


**No.58
OCTOBER
1993**

SOUTH-NORTH DIALOGUE IN KOREA



**OFFICE OF THE SOUTH-NORTH DIALOGUE
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SEOUL, KOREA**

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DIALOGUE
IN KOREA**

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Part I

The Kim Young-sam Government's Three-Phased Approach to Unification and Its Three Guiding Principles

1. Three-Phased Approach to Unification
 - a. *Phase One: Reconciliation and Cooperation*
 - b. *Phase Two: Korean Commonwealth*
 - c. *Phase Three: One Nation, One State*

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Part I

The Kim Young-sam Government's Three-Phased Approach to Unification and Its Three Guiding Principles

Since its inauguration, the civilian-led government of President Kim Young-sam has steadily been promoting reforms in all walks of life with a view to building a New Korea. In the process, the government has set as policy goals a clean government, a sound economy, a healthy society and a unified homeland.

A unified homeland has been made the last policy goal as the government seeks, through reforms, to solidly cement the groundwork for peaceful national unification.

With legitimacy and morality, the new government has removed any ground for friction between itself and the private sector over the question of dialogue, the kind of friction which had beset the bygone administrations, thus further building its ability to negotiate with the North and, at the same time, fostering conditions for rallying the nation's unification capabilities into oneness.

1. Three-Phased Approach to Unification

President Kim Young-sam made public the unification policy of his new government in his opening address made at the Sixth Advisory Council on Democracy and Peaceful Unification on July 6, 1993.

In the formula, President Kim set forth a three-phased approach to unification—reconciliation and cooperation, the Korean Commonwealth and unified state—in conformity with the frame of the existing Korean National Community Unification Formula and in line with the spirit of the Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression and Exchanges and Cooperation Between the South and the North.

As a base for the promotion of unification, the President called for a democratic national consensus, coexistence and co-prosperity and national well-being.

The unification policy of the new government is designed to restore and develop a national community between the South and the North through a gradual and phased approach and ultimately to realize unification with a single system, a single government and a single state.

The idea of a three-phased approach to unification, calling for the accomplishment of a single, unified state in the single nation through the phase of reconciliation and cooperation and that of the Korean Commonwealth, is intended to promote unification in a peaceful, orderly and responsible manner based on the concept that in unification all the Korean people can live well and that no unification would be meaningful if it cannot

bring about national prosperity.

a. Phase One: Reconciliation and Cooperation

During this phase, the South and the North are expected to overcome their hostility and mutual distrust deepened during the Cold War era, and develop relations of reconciliation and cooperation through confidence-building measures.

In order to pursue these objectives, the two parties must be realistic in recognizing that two political entities exist on the Korean peninsula. Each party should accept the other as a partner for coexistence and co-prosperity rather than an enemy to be destroyed.

Despite the fact that the Basic Agreement between the South and the North respects this principle of coexistence, the relationship between the two states has never reached the satisfactory level of reconciliation and cooperation.

As an effort to break the stalemate of inter-Korean relations the Kim Young-sam government has established reconciliation and cooperation as the initial stage of its unification approach. This particular gesture is highly appreciated as a realistic and reasonable step in the course of unification.

Successful reconciliation and cooperation requires more than a mere mutual recognition. Such recognition must be facilitated by concrete measures of confidence-building through exchanges and cooperation in various fields of mutual interest.

During this phase, the mustering of popular support is most essential. The Kim Young-sam government with full legitimacy can vigorously implement its unification policy based on popular

support.

b. Phase Two: Korean Commonwealth

As exchanges and cooperation between the two Koreas are activated and become institutionalized and mutual confidence is built, it will become necessary to institutionalize the peace mechanism on the Korean peninsula. This is the stage of the Korean Commonwealth.

At this phase, the South and the North are expected to augment a common sphere of living and to develop communities of social, cultural and economic activities. At the same time, the two parts of Korea will create a joint mechanism to discuss various means of national unity.

The organization and functions of the Korean Commonwealth are to be agreed upon by the two governments of Korea. The fundamental structure, however, would consist of the permanent establishment of a Council of Presidents and a Council of Ministers with a view to removing obstacles in the course of national unification.

At this stage, the most essential feature is the spirit of coexistence and co-prosperity. The cooperative spirit is needed to enable meaningful exchanges and cooperation between the South and the North for common well-being and mutual prosperity.

c. Phase Three: One State, One Nation

To accomplish a unified state, the Council of Representatives of the South and the North will have completed the legislative formalities of the Constitution of a unified Korea through a demo-


1. Three-Phased Approach to Unification

cratic process.

A unified government and unified parliament will be established after national elections held in accordance with the new Constitution. The new institutions will take requisite legislative and administrative actions to merge the separate government organizations and institutions into single entities appropriate under the unified government, thus completing the process of becoming a truly unified Korea of one nation, one state.

The establishment of a unified Korea, however, does not necessarily mean the completion of national unification. The emergence of a unified government in Korea will inevitably entail complications resulting from the legacies of the long national division.

In order for the unified Korean nation to enjoy the full benefit of unification the political integration of Korea must be accompanied by successful integration of economies as well as



〈The New Government's Three-Phased Approach to Unification〉

I. The Kim Young-sam Government's Three-Phased Approach to Unification and Its Three Guiding Principles

socio-cultural aspects of the two formerly separated parts of the nation.

2. Three Guiding Principles for Unification Policy

The new government has set democratic national consensus, coexistence and co-prosperity, and national well-being as the three guiding principles in implementing its phased unification formula in an effective and legitimate manner.

This government, being a democratic regime born of the people's voluntary support, has been resolutely carrying out a unification policy based on national consensus pooled in a more democratic process than in any other government of the past.


The path of unification will be explored in efforts made in the direction of pursuing peaceful coexistence and common prosperity between the South and the North and of minimizing incongruity between the interests of the state and the nation without isolating or blockading North Korea.

The three guiding principles are meant to place above all others national well-being to elevate the quality of the lives of the whole of the Korean people as a universal value that would embody the liberty, well-being and human dignity of the members of the Korean nation instead of valuing specific ideologies and systems; to reap the fruits of co-prosperity through steady exchanges and cooperation; and thus to build a unified system with one state in the same single nation.

These three principles for the unification policy have sequential relations among themselves. In other words, when a voluntary

2. Three Guiding Principles for Unification Policy

national consensus is formed within the South, then concrete policies could be unfolded to pursue coexistence and co-prosperity with the North Korean system based thereon, and only when the fruits of coexistence and co-prosperity are reaped, can national well-being be attained.



〈Three Guiding Principles for Unification Policy〉

a. Democratic National Consensus

Democratic national consensus is the first requisite that functions as the base for the two other conditions, and the domestic base of unification policy that has to be cemented in the first place.

Coexistence, co-prosperity and national well-being would be hard to come by without genuine national consensus. What is needed at this point is not an emotional or sentimental approach to unification but a rational consensus on achieving unification.

This principle of national consensus is significant, on the

I. The Kim Young-sam Government's Three-Phased Approach to Unification and Its Three Guiding Principles

one hand, in pursuing the unification issue on the basis of spontaneous popular support. Incidentally, it can contribute to lessening the effectiveness of the North Korean tactics of "United Front" which aims at incapacitating the authorities of the South Korean government. It will eventually lead North Korea to respond positively to the South's peaceful overtures.

In the past, in fact, when there lacked the government's legitimacy, conflict and confrontations were serious between the government authorities and non-governmental sector over the issue of unification.


North Korea had taken advantage of such a crack and intensified the southward agitation and propaganda offensive in a bid to set off consumptive debate on unification. Inter-Korean relations thus remained deadlocked and the political situation in the South was unstable.

However, the new government is quite different. On the strength of its legitimacy, the government has already secured a frame for national consensus and has been enjoying popular support for a series of the reforms it has been promoting.

This national consensus is being buttressed by the fact that the dissident forces which had challenged the government's unification policies in the past, are showing a forward-looking posture, trying to understand and cooperate in the unification policies of the new government.

In short, the new government's intent is to promote the unification policy of coexistence, co-prosperity and national well-being on the basis of a national consensus incorporating the reasonable opinions of both critics and conservatives in the new political climate.

2. Three Guiding Principles for Unification Policy



〈Inter-Korean Relation in Three-Phased Approach and Three Guiding Principles〉

b. Coexistence and Co-prosperity

The essence of coexistence and co-prosperity with the North is to seek realization of freedom and abundance of all Koreans while forsaking the posture of confrontation and antagonism which prevailed previously.

The South and the North laid a basic foundation for coexistence and co-prosperity on February 19, 1992 by effectuating the Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression and Exchanges and Cooperation between the South and the North.

However, to date no spirit of the agreement has been practiced. This is primarily due to deep-rooted distrust between the authorities of the two sides. The distrust stems in a large measure from Cold-War mentality and practices.

For the South and the North to genuinely coexist and co-prosper, they should first build up new mutual perceptions and confidence in which they respect each other, recognize differences

I. The Kim Young-sam Government's Three-Phased Approach to Unification and Its Three Guiding Principles

in mutual systems and ideologies, and do not interfere in each other's internal affairs. Besides, the two sides should respect each other as a partner of dialogue and cooperation.

We have already learned from experiences in contemporary history that peaceful coexistence is possible, even between mutually conflicting systems and ideologies. This universal principle constitutes an indispensable step for the Korean people in their march toward unification.

Meanwhile, coexistence should be conducive to co-prosperity of the South and the North.

Living together in poverty is not desirable. Existing together without enjoying freedom is equally undesirable.

Coexistence and co-prosperity literally mean that parties involved would exist together for prosperity.

The South and the North therefore, should engage in exchanges and cooperation in a posture to share what they have.

The true meaning of coexistence and co-prosperity lies in eliminating any policy to isolate or blockade the other. The reason why the new government of the South declared time and again that it has no intention of absorbing the North is because what the South is really after is bringing about national integration in a peaceful and step-by-step manner amid mutual coexistence and co-prosperity.

It is in line with the spirit of coexistence and co-prosperity that the new government's policy is to help North Korea take part in the international community as one of its proud members rather than to isolate it from the rest of the world.

Coexistence and co-prosperity between the South and the North will play the role of a stimulant for the restoration of natio-

nal homogeneity, a development which is especially required in the stage of the Korean Commonwealth where inter-Korean exchanges and cooperation become instituted.

c. National Well-being

National well-being constitutes a base for enhancing the quality of the lives and welfare of all Korean people as well as for accomplishing a unified national state which guarantees individual liberty, human rights and happiness of the population.

In the South thus far, there has been some mistaken conception of nationalism. The kind of national well-being, which the South's new government pursues as a base for its unification policy, however, has nothing to do with resistant or expansionist nationalism and is distinguished essentially from the type of nationalism window-dressed to serve the ruling ideology or security of a regime.

The national well-being the new government pursues is of a universal nature, a nature which puts national well-being above the frictions and enmity stemming from the difference in ideologies and systems in the current state of national division. Such a national well-being is supposed to build a future state of national integration, which guarantees individual freedom and human rights so that the dignity of all the Korean people can be embodied.

The base for national well-being of this kind lies in the universal value of mankind, a value which a unified government should pursue most preciously.

The following was the full text of the opening speech of President Kim Young-sam made at the inaugural meeting of the Sixth Advisory Council of Democratic and Peaceful Unification.

I. The Kim Young-sam Government's Three-Phased Approach to
Unification and Its Three Guiding Principles

In the speech President Kim explained about his government's three-phased approach to unification.

*Address by President Kim Young-sam
at the Inaugural Meeting of the
Sixth Advisory Council on
Democratic and Peaceful Unification*

Distinguished members of the Advisory Council on Democratic and Peaceful Unification, my 70 million fellow Koreans at home and abroad,

It is great to see the Advisory Council on Democratic and Peaceful Unification making a new start today in this era of civilian democratic government.

Peaceful unification is a long-cherished goal of the 70-million Korean people. We have gathered here to renew our determination to realize unification. This Council has the momentous mission of forging a national consensus on peaceful unification and pooling the determination and strength of our people for the task.

I extend my heart-felt gratitude to you, the more than 10,000 Council members at home and abroad, for your dedicated efforts in building the foundation for unification. Today, I have the conviction that you, the newly-named members of the Sixth Council, will devote your all, body and soul to the construction of a unified homeland. Many of the newly-named Council members are noted for their high morality and strong commitment to reform. Accordingly, the public places great expectations on the new Council.

Distinguished Council members,

We are now in the midst of a historic transition. The world is shifting away from ideological rivalry into economic competition and from military

2. Three Guiding Principles for Unification Policy

confrontation into peaceful contests. All the same, the Korean Peninsula remains a Cold-War island in a sea of detente and concord. It has yet to rid itself of the disgrace of being the only divided land on earth.

Still, the duration of the division, less than half a century, is only a very short period for us Koreans who have lived as one people in one state for more than 1,300 years. Our homeland must be unified without fail. The division has inflicted enormous pain and frustration on all of us.

This suffering must now be ended. We must not, however, be sentimentally deluded by a mirage of unification. If freedom without unification is imperfect, then unification without freedom is even more imperfect. If prosperity without unification is problematic, then unification without prosperity is even more problematic.

We must make sure that a unified homeland is able to guarantee political and economic freedom and social welfare, while respecting human rights. The process of unification must be democratic and must lead to greater national prosperity.

To achieve unification, we must first promote South-North reconciliation and cooperation and move toward the next stage of a Korean Commonwealth. Through this course, the South-North cold war and confrontation would gradually fade away, and the way would be paved for a unified homeland for one people in one state. This is our three-stage unification formula.

Distinguished Council members,

Vowing to do my very best to have the South and the North move into the stage of a Korean Commonwealth, I stress the following three principles as the essence of our unification policy:

First, democratic procedures must be respected. The new Government will vigorously press ahead with its three-stage unification policy rooted

I . The Kim Young-sam Government's Three-Phased Approach to Unification and Its Three Guiding Principles

in a national consensus. The new civilian Government is a democratic government characterized by legitimacy, morality and representativeness. Only through such a government can unification be brought about on the strength of spontaneous public support.

The new civilian government will never take advantage of its unification policy to maintain power. Now is the time for North Korea to give up its attempts to foment distrust and strife within our society. Only a legitimate government will be able to solve important issues affecting the destiny of the people and the country. The North ought to acutely realize this.

Second, the principle of coexistence and mutual prosperity must be pursued. Peaceful coexistence between the South and the North must lead to mutual prosperity without fail. What is the value of coexistence in poverty and without freedom? We must seek a coexistence that will enable both the South and the North to enjoy freedom and affluence. It is in this spirit that I have repeatedly made it clear that we have no desire at all to unify the land by absorbing the North.

Third, the principle of national well-being must be upheld. Unification must be pursued in a way that will raise the quality of life for all Koreans. Our vision of a unified homeland is a unified democratic state guaranteeing the freedom, well-being and dignity of all. These are universal values the progressive Korean nation seeks in concert with the rest of the world. We urge North Korea to step out into the wide world. We do not want the North to be isolated.

Distinguished Council members,

The key to improving South-North relations is mutual trust. Trust can only be fostered when accords and promises are kept.

The South and the North agreed to the Joint Declaration of Denuclearization. Both sides agreed not to possess nuclear weapons and to use

2. Three Guiding Principles for Unification Policy

nuclear energy solely for peaceful purposes. Both agreed to conduct mutual nuclear inspections. These promises, however, have not yet been fulfilled. On the contrary, suspicions about North Korea's nuclear intentions have escalated into a global concern, after these accords had already been reached.

Without resolving this nuclear issue, it will not be possible to ensure peace on the Korean Peninsula and in the world at large through improved South-North relations. I take this opportunity to urge North Korea to improve intra-Korean relations by speedily clearing up misgivings about its nuclear development program and contribute to international peace.

Right now, South-North dialogue is held in abeyance. The new Administration, however, holds the door wide open to dialogue out of a desire to prevent the tragedy of the annihilation of the entire Korean people. Dialogue must not be discontinued under any circumstance. Dialogue is even more urgent when such a grave and disruptive issue has come between the members of one people.

South-North relations must now unfold in a new manner. Dialogue should no longer try to foster winners or losers or bring advantages to one side alone. We need a dialogue in which both sides win. With this spirit, we must progressively expand our interactions and solve issues one after another, beginning with those that are the easiest to solve.

First of all, the efforts to ease the suffering by families separated in the South and the North must be brought to a successful conclusion. In particular, urgent efforts must be made to enable senior citizens to see their loved ones while they are still alive. Out of humanitarian considerations, we have already allowed the elderly Li In-mo to return to the North. I urge the North to take a more sincere attitude on this issue.

Distinguished Council members,

The scars of the Korean War have yet to heal, although 40 years

I. The Kim Young-sam Government's Three-Phased Approach to Unification and Its Three Guiding Principles

have passed since the armistice. We must not forget the past. Having learned an object lesson from the bitter war, we must endeavor to create a beautiful era of national unification.

Our immediate task in pursuit of unification is to cultivate our own strength so that all our citizens can have confidence in the future. Weeding out wrongdoing and corruption, revitalizing the economy and restoring national discipline—these are all indispensable and the most effective steps to prepare for unification and bring the day of unification closer.

The task of the new Administration to create a New Korea will be completed with the construction of a unified homeland. This is so because unification represents the greatest reform that our people must pull together to accomplish. Harnessing our newly-ignited enthusiasm for reform will be a short-cut to unification.

It that sense, it is very appropriate to equate our unification movement with our reform movement at this stage. When you, the members of the Advisory Council on Democratic and Peaceful Unification from various regions and professions, take the lead in bringing about change and reform, our tasks will be accomplished even more successfully. As each of you stands at the forefront of reform, our communities and workplaces will be transformed.

Such efforts will catalyze attitudinal reforms and the restoration of ethics. You will thus be the prime movers of unification.

Distinguished Council members,

The great march of reform has just begun. We must further deepen and broaden our reforms. Once again, I urge the Advisory Council on Democratic and Peaceful Unification to fulfill its mission as the prime mover of unification and reform.

Thank you.



Part II

Efforts of the New Government to Resume South-North Dialogue

1. Proposal for Contacts between Delegates to the South-North High-Level Talks
2. Counter-Proposal by North Korea for the Exchange of Special Envoys
3. Exchange of Telephone Messages
4. North Korea's Rejection of Dialogue and the South's Call for the Resumption of Talks
5. Proposal for Meeting of the South-North Joint Nuclear Control Commission, and North Korea's Rejection
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 - c. *Prerequisites Set forth by the North to the Resumption of Dialogue*
7. Statement on First Anniversary of the Effectuation of Auxiliary Agreements

Part II

Efforts of the New Government to Resume South-North Dialogue

1. Proposal for Contacts between Delegates to the South-North High-Level Talks

Tensions have built up in the international community over the North Korean nuclear issues. The United Nations Security Council adopted a resolution against North Korea on May 11, 1993 after North Korea rejected ad hoc inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) of its undeclared nuclear facilities in the Yongbyon area and announced their withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) on March 12, 1993.

The Seoul government has been carefully exploring ways to resolve the nuclear question of North Korea through talks and contacts with Pyongyang in the policy that there can be no substantial progress in inter-Korean relations nor can there be any recon-

II. Efforts of the New Government to Resume South-North Dialogue

ciliation and cooperation between the South and the North unless the North Korean nuclear question directly related to the safety and survival of the Korean nation, is resolved. At the same time, the South has been maintaining a close international cooperative system with world powers like the United States, Japan, China and Russia with a view to effectively persuading North Korea.

As there was a move between the United States and North Korea to have high-level talks in early June before the effective date, June 12, of North Korea's withdrawal from the NPT, the South, in a message signed by Prime Minister Hwang In-sung, the South's chief delegate to the South-North high-level talks, proposed to North Korea on May 20 to have "contacts between delegates to the high-level talks to discuss the nuclear issues at the level of the same Korean people."

While disclosing the policy stance that the nuclear question should be resolved peacefully through dialogue and negotiations before an international organization takes some action, the South suggested in the message that two delegates to the high-level talks meet at the Peace House in the southern sector of Panmunjom on May 27 to discuss matters pending between the two sides.

The proposal was highly significant in that it was the first proposal made since the birth of the new government, and specifically it was made in a circumstance where international concern about the North Korean nuclear issues has been rising.

The idea of contacts between delegates to the high-level talks stemmed from the fact that such delegates contacts were often used in resolving inter-Korean issues in the past, and also from the judgement that it was desirable to have delegates' contacts within the framework of the high-level talks to comprehensively

1. Proposal for Contacts between Delegates to the South-North High-Level Talks

and effectively discuss the nuclear question and other inter-Korean issues.

The following is the full text of the message sent to North Korea on May 20, 1993:

I have assumed the significant and momentous duties of the Chief Southern Delegate to the South-North High-Level Talks and send you cordial greetings.

As you know, through eight rounds of high-level talks in the recent past, the South and the North have signed and put into effect the Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression and Exchanges and Cooperation between the South and the North (South-North Basic Agreement), the Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and the protocols on the implementation of various chapters of the Agreement. We have also created implementing agencies to put the accords into practice.

In particular, the South and the North also agreed to hold the first meetings of the various South-North Joint Commissions one after another at a week's interval beginning on November 5 last year to begin translating the protocols into action in earnest. Had the meetings of the Joint Commissions been held in a normal fashion, discussions on ways to implement the protocols would have made good progress by now and furthermore, concrete projects to promote reconciliation and cooperation would have already been set in motion.

Regrettably, the fact is that both the first meetings of the Joint Commissions and the Ninth Round of the South-North High-Level Talks in Seoul have failed to take place, even though their dates were agreed upon. Moreover, the meetings of the South-North Joint Nuclear Control Commission to work out regulations for mutual nuclear inspections were discontinued in January this year.

II. Efforts of the New Government to Resume South-North Dialogue

Following the inauguration of a new Administration, our side has declared the intention to build a unified and developed democratic nation within this century by developing South-North relations on the basic principles of national well-being, coexistence and co-prosperity. We have enunciated our position that all South-North accords, including the South-North Basic Agreement, must be abided and that when the intra-Korean accords are faithfully translated into action it will be possible to achieve a South-North relationship of reconciliation, cooperation, coexistence and co-prosperity.

All the same, we are greatly chagrined by the fact that the issue of nuclear development in the North, which runs counter to the spirit and letter of the Joint Declaration of Denuclearization, remains the biggest obstacle to substantive progress in South-North relations.

The entire world is now paying keen attention to the implications of the North's decision to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and also its refusal to allow the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to inspect two undeclared sites. The global community is gravely concerned about the possible consequences of this issue if it is not peacefully resolved soon.

The 70 million Korean people ardently desire that this nuclear issue, which not only urgently concerns the interanational community but also is directly related to the fate of all our people, be solved expeditiously so that trust can be restored between the South and the North, and peace can take hold on the Korean Peninsula.

The resolution of the nuclear issue must not be delayed any longer in view of its gravity and urgency, as well as the fervent domestic and international wishes. Our new Administration believes that this issue must be resolved peacefully through dialogue and negotiation before the international community takes new action.

I believe that it is only natural and logical that the South and the North make joint efforts as members of the same ethnic family to resolve

2. Counterproposal by North Korea for the Exchange of Special Envoys

this nuclear issue and that this would be in line with the current call for national reconciliation and well-being.

To realize breakthrough on this issue and for the sake of national well-being, I propose that two members from each delegation to the South-North High-Level Talks hold talks at 10 a.m., Thursday, May 27, in the Peace House in the southern sector of Panmunjom. The delegates should be able to discuss ways to solve the nuclear issue and other related intra-Korean questions still pending.

Our side will be represented by Song Young-dae and Lee Seung-gon, who will be accompanied by four staff members. We think it would be advisable to hold the talks behind closed doors.

I sincerely hope that the proposed meeting will serve as a catalyst for forging an era of genuine South-North reconciliation, cooperation, coexistence and co-prosperity by making a breakthrough on the nuclear issue. I look forward to a positive reply from you.

2. Counter-Proposal by North Korea for the Exchange of Special Envoys

On May 25, the North, in a message signed by Administration Council Premier Kang Song-san, while turning a deaf ear to the South's proposal for delegates' contacts, demanded that special envoys be exchanged between the two sides to convey the top leaders' decision to settle issues pending between the two sides.

North Korea then counter-proposed that a vice-minister-level working-level contact be held at Tongilkak in the northern area of Panmunjom on May 31 to discuss the issue of exchanging special envoys.

II. Efforts of the New Government to Resume South-North Dialogue

It appeared that in their proposal for the exchange of special envoys, there was an ulterior motive to avert the discussion of their nuclear issue, sound out the South's posture toward unification, and to discuss inter-Korean problems based on their ten principles and four demands.

It was unusual for North Korea to propose the open exchange of special envoys. The two sides have never in the past exchanged envoys though they had swapped secret emissaries. In particular, it was against protocol for the North to one-sidedly pinpoint the special envoys by asserting the envoys be deputy-premier-level officials in charge of unification.

The following are excerpts from Premier Kang Song-san's message to the South:

As an epochal proposal to comprehensively resolve major events facing the nation, I courteously propose the exchange of special envoys appointed by the top leaders of the two sides.

The special envoys will have the mission to convey the grave decision of the top leaders to resolve the issue of a summit meeting and settle those matters pending between the North and South for the settlement of the unification issue facing the nation.

In view of the importance of the mission involved, the envoys should be in the level of deputy premier in charge of unification issues and the time of the exchange will be the sooner the better.

The exchange of special envoys will open a new phase in the implementation of the Basic North-South Agreement and the Denuclearization Declaration, and will bring about a substantial progress along the road toward national reconciliation and unification between the North and the South.

We believe that if and when the exchange of authoritative and responsible special envoys is realized, those issues which your side raised and wanted to settle at contacts between delegates to the high-level talks also could be resolved.

The exchange of special envoys should be preceded by a contact between working-level officials of the two sides.

It would be good that a working-level contact be attended by two officials led by a vice-minister-level official and take place at Tongilkak in our sector of Panmunjom at 10 a.m. May 31.

3. Exchange of Telephone Messages

Reacting to this proposal of North Korea, the Seoul government, in a telephone message dated May 29, again proposed to the North that a contact between delegates to the South-North high-level talks be held at 10 a.m. June 5 to discuss at a working level the nuclear issue and other inter-Korean matters related thereto as well as those raised by North Korea.

Making the proposal, the South displayed an incorporative attitude by saying that, "even the issues raised by the North could be taken up under the basic principle that the South-North dialogue should be resumed to settle the nuclear issue on the priority basis."

The following is the full text of the May 29th telephone message to the North:

. This is to acknowledge your letter of May 25. As you know, we pointed out in the letter sent to you on May 20 that the nuclear issue

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has not only caused urgent international concern but has a direct bearing on the fate of the entire Korean people. Accordingly, we made clear our position that this issue must be solved peacefully through dialogue and negotiations without fail.

We emphasized also that in view of its gravity and urgency, the nuclear issue cannot be left unresolved any longer and that both the South and the North must make all possible effort as members of the same ethnic family to solve the problem.

I consider that your letter of May 25 stemmed from both your understanding of the seriousness of the nuclear issue and your sincere desire first to resolve this issue and then to work to advance national well-being by promoting coexistence and common prosperity.

In order for the South and the North to truly become partners for peace and prosperity, we believe that first of all, both sides must unmistakably demonstrate through concrete action their commitment to comply with and implement the Joint Declaration of Denuclearization. This was why we proposed a meeting of selected members of the delegations to the South-North High-Level Talks to discuss ways of solving the nuclear issue and other related issues pending between the two sides.

On the premise that the nuclear issue, the roadblock to progress in South-North relations, must be resolved first of all, we believe that as members of the same ethnic family we will be able to frankly discuss also the other issues that you have raised.

The South-North High-Level Talks has proved to be an effective channel of dialogue; one which has adopted and put into force many accords, including the Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression and Exchanges and Cooperation (South-North Basic Agreement) and the Joint Declaration of Denuclearization—both of which are landmark documents in national history. In your letter of May 25, you also voiced the expectation that the implementation of these pacts would create a new situation leading

to a substantive advancement in South-North relations.

Accordingly, we believe that it will be possible to appropriately deal with the nuclear issue and the other issues raised by you at meetings of selected delegates to the South-North High-Level conference at a vice ministerial level, we assume that you will have no particular objection to meetings of selected delegates to the South-North High-Level Talks.

From that standpoint, we now propose that selected delegates meet at 10 a. m., Saturday, June 5, 1993 in Tongilgak (Unification Pavilion) in your sector of Panmunjom to conduct working-level discussion on ways to solve the nuclear issue and related South-North problems still pending, and also the the new issues that you have raised. We think it would be advisable to hold the talks behind closed doors.

Our side will be represented by Song Young-dae (Vice Minister of National Unification) and Lee Seung-gon (an ambassador-at-large and the southern cochairman of the Joint Nuclear Control Commission) who will be accompanied by four staff members.

With a yearning for South-North coexistence and co-prosperity, I look forward to a positive reply from you.

In their telephone message to the South on May 31 North Korea asserted that, "if and when the exchange of responsible and authoritative special envoys were realized, the question of a summit meeting could be settled and the grave decision of the top leaders conveyed to settle the issues pending between the two sides."

The North added that these matters could be taken up on the premise that the two sides discuss practical ways to carry out the Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.

North Korea again suggested that to materialize the excha-

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nge of special envoys, a working-level contact, not a contact between delegates to the high-level talks, take place at Panmunjom on June 4.

Despite the North's insistence on their position, the South accommodated part of their assertion in a positive policy to provide a breakthrough in the resolution of the North Korean nuclear issues in its counterproposal that a working-level contact between the government authorities of the two sides take place at Panmunjom on June 5 to discuss the issues of finding a breakthrough in the resolution of the nuclear question and of exchanging special envoys as proposed by the North.

The North insisted on June 4 that a working-level contact be held on June 8 to discuss none but working-level matters related to the exchange of special envoys. In a telephone message, the North claimed that, "the issue of finding a breakthrough in the resolution of the nuclear question, suggested by the South, would produce an unnecessary obstacle to the working-level discussion of the exchange of special envoys."

In the same message, the North suggested that a working-level contact take place on June 8 to discuss only those matters related to the proposed exchange of special envoys.

Subsequently from June 7 to June 15, the two sides exchanged telephone messages six more times but failed to iron out their difference over the issue of resuming working-level delegates contacts.

The reason why the South wanted to discuss the question of finding a breakthrough in the resolution of North Korea's nuclear issues during delegates' contacts rather than during the process of exchanging special envoys was because the South had sensed

the ulterior motive of the North trying to avert the exigent nuclear issue by proposing the exchange of special envoys supposedly to arrange a summit meeting.

On June 22 the South again called for a working-level delegates' contact by laying down a more accommodative and flexible idea. The South's new stance was that the issue of the exchange of special envoys shall be taken up together with the discussion of basic matters on the nuclear question at the working-level delegates' contact.

In reply to North Korean Premier Kang Song-san's telephone message of June 15, prime Minister Hwang In-sung today informed the North that two representatives of the South, accompanied by four staff members, will arrive in Tong-ilgak (Unification Pavilion) in the northern sector of Panmunjom at 10 p.m. on Thursday, June 24 as proposed by Pyongyang. The two representatives will be Song Young-dae, Vice Minister of National Unification, and Lee Seung-gon, an ambassador at large and the southern co-chairman of the South-North Joint Nuclear Control Commission.

In a letter to the North Korean premier, the Prime Minister noted that since May 20, the South has indicated its willingness to accept the North Korean-proposed format and agenda of the talks. He said it is high time that the two sides ended tiring debate through telephone messages and instead sat down at a conference table to exchange frank views.

Prime Minister Hwang said that the only remaining difference is whether the nuclear issue should be discussed at working-level talks or through exchanges of special envoys, even though the North agrees that the nuclear issue must be urgently addressed.

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Since the South is prepared to accept the North's proposal to exchange special emissaries, Hwang said, the scheduled working-level talks should be able to conduct a preliminary discussion of the nuclear issue, as well as consultation on how to arrange an exchange of envoys.

The new position was to cope with the condition in which the urgent nuclear question was pushed aside because of the North's one-sided demand for the exchange of special envoys.

The South had offered the new stance also taking into account the fact that North Korea showed little sincerity toward settling the nuclear issues. Pyongyang expressed the willingness to discuss and settle the question of denuclearization of the Korean peninsula on a priority basis in the exchange of special envoys while at the first-round high-level talks between the United States and North Korea held in New York on June 2-11, Pyongyang agreed to shelve their withdrawal from the NPT.

As the South wanted to realize the exchange of special envoys and to discuss procedural matters related to the exchange of envoys along with the basic discussion of the nuclear question, there was no longer ground for the North to reject or put off working-level delegates' contacts if they were interested in resolving the nuclear question.

4. North Korea's Rejection of Dialogue and South Korea's Coll for the Resumption of Talks

North Korea, instead of responding affirmatively to the modified offer by the South, turned down working-level delegates' contacts altogether and tried to shift the blame to the South. In

4. North Korea's Rejection of Dialogue and South Korea's Call for the Resumption of Talks

a statement issued in the name of the Administration Council premier on June 26, the North asserted, "...Due to the unreasonable attitude of the South, the proposed exchange of special envoys cannot be realized."

The boycott in effect pointed to their refusal to discuss and resolve the nuclear question on a priority basis between the two sides of Korea.

It was hardly comprehensible for the North not to take up the nuclear issues as a priority question at inter-Korean government-level talks. This was especially so in view of the fact that they said they recognized the seriousness and importance of the nuclear question and that they had been talking with the United States on the nuclear question.

Following are excerpts from the statement of the North's Administration Council premier:

The exchange of special envoys we have proposed is the most realistic and reasonable method of negotiations, in the given situation, to discuss the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and to provide a breakthrough in realizing peaceful unification of the country.

Public opinion at home and abroad spoke highly of, positively supported, and welcomed our proposal for the exchange of special envoys. This would have been an epochal step taken in consideration of the new environment envisioned in the ten-point platform for grand national unity and the reality of the advent of a new regime in South Korea.

However, the South Korean government authorities, attached from the beginning to the mistaken idea of confrontation of the past, produced an artificial obstacle in the effort to explore a new path of dialogue. They attempted to replace our proposal for the exchange of special envoys—a

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proposal which would surely lead to alleviation, peace and unification—with working-level contacts between delegates to the North-South high-level talks, and to replace our idea of working-level discussion of the proposed exchange with the discussion of the nuclear question.

While turning a deaf ear to our proposal for the exchange of special envoys on one excuse or another, the South in a June 22 telephone message insisted again on basic discussion of the nuclear question among working-level delegates, thus making it express their rejection of the proposed exchange of special envoys.

I regret it much that despite month-long and patient efforts, our proposal for the exchange of special envoys cannot be realized due to the South's unreasonable attitude.

If there occurs any development on the Korean peninsula that goes against the interests of our nation, the South should be held totally responsible.

In reaction, the Seoul government on June 26, in a statement by the government spokesman, expressed regret over the fact that North Korea, while slandering the South, had in effect disrupted a dialogue between the government authorities of the two sides.

He said that a dialogue between government authorities to settle the nuclear question, needed more than any other time in as much as there could be no substantial progress in inter-Korean relations without the resolution of North Korea's nuclear issues. In this respect, the spokesman said, "the South would keep the door of dialogue open always in an effort to settle the nuclear question peacefully."

The following is the full text of the June 26th statement by the spokesman of the Seoul government:

4. North Korea's Rejection of Dialogue and South Korea's Call for the Resumption of Talks

Today, the North Korean premier (Kang Song-san) issued a statement refusing our proposal for South-North working-level sessions to conduct a preliminary discussion of the (North Korean) nuclear issue together with the (North Korean) proposal to exchange special envoys. Moreover, blaming us for this fiasco, the statement indicates that Pyongyang has decided to virtually discontinue dialogue between the authorities of the South and the North.

This is a truly regrettable turn of events. The nuclear issue is now not only an urgent global concern but has a direct bearing on the fate of the entire Korean people. This issue must be addressed without a moment's delay in view of its gravity and urgency. The unwavering position of the Government is that until and unless the nuclear issue is resolved, it will be impossible to pursue either reconciliation or solidarity or peace or unification between the two areas of Korea.

The nuclear issue must be solved before everything else. This is why we have made all possible efforts until now to resolve the issue through dialogue and negotiations as one people. Since our Prime Minister (Hwang In-sung) wrote to the North on May 20 this year, proposing a meeting of selected members of the delegations to the South-North High-Level Talks (at the prime ministerial level) to make a breakthrough on this issue, we have accepted the North Korean-proposed format and agenda of the proposed talks from a broad viewpoint that this issue must be solved peacefully through dialogue. More precisely, we sent a telephone message to the North on June 22 expressing our readiness to exchange envoys with the goal of improving intra-Korean relations and promoting national well-being.

And yet, the North has turned a deaf ear to our earnest efforts and has instead persisted in its one-sided demands, in order only to avoid addressing the nuclear issue. There is no justifying the North's spurning of our efforts to resolve this issue, even while they acknowledge its gravity and

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urgency. They contradict themselves by being so anxious to conduct nuclear talks with the United States.

The North Korean stance deserves domestic and international condemnation because it betrays the yearning of the entire Korean people to see the nuclear issue solved expeditiously so that mutual trust and durable peace can be built between the South and the North. The North must be held accountable for all the consequences of dragging its feet on this issue.

Since there can be no substantive progress in South-North relations without resolving this issue, dialogue to that end is more urgent than ever before. Accordingly, the Government will hold the door open for dialogue to peacefully resolve this issue.

We urge the North once more to change its mind and in good faith to respond positively to our endeavors.

5. Proposal for Meeting of the South-North Joint Nuclear Control Commission and North Korea's Rejection

At a time when an inter-Korean dialogue on the nuclear question was suspended due to the North's boycott, North Korea had the second-round talks with the United States to settle the nuclear issues on July 14-19 in Geneva.

In a joint announcement made at the end of the Geneva meeting, North Korea reaffirmed the importance of the implementation of the Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, and expressed willingness to begin as early as possible a South-North dialogue to resolve bilateral issues including the nuclear question.

5. Proposal for Meeting of the South-North Joint Nuclear Control Commission, and North Korea's Rejection

Here, the South decided to again promote an inter-Korean dialogue to settle North Korea's nuclear question. As for the form of the talks, the South decided to propose the meeting of the South-North Joint Nuclear Control Commission, in as much as North Korea had rejected working-level delegates' contacts in May.

The Joint Nuclear Control Commission met 22 times to work out rules for inter-Korean nuclear inspections under the provisions of the Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. The commission failed to have any meeting or contact since a co-chairmen's contact took place on January 25, 1993.

The reason for the suspension of the commission was that North Korea boycotted the commission using the excuse of noncommission business, that was, a military exercise held in the South.

However, since the Team Spirit exercise North Korea disputed had come to an end a long time before, and since North Korea itself reaffirmed the importance of the implementation of the Joint Declaration of Denuclearization in the joint announcement of the U.S.-North Korea high-level talks in Geneva, North Korea ought to have agreed to normalize the Joint Nuclear Control Commission at an early date to prepare nuclear inspection rules and conduct mutual nuclear inspections based thereon.

In this context, the South proposed holding a meeting of the Joint Nuclear Control Commission at Tongilkak in the northern area of Panmunjom at 10 a.m. August 10, informing the North of the list of the southern members of the commission.

The following is the full text of the August 4th telephone message to the North:

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A year and half has already passed since the South and the North adopted the Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, which promised not only the denuclearization of the peninsula but also verification through mutual inspections.

If the promise made in adopting the Agreement on the Formation and Operation of a South-North Joint Nuclear Control Commission had been kept, regulations governing South-North mutual nuclear inspections would have been finalized a year ago, thereby routinizing such inspections.

The fact is, however, that although the commission has held a combined total of 22 full-dress meetings and working-level contacts, it was unable to conduct serious discussions on how to draw up the relevant regulations. Furthermore, commission meetings and contacts have been totally discontinued since the co-chairmen of the commission met on January 25 this year.

With a view to breaking through this state of affairs, I proposed last May a meeting of working-level representatives from both sides. It is truly regrettable that this was not realized.

I consider it fortunate, however, that in the recent talks with the United States, your side acknowledged the importance of implementing the terms of the Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and expressed a willingness to resume South-North talks to that end at an early date.

The nuclear issue is now a grave matter that has a direct bearing on the fate of the Korean people. As such, it has become the focal point of urgent international concern. I believe it is high time that both sides prudently resolve the nuclear issue, thereby not only achieving a breakthrough towards improved South-North relations but also demonstrating the wisdom and maturity of our people for the whole world to see.

Now your side should agree to promptly normalize the Joint Nuclear Control Commission and expeditiously work out regulations for mutual

5. Proposal for Meeting of the South-North Joint Nuclear Control Commission, and North Korea's Rejection

nuclear inspections and implement them, as you have promised before the world and the 70 million Korean people. In that way, you should live up to the wishes of the entire Korean people.

From that standpoint, I propose that the South-North Nuclear Control Commission meet at 10 a.m., Tuesday, August 10 in Tong-ilgak, in your sector of panmmunjom.

At the same time, I would like to inform you that the following new members from our side have been appointed to the Joint Nuclear Control Commission:

Lee Seung-gon, co-chairman, ambassador-at-large

Chung Se-hyun, vice co-chairman, secretary to the President of the Republic of Korea

Chang Jae-ryong, bureau director general at the Foreign Ministry

Im Tae-soon, consultant to the National Unification Board

Kim Ssang-yol, brigadier general, the Ministry of National Defense

Lee Seung-koo, counsellor, the Ministry of Science and Technology

Chung Ui-bu, counsellor at the Office of the Prime Minister

However, North Korea, instead of sending a reply to the South with regard to the proposal, rejected even the meeting of the Joint Nuclear Control Commission in a statement issued by the spokesman of the northern delegation to the high-level talks.

In the statement, the North expressed a desire not to hold commission meetings, asserting unfoundedly that, "the South would stage the Team Spirit exercise next year also" and "the South proposed commission meetings in a bid to delay the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula."

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While again demanding the exchange of special envoys by saying, "the way to settle issues between the two sides including the nuclear question lies in the exchange of the envoys of the top officers, the statement tried to shift blame for the failure of the dialogue to the South by insisting, "whether all issues including the nuclear question could be resolved satisfactorily depends entirely on the stance of the South toward the North-South dialogue."

Following are excerpts from the statement of the spokesman of the northern delegation to the South-North high-level talks:

As we have stressed time and again, the way to settle issues pending between the two sides including the nuclear question most reasonably and quickly lies in the exchange of special envoys of the top leaders.

It cannot be a rightful way to settle problems to call for the meeting of the Joint Nuclear Control Commission in a circumstance where working-level meetings of the commission have already been deadlocked.

Nonetheless, the South, while turning a deaf ear to our proposal for the exchange of special envoys, demanded a working-level negotiation method such as the meeting of the Joint Nuclear Control Commission in the telephone message as in the past. This is an attempt to delay the implementation of the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula and to splash cold water upon North Korea-U.S. talks.

In this connection, the Seoul government, in a statement of the spokesman of the southern delegation to the South-North high-level talks on August 14th, expressed a regret over the North's rejection of Joint Nuclear Control Commission meetings.

Song Young-dae, vice unification minister and the spokesman of the South's delegation to the high-level talks, said in the

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statement that North Korea's rejection of the meeting of the Nuclear Control Commission following their rejection of working-level contacts between the two government authorities, amounted to turning a deaf ear to efforts to resolve the nuclear question on national level.

The Seoul government made it clear that it would keep the door of dialogue always open in the conviction that the South-North dialogue should be resumed an early date and the nuclear question resolved on a priority basis.

The following is the full text of the statement issued by the spokesman of the South's delegation to the South-North high-level talks:

In a statement released under the name of the spokesman of the northern delegation to the South-North high-level talks, North Korea on August 9 rejected our proposal to resume the meeting of the South-North Joint Nuclear Control Commission.

It cannot but be a matter of much regret that North Korea again turned a deaf ear to the efforts to resolve the nuclear question from the approach of the same nation. On last June 26, North Korea, in a statement made by the Administration Council premier, turned down our flexible and magnanimous offer to have a working-level delegates' contact between the authorities of the South and the North.

The North Korean nuclear issues are not only an international question but also an intra-national question, which constitute a major obstacle to world peace and a progress in inter-Korean relations.

We consider it much fortunate that there has been some progress in the international efforts to resolve the North Korean nuclear issues. We hope that this atmospher will continue to develop in an affirmative direction.

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The Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula the South and the North signed and effectuated is a pledge made before the 70 million Korean people and the world to safeguard the national survival and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes only coming away from the threat of nuclear weapons.

But, the failure to implement the agreement has given a great anxiety to the whole people aspiring for reconciliation and cooperation, peace and unification between the South and the North.

The basic purpose for our side's proposal for the resumption of the business of the South-North Joint Nuclear Control Commission for the sake of the implementation of the Denuclearization Joint Declaration is to bring about a substantial progress in inter-Korean relations through the priority resolution of the nuclear question.

What is regrettable most, however, is the fact that North Korea has abandoned the basic dialogue posture which they ought to retain for the sake of reconciliation and cooperation between the South and the North.

Moreover, North Korea, while turning a deaf ear to our side's efforts to resolve the nuclear question peacefully, unfoundedly slander us in connection with dialogue posture.

The Team Spirit military exercise, for instance, cannot be subject to any dispute because it is one of our rightful defensive training exercises to prepare against military threats from the North.

But, we wish to make it clear once again that if North Korea shows sincerity toward removing suspicions about their nuclear arms development, our side, too, would take corresponding steps.

In addition, it is proper to discuss and resolve the nuclear question and other issues pending between the South and North through dialogue between the responsible authorities. Nonetheless, North Korea clings to such old-fashioned conferences like the Pan-National Conference so called to go against the spirit of the Basic South-North Agreement.

6. The South's Proposal for the Exchange of Envoys

To resolve the North Korean nuclear issues is an exigent time-limit question whose settlement cannot be put off any longer.

To this end, the South-North dialogue should be resumed at an early date. The two sides can no longer waste time indulging in good-for-nothing disputes indefinitely.

This is the very time when a dialogue from the approach of the same nation is needed acutely to stave off national misfortune and explore a path toward coexistence and co-prosperity.

Our side is willing to discuss with North Korea various issues pending between the two sides along with the nuclear question on the premise that the nuclear question would be discussed on the top priority basis.

We make it clear once again that in this policy we continue keeping the door of dialogue wide open.

As we call upon North Korea to return to the rightful dialogue posture and strive to implement and practice the Denuclearization Joint Declaration between the South and the North, we will continue to wait for the North's sincere response to the proposal made by our side Prime Minister on August 4.

6. The South's Proposal for the Exchange of Envoys

a. Revised proposal by North Korea for the Exchange of Envoys

After the proposal for the meeting of the Joint Nuclear Control Commission ended, North Korea showed an affirmative stance toward holding the second-round high-level talks with the United States by, for instance, holding talks with IAEA officials in Pyong-

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yang on August 31 to discuss matters related to the implementation of the Nuclear Safeguards Agreement.

The South initially planned to send a telephone message to the North on September 1 to urge the North to return to the dialogue in a policy to resolve North Korea's nuclear issues before any other questions.

However only a few hours before the South was to send the message on September 1, North Korea, in a statement released in the name of the spokesman of their delegation to the South-North high-level talks, discussed their position with regard to the South-North dialogue.

In the statement, the North revised a little the method of the exchange of special envoys, now suggesting that the envoys should be an official of any level appointed by the top leaders of the two sides, and also that the topics to be taken up could be the denuclearization issue and the question of joint steps to take to ease tension and carry out the Basic South-North Agreement.

Following are excerpts from the statement of the North's spokesman:

We demand that the South should suspend all hostile nuclear war games against the same people, not to pursue a so-called international cooperative system, and never repeat any further acts that go against dialogue and peace.

The South can display such a stand by assuming a progressive posture toward the dialogue and by showing an affirmative response to the proposed exchange of special envoys, a proposal on which the entire people pin much expectations.

6. The South's Proposal for the Exchange of Envoys

If the South shows sincerity toward the dialogue in any way, we will not be bound by the level of special envoys.

If the South cannot name a deputy-prime-minister-level official in charge of unification issues due to its own situation, special envoys of any level appointed by the top leaders of both sides can be exchanged.

It and when reliable special envoys can be exchanged between the North and the South, the nuclear question and other issues pending between the North and the South could be resolved at an early date according to the wish of the top leaders. Our efforts to promote peace and peaceful unification will come to a successful fruition by all means.

We expect that the South will carefully review our repeated call for the exchange of special envoys and display by deeds its changed posture at an early date in favor of its implementation.

b. Proposal by the South for the Exchange of Envoys

The South, regarding the North's disclosure of its dialogue posture as a policy change, withheld a telephone message set to be sent on September 1 and decided to propose the new method of the exchange of special envoys based on its existing policy that, "we will not be bound by the form of talks if the North is willing to discuss and settle the nuclear question on a priority basis."

On September 2, one day after North Korea released its statement, the South, in a telephone message signed by the Prime Minister, proposed exchanging special envoys appointed by the top leaders of the two sides to discuss and resolve the nuclear question on a priority basis and handle other issues pending between the two sides.

The South suggested that a contact between working-level delegates headed by a vice-minister-level official be held on Septe-

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mber 7 at Tongilgak, Panmunjom to discuss working-level matters related to the exchange of special envoys.

As the South, accommodating the North's idea, proposed a working-level delegates' contact for the exchange of special envoys, the possibility of resumed dialogue grew more than any other time in the past. It also seemed possible for the two sides to exchange special envoys to discuss and settle the nuclear question on a priority basis.

The following is the full text of the South's September 2nd telephone message to the North:

We have thus far firmly maintained the position that the nuclear issue that has a direct bearing on the destiny of our people must be peacefully resolved through dialogue. It was in keeping with this position that in the telephone message I sent to you on August 4, I urged quick normalization of the South-North Joint Nuclear Control Commission with the aim of solving the nuclear issue.

To our great chagrin, however, no South-North dialogue has been opened to seek a solution to that issue. The Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, to which both sides have agreed, is a promise to the 70-million Korean people and the world to protect the lives of our people from the horrors of the nuclear bomb, while using nuclear energy solely for peaceful purposes. The implementation of this declaration must not be shunned or delayed.

I put a positive construction on the fact that your side has just resumed talks with the International Atomic Energy Agency on how to implement the nuclear safeguards agreement. I hope and expect that this will give a major impetus to the development of South-North relations.

As you admit, the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula is a very

6. The South's Proposal for the Exchange of Envoys

urgent problem the solution of which cannot be delayed any longer. It is imperative, first of all, to speedily reopen South-North dialogue to address this issue.

I have not forgotten the fact that your side has also declared the intention to discuss and resolve the nuclear issue on a top-priority basis. As for the format of resumed dialogue, we have proposed meetings between working-level representatives and the convocation of the Joint Nuclear Control Commission. On the other hand, you have proposed an exchange of special envoys.

