversary of the South-North Joint Communiqué, stressed that “the only path to independent and peaceful unification of the fatherland is for south and north Korea to return to the basic spirit of the July 4 South-North Joint Communiqué and resume the dialogue.” The Co-chairman then urged north Korea to accept the proposal for a three authorities meeting, saying that the “proposal, stemming from our genuine efforts for peace, was designed to explore ways to consider the importance of the south-north dialogue, to expedite talks and to ease tensions for peace and security on the Korean peninsula and in this area on the spirit of the July 4 Joint Communiqué.” The full text of the statement by Acting Co-chairman Min is as follows. -Editor-

Statement by Acting Seoul Side Co-chairman on the Occasion of Seventh Anniversary of South-North Joint Communiqué

Seven years ago today, the two sides—the south and the north of Korea—agreed on the historical July 4 South-North Joint Communiqué, making it public in Seoul and Pyongyang simultaneously.

The basic spirit of the July 4 Joint Communiqué, as is expressly described in its preamble, is to “remove the misunderstandings and mistrust and mitigate increased tensions that have arisen between the south and the north as a result of long separation, and further to expedite unification of the fatherland” on the basis of the common

national desire for "early realization of peaceful unification of the fatherland."

In the South-North Joint Communiqué, the two sides solemnly pledged before the nation that they, with a view to embodying the basic spirit of the Joint Communiqué, will faithfully carry out the seven-point agreed matters contained therein, such as those on the realization of unification of the fatherland in an independent and peaceful way and on the establishment and operation of a South-North Coordinating Committee for the purpose of solving the issue of national unification and various other issues pending between the south and the north.

Pursuant to the express provisions of Article 6 of the South-North Joint Communiqué, the two sides formed and inaugurated the South-North Coordinating Committee charged with the implementation of dialogue. The agreed *Minute on Formation and Operation of South-North Coordinating Committee*, another important agreement reached between the south and the north, has imposed upon the Coordinating Committee the comprehensive task of discussing and solving, and guaranteeing the implementation of agreements, problems arising in various fields such as politics, economy, military, diplomacy and culture in the south-north relations in the course of pursuing independent and peaceful unification of the divided fatherland.

However, north Korea, in the so-called August 28 statement of 1973 one-sidedly suspended the operation of the South-North Coordinating Committee, and openly trampled down upon the July 4 South-North Joint Communiqué and all other agreed matters between the south and the north. Vice Co-chairmen's meetings of the South-North Coordinating Committee were held once between the south and the north for the purpose of normalizing the business of the South-North Coordinating Committee. Before long, however, north Korea suspended these meetings, too. More, north Korea suspended even the South-North Red Cross Conference held on humanitarian grounds with a view to removing the heart-aching sufferings of the 10 million dispersed family members, and went to

the extreme of cutting the direct Seoul-Pyongyang telephone line unilaterally.

The only path to independent and peaceful unification of the fatherland is for the south and the north of Korea to return to the basic spirit of the July 4 South-North Joint Communiqué and reopen the dialogue.

We have made all available endeavors for the resumption of the suspended south-north dialogue.

Nonetheless, north Korea has persisted in a negative attitude. On January 19, 1979, we proposed that the authorities of the south and the north have dialogue at any time, any place and at any level without any preconditions to discuss various problems raised between the south and the north.

This is because only responsible authorities can, under their responsibility, guarantee the implementation of agreements reached between the two sides.

However, north Korea demanded the convocation of a "whole nation conference" in the name of the so-called "Democratic Front for Unification of the Fatherland" and unilaterally denied the existence of the South-North Coordinating Committee, thereby attempting to scrap the July 4 South-North Joint Communiqué.

In order to provide a breakthrough for the resumption of the south-north dialogue, we, through the Joint Communiqué of the Korea-U.S. summit meeting, issued on July 1, 1979, proposed a meeting of senior official representatives of the south and the north of Korea and the United States.

The proposal was intended to, in line with the spirit of the July 4 Joint Communiqué, seek means to expedite dialogue and ease tensions in consideration of the importance of the south-north dialogue for peace and security on the Korean peninsula and in this region. It is a sincere and realistic proposal stemming from our genuine efforts for peace and determination to forestall fratricidal conflicts and ease tensions between the south and the north by all means and systematically guarantee peace on this land.

On the occasion of the seventh anniversary of the July 4 South-

North Joint Communique today, I wish to emphasize that our side keeps the doors to the resumption of the south-north dialogue wide open.

For the removal of the sufferings of the 10 million family members dispersed in the south and the north, we have made sincere efforts to resume the South-North Red Cross Conference.

We have striven in many ways to normalize the South-North Coordinating Committee. In consideration of north Korea contentions, we even made a proposal for the reorganization of the South-North Coordinating Committee in such a way as to involve political parties and social organizations in the Coordinating Committee.

We also keep doors open to talks between the authorities of the south and the north.

As I remind the responsible authorities of north Korea of the proposal for a three authorities meeting made jointly by the Republic of Korea and the United States on July 1, 1979, I again urge north Korea to discard its negative attitude toward the dialogue and return to the forum of dialogue without any further delay.

We look forward to an affirmative response from north Korea.

(South-North Red Cross Conference)

2. “Resumption of Red Cross Working-Level Meeting on September 20 Proposed”

Lee Ho, president of the Republic of Korea National Red Cross, in a statement issued on August 11, 1979 on the occasion of the eighth anniversary of the August 12 proposal for south-north Red Cross talks, proposed to the north Korean Red Cross that the 26th working-level meeting of the South-North Red Cross Conference be held at 10 a.m. September 20, 1979 at the conference room of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission at Panmunjom to discuss the issue of normalizing the suspended south-north Red Cross talks.

Recalling that September 20th is a significant day because it was eight years ago this day that the historic first preliminary meeting of the south and north Korean Red Cross societies took place, the ROKNRC President also suggested that the operation of the direct Seoul-Pyongyang Red Cross telephone line and the Panmunjom Liaison Office, which has been suspended since August 10, 1976, be restored effective 9 a.m. September 1, 1979.

Especially, the ROKNRC President deplored the reality of Korea in which the countless divided families and relative are unable to meet each other despite the fact that international telephone service was opened recently even with the Soviet Union and East European countries and that some Korean residents in Mainland China visited their homeland and enjoyed the reunion with their families thanks to humanitarian considerations of the Peking authorities. He then urged the north Korean Red Cross to show an affirmative response to the humanitarian efforts of the Republic of Korea National Red Cross to resume the South-North Red Cross Conference at an early date and realize the reunion of the dispersed families. The following is the full text of the statement by Lee Ho, president of the Republic of Korea National Red Cross:

— Editor —

Statement by President of Republic of Korea National Red Cross on Eighth Anniversary of Proposal for South-North Red Cross Conference

«It is already eight years since the Republic of Korea National Red Cross proposed south-north Red Cross talks to north Korea with a view to providing the joy of reunion to the 10 million dispersed family members in the south and the north.

Looking back over the past, the humanitarian contacts, begun between the south and the north with the proposal of the Republic of Korea National Red Cross on August 12, 1971, led to the preliminary meetings between the south and north Korean Red

Cross societies. This had prompted an atmosphere for conciliation for our people who had been living amidst hostile relations for a long time, and had aroused again the expectation of unification.

At the humanitarian talks thus realized between the south and the north, the delegation of our Republic of Korea National Red Cross had exerted with patience and sincerity all efforts to give the joy of reunion to the 10 million dispersed family members in the two sides by bringing to success the talks on the basis of the Red Cross humanitarian spirit and brotherly love transcending the difference in systems and ideas, and to contribute, using this as a stepping stone, to advancing the time of peaceful unification of the fatherland.

With these our humanitarian efforts and the spirit of brotherly love, bolstered by the whole people's aspirations and support from within and without, the year-long preliminary meetings ended in success, paving the way to full-dress meetings held in Seoul and Pyongyang across the barrier of division for the first time in a quarter century period.

With the statement of unilateral boycott of the dialogue made by north Korea on August 28, 1973, however, the path between Seoul and Pyongyang was again shut off, and the humanitarian project which the two sides pledged to accomplish before the nation fails to be materialized to date.

Even after the Seoul-Pyongyang route was closed by north Korea, the Republic of Korea National Red Cross has made sincere efforts in order to resume the South-North Red Cross Conference at an early date and realize the humanitarian reunion of the 10 million dispersed family members.

In particular, at the 25 rounds of the working-level meetings of the South-North Red Cross Conference held at Panmunjom from July 10, 1974 to December 9, 1977, we proposed to north Korea that the suspended full-dress meeting be resumed unconditionally. We also urged that in the solution of the question of dispersed families in a humanitarian manner, the most pressing and practicable projects be undertaken on a priority basis one after another. In this

line, we have made proposals for many reasonable projects.

We proposed, for one, that if north Korea is in a situation where it cannot facilitate the outright reunion between dispersed families, the two sides first solve:

The issue of realizing the reunion between old parents aged 60 years or older and their families.

The issue of establishing a reunion center for dispersed families and a postal matter exchange office at Panmunjom.

The issue of exchanging groups of tomb visitors among dispersed families during traditional holiday seasons.

It was also proposed that if north Korea cannot agree to these propositions, then at least family pictures be allowed to be exchanged between dispersed families.

In addition, we proposed a meeting between the chief delegates of the two sides so as to find a breakthrough in the stalled working-level meetings at Panmunjom and to resume the suspended full-dress meetings at an early date. We further offered a meeting between the two sides' Red Cross president.

Despite these untiring efforts of the Republic of Korea National Red Cross, north Korea has been averting its face from the humanitarian Red Cross meeting and therefore no projects could be materialized to date.

On August 30, 1976, north Korea cut off the direct Red Cross telephone line installed between Seoul and Pyongyang. Moreover, north Korea completely suspended Red Cross contacts by boycotting, in a unilateral notice of "indefinite postponement," the 26th working-level meeting which the two sides agreed to hold on March 20, 1978.

Here, the inter-Korean relations have reverted to the pre-dialogue period, heightening tensions and mutual distrust between the two sides.

Recently our side has made positive efforts to resume the south-north dialogue, but only in vain due to north Korea's negative response.

Needless to say, the discontinuation of dialogue between the

south and the north and persisting tensions run counter to the national wish for lasting peace and the creation of conditions for national unification, as well as to the flow of the international society pursuing mutual opening and cooperation transcending the difference in systems and ideas.

The basic purport and objective of our proposal for south-north Red Cross talks were to ease tensions and create conditions for national conciliation and peaceful unification by opening the door to mutual contacts and exchanges in the course of solving the issue of dispersed families based on the humanitarian spirit beyond the barrier of ideology. "

For this reason, the humanitarian Red Cross talks between the south and the north cannot be suspended, and must be resumed at an early date.

Parallel with the humanitarian south-north talks, our side earlier opened our doors to all countries with systems and ideas different from ours. As a result, our people now exchange communications freely with oversea residents in anywhere around the world, and their oversea travels and visits to their homeland are being made actively.

Lately, in particular, oversea telephone service has been begun between our country and the Soviet Union and East European Communist countries. Even our residents in Communist China actively exchange letters with their families in the country.

Especially, it is widely known that the families of Mr. Lee Eung and Mr. Ahn Hak-bin, who had been living in Mainland China for a long time, returned to the homeland thanks to humanitarian considerations by the Chinese authorities and enjoyed reunions with their separate family members.

Moreover, Mrs. Yoo Mi-ja in Seoul recently had the joy of conversing with her sister, Mrs. Keum-ja, in Moscow over oversea telephone.

Contrary to this progressive trend of the international community, the barrier between the south and the north remains as hard as ever. It is really heart-aching to find ourselves in a situation where

the countless families and relatives dispersed between the south and the north are unable even to meet with their missing family members and relatives despite their being so close on the same land.

On the occasion of the eighth anniversary of the historic August 12 proposal today, I once again urge north Korea to return to the forum of talks with us in response to the earnest wish of the 10 million divided family members and public opinions within and without.

We also call upon north Korea to show an affirmative response to the efforts to normalize the South-North Red Cross Conference by restoring the Red Cross route between Seoul and Pyongyang.

At the same time, we emphasize that north Korea, above all, should normalize at an early date the function of the direct Red Cross telephone line between Seoul and Pyongyang and the Panmunjom Liaison Office, which has been paralyzed for the past three years.

I propose to the north Korean Red Cross that the 26th Red Cross working-level meeting be held at 10 a.m. September 20, 1979 at the conference room of the Neutral National Supervisory Commission at Panmunjom to discuss the question of normalizing the Red Cross talks.

We also ask that the operation of the direct Red Cross telephone line between Seoul and Pyongyang and the Panmunjom Liaison Office will be restored effective 9 a.m. September 1.

September 20th is a significant day. Eight years ago on this day, the first south-north Red Cross preliminary meeting was held.

I look forward to an affirmative response from the north Korean Red Cross to the efforts of the Republic of Korea National Red Cross to resume the suspended South-North Red Cross Conference at an early date and realize the reunion between the 10 million dispersed family members.

The Republic of Korea National Red Cross pledges again that no matter whatever difficulties may lie ahead in the south-north humanitarian talks, it will continue to make sincere and steady efforts to realize the reunion of the 10 million separated family

members.»

The renewed proposal for the resumption of the Red Cross talks and the restoration of the severed direct Seoul-Pyongyang telephone line represents the consistent efforts of the Republic of Korea National Red Cross to solve the humanitarian issue of 10 million dispersed family members in the south and the north. In a word, it was a positive and realistic proposition aimed at bringing to normalcy the stalled inter-Korean dialogue.

The highlights of the statement is that in addition to the proposal, the ROKNRC pointed out the mistake of the north Koreans attempting to link the humanitarian issue to political considerations. It was made clear in the statement that the solution of the humanitarian issue of dispersed families has to be sought beyond any political questions. Another feature is that the north Koreans were strongly urged to reconsider their inhumane and anachronistic refusal to arrange reunion between the separated families. It was noted in this connection that in contrast with the north Koreans' obstinacy, overseas telephone service has been opened with the Soviet Union and East European countries, and Korean residents in Mainland China have been enabled to exchange letters with their relatives in Korea and even to visit their homeland.

Since it proposed south-north Red Cross talks to north Korea on August 12, 1971, the Republic of Korea National Red Cross has made, with patience and sincerity, all available efforts to mitigate the sufferings of the 10 million dispersed family members.

In a striking contrast, however, north Korea was busy laying one obstacle after another to the humanitarian Red Cross talks throughout the entire course of the conference. They were seeking to turn the Red Cross talks into the forum of political propaganda without showing any interest in the task of searching for the 10 million displaced family members in the two sides.

By setting forth the precondition that "there should be the improvement of statutory conditions and the creation of social environment in south Korea" before the substantial debate of Topic No. 1

of the full-dress meeting, "the question of finding out the whereabouts and fate of dispersed family members and relatives," the north Korean Red Cross was only seeking to obtain a political gain—repeal of the Anti-Communist Law in the Republic of Korea.

The north Koreans linked the humanitarian issue of dispersed families and relatives to political questions, arguing, in the jump of logic, that "the path to realizing humanitarianism in our country lies in the materialization of unification of the fatherland," "even humanitarian projects cannot be handled separate from the question of unification of the fatherland... it should be pursued as part of the unification issue," and "anti-communism-related laws should be repealed in south Korea in the first place."

Due to this unreasonable and unrealistic attitude of north Korea, the humanitarian Red Cross talks have failed to register any progress. Consequently, the inter-Korean relations fell back to the pre-dialogue state, with tensions and mutual distrust persisting as ever on the Korean peninsula.

It was against this backdrop that the Republic of Korea National Red Cross, feeling that the sufferings of separated families can no longer be left unchecked, took the occasion of the eighth anniversary of the 1971 proposal for Red Cross talks to urge, with a fresh determination, north Korea to agree to the resumption of the humanitarian talks.

The position of the Republic of Korea National Red Cross toward the humanitarian talks is that the issue of dispersed families and relatives must be solved by all means based on the principle of pure Red Cross humanitarianism beyond any ideological and statutory questions. It believes that all Red Cross projects cannot be hampered by any statutory or social conditions.

Originally, the Republic of Korea National Red Cross proposed the Red Cross talks with a view to solving the question of dispersed families based on the spirit of humanitarianism, easing tensions by means of expanded contacts and exchanges, and to contributing thereby to the realization of national conciliation and further peaceful unification.

The campaign for search for the dispersed families, if implemented properly, would not only have removed the sufferings but have also proven the ability of the nation to remove mutual distrust, find a clue to achieving grand national unity and ultimately realize national unification in a dialogue themselves.

In other words, if and when the question of dispersed families is solved smoothly, it would certainly pave the way to a broader dialogue, which would in turn lead to the laying of a base for mutual understanding and trust, and then to the chain reaction of the restoration of national homogeneity.

It is important that north Korea, giving up its impure attempt to exploit the South-North Red Cross Conference for political gains, returns to the genuine humanitarian Red Cross spirit and shows an affirmative response to the reasonable and realistic ROKNRC proposals intended to provide the joy of reunion to the 10 million dispersed family members. North Korea should help normalize the Red Cross talks by restoring the severed Seoul-Pyongyang direct telephone line in the first place.

3. ROKNRC Reshuffles Delegates and Consultants to Red Cross Talks

Along with the issuance of a statement on the occasion of the eighth anniversary of the proposal for the South-North Red Cross talks, the Republic of Korea National Red Cross on August 11, 1979 effected a reshuffle of the members of its delegation to the South-North Red Cross Conference with a view to creating conditions for the resumption of the deadlocked Red Cross talks.

The streamlining of the ROKNRC delegation, which affects members and consultants, represents the forward-looking attitude of the ROKNRC striving endlessly for the implementation of the Red Cross humanitarian project.

The reshuffle was significant all the more because the new consultants who additionally include those from the religious and woman circles cover various walks of life on the basis of vocational

ability, facilitating a broader participation in the talks.

The action further points to the determination of the ROKNRC to resume the Red Cross talks and thereby help solve the tragedy of national division through the efforts of the nation's own.

The list of the delegates and consultants of the ROKNRC delegation to the South-North Red Cross Conference is as follows:

Delegates

Chief Delegate: Soh Sang-yung (unaffected — Vice President of the Republic of Korea National Red Cross)

Alternate Chief Delegate: Kim Yeon-choo (unaffected - Assistant to the President of the Republic of Korea National Red Cross)

Delegate: Lee Byung-ho (unaffected — Director of the Secretariat of the South-North Red Cross conference)

Delegate: Song Han-ho (new — Consultant on public information to the Republic of Korea National Red Cross)

Delegate: Chung Choo-nyun (unaffected — Spokesman for the Republic of Korea National Red Cross)

Delegate: Choi Moon-hyun (unaffected — Consultant on youth affairs to the Republic of Korea National Red Cross)

Delegate: Cho Chul-hwa (new — Chief of Youth Department, Republic of Korea National Red Cross)

Consultants

Cho Duk-song (unaffected — Editorial writer, the Chosun Ilbo)

Park Bong-sik (unaffected — Professor, Seoul National University)

Kim Dong-kil (new — Former professor, Yonsei University)

Park Jo-jun (new — Minister, Yung Nak Church)

Lee Chul-kyung (new — President, the National Council of

Women of Korea)

Chung Yong-suk (new—Editorial writer, the Dong-A Ilbo)

Han Seung-jo (new—Professor, Korea University)

4. NKRC Again Rejects ROKNRC Call for Resumption of Talks

North Korea once again rejected a recently renewed call of the Republic of Korea National Red Cross for the restoration of the severed direct south-north telephone line and the resumption of the working-level meeting of the South-North Red Cross Conference.

The ROKNRC, in a statement by its president, Lee Ho, on August 11, 1979 on the occasion of the eighth anniversary of the proposal for the Red Cross talks, proposed that the direct south-north telephone line, which north Korea has unilaterally severed, be restored effective September 1 and that the 26th working-level meeting of the Red Cross talks be held at Panmunjom at 10 a.m. September 20, the day marking the eighth anniversary of the first preliminary meeting between the south and north Korean Red Cross societies.

At 9 a.m. September 1, the ROKNRC tried to call over the direct line the north Korean Red Cross as suggested in the proposal. But, the repeated testing calls went unanswered by the north Koreans. Similarly north Korea did not show any response to the proposal for a working-level meeting on September 20, thus again splashing cold water upon the wish of the 10 million dispersed family members in the south and the north for the successful implementation of the humanitarian project.

The direct south-north telephone line, installed under the Agreed Minute on Formation and Operation of Coordinating Committee announced together with the July 4 South-North Coordinating Committee, played a substantial role in the improvement of the inter-Korean relations for five years until August 30, 1976 when north Korea cut it off unilaterally.

When the ROKNRC tried to send a telephone message to the north Korea Red Cross on August 30, 1976 to ask for its cooperation in the efforts to obtain the return of a fishing boat and its crewmen which were abducted earlier in the day by a north Korean gunboat in the East Sea, north Korea did not answer. Thereafter, the ROKNRC asked north Korea time and again to reopen the direct line, but only in vain. The abduction of a south Korean fishing boat, Shinjin-ho No. 3, on August 30, 1976, was preceded by the notorious axe-murder of two American officers by a group of north Korean security guards at Panmunjom on August 18, 1976.

Despite the negative attitude of north Korea toward the inter-Korean dialogue, the ROKNRC, true to the provisions of the Agreed Minute on Operation of Direct Telephone Line between Central Office of South and North Korean Red Cross Societies signed on August 25, 1972, keeps trying to have testing calls with Pyongyang at 10 a.m. every morning except holidays in its sincere efforts to get the stalled dialogue resumed at an early date in line with the invariable wish of the dispersed families.

At this juncture when telephone service has been opened even with Moscow and when exchange of communications is made freely with Korean residents in China, north Korea denies the exchange of communications on the same land over a telephone line which was installed and operated under an express agreement reached between the two sides. North Korea should meet the ardent desire of the dispersed families by contributing to the resumption of the inter-Korean talks through restoration of the direct Seoul-Pyongyang telephone line.

The working-level meeting, whose resumption the ROKNRC proposed in the August 11 statement, was the last channel of the South-North Red Cross talks held at Panmunjom after north Korea, in its August 28, 1973 statement, one-sidedly suspended the full-dress Red Cross talks held seven times in Seoul and Pyongyang by turn for about one year. The full-dress meetings came after year-long preliminary meetings begun on September 20, 1971. North Korea shattered even that last remaining channel of talks in March

1978.

In an effort to resume the deadlocked humanitarian talks, the ROKNRC proposed, in a telephone message on November 15, 1973, that "the eighth full-dress meeting be held within the year, and to this end, a liaison officials' meeting be opened to discuss preparatory steps for the full-dress meeting."

As a result, contacts between liaison officials were held on November 21 the same year, which, in turn, gave birth to the delegates' meetings held seven times in a period of about six months. The delegates' meetings came four and a half months after the suspension of the full-dress meetings.

It was at these delegates' meetings that the two sides agreed to hold working-level meetings. The first working-level meeting, with alternate chief delegates participating as senior members, was held on July 10, 1974 at the conference room of the Neutral Nation's Supervisory Commission to have a "preliminary discussion of the topics of full-dress meetings" and discuss the "issue of resuming full-dress meetings."

A total of 25 rounds of working-level meetings were held for a period of more than four years until December 9, 1977. However, they failed to register any achievements due to the insincerity on the part of the north Korean Red Cross.

The working-level meetings, too, were torpedoed by the north Koreans. They suddenly declared on March 19, 1978, one day before the scheduled 26th working-level meeting, that they were postponing the 26th meeting "indefinitely." The reason they gave was the routine joint Korea-U.S. field military exercise held at that time. In fact, the boycott was no surprise. From the beginning, the north Koreans were attending the working-level meetings only with reluctance, unable to resist public opinions and pressures from within and without advocating a continued dialogue.

By ignoring the latest ROKNRC call for return to the talks, north Korea manifested once again that it has no interest in the kind of humanitarian projects that cannot serve its strategy for communization of the whole Korean peninsula.

Here, Chung Choo-nyun, spokesman for the Republic of Korea National Red Cross, in a statement, expressed regret over the negative attitude of north Korea toward the inter-Korean dialogue, and called for early resumption of the Red Cross working-level meetings, stressing, "the ROKNRC delegation will confidently assume a leading role in the preparation of a base for the easing of tensions and solution of the Korean question in a peaceful manner." The spokesman also said that the doors to the South-North Red Cross Conference remain wide open.

North Korea should return to the forum of dialogue and show a sincerity toward the Red Cross humanitarian project. The following is the full text of the statement by the ROKNRC spokesman:

***Statement by Spokesman for Republic of Korea
National Red Cross***

The Republic of Korea National Red Cross, in a statement issued by Mr. Lee Ho, ROKNRC president, on August 11, 1979 on the occasion of the eighth anniversary of the proposal for the south-north Red Cross talks, proposed to north Korea that the 26th working-level meeting be held at the conference room of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission at 10 a.m. September 20, 1979. It was also urged in the statement that the operation of the direct telephone line between the south and north Korean Red Cross societies be restored effective last September 1.

The proposal for the resumption of the Red Cross talks reflects our sincere position and untiring efforts to realize the reunion of the dispersed families in the south and the north.

The delegation of the Republic of Korea National Red Cross expresses deep regret over the failure to resume the Red Cross working-level meeting and restore the direct south-north telephone line because of the north Korean Red Cross's refusal to show any response to our proposal until this time today.

As is well known, the north Korean Red Cross suspended even

the humanitarian contacts, the last remaining channel of the inter-Korean dialogue, by unilaterally putting off indefinitely the 26th working-level meeting of the South-North Red Cross Conference slated, under a mutual agreement, for March 20, 1978.

Since the Red Cross talks began with the historic August 12 proposal by the Republic of Korea National Red Cross, the delegation of the Republic of Korea National Red Cross has exerted all efforts with patience and sincerity to realize the humanitarian reunion between the 10 million separated family members throughout the entire course of the talks, which consisted of year-long preliminary meetings at Panmunjom, another year-long full-dress meetings held in Seoul and Pyongyang by turn, and the working-level meetings held at Panmunjom for four years and five months.

These consistent efforts of the Republic of Korea National Red Cross were well reflected in a series of the proposals we have made. For a substantial progress in the talks, the Republic of Korea National Red Cross delegation offered a series of urgent and practicable proposal such as the exchange of letters of inquiry on present conditions and whereabouts of dispersed families in the south and the north, mutual exchange of visitors to ancestral tombs from the separated families on each side on traditional holidays, prior reunion and exchange of letters between those parents aged 60 years of older and their parents, establishment of a meeting center for dispersed families and a postal exchange office at Panmunjom, and exchange of family pictures between separated families.

In further efforts to get the talks resumed, our side requested the International Committee of Red Cross (ICRC) for its mediation, and suggested meetings between the Red Cross presidents and also between the chief delegates to the Red Cross talks.

Efforts are being made among all the world countries today to care for mutual understanding and to solve humanitarian and other problems peacefully through dialogue, exchanges and cooperation.

The Republic of Korea is undergoing personnel and material exchanges with the Soviet Union and other Communist countries in the areas of sciences, sports, culture and economy. Lately, oversea

telephone service has been opened with the Soviet Union, and exchanges of postal parcels have begun with the Soviet Union and other Communist countries. Even a joint thesis on seaweeds between Korean and Soviet scholars has been published.

Especially our brethren residing in Mainland China or the Soviet Union have been enabled to exchange letters with their family members in their homeland. Some of them have been here. At the same time, numerous Korean residents in Japan, affiliated with Chochongryon, a pro-Pyongyang Korean resident's group there, visited their homeland here on Chusok and other national holidays. Many more are expected to visit here on the coming Chusok day.

Why is it that despite this universal trend, the dispersed families in the south and the north cannot exchange letters and make mutual visits?

The humanitarian project for the realization of reunions between dispersed families should and can be undertaken in the first place between the two sides beyond political, social and all other barriers.

The delegation of the Republic of Korea National Red Cross is convinced that resumption of the humanitarian South-North Red Cross Conference will play a leading role in the preparation of a base for easing tensions and solve problems pending between the south and the north peacefully.

The Republic of Korea National Red Cross delegation pledges that no matter whatever difficulties and trials may lie ahead, it will exert steady endeavors with the firm belief that the day will surely come when the dispersed families in the two sides can rejoice their reunion.

Lastly, the delegation of the Republic of Korea National Red Cross, stressing that the doors to the South-North Red Cross talks remain always wide open, looks forward to an affirmative response from the north Korean Red Cross.

Part Four

Reference Materials

— Course of South-North Red Cross Conference —

1. Course of South-North Red Cross Conference

(A summary of the course of the South-North Red Cross Conference is presented in the following pages as a reference material for use by our readers in understanding and studying the course and present state of the south-north dialogue. — Editor —)

a. Start of Talks

On August 12, 1971, Dr. Choi Too-sun, president of the Republic of Korea National Red Cross, proposed to the north Korean Red Cross that a "campaign for search for dispersed families in the south and the north" be launch to ease the sufferings of such divided family member totaling 10 millions, and, to this end, south-north Red Cross talks be opened.

The August 12 proposal, embodying the Idea for Peaceful Unification made public by President Park Chung Hee on August 15, 1970, was the most epochal step ever taken between the south and the north since the national division. The overture had aroused the public expectation of national unification and fostered an atmosphere for national conciliation between our people in the south and the north who had been living in a protracted state of division, tensions and hostile relations.

The north Korean Red Cross notified the ROKNRC of its acceptance of the August 12 proposal on August 14, two days after the offer was made. As a result, a historic contact between the messengers of the south and north Korean Red Cross societies was held at Panmunjom on August 20, 1971 to lay a humanitarian bridge between the south and the north for the first time in the quarter-century national division. Following the five rounds of messengers' contacts until September 16, Red Cross preliminary

meetings began to take place at the conference room of the Neutral Nations' Supervisory Commission on September 20, 1971.

The gists of President Park's August 15 Declaration and of the statement of Dr. Choi Too-sun, president of the Republic of Korea National Red Cross, were as follows:

August 15 Declaration of President Park

- | | |
|--|---|
| August 15, 1970
Congratulatory
address on
National
Liberation Day | <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Expresses the willingness to suggest epochal and practicable measures that can reflect humanitarian consideration, can contribute to laying the groundwork for unification, and can remove, step by step, various artificial barriers existing between the south and the north; and proposes a bona fide competition. |
|--|---|
-

Special Statement by Choi Too-sun president of Republic of Korea National Red Cross

- | Time | Substance |
|---|--|
| August 12, 1971
(ROKNRC
conference
room) | <ul style="list-style-type: none">• For the purpose of solving the purely humanitarian problem based on the spirit of the Red Cross, a campaign for search for missing families be launched first to find out the present condition of dispersed families, inform thereof, and arrange their reunion.— First, it is proposed that Red Cross representatives from the south and the north meet shortly to have talks to discuss concretely the campaign for search for families between the south and the north.— Second, it is proposed that a preliminary |

meeting shall be held in Geneva before the end of the coming October to discuss procedural matters for the talks.

b. Course of Preliminary Meetings

The preliminary meetings of the South-North Red Cross Conference wound up after 25 rounds of open and plenary sessions and 16 rounds of closed-door sessions from September 20, 1971 to August 12, 1972. Beginning August 1972, full-dress meetings were held.

The course of the preliminary meetings was as follows:

Classification	Time	Attendees
Preliminary meeting 1st - 25th (Open, plenary sessions)	Sept. 20, '71- Aug. 11, '72 (Conference room of Neutral Nations' Supervisory Commission (NNSC) at Panmunjom)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Delegates of ROKNRC Chief delegate: Kim Yeon-joo Alternate chief delegate: Park Sun-kyoo Delegate: Chung Hong-jin Delegate: Chung Hee-kyung Delegate: Chung Choo-nyun • Delegates of NKRC Chief: Kim Tae-hui Deputy chief: Kim Tock-hyun Member: Cho Myung-il Member: Lee Chong-hak Member: Suh Sung-chul
Working-level sessions on agenda topics 1st - 13th	Feb. 21, '72- June 5, '72 (Conference room of NNSC)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ROKNRC Delegates: Chung Hong-jin Chung Choo-nyun • NKRC Delegates Cho Myung-il

(Closed-door sessions)		Lee Chong-hak
Working-level sessions on other procedural matters 1st - 3rd (Closed-door sessions)	Jul. 27, '72- Aug. 9, '72 (Conference room of NNSC)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ROKNRC Delegate: Chung Choo-nyun • NKRC Delegate: Lee Chong-hak

The major items agreed on at the preliminary meetings were as follows:

- 1) Establishment of permanent liaison offices at Panmunjom.
- 2) Installing of a direct south-north telephone line.
- 3) Sites, topics and procedures of full-dress meetings.
- 4) Scope of delegations to full-dress meetings.

Major Items Agreed On

Classification	Session	Substance
Permanent offices & telephone line	1st (Sept. 20, '71)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Establishment of liaison offices at Freedom House and Panmungak, respectively. • Installing and operation of direct telephone line between two liaison offices.
Sites of full-dress meeting	3rd (Oct. 6, '71)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Seoul and Pyongyang, by turn

Agenda of full-dress meetings	20th (June 16, '72)	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) The question of ascertaining, and notifying thereof, the whereabouts and fate of the dispersed families and relatives in the south and the north. 2) The question of facilitating free mutual visits and free meetings among the dispersed families and relatives in the south and the north. 3) The question of facilitating free exchange of mails among the dispersed families and relatives in the south and the north. 4) The question of facilitating re-union of the dispersed families according to their free individual wishes. 5) Other humanitarian problems to be settled.
Composition of delegations to full-dress meetings	25th (Aug. 11, '72)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 54 persons from each side <ul style="list-style-type: none"> — Delegates: 7 — Consultants: 7 — Attendants: 20 — Reporters: 20 (* At the third full-dress meeting, the number of reporters was increased by 5.)

Lists of Delegates and Consultants

• Delegates

ROKNRC (Aug. '72 — Mar. '73)

Chief delegate: Lee Bum-suk (ROKNRC vice president)
Alternate chief delegate: Kim Yeon-joo (Consultant to ROKNRC president)
Delegate: Kim Dal-sool (Director of ROKNRC Conference Secretariat)
Delegate: Park Sun-kyu (Chief of ROKNRC Chungchong-namdo Chapter)
Delegate: Chung Hee-kyung (Principal of Ewha Girls High School; Mrs.)
Delegate: Chung Choo-nyun (Spokesman for ROKNRC Conference Secretariat)
Delegate: Suh Young-hoon (Chief of ROKNRC Youth Department)

NKRC (Aug. '72 — May '73)

Chief Delegate: Kim Tae-hui (NKRC vice chairman)
Deputy chief delegate: Choo Chang-joon (NKRC secretary)
Delegate: Cho Myung-il (NKRC Executive Committee member)
Delegate: Koong Sang-ho (NKRC senior staffer)
Delegate: Lee Chung-il (NKRC Executive Committee member; Mrs.)
Delegate: Han Si-hyuk (Chief of NKRC Culture and Publicity Department)
Delegate: Kim Soo-chul (Deputy chief of NKRC Planning Department)

ROKNRC (Mar. '73 — Aug. '79)

Chief delegate: Chi Yeon-tai (ROKNRC vice president) * Reshuffled on Mar. 9, 1976
Alternate chief delegate: Kim Yeon-joo (Consultant to ROKNRC president)
Delegate: Kim Dal-sool (Director of ROKNRC Conference Secretariat)

Delegate: Kim Yu-kap (ROKNRC Operations Committee member)
Delegate: Chung Choo-nyun (Spokesman for ROKNRC Conference Secretariat)
Delegate: Lee Byung-ho (ROKNRC Operations Committee member)
Delegate: Choi Moon-hyun (ROKNRC consultant on youth affairs)

NKRC (May '73 — '75)

Chief delegate: Kim Tae-hui (NKRC vice chairman)
Deputy chief delegate: Choo Chang-joon (NKRC secretary)
Delegate: Cho Myung-il (NKRC Executive Committee member)
Delegate: Kim Ryun-joo (NKRC senior staffer)
* Appointed on May 9, 1973
Delegate: Lee Chung-il (NKRC Executive Committee member; Mrs)
Delegate: Han Si-hyuk (Chief of NKRC Culture and Publicity Department)
Delegate: Kim Soo-chul (Deputy chief of NKRC Planning Department)

ROKNRC (Reformed, August 11, '79)

Chief delegate: Soh Sang-yung (ROKNRC vice president) * Reshuffled on May 1, 1979
Alternate chief delegate: Kim Yeon-joo (Consultant to ROKNRC president)
Delegate: Lee Byung-ho (Director of ROKNRC Conference Secretariat)
Delegate: Song Han-ho (ROKNRC Public Information Committee member)
Delegate: Chung Choo-nyun (Spokesman for ROKNRC Conference Secretariat)
Delegate: Choi Moon-hyun (ROKNRC consultant)

on youth affairs)
Delegate: Cho Chul-hwa (Director of ROKNRC
Youth Department)

NKRC (Jan. '75 — Aug. '79)

Chief delegate: Kim Tae-hui (NKRC vice
chairman)
Deputy chief delegate: Choo Chang-joon (NKRC
secretary)
Delegate: Suh Sung-chol (NKRC guidance
member) * Reshuffled in Jan. 1975
Delegate: Kim Ryun-joo (NKRC senior staffer)
Delegate: Lee Chung-il (NKRC Executive Com-
mittee member)
Delegate: Han Si-hyuk (Chief of NKRC Culture
and Publicity Department)
Delegate: Kim Soo-chul (Deputy chief of NKRC
Planning Department)

• **Consultants**

ROKNRC (Aug. '72 — Mar. '73)

Kim Joon-yup (Professor at Korea University)
Yang Hung-mo (Editorial writer at the Joong-ang
Daily News)
Park Joon-kyu (Professor at Seoul National
University)
Ku Pum-mo (Professor at Seoul National
University)
Cho Duk-song (Editorial writer at the Chosun Ilbo)
Song Kun-ho (Editorial writer at the Dong-A
Daily News)
Lee Sang-yul (Senior staffer of the South-North
Red Cross Conference Supporting Committee)

NKRC (Aug. '72 — '73)

- Yun Ki-bok** (Vice chairman of the Workers' Party
Overseas Liaison Committee)
Kim Sung-yul (Vice chairman of Democratic Party)
Kang Chang-soo (Vice chairman of Chongu Party
of Chongdogyo Religion)
Kim Kil-hyun (Deputy secretary of the Democratic
Front for Unification of the Fatherland)
Paek Nam-joon (Vice chairman of the League of
Vocational Organizations)
Oh Kwang-taek (Vice chairman of the League of
Socialist Working Youth)
Kim Byung-sik (First vice chairman of
Chochongnyon)
-

ROKNRC (Mar. '73 — Aug. '79)

- Cho Duk-song** (Editorial writer at the Chosun Ilbo)
Park Bong-sik (Professor at Seoul National
University)
Ko Young-bok (Professor at Seoul National
University)
Kim Chin-bok (Editorial writer at the Seoul
Shinmun)
Lee Chong-ha (Professor at Yonsei University)
Son Je-shuk (Professor at Seoul National
University)
Lee Sang-yul (Senior staffer of the South-North Red
Cross Conference Supporting Committee)
-

NKRC (Mar. '78 — Aug. '79)

- Yun Ki-bok** (Vice chairman of the Workers' Party
Overseas Liaison Committee)
Kim Sung-yul (Vice chairman of Democratic Party)
Kang Chang-soo (Vice chairman of Chongu Party
of Chondogyo Religion)
Kim Chu-chul (Deputy secretary of the Democratic
Front for Unification of the Fatherland)

* Appointed in March '73
Paek Nam-joon (Vice chairman of the League of Vocational Organizations)
Oh Kwang-jaek (Vice chairman of the League of Socialist Working Youth)
Park Chae-ro (Vice chairman of Chochongnyon)
* Rusuffled on Mar. 21, 1973

ROKNRC (Reformed, August 11, '79)

Cho Duk-song (Editorial writer at the Chosun Ilbo)
Park Bong-sik (Professor at Seoul National University)
Kim Tong-kil (Ex-professor at Yonsei University)
Park Jo-jun (Minister at Yongrak Church)
Lee Chul-kyung (Chairman of the Korea Association of Women's Organizations)
Chung Yong-suk (Editorial writer at the Dong-a Ilbo)
Han Seung-jo (Professor at Korea University)

NKRC (Aug. '79 —)

Yun Ki-bok (Vice chairman of the Workers' Party Overseas Liaison Committee)
Kim Sung-yul (Vice chairman of Democratic Party)
Kang Chang-soo (Vice chairman of Chongu Party of Chondogyo Religion)
Kim Chu-chul (Deputy secretary of the Democratic Front for Unification of the Fatherland)
Paek Nam-joon (Vice chairman of the League of Vocational Organizations)
Oh Kwang-taek (Vice chairman of the League of Socialist Working Youth)
Park Chae-ro (Vice chairman of Chochongnyon)

c. Full-Dress Meetings

Seven rounds of the full-dress meetings of the South-North Red Cross Conference were held in a period from August 1972 to July 1973. The times and venues of the meetings were as follows:

Classification	Time	Venue
1st round	Aug. 29-Sept. 2, '72	Pyongyang
2nd round	Sept. 12-16, '72	Seoul
3rd round	Oct. 23-26, '72	Pyongyang
4th round	Nov. 22-24, '72	Seoul
5th round	Mar. 20-23, '73	Pyongyang
6th round	May 8-11, '73	Seoul
7th round	July 10-13, '73	Pyongyang

The first and second rounds of the full-dress meetings were held chiefly for ceremonial purposes in a festive mood because of the emotional factors from the fact that they represented the first travels between the south and the north since the territorial division.

Beginning with the third round meeting, the two delegations discussed Agenda Item No. 1. However, the attitudes of the two sides toward the talks were poles apart. The stands of the two delegations conflicted with each other from the outset, registering little progress in the talks.

The positions of the two sides toward the Red Cross meetings and their proposals made there were:

• Position

ROKNRC	NKRC
Maintains a positive posture in	Persists in the propagandism of

which it laid down the method of inquiring into missing families based on genuine Red Cross humanitarianism.

Kim Il-sung's idolization and communism, attempting to turn the Red Cross talks into the forum of political propaganda.

• **Proposals**

ROKNRC	NKRC
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Proposes that the method of exchanging the "letters of inquiry on separated families" and "letters of reply on separated families" be adopted based on the ICRC-recommended method of searching for missing persons for the implementation of the project of Agenda Item No. 1, while the two Red Cross societies take charge of the project in their respective areas. • Suggests as a project principle that the project of Agenda Item No. 1 be carried out based on Red Cross humanitarianism and neutralism, and the project for dispersed families and relatives should be aimed primarily at restoring the severed blood ties, and should not go beyond the 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Refuses the substantial debate of Agenda Item No. 1, and instead insists that the Red Cross talks should take up the question of changing the laws, political system and even social customs of south Korea. (Demands the repeal of the Anti-Communist Law and National Security Law, suspension of anti-Communist activities and dissolution of anti-Communist organizations.) • Insists that no Red Cross agencies of the two sides should intervene in the project of Agenda Item No. 1, that the dispersed families and relatives should be allowed to search for their missing family members through free travels in the other area. Also suggests that the one publicity per-

frame of blood relationship.

sonnel be sent to each village. (In other words, they meant to propagate Communism in the Republic of Korea.)

Due to these wide discrepancies in the positions of the two sides, no agreement could be reached during the course of the full-dress meetings. The proposals and demands made at each of the full-dress meetings were:

	ROKNRC	NKRC
1st (Aug. 30, '72)	<p>— Confirmation and adoption of five agenda topics — (* Agreed on at 20th working-level meeting)</p>	<p>— Agenda topics and posture toward talks—</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Accept five agenda topics (* The same as the ROKNRC version of topics) • Based on July 4 Joint Communique, brotherly, love, mutual cooperation and understanding, and the principle of Red Cross humanitarianism, the topics must be those that can contribute to national unification.
2nd (Sept. 13, '72)	<p>— Establishment of Office —</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • For working-level discussion of the oper- 	<p>— Five Principles, Etc. —</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Embodiment of democracy, principle of

	<p>ation of the talks, a "working-level sub-committee of south-north Red Cross" be set up at Panmunjom.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • For the execution of agreed matters, a "joint secretariat of south-north Red Cross" incorporating "liaison offices" be established. 	<p>freedom, brotherly love and Red Cross humanitarianism; and appeal for support from various circles.</p>
<p>3rd (Oct. 24, '72)</p>	<p>— Method of Agenda Item No. 1 Project —</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Procedure: Exchange of "letters of inquiry into dispersed families" and "letters of reply on dispersed families." (Managed by the two Red Cross societies in their respective areas.) • Form: The same. (* Sample form delivered.) • Office: South-North Red Cross Panmunjom project office. • Initiation: Initiation within one month after agreement on Agenda Item No. 1 project. 	<p>— Method of Agenda Item No. 1 Project —</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Creation of statutory and social conditions and environments. • Dispatch of publicity personnels. • Scope: Dependent on appeal by dispersed families. • Method: Dependents on demand and views of dispersed families. • Office: "Joint south-north Red Cross committee" and establishment of "Red Cross representatives' offices" at necessary places.

6th
(May 9-10,
'73)

* Policy of the ROK government is to positively support Red Cross projects.

* Political issue cannot, in nature, be discussed at Red Cross talks.

* Proven by smooth travels back and forth between Seoul and Pyongyang by both delegations.

* Explanation of autonomous nature of Red Cross (Autonomous disposition of matters in one's own area)

— Detailed Method of
Agenda Item No. 1
Project —

1. Improvement of
conditions and en-
vironment.

- Repeal of some laws such as Anti-Communist Law and National Security Law.
- Prohibition of fomentation of war and terror atmosphere and national antagonism, and dissolution of organizations engaged in such activities.
- Recognition of inviolable right for all conductors and personal belongings of those taking part in the project.
- Guarantee of support for the project by political parties, social organizations, public organizations and individuals.

2. Dispatch of publi-
city personnels

- One publicity person-
nel per Ri (dong), and
publicity personnel
would engage in ac-
tivities on a city or
country basis.

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> * Disposition of problems incidental to the execution of the project can be referred to an already agreed-on joint project office. * Mutual confirmation between persons concerned. * Agrees in principle on the inclusion of brethren in Japan, but this is an issue falling on the category of Agenda Item No. 5. * Free travels by persons involved are in effect impossible. * Confirmation by the method of exchange of documents would be realistic. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Duty: Study on the state of dispersed families and relatives, explanation, creation of conditions for trust, conciliation and grand unity, and study and presentation of effective ways to implement the project. 3. Scope of families and relatives. • Dependent on one's appeal, and brethren in Japan should be included. 4. Method of project • The basic method should be to search for separated families through free travels by persons concerned in the other area. • Indirect and supplementary methods suggested by persons concerned may be applied.
<p>7th (July 11-12, '73)</p>	<p>— Groups of Chusok Tomb Visitors —</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • As an immediate project for the year, "groups of Chusok tomb visitors" be formed and exchanged. 	<p>— Draft of Proposed Joint Communique —</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Repeal of Anti-Communist Law, National Security Law and other laws and regulations on anti-communism. • Prohibition of anti-

- A working-level meeting be formed among two delegates and three attendants from each side for concrete discussion of the project.

Communist activities and dissolution of anti-Communist organizations.

- Guarantee of the participation in the project by all circles of life, guarantee of the inviolable right for the personal safety and personal belongings of those participants, guarantee of the freedom of their conducts, and provision of conveniences.
- Positive measures to end the present military confrontation and the state of tension.
- Authorities take actions legally and administratively to guarantee the implementation of the above, and declare it at home and abroad.

2. Deadlock of Talks

At the South-North Red Cross Conference, the delegation of the Republic of Korea National Red Cross had exerted with patience and sincerity all efforts to bring the talks to a success on the basis of the Red Cross humanitarian spirit and brotherly love transcending the difference in systems and ideas so as to provide the joy of reunion to the 10 million separated family members and further to con-

tribute, based thereon, to the advancing of the time of the peaceful unification of the fatherland.

However, as the north Korean Red Cross, deviating completely from the path of the Red Cross humanitarian project, had begun to scheme openly to exploit the talks for the propagation of communism and Communist revolutionary theories, the Red Cross talks struck the deadlock in substance, undergoing only perfunctory meetings.

Since its declaration of the suspension of the inter-Korean dialogue in the "Kim Young-joo statement" on August 28, 1973, the north Korean Red Cross refused even to hold the full-dress meetings. Thus, the Seoul-Pyongyang path was again shut off, and the humanitarian campaign for search for dispersed families is yet to be carried out.

3. ROKNRC Efforts to Resume Talks

a. Delegates' Contacts

Even after the closure of the Seoul-Pyongyang route by north Korea, the Republic of Korea National Red Cross strove hard to resume the Red Cross talks and thereby to realize the reunion between the 10 million dispersed family members at an early date.

Thanks to the ROKNRC efforts, seven rounds of delegates' contacts were held at the conference room of the Neutral Nations' Supervisory Commission at Panmunjom in a period from November 28, 1973 to May 29, 1974. Representing the ROKNRC at the delegates' meetings was Kim Dal-sool. The NKRC delegate was Cho Myung-il.

At the delegates' contacts, the two sides agreed on the holding of working-level meetings. Subsequently, a total of 25 rounds of working-level meetings were held from July 1974 to December 1977.

Major matters of agreement reached at the delegates' contacts were as follows:

Classification	Contact	Contents
Opening of working-level meetings	6th (May 22, '74)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Holding of working-level meetings with alternate chief delegates as senior members. (Site - Panmunjom) • Topics: Preliminary discussion of the topics of the full-dress meetings, and the issue of resuming the full-dress meetings.
Time, organization & procedural of working-level meetings	7th (May 29, '74)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 1st working-level meeting: 10 a.m. July 10, '74 • Place: Conference room of Neutral Nations' Supervisory Commission • Organization: Alternate chief delegates (deputy chief delegate), two delegates and four attendants. • Method of meetings: In principle, closed-door sessions, open sessions may be held if necessary through mutual agreement. • Other matters: To be discussed and determined between chief liaison officers.

b. Working-level Meetings

(1) Course

A total of 25 rounds of the working-level meetings of the South-North Red Cross Conference were held at Panmunjom in a period from July 10, 1974 to December 9, 1977, without any achievements.

Even these working-level meetings, which were the last remaining channel of the inter-Korean talks, were brought to a suspension when north Korea did not attend, for no justifiable reasons, the 26th working-level meeting slated for March 20, 1978. Contacts between the south and north Korean Red Cross societies were thus completely severed.

The two sides' delegations to the working-level meetings were as follows:

ROKNRC: Kim Yeon-joo
Kim Dal-sool
Chung Choo-nyun

NKRC: Choo Chang-joon
Cho Myung-il (Cho was replaced by Suh
Sung-chul beginning the 7th
working-level meeting, who
was again replaced by Chung
Jae-il from the 17th working-
level meeting.)
Kim Ryun-joo

*** Severance of Direct South-North Telephone Line**

On August 30, 1976, north Korea severed the direct telephone line linking the south and north Korean Red Cross societies, which had been operated smoothly under mutual agreement.

Upon the hijacking of a south Korean fishing boat, Shinjin No. 3, by a north Korean gunboat in the East Sea on August 30, 1976, which was preceded 12 days before on August 18 by the notorious ax-murder of two American officers by north Korean security guards at Panmunjom, the Republic of Korea National Red Cross was sending a telephone message to the north Korean Red Cross, asking for its intervention for the return of the kidnapped fishermen and their boat, when a north Korean liaison officer refused to take it down. From this time on, north Korea

leaves the direct telephone line severed.

(2) Two Sides' Major Proposals and Demands

The working-level meetings of the South-North Red Cross Conference, held for the purpose of making a preliminary study of the topics of the full-dress meetings and solving the issue of resuming the full-dress meetings, failed to produce any agreement except for the accord on the time of following meetings. The meetings served only to maintain the thread of life of the south-north dialogue.

(a) ROKNRC Proposal

The Republic of Korea National Red Cross strongly urged the north Korean Red Cross to agree to the unconditional resumption of the suspended full-dress meeting and to go on the preliminary discussion of Agenda Item No. 1. At the same time, the ROKNRC suggested that in the solution of the dispersed family issue in a humanitarian manner, urgent and practicable problems be discussed and solved first. As projects needing prompt solution, the ROKNRC set forth:

1) The issue of facilitating reunion between old parents aged 60 or more and their families;

2) The issue of establishing a meeting center for divided families and a postal matter exchange office at Panmunjom;

3) The issue of exchanging groups of tomb visitors between dispersed families on "Chusok (Moon Festival Day)," lunar New Year's Day and other traditional holidays; and

4) If the project for aged parents cannot be carried out promptly, then at least the exchange of family pictures be implemented.

In addition, the Republic of Korea National Red Cross proposed over the direct telephone line on January 26, 1976 that the chief delegates of the two delegations have a meeting to find a breakthrough in the stalled working-level meetings as well as to discuss steps to resume the suspended full-dress meetings.

(b) NKRC Demand

However, all of these reasonable and just proposals by the Republic of Korea National Red Cross were rejected outright by the north Korean Red Cross, which blindly repeated its stereotyped political propaganda that had nothing to do with the humanitarian Red Cross talks.

The north Korean Red Cross held fast to the nonsensical contentions that political problems must be solved before any other issues, that the dispersed family question should be solved concomitant with the solution of the unification issue, and that before the tackling of the dispersed family question, Communist activities should be guaranteed first in the Republic of Korea.

In fact, by demanding the withdrawal of American forces from Korea, stoppage of the south Korean forces modernization plan and cessation of the anti-Communist policy of south Korea prior to any discussion of the already agreed-on agenda topics, the north Korea Red Cross had turned a deaf ear to the repeated ROKNRC urging that it cooperate in ensuring a smooth sailing of the Red Cross talks.

c. Consistent Efforts of ROKNRC

At the juncture of the indefinite suspension even of the working-level meetings designed to discuss the issue of resuming the full-dress meetings of the south-north Red Cross talks, the Republic of Korea National Red Cross urged the north Korean Red Cross at every opportunity to regain reason and return to the forum of talks in the conviction that the ardent wish of the 10 million dispersed family members should be met by all means. Among such ROKNRC calls for the resumption of the South-North Red Cross Conference were:

- 1) Statement by the ROKNRC president on the occasion of the sixth anniversary of the proposal for the south-north Red Cross talks (August 12, 1977): It was urged that the north Korean Red Cross agree to the early normalization of the Red Cross talks based on brotherly love and the Red Cross

humanitarian spirit.

- 2) Statement by the ROKNRC president on the occasion of the seventh anniversary of the proposal for the south-north Red Cross talks (August 12, 1978): It was proposed that a meeting of the presidents of the two Red Cross societies be held at Panmunjom, Seoul, Pyongyang or any other place of mutual agreement to discuss the issue of normalizing the suspended Red Cross talks.
- 3) Statement by the ROKNRC president on the occasion of the eighth anniversary of the proposal for the south-north Red Cross talks (August 11, 1979): It was proposed that the 26th working-level meeting be held at Panmunjom on September 20, 1979 to discuss the issue of normalizing the Red Cross talks, and that the severed direct Red Cross telephone line be restored and the operation of the Panmunjom Liaison Offices be normalized effective 10 a.m. September 1, 1979.

The north Korean Red Cross, however, has ignored all of these ROKNRC proposals, turning its back on the separated families' wish for family reunion and the aspirations of the whole people for peaceful unification of the fatherland.

Notwithstanding, the position of the Republic of Korea National Red Cross maintains a consistent policy, that is, to foster an atmosphere for mutual understanding and trust between the two sides of divided Korea through the solution of the dispersed family issue based on brotherly love and the Red Cross humanitarian spirit, and, on this basis, restore the lost homogeneity of the people and further realize reunity and unification of the nation.

The humanitarian efforts of the Republic of Korea National Red Cross intent on materializing the family search campaign will be carried on until the project yields full fruition.

Published on October 30, 1979

International Cultural Society of Korea

I.P.O. Box 4161

Seoul, Korea

No. 023
July 1980

South-North Dialogue in Korea

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Part I

Initiation of South-North Working-Level Contacts

1. Initiation of Contacts

a. Exchange of Messages Concerning Moscow Olympics

On December 20, 1979, north Korea proposed to form a "single national sports delegation" between south and north Korea for the 22nd Olympiad slated for July 1980 in Moscow. In a message broadcast over Radio Pyongyang, north Korea suggested that a meeting of south and north Korean sports representatives be held in either Pyongyang or Seoul on January 17, 1980 to discuss the question of forming a single team. The message was signed by Kim Yu-soon, chairman of the north Korean Olympic Committee and concurrent chairman of the north Korean Sports Guidance Committee.

Asked about the north Korean offer, Park Chong-kyu, then president of the Republic of Korea Amateur Sports Association (KASA), stated on December 24, "We have yet to receive the north Korean message. The official stand of the Republic of Korea Olympic Committee will be announced upon receipt and study of the message."

At noon on December 26, north Korea, in a radio broadcast, unilaterally notified the south that it would send two messengers to the conference room of the Neutral Nation's Supervisory Commission at Panmunjom at 12 noon on December 27 to deliver the message, since, it said, "South Korea insists that it has not received our message." The notification was made in a statement by the spokesman of the north Korean Olympic Committee and the north Korean Sports Guidance Committee.

The Seoul side of the South-North Coordinating Committee, acting for KASA, received the message at Panmunjom for delivery to the sports association.

The Republic of Korea Amateur Sports Association, having studied the message from north Korea, forwarded a reply to Pyongyang at 12 noon on January 11, 1980 at Panmunjom through the liaison officers of the South-North Coordinating Committee.

In the message, KASA president Park said, "I came to the conclusion that, without first building up considerable mutual trust and acquiring experience in sports exchanges with each other, it is difficult to conceive the realization of forming a single Olympic team between the two zones of Korea." He added that he believed it impossible, in terms of available time and the technical problems involved, to expect any successful outcome from a meeting between the sports representatives of the south and the north Korea to organize a single team for the forthcoming Moscow Olympic Games.

In turning down the north Korean suggestion, the KASA president also said, "I cannot but recall the unfortunate event that your side, taking advantage of the meetings between the sportsmen of the south and the north of Korea to form a single team for the 35th World Table Tennis Championships, held in Pyongyang in May last year, blocked our team's participation in the Championships, only adding to the mistrust between the two sides."

Noting that KASA maintains the position that overall sports exchanges should be realized between the two parts of Korea for the purpose of developing mutual confidence, Park said he sincerely hopes that, if the Pyongyang side concurs, the two sides would hold goodwill matches in any sports event mutually agreed on in Seoul and Pyongyang at any time this year.

The KASA president then suggested that sports representatives of the two sides of Korea hold a meeting to discuss overall matters relating to sports exchanges at a place to be agreed on by both sides after the Olympic Games in July.

After receiving this message from KASA, north Korea sent its second message to the south, in which the north Koreans, distorting and denouncing the KASA message, one-sidedly notified KASA that a meeting of sports representatives should be held at the conference room of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission on February 1 to discuss the question of forming a single team for the Moscow Olympics.

In the renewed offer, however, north Korea set forth only the date and place of the suggested meeting, failing to produce such

detailed matters as time of the meeting, scope of representation, or procedural items.

On January 29 KASA sent a reply to the second message from the north Korean Olympic Committee, in which it reaffirmed that "with the Moscow Olympics only six months away, it is certainly impractical to bring up the question of forming a single unified Korean team." The KASA message also urged north Korea to desist from putting up impractical and unreasonable arguments any longer and, instead, first to respond affirmatively to proposals for facilitating sports exchanges between the south and the north of Korea, thereby contributing to the promotion of mutual trust and the restoration of national homogeneity.

b. Attempt by North Korea to Anomalously Reopen Direct Telephone Line

At 4 p.m. on January 11, 1980, four hours after KASA sent its reply to the first message from the north Korean Olympic Committee through the liaison officers of the Seoul side of the South-North Coordinating Committee, north Korea, in a statement of the north Korean Central News Agency broadcast over Radio Pyongyang, one-sidedly announced it would "reopen the direct south-north telephone line effective 6 p.m. on January 11," contending unfoundedly that "though Pyongyang called Seoul repeatedly over the direct line, no conversation could be held due to Seoul's refusal to answer."

As is well known, north Korea unilaterally severed the direct telephone line between south and north on August 30, 1976 in the wake of the notorious "Panmunjom ax-murder" of American military personnel in the DMZ committed on August 18. Ever since, the SNCC Seoul side and the ROKNRC have time and again called for reopening of the direct telephone line and the Panmunjom Liaison Offices as well as resumption of the suspended inter-Korean dialogue. But north Korea has rejected all these efforts of the south to resume inter-Korean contacts.

In response to Pyongyang's January 11 radio message, both the SNCC Seoul side and ROKNRC waited for any call from the north beginning at 6 p.m. the same day over the four circuits of the direct line (one at SNCC, two at Red Cross societies and one between maintenance offices) installed and supposed to be operated pursuant to the provisions of the "Agreement on Installation and Operation of South-North Direct Telephone Line" and the "Agreed Minute on Procedure of Operation of Direct Telephone Line Between Central Offices of South and North Red Cross Societies."

A north Korean call came over the line at the SNCC at 8:07 p.m., well after the 6 p.m. schedule they had announced, and even after 8 p.m. when the day's operation of the direct line is supposed to end under the agreement.

When an official at the SNCC Seoul side answered the call, the north Korean caller, introducing himself as an official of the "Peaceful Unification Committee," asked the Seoul side man to write down what he would state.

The SNCC Seoul side official, pointing out that the line over which the conversation was held was the one installed at the SNCC, and that the line could be used only by those designated SNCC persons under the "Agreement on Installation and Operation of South-North Direct Telephone Line," demanded that the northern caller be replaced by a duly authorized person. The north Korean caller refused to do so and abruptly hung up at 8:12 p.m.

The January 11 assertion of north Korea that "... Pyongyang called Seoul repeatedly over the direct line but Seoul refused to answer," was totally unfounded.

During the whole period of inoperation of the direct line, both the SNCC Seoul side and ROKNRC sent designated test signals to the north every morning, which had gone unanswered, of course, while standing by ready around the clock to receive any calls from Pyongyang. The Seoul side maintains tape monitoring of the operation of the direct line, which expressly shows that the north Koreans at no time made any call over the line from the time they severed contact in August 1976 until they made the call at 8:07 p.m.

January 11, 1980.

A telephone call between the south and the north of Korea was thus made for the first time after three years and six months of silence. But the telephone call failed to lead to overall resumption of the direct telephone line, due to the attempt of the north to reopen it anomalously. The content of the January 11 telephone conversation was as follows:

The north: Is it Seoul? This is Pyongyang.

The south: This is Seoul. Who is calling, please?

The north: This is an officer of the Peaceful Unification Committee.

The south: Why does an official of the Peaceful Unification Committee use this telephone of the South-North Coordinating Committee?

The north: I have been delegated... Write down, please.

The south: Delegated by whom, the South-North Coordinating Committee?

The north: You will know when you take it.

The south: I shall take it down if it is made in the name of the Coordinating Committee.

The north: I will read it. Listen, please.

The south: Please state that you represent the South-North Coordinating Committee.

The north: (terminates the call)

c. North Korean "Letters" to the South

At 11:15 p.m. January 11, 1980, barely three hours after it made the anomalous telephone call, north Korea, in a statement signed by the north Korean Central News Agency, announced that it would send two messengers to the conference room of the Neutral Nations' Supervisory Commission at Panmunjom at 2 p.m. January 12 in order to deliver to the south letters containing an "important proposal related to national unification."

The SNCC Seoul side, pointing out that the north Korean radio message did not specify who signed the letters and who the addresses were, demanded at 11 a.m. on January 12 that north Korea clarify this first. Around 1 p.m. the same day, north Korea clarified it by radio as demanded, and the SNCC Seoul side sent two messengers to Panmunjom at 2 p.m. and received the letters.

SNCC Seoul side spokesman Lee Dong-bok announced at 11 a.m. on January 14 the receipt of the north Korean letters, saying that they included a letter to the then Prime Minister Shin Hyonhwack from Lee Jong-ok, north Korea's premier, and 11 other letters to political and other figures in the south, which were signed by Kim Il, north Korea's vice president and concurrently secretary of the Workers' (Communist) Party and chairman of the Committee for Peaceful Unification of the Fatherland.

In the letter to Prime Minister Shin, north Korea for the first time used his official title, "Prime Minister of the Republic of Korea." The 11 other addresses were Lee Hui-sung, Army Chief of Staff; Kim Jong-pil, then president of the Democratic Republican Party; Chung Il-kwon, consultant to the president of the Democratic Republican Party; Kim Young-sam, president of the New Democratic Party; Yang Il-dong, president of the Democratic Unification Party; Kim Chol, consultant to the United Socialist Party; Ahn Pil-soo, chairman of the United Socialist Party; and Yun Po-sun, Ham Suk-hon and Kim Dae-jung, co-chairman of the National Alliance for Democracy and National Unification.

The gist of the letter from north Korean premier Lee Jong-ok to Prime Minister Shin was as follows:

"... The authorities of the north and the south should naturally enhance national self-awakening and find a national outlet by realizing unification through collaboration and unity between our Korean people. Of course, there is a difference in systems and ideologies between the north and the south, and it is not that we are without any misunderstanding and distrust.

However, I believe that we should resume a dialogue be-

tween our two sides and pave the way to independent peaceful unification regardless of the difference and by-gones.

Should our dialogue resume, we are willing to hold north-south authorities' meetings along with a broad political conference we have already proposed, and further to promote even a high-level authorities' meeting.

It is in this context that I propose to meet you in person and exchange opinions openheartedly.

The sooner our contact takes place, the better it will be. The venue may well be Panmunjom or Pyongyang-Seoul. A third country will also be acceptable..."

Other letters invariably contained such phrases as "the south and the north should promote collaboration and unity, and expedite efforts for unification," "authorities' talks may be held along with a south-north political conference," "let us meet directly and exchange views openheartedly," and "the venue may well be Panmunjom, Pyongyang or Seoul. A third country will also be acceptable."

Depending on addresses, the expression and contents of their offer for "political conferences" and "talks between authorities" differed. In the letters to Prime Minister Shin, Kim Jong-pil, Chung Il-kwon, Ahn Pil-soo, Kim Su-hwan, Yun Po-sun, Ham Suk-hon and Kim Dae-jung, the north Koreans used the term "political conference." In the letter to Kim Young-sam, they described it as "a broad dialogue and, further, bilateral and multilateral contacts and negotiations between political parties, social organizations, and authorities," while they used the phrase "nationwide dialogue" in the letters to Yang Il-dong and Kim Chol.

In the use of terms of addresses, too, they employed a different approach. Whereas they used various rhetorical modifiers for those in the opposition camp, they did not use them for the addresses in the government camp. (See the following table)

In the meantime, north Korean radio broadcasts reported on January 22 that Pyongyang had sent letters to some Korean residents in the United States and other foreign countries on January 15.

The radio broadcasts said the letters, signed by Kim Il, north Korea's vice president and concurrently secretary of the Central Committee of the Workers' (Communist) Party and chairman of the Committee for Peaceful Unification of the Fatherland, were sent to a total of ten Koreans in the U.S., Japan and West Germany. They were Chang Chong-myong, president of the pro-Seoul Korean Residents' Association in Japan (*Mindan*), Im Chang-young, Kim Chae-jun, Choi Tuck-shin, Kim Chae-hwa, Yun I-sang, Choi Hong-hui, Kim Sung-rak, Lee Sang-chol and Lee Yong-jae. The letters, the radio broadcasts said, proposed that "they exchange opinions on various issues to pave the way to dialogue and unification."

This "epistolary offensive" by north Korea was aimed, of course, at propaganda effect, as was the case with its previous "barrage of letters" staged at the time when the so-called Democratic Front for Unification of the Fatherland proposed a "whole-nation conference" in response to the January 19, 1979 Republic of Korea proposal for a meeting between responsible authorities.

Considering the fact that all of the oversea recipients, with the single exception of Chang Chong-myung, Mindan chairman, have been engaged anti-Seoul activities, it was crystal clear that the north Koreans' fresh offensive for dialogue in the form of a prime ministers' contact was by no means intended for a productive dialogue.

-- Comparison and Analysis of North Korean Letters --

Classification Addresses	Honerific rhetoric	Description of offer	Other contents
Shin Hyon- hwack (ROK Prime Minister)	None	Along with the wide- ranging political con- ference we have al- ready offered, we can hold a meeting be- tween authorities, and and are willing to pro-	The authorities of the north and the south naturally enhance national self-awaken- ing and find a na- tional way out by realizing unification

		mote high-level authorities' talks.	through collaboration and unity between our same people.
Lee Hui-sung (Army Chief of Staff)	... Who is on important duty in the military.		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • If we fight with guns between the same people... • To dispel tensions and the danger of war between the south and the north
Kim Jong-pil (President of Democratic Republican Party)	None	If it is conducive to independent peaceful unification of the country, we think we can hold a meeting between authorities along with a wide-ranging south-north political conference we have already proposed, and are willing to promote high-level authorities' meeting.	
Chung Il-kwon (Consultant to President of Democratic Republican Party)	None	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • We hope the door to a dialogue for unification will open. • We can have a wide-ranging south-north political conference we have already proposed, and, at the same time, can hold a meeting between authorities. 	
Kim Young-sam	... Who is in the forefront for	As a nation-saving step intended to realize the	We sincerely hope that an instructive

<p>(President of New Democratic Party)</p>	<p>the restoration of democracy.</p>	<p>task of unification, we can have a wide-ranging dialogue among political parties and social organizations in the south and the north, and believe we can realize bilateral or multi-lateral contacts and negotiations between political parties, social organizations and authorities.</p>	<p>meeting that can chart ideas for peaceful unification will be realized.</p>
<p>Yang Il-dong (President of Democratic Unification Party)</p>	<p>... Who, as a prominent figure in the political circles of south Korea, has had varied experience.</p>	<p>As for dialogue for unification, such a dialogue, as we have already suggested many times and on which you have expressed your clear view, should be a wide-ranging nationwide one which can be attended not only by authorities but also by all the political parties, social organizations and individuals from various walks of life. If necessary, a meeting between authorities can also be held at the same time.</p>	<p>We hope that a significant meeting will be held by all means to discuss important issues of the nation.</p>
<p>Kim Chol (Consultant to United Socialist Party)</p>	<p>... Who has been steadily for the development of democracy in south Korea.</p>	<p>The dialogue should be a nationwide one attended not only by authorities but also by political parties and social organizations in</p>	<p>We hope that a significant meeting with you will be held without fail to discuss important affairs of the nation.</p>

		the south and the north. If necessary, a meeting between authorities can also be held simultaneously.	
Ahn Pil-soo (Chairman of United Socialist Party)	... Who has been working in the political circles of south Korea for a long time.	We believe we can have a wide-ranging political conference among various parties and factions, and all strata and layers as we have already proposed and as you, too, have called for. At the same time, we are willing to have a meeting between authorities at the same time.	
Kim Su-hwan (Chairman of Central Council of Korean Catholicism)	... Who is concerned about unfortunate sufferings of the nation.	We believe we can hold a wide-ranging political conference among political parties and social organizations in the south and the north, and are willing to have a meeting between authorities at the same time.	Achieving of peaceful unification is the highest love and humanism.
Yun Po-sun (Co-chairman of National Alliance for Democracy and National Unification)	... Who, enjoying a green old age, engages in patriotic activities vigorously.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • If the north and the south were to collaborate and unite with each other, they should open the door to a dialogue at an early date and exchange opinions openheartedly. 	

		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • If and when such a dialogue is realized, we can have a wide-ranging political conference between all the political parties, social organizations and individuals from various strata and layers in the north and the south. We believe we can also hold a meeting between authorities. 	
Ham Suk-hon (Co-chairman of National Alliance for Democracy and National Unification)	... Who is working as a leading figure in the opposition camp.	We can hold a wide-ranging south-north political conference, and, at the same time, a meeting between authorities.	
Kim Dae-jung (Co-chairman of National Alliance for Democracy and National Unification)	... Who has been striving for the democratic development of south Korean society.	If it serves for independent peaceful unification of the country, we can convene a wide-ranging south-north political conference attended by political parties, social organizations and authorities, and, at the same time, a meeting between authorities.	

d. Start of Working-Level Contacts and Formation of Delegations

1) Exchange of Messages Between Prime Ministers of South and North Korea

In his New Year Press Conference held on January 18 this year, President Choi Kyu-hah stated that the government would review in a positive manner the message from north Korea's Lee Jong-ok over the issue of a dialogue between the prime ministers of the south and the north. The President said:

"... North Korea has sent us a letter suggesting a meeting of the prime ministers of south and north Korea.

"Hopefully, we can interpret this as the first comparatively positive response from the north toward our ceaseless efforts to pursue dialogue between responsible authorities of south and north Korea.

"I wish to clarify that I have instructed the relevant offices to examine positively the possibility of dialogue between the prime ministers of south and north Korea. I believe that accordingly our government's position on this matter will be communicated to north Korea in the near future."

Following these remarks of President Choi, the Seoul side of the South-North Coordinating Committee, acting on authorization, forwarded Prime Minister Shin's reply to the January 12 message from Lee Jong-ok, north Korea's premier, to north Korea through SNCC liaison officers at Panmunjom at 10 a.m. on January 24, 1980.

Prime Minister Shin proposed in his reply that the first of a series of working-level contacts to work on procedures necessary for the proposed prime ministers' meeting be held at the Freedom House at Panmunjom or any other place mutually agreed on at 10 a.m., February 6, 1980. The Prime Minister suggested that each side's working-level delegation be formed of three working-level officials, including a vice minister-level chief of delegate and several atten-

dants.

In the reply, Prime Minister Shin called the north Korean premier by his official title. Commenting on this, SNCC Seoul-side spokesman Lee Dong-bok said, "Our Prime Minister used the official title of the north Korean official on the principle of reciprocity after the north Korean premier called Prime Minister Shin by his official title in his January 11 message. The use of the official title does not carry any other legal or political implication." The text of Prime Minister Shin's reply was as follows:

I received your letter dated 12 January 1980.

I believe it is indeed our historic mission that all Koreans must prevent the recurrence of war and consolidate peace in the fatherland in order to achieve peaceful unification of the country.

As our past experiences tell us, I think peaceful unification cannot be achieved by slogans alone, but can be realized only through the accomplishments steadily achieved as a result of practical and substantive measures to lay the groundwork for peaceful unification.

Therefore, we have urged all along that the two sides, transcending differences of ideologies and systems, must first build up mutual understanding and trust by opening the way for humanitarian reunion of the 10 million separated family members, as well as realizing a wide range of south-north exchanges and cooperation in economic, social, cultural and sports fields. We have also proposed, over and over again, to hold a meeting between responsible authorities of the south and the north of Korea.

In keeping with our consistent position, I hope that the prime ministers of south and north Korea will meet in person as soon as possible.

To arrange all the necessary procedures for a meeting of the prime ministers of both sides, I propose to you that a preparatory meeting between working-level representatives of the two sides be held as follows:

1. Delegation: Three delegates headed by vice-ministerial level representative and a few assistants respectively.
2. Venue: "Freedom House" in Panmunjom or a place to be agreed on by both sides.

3. Date and Time: 10:00 hours, Wednesday, February 6, 1980.

I look forward to receiving your affirmative response to my proposal as stated above.

In a press report by the north Korean Central News Agency on January 29, 1980, north Korea announced that it would send its second message to south Korea on January 30 in response to Prime Minister Shin's proposal for working-level contacts to prepare for the procedures of the prime ministers' talks.

In the second message, north Korea's Lee Jong-ok said he agreed with Prime Minister Shin's suggestion that a working-level delegates' contact be held at Panmunjom at 10 a.m. on February 6. The message also said north Korea would send a three-man working-level delegation headed by a 'deputy director of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party and concurrent councilor of the State Council,' plus two technical personnel, to Panmunjom at 10 a.m. on February 6, proposing that the venue of the meeting be the conference room of the Neutral Nations' Supervisory Commission. The north Koreans thus agreed to working-level contacts substantially as suggested by the Republic of Korea.

2) Formation of Working-Level Delegations

Lee Dong-bok, spokesman for the Seoul side of the South-North Coordinating Committee, announced on February 4: "Since north Korea has agreed to the proposal made by Republic of Korea Prime Minister Shin Hyon-hwack in his January 24 letter to north Korea's State Council premier Lee Jong-ok that a contact between the working-level delegates of the two sides be held in Panmunjom at 10 a.m. on February 6 to discuss procedural matters necessary for a meeting between the prime ministers of the south and the north, our side will send three working-level delegates with a vice minister-level officer acting as chief delegate and two attendants to the conference room of the Neutral Nations' Supervisory Commission at 10 a.m. on February 6, 1980."

Disclosing that "our working-level delegates will carry credentials signed by Prime Minister Shin Hyon-hwack," Spokesman Lee said, "we expect that north Korean working-level delegates would also carry credentials signed by north Korea's State Council Premier Lee Jong-ok."

The proposed exchange of credentials between working-level delegates was the third of its kind ever made between the south and the north of Korea. The first exchange was between working-level officials meeting to work out the South-North Joint Communiqué of July 4, 1972. The Seoul and Pyongyang sides exchanged credentials signed respectively by Lee Hu-rak, then director of the Central Intelligence Agency, and Kim Young-joo, then director of Organization and Guidance Department of the Workers' Party. The second exchange took place at the South-North Red Cross Conference, where Seoul-side delegate Chung Hong-jin and Pyongyang-side delegate Kim Tuk-hyun exchanged credentials signed by ROKNRC President Choi Doo-sun and NKRC Central Committee chairman Son Sung-pil, respectively.

In the meantime, the south and the north formed working-level delegations to attend the first working-level contact slated for February 6, and made public the lists of delegates on February 5.

The three working-level delegates of the Republic of Korea as announced by the SNCC Seoul-side spokesman at 10 a.m. February 5 were as follows:

Chief Delegate:	Kim Young-choo , an ambassador of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Delegate:	Chung Chong-shik , director of the Office of Policy Planning, National Unification Board
Delegate:	Lee Dong-bok , director of the South-North Conference Secretariat

The list of the north Korean delegates as announced by the north Korean Central News Agency at 1 p.m. on February 5, 1980 was as follows:

- Chief Delegate:** **Hyon Chun-guk**, deputy director of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party and concurrently councilor of the State Council.
- Delegate:** **Paek Chun-hyok**, bureau director of the State Council
- Delegate:** **Yim Chun-gil**, bureau director of the State Council

The two sides also announced that their delegates would be accompanied by two attendants each. The stage was thus set for south-north working-level contacts for the proposed meeting between the prime ministers of the south and the north, with the first contact slated for 10 a.m. on February 6, 1980.

2. Position of Republic of Korea toward South-North Prime Ministers' Talks

The south and the north of Korea have agreed to hold a meeting of high-level authorities — prime ministers — and have undertaken working-level contacts to prepare for the proposed conference.

The new inter-Korean contact was initiated superficially by the January 11 message of north Korea's premier Lee Jong-ok to the Prime Minister of the Republic of Korea, in which Lee offered a contact between the prime ministers of the south and the north.

Earlier, on January 19, 1979, however, the Republic of Korea, in the late President Park Chung Hee's New Year press conference, proposed a dialogue between the responsible authorities of the south and the north at any time, and place and at any level. President Park stated in the press conference:

"... I call upon north Korea to come to the dialogue table at any place, at any time and at any level, with an open mind and without any preconditions, to discuss with us all problems pending between the two sides — ways to prevent fratricidal war on the Korean peninsula, to assure prosperity for all our 50 million people, and to achieve peaceful unification."

North Korea's offer for a meeting between the prime ministers of the two sides can be taken as its *de facto* acceptance of this January 19 proposal of the Republic of Korea. The north Koreans, who had in the past rejected any dialogue with the south in their insistence on a "political conference" and "whole-nation meeting," made an aboutface and suggested the prime ministers' talks in circumstance, in which the Republic of Korea had kept the door to dialogue wide open.

In line with its consistent policy to forestall the recurrence of war on the Korean peninsula, pursue prosperity for the 50 million people and realize peaceful unification by actively promoting the resumption of inter-Korean dialogue, the Republic of Korea decided to hold a meeting between high-level authorities of the two sides on a level suggested by north Korea, a decision linked in spirit to the January 19 proposal.

The Republic of Korea's basic position toward the proposed prime ministers' talks was clearly made known in the January 24 message of Prime Minister Shin to north Korea, in which the Prime Minister said, "As our past experience tell us, I think peaceful unification cannot be achieved by slogans alone, but can be achieved only through accomplishments steadily achieved as a result of practical and substantive measures to lay the groundwork for peaceful unification." He stressed that "it is our historic mission that all Koreans must prevent the recurrence of war and consolidate peace in the fatherland in order to achieve peaceful unification of the country."

Judging from experience in the past dialogue and the stern reality of national division, it becomes self-evident that the key to a constructive and productive dialogue between the two sides of Korea is the restoration of mutual trust.

Today the rightful sequence for an effective inter-Korean dialogue must be to hold a meeting between the responsible authorities in the first place and then to widen the scope of participation as an atmosphere of mutual trust is fostered in the process of such contact.

In this context, it is imperative that the proposed prime ministers' talks become a fruitful opportunity yielding constructive and productive results without being exploited for propaganda.

The Republic of Korea position is that all issues pending between the two sides should be discussed open once meetings between the responsible authorities of the two sides are realized. North Korea should rectify the unjust attitude it showed in the past and come to the table of the inter-Korean dialogue with more sincerity, if only to meet the wishes of the 50 million people.

Part II

Progress of South-North Working-Level Contacts

1. First Contact

The first working-level contact designed to discuss concrete procedural matters for the proposed meeting between the prime ministers of the south and the north opened at 10 a.m. on February 6, 1980 at the conference room of the Neutral Nations' Supervisory Commission at Panmunjom.

The contact, which lasted one hour and 12 minutes, was attended from the ROK side by three delegates — Chief delegate Kim Young-choo, ambassador of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Chung Chong-shik, director of the Office of Policy Planning, National Unification Board, and Lee Dong-bok, director of the South-North Conference Secretariat — and two attendants. Attending from the north Korean side were three delegates — Hyon Chun-guk, chief delegate and deputy director of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party, and concurrently councilor of the State Council; and Paek Chun-hyok and Yim Chun-gil, both bureau directors of the State Council — and two technical personnel.

The two delegations exchanged credentials signed by each side's prime minister before opening discussions.

The Republic of Korea working-level delegation, first taking up the issue of the rules of procedure for working-level contacts, proposed that 1) the working-level contacts be held behind closed doors in order to ensure effective progress of the contacts, 2) starting from the second contact, the working-level contacts be held alternately at the Freedom House and Panmungak, and 3) designated delegates, one from each delegation, discuss the question of using the existing direct south-north telephone line, with a view to facilitating the convenience of their mutual liaison.

In its counter-proposal, the north Korean delegation suggested that the day's meeting be opened to reporters, and that the two sides discuss and determine the time of the next contact. The north Koreans said the issue of venue did not pose any problem. They agreed, however, to discuss the question of using the direct

telephone line.

The ROK delegation designated Lee Dong-bok, a delegate, to discuss the proposed use of the telephone line. The north Korean delegation named Yim Chun-gil as Lee's counterpart.

Elucidating its basic stand toward the working-level contacts, the ROK delegation expressed the hope that the contacts would become a first step toward resumption of the long-suspended south-north dialogue, with a view to consolidating the road toward peaceful unification of the divided country.

Stressing that unification can be realized only when the two sides take substantial and realistic measures step by step, the ROK delegation said that if and when the proposed prime ministers' talks materialize through the working-level contacts, it would surely contribute toward the improvement of inter-Korean relations and eventually peaceful unification. The ROK delegation then proposed procedural matters necessary for a meeting between the south and north prime ministers as follows:

**Proposal of Republic of Korea Working-Level
Delegation for Procedural Matters of South-North
Prime Ministers' Meeting**

The Republic of Korea working-level delegation proposes the following procedural matters for the proposed meeting between the prime ministers of the south and the north of Korea with a view to realizing the prime ministers' talks effectively at an early date.

a. Time of the Meeting

The time of the meeting between the prime ministers shall be decided after the two sides arrive at an agreement on the rest of the procedural matters.

b. Venue of the Meeting

The proposed meeting between the prime ministers shall be held

in Geneva, Switzerland.

c. Agenda of the Meeting

The agenda of the meeting between the prime ministers shall be agreed on, in principle, at the current working-level contacts.

d. Composition of the Delegations

The prime ministers shall be accompanied, respectively, by two assistants of ministerial and/or vice ministerial ranks and two assistants of the rank of assistant minister and/or bureau director, in addition to a few staff members for documentation, communication, liaison and information.

e. Arrangements inside the Conference Room

The two sides shall not use any special markings inside the conference room except the name-plates of those participating in the meeting from the two sides.

f. Documentation

Documentation of the meeting shall be made respectively by the two sides, with stenographers and tape-recorders allowed to be employed.

g. Agreements

The two sides shall respectively prepare agreements in duplicate in Korean and shall exchange one of the respective duplicate copies upon signature.

h. Sessions

The meeting between the prime ministers shall be held behind closed doors.

i. Press Briefings

The two sides shall conduct respective press briefings, unless the two sides agree on a joint press briefing.

The north Koreans let it be seen that their ulterior intention was to realize a "south-north political conference" which north Korea proposed in Lee Jong-ok's letter of January 12, when they argued, "The proposed prime ministers' contact should be realized as part of multilateral contacts between politicians of the south and the north." This scheme of north Korea has inevitably led to a wide discrepancy between the two sides in the definition of the nature of the contact from the beginning.

At the contact, the north Korean delegation made the following seven-point proposal in connection with the procedural matters of the prime ministers' meeting:

1) The venue of the meeting of the prime ministers shall be Seoul and Pyongyang by turn;

2) Those who accompanying the prime ministers shall be 60 persons, including 30 assistants, specialists and technical personnel, and other 30 pressmen;

3) The personal security of the delegates and accompanying members shall be guaranteed through the exchange of memoranda at the time of each contact;

4) The contact shall be flexible in style. It may be opened to the public or held behind closed doors depending on need at each session;

5) In the light of past conference experience, press briefings shall be made simultaneously upon the preparation of a documented agreement;

6) The duration of stay of a delegation in the other side's area shall be four to five days. The host side shall be responsible for the personnel of the other side; and

7) It would be reasonable and realistic to determine these pro-

cedural matters at this working-level contact so as to realize the prime ministers' contact at an early date.

Meanwhile, under an agreement between the two working-level delegations, Lee Dong-bok, a ROK delegate, and Yim Chun-gil, one of the north Korean delegates, had a closed-door discussion of the issue of reopening the direct south-north telephone line from 11:30 to 11:55 a.m. the same day at the Panmunjom conference room. They agreed to reopen the direct telephone line effective 10 a.m. on February 7. They also discussed procedural matters of the working-level contacts, such as how to reach the alternate sites of the working-level contacts — Freedom House and Panmungak. The matters agreed on at the first working-level contact were as follows:

1) Procedural Matters of Working-Level Contacts

— *Whether to open meetings:*

The first contact is to be open to the public. The question of whether to open subsequent contacts shall be determined through mutual consultation.

— *Venue:*

The first contact is to be held at the conference room of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission. Subsequent contacts shall be held at the Freedom House and Panmungak by turn, with the second contact to be held at Panmungak.

— *Discussion of reopening of direct telephone line:*

Lee Dong-bok, a ROK delegate, and Yim Chun-gil, a north Korean delegate, shall be delegated the power to proceed with working-level discussion.

2) Second Working-Level Contact

Second working-level contact shall be held at 10 a.m. on February 19, 1980 at Panmungak.

3) Operation of Direct South-North Telephone Line

— *Time of reopening:*

The 11th and 12th circuits shall be opened effective 10 a.m. on February 7, 1980.

— *Time of operation:*

From 10 a.m. to 8 p.m. every day except for Sundays, Saturday afternoon, and the official holidays of the two sides.

— *Telephone callers:*

Working-level representatives and their attendants.

4) Procedural Matters of Working-Level Contacts Including Method of Reaching Alternate Conference Sites of Freedom House and Panmungak.

— *Method of shuttle:*

By walking.

— *Recording:*

The host side shall provide tape recording lines.

— *Use of Telephone*

For liaison purpose, telephone shall be used from 9 a.m. until the time of the return of the delegation on the day of a contact.

— *Press corps:*

There will be no restriction on the number of pressmen allowed to cover the contacts.

2. Second Contact

The second working-level contact was held at 10 a.m. February 19, 1980 at Panmungak in the northern sector of Panmunjom as agreed at the first contact. The closed-door session at the second-floor conference room of Panmungak lasted two hours and 30 minutes. It was the first south-north contact ever held at Panmungak in the four years and eleven months since the tenth vice chairmen's meeting of the South-North Coordinating Committee was held there on March 14, 1975.

At this contact, the two sides, discussing matters brought up at the first contact, could reach an agreement only on rather trivial items such as the issues of whether to open the prime ministers'

meeting, preparing documentation of agreement, press coverage, etc. The two sides, however, showed a wide discrepancy over the questions of the venue of, and agenda topics for, the proposed meeting, the most important of the procedural matters. They decided to continue discussing them at the following contact.

Discussing the issue of venue, the ROK delegation said: "We do not mean we are dead opposed to some of the proposed sites being talked about, or are sticking to some others." It stated that "because north Korea suggested in its January 11 letter that the proposed meeting may be held 'either at Panmunjom or Pyongyang-Seoul, and even a third country would be acceptable,' the ROK delegation has simply chosen a third country from among the several alternatives," reminding the north Koreans that "it was not our side that first offered a third country as the venue." The ROK delegation stressed that the place of the meeting should be a third country, inasmuch as it was one of the alternatives offered originally by north Korea.

The ROK delegation further said "our preference for Geneva does not necessarily mean that the venue should always be Geneva. We simply offered Geneva in view of various favorable conditions of the city for international conferences." It then showed flexibility, suggesting "the question of which third country should be the site can be solved through mutual discussion."

Rejecting, however, the ROK delegation's choice of a third country, north Korea showed a somewhat ambiguous posture when it insisted that in its January 11 message it suggested a third country only as a possible alternative under "unavoidable circumstances."

As for the issue of agenda, the ROK working-level delegation maintained that "the agenda for the prime ministers' talks should be arranged beforehand so that the prime ministers could discuss substantial matters when they meet," whereas the north Koreans argued that there was no need to "restrict the scope and contents of the discussion of the prime ministers by determining in advance the topics for their meeting."

At the February 19 contact, the north Korean delegation sug-

gested that the prime ministers would be each accompanied by four to five minister-, vice minister- or bureau director-level officials instead of 30 attendants, as it had proposed at the first contact. This issue was shelved for the time being at the urging of the ROK delegation, which maintained that since the issue of the number of attendants was raised by north Korea on the assumption of Seoul-Pyongyang shuttle talks, the question had better be debated and settled once the venue of the meeting was agreed on.

Emerging from the second contact, Lee Dong-bok, a ROK delegate, made public as follows a six-point agreement related to procedural matters for the prime ministers' meeting:

1) Whether to Open Meeting

Whether to open the meeting or not will be determined at the time of each meeting.

2) Agreement

The two sides shall respectively prepare agreements in duplicate and exchange one of the duplicate copies upon signature.

3) Documentation

Documentation of the meeting shall be made at each side's convenience, by means of stenography and/or tape- and/or video-taping.

4) Press Briefings

The two sides shall separately conduct press briefings in a way convenient to each side, unless the two sides agree on a joint press briefing.

5) Time of the Meeting

The time of the meeting shall be decided depending on progress in the working-level contacts.

6) Facilities and Markings

No markings shall be used in the conference room, except for the name plates of the prime ministers which shall be placed on the table.

Meanwhile, Lee Dong-bok, ROK delegate, strongly called on

the north Korean side at the second contact to see to it that the north Korean press covered the proposals advanced by the ROK delegation instead of reporting only those expressed by the north Korean side.

Noting that the inter-Korean dialogue, being the business of all the Korean people, is a question that should be attended to by all of the people in the south and the north, Lee said that "although the south Korean and Western press covered the views of both sides expressed at the first working-level contact, the north Korean press handled only the suggestions made by the north Korean delegation without reporting the views of our side." Lee said that seen from the context that the dialogue should be carried out in an efficient and productive manner, such biased press attitude of north Korea cannot but be a source of regret.

Before ending the second contact, the two sides agreed to hold the third working-level contact at 10 a.m. on March 4 at the Freedom House.

3. Third Contact

The third south and north Korean working-level contact was held on March 4 at the Freedom House at Panmunjom for three hours and 20 minutes beginning at 10 a.m. The third contact, where the two sides continued to discuss the issues of the venue of, and agenda for, the proposed prime ministers' talks, registered slight progress. North Korea, reversing its earlier stand that there need be no prior fixing of agenda topics, agreed to the suggestion of the Republic of Korea delegation that the agenda of the prime ministers' meeting be determined beforehand.

The two sides, however, failed to reach an agreement on the venue of the proposed meeting. But a clue to the solution of the issue could be found at the closing stage of the contact when the north Korean delegation, in a counterproposal, suggested Panmunjom as the site of the prime ministers' meeting. The ROK delegation said it would study the north Korean offer and make its stand known at the

fourth contact.

After the meeting, Lee Dong-bok, a ROK delegate, told a press conference, "The north Korean side proposed Panmunjom as the venue of the prime ministers' meeting. Strictly speaking, however, this is not a new proposal, but only a fresh attempt to seek a compromise over the question of venue." Lee said north Korea suggested that 1) the prime ministers of the south and the north should meet first at Panmunjom, 2) the prime ministers should have contacts at Panmungak and the Freedom House by turn, 3) the place of the first contact between the prime ministers should be Panmungak, and 4) after their first contact at Panmungak, the prime minister should meet in Seoul and Pyongyang alternately.

Meanwhile, during their chat before entering business discussion, the ROK delegation, reminding the north Koreans that the Republic of Korea National Red Cross had sent a radio message to the north Korean Red Cross on March 3 concerning the missing of the fishermen of two fishing boats, "Haewang-ho No. 6 and No. 7," on the western sea late last January, asked the north Korean delegation to render cooperation so that the missing fishermen, believed to have been taken away by north Korea, could be repatriated.

The two sides agreed to hold the fourth working-level contact at Panmungak in the northern sector of Panmunjom at 10 a.m. on March 18.

4. Fourth Contact

The fourth south-north working-level contact was held on March 18 at Panmunjom to prepare for the proposed meeting between the prime ministers of the south and the north. At the meeting, which lasted three hours and 20 minutes at Panmungak in the northern sector of the truce village, the two sides continued to discuss the two outstanding issues — questions of venue and agenda topics — among the procedural matters of the proposed conference.

At the fourth contact, the ROK delegation proposed the site of the prime ministers' talks as follows in the conviction that no delay

should be allowed in the progress of the working-level contacts merely because of the issue of venue.

- 1) The prime ministers of the south and the north shall meet alternately at the Freedom House and Panmungak in Panmunjom for the proposed meeting between them.

- 2) The prime ministers of the south and the north shall consult directly between themselves for agreement when either of the two suggests that the venue of their talks be moved from Panmunjom to another place.

In addition, the ROK delegation suggested that a decision on which of the two places, the Freedom House or Panmungak, should be the place for the first meeting between the two prime ministers, be reached later in conjunction with setting the date for the first such meeting.

The ROK delegation also made a proposal as follows with regard to the attendants of the prime ministers, personal security of the members of delegations, and provision of conveniences, issues which would inevitably arise should Panmunjom be chosen as the venue of the proposed meeting.

- 1) The prime ministers of the south and the north shall be accompanied to the conference table by four assistants for each — two with the rank of minister and/or vice minister and two with the rank of assistant vice minister and/or bureau director — in addition to a maximum of three attendants each.

- 2) There shall be no restrictions on the number of support personnel and correspondents admitted to the two divided sectors of the Joint Security Area of Panmunjom during the time of the prime ministers' talks, as they operate outside the conference room.

- 3) The prime ministers of the south and the north shall, in advance of their first meeting, exchange letters each signed by themselves respectively, guaranteeing the personal safety of

those persons attending for the purpose of supporting and covering the prime ministers' talks while they are in the other side's area.

4) The host side shall make sure that those persons from the guest side's area be properly guided and cared for while they are in the host side's area for the purpose of attending, supporting and covering the prime ministers' talks.

After studying the ideas advanced by both sides on the issue of venue, the two sides reached an agreement as given below on this question at the fourth contact.

1) The venue of the prime ministers' talks shall, by turn, be the Freedom House and Panmungak.

2) In the event either of the prime ministers wishes to change the venue, the two prime ministers shall consult about the matter.

Besides, the two sides agreed to discuss and settle the issue of which of the two — the Freedom House or Panmungak — should be the venue of the first round of prime ministers' talks at a time when they determine the time of the first meeting of the prime ministers.

As for other procedural matters incidental to the solution of the venue of the proposed meeting, the two sides first adopted two items of the four-point suggestion made by the ROK delegation. The two other items of the ROK proposal were also agreed on in principle. After the north Korean side suggested that some of the words in the two items need to be readjusted, the two sides decided to have Lee Dong-bok of the ROK delegation and Yim Chun-gil from the north Korean side meet and readjust the wording at an appropriate time.

Also at the fourth contact, the two sides offered their respective draft agendas of the proposed meeting.

Reminding the north Koreans that it stressed at the first contact that "unification cannot be achieved merely by unrealistic slogans or by one-sided propaganda rhetoric, but can be realized only when

the two sides first take realistic and practical steps, and gradually expand the scope of such steps, as a means to lay the foundation for peaceful unification," the ROK delegation emphasized that the agenda for the proposed meeting should be prepared in such a way as to insure substantial achievement. The ROK delegation then proposed a three-point draft agenda as follows for the prime ministers' meeting:

Item One: The Question of Fostering Mutual Trust between the South and the North of Korea.

A. The question of laying the foundation for promotion of mutual trust and understanding as well as restoration of national homogeneity between the south and the north of Korea through exchanges and cooperation between the two.

B. The question of implementing humanitarian measures aimed at easing the suffering and lessening the inconvenience of the people resulting from the division of the country.

Item Two: The Question of Establishing Peace on the Korean Peninsula.

Item Three: The Question of Peaceful Unification of the Fatherland.

North Korea, for its part, offered a single agendum titled "**Concerning the Expedition of Independent and Peaceful Unification of the Fatherland through Collaboration and Unity in All Areas of the South and the North,**" a topic which looked more like the general description of the objective of the meeting than an agendum.

Also at the March 18 contact, the ROK delegation, noting that the two sides referred to the proposed meeting by various different titles, suggested that they adopt and use a single uniform title for the meeting. The ROK delegation reasoned that it is awkward for the south and the north to use different titles such as "seeing," "contact"

or “dialogue,” and that a single title was needed even in the sense of making clear the nature of the meeting between high authorities such as prime ministers. The ROK delegation, then, proposed the title “Meeting between the Prime Ministers of the South and the North” for the proposed talks.

The north Korean side, which refers to the proposed meeting as “seeing” or “contact,” insisted that the meeting should be called whatever titles each side pleases under the principle of expediency, thereby rejecting the suggestion of the ROK delegation that the proposed meeting be called by the universally used title, “meeting,” to help facilitate sincere and substantial talks.

Before concluding the fourth contact, the two sides agreed to hold the fifth working-level contact at the Freedom House in the southern sector of Panmunjom at 10 a.m. on April 1.

5. Fifth Contact

The fifth working-level contact was held at the Freedom House at Panmunjom at 10 a.m. on April 1. But the two sides failed even to enter a discussion on the question of agenda for the prime ministers’ meeting in strained circumstances caused by the recent series of north Korea’s armed infiltrations into the Republic of Korea. The contact lasted one hour and 48 minutes, and the two sides decided to hold the sixth contact on April 18 at Panmungak.

The ROK delegation charged that north Korea had perpetrated unforgivable acts of armed provocation against the other side in the dialogue at a time when working-level contacts were going on,” adding that such provocation make one highly skeptical whether north Korea is really interested in the inter-Korean dialogue.

The delegation noted that three north Korean agents were killed while infiltrating across the downstream Han River on March 23; that two days later, on March 25, an armed north Korean spy boat infiltrated as far as the Pohang vicinity, killing some fishermen, and that three armed north Korean personnel intruded 600 meters south

of the Military Demarcation Line on March 27.

“We urge north Korean side to see to it that there will be no recurrence of such infiltration, mindful of the fact that these reckless acts have an adverse impact on the inter-Korean dialogue, that the dialogue cannot be carried on if such acts of overt provocation continue, and that these acts of provocation and brazen-faced distortion of facts amount only to clouding the atmosphere of the working-level contacts intended to prepare for procedural matters of the proposed prime ministers’ meeting,” the ROK delegation said.

The north Koreans, however, asserted ridiculously that such incidents of armed provocation were “fabrications” of south Korea.

Emerging from the contact, Lee Dong-bok, a ROK delegate, told pressmen that his delegation expressly informed the north Koreans that if acts of armed provocation by north Korea persist, aggravating the atmosphere of the working-level contacts, the inter-Korean dialogue could hardly be carried out. He said that this is especially so in view of the fact that the proposed prime ministers’ meeting is aimed at restoring mutual understanding and trust and ultimately achieving peaceful unification through prevention of such incidents as armed provocation, and at consolidation of viable peace between the south and the north.

6. Sixth Contact

The south and the north zones of Korea had their sixth working-level contact at Panmungak in the northern sector of Panmunjom on April 18, 1980. At the three-hour meeting, the two sides discussed questions of an agenda for the proposed prime ministers’ meeting and the title for the talks. But no progress could be registered.

The ROK delegation again suggested that the two sides use a uniform title, “Meeting between the Prime Ministers of the South and the North,” for the proposed talks so as to make clear the objective and nature of the meeting, whereas north Korea, for reasons hardly convincing, adhered to the use of “contact”, maintaining

that the meeting should be called either "South-North Prime Ministers' Contact" or some other phrase convenient to both sides.

Meanwhile, speaking on the issue of the agenda, Kim Young-choo, chief ROK delegate, said, "Our side's draft agenda does not restrict in any way the items subject to discussion at the prime ministers' talks, but has been prepared based on the realistic and reasonable priority order of the processes and stages necessary for the realization of ultimate peaceful unification." The ROK chief delegate emphasized that inasmuch as the prime ministers' talks are a meeting intended to discuss matters important for the nation, the agenda to be taken up must be concrete, reasonable and realistic.

Chief delegate Kim also said, "In the event, the agenda for the prime ministers' meeting is adopted as our side has suggested, and all the issues pending between the two sides would be discussed and solved properly without any restriction." He added that since the promotion of mutual trust and consolidation of peace represent an indispensable step toward peaceful unification, the two sides should first undertake exchanges and cooperation in trade, cultural and sports activities, and take such humanitarian measures as exchanges of letters, opening of two-way telegraph and telephone service, and reunion of dispersed families. The ROK chief delegate said that when an atmosphere for mutual trust is created through such exchanges and cooperation, a series of measures could be taken to insure durable peace on the Korean peninsula.

After the sixth contact adjourned, Lee Dong-bok, ROK delegate, said north Korea's chief delegate Hyon Chun-guk formally notified the ROK delegation that his side would soon make a well-intentioned announcement as to the 22 fishermen of the Haewang-ho Nos. 6 and 7, who were taken to the north during their fishing operations toward the close of last January in the western sea. "I have no idea what the well-intentioned announcement could be, but I presume it could be good news for the families longing for the return of the fishermen," Lee said.

The two sides agreed to hold the seventh working-level contact at the Freedom House on May 6.

7. Seventh Contact

The seventh south-north working-level contact for the proposed prime ministers' talks was held at 10 a.m. on May 6 at the Freedom House in the southern sector of Panmunjom. At the meeting, which lasted for three hours and 15 minutes, the two sides engaged in a heated argument over the question of determining the agenda for the prime ministers' meeting. They nevertheless failed to narrow the difference in their views. The only agreement reached at the contact was to hold the eighth contact at Panmungak on May 22.

At the seventh contact, chief ROK delegate Kim Young-choo explained his three-point proposal as he did at the previous contact. Noting that "the ultimate objective of the proposed prime ministers' talks is "to realize early peaceful unification of the fatherland with the nation's own efforts," Kim said that since unification is a very complicated and difficult task in view of inter-Korean relations and their background, unification must be achieved by first laying a basis for peaceful unification and then by forming a unified government through free general elections held in the entire Korean peninsula under fair management and supervision, in proportion to the indigenous population.

But north Korea disputed this consistent ROK formula for unification based on the principle of "peace first and unification later," arguing that their proposal is better designed for unification and more instrumental for early materialization of the prime ministers' talks. They asserted that the ROK formula is directed only toward "splitting the nation."

Emerging from the meeting, Lee Dong-bok of the ROK delegation said, "while rejecting our three-point principle for unification, the north Koreans attempted to raise an issue over the recent disturbances on some campuses and in labor unions." He said such an attempt bred suspicion of what ulterior motives might lie behind their participation in the inter-Korean talks.

The remarks made by chief delegate Kim Young-choo in con-

nection with the issue of agenda topics at the seventh contact were as follows:

Today we are holding the seventh working-level contact to prepare for a dialogue between the prime ministers of the south and the north.

At the sixth working-level contact, we agreed on most of the procedural matters such as the venue of the prime ministers' meeting and the composition of the participants. Now the issue of determining the agenda for the proposed meeting remains our prime problem to be settled.

If this question of the agenda can be agreed on smoothly between the two sides, the task of our working-level delegates would, in effect, enter a concluding stage.

Both sides have produced their respective ideas of an agenda, and have already begun their discussion.

As I expect that a more frank and sincere discussion will be held at today's contact, based on the studies we have made so that we can agree on the agenda smoothly at an early date, I will elucidate the position of our side.

The agenda for the proposed meeting our side has suggested was:

Item One: The Question of Fostering Mutual Trust between the South and the North of Korea.

A. The question of laying the foundation for promotion of mutual trust and understanding as well as restoration of national homogeneity between the south and the north of Korea through exchanges and cooperation between the two.

B. The question of implementing humanitarian measures aimed at easing the suffering and lessening the inconvenience of the people resulting from the division of the country.

Item Two: The Question of Establishing Peace on the Korean Peninsula.

Item Three: The Question of Peaceful Unification of the Fatherland.

I will make a general explanation about our proposal with a view to helping your side understand our offer and facilitating a smoother discussion at today's contact.

Needless to say, the ultimate objective of the prime ministers' talks, the procedures for which we are now deliberating, is to realize unification of the fatherland, the nation's paramount challenge, at an early date and in a peaceful manner our own people's efforts.

But, as was pointed out in our Prime Minister Shin Hyonhwack's message of last January 24, and as was emphasized time and again at these contacts by our side, the issue of unification is not a question that can be solved with propaganda or slogans alone.

If our unification issue is so simple as to be solved with an agreement on a couple of abstract matters between the south and the north parts of Korea, our country could have been unified long ago without remaining divided for so long a period as 35 years.

Unfortunately, the issue of our national unification is a very complex question in view of the circumstances which led to national division, and the present reality of inter-Korean relations. This is why the issue of unification remains unsettled to date, a long time after national division.

In the long run, independent and peaceful unification of our country must be achieved by establishing a unified government through free general elections held under fair management and supervision, on the principle of the proportion of indigenous populations in the south and the north of Korea.

In the divided south and north, however, two extremely heterogeneous societies have existed and now exist. The societies of the two parts differ not only in political ideologies and systems. In the two societies, the views of the nation and of history, the value system, and the mode of living have grown far

different each other owing to the extremely heterogeneous ideologies and systems. Such a social heterogeneity has developed in all the areas, including even recreation and entertainment, let alone home life, faith and cultural life. The stark reality, therefore, is that the homogeneity of our single people, who have lived together throughout our 5,000-year history, has been much impaired by now.

Moreover, the discontinuities between the two societies is so thorough as to be unprecedented elsewhere in the world throughout history. There have been no travel nor exchanges of materials or correspondence between the south and the north.

In the south and the north today, there are more than 10 million dispersed family members. Day and night they long for their home towns and absent families and relatives. But the separated parents, brothers, sisters and children cannot send or receive even letters of inquiry. They suffer heart-breaking human agony.

Moreover, for three years beginning in 1950 our people underwent the tragedy of a fratricidal war, in which the whole land turned into debris, countless persons lost their lives, and parents, brothers, sisters and children were separated one from another.

For this reason in particular, national unification, the long-cherished desire of our 50 million people, must be achieved in a peaceful manner by all means, not by force of arms. In order to advance this absolute national challenge of peaceful unification, it is exigent to remove the fear of war from the land by establishing and maintaining peace between the south and the north.

But what is the reality? From the time of the 1953 armistice to date, your side has cried for "independent and peaceful unification" in words only. Your side should realize the important fact that since your side's true intention has been widely divergent from its statements, as evidenced by historical facts and various documents and records of conduct by your side, the

people of the Republic of Korea, without single exception, no longer believes what your side says under present circumstances.

This is the stern reality facing our inter-Korean relations under the state of division today. Since the reality of national division is so cruel, and distrust is so deep, any efforts of the south and the north for genuine independent and peaceful unification should, if they are to succeed, not be mere lip service but must be directed, based on objective recognition of the reality as discussed above, toward solving first those problems which are most exigent yet can be settled easily between the two sides, and which consequently can ease the 50 million people's sufferings and mitigate inconveniences deriving from national division, benefitting both sides mutually. By so doing, we must strive to create mutual trust while manifesting sincerity through concrete means.

Even though we begin with minor issues, solution of an easy problem leads — as one of our proverbs goes, “beginning is half done” — to the creation of the basis for mutual trust, facilitating the settlement of questions of a more complex nature. Peace between the two sides, based on mutual trust, would thus take root. As distrust against each other is dispelled gradually and peace becomes consolidated, the south and the north would be able, based upon such groundwork, to open a grand avenue toward independent and peaceful unification.

In other words, the most crucial question in the course of realizing independent and peaceful unification of the divided fatherland is to dispel mutual distrust and to build up trust. Only after peace is consolidated, based on such trust, can the doors to independent peaceful unification be opened wide.

The agenda for the prime ministers' talks our side has proposed reflects this very spirit and, therefore, comprises the most realistic and reasonable topics that can serve to advance independent and peaceful unification of the fatherland.

From such a viewpoint, Item No. 1 of our side's agenda calls for the discussion and solution of various questions that can con-

tribute to the fostering of mutual trust through exchanges and cooperation for solution of humanitarian issues.

Within the scope of the agenda topic, the prime ministers of the two sides would be able to discuss and solve the issues of south-north trade, joint exploration of resources, exchanges and cooperation of businessmen, merchants, industrialists and persons in various other sectors, exchanges in the fields of science, sports, culture and the press, and exchanges in the areas of telegraph, telephone and postal communication. They can also discuss the solution of humanitarian problems such as the question of reunion between 10 million dispersed family members.

Each of these projects, if implemented, will surely contribute toward achieving independent and peaceful unification of the nation. How can your side argue, nevertheless, that they impede unification efforts and result in consolidating national division?

Moreover, these are the projects your side once proposed. If your side now shows a negative response to these offers of our side, your side cannot escape the criticism that when your side made similar proposals in the past, your side paid a mere lip service without any willingness to carry them out.

Item No. 2 of our side's agenda, the question of consolidating peace, is intended to prepare a measure to ensure firmly — on the strength of mutual trust, once such trust is built up through abovementioned exchanges and cooperation and the solution of humanitarian issues — that no fratricidal war like the Korean War could recur between the south and the north. Of course, such measures must include a clause that prohibits not only the recurrence of outright war, but also any and very attempt to overthrow the other side's system by force of arms or other violence.

This, too, is self-evident that such measures would be conducive to the creation of conditions favorable to independent and peaceful unification of the divided fatherland, and are not prejudicial to unification.

Your side argues as if the “consolidation of peace” we offer in Item No. 2 means “consolidation of division.” I believe that such an interpretation either stems entirely from lack of understanding or from misunderstanding, or is deliberately assumed merely for argument’s sake. I emphasize again that when we say “consolidation of peace” it means there should be no resort to arms between the two sides before we discuss peaceful unification. In other words, it means peace should be secured and maintained. It has no other implication. Despite such being the case, how can you assert that “consolidation of peace” represents “consolidation of national division”?

The “creation of trust” and “consolidation of peace” our side has suggested as agenda topics are closely inter-related. For we can discuss the question of securing peace only after mutual trust has been built up to a certain degree; that is, after distrust has been removed. Similarly, we believe, mutual trust can be deepened only when peace is secured.

When mutual trust is fostered and peace is consolidated in this way, then it is clear that major obstacles to peaceful unification would have been removed. This, we believe, would make much easier our discussion of the issue of peaceful unification.

It is in this context that we set forth the issue of peaceful unification of the fatherland in Item No. 3.

As was explained above, our side’s agenda is really unification-oriented, embodying in good order the whole course of a steady approach toward independent and peaceful unification. The itemized order of our side’s agenda topics represents a natural and reasonable sequence of the questions arising in the course of our approach to unification. Still, the items by no means stand independent from one another, but are inter-related in their rational sequence.

Each item of the agenda our side has suggested is set forth in the order of matters requiring solution in consideration of the sequence of events in the course of achieving national unification. We do not insist on item-by-item separate discussion alone, and

the order of the agenda topics does not necessarily indicate any strict restriction on the order of discussion.

It is most desirable that discussion of agenda items be made in principle in the order of the established items. At the prime ministers' talks, however, package discussion to a certain extent or overall discussion may be held through mutual agreement or at mutual conveniences. Individual discussion can also be made in principle in order of the topics given.

Since the creation of mutual trust and consolidation of peace represent a road leading to, and an essential process of, peaceful unification — the goal of the proposed prime ministers' meeting — it cannot be a realistic approach to discussion if we handle the issue of unification before any progress is registered in the discussion of these two agenda items. I believe we should remember the fact that discussion of the issue of creating an atmosphere for trust, and of consolidating peace, constitutes an effort to realize peaceful unification and, at the same time, the beginning of the discussion of the question of peaceful unification.

Inasmuch as the creation of mutual trust and consolidation of peace are closely inter-related, I think that one agenda item can be discussed in linkage with the other.

The question of unification we are trying to settle now is not to divide an already unified country into two, but to integrate into one a country which has been divided into two and has remained so for a long time. I believe that your side should recognize the fact that the protracted division of the country is one of the very reasons why we can hardly achieve unification overnight.

Therefore, I urge your side to desist from adhering to an agendum of ambiguous contents, and instead, to cooperate in carrying on discussion based on our side's agenda, so as to end the working-level contacts at an early date and realize the prime ministers' conference.

Also at the May 6 contact, south Korea made its basic position

clear with regard to north Korea's use of some tricky words, stating: "Because we believe your side's agendum containing such words as 'collaboration' and 'unity' would led to a result running counter to the nature, objective and purport of the prime ministers' talks, we cannot agree to the use of such problematic words in the agenda for the prime ministers' meeting."

In response, north Korea insisted that "your side's opposition to 'collaboration' and 'unity' indicates that your side pursues 'split' and 'confrontation.'"

The following are the contents of remarks made at the seventh contact by Kim Young-choo, chief ROK delegate, to expose the ulterior political implication lurking behind the north Korean terminology, use of "collaboration" and "unity."

At the previous contact, I pointed out that the agendum your side has put forward is not clear in concept and too ambiguous to be called any agendum. It may be good as political slogans, but, as an agendum, it lacks concreteness and fails to produce any items suitable for discussion. In particular, the words "collaboration" and "unity" used in your side's agendum are the kind of expression that is apt to allow various misunderstandings in interpretation.

We have fully studied and reviewed the agendum set forth by your side. Because we believe that your side's agendum, containing such words as "collaboration" and "unity," would bring about a result running counter to the nature, objective and purpose of the prime ministers' talks, we cannot agree to the use of such problematic terminology in the agenda for the proposed meeting.

I want to take this occasion today to explain in a little more detail the reason why we cannot agree to the use of the words "collaboration" and "unity" in the agenda, in a sense to expedite our discussion of the agenda issue by raising the core issue more clearly.

The reason we oppose the use of the terminology "collabora-

tion” and “unity” at this place where the south and the north mutually discuss the question of achieving independent and peaceful unification of the divided fatherland is not because we reject the inherent meaning given to these two words in the Korean dictionary.

The reason we oppose the use of the two words at issue is that your side attaches to these words political meanings different from the inherent ones, and uses them as special political terminology in order to achieve the unilateral objective of your side. The ulterior political scheme hidden herein goes against the task of peaceful unification.

Here, we need to assess what political meaning your side attaches to the words “collaboration” and “unity” and how your side may use the words politically.

Your side’s documented official materials eloquently elucidate the political meaning of these two words.

I quote your side’s official documented materials as follows:

“Collaboration:”

First, “collaboration will enable the people of south Korea to realize the righteousness of the great ‘juche’ idea of the Respected and Beloved Leader as well as the real superiority of the socialist system he has prepared in the northern half of the Republic;”

Second, “collaboration will become an important momentum for the broad masses of the south and the north of Korea to realize more deeply the corruptness of south Korea’s social system, a product of the colonial rule by the American imperialists, and the traitorous crimes of the reactionary rulers in the south; and, at the same time, to hold a firm belief in the justness of the unification formula set forth by the Leader, determining correctly how and in which direction our people should achieve unification of the fatherland;” and

Third, “collaboration will become an important condition

which would awaken the broad masses in national and class ideas, and would enable them to rally firmly around the Leader, arming them with the great 'juche' idea as the only guiding thought, and to embark resolutely on struggles for unification of the fatherland along the path dictated by the Leader."

What does this point to? We cannot but construe that this well explains your side's position; that your side recognizes the value of the so-called "collaboration" only when it functions as a means of forcing through a unification effort under the principles of your side's system. It is beyond doubt that if we agree on the use of the word "collaboration," your side would insist that our side had accepted even the above-quoted unilateral political interpretation of the word.

As for the type of "collaboration," moreover, your side offers political "collaboration," military "collaboration," economic "collaboration," cultural "collaboration" and even diplomatic "collaboration," all unrealistic, empty and fictitious, in total disregard of the cruel reality of national division. Besides, your side makes confusing allegations when it asserts that "overall 'collaboration' should be made in all areas," while, on the other hand, insisting that political "collaboration" is the key and most important among all "collaboration," or that military "collaboration" takes precedence over all other "collaborations," or that economic and cultural "collaborations" should be made before any other "collaboration."

Your side has gone so far as to define even the South-North Red Cross Conference, based on the Red Cross humanitarian spirit, designed to alleviate the sufferings of the 10 million separated family members in the south and the north, as "a form of political collaboration." It is on the basis of this absurd definition of the word that your side argued that political issues should be taken up at the Red Cross talks.

A study largely of your side's documented official materials shows that the word "unity" your side uses is an example of politically deviated terminology.

Despite the fact that the difference in ideologies, ideas and systems between the south and the north constitutes a major element that stands in the way of unification, your side has forged a fictitious image that "unity can be realized on the basis of the common elements of the nation as a homogeneous people," and attempts to create a wrongful impression that the south and the north, based thereon, can achieve "unity" overnight.

Moreover, although your side maintains on the surface that in the "unity" one side should not try to enforce an ideology, idea or system upon the other side, your side utters something to the contrary, demanding that in order to facilitate "unity" south Korea should do away with its anti-Communist policy such as anti-Communist laws, anti-Communist education and the anti-Communist nature of the press.

In short, your assertions clearly show the underlying motive of your side's insistence on the words "collaboration" and "unity": to prepare a base and excuse for disputing our anti-Communist system and demanding so-called "alliance with communism" under the cloak of the theory of "condition and environment," as you did during the past dialogue, taking advantage of the unique political implications your side unilaterally attaches to these words, as discussed above.

In the South-North Joint Communiqué of 1972, the two sides, putting aside for the time being the question of difference in ideologies, ideas and systems between them, agreed to promote national unity in the first place by fostering an atmosphere of mutual trust and easing tensions through various agreed matters such as cessation of mutual slander and defamation, elimination of military provocations large or small, dissolution of the state of military confrontation, positive promotion of the Red Cross talks, implementation of various exchanges, operation of direct south-north telephone lines, and establishment of the South-North Coordinating Committee designed to implement those agreed matters. Nonetheless, your side, disregarding the implementation of the agreed matters, suspended the operation

of the South-North Coordinating Committee, thereby standing in the way of national unity.

Judging from what was discussed above, the reason is obvious why the words "collaboration" and "unity" which your side mentions should not be used in the wording of the agenda for the proposed prime ministers' meeting.

The objective of the prime ministers' meeting cannot be to impose one's ideas upon the other.

In the prime ministers' talks, priority should be assigned to discussing and settling those concrete issues which can be easily solved based on the stern reality of national division and without raising any disputes over internal affairs of the other side; the kind of problems the solution of which can benefit the homogeneous people in the south and the north, alleviate the sufferings deriving from division, ease tensions and contribute to the promotion of peace.

In so doing we will steadily heal the national scars suffered from national division, and pave the way toward rightful achieving of peaceful unification with national wisdom parallel with the fostering of mutual trust.

Our side's agenda featuring the issues of atmosphere for trust, consolidation of peace and peaceful unification are the most realistic and rational items which chart a course toward peaceful unification.

I again ask that your side cooperate in the realization of the proposed prime ministers' talks at an early date by either recognizing the righteousness of our side's agenda and accepting them, or carrying out the discussion of the agenda issue based on our side's items, thereby settling the issue of agenda items promptly.

8. Eighth Contact

The eighth working-level contact was held at Panmungak in the northern sector of Panmunjom for two hours and 24 minutes begin-

ning at 10 a.m. on May 22, 1980. Unlike the past contacts held behind closed doors, the eighth contact was open to the public through mutual agreement.

The delegates from both sides, supposed to continue discussion of the issue of determining the agenda for the prime ministers' meeting, failed to take up the question because of the attempt of the north Korean delegation to slander the Republic of Korea in connection with internal issues such as the recent campus disturbances and the extension of Martial Law on May 17.

ROK Chief Delegate Kim Young-choo said at the contact, "There are many people who suspect that your side had agreed to the working-level contacts not to discuss and solve problems pending between the two sides, but to take the occasion to fan national schism and social confusion, miscalculating and taking advantage of the internal situation of our side." He pointed out that "the remarks your side made today only add to this suspicion." The ROK Chief Delegate went on to say that "if a dialogue is to be successful, the two sides should carry out a dialogue faithfully on the level of authorities, while respecting the inherent order of each other's system."

Earlier in the meeting, Hyun Chun-guk, the north Korean chief delegate, argued, "At this time when the proposed prime ministers' meeting can be held if only the issue of agenda topics is settled, there has occurred an event which aggravates inter-Korean relations and endanges the inter-Korean contact by laying an obstacle in the path of the working-level contacts." Alleging that "south Korean authorities have extended the Martial Law on the excuse that the north has intensified schemes to communize south Korea and seeks a decisive opportunity to unleash invasion of the south," Hyun asserted that "this is an act of provocation against us, the other side in the dialogue."

ROK Chief Delegate Kim Young-choo posed a four-point question to the north Korean delegation to find out the true posture of north Korea toward the issue of the agenda. The question was as follows in substance:

1) If north Korea argues its agendum would better serve to advance national unification than our side agenda, does it mean that unification can be achieved right away without fostering conditions conducive to unification, such as restoration of mutual trust and guarantee of peace?

2) If north Korea can use the words "collaboration" and "unity" only for their inherent meanings without allowing any misunderstanding, is north Korea willing to make a pledge here that it will not renew such political demands as were unilaterally embodied in the words at any session of an inter-Korean dialogue in the future?

3) North Korea concludes that "there are only violent means for the execution of a revolution in south Korea." Does this mean that the "independent and peaceful unification" it talks about refers to unification achieved under the north Korean banner through a "revolution in south Korea" staged in a violent manner?

4) Whereas north Korea argues it will not force its views on the other side as a principle of "unity," it poses various political demands on the other side as prerequisites. Isn't this contradictory behavior?

Also at the May 22 contact, Lee Dong-bok, a ROK delegate, charged north Korea with making undue allegations in connection with the recent student disturbances in the south. Noting that "your side discussed the recent student movement in the south in no less than 2,136 radio broadcasts from last March 27 to May 9," and that many of the north Korean broadcasts were urging south Korean students to "rise up and carry on the righteous struggles to the last," Lee challenged the north Koreans how they dare insist that this is not an act of agitation.

The eighth working-level contact ended without any progress. The two sides merely agreed to hold the ninth working-level contact at 10 a.m. on June 24 at the Freedom House. Originally the north Koreans suggested that the ninth contact be held on July 1, more

than a month later. But, the time was advanced at the urging of the ROK delegation.

In contrast to the north Korean delegation's failure to discuss preparatory steps for the prime ministers' meeting in its indulgence in undue interference in the internal situation of the south, the ROK delegation again explained the properness of its draft agenda, asking the north Koreans to show a sincerity for the early realization of the proposed meeting. The following is the text of the remarks made by the ROK delegation at the eighth working-level contact.

As has been emphasized many times in the past, the agenda for the proposed meeting between the prime ministers of the south and the north, which we are discussing now, is the most important issue among the procedural matters of the prime ministers' talks. The contents of, and the means of preparing, the agenda would determine the nature of the meeting and be instrumental in making it a success or a failure. If the agenda were made up of proper contents and prepared in a reasonable manner, the dialogue between the prime ministers would progress smoothly and yield concrete achievements, contributing much to advancing the time of independent and peaceful unification of the divided fatherland. It is feared, however, that if the agenda were prepared with unrealistic contents in an unreasonable way, the meeting would hardly register any progress, but become only a repetition of the past dialogue where the two sides merely engaged in unproductive arguments before it came to a halt altogether.

Can we allow the prime ministers' dialogue we are promoting as a rare chance to end in the exchange of vague talks and to break up without producing any concrete achievements? If the meeting fails and causes big disappointment to our people in the south and the north, we had better not have such a meeting from the beginning. This is why the issue of preparing the agenda for the prime ministers' meeting is so important.

When we look back over the past, it is apparent that the two

sides think of basically different approaches toward national unification, though they both insist they pursue independent and peaceful unification.

The fundamental cause of our failure to settle the issue of agenda as yet lies, I think, in the different methods of approach to unification, as embodied in each side's draft agenda. I believe that in order to settle the question of the agenda at an early date and in a reasonable way, the two sides should correctly realize once again how their unification approaches, incorporated in their respective draft agendas, are different from each other and, based on such realization, seek a compromise. As I believe this must be the shortest path to the solution of the question, I would like express my opinion thereon.

To put our side's draft agenda briefly, we are proposing three items as the agenda: first, the question of fostering an atmosphere for mutual trust through exchanges and cooperation between the south and the north, and through the solution of humanitarian issues; second, the question of consolidating peace on the Korean peninsula; and third, the question of achieving peaceful unification of the fatherland. At the same time, our side has suggested that the title of the proposed dialogue between the prime ministers, which bears a deep linkage to the agenda issue, be set forth as the "meeting of the prime ministers of the south and the north."

As has been emphasized time and again, our side's three-point agenda given above sets forth the most realistic and reasonable formula for the independent and peaceful unification of our divided fatherland. This is especially so when we take into account the historical circumstances that led to national division, as well as the inter-Korean relations of today, 35 years after division. Our draft agenda is designed to pave the way toward peaceful unification.

Few persons would dispute the fact that unifying the divided fatherland peacefully at an early date is a paramount national challenge, the achievement of which is the aspiration of not only

the 37 million people of the Republic of Korea in the south but also of the 17 million compatriots residing in your area in the north. Anyone who realizes the stern reality we are faced with well recognizes the fact that such an independent and peaceful unification, however, cannot be realized in one day.

Ultimately, the independent and peaceful unification of the divided fatherland should be realized through free and democratic elections held in the entire area of the Korean peninsula. But the realization of peaceful unification by means of such free and democratic elections was thwarted in the past by your side. Thereafter, your side had on some occasions advanced the idea of achieving unification through elections. In effect, however, your side had obstructed the implementation of such elections by demanding, as a condition to such elections, the exclusion of specific political parties, social strata and layers, or individuals of the other side, a one-sided demand which the other side cannot accept.

During the 35 years of national division, unfortunately, a complete social discontinuation and hostile relations have persisted between the south and the north. As a result of social insulation stemming from the impassable barrier along the truce line, as well as from the closedness of your society, the societies of the south and the north have been transformed into strikingly different polarized entities in terms of ideologies, systems and even the way of living.

Moreover, due to the Korean War, the bitterest fratricidal national tragedy throughout our 5,000-year national history, not only have the hostile relations deepened but also mutual distrust, which cannot be easily removed, has come into being between the two sides. Because of the lesson of the Korean War which is still vivid in the memory of the 37 million people of the Republic of Korea, and the violent armed provocations mounted ceaselessly thereafter along and behind the truce line, the people of the Republic of Korea have come to harbor a deep-rooted distrust, and therefore do not believe what your side says unless it

is buttressed by corroborative conduct.

The circumstances I explained above are the actual reality of our divided fatherland. If anyone argues that independent and peaceful unification of the divided fatherland can be achieved in a single stroke without first fostering necessary conditions reflecting the circumstances, it would no doubt be an empty fiction, wholly disregarding reality.

If we are really interested in genuine independent and peaceful unification under this reality, the rightful path to the solution of the question must be for the south and the north to remove the deep-rooted distrust between them first, and foster a peace based on mutual trust taking root between the south and the north, thereby laying the foundation for realization of independent and peaceful unification. The three-point draft agenda of our side — a formula for genuine independent and peaceful unification — lays down clearly the whole process of independent peaceful unification in priority order, fostering of mutual trust, consolidation of peace and then peaceful unification.

We are confident that should the prime ministers of the south and the north meet with the agenda our side has proposed, the two sides would be able to promote exchanges and cooperation on easily solvable projects first in economic, social, cultural and humanitarian areas where there are relatively few obstacles stemming from the difference in ideologies and ideas. And, based on trust achieved through the accumulation of such exchanges and cooperation, the two sides of Korea can ease tensions and bring about a durable peace, thus enabling the whole people to march forward on the road toward realizing independent and peaceful unification of the fatherland, free from the fear of another war.

On the contrary, your side still adheres to the agendum “Concerning the Expedition of Independent and Peaceful Unification of the Fatherland through Collaboration and Unity in all Areas of the North and South.”

If the words contained in your side's draft agendum can be interpreted in accordance only with their inherent meaning, your draft agendum may well be a plausible political slogan. Even so, the agendum of your side is so vague that we have no way to know what it is intended for. Even if your agendum was adopted, therefore, it cannot mean any agreement on the issue of agenda.

But the greater problem your side's draft agenda poses is the political meaning which your side unilaterally imposed upon some of the words used in your agendum different from their inherent definitions. Thus seen, it could be known that although your agendum superficially uses the phrase, "independent and peaceful unification," in effect it is based on your long-standing policy to communize the south by violence.

The words "collaboration" and "unity" contained in your side's agendum are, of course, good Korean words when they are interpreted according to what Korean dictionary says. However, the problem is that your side has distorted the meaning of these words by attaching unilateral political meaning thereto.

As already pointed out at the previous contact, remarks by high authorities and official documents of your side assert, "Collaboration enables the broad masses of the south and the north to awaken themselves to national and class ideas, and to rally firmly around the Leader, arming them with the great 'juche' idea as the only guiding thought, and to embark resolutely on struggles for unification of the fatherland along the path dictated by the Leader." "Collaboration" also means according to your theory "to solve all the problems pending between the south and the north on the basis of the socialistic capability of the northern half."

Similarly, the political meaning of the word "unity" your side is using is to "enable south Korean authorities to do away with their anti-Communist road and to ally themselves with communism." Moreover, your version of "independent and peaceful unification" asserts that it is unification achieved with the united

strength of the "socialistic forces of the northern half and the patriotic and democratic forces of the south after the American aggressors are driven out, colonial rule is liquidated and a genuine people's regime is established in south Korea."

Thus seen, it is more than apparent why your side insists on the use of the words "collaboration" and "unity" in the agenda for the prime ministers' talks. In other words, your side is not interested in the discussion of a formula for independent and peaceful unification at the proposed meeting. All you are after is that, in the event these words at issue were adopted in the agenda, your side would maintain that our side had accepted even the political meaning your side has one-sidedly imposed on these words. It is not so difficult to assume that your side would then demand, based thereon, that our side accept withdrawal of American troops, repeal of anti-Communist policies, and legalization of Communist activities, reasoning that "agreed-on principle should be fulfilled." In short, your goal is to forge a logical base for such absurd demands.

Judging from the intention lurking behind your side's draft agenda, your side does not seek improvement of inter-Korean relations and genuine peaceful unification of the fatherland by means of dialogue, but attempts to use even the proposed talks between the prime ministers, high authorities of the south and the north, as a means of fostering conditions for the so-called "revolution in south Korea," part of your traditional policy to communize the south through violence. It is thus apparent that the ultimate objective your side pursues is to achieve unification within the framework of your system.

In this context, I would like to have your side's sincere answers to the following few questions designed to find out more clearly the true attitude and intention of your side with regard to the issue of agenda topics of the prime ministers' meeting.

First, your side argues that our side's draft agenda is less unification-oriented than your's because ours is designed more for the fostering of conditions than for the solution of the

unification issue itself. Does this mean that your side believes unification can be achieved right away without fostering conditions conducive to unification such as restoration of mutual trust and guarantee of durable peace between the south and the north?

Second, your side insists at the working-level contacts that the words "collaboration" and "unity" do not carry any particular implications and therefore leave no room for any misunderstanding.

According to your official documents or remarks by high authorities of your side, however, the words "collaboration" and "unity" incorporate one-sided political demands such as "elimination of interference by outside forces" and so-called "democratization of the south Korean society." They further demand that our side give up our anti-Communist policy and instead adopt a policy for "alliance with communism" for the sake of "democratization" of our society. If your side can use the words "collaboration" and "unity" only for their inherent meanings, without allowing any misunderstanding as your side maintains at these working-level contacts, are you then willing to make a pledge here that your side will not renew such political demands as were unilaterally embodied in the words at any session of an inter-Korean dialogue in the future?

Third, according to your official documents and remarks made by high authorities of your side, "a revolution in south Korea is prerequisite to unification of the fatherland" because unification of our country "can be achieved in the form of accomplishing a revolution for national liberation on a countrywide scale under the banner of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea," which can be "executed only on the condition of a revolution in south Korea."

Moreover, your side concludes that "although there are either peaceful or non-peaceful means in the realization of unification of the fatherland, there are only violent means for the execution of a revolution in south Korea." Does this mean

that the “independent and peaceful unification” your side talks about refers to a revolution in south Korea through violence, and to unification achieved thereby? Or does it mean that there has been a fundamental change in such a violent unification formula of your side?

Fourth, whereas your side maintains that neither of the two sides should attempt to force its ideas upon the other in one of the principles of “unity,” your side poses various political demands to the other side as prerequisites. Isn’t this a contradictory practice? Similarly, while your side asserts that it doesn’t export revolution, your side instigates violence against the other side by mobilizing all propaganda mechanisms, and goes so far as to argue, “when a revolution flares up in south Korea, we, the same people, will not sit idly by.” Isn’t this also a contradictory utterance?

Which is your true intention?

I sincerely hope that through your answers to these questions I will be able to confirm that your side is truly interested in the realization of independent and peaceful unification and is willing to carry out the proposed meeting of the prime ministers as part of productive talks between the authorities of the south and the north.

I expect that your side, accepting our side’s wish for a constructive inter-Korean dialogue, will constructively cooperate in the solution of the question of the agenda for the prime ministers’ talks on the basis of our side’s unification-oriented draft agenda, based on reality and reasonableness, as discussed above.

Part III

Matters at Issue at Working-Level Contacts

1. Issue of Venue for Prime Ministers' Meeting

A controversy developed over the issue of the venue for the proposed prime ministers' meeting after the ROK delegation agreed to, and advocated, a "third country" among the various proposed sites first advanced by north Korea, whereupon the north Koreans changed their original position and unreasonably adhered only to shuttle talks alternating between Seoul and Pyongyang.

In its proposal for a meeting between the two sides' prime ministers, made in the January 11 letter of Lee Jong-ok, north Korea's State Council premier, to the Republic of Korea Prime Minister, north Korea said with respect to the venue for the proposed meeting, "Panmunjom or Pyongyang - Seoul will be good, and even a third country will be acceptable," thus, in effect, leaving to the ROK side the selection of the venue from among those suggested. The ROK delegation chose a third country.

The issue of the venue, therefore, had no room basically for any dispute, and ought to have been settled at the first contact.

The irrevocable fact was that north Korea put forth a third country as one of the candidate sites. The ROK delegation simply accepted the idea of a third country as offered by the north Koreans. Since it was not that the two sides advanced conflicting offers from the beginning, the two sides should have already settled on a third country as the venue for the proposed prime ministers' meeting in line with the general practice for meetings and common sense. If there were any problem, it could be the issue of choosing the venue from among possible third countries.

At the first working-level contact, however, the north Koreans adamantly stuck to shuttle talks between Seoul and Pyongyang, regardless of their suggestion made in Lee Jong-ok's January 11 letter. They claimed that the phrase "even a third country will be acceptable" does not mean "a third country will be good." They absurdly argued that they offered it "merely as an alternate in the event of an unavoidable circumstance."

The ROK side does not reject or eliminate any of the three candidate sites — Panmunjom, Seoul-Pyongyang or a third country — offered by north Korea. It only assumes the stand that in view of the experience in the past dialogue, and of the nature of the proposed prime ministers' meeting, a neutral third country would be most suitable for a successful dialogue between the prime ministers. This basic posture stands unchanged today.

In the event the proposed meeting is realized and the two prime ministers meet in Seoul and Pyongyang by turn, the danger cannot be eliminated in view of the past Seoul-Pyongyang shuttle talks that either of the two sides may attempt to reap political gains, taking advantages of such shuttle contacts instead of engaging in the solution of inter-Korean problems. If and when this really happens, it would only lead to further deepening of mutual distrust and making the inter-Korean barrier higher.

In the Red Cross talks, in fact, the north Koreans manipulated the humanitarian contacts politically by adamantly having "political party and social organization~personages" attend the Red Cross talks as "consultants" to deliver "congratulatory speeches" of a heavily political nature.

They were interested more in public political-oriented events than in the Coordinating Committee and Red Cross talks themselves, attempting to exploit such occasions as opportunities to launch political propaganda and agitation toward the people of the other side. Moreover, they took full advantage of the free press in the south. Whereas their conduct and utterances were subject to full press coverage in the south, the tightly controlled press of north Korea did not cover any of the remarks by the Seoul delegations. Moreover, on the excuse of "conference atmosphere," they even raised a dispute over the internal affairs of the other side, such as the anti-Communist and National Security Laws, June 23 Special Foreign Policy and the presence of U.S. forces. It was upon these grounds that they finally torpedoed the dialogue altogether.

The significance of a dialogue between the prime ministers does not lie simply in their meeting, but can be found in what would

result from the talks. In determining the venue of the meeting, therefore, the foremost thing that should be taken into account is which place can provide a businesslike and quiet atmosphere so that open-hearted discussion can take place over all pending problems. In this respect, it is self-evident that a neutral country is more advantageous than Seoul-Pyongyang.

If the prime ministers of the south and the north meet in Seoul and Pyongyang alternately, it would certainly make people grow restless in their expectation from such meetings. But inspiring high expectations from the simple fact of meeting cannot be reasonable way of solving problems. A proper posture toward settling the inter-Korean question is for the two sides to carry on a conference in a composed atmosphere, and to fulfill the people's expectations with the fruition of such a conference.

It is with this basic stand that the Republic of Korea delegation tackles the question of venue, and suggested Geneva in Switzerland from among third countries as the site of the proposed meeting.

Still, the suggestion of Geneva did not mean that south Korea would accept no site but Geneva. It simply put forth Geneva in the belief that in view of various conditions for international meetings, Geneva could be most convenient to both sides.

Meanwhile, at the third working-level contact, the north Koreans suggested Panmunjom, another among the three proposed venues they first put forward. The Republic of Korea delegation, in a policy not to allow any further stalemate of the working-level contacts, accepted Panmunjom as the site, at the fourth contact. The two sides arrived at the following agreement:

- 1) The venue of the prime ministers' talks shall, by turn, be the Freedom House and Panmungak.
- 2) In the event either of the prime ministers wishes to change the venue, the two prime ministers shall consult about the matter.

Besides, the two sides agreed to discuss and settle the issue of

which of the two — the Freedom House or Panmungak — should be the venue for the first meeting of the prime ministers' at a time when they determine the date of the first meeting.

2. Issue of Agenda for Prime Ministers' Meeting

a. Comparison of Two Sides' Contentions

From the outset, the working-level delegates of the south and the north engaged in a heated argument over the issue of whether to determine the agenda for the prime ministers' meeting beforehand at the working-level contacts.

Starting with the very first contact, the Republic of Korea delegation emphasized the need to fix the agenda in advance, whereas the north Koreans asserted at the second contact that "there is no need to agree on the agenda beforehand."

Faced with the consistent call for the prior determination of the agenda, however, north Korea agreed in principle to the advance fixing, at the third contact, when it said, "We are willing to consider making prior agreement on an agenda."

Subsequently at the fourth working-level contact, the south Korean delegation produced a reasonable and concrete three-point draft agenda while north Korea advanced a single comprehensive agendum.

If a meeting is to succeed, items to be discussed must be defined clearly, along with the objective of the meeting. To this end, there must be a concrete and reasonable agenda. It is common knowledge, therefore, that an agenda must be fixed before any meeting.

This is all the more so in the case of a high-level meeting between south and north Korea, which have been separated for a long time and which had undergone the national tragedy of fratricidal war. In view of the national expectations pinned upon the meeting, as well as the public hopes for its success at home and abroad, sufficient preparation must be made in advance so that the meeting, once

held, would be able to yield concrete results. To this end, it is very desirable that its agenda be prepared beforehand.

Of course, a meeting between the prime ministers of the south and the north is meaningful in itself. But what is much more important is which issues are chosen and how they would be discussed when they meet. For this reason, to prepare the agenda of this meeting is the most important of the procedural matters that must be agreed on at the working-level contacts.

Nonetheless, the north Koreans opposed the prior settlement of agenda topics, contending that any advance fixation would cause a restriction in the prime ministers' talks. If only to prevent waste of time over the question of an agenda after the proposed meeting was opened, an advance agreement on the "scope and contents" of the discussion between the two prime minister is indispensable.

Since advance agreement on an agenda is intended to determine beforehand the subjects to be taken up by the prime ministers and their priority order, the prior establishment of agenda topics is a natural duty entrusted to the working-level representatives.

Finally, north Korea, persuaded repeatedly by the south Korean side, agreed on the principle of making a prior agreement on the agenda for the prime ministers' talks. The two sides presented their respective draft agendas at the fourth working-level contact.

At the first contact, the Republic of Korea delegation stressed that:

"Unification cannot be achieved merely by unrealistic slogans or by one-sided propaganda rhetoric. For the two sides of Korea to tread the correct path toward peaceful unification, the two sides must first take realistic and practical steps, and gradually expand the scope of such steps, as a means to lay the foundation for peacefully achieved unification."

With regard to the question of establishing an agenda for the prime ministers' talks, the Republic of Korea delegation stated:

- 1) The joint efforts of the two sides toward peaceful unification of the divided fatherland should always be exerted through a dialogue between the responsible authorities of the

south and the north, based on the historical reality of national division that has persisted for 35 years.

2) The joint efforts of the two sides toward peaceful unification of the divided fatherland should be made in such a way as to pursue unification in the course of fostering conditions for unification through a series of step-by-step measures that can substantially contribute toward removing the state of division.

3) In the determination of an agenda for the prime ministers' dialogue, the principle of eliminating any agenda or item that interferes in the other side's internal affairs, must be duly taken into account.

On the basis of these stands and principle, the Republic of Korea delegation has proposed the following agenda for the prime ministers' dialogue:

Draft Agenda for the Prime Ministers' Talks Proposed by the Republic of Korea Delegation

Item One: The Question of Fostering Mutual Trust between the South and the North of Korea.

A. The question of laying the foundation for promotion of mutual trust and understanding as well as restoration of national homogeneity between the south and the north of Korea through exchanges and cooperation between the two sides.

B. The question of implementing humanitarian measures aimed at easing the suffering and lessening the inconvenience of the people resulting from the division of the country.

Item Two: The Question of Establishing Peace on the Korean Peninsula.

Item Three: The Question of Peaceful Unification of the Fatherland.

North Korea's draft agenda was "concerning the expedition of

independent and peaceful unification of the fatherland through collaboration and unity in all areas of the north and the south.” North Korea has held fast to this single-point agenda, contending that “the agenda should be simple and comprehensive so that the two sides can freely and broadly exchange opinions and can arrive at a settlement with ease and flexibility.” Due to this insistency of the north Koreans, no clue has been found to the solution of the issue of the agenda.

The question of an agenda for the prime ministers’ meeting is the most important among the procedural matters subject to solution at the working-level contacts designed to prepare for the proposed meeting.

The working-level representatives, therefore, have been entrusted with the important duty of making thorough preparation for the meeting so that it would be able to discuss and solve all the issues pending between the two sides thereby pave the way to peaceful unification of the fatherland, instead of merely ending in a vague “seeing” or “contact.”

A look into the current inter-Korean relations featuring 35 years’ protracted discontinuation shows that the key elements that stand in the way to peaceful unification are mutual distrust and misunderstanding as well as the heterogeneity that has deepened in all areas of life between the two sides. Besides, the 50 million people in the south and the north entertain the earnest wish that there will be no recurrence of a fratricidal war like the Korean War.

In order to achieve peaceful unification under the circumstances, the two sides must undertake exchanges and cooperation first in easy and practicable areas, and then gradually broaden the scope of such exchanges and cooperation, in the course of which they can mutually open their societies step by step and foster an atmosphere for the restoration of national homogeneity and mutual trust.

Only upon establishment of such trust can the south and the north undertake a series of effective steps to consolidate peace. Mutual trust and durable peace are both indispensable to peaceful

unification. Trust can be built up not by words but by such concrete acts as can substantiate trust.

The stand of the Republic of Korea side is that for the sake of mutual trust, the two sides should first tackle the question of exchanges and cooperation in the areas of trade, culture and sports, and carry out such humanitarian projects as exchange of letters, opening of telegraph and telephone service, and reunion of dispersed families. It is in this conviction that the Republic of Korea delegation has set forth in Item No. 1 those topics geared to facilitate mutual agreement on these projects.

The topics are all the more reasonable in view of the fact that when exchanges and cooperation are realized and their scope is expanded, resulting in the restoration of mutual trust, the two sides would, on the basis of the trust thus achieved, be able to take a set of steps intended for the consolidation of peace on the Korean peninsula, setting final stage for peaceful unification free from any anxiety and threat to peace.

On the contrary, north Korea laid down a comprehensive single-point agendum based on its "unification through collaboration" policy. The north Koreans, who reject the Republic of Korea agenda outright, assert, "In view of the nature and objectives of the prime ministers' talks, a comprehensive and single-point agendum will be more efficient and reasonable than an itemized agenda."

A perusal of north Korea's agendum reveals that its concept is not clear and, moreover, it lacks any concreteness. If it is a propaganda slogan, it may be plausible. But a conference agenda should set forth clearly what the conference would take up.

The north Koreans, nevertheless, insist that their agendum is "broad, deep and intensive in contents," insisting that the agenda "lays down the basic method of realizing goals in the form of suggestiveness." What do they mean by "suggestiveness"? They should have made a concrete explanation rather than using such an ambiguous word as "suggestiveness." They thoughtlessly claim that "agendum should be prepared conveniently and simply so that it can be settled easily," and that "we can wind up working-level con-

tacts early and advance the time of the prime ministers' meeting if we adopt a single and comprehensive agendum."

Of course, the prime ministers of the south and the north ought to meet and discuss national problems at an early date. But a meeting in itself cannot settle everything. In other words, the items they would take up upon their meeting and the priority order of their discussion must be determined beforehand.

The north Koreans assert that the working-level contacts cannot determine the contents of the prime ministers' meeting by setting an agenda beforehand, and, as if to concede the lack of substance in their agendum, that "the past dialogue had no prior topics, a fact which did not cause any obstacle to the dialogue."

Contrary to their allegation, prior determination of an agenda cannot constitute an intervention in the prime ministers' meeting, nor can it impose any restriction on the talks. It should also be known that one of the reasons behind the protracted stalemate of the previous inter-Korean dialogue was the failure to fix agenda items beforehand.

In the meantime, north Korea insists on the use of the words "collaboration" and "unity" in its draft agendum. The problem is that these words are apt to be misunderstood in their conception, and in fact the north Koreans attach insidious political implications to them. If these problematic words were allowed in agenda, it would certainly touch off a dispute over their interpretation, impeding the progress of dialogue.

North Korea concedes that systems and ideologies differ between the south and the north, and some misunderstanding and distrust prevail between the two sides. It insists the two sides nevertheless should collaborate and unite with each other and pave the way toward peaceful unification, transcending such differences.

It is true that as the north Koreans assert there does exist a considerable depth of misunderstanding and distrust between the two sides. This mutual distrust may well be the greatest obstacle to inter-Korean exchanges and peaceful unification of the fatherland. Nothing, therefore, can be more crucial and exigent than elimi-

nation of this very distrust.

Removal of distrust cannot be accomplished overnight, but can be realized only through steady cooperation and exchanges. Exchanges and cooperation give rise to trust, based on which exchanges and cooperation can be expanded, bringing about a deeper mutual trust.

The deep-rooted mutual distrust prevailing between the south and the north can by no means be dispelled by words only, nor can it fade away by itself in due course, as the north Koreans argue. The distrust can be removed only by deeds. The two sides should carry out exchanges and cooperation, beginning with easy projects in realistically practicable areas, and steadily expand such exchanges and cooperation.

In short, north Korea's draft agendum lacks justness and rationality, for it is not clear in its meaning and fails to produce anything concrete with respect to the question of what the prime ministers of the two sides would discuss when they meet. In the following pages, we shall take a closer look at what the north Koreans intend to seek by means of the words "collaboration" and "unity."

b. North Korea's Conception of "Collaboration" and "Unity"

At the south-north working-level contacts, north Korea set forth as the agendum of the proposed prime ministers' meeting the phrase "Concerning the Expedition of Independent and Peaceful Unification of the Fatherland through Collaboration and Unity in all Areas of the South and the North." The Republic of Korea, however, maintains it cannot accept the use of the two words "collaboration" and "unity" in the agenda, pointing out that the words as used in north Korea carry insidious political implications.

This is not the first time that a controversy has developed over these words. A heated debate flared up between the two sides as far back as late 1972 when the north Koreans introduced the word "col-

laboration" in their call for the "realization of political, economic and cultural 'collaboration' and cooperation between the south and the north" at the second co-chairmen's meeting of the South-North Coordinating Committee held in Pyongyang November 2-3.

What are the implications of these words "collaboration" and "unity" the north Koreans are so fond of? What do they attempt to gain through these words?

At the fourth working-level contact, north Korea strove to cover up the underlying meaning of the words when they contended that the word "collaboration" may well be taken to mean "cooperation."

The Republic of Korea delegation made it clear that it is opposed to these words because north Korea has attached to the words political meanings different from their inherent meanings, and is using them as special political terminology in an attempt to help attain their unilateral political goals. The delegation said it is against the words also because the political scheme lurking behind the words runs counter to the task of peaceful unification.

The Korean Language Dictionary published in 1962 by the Publishing Co. of the north Korean Academy of Science describes the meaning of "collaboration" as "to carry out tasks jointly by pooling strength," and that of "unity" as "to become united into a single entity (in terms of ideology, intention and conduct)." But these definitions are no more than simple dictionary-like interpretations of the words.

An official book entitled "Theories of Revolution in South Korea and Unification of the Fatherland Based on Juche Idea" published in 1975 by the Social Science Publishing Co. of the Workers' (Communist) Party in observance of the 30th anniversary of the Workers' Party, clearly indicates that a wicked trap lurks beneath the words "collaboration" and "unity" as used in north Korea.

Discussing the issue of "collaboration" on page 229, the publication said, "In general, wide-ranging collaboration and exchanges in a broad scope incorporating politics, military, foreign policy, economy and culture, mean that states or groups formed with political and economic capabilities take joint steps by pooling their

strength for a certain objective, and mutually give and take on the principle of mutual cooperation.”

The same publication says on page 232, “The collaboration and exchanges to take place between the south and the north, no matter in whatever area — politics, economy or military — they may be made, must be realized inevitably through frequent contacts and travel back and forth between broad political forces and between persons of various groups on a whole-nation level.” It goes on to say that “wide-ranging collaboration and exchanges between the south and the north would enable south Korea, being subjugated to an external force, to detach itself from the tiger’s grip and to maintain independent national dignity, by solving all problems pending between the two sides on the basis of the socialistic capability of the northern half.”

North Korea argues that “most important among the many-sided collaborations and exchanges that must be realized between the two sides is political collaboration,” asserting that “for political collaboration, the south and the north should first take common steps in a political struggle to eliminate intervention of external forces.” It also maintains that “in order to achieve unification peacefully, the two sides should cooperate in strict observance of the demands of peaceful principle.”

North Korea further says that “a higher form of political collaboration is to discuss open-heartedly all problems, small and large, raised in the course of unification by holding a wide-ranging political conference or a grand national meeting, and also jointly to discuss, determine and execute important matters related to the destiny of the nation through a south-north confederation system.”

“Military collaboration,” north Korea contends, “is meant to cope jointly with alien aggression and safeguard the nation’s sovereignty, and for the military authorities of the south and the north to hold bilateral military talks to discuss the questions of making a guarantee against the use of arms, of forming a joint south-north military committee in place of the existing Military Armistice Commission, and of bringing a halt to the military build-

up and arms race.”

Similarly, “collaboration in the area of diplomacy” is for the south and the north “to join the United Nations and other international organizations under a single representation and a single name of the country, and to undertake unified conduct in the external arena.” They say “collaboration in economy is to restore and develop the economy of south Korea, which was destroyed due to the intrusion of the monopolistic capital of American and Japanese imperialism.”

The word “unity” also carries a politically deviated meaning in north Korea. The north Koreans argue that “the principle of grand national unity reflects the objective demands of revolutionary struggle, that are for the whole people to smash the American imperialists’ policy to split and estrange the nation, and to rally solidly around the banners of anti-American and nation-saving struggles and national unification.”

The publication asserts on page 213 that “therefore, all the people should achieve a grand national unity around the banners of anti-American and nation-saving struggles and national unification to realize the great task of national unification, transcending differences in ideologies ideas, political views, faiths and systems.”

Moreover, they contradict themselves by saying, on one hand, that “the principle of unity is not to force one’s ideology, idea and system upon the other (p. 215),” and demanding, on the other, the abrogation of south Korea’s anti-Communist policy.

In short, according to the north Koreans, “political collaboration” means the convocation of a “grand national conference” or the institution of a “south-north federation system,” ideas both conceived as means of achieving national unification under communism, while “military collaboration” is aimed basically at causing the withdrawal of American forces from Korea. “Collaboration in diplomacy” is for the two sides to enter the United Nations under the single ticket of the so-called “Koryo Federation Republic,” and “economic collaboration” is to condemn the economic structure of the Republic of Korea as a “colonial economy” and thereby bring

down the high growth rate achieved under the free economic system.

In this way, the concept of the words "collaboration" and "unity" advocated by north Korea lies in the total rejection of the Republic of Korea, let alone the historical continuity of its system. These words are of empty and fictitious nature, wholly incompatible with the stern reality of the division of the country.

Thus seen, it becomes more than apparent why the north Koreans are so adamant to use the two controversial words in the agenda for the prime ministers' meeting.

In the event the Republic of Korea agrees to the use of the words, it would inevitably result in acceding even to the political implications embodied therein, setting the stage for the north Koreans to demand, when the proposed meeting is convened, the withdrawal of U.S. forces, repeal of the Anti-Communist and National Security Laws, and adoption of a policy of "alliance with communism" on the grounds that the American military presence and the south's anti-Communist policy stand in the way of "collaboration" and "unity."

This is why the Republic of Korea cannot accept the use of "collaboration" and "unity" in the agenda.

What the proposed prime ministers' meeting really needs under the circumstances is ideologically colorless and practicable topics such as the ones advanced by the Republic of Korea, that call for a phased approach toward the Korean question, namely, "mutual trust first, then consolidation of peace and ultimately peaceful unification."

3. Issue of Title of Prime Ministers' Meeting

Along with the issue of the agenda, the question of a title for the prime ministers' talks remains unsettled at the working-level contacts. At the working-level contacts so far, the two sides referred to the prime ministers' talks in different ways. The Republic of Korea side referred to a "dialogue between the prime ministers" while

north Korea used the title "premiers' contact" "premiers' seeing."

Here, the Republic of Korea delegation pointed out at the third working-level contact that it is awkward for the same people using the same language to use different titles for the proposed meeting. At the fourth contact, the delegation proposed that the prime ministers' talks be uniformly called "the meeting between the prime ministers of the south and the north," stating that it is advisable for the two sides to use a uniform title in order to make clear the nature of the dialogue between the prime ministers, high authorities.

The north Koreans, however, insisted that the meeting should be called either "contact" or any other titles convenient to each side, asserting that "it is natural to call the meeting 'contact' inasmuch as the north Korean premier, in his message to the south Korean Prime Minister, proposed a dialogue between the south and the north or a 'contact' aimed at urging independent unification of the country, which was agreed to by the south Korean side."

Inasmuch as the high authorities of the two sides are to meet not for casual chatting but over important problems, it should naturally be called a "meeting." Besides, the issue of a title for the prime ministers' talks is inseparably related to the agenda question.

Since the title of a meeting usually defines the objective and nature of the meeting, it is quite natural for the Republic of Korea delegation to propose the use of a uniform title, "meeting between the prime ministers of the south and the north," for the proposed talks. Even in the previous dialogue, the two sides used the uniform title "conference" for the Red Cross talks and the single word "meeting" in the South-North Joint Communique of 1972.

Since the prime ministers are to meet not merely for seeing each other but for business conference in expectation of substantial achievement, the meeting ought to be called "meeting between the prime ministers of the south and the north."

The north Korean attempt to downgrade and obscure the prime ministers' talks into mere ambiguous "seeing" or "contact" breeds the suspicion that the north Koreans are scheming to lead the proposed meeting into a "south-north political conference" instead

of a “dialogue between the authorities.”

North Korea should desist from the ambiguous posture and show more sincerity so that the two sides can discuss important national affairs effectively through the “meeting of the prime ministers of the two sides.”

The following is the gist of the remarks made by the Republic of Korea chief delegate at the sixth working-level contact on the question of title of the proposed meeting:

As our side already stated at the fourth working-level contact, it is quite unnatural for the two sides to use different words when they refer to the proposed dialogue between the prime ministers of the south and the north.

Believing that the two sides had better use a uniform phrase in order to make clear the objective and nature of the dialogue between the prime ministers — high authorities — of the south and the north, our side has already suggested that the dialogue be uniformly called “meeting between the prime ministers of the south and the north.”

However, your side objected to our proposal and insisted that it should be called “contact between the prime ministers of the south and the north.” The objective of a “meeting” is clear to anyone’s eyes. We regard it ambiguous and unnatural for anyone to term as mere “contact” a meeting at which high authorities like the prime ministers of the south and the north are to discuss and solve important national problems.

Since the two prime ministers are to discuss concretely important national affairs instead of merely shaking hands and leaving, it is more than natural that the dialogue should be called a “meeting.”

Your side, too, has said on many occasions that the prime ministers of the south and the north “should have an open-hearted exchange of opinions.” We cannot understand why your side, nevertheless, opposes the use of the word “meeting” for the important talks between the two prime ministers and insists on

“contact.”

As your side, too, well knows, the two sides jointly used the word “conference” for the past Red Cross talks, and the word “meeting” in the South-North Joint Communiqué of 1972. What is the reason you cannot use the word “meeting” this time?

Your side has suggested that the two sides call the prime ministers’ talks whatever terms each side pleases. But if we cannot unify words like this for a meeting designed to discuss the important question of national unification between the same people using the same language, how can we solve inter-Korean problems after all?

We believe that the two sides should adopt the title “meeting between the prime ministers of the south and the north” and thereby demonstrate that we are carrying on a dialogue smoothly and with a clear objective. I again urge your side to show an affirmative response to this question.

Part IV

Reference

Chronology of Current South-North Dialogue

«1979»

- December 20 — The north Korean Olympic Committee, in a radio broadcast, proposes to the Republic of Korea Amateur Sports Association (KASA) that a meeting be held on January 17, 1980 to discuss the issue of forming a single team for the Moscow Olympics.
- December 24 — Park Chong-kyu, KASA president, says he has not formally received the north Korean proposal of December 20.
- December 26 — The north Korean Olympic Committee, in a radio broadcast, notifies KASA that it would send two liaison officers to Panmunjom at 12 noon on December 27 to deliver a message on the proposal for a single south-north Korean team.
- December 27 — The SNCC Seoul side receives a north Korean message at the NNSC conference room at Panmunjom.

«1980»

- January 9 — The SNCC Seoul-side spokesman announces that a message from the KASA president addressed to the north Korean Olympic Committee chairman would be delivered at 12 noon on January 11 at Panmunjom.
- January 11 — The SNCC Seoul-side delivers the KASA president's message to north Korea, in which the KASA president:
- Stated the north Korean offer could hardly be implemented, and instead proposed that goodwill sports matches be held between the two sides.
 - Welcomed north Korea's participation in international games taking place in Seoul this year.
 - Proposed a meeting after the Moscow Olympics to discuss the question of overall sports exchanges between the two sides.
- January 11 — North Korea asks for the reopening of the direct south-north telephone line, saying that:
- It unsuccessfully tried to have a telephone conversation with the south.
 - It hopes that the Seoul side will receive its call at 6 p.m. on January 11.
- January 11 — North Korea announces that it would deliver messages on matters related to unification to the south at 2 a.m. on January 12 at Panmunjom.
- January 11 — North Korea, in a statement by the spokesman of the Council for Peaceful Unification of the Fatherland, asserts that it made a telephone call to the south in an effort to reopen the direct telephone line at 6 p.m. on January 11, but the Seoul side arbitrarily hung up.

- January 12 — The SNCC Seoul-side spokesman, in a statement, states that:
- North Korea rang up on the direct telephone at 8:07 p.m. on January 11, but when the Seoul side demanded that an authorized person use the telephone, north Korea unilaterally suspended the call.
 - North Korea announces that it would deliver some letters to the south. The Seoul side inquires who would send them and to whom.
- January 12 — North Korea says the letters at issue are signed by Lee Jong-ok and Kim Il and addressed to government authorities and representatives of political parties and social organizations in south Korea.
- January 12 — The SNCC Seoul side receives letters of north Korea's Lee Jong-ok and Kim Il.
- January 18 — President Choi Kyu-hah announces in his New Year press conference a plan to promote positively the proposed meeting between the prime ministers of the south and the north.
- January 19 — The north Korean Olympic Committee announces in a radio broadcast that it would send a second message to the south at 12 noon on January 21.
- January 21 — The SNCC Seoul side receives the second message of the north Korean Olympic Committee.
- January 22 — A north Korean radio broadcast charges that the trial of Yun Po-sun, Hahm Suk-hon, etc. is a scheme to impede the inter-Korean dialogue.
- January 22 — North Korea sends letters signed by Kim Il to some anti-Seoul Koreans abroad, proposing a meeting to discuss unification.
- January 23 — The SNCC Seoul-side spokesman announces that a message from Prime Minister Shin Hyon-hwack to north Korea's Lee Jong-ok will be delivered to the north at 10 a.m. on January 24 at Panmunjom.
- January 24 — The SNCC Seoul side delivers Prime Minister Shin Hyon-hwack's message to the north and makes public its contents. In his message, Prime Minister Shin:
- Proposes a meeting between the prime ministers of the south and the north.
 - Proposes that working-level contacts be held to prepare procedural matters for the prime ministers' talks:
 - Delegates** — Three delegates including a vice-minister-level chief delegate and a few attendants from each side.
 - Time:** 10 a.m., February 6, 1980.
 - Place:** The Freedom House at Panmunjom or another place mutually agreed on.
- January 28 — A north Korean radio broadcast charges that "persecution of democratic personages is a plot designed to monopolize the inter-Korean dialogue."

January 29 — North Korea announces it would deliver Lee Jong-ok's reply to the message of Prime Minister Shin at 10 a.m. on January 30 at Panmunjom.

January 30 — The SNCC Seoul side receives Lee Jong-ok's reply.

January 30 — The SNCC Seoul side announces that north Korea, in Lee Jong-ok's reply, agreed to hold working-level contacts as suggested by Prime Minister Shin.

February 1 — The SNCC Seoul side announces that north Korea also stated in Lee Jong-ok's reply that it would send a three man delegation headed by a deputy director of the Central Committee of the Workers' (Communist) Party and concurrently State Council councilor and two technical personnel to the NNSC conference room at Panmunjom at 10 a.m. on February 6.

February 4 — The SNCC Seoul side states that:

— A Republic of Korea working-level delegation consisting of three working-level delegates including a vice-minister-level chief delegate and two attendants would be sent to Panmunjom at 10 a.m. on February 6.

— The Republic of Korea working-level delegation would carry credentials signed by Prime Minister Shin. It is expected that the north Korean delegation would carry credentials signed by Lee Jong-ok.

February 5 — The SNCC Seoul side makes public the list of the Republic of Korea working-level delegates:

— **Chief Delegate: Kim Young-choo**, ambassador of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Delegate: Chung Chong-shik, director of the Office of Policy Planning, Board of National Unification

Delegate: Lee Dong-bok, director of the South-North Conference Secretariat

— The working-level delegation would be accompanied by two attendants.

February 5 — North Korea makes public the list of its working-level delegates:

— **Chief Delegate: Hyon Chun-guk**, deputy director of the Central Committee of the Workers' (Communist) Party and concurrently State Council councilor

Delegate: Yim Chun-kil, a State Council director

Delegate: Paek Chun-hyok, a State Council director

February 6 — The first south-north working-level contact takes place to prepare for the proposed meeting between the prime ministers of the south and the north at 10 a.m., at the NNSC conference room.

— Contentions of both sides:

Republic of Korea: The proposed prime ministers' meeting should be held in Geneva, and prior arrangement of agenda is necessary.

North Korea: The meeting should be held in Seoul and Pyongyang by turn, and no prior arrangement of agenda is necessary.

— Matters Agreed on:

The direct south-north telephone line would be reopened effective at 10 a.m. on February 7, 1980.

Working-level contacts would be held at the Freedom House and Panmungak alternately.

February 7 — The direct south-north telephone line reopens.

February 19 — The second working-level contact takes place.

— Matters Agreed on:

Procedural matters of the prime ministers' talks (whether to open meeting, documentation, recording, press briefing, time, facilities, marking)

The third working-level contact is to be held at the Freedom House at 10 a.m. on March 4, 1980.

February 20 — North Korea denounces the joint Korea-U.S. military exercise "Team Spirit '80."

March 3 — The ROKNRC president makes public a radio message addressed to Son Sung-pil, chairman of the north Korean Red Cross, in which the ROKNRC president asked his north Korean counterpart to cooperate in securing the early return of the fishermen of the Haewang-ho Nos. 6 and 7 who had been missing since last January 22.

March 4 — The third working-level contact takes place at the Freedom House. North Korea counterproposes on the question of the venue for the proposed meeting:

— The venue of the contacts between the prime ministers of the south and the north shall be Panmunjom.

— The contacts shall be held at Panmungak and the Freedom House at Panmunjom alternately.

— The first contact shall be held at Panmungak.

— After the first contact, subsequent contacts shall be held in Seoul and Pyongyang by turn through mutual agreement.

March 18 — The fourth working-level contact takes place at Panmungak. Matters Agreed on:

-- The meeting between the prime ministers shall be held at the Freedom House and Panmungak by turn.

-- If either of the two sides wishes to change the venue, it shall be discussed mutually.

* The venue of the first meeting between the prime ministers shall be determined when the time of the proposed meeting is discussed and settled.

March 23 — Three armed north Korean agents are shot dead while infiltrating across the Han River.

March 25 — An infiltrating armed north Korean boat is sunk off Pohang.

- March 27 — Three armed north Korean agents intrude 600 meters south of the Military Demarcation Line in the area of Kumhwa, Kangwon-do.
- April 1 — The fifth working-level contact takes place at the Freedom House.
- April 16 — The ROKNRC spokesman announces that a message would be delivered to NKRC's Son Sung-pil the following day.
- April 17 — A message from ROKNRC President Lee Ho is delivered to NKRC's Son Sung-pil at 12 noon at Panmunjom. In the message, the ROKNRC president calls for early return of the fishermen of the Haewang-ho Nos. 6 and 7 being held in the north.
- April 18 — The sixth working-level contact takes place at Panmungak.
- April 22 — NKRC sends a radio message to ROKNRC President Lee Ho, expressing willingness to cooperate in the return of the south Korean fishermen held in the north.
- April 22 — The ROKNRC president comments on a NKRC radio message.
- May 6 — The seventh working-level contact takes place at the Freedom House.
- May 6 — NKRC, in a radio message, asks the ROKNRC to provide materials necessary for the return of the fishermen.
- May 9 — The ROKNRC announces that a message would be delivered to the NKRC the following day.
- May 10 — The ROKNRC delivers the list of fishermen held in the north to the NKRC through Panmunjom.
- May 22 — The eighth working-level contact takes place at Panmungak.
- June 23 — North Korea, via telephone message, announces that Hyun Chun-guk, north side's chief delegate will not attend at the ninth working-level contact due to his alleged ill health.
- June 24 — The ninth working-level contact takes place at the Freedom House.
- July 4 — SNCC Seoul side spokesman issues a statement marking the 8th anniversary of the announcement of the South-North Joint Communiqué.

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
I.P.O. Box 4161

Seoul, Korea

No. 024

Nov. 1980

South-North Dialogue in Korea



Conference Hall for Proposed Prime Ministers' Meeting

A new building erected exclusively for the proposed meeting between the prime ministers of the south and the north of Korea, which incorporates the will and efforts of the south Koreans to realize the prime ministers' talks.

The conference hall was built in the southern sector of the Joint Security Area of Panmunjom for use as the venue for the proposed prime ministers' meeting if it takes place at Panmunjom as suggested. It was dedicated on June 19, 1980, five days before the 9th round of the south-north working-level contacts. Ground was broken for the structure on May 7. The construction cost 161,280,000 won.

The steel-plate, pre-fab building, with floor space of 462 square meters, comprises a conference room, a press room, attendants' room, and auxiliary facilities.

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Part I

The Fifth Republic Defines Will for Peaceful Unification

1. New Constitutional Provision Relating to Peaceful Unification

The Constitution of the Fifth Republic promulgated on October 27, 1980, which will serve as the framework of a new era, incorporates the idea of creating a democratic welfare state as well as the nation's historic mission of realizing peaceful unification of the homeland.

This is a manifestation of the nation's forward-looking determination to pursue the issue of national unification more positively by consolidating public opinion and promoting inter-Korean dialogue in a national consensus.

The parts of the preamble and provisions of the new Constitution relating to the question of peaceful unification are as follows.

— Ed.

Preamble - "We, the people of Korea, ... imbued with the sublime spirit of independence as manifested in the March First Movement, upon the birth of the democratic Fifth Republic charged with the historic mission of peaceful unification of the homeland and national renaissance, having determined: To consolidate national unity with justice, humanitarianism and brotherly love"

Article 68. (1) An Advisory Council on Peaceful Unification Policy may be established to advise the President on the formulation of peaceful unification policy.

(2) The organization, function and other necessary matters pertaining to the Advisory Council on Peaceful Unification Policy shall be determined by law.

2. President Chun Expresses Will to Peaceful Unification

President Chun Doo-hwan, who took office as the 11th term

President of the Republic on September 1, 1980 has expressed his firm determination to pursue peaceful unification of the homeland by saying, "Unification of the nation and its territory must be achieved in a peaceful manner" and "I shall exert sincere efforts with patience to reopen the inter-Korean dialogue which north Korea has unilaterally suspended."

The following consists of part of President Chun's remarks with respect to the issue of national unification. — Ed.

"... Our determination to build a democratic welfare state is ultimately linked to the goal of peaceful unification of our homeland. The government will conduct the South-North dialogue with tenacity in order to achieve this paramount national task, concentrating on settling the most amenable problems first.

"I expect to speak of this South-North issue in more detail at another time. For the moment, I wish to express my conviction that war must be prevented on the Korean peninsula, and that national and territorial unification must be achieved only through peaceful means..."

— *From the President's Inaugural Address* —

"... Our final task in the effort to build a democratic welfare state is to maintain an immovable will to national unification. Our unification policy should be one calling for peaceful unification realized by means of bona fide competition.

"To achieve reunification, we must steadily pursue the solution of inter-Korean issues, at first easy and small matters, with more difficult and bigger problems deal with later. In this effort, we must take the lead with perseverance and tenacity, and with national consensus, by consolidating the free will of the whole people.

"The north Korean Communists should know that if they ignore our efforts toward, and our will to achieve, peaceful unification and continue to harbor the scheme of communizing

the whole Korean peninsula by force of arms, they will suffer irrecoverable punishment...”

— *From the President's address made at a ceremony marking his retirement from active military service, August 22, 1980. —*

“... With the recognition that restoration of mutual trust between the south and the north by means of a direct dialogue between the authorities of south and north Korea and exchanges and cooperation is most important for the alleviation of tensions and consolidation of peace on the Korean peninsula, the government will exert sincere efforts with perseverance to resume the inter-Korean dialogue which the north Korean Communists have unilaterally suspended.

“In addition, the government will launch many-faceted diplomacy and overseas publicity activities with a view to further widening the base of international support for our constructive peaceful unification policy....”

— *From the President's policy address on the introduction of the 1981 national budget bill to the Legislative Assembly for National Security, October 21, 1980 —*

Part II

South-North Working-Level Contacts

1. Ninth Contact

The ninth south-north working-level contact aimed at preparing for the proposed meeting between the prime ministers of the south and the north zones of Korea was held at Freedom House in Panmunjom on June 24, 1980, one month after the previous contact took place. The contact lasted for two hours and five minutes, from 10 a.m. to 12:05 p.m.

At the contact, which north Korea's chief delegate Hyun Chung-guk did not attend on the grounds of poor health, the north Korean delegation indulged only in a propagandist tirade on the internal affairs of south Korea that had nothing to do with the business of the working-level contacts, refusing to discuss preparations for the proposed prime ministers' conference.

The ninth contact failed to register any progress except for agreement to hold the next contact at Panmungak at 10 a.m. on August 20.

Speaking at the contact, chief ROK delegate Kim Young-choo urged north Koreans to agree on the early solution of the dead-locked working-level contacts in conformity with the expectations of the 50 million Koreans and the wishes of the whole world. The chief ROK delegate noted that four and a half months had passed since the working-level delegates of the two sides initiated contacts to work out procedural matters for the prime ministers' meeting which the two sides had agreed in principle to hold with a view to improving their relations and easing tensions and laying the foundation for peaceful unification.

Chief Delegate Kim then made a new proposal, offering a two-point topic for the proposed prime ministers' meeting in place of the three previously advanced agenda items. The newly proposed agenda items were:

Item No. 1 – The question of fostering mutual trust and easing tensions between the south and the north of Korea

through exchanges and cooperation between them.

Item No. 2 – The question of peaceful unification of the fatherland.

The chief delegate also suggested that the first round of the prime ministers' meeting should be held during the month of August or September 1980 at the latest, and that the venue for the first round of the prime ministers' meeting be determined between Freedom House and Panmungak in consideration of the wishes of the north Korean side.

The following are excerpts from the speech by chief ROK delegate Kim Young-choo concerning the new proposal.

Your side has unilaterally denounced our side's draft agenda merely for denouncement's sake. You have asserted that our three-point draft agenda "can hardly be agreed on because it is itemized," and rejected, as "lacking any intent for unification," the position of our side that calls first for the creation of a base for genuine peaceful unification by fostering an atmosphere for mutual trust and consolidating peace.

What is more, although your side has consistently talked aloud about an "independent and peaceful" unification, your side has been found recently defying your side's own words with deeds by trying all out to involve the Non-aligned countries, obviously outside forces, in the settlement of the unification question, in spite of the fact that our working-level contacts were still in progress to make preparations for the proposed prime ministers' meeting.

Such an attempt by your side is an eloquent testimony to how double-faced is your posture toward the inter-Korean dialogue and how mutually contradictory are your words and deeds regarding the issue of independent and peaceful unification.

Your side's recent abortive attempt to make non-aligned countries interfere in the Korean question shows especially

clearly that the shining sun cannot be covered up with such double, deceptive and hypocritical attempt of your side. At the Non-aligned Coordinating Committee session at the United Nations headquarters on June 18, your side tried to influence the non-aligned countries into meddling in the question of the Korean peninsula, based on your side's unilateral and malignant allegations. But this attempt was totally thwarted, faced with opposition from many countries living up to the principle of non-alliance.

Our side is convinced that, your side's insincere attitude notwithstanding, the prime ministers' talks we are promoting should be realized at an early date, without any further delay, in order to resuscitate the hopes of our people who are suffering great anguish due to national division. We believe that to this end, the two sides — the South and the North — should display the spirit of mutual compromise and concession, and thereby cooperate in the early solution of a few items yet to be settled at the working-level contacts.

It is with these, our innermost feelings that I and the rest of my delegation would like to seek an early solution to the issue of agenda topics for the proposed prime ministers' talks, even taking into maximum account your side's positions and views as revealed at the previous working-level contacts.

Our side wishes to propose to your side a package settlement of the several remaining procedural matters, including the issue of agenda, on which we have failed as yet to reach agreement. In this connection, our side makes the following drastic proposal. I hope that your side will recognize the drastic nature of our new proposal, which duly takes into consideration the conflicting positions of the two sides in a display of the spirit of mutual concession, and will agree to it.

Our new proposal is as follows:

First, the agenda items at the prime ministers' meeting shall

be:

Item No. 1 — The question of fostering mutual trust and easing tensions between the south and the north of Korea through exchanges and cooperation between them.

Item No. 2 — The question of peaceful unification of the fatherland.

Second, the question of the date of the first round of the prime ministers' meeting:

The first round of the prime ministers' meeting shall be held during the coming month of August, or September at the latest. In line with the spirit of the agreement on holding the prime ministers' talks in the two sectors of Panmunjom by turn, the second round shall be held one month after the first.

Third, the question of the venue of the first round of the prime ministers' meeting:

The venue of the first round of the prime ministers' meeting shall be determined from between the Freedom House and Panmungak, according to your side's wish.

I hope that your side will fully understand the position of myself and the rest of my delegation, and will carefully study the significance of the epochal proposal our side laid down today, accepting it with an exhibition of the spirit of reciprocity corresponding to our own. I expect that we will mutually cooperate in the erection of a brilliant monument in the solution of our task of national unification, by winding up successfully all the tasks given to our working-level contacts by, if possible, July at the latest, so as to facilitate the realization of the prime ministers' talks no later than August or September.

I look forward to your side's affirmative study and review.

Notwithstanding this epochal suggestion, the north Korean delegation remained solely engrossed in the defamation of the Republic of Korea on such internal issue, not related in any way to

the business of the working-level contacts. In their malignant propaganda tirade, the north Koreans set forth stereotyped "prerequisites" all geared to interference in the internal affairs of the south, while refusing to discuss the question of fixing the topics for the proposed prime ministers' talks on excuse of a cabinet reshuffle in the south, asserting, "Since the Prime Minister of the south who signed the credentials exchanged at the first working-level contact has resigned and there isn't any Prime Minister in the south in reality, it is meaningless to discuss agenda topics."

Reacting to the propaganda allegations, Lee Dong-bok, a ROK delegate, urged the north Koreans to stop attempting to use the dialogue as a means of gaining their ulterior political objectives, and to return to reason and cooperate in the early solution of the business of the working-level contacts. Lee stressed that north Korea should refrain from raising disputes unreasonably with respect to the internal affairs of the other side in the dialogue, for, he said, such interference is bound to result in feeding tensions, apart from the question of whether such meddling is warranted or not.

The ninth working-level contact, too, ended without any progress due to the north Koreans' refusal to discuss the issue of determining the topics for the proposed prime ministers' meeting.

As for the time of the next contact, the Republic of Korea delegation suggested July 8, whereas the north Korean side offered August 26, no less than two months later. When the ROK delegation offered as compromise that the next contact be held in late July, the north Koreans counter-proposed, and held fast to, August 20. The 10th working-level contact was set to be held at Pan-mungak at 10 a.m. on August 20.

One thing worthy of notice is that signs of north Korean loss of interest in the contacts began to surface at this ninth contact. Their chief delegate Hyun Chun-guk failed to attend it on the pretext of sickness; they refused to go into substantial discussion, demanding the repeal of Martial Law and release of those arrested in the south; and they insisted on holding the next contact two months later despite the past practice of convening them at about a two-week in-

terval.

On June 23, only one day before the ninth contact, north Korea informed the south over the direct telephone that its chief delegate would not attend for health reasons. This was not the first time north Korea's chief negotiator "fell ill" only a few days before a scheduled meeting. On January 6, 1975, two days before the ninth vice chairmen's meeting of the South-North Coordinating Committee, north Korea notified the south of the replacement of its vice chairman, Ryu Jang-shik, on the ground of his sickness. Four months later, north Korea said it was putting off the 11th vice chairmen's meeting, slated for May 29, indefinitely, breaking off the last remaining thread of dialogue.

Emerging from the unfruitful contact, Lee Dong-bok said, "We deplore the intransigent attitude of north Korea, but we will restrain our emotion and carry on the working-level contacts with sincerity and patience in a bid to bring the inter-Korean dialogue to success." Lee also said that at the beginning of the ninth contact, he asked the north Koreans to return the fishermen of the Haewang-ho boats Nos. 6 and 7, forcibly captured by north Korean gunboats early in the year, at an early date from a humanitarian viewpoint. However, he said, the north Korean delegates made an incomprehensible response, saying, "The fishermen are reluctant to return to the south in fear for their personal safety."

2. Tenth Contact

The tenth south-north working-level contact was held at 10 a.m. on August 20, 1980 at Panmungak in the northern sector of Panmunjom. At the contact, held two months after the previous one, the two sides failed even to enter discussion of the issue of agenda topics due to the north's insincere attitude and preposterous argument. The contact ended at 11:30 a.m. after agreeing to hold the eleventh contact at Freedom House on September 26, 1980.

At the tenth contact, as on the previous occasion, Yim Chun-gil acted for chief north Korean delegate Hyun Chun-guk, who did not

attend it for "health reasons." Yim asserted at the outset that the tenth contact should be postponed and held at Panmungak on September 30. The north Korean delegate, insisting that "we have come here today not to have a meeting but to make a notification under authority delegated by the Premier of our State Council," argued that "it is utterly meaningless to hold a prime ministers' contact because the anti-Communist agitation against us has reached a peak and because there is no qualified Prime Minister in the south who can meet our Premier on the same footing at the prime ministers' talks." The north Korean delegation then suggested that the tenth contact be postponed until September 30 when it could take place at Panmungak.

Rejecting the north Korean allegation, Kim Young-choo, chief ROK delegate, called for normal progress of the day's contact, pointing out that the assertions of the north Korean delegates merely shed light on the ulterior motives of the north Koreans, apparently determined to call off the projected prime ministers' talks by any means. The chief ROK delegate noted that "the proposed prime ministers' meeting is supposed to be a conference between the authorities of prime ministerial level of the two sides rather than between any specific individual persons," saying that there undeniably exists a Prime Minister in the south who duly performs the duty of Prime Minister internally and externally. He said that the denial, notwithstanding, of the existence of the Prime Minister was an intolerable act against the other side in a dialogue. Chief delegate Kim told the north Koreans, "So far as the inter-Korean dialogue is concerned, there is no obstacle whatsoever on the part of our side. Your assertion that obstacles do exist in the south constitutes a very serious obstacle to the dialogue."

However, the north Korean delegation, rejecting the call for normal progress of the contact, insisted that "today's contact is not a working-level contact... We have come here today only to postpone the contact until a later day."

Reacting to the north Koreans' negativism, the ROK delegation emphasized that the day's contact should be carried on as schedul-

ed, saying, "We cannot accept your one-sided assertion because it represents a breach of etiquette against the other side in the dialogue." Pointing out that a meeting can be postponed for the reason of the situation of a party requesting such postponement, the ROK delegation said it is totally unthinkable for any party to demand postponement on account of the other side's situation. The ROK delegation said that if the north Korean side wanted a postponement of the contact because of its unpreparedness for the discussion of the issue of topics, then the day's contact should be taken as having been duly held, with the next contact scheduled at Freedom House at a time agreed on by both sides.

The two sides, unable to hold the tenth contact normally, agreed only to convene the next contact at Freedom House in the southern sector of Panmunjom on September 26, 1980. They even differed in views as to the numerical sequence of the next contact. The ROK delegation maintained it should be the 11th contact, whereas the north Koreans insisted they couldn't recognize the day's contact and, therefore, the next one should be the 10th. At the suggestion of the ROK delegation that they stop debating this and follow the precedent in which each of the two sides interpreted the conflicting definitions of words at its own convenience, the two sides agreed to hold the next working-level contact at Freedom House on September 26.

Emerging from the unproductive contact, ROK delegate Lee Dong-bok said, "The north Korean delegation appeared seeking to torpedo today's contact for propaganda purposes. But, since there was a substantial discussion through which the time and place of the next contact were agreed on and a north Korean offer was modified and adopted, today's contact cannot be taken as having miscarried and, therefore, the contact to take place on September 26 will be the 11th."

Meanwhile, before entering discussions at the tenth contact, chief ROK delegate Kim Young-choo, reminding north Koreans of the August 12 message of the ROKNRC president, urged the north to cooperate in the effort to resume the South-North Red

Cross Conference at an early date to solve the issue of dispersed families. The chief ROK delegate said, "Since the dispersed family issue is a pressing and important question, the Red Cross talks should be held forthwith so as to solve the problem before the convening of the proposed prime ministers' meeting." He also suggested that the two sides exchange groups of tomb visitors in the holiday season of Chusok.

But Yim Chun-gil, a north Korean delegate, shunned discussion of the suggestion, merely asserting that when the prime ministers' talks take place, the dispersed family issue can be discussed and settled comprehensively. "Since the working-level contacts are held to prepare for the prime ministers' meeting, working-level officials are supposed to be faithful only to their original duty," he said.

The ROK delegation further urged the north Koreans to see to it that the fishermen of the Haewang-ho boats Nos. 6 and 7, which were seized by north Korean gunboats in the Yellow Sea in January 1980, be released from a humanitarian considerations so that they could be reunited with their families before the upcoming Chusok holiday at the latest. But the north Korean delegation alleged that a check with northern authorities concerned showed that the fishermen themselves did not want to return to the south in fear of interrogation or imprisonment after their return. Yim Chun-gil of the northern delegation then argued that "if the southern authorities publicly guarantee the fishermen's safety, we would be willing to persuade them to return to the south." Lee Dong-bok, a ROK delegate, retorted the north Korean assertion by saying, "The free will of the fishermen can be ascertained if and when they are allowed to meet their families at Panmunjom."

3. Miscarriage of 11th Contact

On September 24, 1980, barely two days before the scheduled 11th south-north working-level contact designed to prepare for the proposed meeting of the prime ministers, north Korea unilaterally declared the suspension of working-level contacts, and refused to

receive telephone calls from the south over the direct south-north line.

With the suspension, working-level contacts came to a complete breakdown barely seven months after they were initiated on February 6, blocking the channel of the inter-Korean dialogue once again.

Despite the disruptive maneuver by the north Koreans, the ROK delegation, in a statement on September 26, publicly laid down a six-point proposal intended for the alleviation of tensions and substantial improvement of inter-Korean relations.

The fresh proposal was originally set to be offered at the 11th working-level contact slated for the same day. The full text of the statement of the ROK delegation, containing the new proposal, follows:

At seven p.m., September 24, 1980, only two days before the 11th South-North working-level contact slated for September 26, the north Korean side, in a move unmistakably aimed at unilaterally discontinuing the recent series of the South-north contacts, abruptly broadcast over the north Korean radios a statement allegedly issued in the name of the north Korean delegation to the Panmunjom contacts declaring that it would "no longer attend" the inter-Korean contacts "for the time being" on the ground of charges our side totally unrelated to the dialogue between the two sides of divided Korea.

We take note of the fact that the north Korean act as such constitutes a repetition of its similar deeds perpetrated in the past. For one thing, north Korea suspended the South-North Coordinating Committee and the full-dress South-North Red Cross meetings on August 28, 1973, by means of a unilateral statement broadcast over the north Korean radios, in flagrant violation of the express provisions of the South-North Joint Communiqué of July 4, 1972. For another, north Korean interrupted the Vice Chairmen's meetings of the South-North Coordinating Committee on May 29, 1975, by unilaterally declaring that the

11th Vice Chairmen's meeting slated for the following day was "indefinitely postponed." For still another, north Korea cut off the South-North Red Cross working-level meetings on March 19, 1978, again notifying our side of Korea unilaterally that the 26th working-level meeting scheduled for the following day was "indefinitely postponed." What was more, the north Koreans unilaterally discontinued the operation of the South-North direct telephone lines on August 30, 1976, simply by breaking away from an ongoing conversation between the two sides over the telephone. When viewed against these precedents, we cannot but conclude that the unilateral north Korean announcement of September 25 of its boycott of any further Panmunjom contacts is a replay of the old tricks that north Korea has repeatedly employed in the past to sabotage on ongoing dialogue with the other side of Korea.

Judging from their behavior, it seems all too evident that, from the very outset, the north Koreans have had no genuine intention to realize the proposed inter-Korean prime ministers' conference. It seems evident, in particular, that, as our side of Korea succeeded in overcoming the political instability and social confusion that temporarily followed the assassination of the late President Park Chung Hee on October 26, 1979, thanks to the extended imposition of the martial law on May 17, 1980, the north Korean side quickly began losing interest in the continuation of the Panmunjom working-level contacts, much less the realization of the proposed inter-Korean prime ministers' conference, as it found it impossible to make use of the dialogue any more as a means to take advantage of the aftermath of President Park's assassination for its own political gains. Following the extended imposition of the martial law on May 17 in our side of Korea, the north Korean side began trying to force the Panmunjom contacts to be held at increasingly greater intervals: Before May 17, the Panmunjom contacts were held once every two to three weeks. But, after May 17, the interval between the eighth and ninth contacts was extended to 40 days and that be-

tween the ninth and the tenth to two months. At the tenth contact held on August 20, the north Korean side unsuccessfully tried to make the contact an abortive one by proposing its postponement. And, the north Koreans are now found brazen-faced enough unilaterally to boycott any further Panmunjom contacts.

For a while, the north Koreans succeeded in blocking substantive discussions on the question of agenda of the prime ministers' conference, the only remaining procedural matter to be settled, by making issue of our side's temporarily having an "Acting Prime Minister," instead of a full "Prime Minister." But, with the confirmation of Prime Minister Nam Duck-woo by the National Assembly on September 22, the north Koreans apparently found it impossible to continue to make use of the alleged "absence of a full Prime Minister" in our side of Korea as an excuse to block the substantive discussions at the working-level contacts. Hence the north Korean announcement two days after Prime Minister Nam's confirmation by the National Assembly of its boycott of any further Panmunjom contacts.

In spite of north Korea's unilateral act as such, it remains our firm belief that we must do our best to realize the proposed inter-Korean prime ministers' conference, for we are seriously committed to the cause of easing the tensions and improving the relations between the South and the North of Korea, as a means of moving closer toward a peaceful resolution of the question of unification, through a meaningful dialogue directly between the responsible authorities of the two sides. We do not want to see the South-North dialogue fall again, like it did repeatedly in the past, due to the unilateral move of either of the two sides.

In that spirit, we are going to openly advance a new, dramatic proposal, the one originally prepared for presentation at the 11th working-level contact scheduled to take place today, with a view to seeking a package resolution of all the remaining procedural matters of the proposed prime ministers' conference. Our new proposal is as follows:

- a. We propose that the agenda of the proposed prime ministers' conference shall not be discussed any more at the working-level contacts so that it can be discussed, and agreed to, directly between the two prime ministers when they meet.
- b. We propose that the first prime ministers' conference shall be held between November 3 and 8, 1980, with the second conference taking place within a month after the first one.
- c. We propose that the north Korean side shall choose the venue of the first prime ministers' conference not only between the Freedom House and the Panmungak in Panmunjom, as agreed to previously, but also between Seoul and Pyongyang, if the north Korean side so wishes, with the second conference taking place at the comparable place in the other side of Korea.
- d. We propose that one delegate each of the two sides shall be appointed respectively by their chief delegates so that they can settle other minor procedural matters, as deemed necessary, for the holding of the prime ministers' conference, subjecting the agreements between them to confirmation by their chief delegates for going into effect.
- e. We propose that the two sides shall hold the 11th South-North working-level contact, originally scheduled to take place today at the Freedom House, on October 7, 1980, in order to discuss the new proposal advanced by our side in the above.
- f. We propose that, in due recognition of the need to ease the tensions and improve the relations between the two sides of divided Korea and to consolidate the peace and stability on the Korean peninsula, the South and the North of Korea shall continued, without interruption, to operate the two Seoul-Pyongyang direct telephone lines hitherto operated between the delegations of the two sides to the Panmunjom working-level contacts.

We firmly believe that, if the north Korean side is genuinely interested in seeking a peaceful resolution of the question of unification through a dialogue with us, there is no reason why the north Korean side should be reluctant to accept the new, comprehensive proposal advanced by our side in the above. Therefore, we look forward to a favorable response from the north Korean side soon.

Part III

Suspension of Working-Level Contacts

1. Suspension of Contacts by North Korea, and Efforts of the South for Resumption

Despite the ROK delegation's epochal six-point compromise proposal and suggestion that the 11th working-level contact be held at Freedom House on October 7, north Korea showed no response, and did not send its delegates to the site of the contacts at Panmunjom on October 7.

Lee Dong-bok, spokesman for the ROK delegation, issued a statement on October 7, calling upon north Korea to "return to reason and national conscience and respond affirmatively to our call for early resumption of the working-level contacts." The full text of the statement is as follows:

As is known, north Korea boycotted the 11th working-level contact set to be held on September 26 to discuss procedures for the proposed meeting between the prime ministers of south and north Korea, by declaring unilaterally on September 24 that "we will not attend the south-north contacts for the time being."

Our delegation, pointing to the unreasonableness of north Korea again suspending the dialogue unilaterally, proposed in a statement on September 26 a six-point compromise intended to facilitate the early opening of the prime ministers' talks.

In the proposal, we suggested that the question of agenda for the proposed prime ministers' conference should not be discussed further at the working-level contacts but that it be discussed, and agreed on, directly between the two prime ministers when they meet. It was also offered that the venue of the first prime ministers' meeting could be Panmunjom as agreed upon between the two sides or, if north Korea prefers, either Seoul or Pyongyang.

We proposed that the two sides resume the 11th working-level contact today in an effort to solve the remaining procedural matters based on the new compromise plan, and that

the first prime ministers' meeting be held November 3-8. We further suggested that even if the working-level meetings fail to take place for a while, the direct south-north telephone line should remain open, without interruption, for use in alleviating tensions between the south and the north and fostering peace and stability.

However, north Korea dismissed this epochal compromise and, in consequence, the 11th working-level contact we proposed for today failed to take place. This clearly indicates that north Korea intends to suspend the working-level contacts, altogether, as it had done on many occasions in the past.

Lately, north Korea, ignoring our constructive proposal of September 26, is trying to mislead public opinion through unrealistic and treacherous peace propaganda on the one hand, and, on the other, intensification of vicious and slanderous propaganda. It is pursuing an international strategem to instigate violent overthrow of our government.

The suspension at this time of the inter-Korean dialogue substantiates the fact that north Korea agreed to the working-level contacts with the intent of using the talks to agitate a violent revolution in the south, taking advantage of momentary confusion in the wake of the October 26th incident. But cutting off the direct south-north telephone line after a liaison conversation held at 10:30 a.m. September 25, north Korea has made it clear that from the beginning it had no interest in easing tensions, or in peace and stability.

We believe that despite such a treacherous and anti-national act, we cannot halt our efforts to hold a constructive and productive dialogue between the responsible authorities of south and north Korea. We once again appeal to the national conscience and sense of justice of north Korea, and call upon them to return to reason, and respond affirmatively to our repeated call to resume the working-level contacts at an early date.