Now that both the South and the North have agreed to discuss and solve the nuclear issue on a top-priority basis, there cannot be any reason to delay dialogue merely on account of the question of format. We are ready to engage in frank face-to-face dialogue without concern about the format of talks.

Accordingly, we propose an exchange of a special envoy appointed by the top leader of each side in order to discuss and solve the nuclear issue on a top-priority basis and to deal with other major issues pending between the South and the North.

It is our hope that working-level representatives will be able to meet at 10 a.m., Tuesday, September 7 at Tongilgak in your sector of Panmunjom to discuss practical arrangements for the proposed exchange of envoys. We suggest that two officials from each side, one with the rank of vice minister, serve as delegates to the proposed meeting and that they be accompanied by several assistants.

I hope and expect that the nuclear issue will be expeditiously resolved to help secure world peace, while ushering in an era of South-North reconciliation and cooperation in the interest of the entire Korean people.

I urge you to respond positively and in good faith.

c. Prerequisites Set forth by the North to the Resumption of Dialogue

In a telephone message on September 6, the North laid down two prerequisites to the resumption of the stalled dialogue. The North argued in the message that, "to resume the dialogue, the South should first make it clear it won't stage nuclear war games nor would pursue an international cooperative system."

The North said that only when the South showed an "acceptable" stand toward the prerequisites they set by September 8, a working-level delegates' contact could take place on September 10.

The following are excerpts from North Korea's September 6th telephone message to the South:

If your side is truly interested in a dialogue with us to settle the nuclear question, your side ought to have expressed in the latest telephone message your policy not to stage nuclear war games, nor the pursuance of an international cooperative system against the same people.

It is self-evident before any one's eyes that it stands against reason for the two sides to sit face to face and have a dialogue over the issue of denuclearization in the midst of a nuclear war game designed for one side to attack the other.

Your side, too, must well know that the North-South dialogue to discuss the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula failed to be carried out smoothly and was related entirely thereto.

I hope that your side will show an acceptable stand within the deadline so that the two sides could have a working-level delegates' contact at Tongilkak in our sector of Panmunjom at 10 a.m. September 10 to discuss the exchange of special envoys.

6. The South's Proposal for the Exchange of Envoys

Our side will send to the contact three delegates headed by a vice-minister-level official and four attendants.

It was unreasonable and a matter of regret that North Korea set forth prerequisites to a working-level delegates' contact for the exchange of special envoys and asked the South for the revelation of an "acceptable posture."

The prerequisites the North produced were absurd in nature, which could be resolved as a matter of course once the nuclear question was discussed and resolved as a top priority through the exchange of special envoys.

The South has never staged "nuclear war games" as the North insisted. If the North calls the annual Team Spirit military exercise as "nuclear war games," it could be none but an unfounded claim.

It has been widely known at home and abroad that the Team Spirit exercise is an annual military training exercise staged for a self-defense purpose.

Therefore staging a military exercise or not does not constitute a prerequisite to the resumption of dialogue. The issue, in its nature, should be discussed and settled at the South-North Joint Military Commission in accordance with the Basic South-North Agreement after the dialogue was resumed. Basically, North Korea should endeavor to foster a climate where there needs no such military exercises.

Meanwhile, it was natural for the South to ask the North to affirmatively respond to clearing away international suspicion about their nuclear development inasmuch as South and North Korea alike are signatories to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty

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(NPT) and fulfill their treaty obligations.

It was unreasonable that North Korea, nevertheless, demanded that the South give up its pursuit of an international cooperative system, making it a precondition to the resumption of the dialogue.

Especially in view of the fact that the U.N. Security Council on May 11 adopted a resolution calling on North Korea to fulfill its obligations related to the implementation of the Nuclear Safeguards Agreement it signed with the IAEA and also on all member countries to help North Korea respond affirmatively to the resolution, it was natural for both South and North Korea, as U.N. member nations, to partake in international efforts to settle the nuclear question.

It is absurd therefore for the North to ask the South to give up an international cooperative system.

From this position, the Seoul government on September 8 sent a telephone message to the North, in which it expressed regret over the North's attachment of prerequisites to working-level contacts on the threshold of realizing the exchange of special envoys. It stressed in the message that, "if the North were really interested in resolving the nuclear question and other major issues pending between the South and the North, the North should not attach any preconditions to the inter-Korean dialogue."

Urging the North to agree to working-level contacts without any conditions, the South told the North that it would send three delegates to Panmunjom on September 10 as North Korea suggested.

The following is the full text of the September telephone message sent to the North:

6. The South's Proposal for the Exchange of Envoys

We acknowledge the receipt of your telephone message dated September 6.

In that message, you attached preconditions to the holding of working-level meetings to arrange an exchange of special envoys between the South and the North. This makes it doubtful if your side has a genuine intention of reopening dialogue.

Although you have persistently held that special envoys should be exchanged in order to discuss and resolve the nuclear issue and other major questions pending between the South and the North, you now present preconditions for working-level contacts just before the proposed envoy exchange is expected to take place.

If your side is truly willing to solve the nuclear issue and other major problems pending between the South and the North, you must not attach any condition to reopening South-North dialogue.

Accordingly, I believe that your side ought to come forward, without any condition, to the conference table for working-level discussions.

I hereby inform you that as you have newly proposed, our side will send a three-member delegation, led by a vice minister and accompanied by four assistants, to Tong-ilgak (Unification Pavilion) in your sector of Panmunjom at 10 a.m., Friday, September 10. I urge you to positively respond.

At the same time, the South suggested through the South-North Liaison Office that a South-North liaison officials' contact take place at 3 p.m. September 8 to discuss procedural matters related the working-level delegates' contact slated for September 10. The items to be discussed included the receipt of North Korea's memorandum on personal safety and the number of personnel to visit the other side's area at Panmunjom.

However, the northern liaison official rejected the offer, say-

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ing he had received no instructions on such contact from a higher office. The North thus hinted at boycotting the working-level delegates' contact on September 10.

In an effort to obtain the North's clear-cut position and to have South-North liaison officials' contact, the South informed the North on the morning of September 9 despite its being a Sunday that the southern side liaison staffs would work until 12 noon September 9.

However, while shunning an official notification via the Liaison Office, the North on September 9 disclosed its position over the working-level delegates' contact in the form of a press conference by the spokesman of the northern delegation to the high-level talks.

In the press conference, the North reiterated the prerequisites they attached to the working-level delegates' contact. It asserted, "If the nuclear question and other issues could be resolved satisfactorily in the exchange of special envoys, nuclear war games that stand against the realization of denuclearization should be suspended, and if the nuclear question were to be resolved between the same people, there should be no act to harm the other side in the dialogue in collusion with outside forces."

Saying that they were hoping the South would make an affirmative answer by September 20, the North said that working-level delegates' contact could be held on September 23 on the basis of an affirmative response. They thus showed they won't have working-level contacts for the time being.

For the North to attach one-sided prerequisites to the inter-Korean dialogue cannot but be taken as an indication that they are not interested in resuming the dialogue.

In a comment over what the North Korean spokesman said in the press conference, the spokesman of the South's delegation to the high-level talks said the South's position is to resume the dialogue without any conditions, adding that North Korea should withdraw their undue prerequisites at an early date and return to the contact.

With regard to the two prerequisites the North had produced, the spokesman said that "since our side has already disclosed its position over the preconditions, now is the North Korean turn to make an answer."

7. Statement on First Anniversary of the Effectuation of Auxiliary Agreements

On September 17, the Seoul government, in a statement released by the spokesman of the southern delegation to the South-North high-level talks, called for the faithful implementation of the South-North agreements and the resumption of the South-North dialogue on the occasion of the first anniversary of the effectuation of auxiliary agreements in various areas such as reconciliation, non-aggression and exchanges and cooperation.

Song Young-dae, the South's spokesman, stressed that, "the Basic Agreement and the Joint Denuclearization.

Declaration were valuable documents that have given a hope to all mankind and a pride to the Korean people," adding that the two sides should endeavor to make them a living norm for the sake of the South-North dialogue.

He expressed the hope that the area-by-area joint commis-

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sions would be put into business and concrete matters would be translated into action for reconciliation and cooperation as envisaged in the auxiliary agreements after the special envoys were exchanged and a progress was registered in the resolution of the nuclear question.

The South's spokesman again urged the North to come forward to the working-level delegates' contact at an early date to discuss the exchange of special envoys without any preconditions.

The following is the full text of the statement by the spokesman of the southern delegation to the South-North high-level talks on the occasion of the first anniversary of the effectuation of auxiliary agreements:

Today marks the first anniversary of the effectuation of the protocols on the compliance with and implementation of the chapters of the Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression and Exchanges and Cooperation Between the South and the North (the Basic Agreement).

Last year the South and the North adopted the Basic Agreement in order to achieve national reconciliation, guarantee an easing of tension and the maintenance of peace and promote the common interest and prosperity of the entire Korean people through multifaceted exchanges and cooperation. We also adopted the Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula to eliminate the risk of nuclear war on the Peninsula.

With the adoption of the important documents which will go down in history as a major landmark for the Korean people, the South and the North paved the way for reconciliation and cooperation and gave hope to the 70 million Korean people for peace and peaceful unification.

The Basic Agreement is a solemn historic pledge to the 70 million Korean people and should thus be observed strictly without fail. The North,

7. Statement on First Anniversary of the Effectuation of Auxiliary Agreements

however, abruptly suspended dialogue with the South just prior to the implementation of the protocols which stipulate concrete terms for the compliance with and implementation of the Basic Agreement. As a result no tangible progress has been made toward reconciliation and cooperation between the South and the North.

The most serious barrier to progress in relations between the South and the North is the issue of North Korea's nuclear arms development. All our 70 million people earnestly desire that the nuclear issue, which has a direct and grave bearing on the future of them all, will be resolved as soon as possible so as to restore confidence between the South and the North and bring about peace on the Peninsula.

It was for this reason and out of a belief that the format of the talks matters little so long as this issue and other major questions pending between the South and the North are discussed that the South agreed to the North's proposal to exchange special envoys, in addition to the mechanisms established in accordance with the Basic Agreement. To our dismay, however, the North then attached preconditions to their own proposal for an exchange of special envoys.

It is obvious that the problems between the South and the North can only be resolved through dialogue. It is tantamount to outrightly refusing to participate in dialogue, however, for the North to set preconditions.

Article 10 of the Basic Agreement stipulates that all disputes between the South and the North shall be resolved peacefully through dialogue and negotiation.

We have repeatedly made it clear that the issue of military exercises raised by the North will be discussed when the North assumes a sincere attitude toward the implementation of the Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and agrees to give top priority in South-North negotiations to the issue of their nuclear development.

The North also raised the issue of the South's policy of promoting

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international cooperation in dealing with the nuclear issue. It should be noted, however, that the North pledged to sincerely observe its obligations concerning international nuclear inspections at the time the Joint Declaration of Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula was adopted.

It is natural for the South to seek international cooperation in urging the North to resolve the doubts about its nuclear arms development. The North should never reject or shun dialogue with the South on the issue of resolving its suspected nuclear arms development plan.

Therefore, we once again urge the North to promptly and unconditionally respond to our call for working-level talks to work out the details for an exchange of special envoys.

We hope that special envoys will be exchanged and substantial progress made toward the resolution of the nuclear issue and that this will pave the way for the activation of the various joint commissions and committees organized in accordance with the Basic Agreement. We also hope that concrete measures will be implemented in accordance with the protocols of the Basic Agreement for reconciliation and cooperation between the South and the North.

Once again, we confirm that the Basic Agreement is an important document which gives hope to mankind and is a source of pride for the Korean people. We emphasize, therefore, that mutual efforts must be made to make the Basic Agreement the most important framework for dialogue between the South and the North.



Part III

Efforts of the World Community to Resolve North Korea's Nuclear Issues

1. Statement of U.N. Security Council President and Resolution by the U.N. Security Council
2. Movements of Major Countries on the Nuclear Issues
3. High-level talks between the United States and North Korea
 - a. *First-round Contacts (June 2-11, New York)*
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Part III

Efforts of the World Community to Resolve North Korea's Nuclear Issues

Ever since North Korea announced the withdrawal from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) on March 12, 1993, the Seoul government has endeavored to resolve the North Korean nuclear issues through dialogue between the two sides, regarding it as a vital issue on which the nation's survival was at stake. The South has maintained an international cooperative system to attain the goal of the international community, that is, to retain a nuclear nonproliferation mechanism.

Besides, various international organizations like the United Nations and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the world powers such as the United States, Japan, Russia and China have been urging North Korea to resolve its nuclear question by, among other things, returning to the NPT.

1. Statement of the U.N. Security Council President and Resolution by the U.N. Security Council

Regarding the nuclear question involving North Korea, which had been referred to the United Nations Security Council under a decision made at a special Board of Governors meeting of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the Security Council on April 8 adopted a statement of the Security Council president as its first official step. The statement indirectly called on North Korea to return to the NPT and asked the IAEA to exert constructive efforts to get the question resolved.

The full text of the Security Council president's statement was as follows:

"The members of the Security Council take note of the oral statement of 6 April 1993 and the written report of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Dr. Hans Blix. The members of the Council also take note of the letter of 12 March 1993 of the Permanent Representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) to the President of the Security Council, enclosing one from his Foreign Minister with reference to Article X of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)."

"The members of the Council are concerned at the situation which has arisen. In this connection they reaffirm the importance of the NPT and of the parties to it adhering to it.

"The members of the Council also express their support for the North-South Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula."

"The members of the Council welcome all efforts aimed at resolving

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this situation and in particular encourage the IAEA to continue its consultations with the DPRK and its constructive endeavours for a proper settlement of the nuclear verification issue in the DPRK.”

“The members of the Security Council will continue to follow the situation.”

As North Korea failed to faithfully respond to the call made in the statement of the U. N. Security Council president, the Security Council on May 11, 1993 adopted a resolution urging North Korea to reconsider its decision to withdraw from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and accept IAEA nuclear inspections. It also warned that if North Korea ignores the call, the Security Council may take additional steps.

Of the 15 Security Council member countries, 13 nations voted for the resolution while China and Pakistan abstained. The abstention by China, a close ally of North Korea, was taken to represent its tacit approval of the resolution in support of the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.

Consisting of a nine-point preamble and five articles, the Security Council Resolution No. 825 asked the IAEA General-Director to carry on negotiations with North Korea and report to the Security Council at an appropriate time while requesting all U. N. member countries to urge North Korea to respond favorably to the resolution.

In its Article 5, the resolution said the Security Council would continue to study the North Korean nuclear issues and will, if necessary, decide whether the Security Council should take additional measures. The resolution thereby warned that if the resolution goes unheeded, the Security Council would adopt a se-

cond a resolution and then sanctions against North Korea.

The following is the full text of the U.N. Security Council Resolution No. 825:

SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION(825)

Having considered with concern the letter from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) dated 12 March 1993 addressed to the President of the Council concerning the intention of the government of the DPRK to withdraw from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (the Treaty) and the report of the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

Recalling the Security Council Presidential Statement of 8 April 1993 in which the members of the Council welcome all efforts aimed at resolving this situation and, in particular, encourage the IAEA to continue its consultations with the DPRK for proper settlement of the nuclear verification issue in the DPRK,

Noting in that context the critical importance of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (the Treaty), and emphasizing the integral role of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards in the implementation of the Treaty and in ensuring the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and reaffirming the crucial contribution which progress in non-proliferation can make to the maintenance of international peace and security,

Recalling the Joint Declaration by the DPRK and the Republic of Korea (ROK) on the Denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula, which includes establishment of a credible and effective bilateral inspection regime

1. Statement of the U.N. Security Council President and Resolution by the
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and a pledge not to possess nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment facilities,

Noting that the DPRK is party to the Treaty and has concluded a full-scope Safeguards Agreement as required by that Treaty,

Having also considered with regret the IAEA Board of Governors' findings contained in its resolution of 1 April 1993 that the DPRK is in non-compliance with its obligations under the IAEA-DPRK Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/403), and that the IAEA is not able to verify that there has been no diversion of nuclear materials required to be safeguarded under the terms of the IAEA-DPRK Safeguards Agreement to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices,

Noting the 1 April 1993 statement by the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, and the United States, the depositaries of the Treaty (S/25515), which questions whether the DPRK's stated reasons for withdrawing from the Treaty constitute extraordinary events relating to the subject-matter of the Treaty,

Noting the letter of reply by the DPRK to the Director-General of IAEA dated 22 April 1993 which, inter alia, encourages and urges the Director-General to hold consultations with the DPRK on the implementation of the Safeguards Agreement, noting also that the DPRK has expressed its willingness to seek negotiated solution to this issue,

Welcoming recent signs of improved cooperation between the DPRK and the IAEA and the prospect of contacts between the DPRK and other Member States,

- 1. Calls upon the DPRK to reconsider the announcement contained in the letter of 12 March 1993 and thus to reaffirm its commitment to the Treaty;*

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2. *Further calls upon the DPRK to honor its non-proliferation obligations under the Treaty and comply with its Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA as specified by the IAEA Board of Governors' resolution of 25 February 1993;*
3. *Requests the Director-General of the IAEA to continue to consult with the DPRK with a view to resolving the issues which are the subject of the Board of Governors' findings and to report to the Security Council on his efforts in due time;*
4. *Urges all Members States to encourage the DPRK to respond positively to this resolution and encourages them to facilitate a solution;*
5. *Decides to remain seized of the matter and to consider further Security Council action as necessary.*

2. Movements of Major Countries on the Nuclear Issues

On March 23 the Seoul government had Foreign Minister Han Sung-joo visit the United Nations, the United States and Japan to tell them that the North Korean nuclear issues should be resolved peacefully, asking for their cooperation in this regard.

Minister Han called on U. N. Secretary General Gali and Security Council President O'Brian on the morning of March 25 and discussed ways for the United Nations and the U. N. Security Council to dissuade North Korea from withdrawing from the NPT and settle the nuclear question.

During the meeting, Secretary General Gali, expressing deep concern about North Korea's withdrawal from the NPT and its rejection of IAEA inspections, hinted at the United Nations' posi-

tive intervention in the nuclear question. Security Council President O'Brian, too, said his Security Council would concentrate its energies on getting the issue resolved.

On March 26, Minister Han met with the U. S. Secretary of State and agreed with him to introduce a bill on sanction against North Korea to the Security Council when the nuclear issue is taken up at the Council as one of its formal agenda topics.

Meanwhile, China stressed that North Korea's nuclear question should be resolved peacefully through dialogue. Premier Li Peng said China was against the handling of the nuclear issue by the U. N. Security Council. In a press interview soon after a National People's Congress meeting on March 30, Li Peng said, "North Korea is a sovereign country, and therefore there needs patience in settling this question. Referring the issue to the U. N. Security Council would not be helpful to the resolution of the question."

On April 21, Foreign Minister Han met Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen in Bangkok, Thailand, during which the two ministers shared the view that the situation prompted by North Korea's withdrawal from the NPT is serious and agreed that they would work together to resolve the situation. They also agreed that Minister Qian would visit Seoul in late May.

A Korea-China foreign ministers meeting was held in Seoul on May 26 during Chinese Minister Qian's visit to Seoul. The two ministers agreed that it is important for North Korea to return to the NPT by June 12 and that the two countries would closely consult with each other to see to it that no circumstance requiring the U. N. Security Council to take any additional steps would occur.

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Russia and the United States, in their Vancouver Declaration issued at the end of their summit on April 4, urged North Korea to fully carry out its treaty obligations under the Nuclear Safeguards Agreement it signed with the IAEA and to withdraw its decision to depart from the NPT. Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev said on April 15 that his country was dissuading North Korea, through various channels, from withdrawing from the NPT.

Russian President Boris Yeltsin, while meeting with visiting South Korean Foreign Minister Han Sung-Joo, said Russia had long before suspended the supply of nuclear technology to North Korea and vowed that Russia will see to it that there would be a nuclear-free North Korea. He said Russia will also help bolster the function of the IAEA so that it could properly look into North Korea's nuclear development.

In response, Minister Han, saying that there are a lot of things to do before North Korea's nuclear issues are resolved, asked for Russia's continuous cooperation and common efforts.

Moreover, at a South Korea-Russia foreign ministers meeting on June 7, Russian Minister Kozyrev said Russia will not tolerate North Korea's withdrawal from the NPT, adding that Russia would positively cooperate in the international cooperative system for the resolution of the North Korean nuclear issues.

Also at the regional security conference held in Singapore, which was attended by ASEAN member nations, Pacific-rim countries and the European Community, a statement was adopted on May 21 which expressed, among other things, a serious concern about North Korea's withdrawal from the NPT.

3. High-Level Talks between the United States and North Korea

a. First-Round Contacts (June 2-11, New York)

(1) Progress

The United States had the 30th counselor-level talks between them. Through diplomatic working-level contact with North Korea in Beijing on March 17 to discuss nuclear issues including the one set off by North Korea's withdrawal from the NPT.

At the later 33rd counselor-level contact, the two countries agreed to hold high-level talks between them. Through diplomatic working-level contacts held in New York afterwards, the two countries decided to open high-level U. S.-North Korea talks in New York on June 2 with assistant-minister-level officials leading delegations.

Four sessions of the first-round high-level U. S.-North Korea talks were held from June 2 through June 11 at the office of the U. S. Mission to the United Nations — the first session on June 2, second session on June 4, third session on June 10 and fourth session on June 11. The United States was represented by Robert L. Gallucci, Assistant Secretary of State for Political and Military Affairs, and North Korea by First Vice Foreign Minister Kang Sok-ju.

At the first-round high-level talks, the United States urged North Korea to return to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in the interest of the upkeep of the international mechanism of the NPT.

The U. S.'s position was that if and when North Korea faith-

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fully carries out its treaty obligations under the Nuclear Safeguards Agreement it concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) allowing ad hoc IAEA inspections of their two suspected facilities at Yongbyon, and implemented mutual South-North nuclear inspections under the Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, it would regularize political talks between Washington and Pyongyang and would develop their relations into normal economic relations step by step.

On the other hand, North Korea came to the talks with the aim of obtaining a guarantee of their social system and the promise not to use nuclear weapons against North Korea, to suspend furnishing the U. S.'s nuclear umbrella to South Korea and to suspend the Team Spirit military exercise for good, as well as prompting the United States to withdraw its forces from South Korea.

At the first session on June 2, the United States stressed that North Korea should withdraw its decision to leave the NPT at an early date if it wants to resolve the nuclear question. North Korea asserted, however, that their withdrawal from NPT cannot be subject to negotiations because it was a political decision made in a careful review of the situation. The North Koreans claimed that the issue of inspecting two suspected nuclear facilities at Youngbyon cannot be the target of negotiations, either, because they said that with the NPT withdrawal, the IAEA's duty to inspect the two facilities at issue had dissipated as a matter of course.

On the issue of inspections of North Korean facilities, the United States was in the position that ad hoc IAEA inspections should be undertaken by all means. On the other hand, North Korea insisted it was possible to resolve the nuclear question under

3. High-Level Talks between the United States and North Korea

the Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula which bans, among other things, the use of nuclear weapons and calls for the preparation of inspection rules. The North Koreans argued that in the course of operating the inspection rules of the joint declaration, the IAEA may take part in inspections through separate negotiations.

Regarding the possible sanction of North Korea by the United Nations and other world organizations, the United States hinted at the possibility of such sanction by emphasizing that should North Korea refuse to renounce their earlier decision to withdraw from the NPT by the given deadline, there would be a serious counter-action from the international society.

However, North Korea said they would regard any resolution by the U. N. Security Council on a sanction against North Korea as a “declaration of war” against them. They threatened to take a set of self-defense steps like the automatic scrapping of the Korean Armistice Agreement, replacement of nuclear fuel bars by themselves and the development of nuclear arms.

With regard to the replacement of nuclear fuel and the self-styled radioactive chemical laboratory, the United States expressed a serious concern about North Korea’s rejection of observation by IAEA inspectors of the replacement of fuel bars, stressing that the development of nuclear weapons by North Korea will not be tolerated under any circumstances.

On the other hand, North Korea, while expressing willingness to enter negotiations for the resolution of the controversy over the change of fuel bars, did not offer concrete ways. Pyongyang also suggested that if the United States gave them knowhow on light-water reactor facilities, they would stop operating the ra-

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dioactive chemical laboratory.

Regarding the North Korean demand for the cancellation of the Team Spirit training exercise, guarantee of the non-use of nuclear weapons, and non-deployment of nuclear weapons on the Korean peninsula, the United States said that if and when North Korea's attitude changes, Washington would concretely consider suspending the '94 Team Spirit exercise and using no nuclear weapons. The United States also said that to confirm the non-existence of nuclear weapons on the Korean peninsula, they were willing to promote the pilot inspection of some U. S. military installations in South Korea.

At the second session held on June 4, the North Korean delegates reaffirmed their past posture while repeating their demand for the non-use of nuclear weapons against North Korea, suspension of the Team Spirit exercise and the withdrawal of American forces from South Korea. They argued that their reconsideration of the decision to withdraw from the NPT was impossible and they could not discuss the extension of the time of the withdrawal because there were no instructions from Pyongyang in this regard.

The United States again urged North Korea to return to the NPT and accept ad hoc IAEA inspections, and warned that if North Korea showed no change, the U.N. Security Council would have no choice but to take sanction against them. Washington officials also told the North Koreans that if North Korea changed its position before June 10 and wanted to have talks with the United States, the U.S. would agree to such a meeting. After June 12, however, the United States could not guarantee its participation in a meeting. The U. S. officials also said that if North Korea

3. High-Level Talks between the United States and North Korea

responds favorably to these suggestions, the level of U.S.-North Korea talks could be elevated.

At the third session on June 10, the United States held fast to its basic stand that North Korea should return to the NDP and accept IAEA inspections while North Korea showed little flexibility. North Korea said that they would remain in the NPT and implement the Denuclearization Declaration in return for the elevation of the status of the U.S.-North Korea talks. The two sides thus decided to hold the fourth session on June 11.

At the fourth session on June 11, the United States and North Korea issued a joint statement featuring the suspension of the effect of North Korea's withdrawal from the NPT and continuance of dialogue between the United States and North Korea.

The full text of the joint U.S.-North Korea statement is as follows:

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the United States of America held government-level talks in New York from the 2nd through the 11th of June, 1993. Present at the talks were the delegation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea headed by First Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Kang Sok Ju and the delegation of the United States of America led by Assistant Secretary of State Robert L. Gallucci, both representing their respective Governments. At the talks, both sides discussed policy matters with a view to a fundamental solution of the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula. Both sides expressed support for the North-South Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in the interest of nuclear non-proliferation goals.

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the United States have agreed to principles of:

III. Efforts of World Community to Resolve North Korea's Nuclear issues

• *Assurances against the threat and use of force, including nuclear weapons;*

• *Peace and security in a nuclear-free Korean peninsula, including impartial application of fullscope safeguards, mutual respect for each other's sovereignty, and non-interference in each other's internal affairs; and*

• *Support for the peaceful reunification of Korea.*

In this context, the two Governments have agreed to continue dialogue on an equal and unprejudiced basis. In this respect, the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has decided unilaterally to suspend as long as it considers necessary the effectuation of its withdrawal from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

(2) *Reactions at Home and Abroad*

On the joint statement of the United States and North Korea, the Seoul government, in a Foreign Ministry statement on June 12, favorably evaluated the decision of North Korea to withhold their withdrawal from the NPT and responded favorably to the efforts to resolve the nuclear question diplomatically.

The following is the full text of the Foreign Ministry statement:

We would like to affirmatively evaluate the decision of North Korea to withhold its withdrawal from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and respond to efforts to resolve the nuclear question diplomatically.

We once again emphasize that to completely resolve the nuclear question, North Korea should faithfully fulfill its obligations under the NPT it signed with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and, at the same time, positively respond toward realizing mutual inter-Korean

3. High-Level Talks between the United States and North Korea

inspections.

The government expects that North Korea will dispel nuclear suspicion in the international community at an early date and contribute to world peace let alone to peace and security on the Korean peninsula, and that there will be a substantial progress in reconciliation and cooperative relations between South and North Korea.

Meanwhile, all the South Korean press welcomed North Korea's decision to withhold withdrawing from the NPT. On the other hand, the media, expressing concern about the possible time earning strategy of North Korea, urged the North to show an affirmative response to ad hoc IAEA inspections or mutual South-North inspections.

U.S. President Bill Clinton, in a statement on June 11, described the U. S.-North Korea agreement as a first step toward assuring North Korea's participation in a strong international NPT system, a mechanism that he said would benefit all countries.

Saying that the prevention of nuclear proliferation is one of the top tasks facing the Washington administration, Clinton said the United States would continue to exercise strong influence so that North Korea would completely accommodate international standards and move toward the goal of the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.

U. S. Chief Delegate Gallucci told a press conference upon the issuance of the joint statement that the agreement was an affirmative and rightful mid-term step toward the goal of having North Korea completely return to the NPT. He said there was nothing which the United States had yielded to North Korea in the talks, adding that there were a mountain of issues for the

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two countries to solve in the days to come.

The New York Times, in an editorial of June 12, said North Korea's decision to withhold departing from the NPT served to lay a base on which countries around the Korean peninsula could escape from nuclear threat. However, the newspaper urged the U. S. administration to remain alert and not to slow down diplomatic efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation on the Korean peninsula.

Prime Minister Miyazawa of Japan said in a comment on June 14 that the U. S.-North Korea talks could not be taken to have essentially resolved the North Korean nuclear issues.

The Asahi Shinbun of Japan editorially said on June 13 that North Korea's postponement of its withdrawal from the NPT could be taken as progress in that the worst event was averted with the effect of the withdrawal was around the corner on June 12. The editorial said it was regrettable, however, that the settlement of the issue of inspecting suspected facilities was put off until a later date. It added that the problem depends on how to clear nuclear suspicion concretely in the future.

The Chinese government welcomed North Korea's withholding of its planned withdrawal from the NPT. A Foreign Ministry comment made on June 12 said that China hoped there would be more contacts between the United States and North Korea, and that denuclearization of the Korean peninsula and improved relations between North Korea and the United States would be helpful to peace and stability on the Korean peninsula and the rest of Northeast Asia, serves the universality of the NPT, and expedite peaceful unification of the Korean peninsula.

The People's Daily of China said on June 14 that the U. S.-

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North Korea joint statement was widely welcomed by the international community as the most important achievement since the two countries began to talk. The newspaper said this gave birth to an environment favorable to the settlement of the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula, easing tension on the Korean peninsula, and to the improvement of U.S.-North Korean relations.

Russia, in an official television report, said on June 13 that international tension over North Korea's nuclear issues is expected to be resolved with the decision by North Korea to withhold its planned withdrawal from the NPT. The North Korean decision was a result of both persuasion and pressure from nuclear powers like the United States and Russia. The television report said, however, that since the joint statement did not say whether North Korea would accept nuclear inspections, the U.S.-North Korea talks could not be taken to have been a complete success.

The French government, in a statement on June 14, expressed satisfaction at North Korea's decision to withhold withdrawing from the NPT. It stressed that North Korea should now completely renounce its decision to withdraw from the NPT and faithfully fulfill its treaty obligations under the nuclear safeguards agreement it concluded with the IAEA. The French government said it hopes a dialogue would resume between South and North Korea so that tension would be genuinely eased on the Korean peninsula.

A spokesman for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) expressed welcome to North Korea's decision to withhold withdrawing from the NPT, showing the expectation that inspections of North Korean facilities could be made under the nuclear safeguards agreement the IAEA concluded with North Korea. The spokesman added that the IAEA would again ask North Korean

to accept IAEA inspectors whom IAEA Director-General Hans Blix earlier planned to send.

(3) *Evaluation by North Korea*

In his press conference upon the release of the joint statement, North Korea's chief delegate Kang Sok-ju said that in the U.S.-North Korea talks, things were discussed not at the bait of the issue of NPT withdrawal but in a political approach. He said the two sides agreed not to pose a nuclear threat to each other, respect each other's systems and sovereignty and not to interfere in each other's internal affairs. He said that the suspension of the effect of their withdrawal from the NPT for a necessary period was the decision of North Korea on its own. Kang added that the issue of IAEA inspections would depend on the fairness of the IAEA.

On June 18, First Vice Foreign Minister Kang Sok-ju of North Korea issued a statement in which he, arguing that the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula stemmed from the United States' hostile policy toward North Korea, stressed that the recent agreement on the dissolution of hostile relations between North Korea and the United States, recognition of each other's systems and sovereignty and non-interference in each other's internal affairs, was made from the approach of policy adjustment. He also said that North Korea's decision to temporarily postpone the effect of the withdrawal from the NPT was to facilitate the discussion of practical measures to implement policy pledges contained in the joint North Korea-U. S. statement.

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Regarding the issue of IAEA nuclear inspections, Kang said the question depends on the fairness of the IAEA, adding that North Korea would discuss with the IAEA over the issue.

b. Second-Round Contacts (July 14-19, Geneva)

The second-round high-level U. S.-North Korea talks were held from July 14 through 19 in Geneva. Three sessions took place in the talks on July 14, July 16 and July 19 at the U. S. and North Korean missions by turn. Their chief delegates were same as those of the first-round talks: U. S. Assistant Secretary of State Robert L. Gallucci and First Vice Foreign Minister Kang Sok-ju.

At the second-round talks, the two sides discussed matters based on the joint statement of the first-round talks. The United States strongly asked North Korea to suspend nuclear reprocessing, allow IAEA inspectors to witness the replacement of 5MW fuel bars, allow IAEA inspectors to enter North Korea, enter negotiations with the IAEA for special inspections, and resume the South-North dialogue.

North Korea, in its part, demanded that the United States guarantee its non-use of nuclear weapons against North Korea, declare non-deployment of nuclear weapons in South Korea, suspend the Team Spirit training exercise, and so on.

At the first session held at the U. S. Mission office in Geneva on July 14, the United States took note of its firm security commitment to South Korea and stressed that it was unavoidable for the U. N. Security Council to adopt sanctions against North Korea should the Washington-Pyongyang talks fail.

North Korea, while showing a sensitive reaction to the re-

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marks about possible sanctions, demanded that for the implementation of the June 11 U. S.-North Korea agreement, the United States guarantee its nuclear non-use, declare non-deployment of nuclear arms on the Korean peninsula, suspend Team spirit and other major military training exercises, and so on.

When the United States called on North Korea to have talks with the IAEA for ad hoc IAEA inspections and emphasized the importance of the South-North dialogue, North Korea disputed the fairness of the IAEA and asserted that South Korea had rejected their offer for the exchange of special envoys to discuss an inter-Korean summit meeting.

The U. S. delegates said that third-round U.S.-North Korea talks could be held in early August if North Korea stops reprocessing nuclear material, allow IAEA inspectors when it changes 5 MW atomic reactor fuel bars, allow in IAEA ad hoc inspectors, enter negotiations with the IAEA to resolve the issue of ad hoc inspections, and agree to resume the inter-Korean dialogue for the implementation of the denuclearization declaration.

North Korea said it was difficult to have the third-round talks in August in view of the short time left for preparation.

At the second session held at the North Korean Mission office in Geneva on July 16, North Korea said that if the United States assists in the replacement of a graphite reactor with a light-water reactor, North Korea could discuss with the IAEA on the inspection issue and agree to resume the South-North dialogue on various issues including the nuclear question.

The United States, stressing that the issue of IAEA inspections and the resumption of the South-North dialogue should be resolved by all means, said that North Korea's request for U. S.

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assistance in acquiring a light-water reactor is a matter that could be discussed after the North Korean nuclear issues were resolved. The U. S. delegates said that the third session could be held on July 19 only when North Korea was affirmative toward IAEA inspections.

At the third session held at the U. S. Mission office in Geneva on July 19, the United States and North Korea issued their respective statements featuring that North Korea shall have dialogue with the IAEA and South Korea as soon as possible.

The following is the full text of the press release made by the North Korean delegation:

The delegations of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) and the United States of America (USA) met from July 14–19, 1993, in Geneva for a second round of talks on resolving the nuclear issue.

Both sides reaffirmed the principles of the June 11, 1993 joint DPRK/USA statement.

For its part, the USA specifically reaffirmed its commitment to the principles on assurances against the threat and use of force, including nuclear weapons.

Both sides recognize the desirability of the DPRK's intention to replace its graphite moderated reactors and associated nuclear facilities with light water moderated reactors. As part of a final resolution of the nuclear issues, and on the premise that a solution related to the provision of light water moderated reactors (LWRs) is achievable, the USA is prepared to support the introduction of LWRs and to explore with the DPRK ways in which LWRs could be obtained.

Both sides agreed that full and impartial application of IAEA safeguards is essential to accomplish a strong international nuclear non-proliferation regime.

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ration regime. On this basis, the DPRK is prepared to begin consultations with the IAEA on outstanding safeguards and other issues as soon as possible.

The DPRK and the USA also reaffirmed the importance of the implementation of the North-South Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. The DPRK reaffirms that it remains prepared to begin the North-South talks, as soon as possible, on bilateral issues, including the nuclear issue.

The DPRK and the USA have agreed to meet again in the next two months to discuss outstanding matters related to resolving the nuclear issues, including technical questions related to the introduction of LWRs, and to lay basis for improving overall relations between the DPRK and the USA.

Following the second-round high-level talks, the United States and North Korea announced the agreement reached separately, upon which the two chief delegates held press conferences. The gist of the remarks made in the press meetings was as follows:

Gist of the Remarks Made by U. S. Chief Delegate

The talks had a small yet significant progress. There were the following three additional progresses.

First, North Korea agreed to begin negotiating with the IAEA on the issue of fulfilling obligations envisaged in the Nuclear Safeguards Agreement including the furnishing of additional information on two undeclared facilities at Yongbyon and the permission of visits to them.

Second, North Korea agreed to resume the North-South dialogue at the soonest possible time on the implementation of the Joint Declaration

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of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and other inter-Korean matters.

Third, North Korea announced that it was prepared to give up a graphite reactor in favor of a light-water reactor.

Besides, the United States shall not take part in any peaceful cooperation with North Korea until North Korea expressly fulfills its nonproliferation obligations under the NPT, IAEA and the denuclearization declaration. When North Korea completely fulfills its treaty obligations under the NPT, we could find out a way to realize a switch to a light-water reactor as part of our long-term goal of nuclear nonproliferation, although the sale of an atomic reactor involves complicated financial and legal matters and should be discussed at an appropriate time in the future.

The United States is prepared to carry on negotiations with North Korea so far as a progress is registered in the resolution of the nuclear question. Now that North Korea said it would talk with the IAEA and the Republic of Korea as soon as possible, no third-round U. S.-North Korea talks could be expected to take place until serious talks begin with the IAEA and South Korea.

Gist of Remarks by the Chief North Korean Delegate

The talks were forward-looking and productive. To replace our atomic reactor with a graphite one is an issue that makes clear North Korea's nuclear transparency and suggests that North Korea has no intent of developing nuclear weapons.

Our talks with the IAEA will begin based on ensuring fairness toward us, and our position that inter-Korean issues including the nuclear question should be resolved through North-South talks remains unchanged. The most important method of improving inter-Korean rela-

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tions is to realize a summit meeting. To this end, the exchange of special envoys is important.

A summit meeting was proposed by President Kim Il Sung on many occasions. It was also mentioned by president Kim Young Sam in his inaugural address. To realize a summit meeting, the exchange of special envoys is necessary, where overall inter-Korean relations including the nuclear question could be discussed.

The South, on the other hand, insists on discussing the nuclear issue only through working-level talks. Not even the nuclear issue could be handled at such a meeting. Since the nuclear issue should be discussed at a high level, things would go well when the South agrees to contacts by special envoys.

On the announcement of the outcome of the second-round high-level U. S.-North Korea talks, the Seoul government, in a comment by the spokesman of the Foreign Ministry, regarded the talks as significant progress towards resolution of the nuclear question.

The following is the full text of the comment by the Foreign Ministry spokesman:

The government regards the contents agreed on between and announced by the United States and North Korea in Geneva as a significant progress toward resolving the North Korean nuclear issues.

In particular, we believe that North Korea has chosen a rightful direction toward resolving the nuclear question by accepting the need of maintaining a strong nuclear nonproliferation system, recognizing the importance of overall safety measures by the IAEA for the dissolution of nuclear suspicion as well as of implementing the Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, and by agreeing not only to discuss with the IAEA but also to have inter-Korean contacts.

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The government will in the future watch whether North Korea takes concrete measures at an early date to completely and faithfully fulfill these international obligations and the Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. In particular, we expect that North Korea will promptly negotiate with the IAEA and have inter-Korean contacts.

The government will continue to strongly maintain the international cooperative system including the Korea-U. S. cooperative mechanism until the North Korean nuclear issues are resolved completely.



pendices

1. Chronology of the South-North Dialogue
2. The Kim Young-sam Government's Unification Policy.

*Keynote Address at the 9th U.S. Forum
on the Problems of the Korean Peninsula
by Deputy Prime Minister and Minister
of National Unification Han Wan-sang*

1. Chronology of the South-North Dialogue

- '92. 1. 1 President Roh Tae-woo states in his New Year message he would try to make 1992 the base year in the realization of the Korean National Community.
1. 1 Kim Il-sung issues a New Year message.
1. 7 The Ministry of National Defense announces a plan to suspend the '92 Team Spirit military exercise.
1. 7 North Korea announces in a statement of the spokesman of its Foreign Ministry that it "had decided to sign a nuclear safeguards agreement in the near future and receive inspections at times to be agreed on with the International Atomic Energy Agency."
- 1.14 The first delegates' contact takes place to discuss the exchange of the signed copies of the Joint declaration of Denuclearization.
- 1.21 The second delegates' contact takes place to discuss the exchange of the signed copies of the Joint Declaration of Denuclearization.
- 1.23 The first delegates' contact to discuss the formation and operation of subcommittees takes place.
- 1.29 The second delegates' contact to discuss the formation and operation of subcommittees takes place.
- 1.30 North Korea signs a nuclear safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna, Austria.
2. 7 The third delegates' contact to discuss the formation and operation of subcommittees takes place; the two sides initial an agreement on the formation and opera-

- tion of subcommittees.
- 2.10 A working-level contact takes place on the issue of inviting North Korean delegates to the 41st meeting of the Korean National Council of Churches.
- 2.11 The first senior liaison officials' contact takes place to discuss working-level matters related to the sixth high-level meeting.
- 2.13 The second senior liaison officials' contact takes place to discuss working-level matters related to the sixth high-level meeting.
- 2.14 The third senior liaison officials' contact takes place to discuss working-level matters related to the sixth high-level meeting.
- 2.18~21 The sixth South-North high-level meeting held in Pyongyang.
- The Basic South-North Agreement and the Joint Denuclearization Declaration take effect.
- 2.19 The first delegates' contact to discuss the formation and operation of the South-North Joint Nuclear Control Commission takes place in Pyongyang.
- 2.27 The second delegates' contact to discuss the formation and operation of the Joint Nuclear Control Commission takes place.
3. 3 The third delegates' contact to discuss the formation and operation of the Joint Nuclear Control Commission takes place.
3. 4 The fourth delegates' contact to discuss the formation and operation of the Joint Nuclear Control Commission takes place.

3. 6 The fifth delegates' contact to discuss the formation and operation of the Joint Nuclear Control Commission takes place.
3. 6 Lists of the members of the South-North Political, Military and Exchanges-Cooperation Subcommittees exchanged.
3. 9 The first meeting of the South-North Political Subcommittee held.
- 3.10 The sixth delegates' contact to discuss the formation and operation of the Joint Nuclear Control Commission takes place.
- 3.13 The first meeting of the South-North Military Subcommittee held.
- 3.14 The seventh delegates' contact to discuss the formation and operation of the Joint Nuclear Control Commission takes place.
 - The two sides initial the Agreement on the Formation and Operation of the South-North Joint Nuclear Control Commission.
- 3.17 Copies of the Agreement on the Formation and Operation of the South-North Joint Nuclear Control Commission initially exchanged.
- 3.17 The North's Administration Council Premier Yon Hyong-muk, in a message to Prime Minister Chung Wonshik.
 - Trying to shift blame for the deadlock of talks to the South, charging that the South was delaying the implementation of agreements with the excuse of the nuclear issues.

- 3.18 The first meeting of the South-North Joint Exchanges and Cooperation Subcommittee held.
- 3.18 The lists of the members of the Joint Nuclear Control Commission exchanged.
- 3.19 Copies of the Agreement on the Formation and Operation of the Joint Nuclear Control Commission exchanged finally to put the agreement into effect.
- 3.19 The first meeting of the Joint Nuclear Control Commission held.
- 3.25 The first members' contact of the South-North Exchanges and Cooperation Subcommittee takes place.
- 3.29 The second meeting of the South-North Political Subcommittee held.
- 3.31 The second meeting of the South-North Military Subcommittee held.
- 4. 1 The second meeting of the Joint Nuclear Control Commission held.
- 4. 2 The second members' contact of the South-North Exchanges and Cooperation Subcommittee takes place.
- 4. 3~10 The third meeting of the Ninth Supreme People's Assembly of North Korea held.
- 4. 9 The third session of the Ninth Supreme People's Assembly ratifies the Nuclear Safeguards Agreement.
- 4.10 The third members' contact of the South-North Exchanges and Cooperation Subcommittee takes place.
- 4.18 The second meeting of the South-North Exchanges and Cooperation Subcommittee held.
- 4.21 The third meeting of the Joint Nuclear Control Commission held.

- 4.23 The third meeting of the South-North Political Subcommittee held.
- 4.27 The third meeting of the South-North Exchanges and Cooperation Subcommittee held.
- 4.28 A members' contact of the South-North Exchanges and Cooperation Subcommittee takes place.
- 4.28 The first senior liaison officials' contact to prepare for the seventh South-North high-level meeting takes place.
- 4.29 The first members' contact of the South-North Political Subcommittee takes place.
- 4.30 The third meeting of the South-North Military Subcommittee held.
5. 1 The second senior liaison officials' contact to prepare for the seventh South-North high-level meeting takes place.
5. 5~8 The seventh South-North high-level meeting takes place in Seoul.
- Liaison offices of the South and the North and other implementation organizations formed.
- 5.10 The spokesman of the North Korean Foreign Ministry issues a statement in connection with the issue of simultaneous South-North nuclear inspections.
- Demands overall inspections of "nuclear arms" and "nuclear bases" of the U.S. forces in the South.
- 5.11~16 The director-general and some other officials of the International Atomic Energy Agency visit North Korea.
- 5.12 The fourth meeting of the Joint Nuclear Control Commission held.

- 5.15 The first members' contact of the Joint Nuclear Control Commission takes place.
- 5.18 The Military, Economic Exchanges and Cooperation, and Social and Cultural Exchanges and Cooperation subcommittees, and the liaison offices of the South and the North formed and begin to function.
- 5.19 The fourth meeting of the South-North Political Subcommittee held.
- 5.20 The second members' contact of the Joint Nuclear Control Commission takes place.
- 5.22 Some North Korean armed troops infiltrate into the southern sector of the Demilitarized Zone.
- 5.23 The third members' contact of the Joint Nuclear Control Commission takes place.
- 5.25 The fourth meeting of the South-North Military Subcommittee held.
- 5.25~6.5 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) conducts the first ad hoc inspection of North Korean nuclear facilities.
- 5.27 The fifth meeting of the Joint Nuclear Control Commission held.
- 5.30 The fourth meeting of the South-North Exchanges and Cooperation Subcommittee held.
- 6. 1 Prime Minister Chung Won-shik sends a telephone message to North Korea calling for the acceptance of mutual South-North nuclear inspections.
- 6. 1~10 The North Korean Red Cross, in a statement, calls on the South to repatriate Li In-mo to the North.
- 6. 1 The Republic of Korea National Red Cross additionally

- receives applications for participation in “homeland visiting groups of aged dispersed parents.”
6. 2 Lee Dong-bok, spokesman for the South’s delegation to the South-North high-level talks, issues a statement calling on North Korea to accept mutual nuclear inspections.
6. 5 The first working-level delegates’ contact of the South and North Korea Red Cross societies takes place.
6. 9 The 5th meeting of the South-North Political Subcommittee held.
- 6.12 The second Red Cross working-level delegates’ contact takes place.
- 6.15~19 An IAEA Board of Governors meeting held.
• Calls for simultaneous South-North nuclear inspections.
- 6.16~17 The top leaders of the United States and Russia issue a joint statement on nuclear issues on the Korean peninsula in Washington.
- 6.19 The fifth meeting of the South-North Military Subcommittee held.
- 6.22 The third South-North Red Cross working-level delegates’ contact takes place.
- 6.22 North Korea’s Premier Yon Hyong-muk sends a message to Prime Minister Chung Won-shik, proposing joint steps against Japan’s fabrication of historical documents such as the Protectorate Treaty.
- 6.25 Prime Minister Chung Won-shik sends a message to North Korean Premier Yon Hyong-muk, emphasizing the need to work out an auxiliary agreement on excha-

- nges and cooperation if only to resolve the issue of Japan's fabrication of historical documents.
- 6.25 The North Korean daily Rodong Sinmun editorially emphasizes the need of improved relations with the United States on the 42nd anniversary of the Korean War.
- 6.26 The fifth meeting of the South-North Exchanges and Cooperation Subcommittee held.
- 6.26 The spokesman of the North Korean Foreign Ministry issues a statement on the nuclear question, demanding all-out inspections of "nuclear weapons" and "nuclear facilities" of the U.S. forces in South Korea.
- 6.30 The sixth meeting of the Joint Nuclear Control Commission held.
7. 2 The sixth meeting of the South-North Political Subcommittee held.
7. 7 Prime Minister Chung Won-shik sends a message to North Korea's Premier Yon Hyong-muk
- Steps be taken promptly to facilitate the finding out of the fate and meeting and visits between dispersed families.
 - Programs be promoted to find out the fate of and arrange meeting between specific persons suffering the pain of family dispersion, and facilitate their return and resettlement according to one's own wish.
 - Dispersed family hometown visits be regularized, and a reunion center be set up and operated at panmunjom.
- 7.7~21 The IAEA conducts second ad hoc inspection of North

- Korean nuclear facilities.
7. 8 The fourth South-North Red Cross working-level delegates' contact takes place.
- 7.10 The first chairmen's contact of the South-North Political Subcommittee takes place.
- 7.12 The spokesman of the North Korean delegation to the South-North high-level talks issues a statement, rejecting the proposed exchange and resettlement of aged dispersed family members.
- 7.13 The spokesman of the southern delegation to the South-North high-level talks makes a comment on the North Korean spokesman's statement, stating that the July 7th message to the North contained a method of resolving the issue of Li In-mo. The comment added that the South expected that the North would make a premier-level response.
- 7.14 The fifth Red Cross working-level delegates' contact takes place.
- 7.16 The sixth meeting of the South-North Military Subcommittee held.
- 7.18 The first members contact of the sixth meeting of the South-North Political Subcommittee held.
- 7.19 North Korea's Deputy Premier Kim Dal-hyon visits Seoul on July 19-25 at the invitation of the South's Deputy Prime Minister.
- Observes Daewoo Motor Co., Pohang Ironworks and other major industries, and confers with the President on July 24.
- 7.20 The sixth Red Cross wross working-level delegates' co-

- ntact takes place.
- 7.21 The seventh meeting of the Joint Nuclear Control Commission held.
- 7.23 The first chairmen's contact of the South-North Military Subcommittee takes place.
- 7.25 The seventh South-North Red Cross working-delegates contact takes place.
- 7.28 The sixth meeting of the South-North Exchanges and Cooperation Subcommittee held.
- 7.30 The second chairmen's contact of the sixth meeting of the South-North Political Subcommittee takes place.
8. 3 The first chairmen's contact of the sixth South-North Military Subcommittee meeting held.
8. 4 A working-level contact for the opening of the third forum in Pyongyang on "Peace in Asia and Women's Role" takes place.
8. 5 The third members' contact of the sixth South-North Political Subcommittee meeting takes place.
8. 7 North Red Cross working-level delegates contact takes place.
8. 7 Vice Unification Minister Lim Dong-won, in a comment, regrets the failure to realize the exchange of aged parents' hometown visiting groups, urging North Korea to agree to the exchange of aged parents' hometown visiting groups.
8. 8 Kang Young-hoon, Republic of Korea National Red Cross president, in a statement, urges North Korea to be faithful to the Red Cross spirit and agree to realize the exchange of visiting groups at an early date.

- 8.10 The first members' contact of the sixth South-North Exchanges and Cooperation Subcommittee meeting takes place.
- 8.12 The second members' contact of the sixth South-North Military Subcommittee meeting takes place.
- 8.15 President Roh Tae-woo makes a Liberation Day message
- 8.19 The fourth members' contact of the sixth South-North Political Subcommittee meeting takes place.
- 8.20 The third members' contact of the third South-North Military Subcommittee meeting takes place.
- 8.21 The second members' contact of the sixth South-North Exchanges and Cooperation Subcommittee meeting takes place.
- 8.24 Diplomatic relations between South Korea and China normalized.
- 8.26 The seventh meeting of the South-North Military Subcommittee held.
- 8.26 South Korea and Russia initial a bilateral basic agreement.
 - Vice Foreign Minister Roe Chang-hee and Russian Ambassador to Korea Alexandr Panov initial the Treaty on Basic Relations between the Republic of Korea and the Russian Federation.
- 8.28 The seventh meeting of the South-North Political Subcommittee held.
- 8.31 The eighth meeting of the Joint Nuclear Control Commission held.
- 8.31~9.12 The IAEA conducts its third ad hoc inspection of North

- Korean nuclear facilities.
- 9.1~6 The third forum on “Peace in Asia and Women’s Role” takes place in Pyongyang.
9. 2 The first liaison officials’ contact for the visit of a Nampo inspection team and the Deputy Prime Minister to North Korea, takes place.
9. 3 The seventh meeting of the South-North Exchanges and Cooperation Subcommittee held.
9. 4 The first chairmen’s contact of the seventh South-North Political Subcommittee meeting takes place.
9. 4 The second liaison officials’ contact for the visit of a Nampo inspection team and the Deputy Prime Minister to North Korea, takes place.
9. 5 The eighth meeting of the South-North Military Subcommittee held.
9. 7 The first chairmen’s contact of the seventh South-North Exchanges and Cooperation Subcommittee meeting takes place.
9. 7 The first liaison officials’ contact for the eighth South-North high-level talks takes place.
9. 8 The third liaison officials’ contact for a visit of a Nampo inspection team and the Deputy Prime Minister to the North takes place.
9. 8 The second chairmen’s contact of the seventh South-North Political Subcommittee takes place.
- 9.10 The second liaison officials’ contact for the eighth South-North high-level talks takes place.
- 9.15~18 The eighth South-North high-level meeting held in Pyongyang.

- Area-by-area auxiliary agreements adopted and put into force, and the Joint Reconciliation Commission formed.
- 9.19 The first members' contact of the eighth Joint Nuclear Control Commission meeting takes place.
- 9.25 The fourth liaison officials' contact for a visit of a Nampo inspection team and the Deputy prime Minister to North Korea takes place.
- 9.28 The fifth liaison officials' contact for a visit of a Nampo inspection team and the Deputy Prime Minister to North Korea takes place.
- 9.30 The sixth liaison officials' contact for a visit of a Nampo inspection team and the Deputy Prime Minister to North Korea takes place.
- 9.30 The Second members' contact of the eighth South-North Joint Nuclear Control Commission meeting takes place.
- 10. 1 The first delegates' contact for the issue of repatriating dispersed families and Li In-mo takes place.
- 10. 5 The second delegates' contact for the issue of repatriating dispersed families and Li In-mo takes place.
- 10.6~9 A Nampo inspection team visits the North.
- 10. 6 The Agency for National Security Planning announces the arrest of a spy ring which had formed the South Korean Choson Workers' Party.
- 10. 7 Deputy Prime Minister and National Unification Minister Choi Young-choul urges North Korea in a statement to apologize over the spy ring case.
- 10. 9 Lee Dong-bok, chairman of the South-North Political

- Subcommittee, in a telephone message to North Korea, calls an emergency subcommittee meeting.
- 10.12 North Korea, in a telephone message, rejects an emergency subcommittee meeting called by the South.
- 10.13 The government informs the North of the postponement of the planned visit to North Korea by Deputy Prime Minister Choi Gak-kyu.
- 10.13 North Korea's Administration Council Premier Yon Hyong-muk sends a message to the South in connection with the espionage ring case and the question of Team Spirit military exercise.
- 10.14 The third members' contact of the eighth South-North Joint Nuclear Control Commission meeting takes place.
- 10.21 Prime Minister Hyon Sung-jong sends a message to North Korea, warning that the spy ring case was the violation of the provisions of Article 14 of the Basic South-North Agreement and Articles 15 and 17 of the Auxiliary Agreement in the area of reconciliation.
- 10.22 The ninth meeting of the South-North Joint Nuclear Control Commission held.
- 10.26 The lists of chairmen and members of the South-North Joint Reconciliation Commission mutually notified.
- 10.27 North Korea adopts a joint resolution of the party, administration and social organizations on joint steps to take to cope with the resumption of the Team Spirit military exercise.
- Threatens to boycott the high-level talks and all other inter-Korean contacts.

- 10.28 The first communications working-level contact takes place for the installing and operation of a direct telephone line between the military authorities of the South and the North.
- 10.29 The first members' contact of the ninth South-North Joint Nuclear Control Commission takes place.
- 10.29 Kang Young-hoon, president of the Republic of Korea National Red Cross, sends a telephone message to the North on the holding of a full-dress South-North Red Cross meeting.
- 10.31 North Korea's Administration Council Premier Yun Hyong-muk sends a telephone message to the South, demanding the cancellation of military training exercises like the Hwarang and Toksuri exercises and of the decision to resume the '93 Team Spirit military exercise.
11. 2 Prime Minister Hyun Soong-jong sends a telephone message to the North calling for the meetings of joint commissions.
11. 3 North Korea rejects the call for a full-dress South-North Red Cross meeting.
11. 3 North Korea issues a joint statement of the co-chairmen of the Reconciliation, Military, Economy and Socio-Culture Joint Commissions.
- Boycotts the first meetings of the joint commissions set to be held in November.
- 11.3~14 The IAEA conducts the fourth ad hoc inspection of North Korea.
11. 4 Deputy Prime Minister Choe Young-choul issues a statement urging North Korea to agree to hold the first

- meetings of joint commissions.
- 11.18 The 10th meeting of the South-North Joint Nuclear Control Commission held.
- 11.27 The 11th meeting of the South-North Joint Nuclear Control Commission held.
12. 4 An Byong-su, northern spokesman for the South-North high-level talks, in a telephone message to the South, suggests that the North would agree to resume the South-North dialogue if the South withdrew the decision to resume the Team Spirit exercise.
- 12.10 The 12th meeting of the Joint Nuclear Control Commission held.
- 12.10 Gong Ro-myong, southern spokesman for the South-North high-level talks, in a telephone message to the North, says the resumption of the Team Spirit exercise would be unavoidable so far as the North Korean nuclear issues remain unresolved.
- 12.11 An Byong-su, northern spokesman for the South-North high-level talks, in a telephone message to the South, demands the withdrawal of the decision to resume the Team Spirit exercise prior to a senior liaison officials' contact.
- 12.11 The fourth meeting of the Ninth North Korean Supreme People's Assembly opens, where Premier Yon Hyong-muk was replaced with Kang Song-san.
- 12.12 North Korea, in a joint telephone message to the South by co-chairmen of South-North joint commissions, boycotts the ninth South-North high-level meeting.
- 12.14 The first members' contact of the 12th meeting of the

South-North Joint Nuclear Control Commission takes place.

- 12.14~20 The IAEA conducts its fifth ad hoc inspection of North Korea's nuclear facilities.
The 13th meeting of the joint Nuclear Control Commission held.

- '93. 1. 1 President Roh Tae-woo issues New Year's message.
1. 1 President Kim Il-sung issues New Year's message.
1.25 The first chairmen's contact of the Joint Nuclear Control Commission takes place.
1.26 Sohn In-kyo, chief of the South's Liaison Office, in a telephone message to the North, notifies the North of the staging of the '93 Team Spirit field military exercise and invites North Korea to send observers to the maneuver.
- 1.26~2.6 The IAEA conducts its sixth ad hoc inspection of North Korean
- 1.29 The northern delegation to the South-North high-level talks issues a statement on the decision to resume the Team Spirit exercise.
- 1.29~30 A meeting of communications experts on the Tuman River area development project held in Seoul.
2. 2 Gong Ro-myong, spokesman for the southern delegation to the high-level talks, in a statement, urges North Korea to agree to normalize the stalled dialogue between the government authorities.
2. 3 The eighth meeting of unification-related ministers meeting held.

- 2. 9 The IAEA sends a message to North Korea, urging them to accept ad hoc IAEA inspections.
- 2.15 Son Song-pil, North Korean ambassador to Russia, says North Korea would reject the IAEA's ad hoc inspections.
- 2.16 The IAEA issues a statement regarding its ad hoc inspections of North Korea's nuclear facilities.
 - Points out there were some serious defects in the declaration North Korea made of its nuclear facilities and materials.
- 2.19 Prime Minister Hyun Soong-jong issues a statement on the first anniversary of the effectuation of the Basic Agreement and the Joint Declaration of Denuclearization.
- 2.19 Choe U-jin, northern chairman of the Joint Nuclear Control Commission, in a statement, denounces the attempt of the IAEA to conduct ad hoc inspections of North Korea's nuclear facilities.
- 2.23 Li Chol, North Korean ambassador to Geneva, warns that if the IAEA tries to force through special inspections of North Korea, Pyongyang may scrap the Nuclear Safeguards Agreement.
- 2.25 Kim Young-sam inaugurated as the 14th President.
 - Emphasizes the importance of national consensus on unification.
- 3.10 The ninth unification-related ministers meeting held.
- 3.11 The government formally announces the decision to allow Li In-mo to return to the North.
- 3.12 North Korea announces their withdrawal from the Nu-

- clear Non-proliferation Treaty.
- 3.12 The spokesman of the Seoul government issues a statement on North Korea's withdrawal from the NPT.
- Calls on North Korea to retract their withdrawal from the NPT and agree to early implementation of mutual South-North nuclear inspections.
- 3.16 Liaison officials' contact takes place on Li In-mo's return to the North.
- 3.19 Li In-mo returns to the North through the conference room of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission at Panmunjom.
- 3.24 Sohn In-kyo, Seoul-side head of the South-North Liaison Office, sends a telephone message to the North, containing an invitation by Oh Ik-je, head of the Chondokyo, of North Korean Chondokyo people.
- 3.25 Choe Bong-chun, Pyongyang-side head of the South-North Liaison Office, sends a telephone message to the South, rejecting the south's invitation of North Korean Chondokyo people.
4. 7 The fifth meeting of the ninth North Korean Supreme People's Assembly opens.
- Adopts "10-Point platform and Four Conditions for the Unification of the Fatherland."
- 4.20 Tenth unification-related ministers meeting held,
- 5.10 The spokesman of the National Unification Board makes a comment on North Korea's mailing of letters of appeal containing their 10-point platform for grand national unity" to some South Koreans.
- 5.19 Prime Minister Hwang In-sung, in a telephone mes-

sage, notifies the North of the change of the South-side head of the South-North Liaison Office from Sohn In-kyo to Lee Jun-koo.

- 5.20 Prime Minister Hwang In-sung, in a telephone message, notifies the North of the list of the southern delegation to the South-North high-level meeting:
- Chief delegate: Hwang In-sung (Prime Minister)
 - Delegates:
 - Pyon Jang-won (General, first vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Defense Ministry)
 - Song Young-dae (Vice national unification minister)
 - Chung Jong-uk (Senior presidential secretary for foreign affairs and national security)
 - Lee Dong-bok (Special consultant for the Prime Minister)
 - Lee Seung-gon (Foreign Ministry ambassador)
 - Park Yong-ok (Maj. general, arms controller, Defense Ministry)
- 5.20 Prime Minister Hwang In-sung sends a message to the North, proposing that a contact between delegates to high-level talks be held on May 27 to resolve the North Korean nuclear issues.
- 5.24 In an address at the Seoul meeting of the Pacific Basin Economic Council (PBEC), President Kim Young-sam discusses a plan to promote unification in a phased and peaceful approach after going through the phase of South-North Commonwealth.
- 5.25 North Korea's Administration Council Premier Kang

- Song-san sends a message to the South, proposing the exchange of special envoys appointed by the top leaders and suggesting that a working-level contact take place on May 31 to discuss the exchange.
- 5.29 Hwang In-sung, the South's chief delegate to the high-level talks, sends a telephone message to the North, proposing that a delegates' contact take place on June 5 to discuss the nuclear issue, other questions pending between the two Koreas and the issue North Korea raised newly.
- 5.31 Kang Song-san, the North's Administration Council premier, sends a telephone message to the South, proposing to have a working-level officials' contact on June 4 to discuss the exchange of special envoys.
6. 2 The first meeting of the first-round high-level U.S.-North Korea talks held in New York.
- Delegates: Robert Gallucci (Assistant secretary of state for political and military affairs) and Kang Sok-ju (First vice foreign minister).
6. 2 Hwang In-sung, the South's chief delegate to the South-North high-level talks, sends a telephone message to the North, proposing a working-level delegates' contact take place on June 5 to discuss the question of finding a breakthrough in the resolution of the nuclear question and the issue of exchanging special envoys.
6. 3 President Kim Young-sam meets the press on the 100th day after his inauguration.
6. 4 The second meeting of the first-round high-level talks between the United States and North Korea held.

6. 4 Kang Song-san, the North's Administration Council premier, sends a telephone message to the South, proposing to hold a working-level contact on June 7 to discuss procedural matters related to the proposed exchange of special envoys.
6. 7 Hwang In-sung, the South's chief delegate to the South-North high-level talks, sends a telephone message to the North, proposing to hold a working-level delegates' contact on June 8 to discuss the issue of finding a breakthrough in the resolution of the nuclear question along with the issue of exchanging special envoys.
6. 8 Kang Song-san, the North's Administration Council premier, sends a telephone message to the South.
6. 9 Hwang In-sung, the South's chief delegate to the South-North high-level talks, sends a telephone message to the North, proposing to hold a working-level delegates' contact on June 10 to discuss the nuclear question and the proposed exchange of special envoys.
- 6.10 The third meeting of the first-round talks between the United States and North Korea held.
- 6.11 The U. S. and North Korea issue a joint statement announcing North Korea's withholding of its withdrawal from NPT.
- 6.11 Kang Song-san, the North's Administration Council premier, sends a telephone message to the South, proposing a working-level contact on June 15 to discuss the exchange of special envoys.
- 6.14 Hwang In-sung, the South's chief delegate to the South-North high-level talks, sends a telephone message to

North Korea, expressing the position that the two sides would meet first and try to iron out differences in the principle of respecting each other's stands.

- Proposes to hold a governmental working-level delegates' contact on June 15.

- 6.15 Kang Song-san, the North's Administration Council premier, in a telephone message to the South, proposes to hold a working-level contact on June 24 to discuss the exchange of special envoys.
- 6.22 Hwang In-sung, the South's chief delegate to the South-North high-level talks, in a telephone message to the North, proposes a working-level delegates' contact on June 24 to discuss basic nuclear issues and the proposed exchange of special envoys.
- 6.23 The 11th unification-related ministers' meeting held.
- 6.26 Kang Song-san, the North's Administration Council premier, issues a statement on the failure to materialize the proposed exchange of special envoys.
- 6.26 Oh In-hwan, the South's government spokesman, in a statement, stresses that:
- No progress will be recorded in inter-Korean relations without the resolution of the North Korean nuclear issues.
 - The Seoul government will keep the door of dialogue open always to settle the nuclear question peacefully.
- 6.28 A spokesman for the U.S. State Department announces the schedule of follow-up high-level U. S.-North Korea talks.
7. 6 President Kim Young-sam announces a three-phase

- unification formula and three principles for unification policy in an address at the meeting of the Advisory Council on Democracy and Peaceful Unification.
- 7.10~11 U. S. President Bill Clinton visits South Korea.
- 7.14 The first session of the second-round U. S.-North Korea high-level talks held at the U. S. Mission office in Geneva.
- 7.16 The second session of the second-round high-level U. S.-North Korea talks held at the North Korean Mission office in Geneva.
- 7.19 The third session of the second-round high-level U. S.-North Korea talks held at the U.S. Mission office in Geneva.
- An agreement was announced, which featured the confirmation of North Korea's willingness to have talks with the IAEA and South Korea at early dates.
- 7.26 North Korea holds a report rally on the 40th anniversary of the "Fatherland Liberation War" at the Pyongyang Gymnasium.
- 8.3~10 IAEA inspectors visit North Korea.
8. 4 Hwang In-sung, the South's chief delegate to the high-level South-North talks, sends a telephone message to North Korea:
- Proposing to hold a meeting of the Joint Nuclear Control Commission be held at Tongilkak, Panmunjom to discuss inspection rules and the implementation of mutual nuclear inspections.
 - Informing the North of a change in the southern members of the Joint Nuclear Control Commission.

8. 7 The North's Pomminryon chairman sends a telephone message to the South in connection with the fourth Pomminryon congress.
8. 9 An Byong-su, spokesman for the northern delegation to the high-level South-North talks, issues a statement rejecting the South's proposal for a meeting of the Joint Nuclear Control Commission.
- Stresses that the only way to resolve bilateral issues including nuclear question is to exchange special envoys.
 - Whether to resume the South-North dialogue and resolve issues pending between the two sides depends entirely on the posture and intent of the South.
- 8.12 Kim Dae-jung, the former head of the Democratic Party, lays down a new unification formula at a meeting commemoration the 20th anniversary of the survival of his kidnapping from Tokyo.
- 8.12 Paek In-jun, chairman of the North's Pomminryon headquarters, sends a telephone message to the South calling for a permission of the fourth Pomminryon congress in Seoul.
- 8.13 Han Wan-sang, deputy prime minister and national unification minister, issues a statement in connection with a South-North human chains campaign and the fourth Pomminryon congress.
- 8.14 Song Young-dae, spokesman for the southern delegation to the high-level South-North talks, issues statement urging North Korea to agree to resume the South-North dialogue:

- Stressing that North Korea's nuclear question is an exigent task whose resolution can no longer be delayed.
 - Urging North Korea to endeavor to implement and practice the *Joint Declaration of Denuclearization*, and affirmatively respond to the South's August 4 proposal.
- 8.15 The South-North human chains forming campaign staged.
- 8.15 President Kim Young-sam makes a commemorative address on the 48th anniversary of national liberation:
- Urging North Korea to dispel suspicion about their nuclear weapons development.
- 8.18 The 12th unification-related ministers' meeting held
- 8.26 The IAEA formally announces it would resume talks with North Korea on nuclear inspections.
- Resumed negotiations will be held in Pyongyang from August 31 to September 4.
9. 1 An Byong-su, spokesman for the northern delegation to the high-level South-North talks, issues a statement:
9. 2 Hwang In-sung, the South's chief delegate to the high-level South-North talks, sends a telephone message to North Korea
- Proposing to have a working-level delegates' contact on September 7 to discuss the exchange of special envoys for the resolution of pending issues including the nuclear question without being bound by the form of talks.
9. 6 Kang Song-san, the North's chief delegate to the high-

level South-North talks, sends a telephone message to the South:

9. 8 Hwang In-sung, the South's chief delegate to the high-level South-North talks, sends a telephone message to North Korea
- Stressing that no prerequisites should be attached to the South-North dialogue and that the South would go to a working-level delegates' contact on September 20 without any conditions.
9. 9 An Byong-su, spokesman for the northern delegation to the high-level South-North talks, holds a press conference
- 9.17 Song Young-dae, spokesman for the southern delegation to the high-level South-North talks, issues a statement on the first anniversary of the effectuation of the auxiliary agreements:
- Calling on North Korea to unconditionally attend a working-level delegates' contact on the exchange of special envoys.

2. The Kim Young-sam Government's Unification Policy.

Keynote Address at the 9th U.S. Forum on the Problems of the Korean Peninsula by Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of National Unification Han Wan-sang

I. The Changing Global Situation

Since the late 1980s the world has experienced an epochal change. The Cold War system which dominated the global order for the half century since the Second World War is rapidly dissolving, leaving behind complexity and diversity. In the course of this historic change we have witnessed positive phenomena, such as the easing of tension between the two major blocs, the tempering of ideological confrontation and distrust, and the reduction of human rights abuses.

On the negative side, however, the impact of the collapse of the "Second World"—the Soviet Union and the East European socialist countries—has been disturbing for the First and Third World countries. Indeed, the crises in the former Communist bloc have spilled over into the First and Third World, causing, among other problems, ideological and political identity crises, confusion relating to the governing paradigm of the world order, and crises of regime legitimacy.

In addition to these critical phenomena, ethnic conflict in the former Communist states has deteriorated into civil war. Government controls, justified by Cold War needs, held these ethnic rivalries in check, but they erupted when the Cold War structure was demolished. We see the tragic consequences in Bosnia today,

for example.

On the other hand, in Germany and Yemen, which were divided across Cold War lines against their people's will, we have witnessed national integration and finally unification. Thus, two totally different consequences developed out of the demise of the Cold War system. For its part, Korea is facing more favorable circumstances for national unification in the changing climate of the post-Cold War era. Indeed, Korea has not experienced a better international environment for achieving unification today since Independence in 1945. To use a biblical concept this is the time of *Kairos*, or moment of decision, when our determination for the peaceful unification of the Korean Peninsula is required.

When we focus our attention on the reality of the peninsula, we see ourselves challenged by the need to remove historical obstacles. On both sides of the divided Peninsula, the structure, government, practices and mentality of the Cold War still seriously affect every sector of society. North and South both experience a deeply-rooted Cold War legacy. Basic human rights are restricted and inter-Korean relations are characterized by disagreement and confrontation which arise from mutual distrust. Interaction is carried out as a zerosum game in which one side measures its victories and gains based on the losses of the other side. This has forced each side into a position of discrediting the other in order to improve its own status and legitimacy. To put it simply, the Korean Peninsula has become a lonely island of the Cold War politics in the sea of a new era of international relations.

Yet at this critical juncture, one sign of hope has emerged and begun to take shape. Monumental new developments are taking place on the southern part of the Korean Peninsula. A new

wind of reform is blowing like a gale through South Korea as the newly-inaugurated government of Kim Young-sam sets about building a "New Korea."

In the 1980s in South Korea, an experiment of reform-from-below failed. Far left groups espousing the Proletariat revolution lost their ground after failing to gain public support. However, these unsuccessful attempts at "subversion" opened the way for reform from the top, or what we might call "superversion."

President Kim has recognized that unless the illegality, corruption, graft and moral degradation which is widespread in the higher echelons of society and in government are removed, national reform and social transformation will not be possible. This line of reasoning draws broad popular support. Without self-reform the leadership will not be able to fulfill its historical task of making a new society and leading an enlightened and democratized populace in the right direction. When one considers that the Cold War system itself has served to justify or conceal the structural irrationalities and contradictions, dismantling the Cold War system becomes an integral feature of the reform-from-above program.

This is why the Kim Young Sam government is anxiously pursuing its clean-up of the upper echelons of society first in order to heal the "Korean Disease," paving the way to a grand consensus on the direction of national development. The drive should be linked with grass-roots reform activism and develop into a movement for reform in which the state and civil society participate hand-in-hand. Such a movement is destined to draw broad support because its motive corresponds to the spirit of the times (*Zeitgeist*).

It is self-evident that meaningful reform cannot be carried out without a legitimate government. We, the Korean people, who

have never experienced genuinely legitimate governments, are witnessing the reality for the first time in our history that a civilian government can successfully pursue a determined democratic reform. It is the unqualified support from all segments of the society that gives the government the courage and "clean-hand" to wage an indiscriminate campaign to uproot corruption and irregularities at all levels of the government.

The goal of the reforms is to fundamentally remove the chronic mistrust and deep-rooted enmity between the ruler and the ruled. Bold reform measures taken by a legitimate government can cure the structural complications which have built up in every sector of society. Regional discord, ideological confrontation, mistrust between the generations and conflict between different strata can be moderated or eliminated. Less than three months after the inauguration of the new Administration we can feel and confirm the remarkable effect of our reforms in easing the regional animosity between East and West in the Korean peninsula.

It should not be overlooked that this lessening of uncompromising disagreement between the people can lay the foundation in South Korea for peaceful unification with the North. As the chronic conflict and confrontation between the government authorities and civil society disappear, the people will become integrated. This is an imperative for improving North-South relations in a righteous and effective manner.

Now, let me explain the basic structure of the new government's unification policy and its fundamental themes.

II. Basic Structure and the Three pillars of the New Government's Unification policy

1. Three-Phased Approach to Unification

President Kim Young-sam's unification policy is not fundamentally different from the "Korean National Community Formula for Unification" of the previous regime. But the position from which the policy is pursued is discernably different in that spirit of the civilian era is more faithfully reflected.

As widely acknowledged, the "Korean National Community Formula" is fundamentally a phased approach to unification and the formula is subject to a three-phased implementation, i. e. the stage of reconciliation and cooperation and the stage of South-North Commonwealth which will lead to the final goal of unified Korea of "one nation, one state."

The first phase of unification focuses on the opening of an era of reconciliation and cooperation replacing the long-standing confrontation and antagonism. At present, North and South are supposed to interact within the framework of the "Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-aggression, and Exchanges and Cooperation between the South and the North," being effective in February, 1992. However, we can say that the Armistice Treaty of 1953 is still the main reference to define interactions between two Koreas. In other words, the Korean Peninsula remains in a state of fragile peace.

In the first phase North and South should attempt to build a genuine partnership for fruitful cooperation. Political reconciliation, military confidence-building, and social and cultural exchanges will be promoted in this regard. The new South Korean government which was inaugurated based upon voluntary public support can and should play a legitimate role to initiate every measure for exchanges and cooperation between North and South.

The second phase is the era of the South-North Commonwealth.¹⁾

At an interim stage pending full-fledged unification, the strategy is to institutionalize a Korean Commonwealth and national community.

During this phase, a National Community Charter will be promulgated to govern the North-South relations. At this point inter-Korean relations will be regularized to some extent and some North-South organizations launched. Between two governmental authorities, cabinet-level meetings, legislative conferences and summit meetings will be institutionalized. And at the civilian level, North and South will seek to enlarge the room of integration and enhance homogeneity through expanding trade and exchange visits.

1) Commonwealth has different connotation from its use in say, the British Commonwealth. It refers to the special relationship between the two separate systems of North and South in the interim stage, pending full-fledged unification. As manifested in the Preamble of the Basic Agreement, the notion of Commonwealth is different from that of Confederation which under international law denotes the union of two sovereign states. The concept of South-North Commonwealth, therefore, has some features of Confederation, while referring to the interim and special "intra-Korean" relationship.

Inter-Korean disarmament conferences will be pursued and the armistice mechanism will be replaced by a peace structure. All these efforts to consolidate the foundation for peaceful coexistence and co-prosperity will define the preparatory stage heading toward the political integration and will pave the way toward a single economic community.

In the final phase North and South will build a single, democratic republic through their ultimate union according to the Constitution of Unified Korea and General Elections. Interests of the whole nation and the state interests will coincide at this time. National well-being, which stands for the conditions to materialize freedom, equality and human dignity of each member of the community, will be attained.

2. The Three Pillars of the Unification Policy

Based on the above-mentioned structure, the Kim Young Sam government has come up with three fundamental directions to bring the unification policy to fruition.

First of all, for reasons described above, the policy will be carried out on the basis of the popular support of the general public. Any unification policy devoid of national consensus can only be used to justify the crackdown of dissident movements and solidify power position for an illegitimate government.

Secondly, given the reality that North and South Korea are separate states, albeit within one nation, mutual exchanges and cooperation will be pursued in the spirit of peaceful coexistence and co-prosperity. Policies will be undertaken to help each other

build common prosperity on the principle of mutual understanding of non-intervention, and not to isolate or contain the other party.

Thirdly, South Korea's position is to put the well-being of the whole nation before any other ideological artifact designed to perpetuate regimes and political systems. In order to bear the fruits of coexistence and co-prosperity by way of exchanges and cooperation, and in order to build a unified Korea of "one nation, one state," this approach will be crucial. When the goal of national well-being is achieved, the interests of the nation and of the state will coincide, and each member of the nation can equally enjoy the benefits. In this stage, a national community that accommodates diversity and differences can be achieved.

In sum, the fundamentals of the new government's unification policy consist of public consensus, peaceful coexistence and mutual prosperity, and the well-being of the whole nation. Some details of each basic element and how they interact will follow.

Public Consensus

Public consensus, the first fundamental aspect of unification policy, operates as the basis for the other two. Neither peaceful coexistence and co-prosperity, nor national well-being can be achieved without the support of the general public. First of all, consensus out of voluntary and spontaneous participation of the public should be achieved in order to make the policy of coexistence and mutual prosperity possible between North and South. And based on the substantial achievement of this policy, the ultimate goal of national well-being can be accomplished.

National consensus, therefore, constitutes the cornerstone of the new government's unification policy. The task of building the foundation in preparation for national unification should be initiated within the South.

Previous regimes suffering from a lack or absence of political legitimacy could not draw voluntary support from the general public for their policies, especially in the area of unification. For this reason, there was significant tension and confrontation between the governmental authorities and non-governmental circles.

The louder the public criticism of and resistance to the unification policy, the heavier the emphasis placed on national security. This vicious cycle generated the criticism that the government's unification policy served only to perpetuate the division of the peninsula, and that it was, in reality, an anti-unification policy.

As we saw in the early 1970s with the Yushin (Revitalization) era, the unification policy was used to some degree to compensate for the government's lack of legitimacy. While the South Korean government claimed to be progressive on unification with the July 4th Joint Declaration in 1972, it quickly became apparent to the people that it was a gesture by the regime to bolster its own security.

Such manipulation heightened popular mistrust of the authorities' intention on the matter of unification. In this climate, North Korea's "United Front" tactics were often effective. In short, unification policy lacking firm popular support, functioned only as the tool for the government to control its own people; it also encouraged the North to appeal to the masses through the "United Front" measures, undermining government level coordinations.

This has led to the reality of impasse in the inter-Korean relations.

The generation gap, labor-management confrontation and ideological conflict with regard to the question of unification aggravate national division. Discrepancies can be found between the state and civil society. South Korean delegates in this situation lose their negotiating power in dealing with their counterparts for without the "mandate of the people," their narrative position vis-a-vis the North is weakened. Pyongyang's leadership has exhibited a patterned behavior of discrediting the South's authorities in the hope of benefitting from cleavages in the South itself, and it has become more difficult to create meaningful progress in North-South relations.

In this situation, pursuit of unification policy ends in stalemate. There is sometimes temporary improvement in inter-Korean relations, but such progress is often achieved only by unwise concessions from the South.

The impact of this sort of development in North-South relations is simply short-term, and it often comes with high cost. In this environment, despite the signing of a mutual agreement on reconciliation, there has been no substantial progress in inter-Korean relations.

This has been the situation of inter-Korean relations up to now. Last year a Basic Accord and a Denuclearization Declaration were signed and put into effect, but the Cold War remains on the Peninsula amid mounting tension. The recent question of North Korea's nuclear development has further aggravated tension to a crisis point.

The Administration of President Kim Young Sam was inaugurated at the time of this critical situation on the Peninsula. The

present government was born through direct and fair election and is the first civilian government with unwavering legitimacy to appear since Independence. The reform movement launched by the Kim government enjoys the support of an absolute majority of the people. In the course of reform there is no serious indication of a generation gap, regional conflict, ideological friction or class confrontation. Such frustrations sustained under previous regimes are now melting away.

Currently there is no serious disagreement over unification between the government and groups outside the government. Even the civic bodies which previously challenged the government with regard to the unification question are beginning to understand the government's position and are partially cooperating with the government.

In a new political setting of accommodating the conservative and the critical voices, the government's strong will and intention toward national unification will become evident in the pursuit of coexistence and mutual prosperity and ultimately accomplishing the objective of national well-being. That is because the strong aspiration for national unification can only be realized through voluntary and committed popular support and by creatively adapting to the global trends of the post-Cold War political culture.

Peaceful Coexistence and Co-prosperity

The "Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-aggression, and Exchanges and Cooperation between the South and the North" which was put into effect on February 19, 1992, was claimed to be a basic framework guaranteeing coexistence between two Ko-

reas, but no substantive development has followed. The major reason for the lack of meaningful progress in inter-Korean relations lies in the deep-rooted mistrust between the two authorities of North and South which derives from the Cold War mentality and practices of both sides. Had these historic documents been worked out in the climate of broad consensus of the public, they would have blocked out any effort by the North to engage war with the "United Front" tactics.

The same was true of the July 4th Declaration, a very progressive sounding document which rang hollow because the signatories lacked the will to reform and remove the deep-seated Cold War prejudices in terms of thought, structure, system, or practices.

When North and South want meaningful coexistence, they should demonstrate their determination to break down the wall of the Cold War. They must first recognize each other as viable entities. Most significantly, each should respect the authority of the other's government. Despite rival ideologies and systems, they should not project each other as objects to smash, nor as targets of mistrust. Rather, they should respect each other as partners. Furthermore, the two regimes should not base their own legitimacy on repudiating the other's legitimacy.

In order to achieve this, and in keeping with the international trend, each side needs to sweep away the Cold War antagonisms and the confrontational zero-sum mentality. As long as the North keeps trying to isolate and neutralize the Southern government through its "United Front" tactics, and as long as the South regards the North as an evil power to be contained, real coexistence is impossible to realize.

In contemporary history we have learned that different poli-

tical systems and thoughts are able to peacefully coexist. This coexistence is the *sine qua non* in the course of reaching national unification. It is imperative that top policy-makers in Seoul and Pyongyang change their way of thinking from Cold War confrontation to coexistence. For this reason, both North and South should launch an ideological reform from above to dismantle the Cold War structure.

The attempt to introduce new thinking, new practice, and new life should be directed toward tolerance of the other half living across the DMZ. Historically, Koreans have lived in a culture which has stressed forgiveness and tolerance. Before the division of the Peninsula, Koreans shared a common experience of a peaceful community as one nation for several thousand years. But for the last half century we have been forced to live in a world of different ideologies, systems, and governments and ultimately developed different beliefs and institutions that are mutually incompatible.

From this perspective, the last half century of division is just a brief, unfortunate episode in our long history of one nation, caused by the peculiar political circumstances surrounding our Peninsula at the conclusion of World War II. Despite the differences in political institutions and belief systems that have emerged from our distinctly unique experiences in the last fifty years, the Korean people have lived with the same language, customs, family ties, and state for over thirteen hundred years. This homogeneity must be the historic and cultural foundation for coexistence between North and South.

Coexistence should be conducive to co-prosperity. Living together in poverty is not desirable. Existing together without enjo-

ying freedom is not worthwhile. Coexistence should be developed into common prosperity. In order to reach the stage of co-prosperity, North and South should learn first to exist together. They should exchange, cooperate, and share. Both should be prepared to share what the other needs in a spirit of mutual reinforcement and positive-sum relationship.

In the course of exchange, cooperation, and sharing, the authorities need not be the only entity to lead coexistence and co-prosperity. Sportsmen from North and South can build friendship by exchanging games. Academicians from each side can share their knowledge and expertise. Businessmen can exchange their resources. Students can share their learning, ambitions and dreams. Yet these activities must be made in harmony with the government's coordinating efforts. With the presence of a national consensus, these can only be natural.

A very important matter, however, should not be ignored in this regard.

The government authorities should be the entity handling those matters related to the interests of the state, the whole nation and to the basic rights of individual. Government should play the prime role and have responsibility of protecting and enhancing the rights and life of the nation. This is because the government is given the mandate to fulfill this solemn responsibility by history and by the people.

Problems concerning the whole nation, the entire state and the people, and other important matters can and should be dealt with solely by the government. If this is ignored, coexistence and common prosperity of the whole Korean nation cannot be achieved.

When North and South sincerely hope and earnestly start to make efforts to attain such coexistence and co-prosperity, neither side should try to isolate or contain the other. Nor should either side try to bring about the collapse of the other. We have already learned a lesson in the German experience of unification that sudden collapse of one side can bring tremendous hardship to the whole nation. The new Korean government at this time declares to the world community as well as to the authorities in Pyongyang that the South totally opposes unification by absorption. The South Korean government has neither the intention nor the need to absorb its counterpart in the North. What the South wants and hopes to accomplish is not the unilateral absorption but a peaceful and gradual unification. The government supports a step-by-step approach to unification while securing common prosperity and well-being of the whole nation.

If the North and South really hope to attain peaceful coexistence and co-prosperity, each should help the other to actively participate in international society. The policy of containment or isolation should be replaced by a policy of “engagement.”

It is important that such a policy does not in fact strangle one side. Within this line of argument the “Northern Policy” pursued by the previous administration can be reviewed from a fresh perspective. Even though the policy was pursued by South Korea with the manifest intention of building favorable international circumstances to improve inter-Korean relations, it was seen by the North as a policy of isolation and containment.

The new government reiterates that coexistence and co-prosperity are fundamentals of unification policy which are especially demanded at the stage of the South-North Commonwealth. In

the course of enhancing and establishing exchanges and cooperation between two separate states, policies of coexistence, co-prosperity and participation should be implemented. Peaceful political systems and governments are crucial at this point.

At this stage, of course, “national” interest of each system and the interest of the whole nation might not coincide. However, as exchanges and cooperation between two states and two systems become activated, regularized, and institutionalized, bringing about mutual trust, serious differences of interest between the states and the nation will gradually decrease. The unification policies of North and South should be conducive to this stage of integration.

The recovery of national homogeneity can be expedited at this stage. When interests of the state and the nation can be synchronized, national well-being—the third fundamental of South Korean government’s unification policy—will be fulfilled.

How can we define the national well-being?

National Well-being

National well-being is the fundamental concept which not only drives but also establishes the goal of complete unification. What is the difference between national well-being and nationalism?

Historically, regimes suffering from a lack or absence of political legitimacy have often manipulated the symbols of nationalism. In order to control and eliminate the anti-government forces, the power elite tends to fall into the trap of using nationalism as a shield to protect its vested interest.

The nationalism of the anti-colonial resistance was justifiable in the colonial period. Nationalism worked in this case to provide an ideological weapon and be a source of righteousness to a people under colonial rule. However, when the power elite tries to suppress dissent in the name of nationalism, it degenerates into an excuse for undemocratic controls.

In other situations, nationalism is abused by strong powers as an ideological means for plundering weaker nations. This type of nationalism comes with etatism, chauvinistic nationalism, expansionism or imperialism. And we have witnessed and confirmed historical examples of Nazism and Fascism which ended in tragedy.

The Korean government's notion of national well-being is distinctly different from such distorted nationalism. It has no relationship with nationalism as a ruling ideology, nor nationalism which ensures a government's security. The Kim Young Sam government does not need such a ruling ideology for its regime security. The national well-being established as a pillar of unification policy refers to the quality of life of the whole Korean nation. Above all, it sets a goal of a unified Korean nation with the economic foundation to provide the best standard of living equally to all its people.

We characterize current inter-Korean relations as a special interim relationship in the process towards unification. It is not a normal relationship between two separate states. The accomplishment of national well-being implies harmony between the interest of the state and the interest of the nation.

National well-being clearly projects a particular national value, but it also suggests the universal values which may provide

us in our current division with a means to overcome differences in ideology, thought and political system. The primary task for this final stage of nation building is to create a system of values or ideology that transcends inadequacies of transplanted "western" democracy as well as overcoming the shortcomings of *Juche* ideology that defy common sense.

A harmonious relationship is to be founded upon mutual recognition and acceptance as different entities; yet each party pursues ways of overcoming mutual contradictions and establishing a relationship of mutual reinforcement and cooperation.

National well-being, therefore, is attainable when the unified nation-state becomes internally democratized formulating a single community. Basic human needs and welfare will be secured, equality attained and the fraternal solidarity enlarged. In nationalistic terminology, national well-being espouses the essential goals of "open nationalism," "democratic nationalism," or "communal nationalism."

The vision of a "New Korea" is of a new nation-state and unified motherland characterized by freedom, justice and brotherly love. National well-being is to be accomplished with this vision of New Korea.

III. Concluding Remarks

It is very important to acknowledge that the three pillars or fundamentals of the new government's unification policy correspond to the political and historic features of the Kim Young Sam Administration, an administration inaugurated with legitimacy.

For the first time in contemporary Korean history since Liberation in 1945, reform policies of a civilian government are drawing broad-ranging support from the public. Unlike the previous authoritarian governments which operated with a Cold War mentality and structure, the new government is exerting every effort to pursue clean politics, to build a strong economy, and to establish a healthy civil society, which will ultimately lead to a unified motherland.

The ultimate goal of the policy is to complete the task of national unification. It will not be possible to realize this historic mission unless there is domestic consensus and solidarity. President Kim eloquently pointed this out in his inaugural address when he said, "what is needed at this time is not a sentimental argument to claim unification for its own sake, but an internal consensus for unification." He added that, "no ally can be better than our own whole nation, and no ideology or thought can bring us more happiness than the nation."

The Kim Young Sam Administration is the first civilian government in Korea's contemporary history which is pursuing both domestic reform based on public support and national unification of the divided motherland. It is also the first government which does not seek to manipulate the unification issue for its own selfish power purposes.

The nation is said to be a constant in history, while allies vary. The former Soviet Union which was considered an enemy to Korea became an ally under the different name of Russia. Allied countries do not always remain friendly, but the nation, like the Han River has been flowing for a long period of time and will continue for years to come.

The government in the South is seeking "coexistence and

mutual prosperity” with the North, not as its ruling ideology but in order to attain the well-being of the whole nation. It is thus emphasizing mutual exchange and cooperation between the two Koreas. In expediting the stage of South-North Commonwealth, the Kim government seeks to institutionalize exchanges and cooperation. It will help North Korea to participate with the South in the international community.

The government, therefore, is accelerating coexistence and co-prosperity at the stage of “one nation, two states,” and will pursue the “one nation, one state” relationship when these efforts reach a certain point. The state of national well-being, where state interests and the interests of whole nation coincide, will be achieved through democratization, welfare and the building of one national community.

However, formidable obstacles stand in the way of this vision. Among other things, current suspicions about the North’s nuclear program are increasing tension on the peninsula. A more fundamental problem lies in the Cold War structure itself which still remains deep-rooted in every sector of Korean society.

The first problem is already an international issue which cannot be resolved by our own efforts. However, the nuclear problem is also an intra-Korean issue and the authorities of both sides, particularly the authority of North, should make every effort to resolve it.

The second problem calls for bold steps to dissolve not only the Cold War between North and South, but also the Cold War establishment within both systems. This task requires a new and comprehensive reform effort. Through this endeavor the two governments’ authorities should learn to trust and respect each


other in the course of solving national problems.

As the Cold War era comes to an end, world attention is shifting to the Korean Peninsula. Indeed, this country is no longer perceived as standing on the periphery of the Far East; she is moving toward the center of the hemisphere. At this critical time, if we the Koreans manifest our wisdom to make peace on the Peninsula and resolve the contradiction stemming from Cold War legacies, our contribution will not be limited to our own unification. We will be able to answer many questions of the troubled world of ours. Such an eventuality requires the creation of a political "miracle." However, such a miracle will not occur on its own. It will take patience and tolerance, as well as sweat and tears.

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SOUTH-NORTH DIALOGUE IN KOREA



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**Working-Level Delegates Contacts
to Discuss the Exchange of Special
Envoys between the South and the North**

* Times of the Contacts

First contact: October 5, 1993, Tongilkak, Panmunjom

Second contact: October 15, Peace House, Panmunjom

Third contact: October 25, Tongilkak

Fourth contact: March 3, 1994, Peace House

Fifth contact: March 9, Tongilkak

– Exclusive contact between the two sides' chief delegates.

Sixth contact: March 12, Peace House

– Exclusive contact between the two sides' chief delegates.

Seventh contact: March 16, Tongilkak

Eighth contact: March 19, Peace House

Part I

First-Phase Working-Level Delegates Contacts

1. Background
2. First Contact
3. Second Contact
4. Third Contact
5. Suspension of the Contacts

Part I

First-Phase Working-Level Delegates Contacts

1. Background

The Republic of Korea government has made steady efforts to resume the South-North dialogue and thereby to bring about a breakthrough in resolving the North Korean nuclear question. South Korea maintains that unless the nuclear issue that is directly linked to the nation's security and survival is resolved on a priority basis, there can be no substantial progress in inter-Korean relations nor can there be any reconciliation and cooperation between the two Koreas.

Since the Seoul government proposed contacts between delegates to the South-North high-level talks on May 20, 1993, it has done all it could to resolve the nuclear issue. For instance, the South, in the Prime Minister's telephone message of June 22, 1993, proposed working-level delegates contacts between the South and North Korean authorities by accommodating flexibly even the North Korean offer for the exchange of special envoys.

The efforts of the South Korean government stemmed from

the positive approach toward resolving the North Korean nuclear issue as “an internal question of the Korean nation” through the implementation of the Joint Declaration of Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

This was in consideration of the fact that the North’s nuclear question carries a dual nature of being an “international issue” attracting keen attention from the international community and, at the same time, being Korea’s “national problem.”

However, the North Koreans rejected the South’s call for contacts between delegates to the South-North high-level talks while insisting on their idea of an “exchange of special envoys to convey the will of the top leaders,” which was first suggested in a message from their Administration Council Premier on May 25, 1993.

Reacting to the South’s flexible position that a “delegates contact could discuss the issue of exchanging special envoys,” the North turned down even this proposition, disputing the remarks made by the South’s top leader in a press conference on June 3, 1993, to the effect that “I cannot shake hands with a party having nuclear arms.”

North Korea has thus persisted in maintaining an insincere posture while shunning the resolution of the nuclear question.

Internationally, meanwhile, two rounds of high-level talks (the first round: June 2-11, 1993, New York; the second round: July 14-19, '93, Geneva) were held between the United States and North Korea separately from the negotiations between the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and North Korea.

At the second-round talks, in particular, the two sides agreed to have negotiations between the IAEA and North Korea and bet-

ween South and North Korea at an early date to discuss implementation of the declared denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.

Spurred by the U.S.-North Korea agreement, the South's Prime Minister Hwang In-sung proposed in a telephone message on August 4, 1993, the convocation of the South-North Joint Nuclear Control Commission. In a statement issued by its spokesman for the South-North high-level talks, however, Pyongyang rejected Seoul's proposal while reiterating the demand for the exchange of special envoys.

Notwithstanding, the Seoul government again stressed in a statement by the southern spokesman for the South-North high-level talks on August 14, 1993, that the door to dialogue remained open in order to discuss and settle the nuclear and other pending inter-Korean issues from the approach of dealing with national problems.

In his commemorative address marking the 48th anniversary of National Liberation on August 15, 1993, the South Korean President expressed a willingness "to positively engage in peaceful use of nuclear power and economic cooperation with North Korea and also cooperate with the North in its bid to improve relations with Seoul's allies if the North ensures its nuclear transparency and shows sincerity toward the South-North dialogue."

In reaction, the North Koreans, in a statement by their spokesman for the South-North high-level talks on August 31, 1993, modified their position by suggesting that officials of any level named by the top leaders would serve as special envoys, instead of de facto unilateral naming of the envoys, and also by setting forth a four-point agenda topped by the nuclear question.

The South, in a magnanimous gesture of not being concer-

I. First-Phase Working-Level Delegates Contacts

ned about the form of talks in order to get the nuclear issue resolved, proposed in the Prime Minister's telephone message on September 2, 1993, to exchange special envoys charged with discussing and resolving the nuclear issue on a priority basis and dealing with other major issues pending between the South and the North.

But North Korea shunned any affirmative response to the southern proposal while laying out two prerequisites: suspension of the "nuclear war games" and abandonment of an international cooperative system with respect to the nuclear question.

On October 2, one month later, North Korea, in a telephone message, said it would send three delegates to Panmunjom on October 5 for a working-level contact to prepare for the exchange of special envoys, saying it expected the South to give a clear-cut answer at the working-level contact to its two prerequisites.

The Seoul government, in Prime Minister Hwang In-sung's telephone message to the North on October 4, welcomed the North's affirmative response to its call for a working-level contact to prepare for the exchange of special envoys, providing a list of the South's delegates to the October 5 contact at Panmunjom.

In the message, the South expressed hope that procedural matters related to the exchange of special envoys would be settled smoothly at the working-level contact to facilitate the early exchange of special envoys, thus providing an important impetus to the resolution of the nuclear and other pending inter-Korean issues.

2. First Contact

The first working-level delegates contact was held for two hours from 10 to 12 a.m. October 5, 1993, at Tongilkak in the northern sector of Panmunjom. It took place behind closed doors.

The contact was attended by three delegates from each of the two Koreas. The South's delegates included Chief Delegate Song Yung-dae, vice unification minister; Kim Il-moo, deliberations officer of the Office of the Prime Minister; and Chang Jaryong, the Foreign Ministry's director-general for American affairs. The North Korean delegates were Pak Yong-su, Secretariat deputy director-general, Committee for Peaceful Unification of the Fatherland; Choe Song-ik and Choe Sung-chol, both department directors of the Committee.

During the meeting, the South's chief delegate said that if either the South or the North had developed and possessed nuclear weapons, it would be a tremendous misfortune for the Korean people. He stressed that all pending issues between the two sides could be resolved if only the South and the North discussed them sincerely, bearing in mind they are the same nation.