2. North Korea's Avoidance of Contacts and Creation of Difficulties for Working-Level Contacts

Considering the long record of their acts of negativism with respect to the inter-Korean dialogue, it was not totally surprising to see the north Koreans suspend the working-level contacts. Their stereotyped tactics have been to come to the table of dialogue when they consider it to their advantage, and to boycott it by unilateral notice when they judge continued talks would not serve their interests.

The latest suspension proves once again that their oft-interrupted participation in the inter-Korean talks was not motivated by the effort to achieve national unification peacefully, but was no more than a means sought as part of their revolutionary strategy to communize the whole Korean peninsula.

Their reluctance to carry on the working-level contacts was first shown at the ninth contact on June 24. But, throughout the contacts, there were a number of acts and utterances that led objective observers to suspect their interest in the contacts was not designed to prepare for the proposed prime ministers' meeting. Among such negative or destructive deeds and utterances by the north Koreans were:

(1) Armed Provocations

March 23, 1980: Three armed agents infiltrate into the downstream area of the Han River.

March 25, 1980: One armed espionage boat intrudes in the sea near Pohang, Kyongsang-pukdo.

March 27, 1980: Three armed agents infiltrate 600 meters south of the Military Demarcation Line 5 kilometers east of Kumhwa, Kangwon-do.

September 9, 1980: The fishing boat Namjin-ho and its crew seized by north Korean gunboats while fishing in the East Sea.

(2) *Attempts to Prolong Interval of Working-Level Contacts*

- At the eighth contact, north Korea suggests that the next contact be held 40 days later, on July 1.
- At the ninth contact, north Korea suggests that the next meeting be held two months later, on August 26, attempting to prolong the previous 14 to 16 day interval of working-level contacts.
- At the tenth contact, north Korea attempts to postpone the tenth contact itself until September 30, one month later.

(3) *Absence of Chief North Korean Delegate*

- On June 23, 1980, north Korea informs the south over the direct south-north telephone line that its chief delegate, Hyun Chun-guk, would not attend the ninth contact due to health reasons.
- The north Korean chief delegate fails to attend the tenth contact for the same reason.

(4) *Attempts to Turn Contacts into Propaganda Forum*

Eighth Contact: North Korea refuses to discuss the issue of the agenda for the prime ministers' meeting, demanding that the south lift Martial Law, end military rule, and free arrested persons.

Ninth Contacts: North Korea refuses to discuss the issue of the agenda of the prime ministers' meeting, disputing the qualifications of the Prime Minister of the Republic of Korea.

Tenth Contact: North Korea refuses to go into the business of working-level contacts on the excuse of the qualifications of the Prime Minister of the Republic of Korea, and some internal affairs of the south.

(5) *Attempts to Suspend Working-Level Contacts*

North Korea suspends working-level contacts by an-

nouncing at 7 p.m. September 24, 1980 through Central Radio and Radio Pyongyang that "we will not attend working-level contacts for the time being" on the grounds of some internal affairs of the Republic of Korea.

Part IV

Other Developments in Inter-Korean Relations

«South-North Coordinating Committee»

— *Statement on 8th Anniversary of July 4 Communique* —

**I. Seoul Side Calls for “Full and Complete Observance”
of Joint Communique**

In a statement issued on July 4, 1980 on the occasion of the eighth anniversary of the issuance of the South-North Joint Communique, Lee Dong-bok, Seoul-side spokesman for the South-North Coordinating Committee (SNCC), again urged north Korea to observe the Joint Communique fully and completely, emphasizing that “to this end, the SNCC functions should be restored and its operation normalized at an early date.”

Spokesman Lee reaffirmed the consistent stand of the Seoul side that “we are willing to consider an expanded reorganization of the SNCC, if deemed necessary to normalize the SNCC operation.” The spokesman then strongly asked the north Korean side to come back to national conscience and common sense at an early date and cooperate with the Seoul side for the realization of the spirit and agreements of the Joint Communique by responding to the Seoul-side call for early normalization of the SNCC operation.

The full text of the statement by Spokesman Lee was as follows.

We mark today the 8th anniversary of the historic announcement of the South-North Joint Communique. Eight years ago today, the two sides of divided Korea aroused the expectations shared by the fifty million Koreans of both sides as a whole by announcing the South-North Joint Communique simultaneously in Seoul and Pyongyang, corresponding with their common aspirations for peace and stability on the Korean peninsula, as well as unification of their divided homeland achieved through mutual reconciliation.

To our regret, however, the expectations thus inspired did

not last long. Although the announcement of the Joint Communiqué was followed by the opening of the inter-Korean dialogue through two channels – the political South-North Coordinating Committee (SNCC) meetings and the humanitarian South-North Red Cross talks – the north Korean side unilaterally suspended the dialogue on both channels one year thereafter, after stalemating the dialogue for months over a string of unilateral demands. Since then, the north Korean side has continued to turn a deaf ear to our manifold efforts to resume the suspended dialogue in accordance with the Joint Communiqué, concentrating its efforts, in the meantime, on abusing even the Joint Communiqué, on the basis of particular portions selected to suit the north Korean need and their grossly distorted interpretations, as a means to serve the propaganda purposes of slandering the other party to the dialogue.

What is more, while remaining stubbornly negative as to resumption of the dialogue on the basis of the Joint Communiqué, the north Korean side is busy of late attempting to disown unilaterally the very existence of the SNCC, in disregard of the fact the Committee was organized, and inaugurated, through mutual agreement between the two zones of Korea in accordance with the express provisions of the Joint Communiqué.

We cannot but condemn the north Korean attitude as such, not only as contrary to the spirit of mutual trust essential for a fruitful dialogue between the two sides but also as tantamount, when viewed against the pertinent provisions of the Joint Communiqué charging the SNCC with the mission of supervising implementation of the agreements spelled out in the Joint Communiqué, to renouncing the Joint Communiqué itself unilaterally. As one of the two parties signatory to the Joint Communiqué, we cannot in any way tolerate the north Korean side to perpetrate such a unilateral act.

We take this occasion today to urge once again that the north Korean side observe the South-North Joint Communiqué fully and correctly. For this purpose, we urge that the north

Korean side agree as soon as possible to normalize the SNCC functions and resume its operation. It must be emphasized that, unless the SNCC is brought back to normal operation, it is impossible to honor the agreement in the Joint Communique and that, consequently, the Joint Communique itself will turn into a mere scrap of paper.

Reiterating that we are willing to consider an expanded reorganization of the SNCC, if deemed necessary to normalize the SNCC operation, we strongly ask the north Korean side to come back to national conscience and common sense at an early date and cooperate with us for the realization of the spirit and agreements of the Joint Communique by responding to our call for early normalization of the SNCC operation.

2. North Korea Resumes Slanderous Broadcast

— SNCC Seoul Side Demands Immediate Stoppage —

North Korea resumed slanderous propaganda broadcasts against the Republic of Korea through its public address system along the truce line at 5 p.m. September 4, 1980, a spokesman for the Ministry of National Defense announced on September 5.

According to the announcement, north Korea returned to the blaring tirade from its 11 guard posts along the Demilitarized Zone, in which they made unfounded allegations about the Kwangju incident, slandered a specific person and instigated people. Some of their assertions were: "We call for an inter-Korean dialogue, but south Korea shuns it," "south Korean authorities follow the path of a fratricidal conflict," and "south Korean forces, overthrow the incumbent regime!"

The Defense Ministry spokesman said that the resumed broadcasts followed a silence for a period after the October 26 incident. The south and the north zones of Korea originally agreed to desist from slanderous propaganda against each other along the truce line effective November 11, 1972 under the spirit of the 1972 South-

North Joint Communiqué. But north Korea resumed the propaganda on June 10, 1973 in violation of the agreement and had continued mounting slanderous tirades against the south until October 1979.

Meanwhile, Lee Dong-bok, SNCC Seoul-side spokesman, in a statement issued on September 5 concerning on resumed propaganda broadcast, urged north Korea to desist forthwith from such acts further heightening tensions and deepening mutual distrust, and to show an affirmative response for a productive dialogue based on the spirit of the July 4 Joint Communiqué. The spokesman said the slanderous broadcasts are an express violation of the spirit of the Joint Communiqué as well as of the Agreement on Cessation of Propaganda Broadcasts through Public Address Systems along the Truce Line signed on November 4, 1972. The full text of the statement by Spokesman Lee was as follows:

North Korea made slanderous broadcasts against the south, levelling unfounded accusations at us, through large loud speakers at 11 point along the truce line beginning at 5 p.m. on September 4.

The slanderous broadcasts are an express violation of the spirit of the July 4 South-North Joint Communiqué and the Agreement on Cessation of Propaganda Broadcast through Public Address Systems along the Truce Line concluded between the two sides on November 4, 1972. This is an obvious act of further heightening tensions and confrontation between the two sides.

We can only regard the resumption by north Korea of viciously slanderous broadcasts against the south through large loudspeakers in many areas along the truce line as an attempt to find an excuse to stand in the way of the dialogue by deliberately building up tensions between the south and the north in their fretfulness at failure to realize an ulterior political motive through the dialogue, a failure caused by the firm establishment of our new government which has embarked on the consoli-

dation of democracy and construction of a just society and a welfare state, enlisting broad support from at home and abroad.

We urge that north Korea promptly stop perpetrating acts which deepen tensions and mutual distrust between the two sides in violation of agreed minutes, and agree to a productive dialogue conducive to the easing of tensions and the creation of conditions for mutual trust based on the spirit of the July 4 South-North Joint Communique.

3. SNCC Seoul Side Refutes North Korea's Idea for "Confederation System"

— Offer for "Koryo Democratic Confederation" a Machination —

At the sixth congress of the north Korean Workers' (Communist) Party held in October 1980, the first such congress convened in ten years, the highest authority of the north suggested in a report the idea of a so-called "Democratic Confederation of Korea," propagandizing on it the idea as if it were a fresh formula for peaceful unification.

Refuting the north Korean scheme, the SNCC Seoul side, in a statement on October 15, pointed out that "it is a fictitious notion concocted merely for propaganda purposes, an idea consisting of renaming and window-dressing the suggestion for the so-called "Confederated Republic of Korea" which the north Koreans have advocated for a long time and which has been proven insubstantive and unrealistic.

Noting that north Korea insisted that some "prerequisites" should be met in the south before unification is achieved under the "confederation system," the statement of the Seoul side charged that this shows the idea of "confederation" is an anti-peace machination intended to achieve their ulterior objective on the pretext of a "confederation system."

Lee Dong-bok, SNCC Seoul-side, said in the statement, "Never-

theless, we want to declare once again our basic position that for the sake of realizing independent and peaceful unification of our divided land, any and all questions by either side should be fully discussed face to face at the forum of dialogue between the responsible authorities of both sides so that pertinent agreements can be reached.”

The spokesman added that “accordingly, we are of the belief that if north Korea has an idea of “confederation” or any other proposal arising out of their genuine interest in peaceful unification, the north should expeditiously reopen the dialogue with us to discuss the matter at the conference table, instead of unilaterally feeding ideas about unification into its propaganda mill only.”

The full text of the statement by the SNCC Seoul side is as follows:

At the recent congress of the Workers’ (Communist) Party, the first congress to be held in ten years, the north Korean Communists employed an anachronistic scheme to establish a feudal dynasty by providing for a father-to-son hereditary succession of power, a kind of system unparalleled in other Communist nations, much less in the free world, thus becoming the object of global ridicule.

The north Korean Communists have dumped the July 4 South-North Joint Communiqué, like worn-out shoes, suspending the South-North Coordinating Committee and the South-North Red Cross Conference and severing the direct south-north telephone line. Recently, moreover, they unilaterally suspended the south-north working-level contacts aimed at preparing for the proposed south-north prime ministers’ meeting, as well as the direct telephone line which was restored for a while for the working-level contacts.

Brazenly disregarding the fact that they themselves are responsible for the breakdown of the dialogue, the north Korean rulers had the temerity to speak of “peaceful unification of the divided fatherland” at the congress, attempting to mislead public opinion here and abroad by such treacherous sophistry.

Being a party to the South-North Coordinating Committee, a joint organization of the south and the north established pursuant to the July 4 Joint Communiqué, we are totally dismayed by the senseless behavior of the north Korean Communists. We feel constrained to express our position and views in this regard as follows:

According to news reports, the highest authority in the north again made, in a report at the recent party congress, a self-contradictory tirade on the so-called “confederation system,” a mere fictitious propaganda offer which has been proven insubstantive and unrealistic. He simply renamed and redecorated his past idea of a “Confederal Republic of Korea” into a “Confederal Democratic Republic of Korea, propagandizing it as if it were a new formula for peaceful unification. But what he is up to is a devious attempt to put a sheep’s wool on a wolf. We, therefore, will now analyze the true nature of the offer for unification under a “confederal system” as advocated by the north Korean Communists, and thereby contribute to enhancing the world’s awareness of their impure machinations.

Firstly, the so-called “confederal system” the north Koreans put forth as a unification formula is basically an unrealistic and fictitious idea in which two intrinsically differing concepts of political systems are deliberately mixed up. For they discuss “federation” in Korean words while using the fundamentally different word of “confederation” in a foreign language. This confusion in terminology is obviously intentional. To be more specific, they attempt to pursue two different propaganda objectives at the same time: they try to appeal to the Koreans’ aspirations for unification by using, domestically, the seemingly unification-oriented word of “federation” while, externally, employing the word “confederation” which implies the concept of “peaceful coexistence” between the south and the north, thereby striving to cater to world opinion favoring rationality and practicability. Therefore, it is evident that the “confederal system” north Korea advanced is only a propaganda line, which

is purposefully vague about the choice between the two distinctively different ideas of "federation" and "confederation" and which, accordingly, lacks any substance.

Secondly, in the same report at the congress, the highest authority in Pyongyang reiterated, as prerequisites to the institution of the "federal system," a demand that 1) the incumbent Republic of Korea government be overthrown in favor of a pro-Communist regime, 2) national security-related laws of the Republic of Korea such as the Anti-Communist Law and the National Security Law be repealed, 3) the activities of the so-called "Unification Revolutionary Party" and other Communist and pro-Communist parties and political forces be legalized in the Republic of Korea, 4) those imprisoned for violating the Anti-Communist and National Security Law be released, and 5) a "peace agreement" calling for one-sided withdrawal of American forces from Korea be concluded between the U.S. and north Korea without the participation of the Republic of Korea.

This shows that the objective of the idea of the "confederal system" by north Korea was not to discuss with the south the issue of such a system without any conditions, but to force south Korea to choose the path toward communization by itself and to revert to the pre-Korean War defenseless state.

We find anti-national machinations lurking in their call for such an unrealistic and impractical "confederal system," a scheme to drive a wedge into the national opinion of the south by playing upon the sincere longing for unification among the Korean people at home and abroad with the superficial plausibility of "unification under a confederal system."

The north Koreans, who describe even the South-North Red Cross Conference on the 10 million dispersed family members as "one form of political collaboration," demanded the abandonment of the anti-Communist policy of the Republic of Korea, asserting that south Korea should "foster statutory conditions and social environment" as a prerequisite to the solution of the

question of the displaced families. That is to say, they attempted to exploit even the humanitarian Red Cross talks as a means of creating conditions for their takeover of the south. Similarly, their idea of the "confederal system" is but a similar bait for advancing their insidious design. The north Koreans' call for the "confederal system" has, in fact, nothing to do with peaceful unification, but is merely an anti-peace scheme embodying the seeds of another fratricidal war and violent revolution.

Thirdly, the highest authority in the north babbled about what is called "ten major policies" of the "Confederal Democratic Republic of Korea." We are not in the least interested in discussing the issues stemming from such empty fiction, for the so-called "confederal system" itself, as was pointed out in the above, is a sheerly impracticable fiction, all the more because of the unrealistic "preconditions" it carries. But we would like to determine whether the highest authority in Pyongyang was sincere in his suggestions by delving into the true motives behind those portions of his remarks which totally contradicted what north Korea had actually perpetrated in the past inter-Korean dialogue, so as to keep public opinion at home and abroad from being misled.

The highest authority in the north talks about a so-called "Supreme National Confederal Conference" and a "Standing Confederal Committee" as joint south-north organizations under the "confederal system." North Korea is the very party which unilaterally suspended the South-North Coordinating Committee established in accordance with the express provisions of Article 6 of the historic South-North Joint Communiqué of 1972, and persistently refuses to resume its operation. Under the Agreed Minute on Formation and Operation of South-North Coordinating Committee, duly agreed on between the south and the north, the South-North Coordinating Committee is supposed to perform wide-ranging duties such as 1) solution of the question of independent and peaceful unification, 2) political exchanges between the south and the north, 3) economic,

cultural and social exchanges and cooperation between the south and the north, 4) easing of tensions and prevention of inadvertent military clashes between the south and the north, and 5) the question of taking joint steps between the south and the north in overseas activities. This means that when the functions of the South-North Coordinating Committee are normalized, it will be possible for the two sides to discuss in a smooth manner all the issues that north Korea proposes to discuss under the "confederal system."

We have also made it clear that if deemed necessary, we are willing to consider expanding and reorganizing the South-North Coordinating Committee.

We cannot help but point out the contradictoriness of the north Korean action in raising the question of ill-defined new organizations while discarding the Coordinating Committee, an organization designed to discuss and adjust inter-Korean relations established under mutual agreement. We feel obliged to question their genuineness, if any, from the viewpoint of the need to foster trust indispensable to the improvement of the inter-Korean relationship.

The highest authority in north Korea discuss exchanges and cooperation in the areas of economy, science, culture and education, and transportation and communications links between the south and the north. We would like to point out that these are matters which should be discussed and implemented in the course of a genuine pursuit of peaceful unification, and which we wish to solve and implement concretely. It was based upon such hope that we have called for the solution of the dispersed family issue through the South-North Red Cross Conference, as well as for the mutual opening of societies and concrete exchanges and cooperation in the areas of economy, culture and society. We proposed that if the overall solution of the displaced family question cannot be reached forthwith, the issue of the dispersed families between aged parents nearing death and their children be settled on a priority basis, and

groups of tomb visitors be exchanged on such traditional holidays as lunar New Year's day and Chusok, the moon festival day. We also suggested the creation of a private economic cooperation body for economic cooperation and technical exchanges between the south and the north, and the regular convocation, if necessary, of a meeting between the pertinent ministers of the two sides. If the north is genuinely interested in such exchanges and cooperation, as professed by their highest authority recently, then we urge that such exchanges and cooperation can and should be put into practice promptly without any further delay. But, the problem is that the north does not act as it speaks. To materialize such exchanges and cooperation, the two sides should explore agreement through dialogue between their responsible authorities. Agreement, once reached, should be implemented by all means.

Nonetheless, the north has shown the antinomic contradictoriness of blocking, on one hand, the road to dialogue by scrapping existing agreements unilaterally and rejecting or shunning the other side in the dialogue, while on the other crying for such exchanges and cooperation. This antinomy between the north Koreans' utterances and deeds can also be seen in the fact that they claim the two sides of Korea should not attempt to impose their ideas and systems upon the other side while picking disputes and suspending talks on the excuse of the internal affairs and policies of the other side in the dialogue. Moreover, despite their call for transportation and communications links between the south and the north, they unilaterally suspended on September 24, 1980 the working-level contacts intended to prepare for the proposed prime ministers' meeting and again severed the direct south-north telephone line that was then restored.

In the examination above, we cannot but determine that the idea of the so-called "Confederal Democratic Republic of Korea" raised by the highest authority in north Korea at the recent party congress is but an empty fiction intended only to serve

their propaganda purposes. However, we would like to make our basic stand explicit again; that in order to realize independent and peaceful unification of the divided land, the south and the north should discuss all the issues raised between the two sides and try to reach agreement on such problems through dialogue held directly between the responsible authorities of the two sides. We are of the belief, accordingly, that if north Korea is thinking, in a genuine sense, of any peaceful unification formula, whether it be the so-called "confederal system" or any other, it should reopen the inter-Korean dialogue and discuss it at the conference table, ceasing forthwith the propagandizing of such a formula one-sidedly.

North Korea must realize that should it continue to ignore this proper approach and reject resumption of the dialogue, raising the issue of the "peaceful unification formula" outside the channels of dialogue, nobody on earth will ever take it as a genuine formula for peaceful unification.

It is our conviction that if there was even a modicum of sincerity in the remarks made by its highest authority at the recent party congress, north Korea ought to respond affirmatively to the effort to reopen the direct south-north telephone line which Pyongyang has cut, and to resume the inter-Korean talks. We are prepared either to reopen the business of the South-North Coordinating Committee and thereby resume the inter-Korean talks, or to hold the proposed prime ministers' meeting at any time to discuss all the issues raised between the two sides. If the north Koreans do not positively respond to such a stance, it would only result in proving before the whole world that the remarks made by the highest authority in the north at the recent party congress represented nothing less than treacherous and deceptive falsehoods.

«South-North Red Cross Conference»

— *ROKNRC Statement on 9th Anniversary of
“August 12 Proposal”* —

**4. Unconditional Resumption of Red Cross Talks
Called For**

Lee Ho, president of the Republic of Korea National Red Cross (ROKNRC), in a statement issued on August 12, 1979 on the occasion of the ninth anniversary of the proposal for the South-North Red Cross Conference, urged north Korea to agree to unconditional resumption of the suspended Red Cross talks in line with brotherly love and humanitarian spirit, so as to solve the dispersed family at an early date.

Reminding the north Koreans of the basic purport of the ROKNRC proposal of August 12, 1971 for a “campaign to find the whereabouts of 10 million family members dispersed in the south and the north,” the ROKNRC President reiterated an earlier offer that if it is difficult for north Korea to embark on determination of the overall situation of the dispersed families, the two sides should first establish a reunion center for separated families and a postal exchange office at Panmunjom, arrange reunions between elderly parents and their families, and exchange groups of tomb visitors as pilot projects.

Lee also expressed regret over the failure of north Korea to return the fishermen of the Haewang-ho boats Nos. 6 and 7 for more than half a year after they were seized by north Korean gunboats in the sea off the west coast in late January 1980, urging the north Koreans to return the fishermen to their families promptly and unconditionally, without any further delay.

The ROKNRC President, noting that the ROKNRC furnished necessary materials for their release to north Korea on May 10 as requested by the north Korean Red Cross, said it is incomprehensible

that north Korea has not shown any response as yet despite the provision of such materials. The full text of the statement by Lee Ho, ROKNRC President, is as follows:

We observe today the ninth anniversary of a proposal made by the Republic of Korea National Red Cross (ROKNRC) to hold the South-North Red Cross Conference on ways to eventually reunite the ten million Koreans living separated from members of their families in the two divided parts of Korea.

Nine years ago today, the ROKNRC proposed talks between the Red Cross societies in the South and the North of Korea to initiate a campaign to reunite the separated Korean families, addressing the dire sufferings of those families as well as their relatives purely on the basis of the lofty humanitarian spirit of the International Red Cross movement, while contributing thereby to the building of a foundation for peaceful unification of the country by making use of it as an occasion to promote mutual contacts and exchanges between the two sides of Korea as well as an atmosphere of mutual trust between them.

However, the full-dress inter-Korean Red Cross talks were suspended in August 1973, when the North Korean Red Cross (NKRC) unilaterally announced its decision to boycott any further such Red Cross meetings after trying in vain for months to politically abuse the humanitarian endeavor in the talks with the insistence that abrogation by the Republic of Korea of the Anti-Communist Law and other national security legislations were preconditions for substantive discussions on the problems of the separated families. Although the full-dress talks held in Seoul and Pyongyang by turns were succeeded for some time by a series of "working-level" meetings now held in Panmunjom as a result of the ROKNRC's strenuous efforts to reopen the suspended Red Cross talks, the Panmunjom meetings, too, were discontinued in March 1978, again unilaterally by the NKRC.

It is a well-known fact that the ROKNRC and the NKRC have already agreed to a five-point agenda of the full-dress talks

for resolution of the problems of the separated families, reading, 1) the question of ascertaining, and notifying thereof, the whereabouts and the fate of the members of the separated families, and their relatives, 2) the question of facilitating free visits and meetings among them, 3) the question of facilitating free exchange of mails among them, 4) the question of facilitating reunion of the separated families according to their free individual wishes and 5) other humanitarian problems to be settled.

The ROKNRC has proposed time and again in the past that the two Red Cross societies would spearhead the execution of the whole family reunion program envisioned in the five-point agenda with implementation of the Item One by using the internationally accepted International Committee of the Red Cross method of exchanging tracing cards (inquiry and reply forms) for ascertainment, and notification thereof, of the whereabouts and the fate of the members of the separated families, and their relatives, being traced, with the two Red Cross societies functioning as legitimate intermediaries for the exchange of the tracing cards, back and forth, and the necessary investigative activities to be conducted in areas under their respective jurisdictions, in order to break the ground for the exchange of mails and the mutual visits as well as the eventual reunion among the separated family members.

And, furthermore, the ROKNRC has also suggested that, in case it was still difficult for the two sides to come to an early agreement on a full-scale implementation of the Item One of the agenda, the two Red Cross societies would initially implement such pilot programs as operating a meeting place and a postal office in Panmunjom for the separated family members, and their relatives, facilitating meetings initially among the aged parents and their separated family members and arranging exchanges between the South and the North of organized visits to the ancestral tombs located in the other side's area, respectively.

Needless to say, the question of meetings between the aged

parents and their separated family members is the humanitarian undertaking of one of the most urgent nature in view of the dire agony of such aged parents having only a few remaining years in their lifetime to realize the almost impossible hope of sharing the affection of their blood-ties.

As I observe the ninth anniversary of the proposal made by my organization for the opening of the South-North Red Cross talks, I therefore feel compelled to urge that, in order for us to be able to relieve the sufferings of the separated Korean families, the NKRC will speedily respond to the call of the Red Cross humanitarianism and the spirit of brotherly love and, thereby, quickly agree to an unconditional resumption of the suspended South-North Red Cross Conference.

In closing, I must also express my regret that the sailors of Haewang-ho boats Nos. 6 and 7, our fishing vessels taken under custody by the north Korean authorities off the western coast in late January this year, have not been returned yet after half a year. It is absolutely beyond my understanding that there has not been any response from the North as yet, although the ROKNRC provided the NKRC on May 10 this year with the necessary materials for their release as requested by the NKRC. I again urge that the North will immediately and unconditionally return those sailors to their families anxiously waiting for their early return.

— *Message of ROKNRC President* —

5. “Let Us Resume Red Cross Meeting in Seoul on October 28”

Release of Fishermen before Chusok Holiday Urged

Lee Ho, ROKNRC President, sent a message to Sohn Sung-pil, chairman of the Central Committee of the north Korean Red Cross Society, on September 12, 1980, in which Lee proposed that the

eighth full-dress meeting of the South-North Red Cross Conference, which was called off by north Korea after the seventh meeting was held in Pyongyang in July 1973, be held in Seoul October 28-31, 1980.

The message of the ROKNRC President was delivered to north Korea liaison men by two ROK liaison officers at 12 noon at the conference room of the Neutral Nations' Supervisory Commission at Panmunjom. The ROKNRC officers also handed to the north Koreans a message from the families of the Haewang-ho fishermen held in captivity in the north. The letter was also addressed to Sohn of the North Koreans Red Cross.

At 10 a.m. September 11, one day earlier, the ROKNRC notified the north Korean Red Cross in a radio message that it would deliver two messages to the Supervisory Commission's conference room at 12 noon the following day. The north Korean Red Cross informed the ROKNRC through the Military Armistice Commission at 11:27 a.m. September 12 and it would send two liaison officers to Panmunjom to receive the messages.

In his message, ROKNRC President Lee Ho suggested that "if there is need for the two sides to adjust some differences on some of the procedural matters, we will designate one or two working-level officials each so that they can get together at Panmunjom to iron out the differences." He also asked the north Korean Red Cross to cooperate positively for early release of the 24 south Korean fishermen still held in captivity in the north after their seizure some eight months before by north Korean gunboats while fishing on the high seas in the Yellow Sea aboard the two fishing boats, the Haewang-ho Nos. 6 and 7. He then invited north Korean Red Cross attention to the enclosed letter of appeal from representatives of the grief-stricken families of the fishermen.

The ROKNRC President further called on the north Korean Red Cross to see to it that the Namjin-ho and its fishermen, which were seized by a north Korean gunboat on the high seas at about 6 a.m. September 8 while hurrying back to the port of Sokcho from a fishing zone near Daehwatoe due to a medical emergency, be

returned to their families in the south at an early date in line with the Red Cross humanitarian spirit and brotherly love.

Meanwhile, in their letter of appeal enclosed in the ROKNRC President's message, the representatives of the families of the Haewang-ho fishermen said that they were all hoping that the north Korean Red Cross would be moved by the lofty spirit of Red Cross humanitarianism and brotherly love so that it would be instrumental in returning the fishermen to their families again: Saying that "we would like to believe that the north Korean Red Cross will not act merely as a bystander as the innocent fishermen are faced with the danger of being separated for good from their loved ones — parents, wives, sons and daughters, and brothers and sisters," the representatives continued that since the families of the hapless fishermen well know that the fishermen of Shinjin-ho No. 3 suffered no inconveniences after their return from north Korea in August 1978, they are positive that the fishermen of the Haewang-ho Nos. 6 and 7 would be returned to their homes inasmuch as they see no reason why the Haewang-ho fishermen alone would face personal inconveniences after they returned home. The representatives said their earnest hope was that they could have the fishermen back before the Chusok holiday.

The full texts of the message of the ROKNRC President and the letter of appeal from the representatives of the families of the Haewang-ho fishermen are as follows:

[Message of ROKNRC President Lee Ho.]

As you know, this year marks the 35th year of the division of our country after more than a thousand years as a single homogeneous nation-state. We have to recognize the stark reality that the agonizing plight of our people resulting from the prolonged state of national division is most acutely felt by the ten million Koreans forced to live apart from their families — their parents, their wives, their sons and daughters and their brothers and sisters.

We have an old Korean saying that even mountains and rivers will have a different appearance after a decade. And, as three and a half decades have passed by with the country remaining as divided as ever, we have had to watch many an aged parent leave this secular world without fulfilling their life-long desire of being reunited with their families while there are still many others moaning over their greying hair in the absence of any hope to be reunited with their families living on the other side of the Demilitarized Zone.

You know that eleven days from today we are going to celebrate the 35th Chusok since the division of the country. For all Koreans, Chusok is an occasion of family reunion, being one of the most festive national holidays observed traditionally for thousands of years by our people. Because it is a day of family reunion, Chusok in Korea has become a day of sadness for those who have relatives living across the artificial borderline of the DMZ. It must be noted that, because aging parents are dying one after another every day, the human tragedy of the divided families is becoming ever more heart-breaking with each passing day.

I want to remind you of the fact that the Red Cross is a movement which has grown out of the lofty humanitarianism of helping the injured even on the battle-grounds of raging wars without prejudice to friend or foe. And I would like to make use of this occasion today to call on you to cooperate with me, not merely as compatriots but also as Red Cross workers abiding by the lofty spirit of Red Cross humanitarianism, to join our efforts to remedy the heart-breaking plight of the divided Korean families, irrespective of the political differences that exist between the two sides of our divided country. I am of the firm belief that, by facilitating reunion of these fellow Koreans with their family members, we can prove to be decisively instrumental in creating a climate favorable for the ultimate reunification of our divided country.

In that spirit and belief, I propose to you today to have the

full-dress South-North Red Cross Conference, long interrupted since its last meeting held in Pyongyang in July 1973 which was the seventh in the series, brought back to full resumption unconditionally at an early date.

By previous agreement, you are aware that it is now our turn to host the eighth full-dress talks between our two Red Cross societies in Seoul. Therefore, I am proposing to you that we hold the eighth full-dress talks from October 28 through 31, 1980, in Seoul.

I think it is unavoidable for us to consider some changes in the composition of our respective delegations due to the long period of interruption. But I do not see any fundamental problems with most of the procedural matters of the full-dress talks, such as the composition of the delegations, rules regulating entry into, and exit from, each others territory, itinerary while in the other's territory, communications, transportation and personal safety as well as other necessary conveniences, for we already have agreement under which we successfully held a number of full-dress talks in Seoul and Pyongyang by turns.

If there is nevertheless the need for the two sides to adjust some differences on some of the procedural matters, I think we can designate one or two working-level officials each so that they can get together in Panmunjom to iron out the differences.

Allow me to make use of this occasion to call on you anew to cooperate positively for an early release of the 24 fishermen of our side still remaining in captivity in your side of Korea after their seizure some eight months ago by your side's gunboats while fishing on the high seas in the Yellow Sea aboard the two fishing vessels, the Haewang-ho Nos. 6 and 7.

I have received a full report from our side's delegates to the currently on-going South-North working-level contacts held in Panmunjom on the procedural matters of the proposed South-North prime ministers' meeting on the conversations exchanged between the two sides on the fate of the fishermen at issue. Con-

sequently, I feel obliged to tell you emphatically that your side's alleged concern about the personal safety of the fishermen after their return home to the South is totally groundless, in view of the fact that there has not been any punishment inflicted upon any of the more than three thousand fishermen of our side who have been subjected to the similar fate of returning home after a life in captivity in your side of Korea.

I invite your attention again to the fact that Chusok is only eleven days away. And I strongly urge you to be instrumental in arranging for the prompt return of the hapless fishermen to their families before the arrival of the day of family reunion, in a show of your commitment to the spirit of Red Cross humanitarianism as well as compassion for your compatriots. I call your attention to the enclosed letter of appeal sent to you by the representatives of the grief-stricken families of the fishermen.

I must also inform you that the fishery authorities of our side have just notified me of the seizure of yet another of our fishing vessels, the Namjin-ho No. 2, by your side's gunship in the early morning hours of September 8. It was taken on the high seas off the east coast, together with the 19 fishermen aboard, while it was sailing in haste back to its port of departure in order to bring an emergency patient to the hospital. I hope that your Red Cross society will quickly look into the matter and see that the newly captured fishermen are promptly released, together with their fishing vessel.

I hope you will respond positively, with speed, to the suggestions that I have made in this letter.

[Letter of Appeal from the Representatives of the Families of the Haewong-ho Fishermen]

We are writing this letter to you on behalf of the grief-stricken families of the 24 fishermen now kept in custody for eight months after having been seized by your side, together with their fishing vessels, while fishing on high seas in the Yellow

Sea aboard the Haewang-ho Nos. 6 and 7. We write this letter in order to appeal to you for your help in securing an early release of the fishermen and for their prompt return to their loved ones.

It was with a growing sense of impatience and anxiety that, over the past months, we, the families of the hapless fishermen, have continued to watch the communications between the Red Cross societies of the North and the South, as well as the dialogue at the on-going North-South contacts in Panmunjom, on the fate of the fishermen. We felt relieved when, on January 26, three days after their seizure by your side, it was announced over your side's radio broadcast that the fishermen aboard the two fishing vessels were being detained in your side of Korea for interrogation. We rejoiced over the news that, on May 6, your society asked our side's Red Cross to turn over to your side some "documentary data" necessary for their release and that, on May 9, our side's Red Cross duly complied with the request filed by your society. We subsequently became hopeful that the fishermen would soon be freed and back with their families.

We had reasons to feel hopeful that, with the help for your society, the Haewang-ho fishermen would be freed soon, for we were aware of the fact that, in October 1978, the humanitarian cooperation between the two Red Cross societies was instrumental in the release of the 23 fishermen of the Shinjin-ho No. 3, together with their vessel, one and a half months after their capture by your side off the east coast. We began anxiously looking forward to a further announcement by your side of the specific date of their release.

Therefore, it was a total surprise for us to hear, at the ninth South-North Panmunjom working-level contact (for preparation of a proposed South-North Korean prime ministers' conference) on June 24, that our side's delegates were told by their North Korean counterparts that the release of the Haewang-ho fishermen was being delayed, allegedly due to your side's concern over an appeal by an unspecified number of the fishermen

to be allowed to stay for a longer period of time "for fear of punishment" by our side's authorities when they returned home to the South.

Let us remind you of the fact that the hapless crewmen of the Haewang-ho vessels are nothing more than unsophisticated, easy-going fishermen. And, therefore, we frankly do not see any reason why they should feel concerned about any possibility of being punished when they return to their families. We are all aware of the fact that there were no punishments inflicted upon the Shinjin-ho fishermen when they returned to the South from their captivity in North Korea.

We would like to invite your attention, in this respect, to the fact that the Republic of Korea National Red Cross is presently hard at work trying to secure an early release of the Haewang-ho fishermen, with the full support of the government authorities, amidst the hopes of the entire nation that the Red Cross efforts might succeed as soon as possible. We must point out in very clear terms by all means that it is absolutely unnecessary for your side's authorities to use the alleged appeal by some of the Haewang-ho fishermen as an excuse to delay their release any further.

We would like to believe that, because you are also one of our compatriots, you will not act merely as a bystander as the innocent fishermen are faced with the possibility of being separated for good from their loved ones — their parents, their wives, their sons and daughters and their brothers and sisters. As families of the hapless fishermen, we are all united in hoping that you will be moved by the lofty spirit of Red Cross humanitarianism, as well as compassion for your compatriots, to the effect that you will prove to be instrumental again in reuniting the fishermen with their families. With your help, it is our earnest hope that we can have them back before Chusok, one of our most cherished traditional festive days and an occasion of family reunion, which falls on September 23 this year.

On Behalf of the Families of the
Haewang-ho fishermen,

Chi Seh Yong (Brother of Chi Yong,
Crewmen of the Haewang-ho No. 6)

Chung Duk Sam (Brother of Chung
Dong Soo, Crewman of the
Haewang-ho No. 7)

Kim Bong Oh (Brother of Kim Choong
Oh, Crewman of the Haewang-ho No.
7)

Cho Kyu Hyoung (Brother of Cho
Kyu Ho, Crewman of the Haewang-ho
No. 6)

Park Kum Young (Brother of Park
Chung Yong, Chief Engineer of the
Haewang-ho No. 7)

6. NKRC Ignores ROKNRC Call for Resumption of Red Cross Talks

North Korea again ignored the latest ROKNRC efforts to initiate some Red Cross pilot projects between the south and the north to hold the eighth full-dress meeting of the South-North Red Cross Conference in Seoul on October 8, 1980.

In a statement issued on August 12, 1980 on the occasion of the ninth anniversary of the proposal for south-north Red Cross talks, the ROKNRC urged north Korea to respond affirmatively to the offer of unconditional resumption of the suspended South-North Red Cross Conference based on brotherly love and humanitarian spirit. In the same statement, the ROKNRC also suggested that the two sides establish a dispersed family reunion center and a postal matter exchange center at Panmunjom, arrange reunions between

aged parents and their families, and exchange groups of tomb visitors as pilot projects.

Moreover, in a message delivered to Sohn Sung-pil, chairman of the Central Committee of the North Korean Red Cross Society on September 12, 1980, ROKNRC President Lee Ho again proposed that the eighth full-dress meeting of the south-north Red Cross talks be held in Seoul October 28-31, suggesting that if necessary the two sides could designate working-level delegates and have them meet at Panmunjom to adjust procedural matters for the resumption of the Red Cross talks.

The north Korean Red Cross showed an utterly insincere attitude toward these ROKNRC efforts to advance the time of national conciliation and peaceful unification, and ignored the call for the release of the fishermen held in captivity in north Korea, thus showing that north Korea is interested more in the political goal of communizing the south than in solution of humanitarian problems.

Resuming of the Red Cross talks is, needless to say, a pressing humanitarian question that can pave the way to easing the sufferings and misfortune of the 10 million family members who have lived separated ever since the national division 35 years ago. East and West Germany, divided country like Korea, facilitated mutual visits between dispersed families by concluding the Agreement on Transit between Two Germanies in 1971. Moreover, the International Conference on the Law of Humanity held in 1976 in Geneva adopted a convention on the right to reunion of dispersed families, declaring before the world that reunion of dispersed families is a basic human right guaranteed under international law.

It is unthinkable that the due rights of man should be ignored in the world community today merely for the reason of different systems of thought and ideologies. The posture of north Korea, ignoring these humanitarian aspects, has enraged the 50 million people, and the sophistry and unreasonableness of the north Koreans have become the object of ridicule and censure around the world.

As if he had realized his intransigency belatedly, Kim Il-sung was reported to have told visiting American Congressman Stephen Solarz in July 1980 that he was willing to withdraw the political prerequisites he attached to the discussion and solution of the question of reunion between dispersed families.

However, Radio Pyongyang, reporting so-called "Kim Il-sung teachings" on August 8, demanded the repeal of the South's Anti-Communist and National Security Laws as in the past, arguing that "as long as these laws exist in the south, no dialogue or contact can be made with the south." This assertion points clearly to the treacherousness of Kim Il-sung, indicating that his seemingly cooperative statements made before the American lawmaker was a mere temporary expedient designed to avoid world criticism and censure.

At any rate, north Korea should abandon such an insincere attitude and come to the arena of dialogue to resolve the humanitarian questions proposed by the Republic of Korea National Red Cross in conformity with the wishes of the 50 million people.

Part V

Unreasonableness of North Korea's Idea of “Confederation System”

1. Substance of North Korea's Idea of "Confederal System"

In his Central Committee policy report given at the sixth congress of the Workers' (Communist) Party on October 10, 1980, north Korea's Kim Il-sung again raised the idea of a "confederal system" as a unification formula to launch a fresh deceptive propaganda offensive for "peaceful unification." Kim Il-sung argued that the north and the south zones of Korea should form a confederal state under the name of "Confederal Democratic Republic of Korea" with the two sides retaining their respective ideologies and systems. He suggested that "a supreme national confederal conference" be formed with the same number of delegates from both sides plus an optimum number of representatives of our oversea residents." Kim said that the supreme conference would guide the "regional governments" in the south and the north while the "non-aligned and neutral confederal state" would adjust the issues pending between the two sides in a way that can "best serve national interests."

The method of a "confederal system" is not in the least a new idea. It is no more than a renamed and redecorated version of the unrealistic "confederal system" north Korea had advocated for many years in the past.

The idea of the "Confederal Democratic Republic of Korea" is essentially same in substance as the "Confederal Republic of Korea" north Korea proposed in the past. The only difference is that this time they added the word "democratic" to the title in an apparent bid to make it appear in conformity with their struggle for the so-called "democratization" of south Korea, and that contrary to their past call for a "confederal system" as an interim step, they now call for a "unified confederal state" in an attempt to disguise it as a more positive and concrete formula for unification.

As is well known, north Korea has propagandized the "south-north confederal system" at every opportunity ever since Kim Il-

sung first suggested the “idea” in his address given on August 14, 1960 in commemoration of the 15th anniversary of national liberation. The proposal for the “confederal system” in the wake of the April 19 Student Uprising of 1960 was intended to weaken the south’s anti-Communist capability by making the most of the post-Uprising confusion. As political and social stability was restored in the south after the May 16, 1961 Military Revolution, north Korea stopped calling for the “confederal system” for a while.

But north Korea returned to trumpeting again the ill-defined idea as a unification formula in the early 1970s when the inter-Korean dialogue was initiated against the backdrop of a fast-changing international situation surrounding the Korean peninsula, characterized by the aggravating Vietnam War and the Sino-U.S. reconciliation.

At 10 a.m. on June 23, 1973, the government of the Republic of Korea declared the seven-point Foreign Policy for Peace and Unification. Barely ten hours later, at 8 p.m. the same day, north Korea hastily set forth what it called “five major policies for peace and unification.” In Item Four of the “major policies,” they suggested the formation of a “Confederal Republic of Korea” as an interim step pending unification.

Although the word “democratic” was added to the title this time and they produced the so-called “10-point policy guideline” of the “Confederal Democratic Republic of Korea,” the renamed version taking the form of a “unified state” instead of an interim measure shows nothing different from the original version inasmuch as both, lacking any practicability, were no more than a mere propaganda device intended to mislead public opinion at home and abroad. Both versions of the “confederal system” demanded, as prerequisites utterly ridiculous conditions such as the replacement of the legitimate government of the Republic of Korea with a pro-Communist regime, abolishment of the south’s anti-Communist policy including the repeal of all anti-Communism-related laws, conclusion of a peace agreement between the U.S. and north Korea over the head of south Korea, and withdrawal of the U.S. forces

from Korea.

In short, the ulterior motive behind their call for a “confederal system” as a unification formula is intended to shift the blame for the breakup of the inter-Korean dialogue to the south, and to mislead public opinion at home and abroad. In the following, light will be shed on the true nature of the “confederal system” advanced as a unification formula, so as to contribute to enhancing international awareness of their true purposes.

2. Fictitiousness of “Confederal System”

From the following, it is clear that north Korea’s idea of a “confederal system” is a totally impractical fiction in both logic and reality, which has been advanced merely for propaganda purposes.

First, north Korea tries to make the idea look like a unification-oriented formula by using superficially plausible titles like “Confederal Republic of Korea” or “Confederal Democratic Republic of Korea.” But the concept and contents remain vague, making it hard to tell whether it means a “federation” or “confederation.” They use the word “federation” in Korean while using the fundamentally different word “confederation” in English. This confusion in terms of terminology is obviously intentional.

To be more specific, they attempt to pursue two different propaganda objectives at the same time; they try to appeal to the Koreans’ aspirations for unification by using, domestically, the seemingly unification-oriented word of “federation,” while externally employing the word “confederation” which implies the concept of “peaceful coexistence” between the south and the north, thereby striving to cater to the world opinion favoring rationality and practicability.

It is evident, therefore, that the “confederal system” north Korea advocates is only for propaganda, being purposely vague about the choice between the two distinctly different ideas of “federation” and “confederation” and which, accordingly, lacks any substance.

Second, north Korea, as in the past, sticks to a set of pre-

quisites to the institution of the “south-north confederal system,” which include 1) overthrow of the incumbent government of the Republic of Korea in favor of a pro-Communist regime, 2) legalization of Communist parties including the so-called Unification Revolutionary Party in the south, and 3) conclusion of a peace agreement the U.S. and north Korea excluding south Korea, and withdrawal of American forces from Korea.

This indicates that they do not intend to discuss the idea of the “confederal system” with the south unconditionally but to force south Korea to choose the path toward communization by itself, leaving south Korea defenseless, taking advantage of the idea of the “confederal system.”

While arguing that “the south and the north should establish a unified government in which the two sides participate on the same footing under the principle of recognizing and tolerating each other’s ideology and system as they are,” Kim Il-sung maintains that “organizations of repressive rule in the south should be done away with” and “liberation of the south Korean people and democratization of the south Korean society must be realized.” This interference in the internal affairs and system of the Republic of Korea perpetrated at a time when they raised the idea of the “confederal system” eloquently testifies to how contradictory and treacherous their stand is.

The idea of the “confederal system” is so unrealistic and contradictory that the north Korean themselves did not expect its adoption when they put forward the offer. It is no doubt an anti-national scheme designed to foment a split in public opinion in the south by enlisting the pure-hearted longing for unification among the Korean people at home and abroad with the superficial plausibility of their propaganda.

As everybody knows, north Korea has damped the spirit of the July 4 South-North Joint Communique duly agreed on between the two sides by suspending the South-North Red Cross Conference and the South-North Coordinating Committee. Recently, they broke up the working-level contacts designed to prepare for the proposed

south-north prime ministers' meeting, and terminated unilaterally the operation of the direct south-north telephone line that was restored early in 1980 to facilitate the working-level contacts.

Describing even the South-North Red Cross Conference intended to realize the humanitarian reunion between the 10 million dispersed family members as "one form of political collaboration," north Korea demanded the "improvement" of the south's "statutory and social environment" as a condition to the resolution of the dispersed families issue, attempting to exploit the Red Cross talks in their strategy for the communization of the entire Korean peninsula. Having failed in these machinations, north Korea has suspended the Seoul-Pyongyang shuttle talks and refused to resume the dialogue to date.

Thus seen, it becomes apparent that the north Koreans' idea of a "confederal system" is aimed at causing, under the cloak of achieving unification under this system, the departure of American forces from Korea, collapse of the anti-Communist policy and split in national opinion in the south, with the ultimate goal of weakening the military and anti-Communist capability of the Republic of Korea.

All in all, the "confederal system" advanced by north Korea is but a part of their persistent design for the communization of the whole of the Korean peninsula which, in a genuine sense, has nothing to do with the issue of peaceful unification of the land. Third, Kim Il-sung set forth what is called "ten major policies" of the "Confederal Democratic Republic of Korea," babbling about south-north exchanges and cooperation after institution of the "confederal system."

We are not in the least interested in discussing the so-called "ten major policies" because the idea of the "confederal system" itself, as observed in the above, is utterly ambiguous in its substance and, moreover, basically unrealistic, all the more because of the impracticable prerequisites attached thereto. However, since they scheme to drive a wedge into public opinion in the south in such a manner, we are obliged to shed light on its treacherousness and fictitiousness.

As the "policies" to be pursued by a "unified confederal state" established under the principles of "self-reliance," "non-alliance" and "democracy," the north Koreans advanced programs for "collaboration and exchanges" in various fields; organization of a "single allied armed force;" and "unified adjustment of external activities" of the two governments in the south and the north.

They do not mean to seek immediate improvement of the inter-Korean relations, however, or exchanges and cooperation. What they talk about, as can be seen in the prerequisites they have laid down, are the policies to be executed upon the establishment of a "unified confederal government" after the overthrow of the incumbent government of the Republic of Korea. This makes it self-evident that their suggestions are all imaginary and fictitious.

The Republic of Korea has consistently striven to realize many-sided exchanges and cooperation between the south and the north from the time of the early stages of the dialogue in the early 1970s to date, aware that such exchanges and cooperation represent a realistic and indispensable prerequisite to genuine peaceful unification.

We have proposed the humanitarian project of arranging reunion between the 10 million dispersed family members through the South-North Red Cross Conference as well as mutual opening of the two sides' societies and concrete methods of exchanges and cooperation in the areas of economy, culture and sports.

We have also suggested that if the overall solution of the dispersed family issue cannot be made for the time being because of north Korea's internal situation, the issue of reunion between aged parents and their families be solved first, and groups of tomb visitors among separated families be exchanged on such traditional holidays as Chusok and lunar New Year day as pilot projects.

Furthermore, we offered that the two sides should pursue improvement of the people's living standard and the nation's co-prosperity through economic exchanges and capital and technical cooperation between the two sides. It was proposed that to this end, if necessary, a private economic cooperation body be created along

with a meeting between pertinent ministers of the two sides.

If the north is genuinely interested in such exchanges and cooperation, as professed by their highest authority, then we urge that such exchanges and cooperation can and should be promptly put into practice without any further delay. But the problem is that the north does not act as it speaks.

To materialize such exchanges and cooperation, the two sides should explore agreement through dialogue between their responsible authorities. Agreement, once reached, should be translated into action by all means. Nevertheless, north Korea has showed the antinomic contradictoriness of blocking, on one hand, the road to dialogue by scrapping existing agreements unilaterally and rejecting or shunning the other side in the dialogue; while, on the other, crying out for such exchanges and cooperation.

This antinomy in the north Koreans' utterances and deeds is also evident in the fact that the north Koreans, while claiming that neither side should attempt to impose its ideas and systems upon the other, pick disputes and suspend talks over issues involving the internal affairs and policies of the other side in the dialogue. Moreover, ignoring their own call for transportation and communications links between the two sides, they unilaterally suspended the working-level contacts intended to prepare for the proposed prime ministers' meetings on September 24, 1980, and again severed the direct south-north telephone line that was restored then. What north Korea is really after is not a dialogue and cooperation, but the fomentation of confrontation and split between the two sides.

Fourthly, Kim Il-sung talks about a so-called "Supreme National Confederal Conference" and "Confederal Standing Committee" as the organizations of a "unified government" to be formed under the so-called "confederal state," saying these organizations "should guide the regional governments of the south and the north, and strive to realize unified development of the nation."

Notwithstanding, north Korea has unilaterally suspended the South-North Coordinating Committee established under the express provisions of Article 6 of the historic South-North Joint Communi-

que of 1972, and persistently refuses to resume its operation. As everybody knows, the Coordinating Committee, under the Agreed Minute on its Formation and Operation, is supposed to perform wide-ranging duties such as 1) solution of the question of independent and peaceful unification, 2) restoration of national trust between the two sides, 3) economic, cultural and social exchanges and cooperation, 4) easing of tensions and prevention of inadvertent military clashes, and 5) joint steps between the two sides in overseas activities. This means that if the functions of the South-North Coordinating Committee are normalized, it will be possible for the two sides to discuss in a smooth manner all the issues that north Korea proposes to discuss under the so-called "confederal system."

We have made it clear that if deemed necessary, we are willing to consider expanding and reorganizing the Coordinating Committee and thereby allowing the officials of political parties and social organizations to participate in the Committee in addition to the representation of government authorities.

Nonetheless, the north Korean Communists show the contradictoriness of raising the question of ill-defined new organizations while discarding the existing Coordinating Committee, an organization established under mutual agreement and designed to discuss and adjust inter-Korean relations. We are obliged to question their sincerity from the viewpoint of the need to foster mutual trust indispensable to the improvement of the inter-Korean relationship.

Kim Il-sung says the two sides should strive to realize unified development of the nation while scrapping unilaterally various agreed minutes at any time he finds it advisable. What does this point to? The so-called "Supreme National Confederal Conference" and "Standing Confederal Committee" Kim Il-sung babbles about are mere empty slogans designed to make north Korea appear interested in pursuing peaceful unification through dialogue.

3. Ulterior Motive Behind Call for "Confederal System"

In the examination above, we have determined that the idea of the so-called "Confederal Democratic Republic of Korea" advanced by Kim Il-sung at the recent Sixth Party Congress is but an empty fiction intended only to serve their propaganda purpose.

There are several reasons for the north Koreans' renewal of the time-worn suggestion for a "confederal system" at this time.

First, Kim Il-sung is attempting to avoid international criticism of the designation of his son, Kim Chong-il, as his successor and establishment of his feudal dynasty at the recent Sixth Party Congress by drawing world concern to the issue of the unification of Korea.

The north Korean Communists have become the object of universal ridicule by effecting a father-son succession system, a hereditary succession unparalled elsewhere in the world, at the congress of the Workers' (Communist) Party held for the first time in ten years.

The north Korean Communists could hardly expect smooth sailing for the party convention inasmuch as it was to take place amidst a number of policy blunders such as aggravating living conditions caused by excessive military outlays, chaos and ill effects in many areas prompted by Kim Chong-il's "Three Major Revolutionary Squads," diplomatic failure caused by their belligerency and credit default, and exposure of their strategic loopholes in the inter-Korean dialogue.

Here, they felt the need to raise clamor over the unification issue, carrying high propaganda value in order to make a success the Sixth Congress designed to perfect the hereditary succession of power. It was against this backdrop that they produced their time-worn idea of the "confederal system," their only idea resource in the field of the question of unification, after redressing it in a way that, they thought, better fits the changes of times.

Second, the north Koreans, well aware that their "confederal system" idea lacks any justness and practicability, believe that the idea, nevertheless, can help split public opinion in the south and thus weaken the south's preparedness against the north. They

wishfully think that the title “Confederal Democratic Republic of Korea” itself sounds unification-oriented and democratic, with the effect of making north Korea appear positive toward inter-Korean talks and the unification issue, thus giving rise to a condition where they can easily shift the blame for the breakup of the talks to the south.

Unlike in the past, they do not end merely in offering the “confederal system” this time. By employing various sugar-coated words of rhetoric about “unification,” “nationalism” and “co-existence,” the north Koreans attempt to smoke-screen their intransigence toward dialogue as well as their design to communize the south, hoping to create a condition for the establishment of a “front for national unification in alliance with communism” among the people of south Korea.

Third, by propagandizing externally for the “confederal system” based on a non-alliance and neutral line, the north Korean Communists scheme to seize the hegemony of the Korean question at the United Nations and in the non-aligned world and, at the same time, to isolate south Korea from the rest of the world.

On the one hand, the north Korean Communists strive to implant the image of being highly “rational,” “conciliatory” and “co-existence-oriented” with respect to the issues of stability and inter-Korean dialogue, and thereby to mislead the public opinion of south Korea’s allies such as the U.S. and Japan, with a view to weakening the ties between south Korea and these allies and consequently causing the withdrawal of American forces from Korea.

It is understood that the recent party congress emphasized to an unusual degree importance of non-alliance and peace and concentrated on economic issues instead of the customary emphasis on ideological struggles, in an attempt to produce a fresh image in the world community.

4. Conclusion

North Korea has now gone all-out to exploit the pressing

question of national unification to solidify the position of the "crown prince" of the Kim dynasty, while using all available means to cover up their violent and divisive schemes under the cloak of peace and patriotism.

In order to realize independent and peaceful unification of the divided land, the two sides of Korea should discuss all the issues raised between them and reach agreement through direct dialogue between the responsible authorities of the two sides.

Accordingly, if north Korea is thinking of what it believes is a peaceful unification formula and is genuinely interested in making progress, it should raise this formula openly at the table of dialogue with the south, doing away with one-sided propaganda.

Should it continue to ignore this proper approach and keep exploiting channels outside the dialogue, while rejecting the resumption of the inter-Korean talks, nobody on earth will ever take it as a genuine formula for peaceful unification.

If there is even a modicum of sincerity in the remarks made by Kim Il-sung at the recent party congress, north Korea ought to respond affirmatively to the efforts to reopen the direct south-north telephone line they have cut and to resume the inter-Korean talks.

The Republic of Korea stands prepared either to restore the function of the South-North Coordinating Committee or to hold the proposed prime ministers' meeting to discuss sincerely all the questions raised between the two sides of Korea.

Part VI

References

Chronological Review of South-North Relations

«1980»

- June 19 — A building is dedicated in the southern sector of Panmunjom for the south-north prime ministers' meeting.
- June 23 — North Korea informs the ROK side over the direct telephone line at 9:35 a.m. that its chief delegate Hyun Chun-guk would not attend the ninth working-level contact for health reasons.
- June 24 — The ninth working-level contact is held at Freedom House beginning 10 a.m.
- The ROK side advances two revised agenda topics and a new proposal for the time and place of the first prime ministers' meeting, etc.
 - The ROK side poses a four-point question to the north regarding north Korea-proposed agenda topics.
 - North Korea refuses to discuss the issue of agenda topics on excuse of some internal affairs of the Republic of Korea.
- July 4 — SNCC Seoul-side spokesman issues a statement on the 8th anniversary of the July 4 South-North Joint Communiqué.
- August 12 — ROKNRC President issues a statement on the 9th anniversary of the August 12 Proposal for south-north Red Cross talks.
- August 20 — The 10th working-level contact is held at Panmungak beginning 10 a.m.
- North Korea demands the postponement of the 10th contact on account of some internal affairs of south Korea, attempting to miscarry the contact.
 - The ROK side rejects the suggested postponement, asks the north Korean delegation to enter the discussion of the issue of agenda topics, and agrees to hold the next contact at Freedom House on September 26.
- September 4 — North Korea resumes slanderous broadcasts against the south by high-power loudspeakers along the truce line beginning 5 p.m.
- September 5 — The SNCC Seoul side, in a statement, demands that north Korea stop broadcasts along the truce line and agree to a productive dialogue.
- September 8 — North Korea captures the Namjin-ho No. 2 and its 19 fishermen engaged in fishing on the high seas in the East Sea.
- September 12 — The ROKNRC sends a message to the NKRC via Panmunjom liaison offices, asking that:
- The eighth full-dress Red Cross meeting be held in Seoul October 28-31; and
 - North Korea cooperate in the early release of the south Korean fishermen

- being held in captivity in north Korea.
- A letter of appeal by the representatives of the families of the fishermen held in north Korea is enclosed in the ROKNRC president's message.
- September 16 — The ROKNRC president sends messages to ICRC and the League of Red Cross, asking for cooperation in obtaining the return of the captured south Korean fishermen.
- September 24 — The north Korean working-level delegation, in a statement broadcast at 7 p.m., announces its intention to boycott the 11th working-level contact slated for September 26, suspending the working-level contacts unilaterally.
- September 25 — North Korea suspends the operation of the direct south-north telephone line.
- September 26 — The ROK working-level delegation, in a statement, lays down a six-point offer to facilitate early realization of the proposed prime ministers' meeting, and proposes that the 11th working-level contact be held on October 7, 1980.
- October 7 — The ROK working-level delegation, in a statement, announces that the 11th working-level contact was miscarried due to north Korea's rejection of the ROK delegation's proposal of September 26.
- October 15 — The SNCC Seoul side issues a statement to:
- Expose the fictitiousness of north Korea's idea of the "Confederal Democratic Republic of Korea;" and
 - Urge north Korea to strive to solve problems through dialogue.
- October 27 — Prime Minister Nam Duck-woo, in an address given in observance of the 75th ROKNRC anniversary, urges north Korea to show sincerity toward the resumption of the stalled Red Cross talks.
- November 4 — Three armed north Korean agents are shot dead while infiltrating into Heonggan-do near Wan-do.
- November 5 — North Korea announces on Radio Pyongyang and Central Radio broadcasts that it would return the fishermen of the Haewang-ho Nos. 6 and 7.
- November 12 — The Haewang-ho Nos. 6 and 7 and their 23 fishermen return to the south. The remains of a killed fishermen are yet to be returned.
- November 13 — The ROKNRC president issues a statement on the return of the Haewang-ho fishermen, saying:
- It is fortunate, though belated, that the fishermen were returned;
 - It is regretted that one of the fishermen was killed, and it is expected that the remains would be returned to the bereaved family through Panmun-jom;
 - North Korea should return the 19 fishermen of Namjin-ho captured by north Korea; and

- North Korea should show an affirmative response to the ROKNRC president's message of September 12 calling for the resumption of the Red Cross talks.

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South-North Dialogue in Korea

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Part I

Fresh Start Toward Peaceful Unification

1. Proposal for Exchange of Visits by Highest Authorities of the South and the North of Korea

The inter-Korean dialogue, intended to lay the groundwork for unification of the divided homeland, has been suspended by North Korea as part of the scheme to exploit the dialogue to communize the entire Korean peninsula.

Ever since the functioning of the South-North Coordinating Committee and the South-North Red Cross Conference were suspended, the Republic of Korea has sought untiringly to resume the dialogue in the firm belief that inter-Korean endeavors for peaceful unification must begin with the elimination of the mutual distrust prompted by national division and the Korean War.

Nonetheless, the North Korean Communists, attached to their fundamental strategy to unify Korea on Communist terms, persist in unrealistic and propaganda-motivated allegations, rejecting the path toward peaceful unification. It was in this anti-peace posture that the North Koreans, in a blunt unilateral announcement, broke off the recent working-level contacts intended to prepare for the proposed meeting between the prime ministers of the South and the North.

The ensuing total discontinuity between the two sides has only further deepened the mutual distrust, intensifying their military confrontation to a point where it could explode at any moment. Thus, the need to defuse the perilous tension has become even more acute.

It was against this backdrop that President Chun Doo Hwan proposed on January 12, 1981 an exchange of visits between the highest authorities of the two sides, with a view to eliminating distrust between the South and the North, alleviating the dangerous tension, and providing historic momentum to paving the way to peaceful unification. President Chun then declared, "I invite President Kim Il-sung of North Korea to visit Seoul without any condition attached

and free of any burden.”

In his nationally televised “New Year Policy Statement,” President Chun said, “I hereby solemnly propose that the highest authorities of the South and the North exchange visits, with a view to providing a historic momentum to restoring mutual trust, preventing the recurrence of fratricidal war and paving the way to peaceful unification through unconditional resumption of the suspended dialogue.”

The President offered to fully guarantee his personal safety in Seoul, and to extend all possible cooperation if he wishes to travel to any place of his choice in order to take a first-hand look at the actual situation in Seoul, other cities and rural areas.

“I also want to make it clear that I am prepared to visit North Korea at any time if he invites me on the same terms as I offer,” the Chief Executive said. President Chun added that “The day of reunification will not be far away if only both sides begin reaching agreement on the most amenable matters in the practicable areas.”

The following are extracts of President Chun’s “New Year Policy Statement” on the issue of inter-Korean relations:

It is now 36 years since Korea was liberated from the yoke of Japanese colonial rule. During this time, yet another major tragedy-another stain-has appeared upon the nation's history with the division of our homeland upon liberation.

A fratricidal war, deepening national heterogeneity, strife in the international arena, and an intermittent dialogue are but a few examples of the many spiritual and material wounds inflicted upon us by the territorial partitioning.

It is the paramount national task to reunify our homeland, characterized by a single people; language and culture, into a unified, independent and democratic nation-state.

Looking back on the past decade, we cannot find any improvement in the relations between the two halves of Korea, in spite of the South-North Joint Communique of July 4, 1972. It must be recognized that both sides have consistently engaged in

a war of words and vain expositions of unilateral proposals.

We have no use for empty agreements, which without embodying the will to translate them into action are not worth the paper they are written on. What is truly needed is a firm resolve on both sides to honor even the smallest agreement already reached.

Breaching various agreements contained in the July 4 Joint-Communique, the North Korean Communists have continually sent armed agents into the South, demonstrating that they have not given up their scheme to communize the entire Korean peninsula by force of arms. They are intensifying their slander of the Republic of Korea through radio broadcasts of the so-called Voice of the Unification-Revolution Party, as well as through loudspeakers strung along the entire length of the Armistice Line. They also incessantly attempt to subvert the Republic of Korea Government by organizing and funding anti-ROK organizations abroad.

But their scheme to communize the entire Korean peninsula has been totally frustrated by the iron-clad security of the ROK Armed Forces and the firm resolve of the people to defend their country, which is growing steadily stronger.

Can the Korean people-who have lived for the past 36 years under two different sets of ideologies, ideals and political systems-be unified again? The answer to these questions depends, above all else, on whether a sense of trust can be restored.

Accordingly, I have formulated an epochal proposal to the North Korean authorities, with the aim of finding an avenue to the solution of the unification question that takes into account the prevailing circumstances.

Thus far, a dialogue has been conducted on an on-and-off-again basis at various levels and in various formats. But nothing ever ensued that could contribute to the substantive improvement of relations. The only result has been the wasting of a great deal of time and energy. Even the working-level contacts that

began last year to pave the way for a South-North prime Ministers conference were unilaterally suspended by Pyongyang. As we all know, again there is no South-North dialogue.

Once again, I emphasize that the path to unification is not paved by unilateral proposals rich only in rhetoric, nor by written promises that are not kept; it is paved by the restoration of trust.

But it is not my intention today to argue over things past. To provide decisive momentum to creating mutual trust between the South and the North of Korea, epochal momentum to preventing a recurrence of tragic, fratricidal war, and historic momentum to paving the way to peaceful unification through unconditional resumption of the suspended dialogue, I hereby solemnly propose that the highest authorities of the South and the North exchange visits.

I invite President Kim Il-sung of North Korea to visit Seoul without any condition attached and free of any burden.

I will ensure that his personal safety is fully guaranteed during his stay in Seoul. I will extend all possible cooperation to him if he wishes to travel to any place of his choice in order to take a first-hand look at the actual situation in Seoul, other cities, or rural areas.

I also want to make it clear that I am prepared, at any time, to visit North Korea if he invites me on the same terms as I offer.

I am convinced that any problems between the South and the North can be resolved if we work strenuously to narrow our differences following the historic exchange of visits between the highest authorities, thus creating mutual trust precluding a fratricidal war and contributing to peaceful unification through a resumption of the dialogue.

The day of reunification, our nation's long-cherished goal, will not be far away, if only both sides begin reaching agreement on the most amenable matters in the least sensitive areas and progress toward the more difficult ones.

Meanwhile, on January 14, two days after President Chun's "January 12 proposal," Minister of National Unification Lee Bum-sok proposed to North Korea that the two sides meet to prepare for the proposed exchange of visits between their highest authorities.

In his statement, Minister Lee suggested that each side be represented by three delegates bearing credentials signed by their respective highest authorities. The minister said the site of the contacts could be Panmunjom or Seoul and Pyongyang, adding that he believes the sooner contact is made the better.

Minister Lee urged the North Korean authorities to respond affirmatively to an early realization of the historic "exchange of visits between the highest authorities of the South and the North of Korea." He said he is convinced that all problems pending between the South and North can be solved if the highest authorities of the two sides realize the proposed mutual visits and strive with patience to reduce their differences of opinion.

The full text of Minister Lee's statement was as follows:

As is known, His Excellency President Chun Doo Hwan, in his 1981 Policy Statement of January 12, proposed that the highest authorities of the South and the North exchange visits in order to provide decisive momentum to restoring national trust, preventing fratricidal war, resuming unconditionally the suspended South-North dialogue and paving the way to peaceful unification.

Urging the North Korean authorities to respond affirmatively to an early realization of the historic "exchange of visits between the highest authorities of the South and the North of Korea," the government of the Republic of Korea proposes to the North Korean authorities that the two sides have contacts to discuss concrete procedures to materialize it.

The contacts shall be attended by three representatives and a few attendants from each side, bearing credentials signed by the respective highest authorities. The site of the contacts can be

Panmunjom or Seoul and Pyongyang. We believe that the sooner contact is made the better.

Convinced that all the problems pending between the South and the North of Korea can be solved if the highest authorities of the South and the North of Korea realize the proposed mutual visits and strive with patience to reduce their differences of opinion, our government urges that the North Korean authorities accept our proposal at an early date.

2. Purpose and Motive of “January 12 Proposal”

«Momentum to Mutual Trust»

The proposal offered by President Chun was intended to clear a new path toward peaceful unification. The proposition, if realized, could impart decisive momentum to the fostering of mutual trust, as the highest authorities of the South and the North were to unconditionally visit the other side and thereby personally observe and understand the other side's reality, to which they have been denied access in the 36 years of national discontinuity.

The exchange of visits between the highest officials of the two Germanies—Chancellor Willy Brandt's visit to East Germany in March 1970 and Prime Minister Willi Stoph's visit to West Germany three months later in May 1970—led to the normalization of inter-German relations through the conclusion of the Basic Treaty between them on December 21, 1972. Similarly, the visit of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat to Israel in November 1977 and the visit to Egypt by Israeli prime Minister Menahem Begin in December the same year resulted in the historic Camp David meeting in December 1978, and further in the conclusion of a peace agreement between Egypt and Israel in March 1979.

As these historic events indicate, an exchange of visits between the highest authorities of feuding countries generally provides a clue to the resolution of their disputes, no matter how difficult and complex they may be.

«Impetus to Preventing Fratricidal War»

Kim Il-sung, who rules a society which remains totally isolated from the rest of the world, has distorted information and a misguided perception of the outside world because of his protracted 36-years rule, his extreme personality cult and a human curtain drawn by extensive nepotism.

Kim Il-sung's understanding of reality in South Korea is no better. It is with a basic misapprehension of the southern situation that Kim Il-sung attempts to instigate a "revolution" in the South, continuously infiltrating espionage agents in the hope of doing so. To facilitate his stratagem against the South, he pursues an endless military buildup, greatly paining the North Korean people and heightening tensions on the Korean peninsula.

Once he accepted the recent offer of President Chun and came to Seoul, Kim Il-sung would know how distorted his understanding of South Korea was, realizing that he has no chance to subvert the Republic of Korea with espionage activities, slanderous propaganda or agitation, or to take over the South by force of arms.

As Kim Il-sung would thus realize the futility of his attempt to communize the entire Korean peninsula by force of arms or violence, his visit to Seoul, if materialized, would quickly dispel his dream of bringing South Korea under his Communist dominion.

«Momentum to Advance Peaceful Unification»

It is evident that if and when the proposed visits are materialized, an inter-Korean summit of one form or another would take place in the process. The summit meeting, if realized, would provide decisive impetus to resuming the suspended inter-Korean dialogue in a new dimension.

Moreover, if North Korea accepted President Chun's offer, it would lead to contacts between the two sides designed to work out procedural matters for the visits, thus automatically resuming the dialogue.

There are two methods of reunifying a divided country: one side can overthrow and absorb the other by force of arms or both sides can create conditions for unification by peacefully removing the factors barring the way to unification through steady exchanges and cooperation between them.

South Korea considers the objectives of unification to be restoring national homogeneity, removing the pains of national division on humanitarian grounds and, further, constructing an advanced welfare state and contributing to world peace. Thus the only justifiable and realistically feasible method available is unification through peaceful means.

As for the process of realizing unification, two theories exist, one of which calls for an immediate solution while the other advocates a gradual approach.

To Koreans, unification is a must. The Korean longing for unification is extraordinarily strong and absolute. In reality, however, a need or longing alone does not bring about unification. Because the two sides of Korea have maintained divergent social systems during a protracted national division, mutual distrust and heterogeneity prevails. Any attempt to solve everything at once amidst such conflicting ideas and systems, and prevalent distrust and tension, is liable to wreck peaceful unification altogether. Thus seen, the only practicable method is the gradual approach, in which unification can be attained through a steady process of integration.

Presently between the two sides of Korea, distrust and tension persist due to their conflicting and heterogenous social systems, and no dialogue is underway. In order to achieve peaceful unification in these circumstances, mutual trust should first be restored and a solid groundwork for unification should be laid through dialogue.

The fact that President Chun offered an exchange of visits between the highest authorities of the two sides to provide decisive momentum to creating mutual trust, prevent a recurrence of tragic, fratricidal war, and pave the way to peaceful unification through unconditional resumption of the suspended dialogue, indicates that the President set forth the most reasonable and practicable method

of unification.

3. Significance of January 12 Proposal

President Chun's proposal for an exchange of visits between the highest authorities of the South and the North of Korea is especially significant in that it signifies a fresh effort to improve inter-Korean relations and eventually achieve peaceful unification as the Republic of Korea embarks on the construction of a new historic age in the 1980s.

The multi-channeled dialogue conducted in the early 1970s between the two sides of Korea failed to make any progress due to the insincerity of the North Korean Communists, who sought agreements on paper without any intention to observe them. None of the agreed minutes produced in the short-lived dialogue, therefore, was implemented properly. They were mere "agreements in principle" void of any will on the part of their signatories to abide by them. Under such circumstances, not the least improvement was made in inter-Korean relations. Instead the two sides saw their mutual distrust deepen as they engaged in a war of words intended to shift responsibility to each other in the barrage of propaganda-oriented proposals.

President Chun's January 12 proposal reflects his resolve to put an end to such practices once and for all, and to make a fresh start toward peaceful unification.

Stressing that future efforts for unification must eliminate unilateral proposals rich only in rhetoric or empty propaganda promises, President Chun said that as a first step toward peaceful unification, there should be a restoration of mutual trust achieved by actual deeds and implementations.

Any attempt to improve inter-Korean relations which is not preceded by mutual trust would be like seeking fish in a tree. Similarly, any wish to realize peaceful unification without the basis of mutual trust would amount to a "cake in picture." The Republic of Korea has, for the past ten years, sought to restore mutual trust

through dialogue, but without success. This clearly indicates that past method of South-North contacts would bring about nothing constructive.

President Chun placed particular weight on the exchange of visits between the highest authorities of the two sides because restoring mutual trust would be more conducive to peaceful unification than blindly seeking even unreliable dialogue as in the past. Based on this conviction President Chun stated implicitly that he is willing to open all South Korean society to Kim Il-sung, asking Kim to reciprocate with an invitation to Pyongyang, opening the closed society of North Korea to him.

If and when the visits by the highest authorities of the two sides of Korea are realized, the visits themselves would become the bedrock for the restoration of trust between the two sides. Fostering, in this way, the fundamentals of mutual trust by way of concrete actions would be much more effective than the past practices of issuing propaganda slogans and perfunctory dialogue.

The effort to realize peaceful unification of the divided land on the bedrock of mutual trust fostered through actual deeds was the first of its kind in the 36-year history of national division. It was a bold decision indicative of the firm resolve of President Chun toward peaceful unification.

During the 36 years of national division, countless offers and counter-offers trafficked between the South and the North. But, none of them ever mentioned an exchange of visits between the two sides' highest authorities. President Chun's proposal was indeed a courageous action, expressing the national leader's valor as it provided impetus to creating the mutual trust basic to the attainment of peaceful unification.

While inviting North Korea's Kim Il-sung to visit Seoul, President Chun said he is prepared to visit North Korea at any time if Kim Il-sung invites him. What the President implied was that he does not insist that Kim Il-sung visit Seoul first. President Chun was

indicating flexibility; that if north Korea so wished, he could visit Pyongyang first.

Going a step further, President Chun said, "I will extend all possible cooperation to him if he wishes to travel to any place of his choice in order to take a first-hand look at the actual situation in Seoul, other cities and rural areas." Here, the President meant he is willing to open the entire Republic of Korea society, and asked, implicitly, North Korea to do likewise.

The President's proposition was advanced against the backdrop of South Korea's solid national strength, which is much superior to North Korea's. In effect, the bold proposal can be taken to manifest the President's confidence in the country's absolute edge in a race for national capability, a feat achieved based on the brilliant economic growth of the past.

Another significance of the January 12 proposal is that President Chun expressly defined a unified country by stating that "We must reunify our homeland into a unified, independent and democratic nation-state." The President was firm that no matter how pressing the need for national unification may be, no unification under a Communist dictatorial system can be tolerated.

Today in North Korea, 18 million people are oppressed by a system quite different from Korea's traditional national culture and under the autocratic rule of a single dictator ever since national liberation 36 years ago. The social heterogeneity stemming therefrom has formed a grave roadblock to peaceful unification.

Unification is a national mandate that must be realized by all means. Still, it goes without saying that the nation cannot tolerate unification under Communist terms.

Part II

Reactions to January 12 Proposal

1. Reactions at Home

The whole nation welcomed President Chun's proposal for an exchange of visits between the highest authorities of the South and the North of Korea as it provided "decisive momentum to fostering mutual trust between the two sides of Korea."

The people hailing from North Korea, in particular, urged Kim Il-sung to "accept the proposal and come forward to serve national history." Former North Korean residents invariably expressed the wish that the President's proposition would give impetus to breaking through the barrier between the two sides of Korea and help materialize their longing for family reunion.

All the newspapers of the country greeted the President's offer with headlines, "New Chapter in Thawing Inter-Korean Relationship," "Great Political Decision by national Leader," "Meeting Itself Highly Significant" and "Decision of Confidence." The newspapers then urged North Korea to accept the overture without any conditions.

The following are editorials of major newspapers in Korea on the January 12 proposal by President Chun:

President-Chun's Offer for South-North Summit

Kyunghyang Daily News (January 12, 1981)

The proposal of President Chun Doo Hwan for an exchange of visits between the highest authorities of the two sides of Korea was an epochal proposition, which heralds the unfolding of a new age of inter-Korean relations as well as the opening of a new historic chapter on the Korean peninsula.

The fact that President Chun made the overture at this juncture, the 36th anniversary of national liberation from 36 years of Japanese rule, well portrays the historic determination of the President. In other words, President Chun's determination to create a new historic age is not limited to domestic politics only, but extends to

the entire national territory.

To look back over our history, the Japanese rule and the following 36 years of national division have given this nation tremendous tragedies. It is mandatory that the contemporary generation settle current problems so as not to bequeath the burden of the past to our descendants. The conviction of President Chun that unification should be achieved before the end of the 20th century is based on the mandate of national history.

Of course, in order to solve the historic problem facing us, we must first understand fully the matter at issue, in particular the cause of the national tragedies of the past and their consequences.

To be frank, we feel that the execution of the war criminal who provoked the Korean War must precede any efforts to inherit and develop our historic tradition and continuity. When we consider the historic tragedy wrought by the war caused by Kim Il-sung, such a historic liquidation is believed to be an inevitable course of action.

Moreover, Kim Il-sung has thoroughly distorted our history with the class conception of history. It is also true that he has fomented confrontation and heterogeneity within a single people. He has built up an unprecedented personality cult and formed a hereditary dynasty while heightening tensions between the two sides of Korea.

This conduct and national treachery must, course, be brought to justice. But, one thing we must not forget is that we, nevertheless, cannot tolerate another fratricidal war. This is why we have patiently explored the path toward bringing about durable peace and untiringly pursued unification through dialogue or other peaceful ways.

Keen insight into historic reality often shows the need for unusual wisdom. Faced with the paramount task of achieving national unification, we ponder about what historic wisdom can be.

When we consider the nucleus of the problems raised in the course of the various forms of contact and dialogue between the two sides in the past, it isn't going too far to say that the President's proposal was in line with what the national conscience and historic wisdom dictated. For, a summit between the two sides could, in a

sense, be the last available card.

To be sure, there may be some who can hardly understand why the President had to invite Kim Il-sung, the chieftain of an anti-history, anti-nation and anti-state group, calling him by his official title "President." But, we are confident that the use of his official title does not carry any legal implication. What we need in the solution of the historic inter-Korean task is calm approach toward the question rather than being bound by the issue of title calling.

Still, we cannot overlook the strategy they employed in the past. First of all, North Korea always attempted to exploit inter-Korean contact and dialogue for its "united front" strategy, to advance its ultimate goal of bringing South Korea under its Communist dominion. This was made clear in the process of the short-lived dialogue following the July 4 South-North Joint Communique. The ulterior motive of the North Koreans was evident even at the preliminary contacts held for a while to prepare for the proposed meeting between the prime ministers of the two sides.

Secondly, North Korea has recently set forth the idea of a "Confederal Democratic Republic of Koryo," propagandizing it as if it were the best method of unification. It should be obvious that this idea stemmed from a strategy to isolate South Korea from the rest of the world community.

North Korea argues that under the "confederation system" the two sides of Korea can establish a unified "confederal government" while retaining their respective ideologies and systems. Nevertheless, the North Koreans attach to it utterly unrealistic conditions, which include 1) overthrow of the incumbent South Korean government, and 2) replacement of the Armistice Agreement with a U.S.-North Korea peace agreement, both a far-cry from practicable and realistic terms.

If North Korea is truly willing to recognize the ideology and system of the South as they are, we see no reason why they should reject exchanges between the two sides. We are convinced that above all North Korea ought to respond readily to President Chun's offer for an exchange of visits by the highest authorities of the two

sides. Should they reject the proposition or attempt to exploit it for their strategy by attaching some sinister conditions, it would only amount to exposing their crafty machinations.

The question of divided countries as a whole, the East-West German summitry and the exchange of visits between the top leaders of Egypt and Israel give us much to learn from. In order to ease tensions and remove mutual distrust, nothing can be more effective than a meeting between the highest authorities of the direct parties concerned. Of course, a summit may be accompanied by various problems, but there is no doubt that such a high-level contact would provide decisive momentum to solving the problem.

If North Korea refuses to recognize the status quo of the Korean peninsula and our existence, it would only leave Pyongyang in a self-contradictory stance. We accuse Kim Il-sung of being anti-national and anti-history. Still, we support the solution of the Korean question in a dialogue with him. Herein lies the reason for our wholehearted support of President Chun's recent proposition.

In fact, seen from national and historic aspects, we believe we are in situation where Kim Il-sung ought to be overthrown in North Korea in favor of a fresh momentum to solving the inter-Korean question. The designation by Kim Il-sung of his son, Kim Chong-il, as his successor bears testimony to the problems and instability facing his system. But, we do not wish to make Kim Il-sung's overthrow or a change in the North Korean system conditions to a dialogue with them.

This is because we remain convinced that the base for mutual trust must be created based on stark reality, and then the historic task of preventing the recurrence of war and achieving peaceful unification should be accomplished. In this respect, we do not oppose the idea that the existing truce agreement be replaced by absorbing it in a non-aggression agreement or any other agreement between the two sides of Korea.

Nonetheless, it is quite ridiculous to see that the North Koreans demand a peace agreement with the United States as a condition to the institution of a so-called "confederation system." We believe that

such a notion deserves criticism as having stemmed from flunkeyism, in disregard of the principle of national independence. This also makes manifest how our stance of national integrity basically differs from theirs.

Moreover, their demand for a peace agreement with the United States amounts to turning upside down Kim Il-sung's own suggestion for a peace agreement between the two sides of Korea made in January 1972, and also to rejecting the conclusion of a non-aggression agreement we suggested. It also is an act of turning their backs on the independent and peaceful solution of the Korean question that sheds light on the treacherousness of their idea of "confederation system."

The effort by President Chun to explore the path to genuine peace and unification by proposing a South-North summit, in contrast to such deceptive and fictitious demands by the North Koreans, should be highly commended. The overture shows the true image of the President as a national leader, and indicates that the President's determination to forge a new historic age has further been elevated.

As we welcome and support President Chun's proposal in the name of the whole people, we urge Kim Il-sung to accept the proposition promptly.

Invitation of Kim Il-sung to Seoul

Dong-A Ilbo (January 13, 1981)

President Chun Doo Hwan has drawn worldwide attention by inviting, in his New Year Policy Statement, North Korea's Kim Il-sung to visit Seoul. President Chun's bold invitation of Kim Il-sung attracts our keen interest because it might well reflect the posture of the Republic of Korea toward future inter-Korean relations.

The month of January used to be the time for fresh propositions between the South and the North of Korea. In January 1979, the late President Park Chung Hee proposed the unconditional resump-

tion of dialogue between responsible authorities of the two sides. In January of the following year, 1980, Lee Jong-ok, North Korea's State Council premier, suggested a meeting between the prime ministers of the two sides.

As the whole world knows, however, these two offers failed to materialize because of the North Koreans' attempt to exploit the occasion for their political gain or their one-sided suspension of its preparatory contacts.

We received President Chun's invitation of the North Korean leader with mixed feelings of expectation and anxiety, for we well know that our efforts for dialogue and peaceful unification used to be foiled due to North Korea's manipulative and evasive tactics.

We are worried if Kim Il-sung will not side-step the invitation by posing one condition after another, as he has done ever since the issuance of the 1972 South-North Joint Communiqué. But, the proposal by President Chun is significant in that it is the boldest offer ever made in the history of inter-Korean relations. In a sense, we consider it fortunate that the relationship between the South and the North has developed to a point where the offer for Kim Il-sung's visit to Seoul could be made.

To look back, the door to an inter-Korean dialogue began to open with the Red Cross talks and the 1972 Joint Communiqué. But, the contacts could never go beyond the stage of ministerial contacts. A year ago, North Korea proposed a prime ministers' meeting, which the Seoul side readily accepted. But, the proposed meeting, too, miscarried due to the unilateral suspension of preparatory talks by the Pyongyang side.

President Chun's proposal for a top-level meeting between the two sides of Korea, made against such a backdrop, was a resolute step intended to provide a breakthrough in the deadlocked inter-Korean relations.

In Germany which was divided like Korea at the end of World War II, the top leaders of East and West Germany met as early as eleven years ago. In March 1970, Chancellor Willy Brandt of West Germany met East German premier Willi Stoph in Erfurt, East

Germany. Another summit between the two Germanies came three months later, and two and a half years thereafter East and West Germany concluded the historic Basic Treaty, which guaranteed peaceful coexistence until the time of their unification. One year later, moreover, the two Germanies joined the United Nations together and signed long-term trade and free transit agreements, demonstrating the German people's rationality before the world.

President Chun's invitation of Kim Il-sung was ten years behind the German summit. The delay in the suggestion of a Korean summit was perhaps inevitable in view of the fact that unlike the Germans, the Korean people had to suffer much from Kim Il-sung's invasion of 1950 and incessant threats of communization from the North Korean Communists.

Still, this is not too late. The two sides must prepare an opportunity to talk openheartedly and find clue to the solution of national unification. If Kim Il-sung cannot visit Seoul as he has been invited, President Chun should be invited to visit Pyongyang.

We believe that, notwithstanding the unchanging aggressive schemes of the North Korean Communists and resultant suspension of dialogue, all 50 million Koreans can now feel that the path to national unification has been shortened. Compared with the time when Kim Il-sung unleashed an invasion against the South barely five years after a national division imposed upon Korea by outsiders 36 years ago, we can say realistically that inter-Korean relations have been improved.

The inter-Korean relationship has reached a stage where the two sides have signed the 1972 Joint Communiqué, held a Red Cross conference to search for displaced family members, and now a meeting between the highest authorities of the two sides has been proposed.

The North Koreans' concrete response to the proposition remains to be seen. In view of their characteristics, we cannot say for sure that an affirmative response is forthcoming. Still, the fact that our national will toward unification and prosperity even through top-level contacts has been manifested once again, is in itself something

highly worthwhile. The 1979 proposal for unconditional resumption of dialogue was embodied in the preparatory contacts in 1980 for the proposed prime ministers' meeting. Though the preliminary contacts were broken off, it may well be said that inter-Korean relations moved a step forward with the proposal for top-level meeting in the new year. This doubtlessly indicates that the nation's determination for peace and unification is solidifying.

We are not the only people who long for peace and stability on the Korean peninsula. The United States, Japan and other allies wish the same, and it is apparent that even some of the Communist countries in the vicinity of the Korean peninsula do not want to see tensions in Korea. This is largely because mounting tensions on the Korean peninsula are bound to touch off inconvenient relations among surrounding nations.

But, the problem lies in Kim Il-sung and his followers, preoccupied with the scheme to communize the whole Korean peninsula. Kim Il-sung is urged to accept the invitation to visit Seoul and thereby meet the wish of the nation and the expectations of most of the surrounding countries.

Epochal Offer for Peaceful Unification

Seoul Shinmun (January 13, 1981)

All the people living on this peninsula, whether they are in the South or in the North, harbour the invariable wish for peaceful unification of this land. This is all the more so because they are a homogeneous people with the same culture, tradition and language, and because they know that they can hardly expect any national restoration or glory while they are divided. They, who experienced the tragedy of the Korean War, know that no fratricidal conflict can be allowed to recur in this land, and that the spiritual and material pains and losses stemming from the national split becloud the future of their country.

This is why we cannot give up efforts to bring about reunification by peaceful means no matter how detestable the dogmatic and

nation-splitting attitude of the North Korean Communists toward our consistent efforts for alleviation of tensions may be. The more the North Koreans attempt to seek a chance to provoke another war through intransigent and bellicose schemes, the harder we should work to solidify our determination toward peaceful unification.

In this respect, the proposal made by President Chun Doo Hwan on January 12 for an exchange of visits between the highest authorities of the two sides of Korea, manifests the nation's unswerving will toward peaceful unification. The proposition provides a good opportunity to resume the inter-Korea dialogue which has been suspended due to North Korea's intransigency.

In his New Year Policy Statement, President Chun invited Kim Il-sung to visit Seoul without any conditions and free of any burden, saying that he is willing to extend all conveniences if he wishes to visit any other cities and/or rural areas. President Chun also said he is willing to visit North Korea if he so invited. The President meant to explore an avenue toward peaceful unification through an exchange of visits between the two sides' highest authorities.

If the two authorities with different ideas and systems were to meet on the important issue of peaceful unification, they should first assume an open-hearted posture transcending any prejudices and hostile feelings against each other. This is why President Chun called for Kim Il-sung's visit without any conditions and free of any burden.

Here, we recall the North Korean practice of attaching conditions to the progress of inter-Korean talks, such as "withdrawal of U.S. forces from Korea" and "repeal of some South Korean laws" for the sake of "improving the circumstantial conditions of South Korea." To speak of "conditions for talks," they are the very ones who have turned all North Korean society into a tightly closed world, disqualifying themselves as counterparts in a dialogue. Still, we cannot abandon talks with them.

In view of their conduct, we fully realize that it is by no means easy to undertake an inter-Korean dialogue. If the proposed exchange of visits between the two sides' highest authorities were to be

realized, it would surely serve to restore mutual trust and resume the suspended dialogue. If and when the two sides thereafter continue to strive to narrow their differences of opinion, the tensions between the two sides of Korea would gradually dissipate, and on this basis they could solve easy and practicable problems first, paving the way to peaceful unification.

We would like to point out the example of Germany, in which the two Germanies removed tensions and concluded a basic treaty by exchanging visits. In March 1970, West Germany's Chancellor Willy Brandt visited East Germany, which was reciprocated by East Germany Prime Minister Willi Stoph's travel to West Germany in March of the same year. This exchange of visits resulted in the conclusion between the two Germanies of the Basic Treaty in December 1972, to lay a foundation for the normalization of their relations.

Unlike the case with Germany, which has settled for two Germanies, Korea must end in a single, unified country. But, we must know that the two Germanies provided a clue to the solution of their problem by means of the visits by their highest authorities. Similarly, Egypt and Israel settled their long-standing dispute with an exchange of visits by their top officials providing momentum.

If Kim Il-sung's visit to Seoul were to materialize, it would give him a good opportunity to rectify his misunderstanding of South Korea. Kim Il-sung has turned North Korea into a huge armed camp, cutting himself from all sources of outside information. The fact that Kim is being isolated even from the rest of the Communist world indicates that he rejects exchanges even with socialistic countries.

Kim Il-sung obviously underestimates the sense of anti-Communism and the living standards of South Koreans. He has been infiltrating agents into the South endlessly in the belief that he could easily recruit supporters and foment a Communist revolution in the South. Once Kim Il-sung visits Seoul and observes the situation with his own eyes, he would know that his scheme is ill founded and has no chance to succeed. Therefore, decisive momentum toward improving inter-Korean relations through dialogue would

surely be provided when North Korea's Kim Il-sung realizes correctly the situation of South Korea.

It is already 36 years since we were liberated from the rule of the Japanese imperialists. This period was a succession of trials and agonies. We fought a bloody fratricidal war, the national homogeneity has been split into two heterogeneous entities, and 10 million family members suffer the pains of their dispersion.

To put an end to such misfortune, we initiated a dialogue in the early 1970s. We hoped that even if national unification couldn't be achieved outright, we could prepare a mechanism to prevent the recurrence of war and settle inter-Korean problems beginning with easy and practicable ones, moving steadily toward the ultimate goal of unification.

Our stand on the issue of peaceful unification is well defined in the Three Principles for Peaceful Unification made public in 1974, which provide that the South and the North 1) conclude a non-aggression agreement and thereby consolidate peace on the Korean peninsula, 2) open their doors to each other and restore mutual trust through exchanges and cooperation, and 3) hold free general elections in both sides under fair supervision. Our efforts in inter-Korean dialogue have consistently been based upon these principles.

On the other hand, however, the North Korean Communists lay down empty and propaganda-oriented propositions such as "national conference" and "confederal system." The "national conference" they talk about is, no doubt, intended to serve the so-called "united national front," a typical Communist strategy aimed at facilitating a deceptive coalition with sympathetic elements for the realization of revolutionary goals. The "confederal system," too, is not fit for a homogenous people like Koreans. First of all, it cannot be but mere empty logic when tensions remain unmitigated between the two parts of Korea. Therefore, we cannot find any sincerity and justness in the North Koreans' attitude to the inter-Korean question. If they are truly interested in peaceful unification, they should first remove their deceptive mask.

The January 12 proposal advanced by President Chun Doo

Hwan was a highly sincere, realistic and confident initiative taken against the backdrop of such deceptive peace offensives by the North Korean Communists. We are confident that the proposition will provide epochal and historic momentum to opening a new chapter in the inter-Korea relations in this new age. It is a proposal that is wholeheartedly supported by all the people and that is evaluated by the world community as a highly proper action.

Through the January 12 overture, we have demonstrated that we stand absolutely above the North in terms of national strength. In the offer, President Chun expressed the willingness to open Seoul and other cities and rural areas to Kim Il-sung, asking implicitly if Kim isn't prepared to open all North Korean society to our sight.

It remains to be seen how North Korea will react to the proposition. But, we must renew our determination to achieve peaceful unification and continue to build up our capability if only to push through the January 12 proposal.

Policy Direction of President Chun

Joong-Ang Daily News (January 13, 1981)

President Chun Doo Hwan's January 12 proposal for an exchange of visits between the highest authorities of the South and the North of Korea is highly significant in that it is the first of its kind ever made in inter-Korean relations and that it can provide a breakthrough in the frigid relations between the two sides of Korea.

Chiefly because the two sides merely indulged in a war of statements and rather tended to put forth unilateral offers in their past dialogue, wasting time and energy, many people were pessimistic about the future of the inter-Korean relationship.

Our undeniable public sentiments are that so far as dialogue is concerned, nothing can be expected from the intransigent North Korean Communists, who used to respond to our constructive propositions with illogical and nonsensical demands and who broke up talks whenever they found the dialogue no longer in their interests. Chances for resumed talks with them seemed even more remote

when North Korea put forth the worthless idea of a “confederation system” as a means of unification.

Nonetheless, the national need to ease tensions, consolidate peace and achieve unification peacefully on the Korean peninsula cannot be abandoned merely because of the North Koreans’ intransigence. Rather, we face a greater need to explore the path to dialogue with patience and wisdom.

President Chun’s January 12 proposal was epochal in that we have provided momentum to resuming the dialogue suspended by the North Koreans. Now that the proposal has been laid down, North Korea has to make a response whether it be affirmative or negative. If it is affirmative, it would be very fortunate. If they reject it, it would only shed light again on the treacherousness of their call for “peace”.

The proposition was also epochal because it sought a solution to the inter-Korean question through contacts between the highest authorities of the two sides.

Our past experiences showed that the lower the level of contacts, the more argument and controversy they entailed. It is no wonder that officials of the totalitarian and closed North Korea assume an evasive attitude so as to avoid being held responsible for the part they played in such contacts.

Therefore, only high-level contacts give much possibility of success. In this respect, there can be no better meeting than summit contacts. Still, the highest leader of a country can make this sort of bold offer only when he is confident of state affairs, of support from his people, and of his own ability. Thus seen, the January 12 proposal reflected President Chun’s confidence and boldness.

In international politics today, summit contacts are considered to be the most important method of diplomacy. The seriousness of the inter-Korean problem makes all the more acute the need for an exchange of visits by the highest authorities of the South and the North.

Kim Il-sung, who maintains his unparalleled Communist feudal system in a tightly closed society, may find it hard to accept the offer.

But, if he refuses the proposition, it would stem from nothing but his and his family's greed for power.

As President Chun stressed, the path to territorial unification lies not in the offering of sugar-coated one-sided proposals, but in the restoration of national trust. The trust can be achieved only by accumulating solutions to problems by means of contacts and dialogue. Offers made without any contacts may be taken as deceptive and incidental.

If the North is genuinely interested in peaceful unification, they cannot reject dialogue itself and visits by the highest authorities, one of the most effective methods of dialogue. They should know that if they reject the offer, it would merely unveil their contradictions.

In addition to the proposal, President Chun discussed several other important issues in his policy statement. They were the manifestation of his resolve to advance the political schedule, to ensure fairness in the coming elections, to restore economic stability, and to establish social justice.

The importance of these issues, of course, cannot be too emphasized. We would like to point out the inseparable inter-relationship between various domestic problems and the recent proposal to North Korea.

Simply stated, steady normalization and development of the various sectors of politics, economy and society become a propellant behind the realization of the January 12 proposition.

Only when elections are held fairly and justly under the new Constitution, when a new government and a National Assembly set sail properly, and when democratic constitutional politics are consolidated, can we expect a coherence of national opinion firm enough to buttress a dialogue with the North. Similarly, only when our economy is developed can our superiority over North Korea be sustained.

When our society grows stronger, further building up national strength, North Korea will awaken from the daydream of communizing the entire Korean peninsula and choose the path to easing tensions.

In this respect, we believe President Chun assessed the current political need correctly when he said he would see to it that a Presidential election would be held in February, that a National Assembly election would be advanced by about a month, and that elections would by all means be held in a fair manner because, he explained, corrupt elections would do irrevocable harm to the morality and justness of the Fifth Republic.

Price stability and private initiative in economy, which the President laid down as essential factors to a sound economy, are worth emphasizing in every respect. Especially, the President's call for the need of a "distribution of efforts and sacrifices" would surely be supported by the middle-and low-income strata.

As we expect much from the policy goals President Chun set forth in his Policy Statement, we hope that the epochal proposal to North Korea will be realized through our initiative.

Direction of President Chun's Policies

Chosun Ilbo (January 13, 1981)

In a New Year Policy Statement delivered on the morning of January 12, President Chun Doo Hwan laid down a series of his future policies. The President discussed a political schedule, the economic policy of the new year, the inter-Korean question, social welfare policies, and educational and cultural issues.

The statement has enabled the people to realize how the state policies of the new year will be implemented. Of the various issues the President touched on, we would like to discuss first the inter-Korean question, with the rest to be taken up at a later opportunity.

As for the inter-Korean question, keen attention at home and abroad has been drawn to the new direction of the South-North issue and the bold proposal made by President Chun. Stating that it is the paramount national task to unify early the homeland of a homogeneous people with the same language and culture, the President said a unified land must be a free, national and democratic country.

The freedom, nationalism and democracy mentioned here, of course, go far beyond the level at which North Korea interprets them with their narrow and partisan concepts. In the past, "peaceful unification of the fatherland" was talked about abstractly, a phrase which Kim Il-sung subjugated to his Communist tactics, using it as a deceptive peace offensive against South Korea.

President Chun again stressed that the path toward reunification is to restore mutual trust between the two sides. With this emphasis, the President proposed an exchange of visits between the highest authorities of the two sides with a view to providing momentum to preventing the recurrence of war, resuming the suspended inter-Korean dialogue promptly, and paving the way to unification. Suggesting that the two sides do away with making unilateral overtures filled with rhetoric and impracticable promises on paper only, the President invited Kim Il-sung to visit Seoul. This was an unprecedented and epochal proposition.

President Chun said that he does not attach any condition or burden to the invitation of Kim Il-sung. The President said that he would guarantee the safety of Kim Il-sung during his stay in Seoul, and would extend all conveniences if he wants to visit places other than Seoul. The President said he is willing to visit Pyongyang at any time if he is invited on the same terms.

We can know that the President's proposal for the visits was intended to prevent the recurrence of war and provide a breakthrough in the efforts to realize peaceful unification through the resumption of dialogue. The significance of the proposal cannot be underestimated because it is the boldest offer the South can advance. Of course, he is free to accept or reject it. But, if he is really interested in the peaceful unification he has talked about so often, there can be no reason why he cannot visit Seoul and invite President Chun to Pyongyang. Moreover, there is nothing the two sides can lose in the proposed visits. We know that if he wants to turn it down, he can coin a lot of excuses. Few persons will fail to realize that such excuses would hardly be helpful to the peaceful unification of the Korean peninsula, but would run counter to efforts to

realize it.

If they want peaceful unification, they cannot shun a dialogue, whether they like it or not. Fundamental matters can be solved only through contacts between the two sides' highest authorities. There cannot be any peaceful unification without dialogue and agreement.

No unification can be made, either, through deceptive peace offensives, subversion, attempts to isolate the other side from the rest of the world or the infiltration of armed agents. Recourse to war amounts to national self-destruction in view of the high-performance weapons both sides have.

We believe, therefore, that if North Korea aspires to peaceful unification, it should naturally show an affirmative response to President Chun's proposal.

Policy Statement of New Dimension

Hankook Ilbo (January 13, 1981)

The bold and forward-looking proposal the President made to North Korea has enabled us to assess his policy philosophy regarding the inter-Korean question. The President sees that the question of whether the Korean people can be united into an independent, national and democratic state hinges on whether trust can be restored between the two sides. It was in this context that President Chun solemnly proposed an exchange of visits between the highest authorities of the South and the North of Korea. The proposition, which drew keen attention from the world community as well as from our people at home and abroad, was an epochal and forward-looking offer, free from the problems of the past.

While inviting Kim Il-sung to visit Seoul, President Chun made it clear that he is willing to visit North Korea if he is so invited. As can be seen in the cases of East and West German rapprochement and the peaceful approach between Egypt and Israel, it is evident that visits or summits between the highest authorities of parties concerned would bring about mutual trust and fast progress toward

the solution of chronic problems in many cases.

We urge North Korea to accept the overture without reservation, mindful of the Korean wish for the prevention of the recurrence of war and the world community's expectation of peace. If North Korea agrees to the proposed exchange of visits between the highest authorities instead of adhering to the ridiculous "environmental conditions" or unrealistic "confederation system," it would be greatly conducive to creating momentum toward solving all the problems pending between the two sides of Korea at a single stroke. Can it be possible, after all, to realize exchanges or peaceful unification overnight without the restoration of trust beforehand?

Unification can be achieved only through national reconciliation. We hope that North Korea will realize that unification can never be materialized through division, confrontation or the boycotting of dialogue.

The President's diagnosis of the current economic difficulties was so frank as not to set forth any price control level. We could literally feel his confidence in coping with the situation effectively. The President said that basic to bringing about a second economic jump-off are 1) concerted efforts among the government, industries and workers, 2) ensured social stability, 3) price stability, 4) a privately-led economic system, and 5) the sharing of the necessary work and sacrifice. The President then predicted a recovery from the current economic recession, and export and employment growth beginning in the coming autumn.

President Chun emphasized the need to further bolster the country's self-reliant foreign policy and national defense programs, stating that the existing good-neighbor relations with the United States, Japan and other allies would be developed into mature relationships of partnership. The President also promised efforts to broaden and diversify the country's relations with European and Middle East countries, as well as to improve its relations with non-aligned and non-hostile Communist countries.

Social welfare is one of the most important national goals, along with the rooting of democracy and realization of social justice. Presi-

dent Chun explained in detail about the immediate tasks of social welfare, pointing out rightly that the establishment of a system for coexistence and coprosperity between labor and management is basic to industrial development and national conciliation.

As for educational policies, the President set forth the bolstering of spiritual education, promotion of education in science and technology, and introduction of life-long education. The President also called for integrity in national culture, as well as for the creative development of traditional culture.

Lastly, President Chun called for an end to the conflict-laden climate of the old era, and the enhancement of a creative passion through nationwide participation.

Acceptance of January 12 Offer Urged Again

Kyunghyang Daily News (January 16, 1981)

We still carefully watch how the North Koreans will react to President Chun's January 12 proposal, which provides historical momentum to creating conditions conducive to the realization of peaceful unification. So far, North Korea has kept silent, without making any official response.

But, this does not mean that the North Korean propaganda machine has been silenced. They continue their stereotyped propaganda abuse of South, attempting to undermine the historic significance of the January 12 proposal.

This attitude of the North Koreans prompts us to doubt if they will accept the proposed visits between the two sides' highest authorities. Even if they show some response, it may turn out to be some impracticable counter-offer or unacceptable conditions, as was the case with their response to our suggestion on January 19, 1979 for a meeting between the responsible authorities of the two sides of Korea.

In view of their inflexible posture and internal system, they may need a considerable time to modify their hardline policy toward the South even if they respond affirmatively to the overture. So, even

though they take time to respond to the proposal, we ought to continue making efforts for peaceful unification with patience, persuading them in various ways of the merits of such visits.

We can imagine that there will be many difficulties to surmount before we can substantially improve our relations with the North Koreans. We know that the Germans had to weather numerous ordeals before they could establish a system of coexistence between East and West Germany. The same was true of relations between Egypt and Israel.

One of the main reasons for the failure to establish a basis for peaceful coexistence between the South and the North of Korea is that North Korea has adhered to a policy of unifying the Korean peninsula in a violent and revolutionary manner only. The North Koreans deny the homogeneity of the nation and interpret history only from the standpoint of class struggle, thus showing enmity toward South Korea.

It was due to their unabated strategy for communization that our incessant overtures for peaceful unification have gone unheeded. Even during the past short-lived dialogue, they dug invasion tunnels in pursuit of military adventure, inviting worldwide censure. While trumpeting a call for the solution of the Korean question by the Koreans themselves, North Korea behaves to the contrary. They cry for an exclusive meeting with the United States and, on the other hand, attempt to bring the Korean question before non-aligned conferences.

In short, the "self-reliance" North Korea talks about applies only to "driving the American forces out of Korea," while the concept of their "peace" is used as an excuse to demand a unilateral reduction in our military forces. Similarly, their slogan, "grand national unity," is no more than a "strategic word" intended to cover up the fictitiousness of the "grand national conference" or the "confederation system" they have proposed. We must realize that North Korea, believing that the shortcut to national unification is a recourse to arms, holds fast to the Hanoi-style "united front" strategy.

The ulterior motive behind their idea of "confederation system"

has already been laid bare. But, the North Korean belief that "it still can achieve unification by means of treacherousness and militarism" itself constitutes a dangerous spark.

What is indispensable to preventing the recurrence of war and laying the base of conditions for peaceful unification is not such treachery but the restoration of mutual trust and fostering of conditions for mutual understanding. It is in this context that President Chun's January 12 proposal is taken as a heroic overture intended to reopen a dialogue between the two sides of Korea and thereby bring about a lasting peace on the Korean peninsula.

Considering their hitherto anti-national and treacherous conduct, we can see that they cannot jump at such a proposal. We believe, however, that if the two sides were interested in the dismantling of the barrier of mistrust and concerned about the nation's future and the pains of the 10 million dispersed family members, there can be no reason why they cannot engage in the proposed exchange of visits and thereby explore ways to remove tensions step by step.

If North Korea does not show sincerity toward the proposal, it will only expose the treacherousness of their "peace" offensive. It would be a big mistake for them to believe that their idea of a "confederation system" can continue to have the "strategic effect" of misleading world opinion and splitting Korean communities abroad.

Moreover, their steadfast call for a dialogue with the United States runs counter even to the principle of "National self-reliance" which they so advocate. These "strategic schemes" are all products of their machination to isolate the Republic of Korea from the rest of the world community and to create a base for their "united front" strategy.

But, they should realize that our security posture and national strength and by no means as weak as their miscalculation assumes. If and when Kim Il-sung accepts the January 12 proposal and observes Seoul and other areas of the South in person, he will learn that the Republic of Korea will never fall prey to his machinations

nor can he secure any foothold in the South for his armed infiltrators. We are convinced that once he becomes aware of this stark reality, he will realize that unification can be achieved, not by force of arms, but only through the alleviation of tensions, resumption of dialogue, restoration of mutual trust and coexistence between the two sides.

We would like to emphasize again that Kim Il-sung should agree to the January 12 proposal, aimed at providing historic turning point for national reconciliation and respond immediately the call for working-level talks to pave the way for the exchange of visits between the two sides' highest authorities. If he knows that this is the only way to prevent the recurrence of war and realize peaceful unification, he will see no reason why he cannot agree to the January 12 proposal.

2. Reactions Overseas

President Chun's proposal for an exchange of visits between the highest authorities of the South and the North of Korea was acclaimed as an "epochal and constructive measure for the peaceful unification of the Korean peninsula" by even Third World countries, not to speak of the United States, Japan and other allies.

The United States said January 12 that it was a constructive offer for President Chun to propose a meeting with North Korea's Kim Il-sung, urging North Korea to accept the proposition. A spokesman for the U.S. State Department, commenting on the overture, said, "We welcome it as an offer able to contribute much toward peace, reconciliation and national unification on the Korean peninsula." The spokesman added that "We strongly hope that Kim Il-sung will show a positive response to this historic invitation."

The Foreign Ministry of Japan, too commented that President Chun's overture was "an offer necessary for stability and peace on the Korean peninsula," adding that "Though we do not believe it could be materialized outright, we believe it is an extremely bold proposition reflecting President Chun's confidence."

In addition to these and other major allies, many newspapers around the world, including those in African and Latin American nations, welcomed the proposal, describing it as “the first heroic decision in inter-Korean relations,” “an unprecedented new proposition” and “a bold and epochal proposal.”

The New York Times, reporting President Chun’s proposal before any other U.S. media, said President Chun expressed his willingness to visit Pyongyang for the first summit meeting between the two sides of divided Korea. Commenting that it was the first effort to resume the suspended inter-Korean contacts since the inauguration of President Chun, the Times observed, however, that Kim Il-sung seems unlikely to agree to the offer easily.

The Sankei Shinbun of Japan, in a January 13 editorial entitled “President Chun’s Policy Statement Full of Confidence,” said that the epochal proposal of President Chun reflected his firm confidence with the embarkation of the Fifth Republic drawing near.

The Times and other newspapers of the United Kingdom allotted considerable space to reports on President Chun’s proposal for an exchange of visits between the highest authorities of the South and the North of Korea. In particular, The Times, in an article headlined “North Korean Leader Invited to Seoul for Unification Talks,” reported the proposal in detail along with a picture of President Chun. The prestigious newspaper said it was the first time that a President of South Korea had invited Kim Il-sung, reporting that observers in Seoul believe the overture is a bold attempt aimed at resuming inter-Korean contacts. The Guardian also reported in an article headlined “South Korea Offers Exchange of Visits” and accompanied by a picture of President Chun.

Meanwhile, many countries’ diplomats posted at the United Nations reacted favorably to the proposal advanced by President Chun, urging Kim Il-sung to accept the offer.

As of January 30, the January 12 proposal was favorably commented on or reported in a total of 73 countries on 299 occasions. When unofficial favorable comments are included, the number of such countries reaches 92.

Throughout the 36-year history of national division, no other inter-Korean proposition drew more nearly universal support. The widespread support attests to the validity of the January 12 proposal as an effort for peaceful unification.

To add to the significance of the proposal, not only Korea's allies but Third World nations as well broadly endorsed the January 12 offer, a development which helped weaken the North Korean position at the New Delhi conference of non-aligned foreign ministers in February 1981, obliging Pyongyang to withdraw its plan to raise the Korean issue at the meeting. The North Koreans knew that a majority of the non-aligned countries were supported the position of the Republic of Korea as characterized by President Chun's January 12 proposal.

3. Korean and U.S. Presidents Vow Joint Efforts to Materialize January 12 Proposal

President Chun Doo Hwan had a summit meeting with U.S. President Ronald Reagan on February 2 at the White House during his official visit to the United States, at the invitation of President Reagan, from January 28 through February 7, 1981. In the meeting, held in a cordial and friendly atmosphere, the two Presidents exchanged opinions on the international situation and other matters of common interest, reaffirming the importance of maintaining peace on the Korean peninsula and East Asia.

During the summit meeting, President Reagan assured President Chun of U.S. support for the efforts of the Republic of Korea to resume a constructive dialogue with North Korea in order to ease tension and build the framework for peaceful unification of the Korean peninsula. The U.S. President also commended President Chun for the far-reaching proposal made on January 12, 1981, calling for an exchange of visits by the highest leaders of the South and the North Korea.

The following are parts of the Joint Communique issued by

Presidents Chun and Reagan after the summit, which deal with inter-Korean relations:

President Chun was assured of U.S. support for the efforts of the Republic of Korea to resume a constructive dialogue with North Korea in order to ease tension and build the framework for peaceful reunification of the Korean peninsula.

President Reagan commended President Chun for the far-reaching proposal made on January 12, 1981, calling for an exchange of visits by the highest leaders of the South and the North of Korea.

President Reagan reaffirmed that the Republic of Korea must be a full participant in any U.S. negotiation with North Korea. The two Presidents shared the view that any unilateral steps toward North Korea which are not reciprocated toward the Republic of Korea by North Korea's principal allies would not be conducive to promoting stability or peace in the area.

4. U.N. Secretary General Promises Help in Realizing January 12 Proposal

President Chun Doo Hwan met and talked with United Nations Secretary General Kurt Waldheim on January 31, 1981 during his official visit to the United States. The two leaders reviewed the overall aspects of the situation in Asia and the world. Secretary General Waldheim, in particular, promised President Chun his wholehearted support and cooperation in realizing the January 12 proposal of the President.

President Chun explained to the U.N. Secretary General that his unconditional invitation of Kim Il-sung was intended to provide historic momentum to finding a breakthrough in the deadlocked inter-Korean dialogue and to fostering trust between the two sides of Korea, adding that he is confident that the "proposal would contribute much to peace not only on the Korean peninsula but also in Northeast Asia and, further, the world." The President asked the

Secretary General to play an intermediary role for the realization of the proposed visits.

President Chun told Secretary General Waldheim that inasmuch as Kim Il-sung has been an autocratic power for in 36 years, he can't be correctly aware of the situation in South Korea. The President said he believes, therefore, that if Kim Il-sung visits South Korea and observes the situation of the South in person, it could help forestall the outbreak of a war based on Kim Il-sung's miscalculation. President Chun also said that he is willing to visit North Korea first on the same terms as he set forth for Kim Il-sung.

Secretary General Waldheim, expressing regret over North Korea's rejection of the overture, pledged to "exercise my authority to the full and endeavor to materialize Your Excellency's proposal."

Secretary General Waldheim, who visited Seoul and Pyongyang in 1979, is known to have keen interest in the Korean question.

Upon the meeting with President Chun, the U.N. Secretary General was reported to have conveyed the contents of his meeting with President Chun as well as the President's January 12 proposal to the North Korean mission to the United Nations. On behalf of Waldheim, U.N. Under-secretary General Perez de Cuellar explained to Chun Jae-hong, deputy chief of the North Korean Mission, about the Chun-Waldheim meeting.

However, North Korea rejected any intermediary role by U.N. Secretary General Waldheim. Chun Jae-hong told a press conference on February 6 that he saw no need to convey the January 12 proposal to his home government as requested by U.N. Under-secretary General Cuellar.

Chun Jae-hong said that the position of North Korea with regard to the issue was well described in Kim Il's statement of January 21. The North Korean official then vehemently denounced President Chun's visit to the United States and the joint Korea-U.S. military exercise, "Team Spirit '81,"

Part III

North Korean Reaction to January 12 Proposal

1. Statement by “Committee for Peaceful Unification”

The North Korean Communists have yet to agree to the realistic and practicable January 12 proposal, which is aimed at providing momentum to restoring trust, preventing the recurrence of war and laying the bedrock for peaceful unification through resumption of an inter-Korean dialogue.

On January 19, 1981, one week after President Chun set forth the proposition, Kim Il, chairman of North Korea's so-called “Committee for Peaceful Unification of the Fatherland,” flatly rejected the offer of President Chun.

In a 15-minute statement broadcast on Radio Pyongyang and Central Radio, the North Koreans denounced the January 12 proposal as “a nation-splitting scheme designed to forge two Korea's rather than intended to serve peaceful unification.” The statement then laid down their stereotyped propaganda demands, which included “release of Kim Dae-jung,” “restoration of recently disbanded political parties and organizations,” “abandonment of anti-Communist system,” “withdrawal of the June 23 Special Foreign Policy” and “withdrawal of U.S. forces from Korea.”

By repeating their insistence that “we can talk with those Koreans who do not seek division or anti-communism” North Korea made it clear that it only seeks to communize the entire Korean peninsula, without any interest in the creation of a basis for peaceful unification.

In the same statement, Kim Il, who is concurrent vice-president of North Korea, did not hesitate to use derogatory language in slandering the South with regard to some internal affairs, thus exposing their savagery. The rudeness contrasted the use by President Chun of the official title of Kim Il-sung when he referred to the North Korean leader in his January 12 proposal, though the use of the official title did not carry any legal implication.

The “Committee for Peaceful Unification of the Fatherland” is one of the perfunctory organizations affiliated with the so-called

“Democratic Front for Unification of the Fatherland.” Like many other organizations of North Korea, the “Committee” exists only on paper without any platform of its own. It is an organization whose sole *raison d’être* is to be cited in propaganda statements directed against South Korea.

2. Motive Behind Rejection of January 12 Proposal

The North Korean Communists have turned down the January 12 proposal without any justification. They are simply unable to find any just reason for rejecting President Chun’s suggestion for the creation of a basis for mutual trust and ultimate peaceful unification through actual deeds and practices.

In their rejection, the North Koreans argued that the January 12 proposition was intended for “national division” and a scheme to “perpetuate national division.” They then renewed their call for the unification formula of “confederation.”

But, this excuse by the North Koreans lacks any logic. The January 12 proposal cannot serve to perpetuate national division because it calls for an exchange of visits between the highest authorities of the two sides of Korea as a practical means of restoring mutual trust, preventing war, resuming dialogue unconditionally and fostering a basis for peaceful unification.

However, their idea of “confederation” is in effect intended to perpetuate two Korea’s. Moreover, apart from the substance of the “confederation system,” North Korea attaches ridiculous conditions to the institution of the “confederation,” precluding its practicability. The conditions include the overthrow of the Republic of Korea government, prohibition of anti-Communist activities, conclusion of a peace agreement through direct talks between the United States and North Korea, and withdrawal of American forces from Korea. They demand the overthrow of the other side in negotiations, a party with which they are supposed to discuss and solve the Korean question. Can this attitude advocate, in any way, the genuine peaceful solution of inter-Korean problems?

The North Koreans, who attempt to impose a unilateral propaganda formula upon the other side, are the very ones who seek to split the nation in disregard of any reconciliation and perpetuate national division.

The North Korean rejection of the January 12 proposal bears eloquent testimony to the fact that they are still preoccupied with the communization of the Republic of Korea by force of arms without any interest in the issue of achieving unification of the homeland in a peaceful manner.

The core of their strategy for unification is to foment a "revolution" in the South, which is meant to overthrow the government of the Republic of Korea, and instead establish a regime sympathetic to Communists in the South. It is in this scheme that the North Koreans concentrate on instigating confusion and subverting the government of South Korea. Their idea of a "Koryo confederation" has been conceived only to cause a split in the public opinion of the South.

North Korea also exploits inter-Korean dialogue or contacts as a means of facilitating communization of the South. They do not agree to dialogue or contacts unless they are positive that it will be helpful to fomenting unrest in the South or weakening the South Korean government.

An example can be found in their attitude toward the preliminary contacts aimed at preparing for the proposed prime ministers' meeting between the South and the North. When the South plunged into a power vacuum following the sudden loss of the national leader on October 26, 1979, North Korea agreed, with an ulterior motive, to the working-level contacts for the prime ministers' meeting. However, when the South regained stability, North Korea unilaterally boycotted the contacts.

Their rejection of the January 12 proposal, too, stems, in effect, from their judgment that any contact with the South at this time would not serve their interests. They know there is no chance for their schemes now that stability has been solidly restored in the South by strong leadership.

The refusal of President Chun's proposal shows, at the same time, that the North Koreans have insufficient confidence to resume inter-Korean talks and open their society to the South. Kim Il-sung maintains his power by insulating North Korean society from the outside world and by making a mockery of his people. The hereditary succession involving Kim Il-sung and his son, Kim Chong-il, a laughing stock of the whole world, has been made possible only by his mobcracy.

If the societies of the two sides were thrown open through mutual exchanges, the North Korean people would be able to realize the nature of the system Kim Il-sung has imposed upon them. If and when the treacherousness of the Kim Il-sung regime were thus brought to light, it would deal a crushing blow to the ruling structure of the North Korean Communists.

To Kim Il-sung and his fellow Communists, maintenance of their power stands far above the question of peaceful unification of the homeland.

3. Internal Reaction to North Korea's Rejection of January 12 Proposal

As North Korea rejected president Chun's proposal to lay the bedrock for mutual trust and peaceful unification of the homeland, all the newspapers of South Korea pointed out editorially the unreasonableness of the rejection, urging North Korea to reconsider and respond affirmatively to the overture. At the same time, the Democratic Justice party and other political parties and various social organizations including the Korean Veterans' Association, in statements, denounced the rejection as a "revelation of their scheme to pursue communization of the entire Korean peninsula," and asked them to accept the overture for the sake of peaceful solution of the Korean question. Refuting, in particular, their demand for the release of Kim Dae-jung and other "political prisoners" and for the repeal of the South's anti-Communist policy, the political parties and social organizations said that if North Korea poses such

demands, the North Korean Communists, too, should set free all the inmates in their prisons and renounce its anti-democratic policies.

The following are editorials appearing in major newspapers on the North Korean rejection of the January 12 proposal:

Kim Il-sung's Rejection of Invitation

Dong-A Ilbo (January 21, 1981)

The invitation of Kim Il-sung by President Chun Doo Hwan was coldly rejected by North Korea one week after the proposition was made. We, who are well aware of the treacherous nature of Kim Il-sung, did not foresee that they would easily show an affirmative response to it. Still, we are enraged to see that they coldbloodedly turn down an offer that the two sides get together for talks.

The proposal which President Chun made to Kim Il-sung on January 12 was that they meet together without any conditions to restore mutual trust and explore a path toward unification without being bound by any past problems. In response, Kim Il-sung had Kim Il, vice-president, reject it, using low propaganda phrases and derogatory language.

A statement issued by Kim Il in his capacity as chairman of the "Committee for Peaceful Unification of the Fatherland" repeated their demand that the South renounce its anti-Communist policy, withdraw the June 23 Special Foreign Policy, and drive U.S. forces out of Korea. It also contained a clause alleging they can have a dialogue with those sympathetic with the Communist, who "do not pursue division and anti-Communism."

These absurd and unilateral demands by the North Koreans are not new to us. They were repeated countless times from right after national liberation on such occasions as the South-North negotiations in the wake of national liberation, the South-North Coordinating Committee, the "grand national conference," a confederation system, and prime ministers' meetings.

The type of unification they seek is not unification achieved through coexistence but communization, as North Vietnam took

over South Vietnam. This is why Kim Il-sung refuses inter-Korean dialogue and continues infiltrating armed espionage agents into the South under the excuse of fostering a revolutionary capability strong enough to communize the entire Korean peninsula. This North Korean scheme was evidenced in the unearthing of three espionage rings involving 15 persons by the Agency for National Security Planning on January 19.

We believe, however, that Kim Il-sung is aware of the fact that his attempt to apply the Vietnam method to Korea has been thwarted due to the watertight anti-Communist posture of the South Korean people. They should realize that even during the period of social unrest in the wake of the October 26, 1979 incident, the prevailing sentiment among the people was that "we can't neglect anti-Communism." Vigilance against Communists wasn't shaken even in the miners' riot at Sabuk and the Kwangju turmoil.

Nevertheless, Kim Il-sung shuns any contact with the South as he steps up machinations against the South, both internally and externally. It seems there are two reasons behind this attitude of the North Koreans. One is their miscalculation of the internal situation of South Korea, and the other their reluctance to deal with the South in fear of its adverse effect on Kim Il-sung's personality cult.

Kim Il-sung miscalculated on the eve of the Korean War. When the United States pulled its forces out of Korea in 1948 and U.S. State Secretary Acheson placed Korea out of America's Western Pacific Defense perimeter in 1950, Kim Il-sung took America's abandonment of Korea.

Contrary to Kim's miscalculation, the United States treated South Korea as a test site, where it wanted to prove that the free democratic system can provide a better life than the Communist system. The United States naturally took part in the war without delay. In the three-year war, they had to pay high price, losing a considerable chunk of land. The tragedy which this nation had to suffer due to Kim Il-sung's miscalculation was the worst of its kind throughout the history of Korea.

Even today, 30 years later, Kim Il-sung still miscalculates the

situation in the South. He erroneously believes that he can create a base for communization if he keeps sending armed agents into the South and instigate pro-Communist activities without having a dialogue with the South Korean government. But, this conduct results only in heightening the hostility toward him.

Kim Il-sung seems to have succeeded in maintaining his dictatorship for 32 years with bloody purges. But, he has committed irrevocable mistakes and crimes with regard to the question of national unification from the time of the Korean War. The problem is that the crimes are not confined to himself alone. Kim Il-sung is the very cancer of the nation, considering the fact that his reckless militarism has obliged the two sides of Korea to engage in costly arms and diplomatic races.

Kim Il-sung must be maintaining a vast network of intelligence, and, therefore, aware that it can't be easy to take over the South. The fact that he shuns any dialogue or contact with the South, especially the proposed prime ministers meeting and contacts between the highest authorities of the South and the North, cannot but be taken as having derived from his fear of the consequences of opening his society. He is afraid that the wave of the South's freedom would flow into the North through South-North contacts, unveiling how miserable the so-called "workers' heaven" is compared with the society of South Korea, and how fictitious Kim Il-sung's personality cult is.

A dialogue and contacts between the South and the North of Korea are being sacrificed by Kim Il-sung's miscalculation and personality cult. But, just as the sky cannot be covered with one's palm, the nation's will to unification cannot be checked by Kim Il-sung's personal avarice. We are convinced that miscalculation and fiction become powerless before truth. As we wait for the arrival of that time, we again call for the resumption of a South-North dialogue in whatever form.

Refusal by North Korea of January 12 Proposal
Kyunghyang Daily News (January 20, 1981)

The rejection by North Korea of the January 12 proposal of President Chun Doo Hwan has shed light once again on their ulterior motive. Moreover, it is feared that with the rejection as momentum, North Korea would intensify its propaganda offensive and various provocations against the South. The probability is that they will launch further subversive activities in the South with the Presidential and National Assembly elections just around the corner. In this connection, our particular attention is drawn to the recent uncovering of large-scale North Korean espionage rings.

We believe that we must cope with the North Korean rejection of the January 12 proposal from two angles. First, we must deal with North Korea's subversion and propaganda schemes against us more effectively. For nothing can be more important than to combat the North Korean attempt to subvert the birth of the Fifth Republic.

At this juncture, we must realize that the North Koreans are frantic about sabotaging the historical integrity of the embarking the Fifth Republic. Our special vigilance must be directed toward possible destructive operations by planted North Korean agents and their sympathizers.

The second is that although they have turned down the January 12 overture, we must continue, with patience, to induce them to the forum of dialogue. We cannot spare such efforts if we are to meet the ardent national wish for peaceful unification of the homeland.

Of course, we didn't completely expect that the North Koreans would accept the offer, in view of their all-out propaganda on their fictitious idea of a "confederation system." The fact that they reject the exchange of visits by the highest authorities of the two sides, intended to restore mutual trust, is tantamount to proving that the "confederation" idea has been raised only as an empty propaganda piece.

We feel compelled to stress again that most essential to meeting

the paramount goal of national unification is to accept President Chun's January 12 proposal. For the proposition, intended to open a new chapter of history on this Korean peninsula, stems from the President's pure national conscience and historic will.

We can assume that behind the North Korean rejection of the offer were many of their complicated internal problems. It may be a great risk for them to engage in a dialogue with the South, which may put their Kim Il-sung—Kim Chong-il hereditary system at stake. Accordingly, the more serious their internal problems are, the more attempts they may perpetrate to heighten their provocations against the South and draw the attention of their people toward their southward strategy.

What we cannot overlook here is that there has been no change whatsoever in the North Korean strategy against the South. This has been expressly shown not only in their rejection of the February 12 proposal but also in their persistent machinations against the South. In particular, the recent uncovering of North Korean espionage rings has produced much for our study.

The spy rings involved those former South Koreans who defected to the North, whom North Korea trained as agents and infiltrated into the areas of the South where they originally resided for underground activities. These agents had formed underground networks taking advantage of their relatives or had sought classified information, preparing, in either case, for an armed uprising at a "decisive time." Their membership included a school teacher, a ward official, a businessman linked to the pro-Pyongyang Chochongryon organization in Japan, and some fishermen. Some of them had Soviet-made weapons. Their missions included assassination of government leaders, stirring of public sentiments and collection of military information.

As is well known, Kim Il-sung has stressed time and again that in order to unify the homeland under Communist terms, the so-called "three major revolutionary capabilities" must be enriched.

The first of them is that the armed strength of North Korea itself must be bolstered so as to maintain a military edge over South Korea

and better prepare for a "war of liberation." This goal seems to have already been met. North Korea disburses a huge military outlays to the detriment of its overall economy to increase its military manpower to the level of a staggering 700,000 and acquire large amounts of offensive weaponry.

The second is to implant a large number of its sympathizers in the South and thereby weaken the security preparedness of South Korea. The endless infiltration of armed agents, needless to say, is aimed at achieving this objective by taking advantage of the loophole of our open society.

The third is to elevate its international standing while isolating South Korea from the world community through slander and defamation.

Tactics devised to facilitate this three-stage strategy are 1) increasing the capability of military forces, 2) creating a "united front," and 3) weakening anti-revolutionary forces.

No matter how the situation of the Korean peninsula may change, it is apparent that at least this three-stage revolutionary logic of the North Koreans will not change. But, their tactics are likely to assume various protective colorations depending on developments.

In the recent past, North Korea suddenly grew enthusiastic about inter-Korean contacts when the South plunged into social unrest in the wake of the demise of President Park Chung Hee on October 26, 1979, proposing a prime ministers' meeting between the two sides. However, as South Korea restored stability under strong new leadership, the North Koreans made a sudden about-face, torpedoing the working-level contacts designed to pave the way for their own proposal of a prime ministers' meeting and returning to vehement slanderous propaganda and dispatching armed agents to the South.

This contradictory attitude of North Korea enables us to realize their genuine ulterior motive, that is, to attempt to provoke us when our preparedness seemed slackened. Thus seen, what is most important to us is to further cement our security readiness so as to deny the

bellicose North Korean Communists any opening to exploit.

It now seems that North Korea has unilaterally abandoned efforts to consolidate peace on the Korean peninsula. One evidence is their rejection of President Chun's January 12 proposal. This can be taken as showing their determination to continue pursuing the communization of the entire Korean peninsula by force of arms, instead of trying to solve the Korean question by peaceful means.

Faced with such policy changes by the North Koreans, we must be fully prepared against possible stepped-up infiltrations and subversive activities around the times of the coming presidential and National Assembly elections.

At this juncture, nothing can be more important than for us to unite with a strong sense of anti-Communism. We also emphasize the need to prepare more positive measures to cope with the North Korean rejection at home and abroad.

Ulterior Motive of North Korean Rejection

Seoul Shinmun (January 21, 1918)

The North Korean Communists have turned down the January 12 proposal of President Chun Doo Hwan. After a week-long silence, North Korea, in a statement issued on January 19 in the name of Kim Il, chairman of the "Committee for Peaceful Unification of the Fatherland," rejected the proposition, which is aimed at exploring the path to peaceful unification by means of an exchange of visits by the two sides' highest authorities.

President Chun's January 12 proposal was truly epochal. It was a bold and realistic approach to call for sincere talks between the highest authorities during their visits without any conditions and free of any burden. In view of the fact that visits by the highest officials of East and West Germany led to the conclusion of a basic treaty between them, and an exchange of visits between the highest authorities of Egypt and Israel layed the bedrock for a Mideast peace treaty, President Chun's proposal, too, contained the possibility of providing a breakthrough in the solution of the Korean

question.

World attention was all the more drawn to how North Korea would react to the offer because of the importance of the overture. The world believed that if North Korea agreed to the exchange of visits, it would ease military tensions on the Korean peninsula, leading to the exploration of an avenue to peaceful unification.

However, North Korea has rejected the offer. Contrary to their lip service to “unification of the nation,” North Korea in effect stands in the way of peaceful unification. This double-faced conduct substantiates the conclusion that their idea of a “confederation system” is no more than an empty slogan.

We can fully perceive the ulterior motive behind their rejection of the proposition. They must have been scared at the idea of having an inter-Korean summit at a time when the Kil Il-sung—Kim Chong-il hereditary system has yet to take firm root. They must have also believed that any rise of a mood of detente would threaten the very foundation of North Korea which, itself a huge military camp, is in a constant state of war readiness.

As if to cover up this underlying situation, North Korea has launched a stepped-up slander campaign against the Republic of Korea. They are going all-out to undermine our security posture by demanding that we renounce our anti-Communist policy and withdraw American forces.

Evidently North Korea is not in the least interested in the peaceful unification of the homeland. All they are after is the “liberation of South Korea,” or in other words, communization. The rejection of the January 12 proposal and the unabated defamation of the South well indicate where their objective lies.

In line with their ulterior motives, it is anticipated that the North Koreans will take the following course of action.

Firstly, they will attempt to disturb public opinion in the South through intensified slander and defamation around the coming elections in a bid to estrange the people from the government.

Secondly, they will infiltrate more espionage agents, while attempting to foment social unrest by coining and spreading various

vicious rumors. They may also scheme to secure a sort of foothold in the South for subversive operations.

In short, the probability is that the North Koreans will employ all available schemes to disrupt the smooth sailing of our Fifth Republic. The government and people are urged to cope with their machinations with keen vigilance.

Lastly, we would like to call upon North Korea once again in the name of the nation to accept the January 12 proposal. We wish North Korea would follow a rightful path so as to forestall fratricidal blood shedding and accomplish the historic duty of peaceful unification.

North Korea's Rejection of January 12 Proposal *Joong-Ang Daily News (January 12, 1981)*

It is not totally surprising to learn that North Korea rejected the January 12 proposal of President Chun Doo Hwan for an exchange of visits by the highest authorities of the South and the North of Korea. The refusal came one week after the presidential overture was made.

We, who are familiar with their nature and southward schemes, foresaw from the beginning that North Korea would hardly accept it. We even perceived what excuse they would produce for their rejection.

One thing expressly clear is that the rejection has again exposed their contradictions to the world, and surely enabled us to realize their real nature.

For a long time, the North Korean Communists have been crying for "peaceful unification" or "independent unification," feigning to be the "champion of peace."

For the sake of the peace and independent unification they trumpet so much, they should naturally have a dialogue of any type with the Republic of Korea, which contains about 70 percent of the Korean population and which has about half of the total land. Such a dialogue can be held most effectively by the government of the

Republic of Korea, which alone can be responsible for reaching agreements in such a dialogue.

The January 12 proposal, intended to open a dialogue between the highest authorities, was epochal in that it could assure the maximum efficiency and provide a dramatic reconciliation between the two feuding sides.

Their rejection, nonetheless, of the proposal and shunning of any other contacts only substantiate the conclusion that their highly propagandized utterances were all falsehoods.

If their latest idea of a "confederation system" were as genuinely motivated as they claim, they should try to realize it by sitting down together with us, explaining to us the "merits" of their idea. If they deny such a practical effort, that is, a dialogue with us, then it only shows that the idea is for their propaganda use only.

All in all, their genuine intention is to unify the land under Communist terms, and this intention remains unchanged whether they agree to dialogue or not. Their persistent strategy is that they agree to talks when they judge this to be conducive to creating conditions ripe for unification by force of arms, and that they break off a dialogue when they believe it moves in the direction of detente.

The rejection of the January 12 proposition was also based on their judgment that if they accepted it, it would only result in the de facto recognition of the government of the Republic of Korea, as well as in the acceptance of peaceful coexistence, without any effect of slitting and disturbing the society of the South, a consequence that definitely runs counter to the strategy for unification achieved through force of arms or violence.

Seen from the North Korean attitude, inter-Korean relations have been characterized so far only by arms and diplomatic races. Now that they have turned down our January 12 offer, the next step we should take is to drastically bolster our capabilities to a point where we can outdistance them in those two areas of competition. We must strengthen our defense preparedness and consolidate our spiritual armament by making the people realize the fictitiousness of the North Korean propaganda. Specifically, their recent rejection

renders great advantage to our position in the diplomatic race.

A good opportunity has been provided to make the whole world realize that their unification formula or "peace-oriented" gestures are all thinly veiled schemes designed only for propaganda purposes. How can they deny talks while supposedly pursuing peace?

We feel the need for the government to let the people know the unreasonableness and fictitiousness of the excuses they put forth in rejecting the proposition. The government is also urged to make greater efforts to create conditions which would oblige North Korea to come to the forum of dialogue, and maintain the initiative in the endeavor to solve the Korean question.

Rejection of January 12 Offer

Chosun Ilbo (January 12, 1981)

North Korea has rejected the January 12 proposal advanced by President Chun Doo Hwan. The refusal was made in the name of Kim Il, chairman of the "Committee for Peaceful Unification of the Fatherland." As excuses for the rejection, the North Koreans were said to have demanded the release of a criminal defendant, abandonment of our anti-Communist policy, and withdrawal of U.S. forces from Korea, and to have asserted that they would talk only with those South Koreans who are sympathetic to Communism.

In view of their unchanging nature and the initiative we took in the proposal, we knew that they would likely turn it down with some excuses. Still, we can hardly control our anger at their refusal. Our indignation is greater because the excuses they laid down were interventions in our internal affairs, or based on the logic of denying the very existence of the Republic of Korea. We doubt if we should continue to pursue a dialogue with such a party.

Does the way a specific criminal defendant is legally handled have anything to do with the inter-Korean dialogue? If they want his releases, then they, too, should set free those countless persons held in captivity in their prisons. They were said to have asked us to

renounce our anti-Communist policy. If this logic can hold, then they, too, should renounce their anti-democratic policy.

Their call for the repeal of the June 23 Special Foreign Policy Statement shows that they are not interested in peaceful coexistence. The U.S. forces in Korea would not be here after all if they hadn't provoked the Korean War and if they didn't have aggressive schemes. The logic of their rejection of the January proposal is sheer sophistry and rhetoric.

Despite their rejection, the historic and creative significance of the proposition continues to be valid, and the gains obtained therefrom are substantial. After the proposal, the North Koreans have been driven to the defensive at home and abroad. There are visible signs that the challenging of Kim Il-sung to come and see Seoul in person put them off balance for a while.

Can there be any better offer than the invitation extended by the Head of State of this side to the highest authorities of the other side to come to this side? To this ultimate door-opening, Kim Il-sung was driven to a crossroads, to make last choice, a choice between unveiling his mask of peace and exposing his real intention of Communist revolution or making a policy about-face in favor of peaceful coexistence, whether he likes it or not.

The unchanging intention of the North Korean Communists is, of course, the former. But, they cannot concede this real motive lest it should cause them to be branded as "anti-dialogue." Still, they are too inflexible to choose the latter. The choice of the latter would also unfavorably affect their power structure, which features a hereditary dictatorship.

In a week-long huddle, the North Korean Communists chose "shameful defense" rather than "opening without confidence." This must have been a "humiliating" selection for the unprecedentedly autocratic Communists to make.

They may have safeguarded, for a while at least, their hereditary dictatorial system thanks to the selection of the "shameful defense." But, their decision amounted to a final betrayal of the nation and, further, the world. North Korea will find it hard to disengage itself

from the net woven by their own acts of betrayal of peace and unification.

We believe, however, that we cannot give up our efforts to achieve peaceful unification merely because our recent proposal has gone unheeded. We must continue to strive for the realization of the January 12 proposal, calling for an exchange of visits by the highest officials of the two sides of Korea.

. Trampling of Longing for Unification

Hankook Ilbo (January 21, 1981)

North Korea rejected on January 19 the historic January 12 proposal for an exchange of visits between the highest authorities of the South and the North of Korea, an offer which could provide epochal momentum to solving the Korean question.

We already know that North Korea does not want a unification achieved through dialogue. Despite the July 4 South-North Coordinating Committee, the North Koreans have broken off every channel of the inter-Korean dialogue, such as the working-level contacts to pave the way to the proposed prime ministers' meeting, the South-North Coordinating Committee, the South-North Red Cross Conference, the vice-chairmen's meeting of the Coordinating Committee, and working-level meetings of the Red Cross talks.

The fact that they again rejected the January 12 proposal on the heels of the suspension of these inter-Korean contacts, shows that they are not in the least interested in dialogue, and that they are only engrossed in pursuing unification in a non-peaceful manner. Their rejection also showed that their unification formula of a "confederation system" is no more than a treacherous propaganda piece intended to smoke-screen their aggressive designs and mislead public opinion at home and abroad.

But, we are not content with the reconfirmation of their scheme to communize the whole Korean peninsula by force of arms and with the unveiling of their treacherousness before the whole world through their rejection of the proposition. The rejection, made in a

statement issued in the name of Kim Il, chairman of the “Committee for Peaceful Unification of the Fatherland,” was an anti-national act that gave another disappointment to the 60 million people wishing for peaceful unification.

After President Chun Doo Hwan made the historic overture on January 12, all the people of the South and the North invariably hoped that Kim Il-sung would agree to the offer and thereby resume the suspended inter-Korean dialogue, exploring a path to peaceful unification.

Nevertheless, the North Koreans Communists merely repeated their absurd slanders and stereotyped demands against the South instead of meeting the national aspiration. They merely threw cold water upon the hopeful-hearts of the people.

President Chun's January 12 proposal was the most effective and epochal offer in every respect. The resumption of the suspended dialogue is a must so long as the premise that unification should be achieved peacefully is recognized. Restoration of mutual trust is indispensable to the successful resumption of dialogue. It is also an internationally proven fact that nothing can be speedier and more effective for the restoration of trust and the solution of disputes through dialogue than a summit between the highest officials of the parties directly involved.

It was owing to its logical and practical justness that the President's January 12 proposal has been internationally acclaimed.

However, North Korea, in the same statement, insisted that, for an independent unification, the Republic of Korea should first release Kim Dae-jung, repeal its anti-Communist policy and the June 23 Special Foreign Policy Statement, and withdraw U.S. forces from Korea. It then argued it would talk with only those South Koreans who “do not pursue national division or anti-Communism.” In other words, North Korea was asserting that it would have a dialogue with those who seek to overthrow the Republic of Korea.

This is an insistence that exposes their ulterior motive clearly, a claim that runs diametrically counter to their claim in the offer for a “confederation system” that “confederation can be instituted

between the South and the North of Korea which have conflicting ideologies and systems.”

Thus it is evident beyond any doubt that they have laid down the idea of a “confederation system” not as a genuine method of achieving peaceful unification, but merely as a propaganda device aimed at misleading world opinion.

In fact, with an eye to the non-aligned foreign ministers’ conference slated for February 4 in New Delhi, North Korea attempts to sell the idea of a “confederation system.” The January 12 proposal dealt a blow to such deceptive propaganda schemes. They are certain to suffer yet greater damage because of their rejection of the offer.

The January 12 proposal has clearly revealed to the whole world which side is truly interested in peace. I also provided decisive momentum for our government’s maintenance of hegemony so far as the issue of peaceful unification of the Korean peninsula is concerned.

The government is urged to further intensify information and diplomatic activities at the upcoming non-aligned foreign ministers’ conference, and elsewhere in the world community, to shed light on the fictitiousness of their deceptive peace offensive. For this will be conducive to prompting the North Koreans to renounce their aggressive schemes and to return to the forum of dialogue.

At the same time, we urge all countries, including non-aligned nations, to be careful lest they should be taken in by the North Koreans’ lip service to peace, and to exercise their influence over North Korea so that it will respond affirmatively to the January 12 proposal. We are confident that this is the rightful conduct for genuinely peace-loving nations.



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South-North Dialogue in Korea

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Part I

Basis of National Consensus for Peaceful Unification

1. June 5 Proposal to North Korea

President Chun Doo Hwan, in an address at the inaugural session of the Advisory Council on Peaceful Unification Policy, proposed to North Korea on June 5, 1981 a meeting between the highest authorities of the South and the North of Korea.

The proposal, manifesting President Chun's strong will to bring about peaceful unification of the country, was a more advanced and concrete form of his earlier January 12 proposition in which the President offered an exchange of mutual visits between the highest authorities of the two zones of Korea.

Affirming that peaceful unification of the divided fatherland is a task that has to be achieved by all means with the unbiased efforts of the 60 million Koreans in the South and the North, President Chun reiterated in the January 12 and June 5 proposals that the avenue of unification should be explored with the determination of the entire nation, and in a peaceful manner.

Rather than a mere supplement to the January 12 overture, the June 5 proposal was epochal and significant in that the President boldly sought improved inter-Korean relations and a further advance toward unification by leaving the choice of the time and venue of a meeting to Kim Il-sung. Also noteworthy is the fact that in the latest offer, President Chun again called for Pyongyang's affirmative response to the proposal, pointing out that the national desire for unification cannot be achieved by force of arms, and that if a war recurs, it could lead only to self-destruction of the nation, where there would be neither victor nor loser.

Whereas an exchange of visits between the highest authorities of the two zones of Korea was suggested in the January 12 proposal, President Chun, in the June 5 offer, suggested that he and Kim Il-sung meet at any time and any place to discuss frankly all questions raised by both sides, including the proposed exchange of visits and both South and North Korean unification formulae, adding that the time of the meeting would be the sooner the better.

Also in the June 5 proposal, President Chun advocated that both South and North Korean authorities open their societies to the entire Korean people who have the right to make decisions concerning unification. Here, the President was expressing his strong desire to realize peaceful unification in the 1980s by forcing the North Koreans to abandon their dream of communizing the entire Korean peninsula, thereby fostering national trust between the two divided sides.

The June 5 proposal contained more practical and concrete contents than the January 12 offer, except for the suggestion of an exchange of visits between the highest authorities. The fact that the President kept the door to conference topics wide open by suggesting that the proposed meeting discuss all the issues raised so far between the two sides points to his resolve to tackle the unification issue affirmatively, departing from the manner of discussing unification issues in a posture of mutual mistrust and misunderstanding. President Chun well knew that in the past North Korea engaged in the issue of inter-Korean relations without any will to implement what had been agreed upon, and was merely interested in the exploitation of such talks for a barrage of propaganda statements or propaganda-oriented overtures.

Making it clear in the June 5 proposal that all the citizens of Korea are the masters of a unified nation, and that unification is an exceedingly grave issue on which the advancement and prosperity of the entire nation is staked, President Chun stated that unification cannot be the exclusive concern of a specific political party, or a specific political system, or a specific ideology, or the highest authorities of the South and the North of Korea.

The President stressed that the people of the two zones of Korea ought to be allowed to decide on the system for a unified fatherland after visiting two sides without any prejudice, and observing and examining directly the situations and systems in the two sides.

Another important aspect of the June 5 proposal was President Chun's step of giving flexibility to the North Koreans by suggesting that if their situation did not permit the prompt and complete open-

ing of their society, exchanges could begin first in the athletic, cultural, academic, postal and economic fields, with gradual progress made toward all-out exchanges and a complete opening.

President Chun further let it be known that he is determined to carry on unification efforts more broadly when he expressed the hope that North Korea would consult constructively with any person representing the Republic of Korea any place in the world, or could work through an authoritative international organization to deal with the matter.

As can be seen above, the June 5 proposal was the manifestation of Seoul's sincere position that it stands ready to have a dialogue with North Korea without any conditions. The overture incorporates the wish for unification and confidence in their ability on the part of the people of the Republic of Korea.

Inasmuch as the June 5 proposal was intended to provide a fresh momentum to open inter-Korean contacts, setting forth an epochal approach toward unification, any rejection of it by North Korea would only reveal the fictitiousness and fraudulence of its feigned call for "peace," bringing about its further isolation from the rest of the world community.

It is urged that the North Korean authorities, ruminating over the true meaning of the June 5 overture, will take a modest posture in view of national history, and come to the forum of dialogue, accepting the national will to unification as embodied in the proposal.

The full text of President Chun's address made at the inaugural session of the Advisory Council on Peaceful Unification Policy was as follows:

*Address by President Chun Doo Hwan
at the Inauguration of the Advisory
Council on Peaceful Unification Policy*

Honorable members of the Advisory Council on Peaceful Unification Policy, distinguished guests, and the 60 million fellow Koreans at home and abroad.

We have gathered here today in response to the desire of the entire Korean people to seek the peaceful reunification of the homeland.

Having received the constitutional mandate to unflaggingly pursue the goal of peaceful unification, I hereby announce the inauguration of the Advisory Council on Peaceful Unification Policy. Together with the over 8,000 members of the council, I pledge to make this organization the rallying point for efforts to achieve the peaceful unification of our land.

This council takes its historic first step forward a full 36 years after the division of Korea. Almost before the agony of colonial subjugation was over, the country was partitioned, with numerous families suddenly separated, soon leading to a fratricidal war.

Looking to the past, the Korean nation has maintained an uninterrupted history as a unified independent state for thousands of years in spite of numerous trials and ordeals. The Korean people have jealously preserved a sense of community and cultural homogeneity in the face of repeated invasions and harassments by foreign forces from the northern continent and the southern oceans.

But since the turn of the 20th century our illustrious tradition has been broken twice by national tragedy. Although Korea was a unified sovereign entity for so long, we lost our sovereignty in the early 20th century, and in mid-century, just when we had regained sovereignty we were divided. Although the great tragedy of national subjugation has ended, the equal tragedy of national division still continues. The 36-year duration of the pain of division has this year exceeded the duration of the sorrow of subjugation. Territorial division is like torture to the whole nation. For all Koreans, whether in the South or in the North, the paramount historic task of our time is to save the nation from the pain and sorrow of division.

We in the South have not even for a fleeting moment forgotten our compatriots in the North, while we sweat and toiled

to build the economy in only half of our land. It is our fervent wish that the Seoul-Pusan expressway will soon be extended to Pyongyang and further to Sinuiju on the Manchurian border. But reality is still far from fantasy. Even the railroad that once linked Seoul and Pyongyang is disconnected, with only weeds growing in the track.

Furthermore, a dialogue that began after so much spadework has been cut off, adding to the heartbreak of all Koreans longing for unification. The South and the North cannot remain strangers in this way; having always been a single entity, we cannot survive for long divided. Our blood bonds, our pride and our history will not tolerate eternal division.

Fellow citizens,

As you all know, the division of Korea did not occur by the will of the Korean people, but stemmed from a decision taken by outsiders at the conclusion of World War II. But we must realize that even if outside powers were responsible for the division, it is our responsibility to remedy it. We are the ones who suffer the pain of division. We are the ones who will most enjoy the benefits of reunification. Unification is our business and nobody else's. Only the Korean people can be the prime movers of unification. The ideal of unification cannot be borrowed from others but must be rooted in the national spirit that flows in our blood.

Fellow citizens,

We have spent so many fruitless years discussing unification formulae. But the path to unification is self-evident, when we accept the fact that the entire people of Korea must be the prime movers. Unification must be achieved in accordance with the free will of the entire people and by peaceful methods. Attempts to decide the issue by force of arms will inevitably lead to a bloody war — a course of national self-destruction which no Korean wants and which can never serve the interests of the

people.

But there exists in the northern half of the Korean peninsula a ruling group that persists in a dream of unifying Korea by communizing the entire peninsula. The yearning of the Korean people for unification has not been fulfilled because their dream of unification by military force has not been abandoned. Such a dream runs counter to the reason of civilized men. Moreover, it is totally unrealistic.

War means the destruction of human lives and property and the ravaging of the land. We have already experienced the horrors of war. Should another such war break out now, the achievement, construction and progress out of the debris of war in both South and North Korea over the past 30 years would be wiped out overnight. War among ourselves must be prevented by all means. To prevent war, we must eliminate prejudice, self-righteousness, distrust and miscalculation that are the causes of war.

Once again I urge those advocating unification through communization by force of arms to correctly understand the people's demand for peaceful unification and abandon their delusions about war. For each of us to grasp accurately the true intentions and real situation of the other is essential to dispelling prejudice, self-righteousness, distrust and miscalculation.

Because of this conviction, I proposed on January 12th an exchange of visits between the highest authorities of South and North Korea. I do not have the slightest doubt that this proposal will provide a breakthrough toward unification. My faith has been further strengthened by the broad domestic and international support and encouragement I received following the announcement of that proposal. It is truly regrettable, however, that the North Korean authorities have yet to make an affirmative response.

On this occasion, I renew my call to President Kim Il-sung of North Korea to accept my January 12 proposal that we visit each other free of any obligation and without any condition attached.

It does not matter whether President Kim visits Seoul first or I visit Pyongyang first. The North Koreans can choose.

Furthermore, I would like to extend the scope of my invitation. Should some unavoidable circumstance prevent President Kim from accepting my proposal or from inviting me to visit North Korea, I suggest that we meet each other at some other place for frank face-to-face talks. I leave the choice of venue to the North Korean authorities. It could be either Panmunjom, or a third country, or any other place convenient to them.

If such a summit meeting is realized, I hope to discuss frankly all questions raised by both sides, including the proposed exchange of visits and both South and North unification formulae. I will leave it to the North Koreans to choose the date for the meetings but the sooner the better.

We have made all the necessary preparation for a dialogue with the North Korean authorities. It is our hope, therefore, that the North Koreans will consult constructively with any person representing the Republic of Korea at any place in the world. One way to deal with the matter would be to work through an authoritative international organization or institution, including the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

Sixty million fellow Koreans,

I want to emphasize again that all of us — that is, the entire Korean people — must be the prime movers of unification. Unification is a task for the whole nation; it cannot be the exclusive preserve of a specific political party, or a specific political system, or a specific ideology. Nor is it an exclusive concern of the Presidents of South and North Korea.

The proposed summit would be a catalyst fusing the determination of the entire Korean people, as well as a conduit to channel unification efforts. We shall be able to reap the desired fruit when the entire Korean people forge an unflinching determination to achieve unification and when that determination is properly reflected through dialogue.

Accordingly, it is of paramount importance that the 60 million compatriots have a sense of historical mission as the prime movers of unification and the masters of a unified country. All citizens of the Korean nation have the right to determine how unification should be achieved and what system should be adopted for a unified Korea. All Koreans ought to be given ample opportunities to observe, examine, analyze and compare the situations and systems in South and North Korea, if that right is to be exercised judiciously.

An old saying goes: "Hearing a hundred times is inferior to seeing once." That emphasizes the importance of first-hand observation in understanding and assessment. Unification of our land is an exceedingly grave issue on which the glory and prosperity of the entire Korean people is staked. It would be totally unreasonable to even deny the people the opportunity of "seeing once." In fact, the oftener one takes a first-hand look, the wiser a decision can be made.

Precisely for that reason, I advocate that both South and North Korean authorities humbly open both Korean societies to the eyes of the entire people who have the right to make decisions concerning unification. If the situation in North Korea does not permit the prompt and complete opening of their society, I hope that exchanges can begin first in the athletic, cultural, academic, postal and economic fields, with gradual progress made toward all-out exchanges and a complete opening.

This would not merely serve to broaden the outlook and thinking of the Korean people regarding unification. The opening of South and North Korean societies to each other would restore and enhance mutual trust and brotherly love between the two halves. I am confident that this would result in a grand national reconciliation based on a united spirit and determination.

Fellow Koreans,

It will be only 20 more years before the end of the 20th century, during which long nights of gloom have shrouded Korean history first with the loss of sovereignty and then with the division of the land.

The national spirit of the 60 million Korean people will never tolerate the great national tragedy being carried into another century. When we bring the tragedy of the 20th century to an end before the century is out and lay plans for the future growth and advance of the whole nation, we will have achieved a great triumph in the history of the nation, and of the world as well.

It is my firm belief that the activities of the members of this council will be instrumental in speeding the arrival of the day of triumph. I hope you will all devote your full energies to the cause of peaceful unification.

Thank you.

Chun Doo Hwan

President of the Republic of Korea
and Chairman of the Advisory Council
on Peaceful Unification Policy

2. Birth of the Advisory Council on Peaceful Unification Policy

The Advisory Council on Peaceful Unification Policy, which was formally established in an inaugural session on June 5, 1981, is a constitutional body formed pursuant to the provisions of Article 68 of the Constitution of the Fifth Republic. It is a supra-partisan and nationwide organization which involves many personages from various social strata and layers as prime movers of unification so as to meet more fully the unwavering desire of the 60 million Koreans for early peaceful unification of their divided land.

In other words, the Advisory Council on Peaceful Unification

Policy is a vanguard, entrusted with the duty of devising a progressive vision of national unification and rational unification policy based on the national consensus for unification. The Council, at the same time, is an constitutional organ that will lead from the resumption of inter-Korean dialogue to national reunion in the future. Therefore, the organization carries the historical significance of forming a leading force for unification on a supra-partisan and nationwide base. Further, the Council acts as a national spokesman on matters related to the realization of the Korean nation's ideal for peaceful unification as well as the unification policy of the Republic of Korea government.

The Advisory Council, whose members are honorary, receiving no remuneration, consists of many personages from various walks of life, including the representatives of all the areas of the country, leading figures of various political parties, major social organizations and functional bodies, and representatives of the five provinces of North Korea and overseas Korean communities.

In addition, the organization performs the function of advising the President on the formulation and execution of various policies necessary for peaceful unification, while ascertaining national consensus and pooling nationwide will and ability for peaceful unification of the fatherland.

At the first plenary session of the Advisory Council on Peaceful Unification Policy on June 5, President Chun Doo Hwan's June 5 proposal to North Korea was advanced, as discussed in the foregoing, and a "Resolution for Unification" was adopted. The text of the resolution is as follows:

Our Resolution for Unification

The whole 60 million people of Korea aspire for unification, which is an undeniable historical imperative. We reaffirm that to those who have maintained a time-honored State, it is our highly proper and natural right to seek a way wherein our nation can survive and develop within a single State. It is our sacred

duty and reward that we overcome today's national division and bequeath a unified and prosperous fatherland to our posterity.

At the same time, we firmly believe that unification of our fatherland would contribute to the interests not only of ourselves but of mankind as a whole, as well as assisting the progress of world history. The numerous efforts we have exerted since national division to realize unification have failed to come to fruition due chiefly to mutual distrust. Nevertheless, we wish to reiterate once again our pledge to strive for unification at this time when the duration of national division has passed a generation's span, and when we are at the threshold of the 1980s, opening a new chapter of history.

Now, on this occasion of inaugurating the Advisory Council on Peaceful Unification Policy as the manifestation of the nation's firm determination, and ardent aspiration for unification we hereby resolve that:

— Our national unification should expedite broad national conciliation and wellbeing on the basis of democratic order and national integrity, respecting the creativity and freedom of each of our people to the greatest extent.

— Our national unification should be realized in an independent manner, based on the principle of self-determination of nations, and should be realized by national consensus.

— Our national unification should be realized in a peaceful way under any circumstances. Any means of violence should be eliminated.

— Our national unification should contribute to world peace and promote international conciliation and cooperation, based on reciprocity and good neighborliness, transcending difference in thought, ideals and systems.

— Our national unification should be realized based on the restoration of mutual trust achieved through dialogue, exchanges and cooperation.

To this end, we urge the North Korean authorities to accept President Chun Doo Hwan's January 12 proposal and ensuing

*proposition of June 5 for a summit meeting between the highest
authorities of the South and the North.*

June 5, 1981
Members
the Advisory Council on
Peaceful Unification Policy

Part II

Reactions to June 5 Proposal

President Chun Doo Hwan, urging North Korea to accept his January 12 proposal, suggested on June 5, 1981 that "should some unavoidable circumstance prevent North Korea from accepting my proposal or from inviting me to visit North Korea, then the highest authorities of the South and the North of Korea may meet each other at some other place for frank face-to-face talks," remarking that he is leaving it to the North Koreans to choose the venue and time of such a meeting. President Chun said the place of the meeting could be either Panmunjom or a third country, or any other place convenient to them.

Stressing that both South and North Korean authorities should frankly open both Korean societies to the eyes of the entire people who have the right to make decisions concerning unification, President Chun expressed the hope that to this end, exchanges can begin first in the athletic, cultural, academic, postal and economic fields, with gradual progress made toward full-scale exchanges and a complete opening.

The latest proposal of President Chun again represented the President's firm resolve to prevent the recurrence of tragic fratricidal war in this land by any means, and to continue pursuing the actual approach to unification through dialogue, in conformity with the wishes of the people who, suffering from 36 years of national division, aspire for peaceful unification of the land. On the other hand, the proposal manifested the Republic of Korea's unification efforts based on the absolute majority of its national strength as well as unswerving confidence in itself in dealing with North Korea.

President Chun's June 5 proposal promptly began to command welcome and support both at home and abroad. Some official sources and press media around the world greeted the overture as a "constructive offer" for peaceful solution of the Korean question, expressing the hope that North Korea would accept the offer to contribute to peace in this part of the world.

1. Reactions at Home

All the press media and major political and social organizations of the Republic of Korea heartily welcomed the June 5 proposal of President Chun as another “epochal overture” intended to provide a breakthrough in the strained inter-Korean relations.

In particular, newspapers urged Kim Il-sung to accept it if he is really interested in the peaceful solution of inter-Korean problems.

The following are editorials of major newspapers in Korea on the June 5 proposal:

Let's Meet Whenever and Wherever

The Seoul Shinmun (June 6, 1981)

President Chun Doo Hwan's June 5 proposal to North Korea will be recorded as an epochal overture in the history of inter-Korean dialogue. President Chun offered that the highest authorities of the South and the North of Korea meet at any time, but at an early date if possible, and anywhere, namely, Panmunjom or a third country, of North Korea's choice. The proposal was really historical.

This extraordinary proposal can hardly be matched in the history of any other negotiations, small or large, in the world. No other negotiator ever proposed to resume contacts and dialogue on terms of the other side's choosing.

To look over the past, North Korea always attached some preconditions to its overtures to the South, thus in effect obstructing any resumption or progress of the south-north dialogue. The North Koreans made the inter-Korean dialogue itself stall in its initial stage by insisting on stereotyped and hardly acceptable conditions, such as that they can agree to a dialogue only after American forces were withdrawn from Korea or after South Korea adopted a policy of “allying itself with Communists.”

This is the basic strategy of North Korea with respect to the issue

of the south-north dialogue. North Korea does not hope for any progress of the dialogue. All they are after is to implant a false image of peace on the Korean peninsula by making it appear as if a dialogue were going on between the two zones of Korea, and no tension therefore exists on the peninsula, a contention based on which they plan to demand the pullout of the U.S. forces. Their scheme to obstruct any substantial progress of the talks while keeping the dialogue only perfunctory, was fully exposed in their preconditions, hardly acceptable by the other side in the dialogue.

This North Korean attitude toward the dialogue notwithstanding, President Chun offered a broadminded proposition, without being bound by trivial matters, saying "Let us first meet... I am willing to listen attentively and discuss any issue you may raise." The offer stemmed from a "big brother policy" so called in the science of international relations, which was also the reflection of the Republic of Korea's confidence in its ability over North Korea. Can there be any more sincere and open-hearted position than the offer that the highest authorities of the two sides meet at a time and a place of North Korea's choice, and steadily discuss national issues one by one?

Another important aspect of President Chun's June 5 proposal was the call for "complete opening of the societies of South and North Korea toward each other." In the course of the 30-odd years of national division, heterogeneity and distrust between the two sides have only increased. It can't be easy under the circumstances to resolve national division. More important than any other thing here is for the two sides to exert sincere efforts to overcome the elements of heterogeneity. The first step toward such endeavors must be the complete opening of their societies toward each other.

In the first place, the south and the north must be able to visit each other and witness the truth and reality of the other side. This is the only way they can reach a correct recognition of each other and thereby march steadily toward national unity step by step.

We can assume that North Korea, a closed society, would find it difficult to accept the suggestion. This is why, it seems, President

Chun offered that if North Korea cannot agree to the opening of its society, the two sides should begin mutual exchanges beginning in the areas of culture and sciences. President Chun maintains a reasonable stand advocating a phased approach toward the problem. The President even said North Korea may use the United Nations or other authoritative international organization to deal with the problem.

North Korea should return to national conscience and show an affirmative response to President Chun's epochal proposal. This way, they can ultimately approach peaceful unification, to which they pay lip service so often.

Choose Time and Venue of Meeting Early

The Kyunghyang Daily News (June 5, 1981)

The proposal made to North Korea by President Chun Doo Hwan in a speech at the Advisory Council on Peaceful Unification Policy June 5 was highly significant in that it again manifested the President's indefatigable will to overcome the pains stemming from national division and promoting national reconciliation. What draws our particular attention is the President's suggestion that North Korea choose the time and venue of the proposed meeting between the highest authorities of the South and the North of Korea, and that the two sides of Korea open their societies to each other.

At the time of the birth of the Fifth Republic, President Chun made the historic January 12 proposal to provide a breakthrough in the strained inter-Korean relations. This overture was intended to foster a base for mutual trust between the South and the North and thereby forestall the tragedy of fratricidal conflict and resume the deadlocked inter-Korean dialogue, ultimately bringing about peaceful unification of the land. In short, the President showed a firm stand in the earlier proposition that any effort to approach unification should be proven by deeds instead of the repetition of

fictitious offers or florid language.

The latest offer for the opening of the two societies and the suggestion that North Korea decide the time and venue of the proposed meeting between the two sides' highest authorities represented an advanced version of the January 12 proposal and also the further elevated resolve of the President to realize and construct a unified and prosperous nation. It is highly meaningful that the proposal was made at the birth of the Advisory Council on Peaceful Unification Policy, which will pool nationwide resolve and capability for peaceful unification.

The 36 years of national division, a length of time equivalent to the duration of the Japanese colonial rule of Korea, has been the source of our pains and trials. We had to undergo fratricidal war, and as a result 10 million dispersed family members lead anguished lives.

Most serious is that heterogeneity between the South and the North has been deepening with such a protracted division. The North Korean authorities have obliterated our indigenous heritage, culture and history, distorting them in such a way as to fit their historical materialism. They openly advocate split and struggle in their dogma behind their outward cry for "independence," "peace" or "grand national unity." They instigate violence and revolution in place of peace and order.

To overcome the situation and lead efforts to realize national unification, we have held fast to three principles for peaceful unification since the latter half of the 1970s, the principles being 1) to bring about lasting peace through conclusion of a non-aggression agreement so as to free the people of the South and the North from the fear of war, 2) to restore mutual trust through mutual exchanges and cooperation, and 3) to create a unified government in a democratic manner in accordance with the will of the majority of the people.

However, all these practicable and realistic overtures have been rejected by the North Koreans determined to communize the South under their revolutionary strategy. Nevertheless, we cannot give up

our efforts to realize peaceful unification and national conciliation at this time of strained inter-Korean relations. Our consistent stand is that no matter how brazen-faced and anti-national the North Koreans' machinations may be, we must patiently carry on our endeavors to remove mutual distrust and realize peaceful coexistence. Thus seen, President Chun's latest proposal meant a fresh start toward the development of inter-Korean relations based on national conscience and historical continuity of the nation.

The North Korean authorities should show a positive response to our realistic and justifiable proposition. Any attempt to exploit the offer for their propaganda gain or reject it altogether would amount to digging their own graves. If they recognize the ideologies and systems existing the two sides of Korea, there can be no reason why they should delay a meeting between the highest authorities or turn down inter-Korean exchanges.

Judging from their hitherto closed-door policy, we can see too well that it would be not so easy to agree to exchanges or an open-door policy. Still, if only the two sides' highest authorities can meet, it would no doubt contribute tremendously to restoring mutual trust and forestalling the disaster of war.

If personnel and economic exchanges would follow such a top-level meeting, the tensions between the two sides would subside in favor of an atmosphere for the ultimate realization of national integration.

If two societies with conflicting ideological and systems are to pursue coexistence and unification, they must start with removing mutual distrust and misunderstanding. It was in this context that President Chun called for the opening of the societies of the South and the North to each other, and exchanges in the practicable areas such as sports, culture, sciences, postal service and economy.

If North Korea is really interested in the reunion of the dispersed families and national integration, it should promptly agree to our proposal for peace.

No Ground for Rejection

The Joong-Ang Daily News (June 6, 1981)

Speaking at the Advisory Council on Peaceful Unification Policy on June 5, President Chun Doo Hwan made yet another epochal proposition to North Korea, which in effect was an advanced and more concrete version of his earlier January 12 proposal. The President left to North Korea the choice of the time and venue of the proposed meeting between the two sides' highest authorities and suggested, for the first time, the complete opening of the societies of the South and the North to each other.

In particular, the fact that President Chun opened the scope of topics of the proposed meeting, saying all the matters raised by the two sides may be discussed at the meeting, represents the President's firm determination to realize the meeting by all available means and thereby alleviate tensions on the Korean peninsula, providing a breakthrough in the strained inter-Korean relations.

So far, the North Koreans have obstructed any progress in the dialogue by attaching nonsensical conditions to their offers. Whenever we offered rational and constructive overtures, North Korea responded with ridiculous demands, coming to the table of dialogue or torpedoing it unilaterally depending on their political gains.

All they seek is to make it appear as if a dialogue is going on between the two sides of Korea, thereby to implant the impression abroad that no tensions exist on the Korean peninsula, in their bid to prompt withdrawal of American forces from Korea.

Nonetheless, we cannot reduce or give up our efforts to resume inter-Korean talks. It is the paramount task of the 60 million Koreans to ease tensions, consolidate peace and ultimately realize peaceful unification.

The proposal of President Chun that he and Kim Il-sung meet to discuss whatever questions may be raised by either of the two sides represents the President's sincere and bold attitude to tackle the

Korean question from an effective and constructive stance, doing away with the less efficient manner of dealing with the question in the past.

In international relations today, summit meetings are considered the most important means of diplomacy. Aware that an exchange of visits between Egyptian President Sadat and Israeli Premier Begin has led to dramatic improvement at their bilateral relations, so we feel acutely the need for a direct meeting between the highest authorities of the South and the North of Korea.

Our past experiences show that working-level talks only led to emotional confrontations between the two sides, unable to be helpful in the essential solution of the problem.

Now there is only one choice left. It is for Kim Il-sung to accept President Chun's suggestion that "let us first meet... I am prepared to listen to and discuss any issue raised." If they are really interested in peaceful unification of the land, as they so often cry outwardly, they would hardly find any reason to deny a meeting between the highest authorities.

Another important aspect of the June 5 proposal was call for the complete opening of the societies of the two sides to each other. Due to 30 years of national division, heterogeneity and distrust have built up between the South and the North. If reunion between the two sides is delayed, homogeneity as a single nation would be weakened that much, only giving rise to the danger of an armed clash.

The opening of the societies amounts to a prelude to the work of restoring homogeneity by means of exchanges, and represents the only road to avoiding a renewed fratricidal war.

Of course, we cannot ignore factors of resistance to the opening of the two sides' political, economic and social systems that have grown separately in the past 30 years. It would be especially difficult for Kim Il-sung, who is maintaining a tightly closed Communist feudal system, to accept the proposal. This is why President Chun suggested that if the opening of the societies cannot be made under the present circumstances, then the two sides can first engage

in exchanges in the areas of culture and sciences. This was a rational and realistic idea calling for a phased approach toward the issue.

The most outstanding feature of the June 5 proposal was the President's ruling that the masters of unification are the 60 million people rather than any specific social stratum or politicians. The proposal did not incorporate any ideological motive, nor was intended to drive the other side into a corner, but purely represented the nation's wish for unification.

If the North Korean authorities have a touch of national conscience, they should show an affirmative response to the latest proposal of President Chun. If they reject even this offer, it would only expose the fictitiousness and treacherousness of their cry for peace, prompting their further isolation in the world community.

Approach to Peaceful Unification

The Chosun Ilbo (June 6, 1981)

The Advisory Council on Peaceful Unification Policy was inaugurated on June 5 with the participation of some 8,900 members and a number of dignitaries. The Advisory Council, a constitutional body of the Fifth Republic, has the all-important duty of forming a leading force for peaceful unification and taking part in the establishment and implementation of the government's unification policy from a supra-partisan and nationwide position. The historical task of unifying the divided land cannot be undertaken merely by the government or by any specific political party or by any capable individuals.

It was for this reason that the new Constitution provides for the establishment of the Advisory Council as means of pooling all the capability of the people aspiring for peaceful unification. The issue of the unification incorporates many complex problems. Therefore, the question is apt to cause differences in opinion among political parties, social organizations and individuals, resulting in a

possible split in national opinion. To cope with this possibility, the new Constitution provides for the Advisory Council on Peaceful Unification Policy, with a view to consolidating the views of various strata and layers and many individuals, thereby working out the best direction and method of achieving unification peacefully.

The existence of the Advisory Council on Peaceful Unification, therefore, is highly significant, and its responsibility cannot be too much emphasized.

At the first session of the Advisory Council, President Chun Doo Hwan, chairman of the Council, set forth his opinions and plans with regard to the issue of national unification. Most noteworthy of his remarks was the reaffirmation that unification must be achieved not by force of arms but in a peaceful manner. The President frankly admitted that a unification by force means a bloody war which would result in the self-destruction of the Korean nation.

Upon this recognition, President Chun stressed the need to eliminate prejudice, self-righteousness and misjudgement as a means of forestalling war. The President then proposed to North Korea that the highest authorities of the South and the North meet to discuss various inter-Korean issues. President Chun, saying that the venue of the meeting may be anywhere, including Panmunjom or a third country, left to the North Koreans the choice of the venue. He said the time of the meeting would be the sooner the better. The President said North Korea can also decide the time of the meeting.

President Chun said that if and when such a meeting takes place, it can discuss his earlier January 12 proposal for mutual visits, South and the North Korea unification formulae, and all other issues raised so far between the two sides.

The fresh overture came after North Korea showed no response to the January 12 offer that the highest authorities of the two sides visit each other's area without any conditions. But the June 5 proposal does not supersede the January 12 proposition. President Chun, urging Kim Il-sung to accept the January 12 proposal once again, stated that if North Korea cannot accept the invitation due to an unavoidable situation, then they can meet at Panmunjom or in

any third country. The June 5 proposal, therefore, is intended to realize the January 12 offer on a step-by-step basis.

At the same time, President Chun said the South and the North of Korea must open their societies to each other. He said that if the people of Korea can properly exercise their right to choose the method of unification and the system of a unified Korea, they should be given the opportunity to observe and compare the situation and system of the two sides of Korea. President Chun expressed the hope that if North Korea cannot agree to the complete opening of the societies, the two sides may conduct exchanges first in the areas of sports, culture, sciences, postal service and economy, leading gradually to the complete opening of the societies in the end.

President Chun's June 5 proposition can be boiled down to 1) urging of the acceptance of the January 12 overture, 2) meeting with Kim Il-sung at Panmunjom or a third country, and 3) offer for partial exchanges as a prelude to ultimate opening of the societies. Nobody can foresee whether North Korea, which is yet to accept the January 12 proposal, would agree to the June 5 offer. Seen objectively, however, the June 5 proposal is of a kind which North Korea should and can accept if it has the slightest interest in peaceful unification of the land.

Under no circumstances can the issue of national unification be solved peacefully without a direct conference between the highest authorities of the two zones of divided Korea.

We are well aware that North Korea is busy selling in the world its idea of peaceful unification. But the idea is based on a cold-war type peace offensive rather than a genuine peace policy calling for an approach to national unification in the spirit of conciliation. If they reject mutual visits, meetings and exchanges, the remaining method is none other than war.

If a war breaks out in this limited land at a time when the three nuclear superpowers — the U.S., USSR and Red China — have treaty stakes in the Korean peninsula, and when the two sides of Korea maintain altogether more than one million troops, it would

simply reduce both sides to ashes in a short span of time, leading to total destruction of this nation. It would be a wild day-dream if the North Koreans ever hope to achieve unification on their own terms in a Korean-War style invasion. If they have any reason left, they should know that what is realistic would be to give up war altogether solve all matters of dispute peacefully one by one.

Today the Republic of Korea, no matter guerrilla warfare and subversion may be attempted, cannot produce a "people's democratic revolution" so called. Therefore, if there is any practicable way of unification, it is none other than the method of peaceful unification. And the road to peaceful unification can be explored only in a peaceful manner.

Communism, too, should modify the method of solving a nation's problems, according to changes in time and conditions. The dogmatic tyranny of North Korea will never be applicable to this country. There is no reason why the North Koreans should be afraid of or feel uneasy about the June 5 proposal. We would like to look forward to an affirmative response in the interests of both South and North Korea.

Eight Days After June 5 Proposal

The Dong-A Ilbo (June 13, 1981)

It is eight days since President Chun Doo Hwan made the June 5 proposal. The latest overture, calling for the open-hearted discussion of all inter-Korean issues in addition to the issues of "mutual visits" and "mutual opening of societies," was an epochal and progressive offer. We are looking forward to Kim Il-sung's affirmative response thereto.

However, Kim Il-sung has yet to make any official response. It is regrettable to learn that North Korean press media, all under tight control of the Pyongyang regime, have been defaming the June 5 proposal. On June 10, five days after the proposal was made, the *Rodong Shimun*, the daily organ of the North Korean Workers'

(Communist) Party, and radio broadcasts argued that the June 5 proposition was “not intended to discuss the unification issue but has some ulterior motive.”

We remember that the North Koreans in effect broke off the responsible authorities’ meetings proposed by the late President Park Chung Hee by putting forth a mere propaganda organization called “Democratic Front for Unification of the Fatherland,” and unilaterally boycotted the working-level contacts designed to prepare for a meeting between the prime ministers of the two sides, which they themselves had proposed.

But, it is believed that Kim Il-sung must have noted that President Chun’s January 12 and June 5 proposals calling for an unconditional meeting with Kim Il-sung contained a clause which North Korea cannot ignore or reject, namely, the suggestion that the proposed meeting open-heartedly discuss the South and North Korean unification formulae and all other issues raised by the two sides so far.

The phrase “to discuss all the issues raised by the two sides...” means that no specific matters among those issues would be eliminated in the discussion. The questions raised thus far include among those advanced by the South the questions of searching for dispersed families, simultaneous entry into the United Nations by South and North Korea, conclusion of non-aggression agreement, exchanges in non-political areas, food assistance to North Korea and realization of unification by means of free elections. It is understood that the meeting, if North Korea wishes, can discuss the issues of convening a political conference, grand national meeting and the idea of confederation among those already raised by North Korea. President Chun’s proposals were surely epochal and forward-looking overtures.

If two heterogenous entities are to be integrated into one, they should first recognize the heterogenousness of the other side and explore, with patience, ways to become assimilated. Recognition and understanding of each other’s heterogenous conditions can be made only through open-hearted talks at direct meetings. It is ex-

pected that Pyongyang would show an affirmative response to the offer.

But Kim Il-sung does not open his mouth officially with regard to the June 5 overture to date, no fewer than eight days after the proposal was made. Their press media alone defamed the offer, trying to discredit the society of the South.

North Korea's propaganda machinery charges that "South Korea lacks nationalism," asserting that they alone love the nation. Considering the special conditions of a developing country and the relative overseas dependence inevitably involved in our open capitalistic economic system, we do not deny that our economy is more dependent on factors abroad than the North Korean economy, based on the system of self-sufficiency.

Today's economy cannot be independent of relative terms from abroad, though the degree of such dependence varies. Nor does such inter-dependence represent any lack of nationalism. When a country becomes absorbed in economic development, it may find itself involved in many foreign things. We are not ashamed of having achieved astonishing economic construction in return for such dependence. Rather, we cannot call it a genuine nationalism that North Korea, crying for "self-sufficiency," failed even to settle small foreign debts, damaging national prestige.

Nor can one call it an act of nationalism for the North Koreans to unleash an outright invasion, using Russian-made weapons and opening fire in the heart of the nation during the Korean War.

They also dispute the democracy of South Korea. We do not try to conceal that some problems arose at home and abroad with regard to our democracy. However, few persons will deny that all of our people aspire for democratic development and strive to enable democracy to take firm root in this land. Such a nationwide sense of democracy is a source of pride for us.

In contrast, the "democracy" of North Korea is a totalitarian system of a kind unprecedented even among Communist countries. Kim Il-sung has designated his son, Kim Chong-il, as his heir, to create an unheard-of Communist dynasty. Kim Il-sung

should realize his shame before trying to dispute the issue of democracy in South Korea.

At any rate, if Kim Il-sung is so much concerned about nationalism and democracy of South Korea, he can come to a meeting with President Chun and discuss them openly rather than denouncing them from behind a curtain. Kim Il-sung must accept the June 5 proposal without hesitation for the sake of the nation's future and in order to discuss all the issues raised by the two sides.

To contemporary Koreans, unification is a task too serious to be allowed to drag on due to the egotism of any individuals or political parties.

2. Reactions Overseas

Government sources and press media of many countries around the world have expressed, directly or indirectly, their welcome and support of President Chun's June 5 proposal directed to North Korea.

Even some Communist countries and a number of Third World countries under Communist-bloc influence, not to speak of free world nations, showed affirmative reactions to the June 5 proposal.

In general, overseas comments welcomed and endorsed the proposal, calling it "concrete and constructive." They observed that the latest offer was a more practicable step than the earlier January 12 proposal.

The governments of the United States and Japan, in particular, regarded the June 5 proposal as representing the "reaffirmation of the President's resolve to realize inter-Korean dialogue," observing that the overture would serve to enhance international recognition of the Republic of Korea, while it would drive North Korea into an embarrassing position.

Press comments in many free world countries viewed that the June 5 proposal was a broader one than the January 12 offer, and that it was part of the efforts of South Korea to remove mutual distrust through a summit meeting between the South and the North of

Korea. The comments predicted that the overture, coupled with the planned visit of President Chun to the five ASEAN countries, would serve as an opportunity to further broaden the base for international support of the cause of the Republic of Korea. Major comments from many countries were as follows:

— *U.S. Department of State* —

In a statement on June 5, the U.S. Department of State said it fully welcomes President Chun's June 5 proposal embodying the President's determination to realize an inter-Korean dialogue. The statement said that if and when a dialogue resumes in accordance with the proposal, all the issues raised by both sides of Korea could be discussed.

— *Government and Press Circles of Japan* —

Although official government reactions were not available, Japanese Foreign Ministry officials acclaimed the proposal, saying that regardless of North Korean response thereto, the proposition would result in demonstrating the diplomatic edge of the Republic of Korea over North Korea in the world community. They also said the June 5 overture would provide added momentum for Seoul to deal with North Korea over the unification issue under its initiative.

The newspaper Yomiuri Shinbun commented on June 6 that the latest offer was more concrete than the January 12 proposal because it liberalized topics of the proposed meeting, called for the complete opening of the two societies, and suggested that the venue of the meeting may be a third country. The Japanese newspaper also said that diplomatic observers feel that the proposal has little chance of success because North Korea is preoccupied with consolidating its political system in such a way as to solidify the hereditary succession of power from Kim Il-sung to his son, Kim Chong-il. They also based their pessimism on the continuing slander of the South Korean government by North Korea.

— *BBC of United Kingdom* —

In a news commentary, the BBC radio of the United Kingdom said the June 5 proposal is a broader offer than the January 12 overture. The commentary said, "This latest move is likely to win further support, especially on his forthcoming goodwill tour of the ASEAN nations," observing, however, that the North Korean response is likely to be negative.

— *La Suisses, Switzerland* —

The Swiss daily *La Suisses* supported the June 5 proposal in a June 8 comment, saying, "North Korea's Kim Il-sung rejected the January proposal of President Chun Doo Hwan because it was supposed to be an 'honest meeting.' The likelihood is that the latest June 5 proposal advanced by Seoul is destined for the same fate. Why does Kim Il-sung oppose talks? If Kim Il-sung wants to prove his good faith, he has no way but to meet with President Chun."

— *The South China Morning Post of Hong Kong* —

This Hong Kong newspaper on June 11 emphasized the validity of the June 5 proposal, editorially stating, "Like President Chun's first attempt on January 12 to bring about a summit meeting with Kim Il-sung, his second call is for a similar summit at a venue of Kim's own choice. The proposal is certainly not unrealistic or impractical. Similar visits led to the settlement of the 'two-Germans' problem and to the peaceful accommodation between Israel and Egypt."

— *The International Reporter of India* —

The daily *International Reporter* of India commented on June 8 that the latest proposition was an offer that added a fresh dimension to the January 12 proposal. The proposal was a welcome measure which called on North Korea to accept it for the sake of overall interests of the Korean peninsula.

— *Al-Gomhuria of Egypt* —

The Egyptian newspaper *Al-Gomhuria*, commenting on the June

5 proposal, said on June 9, "The proposal was neither the first nor would it be the last of its kind. Thirty-six years have passed since Korea was divided into the South and the North. The recent proposal may put an end to Korean division, one of the biggest tragedies of this century. What is really important is that they start a dialogue to try to understand each other and agree upon a minimum common element to start with. The old road should be reopened so that they can travel back and forth between Seoul and Pyongyang."

— *El Nacional de Mexico* —

The newspaper *El Nacional de Mexico* carried an editorial on President Chun's June 5 proposal in its June 18 issue, in which the daily, quoting important parts of the overture, pointed out that "although the North Korean people hope for the acceptance of the offer, the North Korean regime has turned it down." The newspaper also said that one thing hardly understandable is that "North Korea, despite its shortage of food, buys advertisements in foreign newspapers and periodicals at large expense to falsify the realities of South and North Korea." It added that Kim Il-sung of North Korea has always been rejecting dialogue "wherein they can have substantial discussions."

By June 20, 1981, about 290 reports and comments were made in favor of the June 5 proposal by official or unofficial government sources and press media of a total of 73 countries around the world.

In addition, the representatives of number of international organizations such as WHO (World Health Organization), ICRC (International Committee of Red Cross) and IPU (Inter-Parliamentary Union) expressed their positive support of the June 5 proposal.

3. Motive Behind Rejection by North Korea of June 5 Proposal

While its responsible authorities kept mum, North Korea, through its propaganda machinery, showed a negative response to the epochal June 5 proposal of President Chun Doo Hwān.

On June 10, the North Korean newspaper *Rodong Shinmun*, organ of the Workers' (Communist) Party, and Pyongyang radio, in their vehement slander of the internal affairs of the South, argued that the June 5 proposal was "not intended to discuss the question of national unification, but aimed at serving some impure objective." The North Korean propaganda media then insisted that their treacherous idea of a confederation system advanced at the sixth congress of the Workers' Party last year is a "rational and realistic" unification formula.

Kim Il-sung himself rejected any dialogue, let alone the June 5 proposal, on July 1 when he asserted that "there can be no dialogue whatsoever with the government of South Korea." He made the utterance in a message on the 25th anniversary of a bogus organization called "Association of Former South Korean Politicians" allegedly consisting of those former South Korean political and social leaders who were forcibly taken by North Koreans to the north during the 1950-53 Korean War.

Moreover, North Korea hijacked a South Korean fishing boat and its crewmen south of the northern limit line off the west coast on June 11, exposing once again their inhuman belligerency, and laying yet another roadblock along the path toward peaceful unification through dialogue.

Needless to say, the June 5 proposal advanced by President Chun is really epochal and historical in providing a breakthrough for the peaceful and rational solution of the Korean question. The offer was unparalleled in that the President gave a free hand to the other side in determining the time and venue of the proposed meeting.

As seen in the above, the proposal has been welcomed and sup-

ported with great enthusiasm in the world community, in the midst of the growing expectations that the June 5 proposals, if and when realized, would be quite conducive to preventing war on the Korean peninsula, and to the achievement of peaceful unification in the long run.

Nonetheless, North Korea keeps turning down the peace-oriented offer despite the world opinion favoring it. The ulterior motive behind their rejection of both the January 12 and June 5 proposals of President Chun is self-evident.

First, North Korea finds it quite burdensome to hold a summit-level dialogue with the South at a time when its internal situation has grown unstable because of the revamping of their system in order to consolidate the Kim Il-sung—Kim Chong-il hereditary system.

Second, North Korea fears that if its society is opened up as suggested in the June 5 proposal, it would shake to the roots the power base of Kim Il-sung, who has built up dictatorial power behind closed doors and turned the whole land of North Korea into a huge military camp in the past 30 years.

Moreover, the basic line of strategy the North Koreans pursued in dealing with South Korea for 30 years in the past has been to foment a "*revolution in South Korea*," that is, communization of the entire peninsula by internal subversion. The reason they came to the conference table in the early 1970s, as was determined expressly afterwards, was to launch a tactical scheme to create decisive conditions ripe for armed action to bring the South under Communist control.

Notwithstanding, North Korea, concealing all these motives, slanders the South with growing ferocity, denouncing the June 5 proposal as "having been impurely motivated."

Above all, the fact that North Korea, which has since long ago put forth the idea of a confederation system as a "counter-proposals," turns down the suggestion that the proposed meeting discuss all the unification formulae advanced by both sides, among other topics, which shows clearly that the confederation idea itself is

an empty fiction devised only for propaganda's sake.

Obviously North Korea has no interest in the resumption of the suspended inter-Korean dialogue, nor in the pursuit of peaceful unification. All they are interested in is to take over the South by arms or violence. To this end, they are going all-out to agitate social turbulence and ultimately violent revolution in the Republic of Korea.

North Korea ought to awaken from such an anachronistic delusion and join the onward march toward peaceful unification to which the 60 million Koreans aspire.

If North Korea does not modify its belligerent stand, and fails to realize its lagging in the race of systems between the two sides of Korea, and its isolation in the world community with deepening internal frictions, the North Korean authorities would hardly avoid the fate of destruction of their own making.

Part III

ASEAN Endorses Republic of Korea's Peaceful Unification

1. ASEAN Leaders Support Republic of Korea's Peaceful Unification Efforts

President Chun Doo Hwan made state visits to the five ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) countries for 15 days from June 25 through July 9, 1981. During his tour, President Chun had a series of summit or top-level meetings to discuss measures to further promote bilateral friendship and expand cooperative relations between Korea and the ASEAN member nations in many areas such as politics, economy, diplomacy, security, culture and technology. The ASEAN leaders with whom the President had high-level meetings were President Soeharto of Indonesia, Prime Minister Hussein Onn of Malaysia, Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore, Prime Minister Prem of Thailand, and President Ferdinand Marcos of the Philippines.

In particular, President Chun and the leaders of the countries he visited shared the view that "peace and security in Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia are closely related to each other and indispensable for the maintenance of the peace and security of Asia and whole world."

With regard to the question of peaceful unification of the Korean peninsula, the ASEAN leaders reaffirmed, in the respective Joint Communiques issued between them and President Chun their positive welcome and support of President Chun's January 12 and June 5 proposals.

Parts of the Joint Communiques relating to the unification issue were as follows:

8. President Chun, reviewing the situation in the Korean peninsula, explained in detail the efforts of the Government of the Republic of Korea to reduce tensions and consolidate peace on the peninsula with a view to achieving reunification of Korea through peaceful means.

He particularly emphasized that the only realistic way to

resolve the Korean question peacefully is to hold direct talks between the highest authorities of south and the north of Korea, as proposed by him on January 12, and June 5, 1981.

President Soeharto, appreciating the explanation of President Chun, reaffirmed his government's policy that Korean question should be resolved by peaceful means through dialogue, supported the direct talks between the two parts of Korea.

9. President Chun expressed his appreciation for the understanding and support given by the Indonesian Government to the position of the Republic of Korea at the United Nations, the Non-Aligned Conferences and other international forums. The two Presidents agreed to continue close consultation and cooperation in the future.

President Chun expressed his view that the admission of both the south and the north of Korea into the United Nations, as an interim measure pending the peaceful reunification of Korea, would contribute to easing tensions and help create an international atmosphere conducive to national reconciliation and peaceful reunification.

President Soeharto supported the efforts for the realization of the entry of the south and the north of Korea into the United Nations in accordance with the principle of universality embodied in the United Nations Charter.

«Korea-Indonesia Summit Joint Communiqué»

9. President Chun, reviewing the situation in the Korean peninsula, explained in detail the efforts of the government of the Republic of Korea to reduce tensions and consolidate peace on the peninsula with a view to achieving reunification of Korea through peaceful means. He particularly emphasized that the only realistic way to resolve the Korean question peacefully is to hold direct talks between the highest authorities of the south

and the north of Korea as proposed' by him on January 12, and June 5, 1981.

President Chun was assured of the continuing support of the Thai government for the Korean government's peace-building efforts. Prime Minister Prem, reiterating his government's position that the reunification of Korea should be achieved by peaceful means through dialogue, supported the direct talks between the two parts of Korea.

10. President Chun expressed his appreciation for the understanding and support given by the Thai government to the position of the Republic of Korea at the United Nations, and other international forums. The two leaders agreed to continue close consultation and cooperation on matters of mutual interest and concern in the future. President Chun expressed his view that the admission of both the south and the north of Korea into the United Nations, as an interim measure pending the peaceful reunification of Korea, would contribute to easing tensions and consolidating peace on the Korean peninsula, and help create an international atmosphere conducive to national reconciliation and peaceful reunification.

Prime Minister Prem supported the efforts for the realization of the entry of the south and the north of Korea into the United Nations in accordance with the principle of universality embodied in the U.N. Charter.

«Korea-Thailand Summit Joint Communiqué»

6. President Chun, reviewing the situation in the Korean peninsula, explained in detail the efforts of the Government of the Republic of Korea to reduce tensions and consolidate peace on the peninsula with a view to achieving reunification of Korea through peaceful means.

He particularly emphasized that the only realistic way to resolve the Korean question peacefully is to hold direct talks bet-

were the highest authorities of the south and the north of Korea, as proposed by him on January 12, and June 5, 1981.

Prime Minister Lee, appreciating the explanation of President Chun and reaffirming the Singapore Government's policy that the Korean question should be resolved by peaceful means through dialogue, supported the direct talks between the two parts of Korea.

7. President Chun expressed his appreciation for the understanding and support given by the Singapore Government to the position of the Government of the Republic of Korea at the United Nations, the Nonaligned Conferences and other international forums. The two leaders agreed to continue close consultation and cooperation in the future.

President Chun expressed his view that the admission of both the south and north of Korea into the United Nations, as an interim measure pending the peaceful reunification of Korea, would contribute to easing tensions and consolidating peace on the Korean peninsula, and help create an international atmosphere conducive to national reconciliation and peaceful reunification.

Prime Minister Lee supported the efforts for an early realization of the entry of the south and the north of Korea into the United Nations in accordance with the principle of universality embodied the U.N. Charter.

«Korea-Singapore Summit Joint Communiqué»

6. President Chun, reviewing the situation in the Korean peninsula, explained in detail the efforts of the government of the Republic of Korea to reduce tensions and consolidate peace on the peninsula with a view to achieving reunification of Korea through peaceful means. He particularly emphasized that the only realistic way to resolve the Korean question peacefully is to hold direct talks between the highest authorities of the south

Korea, as proposed by him on January 12 and June 5, 1981.