The Seoul side then called for resolution of procedural matters to realize the exchange of special envoys at an early date. It noted that the two sides had already agreed to exchange special envoys, sharing the view that the nuclear issues could be settled through such an exchange. The South then produced a draft Agreement on the Exchange of Special Envoys between the South and the North, which featured:

On the duty of the special envoys: The special envoys shall deliver

I. First-Phase Working-Level Delegates Contacts

personal messages from their sides' top leaders to the other sides' top leaders; shall explain the will of their sides' top leaders on the issues raised in connection with the delivery of personal messages; and shall confirm matters of mutual accord between the two top leaders or discuss the points of disagreement through their contacts.

On the method of the exchange of special envoys: It is hoped that since the North was the first to propose the exchange of special envoys, the North's special envoy would visit the South first followed by a visit to the North by the special envoy of the South.

On the time and itineraries of the first exchange of special envoys: The South's position is the sooner the better. The South hopes that the time of the first exchange would be agreed at this working-level delegates contact. The period of the special envoys' stay in the other side could be about five days. Concrete itineraries could be discussed and determined not later than five days before the visits through the South and the North liaison offices.

The North Korean delegates said the exchange of special envoys would be a proper and positive method of resolving the nuclear and other pending inter-Korean issues through political decisions by the top leaders of both sides. They said the working-level delegates should also discuss and settle the issue of removing the "obstacles" that stand in the way of the exchange of special envoys as well as handling procedural matters related to the exchange. The North stressed that to this end, the working-level delegates should discuss issues as common national interests.

The assertions North Korea made prior to the discussion of procedural matters were in substance as follows:

The rank of special envoys shall be authoritative and respon-

sible high-level officials appointed by the top leaders. The mission and duty of special envoys shall be to discuss implementing the denuclearization declaration, taking joint steps for the easing of tension and carrying out the Basic South-North Agreement, promoting grand national unity and realizing a top leaders meeting, as well as other questions of mutual concern.

With regard to the issue of fostering an “atmosphere” to materialize the exchange of special envoys, the North Koreans insisted that the South make clear its position regarding their demand for the suspension of “nuclear war games” and the renouncement of its international cooperative system.

They argued that “these obstacles” should first be removed in order to successfully implement the proposed exchange of special envoys and provide a turning point in the efforts to bring about national unification.

Reacting to the two prerequisites set down by the North, the South, noting that the duty of the working-level delegates was to discuss procedural matters related to the exchange of special envoys, urged the North to try to realize the exchange at an early date by resolving procedural issues with emphasis on those on which the two sides had neared accord.

The Seoul side went on to say that the two issues raised by North Korea could be discussed when the two sides addressed the nuclear and other key pending issues through the exchange of special envoys.

The North Koreans, however, argued that unless their two prerequisites on removing “basic obstacles” were met, no exchange of special envoys could be resolved. Even if it was realized, they insisted, it would go through the vicious circle of “interruption

and resumption.”

In particular, North Korea said that if “nuclear war games” were staged, the suspension of dialogue would be unavoidable and if the South continued to pursue an international cooperative system, there would be no need for South-North dialogue. They denounced the South’s international cooperative system as “nation-harming” or “dialogue denial.”

On the two prerequisites laid down by the North, the Seoul-side delegation brought the northern delegates’ attention to the fact that the Northerners said in their telephone message of June 4 that “what the working-level delegates contacts should do would be to discuss several procedural matters for the exchange of special envoys,” and in another message on June 8 that “the nuclear question can be settled only through talks between high-level responsible officials and the decision of the top leaders.”

The South also stressed that the Team Spirit military exercises were not “nuclear war games” as claimed by the North, saying that it was willing to review the matter flexibly if North Korea were sincere toward discussing and resolving the nuclear question on a priority basis. The South made it express that no decision had been made on whether to stage Team Spirit '94.

Moreover, the South said that its participation in an international cooperative system was a due obligation as a signatory to the Denuclearization Declaration, a member of the United Nations and also as a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The Seoul side said it didn’t want to see North Korea isolated from the rest of the world community or face international sanctions because of its failure to ensure nuclear transparency.

The meeting failed to address procedure as North Korea

shunned it in demanding that the South explain the two prerequisites.

3. Second Contact

The second working-level delegates contact took place from 10 a.m. to noon October 15, 1993, at Peace House in the southern sector of Panmunjom behind closed doors.

In a speech, the South's chief delegate, reminding the North Koreans of the basic duty of the delegates contacts, discussed his side's position on the North's two-point demand.

He said the South had not and would not stage the "nuclear war games" North Korea mentioned. The chief delegate said that if the "nuclear war games" referred to the Team Spirit military exercises, the South was willing to reconsider the matter if North Korea showed sincerity toward resolving the nuclear question.

With regard to the international cooperative system, the South said its call upon North Korea to clear up nuclear suspicions through international inspections was reasonable as the North is a party to the Denuclearization Declaration, a United Nations member and a member of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). He said this problem would be resolved as a matter of course if the nuclear suspicions were dispelled.

The South's chief delegate continued to say that these questions North Korea raised could, if necessary, be discussed in the course of the exchange of special envoys. He then produced a draft agreement of the delegates contact as follows based on the ideas advanced by the two sides:

The South's Stand on Procedural Matters

Whether to Include a Preamble in an Agreement

According to past practice, a preamble is needed to give the basic purpose of the exchange of special envoys.

Rank of Special Envoys

There could be no difference in this issue since an official of a given level appointed by the South's top leader would naturally be as authoritative and high-ranking as the North Korean official.

Duty of Special Envoys

The adoption of discussing the implementation of the Denuclearization Declaration as the topic of special envoys is not proper since such a topic gives the impression of restricting dialogue between the top leaders.

Method of the Exchange of Special Envoys

Special envoys should make visits by turn. If possible, it is hoped that a North Korean envoy would visit the South first.

The Time and Duration of Visits by Special Envoys

The exchange of special envoys should be realized within the month as stipulated in the South's draft agreement. About five days would be good as the duration of a visit by a special envoy.

On the other hand, North Korea, without producing a draft agreement of its own, rejected the South's draft agreement as "too perfunctory" and "failing to set the duty of special envoys clearly."

The North claimed that if the South's draft were adopted, special envoys would wind up being mere messengers relaying the will of the top leaders, unable to discuss and resolve denuclearization and other pending issues between the two Koreas. They

then kept demanding that the South offer an explanation on the two prerequisites they set forth.

Insisting, in particular, that the two prerequisites held the key to realizing the exchange of special envoys, the North shunned the discussion of procedural matters. They argued that one of the important duties of the working-level delegates contacts was to remove obstacles to the exchange of special envoys. The North Koreans were making this assertion when the South charged them with raising issues that had nothing to do with the delegates contacts.

North Korea claimed that the Team Spirit exercise is a “nuclear-testing war game” involving large-scale nuclear weapons and equipment. It is an “offensive training exercise designed to deal a preemptive nuclear blow to North Korea,” they claimed.

With regard to the international cooperative system, the North said there were no suspicions of its nuclear program, asserting that “the issue of denclearization of the Korean peninsula would be settled when the nuclear issue of the southern area was resolved.”

The South, pointing out that North Korean ideas about procedural matters lacked concreteness, stressed that since the two sides’ suggestions were generally in accord in form, the two sides could discuss issues such as the duty of special envoys where differences remained.

Moreover, the Seoul side said that the two “prerequisites” produced by North Korea had nothing directly to do with the working-level delegates contacts, and would only serve to delay the exchange of special envoys. The South said, however, that when the exchange of special envoys was realized, these matters could

be discussed in due course.

In response, North Korea demanded to know whether the South would stage the "Toksuri Training Exercise" and also if the "international cooperative system" was meant only to clear up suspicions about the North's nuclear program. They repeated that without an answer to these questions, there could be no smooth progress in the contact.

The South's delegates stressed that the issue of whether to stage the "Toksuri Training Exercise" was hardly a question to be handled at the contact, and the "international cooperative system" was not a "nation hurting system" but a "system aimed at accelerating peaceful resolution" and not a "dialogue rejection system" but a "system for resolution of issues through dialogue."

After the North questioned the "letter from the United Nations Secretary-General" and the "Japanese nuclear issue," the Seoul side said the U.N. Secretary-General had sent a message and not a letter, and that it is customary that the Secretary-General does not sign such messages. Regarding the Japanese nuclear issue, the South said Japan's nuclear transparency was being ensured through inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency.

The South also pointed out that the North Korean vice foreign minister's remarks in his speech at the U.N. General Assembly that "the nuclear issue is a question to be resolved through dialogue only between us and the United States," ran counter to the spirit of the Denuclearization Declaration.

The North Koreans showed a contradictory attitude by arguing that the denuclearization issue would have to be resolved exclusively through contacts between the United States and themselves, and that ultimately both South and North Korea should

implement the Denuclearization Declaration if denuclearization was to be carried out.

The second contact ended without any result as North Korea refused to discuss procedural matters without withdrawing the two prerequisites.

4. Third Contact

The third working-level delegates contact took place from 10 to 11:14 a.m. October 25, 1993, behind closed doors at Tongilkak.

In his first speech, the South's chief delegate said the contact would serve as an important watershed not only in resolving the nuclear question through the exchange of special envoys but also in the efforts to improve inter-Korean relations and ensure durable peace and stability on the Korean peninsula and in Northeast Asia. He emphasized that the two sides, therefore, should correctly understand such circumstances and do their best to wind up the discussion of procedural matters related to the exchange of special envoys.

The South said the North's refusal to discuss procedural issues in pursuing undue prerequisites was leading it to doubt if the North had any intent of exchanging special envoys after all. It then said the North's insincerity toward the nuclear question apparently stemmed from a failure to grasp properly international moves over the nuclear question.

The chief delegate from the South expressed hope that the nuclear issue would be settled peacefully through dialogue so that North Korea would not suffer disadvantages resulting from its

isolation from the rest of the international community. In this respect, North Korea should withdraw the two unreasonable prerequisites and positively respond to the discussion of procedural issues, he said.

Meanwhile, North Korea said that the two sides should clearly agree on the duty of special envoys at the working-level delegates contacts so that the special envoys, when exchanged, could forthrightly discuss and settle important issues facing the nation. It then set forth a draft Agreement on the exchange of Special Envoys between the North and the South, whose highlights were as follows:

Highlights of North Korean Draft Agreement

Rank of special envoys and attendants:

- (1) *Rank of special envoys—Authoritative and responsible high officials appointed by the top leaders.*
- (2) *Attendants—10 persons including aides and liaison officials.*
- (3) *Press—Six press members.*

Duty of special envoys:

- (1) *To deliver a personal message from the top leader of one's side and verbally explain the message.*
- (2) *To discuss a five-point agenda including the "issue of implementing the Denuclearization Declaration" under the authority delegated by the top leaders.*

** The item of (1) was as proposed by the South.*

Method of the exchange of special envoys:

- (1) *Visits to Pyongyang and Seoul by turn.*
- (2) *Open exchange.*

Times of the exchange of special envoys:

The South's special envoy shall visit Pyongyang within 15 days from the time of mutual accord on an agreement, and the North's special envoy shall visit Seoul within 15 days from the time of the visit by the South's special envoy.

** Specifies the visit by the South's special envoy to Pyongyang first.*

Itinerary:

The duration of visit shall be four days, but can be adjusted through mutual consultations.

** The South offered five days.*

** Other contents like a guarantee of personal safety, travel procedures, press coverage, etc. were similar to the ideas offered by the South.*

The North, which produced a draft agreement of its own for the first time at the third contact, again raised the issues of "nuclear war games" and "international cooperative system," demanding the South explain them.

The South wanted to know if the two demands posed by the North were "prerequisites," and reaffirmed that although the two issues did not suit the nature of the working-level delegates contacts, they could be discussed in the course of the exchange of special envoys.

North Korea declined to give a clear-cut position on whether its demands were prerequisites, simply saying that "our position is to wind up the contacts by whatever means and realize the exchange of special envoys in November."

Pointing out that the North's avoidance of debate on procedural issues had prompted the South to wonder whether the North

had any intent of resolving the nuclear question peacefully or realizing the exchange of special envoys, the South urged the North to be sincere toward discussing procedural matters.

But the North kept demanding that the South clearly answer if it would hold the “nuclear war games,” in particular the “Toksuri Training Exercise, and that the South choose between the “international cooperative system” and a “national cooperative system” in evading discussion of procedural issues.

The third contact, too, thus ended without any achievements.

5. Suspension of Working-Level Delegates Contacts

At the third contact held on October 25, 1993, to discuss procedural matters related to the exchange of special envoys, the North Koreans made it appear as if they were sincere toward debate on procedural issues by producing their version of a draft agreement on the exchange for the first time since the contacts began on October 5.

However, in a telephone message on November 3, 1993, on the eve of the agreed fourth contact, Pak Yong-su, the North's chief delegate, said they were postponing the fourth contact indefinitely, disputing South Korean Defense Minister Kwon Young-hae's remarks made on November 2 in a KBS-TV interview in connection with the annual Korea-U.S. Security Consultative Meeting held in Seoul on November 3-4.

** Defense Minister Kwon's remarks at issue: “We will discuss the issue*

of preparing against an inadvertent provocation North Korea may launch militarily if and when the United Nations unavoidably imposes sanctions against North Korea under circumstances where there is no change in North Korea's posture toward the nuclear issue."

The working-level delegates contacts to discuss procedural matters related to the exchange of special envoys had thus hit a deadlock.

Following is the full text of North Korea's telephone message of November 3 to the South.

As you know, our two sides' delegates had in principle reached an agreement through the three contacts to realize the first exchange of special envoys within November. In the negotiations for its successful realization, we registered progress to a certain extent.

We could expect that when the fourth contact takes place, a major agreement could be reached on the exchange of special envoys between the North and the South.

At such a time, your side's "defense minister," in a so-called special interview held on November 2, one day before the annual Security Consultative Meeting with the United States, abruptly made dangerous remarks in which he, disputing our non-existent nuclear development, said he plans not to spare even a military response.

This inflammatory statement by your side's military authorities cannot but be remarks that deny the Panmunjom working-level delegates contacts themselves now in progress to discuss the exchange of special envoys and, at the same time, the declaration of a military confrontation between the North and the South.

You must not be ignorant of the fact that your side's former

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defense minister openly discussed a "military strike" against our Yongbyon area, giving rise to a seriously unrecoverable aftermath.

We believe that as the exact same development had occurred due to your side's defense authorities, our working-level contacts for the exchange of special envoys are in danger of being rendered meaningless.

Under the circumstances, it has become difficult to have the fourth working-level delegates contact for the exchange of special envoys as planned. Our side's delegates, too, are unable to go to Panmunjom.

As we believe your side is to be blamed entirely for the development, we will watch your side's attitude over a specific period of time.

In reaction, the South expressed regret over the North's indefinite postponement of the fourth contact with an unreasonable excuse at a time when the two sides, in their three working-level contacts, had neared accord on most procedural matters with the exception of a couple of issues.

In a telephone message to the North on November 4, the South's chief delegate, Song Yung-dae, stressed that the two sides should under all circumstances abide by what they had agreed, if only to dispel mutual confrontation and distrust and to foster trust and march onward toward peace and unification.

He urged the North to come to the fourth contact at an early date so as to settle on a priority basis the nuclear question that is linked directly to the safety and survival of the nation and also to discuss and resolve pending issues designed to improve inter-Korean relations.

The following is the full text of Chief Delegate Song Yung-dae's November 4th telephone message to the North.

Your telephone message of November 3 has been received.

As you yourself recognized, the South and the North have shared views on most procedural matters related to the exchange of special envoys with the exception of a couple of issues through our three rounds of working-level delegates contacts.

As we were about to have last-ditch negotiations on our versions of an agreement regarding procedures for the exchange of special envoys, your side suspended the South-North working-level delegates contacts with an unreasonable excuse. I regret it very much.

For the South and the North to dispel confrontation and distrust and promote confidence-building in order to travel the road of peace and unification, we, first of all, should always abide by what has been agreed between the two sides.

Nonetheless, your side has unilaterally scrapped even the time of the conference duly agreed between the two sides. This is yet another attempt to delay any improvement in South-North relations. I am led to doubt whether your side is really interested in realizing the exchange of special envoys.

It is truly regrettable that your side deliberately distorted the true meaning of the remarks made by our Defense Minister and put off the contact.

As emphasized time and again, our side holds fast to the policy of resolving the nuclear question peacefully through dialogue and negotiations.

It is from this stance that our side has been making sincere efforts to realize the exchange of special envoys at an early date so as to discuss and settle the nuclear and other issues pending between the South and the North.

As you know, the international community has lately expressed se-

I. First-Phase Working-Level Delegates Contacts

rious concern about your side's failure to fulfill the treaty obligations of the Nuclear Safeguards Agreement. Rather, your side has widened the area of non-compliance with treaty obligations.

Our side hopes that there will be no unfortunate circumstance in which your side keeps delaying the resolution of the nuclear question and thereby incurs international sanctions.

Before disputing the remarks of our Defense Minister, your side should first show sincerity toward resolving the nuclear question with a fresh recognition and determination so that such an unfortunate situation would not come about.

Today, countries competitively strive to enhance their respective national self-esteem and interests in the post-Cold War age.

And, to us an atmosphere favorable to realizing peaceful unification and national prosperity has been fostered.

I sincerely hope that your side will not turn a deaf ear to this flow of history and national aspirations.

To this end, your side should resolve the nuclear question that remains a major obstacle to improvement of inter-Korean relations. Your side should realize that this alone would ensure our nation's survival and security.

Moreover, your side should not repeat the act of one-sidedly scrapping inter-Korean agreements by giving unreasonable excuses or reasons.

I strongly urge your side to correctly recognize the seriousness of the developments surrounding the nuclear question and return to the working-level delegates contacts at an early date.

I look forward to an affirmative response.

To this call by the South to hold the fourth working-level delegates contact, North Korea, in a statement issued on November

9 by Pak Yong-su, chief delegate to the contacts, again rejected it, thus suspending the South-North dialogue that had resumed after nine months' deadlock.

The North's indefinite postponement of the fourth contact, originally slated for November 4, 1993, using the excuse of remarks made by the South's Defense Minister seemed related to the adoption of a resolution by the 48th United Nations General Assembly on November 1, 1993, and also with the decision made at the 25th annual Korea-U.S. Security Consultative Meeting of November 3-4 in Seoul to shelve the plan to suspend the '94 Team Spirit training exercises.

Part II

Second-Phase Working- Level Delegates Contacts

1. Background Leading to Resumed Contacts
 - a. *Efforts of International Community with Respect to the North Korean Nuclear Question*
 - b. *The South's Proposal for the Resumption of Contacts*
2. Fourth Contact
3. Fifth Contact
4. Sixth Contact
5. Seventh Contact
6. Eighth Contact

Part II

Second-Phase Working-Level Delegates Contacts

1. Background Leading to Resumed Contacts

a. Efforts of International Community with Respect to the North Korean Nuclear Question

As North Korea continued to reject IAEA activities to ensure safeguards ever since the IAEA's sixth special inspection from January 26-February 5, 1993, the North had widened the area of non-compliance with the Nuclear Safeguards Agreement.

In this connection, the 48th U.N. General Assembly on November 1, 1993, adopted a resolution on North Korea, expressing its grave concern that North Korea had failed to honor its safeguards obligations and urging Pyongyang to cooperate with the IAEA in the complete fulfillment of the Nuclear Safeguards Agreement.

Following is the Resolution adopted by the 48th U.N. General Assembly calling upon North Korea to accept IAEA nuclear inspections.

*Resolution on Report of the International
Atomic Energy Agency*

The General Assembly,

- (a) Having received the report of the International Atomic Energy Agency to the General Assembly for the year 1992,*
- (b) Taking note of the statement of the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency of 1 November 1993, which provides additional information on the main developments in the activities of the Agency during 1993,*
- (c) Recognizing the importance of the work of the Agency to promote further the application of atomic energy for peaceful purposes, as envisaged in its Statute,*
- (d) Also recognizing the special needs of the developing countries for technical assistance by the Agency in order to benefit effectively from the application of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes as well as from the contribution of nuclear energy to their economic development,*
- (e) Conscious of the importance of the work of the Agency in the implementation of safeguards provisions of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and other international treaties, conventions and agreements designed to achieve similar objectives, as well as in ensuring, as far as it is able, that the assistance provided by the Agency or at its request or under its supervision or control is not used in such a way as to further any military purpose, as stated in article II of its Statute,*
- (f) Further recognizing the importance of the work of the Agency on nuclear power, applications of nuclear methods and techniques, nuclear safety, radiological protection and radioactive waste management, including its work directed towards assisting developing countries in all*

these fields,

- (g) *Again stressing the need for the highest standards of safety in the design and operation of nuclear plants so as to minimise risks to life, health and the environment,*
- (h) *Noting the statements and actions of the Agency concerning non-compliance by Iraq with its non-proliferation obligations,*
- (i) *Taking note of resolutions GOV/2636 of 25 February 1993, GOV/2639 of 18 March 1993, GOV/2645 of 1 April 1993 and GOV/2692 of 23 September 1993 of the Board of Governors of the IAEA in connection with the implementation of the agreement between the Agency and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear weapons as well as Security Council resolution 825(1993) of 11 May 1993, and expressing its grave concern that the DPRK has failed to discharge its safeguards obligations and has recently widened the area of non-compliance,*
- (j) *Bearing in mind resolutions GC(XXXVII)/RES/614 on measures to resolve international radioactive waste management issues, GC(XXXVII)/RES/615 on strengthening nuclear safety through the early conclusion of a nuclear safety convention, GC(XXXVII)/RES/616 on practical utilization of food irradiation in developing countries, GC(XXXVII)/RES/617 on plan for producing potable water economically, GC(XXXVII)/RES/618 on strengthening of the Agency's main activities, GC(XXXVII)/RES/619 on strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of the safeguards system, GC(XXXVII)/RES/624 on the implementation of the agreement between the Agency and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, GC(XXXVII)/RES/625 on an African Nuclear-Weapon-Free*

II. Second-Phase Working-Level Delegates Contacts

Zone. GC(XXXVII)/RES/626 on the implementation of United Nations Security Council resolutions 687, 707 and 715 relating to Iraq, and GC(XXXVII)/RES/627 on application of IAEA safeguards in the Middle East, adopted on 1 October 1993 by the General Conference of the Agency at its thirty-seventh regular session:

- 1. Takes note of the report of the International Atomic Energy Agency;*
- 2. Affirms its confidence in the role of the Agency in the application of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes;*
- 3. Welcomes the re-appointment of Dr. Hans Blix as Director General of the Agency;*
- 4. Urges all States to strive for effective and harmonious international co-operation in carrying out the work of the Agency, pursuant to its statute; in promoting the use of nuclear energy and the application of the necessary measures to strengthen further the safety of nuclear installations and to minimize risks to life, health and the environment; in strengthening technical assistance and co-operation for developing countries; and in ensuring the effectiveness and efficiency of the safeguards system of the Agency;*
- 5. Welcomes the decisions taken by the Agency to strengthen its safeguards system;*
- 6. Welcomes also the decisions taken by the Agency to strengthen its technical assistance and co-operation activities;*
- 7. Commends the Director General and the secretariat of the Agency for their impartial efforts to implement the safeguards agreement still in force between the Agency and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, and urges the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to cooperate immediately with the Agency in the full implementation of the safeguards agreement;*

8. *Also commends the Director General of the Agency and his staff for their strenuous efforts in the implementation of Security Council resolutions 687(1991) of 3 April 1991, 707(1991) of 15 August 1991 and 715(1991) of 11 October 1991, and endorses his efforts to put in place the necessary measures for the implementation of the plan for future ongoing monitoring, in accordance with Security Council resolution 715(1991);*
9. *Requests the Secretary-General to transmit to the Director General of the Agency the records of the forty-eighth session of the General Assembly relating to the activities of the Agency.*

On November 4, 1993, South Korea and the United States, in a joint statement of the 25th Annual Korea-U.S. Security Consultative Meeting, decided to shelve for the time being the decision to suspend the '94 Team Spirit military exercises. The two countries also asked North Korea to faithfully fulfill its treaty obligations under the Nuclear Safeguards Agreement and to accept simultaneous South-North nuclear inspections.

They also agreed to retain the existing Military Armistice Agreement until it is replaced with a permanent peace mechanism created through direct negotiations between South and North Korea.

In addition, the United States reaffirmed that it would continue to provide a nuclear umbrella to South Korea and shelve a second-stage reduction of the U.S. forces in Korea (an agreement reached at the 24th SCM) at least until North Korea's nuclear transparency is thoroughly assured. The United States further agreed to turn over the peace-time operational control of the South Korean forces to the chairman of the South Korean Joint Chiefs

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of Staff effective December 1, 1994.

Moreover, the two countries shared the view that joint Korea-U.S. military exercises were needed to maintain Korea-U.S. military preparedness, agreeing to continue to develop Korea-U.S. security cooperation in the direction of improving inter-Korean relations and contributing to the unification of the Korean peninsula.

Meanwhile, since the IAEA notified the North on September 8, 1993, of the seven nuclear facilities in the Yongbyon area whose inspection is needed for the continuation of "safeguards measures," North Korea kept rejecting full IAEA inspections. At the U.S.-North Korea talks held on November 11, 1993, North Korea called for a package deal incorporating Pyongyang's implementation of safeguards measures and the issue of improving U.S.-North Korea relations.

Following is the text of a statement issued by North Korean First Vice Foreign Minister Kang Sok-ju calling for the resolution of the nuclear issue through a package deal.

Full Implementation of the Safeguards Agreement Means Our Complete Return to the NPT

In a special circumstance in which we have unilaterally suspended the effectuation of our withdrawal from the NPT, a guarantee of safeguards continuation should be distinguished from the complete fulfillment of the safeguards agreement.

Unless the United States guarantees by deeds that they will not strangle our system, we cannot completely fulfill the safeguards agreement even if we wish to do so.

The nuclear part of the Korean question can be resolved not through pressure but only through the method of dialogue and negotiations.

The nuclear question will be satisfactorily resolved if and when a third-round North Korea-U.S. meeting is held and a package deal is agreed, based on which the United States adopts a practical policy of renouncing nuclear threats and a hostile posture while we implement the safeguards agreement in earnest.

If the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) fabricates things to make it appear that the continuation of safeguards surveillance had been shattered, it would be taken as a sign telling us to pull out of the treaty at an early date.

Under these circumstances, South Korea and the United States held a summit meeting in Washington on November 23, 1993, between Presidents Kim Young-sam and Bill Clinton to establish and pronounce a clear position with regard to the North Korean nuclear question.

The top leaders of the two countries reaffirmed that resolution of the North Korean question could not be delayed any longer and that they would continue to exert efforts to solve the nuclear issue through dialogue. They agreed on a principle for dealing with the North Korean nuclear question, a principle that if North Korea accepts IAEA inspections and there is progress in South-North dialogue, a third-round U.S.-North Korea meeting would be held to promote a thorough and broad approach toward completely resolving the North Korean nuclear question.

Besides, the two presidents agreed that their countries would consult closely on whether to suspend the '94 Team Spirit military exercises and that a final decision on Team Spirit would be made

by the South Korean government.

With the announcement of the joint position of South Korea and the United States, North Korea acceptance of IAEA inspections emerged as the key to resuming three separate dialogues on the North Korean nuclear question: talks between the IAEA and North Korea, between South and North Korea, and between the United States and North Korea.

With regard to IAEA inspections, the North Koreans had asserted that in a special circumstance in which they had withheld their planned withdrawal from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), they could not accept full special or general IAEA inspections. However, they agreed to have working-level contacts with the United States in New York beginning November 24, 1993.

At the first U.S.-North Korea working-level contact, the United States informed North Korea of the agreement made by the top leaders of South Korea and the United States on November 23 on the North Korean nuclear question.

Six more working-level contacts had taken place in New York between the United States and North Korea through January 4, 1994.

Throughout the contacts, North Korea said it could not accept full special and general IAEA inspections and kept demanding the early announcement of the suspension of the '94 Team Spirit military exercises in line with the resumption of South-North dialogue. On nuclear inspections, the North said it would negotiate with the IAEA to determine the level of inspections.

As a result of the U.S.-North Korea contacts in New York, North Korea promised to resume talks with the IAEA on the nuclear inspection issue. According to the pledge, working-level conta-

cts between the IAEA and North Korea took place seven times in Vienna from January 7 through February 15, 1994.

Following the contacts, the North Koreans on February 15 informed the IAEA that they would accept the IAEA demand for inspection of seven declared nuclear facilities in Yongbyon.

The full text of the IAEA statement of February 15 on North Korea's acceptance of nuclear inspections follows:

*Agreement Reached on Inspection
Activities the Seven Declared Nuclear Facilities
in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea*

Following discussions which have been held in Vienna during the recent months representatives of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) today informed the International Atomic Energy Agency that DPRK authorities accept the inspection activities which have been requested by the IAEA in the seven declared nuclear facilities. The aim of the inspection activities is to verify that nuclear material in these facilities has not been diverted since earlier inspections. In addition, inspectors will take certain measures, such as reloading of cameras and changing of seals, to facilitate future verification. The DPRK representatives conveyed their authorities acceptance following the explanation and clarifications that the Agency had provided during the discussions.

The Agency welcomes this new development. It has confirmed today in writing to the DPRK the Agency's readiness to send a team of inspectors to the DPRK as soon as the necessary formalities for entry have been arranged.

North Korea, which had in the past adamantly rejected IAEA inspections of the seven declared nuclear facilities at Yongbyon, resumed talks with the United States on the inspection issue and accepted IAEA inspections, apparently in view of the hardline international opinion on the North Korean nuclear question.

In reality, at the regular IAEA Board of Governors meeting held on December 2, 1993, IAEA Director-General Hans Blix reported on the “continuity of safeguards measures and the outcome of negotiations with North Korea,” pointing to the danger of suspended functioning of surveillance devices and damage to seals on nuclear materials. He said the situation was serious, as the safeguards devices installed on the declared nuclear materials and facilities in North Korea could hardly provide “any significant assurance” on the peaceful use of such nuclear materials and facilities.

The regular IAEA Board of Governors meeting held on December 3, 1993, issued a “Chairman’s Summary” containing the meeting’s discussion of the North Korean nuclear question. The summary was as follows in substance.

First, expressed full support for the measures taken by Director-General Hans Blix to conduct “all-out inspections” of North Korea,

Second, reaffirmed the effectuation of the Nuclear Safeguards Agreement between North Korea and the IAEA,

Third, rejected the North Korean call for a “limited inspection” and urged North Korea to accept inspections at an early date.

Fourth, asked the IAEA Secretariat to convey the matters discussed at the regular IAEA Board of Governors meeting to the U.N. Security Council.

At the same time, the international community, in the Moscow Declaration adopted at the U.S.-Russia summit meeting on January 14, 1994, called upon North Korea to accept international nuclear inspections. A similar statement on the North Korean nuclear question was adopted by the Asia-Pacific Parliamentarians Forum of January 15, 1994.

Moreover, on December 24, 1993, U.N. Secretary-General Butros Butros Ghali visited North Korea via Panmunjom and asked the North Korean leadership to obtain a peaceful resolution of the nuclear question through dialogue. The Rev. Billy Graham also conveyed U.S. President Bill Clinton's message to North Korean President Kim Il-sung during his visit to Pyongyang from January 27-February 1, 1994.

Further, in their summit meeting held in Washington on February 11, 1994, the United States and Japan reaffirmed their position on the nuclear issue, urging Pyongyang to accept IAEA inspection of its nuclear facilities at an early date.

Aware of the mounting international pressure, North Korea on February 15, 1994, accepted the kind of inspections asked by the IAEA. Still, they displayed an insincere manner by delaying visa issuance to IAEA inspectors.

At an IAEA Board of Governors meeting opened on February 21, 1994, IAEA Director-General Hans Blix explained in a report about the steps the IAEA had taken in connection with North Korea's acceptance of nuclear inspections, and urged North Korea to promptly take follow-up administrative steps such as the issuance of visas to IAEA inspectors necessary to check North Korean nuclear facilities.

The Director-General said the purpose of the inspections

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was to verify that nuclear materials at the seven declared facilities in North Korea had not been diverted for other purposes since the earlier sixth IAEA inspection. Saying that the “scope of inspections” would be limited to the nuclear materials of the declared nuclear facilities, Blix emphasized the need for supplementing the existing safeguards system.

Following is the full text of the Director-General’s statement to the Board of Governors, February 21, 1994.

Director-General’s Introductory Statement to the Board of Governors

The first item on the agenda of this meeting has regard to IAEA safeguards. As there is a particularly high level of interest in the Agency’s implementation of safeguards in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, I shall begin my report with that topic.

Implementation of Safeguards in the DPRK

On 15 February—almost a week ago—the Secretariat of the IAEA issued a press release signalling that a team of inspectors was to go to the DPRK with the aim of verifying that nuclear material in seven declared facilities has not been diverted since earlier inspections. During the inspection some measures, such as reloading of cameras and changing of seals, are also to be taken to facilitate future inspections. We indicated that inspectors were ready to go as soon as visas were issued. The press release followed a period of extensive talks in Vienna between the IAEA Secretariat and representatives of the DPRK Permanent Mission to the Agency—talks which

concluded with a detailed understanding and acceptance of the safeguards measures that are to be performed during the inspection.

It is well known through statements both by US and DPRK representatives that DPRK is linking its acceptance of safeguards inspections with certain measures which are the subject of discussions with the US. The Agency is not a party to those discussions and I have no information to convey about them. Our talks with representatives of the DPRK have exclusively been aimed at explaining the need for a range of inspection activities. Even though the talks between the IAEA Secretariat and DPRK representatives have not brought about a common view of the formal basis for the safeguards inspection, there is, as I noted, a common understanding of what the inspection is to comprise. For the inspection actually to take place, the understanding reached on 15 February now needs to be followed by customary co-operation regarding the entry and work of the inspectors. In this respect I should inform you that this morning the DDG for Safeguards, Mr. Pellaud, received a telex from the DPRK authorities. The telex expresses hope that the inspection will take place—I quote—“at an early date.” It appears from the telex, however, that the DPRK authorities are linking the date of the receipt of the IAEA inspection with the dates of “a number of specific action measures” which are related to currently expected contacts between the US and the DPRK.

I do not intend to go into any description of the different phases of our talks with the DPRK representatives, partly because the present result presumably is of greater interest to the Board, and partly because a written report about the development since the Board's latest meeting is now before you as requested at that meeting(GOV/2687/Add.3). Certain points nevertheless deserve to be highlighted.

The agreed aim of most of the inspection activities which are now to be undertaken has been stated to be to verify that nuclear material

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in seven declared facilities has not been diverted since earlier inspections. This is in complete consonance with the objective of safeguards as defined in safeguards agreements. It must be noted, however, firstly that the inspection activities now agreed deal only with material in declared facilities which the Agency has visited before. In particular, they do not comprise visits to additional sites and additional information needed to clarify inconsistencies which exist between DPRK's initial declaration of nuclear material and Agency findings. I am mandated by this Board to consult with the DPRK on the resolution of this matter. I hope such consultations will be possible once inspection of declared facilities has resumed. Without visits to additional sites and access to additional information there would be no way to verify the correctness and assess the completeness of the initial declaration.

It is evident that confidence can only be built on the basis of assurance that no material is concealed or diverted. For such assurance nuclear transparency and effective safeguards are needed.

It should be noted, secondly, that comprehensive safeguards aim at giving assurance on a continuing basis that there is no diversion of nuclear material at any time since the safeguards began to apply in a State. This explains why the Secretariat has only been willing to perform inspections which could offer it the possibility of verifying that there has been no diversion of nuclear material since earlier inspections.

At the meeting of the Board last December I reported that the safeguards system which was in place could no longer be said to provide any meaningful assurance of non-diversion of nuclear material and of peaceful use of the declared installations. The same evidently applies today. For instance, video cameras have been out of operation for many months and will not give information about what might have happened in front in them. The lack of continuity which is caused by such a situation, and

by the absence of the necessary periodic inspections and other measures at all facilities, result in damage to continuity of knowledge which is required to provide the desired assurance of non-diversion. As I stated in December, however, certain safeguards measures can be taken which at least partly compensate for the loss of knowledge that has occurred. Such measures are among those agreed for the next inspection. Only that inspection and its results will tell us whether we shall succeed in restoring continuity of knowledge and, through such knowledge, obtain assurance about non-diversion of declared nuclear material.

I hope the inspection will materialize very soon and that I shall in due course be able to report to you on the results.

On receiving the report of Director-General Blix, the IAEA Board of Governors expressed "grave concern" about the seriousness of the North Korean nuclear question, calling for North Korea's follow-up cooperative efforts in connection with the inspection-related agreement reached between North Korea and the IAEA on February 15, 1994.

The Board of Governors meeting affirmed that the agreement on the inspection of the seven declared facilities at Yongbyon was no more than the first step toward completely resolving the nuclear issue through full compliance by North Korea with its treaty obligations.

Following is the full text of the summary made by the Board Chairman, which was released on February 23, 1994.

*IAEA Board of Governors Considers
Safeguards Inspections in the Democratic People's
Republic of Korea (DPRK)*

"The Board:

Expressed its continuing, deep concern at the seriousness of the situation and its support for a negotiated, peaceful resolution of the nuclear and other security issues of the Korean Peninsula,

Also reiterated its support for the safeguards system,

Expressed its appreciation and support for the Director General and his staff in this matter and reiterated its full confidence in the Secretariat,

Welcomed the agreement of 15 February between the DPRK and the IAEA (on inspection activities) and urged the DPRK to co-operate further with the Agency,

Note that the agreement on inspection of seven declared facilities was only a first step toward resolution of all the nuclear issues including that of full compliance by the DPRK with its obligations under its safeguards agreement,

Expressed concern that the inspectors had not yet been allowed to travel to the DPRK. This inspection should take place in the very near future,

Noted that a large number of Board members had asked the Director General immediately to convene a Board meeting in the absence of satisfactory developments in connection with the inspection, notably if a firm, early date for the start of the inspection had not been settled by the end of this month. It was the sincere hope of the Board that such a step would not be necessary."

It was under the circumstances that the United States and

North Korea had working-level contacts on February 22-25, 1994, to discuss a series of pending issues including implementation of IAEA inspections, resumption of working-level delegates contacts to discuss the proposed exchange of special envoys between South and North Korea, suspension of the '94 Team Spirit exercises, and the time of the third-round U.S.-North Korea high-level talks. On February 25, the two countries decided on four measures to be taken simultaneously.

Following is the full text of the agreement reached at the U.S.-North Korea working-level contact held in New York on February 25, 1994.

Agreed Conclusion

Pursuant to consultation, both sides have agreed to take 4 simultaneous steps on March 1, 1994 as follows:

1. USA announces its decision to agree with ROK's suspension of T/S '94

2. The inspection necessary for the continuity of safeguards as agreed between the IAEA and DPRK on Feb. 15, 1994 begins and will be completed within agreed period.

3. Working level contacts resume in Panmunjom for the exchange of North-South special envoys

4. USA and DPRK announce that third round of US/DPRK talks will begin on March 21, 1994 in Geneva

Each of simultaneous steps is required for implementation of this agreement based on mutual confidence and good faith.

The U.S.-North Korea agreement was made possible after the United States made it clear in the course of working-level contacts that South Korea and the United States would suspend the '94 Team Spirit exercises and that third-round U.S.-North Korea talks would be held only on condition that IAEA inspections were successful and substantial progress was made in the resolution of the nuclear question through the inter-Korean exchange of special envoys.

Following is the full text of an official statement made by the U.S. Department of State on March 3, 1994, on the outcome of the U.S.-North Korea working-level contacts held in New York.

*Resumption of US-DPRK Negotiations on
Nuclear and Other Issues*

(Statement by Michael Mccurry/Spokesman)

The United States government has been informed that a team of inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) arrived in Pyongyang today to begin work at north Korea's Yongbyon nuclear research facility. The IAEA team will carry out activities aimed at verifying that nuclear material at these facilities has not been diverted since earlier IAEA inspections and facilitating future verification. The team expects to complete these inspections necessary to ensure continuity of safeguards in north Korea in about two weeks.

We have also been informed that representatives of the Republic of Korea (ROK) and the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea (DPRK) resumed discussions earlier today in the Joint Security Area at Panmunjom

on the exchange of special envoys who will address intra-Korean issues, including the nuclear issue.

In light of these steps, the United States has agreed with the DPRK to meet in Geneva, Switzerland, on March 21 to begin a third round of negotiations. The talks will aim at a thorough and broad resolution of the nuclear and other issues that separate the DPRK from the U.S. and the rest of the international community.

Assistant Secretary of State Robert L. Gallucci will head the U.S. Delegation to the third round talks.

Also on March 3, the government of the Republic of Korea announced that it and the U.S. government have decided to suspend the combined military exercise, Team Spirit in 1994. The U.S. agrees with that decision. The long-standing security relationship between the ROK and the US remains strong, and the suspension of the Team Spirit '94 will not weaken our joint defensive capabilities. The undertakings of the U.S. regarding Team Spirit '94 and a third round of US-DPRK talks are based on the premise that the IAEA inspections will be fully implemented and the South-North nuclear dialogue will continue through the exchange of special envoys.

Based on the U.S.-North Korea agreement, the South Korean government on February 28, 1994, proposed to North Korea to hold the suspended fourth working-level delegates contact to discuss the proposed exchange of special envoys at Peace House in the southern sector of Panmunjom on March 1, 1994.

South Korea was to announce the suspension of the '94 Team Spirit military exercises on March 1 if the North accepted the proposal. However, North Korea counterproposed that the fourth contact be held on March 3, and the suspension of Team Spirit was made public on March 3.

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Following is the full text of the announcement made by the South Korean Defense Ministry on the suspension of Team Spirit:

Our government has carefully reviewed the issue of whether to hold the '94 Team Spirit military exercises through close consultations with the United States while evaluating the security situation on the Korean peninsula and its surrounding area.

Lately progress has been registered in the course of resolving the nuclear question. Inspections have begun after North Korea accepted all the inspections demanded by the IAEA, and North Korea has returned to the South-North dialogue by agreeing to resume the working-level delegates contacts to discuss the exchange of special envoys.

Accordingly, under the assumption that the IAEA inspections would be successfully completed and that substantial discussions would be made between South and North Korea of the nuclear question through the exchange of special envoys, South Korea and the United States have decided not to hold the '94 Team Spirit military exercises.

In the past, the South Korean government had maintained that the suspension of Team Spirit only for this year could be flexibly examined in view of the fact that the issue of thwarting North Korea's nuclear development was a question linked directly to the nation's survival and that North Korea had steadfastly demanded the suspension of Team Spirit as a prerequisite to IAEA inspections and the resumption of South-North dialogue.

On November 23, 1993, in fact, the top leaders of South Korea and the United States decided to determine whether to hold the '94 Team Spirit exercises in consideration of various security

conditions on the Korean peninsula in the event North Korea accepts IAEA inspections and returns to the South-North dialogue. They agreed that South Korea would make a “final decision” on whether to hold the military exercise this year.

The Seoul government’s announcement of the suspension of Team Spirit ’94 was prompted by the fact that IAEA inspections had begun following North Korea’s acceptance of inspection of the seven declared facilities during its contact with the IAEA on February 15 and that the working-level delegates contacts were resumed to discuss procedural matters related to the proposed exchange of special envoys.

Under the circumstances, Team Spirit was suspended through consultations between South Korea and the United States and in a decision by President Kim Young-sam to resolve the North Korean nuclear question at an early date and bring about durable peace on the Korean peninsula.

The suspension of the ’94 Team Spirit was conditional in every respect as it was made on condition that the IAEA inspections were successful and substantial discussions would be made on the nuclear question through the inter-Korean exchange of special envoys. The conditional suspension was meant especially to stress that all IAEA inspections should be made without any restrictions and the outcome of the inspections should be acceptable to all the world community.

Along with the announcement of the suspended ’94 Team Spirit exercises, the Seoul government, in a Foreign Ministry spokesman’s comment on February 26, 1994, welcomed North Korea’s acceptance of IAEA inspections and resumption of the working-level delegates contacts. Seoul made it clear that the four simulta-

neous measures agreed in the U.S.-North Korea working-level contacts were an "initial step" toward basically resolving the North Korean nuclear question.

b. The South's Proposal for the Resumption of Working-Level Delegates Contacts

The fourth working-level delegates contact originally set to be held on November 4, 1993, to discuss the proposed exchange of special envoys failed to take place for four months due to the North's rejection.

Meanwhile, as part of the international community's efforts to resolve the North Korean nuclear question, the United States had seven rounds of working-level contacts with North Korea in New York from November 24, 1993, to January 4, 1994, during which time the United States reaffirmed its stand that North Korea should accept IAEA inspections and there should be meaningful progress in South-North dialogue for the complete resolution of the nuclear question if the third-round U.S.-North Korea talks were to be held.

North Korea promised to negotiate with the IAEA on inspections and agreed to resume working-level delegates contacts with South Korea to discuss the exchange of special envoys.

In its negotiations with the IAEA on nuclear inspections, North Korea showed an affirmative response toward allowing full checks of the seven declared facilities in Yongbyon as asked by the IAEA. Accordingly, the South Korean government on February 28, 1994, proposed to North Korea to have the suspended fourth delegates contact to discuss the exchange of special envoys of the

top leaders of the South and the North.

The Seoul government proposed to hold the fourth contact in view of the fact that although North Korea's acceptance of IAEA inspections was not wholly satisfactory, the resumed contacts could help ease the strained situation on the Korean peninsula caused by the possibility that the international community might impose sanctions against North Korea, and could be conducive to unfolding a new phase of improved inter-Korean relations as well as to resolving the nuclear question through dialogue and negotiations.

In response to the South's proposal for the holding of the fourth working-level delegates contact, North Korea counterproposed in a telephone message by its chief delegate, Pak Yong-su, on March 1 that the contact be held on March 3, 1994.

In the message, however, North Korea tried to shift the blame for the past suspension of the delegates contacts to the South and showed an unreasonable attitude in setting "one-sided prerequisites." The North Koreans argued that they would take the South's proposal for the holding of the fourth contact as having stemmed from the South's acceptance of their demand for the "suspension of the nuclear war games" and the "renouncement of an international cooperative system."

The South, in a telephone message by its chief delegate, Song Yung-dae, on March 2, accepted the North Korean counterproposal, thus setting the stage for the fourth delegates contact at Peace House on March 3, 1994.

2. Fourth Contact

The fourth working-level delegates contact was held behind closed doors at Peace House from 10 a.m. to 12:15 p.m. March 3, 1994.

The contact was attended by Vice Unification Minister Song Yung-dae, chief delegate; Kim Il-moo, a deliberations officer of the Office of the Prime Minister; and Chang Jae-ryong, Foreign Ministry director-general for American affairs, from the South. The North Korean attendees were Pak Yong-su, deputy director of the Secretariat, Committee for Peaceful Unification of the Fatherland; and Choe Song-ik and Choe Sung-chol, both department heads of the Committee.

Before the contacts were suspended four months earlier due to North Korea's insistence on discussing issues that had nothing to do with the meeting, the two sides had produced their respective versions of a draft agreement and had neared an accord on almost all procedural matters related to the proposed exchange of special envoys.

With a view to realizing the exchange of special envoys at an early date through the conclusion of procedural matters at the fourth contact, the South produced an amendment to a draft agreement which accommodated most of the contents of the North Korean draft set forth at the time of the third contact.

The South was interested in the early exchange of special envoys especially because the exchange was intended basically to discuss and resolve the nuclear and other issues pending between the two Koreas according to the will of the two sides' top leaders and, at the same time, to pave the way for the top leaders'

summit.

In his first speech, the South's chief delegate stressed that all pending issues should be resolved through dialogue between the responsible authorities of the two sides according to the principle of national self-determination. He then laid down a compromise plan accommodating a large part of the North Korean version in such areas as the rank and duty of special envoys and the time of the exchange, urging that debate occur with emphasis on the South's revised version so that an agreement could be adopted and signed at the fourth contact.

The major contents of the South's revised draft agreement were as follows:

First, as for the "rank of special envoys," the "special envoys with optional ranks" contained in the original version were changed to "those with authoritative and responsible ranks."

Second, regarding the "duty of special envoys," five items were concretely laid down as against North Korea ideas, the five being 1) the issue of providing a breakthrough in the implementation of the Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, 2) the issue of normalizing organizations for the implementation and practice of the Basic South-North Agreement, 3) the issue of achieving peaceful unification of the fatherland, 4) other issues raised by either side, and 5) the issue of a meeting between the top leaders of the South and the North.

Third, concerning the "time of the exchange" and "sequence of visits," it is desirable that the North's special envoy visit Seoul first within 10 days after the adoption of an agreement, followed by a visit to Pyongyang by the South's special envoy 10 days after the Seoul visit by a North Korean special envoy. Given the fact that the exchange of special envoys appointed

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by the top leaders has a very important bearing at the moment, faithful implementation of the agreed items should be guaranteed in the course of the exchange of special envoys.

The South emphasized that for it and the North to become genuine partners, the two sides should faithfully abide by agreed terms and respect the international order. Accordingly, it said South-North dialogue, too, should not be held merely for dialogue's sake but be a dialogue that can reap more productive and practical achievements.

In his first speech, the North Korean chief delegate tried to shift the blame for the four-month suspension of the working-level contacts to the South. Without offering any fresh ideas, the North instead made a new two-point demand. This was in addition to the two previously set prerequisites, "suspension of nuclear war games" and "renouncement of an international cooperative system." The new two-point demand entailed "suspension of the introduction of up-to-date weapons like Patriot missiles" and cancellation of President Kim Young-sam's remarks made in a press conference on the occasion of the 100th day of his inauguration that "we cannot shake hands with those possessing nuclear arms."

While asserting that the exchange of special envoys was a question that could not be delayed any longer, the North Koreans insisted that they could begin discussing procedural matters only after the South revealed its position on the four prerequisites.

They went on to assert that in view of the situation at home and abroad and the nature of the questions the two sides were trying to resolve through the exchange of special envoys, the two Koreas should make a fresh start from the position of "national

independence and grand national unity,” a position that should be duly defined in the duty and mission of the special envoys.

Later in the contact, the North said that the exchange of special envoys would be different from past dialogue and, therefore, no hope could be held out for any future dialogue if the exchange were suspended or broken up. It then insisted that the four prerequisites were directly linked to the destiny of the envoy exchange.

In reaction, the South said the North Korean prerequisites, having nothing to do with the contacts, were not necessary as they were unreasonable and improper. It challenged the North Koreans to retract the conditions forthwith if they were really interested in the exchange of special envoys.

North Korea retorted that the South’s response was “irresponsible,” arguing that the four-point demand was “indispensable” to removing obstacles to the exchange of special envoys and also constituted a “basic yardstick” determining whether issues could be resolved through negotiations or by recourse to alien forces.

Rejecting the North Korean assertion, the South said the Team Spirit training exercises were neither nuclear war games nor an obstacle to South-North dialogue. The training was suspended simply in view of a recent change in the North Korean attitude, it said.

Regarding the “international cooperative system,” the South said the system had come into being spontaneously as a manifestation of international concern about the North Korean nuclear question. It said that once the nuclear transparency of North Korea was ensured, the issue would be resolved as a matter of course.