The Prime Minister of Malaysia in thanking the President of the Republic of Korea for his explanation reaffirmed his government's position that the reunification of Korea should be resolved by peaceful means through dialogue between south and north Korea.

9. President Chun expressed his view that the admission of both the south and north Korea into the United Nations as an interim measure pending the peaceful reunification of Korea would contribute to easing tensions and consolidating peace on the Korean peninsula, and help create an international atmosphere conducive to national reconciliation and peaceful reunification. The Prime Minister of Malaysia supported the efforts for the realization of the entry of the south and north Korea into the United Nations in accordance with the principle of universality embodied in the U.N. Charter.

«Korea-Malaysia Summit Joint Communiqué»

7. President Chun reviewed the situation in the Korean peninsula and explained in detail the efforts of the government of the Republic of Korea to reduce tensions and to consolidate peace on the peninsula with a view to achieving reunification of Korea through peaceful means. He particularly emphasized that the only realistic way to resolve the Korean question peacefully is to hold direct talks between the highest authorities of the south and the north of Korea, as proposed by him on January 12 and June 5, 1981.

President Marcos appreciated the explanation of President Chun. He reaffirmed his government's position that the Korean question should be resolved by peaceful means through dialogue and expressed his support for the direct talks between the two parts of Korea.

8. *The two leaders expressed satisfaction at the close cooperative relations between the Republic of Korea and the member countries of the ASEAN in regional and international forums.*

They agreed on the need to continue such cooperation with the objective of easing tensions and of enhancing greater international understanding.

President Chun expressed his view that the admission of both the south and the north of Korea into the United Nations, as an interim measure pending the peaceful reunification of Korea, would contribute to easing tensions and consolidating peace on the Korean peninsula and help create an international atmosphere conducive to national reconciliation and peaceful reunification.

President Marcos supported the efforts for the realization of the entry of the south and the north of Korea into the United Nations in accordance with the principle of universality embodied in the U.N. Charter.

«Korea-Philippines Summit Joint Communiqué»

As can be seen in the above, President Chun obtained positive support for Seoul's peaceful unification formula, a diplomatic feat considered no less important than the agreement on measures to expand economic cooperation between Korea and the ASEAN countries.

Whereas the Republic of Korea extended full support to ASEAN's stand advocating the political solution of the Cambodian situation, the leaders of the ASEAN member nations unreservedly supported the position of the Republic of Korea government that "lasting peace must be maintained on the Korean peninsula and unification should be pursued peacefully through dialogue."

The five ASEAN nations' support for a direct meeting between the highest authorities of South and North Korea, as suggested in the January 12 and June 5 proposals, was all the more significant

because most of the ASEAN countries are member nations of the Non-Aligned Conference. In particular, it was the first time that the ASEAN non-aligned countries endorsed the simultaneous entry of both South and North Korea into the United Nations.

Moreover, President Chun's advocacy of an Asian alliance for regional security has earned a positive support from the ASEAN leaders, thus raising the Republic of Korea's role in and contribution to the maintenance of security and peace in the area. The summitry and press meetings President Chun had during his ASEAN visit served as a rare opportunity to shed light on the Koreans' determination to achieve peaceful unification, as well as on the intransigency and one-man dictatorship of North Korea, which constitute a major obstacle to the realization of peaceful unification.

2. Strong Will toward Peaceful Unification

During his state visit to the five ASEAN countries at the invitation of their heads of state, President Chun Doo Hwan, in addition to having summit meetings to discuss wide-ranging matters of common interest, met the press and many leading figures in various walks of life to explain the Republic of Korea's efforts and determination to realize peaceful unification.

President Chun stated that North Korea is the most tightly closed society on this earth, and accordingly Kim Il-sung misjudges the national strength of the Republic of Korea and the world situation as a whole. The President explained the circumstances leading to his January 12 proposal, saying, "I made a proposal for mutual visits between the highest authorities of the South and the North of Korea with a view to forestalling another war caused by Kim Il-sung's miscalculation of the situation."

President Chun then emphasized the importance of complete opening of the societies of the two zones of Korea, including various exchanges. "Lasting peace can be brought about on the Korean peninsula only when South and North Korea build up their mutual

trust and promote understanding between them," he said.

At his first press conference during the tour, held at the Guest House in Jakarta on June 26, President Chun said that the Republic of Korea will push ahead with its efforts to pursue a peaceful solution of the Korean question patiently, even though North Korea has yet to respond affirmatively to the January 12 and June 5 proposals for direct talks with Kim Il-sung.

The President warned that if North Korea ever invades the South again in miscalculation, the North Koreans will suffer complete destruction of all their major facilities, stating that the Republic has a capability and power strong enough to inflict such damage.

Commenting on the so-called "confederation system" for which North Korea propagandizes, President Chun said the idea is a mere deceptive formula lacking any logical or realistic rationale. "Nevertheless," President Chun said, "If Kim Il-sung accepts my offer and meets me, I am willing, as I suggested in my proposal, to discuss even this confederation idea."

Noting that a confederation system can be employed between two entities only when their ideologies and political systems are similar, when their socio-economic systems are the same, and when they both are intent on preserving peace and engaging in mutual cooperation, President Chun said that it is all too obvious that a confederation can hardly be applied to the Korean peninsula under the present circumstances, where the two sides, above all maintain diametrically conflicting political and economic systems.

The President also pointed out the treacherousness of the North Koreans by saying that "North Korea insists that a confederation system should be realized only after the incumbent government of the Republic of Korea is brought down and Communists rise to power in the South, thus making it clear that they are not a bit interested in unification achieved peacefully through dialogue."

President Chun further said that at the moment, the biggest obstacle to unification is Kim Il-sung and his son, Kim Chung-il. He then predicted that Kim Il-sung will find it unavoidable at some

future time to modify his course.

At a press luncheon hosted by the Foreign Correspondents' Club of Bangkok on July 5, President Chun said that although he proposed a direct meeting between the highest authorities of South and North Korea to discuss measures to forestall the recurrence of war and thus bring about a durable peace on the Korean peninsula, Kim Il-sung rejected the offer in a message sent to a Pyongyang rally on July 1, 1981. The President then gave the following reason for Kim Il-sung's inability to accept the overture despite his lip service to "peaceful unification."

"Kim Il-sung has been holding the 18 million North Korean people incommunicado from the rest of the world for 30 years. In such a tightly sealed society, the North Korean residents are hardly aware of the changes taking place in, the world today, and the actual circumstances.

"Kim Il-sung has created an almost religion-like and rigid personality cult and a hereditary power system under which his dictatorial power is supposed to be handed down to his son, Chong-il.

"What would be the result if such a totalitarian, dictatorial and closed society were opened to the outside world? The people would demand the democratization and liberalization of their society, a demand which would pose a serious threat to the dictatorial system and which would inevitably lead to the collapse of the dictatorial power system. This is Kim Il-sung's problem, which obliges him to refuse to talk with the Republic of Korea, to open the societies of South and North Korea, and to engage in mutual exchanges."

Citing the examples of the Soviet union and Red China, where he said "some degree of practicability and pragmatism began to develop after the passing of an idolized strongman," President Chun said he feels that North Korea, too, will follow the same pattern in

the long run. At the moment, he said, the biggest obstacle to unification is Kim Il-sung and his son, Kim Chong-il who will inherit power from his father.

The President said that the five ASEAN countries and world powers wish for stability on the Korean peninsula, and even those Communist countries which maintain friendly ties with North Korea apparently believe that it would be rational and realistic for Pyongyang to agree to a dialogue with South Korea, thus plunging Kim Il-sung deep in a dilemma.

Saying that he, therefore, believes there is ample possibility that at some future time Kim Il-sung will find it inevitable to modify his course, President Chun said that "until such a time comes, I will patiently continue to exert efforts for peace." The President expressed his firm resolve for peaceful unification by saying, "As a Korean proverb goes 'no tree withstands repeated axing,' I will knock on the closed door of North Korea repeatedly."

Part IV

Other Inter-Korean Developments

1. Proposal for Sports Exchanges and Formation of Single Teams for International Games

The Republic of Korea Olympic Committee (KOC) and the Republic of Korea Amateur Sports Association (KASA) proposed to North Korea on June 19 that the South and the North of Korea form single delegations to the Olympic and various other international games, and that to this end, sports officials of the two sides should hold a meeting in Seoul, Pyongyang or Panmunjom.

In a statement made through KBS Radio at 11 a.m. on June 19, Cho Sang-ho, KOC chairman and concurrent KASA president, said he believes it would be highly significant if the pains of division could be alleviated through various exchanges in the field of athletic competition.

Noting that the 60 million Koreans in the South and the North have long desired to find some way to restore trust between the two sides and to lessen the agony of national division, Cho said, "With the inter-Korean dialogue in a state of suspension, we cannot but feel shame at the present situation as a civilized nation."

The KASA President said that active exchanges including good-will matches in various sports activities and participation as a unified team in international games between athletes from the South and the North would contribute considerably to creating conditions for national concord.

He then proposed to the Chairman of the North Korean Olympic Committee and the North Korean Sports Guidance Committee that the two zones of Korea form a unified team to participate in the 23rd Olympic Games in 1984, and if possible in other international athletic events to be held before that date, including the 9th Asian Games in 1982. Cho also suggested that representatives of the South and the North hold a meeting in Seoul, Pyongyang or Panmunjom at an early date to discuss various problems relating to the formation of single inter-Korean teams.

The proposals of KOC Chairman Cho for inter-Korean sports

exchanges and formation of single teams can be taken as a concrete means of facilitating the "creation of trust between South and North Korea," the need for which was emphasized by President Chun Doo Hwan in his January 12 and June 5 proposals.

In his proposals, President Chun, stressing that the restoration of trust between the South and the North is indispensable to the realization of peaceful unification, proposed the complete opening of both sides' societies to each other for the sake of fostering mutual trust.

President Chun also put forth a flexible and realistic suggestion that if the full opening of both societies is not possible because of the political realities of the two sides, then exchanges can begin first in the athletic, cultural, academic, postal and economic fields, with gradual progress made toward comprehensive exchanges and a complete opening.

The KASA President's proposal for talks between South and North Korean athletic officials, needless to say, is part of the efforts of the Republic of Korea to restore mutual trust and pursue the opening of the two societies. If and when the two zones of Korea hold goodwill sports matches in various athletic fields, exchange athletic skills and information, and take part in various international matches with unified teams, it would no doubt serve as a good opportunity to manifest the nation's ability before the world and, at the same time, provide a decisive momentum to creating an atmosphere for mutual trust.

The Republic of Korea has over the years exerted efforts to bring about sports exchanges with North Korea. But Pyongyang has persistently rejected a series of invitations to take part in international sports events held in Seoul and propositions for inter-Korean sports talks.

Such invitations and offers included a proposal that they send their athletic officials to attend the Asian regional seminar for volleyball coaches which opened in Seoul on August 1, 1973; that they participate in the World Shooting Championships in Seoul on September 9, 1978, and that the two sides hold a conference to

arrange goodwill table tennis matches and other athletic exchanges, which was offered on March 12, 1979.

But all these well intentioned offers failed to materialize due to the North Korean scheme to exploit even sports games for political purposes.

From time to time, North Korea did propose that unified inter-Korean teams be formed to participate in international sports matches. But all these gestures were motivated by their sinister attempt to keep South Korean delegations from international events, thus only fanning distrust between the two zones.

For instance, North Korea proposed on February 20, 1979, barely two months before the opening of the 35th World Table Tennis Championships, the formation of a single inter-Korean team for the pingpong match slated for April 25 through May 6, 1979 in Pyongyang as a means, as it turned out later, of blocking Seoul's participation in the Pyongyang games.

Again, only half a year before the 22nd Olympic Games slated for July 19, 1980 in Moscow, North Korea suggested the formation of a single Korean team for the Moscow Olympics.

There cannot be any valid reason for North Korea to oppose the efforts of the Republic of Korea athletic circles to explore the avenue to mutual exchanges, beginning in the non-political area of sports, at this time when all channels of inter-Korean dialogue have been sealed, thereby contributing to easing of the pains resulting from national division and to laying the base for national reconciliation.

Nevertheless, North Korea had showed no response whatsoever to the proposal. KOC Chairman and concurrent KASA President Cho Sang-ho, in a statement, on July 27, 1981 urged North Korea to respond to the proposal affirmatively at an early date.

In the statement, Cho, expressing regret over Pyongyang's failure to respond to it, urged that South and North Korean athletic officials meet at an early date to discuss his June 19 proposal for the formation of single inter-Korean teams to participate in the 1984 Olympics in Los Angeles and, if possible, in the 1982 Asian Games.

Pointing out that all 60 million fellow Koreans — whether in the South, the North or foreign lands — are watching with deep concern to see what reaction Pyongyang will eventually make, the KASA President stressed that the athletic officials of the South and the North of Korea should open their doors wide to each other's athletic communities and realize exchanges and the formation of unified teams for international games, thus contributing to providing momentum to bring about national conciliation.

Cho said KASA is fully prepared to meet with North Korean athletic representatives at any time, and will await for a North Korean response with patience and in good faith.

He also stated in the statement that the South Korean athletic community vividly remembers that North Korea proposed the formation of a single inter-Korean team for the 35th World Table Tennis Championships, on February 20, 1979, barely two months before the opening of the Pyongyang games, and again suggested the dispatch of a unified Korean team to the 22nd Moscow Olympics only seven months before the Olympiad.

The KASA president emphasized that if the idea of unified inter-Korean sports teams is to become a reality, it is natural to allow sufficient time for athletic representatives of the South and the North to discuss and agree on necessary arrangements.

“It is our belief that if North Korea is genuinely interested in the formation of a unified team, they will not reject our proposal, in which we have expressed to the whole world our resolve to translate the idea into action,” Cho said.

2. SNCC Seoul Side Issues Statement

The Seoul side of the South-North Coordinating Committee, in a statement issued on July 4, 1981 on the occasion of the ninth anniversary of the 1972 South-North Joint Communiqué, urged North Korea to accept the January 12 and June 5 proposals at an early date based in the basic spirit of the Joint Communiqué, and to come forward to the forum of dialogue and cooperation.

Emphasizing that the South-North Joint Communiqué is a historic instrument of agreement that cannot be unilaterally abrogated or scrapped by either side, the statement called upon North Korea to stop trampling violently on the provisions of the Joint Communiqué and to regain national conscience, with the good sense to promptly and sincerely agree to a dialogue, exchanges and cooperation.

The following is the full text of the statement issued by the Seoul side of the South-North Coordinating Committee:

***A Statement by the Seoul Side of the South-North
Coordinating Committee on the Ninth Anniversary
of the July 4 South-North Joint Communiqué***

Today is the ninth anniversary of the South-North Joint Communiqué issued on July 4, 1972. On this occasion, we recall that in agreeing to this joint communiqué, both South and North Korea solemnly pledged to faithfully carry out its terms. Accordingly, we reaffirm that the joint communiqué is a historic instrument of agreement that cannot be unilaterally abrogated or scrapped by either side. Once more, we urge North Korea to faithfully implement the agreements contained therein.

The joint communiqué expressly provides that "in order to ease tensions and foster an atmosphere of mutual trust between the South and the North, the two sides have agreed not to slander or defame each other, not to undertake armed provocations whether on a large or small scale, and to take positive measures to prevent inadvertent military incidents." The communiqué also called for South-North cooperation in seeking the early success of the South-North Red Cross talks, various exchanges in many fields and the installation of a direct telephone line between Seoul and Pyongyang. In essence, the communiqué is an inter-Korean agreement to make all possible efforts to

promote reconciliation and unity between the South and the North in order to achieve the independent and peaceful unification of the divided homeland. Furthermore, the document contains an express agreement to establish and operate a South-North Coordinating Committee as a major channel of dialogue to ensure the implementation of the agreed terms. The Coordinating Committee was actually formed and went into operation under the co-chairmanship of the chief representatives of Seoul and Pyongyang.


North Korea, however, has unilaterally blocked the normal operation of the South-North Coordinating Committee and has unilaterally cut off the Seoul-Pyongyang direct telephone line. Furthermore, they have recently made a one-sided and outrageous statement that "having lost its raison d'être, the Coordinating Committee has already ceased to exist." This is tantamount to reneging on the South-North Joint Communiqué itself. Moreover, North Korea flagrantly violated the supplementary agreement to stop loudspeaker broadcasts against each other along the Demilitarized Zone as of midnight, November 10, 1972. Since September 4, 1980, the North Koreans have conducted more than 180,000 provocative, vitriolic and slanderous broadcasts along the entire length of the DMZ and are still continuing such broadcasts.

On every possible occasion, we have pointed out that North Korea's unilateral abrogation of the historic joint communiqué and its supplementary accords, which both parties solemnly pledged to faithfully abide by, would render futile all endeavors to restore mutual trust between the South and the North. We have also pointed out that such behavior on the part of Pyongyang would set a grave precedent by which all future agreements that might be reached between the South and the North might also be made meaningless. We have repeatedly urged North Korea to reflect upon this crucial matter.

On this ninth anniversary of the South-North Joint Communiqué, we call upon North Korea to correctly understand the

grave consequences of their flagrant violations of all agreed provisions of the communique. We urge them to listen to the national conscience and regain the good sense to promptly come forward to hold a dialogue, conduct exchanges and cooperate, as provided for in the communique. Agreements reached between the South and the North must be carried out without fail. When either side wants to revise an agreement, such a revision must be effected by discussion and agreement between the parties concerned, not by unilateral notification or broadcast by either side.

We emphasize that for both the South and the North to do so will be to uphold the spirit of the joint communique and move along the right path of productive and constructive dialogue. North Korea is urged to accept President Chun Doo Hwan's January 12 and June 5 proposals in a spirit of dialogue. We also sternly urge the North Korean authorities to immediately cease their provocative and slanderous loudspeaker broadcasts against the South.



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Part I

Nationwide Resolve to Resume Inter-Korean Dialogue

1. Statement by Central Committee for National Unification

The Central Committee for National Unification of Korea refuting North Korea's suggestion for a "conference for acceleration of unification," urged North Korea last August 20 to respond affirmatively to a call for dialogue conducive to peaceful unification instead of clinging to their schemes to mislead public opinion. The Central Committee pointed out the unreasonableness and fictitiousness of the so-called August 6 "joint statement by political parties and social organizations," in which North Korea called for the convocation of a "conference for acceleration of unification" among the representatives of political parties and social organizations in the South and the North, plus delegates from Korean communities abroad, but not including South Korean government authorities.

In a statement addressed to North Korea, Cheon Kwan-wu, chairman of the Central Committee, said that the latest overture of North Korea, along with their idea of a "confederation system" which Pyongyang has offered with the prerequisites of withdrawal of U.S. forces from Korea and overthrow of the incumbent Seoul government, was a transparent scheme to serve their goal of communizing the entire Korean peninsula, rather than a real bid for dialogue and peaceful unification.

Stressing that North Korea should realize that so far as the question of national unification is concerned, the entire Republic of Korea remains firmly united, beyond partisan interests, and therefore that none of their devious machinations can ever succeed, the Chairman said, "Because both our government and people share the resolve to realize peaceful unification, their argument for the elimination of some persons from dialogue can only be taken as an act refusing contacts with those striving to realize unification peacefully."

Chairman Cheon said it is utterly unrealistic and unreasonable

for North Korea to attempt to solve inter-Korean problems without the participation of the Head of State and the government, which are responsible for overall state affairs of the Republic of Korea and which cherish the sacred obligation to realize peaceful unification of the fatherland.

“By calling for peaceful unification in words and behaving to the contrary in deeds, the North, Koreans have rejected even the most practicable and easy projects to improve inter-Korean relations, such as the question of arranging reunions between dispersed families and exchange of sports teams between the two zones of Korea,” Cheon said.

The Chairman then vowed to move onward along the road to peaceful unification, saying, “If only North Korea shows even a small degree of sincerity to meet the national aspiration for peaceful unification, our Central Committee for National Unification shall, without blaming misconduct of the past any further, positively take the lead with broad magnanimity in arranging a resumed dialogue that would open a new age and a new historical chapter.”

The full text of the statement by Chairman Cheon of the Central Committee is as follows:

Peaceful unification of our divided fatherland is the ardent wish of our 60 million compatriots in the South and the North of Korea, and a historical mandate of the nation. Nonetheless, no easy path to unification has been found to date, a generation later. National heterogeneity grows deeper day after day and tensions persist between the South and the North.

We cannot leave this tragic state of national division unsettled. It is incumbent upon us to improve inter-Korean relations and explore the road to peaceful unification by all means.

The January 12 proposal for mutual visits by the highest authorities of the South and the North of Korea, and the June 5 proposal for a meeting between the highest authorities of the two sides, both advanced by President Chun Doo Hwan, represented epochal resolves to provide a breakthrough in the

solution of the issue of unification, which, therefore, are being broadly supported at home and abroad.

Should the highest authorities of the South and the North of Korea meet and correctly grasp the reality of each other's situation, or hold a open-hearted discussion without any preconditions of all the issues raised by the two sides, it would eliminate distrust and misunderstanding in favor of trust and understanding, providing a decisive momentum to solve the question of unification.

Nevertheless, the North Korean authorities rejected the January 12 and the June 5 proposals and thereby shut off, in effect, the inter-Korean dialogue itself.

The idea of a "confederation system" which North Korea has offered with the prerequisites of withdrawal of U.S. forces from Korea and overthrow of the incumbent government, or the August 6 proposal of North Korea calling for a "conference for acceleration of unification" between political parties and social organizations of the two sides, excluding government authorities but including such non-existent ghost organizations as the so-called "Unification Revolutionary Party" was a transparent scheme designed to serve their goal of communizing the entire Korean peninsula; rather than a real bid for a dialogue and peaceful unification.

Obviously it is utterly unrealistic and unreasonable for North Korea to attempt to solve inter-Korean problems without the participation of the Head of State and the government, which are responsible for overall state affairs of the Republic of Korea and which cherishes the sanctified obligation to realize peaceful unification of the fatherland.

This is an act that enrages the people of the Republic of Korea and becomes a laughingstock in the world community. It is crystal-clear that in the reality of national division, no effective solution to problems can be expected from a dialogue not including government authorities.

The whole world knows that in North Korea today a

hereditary power system is being consolidated on top of the one-man dictatorship that has reigned there for no fewer than 36 years, since national liberation in 1945. And it is a self-evident fact that in such a society no political parties or social organizations can exist free from control of the Communist party.

Nevertheless, North Korea is attempting to exclude the Republic of Korea government from dialogue, while disputing the internal affairs of the Republic of Korea in the name of their political parties and social organizations. This behavior ought to be condemned in the name of the nation.

The North Korean authorities should realize that so far as the question of national unification is concerned, the Republic of Korea remains firmly united nationwide, beyond partisan interests, and therefore, that, none of their divious machinations can ever succeed. Because both our government and people share the resolve to realize peaceful unification, their argument for the elimination of some persons from dialogue cannot but be taken as an act of denying contacts with those striving to realize unification peacefully. What is most important at the moment is for North Korea to come to the forum of dialogue with the genuine intent of solving the problems pending between South and North Korea.

North Korea calls for peaceful unification in words but behaves to the contrary in deeds. They have rejected a suggested project to find out the fate of dispersed family members, one of the easiest projects contributing to the improvement of inter-Korean relations; one-sidedly severed the direct South-North telephone line; and turned down the proposal for sports exchanges and formation of unified teams for international sports meets, contending that such sports projects can be discussed only when the "conference for acceleration of unification" is held as they have proposed. North Korea should desist from showing such narrow-minded negativism.

If only North Korea shows even a small degree of sincerity to meet the national aspiration for peaceful unification, our Cen-

tral Committee for National Unification shall, without blaming misconduct of the past any further, positively take the lead with broad magnanimity in arranging a new dialogue that would open a new age and a new historical chapter.

It is from this standpoint that I urge the North Korean authorities not to cling any longer to their schemes to mislead our compatriots and the world community, but instead to respond affirmatively to a call for dialogue that can genuinely contribute to peaceful unification.

2. North Korea's "August 6 Joint Statement by Political Parties and Social Organizations"

On August 6, 1981, North Korea put forth yet another deceptive offer for dialogue — a "conference for acceleration of unification" between the representatives of political parties and social organization of the two zones of Korea. The latest scheme was contained in a "joint statement" of 23 political parties and social organizations including the Workers' (Communist) Party, which was adopted at the 76th meeting of the Central Committee of the so-called "Democratic Front for Unification of Fatherland."

The statement urged the convocation of a "conference for acceleration of unification" after renewing the call for the establishment of a "Democratic Confederal Republic of Koryo," an idea raised by Kim Il-sung in his "comprehensive project report" made at the Sixth Congress of the Workers' (Communist) Party in October last year.

A perusal of the statement shows, however, that the latest offer was a far cry from any well-intentioned bid to resume the suspended inter-Korean dialogue or to pursue peaceful unification of the fatherland. It was intended rather to serve notice that they are foreclosing any chance to talk with the incumbent government of the Republic of Korea and those political parties, social organizations and individual figures which support the Seoul government.

In the statement, North Korea, after leveling stereotyped slander at South Korea, argued, “no affirmative results conducive to national unification can be made by any contact with those who professionally pursue anti-Communistic confrontation.” It then asserted that it would be “reasonable to convene a ‘conference for acceleration of unification’ among the representatives of political parties and social organizations of the South and the North and delegates from Korean communities abroad” as a “fresh means of accelerating unification of the fatherland.” Discussing the “conference” in detail, the statement said:

First, a “conference for acceleration of unification” should be convened among the representatives of political parties and social organizations of the South and the North and delegates from Korean communities abroad on the condition of the exclusion of the incumbent government authorities of the South from the “conference;”

Second, bilateral and multilateral talks should be held as a preliminary step among the representatives of various political parties, factions and social strata interested in the “conference; and

Third, once the “conference” is convened, the idea of a “confederation system” and even the “question of forming unified teams for international games,” proposed by the Republic of Korea Amateur Sports Association, can be discussed comprehensively.

This is unmistakable proof of their refusal to have any dialogue with anti-Communist personages their negativism toward all the proposals advanced by the South, including a dialogue between the responsible authorities of the two sides. Besides, they tried skillfully to attract the interest of anti-Seoul and anti-government elements at home and abroad by giving superficial emphasis to the issue of the venue and time of the “conference,” and by feigning flexibility in allowing bilateral or multilateral talks among the representatives of various political parties, social organizations and strata as a preliminary measures. They made it apparent that the focus of the “conference” should be the “confederation system” they have proposed, and strongly implied the rejection of any substantial dis-

cussion of key inter-Korean issues when they asserted that all the proposals, put forward so far by the South are subject to the package discussion in the dimension of so-called "collaboration and exchanges."

Now, let us look into the fictitiousness of the "August 6 joint statement." It clamorously defended the idea of a "confederation system," saying "this is the only reasonable and fair means of realizing peaceful unification under the present circumstances of our country."

They assert, "... all the political parties, other organizations and people in the northern zone eagerly support this formula," and claim unfoundedly, "... the patriotic people of South Korea, too, welcome the idea of a 'Confederal Democratic Republic of Koryo' and, encouraged thereby, more forcefully undertake struggles for the democratization of their society and unification of the fatherland."

In North Korea, however, there do not and cannot exist political parties other than the workers' (Communist) Party. In the North, social organizations are all manipulated and perfunctory organizations under the strict control of the Communist party. The allegation that the political function and activities of their political parties and social organizations are fully recognized and guaranteed in the process of politics cannot be true, for the political parties of North Korea (even if there are some parties other than the Workers' Party) are mere tools serving Kim Il-sung's political system rather than performing the function inherent to political parties of reflecting the people's political opinions upon state affairs. North Korea's social organizations, likewise, cannot play the role of people's interest groups.

Therefore, the fact that North Korea used the names of political parties and social organizations in the recent statement itself represents an attempt to place the validity of "popular support" on their fictitious propaganda and thereby mislead world opinion, improving their notorious image in the world community. Their idea of a "confederation system," too, is a mere fiction without any

substance which has been raised as part of their far-reaching strategy intended to mobilize their people and mislead world opinion. Under the circumstances, what the North Koreans are trying through the "conference for acceleration of unification," the focus of the "August 6 joint statement," is to form a "preparatory committee for the establishment of a confederation." Their scenario is that once the "preparatory committee" is created among anti-Seoul and pro-Pyongyang Korean personages abroad, they would let the "preparatory committee" discredit the reasonable and realistic unification formula promoted by the Republic of Korea.

This machination of North Korea is evident in the contents of the "joint statement," in which North Korea vehemently denounced the government authorities of the South, condemning as a "deceptive scheme to oppose unification under the cloak of unification" the January 12 and June 5 proposals embodying the South Korean government's resolve to realize peaceful unification, overtures which have earned broad support in the world community as well as in the country. Moreover, they have committed the anachronistic mistake of branding as a "scheme to internationally legalize two Koreas" the proposal for simultaneous entry of South and North Korea into the United Nations, realistic need for which was amply endorsed by the Heads of State and other government leaders of the five ASEAN nations during President Chun Doo Hwan's tour of the countries last June and July.

As is well known, the proposal for joint admission into the world organization was never intended to perpetuate national division. In the Special Foreign Policy Statement for Peace and Unification of June 23, 1973, the government of the South declared that "the Republic of Korea will not oppose North Korea's participation with it in international organizations," and "the Republic of Korea shall not object to its admittance into the United Nations together with North Korea, provided that it does not cause hindrance to national unification, and that a majority of the member nations of the United Nations so wish." This policy declaration was based on the conviction that various circumstantial factors should be improved

substantially in order to realize peaceful unification in view of the reality of inter-Korean relations and the universal tendency of seeking detente and peaceful co-existence.

The June 23 declaration embodies the firm resolve of the South Korean government to dispel tensions on the Korean peninsula and thereby contribute to world peace by paving the way for South and North Korea to participate in the United Nations and other international organizations together. It also reflects the stand of the government that until the time of unification, the systems of the South and the North should maintain and develop peaceful relations.

Nevertheless, North Korea, in a sharp contrast to the South's realistic and concrete unification efforts, merely indulges in numerous machinations to obstruct unification and further increase national heterogeneity, while creating a hereditary dynastic system unparalleled in the Communist world. Whereas they denounce and slander the South's unification policy and its idea of simultaneous entry into the United Nations and other international organizations, the North Koreans have paradoxically established diplomatic relations with some of the countries which have formal relations with the Republic of Korea, and have entered some of the world agencies which South Korea joined long ago. But still, they blindly argue that the idea of simultaneous entry into world organizations is a "scheme to forge two Koreas, perpetuating national division."

In the recent "August 6 joint statement," too, North Korea denounced Seoul's proposal for simultaneous entry into the United Nations by South and North Korea as a "disguised offer intended to cover up nation-splitting schemes," contending that "because unification is a task so urgent to the Korean people, and because all alliance movement exists all over the world in support of the independent and peaceful unification of Korea, the issue of unification and all other inter-Korean questions should be solved at an early date through collaboration and exchange between the North and the South."

The words “independent and peaceful unification,” “collaboration” or “exchanges” which North Korea often employs now carry implications quite different from their original meanings. According to statements by high Pyongyang authorities and official documents of North Korea, the “collaboration between the North and the South” they mention means an act of “awakening the people in the South and the North nationalistically and class-consciously, rallying them solidly around the Great Leader with the great ‘juche’ idea as the only guiding thought, and embarking them on struggles for the unification of the fatherland along a path dictated by the Great Leader.” According to the North Koreans, “collaboration” also denotes the act of “settling the problems raised in all areas between the South and the North on the basis of the socialist capability of the Northern half.” Similarly, the political meaning of the word “unity” is to “enable South Korean authorities to end ‘anti-Communist fuss’ and to move in the direction of ‘alliance with communism.’”

“Independent and peaceful unification” means “to achieve unification through unity between the socialist capability of the Northern half and the patriotic and democratic capability of the South after American imperialistic aggressors are driven out of South Korea to liquidate colonial rule and a genuine people’s government is established in the South.”

In this way, North Korea assigns political implications even to common words to seal off the minimum possibility for dialogue and compromise. Going step further, they attempt to shift the blame for suspension of the inter-Korean dialogue, arguing that the Republic of Korea is the obstacle to unification.

The recent “August 6 joint statement” was hardly a departure from this intransigency. The offer for the “conference for acceleration of unification” contained in the “August 6 joint statement” was no more than a scheme intended to find an excuse to reject South Korea’s January 12 and June 6 proposals, to drive a wedge between the government and people and thereby to facilitate the formation of a “united front” in the South, as well as to prepare a “preliminary

meeting of a preparatory committee for confederation" by winning over Korean residents abroad.

Now it appears likely that North Korea will in the future adhere to a hardline posture, rejecting, on the excuse of their call for a "conference for acceleration of unification," all proposals offered by Seoul so long as these call for the participation of government authorities. It also appears certain that they would renew their demand for a "confederation system" and a "conference for acceleration of unification" at every opportunity at home and abroad.

This likelihood was substantiated in their reaction to the statement issued by the president of the Republic of Korea National Red Cross (ROKNRC) calling for an early resumption of the Red Cross talks intended to solve the question of dispersed families, and for the normalization of operation of a Red Cross Panmunjom liaison office and a direct South-North telephone line. In the same statement, the ROKNRC president also expressed willingness to meet the North Korean Red Cross chairman at any time and at any place. Reacting to the ROKNRC statement, North Korea mobilized all their propaganda media to denounce the statement as a "scheme to shift the blame for the breakoff of the Red Cross talks to the northern side," arguing that even such a humanitarian issue could be dealt with at the "conference for acceleration of unification" as part of "many-sided collaboration and exchanges."

Also in their "letters addressed to personages of various political parties, factions and strata and the people of South Korea on the 36th anniversary of national liberation", allegedly adopted on August 15, 1981 by a ghost organization called the "Council for Acceleration of Unification in North Korea," they reiterated the offer of early convocation of a "conference for acceleration of unification," demanding that the South have American forces withdraw from Korea, intensify anti-American struggles, "democratize" society, abolish the National Security Law, promote a policy of allying itself with communism, and "collaborate" with the Communists in the North.

Meanwhile, in reaction to the August 20 statement by the Cen-

tral Committee for National Unification, North Korea issued a statement on August 24 in the name of the spokesman of the "Central Committee of the Democratic Front for Unification of the Fatherland", levelling vehement slanders and defamations at the South. In the statement, Pyongyang alleged that "many-sided contacts and talks are going on to prepare the 'conference for acceleration of unification,'" attempting thereby to obscure the fairness and rationality of Seoul's August 20 statement.

The "August 6 joint statement" of North Korea has thus proven to mere inflammatory and malignant machination intended to slander and defame the South, and permit the North to escape from its difficult position both at home and abroad. The scheme bears testimony to the fact that the North Koreans are yet to awake from the daydream of taking over the South by force of arms.

3. Reactions from Various Circles

The August 20 statement by the Central Committee for National Unification has earned broad and unreserved support from various quarters. The eight political parties and numerous organizations in the economic, cultural, education, labor and religious circles invariably expressed wholehearted support for the August 20 statement, pointing out the unreasonableness and fictitiousness of Pyongyang's idea of convening a "conference for acceleration of unification" among political parties and social organizations without the participation of the government authorities of the South. The political parties and social organizations of South Korea urged North Korea to agree to a sincere dialogue for the peaceful unification of the nation.

The support extended by political parties and social organizations to the January 20 statement was highly significant in that it expressly showed the desire of the 60 million people for peaceful unification, substantiating the fact that no matter how strenuously North Korea may scheme to communize all of Korea, their attempt

is doomed to end in failure in the face of such a firm nationwide aspiration for peaceful unification.

The Advisory Conference for National Unification, a non-governmental organization formed among senior personages from various walks of life to assist the government on matters relating to policy for national unification, adopted and made public a special statement on August 24 in support of the August 20 statement of the Central Committee for National Unification.

The statement, signed by Huh Chung, chairman of the Conference and one-time prime minister, and its 31 members, declared that the Advisory Conference "wholeheartedly supports the statement issued by the Central Committee for National Unification, because it fully reflects the basic and consistent view of the whole people with regard to the question of national unification."

Pointing out that the January 12 and June 5 proposals are the best means of bringing about national unification, the statement by the Advisory Conference also said that the attitude of the North Koreans of rejecting a meeting between the highest authorities of the two sides and instead putting forth the fictitious demand for a "conference for acceleration of unification" points clearly to where their ulterior motive lies, that is, to overthrow the government of the Republic of Korea and create conditions ripe for a Communist revolution and for the establishment of a pro-Communist regime in the South.

The full text of the statement by the Advisory Conference for National Unification is as follows:

Members of the Advisory Conference for National Unification wholeheartedly support the statement issued by the Central Committee for National Unification on August 20, 1981, since it duly reflects the basic and consistent view of our entire people with regard to the issue of national unification.

- (1) The January 12 proposal for an exchange of visits between the highest authorities of South and North Korea, and the June 5 proposal for a meeting between the*

highest authorities of South and North Korea, are the best means of facilitating national unification.

The proposed meeting of the highest authorities of the South and the North represents an epochal resolve embodying the resolute intention of our government to explore ways of pooling the entire people's will to unification. It is therefore the most realistic and rational means of realizing unification of the fatherland.

(2) The rejection by North Korea of dialogue is an act of betrayal to the nation and history. We condemn it in the name of the nation.

While rejecting unconditionally the proposal for a meeting between the highest authorities of the South and the North, North Korea repeatedly demands, on the excuse of "collaboration through alliance with communism," a "conference for acceleration of unification" between political parties, social organizations and personages in various strata, excluding the government of the Republic of Korea. This intransigency of North Korea shows that their ulterior motive is to create conditions ripe for Communist revolution to overthrow the government of the Republic of Korea and instead to establish a pro-Communist regime, without any interest in a dialogue for peaceful unification. We strongly condemn this anti-national, anti-peace and anti-democratic attitude of North Korea in the name of the nation.

(3) In North Korea, which is under a one-party dictatorship, there cannot exist any independent political parties or social organizations other than the Communist Party.

North Korea has perpetrated various atrocities infringing on man's inherent right to survival by means of one-man dictatorship, oppression, surveillance, forced labor and religious persecution, and is today building an unprecedented Communist dynasty. Can any person believe that in North Korea under the circumstances there can be independent political

parties or social organizations free from the control of the Communist Party? It is utterly ridiculous for such dictatorial authorities to demand contacts and dialogue only between political parties and social organizations.

(4) The entire Republic of Korea remains firmly united beyond partisan interests so far as the issue of national unification is concerned.

The Republic of Korea stands united more firmly than at any other time in the past on the basis of democratic ideals. The government, people and all social strata share the same resolve to realize peaceful unification. We again declare that our firm basic stand is to promote effectively the solution of the question of unification.

In the meantime, the Democratic Justice Party, six other political parties and the Parliamentary Politics Fraternity, a floor negotiating body, issued separate statements on last August 20 expressing wholehearted support of the August 20 statement of the Central Committee for National Unification and urging North Korea to abandon their unrealistic plans for the communization of all Korea, and to come to the forum of peace and unification.

The gist of the statements of the political parties is as follows:

«The Democratic Justice Party» Along with the whole people, we wholeheartedly support the statement of the Central Committee for National Unification. We also call upon North Korea to awaken from its day-dream of unifying Korea under Communist terms by force of arms.

The North Korea demand for a "conference for acceleration of unification," as was the case with their call for a "grand national conference," is an old-fashioned and cowardly trick.

We ask North Korea to come to the forum of peace and unification by promptly accepting our January 12 and June 5 proposals, in response to the sincere effort of our people pursuing unification in harmony and unity.

«The Democratic Korea Party» Aware that North Korea's August 6 proposal was another scheme intended to facilitate the communization of the whole Korean peninsula, we totally support the statement of the Central Committee for National Unification, which denounced the North Korean statement.

We urge the North Korean authorities to give up their policy to overthrow the Republic of Korea government in a violent revolution and to accept our January 12 and June 5 proposals.

«The Korea National Party» We wholly support the statement of the Central Committee for National Unification, in which North Korea was urged to respond affirmatively to a call for dialogue that can contribute to peaceful unification.

North Korea, rather than adhering to their fictitious demand for a "conference for acceleration of unification," should agree to the January 12 and June 5 proposals which we made in the conviction that the tragic state of national division cannot be tolerated any further. By so doing, North Korea should meet the aspirations of the nation at an early date.

«The Civil Rights Party» We are convinced that the issue of unification must be solved from the angle of national history, without any linkage with the interests of either the South or the North or of any special group, regime or specific persons.

North Korea should promptly renounce their fictitious idea of convening a "conference for acceleration of unification" as well as their strategy for a violent revolution in the South, and faithfully abide by the South-North Joint Communiqué of 1972, accepting the proposal made by the Central Committee for National Unification.

«The Democratic Socialist Party» We greatly welcome and support the statement of the Central Committee for National Unification, which has correctly pointed out the fictitious and unreasonable unification policy of North Korea.

If North Korea is truly interested in peaceful unification, they should accept our proposal and come to the table of dialogue. Otherwise, they would hardly escape international

censure.

«**The New Politics Party**» *The statement of the Central Committee for National Unification reflects our ardent wish for peaceful unification, and constitutes the reaffirmation of the nationwide support for President Chun Doo Hwan's January 12 and June 5 proposals.*

«**The Anmin Party**» *It is utterly unrealistic for North Korea to demand an inter-Korean dialogue without the participation of our highest authority and government. We support the statement of the Central Committee for National Unification and urge North Korea to show sincerity toward a realistic inter-Korean dialogue.*

«**The Parliamentary Politics Fraternity**» *The call for a dialogue between the representatives of political parties and social organizations is no more than a repetition of their stereotyped demands of the past. We believe that a dialogue between the highest authorities of the South and the North is the only short cut to the solution of the Korean question.*

In addition to these political parties, numerous social organizations also expressed their total support or the August 20 statement of the Central Committee for National Unification, condemning the North Koreans for their anti-national and anti-peace conduct. The social organizations demanded in their respective statements that North Korea give up deceptive schemes and respond affirmatively to a dialogue that can contribute to peaceful unification. The social organizations which supported the August 20 statement in their express statements included the Korean Veterans' Association, Central Committee for Total National Security, Korean Federation of Education Association, Korean Anti-Communist League, Federation of Korean Trade Unions; economic organizations like the Korea Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Federation of Korean Industries, Korea Federation of Small Business, and Korean Traders' Association; six private organizations related to the question of national unification, including the National League for Acceleration

tion of Unification; ten organizations under the Federation of Artistic and Cultural Organizations of Korea; the Central Federation of Five Northern Provincial Societies and the five provincial societies under the Central Federation; 22 Buddhist organizations, including the Korean Chogye Order; and other religious organizations like the Central Mission of Chondo-gyo and the Confucianists' Society.

In particular, the Federation of Korean Trade Unions (FKTU) in its statement said, "Our 7 million South Korean workers extend warm greetings to the North Korean workers victimized by North Korea's hereditary one-man dictatorship and suffering day and night from slave labor." Saying that the FKTU expects that the highest authority of North Korea will return to reason at an early date, the statement urged North Korea to unconditionally accept the January 12 and June 5 proposals, to settle all affairs democratically instead of seeking anachronistic one-man dictatorship or building a hereditary dynasty, to realize that their slander of the South would only lead to the firmer unity of the South Korean people, and to agree to reunion between dispersed families and inter-Korean sports exchanges.

Many press media around the world allotted large space to reporting the statement of Cheon Kwan-wu, chairman of the Central Committee for National Unification. Especially all the newspapers in the South editorially extended their unreserved support to the August 20 statement, while condemning the "August 6 united statement" of North Korea, calling upon the North Koreans to reflect on their intransigency and come to the forum of dialogue with sincerity.

The following are editorial comments of some major newspapers in Seoul on the appeal by the Central Committee for National Unification for the resumption of inter-Korean talks.

North Korea Should Come to Forum of Dialogue

Kyunghyang Daily News (August 21, 1981)

The August 20 statement by Cheon Kwan-wu, chairman of the Central Committee for National Unification, is strongly suggestive of the resolve that his Committee would take the lead in arranging inter-Korean talks based on the spirit of the January 12 and June 5 proposals if only North Korea abandons the scheme to communize the whole Korean peninsula and shows sincerity toward restoring mutual trust and realizing peaceful unification.

The manifestation of the basic stand of the Central Committee for National Unification points to the coherence of the national will to peaceful unification, showing once again how sincerely we are trying to realize a dialogue between the South and the North.

In the first place, we would like to show our wholehearted support and welcome to the firm resolve of the Central Committee, a purely private organization. As President Chun Doo Hwan stated in his June 5 proposal, the issue of national unification is a question affecting the entire nation. It cannot be a monopoly of any specific political party or social organization nor can it be the problem of only the highest responsible authorities of the South and the North.

It is a task that has to be tackled from the ground up by the whole nation.

Thus seen, the role and function of the Central Committee for National Unification, created as a nationwide body for the promotion of unification, cannot be too strongly emphasized. It is also for this reason that we attach special value to the August 20 statement by Chairman Cheon.

The unification policies of South and North Korea have been diametrically conflicting from the outset. As is well known, the basic direction of our government's unification policy is to avert fratricidal war at any cost, to realize unification in a peaceful manner and in accordance with the free will of the whole people, and to this end to restore national trust through elimination of mutual prejudice, dogmatism and misjudgement. We find this guideline of our unification policy highly reasonable and realistic, all the more so in view of the hostile feelings and heterogeneity formed and hardened through a generation of national division.

In contrast, the unification strategy of North Korea, as expressly laid down in the Platform of the Workers' (Communist) Party, lies in the "accomplishment of an anti-imperialistic and anti-feudal democratic revolution all across the nation" and ultimately in the "construction of a Communist society." According to so-called "nation-saving formula" adopted in January 1977, their idea is to call a "political conference" between "the socialistic force in the North" and representatives of the people of various strata and layers in the South pursuing unification, and thereby establish "people's regime" in the South.

They have gone so far as to demand lately the convocation of a "meeting for acceleration of unification," a sort of public rally, while slandering our Head of State and other government authorities. In a proposal aired on August 6, 1981, North Korea insisted that unification should be achieved either through a "confederation system" formed after American troops were withdrawn from Korea and the "incumbent Seoul government was overthrown," or through a "meeting for acceleration of unification" held between political parties and social organizations, excluding government authorities but including such a ghost party as the "Unification Revolutionary Party" which they argue operates underground in the South. This is a machination not intended to promote dialogue and peaceful unification but to organize an anti-South Korean rally on the basis of the strategy of a "united front" which they often employ.

These undue demands no doubt derive from their attempt to mislead public opinion at home and abroad in their fretfulness over the growing international support for our January 12 and June 5 proposals, as against the increasing scepticism aired even by some fellow Communist-bloc countries, not to speak of Third World nations, with respect to their idea of a "confederation system." The fact that they insist that even the question of forming single inter-Korean teams for international sports matches should be discussed at the so-called "meeting for acceleration of unification" shows that how frantic they are to mislead us with excuses.

No matter how strenuously they may feign interest in peaceful unification in a bid to soothe their people's demand for the opening of their society, their treachery has long been laid bare. They should realize that it is good for nothing even for themselves to put forth such ridiculous demands, aimed merely at fanning the split in our public opinion and creating social confusion. They are misjudging our solid sense of anti-communism and strong national capability.

As Chairman Cheon remarked in his statement, North Korea should realize that so far as the question of national unification is concerned, the Republic remains firmly united, and among all the people this is beyond partisan interests and, therefore, that none of their devious schemes can ever succeed.

If North Korea were truly interested in a dialogue, they would show sincerity in ascertaining the fate of the dispersed family members in the South and North, and in reopening the direct telephone line between the two sides.

North Korea should affirmatively respond to the call embodied in the statement of the Central Committee for National Unification, a purely private organization representing the 60 million Korean people's will to national unification. If they reject the Central Committee's call for dialogue following their rejection of the January 12 and June 5 proposals, it would only amount to showing before the whole world that all their demands for dialogue are part of their thinly-veiled deceptive propaganda offensive.

We again urge that North Korea accept the latest overture for dialogue instead of sticking to their time-worn dogmatic way of thinking and deceptive peace machinations.

Statement by Central Committee for National Unification

Dong-A Ilbo (August 21, 1981)

Cheon Kwan-wu, chairman of the Central Committee for National Unification, issuing a statement addressed to North Korea,

urged North Korea last August 20 to “affirmatively respond to a call for dialogue that can genuinely contribute to peaceful unification instead of clinging any longer to their schemes to mislead our compatriots and the world community.”

The Central Committee for National Unification, headed by Cheon, is a purely private organization inaugurated last May with the task of sampling supra-partisan and nationwide opinion and resolve with respect to unification. Therefore, Chairman Cheon’s August 20 statement may well be taken to incorporate supra-partisan and nationwide opinions.

It is a well-known fact we have all been long aware that, as Chairman Cheon pointed out in the statement, Pyongyang’s idea of a “confederation system” offered with the prerequisites of withdrawal of U.S. forces from Korea and overthrow of the incumbent government, for their call for a “conference for acceleration of unification” between political parties and social organizations, excluding government authorities, was a mere scheme designed to serve their goal of communizing the entire Korean peninsula. We are enraged at the brazen-facedness of the Kim Il-sung regime putting forth the idea of a “conference for acceleration of unification” between political parties and social organizations, excluding government authorities, while rejecting our January 12 and June 5 proposals.

In the so-called Kim Young-joo statement issued on August 28, 1973, Kim Il-sung declared that he would not talk with the system of the late President Park Chung Hee. When the October 26 incident occurred in 1979, however, Pyongyang proposed a prime ministers’ meeting between the two sides, and several rounds of working-level contacts were held before the dialogue was suspended. Now, he argues that he won’t meet with the government authorities of the Republic of Korea, but only with political parties and social organizations.

What a capricious man he is! But we cannot laugh off his devious conduct. For hidden deep in his ridiculous acts is a horrible poison needle, namely, communization of South Korea.

North Korea pretended to attend a government-level dialogue for a while upon the issuance of the July 4 South-North Joint Communiqué in the early 1970s. Before long they sealed it off, however. The Seoul side has since suggested a prime ministers' meeting and exchanges in the areas of economy, culture, and sports time and again. As recently as only 10 days ago Kim Yong-shik, president of the Republic of Korea National Red Cross, offered to his North Korean counterpart that they meet to discuss the promotion of reunion of the 10 million dispersed family members.

However, North Korea has rejected all offers! The only remaining means is for the highest authorities of the two sides to meet in person and open-heartedly discuss the issues pending between them, as well as finding a clue to national unification. This is what President Chun Doo Hwan's January 12 and June 5 proposals were intended for. This is no doubt the best practicable method available, as can be evidenced by the broad support the overtures have earned from many press media around the world.

Nevertheless, Kim Il-sung has turned it down, and instead urged the convocation of a "conference for acceleration of unification" among only political parties and social organizations, but excluding our government authorities, arguing that even the question of forming unified Korean teams for international sports matches should be discussed at that "conference." This is an act of trampling down the nation's aspirations for unification and turning a deaf ear to world opinion.

There is only one choice Kim Il-sung can make. It is to agree to a meeting between the highest authorities of the South and the North of Korea in a sincere manner. He should realize that this is the mandate of our five millenia national history.

**Statement to North Korea by Central Committee
for National Unification**

Joong-Ang Daily News (August 22, 1981)

The Central Committee for National Unification, in a statement on August 20, urged North Korea to agree to a dialogue conducive to peaceful unification without adhering to deceptive machinations any longer.

In the statement, Cheon Kwan-wu, chairman of the Central Committee, denounced North Korea's August 6 proposal for a "conference for acceleration of unification" between political parties and social organizations, but excluding government authorities, branding the offer as "a scheme designed to serve their goal of communizing the entire Korean peninsula, rather than a real bid for a dialogue and peaceful unification."

The August 6 statement of North Korea was said to have asserted that even the question of forming unified inter-Korean teams for international sports events at the "conference for acceleration of unification" and that the ghost organization of the "Unification Revolutionary Party" should be allowed to take part in the "conference."

Needless to say, it is utterly unrealistic and unreasonable to attempt to solve the inter-Korean problems without the participation of the Head of State and other government authorities who are responsible for state affairs of the Republic of Korea.

Their latest offer was a mere excuse to shun dialogue with the South, and shows that there is no change whatsoever in their bid to communize the whole Korean peninsula.

Today, the whole world knows that North Korea is an unprecedentedly dogmatic and closed society, even by the standards of the Communist world and, moreover, is building a hereditary dictatorial system around Kim Il-sung and his clan.

Can there be any political parties and social organizations in such a society that can discuss the issue of national unification freely? It is beyond doubt that even if there exist some parties and organizations, they are no more than mere puppets pulled on strings by the Workers' (Communist) Party. It is clear to anyone's eyes that their oft-used ideas of "grand national conference," "political conference" or the recent call for a "meeting for acceleration of unifi-

cation” are in substance a sort of mass rally intended for political propaganda rather than a meeting for discussion’s sake. They have employed the method of offering a rally-type “dialogue” as a means of rejecting genuine dialogue ever since they unilaterally suspended the function of the South-North Coordinating Committee.

Moreover, how can any substantial progress be expected in the inter-Korean question from a meeting attended only by the representatives of political parties and social organizations, without the representative of the government responsible for the state affairs of a country?

North Korea’s insistence on a mass rally is a shallow scheme for them to escape responsibility and censure at home and abroad for their rejection of dialogue. It also is a trick based on their insidious intent to prompt a split in public opinion in the South, and thereby foment conditions favorable to the communization of all Korea. It is only too natural that the contradictory logic of their August 6 statement would become a laughing stock of the world community.

If the North Korean authorities are really interested in peaceful unification, they should abandon their wild fancy of communization and come forward to the forum of dialogue openheartedly.

The August 20 statement of the Central Committee for National Unification, representing the national resolve for unification, displays magnanimity in that the Central Committee would deal with the North Koreans broadmindedly, regardless of their past misdeeds.

Unification of the divided fatherland is the paramount task which our generation should accomplish by all means. However, the task will hardly be realized by imposing one’s own system upon the other.

Aware of this stark reality, North Korea should accept the epochal January 12 and June 5 proposals of President Chun. It is emphasized again that coming to the forum of dialogue is the only way of meeting a mandate of national history and the six million people’s ardent wish for unification.

The North Should Agree to Our Peace Offer

Seoul Shinmun (August 21, 1981)

The statement issued on August 20 by Cheon Kwan-wu, chairman of the Central Committee for National Unification, a purely private organization guiding a national movement for the acceleration of peaceful unification, is highly significant in that it represents the invariable resolve of our six million people to realize peaceful unification.

The statement, in the first place, warned the North Koreans not to cling to schemes to mislead world opinion any longer, expressing its determination to "take the lead with broad magnanimity in arranging a new dialogue that would open a new age without blaming misconduct of the past, if only North Korea shows sincerity to meet the national aspiration for peaceful unification." This is really a broad-minded overture intended to open a workable inter-Korean dialogue under all circumstances on the basis of the basic spirit of our government's January 12 and June 5 proposals.

However, as was pointed out in the statement, North Korea is conspiring at yet another adventure, fretful over the broad support our January 12 and June 5 proposals have been enjoying both internally and externally. They are trying to hold a so-called "conference for acceleration of unification" without the participation of our government authorities, while launching an extensive "letter campaign" to sell their deceptive peace idea to many persons in the country and those residing in Japan. In this manner, they are building up tensions between the two zones of Korea more strenuously than before. They have yet to awake from the day-dream of communization of all Korea, making themselves a laughing stock in the world community. They are simply repeating the act of "self-injury of the nation."

In the 67th meeting of the Central Committee of the "Democratic Front for Unification of the Fatherland", held on

August 6, the North Koreans proposed holding a so-called "conference for acceleration of national unification," a kind of public rally. Afterward, they launched a "letter campaign" appealing for support of the "conference" idea.

Their ulterior motive is only clear. By putting forth the idea of a "conference for acceleration of national unification" disguised as a "fresh peace formula," North Korea schemes to head off the blame from within and without for their rejection of dialogue, and also to propagandize their idea of a "confederation system", thereby splitting our national opinion and creating conditions conducive to Communist revolution.

It is utterly nonsensical to try to solve inter-Korean problems without the participation of our Head of State and the government which are responsible for overall state affairs of the Republic of Korea, and whose paramount obligation is to accomplish peaceful unification of the fatherland. Moreover, the name of the "Democratic Front" which has made the offer of the "conference" itself implies something insidious. The "Democratic Front," feigning to incorporate all the political parties and social organizations in the North, is a puppet organization which takes charge of "united front" operations against the South under the tight control of the Workers' (Communist) Party for the eventual communization of all Korea. Especially, this was the very criminal organization which issued the so-called "appeal for peaceful unification" on June 7, 1950, barely 19 days before the unleashing of their aggression in the Korean War. In the "appeal" they suggested a "conference between political parties and social organizationa in the South and the North," which turned out to be a mere smoke-screen for their imminent invasion.

The fact that they again put forth such a treacherous organization and call for quite an infeasible meeting to discuss a "confederation system" with the preconditions of the withdrawal of American troops from Korea, elimination of the incumbent government of South Korea and adoption of a pro-Communist policy in the South, speaks for itself that they are not after peaceful unifica-

tion but communization of the entire peninsula by force of arms.

Seen from a far-reaching viewpoint, however, North Korea won't be able to resist the currents of history, nor survive in a world community looking forward to the peaceful solution of the Korean question. If they perpetrate further aggression through miscalculation, they won't be able to escape total destruction, faced with our people's firm attitude of anti-communism and the mightily strength of our armed forces. Moreover, it is certain that the ever-widening gap in economic strength between the two sides in favor of the South will someday invoke internal pressure that would oblige the Pyongyang authorities to modify their dogmatic and warlike policy for their own survival.

We again urge that North Korea, which is at the crossroads of destruction or survival, should not longer hesitate in accepting the national magnanimity we have shown recently.

To Genuine Dialogue and Unification

Chosun Ilbo (August 21, 1981)

In 1948 in Pyongyang, a political farce was staged called "joint conference of political parties and social organizations in the South and the North." Our two senior politicians, Kim Koo and Kim Kyu-shik, entered the North to attend the meeting in the hope of finding some clue to some workable inter-Korean dialogue. In the North, however, they found that things did not go as they expected.

The "conference" wasn't a one-to-one discussion but proceeded strictly according to a Communist scenario. All the two politicians from the South did was to remain as no more than other individual attendees and clap their hands when others did.

The Communists merely exploited the "conference" as a tool of their "united front" strategy. Aware belatedly of their ulterior motive, the two Kims flatly rejected another invitation from Pyongyang to attend a second round of meetings of the "conference."

The so-called "conference for acceleration of unification" which North Korea reportedly offered through their puppet organization last August 6 cannot be anything more than a repetition of the time-worn trick they first employed 33 years ago.

As they did during their first try, North Korea shuns a dialogue between government authorities, and seems to believe our private organizations are all sympathetic to their Communist cause and would behave as their scenario dictates. Going a step farther, they argue that a ghost organization, the so-called "Unification Revolutionary Party," should attend the "conference" as a representative of our side.

Frankly speaking, we would like to laugh off the "conference" proposal which deserves no comment. But we are commenting on it timed with issuance of a statement by Cheon Kwan-wu, chairman of the Central Committee for National Unification, as organization which represents all the private forces for national unification.

It is needless to cite the contents of the statement, but North Korea should now correctly grasp the focal position of our private forces.

Firstly, so far as inter-Korean issues are concerned, our various private forces are taking completely common steps, regardless of their differing stands on internal affairs or their varying policy platforms. Among us, there are various political parties pursuing different policy goals. But all of them are invariably the same in their opposition to communism. North Korea should desist from attempting to drive a wedge in our national opinion. Since they have no chance for success.

Secondly, the peaceful unification formula which our anti-Communist common front pursues in concert is the method embodied in the June 5 and January 12 proposals. In this connection, we strongly condemn the North Korean call for a "conference for acceleration of national unification," actually a, "conference for acceleration of communization," without the participation of our Head of State and the incumbent government.

The North Koreans should no longer attempt to make a mockery

of our 50 million people and the conscience of the world. Deplorably, they pay lip service to peaceful unification while scheming for Communist takeover of the south, refuse to talk with our authorities when it comes to the issue of dialogue, and insist on a "conference for communization" when we offer sports exchanges and reunion between dispersed families.

The North Koreans seem to have instituted a dynastic hereditary system because this could be the only way of sustaining their unpopular system. But, in all likelihood, the unparalleled system would only deepen their own contradiction and crisis.

If they have the ability to appraise the situation properly, the Pyongyang authorities would respond affirmatively to the statement of the Central Committee for National Unification which vowed to "take the lead in arranging a fresh dialogue for the sake of a new page of our national history," instead of adhering to their unworkable and old-fashioned trick for the communization of the whole Korean peninsula.

The North Should Modify Its Posture

Hankook Ilbo (August 21, 1981)

Whereas the purpose of a dialogue lies in "conciliation" in our open society, a "dialogue" in a closed society is taken as part of a "struggle." Likewise, the "August 6 proposal" of North Korea and the "August 20 statement" of our Central Committee for National Unification show a fine contrast.

In a statement addressed to North Korea, Choen Kwan-wu, chairman of the Central Committee for National Unification, an organization formed for the purpose of promoting peaceful unification from a supra-partisan and nationwide approach, urged North Korea to reflect on itself, pointing out the ulterior motive and unreasonableness embodied in their "August 6 statement." Chairman Choen also expressed resolve in the statement to "take the lead with broad magnanimity in arranging a new dialogue conducive to

opening a new historical age, without blaming misconduct of the past, if only North Korea shows even a small degree of sincerity to meet the national aspiration for peaceful unification.”

On the other hand, North Korea, in a “joint statement of various political parties and social organizations” signed by 23 self-styled parties and organizations, proposed a “conference for acceleration of national unification” among representatives of political parties and social organizations in the South and the North and Korean communities abroad, but excluding our government authorities. They argued that their one-sided idea of a “confederation system” or inter-Korean humanitarian issues and the question of forming unified Korean teams for international sports events can be discussed as part of “collaboration” and exchanges.

Chairman Cheon categorically rejected as “unrealistic and unreasonable” the North Korean attempt to solve inter-Korean questions without the participation of the Head of State and the government of the Republic of Korea. The Chairman made it clear that their offer, which came on the heels of their rejection of our reasonable January 12 and June 5 proposals, has only enraged the Korean people and become a laughingstock in the world community.

In the statement, Chairman Cheon also stated that although North Korea often uses the names of numerous political parties and social organizations in their statements, “it is self-evident that no political parties or social organizations can exist free from control of the Communist Party in circumstances where a hereditary power system is being consolidated on top of a one-man dictatorship.”

Reminding them that so far as the issue of national unification is concerned, the Republic of Korea remains firmly united beyond partisan interests, the statement called upon the North Koreans to come to the forum of workable dialogue instead of indulging in insidious nation-splitting schemes. The Central Committee for National Unification was showing positive determination to strive to arrange a new dialogue while calling upon Pyongyang’s dictatorial authorities to reflect on themselves and their intransigent attitude,

and to meet the national aspiration for peaceful unification. The Central Committee correctly spoke for our national opinion in these statements, in a manner that contrasts with the practice of the North Koreans judging things from a self-centered perspective.

In fact, the North Koreans' call for a "conference for acceleration of national unification" not attended by our government authorities represents an utter insincerity as to the unvarying wish of the six million people that inter-Korean problems must be discussed and solved efficiently between competent authorities. Similarly, their idea of dealing with and solving the unification issue through a rally-like conference indicates that what they are really after is "united front" propaganda rather than any sincere discussion. Moreover, the word "collaboration" they use is not the synonym for "cooperation" we understand, but denotes the kind of "collusion" necessary for the creation of conditions ripe for "revolution in the South." Going a step farther, they ridiculously demand that their ghost propaganda setup, the so-called "Unification Revolutionary Party," which they falsely claim is active in the South, should attend the "conference."

It is believed that there were some pressing factors in the background against which the North Koreans set forth the "August 6 proposal." It is apparent that they had conceived the suggestion in a bid to escape blame for their rejection of dialogue, bewildered by the broad support enjoyed by our January 12 and June 5 proposals at home and abroad. They seem also to have harbored the daydream of forming a "united front" among our masses or splitting us from inside.

North Korea should agree to a meeting between the highest authorities of the two sides in the first place instead of sticking to their thinly-veiled tricks. They should desist from indulging in fomenting tensions and waging a war of attrition at the cost of the plight of their people.

As long as the paramount task of the nation lies in peaceful unification, the mandate of the times cannot but be for the South and the North to resume a dialogue helpful to the restoration of

mutual trust, and expand exchanges and cooperation in a durable peace. North Korea is again urged to wake from its wild fancy and try to meet the aspirations of the 60 million people for peaceful unification.

Part II

Tenth Anniversary of Proposal for South-North Red Cross Talks

1. Statement by ROKNRC President on the 10th Anniversary of the Proposal for South-North Red Cross Talks

On August 12, 1981, the Republic of Korea National Red Cross (ROKNRC) reiterated the humanitarian stand it had steadfastly maintained over the past ten years and called upon the Red Cross workers in the South and the North to strive positively to alleviate the sufferings of dispersed families.

In a statement issued on the tenth anniversary of the proposal of the South-North Red Cross Conference, Kim Yong-shik, ROKNRC President, expressing the intent not to make an issue out of the past Red Cross talks, showed his willingness "to meet the chairman of the North Korean Red Cross at any time and at any place, if such a meeting would enable us to find a way of breaking the stalemate over solution of the issue of dispersed families in the South and the North." The ROKNRC president also said, "I think a favorable momentum for the resumption of the South-North Red Cross Conference could begin if the delegation of the two Red Cross societies at an international Red Cross meeting slated for this coming November in Manila meet there and discuss the matter."

ROKNRC President Kim also said that, difficult though it may be, the ROKNRC will do its utmost to solve the humanitarian issue to achieve the reunion of 10 million dispersed family members.

"We will always keep the door of dialogue open, and strive with patience and sincerity to see to it that the North Korean side comes to the table of dialogue," the ROKNRC president said.

Following is the full text of the statement by the ROKNRC president on the 10th anniversary of the proposal for the South-North Red Cross Conference:

The Republic of Korea National Red Cross (ROKNRC) marks today the 10th anniversary of proposing the South-North Red Cross Conference to the North Korean Red Cross, in order

to achieve the humanitarian task of reuniting 10 million family members dispersed in the South and the North.

The South-North Red Cross Conference, which was initiated after the ROKNRC's proposal on August 12, 1971, received fullest support at home and abroad, and developed to the point where full-dress meetings were held alternately in Seoul and Pyongyang.

At that time, dispersed family members were overjoyed in expectation of their reunion, and the whole nation had greater hopes for national unification.

However, when the North Korean authorities unilaterally suspended the dialogue on August 28, 1973, the long cherished hopes and expectations of the people were shattered. Now a full eight years have passed since we had the opportunity to hold dialogue on purely humanitarian matters under the spirit of the Red Cross.

Today, international circumstances are such that nations of the world seek to develop a climate of mutual understanding and cooperation, irrespective of ideology and political systems. The Republic of Korea commits itself to taking positive steps in this regard and strives to develop this type of relationship with all nations.

As a result, we now enjoy the free exchange of letters and other communications with our brethren living in the majority of Communist-bloc countries. It is all the more painful that no single letter can be exchanged between parents and children in the same land, South and North Korea, as yet.

To unfold a new chapter of our history in the 1980's, our Republic of Korea government has proposed to the North Korean authorities a meeting and mutual visits between the highest authorities of South and North Korea, calling for the unconditional resumption of dialogue leading to the opening of societies between the South and the North.

On this occasion of the 10th anniversary of the proposal of the South-North Red Cross Conference, as one who has newly

assumed the presidency of ROKNRC, I would like to emphasize that I have no intention of making an issue out of past Red Cross talks. At this stage, the important thing is that our Red Cross workers in the South and the North should positively strive to alleviate the sufferings of the dispersed families from now on before it becomes too late.

I express my willingness to meet the chairman of the North Korean Red Cross at any time and at any place, if this could lead to a new breakthrough in the solution of the question of dispersed families in the South and the North. At the same time, I believe that the operation of the Red Cross Liaison Office at Panmunjom, which was established through agreement between the two Red Cross societies, and of the direct telephone line linking the two Red Cross societies in Seoul and Pyongyang, should be restored to normalcy. I expect that the North Korean Red Cross will take an affirmative step in this regard.

If only the North Korean Red Cross responds affirmatively, our South and North Korean Red Cross delegations to the international Red Cross meeting slated for this coming November in Manila, capital of the Philippines, would have constructive contact and dialogue, providing an epochal momentum for resuming the South-North Red Cross Conference.

No matter whatever difficulties we may face, we shall exert all our sincerity and efforts in promoting the Red Cross humanitarian project to realize the reunion between 10 million dispersed family members. We shall keep open the door of dialogue always, and see to it with patience and sincerity that North Korea will eventually come to the table of conference.

The people of the Republic of Korea wholeheartedly supported the sincere effort of the ROKNRC, based on the Red Cross spirit, to solve the humanitarian issue of arranging reunions between the 10 million dispersed family members. They invariably urged the North Korean Red Cross to respond to the ROKNRC call at an early

date.

Reflecting this public opinion, major newspapers of the South editorialized on the popular wish for resumption of the South-North Red Cross talks, as follows:

Tenth Anniversary of August 12 Proposal

Dong-A Ilbo (August 12, 1981)

August 12 marked the 10th anniversary of the proposal by the Republic of Korea National Red Cross (ROKNRC) for south-north Red Cross talks to find out the whereabouts of family members dispersed in the South and the North. In the proposal of August 12, 1981, the ROKNRC suggested that South and North Korea Red Cross representatives meet for the purpose of "solving soon the purely humanitarian questions pending between the South and the North, in line with the Red Cross spirit."

Two days later the North Korean Red Cross accepted the offer.

Preliminary meetings soon ensued at Panmunjom. One year later, on August 29, 1972, a ROKNRC delegation crossed the truce line to make a historic visit to Pyongyang. Ten days later, a North Korean Red Cross delegation visited Seoul.

Seeing off our Red Cross delegation to Pyongyang and greeting a North Korean Red Cross delegation to Seoul, our South Korean people at that time were full of expectation that the 10 million dispersed family members in the South and North could be reunited before long. However, this expectation was shattered at the third full-dress meeting, the second to take place in Pyongyang. It was at this meeting that the North Korean Red Cross posed the demand that if the Red Cross talks were to go on, the South should first "eliminate statutory and social obstacles," namely, abandonment of the Anti-Communist Law, anti-Communist publications, anti-Communist education, etc., in the South.

These prerequisites indicate that the Kim Il-sung regime agreed to the south-north Red Cross talks not to arrange the reunion of

dispersed families but to exploit the contacts as a means for communizing the South. Faced with the insidious machinations of the North Koreans, the South-North Red Cross Conference, intended for the reunion of the 10 million dispersed family members, has failed to arrange even a single case of reunion to date, 11 years after the Red Cross talks were first proposed.

This is the pain of the 10 million displaced family members, and is also symbolic of the tragedy of our 60 million compatriots. In East and West Germany, which were divided along with Korea at the end of World War II, dispersed family members can travel back and forth with armfuls of gifts whenever they want to see their families. As is the case with Korea, the two Germanys ascribe to conflicting ideologies, capitalism and communism. Nevertheless, dispersed families there can visit each other.

There is no reason why Koreans alone should live completely separated. This is due to Kim Il-sung and his followers.

Although it is ten years since Kim Il-sung accepted the proposal for Red Cross talks as a tool for communizing the South, South Korea has not been communized. Rather, the South has registered rapid economic growth, with its people full of a firm sense of anti-communism. This tells the complete failure of Kim Il-sung's strategy to exploit the inter-Korean Red Cross talks for communization of the South. If his 1950 aggression was a failure of the communization strategy based on violence, then Kim's attempt to promote the communization of the South through the Red Cross talks represented a failure of his communization strategy based on a deceptive peace offensive.

The repeated failure of Kim Il-sung's communization strategy has left only a bloody fratricidal war, the agonizing sufferings of dispersed families, and heightening tensions between South and North Korea. Other things to add to the list could be Kim Il-sung's idolization campaign and the hereditary power succession by his son, Kim Chong-il.

However, Kim Il-sung's idolization and Kim Chong-il's succession to power are doomed to be shaken with the death of Kim Il-

sung. According to the basic rule of the evolution of history, the only things left behind are the deep scars of the fratricidal conflict and the sufferings of the 10 million dispersed family members. Kim Il-sung should be able to have insight into the truth that though power changes hands, people do not change, and that history does not stand still but evolves.

It is not too late. Kim Il-sung should modestly subject himself to the nation's call and history's rule, and agree to the resumption of the Red Cross talks that would remove the pains of the dispersed families and would bring about national conciliation. Following repeated calls by the ROKNRC for resumed humanitarian Red Cross talks, Kim Yong-shik, new ROKNRC president, urged the North Korean Red Cross to agree to inter-Korean Red Cross talks. In a statement on the 10th anniversary of the proposal of the South-North Red Cross Conference, Kim, saying he does not want to make an issue of the past Red Cross talks, expressed willingness to meet the chairman of the North Korean Red Cross at any time and at any place. He also called for the normalization of the direct South-North telephone line.

The ROKNRC President's call for a meeting for tomorrow's sake represents the voice of our 60 million people who are concerned about the future of the Korean people. An unhesitant affirmative response from the North Korean Red Cross is called for.

Tenth Anniversary of August 12 Proposal

Chosun Ilbo (August 13, 1981)

Yesterday, August 12, was a special day — the 10th anniversary of August 12, 1971. It is perhaps too early to say now, but some day in the remote future, August 12, 1971 may be recorded in history as the day of a memorable event.

This was the very day when the Republic of Korea National Red Cross (ROKNRC) proposed to the North the inter-Korean Red Cross talks. With this proposal as momentum, the South and the

North Zones of Korea, which had theretofore turned their backs to each other over a period of a quarter century, sat down together to have Red Cross preliminary talks leading to full-dress meetings held alternately in Seoul and Pyongyang. The two sides also issued the South-North Joint Communique on July 4, 1972 and established the South-North Coordinating Committee, unfolding a full-fledged inter-Korean dialogue.

On this tenth anniversary of the August 12 proposal, Kim Yong-shik, new president of the ROKNRC, has issued a statement addressed to the North Korean Red Cross; asking the North to show sincerity in the solution of the dispersed family issue, and 1) expressed his willingness to meet the North Korean Red Cross chairman at any time and at any place, 2) stressed that the operation of the direct South-North telephone line and the Panmunjom Red Cross liaison office should be restored, and 3) hoped that South and North Korean delegates will make contacts during an international Red Cross meeting slated for this coming November in Manila. The ROKNRC president also said that his Red Cross will keep the door of dialogue always open and strive, with patience and sincerity, to see to it that the North Korean Red Cross return to the forum of dialogue.

We still vividly remember the joy and excitement we experienced when full-dress Red Cross meetings began to be held upon the issuance of the July 4 South-North Joint Communique. However, this emotional rejoicing was shattered one year later when North Korea announced a unilateral suspension of the dialogue in August 1973. On this 10th anniversary of the August 12 proposal, we all share the human sufferings of the 10 million dispersed family members.

Will the North Koreans turn their back on this latest sincere call, too? When the Red Cross talks were opened for the purpose of alleviating the pains of the dispersed families, our own compatriots, the North Korean Red Cross from nowhere produced prerequisites of "the improvement of statutory and social conditions and environment in South Korea," asserting that the objective of the Red Cross

talks could be achieved only when their prerequisites were met. The North Korean Red Cross thus attempted from the very beginning to politicize the non-political Red Cross talks.

Under the circumstances the Red Cross talks, which ought to be held based on pure humanitarianism and brotherly love, hit a bottleneck before long. One year later, the talks were broken off unilaterally altogether. Ever since, the ROKNRC has been making untiring efforts to resume the suspended Red Cross talks.

In fact, the offer for a meeting between the heads of the two Red Cross societies is nothing new. It was an overture made by the ROKNRC on the seventh anniversary of the August 12 proposal in 1978. Besides, a meeting between the chief Red Cross delegates was also suggested. This was not all. The ROKNRC had proposed time and again that the two sides arrange reunions between aged parents and their children, establish a reunion center and a postal exchange office at Panmunjom, or exchange groups of tomb visitors on traditional holidays as pilot projects. It was further suggested that if North Korea could not accept these offers, then separated families be allowed to exchange family pictures.

International telephone service has been opened long ago between South Korea and the Soviet Union and East European countries. Communication and postal exchanges are taking place with other Communist-bloc nations, too. Our residents in Mainland China have visited their homeland, while our compatriots in Soviet Sakhalin mailed gifts to their relatives here. At this time of such universal exchanges, why should North Korea alone remain so cool toward their own brethren, turning their back on the heart-aching sufferings of the dispersed families?

We would like to pin renewed expectations on the urging of our Red Cross on this tenth anniversary of the "August 12 Proposal." For this will become a sure milestone leading to national conciliation instead of hostile confrontation, and to unification instead of disharmony.

Broad Proposal by ROKNRC President

Joong-ang Daily News (August 13, 1981)

The difference in ideals and systems between the two zones of Korea is so deep today, 36 years after national division, that prospects for national unification seem just as dark. Still, we cannot give up our hopes and endeavors for unification. We are confident that the "national homogeneity" existing between the South and the North will some day make our wishes not in vain.

It is for this reason that we are pursuing many-sided inter-Korean contacts. On the tenth anniversary of the proposal for the South-North Red Cross Conference last August 12, ROKNRC President Kim Yong-shik suggested that the heads of the South and North Korean Red Cross societies "meet and discuss the question of reuniting dispersed families at any time and at any place."

In the proposal, the ROKNRC President said that in the current international environment where the doors of a nation are wide open even to countries with ideologies and systems different from its own, no letters, lamentably, can be exchanged between parents and their children separated so short a distance between South and North Korea.

From the long auto queues of East and West German people visiting their families and relatives on the other side on holidays, we can read the pride of the Germans being a single race and nation. At the same time, we see no reason why Koreans cannot do the same.

As the time of national division becomes more and more prolonged, it will be difficult to maintain national homogeneity. This makes it all the more exigent that the South and the North should meet and have a dialogue.

The representatives of the South and North Korean Red Cross agreed in June 1972 to promote mutual visits, exchange of letters and eventual reunion between dispersed families after finding out

their whereabouts and situation. This was considered a pressing yet easy task because it was a humanitarian need of blood relatives, transcending the difference in ideals and systems.

However, this agreement failed to be implemented and the Red Cross talks were broken off after the North Korean Red Cross posed ridiculous prerequisites that the South should "improve its statutory and social environment" before proceeding with the Red Cross talks any further.

The North Koreans were asking things beyond the reach of the authority and competency of Red Cross, attempting to use the Red Cross talks based on humanitarianism and brotherly love as a forum for their political propaganda.

Our side had made it clear in the Red Cross meeting that we have never intended to enforce our system or ideology upon the North, nor would we tolerate any attempt of the North to impose theirs upon us.

It is believed that at the beginning North Korea hoped that the channel of the inter-Korean dialogue would lead to unrest in the South. When this did not happen, they seemed rather to have feared that the talks would shake the basis of their own closed society. Their attempt to exploit the purely humanitarian issue of dispersed families as a means of Communist revolution had failed.

To repeat it again, the issue of alleviating the sufferings of dispersed families is aimed at restoring national homogeneity by creating an atmosphere of mutual understanding and trust between the South and the North.

Considering the fact that the North itself accepts the return of our compatriots in Japan, and even the Japanese wives of some of the returnees, we cannot understand why North Korea so adamantly rejects such a basic exchange as postal service between the two sides. We also see no reason why North Korea, which often blames the South for "nation splitting," should turn down our every offer for the recovery of national homogeneity.

The ROKNRC made it clear in the recent statement that it would not make an issue out of the past breakoff of the talks. We

earnestly urge the North Korean Red Cross to return to the dialogue with fresh resolve.

How Long Will North Korea Ignore Humanitarianism?

Kyunghyang Daily News (August 12, 1981)

Our government's basic position toward the issue of inter-Korean dialogue, needless to say, is to restore national homogeneity by creating an atmosphere for mutual understanding and trust between the South and the North, and further to achieve national reconciliation and peaceful unification.

It is in line with this basic humanitarian stand of the government that ROKNRC President Kim Yong-shik on the 10th anniversary of the August 12 proposal stressed that the two Red Cross societies should try to alleviate the human sufferings of the dispersed families with a fresh resolve, expressing his willingness to "meet the North Korean Red Cross chairman at any time and at any place."

In his statement addressed to the North, the ROKNRC president, saying that he would not make an issue out of the past conduct of the Red Cross talks, called for normalization of the operation of the Panmunjom Red Cross liaison office and the direct Seoul-Pyongyang telephone line.

He further said that if and when the South and North Korean Red Cross delegates attending an international Red Cross meeting slated for this coming November in Manila meet and have a favorable dialogue, it may provide an epochal momentum to resume the South-North Red Cross Conference. In this manner, our readiness to meet North Korean delegates whenever and wherever was expressly demonstrated.

The cause of the suspension of the Red Cross talks was that North Korea handled the issue of dispersed families not as a humanitarian question but as a means of fomenting Communist revolution. The words "humanitarianism" and "peace" they speak strongly incorporate the political trick of "liberation of South

Korea” or “revolution in the South.”

This crafty scheme pursued by the North Koreans under the guise of humanitarianism was exposed in a press conference held by crewmen of the fishing boat Taechang-ho No. 2 after their return home from abduction to the North. According to them, some members of the so-called “Committee for Peaceful Unification of the Fatherland” told the fishermen that once they returned to the South they should “collaborate with revolutionary programs, and when a war flares up, organize an armed uprising.” This clearly shows that their lip service to peaceful unification is no more than a deceptive propaganda slogan.

Besides, a look at the attitude North Korea maintained through the past Red Cross talks shows that they regarded the conference as a part of their “united front” strategy. In other words, the aim they sought through the Red Cross talks was to realize a kind of “political collaboration,” namely, a “political conference” or a “grand national conference,” as well as to achieve their idea of a “confederation system.”

This machination of the North Koreans was indicated in the assertions they made during the short-lived Red Cross conferences. They had gone so far as to demand so-called “improvement of statutory and social environmental conditions” in the South. The specific prerequisites they posed were that the South guarantee domestic Communist activities by North Korean operatives, bring about withdrawal American forces from Korea, and renounce all of anti-Communist policies.

When they realized that their scheme had no chance, the North Koreans torpedoed the Seoul-Pyongyang shuttle meetings and launched a frantic propaganda campaign trying to shift the responsibility for the breakoff of the talks onto the South.

Another reason for their termination of the inter-Korean talks lay in the vulnerability of their own system. As the national strength of the South grew spectacularly, stronger light was shed on the weaknesses of the North Korean system. In addition, when the North Korean people’s discontent piled up over the proposed

dynastic hereditary power succession between Kim Il-sung and his son, Chong-il, North Korea strove hard to cover up the popular restlessness and placate the discontented people.

At this time, when our compatriots in any country around the world, including Mainland China and the Soviet Union, can now exchange letters with their relatives here and in some instances can even enjoy reunions, it is lamentable that exchange even a single letter between the dispersed families in the South and the North zones of this same land, who have had to live unaware of the fate of their missing family members and relatives for no fewer than 30-odd years.

We urge that North Korea return to genuine brotherly love and a humanitarian spirit, and unconditionally join with the efforts of our 60 million people trying to gratify the ardent wishes of the dispersed families. North Korea should also desist from abducting and brainwashing our innocent fishermen, and come to the forum of inter-Korean dialogue promptly.

Let's Meet Whenever and Wherever

Seoul Shinmun (August 12, 1981)

We observe the tenth anniversary of the proposal of the Republic of Korea National Red Cross (ROKNRC) for a "South-North Red Cross conference for the reunion of dispersed families," an initiative which opened a monumental new chapter in the history of inter-Korean relations. On August 12, 1971, Dr. Choi Doo-sun, then president of ROKNRC, made an epochal proposition that "the South and North Korean Red Cross hold a meeting to arrange the reunion of the 10 million dispersed family members in the South and the North." North Korea accepted the offer and the first inter-Korean dialogue since the 1954 Geneva meeting took place amidst the emotional rejoicing of the whole people.

Truly, the South-North Red Cross talks resulting from the ROKNRC's August 12 proposal contributed tremendously to stabili-

ty and prevention of war on the Korean peninsula. Before the talks, the peril of war hung low over the Korean peninsula. In a hardline strategy against the South, North Korea had launched dangerous armed provocations from the early 1960s, which included an attempted raid on Chong Wa Dae, infiltration of hundreds of armed guerrillas into the east coast area, and seizure of the *USS Pueblo*.

In the perilous circumstances, the government of the Republic of Korea chose the road of dialogue and negotiation. After the late President Park Chung Hee expressed his willingness to make an "epochal proposal to eliminate the artificial barrier of national division" on August 15, 1970, the ROKNRC's proposed "inter-Korean Red Cross talks" were announced exactly 10 years ago today, August 12, 1971. Faced with the surging wave of the then universal mood for detente, even the warlike Kim Il-sung regime had no choice but to accept the offer for a dialogue. The historic South-North Red Cross Conference was thus held alternately in Seoul and Pyongyang. Upon the groundwork of this Red Cross contact, there came the announcement of the South-North Joint Communique, a great milestone in the national history, on July 4, 1972, and the meetings of the South-North Coordinating Committee.

Our popular support for the two channels of the inter-Korean dialogue, Red Cross talks and the South-North Coordinating Committee, was really great. The people were full of the expectation that the crisis of war would be removed from the Korean peninsula through Koreans' own efforts; that reunion between the 10 million suffering separated family members would be realized, and that peace would be constituted, leading ultimately to national reunification.

However, Pyongyang had soon begun to throw cold water upon these expectations. If the inter-Korean dialogue had brought about a relaxation of tension, it would mean that the Kim Il-sung regime would have to renounce its warlike policy against the South. In this event, the possibility loomed of the crumbling of the dictatorial system, built up on the excuse of war preparation. The

South-North dialogue became an opportunity for the wind of freedom to reach North Korea. Therefore, the immediate task for the North Koreans was how to keep the wave of freedom from reaching their area.

They sought the disruption of the inter-Korean dialogue itself. They set forth a set of preconditions such as "South Korea should ally itself with communism," "National Security and Anti-Communist Laws should be abolished," and "a democratic person should come to power." Despite the existence of the channel of dialogue, they demanded a rally-like "grand national conference" or "nationwide meeting." They rejected the humanitarian Red Cross talks, too.

Notwithstanding this posture of North Korea, there is no change whatsoever in our resolve to solve the inter-Korean questions with the nation's own efforts through dialogue and negotiations. This was stated expressly in the January 12 and June 5 proposals of President Chun Doo Hwan. In the January 12 overture, President Chun proposed an exchange of visits of Seoul and Pyongyang between the highest authorities of the South and the North so as to handle all issues pending between the two sides open-heartedly. In the June 5 proposal, the President offered a meeting between the highest authorities, saying that North Korea can choose the time and place of the proposed meeting.

On the tenth anniversary of the historic August 12 proposal, we emphasize once again that the inter-Korean dialogue should be reopened in whatever form at an early date. We are prepared to discuss with North Korean representative open-heartedly the issues facing our nation regardless of the time, place and topics. We expect that North Korea will return to reason and respond affirmatively to our sincere overture.

Is There Any Humanitarianism on Part of North Korea?

Hankook Ilbo (August 12, 1981)

It is already ten years since the Republic of Korea National Red Cross (ROKNRC) proposed to the North Korean Red Cross on August 12, 1971 a "campaign to search for 10 million dispersed family members" based on brotherly love and humanitarian spirit. The Red Cross talks, held to reflect our people's ardent aspirations, have been unilaterally suspended by North Korea. In addition, the fishermen of Taechang-ho No. 2, who were just freed from unlawful abduction to the North, made a frightening revelation in a press conference yesterday.

The ROKNRC proposed the Red Cross talks in the hope of alleviating the sufferings of the families dispersed in the South and the North from a humanitarian point of view, and of widening, in this way, mutual contacts and exchanges and helping restore trust, thereby preparing the base for eventual peaceful unification.

However, North Korea sought to politicize the purely humanitarian Red Cross talks. In August 1973, they torpedoed the full-dress Red Cross meetings which had barely started in August 1972 and suspended even the working-level Red Cross contacts in March 1978. They were insisting on the "improvement of statutory and social environmental conditions," an interfering demand which had nothing to do with the humanitarian program. In other words, North Korea sought to link even the Red Cross talks to their scheme for "revolution in the South" and, realizing that they had no chance at all, broke off the talks altogether.

However, our consistent stand is that because the task of alleviating the human sufferings deriving from national division and the approach toward peaceful unification, a national mandate, is the paramount goal of this age, we would keep on knocking at the tightly closed door of North Korea with sincerity and patience, hoping that some day North Korea would reflect on themselves and respond to our efforts.

Nevertheless, judging from what the kidnapped fishermen told of the brainwashing they were forced to undergo, of the espionage mission assigned to them by the North Koreans, and of the frantic war preparations they witnessed in the North, the Kim Il-sung and

Kim Chong-il system still adheres to an inhumane and anti-national scheme to bring the whole Korean peninsula under their Communist rule. North Korea is holding 445 of our fishermen in captivity along with their ships, numbering 33. The recently freed fishermen of Taechang-ho No. 2 had been held in the North no fewer than eight months. This sharply contrasts their freeing of Japanese fishing boats a few days after their seizure.

The Taechang-ho fishermen said in the press conference that they could find no hints of any brotherly love or humanitarianism in the North Koreans. Everything they were forced to undergo in the North, such as "ideological study," "individual investigation," "practice of songs," "viewing of films," "study trips" and "practice of press interview," were enforced as part of Communist brainwashing and their plan to instill the sense of Kim Il-sung's personality cult in the fishermen's minds. In addition, North Korea was said to have imposed upon them the "mission" to organize an armed uprising at a decisive time.

The returned fishermen also said that the North Koreans openly vowed that if another incident like the Kwangju turmoil should occur, they would invade the South to intervene in it directly. The fishermen also said that frantic war preparations were going on in all areas in the North. The guides who tried to brainwash them were seen wearing the same clothes all the time through winter, and many vehicles along streets were using charcoal as fuel.

To put it briefly, the North Koreans are preparing for another invasion at the cost of the people's lives. It is believed that they abducted our fishermen mainly to train them as espionage agents and saboteurs. They seem to be miscalculating our situation.

In our open society, however, we have flexible yet strong vitality. In particular, we enjoy evident freedom, prosperity, humanity and affluence, of a kind which can hardly be seen in the North. It is more than natural that the freed fishermen vowed to do their best in safeguarding their country and survival.

We cannot relax our vigilance against the persistent war preparation and subversive schemes by the North Koreans.

Whenever we encounter an incident like this, we renew our resolve to prepare ourselves better against any contingency. North Korea's inhumane and anti-national conduct will only produce adverse effect for them.

It isn't too late. The North Koreans should awake from their miscalculation of our situation and from their wild urge for the comunization of all Korea, and respond affirmatively to the unconditional resumption of the Red Cross talks. It is civilized mankind's common practice that even in a state of hostilities, a dialogue between the Red Cross organizations of the warring parties cannot be denied. We call upon Pyongyang to agree to resume the inter-Korean dialogue, becoming correctly aware of our national aspirations and the need of the times.

2. Chronological Reviews of South-North Red Cross Talks

«1970»

August 15 — President Park makes the “August 15 Declaration,” proposing a bona fide competition between the south and the north and expressing the willingness to suggest more advanced, epochal measures to remove various artificial barriers existing between the two sides step by step, in the interest of laying the groundwork for unification and on the basis of humanitarian consideration.

«1971»

August 12 — Dr. Choi, president of the Republic of Korea National Red Cross (ROKNRC), proposes a South-North Red Cross Conference to discuss a search campaign for dispersed families in south and the north.

August 14 — The North Korean Red Cross (NKRC) accepts the ROKNRC offer, and suggests that documents related thereto be exchanged by two messengers from each side at 12 noon August 20 at Panmunjom.

August 15 — President Park pledges positive support for the proposed family search campaign.

August 20 — The two sides exchange documents related to the proposed Red Cross talks at the first south-north Red Cross messengers' contact.

August 21 — The ROKNRC suggests that the first preliminary Red Cross meeting be held at 11 a.m. September 28 at Panmunjom, that each side be represented by a five-man delegation, that the lists of the two sides' delegates be exchanged at 12 noon September 24 at Panmunjom, and that the preliminary meetings discuss the procedural matters of full-dress Red Cross meetings.

August 26 — A message on the ROKNRC proposal for the procedural matters of the preliminary talks is delivered to the NKRC at the second messengers' contact.

August 27 — The NKRC counter-proposes that the first preliminary

- meeting be held at 11 a.m. September 20 and that the lists of the two sides' delegates be exchanged at 12 noon September 16.
- August 30 — The ROKNRC receives a message on the NKRC's counter-proposal at the third messengers' contact.
- August 31 — The ROKNRC accepts the NKRC's counter-proposal. The first preliminary meeting is thus set to be held at 11 a.m. September 20 at the NNSC conference room at Panmunjom with five delegates attending from each side. The lists of the delegates of the two sides are to be exchanged at 12 noon September 16.
- September 3 — A ROKNRC statement on its acceptance of the NKRC's counter-proposal is delivered to the NKRC at the fourth messengers' contact.
- September 15 — The ROKNRC makes public the list of its delegates to the full-dress meetings.
- September 15 — The NKRC makes public the list of its delegates to the full-dress meetings.
- September 16 — The two sides exchange the lists of their delegates to the preliminary meetings at the fifth messengers' contact.
- September 16 — The ROKNRC establishes an advance office for the Red Cross talks (11km south of Panmunjom).
- September 20 — The first preliminary meeting of the South-North Red Cross Conference (SNRCC) is held.

Agreement:

- Venue of preliminary meetings: Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission conference room at Panmunjom.
- Establishment of permanent conference liaison offices and installation of a direct telephone line.

At the meeting, the ROKNRC suggests a seven-point procedure for the full-dress meetings, whereas the NKRC offers the agenda topics of full-dress meetings in disregard of the preliminary meeting procedures.

- September 22 — The south and north Korea Red Cross establish their permanent liaison offices at Panmunjom and install a direct telephone line between the two offices. The ROKNRC liaison office is located at Freedom House and the NKRC liaison office at Panmungak.

September 29 — The second preliminary meeting is held, and the two sides agree on procedural matters for the preliminary meetings. The ROKNRC proposes that full-dress Red Cross meetings be held in Seoul and Pyongyang by turn.

Agreement:

- Eight items on the procedure for preliminary meetings.
- Priority order of the topics of preliminary meetings.

October 6 — The third preliminary meeting is held, and the two sides agree to hold the full-dress Red Cross meetings in Seoul and Pyongyang by turn, and to include in the scope of “other procedural matters” the ROKNRC-proposed 18 additional issues incidental to the selection of Seoul and Pyongyang as sites for the full-dress talks as suggested by the ROKNRC.

October 13 — The fourth preliminary meeting is held to discuss scheduling the full-dress meetings.

- The ROKNRC, maintaining the sooner the full-dress talks could convene the better it would be, suggests that the time be discussed at the final stage of the preliminary meetings.

- The NKRC maintains that the first full-dress meeting will be held at 10 a.m. December 10, 1972.

October 20 — The fifth preliminary meeting is held to discuss scheduling the full-dress meetings.

October 27 — The sixth preliminary meeting is held. The two sides agree to put off the issue of scheduling until a later date and discuss the question of agenda items for the full-dress meetings.

November 3 — The seventh preliminary meetings held to discuss the question of agenda items.

- The ROKNRC points out the need for a priority solution to the family search campaign.
- The NKRC insists that friends should be included in the scope of a family search campaign.

November 11 — The eighth preliminary meeting is held to discuss the question of agenda items.

- The ROKNRC emphasizes that the proposed family search campaign should be discussed at the full-dress meetings on a priority basis.
- The NKRC insists that separated families, relatives and friends

- should be allowed to travel in the area of the other side freely.
- November 19 — The ninth preliminary meeting is held to discuss the question of agenda items.
- The ROKNRC suggests an extensive definition of separated families.
 - The NKRC holds fast to their insistence that the free travel of families, relatives and friends should be guaranteed first.
- November 24 — The tenth preliminary meeting is held to discuss the question of agenda items.
- The ROKNRC suggests that part of the relatives north Korea talks about may be included in the definition of families.
 - The NKRC sticks to its previous three-point proposition.
- December 3 — The 11th preliminary meeting is held to discuss the question of agenda items, and the ROKNRC sets forth a modified six-point proposal.
- December 10 — The 12th preliminary meeting is held to discuss the question of agenda items.
- The ROKNRC urges the NKRC to accept the modified proposal laid down at the 11th preliminary meeting.
 - The NKRC produces a three-point proposal closely resembling the modified ROKNRC offer.
- December 17 — The 13th preliminary meeting is held to discuss the question of agenda items.
- The ROKNRC points out the rationality and fairness of its modified offer.
 - The NKRC adheres to the demand for free travel.

«1972»

- January 1 — President Park, in his New Year message, pledges positive support for the South-North Red Cross talks.
- January 10 — The 14th preliminary meeting is held to discuss the question of determining agenda items for the full-dress meetings.
- The ROKNRC stresses the urgency of a project to eliminate the sufferings of the separated families in the south and the north.
 - The NKRC continues to demand a guarantee of free travel.
- January 11 — President Park, in his New Year press conference, vows that the government will extend all available support for the success

- of the Red Cross talks.
- January 19 — The 15th preliminary meeting is held to discuss the question of agenda items.
- The ROKNRC urges the early determination of agenda items for the full-dress talks.
 - The NKRC continues demanding the prior guarantee for free travel.
- January 28 — The 16th preliminary meeting is held to discuss the question of agenda items.
- The ROKNRC proposes that like items suggested by both sides be worded in a single manner.
 - The NKRC agrees to produce a modified proposition of the 17th preliminary meeting.
- February 3 — The 17th preliminary meeting is held to discuss the question of agenda items.
- The ROKNRC sets forth a new six-point proposal on the question of determining agenda items for the full-dress talks.
 - The NKRC sets forth a new three-point proposal on the question of determining agenda items for the full-dress talks.
- February 10 — The 18th preliminary meeting is held to discuss the question of agenda items.
- The ROKNRC emphasizes the need for working-level discussion to adjust wording of topics on which the two sides basically agree.
 - The NKRC objects to the use of the word “arrangement” on the ground that the word carries the implication of “limitedness.”
- February 17 — The 19th preliminary meeting is held, and the two sides agree to hold a series of working-level meetings to adjust the wording of agenda topics for the full-dress meetings.
- February 21 — The first working-level meeting is held to adjust the wording of agenda topics for the full-dress meetings.
- * 12 rounds of the meeting took place hereafter.
 - * Work on the wording of agenda topics for the full-dress meetings is completed. The two sides' high-level officials visit each other's side.
- June 16 — The 20th preliminary meeting is held, and the two sides agree on agenda items for the full-dress meetings.
- July 4 — The South-North Joint Communiqué is announced in Seoul and Pyongyang simultaneously.