The South said that the deployment of Patriot missiles was for defensive purposes and had been planned long ago, pointing

out that the disputing of the matter by North Korea, which itself had test-fired "Rodong No. 1" missiles, amounted to a robber accusing his victim.

About the North Korean demand for a retraction of the remarks by the South's top leader, the South said they were proper in that North Korea had withdrawn from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and turned down IAEA inspections, raising grave nuclear suspicions. The South then demanded that the North apologize for unreasonably disputing the remarks by the top leader of the South at a meeting designed to discuss the exchange of special envoys. It also called for the withdrawal of the four prerequisites.

Asked by the South if the four-point demand constituted prerequisites, North Korea avoided a clear reply, merely saying that they were indispensable steps designed to facilitate the exchange of special envoys in an amicable atmosphere without any interruption.

The fourth contact, too, adjourned without a discussion of procedural matters, with the North Koreans employing delaying tactics by refusing to discuss procedural matters in their demand for the South's answer to their four prerequisites.

3. Fifth Contact

The fifth working-level delegates contact took place at Tongilkak from 10 to 11:58 a.m. March 9, 1994. It was held behind closed doors.

The South's chief delegate, in his first speech, stressed that

the two sides had agreed to exchange special envoys with a view to resolving the nuclear and other major issues according to the will of their top leaders. The two Koreas also shared the view that this was an exigent task whose implementation could not be delayed any longer, he said.

The South expressed regret over the unreasonable posture of North Korea which, it charged, had been delaying the discussion of procedural matters in its demands for four prerequisites—two conventional calls for the “suspension of nuclear war games” and the “renouncement of an international cooperative system” and two fresh conditions, “stoppage of the introduction of up-to-date weapons like Patriot missiles” and “retraction of nuclear-related remarks made by the top leader of the South.”

The South said that the revised version of an agreement it produced during the fourth contact was a compromise plan that incorporated a large part of the North’s version in both form and content. It pointed out that if only the two sides had agreed on a couple of items based on the revised draft, an agreement on the exchange of special envoys could have been adopted.

The South Korean delegation then made clear its position on the four-point demand raised by North Korea as follows:

First, regarding the call for the stoppage of “nuclear war games,” the South said it had stated many times in the past that it had never staged and would not stage any nuclear war games. It pointed out that nevertheless, the North’s continued discussion of the issue, with the threat that the exchange of special envoys could be interrupted if such war games were held during the exchange, was apparently intended to secure a “ground” to torpedo the exchange if it was carried out in an unsatisfactory manner.

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Second, on their demand for the renouncement of an international cooperative system, the South said that the nuclear issue carried a dual nature of being an international question and, at the same time, an intra-national issue. South Korea made it clear that it would continue to exert all available efforts to resolve the nuclear issue peacefully both within the nation and internationally.

The South went on to say that if the North Koreans were so concerned about the international cooperative system they should try to resolve it by proving their innocence through nuclear inspections and thereby displaying their nuclear transparency and also by respecting the international order.

Third, on their demand for a halt to the introduction of the latest weapons including Patriot missiles, the South pointed out that a sense of military crisis had been building up not only on the Korean peninsula but in Northeast Asia because of deepening suspicion of North Korea and its successful development of "Rodong No. 1" long-range missiles.

The South said that it was under these circumstances that talks began on introducing Patriot missiles into Korea. Their deployment was still being reviewed and even if they were deployed in Korea, there would be nothing to worry about because they are purely defensive weapons, it said.

Fourth, concerning the issue of remarks made by the top leader of the South, the South said it should be noted that the remarks at issue were made against the backdrop of the North announcing its withdrawal from the NPT and rejecting IAEA inspections, giving rise to serious concern in the world community. The South challenged North Korea to retract such an unreasonable demand and apologize for disputing the top leader's remarks.

Noting that the basic aim of the working-level delegates contacts was to prepare procedures for the exchange of special envoys, the South said that the revised version of an agreement it produced during the fourth contact was a reasonable draft which not only fully reflected the ideas the North had set forth with regard to procedures for the exchange of special envoys but also contained all the procedural items necessary for the exchange.

In the form of an agreement, the South revised its original version comprising a preamble and 24 paragraphs in nine articles into one consisting of a preamble and 28 paragraphs in 13 articles so that it could be in complete accord with the number of articles and paragraphs in the North Korean version.

In content, also, in those areas on which the two sides shared similar views such as the preamble and the rank of special envoys, the South accommodated many of the North's ideas. Even on the issue of the duty of special envoys, the South, taking into account the North's view that their itemized agenda should be specified in an agreement, newly set forth five duties of the envoys.

The South urged the North to retract the four-point demand and agree to discuss procedural issues so that the proposed exchange of special envoys could be realized at an early date.

Meanwhile, the North's chief delegate, in his first speech, reiterated the four-point demand raised at the fourth contact. Denouncing the South's international cooperative system, the North Koreans said the South's assertions about the "fulfillment of international obligations" or "correct duty obligation toward the international community" were a near-sighted and flunkeyistic way of thinking, which amounted to referring intra-national issues to foreign forces. The North then proposed a revised version of an

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agreement, featuring changes in some items such as the duty of special envoys and the times of the envoy exchange.

As to the duty of special envoys, the new version set forth seven points instead of five points as in their earlier version. The two new duties concerned establishing a method of achieving independent and peaceful unification of the fatherland and fully respecting the principle of national independence. The five points they produced during the third contact covered carrying out the Denuclearization Declaration, exploring joint measures to ease tension and implementing the Basic South-North Agreement, promoting grand national unity, other pending issues, and a meeting of the top leaders of the two sides:

Regarding the times of the exchange, the North's revised version called for the southern special envoy's visit to Pyongyang first, stipulating, "The South's special envoy shall visit Pyongyang within 15 days from the time of an agreement between the two sides, and the northern special envoy's visit to Seoul shall be made within 15 days of the southern special envoy's visit to Pyongyang." The North asserted that the southern envoy's visit to Pyongyang first was proper in view of the reality of South and North Korean politics and other reasons.

On "the duty of special envoys" contained in the South's compromise plan produced during the fourth contact, the North said the issue of implementing the Denuclearization Declaration should be formalized if either side had no ulterior motive inasmuch as the issue had already been agreed.

The North wanted to include the issues of easing tension and promoting grand national unity in the list of the duty of special envoys. Besides, the North suggested that the "issue of peaceful

unification of the fatherland” be replaced with the “issue of establishing the method of achieving independent and peaceful unification of the fatherland.”

The North Koreans went on to argue that promoting grand national unity was “a basic premise for the unification of the fatherland” and an important issue linked to future national unification. This was indicative of the fact that their call for national unity was part of their pet “united front strategy” based on the so-called 10-Point Platform for Grand National Unity the North had adopted.

Following are the major points of the revised versions produced by both sides.

Comparison of Major Differences between the Two Versions

1. Rank of Special Envoys

Authoritative and responsible high-level officials appointed by the top authorities of the South and the North.

2. Duty of Special Envoys

Delivery of the top leaders' personal messages and verbal explanation about the top leaders' will.

The South:

- (1) The issue of providing a breakthrough in the implementation of the Joint Denuclearization Declaration.*
- (2) The issue of implementing the Basic South-North Agreement and normalizing implementation organizations.*
- (3) The issue of peaceful unification of the fatherland.*

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- (4) *Other issues raised by either of the two sides.*
- (5) *The issue of a meeting between the top leaders of the South and the North.*

The North:

- (1) *The issue of implementing the Joint Denuclearization Declaration.*
- (2) *The issue of expeditiously taking joint steps to ease tension and to implement the Basic North-South Agreement.*
- (3) *The issue of promoting grand national unity.*
- (4) *The issue of establishing a method of realizing independent and peaceful unification of the fatherland.*
- (5) *The issue of strictly abiding by the principle of national independence.*
- (6) *Other pending issues of mutual concern.*
- (7) *The issue of a meeting between the top leaders of the North and the South.*

3. *Method of the Exchange of Special Envoys*

The South:

The North's special envoy shall visit Seoul first within 10 days after the adoption of an agreement, followed by a visit to Pyongyang by the special envoy of the South.

The North:

The South's special envoy shall visit Pyongyang first within 15 days after the adoption of an agreement, followed by a visit to Seoul by the special envoy of the North.

4. *Period of Visit*

The South:

Four nights and five days.

The North:

Three nights and four days.

In the course of the discussion, the South suggested that the two sides first determine the areas of similarity between the two versions of a draft agreement and then discuss those matters in which the two sides differed. The North, however, insisted that the South express its position on the four-point demand.

When the South rejected this call, reminding that it had already made its posture clear during the fourth contact, the North denounced it as a "posture of confrontation" and an "act of repeating the suspension or breakup of the dialogue."

Toward this intransigent attitude the South said that it had never staged any nuclear war games and that routine military training exercises were proper, noting that even the Basic South-North Agreement does not provide for the stoppage of any military exercises. Refuting their demand to end the introduction of Patriot missiles and other sophisticated weapons, the South pointed to the unreasonableness of their demand, asking at whom were the "Rodong No. 1" missiles aimed.

On their demand for the retraction of some nuclear-related remarks made by the top leader of the South, the southern delegation, noting that the North did not take issue with the comments in the first three contacts, pointed out that their belated refutation of the remarks had stemmed from an ulterior motive. Saying that the North Koreans need not be concerned about the remarks if they had no nuclear weapons, the South said the North's making an issue of the comments only served to fuel suspicions about their possession or development of nuclear weapons.

The South said that if the North Korean logic held, then remarks made by Kim Il-Sung in his New Year's message that "the civilian government is in form only and is no different from

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a military fascist regime” and “we have nothing to expect (from the regime) and don’t need to watch it,” should also be retracted.

Moreover, the South stressed that it was an intolerable act for the North’s Central Radio to vilify the top leader of the South in worse words than ever before on March 5, immediately after the fourth contact.

In reaction, the North Koreans said they would deal with the South’s assertions “sternly,” threatening that if the South made similar statements again, they would regard it as a boycott of the working-level delegates contacts.

Following the adjournment of the contact, an exclusive chief delegates contact took place for 23 minutes beginning at 12:10 p.m. at the suggestion of the North.

At the exclusive contact, the North Koreans kept demanding that the South address their four-point demand while the South called for the discussion of a draft agreement on the exchange of special envoys and the early resolution of the proposed exchange.

It seemed that North Korea, aware of unfavorable international public opinion, had produced a revised version of a draft agreement and proposed an exclusive chief delegates contact with a view to concealing its reluctance to exchange special envoys and securing a ground to shift the blame for any failure to exchange envoys to the South.

Besides, the North Koreans’ addition of two agenda items to the list of earlier topics, “the issue of establishing the method of achieving independent and peaceful unification” and “the issue of strictly respecting the principle of national independence,” nakedly revealed their basic stand that they were not interested in

resolving the nuclear question through the exchange of special envoys and would discuss it only with the United States.

In this way, North Korea persisted in asking for the South's explanation about the four-point demand while shunning the discussion of procedural matters related to the exchange of special envoys.

As the North, though it produced a revised version of a draft agreement, insisted that it would discuss procedural matters only after the four-point demand was resolved, the two sides failed to discuss procedural matters, bringing the fifth contact to a fruitless end.

4. Sixth Contact

The sixth working-level delegates contact took place behind closed doors at Peace House from 10 a.m. to 12:33 p.m. March 12, 1994.

In his first speech, the South's chief delegate, pointing out that the cause of the dispute over the four-point demand lay in nuclear suspicion, strongly urged the North to withdraw the unreasonable demand. He discussed the South's position on such procedural issues as the duty of special envoys, the sequence and time of the exchange of envoys and the period of their visits.

Stressing that the basic cause of the matters the North discussed in its four-point demand was the growing suspicion about its nuclear development, the South discussed its position as follows.

On their demand for the stoppage of the "nuclear war games," the South has said time and again that no such games existed

and there will be none in the future, either.

In particular, the South professed on many occasions that if the North showed sincerity toward resolving the nuclear question, the South is willing to suspend the Team Spirit exercises.

In fact, Team Spirit was suspended in 1992 when the North signed the Nuclear Safeguards Agreement and agreed to undergo international inspection of its nuclear facilities. Early in the year, also, the suspension of Team Spirit was announced following the North's statement that it would accept international nuclear inspections and faithfully return to the South-North dialogue.

Therefore, if and when the North guarantees nuclear transparency by being sincere toward removing suspicion about its nuclear development, the issue of suspending Team Spirit would be dissolved by itself.

Regarding the issue of an international cooperative system, it was a mere international counteraction of the North's own making as the system had come into being to cope with the growing suspicion of nuclear weapons development and breach of basic international norms by the North. It was quite natural for the South to take part in an international cooperative system designed to resolve a nuclear problem that threatens the nation's survival.

On the Patriot missile issue, North Korea should think twice before demanding the stoppage of the missile's introduction. It was natural for the South to study the possible introduction of Patriot missiles as North Korea has developed the "Rodong No. 1" missiles able to carry nuclear warheads, much less showing sincerity toward resolving the nuclear question.

About the disputed remarks by the top leader of the South, the remarks revealed both concern about and determination to resolve

the problem of nuclear weapons development by North Korea.

Meanwhile, the South expressed hope that the discussion of procedural matters would be wound up early so that the proposed exchange of special envoys could be materialized at an early date.

It noted that in discussions at the five working-level contacts, the two sides concurred on an agreement consisting of a preamble and 28 paragraphs in 13 articles while in content the two sides' versions of a draft agreement were similar with the exception of several areas such as the duty of special envoys, the sequence and time of the exchange of special envoys, and the period of visits.

The South suggested that at the contact, therefore, the two sides focus on those matters in which they showed substantial differences. The South then presented its position as follows.

First, with regard to the duty of special envoys, our side already produced a new five-point compromise plan which accommodated a large part of North Korean ideas at the time of the fourth contact. Nonetheless, the North introduced two new agenda topics, "the issue of establishing the method of achieving independent and peaceful unification of the fatherland" and "the issue of strictly respecting the principle of national independence," in addition to the existing five topics. The presentation of additional topics only serves to make the discussion of procedural matters more complicated and render negotiations more difficult, thus showing that yours is not a productive dialogue posture.

Regarding the duty of special envoys with respect to Paragraph (1) of our side's version (the issue of providing a breakthrough in the implementation of the Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Penin-

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sula), and Paragraph (1) of your side's version (the issue of implementing the Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula), it is proper that efforts be made in the exchange of special envoys to provide a "breakthrough" in implementing the Denuclearization Declaration with matters related to its concrete implementation being left to the Joint Nuclear Control Commission inasmuch as the Joint Denuclearization Declaration and the Agreement on the Formation and Operation of a Joint Nuclear Control Commission specifically stipulate that the implementation of the Joint Denuclearization Declaration is the business of the Joint Nuclear Control Commission.

On Paragraph (2) of our version (the issue of normalizing organizations for the implementation and practice of the Basic South-North Agreement) and Paragraph (2) of your version (the issue of expeditiously taking joint steps to ease tension and implement the Basic South-North Agreement), these issues would be settled by themselves if only the two sides carry out the pledge made at the eighth South-North high-level meeting, to the effect that they would put into full operation the various joint commissions to translate into action the Basic Agreement and area-by-area subsidiary agreements.

Our side offered "the issue of normalizing organizations for the implementation and practice of the Basic South-North Agreement," with a view to literally carrying out and respecting the Basic South-North Agreement duly agreed between the two sides. There is no need to include the clause on "easing tension" suggested by your side since its spirit is fully reflected in the Basic South-North Agreement and the subsidiary agreement in the area of non-aggression. It is proper, therefore, to delete the clause of "joint steps" also because if implementation organizations were normalized, such steps would be taken as a matter of course.

Paragraphs (3), (4) and (5) of the North's version (the issue of

promoting grand national unity, the issue of establishing the method of achieving independent and peaceful unification of the fatherland, and the issue of strictly respecting the principle of national independence) would be resolved by themselves once the Basic South-North Agreement was faithfully implemented and practiced since the preamble of the Basic Agreement stipulates that the two sides reaffirm the three principles for unification as embodied in the July 4, 1972, Joint South-North Communiqué.

Paragraph (3) of our version (the issue of peaceful unification of the fatherland) is designed for the two sides to open-heartedly discuss the issue of the nation's peaceful unification, a national aspiration, through the exchange of special envoys under a "comprehensive conception."

Second, regarding the issue of the sequence of visits by special envoys and the time of the exchange, it is reasonable and also our side's position that since the North first proposed the exchange of special envoys, the North's envoy should visit Seoul first. As to the time of the exchange, it is desirable that the exchange begin within 10 days of the adoption of an agreement as our side's version calls for.

Third, with respect to the period of visits, our side offers four nights and five days whereas the North wants to make it three nights and four days. Since an adequate period of time would be needed for the special envoys to fulfill their duty faithfully and smoothly, it would be desirable to make the period four nights and five days.

Meanwhile, the North Koreans had in effect withdrawn the four-point demand, saying that they had taken a series of decisions and remarks made by Seoul as a sign of understanding of the justness of the four-point demand. The decisions and remarks they mentioned included the decision to suspend the '94 Team Spirit exercises, the remarks that more efforts would be made on

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the issue of the international cooperative system from national aspects, the decision to withhold the introduction of Patriot missiles, and the remarks made by the top leader to the effect that Spirit exercises, the remarks that more efforts would be made on the issue of the international cooperative system from national aspects, the decision to withhold the introduction of Patriot missiles, and the remarks made by the top leader to the effect that "information available indicates that North Korea does not have nuclear weapons."

At the same time, the North unexpectedly demanded that the two sides declare in a joint statement at home and abroad that they reaffirm the determination to exchange special envoys as an "epochal measure" and that "the two sides had completely agreed to exchange special envoys at an early date."

The South said a joint statement was not necessary inasmuch as the determination and need to exchange special envoys had been affirmed repeatedly through the exchange of telephone messages and numerous contacts. All these could be settled once an agreement was worked out forthwith, the South said.

The North asserted that a joint statement was designed to "give hope to the peoples at home and abroad who were concerned about the future of the exchange of envoys," adding that a joint statement was intended to "dispel doubt about the implementation of the exchange between the two sides."

On the issue of procedural matters, the two sides reached a virtual accord on 25 of the 28 items through the discussion of their respective versions, the three unsettled items being the "duty of special envoys," "sequence and time of the exchange of special envoys" and "period of visits." The two sides sought to iron out

their differences on the three remaining items, but in vain.

At the following exclusive chief delegates contact, the South tried to work out a compromise plan on the unsettled items. But, no progress was recorded.

The North's de facto withdrawal of the four-point demand and proposal for a "joint statement on the two sides' agreement in principle on the exchange of special envoys," was intended to allow it to make a "tactical backdown" so that it, while appearing to be sincere toward the working-level contacts, could secure grounds to hold the thrid-round U.S.-North Korea talks on March 21 as scheduled. The "tactical backdown" seemed necessary as the North Koreans sensed the South's firm posture against their four-point demand as well as public opinion working against them at home and abroad.

The sixth contact, too, ended without particular achievements as the North, while refusing to discuss procedural matters, persisted in a perfunctory manner simply to escape blame for the failure of the talks.

5. Seventh Contact

The Seventh working-level delegates contact took place from 10 to 12 a.m. March 16, 1994 at Tongilkak. It was held behind closed doors.

In his first speech, the South's chief delegate, while affirmatively evaluating the North's withdrawal of the four-point demand at the sixth contact, produced a compromise plan on the three unsettled items: "duty of special envoys," "sequence and time of

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the exchange of special envoys” and “period of visits.”

With respect to Item (1) (the issue of providing a breakthrough in the implementation of the Joint Denuclearization Declaration) of the South’s version and Item (1) (the issue of implementing the Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula) of the North’s version, which deal with the duty of special envoys, the South said its idea was to discuss and settle through the exchange of special envoys the principle, objects and method of South-North mutual nuclear inspections, and to leave its concrete implementation to the South-North Joint Nuclear Control Commission.

The South said that if the North agreed to this it would accept the North Korean idea, the issue of implementing the Joint Denuclearization Declaration on the Korean Peninsula, as envisaged in Paragraph (1) of the North’s version.

On Item (2) (the issue of normalizing the implementation and practice organizations of the Basic South-North Agreement) of the South’s version and Item (2) (the issue of taking joint measures to ease tension and implement the Basic South-North Agreement) of the North’s, the South said the issue of easing tension could be settled by itself once the Basic South-North Agreement was implemented faithfully.

The issue of taking joint measures, too, could be prepared as a matter of course once the implementation organizations of the Basic Agreement operated normally, said the South, proposing the adoption of the issue of implementing the Basic South-North Agreement incorporating both sides’ ideas as a compromise plan.

Regarding Item (3) (the issue of peaceful unification of the fatherland) of the South’s version and Items (3) (4) and (5)

(the issue of promoting grand national unity, the issue of establishing the method of achieving independent and peaceful unification, and the issue of strictly respecting the principle of national independence) of the North's, the South offered a compromise item, "the issue of realizing the unification of fatherland based on the three principles of independence, peace and grand national unity," incorporating both sides' ideas, on condition that the North integrate their Items (3) (4) and (5) into a single item.

The reason for the South's proposal was that the compromise item reflected not only the three principles for national unification embodied in the July 4, 1972, South-North Joint Communiqué but also in the preamble of the Basic South-North Agreement. The South said that if the issues were itemized separately, it would complicate the duty of special envoys and make a mutual agreement all the more difficult to work out.

On the "sequence of visits by special envoys and the time of visits," the South said that though the North wanted the southern envoy to visit Pyongyang first because of "political reality," it is reasonable that the North Korean envoy visit the South first in view of the fact that it was the North that proposed the exchange. It then emphasized that based on reciprocity, the times of the first visits by both sides' special envoys should be specified without fail.

The South said that if the time of the first visits could be agreed on, a "preparatory period" need not be specified. It also said it was willing to show flexibility in determining the period of envoys' visits.

The South said four days would not be sufficient for the envoys to fulfill their basic duty comprising calls on the top leaders

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and contacts with their counterparts. It said that since the two sides had agreed on adjusting the period of visits if necessary through mutual negotiations, the issue could be settled easily once they discussed the matter with flexibility.

Meanwhile, the North Koreans, contending that they had taken the epochal step of withdrawing the four-point demand at the sixth contact from the posture of realizing the exchange of special envoys in a good atmosphere, insisted on adopting a "joint statement" containing "the two sides' reaffirmation of the will to exchange special envoys and agree on the realization of the exchange at an early date."

Regarding working-level procedural matters, the North reiterated that its ideas on the duty of special envoys, the sequence of the exchange of visits, and the time and period of envoys' visits were reasonable. As for the sequence of visits, the North emphasized that a southern envoy should visit Pyongyang first because it had proposed the exchange of special envoys in response to remarks on a summit meeting made by the South's top leader in his inaugural speech.

Prior to the discussion of procedural issues, the North maintained that the two sides should begin discussing procedural matters only after they agreed on a "joint statement." It argued that whether the South agreed on a "joint statement" would serve as a yardstick determining the South's interest in the exchange of special envoys.

In reaction, the South said that concern had been raised about the exchange of special envoys because the North had delayed the discussion of procedural issues by putting forth the four-point demand and splitting the duty of special envoys into seven

items. The South said that the North's adherence to a "joint statement" amounted to erecting yet another obstacle to the discussion of procedural issues as was the case with the four-point demand.

Saying that a "joint statement" lacking any substantial agreement deserved no consideration, the South stated that if the North nevertheless insisted on the undue demand, much suspicion would be incurred from within and without.

Regarding procedural issues, the South advanced three principles as criteria for establishing the duty of special envoys, the three being 1) respect for agreed matters between the South and the North, 2) comprehensive and impartial expressions, and 3) concrete agenda topics being determined by the top leaders.

The South stressed that "national independence" could be materialized on the basis of integrated mutual perceptions, maintenance of the principle of resolution between the parties involved in the effort to resolve the nuclear and other issues, and on "open democracy" attained through the cultivation of national capability.

"Grand national unity," it said, should be preceded by the dissolution of mutual distrust through opening, exchanges and cooperation; rooting of peace through resolution of the nuclear question; and a guarantee of freedom and human rights for all Koreans. The South said there was no reason why North Korea should not accept the South's version.

On the "duty of special envoys," however, the North said the "issue of independence" arose as an exigent question because it formed the basis for resolving national issues, asserting that, "independence" was intended to eliminate interference by alien forces. The North asserted that basic questions arising from the improvement of inter-Korean relations and national unification

should be established through the exchange of envoys.

The North Koreans further insisted that since “the issue of grand national unity” was designed to foster “conditions and an atmosphere” for the removal of misunderstanding and distrust, their three items—“the issue of promoting grand national unity,” “the issue of establishing the method of unification” and “the issue of respecting the principle of national independence”—should be specified as the duty of special envoys.

The South tried to resolve procedural issues with emphasis on its compromise plan on the “duty of special envoys.” But the contact adjourned without any progress in the discussion of procedural matters mainly because the North kept demanding a seven-point duty of envoys and the release of a joint statement.

Following is a comparison between the two sides’ contentions made at the seventh contact:

Duty of special envoys

The South:

- (1) *The issue of implementing the Joint Declaration of Denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.*
- (2) *The issue of implementing the Basic South-North Agreement.*
- (3) *The issue of realizing unification of the fatherland based on the three principles of independence, peace and grand national unity.*
- (4) *Other issues raised by either of the two sides.*
- (5) *The issue of a meeting between the top authorities of the South and the North.*

The North:

- (1) *The issue of implementing the Joint Declaration of Denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.*

- (2) *The issue of expeditiously taking joint steps to ease tension and implement the Basic South-North Agreement.*
- (3) *The issue of promoting grand national unity.*
- (4) *The issue of establishing the method of achieving independent and peaceful unification of the fatherland.*
- (5) *The issue of strictly respecting the principle of national independence.*
- (6) *Other pending issues of mutual concern.*
- (7) *The issue of a meeting between the top leaders of the North and the South.*

Method of the exchange of special envoys

The South:

The North's special envoy shall visit Seoul first within 10 days of the adoption of an agreement, followed by a visit to Pyongyang by a southern special envoy.

The North:

The South's special envoy shall visit Pyongyang first within 15 days of the adoption of an agreement, followed by a visit to Seoul by a northern special envoy.

Period of visits

The South:

Four nights and five days.

The North:

Three nights and four days.

Issue of four-point demand

The South:

Calls for the withdrawal of the four-point demand, pointing to its unreasonableness.

The North:

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Puts forth the four-point demand.

- (1) Suspension of nuclear war games.*
- (2) Renouncement of an international cooperative system.*
- (3) Stoppage of the introduction of Patriot missiles and sophisticated weapons.*
- (4) Retraction of the remarks made by the top leader to the effect that "no handshakes can be made with those possessing nuclear weapons."*

** The four-point demand was in effect withdrawn at the time of the sixth contact.*

Issue of a joint statement

The South:

*Opposed to the release of a joint statement since it was needless.
— Calls for an agreement on procedural matters.*

The North:

Insists on the release of a joint statement covering the reaffirmation of the will to exchange special envoys and the determination to adopt an agreement on the exchange in the foreseeable future.

** Of the 28 items of a draft agreement, 25 items were agreed on, which included the rank of special envoys, the number of attendants and press members, period of visits and procedures for travel back and forth.*

Even at the seventh contact, the North Koreans, in their insistence on the release of a "joint statement," tried to shift the blame for the delay in the exchange of special envoys to the South in their basic strategy not to realize the exchange before the third-round U.S.-North Korea talks take place and not to let the issue

of an envoy exchange stand in the way of realization of the third-round U.S.-North Korea meeting.

Meanwhile, the North showed an affirmative response toward the South's compromise item, "the issue of implementing the Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula," incorporating Items (1) of both sides' versions. On the issues of independence and grand national unity, however, the North insisted that they should be specified as separate items, thus placing yet another obstacle to the discussion of procedural issues in addition to the issue of a "joint statement."

6. Eighth Contact

The eighth working-level delegates contact took place behind closed doors from 10 to 11:15 a.m. March 19, 1994, at Peace House in Panmunjom.

The South's chief delegate, in his first speech, expressed deep concern about the mounting seriousness of the North Korean nuclear question after the North denied IAEA inspectors access to its Radiochemical Laboratory suspected of being a nuclear reprocessing plant. The denial came despite Pyongyang's earlier agreement with the IAEA on inspections.

Noting that the working-level delegates contacts had in the past failed to register any progress due largely to the "four obstacles" North Korea had deliberately produced, the South strongly urged the North to remove the obstacles without any conditions and agree to return to the inherent duty of the contacts, that is, to discuss the procedural matters related to the exchange of special

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envoys.

The South said the obstacles included such unreasonable items as the "four-point demand," the prior release of a "joint statement" and the itemizing of the duty of special envoys to make the discussion of procedural matters more difficult.

The "four obstacles" erected by the North were as follows:

First obstacle (raised during the first and second contacts)

Demand for the "suspension of all nuclear war games" and renouncement of the "international cooperative system" as de facto prerequisites to the discussion of procedural matters.

Second obstacle (raised during the fourth contact)

"Four-point demand" as prerequisites to the discussion of procedural matters. The four included two new items in addition to the two previously raised. The two new demands were the "suspension of the introduction of Patriot missiles" and the "retraction of the remarks by the top leader of the South to the effect that no hand-shaking can be made with those possessing nuclear weapons."

Third obstacle (raised during the fifth contact)

When the South accepted most of the "five-point duty of special envoys" suggested by the North, North Korea produced two fresh items as additional duties to complicate the discussion of procedural matters. The two new items were "the issue of establishing the method of achieving independent and peaceful unification of the fatherland" and "the issue of strictly respecting the principle of national independence."

Fourth obstacle (raised during the sixth through eighth contacts)

Demand for the prior release of a "joint statement" that the two sides "had in principle agreed on the determination to realize the exchange of special envoys."

At the same time, the South asked the North Koreans to clarify if they were interested in resolving the nuclear question on a priority basis through the exchange of special envoys. The South noted that the fundamental purpose of the exchange of special envoys was, according to the will of the top leaders of the two sides, to discuss and settle the nuclear question standing in the way of substantial improvement in inter-Korean relations and to pave the way for faithful implementation and practice of inter-Korean agreements, thereby promoting reconciliation, cooperation, coexistence and co-prosperity between the South and the North.

Regarding the issue of procedural matters, the South again emphasized the reasonableness of the compromise plan it had presented at the seventh contact on their differences such as the “duty of special envoys,” “sequence and times of the exchange of special envoys” and the “period of visits by special envoys.” It urged that procedural issues be settled at the contact.

However, North Korea reiterated its four-point demand, asserting that the South was using the projected exchange of special envoys to obstruct the third-round U.S.-North Korea talks by dragging on the working-level delegates contacts to torpedo the proposed exchange of special envoys. The North said that the South should recognize this and apologize.

Also disputing the South’s National Security Law, plan to resume the Team Spirit military exercises and the introduction of Patriot missiles, North Korea, charging the South with assuming a “confrontational posture,” demanded that the South expressly disclose whether it would accept the North Korean proposal on the exchange of special envoys or give up the working-level delega-

tes contacts.

In subsequent discussions, the North asserted that initiation of talks on procedural matters didn't matter at a time when the "fate of the exchange of special envoys" was at stake. They then demanded again that the South answer whether it would accept the "four-point demand," stop using the exchange of special envoys as a means of obstructing the third-round U.S.-North Korea talks, and abandon its "confrontational stance."

In reaction, the South, while pointing out that North Korea had kept raising extra-conference issues to deliberately delay or avoid discussing procedural matters since the fourth contact, proposed the following three-point measure as an "emergency proposal," stressing that it was necessary for smooth implementation of the exchange of special envoys and improvement of inter-Korean relations.

The "emergency proposal" was that 1) the North stop slandering and defaming the top leader of the South forthwith, 2) immediately stop agitating the southern people to stage antigovernment struggles, and 3) North Korea explain whether it was interested in discussing and resolving the nuclear question on a priority basis through the exchange of special envoys.

As a reason for the proposal, the South produced a "letter of accusation" released by the North's Committee for Peaceful Unification of the Fatherland on February 25, 1994. The South said that the working-level contacts could not but be a "fictitious dialogue" where the North was represented by the very person who prepared the "letter of accusation," challenging the North to retract the letter and make an apology right away.

** Contents of the "letter of accusation" of February 25:*

Vehemently denounced the civilian-led Seoul government and asserted, "The youths, students and people of all layers and strata should struggle more forcefully to deal a crushing blow to the head of the traitorous clique and to construct an independent democratic government."

While refusing to reply to the South's demand, North Korea denounced the decision to resume the Team Spirit training exercises, introduction of Patriot missiles and the decision to join international sanctions against North Korea as a "dialogue boycott declaration," "declaration for the boycott of the exchange of special envoys," "declaration of all-out confrontation" and "war declaration."

In particular, the North's chief delegate Pak Yong-su did not hesitate to make unprecedentedly "war threatening remarks" asserting, "we will deal with a dialogue with a dialogue and a war with a war" and "Seoul is close... if a war breaks out, Seoul will become a sea of fire."

The working-level delegates contacts were broken off at the eighth contact as the North Korean delegates walked out of the conference room without even setting the time of the next contact.

While making the inflammatory remarks about the "sea of fire," the North again raised the "four-point demand" it had previously withdrawn, asked the South to apologize for the "use of the proposed exchange of special envoys in obstructing the third-round U.S.-North Korea talks," and asked the South if it would give up the "confrontational posture."

The intransigence the North Koreans showed at the eighth contact stemmed from their policy to break up the working-level

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delegates contacts designed to discuss the exchange of special envoys under circumstances in which it had been disclosed during the IAEA inspection of the seven declared facilities in Yongbyon on March 3-14 that North Korea had rejected an important IAEA inspection of the Radiochemical Laboratory and, as a result, it had become doubtful whether the third-round U.S.-North Korea talks could take place.

Upon the breakup of the working-level delegates contacts, the South, in a statement issued on March 19, 1994, by Deputy Prime Minister and National Unification Minister Lee Yung-duk, disclosed a firm posture. The full text of the statement was as follows:

We can hardly contain our disappointment at North Korea's unilateral breakup of the working-level delegates contacts designed to discuss the exchange of special envoys to resolve the nuclear question.

Today's breakup of the dialogue by North Korea amounted to turning a deaf ear to our dialogue efforts and international endeavors to resolve the nuclear question. The rupture cannot be acceptable to any person nor can it be justified by any excuse.

Contrary to our patient efforts, the North Koreans had persisted in delaying and shunning the adopting of an agreement on the exchange of special envoys before they torpedoed the contacts themselves while bragging that they would not hesitate to wage war.

This development has caused much concern to our all people and the peace-loving peoples of the world who wish to see the nuclear question resolved peacefully.

North Korea has not only unfaithfully gone through inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency but also rejected the exchange

of special envoys designed to settle the nuclear question. North Korea itself has thus driven the situation into a serious phase.

There is no change in our policy to resolve the nuclear question peacefully through dialogue.

Our determination to preserve peace is firm and we have the ability to preserve peace.

The government shall explore all available means to resolve the North Korean nuclear question while closely maintaining international cooperation.

We urge North Korea to correctly understand the situation at home and abroad in which they find themselves and return to a rightful posture at an early date, entering into dialogue to resolve the nuclear question.

Part III

Related Developments after Failure to Exchange Special Envoys between the South and the North

1. International Developments Related to
Nuclear Inspection of North Korea
2. Announcement of “April 15th Measures”
by the Government

Part III

Related Developments after Failure to Exchange Special Envoys between the South and the North

1. International Developments Related to Nuclear In- spection of North Korea

On February 15, 1994, North Korea accepted inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) of its seven declared facilities in Yongbyon.

Later through U.S.-North Korea working-level contacts on February 22-25, North Korea announced agreement on four simultaneous measures: suspension of the '94 Team Spirit exercises, IAEA inspection of seven declared facilities, resumption of working-level delegates contacts to prepare for the exchange of special envoys, and the holding of the third-round U.S.-North Korea high-level meeting in Geneva on March 21, 1994.

Under the changing circumstances, South and North Korea

III. Related Developments after Failure to Exchange Special Envoys between the South and the North

resumed the working-level delegates contacts to discuss the exchange of special envoys, and the IAEA inspected the seven declared nuclear facilities of North Korea from March 1 through March 15.

However, North Korea refused to discuss procedural matters for the exchange of special envoys, instead demanding advance resolution of the four-point prerequisite and the priority release of a joint press statement. Besides, North Korea was highly insincere toward the IAEA inspections.

During the inspections, North Korea did not allow a check of the Radiochemical Laboratory at Yongbyon, an important part of inspection activities agreed beforehand between the IAEA and North Korea.

The Radiochemical Laboratory, whose inspection North Korea had denied, is in effect a large-scale nuclear reprocessing facility which was found to be different from its description contained in North Korea's initial report forwarded to the IAEA in 1990.

Therefore, checking the Radiochemical Laboratory was key to the overall inspection of North Korean nuclear facilities. However, the North denied the IAEA access to the laboratory, contending that its inspection should be undertaken after a package deal was agreed at the third round U.S.-North Korea high-level talks.

As North Korea rejected international inspection of the core part of its nuclear reprocessing facilities, the IAEA attempt to find out whether nuclear material had been diverted since the previous IAEA inspection in February 1993 for non-peaceful purposes like nuclear arms development, could not be fulfilled.

Following is the text of an official statement made by IAEA Director-General Hans Blix on March 16, 1994, on the outcome

of the inspection of North Korean nuclear facilities:

*IAEA Inspection in the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK)*

A team of inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) made an inspection visit to the DPRK from 1 to 15 March, based upon an understanding as to the aim and scope of the inspection reached in Vienna on February 15. At that time a list of safeguards measures was specified, corresponding to the Agency's requests regarding the seven declared nuclear facilities in the DPRK, and designed to verify that no diversion of nuclear material had occurred there since the Agency's last inspections.

The inspectors returned to Vienna on March 15 and an informal briefing for the Board of Governors was held on March 16 to inform them of how the inspection had been carried out.

The detailed results must await performance of follow-up analytical and evaluation work in Vienna, but the Board members were advised that, although many of the agreed inspection measures were carried out as envisaged, other important measures which had been agreed were refused at the radiochemical laboratory in Yongbyon.

As a result of this rejection, the IAEA secretariat had to brief the Board that the Agency was not in a position to verify that there had been no diversion of nuclear material at the facility where the relevant measures were rejected.

A meeting of the Board of Governors on this subject will be held on Monday, 21 March.

As North Korea was insincere toward the IAEA inspections

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and broke up even the working-level delegates contacts to prepare for the proposed exchange of special envoys, South Korea and rest of the world community were caught in a dilemma.

Here, the IAEA convened a special Board of Governors meeting on March 21, 1994, to review a Secretariat report that an agreed and indispensable inspection of North Korea's Radiochemical Laboratory was rejected by North Korea and it couldn't be confirmed whether nuclear material had been diverted or reprocessed since February 1993. The special meeting called upon North Korea to allow all inspections needed by the IAEA and fulfill its treaty obligations under the Nuclear Safeguards Agreement.

At the same time, the meeting adopted a resolution (GOV/2710) on North Korea under the sponsorship of 16 countries including the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom and Japan, in which the IAEA affirmed that North Korea was a due party to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and thus obligated to ensure nuclear safeguards, and said it would refer the North Korean nuclear issue to the United Nations Security Council.

Following is the full text of the resolution on North Korea adopted by the special IAEA Board of Governors meeting:

*Implementation of the Agreement between the Agency and
the Democratic People's Republic of Korea for the
Application of Safeguards in Connection with
the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons*

The Board of Governors.

1. International Developments Related to Nuclear
Inspection of North Korea

- (a) *Recalling the Board of Governors' resolutions GOV/2636 of 25 February 1993, GOV/2639 of 19 March 1993, GOV/2692 of 23 September 1993, the General Conference's resolution GC(XXXVII)/RES/624 of 1 October 1993, and in particular, GOV/2645 of 1 April 1993, which found the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) to be in non-compliance with its safeguards agreement (INFCIRC/403) and referred the matter to the Security Council of the United Nations,*
 - (b) *Recalling also resolution 825(1993) adopted by the Security Council of the United Nations on 11 May 1993, which, requested the Director General to report on this matter to the Security Council,*
 - (c) *Noting the Director General's written and oral reports of 21 March 1994 and GOV/2687/Add. 4 in which he stated that the Agency inspection team was not allowed to conduct indispensable and agreed inspection activities at the DPRK radiochemical laboratory, and that the Agency is unable to draw conclusions as to whether there has been either diversion of nuclear material or reprocessing at the radiochemical laboratory since February 1993,*
 - (d) *Noting further the Director General's reaffirmation that the Secretariat remains available to perform inspection activities in the DPRK in accordance with its procedures and agreements, and*
 - (e) *Taking account of the fact that the DPRK is a party to the NPT and is bound by its safeguards commitments;*
-
- 1. *Expresses grave concern that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has failed to implement essential elements of resolutions of the Board and the General Conference concerning its non-compliance with its safeguards agreement (INFCIRC/403);*
 - 2. *Finds that the DPRK is in further non-compliance with its safeguards agreement, has aggravated this situation by not allowing IAEA inspectors*

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- to conduct indispensable inspection activities and that the Agency consequently remains unable to verify that there has been no diversion of nuclear material required to be safeguarded under the terms of the safeguards agreement to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;*
- 3. Strongly endorses and commends the patient and impartial efforts of the Director General and the Secretariat to implement the safeguards agreement;*
 - 4. Regrets the stalemate in the Agency's efforts to resolve the DPRK safeguards issue, as requested by the Security Council of the United Nations, due to the lack of cooperation of the DPRK;*
 - 5. Calls upon the DPRK immediately to allow the IAEA to complete all requested inspection activities and to comply fully with its safeguards agreement;*
 - 6. Requests the Director General to transmit this resolution and his report to all members of the Agency and to the Security Council and the General Assembly of the United Nations in accordance with Article XII. C. of the Statute; and*
 - 7. Remains seized of the matter and requests the Director General to report back to the Board any significant development at its next meeting when it will consider, if necessary, further measures in accordance with Article XII. C. of the Statute.*

However, North Korea, in a statement issued by the spokesman for the North's Atomic Energy General Bureau on March 18, 1993, repeated that it had cooperated fully with the IAEA inspections and allowed all inspection activities needed to ensure the continuity of safeguards measures.

In addition, despite the fact that the authority that determines the diversion of nuclear materials and the continuity

of safeguards measures is not North Korea, the entity inspected, but the IAEA. North Korea insisted that "the inspection activities conducted by the IAEA can fully verify that no nuclear materials were diverted from our nuclear facilities and also can clearly guarantee the continuity of safeguards measures." Pyongyang argued that the IAEA should withdraw its negative evaluation of the inspection it made of North Korean facilities.

Moreover, after the North Korean nuclear question was referred to the U.N. Security Council based on a resolution adopted by the special IAEA Board of Governors meeting, North Korea, in a Foreign Ministry statement on March 21, 1994, asserted that the IAEA had deliberately distorted the outcome of its inspection

The North Koreans also maintained that the United States refused to carry out the "four simultaneous measures" agreed at the U.S.-North Korea contact of February 25 in New York by attaching "undue prerequisites," which called for satisfactory IAEA inspections and the exchange of special envoys between South and North Korea.

North Korea threatened to translate into action its plan to withdraw from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Complaining that the United States and the IAEA had deliberately distorted the outcome of the inspections designed to guarantee the continuity of safeguards measures for use as an excuse to apply pressure upon Pyongyang, the North said it would no longer feel obligated to guarantee the continuity of the IAEA's safeguards.

Following is a summary of the statement issued by the spokesman for the North Korean Foreign Ministry on March 21, 1994:

III. Related Developments after Failure to Exchange Special Envoys between the South and the North

As is known, North Korea and the United States agreed at their New York contact on February 25 on four simultaneous actions: suspension of the '94 Team Spirit military exercises, resumption of working-level delegates contacts for the exchange of special envoys, implementation of inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency to ensure the continuity of safeguards, and the holding of the third-round U.S.-North Korea meeting in Geneva on March 21.

We accepted the inspection team of the International Atomic Energy Agency in time and faithfully ensured inspection activities to a sufficient extent to guarantee the continuity of safeguards at the seven declared facilities.

Besides, we have held North-South working-level delegates contacts many times and exerted all available efforts to realize the exchange of special envoys at an early date. We have proposed concrete methods and proper measures to this end.

However, the United States has moved to suspend the New York agreement on the implementation of simultaneous steps with the excuse that the IAEA inspections were not satisfactory and the inter-Korean exchange of special envoys failed to take place.

The United States says that if we do not allow IAEA re-inspections and realize the North-South exchange of special envoys, it would go ahead with the '94 Team Spirit military exercise, would not hold the third-round North Korea-U.S. talks, and would refer our question over to the U.N. Security Council.

As the United States, in this way, drives the situation to the extreme by turning upside down the New York agreement and by breaking up the North Korea-U.S. meeting, it has become impossible for us to one-sidedly comply with our obligations related to the simultaneous measures any further.

Here, we have decided not to send our delegation to the third-round North Korea-U.S. meeting.

In coping with the act of the United States and the International Atomic Energy Agency, deliberately distorting the outcome of the recent inspections designed to ensure the continuity of safeguards and using it as an excuse to apply pressure against the Republic, we shall no longer regard the guarantee of the continuity of safeguards as our obligation.

In our Republic's statement of March 12 last year, we pointed out that the basic reason for our withdrawal from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty lay in the United States' policy of nuclear threats and strangulation of us as well as in unfairness on the part of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Again in the New York North Korea-U.S. joint statement of May 11, 1993, we made it clear that we would one-sidedly and temporarily suspend the effectuation of our withdrawal from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty on condition of the continuity of North Korea-U.S. talks to resolve the nuclear question.

If the United States shuns to the end North Korea-U.S. talks and resumes the '94 Team Spirit military training exercise to step up nuclear threats against us, or if the International Atomic Energy Agency distorts the outcome of its inspection of us and expands its impartiality, resorting to coercion and pressure, we will have no choice but to translate into action the measures made public in the Republic's government statement of last March 12 in order to safeguard the sovereignty of the nation and the security of the state.

These contentions, as could be seen in the March 15 remarks of Choe Han-chun, a councilor at the North Korean Embassy in Beijing, and the March 25 statement of the spokesman for North

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Korea's Atomic Energy General Bureau, constitute a clear distortion of their failure to fulfill inspections.

** Councilor Choe Han-chun's remarks:*

"During the IAEA inspection team's visit to North Korea, they asked for the sampling of fuel at a facility. But, our side rejected it as improper demand."

** Contents of a statement by the spokesman for the Atomic Energy General Bureau:*

"It doesn't make sense for the IAEA Secretariat to argue that simply because they couldn't collect a couple of samples from the glove box as they planned, they couldn't verify the non-existence of reprocessing activities at the Radiochemical Laboratory."

Despite the fact that a special IAEA Board of Governors meeting on March 21, 1994, decided to refer the North Korean nuclear question to the U.N. Security Council and urged North Korea to allow all inspection activities needed by the IAEA and to fully fulfill its treaty obligations under the Safeguards Agreement, North Korea had kept rejecting IAEA inspections and made false allegations with regard to their outcome.

Reacting to the insincere attitude of North Korea, IAEA Director-General Hans Blix on March 24, 1994, reported to the U.N. Security Council that nuclear inspections of North Korea showed that North Korea had widened non-compliance with the Safeguards Agreement and aggravated the situation by refusing to allow inspection activities indispensable to the IAEA inspection team, that as a result the IAEA could not verify the non-diversion of nuclear materials subject to safeguards measures under the Safe-

guards Agreement for use in nuclear weapons or nuclear detonation devices, and that additional inspection activities were needed to determine whether North Korea had promoted the development of nuclear arms.

Based on the report, the U.N. Security Council on March 31, 1994 (April 1 Korea time), adopted a "Statement of the U.N. Security Council President" expressing the deep concern of the international community about the failure to determine whether there was any diversion of nuclear materials and other operations like reprocessing and urging North Korea to cooperate in accomplishing the purpose of the inspection activities agreed between the IAEA and North Korea on February 15, 1994.

The statement also called for the resumption of South-North dialogue to discuss implementation of the Joint Declaration of Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. It further said that the Security Council would, if necessary, review additional measures to attain the complete fulfillment of the Safeguards Agreement signed between the IAEA and North Korea.

Following is the full text of the statement of the U.N. Security Council President of March 31, 1994:

Presidential Statement(3.31)

The Security Council recalls the statement made by the President of the Council on 8 April 1993(S/25562) and its relevant resolution.

The Council reaffirms the critical importance of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards in the implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (the Treaty) and the contribution

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which progress in non-proliferation makes to the maintenance of international peace and security.

The Council notes with deep appreciation the efforts of the Director-General of the IAEA and the Agency to implement the IAEA-Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) safeguards agreement (INFCIRC/403).

The Council reaffirms the importance of the Joint Declaration by the DPRK and the Republic of Korea (ROK) of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, and of the parties to the Declaration addressing the nuclear issue in their continuing dialogue.

The Council welcomes the joint statement of the DPRK and the United States (U.S.) of 11 June 1993, which included the DPRK's decision to suspend the effectuation of its withdrawal from the Treaty, and the understanding reached between the DPRK and the U.S. in Geneva in July, 1993, and the progress achieved on that basis.

The Council welcomes also the agreements reached in February, 1994, between the IAEA and DPRK, and between the DPRK and the U.S.

The Council takes note that the DPRK has accepted in principle IAEA inspections at its seven declared sites, following its decision to suspend its withdrawal from the Treaty on 11 June 1993, and the Statement by the General Department of Atomic Energy of the DPRK (S/1994/319).

The Council takes note also of the IAEA Board of Governors' findings concerning the matter of compliance and the IAEA Director-Director's report to the Security Council of 22 March 1994 (S/1994/322), and expresses its concern that the IAEA is, therefore, unable to draw conclusions as to whether there has been either diversion of nuclear material or reprocessing or other operations.

The Council calls upon the DPRK to allow the IAEA inspectors to complete the inspection activities agreed between the IAEA and DPRK

on 15 February 1994, as a step in fulfilling its obligations under the IAEA-DPRK safeguards agreement and in honouring non-proliferation obligations of the Treaty.

The Council invites the Director-General of the IAEA to report further to the Security Council on the question of completion of the inspection activities agreed between the IAEA and the DPRK on 15 February 1994 when the Director-General is scheduled to report on the follow-on inspections required to maintain continuity of safeguards and to verify that there has been no diversion of nuclear material required to be safeguarded, as noted in the Director-General's report to the Council (S/1994/322).

The Council requests the DPRK and ROK to renew discussions whose purpose is implementation of the Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

The Council appeals to those Member States engaged in dialogue with the DPRK to continue that dialogue in accordance with the agreement reached on February 25 1994.