- July 10 — The 21st preliminary meeting is held to discuss the question of forming delegations to the full-dress meetings.
- July 14 — The 22nd preliminary meeting is held to discuss the question of forming delegations to the full-dress meetings.
- July 19 — The 23rd preliminary meeting is held, and the two sides agree on the issue of forming delegation to the full-dress meetings.
— The two sides also agree in principle to hold the first full-dress meeting on August 5, 1972.
- July 26 — The 24th preliminary meeting is held, and the two sides agree to hold working-level meetings to discuss miscellaneous matters for the procedure of the full-dress meetings, as well as convening a working-level communications meeting.
- July 27 — The first working-level meeting is held to discuss miscellaneous matters for full-dress meeting procedures.
— Place: NNSC conference room at Panmunjom.
* 2 rounds of the meeting took place hereafter.
- August 11 — The 25th and final preliminary meeting is held, and the two sides agree on the miscellaneous matters for full-dress meeting procedures.
Agreement:
Agreement and confirmation of miscellaneous matters for the full-dress meeting procedures.
— Schedule for the full-dress meetings:
The first full-dress meeting — 10 a.m. August 30, 1972, Pyongyang.
The second full-dress meeting — 10 a.m. September 13, 1972, Seoul.
- August 15 — President Park, in his Liberation Day commemorative message, calls upon north Korea to show a sincere posture toward the South-North Red Conference.
- August 17 — The ROKNRC makes public the list of its delegates to the full-dress meetings.
- August 18 — The South and North Korean Red Cross install 20 direct telephone circuits between Seoul and Pyongyang in preparation for the full-dress meetings.
- August 22 — Seoul-side SNCC co-chairman Lee issues a statement guaranteeing the personal safety of the members of the north Korean

Red Cross delegation.

August 23 — The north Korean Ministry of Social Security issues a statement guaranteeing the personal safety of the members of the ROKNRC delegation.

August 24 — The two sides exchange the texts of their statements on the guarantee of personal safety at Panmunjom.

August 25 — The ROKNRC notifies the NKRC of the list of 54 persons set to attend the first full-dress meeting of the Red Cross talks.

August 25 — A direct telephone circuit opens between the central offices of the south and north Korean Red Cross societies.

August 29 — September 2 — The first SNRCC full-dress meeting is held in Pyongyang.

Agreement:

— Confirmation and adoption of the five agenda items for full-dress meetings.

— The two sides pledge to strive to ease the sufferings of dispersed families and to lay a foundation for national unification based on the spirit of the South-North Joint Communiqué and Red Cross principles.

— The number of attendees was set at seven delegates, seven advisors, 20 attendants and another 20 reporters from each side (ROKNRC chief delegates: Lee Bum-suk, and chief of the NKRC delegation: Kim Tae-hui.)

September 12 — 16 — The second full-dress meeting is held in Seoul.

Agreement:

— The two sides agree to embody the principles of democracy and freedom, the spirit of the South-North Joint Communiqué, brotherly love and the Red Cross humanitarian spirit, in solving the agenda items.

— Discussion of the agenda topics will begin at the third full-dress meeting.

— The third full-dress meeting is slated for October 24, 1972 in Pyongyang and the fourth full-dress meeting for November 22, 1972 in Seoul.

October 23 — 26 — The third Red Cross full-dress meeting is held in Pyongyang to begin the discussion of Topic No. 1, "Question of tracing, and informing thereof, the fate and whereabouts of the families

and relatives dispersed in the south and the north.”

Agreement:

The two sides verbally agree to increase by five the number of pressmen covering the meetings on each side.

November 22 — 24 — The fourth Red Cross full-dress meeting is held in Seoul.

Agreement:

— Agreement on the establishment of a south-north Red Cross joint committee and a joint south-north Red Cross project office at Panmunjom.

— Agreement on the discussion and adoption of regulations on the function, operational procedure and composition of the proposed joint committee and project office.

— Agreement on discussion of the establishment of other necessary offices.

«1973»

March 20 — 23 — The fifth Red Cross full-dress meeting is held in Pyongyang.

Agreement:

— The two sides agree to hold the sixth full-dress meeting in Seoul on May 9-10.

May 8 — 11 — The sixth Red Cross full-dress meeting is held in Seoul.

Agreement:

— The two sides agree to hold the seventh full-dress meeting on July 11.

July 10 — 13 — The seventh Red Cross full-dress meeting is held in Pyongyang. The ROKNRC proposes the exchange of groups of tomb visitors on Chusok holiday. The NKRC rejects it.

* The two sides failed to make an agreement of the schedule for 8th full-dress meeting, only resulting in discontinuance of the meeting.

August 28 — Kim Young-joo, SNCC Pyongyang-side co-chairman, declares the unilateral suspension of the inter-Korean dialogue.

November 15 — The ROKNRC proposes that a liaison officers' meeting be held at Panmunjom on November 16 to discuss the opening of the eighth full-dress meeting of the Red Cross talks before the end of the year.

November 17 — The NKRC counter-proposed that a liaison officers' meeting be held at 10 a.m. November 21 at Panmunjom. The ROKNRC accepts it.

November 21 — A south-north Red Cross liaison officers' meeting is held from 10 a.m. to 10:50 a.m., where the ROKNRC suggested the eighth full-dress meeting be held in Seoul on December 19 while the NKRC suggested that one of the delegates to the full-dress meetings from each side attend the following liaison officers' meeting.

November 28 — The first Red Cross working-level meeting is held from 10 a.m. to 11:30 a.m. at Panmunjom. The NKRC rejects the ROKNRC suggestion that the eighth full-dress meeting be held in Seoul at an early date.

December 13 — The ROKNRC sends a message to the NKRC, urging it to agree to the holding of the eighth full-dress meeting at an early date.

December 21 — The NKRC, in a telephone message, insists that the eighth full-dress meeting be held in Pyongyang instead of in Seoul on the grounds of a so-called "environment" problem.

«1974»

February 25 — 2nd SNRCC delegates' contact (Panmunjom). ROKNRC delegate asks that 1) NKRC assure humanitarian treatment of the fishermen kidnapped to north in the Feb. 15 incident and 2) agree to have the 8th full-dress SNRCC meeting in Seoul Apr. 9-10, 1974. NKRC delegate turns deaf ear to the ROKNRC suggestions.

March 11 — 3rd SNRCC delegates' contact (Panmunjom)

NKRC rejects the ROKNRC suggestion that the 8th full-dress SNRCC talks be held Apr. 9-10, 1974, and, instead, proposes that the two sides hold "Panmunjom preliminary meetings," with each side represented there by the alternate chief delegates, "for preliminary discussions on agenda items of the full-dress talks."

April 3 — 4th SNRCC delegates' contact (Panmunjom)

ROKNRC proposes that 1) ROKNRC, NKRC and International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) form a tripartite fact-finding team for investigation of the conditions of the fishermen detained in north Korea and 2) the two sides hold "temporary Panmunjom meetings of the full-dress talks," with each side represented by the chief delegate, instead of the "preliminary meeting" proposed by

NKRC.

NKRC instantly rejects of ROKNRC proposals.

April 29 — 5th SNRCC delegates' contact (Panmunjom)

ROKNRC asks NKRC to offer the latter's good offices for exchange of mails between the Republic of Korea fishermen detained in north Korea and their families. However, NKRC turns a deaf ear to the ROKNRC request.

May 22 — 6th SNRCC delegates' contact (Panmunjom)

The two sides agree to hold SNRCC "working-level meeting" in Panmunjom, each side represented by the alternate chief delegate, for discussions on 1) agenda items of the full-dress talks on a preliminary basis and 2) the question of holding the 8th full-dress SNRCC talks.

May 29 — 7th SNRCC delegates' contact (Panmunjom)

The two sides agree to have the first "working-level" meeting held on July 10, 1974, in the conference room of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC) in Panmunjom, and to have their respective sides represented at the meeting by a three-men delegation each, headed by the alternate chief delegate.

July 10 — 1st SNRCC Working-Level Meeting

ROKNRC proposes that 1) the 8th full-dress SNRCC talks be held on August 30, 1974, in Seoul and 2) the two sides undertake, as a pilot project, tracing services for aged parents prior to sweeping implementation of tracing services for separated families and relatives in general.

NKRC rejects the ROKNRC proposals.

July 24 — 2nd SNRCC Working-Level Meeting

NKRC proposes that the two sides adopt a "joint statement" asking the Republic of Korea Government to 1) repeal the Anti-Communist Law and National Security Law. 2) disband all anti-Communist organizations and anti-communist authorities, 3) illegalize opposition to communism and 4) allow participation by political parties and social organizations in the implementation of the tracing services currently at issue at the SNRCC.

August 15 — President Park declares, in his commemorative speech on the 29th anniversary of National Liberation, three basic principles for peaceful unification of the country; 1) concluding of a "non-aggression agreement" between the two sides of Korea, 2) con-

tinuation of the South-North Dialogue and implementation of exchanges and cooperation between the two sides of Korea and 3) holding of a free all-Korea election, under fair election management and supervision, with a representation in direct proportion to the indigenous population in the two sides of Korea, for achievement of the unification.

August 28 — 3rd SNRCC Working-Level Meeting

ROKNRC raises the attempted assassination of the President of the Republic of Korea by communist north Korea of August 15 and demand that north Korea 1) punish those responsible for the murder attempt of August 15, 2) give up the policy blindly pursuing a violent class revolution in the Republic of Korea and 3) show sincerity to have the humanitarian talks of SNRCC normalized at an early date.

September 25 — 4th SNRCC Working-Level Meeting

ROKNRC urges NKRC to accept the ROKNRC offer of "Aged Parents First" program, NKRC again refuses the ROKNRC offer.

November 5 — 5th SNRCC Working-Level Meeting

November 29 — 6th SNRCC Working-Level Meeting

ROKNRC presents a detailed program for implementation of the "Aged Parents First" project.

* 19 more rounds of the meeting were succeeded until Dec. 9, 1977.

«1978»

March 19 — The north Korean Red Cross informs the ROKNRC in a radio broadcast that it would postpone unilaterally the 26th Red Cross working-level meeting slated for March 20.

March 20 — The 26th Red Cross working-level meeting fails to take place due to the NKRC's boycott.

March 20 — The ROKNRC spokesman issues a statement on the NKRC's boycott, calling for the early resumption of the suspended meeting.

August 12 — The ROKNRC, in a statement on the seventh anniversary of the proposal for the Red Cross talks, suggests that the chiefs of the south and north Korean Red Cross societies hold a meeting either in Panmunjom, Seoul, Pyongyang or a mutually agreeable third place to discuss the resumption of the stalled Red Cross talks.

«1979»

- August 11 — Lee Ho, president of the ROKNRC issues a statement urging NKRC;
- the suspended 26th working-level meeting of the SNRCC be resumed at 10 a.m. Sep. 20, 1979 at Panmunjom.
 - the suspended South-North Direct Telephone Line and Panmunjom liaison office be restored at 9 a.m. Sep. 1, 1979.

«1980»

- August 12 — ROKNRC, in a statement, urges NKRC to agree to the unconditional resumption of the Red Cross talks and to release the fishermen of the south detained by the north.
- September 12 — ROKNRC sends a letter to NKRC suggesting that the suspended 8th full-dress SNRCC be held on October 28 in Seoul.

«1981»

- January 12 — President Chun Doo Hwan suggests an exchange of visits between the highest authorities of each side.
- July 5 — President Chun Doo Hwan suggests the north to hold a meeting between the highest authorities of the south and the north.
- August 12 — Kim Yong-shik, President of the ROKNRC issues a statement on the occasion of the 10th anniversary of the proposal for SNRCC
- proposing that presidents of the south and the north Red Cross society meet at any time and place to discuss normalization of the talks.
 - urging South-North Direct Telephone Line be normalized.



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Part I

President Chun Doo Hwan Declares “Formula for National Reconciliation and Democratic Unification”

1. Announcement of Unification Formula

President Chun Doo Hwan announced on January 22, 1982, a more systematic, realistic and comprehensive unification formula than any previous proposals South and North Korean authorities had ever put forth since national division. In the formula, made public in his New Year Policy Statement delivered before the National Assembly, President Chun expressly laid down the basic principles for national unification, method of realizing unification, procedures leading to unification, and the form and polity of a unified land.

Saying that the new unification formula was originally prepared for discussion at a face-to-face meeting between the highest authorities of South and North Korea, if and when such a meeting were held, as proposed in his January 12 and June 5 proposals, President Chun stressed that "unification must be accomplished on the principle of national self-determination and through democratic and peaceful procedures that reflect the free will of the entire people."

The President said in the statement that the most reasonable way to achieve peaceful unification is to adopt a unified constitution for the whole of Korea, testifying to the commitment of the entire people to achieve unification — a commitment attained through the promotion of national reconciliation. President Chun proposed that to have such a unified constitution adopted, "the South and North should organize a Consultative Conference for National Reunification, with participants from the two sides representing views of the residents in their respective areas, and authorize this body to draft a unified constitution presenting the terms and conditions of a unified democratic republic of Korea committed to the ideals of nationalism, democracy, liberty and individual well-being."

President Chun then suggested that when a draft unified constitution is drawn up, the two sides make it into law through free, democratic referendums held throughout the whole peninsula, then

forming a unified legislature and a unified government through general elections held under the provisions of the constitution, thus accomplishing much-hoped-for national unification.

Stressing that the fostering of national reconciliation and conditions for unification is essential to the preparation of a unified constitution, as well as to the realization of a unified government and legislature, President Chun further proposed to this end, the conclusion of a provisional Agreement on Basic Relations between South and North Korea.

Part of President Chun's New Year Policy Statement relating to the proposal for the unification formula reads as follows:

Turning now to the question of South-North Korean relations, recent history teaches us that Korea will never be united as long as the South and the North each insists on a unification formula intended to advance only its own ideology, ideals and institutions. If we are to be successful, unification must be sought from the realization that the Korean people have been a single ethnic family from time immemorial, sharing a common descent, history, culture and tradition.

Unification must not be pursued exclusively or arbitrarily by any specific class or group, nor should it be sought by force of arms or other violent means. I am firmly convinced that unification must be accomplished on the principle of national self-determination and through democratic and peaceful procedures that reflect the free will of the entire people.

It was with an open mind and a desire to seek such a democratic and peaceful path to unification that last year I proposed on January 12 and again on June 5 an exchange of visits and a face-to-face meeting between the top leaders of South and North Korea. I want to make it clear that every possible effort has been—and will continue to be—made by the Republic of Korea Government to realize these proposals.

At the same time, I would like to make use of this occasion to disclose a new peaceful unification formula that was originally

prepared in anticipation of a South-North summit meeting. I do so with a view to providing the North Korean authorities and the rest of the world with an opportunity to comprehend our genuine intent. It is my conviction that the most reasonable way to peaceful unification is to adopt a constitution of a unified Korea testifying to the commitment of the entire people to unification—a commitment attained through the promotion of national reconciliation—and to then established a unified state on the terms and conditions laid down in the constitution.

I suggest that, to have the said constitution adopted, the South and the North organize a Consultative Conference for National Reunification (CCNR) with participants from the two sides representing the views of the residents in their respective areas and authorize this body to draft a constitution presenting the terms and conditions of a unified democratic republic of Korea committed to the ideals of nationalism, democracy, liberty and individual well-being. I would further suggest that, when such a draft constitution is drawn up, the two sides make it into law through free, democratic referendums held throughout the whole peninsula. The unification of the country can then be accomplished by organizing a unified legislature and establishing a unified government through a general election held under the constitution of the unified Korea.

It is my understanding that such issues as the political ideology, the name of the country, the basic domestic and foreign policy directions, the form of government and the methods and dates of the general elections for a unified legislature will have to be discussed and agreed on in the CCNR in the course of drafting the constitution. It is our intention to present our own draft of a constitution for a unified country to the CCNR. If North Korea genuinely desires an independent and peaceful unification, they will also have to present a draft constitution for a unified country before the CCNR, so that the two versions can be studied and forged into a single draft.

It is essential to promote trust between the South and the

North and steadfastly eliminate from national life all impediments to unification to facilitate the historic drafting of a unified constitution. Accordingly, the unnatural relations between the South and the North which have resulted in self-inflicted injuries must be brought to an end and replaced by normal contacts that promote the national well-being.

To achieve this end, I hope that the South and the North will first normalize relations and, within the framework of these normalized relations, take concrete steps to bring about national reconciliation. I therefore propose, as a practical arrangement leading to unification, the conclusion of a Provisional Agreement on Basic Relations between South and North Korea featuring the following provisions:

First, relations between South and North Korea shall be based on the principle of equality and reciprocity pending unification.

Second, the South and the North shall abandon all forms of military force and violence, as well as the threat thereof, as a means of settling issues between them and seek peaceful solutions to all problems through dialogue and negotiation.

Third, South and North Korea shall recognize each other's existing political order and social institutions and shall not interfere in each other's internal affairs in any way.

Fourth, the South and the North shall maintain the existing regime of armistice in force while working out measures to end the arms race and military confrontation in order to ease tension and prevent war on the Korean peninsula.

Fifth, in order to eliminate national suffering and the inconvenience resulting from the partition of the land and to promote an atmosphere of national trust and reconciliation, the South and the North shall progressively open their societies to each other through various forms of exchange and cooperation. To substantially advance the interests of the people, the South and the North shall facilitate free travel between the two halves of the peninsula, including the reunion of separated families:

and shall promote exchanges and cooperation in the fields of trade, transportation, postal service, communications, sports, academic pursuits, education, culture, news gathering and reporting, health, technology, environmental protection, and so forth.

Sixth, until unification is achieved, both parties shall respect each other's bilateral and multilateral treaties and agreements concluded with third countries, irrespective of differences in ideologies, ideals and institutions, and consult with each other on issues affecting the interests of the Korean people as a whole.


Seventh, the South and the North shall each appoint a plenipotentiary envoy with the rank of cabinet minister to head a resident liaison mission to be established in Seoul and Pyongyang. The specific functions of the liaison missions shall be determined by mutual consultation and agreement with both parties providing the liaison mission from the other party with all necessary facilities and cooperation to ensure its smooth functioning.

It is my earnest hope that North Korea will expeditiously accept the proposal for a meeting between the top leaders of the South and the North in order to conduct frank and open-minded discussions on all issues noted above.

I propose to North Korea that high-level delegations from the South and the North, headed by cabinet-rank chief delegates, meet together at the earliest possible date in a preparatory conference to work out the necessary procedures for a South-North summit meeting. I want to make it clear that if North Korea is agreeable to the proposal for a preparatory conference, the Government of the Republic of Korea has already made the necessary preparations to send a delegation.

2. Contents of Unification Formula

a. Chart of the Unification Formula



b. Major Contents of Unification Formula

As can be seen the foregoing chart, the unification formula envisages several important features.

Firstly, the formula expressly sets forth principles for the peaceful unification of the land. In other words, the unification formula makes it express that unification cannot be pursued by the method of forcing one's own thought, ideology or system upon the other, nor can it be managed exclusively and arbitrarily by any specific class or group, or be sought by force of arms or other violent means. It stipulates that unification must be accomplished on the principle of national self-determination, and through democratic and peaceful procedures that reflect the free will of the entire 60 million people of South and North Korea.

Secondly, the unification formula clearly lays down the method for unification and the form and polity of a unified land. The formula suggests that as a means of achieving unification, the two sides must put an end to their abnormal and self-injurious relations in favor of self-regarding ones to facilitate national reconciliation. Once reconciliation is fostered, it says, the two sides should materialize unification through general elections held under the principle of peaceful unification.

As to the form and polity of a unified country, the formula rejects the communism under which North Korea has relentlessly been trying to unify Korea and instead advocates the creation, through free choice by the people of South and North Korea, of a unified democratic republic pursuing the ideals of nationalism, democracy, liberty and well-being of citizens.

Thirdly, the unification formula proposes to North Korea the formulation of a unified constitution to achieve unification. Such a unified constitution is intended to be a grand charter of national reconciliation which would incorporate the will of the 60 million people of South and North Korea toward unification, and which would set forth the political ideals, name and basic policy direction of a unified country, the form of a unified government, and the procedures and methods of general elections for a unified legislature.

Thus the unified constitution, when formulated as proposed, would become a basic milestone for national unification, as well as a constitutional base for all future discussions on the issue of unification. In the course of drafting the unified constitution, even the idea of a “confederation system” which North Korea advocates can be reviewed as one of method of unification.

Fourthly, the new unification formula proposes the formation of a Consultative Conference for National Reunification with a view to drafting a unified constitution.

The Consultative Conference, formed from delegates from the two sides representing the views of the residents in their respective areas, would be a joint inter-Korean organization whose duty would be to draft a unified constitution. The Consultative Conference would review two draft versions of the unified constitution prepared by each side and forge them into a rational single draft.

What Consultative Conference for National Reunification suggested in the unification formula differs basically in nature from the kind of dialogue channel proposed by North Korea, such as a “grand national conference” or a “meeting to expedite unification.”

North Korea’s ideas carry in themselves quite unreasonable provisions. Whereas they argue that such gatherings should be attended by delegates from all the political parties and social organizations and persons from various strata of the two sides, plus representatives of Korean communities abroad, North Korea excludes the participation of the authorities of the Republic of Korea government, demanding that South Korea select its delegates on criteria dictated by North Korea. It is self-evident that their ideas of a “grand national conference” and a “meeting to expedite unification” are hardly feasible from the outset, and a mere diversion staged as part of their deceptive peace offensive.

Fifthly, the formula provides rapid momentum leading to unification.

A unified constitution is to be drafted in the first place by the Consultative Conference for National Reunification, followed by confirmation of the unified constitution through a national referen-

dum among the entire population of South and North Korea, and the creation of a unified legislature and a unified government through general elections held in the entire territory of South and North Korea under the provisions of the confirmed unified constitution, to accomplish a unified country in the form of a single democratic republic.

Sixthly, the unification formula suggests the conclusion of a Provisional Agreement on Basic Relations between South and North Korea.

If the suggested unified constitution were to be prepared smoothly, the two sides should first foster their mutual trust and remove all impediments to unification from national life. To this end, the unification formula proposes to normalize inter-Korean relations first through the conclusion of a Provisional Agreement on Basic Relations between South and North Korea, and on the strength of the normalized relations to take measures to bolster national solidarity, remove factors detrimental to unification, and prevent war, thereby promoting national reconciliation and fostering an atmosphere suitable for the preparation of a unified constitution.

The provisional agreement suggested provides for following seven items to be observed pending the time of unification:

- 1) The two sides shall maintain their relations based on the principle of reciprocity and equality pending the establishment of a unified country.

- 2) The two sides shall completely desist from using or threatening force of arms or other violence in solving bilateral disputes, and shall seek peaceful solutions to all problems through dialogue and negotiations.

- 3) The two sides shall recognize each other's existing political order and social institutions, and shall not interfere in each other's internal affairs in any way.

- 4) The two sides shall maintain the terms of the existing armistice in force while working out measures to end the arms race and military confrontation, in order to ease tension and prevent

war on the Korean peninsula.

5) The two sides shall promote the opening of their societies through mutual exchanges and cooperation in order to eliminate national suffering and inconvenience resulting from national division and to foster an atmosphere of national trust and reconciliation. The two sides shall cooperate with each other in the various areas of trade, transportation, postal service, communications, sports, academic pursuits, education, culture, press, health, technology, environmental protection, etc., to facilitate free travel and many-sided exchanges between the South and the North including the reunion of separated families, and shall exert concrete efforts to advance the interests of the nation through such exchanges and cooperation.

6) The two sides shall, pending the time of unification, respect each other's bilateral and multilateral treaties and agreements concluded with third countries, irrespective of differences in ideologies, ideals and institutions, and consult with each other on issues affecting the interests of the Korean people.

7) The two sides shall each appoint a plenipotentiary envoy with the rank of cabinet minister, and establish a permanent liaison mission in Seoul and Pyongyang, respectively. The two sides shall determine the specific functions of the liaison missions and provide the liaison missions from the other side with all necessary facilities and cooperation to ensure its smooth functioning.

The call for the normalization of inter-Korean relations by means of a provisional Agreement prior to unification was motivated by the belief that in order to ensure national reconciliation for unification, the two sides would carry out the following undertakings, while desisting from the use of force and forestalling the recurrence of war before peaceful unification.

- The promoting of mutual trust and understanding through the removal of accumulated distrust and misunderstanding between the two sides.

- The solving of military problems through consultation,

problems which constitute the prime factor behind the heightening tension and confrontation.

— The removing of the sufferings and inconveniences resulting from national division through multi-faceted exchanges and cooperation, and gradual opening of the societies of the two sides to the entire 60 million Koreans.

— The discussion and solution of problems in areas where common interests of the Koreans can be pursued, such as international economic and cultural exchanges, entry into the United Nations and mental recognition, on the premise that the two sides respect each other's existing diplomatic relations and agreements and on the principle of reciprocity.

— The discussing and solving of conflicting issues through the establishment of permanent liaison missions in each other's areas.

Seventhly, the unification formula reiterates the call for the early holding of a meeting between the highest authorities of South and North Korea in order to conduct frank and open-minded discussions on all the issues given above and, to this end, suggests an inter-Korean preliminary meeting of cabinet-rank officials.

The preliminary meeting is designed to work out the necessary procedures for a meeting of the highest authorities of the two sides, as proposed in the January 12 and June 5 proposals. The choice of the time and venue for such preliminary meeting was left wholly to North Korea.

3. Purpose in Announcing Unification Formula and Its Major Features

The announcement of the formula for national reconciliation and democratic unification, originally prepared in anticipation of an inter-Korean summit meeting, was designed first to prompt the North Koreans to accept President Chun's January 12 and June 5 proposals for an exchange of visits and a meeting between highest

authorities of the two sides.

To date, North Korea has rejected President Chun's overtures, providing little likelihood for the suggested top-level contacts to materialize under the circumstances, the Republic of Korea government made public the formula originally set for a summit meeting, with a view to providing another opportunity for the North Koreans to realize the real intent of the South, which might prompt them to agree to a meeting of highest authorities.

Another purpose of the announcement was to clarify the Republic's stand to the world community, thereby contributing to the creation of international opinion which could influence modification of the intransigency of North Korea.


The formula for national reconciliation and democratic unification is considered the most equitable and practicable of all the theories for unification of divided nations, and probably better represents the unification wishes of the entire Korean people than any other unification formula ever presented by the two sides of Korea in the past.

In other words, the announcement of the unification formula was designed to provide added momentum and further to broaden the internal and external base of support for the Republic's unification policy, a development which, it is hoped, would oblige the North Koreans to agree to resume the suspended inter-Korean dialogue for the peaceful solution of the Korean question.

Meanwhile, the unification formula made public for these purposes is characterized by the following highlights:

First, the methods and procedure of unification and the form and polity of a unified nation are given expressly and concretely. In other words, the formula sets forth a method and procedure for peaceful unification not to be achieved by force of arms or other violence, and for democratic unification, not unification to be achieved under communism. As the policy of a unified country, it clearly states that a unified democratic republic should be committed to the ideals of nationalism, democracy, liberty and well-being of citizens.

* Steps to Unification



As the methodology of unification, the formula specifically suggests that:

— Neither of the two sides should insist on a kind of unification that is in conformity only with its own ideology, ideals and institutions.

— Unification cannot sought or achieved exclusively by any limited class, group or groups.

— No force of arms nor other violence can be employed in pursuing unification.

— Unification should be accomplished on the principle of national self-determination, and through democratic and peaceful procedures that reflect the free will of the entire people.

— To facilitate such unification, national reconciliation should be promoted through conclusion of a Provisional Agreement on Basic Relations between South and North Korea, a unified constitution should be adopted, and unification should be accomplished through democratic general elections held under the provisions of the unified constitution.

Second, concrete measures were laid down to terminate the hitherto abnormal and self-injurious relations in favor of a normal and self-regarding relationship, thereby to foster national reconciliation for eventual unification.

The unification formula suggests that to prepare for unification, the two sides, upon normalizing their relations, should promote reconciliation by restoring national solidarity, eradicating factors obstructing unification, and taking measures to prevent the recurrence of war.

*** Highlights of Suggested Provisional Agreement on
Basic Relations (7 Items)**

1) Respect for the principles of reciprocity and equality in mutual relations pending the time of unification.

2) Renouncing of the use of force of arms or other violence in favor of solving of disputes peacefully through dialogue.

3) Recognizing of each other's political order and social system, and non-interference in each other's internal affairs.

4) Maintaining the existing armistice system, and discussion of measures to end the arms race and dissolve the state of military confrontation.

5) Promotion of opening of the societies of the two sides through multi-faceted exchanges and cooperation (in reunion of dispersed families, trade, transportation, postal service, communications, sports, academic pursuits, education, culture, press, health, technology, environmental protection, etc.)

6) Respecting each other's bilateral and multilateral agreements concluded with third countries, and consultation on matters affecting the interests of the Korean nation pending the time of unifi-

cation.

7) Establishment of respective permanent liaison missions in Seoul and Pyongyang.

The suggested conclusion of this Provisional Agreement is by no means the ultimate goal of inter-Korean relations, but is intended to prepare a foundation on which the two sides can build trust by gradually removing factors detrimental to unification from all the areas of national life, thereby facilitating smooth progress of the drafting of a unified constitution and ultimately unification through general elections.

Third, the unification formula is geared to surmount the hitherto "theory of confrontation" between the South and the North of Korea, blocking North Korea's deceptive propaganda on "peaceful unification" effectively.

The formula suggests that of the ideas advanced so far by the two sides, those on which bilateral agreement may be attainable should be positively explored, and some of the North Korean ideas be given due consideration, to induce bilateral agreement. By so doing, it is hoped to block North Korean propaganda effectively.

In other words, since the new unification formula suggests the formation of a Consultative Conference for National Reunification, with delegates representing the will of the people of the two sides, the formula in a sense encompasses the North Korean demand for a tricky dialogue among various heterogeneous individuals and groups, as proposed by the North in its concept of a "grand national conference" or a "meeting to expedite unification," thereby paving the way to inter-Korean agreement on the form of dialogue if North Korea is indeed interested in talks. This is expected to obliterate any grounds for the unfounded North Korean charge that South Korea is pursuing divisiveness and a "two-Korea policy."

At the same time, by stipulating that the form and polity of a unified nation and the procedures for general elections be fairly discussed and determined at the time of drafting a unified constitution at a Consultative Conference for National Reunification, the new formula applies a brake to North Korea's treacherous and

fictitious propaganda on the question of unification. The formula challenges North Korea to put up their "confederation" formula, if they really mean it, at the proposed Consultative Conference, rather than attempting to force it upon the other side by one-sided propaganda. Promising that the South would introduce its draft version of a unified constitution to the Consultative Conference when it is formed, it asks North Korea likewise to produce its version.

Moreover, the unification formula suggests that the North Korea's so-called "prerequisites" can be studied at the time when the political and basic policy direction and form of a unified country and the procedures for general elections are discussed during the drafting of a unified constitution.

4. Linkage with Past Unification Formulas

The formula for national reconciliation and democratic unification constitutes the Republic's consistent and comprehensive proposal that incorporates the basic spirit and contents of other ideas that South Korea proposed in the past over the question of national unification.

While retaining the style of phased approach featuring "stable peace first and unification later," the new formula incorporates the provisions of Items 1 and 2 (consolidation of peace and restoration of mutual trust) of the Three Major Principles for Peaceful Unification into the seven items of a suggested Provisional Agreement on Basic Relations between South and North Korea. Similarly, the provision of Item 3 (holding of general elections in proportion to indigenous population) is reflected in the suggested series of unification procedures: formation of a Consultative Conference for National Reunification, adoption of a unified constitution, and formation of a unified legislature through general elections held under democratic principles.

Besides, the suggested conclusion of a Provisional Agreement on Basic Relations encompasses, as given below, the contents of the proposal for an inter-Korean non-aggression agreement of January

18, 1974 and part of the June 23 Special Foreign Policy Statement Regarding Peace and Unification of 1973.

*** Absorption of Contents of Proposal for Non-Aggression Agreement:**

– Item 1 (issue of non-aggression by force of arms) of Non-Aggression Agreement into “avoidance of the use of force of arms or other violence” in Item 2 of Provisional Agreement:

– Item 2 (issue of non-interference in internal affairs) of Non-Aggression Agreement into “recognition of each other’s existing system and non-interference” in Item 3 of Provisional Agreement on Basic Relations; and

– Item 3 (issue of maintaining the efficacy of the Armistice Agreement) of Non-Aggression Agreement into “maintenance of the existing armistice system” in Item 4 of the provisional Agreement on Basic Relations.

*** Absorption of Contents of June 23 Statement:**

– Item 2 (issue of non-interference in internal affairs and non-aggression) of June 23 Statement into “desistance from the use of force of arms or other violence, peaceful solution of disputes, non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, maintenance of the existing armistice system” in Items 2, 3 and 4 of Provisional Agreement on Basic Relations;

– Item 3 (issue of resuming inter-Korean dialogue) of June 23 Statement into “solution of disputes through dialogue, and promotion of the opening of societies through exchanges and cooperation” in Items 2 and 5 of Provisional Agreement on Basic Relations; and

– Items 4, 5 and 6 (issue of simultaneous entry into the United Nations, etc.) of June 23 Statement into “respect for each other’s international treaties and agreements, and mutual discussion of matters affecting the interests of the Koreans” in

Item 6 of Provisional Agreement on Basic Relations.

In the meantime, the unification formula manifests a more positive posture toward settling even military-related problems.

The unification formula, as seen in the above, provides for invigorated efforts to solve the question of national unification in a democratic way on the principle of national self-determination, and also calls for discussion and solution of the issues of terminating arms race and dissolving the state of military confrontation between the South and the North while maintaining the existing armistice system.

Since the issue of the U.S. forces in Korea is linked to the Korea-U.S. Mutual Defense Agreement, it should be recognized as a matter to be respected as an issue under bilateral international agreements. Still, the formula paves the way to discussing and solving even this question in connection with internal and external basic policies during the drafting of a unified constitution.

5. Difference Between South and North Korean Unification Formulas

There are several basic differences between the formula for national reconciliation and democratic unification and the North Korean idea of a so-called "confederation system."

Firstly, the new unification formula shows a significant difference from North Korea's in the form and polity of a unified country they both pursue. Whereas the South Korean unification formula seeks to establish, by peaceful and democratic means, a completely unified democratic republic, pursuing the ideals of nationalism, democracy, liberty and well-being of citizens, the North Korean idea is aimed at bringing about an incomplete unification under which two regional governments are to exist under the cloak of a confederation.

Moreover, North Korea's ultimate goal is not even confederation but actually the communization of the entire peninsula. The North

Koreans attempt to force undue and one-sided "prerequisites" among them the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Korea and the overthrow of the Republic of Korea government -- upon the South on the pretext of a "confederation system," and insist on removal of the anti-Communist system of the South in favor of a pro-Communist one, hoping thereby to facilitate inter-Korean "collaboration" under Communist terms for ultimate communization of all Korea.

Second is differences in the method of unification. The new formula for national reconciliation and democratic unification provides a set of democratic procedures leading to unification; consisting of: 1) the drafting of a unified constitution at the Consultative Conference for National Reunification, 2) confirmation of the unified constitution through national referendums, 3) holding of general elections under the constitution, and 4) forming of a unified legislature and government through general elections. However, the North Korean formula forecloses any democratic procedures. It excludes specific persons of the Republic of Korea from taking part in "confederal organizations" such as a "supreme national confederal conference" and a "confederal standing committee" while attempting to force unacceptable unilateral conditions upon the South.

Third is the difference in approach to unification. The unification formula of the Republic calls for the normalization of inter-Korean relations through the conclusion of a Provisional Agreement on Basic Relations. Under the formula, the two sides would then take steps based on this Agreement to restore national solidarity, remove factors detrimental to unification, and prevent the recurrence of war; thereby fostering national harmony and an atmosphere conducive to the peaceful and democratic achievement of unification.

In contrast, North Korea's formula, while outlining some inter-Korean cooperation in what is called the "ten major policies," makes it clear that this cooperation can be considered only after a confederation is formed or, in other words, no exchanges and cooperation whatsoever can occur between the two sides until the "com-

munization of the whole of Korea has become a certainty.”

Besides, there exists a substantial difference between the suggested Consultative Conference for National Reunification and the North's ideas of a “grand national conference” and a “meeting to expedite unification.” The Consultative Conference is to be formed of delegates from each side who would represent the views of the residents of their respective areas whose duty would be confined to drafting a unified constitution only. Each side would select its representatives under its own political order, and would not interfere in the selection of the other side's representatives.

However, North Korea, in its call for a “meeting to expedite unification,” insists that the authorities of the incumbent government of the Republic of Korea cannot take part in the meeting, along with a number of other South Koreans singled out by North Korea, and that there should be changes in the statutory order and political and social condition of the Republic of Korea.

Part II

Reactions to “Formula for National Reconciliation and Democratic Unification”

1. Reactions at Home

Various groups and individuals in the Republic of Korea welcomed as "most practicable and realistic" the Formula for National Reconciliation and Democratic Unification announced by President Chun Doo Hwan on January 22, 1982, and expressed strong hope that North Korea would accept it.

The National Assembly was among the first to extend wholehearted support to the new unification formula. At its plenary session on the following day, January 23, the legislature unanimously adopted a resolution in support of the formula. In the resolution, the National Assembly challenged North Korea to agree to the conclusion of a provisional Agreement on Basic Relations between South and North Korea, as well as to the formation of a Consultative Conference for National Reunification for the sake of peaceful unification of the nation. The resolution then appealed to other countries to cooperate in the effort to realize President Chun's proposal.

The text of the National Assembly resolution supporting the unification formula is as follows:

The National Assembly of the Republic of Korea, In conformity with the wish of the entire Korean people for peaceful unification of the fatherland, and the hope of the peoples of world for durable peace on the Korean peninsula;

Expressing deep regret over the negative response shown by the North Korean authorities toward the January 12 and June 5 proposals made by President Chun Doo Hwan for peaceful unification of the fatherland; and

Renewing our basic stand that unification of the fatherland should be realized in a democratic and peaceful manner without the use of force of arms or other violence and on the principle of national self-determination, and our strong resolve not to spare all available endeavors to achieve this objective,

1. Highly welcomes the strong resolve and effort shown by President Chun Doo Hwan through the concrete and epochal proposal made to North Korea on January 22, 1982 on the heels of the January 12 and June 5 proposals;

2. Wholeheartedly supports as most realistic and practicable the proposal for the conclusion of a Provisional Agreement on Basic Relations between South and North Korea, a proposal made under the objective of "adopting a unified constitution by pooling the will of the entire people for unification, and of accomplishing a unified state under the constitution;"

3. Strongly urges the North Korean authorities to respond positively to the proposal for concluding a Provisional Agreement on Basic Relations between South and North Korea for peaceful unification of the fatherland, and also to the formation of a Consultative Conference for National Reunification for the preparation of a unified constitution; and

4. Aware that peace and stability on the Korean peninsula are directly linked to peace and prosperity of the world, expects that the peoples and parliaments of all peace-loving countries of the world will positively cooperate in realizing the proposal made by President Chun Doo Hwan to North Korea on January 22, 1982.

At the same time, the Advisory Council on Peaceful Unification Policy expressed its full-fledged support of the new unification formula on January 23. In a resolution adopted at regional meetings, the Advisory Council expressed the conviction that a unified democratic republic committed to the ideals of nationalism, democracy, liberty and well-being of citizens is the most desirous form and polity of a unified country. The resolution also said it reaffirms that mutual visits and a meeting between the highest authorities of South and North Korea as proposed by President Chun Doo Hwan are a shortcut to transforming the existing confrontation into a relationship of trust and harmony between South and North.

Following is the text of the resolution adopted by the Advisory Council.

As we wholeheartedly welcome and support the call for the early realization of a meeting between the highest authorities of South and North Korea, and the announcement of a formula for peaceful unification of the fatherland, made by President Chun Doo Hwan in his New Year policy statement before the National Assembly on January 22, 1982, we hereby manifest our resolution as follows:

— *We reaffirm that the realization of mutual visits and a meeting between the highest authorities of South and North Korea as proposed by President Chun Doo Hwan is a shortcut to transforming the present inter-Korean relations, laden with antagonism and confrontation, into a relationship of trust and harmony;*

— *We are convinced that a unified democratic republic committed to the ideals of nationalism, democracy, liberty and well being of citizens is the genuine form and polity of a unified fatherland to which 60 million people in this land aspire;*

— *Convinced that the idea of free general elections held on the terms of a unified constitution in South and North Korea, as suggested by President Chun Doo Hwan, is the most reasonable road leading to independent, democratic and peaceful unification, which our people desire, we pledge ourselves to exert all available endeavors to realize it.*

— *Convinced that the conclusion of a Provisional Agreement on Basic Relations between South and North Korea proposed by President Chun Doo Hwan is a rational and realistic step toward solving various exigent problems pending between the South and the North, we look forward to its early conclusion; and*

— *We strongly call upon the North Korean authorities to recognize the justness of our unification formula, and agree to a*

meeting between the highest authorities of South and North Korea, thereby responding affirmatively and discussing openheartedly the question of national unification and all other issues pending between South and North Korea.

The incumbent Democratic Justice Party and other political parties also welcomed positively President Chun's new formula, and urged the North Korean authorities to accept it. The gist of statements issued by the political parties in support of the new unification formula follows:

«The Democratic Justice Party» We join our entire people in wholeheartedly welcoming and supporting the unification formula announced by President Chun Doo Hwan. We are positive that the formula is the most concrete and realistic idea incorporating our resolve to achieve unification, and represents a heroic decision that will unfold a new chapter on the road to national unification.

The North Korean authorities should return to national conscience and accept the proposal promptly to resume the inter-Korean dialogue which they have unilaterally suspended. We solemnly urge North Korea to terminate the abnormal self-injurious relations, and thereby join in the effort to create a history of national reconciliation.

«The Democratic Korea Party» We positively support the unification formula disclosed by President Chun Doo Hwan, which we consider most realistic and practicable. The proposal for the formation of a Consultative Conference for National Reunification is epochal, an idea which incorporates the national hope for the creation of a unified democratic Republic. The unification formula, applauded by all Koreans, would surely draw positive response from other countries of the world.

«The Korea National Party» The new unification formula made public by President Chun Doo Hwan is an epochal offer reflecting the aspirations of our 60 million people for the early

removal of tension and tragic national division. We wholeheartedly support the formula. North Korea should accept the unification formula which carries concrete and realistic measures to realize peaceful unification, and thereby see recorded in our national history that unification was achieved by our own hands in this generation.

«**The Democratic Socialist Party**» President Chun Doo Hwan's proposal for the formulation of a unified constitution is the most concrete and comprehensive idea of its kind ever presented since national division, representing the strong resolve of President Chun to realize unification of the fatherland by the whole Korean people. We demand that North Korea agree to the proposal promptly, and display the look of grand national harmony before the world community.

«**The Civil Rights Party**» The proposal for the writing of a unified constitution advanced by President Chun is a concrete, positive and forward-looking initiative. If the North Korean authorities truly love the nation, they should accept the formula as the national conscience dictates.

«**The New Politics Party**» We welcome the new unification formula, which sets forth constructive devices to advance the time of peaceful national unification.

«**The Liberal National Party**» The new unification formula is significant in that it is designed to advance the course of unification to be achieved under the principles of independence and national self-determination. We believe that it is a practicable and rational formula.

In the meantime, the Republic of Korea National Red Cross (ROKNRC) on January 23 urged North Korea to agree to a meeting of the highest authorities of South and North Korea so as to "remove the tragedy of 37-year-long national division and advance the time of much-hoped-for unification." In a press conference, Kim Yong-shik, ROKNRC president, said that the formula for national reconciliation and democratic unification is an idea for independent

unification to be realized on the principle of national self-determination. "In keeping with the spirit of the new unification formula, North Korea should agree to resume the inter-Korean Red Cross talks at an early date, since the solution of the dispersed family issue is one of the most exigent questions," the ROKNRC president said. He said the Red Cross, for its part, stands ready to return to the talks if only the North Korean counterpart agree.

Various private organization in the areas of economy, art, culture and religion unvaryingly supported the unification formula, welcoming it as the most rational and concrete formula intended to realize peaceful unification of the land. In their respective statements, the organization challenged North Korea to give up the fictitious ideas which are no more than political propaganda pieces, and instead respond affirmatively to the new formula by returning to national conscience.

The press media of the Republic of Korea expressed, in editorials and commentaries, their unreserved support for the formula for national reconciliation and democratic unification.

Following are editorials of Seoul daily newspapers on the unification formula:

Far-Sighted Blueprint for Unification

The Kyunghyang Daily News (January 22, 1982)

National Unification is our unvarying and exigent wish, which none of our 60 million people can ever deny. If there is a practicable unification formula that all Koreans approve and the whole world recognizes, no reason can exist why we should hesitate in translating it into action.

It is a tragedy of the century that we, although the same people, have lived with hostile sentiments against each other for more than a generation, unable to surmount the sufferings stemming from national division. It is obviously a sensible approach to unification that in order to terminate such a tragedy of national division an in-

frástructure for peaceful unification should be prepared in the first place, and then the national sufferings caused by division removed step by step, thereby broadening the avenue of mutual trust.

It was with this very idea that President Chun Doo Hwan declared a new unification formula in his New Year policy statement delivered before the National Assembly last January 22.

The unification formula announced by President Chun is being applauded as historic and epochal both at home and abroad, inasmuch as it is the first concrete, systematic and comprehensive formula ever set forth by South and North Korea since national division.

The new unification formula specifically makes it clear that "unification cannot be pursued by force of arms or other violent means, but should be realized on the principle of national self-determination in a democratic and peaceful way that reflects the free will of the entire people."

To this end, the formula calls for the realization of national reconciliation through the conclusion of a Provisional Agreement on Basic Relations between South and North Korea. It then suggests that once reconciliation is materialized, a unified constitution be formulated and national unification accomplished through democratic general elections held under the provisions of such a unified constitution.

By envisioning that the polity of a unified country should be a unified democratic republic pursuing the ideals of nationalism, democracy, liberty and well-being of citizens, the new unification formula is considered more forward-looking and advanced than any other plan for unification.

Moreover, the formula basically differs from the North Korean idea advocating incomplete unification, in which two regional governments are envisaged under a so-called "confederation system."

The North Korean idea of a "confederation system" is in fact not intended even for unification under "confederation," but is aimed at facilitating the communization of all Korea. Their scenario is to

engineer the withdrawal of American troops from Korea and the overthrow of the Republic of Korea as preconditions for a “confederation system”, and thereby to replace our anti-Communist system with a system sympathetic to communism, thus to facilitate “collaboration” between the two sides of Korea under the hegemony of the Communists, and ultimately to unify the Korean peninsula on their own terms.

In the method of and approach to unification, the new formula demands national reconciliation as a basic premise. In other words, the formula embodies a firm resolve to overcome the state of confrontation by terminating self-injurious abnormal relations in favor of a self-regarding normal relationship.

At the same time, the proposed calls for formation of a Consultative Conference for National Reunification as a channel of dialogue that can represent the views of all the people of the two sides — an inter-Korean body with the duty of drafting a unified constitution. The unification formula broadly encompasses even North Korea’s tricky proposals for, say, a “grand national conference” or a “meeting to expedite unification.”

In effect, the formula keeps the door wide open to an inter-Korean agreement on the apparatus of dialogue. The question is whether North Korea is truly interested in a dialogue.

However, we cannot overlook the fact that North Korea’s idea calls for the exclusion of specific groups and personages of the Republic of Korea from the formation of what they call the “supreme national confederal conference” or “confederal standing committee,” and that North Korea insists on a set of absurd preconditions, advocating the hegemony of a specific class in the promotion of unification.

Notwithstanding, the new unification formula implies that even the North Korean idea of a “confederation system” can be referred to the Consultative Conference, inasmuch as it stipulates that the political ideals, name and basic policy direction of a unified nation, the form of a unified government, and the method and procedure of general elections designed to form a unified legislative be discussed

and determined in the course of drafting a unified constitution by the Consultative Conference.

Since it indicates that any idea for unification that North Korea puts forth may be discussed at the Consultative Conference, we can realize how open-minded and magnanimous President Chun's new unification formula is.

On the other hand, the new unification formula retains our consistent phased approach to unification, calling for the alleviation of tension first, followed by restoration of trust and realization of unification. In fact, Items 1 and 2 (consolidation of peace and restoration of trust) of the existing Three Major Principles for Peaceful Unification are embodied in the seven items of the Provisional Agreement on Basic Relations, while Item 3 of the Three Major Principles is incorporated into the procedures for formation of the Consultative Conference for National Reunification and a unified legislature.

We won't go too far by saying that the new formula represents the grand compilation of all our peaceful unification formulas, including the proposal for a non-aggression agreement of January 18, 1974, and the unification-related part of the Special Foreign Policy Statement Regarding Peace and Unification of June 23, 1973. In one word, the new unification formula is a more advanced and concrete form of the January 12 and June 5 proposals, and is also a "blueprint for peaceful unification" in this new age, in the sense that it encompasses all the unification ideas the government has set forth in the past.

President Chun's conviction that in order to forestall the recurrence of a fratricidal war and reunify the land peacefully, the highest authorities of the South and the North should meet at an early date to discuss openheartedly all inter-Korean issues was already described in the June 5 proposal. President Chun advocated the complete opening of the societies of South and North Korea, and has expressed the view time and again that because unification is a problem that affects the whole Korean people, the issue of unification cannot be the monopoly of any specific political party or

system or ideology. The President thus made it clear that the principal promoters of unification and masters of a unified land shall be the whole population of the nation, not any specific stratum.

If the two sides of Korea were to normalize their relations and thereby realize national reconciliation, it is a must that impediments to unification should be removed from all the sectors of national life. Thus, we welcome the proposal in the unification formula for conclusion of a Provisional Agreement on Basic Relations between South and North Korea.

One thing especially noteworthy is that the suggested provisional agreement called for, among other things, the establishment of permanent liaison missions in each other's areas, namely, Seoul and Pyongyang. We believe that such liaison missions would facilitate the solution of problems through close discussion between the two sides, making possible national integration for reunification.

In the relations between East and West Germany, the operation of liaison missions in the two areas has been quite a success. In the inter-Korean relations, too, the establishment of permanent liaison missions could constitute a channel highly conducive to seeking an avenue of broad exchanges and cooperation. Between the two sides of Korea, there exist many ways to advance the interests of the Korean nation. Among them would be the reunion between dispersed families, free travel and multi-faceted exchanges. Such promotion of national interests can be realized only if the two sides agree even before national unification.

Because the Koreans are a homogenous people sharing the same history, language, cultural heritage and customs, and having formed a unitary sphere of living, the partition of the Korean peninsula is a human and national tragedy before any question of ideology.

The biggest obstacle to national unification lies in the basic unification strategy of the North Korean Communists, seeking communization of all Korea through violence ever since national division. From the time of the Korean War to date, the North Koreans have perpetrated ceaseless acts of armed provocation.

It remains to be seen how the North Koreans, who reject any

inter-Korean dialogue in their pursuit of communization, would react to the historic unification formula announced by President Chun.

But if they turn down even this most realistic formula for national unification, it would amount to shedding light once again on the treacherousness and fictitiousness of their cry for "peace."

The most exigent matters to solve between the two sides of Korea are to restore mutual trust, prevent the recurrence of war, and resume dialogue. Moreover, we cannot tolerate any means of violence that would do self-injurious harm to the nation, nor can their unilateral adherence to a "confederation system" alone shorten the road to unification. The North Korean demand, a "peace agreement" with the United States, too, is a far cry from the principle of national self-determination.

Public opinion at home and abroad will never tolerate their attempt to mislead the world with such an absurd claim. We hope that North Korea will respond affirmatively to our new unification formula and thereby contribute toward decisively easing tension on the Korean peninsula and achieving national unification.

We would like to emphasize once again that there is no other shortcut to unification than for the highest authorities of the two sides to meet and discuss the new unification formula. North Korea should agree to President Chun's proposal for a high-level preliminary meeting to prepare for a meeting of the highest authorities of South and North Korea.

At the same time, we highly evaluate the unification formula as it embodies the strong resolve of President Chun to realize "liberation from the fear of war" by all means. We expect that all of our people will rally solidly around this far-reaching blueprint for unification. For, unlike other issues, the question of unification can successfully be settled only when it is supported with firm national consensus and understanding.

Call For Affirmative Response to Formula

Dong-A Ilbo (January 22, 1982)

The most epochal feature of the New Year policy statement of President Chun Doo Hwan was the unveiling of a new formula for the unification of South and North Korea. Stressing that unification must be realized in a democratic and peaceful manner based on the principle of national self-determination, President Chun proposed to North Korea the formation of a Consultative Conference for National Reunification, drafting of a unified constitution, and the conclusion of a Provisional Agreement on Basic Relations between South and North Korea. Being the most comprehensive, concrete and forward-looking unification formula ever presented since national division, the proposal is well worth keen interest from within and without.

The new unification formula provides for the establishment of a Consultative Conference for National Reunification where a single constitution designed to give birth to a unified democratic republic is to be prepared. The formula suggests that when such a unified constitution is drafted, it be made into law through a free and democratic national referendum held throughout the whole peninsula. A unified legislature and a unified government would then be created through general elections held pursuant to the provisions of the unified constitution.

Pending the time unification is achieved under these procedures, the two sides are supposed to conclude a Provisional Agreement on Basic Relations, establishing permanent liaison missions in Seoul and Pyongyang, respectively. In the process, of course, the South and the North would base their bilateral relations on the principles of reciprocity and equality, renounce the use of force or violence, desist from engaging in an arms race, and expand exchanges and cooperation.

No one, who has experienced the tragedy of national division, and who witnessed the havoc of the fratricidal Korean War can re-

ject the new unification formula. Moreover, it can be easily realized that the suggested Consultative Conference for National Reunification and Provisional Agreement on Basic Relations are very realistic and rational compared with the North Korean ideas for unification, such as a "confederation system" and a "grand national conference."

In fact, the idea of a "confederation system," for instance, is never intended for unification on the footing of reciprocity, since it demands as prerequisites the withdrawal of American troops from Korea and the exclusion of our incumbent government authorities. The North Korean ideas are aimed only at fomenting an atmosphere conducive to the communization of all Korea. Besides, by calling for a unified government and a regional autonomous system, the "confederation system" attempts rather to force their own system upon us, in disregard of the indispensable process of dissolving heterogenous elements between the two sides and of fostering reconciliation.

The idea of a "grand national conference" is no better. Although it demands a meeting between the two sides' political parties and social organizations, it insists on the exclusion from the meeting of the authorities in charge of the order of the South, thus making clear that what they are after is not national reconciliation but communization of the whole Korean peninsula.

In a sharp contrast, the suggested Consultative Conference for National Reunification is supposed to be formed with delegates representing the will of the people of both sides. This representation, encompassing the authorities of the two sides who rule the two zones, cannot but be a more realistic and rational approach.

The Consultative Conference would besides be entrusted with the duty of drafting a unified constitution and determining the political ideals, name and polity of a unified country, as well as the form of a unified government. Both sides would be able to present their views and listen to each other's position fully at the Consultative Conference. This is an approach intended to find a mutually acceptable formula rather than to impose one's view upon

the other.

The suggested Provisional Agreement on Basic Relations between South and North Korea, too, is a method of finding answers based on today's reality of South and North Korea. Since the two sides have joined specialized agencies of the United Nations, and maintain diplomatic relations with a total of more than 100 countries, they should try to find a system to enter realistically into mutual dialogue and cooperation.

There inevitably arises the need for a provisional agreement on basic inter-Korean relations. We need this sort of agreement badly, even in view of the fact that East and West Germany have been successfully promoting exchanges and cooperation after they concluded an agreement on their basic relations ten years ago.

Therefore, North Korea should accept President Chun's unification formula without any reservation and join the effort to open a new chapter in national reconciliation. The unification formula envisages broad inter-Korean projects, including the formation of a Consultative Conference on National Reunification, conclusion of an agreement on basic relations, termination of the arms race, and a meeting between the highest authorities.

Since these broad programs may encompass some of the ideas North Korea has offered with respect to the issue of unification, North Korea should promptly respond to the latest unification offer and show sincerity toward finding out a mutually acceptable method of unification.

Rational Unification Formula

The Joong-Ang Daily News (January 22, 1982)

President Chun Doo Hwan delivered his New Year policy statement at the National Assembly on January 22. What drew our attention most in the statement, dealing broadly with politics, economy, social, culture, etc., were his remarks on the question of national unification.

President Chun said that the most reasonable way to peaceful unification is to adopt a unified constitution testifying to the commitment of the entire people to unification — a commitment attained through the promotion of national reconciliation — and then to establish a unified state on the terms and conditions laid down in the constitution.

The President also suggested the creation of a Consultative Conference for National Reunification whose duty would be to discuss various issues related to unification, such as political ideology, the name of the country, basic domestic and foreign policy directions, the form of a unified government, and methods and procedures for general elections for a unified legislature.

In particular, President Chun, in the unification formula, proposed the conclusion of a Provisional Agreement on Basic Relations between the two sides pending the time of unification, and also the establishment of permanent liaison missions in each other's area. Through these concrete proposals, President Chun showed once again before the whole world how sincere and serious are our efforts for peaceful unification.

As the President made clear, no unification can ever be realized so long as either of the two sides adheres to the kind of a unification that is in full conformity with its own thoughts, ideals and system.

In this respect, the unification formula is especially significant in that it reaffirms the principle that unification must be realized according to the consensus among all Koreans, and in that the formula encompasses and systematizes all the unification ideas our government has put forth thus far.

Moreover, the formula exhibits our magnanimity and confidence by paving the way to discussion even of North Korea's ideas for unification such as a "confederation system." The formula also incorporates the resolve to rectify the North's negative stand toward our January 12 and June 5 proposals and thereby realize a meeting of the highest authorities of South and North Korea.

Our January 12 and June 5 overtures, intended to provide a breakthrough in unification efforts upon the groundwork of mutual

understanding, have earned worldwide support. Only North Korea rejected them, asserting that the proposals were a "scheme to fabricate two Koreas." The North Koreans have since stepped up slanders and armed provocation against the South. Nonetheless, we cannot slow down or give up our efforts to consolidate peace and ultimately bring about peaceful unification merely because of North Korean intransigence.

We are of the opinion that the cooler the North Korean stand toward unification is, the greater efforts we should make to find a clue to realizing inter-Korean dialogue. Our steadfast endeavor to resume the deadlocked dialogue was well displayed when President Chun, in his unification formula, proposed a cabinet-rank officials' preliminary meeting, stating that "we are all prepared to send our delegation."

One obvious thing is that the restoration of national trust would be possible only through mutual contacts and dialogue. Advancing of offers only by word while ruling out any actual contacts is an act of treachery and deception. If North Korea is truly interested in peaceful unification of the fatherland, they should come to the forum of dialogue, the door of which has been thrown wide open by us, and discuss openheartedly the issue of unification, an issue where our own and national destinies are at stake.

New Milestone for National Unification

Seoul Shinmun (January 23, 1982)

The Fifth Republic, committed to the perfecting of an independent democratic state, has been emphasizing the need for national unification from the time of its birth. The government earlier made the January 12 and June 5 proposals for an inter-Korean summit meeting, in line with the new age's strong will to unification, a desire that peace should be consolidated in this land and national prosperity be ensured by advancing the time of national reunification.

In a New Year policy statement he delivered at the National

Assembly on January 22, President Chun Doo Hwan made public an epochal and systematic blueprint for independent and peaceful unification of the nation. The President once again knocked on the door of tightly closed North Korea, in the belief that despite North Korea's negative stand toward the January 12 and June 5 propositions, there can be no suspension in the endeavor to pave the way to unification.

The latest proposal of President Chun is significant in that he put forth a series of persuasive procedures leading to unification on the principles of independence and peace. Moreover, the formula realistically provides the polity of a unified democratic republic by stating that the unified country must commit itself to the ideals of nationalism, democracy, liberty and well-being of citizens. If the North Koreans accept the January 12 proposal, giving birth to the suggested meeting between the highest authorities of the two sides, the day will not be far off when our dream for the establishment of a unified democratic republic will come true.

As a first step toward solving the inter-Korean problems, President Chun proposed cabinet-rank officials' preliminary meeting, which would prepare for an inter-Korean top officials' meeting, designed to discuss openheartedly all the suggested methods of achieving peaceful unification.

As the topics for a summit meeting, President Chun suggested two ideas. One is the issue of concluding a Provisional Agreement on Basic Relations for enforcement pending the time of unification. The objective of the provisional agreement is for the two sides to forestall armed clashes and maintain peace until unification is achieved. This would be a time-limit agreement which would be abolished the moment unification is realized.

The President suggested various systematic devices for inclusion in such a provisional agreement, all intended to help maintain peace, among them the maintenance of the existing armistice system, desistance from the arms race, termination of the state of military confrontation, and mutual exchanges and cooperation. A provision for the creation of permanent liaison missions in Seoul and

Pyongyang is also contained in the suggested provisional agreement.

As a whole, the primary significance of the provisional agreement lies in the fact that the idea is intended to turn inter-Korean relations into a systematic and peaceful relationship. In fact, the suggested provisional agreement incorporates the resolve to abide by the "principle of peaceful unification" envisaged in the South-North Joint Communique of July 4, 1972. If unification is followed by a persecution and purge by one class against another, such a unification would be of no value. We value only the kind of unification where all the 60 million people can live well in harmony. The provisional agreement on basic inter-Korean relations proposed by President Chun is essential to the realization of such a desirable unification.

Another topic set forth by President Chun concerns the method of realizing unification. As the principle of the method of unification, President Chun rightly set forth "national self-determination," "democratic procedure" and "peaceful method." This is completely in accord with the spirit of the 1972 Joint Communique.

Following his call for an inter-Korean summit meeting, President Chun proposed the formation of a Consultative Conference for National Reunification with delegates from the two sides representing the views of the residents in their respective areas. The duty of this Consultative Conference would be to draft a unified constitution. This is a highly realistic and epochal idea. Never had either side suggested formulation of such a unified constitution before.

President Chun suggested that in the course of drafting the unified constitution, the two sides discuss the name of the unified land, polity of a unified government, and the issue of general elections based on ideas advanced by both sides. This implies that if North Korea truly supports the idea of a "confederation system" they should put it to the Consultative Conference rather than attempting to force the idea upon us with unilateral propaganda. If they have any other ideas helpful to national unification, they can frankly raise them at the Consultative Conference without any pre-

justice.

This attitude stems from our uncompromising stand that we will not try to force our system one-sidedly upon North Korea. Unification is a job in which "I" and "you" should pool their wisdom and make concession for each other so as to produce "we." Therefore, the proposal that the two sides write together a unified constitution through the Consultative Conference represents our utmost sincerity toward unification.

President Chun then proposed that when such a unified constitution is drafted, the two sides make it into law through free and democratic referendums held throughout the whole Korean peninsula. According to the President, the unification of the country can then be accomplished by organizing a unified legislature and establishing a unified government through general elections held under the unified constitution. It goes without saying that this is an entirely reasonable procedure.

One thing that should be stressed here is that President Chun expressly set forth the polity of a unified land by saying that a unified democratic republic should pursue the ideals of nationalism, democracy, liberty and well-being of citizens. Since national division to date, a lot of opinions have been advanced with respect to the question of unification. But none of them ever touched on the polity of a unified country. Needless to say, principles that can embrace all the Koreans are these very ideals of nationalism, democracy, liberty and well-being of citizens.

Now the grand path toward unification has emerged crystal-clear. President Chun's unification formula certainly represents a great milestone leading to an independent and peaceful unification. We, who support the formula wholeheartedly, hope that North Korea will respond to it affirmatively. Nothing can be materialized out of one side's efforts alone. The realization of unification is a national task that ought to be promoted by the two sides alike. North Korea is called upon to return to national conscience and accept the unification formula.

Epochal Formula for Unification

Chosun Ilbo (January 23, 1982)

President Chun Doo Hwan made public the guidelines of a series of major policies for the year 1982 in his policy statement at the National Assembly on January 22. He dealt with various fields of state affairs such as foreign policy, the economy, national defense, unification, and social and education problems, disclosing before the people the government's policy goals in this year.

The part of the statement that deservedly drew particular interest from within and without was on the inter-Korean question, namely, the presentation of a new and epochal unification formula.

The inter-Korean Red Cross meeting, begun in August 1971, was suspended long ago, and so was the business of the South-North Coordinating Committee, born of the South-North Joint Communique of July 1972. As a result, as is well known, tension has been heightened and a cold-war-type military crisis has been fomented on the Korean peninsula. In an effort to solve this dangerous situation, President Chun proposed to North Korea on January 12 and June 5, 1981 an exchange of visits and a meeting between the highest authorities of the two sides. But the North Korean response was negative.

In the process, inter-Korean relations have turned from bad to worse. Unless this perilous situation is solved, the two sides of Korea are bound to squander their money and energies in this fruitless confrontation. It was against this background that President Chun announced a new unification formula calling for the realization of unification in a democratic and peaceful manner on the basis of the principle of national self-determination.

In the formula, President Chun suggested the creation of a Consultative Conference for National Reunification, with delegates representing the views of the people of the two areas, whose duty would be to draft a unified constitution for the establishment of a unified democratic Republic. The President made it clear that a

unified land should commit itself to the pursuit of the ideals of nationalism, democracy, liberty and well-being of citizens. Since the ideology, name and major policy guidelines of a unified country, as well as the time and method of general elections, are supposed to be discussed in the process of drafting a unified constitution, it is possible for North Korea to raise there whatever ideas it conceives.

When a unified constitution is prepared, it would be made into law through a national referendum held throughout South and North Korea in a democratic and free manner. A unified legislature and a unified government would then be inaugurated through general elections held under the provisions of the unified constitution to accomplish the much-hoped-for unified country.

We are confident that if North Korea is truly interested in independent and peaceful unification, they would find no reason whatsoever why they should reject this most rational formula. So far, North Korea has put forth a "confederation system" and some other unification ideas. Rather than attempting to force their ideas upon us, the North Koreans should raise their ideas at the suggested Consultative Conference for discussion.

But even if the two sides agree on the drafting of a unified constitution, matters would hardly progress smoothly if the two sides do not trust each other. This is why President Chun emphasized the need for national reconciliation, proposing the conclusion of a Provisional Agreement on Basic Relations between South and North Korea as an interim step pending the time of unification.

The contents of the suggested agreement can be boiled down to 1) basing of mutual relations on the principles of reciprocity and equality, 2) peaceful solution of disputes through dialogue and discussion, 3) recognition of each other's system and non-interference in each other's internal affairs, 4) maintenance of the existing truce system, termination of the arms race and dissolution of the state of military confrontation, 5) mutual opening of both societies through exchanges and cooperation, 6) respect for each other's bilateral and multilateral international agreements, and 7) appointment of plenipotentiary envoys and establishment of perma-

ment liaison missions in Seoul and Pyongyang.

President Chun then reiterated the call for a meeting between the highest authorities of South and North Korea. To this end, the President suggested a cabinet-rank officials' preliminary meeting.

The unification formula announced by President Chun is the most comprehensive and concrete among various unification ideas advanced so far. It won't be going too far to say that the formula is also the most rational and realistic of all the unification-related proposals made by the two sides. Everybody can grasp the contents of the new formula clearly because its wording is crystal-clear, not ambiguous or abstract.

Now the problem lies in whether North Korea is interested in democratic and peaceful unification based on the principle of national self-determination. We hope that North Korea will carefully study the unification formula and make an affirmative response.

The new formula consists largely of two parts: one is the call for the creation of a Consultative Conference for National Reunification, and the other the proposal for a Provisional Agreement on Basic Relations. Because the two ideas are closely inter-related, we cannot say which is more or less important.

Conflicting political systems and socio-economic orders have been prevalent on both sides during the 37 years of national division, so it is absolutely important for both sides to take realistic measures for reconciliation through such a provisional agreement.

Today's reality is that when the Republic of Korea suggests something, North Korea blindly defames and opposes it, refusing even to talk with us. But is there anything North Korea has gained out of such negativism? There was and will be nothing. In Korea, unification can not be achieved through war, revolution, political agitation, internal disturbance, infiltration or diplomatic machination. These are old-fashioned schemes. What can be brought about by them would be nothing but the waste of national energy.

Therefore, if they wish to realize unification, there is no way but to accomplish it in a peaceful and democratic manner, whether they

like it or not. Only a fool would dream of the use of arms, which would result in the destruction of Koreans, especially in this age of the dreadful effectiveness of weapons.

To achieve unification peacefully, we must sit face to face whether we like it or not. If anyone rejects such a meeting, it means he does not wish to pursue peaceful unification. We hope that North Korea will modify its stiff and bigoted posture, and deal with the reality with more flexibility. Only by so doing can we explore the path to our survival in this cruel world.

Grand Path to Unified Country

Hankook Ilbo (January 23, 1982)

President Chun Doo Hwan impressively discussed the government's policy guidelines for this new year in a policy statement he delivered before the National Assembly on January 22. Most noteworthy point in the statement was the epochal announcement of a unification formula which was originally prepared in anticipation of a meeting between the highest authorities of the two sides.

The formula offers comprehensive and rational ideas as to the methodology and approach to peaceful unification, as well as the polity of a unified country.

In the formula, President Chun rejected the attempt of the North Korean Communists to adhere to their own ideas or to handle unilaterally the question of unification, or to seek unification through violent revolution in the south. The President expressed the conviction that "unification must be accomplished on the principle of national self-determination, and through democratic and peaceful procedures that reflect the free will of the entire people."

As a concrete methodology, President Chun proposed the formation of a Consultative Conference for National Reunification with delegates representing the will of the people of the two sides, whose duty would be to draft a unified constitution designed to realize a unified democratic Republic. President Chun said that the

two sides can then make the draft constitution law through a national referendum held across South and North Korea in a free atmosphere, and then hold general elections to inaugurate a unified legislature and a unified government.

This is the most rational and clear-cut formula, one which our people and world opinion aspiring for reconciliation and peace on the Korean peninsula can unvaryingly support. This justifiable formula contrasts sharply with the tricky and unreasonable ideas with North Korean schemes such as a "confederation system", with one-sided prerequisites attached, or a "regional autonomous system" and a "meeting to expedite unification."

At the same time, President Chun proposed the conclusion of a Provisional Agreement on Basic Relations between South and North Korea. The gist of its contents is: 1) basing of bilateral relations on the principles of reciprocity and equality, 2) desisting from the use of threat of force of arms or other violence, 3) non-interference in internal affairs, 4) preservation of the existing armistice system and discussion of steps to dissolve the state of military confrontation, 5) opening of societies through exchanges and cooperation, 6) respect for each other's international treaties and agreements pending the time of unification, and 7) establishment of permanent liaison missions in Seoul and Pyongyang.

This new formula encompasses all the ideas necessary for a sincere and peaceful approach to unification advanced by various circles of the nation during the generation's period since national division. Seen objectively and without prejudice, North Korea could glimpse no reason why they should reject the contents of the new formula. President Chun further suggested that to discuss all these issues openheartedly, North Korea should agree to the holding of a meeting of the highest authorities of the two sides at an early date. To this end, a preliminary meeting between cabinet-rank delegates was also proposed. We call upon North Korea to respond to the overtures affirmatively, without any reservations, in conformity with the hope of the entire people for unconditional resumption of the inter-Korean dialogue, and with the expectation of the peace-loving

world community. They should know that unification can be realized only through national reconciliation.

The unification formula announced by President Chun envisages the polity of a unified land as a unified democratic republic, committed to the ideals of nationalism, democracy, liberty and well-being of citizens. We all long for unification because we are the same homogenous people. The ideals of democracy, liberty and well-being are in line with the universal trend, and also are historical tasks which none of our people can deny.

2. Oversea Reactions

The Formula for National Reconciliation and Democratic Unification announced by President Chun Doo Hwan has drawn broad support from many countries. The governments of major allies such as the United States, Japan, Great Britain and West Germany, and even a number of non-aligned nations including Indonesia, Uruguay, Sri Lanka and Jordan, welcomed the formula as more comprehensive, realistic and practicable than any other such idea ever presented, vowing that they would not spare any possible cooperation in realizing the unification formula.

At the same time, press media around the world, including many Third-World countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America, reported President Chun's unification formula in detail, and welcomed it as "highly comprehensive and realistic" in editorials and commentaries.

As of January 30, 1982, a total of 348 newspapers, news agencies and broadcasting stations reported the formula 566 times in all. The number of editorials carried by major newspapers reached 23 and that of commentaries 37.

In addition, experts on East Asian affairs and influential personages in many countries invariably supported the unification formula, pointing to the justness and practicability of the formula. A number of Korean communities abroad also extended their wholehearted support to the formula, and urged North Korea to respond

affirmatively to it.

By area, the oversea reactions were as follows in substance:

The United States: U.S. President Ronald Reagan, in a personal message sent to President Chun Doo Hwan on February 1, welcomed the Formula for National Reconciliation and Democratic Unification as “comprehensive, reasonable and forward-looking.” In the message, delivered to President Chun by American Ambassador to Korea Richard L. Walker, President Reagan said he believes the formula can contribute significantly to peace and reconciliation in Korea and to the stability of Northeast Asia. “I hope that North Korea will respond favorably to it,” he said.

The text of President Reagan’s personal message follows:

Your Excellency, I thank you for your letter of January 22 informing me of the major new proposals for unification of the Korean peninsula which you announced that same day.

These proposals are comprehensive, reasonable and forward-looking.

They respond to the deepest aspirations of the Korean people, and reflect the basic reality that the unification of the Korean peninsula must be worked out by the Koreans themselves.

We welcome this constructive initiative, as we did your invitation last year to meet with North Korean president Kim Il-sung.

I believe your proposals can contribute significantly to the prospects for peace and reconciliation in Korea and to the stability of Northeast Asia.

They have my full support, and I strongly hope that the North will respond favorably to them.

Prior to President Reagan’s personal message welcoming the unification formula, the U.S. government promptly expressed its welcome and support to President Chun’s proposal. Dean Fischer, spokesman for the State Department, said on January 22, “We

wholly welcome the new proposal of President Chun. It is highly constructive, and together with the last year's offer for a meeting between the highest officials of South and North Korea, will contribute significantly to peace, conciliation and reunification." The State Department spokesman said that the United States strongly hopes that North Korea will respond to the proposal favorably.

Along with this welcoming reaction from the U.S. government, American news media reported the unification formula extensively, welcoming and supporting it in editorials and commentaries.

The *New York Times* commented on January 22, that the new unification formula was the most concrete idea ever presented between the leaders of South and North Korea since 1953. The *Times* observed that an exchange of North and South Korean ambassadors, as proposed in the formula, would appear to be a step in the direction of "cross recognition" of South and North Korea by the four powers having stakes in the Korean peninsula, a system several Administrations in Washington have expressed willingness to take part in.

The *New York Times* said that most of the proposals advanced between the two sides of Korea in the past were intended to score propaganda points, and were not so concrete as President Chun's latest statement.

The *Washington Post* said in its January 23 issue that the new formula represented the most sweeping and detailed proposal put forward since the end of World War II, and reflected the efforts of the South Korean government to deal positively with the national unification issue.

The *Christian Science Monitor* observed on January 26 that President Chun Doo Hwan's new formula is more concrete and comprehensive than any past proposals, and has immediately been applauded overseas as "imaginative," "constructive," and "practicable."

The *Monitor* also said the formula offers an explicit and comprehensive, step-by-step path to final unification.

The Korean communities in New York, Los Angeles and other

areas in the United States welcomed the unification formula as "more epochal and concrete than any other formula," urging North Korea to accept the formula promptly so as to help achieve long-cherished unification.

Japan: The government and press of Japan applauded President Chun's formula, describing it as a "realistic and concrete" device.

Japanese Foreign Minister Yoshio Sakurauchi said on January 22 that the government of Japan welcomes the new formula, saying that the proposal indicated a more concrete and realistic procedure for peaceful unification.

In a special statement, Minister Sakurauchi said the future of the Korean peninsula should basically be solved by the two parties concerned, adding that Japan hopes that a substantial dialogue would resume between the two parties soon, so that they can undertake constructive measures to achieve peaceful unification.

Prime Minister Zenko Suzuki said in a testimony before the Diet on January 28 that the new unification formula announced by President Chun is realistic and concrete. "We hope that a substantial dialogue will be realized between South and North Korea at an early date," said the Japanese Prime Minister.

Suzuki also said that if there is anything Japan can do for the relaxation of tension between the two sides in Korea, his government will not spare cooperation.

Asahi Shinbun, *Yomiuri Shinbun* and other major Japanese newspapers, reporting President Chun's proposal in detail, observed in editorials and commentaries that the proposal, conceived during success in domestic politics and foreign policy, provides ideas and concrete procedures for unification for the first time.

In an editorial on January 23, *Asahi Shinbun* said that the new unification formula cannot be brushed aside or ignored as a mere political propaganda piece, and expressed the hope that it will serve as a clue to resuming the inter-Korean dialogue.

The editorial went on to say that in view of the harsh situation, in which the two sides of Korea are obliged to use excessive military

outlays in a difficult world-wide economic situation, there needs to be a high political judgement with which they affirm the practice of democracy as joint infrastructure for co-existence and unification, and sit down together at the table of dialogue.

The Association of Korean Residents in Japan (*Mindan*) said in a statement on January 22 that President Chun's new formula is sincere and realistic, an historic proposal, which it said gives a great hope to the Korean residents in Japan. The statement challenged North Korea and Chochongryon, a pro-Pyongyang Koreans' body in Japan, to agree to the new unification formula unconditionally.

The Japanese side of the Korea-Japan Parliamentarians Council applauded the new unification formula, saying that President Chun's proposal represents a firm resolve to reunify the Korean peninsula peacefully. In a statement, the Council said North Korea should respond favorably to the concrete and practical offer, and thereby help realize Korean unification at an early date.

Europe: The Foreign Office of Great Britain described the unification formula as an "imaginative and determined" approach. Saying that the British government fully supports the proposal, the Foreign Office said it would convey its support to the Korean government through the British Embassy in Seoul.

The Office of Chancellor and Foreign Office of West Germany praised President Chun's proposal as "wonderful and timely." The Swiss government and ranking officials of international organizations in Geneva, including the International Committee of Red Cross, expressed deep interest in the proposal, vowing their cooperation in translating it into action. The Socialist government of France was also reported to be reviewing the new unification formula carefully.

Austrian Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Willibald Pahr said in a press conference in Seoul on January 29 during his official visit to Korea that he had carefully studied the proposal for peaceful unification presented by President Chun, and is of the opinion that negotiations between the two parties of Korea without any precon-

ditions are most essential to pave the way for reunification. "We will continue to emphasize the need for such negotiations," the Austrian minister said. He also said his government will support the stand of the Republic of Korea to help realize President Chun's proposal, and will advise other countries to support Seoul's policy.

Influential European newspapers and broadcast media, including *The Times*, BBC, *Die Welt* and *Le Monde* supported President Chun's unification formula in their editorials, commentaries and feature articles, saying that the formula is a comprehensive and democratic offer encompassing even North Korean ideas. "This is the kind of a suggestion which, seen from a far-reaching aspect, could provide momentum for solving the state of national division," the media said.

In particular, BBC dealt extensively with the unification formula six times from January 22 through 28 in its "Twenty Four Hours" and "The World Today" programs.

Speakers included Richard Harris of *The Times* of London; Jackie Reditt, BBC correspondent in Seoul; Richard Halloran of the *New York Times*; and Scott Plummer of *The Times* of London.

The speakers invariably hailed the new formula as a "proposal embodying President Chun's sincerity toward achieving national unification," as a "concrete and specific offer," as a "timely initiative," and as a "proposal that builds up the image of President Chun as national statesman."

The Times of London said in an editorial on January 25 that President Chun, departing from the defensive stand of the past, had proposed an inter-Korean summit meeting from a position superior to Kim Il-sung. The editorial went on to say that President Chun seems to believe that even if each side would come with differing versions of a draft constitution, Korean nationalism would win the day. Noting that Kim Il-sung's doctrine is being doused by events, *The Times* said that it would be surprising if Pyongyang was not now the more nervous capital.

The Korean communities in European countries, including those in France, West Germany, Great Britain and Switzerland, ex-

pressed their firm support for President Chun's unification formula in statements issued on January 22. They said that the new formula is the only method of achieving national unification independently and peacefully, adding that North Korea should accept the proposal promptly.

Southeast Asia and the Middle East: Many influential newspapers and periodicals in Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Thailand and Singapore welcomed the unification formula as a "rational and concrete proposal," observing that whereas South Korea showed magnanimity by encompassing even North Korean ideas, North Korea stands preoccupied with its own demands. Some pro-Peking newspapers in Hong Kong, too, used Seoul-dated foreign dispatches in reporting the new unification formula.

Government officials of various Middle East countries, including Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, the Arab Emirates and Oman showed affirmative reactions to President Chun's unification formula. A ranking official of the Bahrain Foreign Ministry described the formula as an "epochal initiative in the interests of the relaxation of tension and peaceful unification of the Korean peninsula." The official said that the Bahrain government supports the peaceful unification efforts of the Republic of Korea, and will try to defend the position of South Korea at the United Nations and other international organization.

The Korean community in Hong Kong and the 100,000 Korean workers in the Middle East in separate statements showed their full support for the formula, urging North Korea to accept the proposal promptly.

Latin America and Africa: Newspapers and broadcast media in Latin American and African nations, including Mexico, Brazil, Uruguay, Colombia, Zaire, Upper Volta and Nigeria, editorially welcomed the unification formula of President Chun. For instance, *El Nacional* of Mexico said in an editorial on January 25 that the unification formula is in accord with the stand of the Mexican government, hoping to see various problems facing world countries

solved peacefully. "President Chun's formula is a good model solution of a problem through peace, not violence or aggression," the editorial said.

The newspaper *Salongo* of Zaire, noting that President Chun twice proposed a top-level inter-Korean meeting in 1981, observed that "contacts between South and North Korea will be the only way of easing tension and solidifying the will to unification."

3. Reaction from North Korea

As seen in the foregoing, the formula for national reconciliation and democratic unification announced by President Chun has drawn broad support from various circles at home and abroad. Nonetheless North Korea, regardless of such world opinion, rejected the unification formula in their intensified slanderous propaganda against the South.

On January 23 the North Korean propaganda radio "Voice of Unification Revolution" denounced the unification formula, calling it a "dividing theory under the cover of unification." Their formal rejection came on January 26 when a statement signed by Kim Il, Pyongyang's vice president and concurrently chairman of the "Committee for Peaceful Unification of the Fatherland," broadcast by their Central Radio, asserted that the formula is a "mere political scheme that disregards reality."

Kim Il's statement then alleged that the idea for a "confederation system" advanced by Kim Il-sung at the sixth congress of the Workers' Party is the "only practicable and realistic unification formula adoptable by the whole people, in view of our country's reality and surrounding situation." They rejected the suggested conclusion of a Provisional Agreement on Basic Relation between South and North Korea in particular, calling it a "scheme to create two states and two nations by legally fixing the reality of national division."

North Korea also reiterated their "prerequisites" in the statement, insiting that "if the South Korean authorities truly want to settle the unification issue, they should, as a first step toward

unification, solve basic problems preliminary to unification by withdrawing American troops, realizing democratization and putting an end to anti-Communist and confrontation policies through the repeal of the Anti-Communist Law and dissolution of anti-Communist organizations and, at the same time, should grant freedom of political activities by releasing all political prisoners.”

The North Koreans attempted in the statement to shift the responsibility for the suspension of inter-Korean contacts to the South, as they have done it every opportunity in the past. They contended, “If the South Korean authorities display a fresh start in deeds by removing such obstacles to unification, we are willing to meet them even tomorrow. The problem rests with how the South Korean authorities who harbor impediments to unification would behave.”

But, as the whole world knows, it is the North Koreans themselves who pose obstacles to unification. They lay one impediment after another through deification of their rulers, creation of an unprecedented and undemocratic hereditary power succession system and relentless pursuit of communization of all Korea. It is also well known that it was entirely due to North Korea that the inter-Korean dialogue has been suspended.

Nonetheless, North Korea tried to shift responsibility to the South again in Kim Il's statement, in a desperate bid to offset the growing international support for President Chun's unification formula, and thereby to save themselves from being driven farther into an isolated corner in the world community.

The fact that the rejection statement was signed, unlike in the past, by a high official of the Pyongyang regime, namely the vice president, indicates that it was an official reaction, which in turn suggests that the basis for their strategy against the South remains unchanged. As did their past statements, Kim Il's statement asserts that a “confederation system” is the only reasonable and realistic unification formula, while sticking to the customary “prerequisites” intended to communize the Republic of Korea in their obvious attempt to force their own thought, system and political order upon

the South. In the words, Kim Il's statement rejected the formula for national reconciliation and democratic unification and, at the same time, reiterated that they would try to force through the idea of a "confederation system" one-sidedly.

Even after they made public their rejection in Kim Il's statement North Korea, in so-called statements by various social organizations and in press reports and commentaries, kept on denouncing in an ever more heated tone, the South's unification formula and reiterating their intent of carrying through a "confederation system."

State of Denunciation of South Formula

From January 26 thru February 1

Classi- fication	Statements by social bodies	Commentaries on Rodong Shinmun	Radio Broadcast	Voice of Revolutionary Unification Party	Total
Number	4	6	27	15	52

* Radio reruns not counted.

As study of recent North Korean allegations with respect to the inter-Korean issue shows that they have not toned down personal attacks on the government authorities of the South, but continue to denounce the formula for national reconciliation and democratic unification without producing any logical grounds for their rejection, attempting to distort the realistic rationality of the unification formula.

On one hand, the North Koreans have been trying to make it appear as if Kim Il's statement were enjoying broad support around the world by promptly reporting the statement issued by Chochongryon, a pro-Pyongyang Korean body in Japan, in support of Kim Il's statement, and other pro-Pyongyang opinions raised in some Communist-bloc countries. In another scheme to recover their

fallen image, the North Koreans conspired to convene a “meeting to expedite unification” ahead of schedule to promote their pet project, the discredited “confederation system.”

4. Statement by Central Committee for National Unification

The Central Committee for National Unification on January 28 denounced the North Korean rejection of President Chun Doo Hwan’s formula for national reconciliation and democratic unification, stating that this constitutes a reprehensible act of perpetuating national division.

In a statement, Cheon Kwan-wu, chairman of the Central Committee, challenged North Korea to respond favorably for the realization of a meeting between the highest authorities of South and North Korea at an early date, and come to the forum of dialogue to discuss such important issues as the suggested formation of a Consultative Conference for National Reunification and conclusion of Provisional Agreement on Basic Relations.

Chairman Cheon said in the statement that “President Chun’s unification formula once again manifested our government’s resolve and the national desire that unification should be realized within our generation by all means. The formula constitutes an epochal measure which paves the way to the resumption of dialogue by boldly encompassing even North Korean ideas.” He said that the new unification formula has been welcomed and supported broadly at home and abroad. Cheon accused North Korea of pursuing an incomplete type of unification under the cloak of a “confederation system” regardless of the need for full national reconciliation.

Asking which one represents an act seeking to perpetuate division and obstruct unification — faithful implementation or rejection of dialogue, Chairman Cheon said he is puzzled why North Korea is absorbed in slandering the other side behind the scenes while refusing a dialogue.

The Chairman also said that it goes without saying that the

nation remains divided to date, 37 years after national division, primarily because North Korea has suspended dialogue, rejecting any exchanges and cooperation. He then vowed that his Central Committee will employ all available means to materialize the formula for national reconciliation and democratic unification by pooling supra-partisan and nationwide resolve to achieve unification.

The following is the text of Chairman Cheon's statement:

In a policy statement delivered before a special National Assembly session on January 22, President Chun Doo Hwan presented the polity of a unified nation and the method of achieving peaceful unification clearly and concretely.

The unification formula has not only manifested once again the national aspiration and our government's practical resolve that unification of the fatherland should by all means be achieved during our generation, but has paved the way to the resumption of an inter-Korean dialogue by boldly encompassing even North Korean ideas in order to accelerate the realization of a meeting between the highest authorities of South and North Korea. This epochal formula is being widely supported and welcomed at home and abroad.

However, North Korea showed a negative response to our peaceful unification formula in a statement issued on January 26 in the name of the vice president and concurrent chairman of the Committee for Peaceful Unification of the Fatherland. It was learned that in the statement North Korea denounced as "unrealistic" our unification formula announced by President Chun, contending that their idea of a "confederation system" is the only workable unification formula. Moreover, North Korea again demanded the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Korea and repeal of the Republic of Korea's anti-Communist policy as prerequisites to dialogue. They reaffirmed the stand that unless these demands are met they cannot agree to any dialogue between South and North Korea.

Our Central Committee for National Unification, which is a supra-partisan and nationwide private organization designed to expedite peaceful unification of the fatherland, is deeply disappointed at this negative stand of North Korea. We cannot but urge their reflection and rectification of their intransigent posture in the name of the whole people.

As is well known, our formula for national reconciliation and democratic unification calls for the steadfast elimination of all impediments to unification from national life, and normalization of the abnormal inter-Korean relations for the realization of national reconciliation. The formula expressly provides for the adoption of a unified constitution through the pooling of the nationwide will to unification, and the establishment of a unified democratic republic under the terms of the constitution. In particular, we elaborated on the composition and function of a Consultative Conference for National Reunification as a channel of dialogue intended to result in the drafting of a unified constitution, showing the magnanimity with which we are willing to discuss even North Korean ideas.

It is deplorable that nevertheless North Korea again distorts our unification formula and rejects it, making undue interference in our affairs and posing unacceptable demands. North Korea adheres to a policy of rejecting democratic procedure in its pursuit of incomplete type of unification under the cloak of a "confederation system" regardless of the need for full national reconciliation. If they truly think that this is a proper method of unification, then the North Koreans should naturally come to the forum of dialogue and discuss it with us openheartedly.

We would like to ask North Korea which one — sincere implementation or rejection of an inter-Korean dialogue — can represent an act perpetuating national division, and why North Korea is absorbed in slandering the other side behind the scenes while refusing a dialogue.

It goes without saying that our nation remains not unified to

date, 37 years after national division, basically because North Korea rejects a dialogue between the parties directly concerned and suspends any exchanges and cooperation. North Korea should realize, though belatedly, that their attitude represents the very act of fixing division and splitting our nation for good.

We again urge North Korea to stop distorting or rejecting our justifiable proposal any longer, and instead agree to a meeting between the highest authorities of the two sides for discussion and solution of important issues, such as the suggested formation of a Consultative Conference for National Reunification designed to draft the constitution of a unified state and the conclusion of a Provisional Agreement on Basic Relations between South and North Korea aimed at dissolving all the impediments to unification that exist between the South and the North.

Our Central Committee for National Unification will pool supra-partisan and nationwide resolve to achieve unification and exert utmost endeavors to realize the formula for national reconciliation and democratic unification proposed by President Chun Doo Hwan.

Part III

Proposal for Twenty Pilot Projects for National Reconciliation and Democratic Unification

1. Proposal by Minister of National Unification for Practical Pilot Projects

Minister of National Unification Shon Jae-Shik proposed to North Korea on February 1 that South and North Korea together implement 20 pilot projects to implement the formula for national reconciliation and democratic unification.

The following is the text of the statement made by Minister of National Unification Shon proposing the 20 pilot projects:

President Chun Doo Hwan declared before the world a formula for national reconciliation and democratic unification in his New Year policy statement delivered at the National Assembly January 22, in which the President expressed the conviction that the most reasonable way to peaceful unification is to adopt a unified constitution testifying to the commitment of the entire people to unification — a commitment attained through the promotion of national reconciliation — and to then establish a unified state under such a constitution.

President Chun suggested in the unification formula that to draft the said constitution, a Consultative Conference for National Reunification be formed with delegates from the South and the North representing the views of the residents in their respective areas. The President then proposed to the North Korean authorities the conclusion of a seven-point Provisional Agreement on Basic Relations between South and North Korea as a practical way of smoothly facilitating the historical task of preparing the unified constitution and thereby, national unification.

In addition, President Chun again urged North Korea to hold at an early date a meeting of the highest authorities of South and North Korea to discuss all these issues open-mindedly. To this end, President Chun proposed to the North Korean authorities a cabinet-rank officials preliminary meeting

between the two sides.

As our unification formula encompasses even North Korean ideas, we see no reason whatsoever why North Korea cannot respond to it affirmatively.

Towards solving the question of unifying the divided land, it is important to maintain a positive posture to substantially settle issues pending between the South and the North through dialogue rather than merely paying lip service to unification.

The government of the Republic of Korea, therefore, once again calls upon the North Korean authorities to agree to the holding of a cabinet-rank officials preliminary meeting at an early date to realize the meeting between the highest authorities of South and North Korea, and asks them to agree to translate promptly the following pilot projects into action in keeping with the spirit of the unification formula announced by President Chun.

- (1) The connecting and opening of a highway between Seoul and Pyongyang as a means of guaranteeing free passage between the South and the North.*
- (2) The realization of postal exchanges and reunion of separated families, thereby easing their sufferings.*
- (3) The designating and opening of the area north of Mt. Sorak and south of the Diamond Mountains as a joint tourist zone.*
- (4) The joint management of homeland visits by overseas Korean residents and their free travel between the two sides by way of Panmunjom.*
- (5) The opening of the harbors of Incheon and Chinnampo to facilitate free trade between the South and the North.*
- (6) The allowing of free listening to each other's regular radio programs through the removal of tricky propaganda and jamming facilities for the promotion of mutual understanding between the South and the North.*
- (7) The participation of North Korean delegations in the 1986 Asian Games and 1988 Olympiad, and their entry into the*

South by way of Panmunjom.

- (8) *The allowing of all foreigners wishing to visit the South and the North free access to the two areas by way of Panmunjom.*
- (9) *The creation of joint fishery zones for the convenience of fishermen of both the South and the North.*
- (10) *The conducting of mutual goodwill visits from various circles, such as politicians, businessmen, youths and students, workers, writers and artists, and sportsmen, to improve relations and foster trust between the South and the North.*
- (11) *The guaranteeing of free press coverage by the journalists of the two sides in each other's area to facilitate the correct reporting of the realities of the societies of the South and the North.*
- (12) *The undertaking of joint research on national history for the purpose of preserving and developing the national culture.*
- (13) *The exchange of goodwill matches in various fields of sports and participation in international games under single delegation between the South and the North.*
- (14) *The trading of products of daily necessity for the convenience of residents of both sides.*
- (15) *The joint development and utilization of natural resources between the South and the North to enhance the national economy.*
- (16) *The exchange of technicians and exhibitions of manufactured products to contribute to the industrial development of the South and the North.*
- (17) *The creation of sports facilities inside the Demilitarized Zone for goodwill matches between the South and the North.*
- (18) *The conducting of a joint academic survey to study the ecological system of the fauna and flora inside the Demilitarized Zone.*

- (19) *The complete removal of military facilities from within the Demilitarized Zone in order to alleviate military tension between the South and the North.*
- (20) *The discussion of measures to control arms between the South and the North, and the installing and operation of a direct telephone line between the officials responsible for the military affairs of the two sides.*

2. Reactions

Various circles at home and abroad welcomed the proposal for 20 pilot projects Minister Sohn addressed to North Korea, observing that they were “realistic initiatives that can be translated into action right away” and “the kind of undertakings that should be implemented by all means in order to mature trust between South and North Korea.” It was stressed that North Korea should accept them because there can be no reason whatsoever why North Korea should reject them.

All political parties in the Republic of Korea, including the Democratic Justice Party, Democratic Korea Party and Korea National Party, in their respective statements, said that the 20 projects proposed can be implemented immediately within the extent of the formula for national reconciliation and democratic unification announced by President Chun on January 22.

Stressing that they hope that North Korea will carefully study the proposal and show a response that would not run counter to national wishes, the political parties advised North Korea to accept the projects for the sake of the nation’s interests and thereby meet the aspirations of the 60 million Koreans.

Separated family members hailing from North Korea and those engaged in areas related to the suggested 20 pilot projects invariably hoped for the implementation of the projects, urging North Korea to respond to the offer affirmatively.

Japanese press media, too, welcomed the proposal for the pilot projects, viewing the overture as a peace initiative that has made

more concrete the unification formula announced by President Chun earlier. The Japanese press said that the latest proposal "has driven North Korea into a situation where it has to respond to it in any form" (*Asahi Shinbun*) and that "the sincere peace efforts of South Korea will result in enhancing the international standing of the Republic of Korea" (*Sankei Shinbun*).

Various newspapers and broadcast media in South Korea positively supported the suggested pilot projects in their editorial comments, and called upon North Korea to respond to the latest offer favorably.

The following are editorials appearing in major South Korean newspapers on Minister Sohn's proposal for 20 pilot projects:

What Suggested Pilot Projects Point to

The Kyunghyang Daily News (February 1, 1982)

The fact that in order to achieve national unification, the two sides of Korea should first settle easy problems gradually among the sufferings and misfortunes stemming from national division, and thereby broaden the avenue of mutual trust, is a rightful procedure which neither of the two sides can deny.

But, in circumstances where national homogeneity has crumbled and factors harmful to unification are rampant due to protracted division, it would not be easy readily to accept any unification formula advanced by the other side, no matter how reasonable and justifiable it might be.

The proposal for the conclusion of a *Provisional Agreement on Basic Relations* between South and North Korea, which President Chun Doo Hwan made in his announcement of a new unification formula, was intended chiefly to restore national homogeneity.