The Council decides to remain actively seized of the matter and that further Security Council consideration will take place if necessary in order to achieve full implementation of the IAEA-DPRK safeguards agreement.

The South Korean government has striven to resolve the North Korean nuclear question peacefully through dialogue between South and North Korea as direct parties to the Korean question along with international-level efforts, though the nuclear issue is a question of international nature as it stemmed from the North's failure to fulfill its obligation of undergoing IAEA inspections.

However, North Korea has turned a deaf ear to such efforts of the Seoul government. It deliberately torpedoed the South-North

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working-level delegates contacts to prepare for the exchange of special envoys designed to resolve the nuclear question while having even breached an international pledge by refusing to permit IAEA inspections.

This insincere posture of North Korea and growing nuclear suspicion led to the undesirable consequence of referring the North Korean nuclear question to the U.N. Security Council. It was regrettable that North Korea couldn't escape international censure.

Notwithstanding the situation, North Korea, in a Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement issued on April 4, 1994, in connection with the U.N. Security Council President's statement of March 31, argued, "It is against the purpose and principle of the United Nations Charter for the U.N. Security Council to discuss the nuclear question based only on an undue conclusion of the IAEA. This is designed for the United States to put into practice a hostile and strangulation policy against North Korea intended to deliberately strain the Korean situation without any interest in the resolution of the nuclear question."

At the same time, the North charged the South Korean government with seeking to push ahead with such nuclear war games as the Team Spirit military exercises with the intent of moving toward nullifying the Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. The North was simply repeating propaganda to shift blame to the South for the suspension of the South-North dialogue.

Going a step further, the North Koreans indicated they would replace fuel rods and remove surveillance seals installed by the IAEA, asserting that they were obliged to normalize "peaceful nuclear activities" which they claimed were frozen to facilitate

the third-round U.S.-North Korea talks.

It was not clear what the "normalization of peaceful nuclear activities" mentioned by the north meant.

But, one obvious point was that North Korea's activities at nuclear facilities without reporting to the IAEA could not but constitute yet another treaty violation of the safeguards agreement, an act disregarding an international pledge and trust.

The president's statement of the U.N. Security Council on the North Korean nuclear question meant that the Council, primarily responsible for the maintenance of world peace and security, displayed its "deep concern" about and firm determination to resolve" the nuclear issue.

At the same time, the statement urged North Korea to accept additional inspections by the IAEA and said that if necessary the Council would take additional steps to ensure complete fulfillment of the Nuclear Safeguards Agreement signed between the IAEA and North Korea. Whether North Korea would accept additional IAEA inspections has emerged as the key to ensuring its nuclear transparency.

2. Announcement of "April 15 Measures" by the Seoul Government

In connection with the breakup of the working-level delegates contacts to discuss the exchange of special envoys, North Korea, in a statement issued on March 21, 1994, by its delegation to the contacts, denounced the South for "using the proposed exchange of special envoys for an impure political purpose," namely, to

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jeopardize the scheduled third-round U.S.-North Korea talks. Saying that its demand for prior release of a joint statement was fully justified, the North asserted that the breakup of the working-level delegates contacts was due to the South's confrontational posture. It vehemently defamed the government and top leader of the South.

To counter the North Korean charge, the South, in a statement by its chief delegate to the contacts, stressed that the breakup was due to the North's insistence on discussing matters that had nothing to do with the purpose of the contacts.

The South said that the postponement of the third-round U.S.-North Korea talks, criticized by North Korea was based on North Korea's own agreement that the talks would take place only when it had fully undergone IAEA inspections and the exchange of special envoys was realized.

The South noted that at the eighth working-level delegates contact, the southern delegation made a three-point emergency proposal in the interest of a productive South-North dialogue and the establishment of rightful inter-Korean relations, the three-point proposal being a halt to slandering of the top leader of the South, a halt to instigating the South Korean people to stage anti-government struggles, and expression of a clear-cut position to realize the exchange of special envoys from the approach of resolving the nuclear question on a priority basis.

The South then said there was no change in its policy of settling the nuclear question peacefully through dialogue, and urged North Korea to return to the South-North dialogue early to resolve the nuclear issue peacefully.

Following is the full text of a statement issued by Song Yung-dae, the South's chief delegate, on March 21, 1994, in connec-

tion with the North's deliberate breakup of the working-level delegates contacts to discuss the exchange of special envoys.

Today North Korea, in a statement issued by its delegation to the working-level delegates contacts to discuss the exchange of special envoys, distorted things and slandered our side to make it appear as if the blame rests with us for the breakup of the working-level contacts.

While denouncing our side over the issue of Team Spirit training exercises and the international cooperative system, North Korea made the unreasonable assertion that our side had unilaterally torpedoed the working-level delegates contacts with a view to obstructing the third-round U.S.-North Korea talks.

This attitude of North Korea amounts to a robber accusing his victim, enabling them to shift the blame for the breakup of the contacts to our side and escape international pressure over suspicion of their nuclear development. All people are both disappointed and angered at their contentions.

The purpose of our decision to realize the exchange of special envoys is to discuss and settle the North Korean nuclear question peacefully through dialogue, an issue that is linked directly to world peace let alone to the survival of the nation.

At the eighth contact, moreover, the North Koreans again raised their four-point demand which they had earlier withdrawn and did not hesitate to make various extreme threats such as "we don't hesitate to go to war" and "we shall turn Seoul into a sea of fire." The North Koreans, broke up the working-level delegates contacts by walking out of the conference room without setting even the time of the next contact.

It was like turning a thing upside down for the North to nevertheless argue as if it was the South that shunned the contacts.

The issue of the third-round U.S.-North Korea talks, which the North

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has disputed, was an international promise to which North Korea itself agreed, a promise that the third-round talks would be held on condition that North Korea allowed full IAEA inspections and the inter-Korean exchange of special envoys was realized.

Moreover, our side has professed that if North Korea shows sincerity toward resolving the nuclear question, we would be willing to positively support the effort of North Korea to improve its relations with our allies.

If North Korea is truly interested in negotiations with the United States, it should respect the order of the international community and discuss realization of the exchange of special envoys to resolve the nuclear question in a sincere manner.

It is nonsensical that nonetheless, North Korea, which did not faithfully undergo IAEA inspections and one-sidedly broke up the working-level delegates contacts for the exchange of special envoys, argued as if our side obstructed the contacts.

Meanwhile, North Korea again slandered and defamed the top leader of our side and instigated our people to stage anti-government struggles.

At the eighth working-level contact, our side posed a three-point demand to North Korea as the minimum necessary steps for a constructive dialogue and for the establishment of rightful inter-Korean relations. The three-point demand was the stoppage of slander and defamation of the top leader of our side, a halt to instigation of our people to stage anti-government struggles, and manifestation of its express position to realize the exchange of special envoys from the approach of settling the nuclear issue on a priority basis.

Nevertheless, the North retains a Cold-War-like attitude, trying to fan confusion within the South and overthrow our system, much less accommodating our just demand. This is a case that nakedly displays their bellicosity.

2. Announcement of "April 15th Measures" by the Government

There is no change in our position that the nuclear issue should be resolved peacefully through dialogue. The door to dialogue is still open.

However, if North Korea chooses a road other than dialogue, we would like to make it clear that we will react sternly with determination and strength to preserve peace.

We strongly urge North Korea, coolly aware of the situation at home and abroad in which it finds itself, to return to a sincere and rightful posture at an early date and enter into South-North dialogue to resolve the nuclear issue peacefully.

Meanwhile, even during the IAEA inspections held from March 1 through March 15, 1994, North Korea rejected an inspection (fuel sampling) of the Radiochemical Laboratory, making it impossible to realize the "four simultaneous measures" (first-phase steps towards complete resolution of the nuclear question) agreed between the United States and North Korea on February 25, 1994. Accordingly, the "course of dialogue" for the settlement of the North Korea nuclear issue reverted to the starting point.

Under the circumstances, the U.N. Security Council on March 31, 1994, urged North Korea to accept additional IAEA inspections and return to the South-North dialogue to discuss implementation of the Joint Declaration of Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. Nonetheless, North Korea, in a statement issued by a Foreign Ministry spokesman on April 4, 1994, threatened to "resume nuclear activities" and stepped up defamation of the government and top leader of the South.

The North Koreans' attitude, as was disclosed in the course of the working-level contacts and the April 4 statement of a Foreign Ministry spokesman, indicated that their unchanging basic policy

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was to resolve the nuclear question only through third-round talks between themselves and the United States and that they were not interested in resolving the question through the exchange of special envoys.

Moreover, at a reporting session held to commemorate the first anniversary of the 10-Point Platform for Grand National Unity on April 4, 1994, North Korea vehemently agitated for anti-government struggles against the civilian-led Seoul government. In a joint session of the administration, political parties and social organizations on April 11, North Korea, in a report read by Yang Hyong-sop, chairman of the Supreme People's Assembly, called for an "August 15 national conference."

The proposal, being part of their "united front strategy," meant that they were not at all interested in a practical dialogue between the responsible authorities of the two sides.

Moreover, in view of the fact that the exchange of special envoys is in fact an "indirect dialogue" between the top leaders of the two sides, the stepped-up slander of the top leader of the South indicated the North's rejection of dialogue with the Seoul government authorities, and meant that resolution of the nuclear question through the exchange of envoys had become practically impossible.

All this indicated that the idea of the "four simultaneous measures" which the Seoul government had promoted as a means of holding the third-round U.S.-North Korea talks after the exchange of special envoys could no longer be implemented due to North Korea's rejection, and that accordingly there arose the need to re-examine the idea.

Here, the South Korean government decided to withdraw

the call for the exchange of special envoys in a policy to resolutely do away with a "perfunctory dialogue" that is of no substantial help to the resolution of the nuclear question, to help pave the way for early implementation of additional IAEA inspections, and to seek a "practical and productive South-North dialogue" to settle the nuclear issue.

Following is the full text of the April 15 Announcement on the Withdrawal of the Exchange of Special Envoys and Opening of Door to Dialogue for the Implementation of the Joint Declaration of Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula adopted at the South's second unification and security policy coordination meeting on April 15, 1994:

Following the announcement of a plan by North Korea to withdraw from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in March last year, the government proposed to hold contacts between the delegates to the South-North high-level talks and resume South-North Joint Nuclear Control Commission meetings with a view to implementing the Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula based on the principle of resolving the nuclear question between the direct parties, namely, the South and the North.

However, as North Korea rejected them in favor of the exchange of special envoys, we had accepted the method of exchange from a broader standpoint that we won't be particular about the form of talks in order to get the nuclear question resolved.

In the eight rounds of working-level contacts, North Korea persisted in showing an insincere attitude, delaying substantial debate with one excuse after another before breaking them up altogether with the threat that Seoul would be turned into a "sea of fire."

III. Related Developments after Failure to Exchange Special Envoys between the South and the North

Thereafter, North Korea intensified its confrontational position by vehemently slandering the South, agitating for anti-government struggles and demanding a "national conference."

Given the fact that the exchange of special envoys, being an indirect dialogue between the top leaders, should be based on mutual trust, the North Korean attitude clearly indicated they were not interested in the exchange.

Under the circumstances, we have concluded that it has become difficult to resolve the nuclear question through the exchange of special envoys and therefore decided not to promote it any further.

However, there is no change in our policy to resolve the nuclear question on a priority basis.

To this end, there should be a South-North dialogue to conduct mutual inspections based on the Joint Declaration of Denuclearization.

Our government's firm position is that without mutual South-North inspections, there can be no implementation of the Joint Declaration of Denuclearization or any North Korean guarantee of nuclear transparency.

Detailed matters related to the promotion of dialogue will be determined through consultations between South Korea and the United States.

In this connection, we believe IAEA inspections of North Korea should be realized at an early date.

The measures taken by the South Korean government on April 15 were intended to depart from the "comprehensive goal" of resolving the nuclear question, settling other major problems pending between the two sides and holding a South-North summit meeting as envisioned in the method of the exchange of special envoys, and instead to reaffirm the priority goal of "realizing mutual South-North nuclear inspections" through implementation

of the Joint Declaration of Denuclearization.

This is because without prior resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue, there can be no solution of any other issues pending between the two sides.

In particular, the President's Statement of the U.N. Security Council of April 1, 1994, urged the South and the North of Korea to resume a dialogue to discuss implementation of the Joint Declaration of Denuclearization. The Joint Declaration is a joint obligation agreed between the responsible authorities of the South and the North and whose implementation the two sides pledged before the world.

In terms of their form, the measures were meant to untie a knot by withdrawing the envoy exchange, which was one of the prerequisites to holding the third-round U.S.-North Korea talks, and to implement the Joint Declaration of Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula by positively energizing the South-North high-level talks and South-North Joint Nuclear Control Commission, both dialogue channels already agreed between the two sides, in place of the exchange of special envoys.

In the area of implementation, the measures were intended to resolutely dispel a "perfunctory dialogue" that was of no help to the resolution of the nuclear question, and instead to widen the road to early implementation of additional IAEA inspections and to pursue a practical and constructive South-North dialogue to resolve the nuclear issue while maintaining a close cooperative system with the international community including the United States.

Furthermore, the April 15 measures were designed to serve a stern warning to North Korea and thereby disapprove of the North's


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double-faced dialogue posture and its machinations against the South in favor of the establishment of “stable and orderly South-North relations.”

Meanwhile, the withdrawal of the exchange of special envoys does not mean there is any change in the South’s policy to resolve the nuclear question on a top priority basis through dialogue and negotiations.

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Part I

Preliminary Contacts for South-North Summit



Copies of the Agreement on South-North Summit Meeting is being exchanged between the South's Chief Delegate Lee Hong-koo and his North Korean counterpart, Kim Yong-sun.

Part I

Preliminary Contacts for South-North Summit

1. Background

It is naturally the wish of the whole Korean people to dispel the mutual distrust and frictions that have persisted between South and North Korea for nearly half a century, to lay the groundwork for coexistence and co-prosperity of the Korean people, and to pave the way for peaceful unification.

In his inaugural address of February 25, 1993, President Kim Young-sam of the Republic of Korea emphasized the need for mutual South-North cooperation, saying, "If President Kim Il-sung is truly concerned about the nation and is interested in genuine reconciliation and unification between the South and North Korean people, I

can meet him at any time and anywhere to discuss them.”

The presidential remarks were suggestive that the quickest and most effective method of the South and the North marching onward toward reconciliation and unification is open-hearted discussion of all problems directly between their top leaders.

However, North Korea stood in the way of improving inter-Korean relations by turning a deaf ear to the Basic South-North Agreement and the Joint Denuclearization Declaration, both in the stage of implementation, and by declaring its withdrawal from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) following its rejection of special nuclear inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

Moreover, by announcing, among other things, an intent to withdraw from the IAEA and stating they would not hesitate to “go to war” only to invite further isolation from the rest of the world community, the North Koreans had driven South-North relations to the brink of war.

It was under these circumstances that at a press conference on the first anniversary of his inauguration on February 25, 1994, President Kim said he would promote a summit meeting with President Kim said he would promote a summit meeting with President Kim Il-sung when he found

such a meeting conducive to thwarting North Korea's nuclear development.

The remarks envisioned the President's national passion that all pending intra-Korean problems should ultimately be resolved through peaceful dialogue between the South and the North as well as his determination to provide a breakthrough in easing tension on the Korean peninsula and improving South-North relations through a summit meeting.

In June 1994 former U.S. President Jimmy Carter, who had just been to North Korea, called on President Kim Young-sam at Chongwadae to tell him that North Korea's Kim Il-sung was grateful for Kim Young-sam's earlier proposal for summit talks, expressing the wish that "I would like to meet President Kim Young-sam at any place at the soonest possible time without any conditions."

Learning of Kim Il-sung's suggestion, Kim Young-sam responded, "I will meet President Kim Il-sung anywhere and at any time without conditions." He said necessary procedural matters could be discussed by working-level officials.

Accordingly the South Korean government sent a telephone message to the North on June 20, 1994 proposing that a South-North preliminary contact be made at 10 a.m.

June 28 at Peace House in the southern sector of Panmunjom to discuss procedural matters related to a South-North summit meeting. It suggested vice prime minister-level officials attend the contact as chief delegates. The message, signed by Prime Minister Lee Young-duk, was addressed to the North's Administration Council Premier Kang Song-san.

In response, North Korean Premier Kang cabled a telephone message to the South on June 22, saying the North welcomed and agreed to the proposal made by the South.

As the North agreed to the South's proposal, the South gave the North a list of its delegates to the preliminary contact on June 23 with the North reciprocating on June 25. The stage was thus set for preliminary contacts to prepare for an inter-Korean summit meeting.

The text of the telephone message from Prime Minister Lee Yung-duk to North Korean Premier Kang Song-san is as follows:

Our people have suffered added pain due to distrust and confrontation for nearly half a century. Besides, we are in a regrettable situation in which tension has been building up lately between the South and the North over the nuclear question.

Former U. S. President Jimmy Carter, who has recently been to your area, has conveyed to us the proposal by your side's top leader that

a South-North summit meeting be held at the soonest possible time without any conditions.

Acting with the authority delegated to me, I hereby inform your side that in view of the national desire and of the domestic and external situations we find ourselves in today, your side's proposal is a highly desirable thing and we agree to it.

Our side has made it clear that it is desirable for the top leaders of the South and the North to meet directly if it would be conducive to resolving at an early date the tension existing between the South and the North due to the nuclear question, and also to paving the way for peaceful unification of the fatherland through the rooting of reconciliatory and cooperative relations.

Hoping to have preliminary contacts to discuss procedural matters relating to a South-North summit meeting at an early date, our side proposes to have a contact at Peace House in our sector of Panmunjom at 10 a.m., Tuesday, June 28.

We suggest that each delegation comprise three delegates headed by a deputy prime minister-level official and that there be about five attendants for each side.

We hope there will be an affirmative response from your side and expect your side will take a corresponding measure at an early date.

2. Preliminary Contacts

A preliminary contact to discuss procedural matters

related to holding a South-North summit meeting was held at Peace House in the southern sector of Panmunjom at 10 a. m. June 28, 1994. At the closed-door contact, deputy prime minister-level officials served as chief delegates.

Delegates included Lee Hong-koo, Deputy Prime Minister and National Unification Minister (chief delegate); Chung Jong-wuk, Senior Presidential Secretary for Foreign Affairs and National Security; and Yoon Yeo-jun, Special Assistant to the Prime Minister, from the South. The North Korean delegates were Kim Young-sun, chairman of the Unification Policy Committee, Supreme People's Assembly (chief delegate); An Byong-su, vice chairman of the Committee for Peaceful Unification of the Fatherland; and Paek Nam-jun, a responsible councillor of the Administration Council.

Following keynote speeches by the chief delegates, each side's draft version of an agreement on preliminary contacts was produced and discussed. In the marathon 13-hour talks, the longest meeting in the history of South-North dialogue, the two sides succeeded in working out an agreement on a South-North summit meeting. The talks comprised two rounds of plenary sessions, two exclusive contacts between the chief delegates, and a delegates contact to adjust the wording of the agreement.

In his keynote speech, the South's chief delegate, Deputy Prime Minister and National Unification Minister Lee Hong-koo, said the contact took place in accordance with the agreement reached in principle between the top leaders of the two sides that "a summit meeting shall be held at the soonest possible date without any conditions." Lee stressed that an inter-Korean summit meeting should be realized at an early date so as to dispel tension and resolve all issues pending between the two sides, thereby paving the way for unification.

Deputy Prime Minister Lee, emphasizing that the Joint Declaration on Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula should be implemented and respected by all means for peace and unification of the Korean peninsula, disclosed the South's ideas with respect to the procedures for a South-North summit as follows:

- In accordance with the principle of reciprocity between the South and the North, a first-round summit meeting shall be held in Seoul on July 12-14, 1994, and a second round in Pyongyang on August 23-25.

- To ensure effective proceedings the summit meeting shall take the form of exclusive talks between the two top leaders. Two assistants and a recorder shall be present at the

meeting.

- In view of the weight of a summit and the interest drawn to it at home and abroad, the number of attendants and press members shall be about 100 and 80, respectively.

- Matters related to security and protocol shall be discussed through separate working-level contacts. But, the fact that the South and North have special relations instead of a relationship between two separate countries should be duly taken into account.

- Other matters such as the recording of the talks, guarantee of personal safety, procedures for travel back and forth, furnishing of conveniences and reporting may well be settled by following the practices of past South-North talks.

Urging North Korea to make sincere efforts and show affirmative response so as to adopt a letter of agreement and realize a South-North summit meeting at an early date, the South produced its version of a draft agreement.

The chief North Korean delegate began his speech with praise for Kim Il-sung. Asserting that “the South and the North have now reached a point where they have to choose one of two incompatible roads: peace or war, and unification or internecine destruction,” he said, “President Kim Il-sung personally proposed a highest-level meeting

when the two sides began dialogue in May 1972, and made particular efforts to materialize a truly significant top-level meeting in the interest of unification.”

On procedural matters, North Korea insisted that the summit talks should be held in Pyongyang since, it asserted, President Kim Il-sung had already invited President Kim Young-sam to Pyongyang and Kim Young-sam, too, expressed his willingness to visit Pyongyang.

Asserting that the summit should be held in mid-August around national liberation day, the North Korean delegation produced a four-point draft “agreement on preliminary contacts for the North-South highest-level meeting.”

On the issue of summit proceedings, the North asserted that what the contact should do was only to agree on the time and place of the proposed summit with working-level procedural matters to be settled through separate delegates contacts.

Besides, North Korea insisted on a somewhat ambiguous clause in its draft version which made the conference atmosphere tense. The clause at issue was, “Both sides shall not engage in acts of beclouding the atmosphere of the summit effective July 1, 1994.”

The gist of the draft agreements the two sides laid

down at the contact was as follows:

The South

- **Name of the meeting:** *South-North Summit Meeting*
- **Time and place of the meeting:**
 - First session: July 12-14, 1994 in Seoul*
 - Second session: August 23-25, 1994 in Pyongyang*
- **Form of the meeting:** *Exclusive; Attendance of two assistants, one recorder*
- **Duration of stay:** *Two nights and three days*
- **Attendants and press members:** *100 attendants, 80 press members*
- **Recording of talks:** *Stenography, tape-recording, video-recording, etc.*

The host side shall provide two circuits for the relay of tape-records, and shall scatter ultrashort waves for video-recording.
- **Guarantee of personal safety:** *A memorandum signed by the prime minister guaranteeing personal safety shall be delivered to the other side three days before the visit.*
- **Insignia and identification of attendants and press members:**
 - *Guarantee of inviolable rights to luggage and personal effects.*
 - *Insignia of attendants : At each side's convenience.*
 - *Press members : Use of armbands.*

- *Marking of a conference site : No marking.*
- *Facilities : To be installed if necessary.*
- *Communications facilities to be installed and provided.*
- ***Procedures for travel back and forth:***
 - *List of visitors to be delivered to the other side three days in advance.*
 - *Means of transportation: Automobiles, train or airplane.*
- ***Furnishing of conveniences:***
 - *Furnishing of such conveniences as board, transportation and communications.*
 - *Delivery of pouches twice a day.*
- ***Reporting:*** *In ways convenient to each side.*
- ***Press coverage:*** *Guarantee of press coverage.*
- ***Direct telephone service:*** *Use of existing direct telephone circuits.*
- ***Other working-level procedural issues:*** *Security and protocol matters to be decided at separate working-level contacts.*

The North

- ***Time and place of the meeting:*** *In the middle of August, 1994 in Pyongyang*
- ***Procedural matters:*** *The issues of the composition and size of delegations, itineraries, dispatch of advance parties, procedures for travel back and forth, guarantee of conveniences and other working-level matters, shall be discussed and agreed on at delegates contacts to be attended by one of the delegates to the preliminary contact and two*

attendants. Delegates contacts shall begin on Friday, July 1, 1994.

- *The two sides shall not commit acts of beclouding the atmosphere of the North-South highest-level talks effective July 1.*

Upon introducing their respective draft agreements, the two sides began discussing procedural matters. Both sides affirmed their mutual determination to realize a South-North summit meeting, exchanging opinions on the issues of the place and time of the summit as well as on the question of “fostering atmosphere” suggested by the North.

Whereas the South offered a flexible idea that the question of the summit venue could be resolved by itself once the two sides agreed on the date of the meeting based on the principle of reciprocity, the North Koreans, while insisting that the meeting should take place on August 15, rejected the suggestion that the time of the talks be set according to the principle of reciprocity.

They argued that “the summit talks would not be regularized” and “we don't need to follow international practices of applying the principle of reciprocity, namely, exchange of visits even in view of the particular conditions that characterize inter-Korean relations.”

When the South asked the North to explain the meaning of “fostering a conference atmosphere,” North Korea showed an ambiguous posture shunning any clear-cut explanation. It only said that “all things that contribute to an unfavorable atmosphere are included” or “both sides should desist from committing acts harmful to the atmosphere.” The contact seemed to be hardly progressing.

To break the deadlock, the South proposed a recess, calling for an exclusive contact between the chief delegates. North Korea accepted the offer and in-depth talks between the chief delegates resulted in rapid progress with the two sides agreeing on the following basic matters.

- The summit meeting shall begin on July 25, 1994, but the duration of stay shall be decided at a later date.

- The place of the meeting shall be Pyongyang.

- The issue of a second meeting shall be determined by the top leaders during their Pyongyang meeting.

- The wording of the agreement reached at the chief delegates contact shall be fixed at a meeting attended by a delegate and two attendants from each side.

The two sides then held a delegates contact to adjust the wording of an accord based on the agreed items adopted

by the chief delegates.

However, the delegates contact, too, hit a bottleneck because of the North's insistence that concrete working-level procedural matters should be discussed at a separate delegates contact, that no duration of stay should be specified and that the issue of “fostering a conference atmosphere” should be included as a separate clause in the agreement.

The delegates contact to adjust the wording came to an end after agreeing that the differences be ironed out at a chief delegates contact.

Accordingly the chief delegates had a second exclusive contact, during which the two sides agreed on such matters as the time and place of a summit, the issue of whether to hold a second summit, the question of the conference atmosphere, and the issue of holding delegates contacts to discuss working-level procedural matters.

The marathon 13-hour talks thus came to an end. At the second plenary session attended by all delegates, the chief delegates signed an agreement, giving birth to the Agreement on Holding a South-North Summit Meeting.

*Agreement for Holding Summit Meeting
between the south and the North*

A bilateral deputy-prime-minister-level preliminary contact to prepare for a South-North summit meeting was held at Panmunjom on June 28, 1994.

At the meeting, both parties agreed as follows:

A South-North summit will be held in Pyongyang on July 25-27, 1994. The duration of the meeting may be extended, if necessary.

A second summit meeting will be decided by the two top leaders.

The composition and size of delegations to the South-North summit meeting, the format of the meeting, itineraries, the dispatch of an advance team, procedures for travel to and from Pyongyang, guarantee of personal safety and conveniences and other procedural matters will be discussed and agreed on at a working-level contact between one delegate to the preliminary contact and two attendants from each side.

The working-level contact will be held at 10 a.m., Friday, July 1, 1994 at Tongil-gak(Unification Pavilion) in the northern sector of Panmunjom.

The two sides shall endeavor together to create a favorable

atmosphere for the South-North summit meeting by promoting reconciliation, unity, trust and understanding.

June 28, 1994

Lee Hong-koo

Deputy Prime Minister/

Minister of Unification

Republic of Korea

and

Chief Delegate

Kim Yong-sun

Chairman of the Unification

Policy Committee,

the Supreme People's Assembly

Democratic People's

Republic of Korea

and

Chief Delegate

3. Achievements and Significance

The South attended the preliminary contact for a South-North summit meeting with two policy aspects in mind.

The first was the principle of an “early summit,” that is, to realize a summit in July. This was aimed at, above all, clearing up the tension caused by the North Korean nuclear question.

The second was the principle of reciprocity, that is, to

hold South-North summit talks in Seoul and Pyongyang by turn. The South accepted Pyongyang as the site of the first summit from a broad-minded approach that “the two top leaders should meet at any time and at any place without any conditions.”

The outcome of the preliminary contact was highly significant in that the two sides reached an official agreement to hold a South-North summit meeting.

The contact set down the successful staging of the summit by agreeing on the time and place of the first summit meeting as well as on the issue of holding a second summit. The agreement was made possible by the South's resolute accommodation of North Korean ideas, an accommodation made from a broad-minded posture buttressed by the confidence of the civilian-led government.

One achievement that cannot be ignored was that the ground work was laid for another round of summit talks as against the North Korean policy of holding the summit “only once in Pyongyang.”

Initially North Korea insisted on holding the summit in Pyongyang only. In a compromise agreement later, it was decided to “determine the issue of holding another round of summit talks according to the will of the top leaders of the two sides.”

This means that the principle of reciprocity advocated by the South was pushed through in a flexible way to lay down a base for realizing another round of summit talks.

North Korea wanted the issue of fostering a conference atmosphere to be included in the agreement. But, at the insistence of the South that there could be no preconditions whatsoever to an inter-Korean summit, the expression was sharply modified to keep it from becoming a “prerequisite.”

The agreement on a summit was the result of President Kim Young-sam's consistent North Korea policy. Beginning with the call made in his inaugural address, President Kim had proposed and steadfastly promoted a South-North summit meeting. The agreement was the result of such persistent persuasion of North Korea.

This was the fruition of President Kim's strong will and political determination. Beneath the agreement was his courage and determination to do whatever he could to solve pending inter-Korean problems and other national questions.

The projected inter-Korean summit was a great feat, the first of its kind in half a century of national division. It was significant in that the agreement was to provide significant momentum to bring about progress in inter-Korean relations, an opportunity to resolve various inter-

Korean problems at a single stroke.

With the agreement, the possibility had grown of the advent of an age of genuine reconciliation and cooperation on the Korean peninsula, hitherto an area unaffected by the post-cold war order.

The agreed summit meeting made it possible to meet the with of the 10 million separated family members through a dialogue between the two leaders and to pave the way for co-prosperity as opportunities could be provided to furnish substantial help to North Korea as well as prompt an “orderly change in stability” in the North.

The scheduled inter-Korean summit meeting had raised widespread expectations that the talks would restore a national community and provide momentum to securing a road toward peaceful unification of the fatherland.

4. First Delegates Contact to Discuss Working-Level Procedures

The first delegates contact to discuss working-level procedures for a south-North summit meeting took place at Tongilkak in the northern sector of Panmunjom at 10 a. m. July 1, 1994. It was held behind closed doors.

The attending delegates were Yoon Yeo-jun, special assistant to the Prime Minister; Koo Pon-tae, director of the National Unification Board's Office of Unification Policies; and Ohm Ik-jun, assistant to the Prime Minister, from the South. The North Korean delegates were Paek Nam-jun, a responsible councilor of the Administration Council; Choe Sung-chol, a director of the Secretariat, Committee for Peaceful Unification of the Fatherland; and Choe Song-ik, a director of the Secretariat, Committee for Peaceful unification of the Fatherland.

After enjoying a casual exchange of personal regards, remarks about the weather and the public reaction to the decision to hold a summit, the two sides explained their respective basic positions on the contact and produced their versions of a draft agreement before entering full-dress talks.

As he set forth the South's version, delegate Yoon Yeo-joon stressed that the two sides should do all they could to help stage the summit smoothly. He said that since the planned summit was a significant event, taking place for the first time in half a century of national division, it would have a greater bearing than any other tour a South Korean President had made of other countries in the past.

North Korea's delegate Paek Nam-Jun said, as he introduced his version of an agreement, that the contact

could arrive at an accord without much difficulty because both sides would try to steadily and fully prepare for the summit over a sufficient period of time and because the deputy prime minister-level preliminary contact had already agreed on such basic matters as the time and place of a summit.

Following is the gist of the versions of a draft agreement introduced by the two sides at the delegates contact:

The composition of delegations

The South:

- *Attendants : 100 persons*
 - *Official attendants : 15 persons*
 - *Unofficial attendants : 85 persons*
- *Press members : 80*

The North

- *Attendants : 100 persons*
- *Press members : 80*

Format of summit meetings

The South

- *Two rounds of exclusive summit meetings between the two top leaders.*
 - *There shall be additional summit talks if necessary.*

- *Two assistants and a recorder shall be present at summit meetings.*

The North:

- *Exclusive talks*
- * *Implies at least twice or more.*
- *An optimum number of assistants shall be present at summit talks.*

The issue of the dispatch of advance teams

The South:

- *Dispatch of advance team 14days before the visit (four nights and five days).*
 - *Size : 25 persons*
- *Dispatch of a second advance team six days before the visit*
 - *size : 50 persons*

The North:

- *Dispatch of an advance team seven days before the visit (two nights and three days)*
 - *Size : Five persons*

Itineraries

The South

- *To be conveyed 20 days before the visit.*
- *To be determined through a delegates contact after the return of the first advance team.*

The North:

- *To be conveyed 10 days before the visit.*
- *To be determined through mutual consultation.*

Issue of working-level officials contacts

The South:

- *Contacts of security, protocol and press working-level officials shall take place at the scene during the dispatch of the first advance team.*
- *Contacts of communications working-level officials shall take place separately at Panmunjom.*

The North:

- *working-level contacts of security and protocol officials shall take place at Tongilkak in Panmunjom on July 15.*

Notification of the lists of visitors

The South:

- *Three days before the visit.*

The North:

- *Seven days before the visit.*

Security

The South:

- *Guarantee of security people's activities and joint security programs between the two sides.*
- *Allowing of the carriage of security and communications equipment.*

Issue of insignia

The South:

- *Prohibition of the use of any insignia at the conference room and other sites of events (including the place of accommodation).*
- *Prohibition of the use of any insignia at the conference room.*

Recording of talks

The North:

- *Recording of the talks shall be made in any way convenient to each side such as stenography, audio recording or video recording.*
- *Furnishing of two circuits for audio recording and of ultrashort waves for video recording.*

Guaarantee of media coverage

The South:

- *Guarantee of the introduction and operation of telefision relay vehicles and their auxiliary vehicles two days before the visit, and of the activities of 20 broaadcasting and technical personnel.*

Communicatons

The South:

- *Use of protable satellite telephoone sets in additioon to direct telephone circuits.*
- *Provision of transmission lines for television images and facilities for satellite relay*

The North:

- *Use of direct telephone lines.*

After reviewing their versions, the two sides discussed those items on which they differed.

During the discussions, North Korea held fast to its stance on the issues of the number of summit meetings, the number of attendants to be preasent at summit talks, the

dispatch of advance teams, itineraries and the date of notification, and the introduction of television relay equipment.

The South suggested that the two sides first determine items of mutual accord and of disagreement and then recess the meeting, and that the meeting be resumed in the afternoon after the two sides had readjusted their opinions.

The contact resumed at 2 p.m. to continue discussing working-level procedural matters.

However, the talks made hardly any progress as the North showed no change in its attitude of simply putting in order those procedural items contained in the agreement made at the deputy premier level preliminary contact. The South, on the other hand, tried to concretely describe the agreed items in view of the importance of the summit meeting.

The July 1 contact ended without any achievement. But, the two sides decided to study matters further and meet again at Peace House in the southern area of Panmunjom at 10 a.m. July 2.

5. Second Delegates Contact to Discuss Working-Level Procedures

The second delegates contact to discuss working-level procedural matters related to a proposed South-North summit meeting was held at Peace House in the southern area of Panmunjom at 10 a.m. July 2. The contact was closed to the public.

Citing North Korean Delegate Paek Nam-jum's remarks that "President Kim Young-sam made a tremendously courageous decision," the South's Delegate Yoon Yeo-jun said that "given the unique nature of past inter-Korean relations or the current atmosphere of the Korean peninsula, President Kim Young-sam's decision to hold a summit stemmed from the spirit of his favorite catchword, 'Taedomumun' (There Is no Hindrance along Major Road)." He then urged the North Koreans to try to resolve pending matters in the spirit of mutual concession and cooperation.

The South produced a compromise plan on the format of the talks, itineraries, the time of notification and procedures for travel back and forth. North Korea, showing an affirmative response to the compromise plan, set forth a revised plan closer in content to the South's, making the

talks' prospects bright.

With respect to the itineraries North Korea was preparing, the South suggested that:

- Itineraries be worked out with emphasis on the summit meeting itself;

- On any visits to specific places by the South's President, he be always accompanied by the North's President;

- At least one of the summit sessions be held at the place where the South's President would be staying; and

- Arrangements be made so that the South's President could host a return dinner.

On the dispatch of advance parties, the South elaborated that the first advance team would be an “on-the-spot observation team” with the simple duty of observing the programs and discussing working-level matters, while the duty of the second advance team would be in accord with what the North Koreans were mentioning. The South said that since the members of the second advance team would be included in the number of overall attendants, there would be no particular difference except that they would visit the North several days ahead of the visit by the main party.

Here, the North offered a compromise plan, suggesting that the first advance team comprise 10 persons, observe the site of programs and discuss working-level matters, that the team be named a “working-level contact” and the duration of its visit be three nights and four days from July 13 to July 16. It said that the second team, also comprising 10 persons, should be dispatched on July 20, five days ahead of the visit.

Regarding security, the North suggested that relevant officials discuss the issues of South Korean security agents' activities, joint South-North security programs and security equipment during a working-level contact, whereas the South wanted to have contacts between “responsible working-level officials” in the areas of security and communications at Panmunjom in addition to contacts between working-level officials on site, that is, in Pyongyang.

The two sides agreed to have a communications working-level contact at Peace House, Panmunjom, on July 7 and a security working-level contact at Tongilkak, Panmunjom, on July 8.

In connection with the question of television relays, the South asked the North to allow the introduction of relay vans, generator-vehicles and equipment carriers and to guarantee the activities of 20 broadcast technicians. The

North promised to furnish on a priority basis all the facilities necessary for satellite broadcasting, such as relay vans and equipment, to which the South agreed.

Working-level procedures related to a summit meeting were thus agreed in all areas.

But, the course of such agreement was not always smooth. This was because the North tried to reduce as much as possible the number of advance party members, and failed to follow general practices related to summit talks in such issues as communications and television relays.

The text of the agreement on working-level procedures for a South-North summit meeting read as follows:

*Agreement on the Procedures for Holding
Summit Meetings between the South and the North*

According to the Agreement on South-North Summit Meeting made at a deputy-prime-minister-level preliminary contact of June 28, 1994, the South and the North had a delegates contact to prepare for a South-North Summit Meeting at Panmunjom on July 1-2, 1994 and agreed on working-level procedural matters as follows;

The Composition and Size of the Delegation

a) The southern delegation will be composed of 100 members.

b) The number of the members of the news media to travel with the southern delegation will be 80.

Format of the Summit Meetings

a) The summit meetings will be one-on-one sessions between the top leaders of both sides.

b) Two to three aides and a minutes taker from each side will attend the summit meetings.

The Itinerary

a) The southern delegation will stay in the North for two nights and three days. However, the length of stay may be extended if necessary.

b) The North will transmit a detailed proposed itinerary to the South 15 days prior to the visit via the South-North Liaison Offices; the itinerary will be finalized by consultation between the two sides.

Working-Level Sessions and Dispatch of Advance Parties

a) To discuss matters related to security, protocol, communications and media coverage, 17 working-level delegates from each side will meet in Pyongyang for three nights and four days from July 13-16. Prior to this, three working-level delegates from each side will meet at 10 a. m. on July 8 at Tong-ilgak(the Unification Pavilion) in the northern sector of Panmunjom to discuss security matters; and three working-level delegates from each side will meet at 10 a. m. on July 7 in the Peace House in the southern sector of Panmunjom to discuss communications matters.

b) The South will dispatch a 25-member advance party to the North three days prior to the visit by its delegation. The advance party

will remain in the North until the summit meetings are concluded.

c) The itineraries in the North of the working-level delegates and the advance party from the South will be worked out by consultation between the two sides promptly upon their arrival in the North.

Travel by the Southern Delegation

a) The South will deliver the roster of the members of the summit delegation to the North seven days prior to its visit to the North. In the case of working-level delegates and the advance party, their rosters will be delivered to the North four days prior to their visits to the North. The rosters will include names, sex, positions and photographs. If and when there are personnel changes after the rosters have been delivered, the South will first inform the North by hot-line telephone and send written notification via the South-North Liaison Offices.

b) The southern delegation will enter the North through Panmunjom and will use motor vehicles provided by the North to travel in the North.

Provision of Conveniences

a) The North will provide the visiting southern personnel with room and board, transportation, communications, medical care and all other necessary conveniences.

b) The southern delegation will comply with the guidance and directions by the North during its stay in the North.

c) While the southern personnel stay in the North, the North will ensure that their pouches will be transported to the South twice daily.

Guarantee of Personal Safety

a) The North will deliver to the South a written guarantee of the personal safety of the visiting southern personnel signed by its Premier

via the South-North Liaison Offices three days prior to their visit.

b) The North will guarantee the inviolability of the personal effects of the visiting southern personnel.

Identifications of Members of the Entourage and the Media

a) Each side will adopt as it sees fit the identification tags for the members of its entourage.

b) Members of the news media will wear press arm bands.

c) The members of the entourage and the news media from the South shall bear identifications issued by its Prime Minister.

Signs for Summit Venues and Provision of Facilities

a) There will not be any sign posted for the venues of the summit meetings and related events(including the accommodation).

b) No other facilities will be installed at the venues of the summit meeting other than those which are needed for the meetings.

c) The North will install communications facilities for use by the southern delegation at the venues of the summit meetings and related events(including the accommodations).

Recording the Proceedings of the Summit

Each side may record the proceedings of the summit meetings by any means that it prefers, such as stenography, audio recording or video recording.

Media Coverage of the Summit

a) The news media from each side may cover the summit meetings as they see fit. Joint press releases may be prepared and issued as needed.

b) The North will guarantee the South on a top priority basis the necessary facilities and personnel to enable it to broadcast the events live and will make transmission lines and satellite channels available for

sending out television programming.

News Gathering

a) The North will ensure the news gathering activities of the members of the southern media during their stay in the North.

b) Both sides will endeavor to ensure accurate and fair reportage.

Other Practical Matters

a) During its stay in the North, the southern delegation will make use of the existing telephone hot line between Seoul and Pyongyang.

b) Other practical matter that may arise will comply with the precedents set for the South-North High-Level Talks [between the Prime Ministers].

Effectuation of This Agreement

This Agreement will enter into force on the day it is signed and handed between the two parties.

July 2, 1994

Yoon Yeo-joon

Paek Nam-jun

Delegate to Deputy Prime

Delegate to Deputy Prime

Ministers Preparatory

Ministers Preparatory

Session on Holding

Session on Holding

a South-North Summit

a South-North Summit

6. Working-Level Officials Contacts on Communications and Security

a. Communications Working-Level Contact

In accordance with the agreement reached at the working-level contacts to prepare for a summit meeting, a South-North communications working-level contact took place at Peace House, Panmunjom on July 7, 1994. The contact, held behind closed doors, was attended by three officials from each side.

The two sides concretely discussed and agreed on many of the basic matters raised, such as television relays, use of direct South-North telephone circuits and use of portable satellite communications telephone sets, with unsettled items set to be discussed further at a working-level contact taking place in Pyongyang beginning July 13.

b. Security Working-Level Contact

A security working-level contact took place at Tongilkak in the northern sector of Panmunjom on July 8 pursuant to the agreement made at the working-level

contact. The contact, which was not open to the public, was attended by three officials from each side.

The two sides agreed on most issues related to security including the extent and method of security during the South Korean President's stay in Pyongyang, and agreed to discuss those on which they differed at a working-level contact slated for July 13 in Pyongyang.

7. Postponement of Summit Meeting

The South Korean government had made steady efforts to facilitate the proposed summit talks by, for instance, positively launching a rectangular diplomacy toward the United States, Japan, Russia and China with a view to enhancing conditions for the date and other matters of the summit talks.

As working-level issues on the summit were resolved thanks to efforts mostly by the Seoul government, the government could smell success as relevant agencies prepared for the talks.

Joint inter-Korean preparatory schedules, too, were going on as planned. Communications and security officials contacts took place on July 7 and 8 as scheduled in a smooth

and cooperative atmosphere.

Under a working-level agreement, the South delivered a list of the officials taking part in the July 13-16 working-level contact in Pyongyang to the North at Panmunjom on July 9 and the North, in return, handed to the South a memorandum guaranteeing the visitors' personal safety, which was signed by the North's premier.

On the morning of the same day, South Korean broadcasting reports said the Central Broadcasting Station of North Korea would make a special announcement at noon when noon came, North Korean television and radio reported the death of President Kim Il-sung.

North Korea informed the South on July 11, 1994 that the summit meeting would have to be postponed because of an incident. The notification was made in a cordial letter signed by Kim Yong-sun, the chief delegate to the preliminary contact for a South-North summit, and addressed to the South's Deputy Prime Minister Lee Hong-koo. The summit talks were thus put off indefinitely.

Afterwards, the South Korean government expressed the view that the inter-Korean agreement on a summit meeting remained effective, disclosing the basic stand that since the talks were postponed due to a North Korean development, they could resume with the North's

notification of such a wish.

South-North talks should resume at an early date in all sectors. Of them, a summit meeting can take place at any time when the North informs the South inasmuch as all preparations had in effect been completed.

The text of the North Korean message which notified the South of the postponement of the summit talks is as follows:

I hereby notify your side that the South-North summit meeting will have to be postponed due an incident in our side as was already made known through important reports.

Part II

Three-Stage Unification Formula for the Creation of Korean National Community



President Kim Young-sam announces a new unification formula in his commemorative address marking the 49th anniversary of national liberation.

Part II

Three-Stage Unification Formula for the Creation of Korean National Community

*-Declaration by President Kim Young-sam in His
Commemorative Address on 49th Liberation Day*

In his commemorative address made at a ceremony marking the 49th anniversary of national liberation on August 15, 1994, President Kim Young-sam set forth his government's comprehensive unification formula envisaging the concrete basic philosophy, principles and process of unification.

Declaring that a “competition for system between the South and the North has already been completed,” President Kim stressed the importance of achieving unification via the method of liberal democracy.

“Unification should be based on human-centered liberal democracy rather than on any ideology centered on classes or groups,” the President said.

The speech might well have displayed the strong confidence of the President, who had earned liberal democracy through struggles for democratization as well as the South Korean people's wish that liberal democracy be spread even to the northern area.

1. Introduction

During the first half of the 20th century, Korea lost its independence and suffered great frustration and humiliation due to its failure to muster its inherent national capabilities to cope with the changing international situation. Furthermore, the land remains tragically divided although nearly five decades have passed since it was liberated from colonial subjugation. Korea thus continues to be the last battlefield of the Cold War which has ended throughout the rest of the world.

As the 20th century approaches its close, however, the course of national history is facing a potentially great turning point amid enormous changes now sweeping the globe.

Externally, a new world order oriented toward freedom and welfare for all in an open global community is emerging following the collapse of the Communist bloc and the consequent East-West reconciliation. The world trend is toward greater respect for human dignity and closer international cooperation for peace and prosperity. The international community is now driven chiefly by an ever more intense pursuit of practical interests through borderless economic competition.

Internally, democracy has spread firm and deep into Korean soil following the birth of the current civilian democratic Administration in February 1993. The intrinsic national spirit is being revived and the groundwork is being laid for propelling the nation onto the center stage of the 21st century. Reforms have been carried out throughout society, spurring steady growth in national might. This has enhanced the people's confidence that it will be possible to usher in a new era of national unity.

Relations between South and North Korea are bound to enter into a new phase following the death of Kim Il-sung who had ruled North Korea for nearly five decades. Having run into the limitations of its socialist system that has led to increasing international isolation and mounting economic woes, North Korea will almost certainly have to attempt a

major transition as it readjusts its post-Kim power structure.

The new global trends and anticipated in intra-Korean relations dictate that the nation pool its determination and energies to build a unified homeland of blooming democracy and brimming prosperity before the present century is out. Keeping a close watch on the shifting environment of the Korean Peninsula, President Kim has just enunciated a comprehensive and forward-looking unification policy that has been developed with greater confidence in the future of the nation after listening to the opinions of all segments of society.

2. Image of Unified Fatherland

The unified fatherland the South Korean people seek to attain is a country which is rooted in the national tradition and culture and which guarantees each individual's happiness and national prosperity.

The basic values that form the basis of this vision are liberty, well-being and human dignity.


The word "liberty" here means that pain and inconveniences stemming from national division dissipate; self-rule and the creativity of all people are respected; and

political and economic freedom is ensured.

“Well-being” refers to the creation of an affluent economy through the substantial expansion of all-out national capacity and the equal distribution of its fruits among all the people.

The word “human dignity” means the removal of human suffering and oppression deriving from division and respect for human rights based on statutory order and justice.

The unified fatherland the Korean people should attain is a single national community in which everyone becomes master, that is, a state where each individual's liberty, well-being and human dignity are ensured, a state which would play a leading role in the coming Asia-Pacific age, and a great, advanced democratic state contributing to world peace and co-prosperity of mankind.



3. National Community Unification Formula

The South Korean government, in the President's National Liberation Day message on August 15, 1994, proclaimed a National Community Unification Formula featuring the process of "reconciliation and cooperation, a South-North Commonwealth and a unified state."

The formula is designed to realize "unification that allows all people to live well," which is to be achieved through a peaceful and phased way.

The new unification formula, consistent in nature with past unification formulas, sets forth a three-stage process of unification based on man-centered liberal democracy and featuring the principles of liberty, peace and democracy.

Stage of Reconciliation and Cooperation

This is a stage where the South and North enter into a relationship of reconciliation and cooperation instead of hostility and confrontation.

To this end, the South and the North in this stage must build up mutual trust by, as they pledged in the Basic South-North Agreement, recognizing each other's system and energizing multi-pronged exchanges and cooperation.

Also in this stage, the two sides, as they carry out inter-Korean accords like the Basic Agreement, shall resolve such humanitarian issues as the question of arranging reunions of dispersed families.

Stage of South-North Commonwealth

This is a stage where the South and the North restore and further develop their economic, social and cultural links through co-prosperity and consolidation of peace.

At this stage, the South and the North would realize a common national living sphere as an intra-national special relationship, not as state-to-state relations.

Also in this stage, the South and the North would jointly form an organization where the two sides would discuss various ways of political integration while South and North parliamentary delegates work out a unified constitution.


Stage of Unified State

This is a stage where unification into a single state within one nation is accomplished.

At this stage, the South and the North realize political

integration by forming a unified legislature and government under democratic procedures based on a unified Constitution, thus accomplishing complete unification featuring a single government and system of a single state within one nation.

Process of Unification



Comparison between the Unification Formulae of South and North Korea

North Korea's unification formula for creating a Democratic Confederation of Koryo is prone to perpetuating

national division rather than achieving unification since it lacks detailed explanations about an interim process and aims to create two governments and two systems in a single state.

The National Community Unification Formula being advocated by South Korea, however, is more realistic and reasonable since it pursues a completely unified state featuring one system and a single government in a single state and since it calls for a phased approach in methodology.

Comparison Between the Unification Formulae of South and North Korea

	South	North
Name of the formula	Korea National Community Unification Formula	Formula for Creating a Democratic Confederation of Koryo (an old name for Korea)
Basic philosophy	Based on the values of freedom and democracy	Juche[self-reliance] ideology (a variation on Stalinism)
Unification Process	In 3 phases: reconciliation and cooperation-a Korean commonwealth-a unified single nation-state Emphasis is on building a single national community leading to full unity	Gradual completion of a confederation Emphasis is on developing the structure of a unified state
Interim arrangement	Korean commonwealth	None

How to found a unified Korea	By democratic general elections in both the South and the North under the constitution of a unified Korea	Through negotiation at a conference of delegates from political and civic groups
Format of a unified Korea	A unified single nation-state with one system and one government	A confederation of two states, each with its own system and government
Vision of a unified Korea	Advanced democratic country ensuring freedom, welfare and human dignity for all	None
Prime mover behind unification	Entire Korean people	Proletariat

4. Basic Aims

a. Initiatives for Ending Division

The basic purpose of President Kim Young-sam's Liberation Day speech was to express the nation's determination to turn the 50th Liberation Day in 1995 into the catalyst for ushering in an "era of the 70 million Korean people living under one roof." He suggested that the Republic confidently work toward that goal on the strength of its national might that has been built up thus far, as well as on the legitimacy and moral authority of the present

democratic civilian Government.

Looking back, Korea was made to suffer humiliation and frustration under foreign colonial rule during the first half of the 20th century. Subsequently, the Korea people have had to suffer until the present the pain of division, aggravated by a fratricidal war, under the Cold War regime. Though patriotic Korean ancestors all yearned for a unified and independent country on this land, the nation has been unable to end the nearly 50 years of division—a major drain on national resources and energies.

Now that the competition between the South and the North over which can build a better society has already been decided, it is high time to pool the nation's determination and energies to confidently strive toward the goal of creating a new, truly democratic and prosperous, unified Korea before the present century is over. President Kim said that the nation should take the initiative and endeavor to shape a great future for the entire Korean people so that they will be able to stand tall and proud at the center stage of world civilization in the next century.

His vision seems to be shared by a large majority of the

people. A poll conducted in July 1994 showed that 85.9 percent of ordinary South Koreans of 20 years of age or older and 91.4 percent of the members of the Advisory Council on Democratic and Peaceful Unification believed that unification will be possible within 10 years. By comparison, in a similar survey conducted in June 1993, only 43.9 percent of the respondents said unification would be possible within 10 years.

b. Turning Changes into Opportunities

North Korea is now in a state of flux following the death of Kim Il-sung, its only leader for the past half century. In consequence, it appears inevitable that South-North relations will now enter into a new phase. This should offer the Republic an unprecedented opportunity to take a new initiative and actively transform South-North relations. To that end, it has become imperative to comprehensively reexamine and redefine the Republic's existing unification policy, as well as its policy toward the North in order to set clear-cut guidelines for future endeavors toward national unity.

The thrust of the new policies is to outgrow the past passive and defensive policies toward North Korea and to present it with a clear vision of a unified Korea, as well as well-defined and forward-looking unification formula designed to ensure well-being and prosperity for all Koreans. In that way, it should be possible to induce North Korea to change and reform itself so that the two side can move together toward that goal.

Thus, the 1994 Liberation Day speech by Preside Kim enunciated in concrete terms the Republic's immediate policy toward the North, as well as the basic concept and major components of its unification policy. At the same time, he urged the nation to make thorough preparations for unification. On the basis of the new policy concepts, it has now become possible for the ROK Government to work out multi-faceted and all-inclusive steps to make the most of every opening for improving intra-Korean relations, while keeping a close eye on further developments in the North, including the process of succession to power.

In the above-mentioned poll in July 1994, 77.4 percent of ordinary South Koreans of the age of 20 or older and 92.4 percent of the members of the Advisory Council on

Democratic and Peaceful Unification said that the Republic's policy toward North Korea must be changed in view of the demise of Kim Il-sung.

c. Freedom and Democracy Basic to Unification

President Kim's Liberation Day speech made it clear that the philosophy behind the Republic's unification policy is rooted in the values of freedom and democracy. World history has proclaimed the victory of freedom and democracy following the collapse of Communism in the Soviet bloc. The contest for the hearts and minds of people between the two opposed ideologies has ended. Nowadays, freedom and democracy are prevailing as universal values.

Over the past century, the Korean people have also consistently pursued the goal of an independent, free, democracy and prosperous country. They have tirelessly struggled for the twin goals of economic development and democratization against all odds and have finally achieved both. The Republic of Korea is now widely regarded as a model for emerging countries.

Through the Liberation Day address, it was made crystal clear that the values of freedom and democracy must be embodied in both the unification process and a unified Korea. At the same time, President Kim declared that any challenges to the Republic's free and democratic system, especially from such pro-North Korean and radical groups as Jusapa the student group committed to Juche(self-reliance) ideology developed by Kim Il-sung will not be tolerated. He expressed a firm determination as the chief executive to defend freedom and democracy at any cost.

d. Every Korean Must Pull Together

The Government of President Kim defines the basic principles that must be upheld in pursuing unification as independence, peace and democracy. In this way, consistency with the unification policy of the former administration is maintained.

Still, the new Administration's unification policy places greater emphasis on the freedom and democratic participation of all individual citizens. This is in keeping with the fact that the basic philosophy behind that policy is

rooted in the values of freedom and democracy. In particular, the redirected unification policy stresses that unification must be realized through democratic procedures that guarantee each and every Korean the the opportunities to participate in the process, and that a unified Korea must be a democratic country to which every Korean truly belongs.

In fact, the principle of “grand national unity” set forth in the South-North Joint Communiqué of July 4, 1972, calls for democratic unification on the strength of the freedom and rights of all Koreans. This is in agreement with the principle of democracy as described in the unification policy of the Kim Young Sam Administration.

e. Restoring a National Community

For many past centuries until they were artificially divided in 1945, the Korean people lived in a single national community. This age-old sense of community still binds all Koreans together. It explains why Korea must be reunified and is indeed the motivating power for unification.

The Republic has consistently maintained the position

that through interaction and cooperation, the South and the North must restore and develop a single national community leading to a unified democratic state committed to public welfare. This concept of a single national community is focused more on how to ensure that the entire Korean people will live together under one roof than on how to distribute power or how to develop the structure of a unified state. In that way, the Korean National Community Unification Formula envisions that through the process of building a single national community to bring the South and the North together, the conditions necessary for political unification will also be created, leading to the completion of a single unified nation - state.

The concept of a national community proposed by the South and that of a confederation proposed by the North are compared in the following table.

<p>The concept of a National Community proposed by the South is focused on:</p>	<p>The concept of a Confederation proposed by the North focused on:</p>
<p>How to ensure that the entire Korean people will live together under one roof</p>	<p>How to distribute power</p>

freedom, democracy and the well-being of all	the interests of a specific class and groups
Building a single national community	Developing the structure of a unified state

f. The Three Phases of the Unification Process

The 1994 Liberation Day speech by President Kim systematized the various basic ideas about unification that had been voiced on many occasions since the birth of his new Administration about a year and a half before.

The kernel of the unification policy of the Republic has shifted away from territorial, legal and political unification in a single step and toward phased and progressive integration by way of the restoration and development of a single national community that has broken down due to prolonged hostility and confrontation between the two parts of Korea. This new phased approach to unification was first adopted by the Republic in the initial version of the Korean National Community Unification Formula laid down in September 1989.

Soon after its birth in early 1993, the new democratic

civilian Administration unveiled a three-phase unification formula calling first for South-North reconciliation and cooperation, next for the formation of a Korean commonwealth and lastly for the completion of a single, unified nation-state. While preserving the basic framework of the initial Korean National Community Unification Formula, this modified plan was designed to facilitate the implementation of the Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression and Exchanges and Cooperation (commonly called the South-North Basic Agreement) and the South-North Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, both of which entered into force on February 19, 1992. This was why the first phase of the unification process was defined as the “phase of reconciliation and cooperation.”

Thereafter, however, there arose a need to elaborate on the basic philosophy behind the new Administration's unification formula, as well as the vision of a unified Korea. Moreover, the name, “the Three-Phased Unification Formula,” also had the connotations of emphasizing only the technicalities of the unification process, rather than its substance.

The new Administration thus decided to further

develop and refine its unification formula, taking into account the recent changes in the international situation in general and the environment of South-North relations in particular. It also decide to more clearly define the basic philosophy and principles of unification and the vision of a unified Korea. It also readopted the name, “the Korean National Community Unification Formula,” which best described the thrust of the formula.

g. Dealing with the New North Korean Regime

As President Kim said in his 1994 Liberation Day speech, the process of succession to power in North Korea must not lead to destabilization on the Korea Peninsula. Now that Kim Il-sung's monolithic grip is gone, the North should be able to break out of its Cold War shell of self-imposed isolation and pursue reform and change in earnest. The new North Korean leadership should actively capitalize on the new global trends toward freedom, social welfare and openness.

President Kim thus called on the North to now take pragmatic approaches especially to South-North relations so that the two areas of Korea can work together to secure

durable peace and promote the economic well-being of the entire Korean people by harnessing their creative energies and capabilities. He thus expressed what is expected of the new North Korean regime, while describing the basic goals of the Administration's policy toward the North.

In other words, the President made it clear that the Republic will continue to uphold the concept of South-North relations being “a special interim relationship stemming from the process towards unification” as defined in the preamble to the South-North Basic Agreement and the pledge by the South and the North to “recognize and respect each other's system” as stated in Article 1 of that agreement.

The Republic's position that it does not want to unify Korea by absorbing the North was reiterated as part of the efforts to persuade Pyongyang to discard its futile ideological confrontation against the South.

h. Urging Shifts in the North's Policy Toward the South

In his Liberation Day speech, in addition to

enunciating the basic concept and goals of the Administration's unification policy, President Kim urged the North to change its policy toward the South so that the two parts of Korea will be able to resolve the issues pending between them. He made it clear once again that the doors will be kept open for dialogue at any time and any place.

The global trends toward freedom, social welfare and openness underline the Republic's unification policy centered on the restoration and development of a single Korean national community. This should make it easier for the South to pull the North into its embrace, rather than continuing to chase after it in vain.

To that end, President Kim called on the North to give up its ambitions to communize the South, to address human rights issues, including the issues of the numerous families separated by the partitioning of the Korean Peninsula and of the South Koreans who were abducted to the North and are now detained there, and to comply with the South-North Basic Agreement and the joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

In particular, it was announced once more that the transparency of North Korea's nuclear activities is ensured,

the Republic is prepared to support its development of the peaceful use of nuclear energy, including light-water reactor construction, by providing it with the necessary capital and technology. The North was urged to give up its isolationist adventurism coupled with its nuclear ambitions.

i. Outlining Joint Project for National Development

In his Liberation Day address, President Kim proposed that South-North joint projects be undertaken to facilitate the development of a single national community. He said that the first such project could be light-water nuclear reactor construction in the North in the event the nuclear issue is fully resolved.

Political and economic barriers are being lowered and even dismantled throughout the world so that nations can race into a new era of peace and prosperity. The world is now being driven chiefly by economic competition for greater practical interests, rather than by ideological or military rivalry.

The Korean people should also free themselves from the yoke of futile ideological confrontation so South-North

relations can be reoriented toward the goal of greater well-being for all. The South and the North should pull together to build an unified and truly advanced country in which public welfare is guaranteed and everyone lives well.

To that end, the two areas of Korea must promptly begin to cooperate to build an economic community designed to bring all the creative capabilities and energies of the Korean people into play. This will lead to a broader Korean national community and thus even greater well-being for the entire Korean people.

It was with that spirit that President Kim proposed South-North joint projects for national development, with light-water nuclear reactor construction in the North earmarked as the first of such projects. This idea was not conceived as a payoff for solving the nuclear issue.

j. Stepping Up Preparations for Unification

Unification no longer remains in the realm of a pipe dream or wishful thinking; it has now become a realistic goal, a feasible task. This calls for greater preparedness on

the part of the South for unification, including the buildup of its capabilities to accomplish the task, as well as its more active efforts to improve intra-Korean relations.

The German and Yemeni experiences show that unification abruptly realized without careful and systematic planning and preparations can lead to enormously adverse consequences, even a new and real national catastrophe.

Of course, the Administration has been pursuing a policy of progressive South-North integration, first to bring the two heterogeneous societies together into a single national community and further develop it so that a fully unified Korea can be built eventually. However, it would be unwise to rule out the possibility that unification can take place abruptly and unexpected against the wishes of the South. Accordingly, all possible scenarios must be examined and sufficient preparations made for any possible turn of events.


The most important way of preparing for unification is by translating the vision of a unified homeland into reality first in the South itself - that is to say, by developing South Korean society into a model democratic community. This

calls, among other things, for a clear understanding on the part of each and every citizen of what his or her duties, as well as rights, are. The public should also be fully prepared to share the pain cost of attaining the glorious goal of unification.

President Kim's Liberation Day speech was based on an acute awareness of all those implications and ramifications of the unification process. It was intended to prompt both the Government and the general public to think ahead and brace themselves for this momentous national task.

art III

Third Round of US-North Korea High-Level Talks



An aerial photo of nuclear facilities in the Yongbyon area of North Korea.

Part III
Third Round of
US-North Korea High-Level Talks

**1. Replacement of Fuel Rods by North Korea and
Withdrawal from the IAEA**

a. Replacement of Fuel Rods at 5MW Atomic
Reactor

On April 20, 1994, North Korea delivered a message to the IAEA Secretariat asking for the IAEA's observation of the replacement of fuel rods at its 5-megawatt atomic reactor at Yongbyon.

Earlier on April 4, North Korea voiced strong dissatisfaction with the statement issued on March 31 by the President of the United Nations Security Council. In a

statement by a Foreign Ministry spokesman, North Korea implied that it might arbitrarily replace the spent fuel by saying that it would be obliged to normalize “peaceful nuclear activities” which it had frozen to facilitate the third round of US-North Korea talks.

The issue of the IAEA's witnessing of fuel rod replacement had drawn much attention since it, along with the question of special inspections, was key to tracing the past nuclear activities of North Korea.

In other words, if special inspections of two undeclared facilities at Yongbyon amounted to a look at the end of plutonium extraction, observation of fuel rod replacement was likened to monitoring the start of the extraction of plutonium.

The North Koreans had asserted that since the 5-megawatt atomic reactor was put into operation in 1986, they had never replaced any fuel rods except for extracting 90 grams of plutonium from partially damaged fuel rods in 1989.

However, an analysis of nuclear materials samples obtained through six separate preliminary inspections by the IAEA had given rise to suspicion that North Korea might have extracted kilograms of plutonium on more than three occasions. It was thus confirmed that there was a major

discrepancy between the initial North Korean report to the IAEA and the outcome of IAEA inspections.

The issue of IAEA observation of fuel rod replacement had grown more important as such monitoring could serve to ensure the nuclear transparency of North Korea and determine the authenticity of its claim. But, it was doubtful if North Korea would accept the technical methods indispensable to such IAEA observation.

On April 24, 1994, an IAEA spokesman said the agency would not send any inspectors to North Korea unless North Korea allowed them to extract fuel rod samples. The IAEA sent a message to North Korea on April 27 asking for a guarantee of overall inspections so that it could fully verify the process of fuel rod replacement.

However, North Korea implied through many channels that it would replace fuel rods irrespective of IAEA observation.

On May 3, a spokesman for the North Korean Foreign Ministry said that the IAEA's desire to monitor fuel rods on a selective basis meant it wanted to conduct regular and random inspections in disregard of the special status of North Korea, which he said had temporarily suspended the effect of its withdrawal from the NPT. "We will not tolerate the IAEA attempt under any circumstances," the spokesman

said.

The spokesman went on to maintain that “if the IAEA refuses to accept our proposal and insists on their unreasonable demand to the end, we will be obliged to replace fuel rods under our own schedule.”

Again on May 6, 1994, North Korean Foreign Minister Kim Yong-nam sent a message to IAEA Director-General Hans Blix telling him that the IAEA demand on fuel was a matter of principle which North Korea could not tolerate so long as it had special status. “If there occurs an abnormal event like a halt to the functioning of surveillance equipment due to unreasonable acts on the part of the IAEA, we will not be responsible for the grave consequence resulting therefrom,” Kim said.

In reaction, the IAEA said the North Korean foreign minister's message was far from satisfying the minimum IAEA demand and said it would not send inspectors to North Korea.

On May 12, 1994, Pak Yong-nam, director of North Korea's General Bureau of Atomic Energy, said that “North Korea had no way but to replace fuel rods on its own as the IAEA refused to send inspectors by posing unreasonable conditions.” As North Korea thus informed the IAEA of the start of fuel rod replacement, the North Korean nuclear

question had entered yet a new phase.

b. Issue of Separate Storage and Later Measurement of Spent Nuclear Fuel

The IAEA dispatched inspectors to North Korea from May 17-24 to make an additional inspection of the Radiochemical Laboratory in Yongbyon and to determine whether the replacement of fuel rods at the 5-megawatt atomic reactor had started. The inspectors completed the additional inspection but were barred by North Korea from obtaining samples of spent fuel.

IAEA delegates, who were visiting Pyongyang to discuss the issue of observing fuel rod replacement, talked with North Korean officials from May 25-27 on the question of whether to measure spent fuel rods at a later time.

In the discussion, the IAEA offered various means of verifying the fuel's history and of later measuring fuel rod samples to determine if the rods used were the first fuel for the reactor. The ideas set forth included the selection and separate storage of spent fuel. But, the North Koreans stuck to their position that since they held a "unique status," they could not accept the verification measures advanced by the

IAEA.

Meanwhile, U.S. Nuclear Ambassador Robert Gallucci said in a press conference on May 26 that if later measurement of spent fuel was impossible due to the failure to reach an agreement on the selection of fuel samples and their separate storage as demanded by the IAEA, the entire third round of US-North Korea talks would break off and the North Korean nuclear question would have to be turned over to the U.N. Security Council.

IAEA Director-General Hans Blix forwarded a report on North Korea's replacement of fuel rods to the United Nations Secretary-General on May 27, 1994.

In the report, the IAEA said that almost half of the fuel rods in the reactor had been withdrawn as of that time and that the extraction was made in a way which eliminated the chance for fulfilling overall safety measures as required by the IAEA.

The report warned that if future extraction were carried on at the same pace, the IAEA's ability to select and store spent fuel rods for later measurement would disappear in a few days. It said that if this actually happened, the IAEA would not be in a position to verify that North Korean nuclear materials were in safe condition.

In this connection, the U.N. Security Council adopted

a Presidential statement on May 30 expressing serious concern about the report by the IAEA Director-General. The statement urged North Korea to replace fuel rods in a way that retains the technical ability to measure spent fuel, and called for immediate discussion between the IAEA and North Korea on necessary technical measures.

Following is the text of the UNSC President's statement:

The Security Council recalls the statement made by the President of the Council on 8 April 1993(S/25562) and 31 March 1994(S/PRST/1994/13) and its relevant resolution.

The council has noted the fact that the DPRK has allowed the International Atomic Energy Agency(IAEA) inspectors to complete the inspection activities agreed between the IAEA and the DPRK on 15 February 1994, thus taking one step in fulfilling its obligations under the IAEA-DPRK safeguards agreement and in honoring its non-proliferation obligations under the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

The council reaffirms the critical importance of IAEA safeguards in the implementation of the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and the contribution which progress in non-proliferation makes to the main tenancy of international peace and security.

The council has considered the letter from the director general of the IAEA to the secretary-general 27 May 1994, and is gravely concerned by the IAEA's assessment that if the discharge operation at

the 5-megawatt reactor continues at the same rate, the IAEA's opportunity to select segregate and secure fuel rods for later measurements in accordance with IAEA standards will be lost within days. The council strongly urges the DPRK only to proceed with the discharge operation at the 5-megawatt reactor in a manner which preserves the technical possibility of fuel measurements, in accordance with the IAEA's requirements in this regard.

The council calls for immediate consultations between the IAEA and the DPRK on the necessary technical measures.

The council requests the Director General of the IAEA to maintain IAEA inspectors in the DPRK to monitor activities at the 5-megawatt reactor.

The council decides to remain actively seized of the matter and that further security council consideration will take place if necessary in order to achieve full implementation of IAEA/DPRK safeguards agreement.

As the U.N. Security Council called for negotiations between the IAEA and North Korea on necessary technical matters, the IAEA on May 31 offered new ideas for the replacement of atomic reactor fuel rods.

The technical method which the IAEA suggested to North Korea was related to determining the location of fuel necessary for verifying the history of 5-megawatt reactor fuel rods, a method which was the last available way of

determining whether nuclear fuel was diverted for military use in the past.

But North Korea, in a statement issued by the spokesman for the General Bureau of Atomic Energy on June 2, denounced the May 27 IAEA report to the U.N. Security Council on the replacement of fuel rods, reiterating that it could not allow the storage of some fuel rods at least until the country's special status was removed. It then warned that if the IAEA declared that there was no longer any technical room for later measurement of fuel rods, then North Korea would take decisive counter steps.

In the end, IAEA Director-General Hans Blix reported to the U.N. Security Council on June 2, 1994 that it had become impossible for his IAEA to select fuel rods for use in later measurement that would determine whether the nuclear fuel from the North's 5-megawatt atomic reactor had been diverted for military use in the past. The IAEA thus formally confirmed the "impossibility of later measurement of North Korean nuclear fuel."

As against the IAEA conclusion that it had become impossible to measure North Korean nuclear fuel at a later time, there arose some contentions arguing that it was still possible to do so. The contentions, based on a North Korean assertion, were that later measurement was possible and that

all the spent fuel rods, instead of selected ones, could be gauged at a later time.

The North Korean argument was that since the entire process of fuel rod replacement had been recorded by its experts, the original locations the rods could be re-enacted if necessary. But, the efficacy of this method was questionable since the possibility of intentional mis-recording or the fabrication of fuel rod location could not be ruled out.

It is also questionable whether North Korea will actually allow all of the 8,010 fuel rods withdrawn to be measured in view of its rejection of the gauging even of selected rods. Besides, it is technically problematic to restore such a large number of fuel rods to their respective locations.

It therefore should be concluded that it has become impossible to measure the spent fuel from the North Korean 5-megawatt atomic reactor at a later date in view of the judgement and decision of the IAEA, an international organization whose authority and reliability are duly recognized in terms of objectivity, fairness, technology and dependability.

c. North Korea's Withdrawal from IAEA

In a special statement issued on June 2, 1994 in connection with North Korea's declaration that the IAEA wouldn't be allowed to measure its nuclear fuel rods in the future, the U.S. Department of State said that it was cancelling all plans to hold a third round of U.S.-North Korea high-level talks and that the issue of imposing sanctions against North Korea should be taken up as soon as possible.

IAEA Director-General Hans Blix said in a report to a regular IAEA Board of Directors meeting on June 6 that “the overall objective of the Nuclear Safeguards Agreement could not be obtained” because North Korea unilaterally replaced atomic reactor fuel rods in addition to rejecting special inspections of its two undeclared facilities at Yongbyon.

IAEA spokesman, David Kyd, formally announced on June 9 the completion of the replacement of reactor fuel rods in North Korea, saying that “we have missed the only available opportunity to decipher their past nuclear activities as they have in effect completed the removal of spent nuclear fuel.”

Under the circumstances, the IAEA Board of Directors

meeting on June 10 voted overwhelmingly for a resolution calling for sanctions against North Korea as a primary measure. The vote was 28 for and one (Libya) against with four (China, India, Lebanon and Syria) abstaining.

DPRK Resolution
(GOV/2741/Add. 1)

The Board of Governors,

(a) Recalling the Board of Governors Resolutions GOV/2636 of 25 February 1993, GOV/2639 of 19 March 1993, GOV/2645 of 1 April 1993, GOV/2692 of 23 September 1993, and GOV/2711 of 21 March 1994, and the General Conference's Resolution GC(XXXVII)/RES/624 of 1 October 1993 finding the Democratic People's Republic of Korea(DPRK) to be in non-compliance with its safeguard agreement(INFCIRC/403),

(b) Taking account of the fact that DPRK remains a party to the NPT and is therefore bound by its safeguards obligations,

(c) Recalling also that the Board, in accordance with the Statute and the safeguards agreement between the DPRK and the IAEA, has reported the DPRK's non-compliance to the United Nations Security Council on 1 April 1993 and on 22 March 1994, as the organ bearing the main responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security,

(d) Noting with deep regret the Director General's written and

oral reports of 2 June 1994 and 3 June 1994 and his statement to the Board on 7 June 1994 in which he reported that the limited opportunity which remained for the IAEA to select, segregate and secure fuel rods from the DPRK's 5-megawatt reactor for later measurements in accordance with Agency standards has been lost, and that the Agency's ability to ascertain, with sufficient confidence, whether nuclear material from the reactor had been diverted in the past had also been lost,

(e) Recalling further the 30 May 1994 Statement by the President of the Security Council, particularly the request to the IAEA Director General to maintain IAEA inspectors in the DPRK to monitor activities at the 5-megawatt reactor,

(f) Noting also that the Agency has been able to perform certain safeguards activities in the DPRK and Director General's reaffirmation that the Secretariat remains available to conduct inspection activities as required by its safeguards agreement with the DPRK or requested by the United Nations Security Council,

(1) Deplores the DPRK's failure to implement essential elements of resolutions of the Board and the General Conference concerning its non-compliance with its safeguards agreement (INFCIRC/403);

(2) Finds that the DPRK continues to widen its non-compliance with its safeguards agreement by taking actions which prevent the Agency from verifying the history of the reactor core and ascertaining whether nuclear material from the reactor had been diverted in past years;

(3) Strongly supports and commends the tireless efforts by the Director General and the Secretariat to implement the safeguards agreement;

(4) Calls on the DPRK immediately to extend full cooperation to the IAEA secretariat, in particular by providing access to all safeguards-relevant information and location;

(5) Encourages the Director General to continue his efforts to implement fully safeguards agreement and, in particular, to retain all IAEA safeguards measures effectively in place, and to make available safeguards inspectors and equipment in the DPRK as requested by the United Nations Security Council;

(6) Decides, in conformity with the provisions of Article VII. c. of the Statute, to suspend non-medical assistance to the DPRK being provided by the Agency;

(7) Requests the Director General to transmit this resolution to all members of the Agency and the Security Council and the General Assembly of the United Nations; and

(8) Remains seized of the matter and requests the Director General promptly to report all relevant development on this issue to the Board.

As the world community was moving toward sanctions over the North Korean nuclear question, North Korea declared in a statement by a Foreign Ministry spokesman on June 13, 1994 it was withdrawing from the IAEA, and formally notified the United States, the country with which the IAEA Charter has been deposited, thereof on June 14.

In the statement, North Korea said it was leaving the IAEA and would not undergo any further inspections due to its special status. Saying that it was an unavoidable option for North Korea to respond to expanded sanctions by hostile forces with expanded self-defense measures, the statement stated it would regard any United Nations sanction as a declaration of war.

Following is the full text of the statement by the North Korean Foreign Ministry spokesman:

The Secretariat of the International Atomic Energy Agency, licking the heels of the United States' policy to strangulate (North) Korea, has recently perpetrated an act gravely violating the dignity and sovereignty of our Republic.

A regular Board of Directors meeting of the International Atomic Energy Agency on last June 10 adopted a totally unfounded resolution suspending the Agency's cooperation with our country in its demand for the opening of our military sites in connection with the nuclear question.

This is an express sanction by the Agency against us and in essence a prelude to United Nations sanctions.

With the fabricated decision as momentum, the conspiracy by the United States and some sectors of the Secretariat of the Agency to isolate and strangulate our Republic under the cloak of resolving the nuclear question, has finally entered the stage of implementation.

As is already known, we have hitherto made all available well-intentioned efforts to display the transparency of our nuclear activities even under our special status.

But, the more IAEA inspections we receive, the more intense the pressure and complexity against us grow. The safety and sovereignty of our Republic are increasingly threatened.

Some sectors of the Secretariat of the Agency have been escalating schemes to strangle our Republic in disregard of all the good intentions and magnanimity we have showed. They have gone so far as to sanction us this time.

This is the overt revelation of the attempt by the United States and IAEA Secretariat to infringe upon our sovereignty and strangle us taking advantage of inspections.

Today when some sectors of the IAEA Secretariat have chosen to take nakedly forcible measures, the conclusion at which we have arrived is that the longer we remain in the unfair framework of the Agency, the greater pressures against us will become. Our peaceful nuclear activities, too, would be undermined that much more.

Our people are not the kind of people who swallow humiliation in the face of their national sovereignty and dignity being trampled upon.

The recent demand by the IAEA Secretariat for overall IAEA inspections with the threat of sanctions constitutes an unbearable insult to our people who regard their sovereignty as their life.

The more threats or sanctions they apply to us, the stronger our determination will become and the freer our peaceful nuclear activities will be.

The Foreign Ministry of the Democratic People's Republic of

Korea, acting on authority delegated, hereby pronounces that we have decided to take the following steps as the IAEA has taken unreasonable sanctions against us and haughty schemes to encroach even upon our military facilities.

First, we immediately withdraw from the International Atomic Energy Agency.

We declare null and void all those undue resolutions the Agency has adopted in connection with our problems. We shall not be bound by any regulations or decisions of the Agency in the future.

We can do without the Agency in developing our self-reliant nuclear power industry and expanding international cooperation in the area of nuclear activities.

Second, we hereby declare that the kind of inspections we had received under our special status to ensure the continuity of safeguards can no longer be made as of now.

Until the time when it is decided whether we shall return to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty or withdraw from it completely, we shall under no circumstances allow any undue inspections.

Under the circumstances, IAEA inspectors will no longer have anything to do in our country.

Third, we strongly reaffirm our position that we shall regard United Nations sanctions as a declaration of war against us.

Sanctions and dialogue cannot be compatible.

It is our inevitable choice to cope with expanded sanctions by hostile forces with self-defense measures.

This position of ours will by no means change until the nuclear question is resolved fairly through dialogue and negotiations.

We will carefully watch all future developments.

Reacting to the North Korean declaration to withdraw from the IAEA, the IAEA issued a statement on June 14 stressing that “obligations of the Nuclear Safeguards Agreement signed between members countries and the IAEA are one thing and IAEA membership is another.”

The statement was meant to affirm that withdrawal from the IAEA and departure from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) are separate things, and that since the Agreement North Korea signed with the IAEA would remain in force so long as North Korea remains a signatory to the NPT, North Korea's obligation to accept IAEA inspections remains unchanged even though it withdrew from the IAEA.

Meanwhile, the South Korean government, in an emergency unification and security policy meeting presided over by Deputy Prime Minister Lee Hong-koo on June 14, 1994, expressed deep concern that North Korea's withdrawal from the IAEA had made the nuclear question all the more difficult.

Also urging North Korea to cooperate in all safeguards measures required by the NPT system, the Seoul

government made clear it would continue to make unswerving and consistent efforts to bring about a peaceful resolution to the North Korean nuclear question.

2. Third Round of US-North Korea High-Level Talks

a. Background

At their summit meeting held in Washington on November 23, 1993, South Korea and the United States agreed to resolve the North Korean nuclear question using a thorough and broad approach, reaffirming that a third round of high-level US-North Korea talks would be held only in line with substantial progress in talks between the IAEA and North Korea as well as in inter-Korean dialogue.

It was based on this common understanding between South Korea and the United States that the United States agreed with North Korea—through seven working-level contacts from November 24, 1993 to January 4, 1994— that they could have a third round of high-level talks if North Korea agreed with the IAEA on the issue of inspecting the seven declared North Korean nuclear facilities including the

radiochemical laboratory and also if there was substantial progress in South-North dialogue.

After the IAEA-North Korea talks based on the Washington-Pyongyang agreement came to a successful end on February 15, 1994, the United States and North Korea had two working-level contacts in New York from February 22 through 25 to agree on “four simultaneous measures.”

The four measures were 1)start of IAEA inspection of seven nuclear facilities at Yongbyon, 2)resumption of inter-Korean working-level contacts to discuss the proposed exchange of special envoys, 3)announcement of the conditional suspension of the '94 Team Spirit military exercise, and 4)opening of third round U.S. - North Korea talks in Geneva on March 21, 1994.

However, the third round of talks failed to take place as planned due to North Korea's rejection of IAEA inspections of its radiochemical laboratory and the breakup of South-North working-level contacts on the exchange of special envoys with its provocative remark that “Seoul would be turned into a sea of fire.”

Thereafter, international tension built up perilously over the North Korean nuclear question as the IAEA on June 10, 1994 adopted a sanctions resolution against North Korea following Pyongyang's replacement of fuel rods at its 5-

megawatt atomic reactor, and North Korea announced its withdrawal from the IAEA on June 13, 1994.

Meanwhile, former U.S. President Jimmy Carter, who visited Pyongyang on June 15, 1994 at the invitation of North Korea, said in an interview with Cable News Network(CNN) that North Korea expressed willingness to freeze its present nuclear development if the international community provided economic and technical assistance in the construction of light-water reactors.

In this connection, U.S. President Bill Clinton said in a special statement on June 16, 1994 that “if the North Korean offer was meant to suspend the existing nuclear program, it would represent progress on which we can pin some expectations and we can hold high-level talks with North Korea with pleasure.”

Thus the stage was set for the third round of U.S. - North Korea talks, which opened on July 8, 1994.

b. Third Round of US-North Korea High-Level Talks

The third round of U.S. -North Korea high-level talks, which had been suspended after their first meeting on July 8,

1994 due to the sudden death of Kim Il-sung, resumed in Geneva from August 5-12.

At the meeting, the two countries agreed on basic steps to finally resolve major pending issues, releasing an announcement on August 12, 1994. The agreed items included replacing North Korean graphite reactors with light-water ones and freezing nuclear projects, normalizing political and economic relations between the United States and North Korea, and North Korea's return to the NPT and honoring the Joint Declaration on Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

Agreed statement

*Between The United States of America and
The Democratic People's Republic of Korea*

Geneva, August 12, 1994

*The delegations of the United States of America(U.S.) and the
Democraton People's Republic of Korea(DPRK) met in Geneva from
August 5-12, 1994, to resume the third round of could of talks.*

*Both sides reaffirmed the principles of the June 11, 1993, U.S.-
DPRK joint statement and reached agreement that the following
elements should be part of a final resolution of the nuclear issue:*

(1)The DPRK is prepared to replace its graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities with light-water reactor(LWR) power plants, and the U.S. is prepared to make arrangements for the provision of LWRs of approximately 2,000MW(e) to the DPRK as early as possible and to make graphite-moderated reactors. Upon receipt of U.S. assurances for the provision of LWRs and for arrangements construction of the 50MW(e) and 200MW(e) reactors, forego reprocessing, and seal the Radiochemical Laboratory, to be monitored by the IAEA.

(2)The U.S. and the DPRK are prepared to establish diplomatic representation in each other's capitals and to reduce barriers to trade and investment, as a move toward full normalization of political and economic relations.

(3)To help achieve peace security on a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula, the U.S. is prepared to provide the DPRK with assurances against the threat or use of nuclear weapons by the U.S., and the DPRK remains prepared to implement the North-South Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

(4)The DPRK is prepared to remain a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and to allow implementation of its safeguards agreement under the Treaty.

Important issues raised during the talks remain to be resolved. Both sides agree that expert-level discussions are necessary to advance the replacement of the DPRK's graphite-moderated program with LWR technology, the safe storage and disposition of the spent fuel, provision of alternative energy, and the establishment of liaison offices. Accordingly, expert-level talks will be held in the U.S. and DPRK or elsewhere as agreed. The DPRK and U.S. agreed to recess their talks

and resume in Geneva on September 23, 1994.

In the meantime, the U.S. will pursue arrangements necessary to provide assurances for the LWR project to the DPRK as part of a final resolution of the nuclear issue, and the DPRK will observe the freeze on nuclear activities and maintain the continuity of safeguards, as agreed in the June 20-22, 1994, exchange of messages between Assistant Secretary of State Robert L. Gallucci and First Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Kang Sok-ju.

At the meeting, the United States, while stressing that securing the transparency of North Korean nuclear activities in the past, present and future would be essential to resolving the nuclear question, urged North Korea to return completely to the NPT, accept overall IAEA inspections and carry out the denuclearization declaration on the Korean peninsula.

In particular, the United States maintained that to obtain the transparency of the North's past nuclear activities, the special inspections asked by the IAEA were a must.

The United States expressed the view that if North Korea took these steps, Washington would consider taking various political, economic and security measures toward Pyongyang such as the steady improvement of US-North Korea relations, easing of various controls against North

Korea and a non-first-use pledge on nuclear weapons.

Disclosing its position on the issue of support for light-water reactors, a position reached in close consultation with South Korea, the United States said that if North Korea took concrete measures to resolve the nuclear question, it would study giving assistance in the construction of light-water reactors as part of the final resolution of the nuclear question. The United States added that no such support would be offered if North Korea failed to fulfill its obligations including special inspections.

The United States also asked that as the most urgent task to facilitate these steps smoothly, North Korea should not reprocess spent fuel rods unilaterally taken from its 5-megawatt atomic reactor last May and instead turn them over to a third country.

In addition, the United States stressed that it would carry on its talks with North Korea only if the North froze its nuclear program as agreed between Kim Il-sung and former U.S. President Jimmy Carter, more specifically only if North Korea did not process spent fuel nor install new fuel rods in the 5-megawatt atomic reactor.

Meanwhile, in connection with South-North dialogue, the United States made it clear that there should be corresponding progress in inter-Korean dialogue if any

progress were to be recorded in US-North Korea relations. Saying that implementation of the joint denuclearization declaration, such as mutual nuclear inspections and dismantling of nuclear reprocessing facilities, is essential to the ultimate resolution of the nuclear question, the United States said that to this end South-North dialogue should resume at an early date.

For its part, North Korea, acting on the basis of the agreement reached at the first round of US-North Korea talks held on June 11, 1993, produced a set of demands which included a U.S. guarantee of assistance in the switch from graphite reactors to light-water one, provision of alternative energy, non-use of nuclear arms by the United States against North Korea, and early improvement of US-North Korea relations.

In particular, North Korea used a large part of the conference time to discuss the issue of light-water reactors, thus suggesting that resolution of the light-water reactor question holds the key to the success of the talks.

Earlier North Korea strongly suggested it was unavoidable to re-operate its 5-megawatt atomic reactor and to reprocess the withdrawn fuel rods. Faced with a strong reaction from the United States, North Korea agreed to withhold action for the time being.

Despite the differences surfacing in the talks between the two sides, the United States and North Korea managed to put in order the agreed items regarding the four objectives envisioned in a future final agreement and those matters requiring immediate attention.

The two sides agreed in principle on the following matters with respect to “North Korea's obligations” among the major elements of a future final agreement:

First, North Korea is supposed to remain in the NPT and fulfill all the obligations of the safeguards treaty.

The safeguards treaty obligations mentioned here refer to the overall safety measures demanded by the IAEA under the preliminary, general and special inspections described under the Safeguards Agreement signed between North Korea and the IAEA.

In this connection, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Robert L. Gallucci, chief American negotiator, said in a press conference on August 13 that during the talks, North Korea accepted the concept of special inspections. He said that unless North Korea agreed to undergo special inspections, there would be no support for light-water reactors.

In fact, the United States can not extend cooperation to North Korea in the area of atomic energy under its laws

unless North Korea is duly recognized by the IAEA as a safeguards-abiding country. Besides, such American assistance is also bound to be restricted by related international regulations.

The second is the question of implementing the Joint Declaration on Denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. In the joint statements issued at the end of the first and second rounds of U.S.-North Korea talks in 1993, there were general phrases regarding the importance of implementing the joint denuclearization declaration. At the recent third-round talks, however, North Korea affirmed that its implementation would be essential to the final resolution of the nuclear question. The stage was thus set for promoting both U.S.-North Korea and inter-Korean talks on a supplementary basis.

The third question is to freeze or close down North Korea's graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities along with assisting in its switch to light-water reactors. Specifically the construction of 50-megawatt and 200-megawatt reactors is to be frozen, reprocessing of spent fuel rods given up and a radiochemical laboratory closed down and placed under IAEA surveillance. These are the concrete measures that ought to be put into action as soon as the steps the U.S. is to take in this regard are provided.

As short-term measures, meanwhile, North Korea agreed to continue to freeze its nuclear activities and maintain the IAEA safeguards measures to which it earlier agreed as a basis for the resumption of talks with the United States.

Therefore, the highlight of the latest agreement was that the reprocessing of spent fuel rods would continue to be frozen, then abandoned altogether when there is a U.S. guarantee of necessary measures.

As for the “measures to be taken by the United States,” Washington would shoulder the burden in the following three areas:

First, the United States would arrange the provision of about 2,000-megawatt-capacity light-water reactors and take necessary steps to furnish substitute energy in connection with the switch of atomic reactors.

Changing graphite reactors into light-water ones using enriched uranium is highly desirable since when light-water reactors are employed, the transparency of the use of fuel can be easily secured by enriched uranium-exporting countries, since plutonium extracted from light-water reactors is not fit for use in making atomic weapons, and since its safety is much higher than graphite reactors.

The proposed provision of substitute energy is to make

up for the expected loss caused by North Korea's nuclear freeze from the time of completion of 50-megawatt and 200-megawatt graphite reactors now under construction to the dedication of light-water reactors.

However, a large part of the concrete matters relating to the issue of supporting light-water reactors remained unsettled. The unresolved matters included procedures for assistance in light-water reactors, method of financial support, the extent of foreign participation, and relation to North Korea's fulfillment of its treaty obligations.

Also pending are the creation of diplomatic channels in each other's capital and lowering of trade and investment barriers as part of measures to improve political and economic relations between the United States and North Korea.

Diplomatic channels entail many stages including resident missions. It is believed that the recent agreement envisaged the setting up of channels in the form of liaison offices initially.

In the establishment of such channels, the time of their creation and their function would be adjusted depending on the extent of North Korea's fulfillment of its nuclear treaty obligations. Before ultimate diplomatic normalization, North Korea would, in addition to the resolution of the

nuclear question, have to settle such issues as missile exports, human rights questions and the progress of inter-Korean dialogue.

The third area concerns a U.S. guarantee of non-use of nuclear weapons against North Korea. This is an issue which North Korea has persistently been demanding since the first round of talks in June 1993. There will be more concrete discussion of the matter in the future.

In addition to these future tasks, the two sides agreed on the need for bilateral experts meetings as a short-term measure. The experts meetings were to discuss the questions of light-water reactors, safe storage and handling of spent fuel rods, provision of substitute energy and creation of liaison offices.

Given the fact that the disposal of spent fuel rods has been the most exigent issue, the experts talks were expected to be centered on the question of spent fuel.


The recent agreement was not the final accord on concrete implementation measures, but served to set a clear direction in which future nuclear talks should proceed. The agreement could be taken to have provided momentum to resolving the nuclear question in that it offers the basic direction for ensuring the transparency of North Korea's past, present and future nuclear activities.

Meanwhile, the United States and North Korea had a working-level contact in New York on September 10, 1994 and agreed to hold the planned two experts meetings in Berlin and Pyongyang.

The meeting held in Berlin discussed the issues of converting graphite reactors to light-water ones, provision of alternative energy, and the safe storage and handling of the spent fuel from the 5-megawatt atomic reactor. The Pyongyang meeting was centered on the form of liaison offices to be created in each other's capital cities.

rt IV

Human Rights in North Korea and Statement by ROKNRC President



Republic of Korea National Red Cross President Kang Young-hoon announces a statement addressed to the North on the occasion of the 23rd anniversary of his Red Cross's proposal for the South-North Red Cross Conference.

Part IV

Human Rights in North Korea and Statement by ROKNRC President

1. Human Rights Conditions in North Korea

The South Korean government has held the clear position that in order for the Korean nation to move onward toward restoring and developing the national community and achieving unification, each of the 70 million people, whether they be in the South or the North, should be able to enjoy mankind's universal values such as human dignity, freedom and well-being.

In this line, the government has, in the course of the South-North dialogue, exchanges and cooperation, endeavored to substantially improve the human rights situation in North Korea in a way that would minimize the

impact such efforts would have on inter-Korean relations. It also exerted similar efforts through multi-pronged international channels like global organizations, international human rights associations and friendly countries.

Yet, the Report on North Korean Political Prisoners made public on July 30, 1994 by Amnesty International at its Asia-Pacific meeting in Seoul, has brought both shock and serious concern not only to the South Korean people but also to the international community.

The report has disclosed that a political prisoners camp has been operated for more than 30 years at Sungho village about 70km east of Pyongyang. This is in sharp contrast to the North Korean claim that there are no political prisoners camps whatsoever in North Korea.

The report also confirmed that a considerable number of the 93,000 Korean residents of Japan, who had been repatriated to North Korea over many years beginning in 1958, have long been held as political prisoners. This has shed added light on the reported flight of the Korean repatriates.

What was especially surprising was the report's confirmation that Mr. Ko Sang-mun, previously a teacher at Sudo Girls High School in Seoul who was abducted by the

North Koreans during a training tour of Europe in 1979, is being held at the political prisoners camp.

In short, North Korea is a dead end in terms of human rights, an area where human rights are hardly ensured legally or institutionally.

The North Korean Constitution, in its Chapter 5 “Basic Rights and Duties of Citizens,” regulates basic rights. But, they are no more than window-dressing clauses subject to restriction pursuant to the provisions of the party platform and rules which stand above the Constitution.

In North Korea, the principle of legality, prohibition of analogical interpretation and division of the three powers, which are a must for ensuring human rights in constitutional countries, are ignored totally.

At the same time, people's daily activities and ideological traits are thoroughly monitored and controlled through various surveillance organizations.

Once a person is caught by such surveillance, he or she is detained without due procedures and meted out inhumane punishment such as torture without fair trial. In particular, when a person is accused of denouncing Kim Il-sung or his son or violating party policies, the accused is often referred to a “people's trial” in a demonstration designed to show to the people the severity of punishment.

Besides, it is known that violation of human rights is committed in structural and institutional ways as part of daily life in the communist country.

North Korea strictly classifies citizens depending on the degree of family loyalty to the regime, and discriminates against people in terms of individual status, occupation, education and food rations in accordance with such classification.

To keep people shielded from outside information, strict censorship is done against all media and publications while free behavior, such as changing residence or travel, is strictly barred.

Meanwhile, North Korea handles the supply of garments, food and housing as a means of public control. By deliberately controlling food and dwellings that are already in short supply, North Korea tries to keep people from going outside the system.

In employment too, one's job is determined by the party or the regime irrespective of one's occupational wish. Discharged soldiers and middle school graduates are known to be assigned to heavy manual work sites like mines and logging yards.

Because of such surveillance, control and widespread human rights violations, the North Korean people's

creativity and volunteer spirit are heavily constrained their behavior is made uniform as a whole.

North Korea ambiguously describes political prisoners as counter-revolutionaries, people with unhealthy ideology, and hostile elements (opposed to the party and regime). It publicly says “these people should be trampled down upon mercilessly.”

Political prisoners are not handled by ordinary judicial institutions like prosecutor's offices or courts but by the State Security Department, where they are dealt with behind closed doors without due trials. North Korea employs a guilt-by-association system under which even the family members of a person branded as a political prisoner are punished.

The history of political prisoners camps in North Korea dates back to 1958 when North Korea held in captivity those purged as Yen-an Faction members and their families at a specific area instead of at ordinary prisons.

In North Korea, political prisoners are held at separate facilities known as “Archipelagos of Prisoners,” which the North officially calls “No. XX Management Areas.” They are referred to among the people as “Special Dictatorship Target Areas,” “Factional Caves,” “Political Prisoners

Camps” or “Exile Areas.”

There are 12 political prisoners camps in the five provinces of Hamkyongnam-do, Hamkyongbuk-do, Pyongannam-do, Pyonganbuk-do and Chakang-do. Their inmates are estimated at about 200,000.

The political prisoners camps are in general classified into “Completely Controlled Districts” and “Revolutionalized Districts” depending on the kinds of crimes committed by inmates.

The “Completely Controlled Districts” hold anti-party and counter-revolutionary elements, factional elements and those who sought to flee abroad. Here prisoners are held almost for life.

The “Revolutionalized Districts” are for impure elements among the former Korean residents of Japan who have been repatriated to the North, party policy violators and those inclined toward liberalism. Inmates here are known to be freed depending on the outcome of reviews after they had served specific periods of time.

Among the inmates at these camps are a North Korean Who's Who list of one-time vice premiers Kim Chang-bong and Pak Gum-chol, vice president Kim Dong-gyu, state security minister Kim Byong-ha, chief of the General Bureau for Operations against the South Ho Bong-hak and

party secretary Yu Jang-sik, according to human rights reports released by Amnesty International and testimonies by defectors.

Meanwhile, North Korea has abducted and still holds about 440 South Koreans from the time of the Korean War armistice to date. Among them are the crew of a fishing boat, "Tongjin-Ho."

The South Korean government has thus far made multi-pronged efforts to obtain the abductees, release. Even since the start of the 1980s, the government has called for their return in a total of 22 statements, messages, etc.

Especially upon the birth of the civilian-led government, South Korea repatriated Li In-mo to the North unconditionally as a means of providing a breakthrough in the resolution of humanitarian issues such as the return of South Koreans abducted by the North.

Regrettably, however, there has been no affirmative response to date to the south's efforts to obtain the release of abductees.

Despite the report made by Amnesty International on July 30, 1994 and the South Korean government's repeated calls for their return, North Korea asserted that it has no political prisoners camps and that Ko Sang-mun defected to the North on his own.

The issue of South Korean abductees has grown into a serious question of survival, no longer being a mere humanitarian issue.

The Seoul government has been exerting a variety of efforts to obtain the release of all the abductees, including the crew of a hijacked KAL plane and the fishermen of "Tongjin-Ho," in addition to Ko Sang-mun mentioned by the Amnesty International report.

The government regards the issue of separated families as a fundamental human rights question and will thereby do all it can to ease the pain and misfortune of dispersed families.

While striving to resolve the issue through relevant world organizations like the International Committee of the Red Cross and the U.N. Human Rights Committee, the government will positively raise the issue of dispersed families and abductees from a humanitarian point of view once South-North dialogue resumes.

In particular, the government will make stepped-up efforts through the Republic of Korea National Red Cross to ascertain the fate of abductees including Ko Sang-mun and realize the exchange of letters and eventual repatriation.

To deal with the issue of abductees more concretely and steadily, the South Korean government has formed the

Council of Relevant Ministers on Persons Held in Captivity in North Korea and plans to operate an inter-ministry working-level task force in this connection.

2. Statement by ROKNRC President on 23rd Anniversary of the Proposal of Red Cross Talks

In connection with the Report on North Korean Political Prisoners released by Amnesty International on August 1, 1994, President Kim Young-sam asked his Cabinet to do all it could to obtain the return of those abducted by the North.