The 20 pilot projects which Minister of National Unification Sohn Jae-Shik proposed to North Korea on February 1 represented the strong resolve of the government to move a step closer to the goal of unification by broadening the base of mutual understanding and

trust through practicable exchanges and cooperation.

The fact that the government proposed such concrete pilot projects to North Korea, which had just turned down the new unification formula in a statement signed by the chairman of a deceptive organization, "Committee for Peaceful Unification of the Fatherland," proves that the effort of our government to solve problems pending between the two sides is both sincere and positive.

We highly value the forward-looking resolve of the Board of National Unification, and sincerely hope that the pilot projects will be translated into action at an early date.

The projects which the Minister of National Unification proposed can be undertaken promptly if only the North shows sincerity.

Linking and opening of a road between Seoul and Pyongyang to guarantee free passage between the two zones, postal exchanges and reunion between dispersed families, development of a free tourist zone, joint management of homeland visits by Koreans abroad and their free travel in the two areas, opening of the harbors of Inchon and Chinnampo, designation of joint fishery zones, trade in products of daily necessity, etc. ... all these, if realized as proposed, would truly serve to enhance mutual interests. Other suggested projects such as joint exploration and use of natural resources, exchange of technicians and exhibitions of products, joint academic survey in the Demilitarized Zone and free listening to each other's broadcasts, too, are intended to contribute to mutual interests and understanding.

These are not all. If all the military installations were removed from the Demilitarized Zone and a hot line installed and operated between the highest military officers of the two sides, as suggested the military tension existing between the South and the North would certainly dissipate by itself. Moreover, exchanges between politicians, businessmen, workers, writers, artists and sportsmen, free press coverage by journalists of the two sides, and participation in various international games under a single delegation would be the shortcut to improving inter-Korean relations and promoting mutual trust.

Even though we all cannot enjoy sightseeing on Mt. Halla and Mt. Paektu, it would be highly significant if the two sides designate the area south of the Diamond Mountains and north of Mt. Sorak as a common recreational area. If this is realized, it would give an opportunity for foreign athletes participating in the 1968 Seoul Olympics to view the enchanting scenes of the Diamond Mountain.

At the same time, if and when a North Korean delegation would participate in the Seoul Asian and Olympic games in 1986 and 1988, respectively, coming to the South by way of Panmunjom, and if foreigners can be granted free access to the two areas, it would serve as a momentum to manifest our people's independent capability before the world.

It cannot but be a great misfortune that our people who have formed a single national culture have been unable even to make joint study of our indigenous culture owing to national division.

Even if it would be difficult for scholars of the two sides to visit and talk to each other, it is highly desirous for the sake of the preservation and development of our national culture that they, say, exchange material by mail, and participate in joint seminars or joint exhibition of relics or cultural material.

The question of how to remove the sufferings stemming from national division and explore the avenue of economic exchanges and cooperation in pursuit of common interests holds the key to national prosperity.

In this respect, we highly welcome the proposal by the Minister of National Unification for the creation of joint fishery zones, opening of the harbors of Inchon and Chinnampo, joint exploration and use of natural resources, and exchange of exhibitions of industrial products. We believe that these pilot projects are the first step toward trade between the two sides.

If and when these exchanges and trade are materialized, it would boost mutual interests even in the areas of politics and foreign service. For it would mean the end of the state of cold war in inter-Korean relations, a development contributory to peace and stability in Northeast Asia.

The 20 pilot projects proposed by the Minister of National Unification are all based on the open-door policy of our government, with each of them aimed at promoting the common interests of the Korean people.

If any of the projects were translated into action, it would greatly help eradicate the prejudice, dogmatism, distrust and misunderstanding existing between the two zones of Korea, and would help facilitate implementation of the new unification formula announced by President Chun, which calls for the drafting of a unified constitution and the achieving of a unified country under the terms of the constitution.

It would be difficult for North Korea to reject these practicable projects as they did in the past. If North Korea is truly interested in peace on the Korean peninsula and peaceful coexistence between the South and the North, they should promptly accept the 20 pilot projects rather than adhering to their undue and fictitious ideas such as a "confederation system" or a "grand national conference."

We again urge North Korea to show an affirmative response to the proposal for the pilot projects, which was made with the firm resolve to advance the time of unification despite the incomprehensible negativism on the part of North Korea.

Reconciliation through Exchanges

Dong-A Ilbo (February 1, 1982)

Minister of National Unification Sohn Jae-shik, calling upon North Korea to accept President Chun Doo Hwan's proposal for the formulation of a unified constitution, on February 1 proposed to North Korea a total of 20 pilot projects for implementation between the two sides of Korea. The contents of the projects well deserve support from the whole world, let alone the 60 million Koreans suffering from national division.

The projects are all practical ideas based on President Chun's proposal for the formulation of a unified constitution, and represent

an indispensable path that has to be followed before unification.

The 20 pilot projects include the linking and opening of a highway between Seoul and Pyongyang, opening of an area south of the Diamond Mountains and north of Mt. Sorak as a free tourist zone, opening of the harbors of Inchon and Chinnampo, free passage via Panmunjom, creation of joint fishery zones, participation in international games with a single delegation, joint exploration of natural resources, removal of military facilities from the Demilitarized Zone, discussion of measures to control arms, and personnel and material exchanges.

Considering the stiff inter-Korean relations of the past 37 years, the proposal of the pilot projects is a surprise. This is all the more so when we think of the three-year-long fratricidal conflict, and of the state of confrontation in which we have no way even to hear from dispersed family members. Moreover, the proposal reflects our relentless resolve to achieve unification, as it was made on the heels of North Korea's rejection of President Chun's proposal.

We believe that the peoples of the world have become able to reconfirm which of the two sides of Korea explores the path of national self-determination and exerts endeavors to bring about unification and national reconciliation. In a period of ten days, the Seoul side offered the formation of a Consultative Conference for National Reunification, formulation of a unified constitution and the conclusion of a Provisional Agreement on Basic Relations, all for the ultimate creation of a unified democratic republic, and put forth the proposal for various material and personnel exchanges as pilot projects.

The Kim Il-sung regime would hardly find any excuse to turn down our unification proposal. Only recently, they rejected the proposal for the formulation of a unified constitution, demanding that the South renounce its anti-Communist policy, release political prisoners and issue an apology by the Republic of Korea government. They also denounced the proposal as a "chart that disregard reality." We were enraged at their brazen-facedness in calling the most realistic and comprehensive formula an "unrealistic chart." It

remains to be seen how the North Koreans would react to the proposal for pilot projects such as the creation of joint fishery zones and opening of harbors, which are all intended to ensure better lives for our compatriots.

In Germany, which has been divided as is the case with Korea, East and West Germany engage in trade which amounts to about 900 million dollars per year. West German and West Berlin people visit their families or relatives in East Germany and East Berlin, and a total of 941 telephone circuits have been installed between the two Germanies. Aren't East and West Germany enjoying common prosperity, while restoring the homogeneity of the German nation, transcending the difference in ideology through such exchanges and visits? West Germany is the third strongest industrial country in the world, and East Germany is the most advanced industrial nation among East European countries, ranking tenth in the world in terms of national strength.

Of course, the prosperity of East and West Germany is attributable to the talents of the German people. But what cannot be overlooked is the fact that the two Germanies could be absorbed in economic development in the midst of political stability achieved through a detente system between them.

To bring about a better life in this age of cruel international competition, we, too, should depart from the state of confrontation in the first place. For this purpose, there is no way but national reconciliation. And it has to be begun with personnel and material exchanges. As we look forward to the time when we can enjoy the view of the Diamond Mountains, in the name of the 60 million Koreans we call upon the North Koreans to accept the proposal without reservation.

Where There is a Will There is a Way

Seoul Shinmun (February 2, 1982)

Following the epochal proposal for a formula for national recon-

ciliation and democratic unification by President Chun Doo Hwan, our government again displayed before the world its strong resolve to carry out the proposal when Minister of National Unification Sohn Jae-Shik proposed 20 pilot projects in a special statement addressed to North Korea on February 1.

The ultimate objective of the proposal is to establish through a meeting of the highest authorities of the two sides a unified country committed to the ideals of nationalism, democracy, liberty and well-being of citizens. But the immediate aim is for the two sides to restore mutual trust and foster an atmosphere conducive to a peaceful approach to unification through exchanges and cooperation in easy areas before or parallel with such a summit meeting.

What draws our attention is the fact that the suggested 20 projects include 13 new undertakings, such as the opening of a highway between Seoul and Pyongyang, creation of a free tourist zone consisting of the Diamond Mountains and Mt. Sorak, opening of the harbors of Inchon and Chinnampo, designation of joint fishery zones, joint exploration of natural resources, peaceful use of the Demilitarized Zone and the installing of a hot line between the highest military officers of the two sides. The offer for the 20 projects points clearly to our sincerity toward the peaceful solution of the inter-Korean question.

We believe that these are the kinds of projects which can be put into action promptly if only North Korea agrees to them, and that implementation of any of the pilot projects would contribute significantly to the easing of tension on the Korean peninsula, and to the restoring of trust between the two sides.

It was for this reason that Minister Sohn stressed in the statement, "What is most important in solving the question of unification of the divided land is for the two sides to show sincerity toward settling problems pending between them through dialogue rather than calling for unification by words only."

Of course, we are well aware of the troubles North Korea is faced with internally. The fact that North Korea rejected President Chun's unification formula as a "chart that disregards reality" and

instead renewed their demand for the withdrawal of American troops from Korea and repeal of South Korea's anti-Communist policy, indicates that their ulterior motive is still to communize the South. We know that also behind their rejection is their fear that if they accepted the proposal, it would deal a crushing blow to their hereditary dictatorial system which is being sustained only by a tight closed-door policy and a hawkish posture toward the South.

Nevertheless, the North Korean authorities cannot ignore today's international trend, and various issues pending between the two sides of Korea. The bold unification formula which is so flexible as to encompass even North Korean ideas in the process of drafting a unified constitution, now attracts growing support from the world community. Even some Communist-bloc countries have shown an affirmative reaction to it. If North Korea rejects even the pilot projects, which include the most practicable and concrete ideas, such as the opening of both societies, exchanges, cooperation, and relaxation of tensions, it would only drive North Korea further into a corner.

Before the North Koreans, therefore, there are only two choices. One is to agree to the pilot projects and thereby choose the gradual road to peace, while the other is to reject the desire of the nation and the world community, thus bringing upon themselves international and historical condemnation for their belligerency.

We would again like to sternly urge the North Korean authorities to return to national conscience and respond favorably to the main current of the time without any hesitation.

Practicable Inter-Korean Exchanges

The Joong-Ang Daily News (February 2, 1982)

If the proposal made by President Chun Doo Hwan on January 22 for the formulation of a unified constitution is a basic blueprint for unification, the proposal for 20 pilot projects advanced by the Board of National Unification yesterday may well be the practicable

particulars.

In view of their unconditional rejection of the invitation to cooperate in the writing of a unified constitution, we fear the North Koreans will repeat their customary negative response toward the 20 pilot projects. President Chun's proposal featuring the suggestion of a unified constitution has earned broad acclaim from many press media and other sectors around the world because, we believe, the unification formula does not intend to adhere to our ideas alone but opens the door to the review of North Korean suggestions, too, on essential matters of unification. No other unification idea is more faithful to the concept that there is always the other side in negotiations.

We would like to invite North Korean attention to the fact that the pilot projects proposed by the Board of Unification, too, are subject to their reactions or possible counter-offers. The fact that we have suggested that North Korea, if it does not want to participate in all 20 projects, may accept some of them on a selective basis, well reflects that our proposal is well-intended and sincere. We note that the 20 pilot projects are highly practicable and realistic, among them being the opening of a highway linking Seoul and Pyongyang, trade through Incheon and Chinnampo, free passage by way of Panmunjom, and peaceful uses of the Demilitarized Zone.

Our magnanimous attitude contrasts sharply with the stand of North Korea, an insistence that "to achieve unification, American forces should withdraw from Korea, South Korea should renounce its anti-Communist policy and the South Korean government should make an apology."

As has been pointed out many times before, the first step toward the long journey to unification is to overcome the political, social, economic and cultural heterogeneity born of the 37 years' division.

Unlike the case of Germany, which is a divided country like Korea, mutual distrust and antagonism are deep-rooted between the two sides of Korea as a result of the three-year-long fratricidal conflict. In particular, the revolutionary policy of Kim Il-sung has turned the entire territory of North Korea into a huge armed camp

and instilled false images of the “hell-like situation” of South Korea into the minds of the North Koreans.

It is to rectify this tragic situation that we have been proposing all available exchanges. The 20 pilot projects cover all thinkable undertakings. But if North Korea advances any additional projects or counter-proposals, we will welcome them in so far as they are well-motivated and reasonable. In this respect, we call upon the North Koreans to show sincerity toward our proposals for the formulation of a unified constitution and implementation of 20 pilot projects.

In Germany, it is not that the two sides opened their doors to mutual exchanges overnight through the conclusion of a basic agreement in 1973. Before the signing of the basic agreement, multi-faceted exchanges took place between the two Germanies ever since their territorial division, which made possible the Germany summit meeting in 1970 and the conclusion of the basic agreement two years later.

North Korea unfoundedly denounces the idea of a unified constitution as “unrealistic and intended to perpetuate national division.” How can such realistic offers as exchanges in easy areas, heart-to-heart contacts between the people of the two sides, and removal of arms from the Demilitarized Zone, which has been the focus of tension on the Korean peninsula, be unrealistic?

There is an old saying that goes “If you don’t like it, you can’t see it even though you look at it, and you can’t hear it even though you listen to it.” To those people who are more interested in the preservation of the Kim Il-sung dynastic system than in the unification of the land, the realistic proposal may not be seen nor heard.

In fact, there can be nothing more feared by them than the opening of the societies of the two sides. But the North Korean authorities should realize that there is a limit to their resistance to the tide that runs toward national conciliation and unification.

From Exchanges to Unification

Chosun Ilbo (February 2, 1982)

Minister of National Unification Sohn Jae-shik proposed to North Korea on February 1 the implementation of 20 pilot projects indispensable to an approach toward national unification. The suggested projects are substantial undertakings intended to facilitate the formula for national conciliation and democratic unification which President Chun Doo Hwan announced in his policy statement on January 22. The proposal, conceived by the government of the Republic of Korea, is an offer to join in projects aimed at paving the way to a realistic approach to unification, which would surely enlist the support of world countries so far as they do not oppose the unification of the Korean peninsula.

The 20 projects offered can be classified into three categories — those intended for the opening of the two societies, for mutual exchanges and cooperation, and for the easing of tension. Those falling under the category of society opening are: 1) linking and opening of a highway between Seoul and Pyongyang, 2) opening of an area south of the Diamond Mountains and north of Mt. Sorak as a free tourist zone, 3) joint management of homeland visits by Korean residents abroad, 4) mutual opening of the harbors of Inchon and Chinnampo, 5) exchange of postal matter and reunions between dispersed families, 6) removal of propaganda broadcasting facilities and free listening to regular broadcast programs, 7) participation of North Korean delegations in the Seoul Asian and Olympic games, and their entry into the South by way of Panmunjom, and 8) passage of Panmunjom and free travel in South and North Korea for foreigners.

The projects related to mutual exchanges and cooperation include 1) designation of joint fishery zones, 2) mutual goodwill visits between politicians and other personages, 3) guarantee of free press coverage by journalists of the two sides, 4) joint study of national history, 5) participation in international sports games with a joint

delegation, 6) trade in products of daily necessity, 7) joint exploration and use of natural resources, and 8) exchange of technicians and exhibition of industrial products.

Those designed to ease tension are 1) creation of sports grounds inside the Demilitarized Zone, 2) joint survey of the ecological system in the Demilitarized Zone, 3) complete removal of military facilities from the Demilitarized Zone, and 4) installing of a hot line between the highest military officers of the two sides.

These pilot projects are the broadest, most comprehensive and practicable ones among the various ideas advanced so far by the two sides. Among the 20 projects are some which have already been proposed by the Republic of Korea government in its statements or through the South-North Coordinating Committee and the South-North Red Cross Conference. But 12 of the projects are offered for the first time. So far as we know, these are enough to facilitate mutual door-opening, exchanges and cooperation, and relaxation of tension.

No matter how loudly one may cry for unification, it would be a mere empty word if there is no concrete formula for approaches to unification. Even if there is some formula, it can hardly contribute to the solution of the issue if it favors one side only and poses a threat to the other. The 20 pilot projects proposed by Minister Sohn can by their nature serve to promote the interests of both sides, and pose no threat to the existence or security of either of the two sides. We are sure that they are the most rational preconditions to peaceful unification.

If some intend to solve the unification issue through war, then there will be no need of relaxation of tension, exchanges or mutual door-opening. Persons harboring such intentions may take the proposal for the relaxation of tension, exchanges and door-opening as nothing more than a device aimed at weakening the other side and driving it into a corner through internal or external infiltration. However, it can be proved objectively that there is no such intention at all on the part of the Republic of Korea. Even if one side offered some projects with an ulterior motive, none would ever be taken in

in this Age of Information.

The proposal for the pilot projects was made under the responsibility of the government in conformity with the ardent aspiration of the Republic of Korea's people for peaceful unification. We reject unification discussions waged as a means of propaganda by the North. We well know that even if one side makes such a propaganda offer, it is bound to collect an adverse effects only. The time passed long ago when someone, as a certain man actually did once, can use the call for peaceful unification as a smoke-screen for war preparations, or as a pretext for a deceptive peace offensive. Our proposal is sincere and derives from the intent of exploring the path of our national survival in this cruel situation.

Of course, North Korea is totally free to accept or not. But, judging from their reaction to President Chun's January 22 proposal, it is almost certain that they will turn down the pilot projects, too, in pursuit of their stereotyped slander and defamation against the South. Even if they deny the suggested projects, they would find it inevitable to put forth substantially the same projects under some changed names if they wish to solve the unification question peacefully. Without such door-opening, exchanges, cooperation and relaxation of tension, no peaceful unification can be realized under any circumstances.

Whenever it came to the issue of unification, North Korea used to demand the withdrawal of American forces from Korea, restructuring of South Korea's constitutional order and legalization of Communist activities in the South. Can North Korea accept it if we ask them to scrap their military treaties with the Soviet Union and Red China, to dismantle their own-man dictatorial system and to legalize political forces opposed to communism? The fact that they adhere to such absurd demands indicates that they are not interested in the discussion of unification.

The relations the two sides maintain consist of a confrontation between the two conflicting socio-political systems, and military tension... these are problems which in nature cannot be solved by mutual silence or mutual slander.

To settle these basic problems, various preconditions should ripen through which the two sides can approach each other, engage in exchanges, and open their societies to each other. This is an elementary rule of politics. To denounce a call for such preconditions as a "scheme to perpetuate national division" is tantamount to rejecting peaceful unification. We hope that North Korea will bend a responsive ear rather than merely attempting to find excuses to turn down whatever proposals come from the South.

Deeds Rather Than Words

Hankook Ilbo (February 2, 1982)

Our effort to approach unification is often likened to the "long march" because it involves a continuous movement forward buttressed by strong will power and patience. We cannot become exhausted because of adverse reactions, or give up our march because of difficulties.

The proposal for 20 pilot projects made on February 1 well reflects our relentless resolve for unification, in the cause of which we knock on the tightly closed doors of North Korea ceaselessly.

In a press interview, Minister of National Unification Sohn Jae-Shik offered the pilot projects in line with President Chun Doo Hwan's unification formula of January 22, projects which Minister Sohn said can be implemented even right away if only North Korea agrees to them.

The 20 projects can be classified into three categories: 1) eight projects for the opening of the two sides' societies, including one calling for the linking and opening of a highway between Seoul and Pyongyang, 2) eight other projects for mutual exchanges and cooperation, such as the creation of joint fishery zones, and 3) four projects for the relaxation of tension, including the installing of a hot line between the highest military officers of the two sides.

Like President Chun's January 22 formula, the proposal for the 20 projects is a manifestation of the comprehensive resolve encom-

passing even some of the past suggestions advanced by North Korea. The suggested projects, covering the wishes of the 60 million Koreans at home and abroad, especially the 10 million separated family members, include 12 undertakings proposed for the first time.

The mutual opening of the societies of North and South Korea is a requirement indispensable to the reaffirmation or re-establishment of national homogeneity. North Korea may have some perplexing reasons that keep them from agreeing to the opening of the societies. But we believe there can be nothing difficult in carrying out the suggested projects, such as the designation of the Sorak and Diamond Mountains as a free tourist zone, trade through Inchon and Chinnampo harbors, exchanges of postal matter between dispersed families, and guaranteed passage of Panmunjom by oversea Koreans and foreign visitors.

Promotion of exchanges and cooperation, including joint exploration of natural resources, will certainly serve mutual interests. A series of military devices intended to forestall fratricidal conflict will earn us an approving nod from the world community.

As long as national unification should be realized in a peaceful manner, our approach to that end must be one that can ease our sufferings deriving from national division and can be helpful to the restoration of mutual trust. Moreover, the 20 projects represent a realistic answer to all the problems and ideas raised between the two sides over a period of more than a generation.

Nevertheless, we cannot be optimistic about the North Korean reaction. We know that they rejected outright President Chun's unification formula in a statement issued on January 26 by Kim Il, Pyongyang's vice president. Still, it isn't too late. North Korea shouldn't ignore the national wish and international opinion any longer. They should manifest a forward-looking and open-minded posture instead of adhering to dogmatism and wishful judgement of the situation.

We believe that North Korea can escape the criticism of their being stiff-necked by agreeing to even some of the 20 projects if they

cannot accept all of them in a package deal. We hope that they will realize that their attempt to justify rejection of dialogue will never succeed.

The ugly barrier lying between the two sides must be dismantled beginning with easy areas first. We see no reason why cannot do what the Germans have been doing so successfully. We again urge that North Korea show an open mind for the sake of the grand national cause, and move a step closer toward opening the societies of South and North Korea.

Appendix

Chronological Review of Major Unification-Related Proposals by South and North Korea

- March 25, 1948 — The 26th meeting of the Central Committee of the North Korean National Front, opposing general elections in South Korea alone, proposes that a joint meeting of the delegates of South and North Korean political parties and social organizations be held in Pyongyang on April 14, 1948.
- April 30, 1948 — In a statement of the “joint meeting of the representatives of South and North Korean political parties and social organizations,” North Korea proposes the establishment of a provisional government through an all-Korea political conference to be convened after withdrawal of alien forces.
- June 12, 1948 — The Constitutional Assembly of South Korea proposes that general elections be held in proportion to indigenous population in North Korea to elect representatives to join the National Assembly of South Korea.
- June 7, 1950 — A letter of appeal issued by an expanded meeting of the Democratic Front for Unification of the Fatherland, in North Korea, proposes that a meeting of the representatives of South and North Korean political parties and social organizations be held to discuss the creation of a unified supreme legislature through general elections to be held August 5-8.
- June 19, 1950 — The Standing Committee of the Supreme People's Council, North Korea, proposes to the National Assembly of the Republic of Korea that the Supreme People's Council and the National Assembly be merged into a single legislature to realize unification.
- June 25, 1950 — North Korea invades South Korea.
- November 23, 1953 — President Syngman Rhee of the Republic of Korea proposes in a statement that remaining seats of the National Assembly be filled through general elections held in North Korea alone.
- April 27, 1954 — North Korean Foreign Minister Nam Il proposes at the Geneva conference that general elections be held to form a unified government.
- May 22, 1954 — Republic of Korea Foreign Minister Pyon Yong-tae proposes at the Geneva conference that free general elections be held under the supervision of the United Nations.
- October 2, 1954 — The third National Assembly of the Republic of Korea adopts a unification formula calling for expansion of the

- sovereignty of the Republic of Korea through general elections held in the North Korean areas under the supervision of the United Nations.
- October 30, 1954 — The eighth meeting of the First Supreme People's Council of North Korea appeals for joint meeting of the representatives of South and North Korean political parties and social organizations, or a joint meeting of the South and North Korean legislatures.
- August 15, 1955 — In a speech marking the 10th anniversary of national liberation, Kim Il-sung of North Korea proposes an international meeting to guarantee peace, and the conclusion of an agreement banning use of force of arms between South and North Korea.
- April 28, 1956 — In a declaration adopted by its third congress, the Workers' (Communist) Party of North Korea proposes the establishment of a unified government through general elections, and calls for joint struggles against the United States.
- September 10, 1957 — The National Assembly of the Republic of Korea calls in a resolution for general elections in the North Korean area under the supervision of the United Nations, and the entry of the Republic of Korea into the United Nations.
- September 20, 1957 — In a speech made at the first session of the Second Supreme People's Council of North Korea, Kim Il-sung proposes the withdrawal of all alien forces, reduction of the armed forces of the two sides to 100,000 each or less, and free passage, communications and cultural exchanges between South and North Korea.
- April 21, 1960 — A joint meeting of the leaders of North Korean political parties and social organizations proposes the formation of a joint conference of South and North Korean political parties and social organizations.
- August 14, 1960 — In a speech marking the 15th anniversary of national liberation, Kim Il-sung of North Korea proposes a confederation system.
- August 27, 1960 — Prime Minister John M. Chang of the Republic of Korea, in a policy statement, proposes general elections in South and North Korea under the supervision of the United Nations.
- November 2, 1960 — The Fifth National Assembly of the Republic of Korea passes a unification formula calling for general elections held in South and North Korea pursuant to the provisions of the Republic

- of Korea Constitution and under the supervision of the United Nations.
- June 24, 1961 — Republic of Korea Foreign Minister Kim Hong-il stresses in a statement that the unification of the Korean peninsula can be achieved only in a peaceful way.
- December 10, 1963 — A joint letter of appeal by the Supreme People's Council, Korean Democratic Front, and the Committee for Peaceful Unification of the Fatherland, North Korea, calls for the withdrawal of U.S. forces, conclusion of a peace agreement, and reduction of each side's military forces to 100,000 or less.
- November 3, 1964 — In a Students' Day message, President Park Chung Hee of the Republic of Korea rejects any unification method other than free general elections held in South and North Korea under the supervision of the United Nations.
- August 15, 1970 — In a Liberation Day message, President Park Chung Hee proposes a well-intentioned competition between the two sides, urges North Korea to renounce policies to seek communization of all Korea and instigate a violent revolution in the South, expresses his willingness to produce realistic measures to remove artificial barrier step by step, and discloses a plan not to oppose North Korea's participation in the United Nations debate of the Korean question.
- April 12, 1971 — In a report adopted at the fifth meeting of the Fourth Supreme People's Council, North Korea demands the withdrawal of U.S. forces and lays down seven other proposals.
- August 12, 1971 — Choi Tu-son, president of the Republic of Korea National Red Cross, proposes a campaign of search for dispersed families in the South and the North of Korea.
- April 5, 1973 — In a report at the second meeting of the Fifth Supreme People's Council, Kim Il of North Korea proposes the conclusion of a peace agreement between South and North Korea.
- June 23, 1973 — President Park Chung Hee of the Republic of Korea promulgates the Special Foreign Policy Statement Regarding Peace and Unification.
- June 23, 1973 — In a speech at a rally welcoming the visit by Czechoslovakia's Gustav Husak, Kim Il-sung lays down five major policies.
- August 28, 1973 — Kim Young-joo, Pyongyang side chairman of the South-North Coordinating Committee, announces his boycott of the

Coordinating Committee.

- January 18, 1974 — Republic of Korea President Park Chung Hee proposes a non-aggression agreement in his New Year press conference.
- August 15, 1974 — President Park Chung Hee announces the Three Major Principles for Peaceful Unification in his Liberation Day message.
- January 14, 1975 — President Park Chung Hee reiterates in his New Year press interview his call for the conclusion of a South-North non-aggression agreement.
- January 12, 1977 — President Park Chung Hee, in a New Year press conference, proposes food assistance to North Korea.
- January 15, 1977 — In letters signed by a joint meeting of North Korean political parties and social organizations, North Korea demands the convocation of a South-North political conference.
- August 15, 1977 — President Park Chung Hee, in a Liberation Day message, calls for the restoration of mutual trust through free general elections and inter-Korean dialogue.
- January 18, 1978 — President Park Chung Hee, in a New Year press conference, calls for the unconditional resumption of dialogue.
- June 23, 1978 — President Park Chung Hee, in a special statement, proposes an inter-Korean economic cooperative body for the promotion of economic ties between the two sides.
- September 9, 1978 — In a speech marking the 30th anniversary of the North Korean regime, Kim Il-sung demands that the South change its “nation-splitting policy” into a unification policy and its anti-Communist policy into a pro-Communist policy.
- January 19, 1979 — In a New Year press conference, President Park Chung Hee proposes a meeting between the responsible authorities of the two sides at any time, place and level.
- July 1, 1979 — A joint statement by the Republic of Korea and the United States proposes tripartite meeting on the Korean question.
- January 18, 1980 — In a New Year press conference, President Choi Kyu Ha of the Republic of Korea vows efforts to consolidate peace and promote unification through dialogue.
- October 10, 1980 — The sixth congress of the North Korean Workers’ Party proposes the creation of a “Democratic Confederal Republic of Koryo.”
- January 12, 1981 — In a New Year press conference, President Chun Doo

Hwan of the Republic of Korea proposes an exchange of visits between the highest authorities of the two sides.

June 5, 1981 — In a speech at the opening of the Advisory Council on Peaceful Unification Policy, President Chun Doo Hwan proposes a meeting between the highest authorities of the two sides.

January 22, 1982 — In a 1982 policy statement, President Chun Doo Hwan announces a formula for national reconciliation and democratic unification.

February 1, 1982 — Republic of Korea Minister of National Unification Sohn Jae-shik, in a statement, proposes 20 pilot projects for resumption of contacts and reduction of tensions between South and North.



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International Cultural Society of Korea

C.P.O. Box 4161

Seoul, Korea

Dear Reader,

The questionnaire that follows was prepared as an aid towards making **South-North Dialogue** more informative and readable. Your frank answers to the questions would be greatly appreciated. Please forward the questionnaire to the following address:

P.O. Box 4161
Central Post Office
Seoul 100, Republic of Korea

Questionnaire

Nationality:

Age: Sex: Education:

Occupation:

Please check your choices.

1. How often do you use or consult **South-North Dialogue** in your duties and research activities?

- a. *Very often.*
- b. From time to time.
- c. Seldom.

2. Do you find this booklet helpful to your understanding of the inter-Korean question?

- a. *Very helpful.*
- b. Needed information is often missing.
- c. Not very helpful.

3. How do you like the phrasing and style of this booklet?

- a. Easy to understand.
- b. So, so.
- c. Difficult to understand.

4. Please state your suggestions and comments on **South-North Dialogue**.

No. 029
Oct. 1982

South-North Dialogue in Korea

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Part I

Call for Resumption of Inter-Korean Talks to Realize “Formula for National Reconciliation and Democratic Unification”

1. Proposal for Meeting of High-Level Delegates

Minister of National Unification Sohn Jae-shik, in a statement addressed to North Korea, proposed on February 25, 1982 that South and North Korea hold a meeting of high-level delegates, headed by a cabinet-rank official, in Seoul, Pyongyang or Panmunjom within the month of March 1982.

Noting that the Formula for National Reconciliation and Democratic Unification announced by President Chun Doo Hwan had been broadly and wholeheartedly welcomed and supported both at home and abroad, Minister Sohn reminded the North Koreans of the earlier call for their favorable response to the offers for a meeting between the top leaders of the two sides, as well as to the 20 proposed pilot projects, both intended to facilitate implementation of the formula for democratic unification.

Minister Sohn noted in the statement that North Korea had rejected the reasonable unification formula of the Republic of Korea, reiterating their stereotyped preconditions to dialogue, including withdrawal of U.S. forces from Korea and repeal of the anti-Communists policy. Further charging that North Korea acted in a brazen, nonsensical manner by arbitrarily selecting and announcing the names of the "delegates who will represent the South" at a proposed "joint meeting between South and North Korean politicians," Minister Sohn strongly urged North Korea to rectify such devious attitude at an early date.

Minister Sohn said that he was proposing a meeting between high-level delegates of South and North Korea in the hope of advancing through dialogue the peaceful unification desired by all Koreans. Making public, then, the three agenda topics of the proposed meeting and the list of a nine-member Republic of Korea delegation, Minister Sohn said he looked forward to North Korea's affirmative response to his proposal.

The full text of Minister Sohn's statement proposing the meeting was as follows:

On January 22, President Chun Doo Hwan set forth a comprehensive and practical formula intended to achieve reconciliation with North Korea leading to democratic unification. This rational approach has been wholeheartedly welcomed by the Korean people and has received broad support from abroad.

President Chun proposed the formation of a Consultative Conference for National Reunification to prepare a constitution for a united Korea and also the conclusion of a provisional Agreement on Basic Relations between South and North Korea for the normalization of inter-Korean relations. In this regard, the President urged North Korea to respond favorably to his earlier call for a meeting between the top leaders of the South and the North.

Noting that the President's recent unification plan took into account past North Korean proposals, the Republic of Korea government proposed on February 1 a series of 20 pilot projects to promote exchanges and cooperation thus initiating the opening of the two societies to each other and relaxing the tension between the South and the North.

However, North Korea has rejected the South Korea formula, reiterating their stereotyped preconditions to dialogue, including the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Korea and the repeal of the anti-Communism policy. Furthermore, on February 10 North Korea called for the convocation of a "joint meeting between the politicians of South and North Korea," and arbitrarily decided and announced the names of the "50 delegates who will represent South Korea," making the absurd assertion that "the government authorities, political parties and social organizations of South Korea cannot be a party to dialogue."

It is utterly nonsensical and beyond our understanding that North Korea would attempt to decide who should represent the Republic of Korea in any dialogue. Certainly this must be a first in history and cannot in any way be condoned.

It is preposterous for the North Korean Communists to criti-

cize the political system' of the Republic of Korea when they have been ruled by a single dictator for 37 years. Even now they are attempting to establish a hereditary succession of power while oppressing the 18 million North Koreans mercilessly.

We strongly urge the North Koreans to change their attitude and, in the hope of advancing through dialogue the peaceful unification desired by all Koreans, we propose that:

1) South and North Korea hold a high-level delegates meeting in Seoul, Pyongyang or Panmunjom within the month of March;

2) the high-level delegates meeting between the South and the North discuss:

— The question of holding a meeting between the top leaders of South and North Korea to organize a Consultative Conference for National Reunification for the drafting of a constitution of a unified Korea and also to promote the normalization of relations between the South and the North;

— The question of the meeting proposed by North Korea on February 10, 1982; and

— Various issues that must be urgently settled to promote exchanges, cooperation, the opening of the two societies to each other and the relaxation of tension between the South and the North.

3) each delegation to the meeting between the South and the North be composed of nine delegates headed by a cabinet-rank official.

The following is the Republic of Korea delegation to the proposed meeting between South and North Korea:

Chief Delegate:

Roh Tae Woo

Second Minister for State Affairs

Deputy Chief Delegate:

Kim Sang Koo

*Deputy Secretary-General of the Advisory Council on
Peaceful Unification Policy*

Delegates:

Lee Young Il
National Assemblyman (Democratic Justice Party)

Kim Moon Suk
National Assemblyman (Democratic Korea Party)

Kang Ki Pil
National Assemblyman (Korea National Party)

Baik Chan Kee
National Assemblyman (Democratic Socialist Party)

Lee Hong Koo
*Consultant to the Advisory Council on Peaceful Unifi-
cation Policy*

Kim Tae Suh
Consultant to the Advisory Council on State Affairs

Song Han Ho
*Director of the Secretariat for South-North Dialogue,
National Unification Board*

*We look forward to North Korea's affirmative response to
this proposal.*

A perusal of the proposal shows that the offer features several new factors. The first is that its agenda topics were set forth concretely. The proposal clearly states that when a high-level delegates' meeting between South and North Korea is realized, it would discuss the following three topics:

(1) The question of holding a meeting between the top leaders of South and North Korea to organize a Consultative Conference for National Reunification for the drafting of a constitution for a unified Korea, and also to promote the normalization of relations between the South and the North;

(2) The question of the meeting proposed by the North Koreans on February 10, 1982;

(3) Various issues that must be urgently settled to promote exchanges, cooperation, the opening of the two societies to each other and the relaxation of tensions between the South and the North.

By even including North Korea's offer for a "joint meeting between South and North Korean politicians" in the list of topics in addition to its own ideas, the Republic of Korea showed great flexibility in its effort to solve all issues pending between the two sides through dialogue, an attitude which strikingly contrasts with the narrow-minded intransigence of North Korea.

The second highlight is that the proposal paves the way for representation of a broad range of public opinion by suggesting that each side's delegation be composed of no fewer than nine members, headed by a cabinet-rank official. To insure it fully reflects public opinion, the delegation of the Republic of Korea was so chosen as to represent the administration, political parties and the Advisory Council on Peaceful Unification Policy.

The number of delegates represents a sizable increase compared with the delegates to the South-North Coordinating Committee and the full-dress meeting of the South-North Red Cross Conference, which numbered no more than five and seven, respectively. The proposal of more delegates than before was intended to lend greater prestige to the delegation by allowing the inclusion of influential people from the administration, political parties, etc.; to provide it with the full competence to discuss and solve the issue of dialogue and other substantial matters related to inter-Korean relations; and to demonstrate the sincerity of the South's attitude toward dialogue,

as against the incongruity of the North Koreans, who were so nonsensical as to name the "delegates" of the other side in what they call a "joint meeting between South and North Korean politicians."

The third feature of the proposal is that it offers to encompass even North Korean ideas.

In their call for a so-called "joint meeting between South and North Korean politicians," North Korea ridiculously hand-picked the "delegates who would represent the South" at the suggested meeting, contending that the "present political parties and social organizations in the South, let alone the government authorities, cannot be the other side in a dialogue."

Nonetheless, the Republic of Korea does not reject the absurd stand of North Korea outright, but instead tries to give an opportunity for them to clarify through dialogue the circumstances which had led them into making such a proposal. It would be totally reasonable if the Republic of Korea simply brushed aside their absurd suggestion. Yet, its position is that North Korea, nevertheless, should be given the opportunity to explain themselves through talks, showing the seriousness with which the South approaches the question of national unification.

The latest proposal to North Korea was a consistent and practical measure intended to realize a Formula for National Reconciliation and Democratic Unification and advance the 20 pilot projects which could be implemented promptly if the North Koreans would only agree to them.

The proposed high-level meeting of delegates does not foreclose the idea of a preliminary meeting to prepare for a summit conference between the top leaders of South and North Korea. However, the idea is that if and when the two sides agree on a meeting of the top leaders at the high-level delegates' talks, then a separate preliminary meeting would be dispensed with.

What, then, were the circumstances that led the Republic of Korea into proposing the high-level delegates' meeting, and where did its objective lie?

As is widely known, the government of the Republic of Korea, in

a Presidential policy statement, proposed on January 22, 1982 a Formula for National Reconciliation and Democratic Unification which was followed by Minister of National Unification Sohn Jaeshik's suggestion on February 1, 1982 that the two zones of Korea implement 20 highly practicable pilot projects, in line with the spirit of the new unification formula.

These successive overtures have made more institutional and concrete than before the resolve of the government of the Republic of Korea for peaceful unification, which has naturally broadened the base of support for the South's unification policy in the world community.

In contrast, North Korea had been driven into an embarrassing position by their rejection, made in Kim Il's January 26 statement, of the South's new unification formula, which incurred worldwide criticism. In a statement issued on February 10 in the name of the so-called Committee for Peaceful Unification of the Fatherland, North Korea, with the same negativism shown earlier in Kim Il's statement, levelled unfounded accusations at the South with regard to the offer for 20 pilot projects, and then demanded a "joint meeting between South and North Korean politicians." North Korea thus once again shunned a chance for constructive dialogue for unification, merely attempting to exploit the unification issue for political propaganda against the South as they have done in the past.

If the government of the Republic of Korea had reacted to the North's negativism and propaganda barrage with an eye-for-an-eye attitude, it would have only prompted an unproductive propaganda war between the two halves of Korea, and caused inter-Korean relations to remain meshed in Cold-War wrangling, a development obviously inconsistent with the constructive unification efforts exerted by the government of the Republic of Korea.

North Korea has sealed the door to dialogue by rejecting both the new unification formula and the 20 proposed pilot projects on unjustifiable excuses deriving from their aberrant ideas and domestic problems. Nevertheless, the consistent effort of the South

is to induce the intransigent North Koreans to return to a dialogue and thereby improve inter-Korean relations.

It was in this context that Minister of National Unification Sohn proposed to hold a high-level delegates' meeting between the two sides. The offer bears the following several important objectives.

First, the Republic of Korea ought to take the initiative in improving inter-Korean relations for ultimate national unification. It is the Republic of Korea that represents the historical continuity of the nation in all areas political, economic, social and cultural. In terms of overall national strength involving manpower and production, too, the Republic of Korea far outpaces North Korea. Under the circumstances, no approach can ever, in reality, be made toward the solution of inter-Korean problems unless the Republic of Korea takes the initiative.

One of the objectives of the proposal for a high-level delegates' meeting was for the South, in a show of magnanimity, to influence the North Koreans into changing their attitude, and accept constructive unification endeavors, even though they have continued to shun any dialogue by setting unreasonable preconditions, and have attempted to avoid responsibility for their intransigence by means of the poorly conceived idea of a "joint meeting between South and North Korean politicians."

Second, the latest proposal was intended to provide a breakthrough in efforts to arrange the resumption of the inter-Korean dialogue.

The problems pending between the two sides cannot be settled through specious ideas or absurd demands. They can be solved only when the two parties concerned come forward to the forum of dialogue, produce their ideas, seek agreement and implement sincerely what is agreed on. Therefore, in spite of the North Korean insincerity, the South intends to remain broadminded and allow even North Korean contentions to be discussed in a dialogue, in its bid to induce the North into talks and thereby to find a breakthrough in the deadlocked dialogue.

Third, the proposal for a high-level delegates' meeting is in part

designed to awaken the North Koreans to the uselessness of their interfering propaganda schemes against the South.

In the past, North Korea had produced stereotyped “preconditions” as their excuse to reject a dialogue with the South. Recently, however, they have demonstrated an even more intransigent attitude than usual through the ridiculous subterfuge of trying to determine who would represent the other side in a dialogue.

This is a strong indication that they have no interest in a normal dialogue, but are only determined to interfere in South Korea’s internal affairs over the issue of unification and, at the same time, to intensify their propaganda, thus heading off international criticism of their rejection of dialogue.

In the recent proposal, however, the South did not reject outright the demands of the North, but included them on the list of the items subject for review. It was hoped that this would forestall their interference in the internal affairs of the Republic as well as their propaganda scheme, which would, in turn, help enable the South to take the leadership in the race of unification diplomacy, and lead the North to realize the uselessness of its conspiracies against the South, returning as a result to the table of normal dialogue.

To sum up, the proposal for a high-level delegates’ meeting represented the determination of the government of the Republic of Korea to induce North Korea into normalizing the stalled inter-Korean dialogue from the broadminded and practical posture of pursuing peaceful unification despite the North’s negativism.

Meanwhile, the press at home and abroad and all circles in the country wholeheartedly welcomed the proposal for a high-level delegates’ meeting between South and North Korea, calling upon North Korea to accept the offer promptly and return to the forum of dialogue.

The three major political parties — the Democratic Justice Party, Democratic Korea Party and Korea National Party, in their respective statements, applauded the proposal, expressing the hope that North Korea would favorably respond to it promptly,

Spokesman of the Democratic Justice Party: The latest proposal to North Korea represents our strong determination and untiring efforts to provide a breakthrough in the stalled dialogue under any circumstances. If the North Koreans reject even this offer, it would only shed light on the treacherousness of their “peace” offensive as well as their machinations to renew southward aggression.

Spokesman of the Democratic Korea Party: The proposal is another indication of our sincere efforts to resume the inter-Korean dialogue. North Korea should awaken from the delusion of the idea of a “joint meeting between South and North Korean politicians,” in which they themselves hand-pick South Korean “delegates”, who include even “representatives” of their ghost organization, the so-called “Unification Revolutionary Party.” We urge North Korea to accept our most reasonable proposal.

Spokesman of the Korea National Party: We hope that North Korean authorities will accept the proposal promptly without any conditions and show their good will, if any, to peaceful unification by deeds.

Domestic newspapers, editorializing on the proposal, invariably observed that the offer was a broadminded overture highly helpful in inducing the intransigent North Koreans back into the forum of dialogue from an elder-brotherly magnanimity. The newspapers urged the North to show a sincere response to the latest offer in the interests of the nation’s peaceful unification. The following is one of the editorials on the proposal for a high-level delegates’ meeting:

Do Not Shun Path to Dialogue

Seoul Shinmun, February 26, 1982

Our government, with patience and sincerity, is taking a set of measures to realize the Formula for National Reconciliation and Democratic Unification a grand path to peaceful unification which President Chun Doo Hwan has laid down.

Following his earlier proposal for 20 pilot projects, Minister of

National Unification Sohn Jae-shik has recently offered a meeting of high-level delegates between South and North Korea. Needless to say, this was part of the concrete measures our government has been taking.

In a statement addressed to North Korea, Minister Sohn proposed on February 25 that South and North Korea hold their high-level delegates' meeting in either Seoul, Pyongyang or Panmunjom within the month of March.

The Minister suggested in the proposal that the high-level meeting discuss 1) the question of holding a meeting between the top leaders of South and North Korea to organize a Consultative Conference for National Reunification for the drafting of a constitution for a unified Korea; 2) the question of the meeting proposed by North Korea on February 10, 1982; and 3) various issues that must be urgently settled to promote exchanges, cooperation, the opening of the two societies to each other and the relaxation of tension between the South and the North.

Also suggesting that each delegation to the high-level meeting be composed of nine delegates headed by a cabinet-rank official, Minister Sohn made public the list of the Republic of Korea delegation led by Second Minister for State Affairs Roh Tae-woo.

The motives of the latest overture were to provide a breakthrough in efforts to resume the deadlocked dialogue by inducing the North Koreans to the forum of dialogue from an elder-brotherly broadmindedness with which the South has taken the initiative in the question of peaceful unification. This attitude shows a fine contrast with the intransigence of North Korea which has rejected all our peace-oriented offers.

As our proposals for the new peaceful unification formula and the subsequent 20 pilot projects have drawn growing support both at home and abroad, and as their rejection, on the excuse of stereotyped "preconditions," of the two proposals has come under worldwide accusation, North Korea came to lay down on February 10 the idea of a "joint meeting between South and North Korean politicians" in a statement issued in the name of the so-called Com-

mittee for Peaceful Unification of the Fatherland.

One thing utterly incomprehensible in their offer was that they themselves hand-picked 50 dissidents who would “represent the South at the joint meeting,” while arguing that the government authorities, political parties and social organizations of the South cannot be the other party in a dialogue.

As Minister Sohn pointed out in his proposal statement, it is unprecedentedly nonsensical and brazen-faced for the North Koreans to attempt to decide who should represent the South in dialogue. Their underlying objective must be to undermine our new unification formula and mislead public opinion at home and abroad. But it can only be a case of miscalculation for them to attempt to mislead the views of the world community.

In the latest proposal, however, our government showed a bold magnanimity by showing willingness to include even their poorly conceived idea of a “joint meeting between South and North Korean politicians” among the items subject for discussion at the proposed high-level meeting.

Our delegation was formed in a way that comprised representatives of government authorities, both majority and minority political parties and the Advisory Council on Peaceful Unification Policy so that it could reflect the broad opinions of our people. We further suggested that North Korea choose its delegates totally at its own discretion.

Now, the only choice left for the North Koreans is to show a sincere response to our offer. We wish to point out once again that if they reject the latest proposal too, they would never be able to avoid the historical judgement that it is North Korea which is totally to blame for perpetual national division.

Meanwhile, Japanese newspapers, too, highly appraised the realistic justness of the proposal for a high-level delegates' meeting. Handling the news of Minister Sohn's proposal as the top story of their foreign news pages, Japanese dailies said the overture seemed designed to realize concretely the Formula for National Reconciliation and Democratic Unification proposed earlier by Presi-

dent Chun Doo Hwan. The proposal, they reported, also suggested that any inter-Korean negotiations should be undertaken by none but government authorities of the two sides.

2. Statement Calls on North Korea to Agree to High-Level Delegates' Meeting

Minister of National Unification Sohn Jae-shik, noting that North Korea has yet to show any official response to his February 25 proposal for a South and North Korean high-level delegates' meeting, urged the North Koreans on March 26 to accept the proposal at an early date.

In a statement, Minister Sohn said, "If North Korea is truly interested in peaceful unification and wishes to settle through dialogue issues pending between the South and the North, they ought to demonstrate their sincerity by agreeing to hold a high-level delegates' meeting and discussing their ideas with us, rather than paying lip service to exchanges and cooperation, and should accept the 20 pilot projects and cooperate in improving inter-Korean relations and promoting national reconciliation."

Minister Sohn also said that inasmuch as the various issues pending between the South and the North and the question of Korea's future must be settled through dialogue, the government again urges North Korea to stop looking for excuses not to talk with the south and instead come to the forum of dialogue as soon as possible.

The full text of Minister Sohn's statement urging North Korea to accept the offer for a high-level delegates' meeting was as follows:

On February 25, the Republic of Korea proposed to North Korea to hold a high-level meeting in Seoul, Pyongyang or Panmunjom within the month of March. We suggested that the agenda include:

- the question of holding a meeting between the top leaders of South and North Korea to organize a Consultative Conference for National Reunification for the*

- drafting of a constitution of a unified Korea and also to promote the normalization of relations between the South and the North;*
- the question of the meeting proposed by North Korea on February 10, 1982; and*
 - various issues that must be urgently settled to promote exchanges, cooperation, the opening of the two societies to each other and the relaxation of tension between the South and the North.*

We also suggested that each delegation to the meeting be composed of nine delegates headed by a cabinet-rank official. At that time, we published the list of the Republic of Korea delegation, indicating that we were prepared to meet promptly whenever the North Koreans agreed.

In making the proposal we intended to express our earnest desire to improve inter-Korean relations and to explore any possible peaceful avenue to unification. The proposal was comprehensive and constructive, indicating a willingness to discuss the North Korean demands as well as the question of holding a meeting between the top leaders of South and North Korea in keeping with President Chun's formula to achieve national reconciliation and democratic unification.

It is regrettable, however, that this late in the month, we have still not had an affirmative response from North Korea. Moreover, North Korea has not accepted our proposal to begin 20 pilot projects even though they have said that the suggested projects include some of their own ideas. It is contradictory of them to refuse to undertake the pilot projects while at the same time crying for inter-Korean exchanges and cooperation.

If North Korea is truly interested in peaceful unification and wishes to settle through dialogue all the issues pending between the South and the North, they ought to demonstrate their sincerity by holding a high-level meeting and discussing their ideas with us. Rather than paying lip service to exchanges and cooperation between the South and the North, they should

accept the 20 pilot projects and cooperate in improving inter-Korean relations and promoting national reconciliation.

In as much as the various issues pending between the South and the North and the question of Korea's future must be settled through dialogue, we again urge North Korea to stop looking for excuses not to talk with us and instead come to the forum of dialogue as soon as possible.

We want to make it very clear that even if North Korea is unable for whatever reason to hold a high-level meeting in March, we will keep the door to dialogue open at all times. We hope that North Korea will respond affirmatively and that we will be able to hold a high-level meeting at an early date.

The above statement served to assure the North Koreans once again of the South's firm determination to arrange an inter-Korean conference by all available means. Also by letting it be known clearly that even if the proposed meeting failed to take place in March as originally suggested, the Republic of Korea would nevertheless keep the door to dialogue open at all times, the statement was intended to prompt the North Koreans to do away with their intransigence and come forward to the forum of dialogue at an early date.

3. Resolution by Advisory Council on Peaceful Unification Policy

The Advisory Council on Peaceful Unification Policy marked its first anniversary on June 5, 1982. In a message sent to a ceremony marking the first anniversary, President Chun Doo Hwan, the concurrent chairman of the Advisory Council, expressed his sincere appreciation to the members of the Council for the dedicated efforts they are making to accomplish the great task of unification both at home and abroad. The President reminded them that the Advisory Council was inaugurated as a constitutional body at the time of the birth of the Fifth Republic as part of the national resolve to pursue peaceful unification as the nation's primary goal.

President Chun went on to say in the message that it was under the inaugural spirit of the Advisory Council that he sought to explore a new horizon in the realization of peaceful unification by proposing contacts between the top leaders of the two sides, and laying down the Formula for National Reconciliation and Democratic Unification. The President deplored that the North Koreans, nevertheless, had turned a deaf ear to his reasonable and just offers in their blind pursuit of the communization of all Korea by force of arms.

The President said that North Korea, in their divisive and confrontational attitude, has showed no affirmative response to any of the numerous overtures the South has made in a bid to ease the sufferings stemming from territorial division. "Nonetheless, we shall never be frustrated nor give up our efforts in despair," President Chun stressed.

The President also cautioned the people against their possible lapse of memory about the past, namely, about the reality of national division, about the sufferings of the North Korean brethren, and about the mission of unification. He then stressed that the people must further harden their resolve toward unification, and focus their thoughts and conduct upon the goal of national unification, based on thorough recognition of the importance and urgency of unification.

The following is the text of President Chun's message sent to the ceremony marking the first anniversary of the founding of the Advisory Council on Peaceful Unification Policy:

Members of the Advisory Council on Peaceful Unification Policy,

On the first anniversary of the Advisory Council on Peaceful Unification Policy, which is the centripetal body of national unification, I wish to first extend my sincere appreciation and congratulations to you for the dedicated efforts you have made at home and abroad to accomplish the great task of national unification.

I join the people in felicitating you that over a short span of time, the Advisory Council has successfully formed its nationwide organization and has become able to move solidly onward step by step toward peaceful unification, pooling the will and energies of the whole people.

We inaugurated the Advisory Council on Peaceful Unification Policy as a constitutional body at the time of the birth of the Fifth Republic as a manifestation of our determination to make the realization of peaceful unification of the fatherland the primary goal of national policies, and to accomplish it at an early date, in compliance with the unvarying wishes of our 60 million brethren.

You members, therefore, are pioneers in the exploration of our national history, who have united with one another around the lofty ideal of national unification, transcending difference in regions, occupations and partisan interests.

Members of the Advisory Council,

We have made untiring efforts to achieve peaceful unification in line with the national resolve with which the Advisory Council was inaugurated.

Following the proposals for mutual visits and a meeting between the top leaders of the South and North Korean authorities, which I made in my 1981 policy statement and my address at the opening of the Advisory Council respectively, I put forward last January the Formula for National Reconciliation and Democratic Unification, thus unfolding a new horizon in the effort to realize unification.

However, the North Korean Communists continue to turn their deaf ears to our reasonable and justifiable proposals, while nursing a daydream to communize all Korea.

They have showed no affirmative response to any of the many overtures we have advanced to alleviate sufferings from national division. They simply keep on bolstering their nation-splitting and confrontational attitude.

But we will never be frustrated or resign ourselves.

We firmly believe that no logic of national division, egoistic attachment or hatred can deceive people for long, and that the history of nations and mankind moves forward toward the universal values of harmony and peace.

I am positive that the North Korean Communists won't be able to look away from this flow of history for ever. The day will surely come when they will be obliged to accept the reality of ripening conditions for national reconciliation and peaceful unification.

Still, we cannot simply wait for such a day with our arms folded. History sides not with bystanders but with those who work hard with firm resolve.

We can become the genuine subject of unification and national history only when we accept the historical task of national unification not as others' business but as our own, and take it not as the remote future's business but as just today's.

At the same time, we must coolly examine ourselves as to whether we are not oblivious, unknowingly, of the abnormal state of national division in the lapse of the long period of 37 years.

What we must guard against at this moment are firstly our forgetting the reality of national division; secondly our forgetting the suffering of our North Korean brethren, and thirdly our forgetting of our mission of unification.

While we alert ourselves against this possible forgetfulness, we must further harden our resolve for unification.

Unification cannot be a task that can be carried forward from our generation to the next or from the current 20th Century to the 21st.

If unification were delayed over a protracted time, national heterogeneity would further deepen, making it more difficult and time-consuming to realize unification. Even if unification were achieved, it would be that much more difficult to restore our national homogeneity.

Based, therefore, on our thorough recognition of the need and urgency of unification, we must focus our thoughts, conduct and objectives on the unification of the fatherland.

I am convinced that when you members of the Advisory Council fulfill your pioneering role, true to such self-awakening, it will surely come to shining fruition.

Expecting that you members of the Advisory Council would exert redoubled efforts for the sake of the glorious day of national unification, I wish you and your families continued happiness.

*Chun Doo Hwan, President
Chairman
Advisory Council on Peaceful Unification Policy*

Meanwhile, during the first anniversary ceremony, the members of the Advisory Council adopted a resolution calling upon North Korea to agree to a meeting between the top leaders of South and North Korea in compliance with President Chun's resolve for peaceful unification as shown in his message to the Advisory Council. The text of the resolution was as follows:

Our Advisory Council on Peaceful Unification Policy was inaugurated on June 5 last year as a supra-partisan, nationwide advisory organization on unification policy, which is aimed at pooling the people's will to unification and helping facilitate the peaceful unification of the fatherland.

At the historic inaugural ceremony of the Advisory Council on Peaceful Unification Policy, President Chun Doo Hwan proposed a meeting between the top leaders of the South and North Korean with a view to providing a breakthrough in the inter-Korean dialogue. Further on January 22 this year, President Chun laid down the comprehensive Formula for National Reconciliation and Democratic Unification, setting forth concretely a reasonable method of achieving peaceful unification between the divided nation and proposing to North Korea that

the Formula be discussed open-heartedly at a meeting between the top leaders of South and North Korea.

In the Formula, President Chun suggested that a Consultative Conference for National Reunification be formed with participants from the two sides representing the views of the residents in their respective areas, which would draft a unified constitution, presenting the terms and conditions of a unified democratic Republic committed to the ideals of nationalism, democracy, liberty and individual well-being. The President further proposed that when such a unified constitution is drafted, it be made into law through free, democratic referendums held throughout the whole areas of South and North Korea, and that the unification of the country can then be accomplished by organizing a unified legislature and establishing a unified government through general elections held under the unified constitution.

The Formula also envisages a set of practical arrangements pending the time of unification, which were intended to transform the self-injurious and unnatural relations between the South and the North into self-regarding normal relations that can lead to the realization of national reconciliation.

Specifically, President Chun proposed to North Korea the conclusion of a Provisional Agreement on Basic Relations between South and North Korea featuring 1) maintenance of mutual relations based on the principle of equality and reciprocity, 2) peaceful solution of disputes through dialogue, 3) recognition of each other's system and non-interference in each other's internal affairs, 4) maintenance of the existing armistice structure, desisting from the arms race, and removal of the state of military confrontation, 5) promotion of the opening of each society through mutual exchanges and cooperation, 6) respect for each other's international treaties and agreements pending the time of unification, and 7) opening of a liaison mission in each other's area,

However, North Korea has rejected our Formula for Na-

tional Reconciliation and Democratic Unification and all other ideas of dialogue between the South and the North. On the occasion of the first anniversary of the Advisory Council on Peaceful Unification Policy, we renew once again our profound duty and, pooling together the wishes of all the people, hereby resolve as follows:

— We reaffirm that the Formula for National Reconciliation and Democratic Unification announced by President Chun Doo Hwan is the most reasonable means of realizing independently, democratically and peacefully the unification of the fatherland aspired to by our people.

— We call upon North Korea to rectify their divisive attitude of rejecting the inter-Korean dialogue on unjustifiable excuses and to respond affirmatively to the holding of a meeting between the top leaders of the South and North Korean authorities at an early date, so as to discuss the question of realizing the Formula for National Reconciliation and Democratic Unification.

— We call upon North Korea to accept our government's proposal for 20 pilot projects at an early date and realize exchanges and cooperation between the South and the North, thereby removing the sufferings and inconveniences of the people resulting from national division, and spurring national reconciliation.

— We pledge to fulfill our mission in advancing the peaceful unification of the fatherland by expanding our national strength through national unity and by pooling together all the people's aspirations for unification.

June 5, 1982

Members

Advisory Council on

Peaceful Unification Policy

Part II

Deceptive Offer for Dialogue by North Korea

1. Call for “Joint Meeting between South and North Korean Politicians”

On February 10, 1982, North Korea issued a statement in the name of the “Committee for Peaceful Unification of the Fatherland,” in which they turned down the Formula for National Reconciliation and Democratic Unification and 20 pilot projects, both proposed by the Republic of Korea, unfoundedly denouncing them as “divisive theories,” and instead demanded the convocation of a so-called “joint meeting between South and North Korean politicians.” The North Korean statement read in part:

“... The idea of general elections which (those in power in South Korea) recently put forward is a mere doctrinairism taken from a political science textbook. The Provisional Agreement on Basic Relations between South and North Korea they suggested is a means of dividing the nation into two states forever. The so-called 20 pilot projects allegedly designed to facilitate their realization, too, were nothing new. Most of them are no more than a fraction of the ideas we have historically laid down for collaboration and exchanges between the South and the North....

“The thing that becomes most urgent in the solution of the unification issue is to solve correctly the question of negotiations between the North and the South... In view of the serious historical lesson taught in the past South-North dialogue, those who are currently in power in South Korea have no place at the table of negotiation.... The political parties and social organizations of South Korea, too, cannot become the other party in unification conference under present conditions.

“The path to unification talks which we can choose at least under the present political conditions of South Korea lies in the arrangement of a joint meeting attended by noted politicians with national conscience in the North, the South and abroad....

We, therefore, propose the convocation of a joint meeting among North and South Korean and oversea politicians as a body for negotiations.

“Individual politicians committed to national unification and salvation can participate in the joint meeting regardless of their past. Its size may well be about 100 persons in all, 50 each from the North and the South including oversea personages. This joint meeting shall not be a bilateral conference between the North and the South but be a multi-lateral round-table meeting designed to discuss the issue of unification irrespective of the areas where the attendees reside and their affiliation.

“The joint meeting should open-heartedly discuss all the possible ideas of unification, including the formula for the establishment of a Democratic Confederal Republic of Koryo and, at the same time, study the issue of materializing collaboration and exchanges between the North and the South in linkage with unification idea...”

“Those in power in South Korea should not prevent politicians from attending the meeting, should release those politicians serving in prisons, should restore freedom of political activities for all politicians, and should guarantee all the conditions necessary for their attendance at the meeting...”

* At the end of the statement, North Korea publicized the list of 50 persons each from the South and the North who, it said, would attend the meeting.

Several characteristics can be seen in this North Korean proposal, in which they rejected the South's new unification formula as a “divisive scheme” and instead offered a meeting of 100 politicians from the South, the North and abroad to “discuss the confederation idea and other unification issues,” with all the 100 attendees hand-picked by the North Koreans themselves.

First, on the question of parties to a dialogue, North Korea displayed an utterly intransigent attitude by insisting that they cannot come in contact even with the constitutional political parties

and social organizations of the Republic of Korea.

In their statement, ostensibly issued not by the Pyongyang authorities but by a social organization called "Committee for Peaceful Unification of the Fatherland," North Korea unprecedentedly argued that "none of the existing political parties and social organizations in the South, not to speak of its government authorities, can be a party to the unification conference." This was a step farther from their past stand advocating a "political conference exclusive of authorities."

Second, the structure of the so-called "joint meeting of South and North Korean politicians," the core of their proposal, was highly unique.

They were scheming to make the proposed meeting a forum of political propaganda by insisting that 50 persons from each of the two sides attend the meeting on an individual basis, though the meeting was supposed to cover the representation of political parties, social organizations and Korean communities abroad, as was the case with the "political conference" they suggested in the past.

North Korea suggested a "multi-lateral round-table meeting" as the form of the suggested meeting. This, according to them, was to prompt the attendees from both sides to act according to their own individual judgement without any sense of affiliation.

Moreover, by suggesting that the proposed meeting discuss the "confederation idea, all other unification formulas, and the question of collaboration and exchanges," North Korea sought to recover from their fallen image suffered due to their intransigence in the inter-Korean issue. In other words, they wanted to feign to be so broad-minded and eager about inter-Korean contacts as to be willing to include even the South's proposals for a new unification formula and 20 pilot inter-Korean projects in the topics of the "joint meeting."

Third, the lineup of the 100 "attendees" North Korea unilaterally chose indicates that although the meeting, according to them, was non-governmental, the delegates from the North were all those in the very core of the North Korean power structure, including Kim

11, the third highest figure in the all-powerful Workers' Party.

In contrast, the 50 southern "delegates" they hand-picked were mostly those denied political activities, those serving prison terms, old politicians excluded from the incumbent government, and radical dissidents. They even include some ghost figures like "Lee Chong-sang" who they argued would represent, from the southern side, the ghost "Unification Revolutionary Party," trying to play up the "existence" of a non-existent political body which North Korea ridiculously claims is operating in the South.

In addition, 13 of the 14 southern "delegates" from abroad were known as anti-Seoul and pro-Pyongyang personages like Choi Hong-hi, Choi Tuk-shin, Kim Chae-hwa and Pae Tong-ho. North Korea was attempting to secure a numerical edge at the proposed meeting by making their own men "represent the people of South Korea" there.

In another deceptive move, they included four active South Korean politicians among the 50 southern "delegates" but introduced them only by their former titles, in an apparent attempt to make themselves appear not altogether to shut off contacts with presently active South Korean politicians.

2. Ulterior Motives behind Call for Joint Politicians Meeting

North Korea's proposal for a so-called "joint meeting between South and North Korean politicians" was a poorly devised scheme to undermine the justness of the South's Formula for National Reconciliation and Democratic Unification. In a circumstance where they had no devices to counter the highly popular new unification formula and the 20 pilot projects offered from the South, North Korea hastily put forth the call for a joint politicians' meeting to feign concern about dialogue while shunning any direct reaction to the South's proposals.

In their latest proposal too, the North Koreans renewed their stereotyped assertions about "social conditions and environment" of

the South and levelled interfering slanders over the “political situation of South Korea,” trying to shift the blame for the breakup of the dialogue to the South and to smoke-screen their own intransigence.

North Korea unilaterally chose and made public list of so-called 50 South Korean “delegates” to the “joint politicians’ meeting.” Could there have been any instance in the world in which a party to a negotiation hand-picked the representatives of the other party? Moreover, they rejected the representation of political parties and social organizations, let alone government authorities, of the Republic of Korea, while filling up the 50 “southern delegates” with a considerable number of convicts, pro-Pyongyang residents abroad and even the “representative” of the non-existent “Unification Revolutionary Party.” This testifies clearly that their proposal was not intended in any way for a dialogue.

Besides, by asserting that the “joint politicians’ meeting” would not be a bilateral meeting but a multilateral round-table conference between individual politicians, the North Koreans themselves let it be known that the “joint politicians’ meeting” would not be a genuine inter-Korean dialogue but a treacherous gathering of the same nature as the “South-North political conference,” grand national conference” or “meeting to expedite national unification” they have demanded in the past, only under a different name this time.

A study of their major assertions renders their duplicity all the more obvious.

*a. Question of “Conditions and Environment”
(Democratization)*

North Korea has been insisting that “conditions and environment harmful to free discussion and materialization of unification should be rectified.” They first posed the demand for the improvement of “conditions and environment” at the Red Cross talks held in the early 1970s to solve humanitarian questions, when they argued

that “for the sake of the Red Cross project, no atmosphere should be fostered against communism in South Korea.” Such a demand was later reiterated often as one of “prerequisites” to the resumption of the dialogue, namely, “to solve the unification issue, the South Korean society should be democratized first.”

In their insistence on the so-called “improvement of conditions and environment (democratization),” North Korea demands specifically that:

- All laws against communism, including the Anti-Communist Law, should be repealed in South Korea;
 - All organizations and institutions engaged in opposing North Korea and communism should be abolished;
 - All activities against communism should be terminated;
 - All “democratic personages” imprisoned should be released;
- and
- Free political activities should be guaranteed to all political parties and social organizations including the “Unification Revolutionary Party.”

But their call for the “improvement of conditions and environment” or for the “democratization of the South Korean society” amounts to turning upside-down the procedural order of peaceful unification. For their insistence can only be taken to derive from their strategy to foment a “revolution” in South Korea, a strategy that calls for “a revolution in the South first, and unification under communism later.”

(* North Korea contends that only when a regime opposing communism steps down and a “democratic regime sympathetic to communism” comes into being in the South to “democratize” the South Korean society, can “independent and peaceful unification be realized successfully through a unity between the socialist forces of the Northern People’s Republic and the patriotic democratic forces of South Korea.” (See *Keunroja*, “Democratization of South Korean Society Is an Urgent Demand for Sake of Unification of the Fatherland” (Pyongyang: North Korean Workers’ Party

Publishing Co., December, 1978, p. 53)

In fact, the “democratization” and “democratic personages” North Korea refers to so often mean none but “communization” and “Communists” or “Communist sympathizers.” It also is obvious that the “democracy” North Korea discusses does not mean the human ideals of liberty and equality but communism; that is, “proletariat democracy.”

(* North Korea divides democracy into “bourgeoisie democracy” and “proletariat democracy.” They assert, “proletariat democracy which can come into being upon the base of the fundamental liquidation of bourgeoisie democracy, is the highest form of democracy, in which dictatorship is exercised toward the minority-exploiting class and democracy is practiced for workers and other broad working people.” As can be seen here, the “democracy” they talk about does not mean the democracy with its basic spirit resting on liberty and equality, which are the general concepts of the West, but points to proletariat democracy implemented through proletariat dictatorship. (*Political Dictionary*, North Korean Social Science Publishing Co., December 1973, p. 1,177)

Therefore, although North Korea ostensibly says they demand the “improvement of conditions and environment” for the sake of peaceful solution of the unification issue, their message, in fact, is that they would not deal with the incumbent government of the Republic of Korea until “the present system of the South is overthrown through violent revolution in favor of a Communist or pro-Communist regime.”

As a matter of genuine democracy, North Korea is least in the position even to discuss it. To force through Kim Il-sung’s “one-man dictatorship,” they deny freedom of speech, publication, assembly and organization, and even freedom of residence and occupation, not to speak of the freedom of thought and faith. Moreover, they tightly control people in total disregard of human rights, turning the society of North Korea into a *de facto* armed camp. They brand as “harmful elements” those whom they consider harmful to their

“one-man dictatorship” and intern them in concentration camps which they call “special dictatorship districts.” The inmates of such concentration camps are known to number about 100,000. What is more, they attempt to extend the 37-year “one-man dictatorship” generation after generation by scheming to institute a hereditary power succession system unparalleled in the Communist world.

*b. Question of “Exchanges” and “Cooperation”
(Collaboration)*

North Korea asserts that “many-sided collaboration and exchanges” should be carried out in various fields such as politics, military, diplomacy, economy and culture between the two sides in order to improve the inter-Korean relations and expedite unification. They insist that “multi-faceted collaboration and exchanges would be highly significant in restoring the severed national relationship and preparing preconditions to unification, and would also constitute an important momentum to dismantling the barrier of territorial division and achieving a grand national unity.”

However, when the Republic of Korea, at a meeting of the South-North Coordinating Committee, suggested exchanges and cooperation to facilitate the mutual opening of the two sides’ societies, North Korea rejected them, demanding that the South should first meet “preconditions” such as the renunciation of anti-Communist policy. North Korea was also demanding “political and military collaboration” ahead of collaboration in other fields, especially the “solution of military issues on a priority basis.”

North Korea has since turned down offers for exchanges and cooperation between the two divided halves. They rejected the latest Republic of Korea proposal for 20 pilot projects, too, arguing, “They are nothing new. Most of them are just part of the ideas we proposed in the past for the sake of inter-Korean collaboration and exchanges. They are simply designed to keep up national split.”

However, in order to achieve national unification, it is most important for the South and the North to explore dialogue, exchanges

and cooperation, and thereby foster mutual trust and restore national solidarity, materializing national reconciliation concretely in all sectors of national life.

Both South and North Korea solemnly pledged before the people in the South-North Joint Communiqué that they would engage in mutual exchanges and cooperation for national solidarity and restoration of national trust (Article 3, South-North Joint Communiqué, July 4, 1972). They further agreed to establish five subcommittees — political, military, foreign affairs, economic and cultural — under the Coordinating Committee to manage exchanges and cooperation (Agreed Minute on Formation & Operation of South-North Coordinating Committee, November 4, 1972). Therefore, the implementation of inter-Korean exchanges and cooperation stands today as an exigent task that has to be undertaken for both ultimate national unification and the fulfilling of what has been agreed on between the two sides.

From this basic standpoint, the Republic of Korea has proposed a series of measures of exchanges and cooperation. But none of them has been materialized, due to the North Koreans' rejection.

When the question of exchanges and cooperation was about to enter a stage of substantial discussion at the Coordinating Committee meetings in the early 1970s, North Korea demanded "repeal of anti-Communist policy" in the South and posed other nonsensical "preconditions," demanding the initial solution of any "military issue" in a bid to shatter any chance for such exchanges and cooperation.

In the meantime, while insisting that their idea of a confederation system is the only conceivable means of ultimate unification, North Korea nevertheless maintains that inter-Korean exchanges and cooperation can be realized only after a confederation is instituted. In other words, the North Koreans are arguing that they cannot agree to any exchanges or cooperation before the *de facto* communization of all Korea, an attitude which belies their assertion that "many-sided collaboration and exchanges are prerequisite to unification."

Similarly, North Korea, reacting to the 20 pilot inter-Korean projects offered by the South, described them as “a mere part of the ideas we have already suggested.” Nevertheless, they denounced them as “having been intended to keep up national split,” displaying their self-contradiction. Still, they argued that the question of exchanges and cooperation should be discussed at a “joint meeting between South and North Korean politicians” which they proposed.

In response, the Republic of Korea proposed a high-level delegates’ meeting to take up the issues of exchanges and cooperation, opening of both societies to each other and even the question of the North Korean call for a “joint meeting between South and North Korean politicians.” However, the North rejected this, too, thus making it clear that they are least interested in any inter-Korean exchanges and cooperation, and that their idea of “discussing exchanges and cooperation through a joint politicians’ meeting” was a mere propaganda piece designed to cushion public censure for their refusal of the offer for exchanges and cooperation.

c. Question of Schismatic Policy

When a gap between the two sides’ approaches to the Korean question started to emerge conspicuously at the third plenary meeting of the South-North Coordinating Committee in March 1973, North Korea began to accuse the South of pursuing a “scheme to perpetuate national split.” In particular, they condemned the Republic of Korea’s Special Foreign Policy Statement Regarding Peace and Unification of June 23, 1973 as a “divisive policy.” They said, “This is an anti-national act of the South Korean authorities trying to forge not a single unified Korea but two split Koreas... This criminal paper featuring a call for the simultaneous entry of the South and the North into the United Nations openly declares and makes a policy the road to two Koreas which they have pursued in secret.”

Thereafter, North Korea has taken every opportunity to accuse the Republic of Korea of “seeking the perpetualization of national

division while calling for a dialogue with confrontation, a competition with dialogue and coexistence with dialogue behind the superficial slogan of peaceful unification." They also charged the South with concentrating all energies upon military buildup.

Concerning the suggestion for the conclusion of a Provisional Agreement on Basic Relations between South and North Korea contained in the Formula for National Reconciliation and Democratic Unification of January 22, 1982, North Korea denounced it as a "repetition of the divisive June 23 statement, which is intended only to legally fix the present reality of national division and thereby perpetuate two states and two nations." The subsequent offer for 20 pilot projects made by the Republic of Korea Minister of National Unification on February 1, 1982, too, was condemned by the North Koreans. Their charge this time: "Their call for some pilot projects itself is only aimed not at throwing wide open the gate between the South and the North, and accelerating unification, but at keeping up national split."

To the contrary, however, it is the North Koreans' conduct that is divisive. For they are the very ones who reject the path to peaceful unification through dialogue, sow the seeds of discord between the same people, and stand in the way of reconciliation. The history of the past 37 years' national division clearly testifies that North Korea is to be blamed for the protracted division.

On November 4, 1947, the third United Nations General Assembly adopted a resolution calling for a general election in all parts of the Korean peninsula in proportion to indigenous population and the formation of a Temporary U.N. Commission on Korea to supervise such an election. This was the first opportunity ever given to the Koreans for their peaceful unification. But North Korea rejected it outright.

(* On September 17, 1947, the third U.N. General Assembly adopted the Korean question as an agendum, and referred it to the First Committee for consideration, and adopted on November 14, 1947 a resolution (General Assembly Resolution 112 (II)) providing that 1) general elections were to be

held in all parts of the Korean peninsula not later than March 31, 1948 on the basis of adult universal suffrage and by direct and secret vote under the supervision of the United Nations to form a national assembly in proportion to indigenous population, with authority to establish a national government, 2) all alien forces were to be withdrawn following the establishment of a national government, and 3) a U.N. Commission on Korea would be formed to observe the general elections. But North Korea opposed this resolution of the U.N. General Assembly.)

This is among the most express evidence substantiating which side is responsible for rejecting the rare opportunity for unification and causing the national sufferings and misfortunes of territorial division and national split to persist to date.

Moreover, the three-year fratricidal war caused by the North Korean invasion in 1950 was the decisive seed of mutual antagonism and distrust. At least before the Korean War, the scars of antagonism and distrust were not so deep. This makes self-evident which side is the division monger. Besides, the various armed provocations and atrocities North Korea perpetrates only heighten tensions and further deepen misunderstanding and distrust between the same people.

In the past 37 years, North Korea has built a closed society totally insulated from the outside, remodeling their people into diehard Communists under the so-called "monolithic ideological system." As a result of this human remodeling, a hostile confrontation persists between the societies of the same people, with substantial heterogeneity progressing in all realms and areas of the national life. A really horrible state is evolving, in which the basic historical and cultural identity of the Korean people is at serious stake. This cannot but be taken as yet another act prompting national split.

In the Formula for National Reconciliation and Democratic Unification he laid down on January 22, 1982, President Chun Doo Hwan suggested the formulation of a unified constitution to expedite peaceful unification of the divided fatherland. President

Chun proposed that to draft such a unified constitution, a Consultative Conference for National Unification be formed with participants from the two sides representing the views of the residents of their respective areas. Disclosing a plan to present the South's draft of a constitution when the Consultative Conference is formed, the President asked North Korea to produce their own version so that the two versions might be forged into a single draft.

If North Korea had accepted the southern offer to formulate a unified constitution, a much hoped-for unified state could be established smoothly. Nevertheless, North Korea turned it down on the excuse of the so-called "preconditions," blocking again the road to the solution of the Korean question. This was the very divisive attitude of perpetuating national division.

Both the Special Foreign Policy Statement Regarding Peace and Unification and the proposed Provisional Agreement on Basic Relations between South and North Korea, which North Korea denounces as "divisive schemes," rest on the principle of peace and harmony, the key conditions of national unification. In view of the situation surrounding the Korean peninsula and the distrust accumulated between the two sides of Korea, it is quite natural that measures for peace and harmony, such as a mutual door opening policy toward countries having a stake in Korea, prevention of war in Korea and promotion of exchanges and cooperation, should be taken internally and externally for the sake of peaceful unification. They are sincere overtures intended only to advance unification rather than being "divisive schemes" as the North Koreans charge.

The North has rejected the South's proposal for 20 inter-Korean pilot projects, denouncing them as "aimed at keeping up national split," though they describe the suggested projects as an "extremely small part of the proposals we have already offered." If this logic can stand, then their own proposals for various ideas of exchanges and cooperation were advanced simply to foment national split. This is another show of their self-contradiction.

Moreover, when the Republic of Korea did not reject their call for a "joint meeting between South and North Korean politicians"

despite its absurdity, and offered to hold a high-level delegates' meeting to discuss their idea of a "joint meeting" and other issues, North Korea turned it down, too, indicating that what they are really after is not a dialogue but propaganda gains.

d. Issue of Responsibility for Breakup of Dialogue

North Korea asserts that their basic policy toward the question of national unification is to "solve it through dialogue and negotiations on a peaceful and democratic basis." They say that they entered a dialogue with the South in the early 1970s, 1979 and early 1980 in the hope of realizing unification, only to see the talks break up without any affirmative results. They then contend that the reason for the failure lay not in the difference in opinion over procedural or technical problems, but in the act of betrayal on the part of South Korea which "tenaciously pursued a divisive policy even at the forum of dialogue intended for realizing unification, and thereby stood in the way of any progress of the dialogue."

They also argue that "although South Korea had come to the table of dialogue, unable to withstand the pressure of internal and external public opinion supporting our reasonable proposal with respect to unification, they used the dialogue not to advance unification but as a means of solidifying national split." They go on to charge that "behind the curtain of the dialogue, South Korea played up its anti-Communist policy, heated up slanderous propaganda against us, the other side in the dialogue, and aroused the sense of military confrontation, thus building up tensions, obstructing any progress in the dialogue, and shattering the dialogue itself."

Contrary to their argument, the North Koreans themselves are to be blamed for the suspension and breakup of the inter-Korean dialogue held in several channels. North Korea began to torpedo the dialogue when it was about to enter the stage of substantial progress.

On August 28, 1973 when both the South-North Red Cross Conference and the South-North Coordinating Committee were under-

way, North Korea suddenly suspended the two-channel dialogue in the “Kim Young-joo Statement.” The Red Cross working-level meetings and the vice chairman’s meetings of the Coordinating Committee, opened subsequently as a result of the untiring effort of the Republic of Korea to resume the suspended dialogue, also came

Instances of North Korean Breakoff of Dialogue

Classification	Date	Contents
Meetings of South-North Coordinating Committee	August 28, 1973	Suspended in a statement issued by Kim Young-joo, Pyongyang-side co-chairman of South-North Coordinating Committee.
Full-dress meetings of South-North Red Cross Conference	August 28, 1973	Suspended in a statement issued by Kim Young-joo, Pyongyang-side co-chairman of South-North Coordinating Committee.
Vice Chairman's Meetings of South-North Coordinating Committee	May 29, 1975	Pyongyang-side vice chairman notifies the South in a radio message of indefinite postponement of 11th vice chairmen's meeting slated for May 30.
Working-level Meetings of South-North Red Cross Conference	March 19, 1978	Notification in a radio message of indefinite postponement of 26th working-level meeting scheduled for March 20.
Working-level contacts for prime ministers' meeting	September 24, 1980	North Korean working-level delegation in a statement notifies the South of its one-sided decision to postpone the 11th working-level contact slated for September 26 indefinitely.

to an end before long with terse notifications of indefinite postponement.

Moreover, at the anomalous contacts held in 1979, North Korea unilaterally declared the loss of the *raison d'être* of the South-North Coordinating Committee born of Article 6 of the South-North Joint communique and the Agreed Minute on Establishment and Operation of South-North Coordinating Committee. They thus attempted to scrap even an official paper duly agreed on between the two sides.

Their destructive maneuver did not end here. They broke off the working-level delegates' meeting, as well, designed to prepare for a contact between the prime ministers of the two sides, which were initiated at a time when the South was plunged into a political and social unrest following the assassination of President Park Chung Hee. On September 24, 1980 around the time when stability had been restored, North Korea announced in a radio broadcast that they would put off indefinitely the 11th working-level delegates meeting due two days later, betraying once again the unvarying aspiration of the 60 million people for unification.

The fundamental cause of the rupture of all contacts was that they hoped to use the dialogue only as a means of psychological warfare, that is, a means of pushing a Communist revolution in the South. Taking advantage of the dialogue, they sought to create conditions ripe for communization of all Korea by undermining the anti-Communist posture of the South, causing split in public opinion, and prompting the withdrawal of American forces from Korea.

e. Issue of Representation in Dialogue

In proposing a dialogue, North Korea has attempted in most cases to impose its own criteria for the representation of the South, depending on times. When they proposed an "all-Korea political conference" and a "conference of the representatives of political parties and social organizations of South and North Korea" in the post-liberation era, North Korea excluded right-wing and anti-

Communist political leaders of the South from participation. Again, when they realized that the South-North Coordinating Committee formed at the government authorities' level would hardly serve their cause for the communization of all Korea, they suspended it outright and instead demanded the convocation of a "South-North political conference," "whole-nation conference" and "meeting to expedite national unification," the kind of mass-rally type meetings supposed to be attended by representatives of only those political parties and social organizations founded upon the Communist view of classes.

Lately, they have gone so far as to deny any workable inter-Korean dialogue by "disqualifying" the leaders of the existing political parties and social organizations of the Republic of Korea, let alone government authorities, from participation in any "dialogue." Following the announcement of the Formula for National Reconciliation and Democratic Unification. North Korea proposed a "joint meeting of South and North Korean politicians" attended only by those hand-picked by themselves, saying that the incumbent political parties and social organizations as well as the government authorities of the South are not "qualified to attend the meeting."

(By attempting to force through their own criterion for the South's representation in inter-Korean meetings which they proposed, North Korea tried to eliminate liberal democratic and anti-Communist personages from any dialogue, so that they themselves could take the initiative. The major instances of their attempted restriction of the South's representation were as follows.)*

Cases of Attempted Restriction of South's Representation

Type of Restriction	Suggested Meeting	Remarks
Exclusion of specific leaders of political parties and social	All-Korea political conference (April 30, 1948)	— Participation by political parties and individuals opposed to the establishment

organizations	Meeting of representatives of political parties and social organizations of South and North Korea (June 7, 1956)	<p>of the government of the Republic of Korea.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> — Exclusion of South Korean political leaders and leading figures of major right-wing conservative political parties. * Elimination of the leaders of the Korea National and Democratic National Parties, and such prominent leaders as Syngman Rhee, Lee Bum-suk, Kim Sung-soo and Shin Sung-mo.
Participation by leaders of political parties and social organizations	<p>South-North politicians' conference (April 12, 1971)</p> <p>Grand national conference (June 23, 1976)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> — Participation by individual figures of political parties and social organizations of South and North. * Participation by only those figures of political parties and social organizations acceptable to them from the Communist view of classes (workers, farmers and petit bourgeois).
Exclusion of government authorities	Meeting to expedite national unification (August 6, 1981)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> — Participation of representatives of political parties and social organizations of South and North, and overseas Korean residents. * Rally-type meeting exclusive of specific personages and political parties.
Exclusion of government authorities and leaders of existing political and social organizations	Joint meeting of South and North Korean politicians (February 10, 1982)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> — 50 South Korean "delegates" were unilaterally chosen and announced by North Korea. * The "southern delegates" include anti-Seoul and pro-Pyongyang residents abroad, convicts and figures of ghost organizations.

Given the existence of the independent political entities on the two sides committed to different ideologies and systems, the efficacy of any solution of the inter-Korean questions can be guaranteed only when such agreement is reached between the two sides' authorities which alone can be responsible for the implementation of any of such agreement. It is in recognition of this fact that the Republic of Korea has proposed talks between the authorities in the interests of constructive negotiations. The South does not insist that dialogue should be confined to the authorities alone. It is willing to allow representatives of political parties and social organizations to join authorities in talks, as was the case with the suggested high-level delegates' meeting or the Consultative Conference for National Unification envisaged in the unification formula.

However, North Korea rejects any talks between government authorities, contending that "the government of South Korea is not qualified to discuss the issue of unification." Their refusal to talk with the authorities of the South runs counter to their earlier acceptance of authorities' contacts such as the South-North Coordinating Committee and the working-level delegates' contacts to prepare for a meeting between the prime ministers of the two sides. Their alleged aversion to authorities also contradicts their earlier interest in contact of top-level authorities. Commenting on the South's proposal for a meeting between top leaders, an editorial in the *Rodong Shinmun* (mouthpiece of the workers' Party) said on February 8, 1981, "We, too, proposed the highest-level authorities' contacts earlier."

In their proposal for a "grand national conference" and a "meeting to expedite national unification" to be attended by representatives of political parties and social organizations, North Korea insisted that the representative of the so-called "Unification Revolutionary Party," a ghost which the North Koreans framed up as part of their "united front" strategy, should be included in the delegation of the South. Going a step farther lately, North Korea, in their call for a "joint meeting between South and North Korean politicians," rejected the existing political parties and social

organizations, let alone the incumbent authorities of the Republic of Korea, and instead made the unprecedented move of hand-picking the delegates of the other party to a meeting.

Their insistence on “multi-lateral round-table” talks with some convicts, pro-Pyongyang residents abroad and representative of a ghost organizations as delegates from the South clearly indicates that their ulterior motive is to subvert the anti-Communist system of the Republic of Korea before agreeing to any substantial dialogue with the South.

Part III

Tenth Anniversary of South-North Joint Communique

1. Statement by SNCC Seoul Side

Min Kwan-shik, Seoul-side acting co-chairman of the South-North Coordinating Committee (SNCC), issued a statement on July 3, 1982 on the occasion of the 10th anniversary of the issuance of the South-North Joint Communiqué, calling upon North Korea to return to the forum of dialogue to discuss inter-Korean problems open-heartedly.

“We urge North Korea to stop turning a blind eye to the wishes of the people, to regain reason and to come forward to the forum of dialogue at an early date, in keeping with the spirit of the Joint Communiqué for frank and open-minded discussions of the future of the Korean people and the various issues pending between the two sides,” he said.

Noting that the basic spirit of the Joint Communiqué lies in advancing peaceful unification of the homeland through dispelling of the misunderstandings and mistrust stemming from the prolonged estrangement and confrontation between the South and the North, the Seoul-side acting co-chairman said he is convinced that a broad avenue for peaceful unification of the fatherland will be cleared only if both South and North Korea reaffirm the spirit of the 1972 Joint Communiqué and unconditionally resume a dialogue to resolve, through discussions and negotiations, issues affecting the future of the nation and problems pending between the South and the North.

Acting co-chairman Min said the South has exerted efforts to consolidate peace on the Korean peninsula and restore mutual trust under the spirit of the South-North Joint Communiqué. Despite such sincere endeavors of the South, Min deplored, North Korea has refused to come to the conference table, while exploiting the unification issue for their political propaganda and defamation of the Republic of Korea.

The Seoul-side acting co-chairman then urged North Korea to accept soon the Formula for National Reconciliation and

Democratic Unification which the government of the Republic of Korea offered in a bid to facilitate the resumption of dialogue.

The following is the full text of the statement made by Min Kwan-shik, Seoul-side acting co-chairman of the South-North Coordinating Committee:

Today is the 10th anniversary of the historic South-North Joint Communique issued on July 4, 1972. The communique, issued simultaneously in Seoul and Pyongyang 10 years ago, inspired the entire Korean people with great expectations for the peace, stability and unification of the peninsula.

To satisfy the national yearning for the peaceful unification of the homeland at the earliest possible date, the basic spirit of the joint communique called for dispelling the misunderstanding and mistrust stemming from the prolonged estrangement and confrontation between the South and the North, as well as easing tension on the peninsula.

In pursuit of that spirit, we attempted, with all our energies and in good faith, to implement agreements reached between both sides through dialogue with the aim of securing lasting peace on the peninsula and restoring mutual trust through South-North exchange and cooperation.

On August 28, 1973, however, North Korea unilaterally discontinued its participation in the South-North Coordinating Committee that had been established and operated by mutual agreement. They have since continued to trample all South-North agreements, including the joint communique, itself.

Nevertheless, we have continued, on every possible occasion, to urge North Korea to faithfully carry out all South-North agreements concluded in the spirit of the joint communique, while at the same time reviving the South-North Coordinating Committee. North Korea, however, has persisted in denying even the existence of the committee, attempting in effect to scrap the joint communique.

We are convinced that a broad avenue for peaceful unifica-

tion of the homeland will be cleared only if both South and North Korea reaffirm the spirit of the 1972 joint communique and unconditionally resume a dialogue to resolve, through discussions and negotiations, issues affecting the future of the people and problems pending between the South and North.

Based on that conviction we have pledged renewed efforts for peaceful unification during the 1980s, and presented specific, practical proposals to create a new forum for dialogue to which we have been tirelessly urging the North to respond affirmatively.

On January 12, 1981, we proposed an exchange of visits between the top leaders of the South and the North. On June 5 last year, we suggested a South-North summit conference. We proclaimed to the world on January 22, 1982, a formula epitomizing the people's wish for unification that spelled out plans for achieving unification through national reconciliation and democratic processes. This was followed by a proposal to implement, as promptly as possible, 20 pilot projects to begin to translate the spirit of that formula into action. Furthermore, we offered a high-level South-North conference to discuss even North Korea's position on unification.

We deplore and are concerned that in spite of our sincere endeavors to advance peaceful unification, North Korea continues to use the unification issue to promote political propaganda and slander the Republic of Korea, without indicating any desire to resume the dialogue.

On the 10th anniversary of the 1972 joint communique, we once more urge the North to stop turning a blind eye to the wishes of the people, to regain reason and re-open the Seoul-Pyongyang telephone line, and to come forward to a forum of dialogue in keeping with the spirit of that communique for frank and open-minded discussions of the pending questions and the future of the Korean people.

July 4, 1982

Min Kwan Shik
Acting Co-chairman on the Seoul Side
The South-North Coordinating Committee

2. Agreements of South-North Joint Communiqué and North Korea Violations

The South-North Joint Communiqué, announced simultaneously in Seoul and Pyongyang at 10 a.m. on July 4, 1972, pointed to a path toward peaceful unification of the fatherland. In the Joint Communiqué, the two sides agreed to solve the unification issue and other inter-Korean problem through dialogue and negotiations, and to achieve the unification of the fatherland peacefully. It was signed by Lee Hu-rak, then director of the Central Intelligence Agency, from the South, and from the North by Kim Young-joo, director of the Workers' Party Organization and Guidance Department, who put their signatures to the paper "upholding the desires of their respective superiors."

The two sides stated in the Joint Communiqué that they had reached "full agreement" on the following seven points, with a view to "removing misunderstanding and mistrust, mitigating increased tensions that have arisen between the South and the North as a result of the long separation, and expediting unification of the fatherland."

1) The two sides have agreed to the following principles for unification of the fatherland:

First, unification shall be achieved through independent efforts without being subject to external imposition or interference.

Second, unification shall be achieved through peaceful means, and not through use of force against one another.

Third, a great national unity, as a homogeneous people, shall be sought first, transcending differences in ideas, ideologies and systems.

2) In order to ease tensions and foster an atmosphere of mutual trust between the South and the North, the two sides have agreed not to defame and slander one another, not to undertake armed provocations against another, whether on a large or a small scale, and to take positive measures to prevent inadvertent military incidents.

3) The two sides, in order to restore severed national ties, promote mutual understanding and to expedite an independent peaceful unification, have agreed to carry out various exchanges in many areas.

4) The two sides have agreed to cooperate positively with one another to seek an early success of the South-North Red Cross Conference, which is currently in progress amidst the fervent expectations of the entire people of Korea.

5) The two sides, in order to prevent unexpected military incidents and to cope with problems arising in the relations between the South and the North directly, promptly and accurately, have agreed to install and operate a direct telephone line between Seoul and Pyongyang.

6) The two sides, in order to implement aforementioned agreements, settle all the problems that exist in the relations between the South and the North and to solve the question of unifying the country, based on the agreed principles, have agreed to create and operate a South-North Coordinating Committee, jointly chaired by Director Lee Hu Rak and Director Kim Young Joo.

7) The two sides, firmly convinced that the aforementioned agreements correspond with the common aspirations of the entire people eager to see early unification of their fatherland, hereby solemnly pledge before the entire Korean people that they will faithfully carry out the agreements.

For brevity, the two sides agreed in the Joint Communiqué to achieve unification of the fatherland on the principles of independence, peace and broad national unity and, while maintain-

ing peace, to lay the foundation for unification by restoring national homogeneity through multi-faceted exchanges and cooperation pending the time of unification.

To materialize these principles, the two sides agreed to install and operate a direct telephone line between the South and North, to cooperate positively with one another in seeking early success of the South-North Red Cross Conference, and to create and operate a South-North Coordinating Committee as an implementation body to carry out agreements, solve all problems pending between the two sides, and settle the question of unifying the country. The two sides then "solemnly pledged before the entire Korean people" that they would faithfully carry out the agreements.

Along with the South-North Joint Communiqué, the South and the North agreed to put an official seal on the direct South-North telephone line which was in use during the exchange of high-level officials' visits between the two sides. Accordingly, the two sides prepared a separate agreement on the opening of a direct telephone line between them, making it public along with the issuance of the Joint Communiqué on July 4, 1972.

The Agreement on Installation and Operation of a South-North Direct Telephone Line states that the direct telephone service is for the two sides to cope directly, promptly and accurately with the task of achieving unification of the fatherland peacefully and independently, with problems arising in the relations between the South and the North, and with unexpected incidents between them.

The Agreement also stipulates such operating procedures as places of installation, time of operation and tests, and makes it express that the Agreement would remain in effect unless abolished through mutual agreement.

Following the issuance of the South-North Joint Communiqué, the co-chairman of the proposed South-North Coordinating Committee met at Panmunjom, Pyongyang and Seoul from October 12 through November 30, 1972 to solve various issues related to the formation and inauguration of the Coordinating Committee.

As a result, the two sides concluded the Agreed Minute on For-

mation and Operation of a South-North Coordinating Committee at the second co-chairman's meeting on November 4. Consequently, the South-North Coordinating Committee was formally inaugurated on November 30.

According to the Agreed Minute, the objective of the Coordinating Committee is to "implement the agreements spelled out in the July 4 Joint Communique, improve inter-Korean relations, undertake cooperative activities in various fields, and thus to settle the question of unifying the country on the basis of the agreed principles for unification of the fatherland."

The Agreed Minute stipulates that the Coordinating Committee has the function of deliberating and settling the question of realizing peaceful unification independently and peacefully, the question of effecting exchanges between the political parties, social organizations and individuals of the two sides, the question of facilitating economic, cultural and social exchanges and cooperation, the question of relaxing tensions, preventing armed clashes and dissolving the state of military confrontation, and the question of enhancing the national pride as a single homogeneous nation by taking joint steps in overseas activities. The Coordinating Committee's function also included the guaranteeing of the implementation of these settlements.

The Agreed Minute stipulates that the Coordinating Committee would be composed of one co-chairman, one vice chairman, one executive member and two members from each side. The number of the Committee members might be increased when deemed necessary. An executive council might be created within the Coordinating Committee to discuss and settle problems arising while the Coordinating Committee was in recess. The Agreed Minute further provides the establishment of five subcommittees — political, military, foreign affairs, economic and cultural.

Under the Agreed Minute, the plenary meetings of the Coordinating Committee were held in Seoul and Pyongyang by turn, with the first plenary session taking place in Seoul on November 30, 1972. At these plenary sessions, the Seoul side proposed early

preparation of the operating regulations for the Coordinating Committee and an Executive Council as well as the creation of a Joint Secretariat, so as to set in motion the working-level function of the Coordinating Committee at an early date. The Seoul side also suggested that in view of the reality of national division, the Coordinating Committee should first undertake projects in those non-political and non-military areas where the least factors of friction and resistance from the difference in systems and ideas were anticipated, and then move on to the political and military areas on the basis of the understanding and trust built up through initial efforts. Another proposal from the Seoul side was that, of the five subcommittees supposed to be set up under the Coordinating Committee, the subcommittees of economy, social and culture be set up first to implement academic, cultural and sports exchanges, to form single delegations to international sports games, to jointly develop archaeological and historical programs, and to undertake exchanges in the areas of communications, tourism and journalism.

However, the Pyongyang side demanded the prior solution of military issues such as the stoppage of military buildup and arms race, reduction in military troops and equipment, stoppage of import of weapons and other military materials from abroad, and the withdrawal of American forces from Korea. They also demanded that a "joint conference of political parties and social organizations on both sides of Korea" be held separately from the South-North Coordinating Committee.

In fact, the Pyongyang side was showing an uncompromising and one-sided attitude from immediately after the issuance of the Joint Communiqué. In a press conference held following his announcement of the Communiqué in Pyongyang on behalf of Kim Young-joo, Pyongyang-side co-chairman, Park Sung-chul claimed that "the three principles for national unification embodied in the Communiqué were set forth by Leader Kim Il-sung and agreed to by South Korea... Now that the Joint Communiqué has been issued, the American imperialists should leave the country, carrying with them their aggressive forces, without any delay."

At the co-chairman's meetings, too, the Pyongyang side, on the excuse of the three principles for unification, demanded that the Republic of Korea renounce its anti-Communist policy, legalize communism, stop fostering the liberal democratic system, prevent the United Nations from interfering in the Korean question, withdraw American forces from Korea, and stop building up arms and conducting military training exercises.

Due to these undue demands, coupled with their distorted interpretation of the clauses of the Joint Communiqué, the meetings of the Coordinating Committee were saw a rough sailing before they came to a total halt following the third session held in Seoul.

On August 28, 1973, shortly before the fourth Coordinating Committee session set to be held in Pyongyang, North Korea asserted in a statement by Kim Young-joo, Pyongyang-side co-chairman, that they could not carry on the dialogue with the South Korean authorities, denouncing the South's Special Foreign Policy Statement Regarding Peace and Unification of June 23, 1973 as an "attempt to forge two Koreas." They thus unilaterally suspended both the meetings of the South-North Coordinating Committee and the South-North Red Cross Conference. North Korea had also begun to show less enthusiasm about the operation of the direct South-North telephone line, cutting all 23 circuits of the direct line altogether on August 30, 1976, soon after the axe-murder of two American officers at Panmunjom on August 18, when they refused to accept the South's telephone message asking for the return of the southern fishermen kidnapped on the high seas by North Korea.

Thereafter, North Korea has turned down repeated calls from the South for the resumption of the dialogue and restoration of the suspended telephone line, and dismissed all the proposals for exchanges and cooperation designed to ease tensions. They have resumed propaganda broadcasts by the public address system along the truce line in their intensified slanders against the South, dug infiltration tunnels across the truce line, kept on intruding armed agents into the South, and perpetrated armed provocations along the Demilitarized Zone. North Korea has thereby violated the basic

spirit of the South-North Joint Communiqué, in which they “solemnly pledged before the people to realize unification of the fatherland by improving inter-Korean relations and restoring the national homogeneity through dialogue and cooperation.”

Moreover, North Korea has gone so far as to deny the existence of the South-North Coordinating Committee, the mechanism of dialogue established to oversee the implementation of the agreements of the Joint Communiqué. At the contact between the Seoul-side representatives of the Coordinating Committee and the delegates of the North’s “Democratic Front for Unification of the Fatherland” on March 7, 1979, the North Koreans unilaterally claimed that “the South-North Coordinating Committee does not exist any longer.”

The denial of the Coordinating Committee and the severance of the direct telephone line both created under express mutual agreement, amount to denial of the South-North Joint Communiqué itself, an act which shows their utter insincerity, and which can hardly escape national censure. It is apparent that unless there is a change in this insincerity, no fruition can ever be expected in inter-Korean relations in days ahead. North Korea ought to show a change in their attitude that can prove their sincerity, if any.

On the other hand, North Korea is busy attempting to distort the meaning of the South-North Joint Communiqué for propaganda purposes. As was shown in the course of the meetings of the Coordinating Committee, North Korea has one-sidedly distorted the three principles for peaceful unification embodied in the Joint Communiqué, using it as a ground for their demand for the withdrawal of American forces from Korea and the repeal of the anti-Communist policy of the South.

With regard to the principle of independent unification, one of the three principles, North Korea uses it as an excuse to call for the departure of American troops from Korea, arguing, “To be frank, independent unification means that U.S. forces should pull out of Korea.” (*Theory of Revolution in South Korea and Unification of Fatherland*, Pyongyang, North Korean Social Science Publishing

Co., October 1975, p. 203.)

Similarly, concerning the principle of peaceful unification, North Korea, without any mention about their own armed provocations against the South and military buildup, demands that the South desist from military improvement programs. Discussing the principle of peaceful unification, North Korea asserts, "To accomplish unification in a peaceful way incorporates a revolutionary policy to carry through a revolutionary war of justice... Our call for peaceful unification has nothing to do with any peaceful coexistence between the two social systems." (Op. cit., p. 210.) This indicates that North Korea has not given up its scheme to unify the country by means of war, and that they basically deny the need for establishing peace on the Korean peninsula.

On the grounds of the principle of broad national unity, North Korea demands what they call "democratization of the South Korean society," in which they insist the anti-Communist policy should be abolished, the Communist party legalized, and pro-Communist personages allowed to engage in free political activities in the South.

Also noteworthy is the fact that North Korea is completely dismissing the agreements of Articles 2 through 6 of the Joint Communiqué, in addition to distorting, as seen above, the meanings of the three principles for unification contained in Article 1. North Korea says that the South-North Joint Communiqué is a "unification platform which the South and the North should abide by" and, at the same time, an "action code which both sides should compulsorily respect." Nonetheless, the North Koreans accentuate only deviated meanings of the three principles for unification in their propaganda, while avoiding the discussion of other matters of agreement intended to ease tensions and restore trust by means of exchanges and cooperation.

In fact, they attempt to nullify the South-North Joint Communiqué itself by suspending the inter-Korean dialogue, cutting the direct telephone line, intensifying unfounded slanders against the South, infiltrating armed agents, rejecting the South's repeated calls

for exchanges and cooperation, and even denying the existence of the South-North Coordinating Committee.

This may well indicate what the North Koreans originally attempted to gain when they agreed to the Joint Communiqué. From the outset, they were not interested in peaceful unification. What they were after was to create conditions ripe for their armed invasion or for Communist revolution in the South. This is why they persistently demand the withdrawal of American troops from Korea and reduction in South Korean forces, and try to subvert the anti-Communist system, to undermine the South Korean government, and to foment social unrest in collaboration with some dissident forces in the South.

It is a testimony to their treacherousness and self-contradiction for the North Koreans to describe the South-North Joint Communiqué as a “unification platform” and “action code” on one hand and to violate and attempt to destroy it on the other.

3. Spirit of South-North Joint Communiqué and Formula for National Reconciliation and Democratic Unification

The Formula for National Reconciliation and Democratic Unification declared by President Chun Doo Hwan is a comprehensive unification policy incorporating the spirit of the South-North Joint Communiqué and the unification ideas advanced by the Republic of Korea in the past. The new unification formula is based, above all, on the basic spirit of the Joint Communiqué that the unification question and all other issues pending between the two sides should be settled through dialogue and negotiation. As is well known, the South and the North reached an agreement on several important items concerning national unification in the South-North Joint Communiqué.

First, the two sides agreed that the unification of the divided fatherland must be realized through independent efforts and peaceful means. They recognized the objective reality that extreme

heterogeneity has developed between the two sides due to the more than a quarter century's separation and the fratricidal conflict of the Korean War. The two sides shared the view that in order to promote independent and peaceful unification under the circumstances, national unity must be brought about in the first place through the restoration of national homogeneity, transcending differences in thoughts, ideas and systems between the two sides.

Second, the two sides agreed that in order to promote such national unity, any form of war (any use of military force) should be rejected and "misunderstanding and distrust should be removed and tensions eased between the South and the North."

To this end, the two sides decided to undertake items envisaged in Articles 2 through 5 of the Joint Communique, which included 1) desisting from defaming and slandering each other and from undertaking armed provocations, and taking positive steps to prevent inadvertent military incidents, 2) promotion of many-sided exchanges, 3) making positive cooperation to seek early success of the South-North Red Cross Conference which was then underway, and 4) opening and operating of a direct telephone line between Seoul and Pyongyang.

Third, the two sides agreed that these projects to improve inter-Korean relations should be promoted between the responsible authorities of the two sides, and that to manage the implementation of the agreed matters they would establish and operate a South-North Coordinating Committee with direct telephone circuits installed between them.

As these agreed items of the Joint Communique clearly show, the agreement reached between the two sides concerning political dialogue and the path to unification was intended to ease tensions and consolidate peace, and to promote exchanges and cooperation, thereby realizing unification independently and peacefully.

This inter-Korean agreement is in complete accord with the incessant endeavors the government of the Republic of Korea has exerted since the turn of the 1970s to achieve peaceful unification of the fatherland. The basic spirit of the South-North Joint Communi-

que, too, was actually based on the reasonable unification policy of the Republic of Korea. This is why the Joint Communiqué has enjoyed broad support at home and abroad largely for its logical justness.

As seen in the above, however, North Korea, from the mid-1970s on, has trampled upon the spirit of the Joint Communiqué on which two sides expressly agreed and whose observance they promised solemnly before the entire people. They only pursue the communization of all Korea by force of arms while unfoundedly slandering the South's peaceful unification efforts and launching deceptive "peace" offensives.

It was against this back ground that the government of the Republic of Korea has laid down the Formula for National Reconciliation and Democratic Unification for the sake of peaceful unification of the fatherland. Offering the new unification formula, the South showed broadmindedness by not disputing the unjust behavior of North Korea, and even encompassing North Korea's ideas for review on the basis of the spirit of the peaceful unification policy the government has been pursuing.

The basic spirit and agreed items of the Joint Communiqué were duly embodied and reflected in the new unification formula. In the Joint Communiqué, the two sides clearly agreed to "hold meetings to improve inter-Korean relations and to study the issue of unifying the divided fatherland," arriving at the basic spirit that "the two sides would remove misunderstanding and mistrust, and mitigate increased tensions that have arisen as a result of long separation, and would further expedite unification of the fatherland."

This basic spirit of the Joint Communiqué was reaffirmed in the January 12 and June 5 proposals of President Chun Doo Hwan for contacts between the top leaders of the two sides, and was further embodied in the Formula for National Reconciliation and Democratic Unification, where it was employed as the code of conduct calling for "solution of the unification question and all other issues between the two sides of Korea through dialogue and negotiations."

At the same time, the principle of “independent and peaceful unification in broad national unity” agreed on in Article 1 of the Joint Communiqué was reflected in the following unification principle underlying the new unification formula:

“If we are to be successful, unification must be sought from the realization that the Korean people have been a single ethnic family from time immemorial, sharing a common descent, history, culture and tradition.

“Unification must not be pursued exclusively or arbitrarily by any specific class or group, nor should it be sought by force of arms or other violent means. Unification must be accomplished on the principle of national self-determination and through democratic and peaceful procedures that reflect the free will of the entire people.”

The unification formula clearly sets forth the road to the realization of democratic and peaceful unification by spelling out the procedure and method of unification on the basis of such principles. In other words, the formula calls for the creation of a Consultative Conference for National Unification between the representatives of the residents of the two sides for the purpose of drafting a single unified constitution. When such a constitution is drafted, it is supposed to be finalized through national referendums held in the entire areas of South and North Korea. The unification of the country can then be accomplished by organizing a unified legislature and establishing a unified government through a democratic general elections held under the unified constitution.

If unification were realized through this course, the principles of democratic and peaceful unification would have been embodied in such a course itself. Also by stipulating that “such issues as the political ideology, the name of the country, the basic domestic and foreign policy directions, the form of government and the methods and dates of the general elections for a unified legislature could be discussed between the representatives of the two sides” in the course

of drafting a unified constitution, the Formula for National Reconciliation and Democratic Unification fully encompasses and reflects the principles of national unification envisaged in Article 1 of the South-North Joint Communiqué.

Moreover, the unification formula incorporates the agreed matters contained in Articles 2 through 5 of the Joint Communiqué, suggesting that they could be realized by means of national reconciliation achievable through the conclusion of the proposed Provisional Agreement on Basic Relations Between South and North Korea and through the undertaking of the 20 pilot projects as proposed by the South. In other words, the agreed items of the Joint Communiqué, which include easing of tensions, fostering of mutual trust, stoppage of slanders and armed provocations, prevention of military clashes, implementation of many-sided exchanges, promotion of Red Cross humanitarian projects and opening of a direct South-North telephone line, are the kind of projects that can best be carried out when the seven-point Provisional Agreement is signed and the suggested 20 projects are promoted.

In the Joint Communiqué, the two sides provided a channel of dialogue between their authorities. Article 6 of the Joint Communiqué says, "In order to implement such agreements, settle all the problems that exist between the South and the North, and solve the question of unifying the country based on the agreed principles, the two sides have agreed to create and operate a South-North Coordinating Committee."

However, aware of the present reality of the *de facto* paralysis of the function of the Coordinating Committee caused by North Korea's aboutface displayed in the course of the 1970s' dialogue, the new unification formula paves the way to the realization of a meeting between top leaders of South and North Korea and a high-level delegates' meeting with a view to providing the most comprehensive and workable mechanism of dialogue between authorities of the two sides. In this way, the formula also embodies the purport of dialogue by authorities envisaged in the Joint Communiqué.

As is seen above, the Republic of Korea's Formula for National Reconciliation and Democratic Unification is a grand avenue toward unification, which encompasses even North Korean ideas for study while retaining the essence of the South-North Joint Communique, as well as that of the South's past unification policies.



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Part I

Opening of Each Society to Advance National Reconciliation

1. Announcement of "Guarantee of Unrestricted Travel to Homeland by Brethren in North Korea and Other Communist Zone"

President Chun Doo Hwan announced on August 15, 1982 a "guarantee of unrestricted travel to and from the homeland by those Korean compatriots residing in North Korea and other Communist-bloc countries" as a forward-looking measure to advance national reconciliation.

In his commemorative address on the 37th anniversary of national liberation, President Chun said "the time has come when we must demonstrate to the whole world that we are capable of solving by ourselves the question of unification," stressing that the spirit of independence regained through national liberation must serve as the basic principle by means of which to solve the unification issue.

The President, calling on North Korea to show a favorable response, stressed that to this end, the two sides of Korea should initiate a summit meeting so as resolutely to throw the door wide open to contact and dialogue.

President Chun then declared, "We shall be the first to open our doors to fellow countrymen living in any part of the Communist world, including North Korea . . . Any compatriot can freely and safely travel to and from the Republic of Korea and the Republic of Korea government will absolutely guarantee such unrestricted travel."

The President said he was taking the new policy measure in the conviction that "to facilitate the momentous task of carrying on sincere dialogue aimed at unification, we must also strive in concrete ways to promote national reconciliation," adding that "at the very least, this should involve an end to the present abnormal relations between the South and the North and the opening of the two societies to each other."

President Chun said he is convinced that when anyone of Korean extraction can freely travel to and from the homeland, regardless of the ideology or political system he may subscribe to or where he may reside, only then can we effectively promote fraternal love and speed national reconciliation. "This will no doubt ultimately become the driving force of national unification," the President said.

Part of President Chun's Liberation Day address relating to the inter-Korean question and guarantee of unrestricted travel to the homeland was as follows:

It was with the aim of establishing the image of a people creatively contributing to world progress that I proposed last year an exchange of visits and summit talks between the top leaders of South and North, and that in January, I announced the Formula for National Reconciliation and Democratic Unification.

As you well know, the liberation on August 15, 1945 enabled us to reaffirm our spirit of independence. I am convinced that this spirit of independence must serve as the basic principle by which to solve the unification question. This basic spirit would be gravely violated if we were to repeat the tragedy of fratricide, or continue the futile confrontation any longer. Firmly upholding the principle of self-determination of peoples, I believe that the time has come when we must demonstrate to the whole world that we are capable of solving by ourselves the question of unification—the most cherished goal of all Koreans.

To that end, it is imperative that representatives of the South and the North sit down at the conference table to discuss the future frankly and open-mindedly. Without dialogue no issue can be resolved peacefully. If both sides keep their doors closed as they do now and avoid contact with each other, national reconciliation and unification will be delayed that much longer.

What is required both by history and our own desires is to throw the door wide open to contact and dialogue. To accomplish this end resolutely, I want to emphasize again the necessity for a summit, at the earliest possible date, between the two leaders of the South and the North. Once more I urge Pyongyang to respond affirmatively to this proposal.

I am convinced, furthermore, that to facilitate the momentous task of carrying on sincere dialogue aimed at unification, we must also strive in concrete ways to promote national reconciliation. At the very least, this should involve an end to this present abnormal relations between the South and the North and the opening of the two societies to each other.

In that spirit, I take this occasion to announce that we shall be the first to open our doors to fellow countrymen living in any part of the Communist world, including North Korea. I want to make it clear that any compatriot

can freely and safely travel to and from the Republic of Korea, and that the Republic of Korea government will absolutely guarantee such unrestricted travel.

It is my conviction that when anyone of Korean extraction can freely travel to and from his homeland, regardless of the ideology or political system he may subscribe to or where he may reside, only then can we effectively promote fraternal love and speed national reconciliation. This will no doubt ultimately become the driving force of national unification.

The declaration by the Republic of Korea government of the guarantee of free visits to the homeland by the Korean residents living in North Korea and other Communist-bloc countries is designed to end the existing abnormal inter-Korean relations and pave the way to national reconciliation, aimed at peaceful unification of the homeland.

As is well known, mutual distrust, antagonism and tensions are building up on the Korean peninsula, and the barrier of national division is growing thicker, as a result of the Korean War provoked by North Korea and their incessant provocations thereafter.

Under the circumstances, the most exigent matter in exploring the road to peaceful unification is for the two sides to dissolve such distrust and antagonism, and instead to promote mutual understanding and trust by opening their door to exchanges and cooperation, fostering national reconciliation in due course.

It was to meet this pressing need that the government of the Republic of Korea put forth the Formula for National Reconciliation and Democratic Unification on January 22, 1982, and time and again called upon North Korea to agree to holding a meeting between the top leaders of the two sides at any place and at any time to discuss and solve the question of national unification.

Moreover, the South has repeatedly proposed to North Korea the complete opening of the two societies to each other, and suggested 20 inter-Korean pilot projects which could be implemented without difficulty if only the North showed any sincerity.

However, North Korea has rejected all of these proposals offered by the government of the Republic of Korea to promote peaceful unification

of the divided land, which included plans for mutual visits and a meeting between the top leaders of the two sides (January 12 and June 5 proposals), the Formula for National Reconciliation and Democratic Unification and 20 pilot projects. In addition, they have recently abducted South Korean fishermen on the high seas and stepped up their malignant propaganda broadcasts, only to aggravate distrust and antagonism between the two sides of Korea.

Notwithstanding such intransigence on the part of North Korea, the government of the Republic of Korea declared it would be the first to open its society to all the Korean residents living in Communist-bloc countries including North Korea, guaranteeing their unrestricted travel to and from the homeland. This was a manifestation of the firm resolve for peaceful unification among the people and government of the Republic of Korea, a resolve that cannot be interrupted by any means.

The guarantee of free travel to and from the homeland by those Koreans residing in Communist-bloc countries, as announced in the Presidential message on the 37th Liberation Day, was significant in several senses.

First, by opening its society despite North Korea's rejection of repeated suggestions for the mutual opening of the societies, the Republic of Korea enables any of the Korean people to conduct first-hand observation and gain correct understanding of their homeland, contributing to national reconciliation and further to the laying of a base for peaceful unification.

Second, by allowing any of the Korean people to travel freely to and from the Republic of Korea, regardless of the difference in the ideologies and systems of the areas they belong to, the Republic of Korea intends to embody the spirit of the Formula for National Reconciliation and Democratic Unification stating that the entire Korean people, the subject of unification, should be given the opportunity to compare the systems of the two sides fairly so that they can make choice between the two.

Third, the guarantee of free travel represents the resolute and forward-looking effort of the Republic of Korea to lay the groundwork

for national reconciliation and democratic unification by implementing positively what can be done by itself, irrespective of any concurrence from the North, since the measure was designed for the South to open its society first regardless of the North's response.

In fact, the guarantee of freedom of travel is the more advanced policy form of the Republic of Korea's humanitarian consideration in which it has facilitated homeland visits by those Koreans living in the Soviet Union, Mainland China and some other Communist-bloc countries and allowed exchange of letters between them and their relatives in the South.

For it can be known through historical lessons that the opening of a society by means of personnel exchanges is the shortest cut to realizing national reconciliation, as can be seen in the case of Germany, where the two Germanies promote national coprosperity, transcending the differences in their ideologies, through exchange of visitors totaling some 8 million a year (about 6,500,000 from West Germany to East Germany, and 1,500,000 from East Germany to West Germany).

2. Reactions to Guarantee of Unrestricted Travel

Major political parties, social organizations and press media in the country welcomed as a "bold forward-looking decision" the measure taken by the government to guarantee unrestricted travel to and from the homeland by Korean residents in North Korea and other Communist-bloc nations. Saying that the decision represented a renewed resolve for national reconciliation as well as marking a significant milestone in the laying of the base for unification, they observed that "If and when homeland visits by compatriots in the Soviet Union and Mainland China were realized, it would serve as a stimulus to the North Koreans."

The Democratic Justice, Democratic Korea and Korea National Parties, in their respective statements, expressed their wholehearted welcome and support for the measure, describing it as "another manifestation of the strong determination to achieve peaceful unification of the Korean Peninsula." The political parties said they were positive

that the guarantee of free travel would draw positive support from the governments of foreign nations, let alone Korean residents abroad.

In their feature stories and editorials, domestic newspapers, too, spoke highly of the decision, hoping that the government authorities would in take multi-pronged diplomatic efforts to bring about fruitful results.

The editorials appearing in major news papers on the guarantee of free travel were as follows:

Homeland Visits by Compatriots in Communist Zone

The Kyunghyang Daily News
August 17, 1982

In his 37th National Liberation Day address, President Chun Doo Hwan declared that our society would be opened to all our compatriots residing in Communist-bloc countries, including North Korea, and the government would guarantee their free travel to and from the country. The declaration may well be taken to represent the nation's strong resolve to achieve national reconciliation and democratic unification.

President Chun expressed his unswerving attachment to peaceful unification when he said in the address, "When anyone of Korean extraction can freely travel to and from his homeland, regardless of the ideology or political system he may subscribe to or where he may reside, only then can we effectively promote fraternal love and speed national reconciliation. This will no doubt ultimately become the driving force of national unification."

Last year, too, President Chun offered ideas on independent unification such as the January 12 and June 5 proposals. On January 22 this year, the President laid down the historic Formula for National Reconciliation and Democratic Unification. Later, on February 1, the Minister of National Unification, in his proposal for 20 pilot projects, suggested to North Korea that "the two sides jointly manage homeland visits by oversea compatriots and allow them to freely travel through the South and the North by way of Panmunjom."

The proposal of a campaign for searching out dispersed families on the two sides was an action embodying such a will to national reconciliation and, at the same time, the manifestation of a humanitarian spirit with which we strive to remove the sufferings deriving from national division.

The project of homeland visits by Korean residents in Japan affiliated with Chochongryon, a pro-Pyongyang Korean residents' group, which was begun at the time of the Chusok holiday in 1975, was linked to such an open-door policy as well as to the campaign for national reconciliation.

In fact, there are not a few barriers that have thickened between the two sides as a result of the protracted national division of more than 37 years. Apart from the geographical wall, the hardening barriers of ideologies, thought, systems and the sense of values cannot but be the biggest obstacle to national unification.

Thus seen, the resolve to open our society to our compatriots in Communist-bloc countries including North Korea and to guarantee their free travel to and from the country is the product of a bold determination to restore national homogeneity by dismantling all the barriers resulting from national division.

We expect that all the Communist-bloc nations will show a positive response to the measure so that our decision can be put into practice. It is known that our compatriots residing in Communist-bloc nations not counting North Korea total about two and a half million. Of them, two million are in Mainland China and the remaining half a million in the Soviet Union. If they are to visit their homeland, there must be humanitarian consideration on the part of Chinese or Soviet authorities.

These brethren in China and the Soviet Union are mostly those who moved there to escape from persecution by the Japanese imperialists, and their descendants. It cannot but be a tragedy that these people still cannot visit their homeland, 37 years after national liberation. Therefore, the alleviating of their human sufferings is an act embodying the spirit of universal humanitarianism and, at the same time, constitutes a short cut to laying the groundwork for peaceful unification.

In Germany, which is a divided nation like us, no fewer than eight

million people freely cross the border of the two Germanies every year though their ideologies and systems are different from each other. North Korea should not take the situation of Germany merely as another's business. In this age of all-out pursuit of one's own national interests, it is a great national misfortune and loss that the South and the North of Korea have to waste vast energies in their confrontation.

If we were able to achieve national reconciliation, we would be confident and capable enough to overwhelm, say, Japan. In particular, we are proud of being a people who have been granted the right to host the 1986 Asian Games and the 1988 summer Olympics. All of our compatriots across the world should participate in the great festivals of humanity, regardless of the difference in ideologies and systems, and thereby take the occasions to further enhance our national pride. We hope that President Chun's August 15 declaration to guarantee free homeland travel by our compatriots in the Communist zone will serve to cement the base of such a national reconciliation and display our national pride before the world.

Nothing can be more inhumane than unjustifiable rejection of personnel exchanges in this age of openness. Moreover, the inability of travel between compatriots runs counter to the basic spirit of the universal human rights declaration. To materialize homeland visits by our brethren in Communist countries, there should be due cooperation from Communist-bloc nations. To this end, our government authorities should launch many-sided diplomatic endeavors.

Door Opening to Compatriots in Communist Zone

Dong-A Ilbo

August 17, 1982

President Chun Doo Hwan, in his Liberation Day address, announced, "We shall be the first to open our doors to fellow countrymen living in any part of the Communist world, including North Korea," adding that "any compatriot can freely and safely travel to and from the Republic

of Korea, and the Republic of Korea government will absolutely guarantee such travel."

The opening of the door to our brethren residing in the Communist zone can rightly be taken to represent a pure humanitarian spirit based on brotherly love. We have witnessed the pain with which the 5 million people who have come to the South from North Korea miss their families back in the North. They often have sleepless nights worrying about their missing families and have to observe rituals looking with longing at the empty northern sky.

The desire to become reunited with their separated families has led to the designation of August 12 as the "Day of Separated Families." In view of such pains of dispersed families, the decision to open our door to compatriots in the Communist zone cannot but be a humanitarian consideration intended to ease our brethren's sufferings.

The Seoul side has countless times urged North Korea to agree to resume the Red Cross talks to arrange the reunion between separated families. But the Kim Il-sung regime has coldbloodedly rejected this. Nevertheless, the Republic of Korea National Red Cross again called for the resumption of the Red Cross talks on last August 12. Besides, the Korean Broadcasting System (KBS), in programs directed toward our compatriots abroad, has been relaying regards from their relatives in the country to those residing in Mainland China and the Soviet Union. A large number of letters have been reaching KBS from those in China who had listened to KBS programs, in which they invariably inquired after their relatives in the homeland. Not a few compatriots have already returned to the country from Mainland China, while some others have been here for the first time in 40 to 50 years. A large number of Korean residents in Japan affiliated with Chochongryon, a pro-Pyongyang Korean residents' organization, have been to the country to meet with their blood relatives.

In fact, the Republic of Korea has opened its doors to our compatriots in Communist-bloc countries since long ago. In his Liberation Day address, President Chun formally declared such a door-opening, stating that "anyone can freely and safely travel to and from the Republic of Korea, and the government of the Republic of Korea will

firmly guarantee such travel.”

President Chun’s declaration, therefore, has paved the way for the 2,200,000 compatriots in Mainland China, 400,000 brethren in the Soviet Union and those Chochongryon-affiliated compatriots in Japan, let alone the 20 million brethren in North Korea, to visit South Korea regardless of the difference in ideologies and systems.

What remains to be done now is for the authorities of the Kim Il-sung regime, Mainland China and the Soviet Union to take measures to facilitate such travels. Mainland China and the Soviet Union, not to speak of North Korea, should allow our interested compatriots to visit the Republic of Korea.

We understand that most of the Communist-bloc countries other than North Korea permit humanitarian oversea trips. No fewer than eight million Germans travel between West and East Germany in a year, and countless people in East European nations visit Western countries to meet their relatives.

Now that our government has declared its door opening toward our compatriots residing in Communist-bloc countries, the government should, through indirect diplomatic channels, urge the governments of the relevant countries to allow our compatriots’ travel to the country and also turn to various international organizations for their cooperation. Since humanitarian projects are the manifestation of human love transcending ideologies and national boundaries, we are positive that such travels will surely be materialized some day. We again call on the government and other concerned offices to exert uninterrupted efforts in this regard.

Homeland Visits by Compatriots in Communist-Zone Countries

The Joong-Ang Daily News
August 16, 1982

President Chun Doo Hwan’s August 15 declaration that “The

government will guarantee unrestricted travel to and from the homeland by any compatriots residing in Communist-bloc countries, including North Korea," is highly noteworthy because it shows how sincere our posture is toward achieving peaceful unification.

President Chun pointed out in his 37th Liberation Day address that "If both sides keep their doors closed as they do now and avoid contact with each other, national reconciliation and unification will be delayed that much longer." He then declared that the government would guarantee free homeland visits by our brethren in the Communist zone.

In fact, the effort to promote national reconciliation through the opening of the societies of the two sides has been one of the consistent policy goals of the government ever since the advancement of the January 12 and June 5 proposals to North Korea.

The guarantee of free homeland visits by our brethren in the on-going homeland visits by Korean residents in Japan affiliated with Chochongryun, a pro-Pyongyang Koreans' group, stems from our confidence in the superiority of our society and system.

It is known that about 2,500,000 Korean residents presently live in Communist-bloc countries, not counting North Korea. Of them, about two million are in northern China, forming their own autonomous district and retaining our traditional customs. The remaining half million are in the Tashkent and Sakhalin areas of the Soviet Union. Information about them has begun to trickle in as the two Communist countries have been opened to the West a little.

It is said that the value of one's homeland can be known only when one is away from the homeland. It is not difficult to imagine the pains these compatriots, who had left the country when it was colonized by an alien nation, suffer because of the inability to visit the homeland to date, no fewer than 30 years after national liberation.

The announcement by President Chun of the guarantee of free homeland visits by our brethren in the Communist zone was not only politically motivated by the intent of providing an opportunity for all our people to compare fairly the systems of the two sides, thereby embodying the spirit of our Formula for National Reconciliation

and Democratic Unification.

First of all, such a guarantee deserves welcome because it is a humanitarian measure intended to enable oversea compatriots to visit their hometowns and meet their long-separated relatives freely. In the past the government has arranged exchanges of letters and homeland visits by our brethren in the Communist zone. In fact, there were even several cases in which Korean residents in mainland China visited their hometowns in the country and stayed for about a month before returning to China.

It cannot be easy to reunify a divided land. However, it is a historic mission incumbent upon our generation that no matter how difficult it may be, we must steadily carry on our efforts to reunify our land. In this respect, the announcement of the "guarantee of free homeland visits by compatriots in the Communist zone" constitutes yet another milestone on the road toward peaceful unification.

In Germany, which is a divided country like ours, no fewer than eight million people travel between the two Germanies each year. Needless to say, such visits serve to reaffirm national homogeneity and promote national reconciliation.

Now is a time when we are wary of the possible revival of Japanese militarism, a time which especially requires the oneness of our people more acutely than ever before.

If the North Koreans reject even our proposal envisaged in the August 15 declaration, it would be telling proof that they are not interested in national unification at all. We sincerely hope that the significance of the declaration would positively contribute to the solution of the unification issue.

Buildup of National Strength Is Historical Mandate

Seoul Shinmun

August 17, 1982

The 37th Liberation Day address of President Chun Doo Hwan contained noteworthy contents, which have drawn much attention both at home and abroad. In the address, President Chun offered a new proposition to North Korea, declaring that the South would be the first to open its society so that our compatriots residing in Communist-bloc countries including North Korea can freely visit their homeland. The President also appealed to the nation that to prevent the people experiencing again the kind of pain and humiliation to which they were subjected in the pre-liberation years, they should all unite with one another in harmony and embark, as this very moment, upon a long march toward greater national strength.

It goes without saying that the latest August 15 proposition was yet another resolute measure designed to translate into action the basic spirit of the January 22 Formula for National Reconciliation and Democratic Unification and the June 5 proposal calling for the complete opening of the two sides' societies, with a view to laying the groundwork for peaceful unification.

At the same time, the President's call for a long march toward building up national strength can be taken as marking a milestone in the campaign to "overcome Japan," a drive which is designed in the long run to rectify Japan's prejudice against Korea as revealed in the recent uncovering of distortion of Japanese history textbooks.

Let us first elucidate the meaning of the August 15 proposition to North Korea, and commit ourselves to its implementation. As a first step toward overcoming the heterogeneity and distrust that have deepened in the protracted division of the nation, it is imperative that the two sides should open their societies to each other. It is only too natural that in order to achieve peaceful unification, the entire population of the nation—the subjects of unification—should be

accorded an opportunity to visit and observe each other's system so that they can make a free choice between the two.

However, it seems that the North Korean situation does not allow them to agree to such an opening. Judging from their experience in the dialogue in the 1970s, they fear that should they agree to it, the basis which sustains their dictatorial power system may collapse overnight. It was with this in mind that we recently made the positive suggestion that we would be the first to open our society.

This way our proposal represents a magnanimous one-sided concession of a magnitude unparalleled in the world history of negotiations. This is why the proposal draws wholehearted welcome and support from the world community. Therefore, if North Korea rejects the offer again, they would hardly escape the condemnation that they basically avert their eyes from the independent and peaceful solution of the unification issue.

Opening of Homeland to Compatriots in Communist Zone

Chosun Ilbo

August 17, 1982

President Chun Doo Hwan made a really important declaration in his 37th Liberation Day address. It was the announcement of an historic measure affirming that the South would be the first to open its society to our compatriots in Communist-bloc countries, including North Korea. President Chun then said, "I make it clear that any compatriot can freely and safely travel to and from the Republic of Korea, and that the government of the Republic of Korea will absolutely guarantee such unrestricted travel."

What we can expect from the declaration is that such free homeland visits would lead to resuscitating brotherly love and advancing national reconciliation.

The announcement, which may well be called the "August 15 declaration," was a more advanced proposition than the January 12

and June 5 proposals. It was a policy conceived with the great task of national unification in mind.

Unfortunately North Korea, as is widely known, has responded to our series of peace proposals with slander and bad words. What they have done since they unilaterally suspended the campaign to search for dispersed families and South-North Coordinating Committee meetings about 10 years ago was that they have only intensified tension and heightened the danger of war between the two sides of Korea.

They have cut off the direct telephone line installed between Seoul and Pyongyang, turned down the offer for an unconditional meeting between top leaders, and turned a deaf ear to our call for the improving of bilateral relations through economic, cultural and sports exchanges. Despite their erection of such barriers, they have attempted a poorly conceived propaganda offensive against the South in a bid to avoid international criticism. The ridiculousness and fictitiousness of their deceptive peace offensive can be known by the fact that they even hand-picked the "delegates" who would "represent" the Republic of Korea at a south-north political conference they proposed.

Despite such nonsensical behavior of the North Koreans, the Republic of Korea has continued to strive to promote peaceful unification. Born of these untiring efforts was the Formula for National Reconciliation and Democratic Unification which the North Koreans rejected. The unification formula contained a device for North Korea to produce its own idea of unification. Nevertheless, the North attempts to cover up the truth through childish propaganda warfare.

Still, we cannot give up our efforts to realize peaceful unification. As a prelude to unification, we must ease tension, forestall the recurrence of war and consolidate peace between the two sides.

The North Koreans, too, call for "peaceful" and "independent" unification. But we must not overlook the fact that a scheme to communize all Korea by force of arms is lurking in the "peace" and "unification" they advocate. The words "peace" and "independence" they put forth are the same words but carry diametrically different meanings from ours.

If a war should ever recur between the two sides, the whole land

would be reduced to debris overnight because of the possession of highly destructive weapons by both sides. The Korean people can hardly escape extermination before they would have any chance to pursue their ideologies. The only way to save the nation from the danger of war and to get closer to peaceful unification is for the brethren of the South and the North to renounce any playing with fire and seek reconciliation despite their different ideologies. This is the only rational road left between the two sides of Korea.

The recent August 15 declaration was yet another milestone along such a road. We seek to achieve the broadest national reconciliation by facilitating homeland visits by our brethren living in Communist-bloc countries, including North Korea. In addition to those in North Korea, about two million Koreans live in the northeastern region of China as well as in various Chinese cities and even in some parts of Mongolia. About 400,000 more are believed to be in the Sakhalin, Tashkent and Khabarovsk areas of the Soviet Union. Some brethren, though the number is extremely small, live in Cuba.

Of these compatriots, those on the Chinese continent and in the Soviet regions of Sakhalin and Khabarovsk have parents, sisters and brothers, and other relatives mostly in South Korea. Yet, they have had no opportunity to visit them for about 40 years, since after or before World War II. Fortunately, mail can be exchanged between them, through which they can search for and inquire after their missing families and relatives. We can hardly control our tears whenever we listen to pathetic stories of dispersed families as broadcast by radio.

We are sure that the North Korean Communists dismiss this sort of national pains as "counter-revolutionary sentimentalism." But we believe this is an uncontrollable revelation of the real human nature standing above time, national boundaries and ideology.

Homeland visits by those compatriots sympathetic to communism began seven years ago when visits here by those in Japan affiliated with Chochongryon, a pro-Pyongyang Korean residents organization, were promoted. Thereafter, countless people have been here safely, paying tribute to their ancestors' tombs and meeting their long-separated relatives. The results of the visits are highly significant from

both national and humanitarian standpoints. Even among those in mainland China, there were some who, though their cases were exceptional, had visited their hometowns here.

Homeland visits by Korean brethren in the Communist zone cannot be materialized with South Korea's efforts alone. Magnanimous measures are needed on the part of the Communist countries where they live.

Here, we expect that the authorities of the Soviet Union and Mainland China will provide the maximum conveniences for the visits to the Republic of Korea by Korean residents in their countries. We well know that we are not in a position to negotiate directly with them over the issue because of the lack of diplomatic relations with them, and that these countries apply some restrictions to overseas trips by their citizens. Still, it would be a natural policy consideration and would be in complete conformity with principle of universal humanitarianism that they allow their minority people to visit their homelands to meet their blood relatives.

Koreans are convinced that if such homeland visits serve to foster a peaceful atmosphere on the Korean peninsula, so it would be beneficial to the interests of China and the Soviet Union themselves, as well as being contributory to world peace.

Road to Great Fatherland

Hankook Ilbo

August 17, 1982

Where there is a will, there always is a way. Will can produce unbounded strength like a large river only when it is pooled together. The way to safeguard the self-esteem of the nation and to enliven the nation's today and tomorrow depends exclusively on our determination to build up our national strength.

Only when we are strong today can our past history shine. When we overflow with a firm will to independence and national strength, nobody would dare to look down upon us and attempt to subject us to

humiliation.

The relations of peaceful and equal coexistence between countries can be possible only on the basis of strong national unity and strength. We know this through our painful history. Reflection on the past is the beginning of self-awakening to the future.

On the 37th anniversary of national liberation, we renew our insight into the reality of national division and our determination to overcome challenges from outside. We must use the occasion of the anniversary of our liberation and independence to speed up our march toward a "second liberation," namely, the buildup of national strength and the elevation of our international standing.

The need has grown to explore the avenue toward a great fatherland. In his Liberation Day address, President Chun, while looking back over the period of the Japanese rule when even our names and language were forfeited, emphasized his strong will for, and the pressing need of, the buildup of national strength. The President's embarkation on a trip to four African countries and Canada must be a good-neighborly undertaking designed to elevate and demonstrate the standing of the Republic of Korea. The remarks he made in his departure statement that "We have become able to move uprightly onward toward the rest of the world thanks to the arduous endeavors the people have made in the past two years for stability and take-off" well represent such a conviction.

The pains of the legacy of the Japanese colonial rule are yet to be eliminated completely. We believe that the historical awareness that, if it had not been for their forcible occupation, there would have been no bitter reality of national division, holds the key to exploring the future. We have now erected the milestone of "overcoming of Japan," going beyond the stage of "resistance to Japan." This is based on the principle of mutual respect and coexistence, not rejection.

To look back upon the past, the annexation by Japan was the result of our powerlessness. A people who had their sovereignty stolen could not but be considered vagrants. They became scattered in Japan, China and the Soviet Union. This was the legacy of colonial rule. President Chun announced that the government would guarantee

“free and safe travel to and from the homeland by our compatriots residing in Communist-bloc countries, including North Korea.” The President was opening our society. This was a highly significant proposal for “great reconciliation” intended to ease the sufferings stemming from national division and family separation.

We regained our homeland at the time of national liberation. But the compatriots in the Communist zone had lost their hometowns due to national division. But now the bosom of humanitarianism has been opened wide to them by the opening of systems. They have nothing to worry about now that their free and safe travel has been guaranteed. The bitterness of life in strange lands would be removed through reunion with families and relatives. They would realize that there is a dependable homeland behind them.

We must recover the jubilation of national liberation through homeland visits and reunion with families. We have witnessed the success of the homeland visits by our compatriots in Japan.

In Germany, which is a divided country like Korea, about eight million people travel across the boundary of the two Germanies each year. There is a confrontation in ideologies and systems. Still, the integration of a people grows stronger.

North Korean authorities should realize that the proposal for homeland visits by brethren in the Communist zone embodies the determination to achieve democratic unification in a peaceful way. Unification will be delayed if they keep trying to heighten the barrier of division and reject dialogue. Continued advocacy of national division cannot but be brought before the justice of the nation and history.

We must explore the path to unification by ourselves. We cannot hope for nor can we tolerate intervention by any foreign interests.

In the first place, the authorities of the South and the North should sit down together. We will keep the door to dialogue open always. Our offer for a meeting between the top leaders of the two sides still stands. We wonder how long they can stay mute, ignoring the ardent wishes of the people.

The flow of history will never permit the hereditary succession of

power, but remove the barriers of division in the long run. We expect that North Korea will respond favorably to our forward-looking sincerity toward the issue of unification.

To achieve the great task of unification, we must further consolidate national strength and cement the superiority of democracy and open society. We also hope that the amnesty granted on Liberation Day will become a cornerstone of reconciliation.

The waves of turbulence run high. But our potential is powerful enough to surmount all trials. We stress again that our national self-esteem can be achieved first through self-confidence and buildup of our ability. When the will of our people can be pooled, there will surely unfold a broad avenue toward a strong fatherland.

From our President's tour of Africa and Canada in the wake of the Liberation Day, we can foresee the bright future of our nation as well as the duty to explore the prosperous future of mankind in concerted efforts.

Part II

Demonstration in Africa of Resolve for National Reconciliation and Democratic Unification

1. Significance of President Chun's Tour of Africa

President Chun Doo Hwan visited four African nations—Kenya, Nigeria, Gabon and Senegal—and Canada from August 16 through September 1, 1982. He was the first Korean head of state ever to set foot in Africa.

In his talks with the leaders of the four African countries, President Chun broadened the base of mutual understanding between Korea and Africa, and discussed the future of bilateral partnership. In a summit meeting in Canada, President Chun hardened the blood-tested traditional alliance and exchanged views broadly on the approaching Pacific age.

The presidential tour, in particular his visit to African countries, was highly significant not only in the practical aspect of the broadening of bilateral cooperation, but also from the viewpoint of affirming solidarity between the Republic of Korea and African nations. This is why the visit has drawn keen attention from neighboring Japan and many European countries, not to speak of North Korea. Third world nations, too, had shown particular interest in the tour.

Seen from the diplomatic aspect, President Chun's tour of Africa and Canada marked an important milestone in the effort to terminate the South-North confrontation at an early date. The 45 black African countries south of the Sahara account for one third of the member nations of the United Nations and almost half of the 97 countries forming the Non-Allied Conference. The voice of these African nations has grown tremendously in the world community. They have emerged as an influential pressure group.

In the diplomatic confrontation in Africa between South and North Korea, the North maintains a numerical edge. North Korea maintains diplomatic ties with 40 countries (resident missions in 30 nations), whereas the countries with which the Republic of Korea is in formal contact number 28 (resident missions in 14 countries). In addition, those African countries which maintain diplomatic relations exclusively with North Korea total 15, as against only four with the South.

Taking advantage of this quantitative edge, North Korea has indulged in deceptive propaganda largely toward less developed countries, slandering and defaming the Republic of Korea and undermining efforts to achieve peaceful unification.

The recent African tour by President Chun created momentum to rectify the distorted understanding of Korea among some Africans, and to enable them to realize that Korea, like African countries, had the bitter experience of alien domination and now is a trusted partner as a country of the Third World, which works hard in pursuit of common interests.

With the Presidential visit as a turning point, North Korea's numerical diplomatic edge should fade, obliging the North Koreans to reconsider their undue diplomatic competition and further to change their attitude toward inter-Korean dialogue in favor of constructive talks.

In addition, the tour has earned new partners for the fast-developing economy of Korea. African nations, having successfully survived a transitional period, have awakened to need for economic development.

In consequence, the tour of Africa by President Chun marked yet another important milestone in the laying of the base for national unification and facilitating a second economic take-off.

2. Support by African Leaders for Unification Efforts by Republic of Korea

One of the important achievements of President Chun's visit to Africa and Canada was that it has led to the creation of a firm groundwork for positive support of the peaceful unification efforts of the Republic of Korea. The enlisting of international support, as President Chun himself stated, is one of the conditions for national unification, the long-cherished wish of the 60 million Korean people.

The summit diplomacy undertaken by President Chun as part of the diplomatic endeavors to achieve such a solemn historical task attracted keen attention from the beginning, especially because it was directed toward the African region, the only area where North Korea outruns

the South in diplomatic competition.

During the five-nation tour, President Chun stressed that the unification of Korea must be achieved not by force of arms but in a peaceful way through dialogue, and explained the constant efforts the Republic of Korea has been making to this end, thereby earning wholehearted support from the leaders of the countries he visited. In particular, it is considered a great fruition of peaceful unification diplomacy toward non-aligned nations that the heads of state of the four African countries, as seen in respective joint communiqués, expressed, their unreserved support for South Korea's overtures such as the suggestion of the entry of South and North Korea into the United Nations under the June 23 Special Foreign Policy statement, the January 12 and June 5 proposals for a meeting between the top leaders of the two sides of Korea, and the Formula for National Reconciliation and Democratic Unification.

Moreover, it is highly noteworthy that these African nations which, swayed by the slanderous propaganda by North Korea, had in the past taken a rather ambiguous posture toward the inter-Korean question, have come to grasp a correct picture of the Korean situation through President Chun's tour and become "confident supporters" of the Republic of Korea.

This is all the more notable in view of the fact that the four African nations President Chun visited are the kernel among the 45 black African countries, having powerful influence in the Non-Aligned Conference, the United Nations and other world organizations.

In particular, Kenyan President Daniel arap Moi, who is the chairman of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), praising the efforts and initiatives made by the Republic of Korea for peaceful unification, expressed his firm support for the Republic's dialogue policy. Similarly, President Shehu Shagari of Nigeria and Gabonese President Omar Bongo welcomed the efforts of the Republic of Korea seeking the simultaneous entry into the United Nations by South and North Korea in accordance with the proposal of South Korea, and pledged, in respective joint communiqués, continued support for the just cause of the Republic of Korea at the United Nations and the Non-Aligned Conference.

The support by the heads of state of the African countries for unification efforts of the Republic of Korea as expressed in joint communiques issued between them and President Chun was expressed as follows:

< Korea-Kenya Joint Communique >

"7. President Chun, reviewing the situation on the Korean peninsula, explained in detail the efforts of the government of the Republic of Korea in trying to achieve the reunification of the peninsula by peaceful means.

He particularly emphasized that the only realistic way to achieve eventual reunification is by holding direct talks between the highest authorities of South and North Korea.

President Moi, appreciating the efforts and initiatives of the Republic of Korea, assured President Chun of continued Kenyan government support of the dialogue policy as advocated by the Korean government."

< Korea-Nigeria Joint Communique >

"9. President Chun Doo Hwan, discussing the question of the Korean peninsula, explained the efforts of the government of the Republic of Korea to ease tension on the Korean peninsula and realize peaceful unification of Korea, especially the Formula for National Reconciliation and Democratic Unification..

"10. President Shagari appreciated the initiatives of the Republic of Korea government in the effort to consolidate peace on the Korean peninsula, expressing his support for the peace-oriented efforts of the Republic of Korea.

"11. President Chun expressed appreciation to the government of Nigeria for understanding and supporting the stand of the Republic of Korea at the United Nations, Non-Aligned Conference and other international meetings. In this regard, the two Presidents agreed to continue close consultation and cooperation. President

Chun expressed the view that the entry by South and North Korea into the United Nations as an interim measure pending the peaceful unification of Korea would contribute to easing tension and be helpful in the creation of a national atmosphere for the realization of peaceful unification through national reconciliation.

President Shagari supported such efforts to realize the entry by South and North Korea into the United Nations under the principle of the United Nations Charter."

< Korea-Gabon Joint Communiqué >

"President Chun, reviewing the situation on the Korean peninsula, explained the efforts of the government of the Republic of Korea to reduce tensions and consolidate peace on the peninsula with a view to achieving reunification of Korea by peaceful means. He particularly emphasized that the only realistic way to resolve the Korean question peacefully is to hold direct talks between the highest authorities of the South and the North of Korea. President Chun also expressed the view that the admission of both South and North Korea into the United Nations, as an interim measure pending the peaceful reunification of Korea, would contribute to easing tensions and help create an international atmosphere conducive to national reconciliation and peaceful reunification.

"The President of the Republic of Gabon, who is an advocate of dialogue, assured President Chun that the Gabonese government would continue to welcome and support all such initiatives to realize unification of the Korean peninsula in a peaceful way, and to take such a posture at the United Nations, the Non-Aligned Conference and other international meetings. In addition, President Bongo supported the efforts of the Korean people for the realization of the entry of South and North Korea into the United Nations in accordance with the wishes of the world community and the Korean people.

"President Chun expressed his appreciation for the understanding and support given by the Gabonese government to the just position of the Republic of Korea at the United Nations, the Non-Aligned Conferences and other international forums."

(Korea-Senegal Joint Communiqué)

"The Senegalese President reaffirmed the Senegalese position that it supports peaceful and permanent solution to Korean unification based on genuine and lasting reconciliation between the parties concerned, and expressed his support for the efforts rendered by President Chun since his inauguration to achieve unification in a peaceful manner."

The support expressed by these African Presidents for the position of the Republic of Korea with regard to the unification question was an important feat registered in the nation's diplomacy toward Africa, especially the Non-Aligned Conference. It was an epochal achievement that amounted to expanding the realm of diplomacy for peaceful unification that has already been broadened through President Chun's tour of the five ASEAN countries last year.

Especially, it was a highly meaningful gain that President Chun had opportunities to explain in detail before the African leaders the Formula for National Reconciliation and Democratic Unification, the core of the unification policy of the Fifth Republic, and thereby earned their support for the rationality of the unification formula, thus fostering a firm base for unification. Some Third World nations, out of their pro-North Korean propensity, had been inclined toward supporting North Korea's stand. Belatedly, however, these countries, awakening to the deceptiveness of the North Korean idea of a "confederation system," have come to support the Republic's Formula for National Reconciliation and Democratic Unification. This indicates that the international atmosphere for Korean unification has been turning in the South's favor.

Nonetheless, North Korea continues to reject the Formula for National Reconciliation and Democratic Unification in their demand, as prerequisites to dialogue, for the dissolving of the incumbent government of the Republic of Korea, withdrawal of U.S. forces from Korea and the repeal of anti-Communist laws, the kind of demands that, if met, would leave the Republic of Korea totally defenseless before their incursion. North Korea should take a careful look at the flow of world opinion and, returning to national conscience, respond affirmatively to the Republic's rational unification formula.

Part III

**Eleventh Anniversary of Proposal for
South-North Red Cross Talks**

1. ROKNRC President Issues Statement on 11th Anniversary of Proposal for Red Cross Talks

Yoo Chang-soon, President of the Republic of Korea National Red Cross (ROKNRC), issued a statement on August 12, 1982 on the occasion of the 11th anniversary of the ROKNRC proposal for the South-North Red Cross Conference, in which he again urged the North Korean Red Cross to "agree to the unconditional resumption of the South-North Red Cross Conference so that the delegates of the two Red Cross societies can sit face to face again to discuss and solve, with a fresh outlook, the issue of the 10 million separated family members."

Yoo said, "I believe that the direct telephone line already installed between Seoul and Pyongyang should be reopened, and the functions of the Conference Liaison Office at Panmunjom restored," adding that he is looking forward to an affirmative and sincere response from the North Korean Red Cross.

The ROKNRC President recalled, in the statement; that eleven years ago the ROKNRC proposed to North Korea the initiation of South-North Red Cross talks from the humanitarian viewpoint that the sufferings of 10 million separated family members should be relieved. Yoo said that the ensuing talks and the installing of a direct South-North telephone line across the forbidden barrier had given all dispersed family members a hope of reunion and the whole people of the South and the North a high expectation of national unification.

"North Korea, however, mercilessly frustrated this ardent wish of all the people by unilaterally announcing suspension of the dialogue on August 28, 1973," he said. Calling for the unconditional resumption of the South-North Red Cross talks, Yoo said that although the Republic of Korea National Red Cross has asked North Korea to agree to resume the talks by proposing an "aged parents project," "exchange of family pictures," "exchange of tomb visitors" and "establishment of a reunion center and a postal exchange office at Panmunjom," "none of these efforts of our Red Cross have come to fruition due to the intransigence of North Korea."

The Red Cross President also urged the North Korean Red Cross to

cooperate positively to obtain the early return of not only the crewmen of the "Masan-ho No.5", who were abducted in the East Sea on July 13, 1982, but also the 406 other fishermen who have been abducted and held captive since 1954 in North Korea.

The full text of the statement of Red Cross President Yoo was as follows:

Eleven years ago today, the Republic of Korea National Red Cross proposed to North Korea the initiation of South-North Red Cross talks. From the humanitarian view that the sufferings of 10 million separated family members should be relieved, the talks were proposed to initiate a search for such persons throughout the South and the North.

As a result of the proposal, a dialogue began between the South and the North for the first time in a quarter century of territorial division. A direct South-North telephone line was installed across the DMZ, giving all dispersed family members a hope of reunion, and of eventual national unification.

North Korea, however, mercilessly frustrated this ardent wish of all the people by unilaterally announcing suspension of the dialogue on August 28, 1973, only one year after the inception of plenary talks.

Despite such action, the Republic of Korea National Red Cross has time and again urged the North Korean Red Cross to resume unconditionally the South-North Red Cross Conference, in compliance with the fervent wishes of the 10 million dispersed family members, and of the entire people. To expedite a solution to the question of separated families, the Republic of Korea National Red Cross proposed an initial "project to search for aged parents" and other pilot projects such as "exchange of family pictures," "exchange of groups of tomb visitors," and the "creation of a reunion center and an office for the exchange of postal items at Panmunjom."

Moreover, hoping for a breakthrough, the Republic of Korea National Red Cross has, on a number of occasions, proposed a meeting between the chief delegates to the South-North Red Cross Conference, or a meeting between the Red Cross Presidents of the two sides.

However, none of these efforts have come to fruition due to the intransigence of North Korea. The initiatives that our National Red Cross have persistently offered are of the kind that can be put into action easily if only North Korea

shows a spark of interest and humanitarianism in the settlement of the issue of dispersed families.

Accordingly, I again urge the North Korean Red Cross to agree to the unconditional resumption of the South-North Red Cross Conference so that the delegates of the two Red Cross societies can sit face to face again to discuss and solve, with a fresh outlook, the issue of the 10 million separated family members.

I also believe that the direct telephone line already installed between Seoul and Pyongyang should be reopened, and the functions of the Conference Liaison Office at Panmunjom restored. I am looking forward to an affirmative and sincere response from the North Korean Red Cross.

At the same time, I wish to express my deep regret at North Korea's failure to return the 35 crewmen of the fishing boat "Masan-ho No. 5."

It has been one month since their abduction on July 13 while fishing in the East Sea. I again ask that, in the spirit of Red Cross humanitarianism and brotherhood, the North Korean Red Cross take the lead in securing the early return of these fishermen to their grief-stricken families.

I also urge that the North Korean Red Cross positively cooperate to obtain the early return of not only the crewmen of the "Masan-ho No. 5" but also the 406 other fishermen who have been unlawfully abducted and held captive since 1954 in North Korea.

2. Designation of "Day of Separated Families"

The 5 million separated family members residing in the South have designated a "Day of Separated Families" in a show of their longing for the day when the barrier dividing the nation would be removed.

In an inaugural ceremony held at the Unification Hall at Changchung-dong, Chung-ku, Seoul on August 12, 1982, the 11th anniversary of the proposal for South-North Red Cross talks, the Central Federation of Five Northern Provincial Citizens' Associations, headed by Kim Yon-kyu, designated August 12 as the "Day of Separated Families" and decided to observe commemorative ceremonies on this day every year and also to launch organized activities to promote reunion between dispersed

families.

The designation of the "Day of Separated Families" was designed, as indicated in the Prospectus announced during the ceremony, "for the 10 million dispersed family members to take part positively in the project to regain their lost hometowns and families and launch organized campaigns by themselves without depending merely upon the efforts of the government and Red Cross authorities." It also represented the determination of the separated families through such designation, to "invite world attention to the forgotten scar of national division and, in particular, appeal the pressing state of the dispersed families to world opinion, assuming a leading role in peacefully dismantling the artificial barrier of division through the separated families' own strength and efforts."

The designation and accompanying resolve came against the background that the South-North Red Cross talks remained suspended since North Korea shattered the channel of dialogue begun following the August 12, 1971 proposal by the Republic of Korea National Red Cross for the initiation of a campaign to search for dispersed families.

During the inaugural ceremony, the separated family members adopted a message to the North Korean compatriots as well as letters of appeal addressed to the chairman of the International Committee of the Red Cross, the Secretary General of the United Nations, the chairman of the U. N. Human Rights Committee, and the secretary general of Amnesty International. They also adopted a four-point resolution in which they renewed their commitment to national unification and reunion between dispersed families.

The full texts of the Prospectus, message to the North Korean brethren and the letters of appeal to international organizations announced or adopted during the ceremony were as follows:

Prospectus

Eleven years ago today, August 12, the Republic of Korea National Red Cross, calling for a "campaign to search for dispersed families in the South and the North," proposed to North Korea the initiation of South-North Red Cross talks.

On this occasion today, we designate August 12 as the "Day of Separated Families." We intend to commemorate this day as our own every year.

At the time when the Republic of Korea National Red Cross proposed a campaign to search for separated families in the South and the North on August 12, 1971 and subsequently Red Cross meetings were taking place at Panmunjom, Seoul and Pyongyang, our separated family members were full of the expectation that the day would not be far off when we could meet our families left in the North.

We the separated family members knew better than anyone else that the Red Cross humanitarian spirit can hardly arise among the North Korean Communists overnight. Still, our concern for our missing families in the North was so sincere and acute that we found ourselves pinning hopes on the talks.

However, North Korea again shut off the Seoul-Pyongyang route of dialogue and boycotted the South-North Red Cross Conference, trampling upon our fervent wishes.

This has only resulted in aggravating the sorrows and frustration of our dispersed families, and further inciting our anger and hatred toward the inhumane North Korean Communists.

Even after the suspension of the South-North Red Cross Conference, the Republic of Korea National Red Cross has time and again urged the North Koreans to agree to resume the talks soon, and suggested that if they were in a position which did not allow them to resume the talks, then at least such practicable humanitarian projects as could mitigate the sufferings of dispersed families might be carried out initially. But North Korea has rejected all these, allowing nothing to be done to soothe the heartbreak of our dispersed families.

However, we cannot sit with our arms folded, merely denouncing the brazenfaced and insincere attitude of North Korea, ignoring even brotherly love and humanitarianism. We need the kind of magnanimity and wisdom more acutely now than at any other time with which we can turn today's pains and frustration into hope and courage, and sublimate our hatred and anger at the North Korean Communists into a vigorous march toward national reconciliation and democratic unification.

Here, we, the direct parties to the issue of dispersed families, have

resolved to take part positively in the effort to regain our lost hometowns and missing families and launch organized activities by ourselves without depending merely on the endeavors of the government and the Republic of Korea National Red Cross. By so doing, we hope to invite world attention to the scar of our national division which is being forgotten in the long period of division, and proclaim our exigent condition to our whole people and international opinion. At the same time, we resolve to play a leading role in eliminating peacefully the artificial barrier between the South and the North with our own strength and efforts.

In today's world community, even those countries with different ideologies and systems open their doors to one another, promoting exchanges and cooperation. We are confident that the day will surely come before long when the tightly closed door to North Korean society would open in compliance with the spirit of the times and our national appeal.

With this prospect and confidence, we pledge ourselves to do what we can to the best of our ability until our goal is achieved.

We look forward to positive support from the nation and relevant authorities.

August 12, 1982

Kim Yon-kyu

Representative of Dispersed

Families in the South and the North

Message to North Korean Compatriots

Dear North Korean Compatriots,

Today we, the five million citizens of five northern provinces who have come to the South, have designated August 12 as the "Day of Separated Families" in observance of the significant day, 11 years ago, when the Republic of Korea National Red Cross proposed to the North Korean Red Cross the South-North Red Cross Conference to discuss the initiation of a campaign to search for the families dispersed in the South and the North.

With the designation of the "Day of Separated Families," we hope to invite the attention at home and abroad to the question of 10 million

dispersed family members, and make the firm determination that we the dispersed family members will obtain liberation from the present tragic situation at an early date.

To look back upon the past, our five million citizens from the five northern provinces were separated from our parents, wives and children or brothers and sisters when we left our beloved hometowns in search of freedom in the South to escape the inhumane tyranny of the North Korean Communists, causing our tragic separation from you North Korean compatriots in the South and the North today. Ever since, we have been in a terrible state where we live unaware of the fate of separated families even now, 30-odd years later.

The proposal made on August 12, 1971 by the Republic of Korea National Red Cross to the North Korean Red Cross for the South-North Red Cross talks was the manifestation of the lofty Red Cross spirit to dissolve such a tragic condition of the dispersed families in the South and the North based on the humanitarian spirit.

As a result of the proposal, the door to inter-Korean dialogue was opened between the South and the North of Korea for the first time in a quarter century. Meeting in Seoul and Pyongyang by turn, South and North Korean Red Cross delegates agreed to find out, and inform thereof, the whereabouts and fates of the dispersed families and relatives in the South and the North, and even arrange their visits and reunions, besides the exchange of letters between them.

Nevertheless, the North Korean Communists attempted to utilize the humanitarian project between the South and North Korean Red Cross societies as part of their subversive schemes against the South. Having failed in the attempt, they unilaterally announced their boycott of the dialogue on August 28, 1973, severing the new bridge of inter-Korean dialogue and sealing off tightly the Seoul-Pyongyang route of dialogue.

Thereafter, the Republic of Korea National Red Cross has time and again stressed to the North Korean Red Cross that the South-North Red Cross talks should be resumed, based on the Red Cross humanitarian spirit, regardless of the political reality of the South and the North. However, North Korea has shown no response at all.

The duration of our family separation in the South and the North ranges from 32 to 37 years. Our dispersed families' sorrows and frustration grow acuter as not a few of our dispersed family members, who have become senile in this long course, die with their longing for their hometowns and families in the North unsatisfied.

In a humanitarian bid to solve such a tragic condition by all means, the Republic of Korea National Red Cross had proposed to North Korea the initial undertaking of reunion between aged persons 60 years old or older and their children, and the exchange of family pictures between separated families. But all of the suggestions were rejected by North Korea. We were further disappointed when North Korea turned down the Republic of Korea National Red Cross call for an exchange of tomb visitors among separated family members during Chusok and other holidays.

However, we cannot remain content merely with accusation of the inhumane North Korean Communists. We five million separated family members who have come to the South have pooled our wisdom and decided, as the first commemorative activities of the "Day of Separated Families" today, to take part positively in the effort to regain our lost hometowns and find our missing families, and to play a leading role in dismantling peacefully the artificial barrier separating us into South and North while appealing our condition to world opinion.

North Korean compatriots,

So long as today's international circumstance and the flow of the times move toward the opening of society, and while our dispersed families' strong will and relentless efforts continue, we feel sure the tightly closed doors of North Korea will open and the day of our reunion will surely come.

We must throw the door to inter-Korean contacts and dialogue wide open at an early date. And let us, by so doing, rally around the spirit of harmonious patriotism and exert untiring efforts in sincerity to bring about unification within our generation, in accordance with the Formula for National Reconciliation and Democratic Unification which President Chun Doo Hwan announced on January 22 this year, for the sake of peaceful unification of the fatherland, the invarying wish of our 60 million people.

Praying that the day of unification when we can rejoice in our reunion

will unfold before us at an early date, and hoping that you North Korean compatriots will wisely surmount with patience and courage the hardships of the Communist hell, we send this message to you our compatriots in the North in the name of the 5 million dispersed family members in the South

August 12, 1982

**Letters of Appeal from Separated Families in Korea
to International Organizations**

To: Chairman, International Committee of the Red Cross
Secretary General, United Nations
Chairman, U. N. Human Rights Sub-Committee
Secretary General, Amnesty International

As you well know, our country was divided at the end of World War II and the Korean War, caused by a Communist North Korean invasion in 1950, raged for three years, giving rise to countless dispersed families.

For 30 years thereafter to date, we the dispersed families in the South and the North of Korea, unaware of each other's fate or any pertinent information, live in agonizing pain, worried about missing blood relatives and longing for the day of reunion. On August 12, 1971, the Republic of Korea National Red Cross made a proposal to the North Korean Red Cross for South-North Red Cross talks with a view to connecting the severed veins of the dispersed families.

Upon the proposal of the Republic of Korea National Red Cross, the South-North Red Cross Conference was initiated between the two sides to settle the issue of dispersed families for the first time in the quarter century of national division. Eleven years ago this day, the rejoicing and high expectations the dispersed families felt were literally unutterable. However, our such expectations evaporated like bubbles when North Korea unilaterally suspended the Red Cross talks held in Seoul and Pyongyang by turn.

Even after North Korea boycotted the humanitarian South-North Red Cross Conference designed to dissolve the sufferings of the separated families,

the Republic of Korea National Red Cross repeatedly urged North Korea to agree to the resumption of the Red Cross talks. It also suggested that if they were not in a position to resume the Red Cross conference immediately, then a postal exchange center should be set up at Panmunjom initially to facilitate the exchange of letters between the dispersed families. Our National Red Cross further proposed that groups of tomb visitors among dispersed families be exchanged on traditional holidays, reunion between aged parents and their children be arranged on a priority basis, and exchange of family pictures be allowed between displaced families. However, North Korea has rejected all of these suggestions.

Contrary to the international trend of most countries promoting good neighborly relations through exchanges and cooperation, transcending differences in ideologies and systems, inter-Korean relations today remain in a heartbreaking condition where dispersed families in the South and the North are unable even to exchange letters of regard.

We well know that our Republic of Korea National Red Cross continues to make all possible efforts to dispel the pain of the 10 million dispersed family members, and that our government is striving to bring about a solution to humanitarian issues pending between the South and the North.

However, it is unlikely that these efforts would come to fruition and lead to the solution of the issue of the 10 million dispersed family members soon because of the intransigence of the North Korean Communists, who reject any sort of dialogue.

Here we have launched, in an inaugural meeting today, a campaign for the reunion of separated families as a purely private movement. We have resolved that we the dispersed family members, the direct parties concerned, will positively take part in the effort to solve the dispersed family issue by ourselves, appealing to the rest of the nation and to world opinion. For this purpose, we have designated today, August 12, the day when the Republic of Korea National Red Cross proposed to the North Korean Red Cross the historic South-North Red Cross Conference eleven years ago, as the "Day of Separated Families," and are holding its first commemorative activities today.

We are sending this message of appeal to you in the confidence and hope that the misfortune and pain we 10 million dispersed family members suffer

could be eased even a little on the strength of your competency and authority.

We hope that you will continue to take a keen interest in the issue of the separated families in the South and the North of Korea, and will exert an available endeavors to materialize humanitarian reunions between our dispersed families. In particular, we hope for your proper mediation in the resumption of the suspended South-North Red Cross Conference.

We pray that God's blessing will always be with you.

August 12, 1982

Resolution

The appearance of 10 million separated family members resulting from national division and the Communist North Korean invasion in the Korean War is the tragedy of the nation. Even at this moment, we can hear the heart-breaking cries of the dispersed families searching for their missing relatives.

The question of dispelling this national pain through unification of the divided land and reunion between dispersed families is the mandate of our national history, and at the same time the paramount task incumbent upon our generation. No matter how thorny the path to national unification and reunion of separated families may be, our generation must solve this issue by all means.

The unification of the divided homeland must be realized on the basis of national reconciliation through democratic procedures and peaceful ways that reflect the free will of the entire people. A unified homeland must be a national democratic, free and welfare state where the happiness of the entire people can be guaranteed. Nothing will be left unsolved before the strong will and untiring efforts of the dispersed families and the rest of the people in the South and the North. As we ruminate over the poignant situation of the 10 million dispersed family members in the South and the North, we hereby make the following resolution for national unification and reunion of dispersed families.

We hope for the early realization of our government's Formula for

National Reconciliation and Democratic Unification calling for the formation of a Consultative Conference for National Reunification to draft a unified constitution and the accomplishment of a unified state through free general elections held under the terms of the unified constitution. We strongly urge North Korean authorities to respond positively to the unification formula.

— The question of dispersed families must be settled from the standpoint of pure humanitarianism and brotherly love, transcending differences in ideologies, ideas and systems. We are convinced that so doing will open a road contributory to national reconciliation and peaceful unification.

— We are confident that the South-North Red Cross Conference should be resumed at an early date in order to dispel the bitter pain of the 10 million dispersed family members. We demand that North Korea not dismiss such a national appeal any longer, but promptly agree to resume the South-North Red Cross Conference.

— With the designation of today as the “Day of Separated Families” as a starting point, we pledge ourselves to promote multi-faceted campaigns for the reunion of the dispersed families, and to exert our utmost efforts until our lofty goals as stated above are achieved.

August 12, 1982

Meanwhile, Minister of National Unification Sohn Jae-shik, who was invited to the ceremony, extended felicitations to the Central Federation of Five Northern Provincial Citizens' Associations on the designation of August 12 as a “Day of Separated Families.” In a speech of encouragement, Minister Sohn said it is a matter for hearty congratulation that the Central Federation has designated the special day on the occasion of the 11th anniversary of the proposal by the Republic of Korea National Red Cross for South-North Red Cross talks, with a view to renewing the resolve to realizing reunion between separated families and achieving national unification.

Minister Shon then exhorted the people hailing from the five northern provinces to ignore hardships and pains, and work hard with passion and sincerity along with the rest of the nation until separated

families are reunited and peaceful unification is achieved, so that "we can hand down a unified, welfare homeland to our posterity." The text of Minister Shon's speech of encouragement is as follows:

Speech of Encouragement

Representatives of citizens from five northern provinces and distinguished guests,

I extend my heartfelt congratulations to the Central Federation of Five Northern Provincial Citizens' Associations on the designation of August 12 as a "Day of Separated Families" and the observance of its first commemorative activities on the occasion of the 11th anniversary of the proposal for the South-North Red Cross talks with a view to further enervating the campaign for reunion of separated families in the South and the North, as well as renewing the will to national unification.

In particular, it is my honor to have this opportunity to say a few words of encouragement before this rally where you members of separated families have pledged yourselves to take the lead positively in removing peacefully the artificial barriers separating the South and the North.

To look back, our people have suffered unutterable misfortune and pains in the 37 years of national division. But you citizens hailing from the five northern provinces are eloquent witnesses who are experiencing the tragedy of division more acutely than any other persons.

In order to dispel the pains our people have been suffering from long ago due to national division, and to promote peaceful unification of the homeland, as you well know, we had undertaken the South-North Red Cross Conference aimed at realizing humanitarian reunions between the 10 million separated family members, and have exerted other efforts steadily to open the door to dialogue and contacts in all possible forms.

Unfortunately, however, these many-sided efforts failed to yield any fruit to date due to the intransigent attitude of North Korea. Lately, North Korea has intensified its divisive schemes and hostile activities, further hardening the barriers of national division.

Moreover, despite censure from the rest of the world, the North Korean Communists have further tightened their grip on North Korean society and

oppress their people mercilessly in an attempt to force through the institution of a hereditary dynasty unparalleled in modern history.

Thus, North Korea follows a path running counter to national reconciliation and unification, with developments in the North further straining inter-Korean relations. It is feared that if they might go so far as to perpetrate a subversive campaign against the South.

Citizens hailing from the five northern provinces,

The question of peacefully reunifying the homeland and reuniting the dispersed families in the South and the North is the ardent desire of the 60 million Korean people, and at the same time a pressing task which we must accomplish by all means.

Thus seen, the proposals made by President Chun Doo Hwan last year for mutual visits and a meeting between the top leaders of South and North Korea were a heroic decision designed to provide an impetus to throw wide the door to inter-Korean dialogue and contacts.

The Formula for National Reconciliation and Democratic Unification which President Chun announced in a policy address last January 22 was also a most reasonable method of unifying the South and the North on the basis of national reconciliation in a peaceful way and through democratic procedures that reflect the free will of the entire Korean people. The formula represented our progressive and positive resolve to unfold a new chapter in our national history.

Furthermore, on the basis of the practical spirit of the Formula for National Reconciliation and Democratic Unification, I proposed to North Korea on February 1 this year 20 pilot projects which can be put into practice easily and promptly and which can ease the misfortunes and pains deriving from national division.

The pilot projects I proposed include the exchange of postal matter aimed at alleviating the ignorance of the dispersed families in the South and the North speedily, the humanitarian issue of realizing reunion between separated families, and other undertakings in various fields that are designed to contribute to peace on the Korean peninsula as well as to assist national survival and prosperity, and that can facilitate national reconciliation. The projects encompass even those suggested by North Korea.

However, North Korea persistently pursues a policy of South-North

confrontation and national schism in disregard of such our sincere efforts and the 60 million Koreans' aspiration for the peaceful unification of the homeland.

North Korea went so far as unilaterally to suspend the South-North Red Cross Conference held for the purpose of easing, from the humanitarian point of view, the people's misfortune caused by national division. To date, they have shown no interest in resumption of the dialogue. This inhumane attitude of the North Korean Communists was a matter for bitter lamentation and enraged all of us. Nevertheless, we cannot sit by idly, filled merely with lamentation and frustration.

We must further solidify our will to unification and, at the same time, steadily build up our ability for independent and peaceful unification. We should do all we can to enable the North Korean Communists to awaken from their daydream of an anachronistic revolutionary campaign.

Some of our people say that peaceful unification is something that can be achieved only in the remote future. I am positive, however, that, depending on our endeavors, unification can be realized at an unexpectedly early date. The unification of our nation is our own business which is not imposed from outside but should be accomplished by ourselves.

To remain mere spectators is an act of abandoning the initiative for unification. Unless we seek it by ourselves, the road to unification will never come into sight. Only from affirmative thinking and judgement can there come about the kind of action and courage necessary to accomplish the goal.

In this sense, it is highly significant and timely that you dispersed family members are observing a ceremony today in which, with unerving confidence in peaceful unification and reunion of dispersed families, you renew your determination to resolve your own problems by yourselves and thereby launch an organized campaign. All our people will extend their unreserved welcome and support to the courage and wisdom you have shown.

Dispersed family members,

I expect that this ceremony today will end not merely in establishing and promoting the will to and confidence in unification among dispersed family members, but will develop into a nationwide campaign to expedite peaceful unification through the expansion of your determination among the rest of the people, thus contributing much to national unification.

Each of these steady efforts will be not in vain, but will serve as fertilize, and propellent for peaceful unification, moving us toward a unified nation step by step. The path to peaceful unification can thereby be shortened, and we will be rewarded with the rightful consequences of history.

Until that time comes, you citizens from the five northern provinces ought to persevere despite all difficulties and pains, and work hard together with the rest of the nation with passion and sincerity so that we can hand down a unified welfare state to our posterity.

I wish you dispersed family members continued success and good health. Thank you.

August 12, 1982
Sohn Jae-shik, Minister
National Unification Board

The designation of August 12 as a "Day of Separated Families," called forth public approval as well as that of press media in the country, accepting the touching appeal of the dispersed families as the manifestation of the entire nation's pain and tragedy, and urging the North Korean authorities to awaken to reality and agree to the resumption of dialogue unconditionally.

In particular, major domestic newspapers, in their editorials given below, praised the purport of the designation of the "Day of Separated Families," calling upon the North Korean Red Cross to respond favorably to the South's repeated call for dialogue.

Day of Separated Families

Dong-A Ilbo
August 12, 1982

The Central Federation of Five Northern Provincial Citizens' Associations has designated August 12 as the "Day of Separated Families,"

resolving to observe various activities on this day every year. The designation of the "Day of Separated Families" is designed to reaffirm the purport of the proposal by the Republic of Korea National Red Cross for a campaign to search for dispersed families as well as to provide an impetus to reinvigorate the promotion of the family-search campaign.

By designating the day of the initial proposal for the family-search drive as the "Day of Separated Families," the dispersed families have let their determination be known at home and abroad that the campaign to search for dispersed families cannot be delayed.

The five million people who successfully escaped Communist tyranny in the North have earned freedom but lost their beloved parents, wives and children, or other relatives. To date, some 30 years later, they have no way to learn even the fate of their missing families and relatives left in the North. It was a period of 30 years spent in tears and sighs. The wish to settle this frustration came in the form of the designation of the "Day of Separated Families." As the Central Federation itself stated in the Prospectus, the designation called upon "we dispersed family members ourselves to play a positive role and launch an organized campaign to recover our lost hometowns and families.'

But the "Day of Separated Families" is not an occasion to be observed only by those who have blood relatives and hometowns in the North. This is a day when all of us should share the sorrow of the dispersed families and explore the path toward reunion in concert. For the pains of the separated families cannot be only their own, but must be something for which our whole people should be held responsible.

In this respect, the "Day of Separated Families" is a day to reaffirm the will of the 60 million people in the South and the North to overcome the tragedy of national division. The entire people must observe this day solemnly. The "Day of Separated Families" is a day to pray for the reunion between dispersed families in the South and the North and, at the same time, a home-longing day as well as being a day to aspire for national unity.

We wish to take this occasion to urge North Korea to show a favorable response to the resumption of the South-North Red Cross Conference

aimed at realizing reunion between the 10 million dispersed family members. The Republic of Korea National Red Cross has repeatedly proposed that if it is difficult to arrange reunion between dispersed families right away, then the two sides should explore ways to find out the whereabouts and fates of aged parents; allow the exchange of family pictures and of tomb visitors; and establish a reunion center and a postal exchange office at Panmunjom. Yoo Chang-soon, new president of the Republic of Korea National Red Cross, too, urged the North Korean Red Cross on August 12 to agree to the unconditional resumption of the Red Cross talks so as to settle the dispersed family issue.

North Korea should listen to the heart-aching cries of dispersed families searching for their missing blood relatives, and return to the Red Cross talks. The pains of the dispersed families longing for reunion are by no means limited only to those five million people who have come to the South from the North. They apply to another five million dispersed family members in the North as well who cannot outwardly express their pains.

It is too cruel that no fewer than 10 million people, or one sixth of our entire people, have had to live separated from their beloved families for as long as 30 years merely because of the inhumaneness of Kim Il-sung and his followers. Kim Il-sung's regime won't crumble overnight simply because of the finding out of the fate of dispersed families, exchange of family pictures or the establishment of a reunion center at Panmunjom. For these steps are designed only to settle the frustration accumulated over a 30-year period.

Nevertheless, Kim Il-sung closes his ears to the tearful cries of the 10 million dispersed family members. Perhaps we cannot expect a vestige of humanitarianism from the very war criminal who provoked the Korean War. Still, we wish to believe that reunion between dispersed families would be realized some day since it is in the course of moral law. We are positive that the frustration and will to reunion lurking in the "Day of Separated Families" will in due course be sublimated into the "Day of Reunion between Separated Families."

Day of Separated Families

The Joong-Ang Daily News

August 12, 1982

It is already eleven years since the Republic of Korea National Red Cross proposed South-North Red Cross talks with a view to removing the sufferings of the 10 million separated family members. With the proposal, a dialogue was begun between the South and the North for the first time in a quarter-century of territorial division. All of us had pinned high expectations on the dialogue, entertaining the hope that it might be the initial step toward unification of the homeland.

However, due to the unilateral boycott of the dialogue by North Korea in 1973, the Red Cross conference and even the function of the South-North Coordinating Committee came to a standstill. The Red Cross working-level meetings, which had thereafter maintained the thin thread of the Red Cross contact, have been put off indefinitely since 1977.

To look back, how can we, who have been unable even to realize the exchange of letters of inquiry between the families dispersed in the South and the North, accomplish the great task of national unification? We can hardly control the sense of shame.

Needless to say, this regrettable consequence is due entirely to the persistent intransigence of the North Korean Communists. An exchange of letters of regard between the same family members has nothing to do whatsoever with ideology or system. It is self-contradictory that the North Koreans, said to have been armed strongly with Kim Il-sung's monolithic thought, should fear that any confirmation of the existence of some family members in the South could lead to social unrest.

Our compatriots residing in Mainland China and the Soviet Union send letters here after listening to our radio programs, but never at the risk of any harm to the societies they belong to. It also is nonsensical to say that the exchange of large numbers of visitors between West and East Germanies on holidays could cause the shaking of either of the regimes.

It is simply to ease the sufferings of the dispersed family members from a humanitarian standpoint that we have been untiringly calling for the campaign to search for dispersed families. It is also aimed at awakening the North Korean Communists to national homogeneity, although their ideology and system are different from ours. Further, it is hoped that the operation of such a campaign would contribute to enhancing the sense of mutual trust as well as national pride.

The Republic of Korea National Red Cross, too, has pointed out that "if North Korea has any least interest in a humanitarian solution, the issue of separated families can be settled easily." It was in this basic recognition that the Republic of Korea National Red Cross called for the unconditional resumption of the Red Cross talks, reopening of the direct South-North telephone line, restoration of the function of the liaison office at Panmunjom and return of the fishermen kidnapped to the North.

This is a natural demand, which can be settled right away if only North Korea is interested. Moreover, the Central Federation of Five Northern Provincial Citizens' Associations has designated today, marking the 11th anniversary of the proposal for the Red Cross talks, as the "Day of Separated Families," resolving to launch an organized undertaking by itself to regain their lost hometowns and missing family members.

The move provided yet another channel of dialogue. We see no reason why North Korea cannot respond to it favorably.

Lately North Korea has rejected all the calls of the South for a dialogue. They simply hold fast to the idea of a confederation system as the method of unification. They indulge in the buildup of their arms. A recent analysis by an overseas institute indicated that the North Korean regular troops alone reach more than 678,000 and that North Korea is constantly developing the strategy of armed provocation.

In North Korea there is one soldier in every 25 people, whereas in the South it is one in 63. North Korea's rate is the highest in the world except for Israel's, one in 23.

The ulterior motive behind their rejection of dialogue and buildup

of arms is only too obvious. But, they should know it is ill-founded and a foolish thing to do, for it would only cause the waste of national energies. North Korea should waken from its daydream and regain national conscience at an early date. We again advise North Korea to return to the conference table without further delay.

Designation of "Day of Separated Families"

Chosun Ilbo

August 13, 1982

Yesterday, August 12, was designated as the "Day of Separated Families." The designation was made by the five northern provincial citizens themselves. In a ceremony yesterday, the northern provincial citizens resolved that "we the dispersed family members will play a leading role in removing peacefully the artificial barrier between the South and the North launching an organized campaign by ourselves to regain our lost hometowns and missing family members." The northern provincial citizens then called the attention of world opinion to the dispersed family issue by adopting letters of appeal for assistance addressed to the International Committee of the Red Cross and the United Nations Secretary General, as well as a message to the North Korean people.

An additional proper noun has thus come into being in our national history. As is well known, eleven years ago on August 12, Choi Too-sun, then president of the Republic of Korea National Red Cross, proposed to the North Korean Red Cross the initiation of a Red Cross conference intended to search for the 10 million family members dispersed in the South and the North. The North Korean Red Cross agreed, and a year's preliminary talks were followed by seven rounds of full-dress meetings held in Seoul and Pyongyang by turn before the talks were suspended by boycott announced by Pyongyang's Kim Young-joo on August 28, 1973.

The expectation which the dispersed families, born of national deviation, had pinned on the Red Cross talks was ardent. However,

the conference soon hit a deadlock due to political machination of the North Koreans. The frustration of the dispersed families longing for blood relatives had piled up. To advance the time of reunion which such a frustration would surely bring about some day, the dispersed families themselves have designated the "Day of Separated Families" and resolved to take a more positive role in the effort to facilitate family reunion.

On the first "Day of Separated Families", which coincided with the 11th anniversary of the August 12 proposal, Yoo Chang-soon, President of the Republic of Korea National Red Cross, in a statement, urged the North Korean Red Cross to agree to the unconditional resumption of the Red Cross talks and also to show a favorable response to the reopening of the direct South-North telephone line and the restoration of the function of a conference liaison office at Panmunjom. The Red Cross President also asked the North Korean Red Cross to assist in the early securing of the return of the 35 crewmen of the fishing boat "Masan-ho No. 5" who were abducted by a North Korean warship in the East Sea on July 13, and the 406 other fishermen whom North Korea still holds in captivity.

On the occasion of the 10th anniversary of the August 12 proposal last year, the Red Cross president proposed to North Korea a meeting between the Red Cross President of the two sides at any time and at any place to discuss the issue of resuming the Red Cross talks at an early date. At the time of the seventh anniversary in 1978, too, the Republic of Korea National Red Cross made a similar offer as well as a suggestion for a meeting between the chief delegates of the two sides.

This is not all. We proposed reunions, as a pilot project, between aged parents of 60 or more and their children, the creation of a dispersed families' reunion center and a postal exchange office at Panmunjom, exchange of tomb visitors on traditional holidays, and, if the North cannot agree to these, then the exchange of family pictures.

But North Korea has shown no response at all so far. International telephone service has already been begun between South Korea and

East European countries, including the Soviet Union: communications and postal matter flow back and forth with other Communist-bloc countries; some of our compatriots in mainland China have returned to the bosoms of their families in our country; and some Korean resident in Sakhalin have sent gifts to their relatives here. Nevertheless, no sign can be seen of any exchange between the dispersed families in the same land.

This cannot but be the tragedy of the century. How long does North Korea intend to stick to such inhumaneness and coldbloodedness, the like of which can hardly be found elsewhere? We again condemn the North Korean Communists for their intransigence.

Reunion of Dispersed Families

Hankook Ilbo

August 13, 1982.

Yoo Change-soon, President of the Republic of Korea National Red Cross, issued a statement on the occasion of the 11th anniversary of the proposal for South-North Red Cross talks, in which he again called for unconditional resumption of the suspended Red Cross meetings. The statement suggested that the representatives of the two Red Cross societies should meet face to face with fresh mind to discuss and solve the issue of 10 million dispersed family members. It also stressed that the direct telephone line installed between Seoul and Pyongyang in an agreement between the South and North Korean Red Cross should be reopened, and the function of the Panmunjom liaison office restored to normalcy. The Red Cross President also urged the North Korean Red Cross to cooperate in efforts to obtain the early return of the fishermen of the "Masan-ho No. 5" who were abducted to the North a month before, and of 406 other South Korean fishermen held captive since 1954.

The South-North Red Cross Conference was initiated at the urging of the Republic of Korea National Red Cross that, inasmuch as the issue of dispersed families forms a "national tragedy," humanitarian projects

should be undertaken between the two sides to find the whereabouts and fates of dispersed families and arrange reunions between surviving scattered families, even under the condition where the barriers separating the South and the North remain unremoved.

In fact, the question of separated families is the most acute of all tragedies. Unfortunately, this tragedy exists right on the Korean peninsula. As the French Foreign Minister observed after his recent visit to Seoul, "The division of the Korean peninsula is so absolute and dangerous that it cannot be comparable to West and East Germanies." No other place has such thorough discontinuity between the divided parts.

But if only there is constant awakening to national integrity between the divided areas, unabated brotherly love, and interaction of humanitarian spirit, the issue of separated families may well be solve before any other problems. The short-lived Red Cross talks were actually promoted with a view to solving one of our tragedies based on national, humanitarian and Red Cross spirit, transcending political and social restrictions and ideological differences between the two sides.

When the Red Cross talks were experiencng rough sailing, we proposed as pilot projects the reunion between aged parents and their children, exchange of groups of tomb visitors, exchange of family pictures, and establishment of a family reunion center and a postal matter exchange office at Panmunjom. However, North Korea rejected all these fundamental and practical offers, insisting that "political conditions and environment should first be created in the South."

At the International Human Law Meeting held in 1976 in Geneva, it was resolved that reunion between separated families is not simply a "wish of families" but the "right of families." This means that dispersed families have the right to be reunited, and countries and areas with dispersed families in their lands have the obligation to facilitate their reunions. However, the Korean peninsula is in circumstances where such an international resolution cannot be put into practice. North Korea is a place which is beyond the reach of national and humanitarian conscience. They have refused to turn receptive ear to our humanitarian overtures.

On August 12, 1980, our Red Cross proposed to resume the Red Cross talks unconditionally to ease the sufferings of dispersed families, based on the spirit of genuine Red Cross humanitarianism. Again in 1981, the Republic of Korea National Red Cross offered that a meeting of the two sides' chief delegates be held at any time and at any place without raising any issues of the past. This year again, the Red Cross President called for the unconditional resumption of the talks.

It goes without saying that the confrontation between the South and the North should be terminated at an early date. Even before this, we should endeavor to see to it that national wisdom is pooled between the South and the North in alleviating sufferings on humanitarian issues within our nation.

On last January 22, we put forth a unification formula based on the grand cause of national reconciliation. We are calling upon the North to take the path of reconciliation, putting an end to the bitterness of national division. At this time, the Central Federation of Five Northern Provincial Citizens' Associations has designated August 12 as the "Day of Separated Families," resolving to launch a campaign to search for missing families and to endeavor to secure national reconciliation.

The "Day of Separated Families" is an apt occasion to call for North Korea's return to the Red Cross talks, and for the whole nation to try to surmount its tragedy. We once again ask North Korea to turn a receptive ear to our nation's fervent wish, and respond affirmatively to our repeated call for unconditional resumption of the South-North Red Cross Conference.

**Campaign for Dispersed Families' Reunion
is Path to National Integration**

The Kyunghyang Daily News
August 12, 1982

It is heart-breaking to think that our nation, a homogeneous

people with the same blood, same history, same language, and with a cultural tradition and customs formed homogeneously, has to become heterogeneous with many families separated due to national division.

It was to try to remove these very sufferings that the Republic of Korea National Red Cross earlier proposed to North Korea an initial solution of the question of the 10 million family member separated in the South and the North from a purely humanitarian standpoint.

We are perplexed to find ourselves still discussing the dispersed family issue today, 11 years later. The Red Cross talks, opened due our side's sincerity and efforts, came to a stand still after only the seventh full-dress meeting held in July 1973 due to North Korea's absurd political and military schemes, shattering the expectation of the dispersed families for their possible reunion.

The North rejected even the proposal to arrange reunions between aged parents and their children, and such practicable projects as exchange of family pictures, exchange of groups of tomb visitors, creation of a reunion center and a postal exchange office at Panmunjom and reopening of the direct South-North telephone line. Moreover, they went so far as to abduct our fishermen on the high seas and perpetrate various provocations along the truce line.

It is too well known that their absurd idea of a "confederation system" and proposal for a peace treaty with the United States are all part of their strategy for the communization of all Korea. It can only be sheer nonsense if the North Korean Communists, with such a notorious record, dare to discuss humanitarianism and peaceful unification.

We know that they have to tighten their grip on, and further close, the North Korean society and smoke-screen their people's grievances in order to consolidate the unheard-of father-son hereditary power succession system. Still, it is utterly nonsensical to violate even moral laws.

It is a great national shame that, contrary to the international trend toward pursuing common interests through exchanges and cooperation, transcending differences in ideologies and systems, not even letters of greeting can be exchanged between families scattered

in the South and the North.

The challenge levelled last August 12 by the Republic of Korea National Red Cross President at North Korea to agree to the unconditional resumption of the Red Cross talks was a natural demand seen from the aspect of such national shame.

If North Korea truly respects humanitarianism, they should respond affirmatively to the fervent wishes of the 60 million people to meet the long-cherished desire of the dispersed families.

At the same time, we consider it highly significant that the Central Federation of Five Northern Provincial Citizens' Associations has designated August 12 as the "Day of Separated Families." We expect that their lofty campaign to arrange reunions between dispersed families will draw wholehearted support and assistance from the rest of the nation.

True, citizens of the five northern provinces are themselves members of dispersed families who experience the tragedy of national division more acutely than any other people. The campaign for separated families' reunion carries an important significance because it has been initiated by these separated families themselves. We sincerely hope that this campaign—a pledge of the separated families' will to and confidence in unification—will spread broadly and develop into a nationwide movement to expedite peaceful unification.

In this sense, we are sure that the "Day of Separated Families" activities can not only be events on the part of families dispersed between the South and the North, but also a national reunion drive that can advance the reunion with those living separated against their will.

The cause of so many dispersed families in our country was the forcible occupation of the Korean peninsula by the Japanese, the artificial division of the country, and the Communist invasion of the South during the Korean War. Our compatriots suffering numerous hardships in mainland China and the Soviet Union are heroes of the tragedy of Japanese aggression.

To have them reunited with their dispersed families will have not only the visible effect of dispelling the pains of displaced families,

but also the far-reaching effect of demonstrating our national pride and potential. It is our hope that the "Day of Separated Families" will help its real meaning to permeate our North Korean brethren and, at the same time, serve as a momentum to accord even to the separated families in Sakhalin and northern China the joy of being reunited with their blood relatives.

We urge the North Korean authorities to respond favorably to the meaning of the designation of the "Day of Separated Families." It should be noted that one way to display such affirmative response by deed is for them to agree to the unconditional resumption of the South-North Red Cross Conference.

North Korean Red Cross Should Not Dismiss Humanitarianism

Seoul Shinmun

August 13, 1982.

Yoo Chang-soon, President of the Republic of Korea National Red Cross, yesterday issued a statement on the occasion of the 11th anniversary of the proposal for the South-North Red Cross talks, in which he again urged the North Korean Red Cross to agree to the unconditional resumption of the South-North Red Cross talks designed to discuss and solve the issue of the 10 million separated family members.

Also in the statement, the Red Cross President asked the North Korean Red Cross to cooperate in efforts to obtain the early return of the 35 crewmen of our fishing boat "Masan-ho No. 5" who were abducted during their fishing operations in the East Sea last July 13, as well as the 406 other South Korean fishermen whom North Korea has kidnapped and has been holding in captivity since 1954.

Meanwhile, the Central Federation of Five Northern Provincial Citizens' Associations has designated the anniversary date of the proposal for Red Cross talks as the "Day of Separated Families." In the first commemorative activity, the Central Federation resolved to take part

positively in the project to regain missing families and launch organized movements.

The North Korean Red Cross ought to show a sincere response toward this pathetic resolve of the dispersed families to solve their human pains by themselves as well as toward the call made by our National Red Cross for the early settlement of their sufferings, symbolic of the tragedy of national division.

To look back, the South-North Red Cross Conference was initiated at the humanitarian level in accordance with the proposal made by the Republic of Korea National Red Cross eleven years ago August 12 for a campaign to search for dispersed families. On July 4 of the following year, the South-North Joint Communique, a major milestone in our national history, was issued, giving birth to the South-North Coordinating Committee. National support for and expectation from these two channels of dialogue were great.

To be frank, the expectations we had then were that with the dialogue, the danger of war on the Korean peninsula would be dispelled through Koreans' own efforts; the 10 million dispersed family members who had to live in pain because of the force family separation would be reunited; and lasting peace would be systematized, making bright the prospects of eventual unification of the land.

However, North Korea unilaterally boycotted the inter-Korean dialogue on August 28, 1973, betraying such a national aspiration overnight. North Korea initially responded favorably to the proposal for dialogue because, unable to resist pressure from the then international trend toward detente, they schemed to try a new approach toward communization of all Korea by means of dialogue. But once the dialogue opened, it served provided momentum to infuse the wind of freedom into the closed and dictatorial society of North Korea. The bewildered North Korea had no choice but to torpedo the dialogue itself.

Thereafter, North Korea has persistently refused to resume the dialogue, posing absurd prerequisites such as the repeal of the South's anti-Communist policy and the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Korea. Notwithstanding such an intransigent attitude of North Korea, there has

been no change whatsoever in the policy of our government trying to solve our national issues with our nation's own ability through dialogue and negotiations. The world community supports this policy wholeheartedly.

About one hundred nations have expressed their support for the Formula for National Reconciliation and Democratic Unification which President Chun Doo Hwan announced early this year. The broad international support can be proved by the fact that among the number were some 40 non-aligned nations which maintain diplomatic ties with both South and North Korea. Therefore, if North Korea wants to avoid any further international isolation, it should respond affirmatively to our unification formula without any delay.

As can be seen in the case of inter-German relations, where some 8 million people travel back and forth between East and West Germany each year, reunion between dispersed families is a purely humanitarian issue that has nothing to do with the maintenance of a national system. We again strongly urge North Korea to accept our offer promptly.

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