Specifically President Kim told the National Unification Board, Foreign Ministry and other relevant government bodies to use all available channels in appealing to world opinion for the release of Ko Sang-mun and the other abductees, and to do their best in negotiating their return from both humanitarian and human rights points of view.

Meanwhile, the families of some abductees, including Chong Jong-do, Yu Song-kun and Yon Kyu-hwan, sent letters of appeal on August 2 through 4 to Kang Young-hoon, president of the Republic of Korea National Cross, asking

that the Red Cross take positive steps to obtain the release of their abducted kin.

The National Assembly Foreign Affairs and Unification Committee on August 9 called for the immediate return of abductees in its “Position on the Repatriation of People Held in Captivity in North Korea and the Improvement of Human Rights Conditions.”

The Committee said the government should positively join in the efforts to determine the fate and gain the return of the abductees, while asking the North Korean authorities to abide by human rights conventions and to accept a review of human rights conditions by international organizations. It further urged North Korea to faithfully implement and practice the provisions of the Basic South-North Agreement if only to resolve humanitarian questions like reunions of separated family members and the return of abductees.

Reflecting this climate at home and abroad, the Republic of Korea National Red Cross on August 12, 1994 proposed a contact between the presidents or vice presidents of the South and North Korean Red Cross societies. The overture was made in a statement issued in observance of the 23rd anniversary of the ROKNRC proposal for the South-North Red Cross talks.

In the statement, ROKNRC President Kang Young-

hoon asked for the early resumption of the suspended Red cross talks and the exchange of hometown visitors groups among separated families. He also emphasized the importance of finding out the fate and whereabouts of those held in captivity in North Korea as well as reuniting dispersed families.

Following is the full text of the ROKNRC President's statement:

Today marks the 23rd anniversary of the proposal made by the Republic of Korea National Red Cross to the North Korean Red Cross for a campaign to trace the 10 million family members separated in the South and the North.

The South-North Red Cross Conference, which kicked off amid high expectations among the whole Korean people, has unexpectedly hit a deadlock. The talks are in a regrettable condition in which they failed to achieve the hoped-for outcome to date, two decades and three years later, notwithstanding the Korean proverb saying "even mountains and rivers change in a decade."

To look upon the past, the course of the South-North Red Cross Conference was a succession of hopes and frustrations. When South and North Korean Red Cross officials met at Panmunjom for the first time in a quarter-century of division and traveled back and forth to Seoul and Pyongyang across the barrier of division, we were full of hope that the severed national bond would be reconnected. On the other hand, we

were frustrated and disappointed when the path of such travel was sealed.

When dispersed family members shared the emotional joy of meeting in Seoul and Pyongyang thanks to the exchange of dispersed family hometown visitors, we were burning with the hope that reunions between separated blood relatives would be realized. When the steam of hometown visitors came to a halt, we were frustrated and chagrined.

Dispersed families in the South and the North have hardly escaped from the pitiful circumstances in which they live, unaware even of the fates of their missing kin in the long period of half a century. A countless number of aged dispersed family members are passing away without being able to meet their wishes. This cannot but be deemed really pathetic.

The South and North Korean Red Cross societies have had about 100 meetings and contacts in the protracted off- and on-again talks and nearly reached accord on solving the dispersed family question. To our regret, however, we have been unable to translate it into action.

Fortunately, the South and North Korean governments, in the agreement of the South-North high-level talks, decided to resolve the dispersed family issue in a humanitarian manner, thus making it possible for the two Red Cross societies to resolve the question easily.

There is no reason why the South and North Korean Red Cross officials should hesitate any longer. They should sit together at an early date, reaffirm what has thus far been achieved, and promote the implementation of projects.

The suspended South-North Red Cross Conference should be resumed at an early date. We should lay a broad humanitarian bridge

whereby dispersed family members in the South and North can exchange letters, meet each other and freely travel back and forth.

There should be more exchange of hometown visitors groups among the dispersed families in the South and the North instead of ending it as a mere one-shot project. Moreover, the exchange of aged dispersed family hometown visitors, which was agreed at the South-North high-level talks and procedures for which were concretely agreed at South-North Red Cross working-level delegates contacts, should be realized without further delay.

A humanitarian hand should be extended also to those who have to live separated in the South and the North against their will due to unfortunate incidents that occurred in the state of division.

South Koreans who could not return home after they were abducted to the North number more than 400 thus far. Their families lead painful days without being aware of the fate of their missing kin.

Besides, the list of those held at a North Korean political prisoners camp, which was recently released by Amnesty International, included 11 persons hailing from the South. The list has made the pain of their families grow all the more acute.

The fate and whereabouts of these people held in captivity in North Korea should be made known, and they should be allowed to return to the bosom of their families.

As I ruminate over the will of my predecessor who, displaying a lofty humanitarian spirit, gave birth to the South-North Red Cross Conference 23 years ago today, I would like to propose that the presidents or vice presidents of our two Red Cross societies meet without any conditions to provide a fresh turning-point in the discussion of the

issues I mentioned. Hoping that such a meeting will take place at Panmunjom at an early date, I look forward to the North Korean side's affirmative response.


Before concluding I would like to express my appreciation to the people who, despite the failure of the Red Cross to register any progress in the issue of dispersed families, are giving our Red Cross their unchanging support patiently and sincerely so that we can carry on the talks.

In a comment appearing in the August 15th issue of the Rodong Sinmun, North Korea rejected the South's proposal for a meeting between either Red Cross presidents or vice presidents, asking if “the South has the gall to raise such a voice” in its vehement denouncement of the ROKNRC President's statement

Without discussing the South's proposal, North Korea persisted in a stereo typed propaganda tirade, demanding the repeal of the National Security Law, delivery of materials discovered at what was once a North Korean War Prisoners Camp on Koje-do and the repatriation of Kim In-so and Ham Se-hwan.

Despite the intransigence of North Korea, the South maintains a policy of positively trying to resolve, from a humanitarian approach, separated family issues such as

family meetings at Panmunjom or third countries and support for the exchange of letters. In particular, the South intends to continue to urge North Korea, through such global organizations as the International Committee of the Red Cross and the United Nations, to resolve the issue of abductees.



**President Kim Young-sam's
1994 Liberation Day Speech**

President Kim Young-sam's 1994 Liberation Day Speech

August 15, 1994

Fellow citizens,

I join all of you in heartily celebrating the 49th anniversary of national liberation. In observing the second National Liberation Day since the birth of this democratic civilian Administration, we are more hopeful and confident than ever before about the bright future of our nation. Over the past year and a half, our people have endeavored together to promote change, reform, openness and progress. We have enhanced the nation's competitiveness on the strength of a clean government.

We have restored the building in Shanghai that used to house the Provisional Korean Government. The remains of several patriotic ancestors have been brought home and in their homeland.

The legitimacy of the Republic of Korea has been more firmly established than ever before. Our intrinsic national spirit is being revived as we are proudly shaping a brighter future for our nation. At the same time, the center of a new civilization is shifting toward the Asia-Pacific region. An opportunity is approaching for us to become a key player in this Asia-Pacific era and in the emerging new civilization.

The Korean people cannot live divided forever. We must pool all our national determination and energies. We must become one again and forge an era in which our proud people are at the forefront of a new civilization.

My 70 million compatriots at home and abroad,

As the President of the Republic of Korea, I have not forgotten for even a single moment my responsibility for the security, survival, unification and prosperity of our 70 million people. It was with this acute sense of responsibility

that this past July I pursued a South-North summit meeting.

Now that both the currents of world history and the trend of South-North relations are entering a new phase, I hereby wish to redefine the basic position of our Government on unification.

Over the past century, the Korean people have tirelessly striven to secure independence, freedom and democracy. National liberation will have been truly completed only when we have built a unified Korea marked by blooming democracy and brimming prosperity.

World history has already proclaimed the victory of freedom and democracy. We are now living in the age of ever-spreading democracy. With the advent of this civilian government, democracy is spreading its roots into our soil ever deeper and firmer. We will defend our hard-won freedom and democracy at any cost. I want to make it clear once again that any challenges to our free and democratic system will not be tolerated.

The basic philosophy behind our quest for unification is also centered on the values of freedom and democracy.

Without freedom, there can be no democracy. Without democracy, there can be no genuine freedom and peace. With firm faith in democracy and on the strength of the independent abilities of our nation, we must strive harder to overcome the lingering remnants of the Cold War and end the territorial division in order to achieve the longcherished goal of peaceful unification without fail.

The unification process should be focused not on how to distribute power but on how to enable our people to live together. Unification should be grounded on the values of freedom, democracy and well-being for all, rather than on any ideology focused narrowly on a specific class or group. Efforts toward unification should be concerned not so much with developing a hypothetical structure of a unified state as with building a national community within which all Koreans can live together.

Unification should be achieved on our own according to the wishes of our people and by virtue of our inherent national capabilities. Unification must be achieved peacefully without fail. It must not be achieved through war or one side overthrowing the other. Unification must be achieved democratically on the strength of the freedom and

rights of all Koreans.

It will not be possible to unify the South and the North overnight, because the two parts of Korea have been locked into mutual hostility and distrust for as long as they have consistently pursued distinctly different ideologies and markedly different political and social systems. Unification should be a gradual and phased process of building a single national community.

The Government has already made public a three-stage unification formula for building a single national community. It calls first for reconciliation and cooperation between the South and the North, next for forming a Korean commonwealth and lastly for completing a single unified nation-state.

First of all, the presently hostile and confrontational South-North relations must be replaced with an amicable and cooperative relationship. Yemen failed to prevent a civil war even after it was politically unified. This is because it was unified hastily and superficially without having gone through a process of real reconciliation and cooperation.

South and North Korea must first promote coexistence and coprosperity and then join together in a Korean commonwealth to ensure lasting peace. During the commonwealth stage, the two areas of Korea should form and develop a single socio-economic community to lay the groundwork for political integration.

In short, the Government's Three-Stage Unification Formula for Building a Korean National Community is designed to ultimately build a single nation-state after going through interim stages of integration. The path to unification must also be the path to democracy and prosperity. A unified homeland which will belong to all 70 million Koreans must be built on a national community and must guarantee every individual citizen freedom, welfare and human dignity.

My compatriots at home and abroad,

The Cold War era is finally leaving the Korean Peninsula, too. The competition between the South and the North over which can create a better society has already been decided. The 20th century has witnessed the failure of the experiments of socialism and Communism. Following the demise of the Cold War, the whole world is now marching

down the avenue of freedom, well-being and openness. The Korean Peninsula alone cannot be excluded from this historic global trend.

The North Korean leadership must, as a matter of course, abandon their obsolete strategy of communizing the South. They must also undertake bold reforms, including the improvement of the human rights situation. Pyongyang must not only recognize the plight of dispersed families as a basic human rights issue but also promptly cooperate to resolve the problem of South Koreans who were abducted.

South-North relations should be focused on how to promote the well-being of the entire populace, rather than be mired on futile ideological confrontation. Now is the time for us to endeavor harder to catch up with the changing times and make pragmatic preparations one after another for moving toward peace and cooperation.

Currently, North Korea is undergoing a major transition as it experiences its first succession of power since the regime was found (in 1948).

We hope that the North will come to pursue a path of

reform and openness amidst stabilization. Our Government and our people, as fellow brethren, will spare no effort in supporting and cooperating with the North for such endeavors. Only after the people of the South and the North cooperate with each other and bring about mutual prosperity will it be possible to form a single economic community which will naturally pave the way for unification.

National unification should not hinder the Korean national community's efforts to join the ranks of the advanced nations; instead, it should help further develop the creativity and potential of our people. This is the reason that we do not desire unification by absorption.

The first step toward improving South-North relations should be to build mutual trust. Mutual trust can only be built when mutual commitments are sincerely translated into action. The Basic Agreement between the South and the North and the Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula were landmark accords for reconciliation and cooperation declared before the entire Korean people and international society.

The North Korean nuclear issue which has created

such serious tension on the Korean Peninsula during the past year, should be resolved by complying with the Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. For the sake of creating an atmosphere conducive to promoting reconciliation and cooperation, we must immediately stop slandering each other and expeditiously build up military trust so that the state of military confrontation can finally be ended.

Our doors are always open for dialogue with the North at any place and any time. The North must open its doors and join the rest of the international community. We have never wanted to see the North isolated from the rest of the world. For its part, the North must give up its isolationist adventurism emboldened by its nuclear ambition.

If and when the North guarantees the transparency of its nuclear activities, we are ready to support their development of the peaceful use of nuclear energy, including light-water nuclear reactor construction, by providing them with the necessary capital and technology. This could well become the very first joint project for national development leading to the establishment of a single community of the Korean people.

Fellow citizens,

I repeat once again that we are hoping for a unification which is gradual and step-by-step. However, there is, of course, the possibility that unification could occur unexpectedly at any time. We must examine every possibility and be fully prepared for any outcome.

Whenever or however it happens, national unification must begin with the restoration and development of the presently divided and heterogenous elements of Korean society into a unified national community. To this end, we must begin by developing our own society into a model democratic community. Unification will not only bring glory and joy, but will also entail pain and sacrifice, and we must gather the strength and courage needed to endure this.

We must always keep in mind the difficulties being experienced by our brethren in the North. The problems of the North are our own problems. We must always be prepared and ready to cooperate with our fellow brethren. We must resolutely prepare ourselves for national reconciliation and unification.

Fellow citizens and brethren overseas,

As we reflect on the past half-century, we cannot help but be emotionally moved and at the same time ashamed of ourselves, even more so as we recall the difficulties and sufferings of our people in the South, in the North and overseas. We must strive to make the year 1995, the 50th anniversary of the restoration of our independence, a milestone in our history. It is for this reason that we are beginning preparations now for commemorating that event.

I would like to propose to my compatriots at home and abroad that the 50th anniversary of liberation be made a catalyst for our concerted efforts toward opening an era of the 70 million Korean people living under one roof.

Our people successfully overcame the oppression of colonial rule, and our independence was restored. Our people fought against dictatorship and successfully established a democracy. Our people rose from the ashes of the Korean War and brought about the Miracle on the Han River.

As an extension of this, now our people must endeavor


to create a New Korea, a unified nation fully enjoying democracy and prosperity. Just as our forebears shed their precious blood for the liberation of our homeland, we must now shed our own sweat for a second liberation. By doing so, I hope we will be able to hand over to our posterity the unified, prosperous homeland our forebears and we dreamed about and have striven so long to create.

Our nation will stand tall at the center of a new world civilization without fail. Let us all pool our strength and closely cooperate for a second liberation. let us all march together toward a great era of national unity.

Thank you.

SOUTH-NORTH DIALOGUE IN KOREA

No. 61 DECEMBER 1994



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IN KOREA**

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Part I

Measures to Energize South-North Economic Cooperation

- 1. Contents of Measures Announced**
- 2. Background**
- 3. Tasks to Energize South-North Cooperation**
- 4. Reactions from North Korea**

1. Contents of Measures Announced

President Kim Young-sam said on November 7, 1994, "In the future, South-North relations should be promoted in a way that can facilitate a creative and mutual cooperative relationship. To this end, it is necessary for the South and the North to work out the basic framework of economic cooperation through consultations between the government authorities under the spirit of mutual assistance." The remarks were made in a speech the President made at a send-off dinner hosted by a group of leading businessmen on the eve of his departure on a tour of the Philippines, Indonesia and Australia. In Indonesia, President Kim was to attend a summit meeting of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). President Kim said that to foster conditions for such cooperation, the South would take phased steps to energize South-North economic cooperative projects, including granting premission for visits to the North by South Korean business persons.

According to the Presidential remarks, the government held the 17th unification-related ministers meeting chaired

by Deputy Prime Minister-National Unification Minister Lee Hong-koo on November 8 to discuss follow-up measures to invigorate inter-Korean economic cooperation. The meeting resolved to actively cope with the new developments prompted by the U.S.-North Korea unclear agreement and energize elementary-level South-North economic cooperation with a view to providing momentum to improve South-North relations and paving the way for the development of a national community.

The measures to promote South-North economic cooperation as adopted and announced by the unification-related ministers meeting were as follows:

First, mutual visits by South and North Korean economic-related people, including visits to the North by business persons, shall be allowed. South Korean businessmen will be allowed to visit North Korea to discuss pilot projects with North Korea and conduct feasibility studies in the North; private fact-finding teams will be permitted to visit the North to look into investment conditions; and programs for inviting North Korean business persons to attend investment briefing sessions and observe the South's industrial facilities will be permitted.

Second, by taking measures to energize the ongoing commodity exchanges through processing on commission, visits to the North by technicians for the operation of production facilities, technical guidance and quality control on site in North Korea will be allowed and so will the shipment of facilities for use in commodity exchanges on commission.

Third, pilot economic cooperation projects will be permitted, for which small-scale projects will be allowed beginning in such areas as

can contribute to enhancing the living standards of the North Korean people and forming a national community. At the same time, the creation of offices in the North by domestic industries, which will be necessary for the promotion of economic cooperation, will be allowed.

In addition, the pilot employment of North Korean workers at sites for construction and resources development in third countries will be allowed, as well as investment through joint ventures or locally incorporated firms in third countries and participation in multilateral cooperative projects undertaken through international organizations.

At the same time, depending on progress in inter-Korean relations in the future, the government will prepare a basic framework for economic cooperation such as investment guarantees and the prevention of double taxation through consultations between South and North Korean authorities.

While announcing these immediate steps to energize South-North economic cooperation, the government nevertheless cautioned against any excess expectations from these measures or hastening in South-North economic cooperation, asking for the people's cooperation so that the steps can be promoted steadily from a long-term point of view.

The government said it would work out concrete and detailed items to facilitate the measures by calling a meeting of the Council for the Promotion of South-North Exchanges and Cooperation in the foreseeable future.

On November 24, the government held the 25th meeting of the Council for the Promotion of South-North

Exchanges and Cooperation chaired by Deputy Prime Minister Lee Hong-koo to review regulations to institutionally back up the measures.

At the meeting, attendees shared the view that South-North economic exchanges and cooperation should be promoted in a prudent and orderly manner in accordance with the provisions of various domestic laws related to South-North Exchanges and Cooperation. To this end, the meeting discussed necessary regulations and concrete measures.

The regulations reviewed at the 25th meeting of the Council for the Promotion of South-North Exchanges and Cooperation were as follows:

- Regulations on the handling of projects involving South-North economic exchanges and cooperation.

o Procedures and documents necessary for the promotion of South-North economic exchanges and cooperation were set forth; letters of intent signed with the North Korean side are supposed to be included in a written application for approval by the undertaker of cooperation projects, a letter of consultations with the North Korean side and a letter of confirmation by the North Korean authorities are to be included in a written application for the approval of cooperation projects.

o Types of projects allowable in South-North economic cooperation were made concrete, such as joint ventures, joint-venture investment, exclusive investment, joint-venture investment with third countries, and employment of people of the other side.

○ *In case a person's frequent travel to the North is necessary for the effective promotion of economic cooperation, such visits are to be permitted in a period not exceeding one and a half years. During the permitted period, a person will be able to visit the North merely with a report thereof.*

○ *The period for handling an application for permission of a cooperation project will be shortened from the present 50 days to 30. If unavoidable, the period may be extended by 20 days only once.*

- A guideline on the opening of offices by domestic industries and economic organizations in North Korea :

○ *Domestic industries and economic organizations are to be able to establish offices in the North with approval by the National Unification Minister for market surveys, liaison and research activities. Regulations were provided on the documents and procedures necessary for the creation of such offices.*

○ *The period for the presence of offices of domestic economic organizations like industries and banks in North Korea will be determined by the National Unification Minister to an extent not exceeding three years. Such offices may be created anywhere in the North.*

○ *In the event a staff member of such an office needs to make frequent visits to the North to promote business, he would be allowed to do so within a period not exceeding one and a half years. During the permitted period for frequent visits, a person may visit the North only with a report thereon.*

- An amendment to the public notice on items subject to material exchanges and on procedures for the approval of their shipment and introduction.

o Among the shipment of production facilities for use in processing on commission in the North, those facilities to be taken to the North free of charge and those valued at more than 1 million dollars (annual accumulative total of 3 million dollars) may be taken to the North with the approval of the National Unification Minister. Small-scale facilities may be shipped to the North with the approval of the president of a band authorized to deal in foreign exchange.

Also at the meeting, it was decided to make business persons aware of “sample models of contracts on investment in the North” and “matters of attention in negotiations for economic cooperation” in advance in the courses of approving visits to the North or economic cooperation projects so as to help them advance to the North prudently. It also resolved to encourage the self-adjusting function of the private sector to the maximum so that South-North economic cooperation projects will be promoted in an orderly manner.

Besides, the government decided to carry on efforts to streamline or simplify regulations related to inter-Korean economic cooperation with a view to supporting the effective implementation of South-North economic exchanges and cooperation.

The attendees shared the view that North Korea was showing uncertainty with respect to South-North economic cooperation and decided that it is important under the circumstances to carry out cooperation projects carefully

and calmly. The meeting stressed that though the government presently allows business people's visits to the North and small-scale cooperation projects on a pilot basis, a clear guarantee through an agreement between South and North Korean authorities is needed to promote full-fledged South-North economic cooperation.

The South Korean government expects that based on the regulations reviewed at the meeting, South-North economic exchanges and cooperation would be promoted in an orderly and prudent way to contribute to improving inter-Korean relations and realizing a plan for common national development.

2. Background

The South Korean government, under a decision made at the 11th meeting of unification-related ministers held on June 22, 1993, had withheld approval for businessmen's visits to North Korea to discuss South-North economic cooperation pending "a breakthrough in the resolution of the unclear question."

Since the requirement of "a breakthrough in the resolution of the unclear question," the first step toward settling the unclear issue, could have been met with the U.S.-North Korea nuclear agreement made in Geneva on October

21, 1994, the Seoul government believed that the time had come to seriously study and foster economic cooperation between the South and the North.

Under the circumstances, the government took phased measures to energize inter-Korean economic cooperation with a view to actively coping with changing conditions on the Korean peninsula, developing South-North ties into a substantially cooperative relationship, and realizing President Kim Young-sam's "plan for common national development."

The background of the measures to invigorate inter-Korean economic cooperation can be classified into two parts: North Korean nuclear question at the U.S.-North Korea Geneva talks. In other words, the steps didn't come overnight, but were, in every respect, in line with the consistent policy of linking the nuclear question to inter-Korean economic cooperation.

The measures, designed in effect to ease the decision made earlier in connection with the North Korean nuclear question in a way that befits the changing conditions, cannot be taken to be a new proposal to the North or to signify a change in the existing government policy.

Moreover, the steps are set to be implemented only when the U.S.-North Korea Geneva agreement is translated into action faithfully, and, therefore, the future of South-North economic cooperation will depend on how the

implementation of the U.S.-North Korea Geneva agreement turns out.

Second, the measures were part of the future-oriented efforts of the Seoul government to cope actively with new conditions on the Korean peninsula.

As all countries tend to act with emphasis on their economic interests and well-being, the whole of the Asia and Pacific region has arrived at a time when it, with the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit as momentum, should proceed toward a single common market without any barriers.

South and North Korea should join in this flow. To this end, a change in perception is needed, a change under which promotion of the whole nation's well-being is the center of South-North relations.

To pave the way for balanced development of the national economy as well as for promotion of the well-being of all Koreans, South and North Korea should form an economic community at an early date. To this end, North Korea should depart from its old-fashioned and wasteful policy of slandering the other side and building up tension.

Since the recent measures stemmed from a future-oriented perception, that was, creative and substantial inter-Korean relations, the steps should be backed up by sincere efforts to balance dynamic changes in the surrounding situation against the improvement of inter-Korean relations.

3. Tasks to Energize South-North Cooperation

It could hardly be expected that the South Korean government measures to energize South-North economic cooperation would lead to instant materialization of inter-Korean economic cooperation. To invigorate South-North economic cooperation, there should be due practical determination on the part of the South and the North to promote economic cooperation and also an agreement between government authorities to institutionally guarantee economic cooperation.

As was seen in its reaction to the South's measures to energize inter-Korean economic cooperation, North Korea too recognizes the importance of the basic South-North agreement and Joint Economic Cooperation for the implementation of South-North economic cooperation. This demonstrates that to energize inter-Korean economic cooperation, the organizations and matters agreed between the government authorities of the two sides should be put into action.

Even if businessmen were allowed to visit North Korea in the future, such visits could not be materialized without an agreement between government authorities or a guarantee by the North Korean authorities on visitors' personal safety and their safe return home.

Even though a small number of businessmen may be allowed to visit the North as test cases in the initial stage, there should be a definite guarantee between South and North Korean authorities to promote full-fledged inter-Korean economic cooperation. Otherwise, there would be the consequence of the government authorities doing nothing about people's safety and possible losses on the part of industries.

Therefore, the government will do all it can to work out a basic framework for economic cooperation through negotiations between the government authorities of the two sides depending on future progress in inter-Korean cooperation, which should feature a guarantee of transit and communications by mutual visitors, their personal safety and agreements on investment guarantees and the prevention of double taxation.

4. Reactions from North Korea

Reacting to the measures by the South Korean government to energize South-North economic cooperation, North Korea, in a statement made by the spokesman for the Committee for the Peaceful Unification of the Fatherland and through other remarks, slandered the South's top leader and repeated unreasonable demands such as a call for the

repeal of the National Security Law.

It was not that the South did not anticipate altogether such a negative response from the North. But, the measures taken by the South Korean government were not premised from the beginning on an affirmative response from the North but were one-sided steps taken in a far-reaching and forward-looking posture to bring about common national development.

Therefore, the North Korean reaction won't have much effect on the South's policy of implementing the measures.

While denouncing the Seoul government steps to invigorate inter-Korean economic cooperation, the North Koreans did not mention private-level economic cooperation itself. This points to their two-faced practice of carrying on private-level economic cooperation.

Therefore, if the North Koreans attempt to politically exploit South-North cooperation by linking it to their "united front" strategy in connection with the measures, the prospects for South-North economic cooperation would become clouded again. If North Korea persists in demanding the repeal of the National Security Law and the repatriation of long-term prisoners loyal to Pyongyang, it will certainly hamper not only inter-Korean economic cooperation but also the improvement of overall South-North relations.

The recent steps taken by the South Korean government to ease restrictions on economic cooperation are

designed in every respect to provide momentum for elevating national well-being and for bringing about a breakthrough in efforts to improve inter-Korean relations.

To make South-North economic cooperation successful, North Korea should accept the South's measures to energize economic cooperation so as to help them bolster the development and well-being of the Korean national community.

Part II

Third-Round U.S.-North Korea High-Level Talks

- 1. Course of Second Meeting of Third-Round Talks**
- 2. Contents of U.S.-North Korea Agreement**
- 3. Developments after U.S.-North Korea Agreement**

1. Course of Second Meeting of Third-Round Talks

When the United States and North Korea wound up the first meeting of their third-round high-level talks on August 12, 1994, the two sides agreed to hold experts meetings to discuss basic matters related to the nuclear question and their implementation. The items included replacing North Korea's graphite-moderated atomic reactors with light-water ones and freezing its nuclear development program, normalizing political and economic relations between the United States and North Korea, North Korea's return to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), and implementing the Declaration on Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

Under the decision, the United States and North Korea held two experts meetings in Pyongyang and Berlin to discuss concrete working-level issues related thereto.

- The experts meeting in Pyongyang, September 10-13, 1994.

Topic : The question of opening liaison offices.

- The experts meeting in Berlin, September 10-14,

1994.

Topic : The questions of supporting the construction of light-water reactors in the North and providing alternative energy to the North, and of safe storage and handling of spent fuel rods taken from a 5MW reactor.

Based on the outcome of the discussions at the Pyongyang and Berlin experts meetings, the two countries held the second meeting of their third-round high-level talks in Geneva for seven days from September 23 through 29.

However, no substantial progress was registered at the meeting as the two sides failed to narrow their differences on technical matters related to such nuclear issues as special inspections and the handling of spent fuel, and on the question of linking these matters to the construction of light-water reactors.

The second meeting was resumed on October 5, at which the two sides, through marathon talks in the forms of delegates' plenary sessions, experts contacts and chief delegates meetings, arrived at a final agreement on October 17 winding up the talks that lasted one and a half years.

The Agreed Framework worked out was formally signed by the chief delegates of the two countries on October 21 after it was endorsed by their respective governments.

The efforts to resolve the North Korean nuclear

question following the North Koreans' declaration of their plan to withdraw from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty on March 12 last year had experienced many ups and downs as the question swung between dialogue and sanctions. There were several crises threatening a break up even at the final second meeting. But, the agreement was hammered out thanks to the joint position and efforts of South Korea and the United States to resolve the issue through dialogue as far as possible.

Throughout the course of the negotiations, South Korea and the United States believed that securing the transparency of the North's past, present and future nuclear activities was indispensable to the fundamental solution of the North Korean nuclear question. In this connection, the two countries sought, as the ultimate objectives of the nuclear talks, to have North Korea return completely to the NPT, to completely normalize IAEA inspections, full implementation of IAEA safeguards measures including special inspections, and the implementation of the Declaration on Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

The U.S.-North Korea agreement reached at the second meeting of the third-round high-level talks could hardly be taken to have fully met the aims the South Korean government had pursued. Yet, the agreement might well have constituted fresh momentum in the macroscopic and overall aspects of seeking peace and stability on the Korean

peninsula, energizing inter-Korean relations, ultimate opening of the North Korean system, and possible expansion of the South's diplomatic horizons.

The agreement adopted at the second meeting consisted of the Agreed Framework that has been made public and a Confidential Minute. The Confidential Minute was learned to have contained details of the clauses envisioned in the Agreed Framework and those parts which North Korea was loath to publicize.

The following is the full text of the Agreed Framework adopted by the United States and North Korea on October 21, 1994:

Delegations of the Governments of the United States of America (U.S.) and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) held talks in Geneva from September 23 to October 21, 1994, to negotiate an overall resolution of the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula.

Both sides reaffirmed the importance of attaining the objectives contained in the August 12, 1994 Agreed Statement between the U.S. and the DPRK and upholding the principles of the June 11, 1993 Joint Statement of the U.S. and the DPRK to achieve peace and security on a nuclear-free Korean peninsula. The U.S. and DPRK decided to take the following actions for the resolution of the nuclear issue:

1. Both sides will cooperate to replace the DPRK's graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities with light-water reactor (LWR) power plants.

1) In accordance with the October 20, 1994 letter of assurance from the U.S. President, the U.S. will undertake to make arrangements for the provision to the DPRK of a light-water reactor project with a total generating capacity of approximately 2,000MW(e) by a target date of 2003.

- The U.S. will organize under its leadership an international consortium to finance and supply the light-water reactor project to be provided to the DPRK. The U.S., representing the international consortium, will serve as the principal point of contact with the DPRK for the LWR project.

- The U.S., representing the consortium, will make best efforts to secure the conclusion of a supply contract with the DPRK within six months of the date of this document for the provision of the LWR project. Contract talks will begin as soon as possible after the date of this document.

- As necessary, the U.S. and the DPRK will conclude a bilateral agreement for cooperation in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

2) In accordance with the October 20, 1994 U.S. letter of assurance from the U.S. President concerning interim energy alternatives, the U.S., representing the consortium, will make arrangements to offset the energy foregone due to the freeze of the DPRK's graphite-moderated reactors, pending completion of the first LWR unit.

- Alternative energy will be provided in the form of heavy oil for heating and electricity production.

- Deliveries of heavy oil will begin within three months of the date of this Document and will reach a rate of 500,000 tons annually, in accordance with an agreed schedule of deliveries.

3) Upon receipt of U.S. assurances for the provision of light-

water reactors and for arrangements for interim energy alternatives, the DPRK will freeze its graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities and will eventually dismantle these reactors and related facilities.

-The freeze on the DPRK's graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities will be fully implemented within one month of the date of this document. During this one-month period, and throughout the freeze, the IAEA will be allowed to monitor this freeze, and the DPRK will provide full cooperation to the IAEA for this purpose.

-Dismantlement of the DPRK's graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities will be completed when the LWR project is completed.

-The U.S. and DPRK will cooperate in finding a method to store safely the spent fuel from the 5MW(e) experimental reactor during the construction of the LWR project, and to dispose of the fuel in a safe manner that does not involve reprocessing in the DPRK.

4) As soon as possible after the date of this document U.S. and DPRK experts will hold two sets of experts talks.

-At one set of talks, experts will discuss issues related to alternative energy and the replacement of the graphite-moderated reactor program with the LWR project.

-At the other set of talks, experts will discuss specific arrangements for spent fuel storage and ultimate disposition.

II. The two sides will move toward full normalization of political and economic relations.

1) Within three months of the date of this document, both sides will reduce barriers to trade and investment, including restrictions on telecommunications services and financial transactions.

2) Each side will open a liaison office in the other's capital

following resolution of consular and other technical issues through expert level discussions.

3) As progress is made on issues of concern to each side, the U.S. and DPRK will upgrade bilateral relations to the Ambassadorial level.

III. Both sides will work together for peace and security on a nuclear-free Korean peninsula.

1) The U.S. will provide formal assurances to the DPRK, against the threat or use of nuclear weapons by the U.S.

2) The DPRK will consistently take steps to implement the North-South Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

3) The DPRK will engage in North-South dialogue, as this agreed framework will help create an atmosphere that promotes such a dialogue.

IV. Both sides will work together to strengthen the international nuclear non-proliferation regime.

1) the DPRK will remain a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons(NPT) and will allow implementation of its safeguards agreement under the Treaty.

2) Upon conclusion of the supply contract for the provision of the LWR project, ad hoc and routine inspections will resume under the DPRK's safeguards agreement with the IAEA with respect to the facilities not subject to the freeze. Pending conclusion of the supply contract, inspections required by the IAEA for the continuity of safeguards will continue at the facilities not subject to the freeze.

3) *When a significant portion of the LWR project is completed, but before delivery of key nuclear components, the DPRK will come into full compliance with its safeguards agreement with the IAEA(INFCIRC/403), including taking all steps that may be deemed necessary by the IAEA, following consultations with the Agency with regard to verifying the accuracy and completeness of the DPRK's initial report on all nuclear material in the DPRK.*

Kang Sok-ju

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Democratic People's Republic
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of United States of America
Ambassador at Large of the
United States of America*

2. Contents of U.S.-North Korea Agreement

The U.S.-North Korea Agreement was most significant in that it served to secure the transparency of North Korea's past, present and future nuclear activities.

During the talks, North Korea agreed to completely return to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and accept IAEA inspections -- including special inspections -- of all of its nuclear facilities while promising to freeze its nuclear program and dismantle its existing nuclear facilities. Once

North Korea freezes its nuclear activities and accepts IAEA inspections of all nuclear facilities, the transparency of its past, present and future nuclear program would be secured by itself.

Moreover, South Korea will play a central role in providing light-water reactors for North Korea. Besides, North Korea agreed to carry out the Declaration on Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and to resume South-North dialogue.

Dissolution of Suspicion about Past Nuclear Program

With regard to the question of looking into suspicions about its past nuclear program, North Korea agreed to fully fulfill its IAEA safeguards obligations including all steps deemed necessary by the IAEA prior to the delivery of key parts of the light-water reactors. Here, the phrase “full fulfillment of the IAEA safeguards obligations,” of course, includes special inspections.

Though the timing of special inspections was deferred to a later date than originally expected, it was highly significant that the North Koreans agreed at the talks to accept special inspections for the first time since claiming the two undeclared facilities were military facilities and declaring they would withdraw from the NPT over the issue

of special inspections.

Freezing of Nuclear Program and Dismantling Related Facilities

North Korea agreed to totally freeze all activities at its existing nuclear facilities after a month's preparatory period from the date of the formal signing of the agreement, and to dismantle all related facilities in pace with the stages of the construction of light-water reactors.

In other words, North Korea agreed not to refuel the 5MW reactor, to stop building 50MW and 200MW reactors and shut down the reprocessing facilities called a radiochemical laboratory, and to place all these facilities under the surveillance of the IAEA. Going a step further, North Korea agreed to ultimately dismantle all these facilities prior to the operation of light-water reactors.

If the 50MW and 200MW reactors were completed and put into operation, North Korea would be able to secure enough plutonium to mass-produce nuclear weapons, in which case it would become more difficult than now to remove the nuclear threat from North Korea. This problem, therefore, holds the key to resolving the future nuclear issue of North Korea.

In a sense, North Korea's freezing of its nuclear program or dismantling of its nuclear facilities may be taken

for granted as an international obligation. But, North Korea, like other countries, is allowed to engage in peaceful nuclear activities like the possession and operation of nuclear power plants. Nonetheless, North Korea agreed to freeze and dismantle these lawful facilities in an overall scenario to solve the nuclear question. Therefore, it is highly significant that these measures make it possible to block from the root North Korea's potential to develop nuclear weapons itself, going beyond the stage of simply preventing North Korea from developing nuclear arms.

Handling of Spent Fuel Rods

It was decided that North Korea would safely store spent fuel and turn it over to a third country in the long run without reprocessing during the construction of light-water reactors, and that the United States and North Korea would hold experts meetings in this connection to discuss the issues of safe storage of the fuel rods and their ultimate disposition.

Some people view that the United States yielded to the North Korean demand with regard to the timing of the transfer of spent fuel rods to a third country. However, South Korea and the United States dealt with the problem from the position that the transfer timetable could be flexible if only North Korea does not reprocess them and the closure of the North's reprocessing facilities could be firmly ensured.

Guarantee of Surveillance by the IAEA

A mechanism may well be said to have been prepared to ensure thorough surveillance by the IAEA of North Korea's past, present and future nuclear activities since it was agreed that the IAEA would strictly monitor the freezing of its graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities and that North Korea would furnish full cooperation therein.

Issue of North Korea's Relations with NPT

As for the issue of North Korea's relations with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), the question was resolved completely as North Korea formally affirmed in the agreement that the country is a signatory nation of the NPT. It is one of the central achievements gained through the agreement that North Korea, which earlier withdrew from the NPT over the issue of special inspections, accepted special inspections and completely returned to the NPT.

Support for Light-Water Reactors

The United States promised to provide North Korea with light-water reactors with a combined capacity of about 2,000MW. Here the 2,000MW capacity refers to two 1,000MW-capacity reactors. The firm position of South

Korea and the United States on the issue is that the light-water reactors of this capacity signify the model of Uljin Atomic Power Plants Nos. 3 and 4 under construction. It was learned that this matter was fully understood between the United States and North Korea.

According to the agreement, the United States would form an international consortium to raise funds for the light-water reactors for North Korea and to take charge of their delivery, and would, on behalf of the consortium, endeavor to conclude with North Korea a contract for the delivery of light-water reactors within six months of the signing of the agreement.

The provision of light-water reactors to North Korea is highly significant in that it would serve to rein in North Korea's nuclear development program. For, firstly, light-water reactors use as fuel enriched uranium and therefore the transparency of the consumption of uranium is available for the country that exports enriched uranium; secondly, plutonium extracted from a light-water reactor is not suitable for the manufacture of weapons; and thirdly, spent fuel rods can be stored almost permanently without reprocessing them.

Provision of Alternative Energy

As alternative energy in return for freezing the

operation of a 5MW reactor and the construction of 50MW and 200MW reactors, the United States agreed to provide to North Korea up to 500,000 tons of heavy oil a year beginning with 50,000 tons in the initial stage pending the completion of light-water reactors.

The provision of 500,000 tons of heavy oil to North Korea was not without foundation. The decision was based on an overall technical review of the loss of energy North Korea would suffer due to freezing the operation of the 5MW reactor and construction of 50MW and 200MW light-water reactors. Besides, heavy oil cannot be used for military purposes but only for energy generation.

Resumption of South-North Dialogue

In the agreement, North Korea promised to (1) consistently take measures to implement the Joint Declaration on Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, and (2) undertake South-North dialogue since the agreement would be helpful to fostering an atmosphere for spurring dialogue.

In the beginning, North Korea opposed the inclusion of the principle of resuming South-North dialogue itself in the agreement. Faced with a firm posture of the United States which had close consultations with the South, however, North Korea agreed in the end to include on South-

North dialogue in the agreement.

The time for resuming inter-Korean dialogue is inter-related with various elements for the implementation of the U.S.-North Korea agreement. Therefore, the Seoul government plans to see to it that the agreement is implemented in the direction of facilitating the early resumption of South-North dialogue.

Improvement of U.S.-North Korea Relations

With regard to the issue of improving U.S.-North Korea relations, the agreement stipulates that the United States would begin easing some trade and economic sanctions within three months of the signing of the agreement, that liaison offices would be opened in each other's capital cities upon the resolution of consular and technical problems through future expert-level meetings, and that the two countries would elevate their relations to the ambassadorial level in the long run once progress is made in matters of mutual concern.

In this connection, South Korea and the United States have reached complete accord on managing various conditions in a way that would prompt U.S.-North Korea relations to improve in tandem with South-North dialogue. The agreement does not give any express time for the exchange of liaison offices between the United States and

North Korea, providing only that the liaison offices would be established when all technical problems are settled through U.S.-North Korea experts meetings.

It would become all the more difficult to predict the date for the exchange of liaison offices, given the fact that it would not be easy to resolve technical problems involved and, besides, improvement of U.S.-North Korea relations is to be made in parallel with progress in inter-Korean relations.

Moreover, the firm position of South Korea and the United States is that for ultimate diplomatic normalization between the United States and North Korea, various issues pending between the United States and North Korea such as the missiles issue, the chemical weapons question and the human rights issue should be resolved along with the complete resolution of the nuclear question.

Significance of U.S.-North Korea Agreement

The U.S.-North Korea agreement was highly significant in that it laid the ground for the fundamental resolution of the nuclear question.

In addition, the agreement sets a significant cornerstone for the prevention of tensions and maintenance of stability and peace on the Korean peninsula, going beyond the stage of settling the nuclear question. If the

Geneva talks had failed, North Korea may have refueled the 5MW reactor and gone ahead with reprocessing the spent fuel rods already extracted even to elevate their negotiating power.

In that event, the basis for U.S.-North Korea dialogue would have been shattered, with the North Korean nuclear question referred to the U.N. Security Council again and talk rising of sanctions against North Korea while tensions built up on the Korean peninsula as was the case last May. In such circumstances, it would have been harder to solve problems even if relevant countries returned to the dialogue table.

The recent agreement has also contributed to ripening conditions for inter-Korean cooperation and North Korea's opening. The nuclear issue had been a big obstacle to the improvement of South-North relations. Now that the obstacle is being overcome, South and North Korea should seize the opportunity to positively promote substantial exchanges and cooperation between them.

In particular, since the South is supposed to play a central role in supplying North Korea's light-water reactors, it is expected that an influx of the South's personnel and material resources into the North at the South's own initiative, would spur the opening of North Korea. With this as an impetus, the South would be able to induce North Korea to become a responsible member of the international community.

3. Developments after U.S.-North Korea Agreement

On October 18, the South Korean government had the 16th unification-related ministers meeting led by Deputy Prime Minister and National Unification Minister Lee Hong-koo, which welcomed the agreement as a substantial base for the complete resolution of the North Korean nuclear question.

Also affirming that the U.S.-North Korea agreement was the fruit of the joint efforts South Korea and the United States had made under unswerving principles and goals, the Seoul government urged North Korea to faithfully implement what was agreed between the United States and North Korea and thereby contribute to stability and peace on the Korean peninsula.

The following is the full text of a statement issued on the same day by a spokesman for the Foreign Ministry:

The nuclear talks between the United States and North Korea were settled in Geneva on October 17. The U.S.- North Korea agreement was the result of the joint efforts South Korea and the United States had made based on the basic aim to resolve the nuclear question through dialogue and also of the positive support and cooperation rendered by the international community. The agreement lays a base for the fundamental resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue and the maintenance of stability and peace on the Korean peninsula.

The two countries of South Korea and the United States maintained a close cooperative system throughout the course of the negotiations and maintained firm objectives and principles based on the basic position of seeking a thorough and broad-ranging resolution of the nuclear question.

The government urged North Korea to take positive and sincere measures to register epochal progress in inter-Korea relations as well as to dispel all nuclear suspicions completely through the faithful implementation of the recent agreement. South Korea and the United States will continue cooperating closely to see to it that North Korean thoroughly abides by the agreement.

On October 21 soon after North Korea signed the basic U.S.-North Korea agreement, the North's chief delegate Kang Sok-ju said at a press conference the agreement is a "historical document," expressing his satisfaction with it. He said he thinks highly of it because he said it concretely reflects North Korea's position.

Meanwhile, referring to the fact that President Clinton called Kim Jong-il "Your Excellency Kim Jong-il" in a letter of guarantee addressed to him, North Korea claimed that President Clinton used the honorific because "Comrade Kim Jong-il, the supreme leader, commands much respect throughout the world as he is formally recognized as the sole successor to the Great Leader."

On November 4, 1994, the U.N. Security Council adopted a presidential statement with respect to the U.S.-North Korea agreement, saying that the Council is satisfied

with the device contributing to the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula and the maintenance of peace and security. The Council unanimously approved the U.S.-North Korea agreement.

The Security Council, attached particular significance to the decision made by U.S. and North Korean authorities on a switch to light-water reactors, normalization of political relations, cooperation in peace and security, efforts to strengthen the NPT system, complete return of North Korea to the NPT and the overall implementation of safety measures of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

Moreover, the Security Council viewed North Korea's decision to freeze its nuclear activities as a voluntary measure that goes beyond the scope of safeguards agreements with the NPT and IAEA. By affirming that the IAEA's surveillance activities toward the decision remain within the surveillance stipulated under the safeguards agreement, the Security Council granted an additional right to the IAEA.

The following is the full text of the U.N. Security Council President's Statement:

PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT

4 November 1994

The Security Council recalls the statements made by the

President of the Council on 8 April 1993 (S/25562), 31 March 1994 (S/PRST/1994/13) and 30 May 1994 (S/PRST/1994/28) and its relevant resolution.

The Security Council reaffirms the critical importance of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards in the implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (the Treaty) and the contribution which progress in non-proliferation makes to the maintenance of international peace and security.

The Security Council notes with satisfaction the "Agreed Framework between the United States of America and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK)" (Agreed Framework) of 21 October 1994 as a positive step in the direction of denuclearizing the Korean peninsula and maintaining peace and security in the region.

The Security Council notes that the parties to the Agreed Framework decided to (1) cooperate in replacing the DPRK's graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities with light-water reactor power plants, (2) move towards full normalization of political and economic relations, (3) work together for peace and security on a nuclear-free Korean peninsula, and (4) work together to strengthen the international nuclear non-proliferation regime.

The Security Council takes note of the decision of the DPRK in the Agreed Framework to remain a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. It notes also the DPRK's decision to come into full compliance with the IAEA-DPRK Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/403) under the Treaty.

The Security Council underlines that the Safeguards Agreement remains binding and in force and looks to the DPRK to act thereon.

The Council requests the IAEA to take all steps it may deem

necessary, following consultations between the IAEA and DPRK with regard to verifying the accuracy and completeness of the DPRK's initial report on all nuclear material in the DPRK, to verify full DPRK compliance with the IAEA-DPRK Safeguards Agreement.

The Security Council notes with approval the DPRK decision in the Agreed Framework to freeze its graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities, which is a voluntary measure beyond what is required by the Treaty and the IAEA-DPRK Safeguards Agreement.

The Security Council, having received an oral report from the Director General of the IAEA, notes further that IAEA monitoring activities with respect to such a voluntary measure are within the scope of verification activities under the IAEA-DPRK Safeguards Agreement.

The Security Council requests the IAEA to take all steps it may deem necessary as a consequence of the Agreed Framework to monitor the freeze.

The Security Council also requests the IAEA to continue to report to it on implementation of the Safeguards Agreement until the DPRK has come into full compliance with the Agreement and to report to the Council on its activities related to monitoring the freeze of the specified facilities.

The Security Council reaffirms the importance of the Joint Declaration by the DPRK and the Republic of Korea on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, and welcomes the decision of the DPRK to take steps consistently to implement that declaration and to engage in dialogue with the Republic of Korea, as the Agreed Framework will help create an atmosphere that promotes such dialogue.

The Security Council will remain seized of the matter.

On the statement of the Security Council President the

South Korean government, in a comment by the spokesman for the Foreign Ministry on November 5, 1994, welcomed the statement. The text of the comment read:

The U.N Security Council, in its President's statement, on November 4 expressed satisfaction at the U.S.-North Korea statement and, in particular, reaffirmed the importance of North Korea's full implementation of its obligation of IAEA inspections and the South-North Joint Declaration on Denuclearization. Our government welcomes it as a proper action.

The statement of the U.N. Security Council is believed to be an important measure inasmuch as the Security Council assigned additional authority to the IAEA with regard to the IAEA's surveillance on the freezing of the North's nuclear program among the items agreed between the United States and North Korea.

The government urges North Korea to faithfully carry out the U.S.-North Korea agreement and, at the same time, agree to resume South-North dialogue and implement the Joint Declaration on Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula at an early date.

On November 11, 1994, the IAEA, at a special Board of Governors meeting, adopted a chairman's summary, deciding to embark on surveillance activities to monitor the freeze of North Korea's nuclear program.

Expressing the hope that the U.S.-North Korea agreement would lead to the early implementation of the safeguards agreement, the IAEA urged North Korea to fully cooperate with the IAEA in the implementation of related

matters.

On November 1, 1994 prior to the urging by the IAEA, North Korea of course declared at home and abroad the freezing of its nuclear program in accordance with the U.S.-North Korea agreement.

It is not that the IAEA has the right to freeze nuclear facilities in operation and inspect them in any country. However, since the IAEA has been given by the Security Council the political and international statutory rights, the IAEA retains both the right and obligation to conduct nuclear inspections in North Korea and faithfully report to the Security Council thereon within the extent of such given authority.

Meanwhile, during his visit to Indonesia to attend a summit meeting of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), President Kim Young-sam met with U.S. President Bill Clinton and Japanese Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama on November 14 and issued a joint statement with them, sharing the view that "improvement of inter-Korean relations such as the resumption of South-North dialogue is essential to the implementation of the U.S.-North Korea agreement.

Appendices

1. Chronology of South-North Dialogue by Area

2. South-North Dialogue Table of Contents

1. Chronology of South-North Dialogue by Area

South-North Sports Talks (37 Meetings)

■ South-North Table Tennis Talks : Four Meetings

- On the issue of forming and fielding a single inter-Korean delegation to the 35th World Table Tennis Championships held in Pyongyang April 25-May 5, 1979.

The 1st meeting : February 27, 1979

The 2nd meeting : March 5, 1979

The 3rd meeting : March 9, 1979

The 4th meeting : March 12, 1979

*Held at the conference room of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC) at Panmunjom.

■ South-North Sports Meetings for Forming and Fielding a Single Delegation to the '84 Olympics in Los Angeles : Three Meetings

- On the issue of forming and fielding single South-North delegations to the 23rd Olympics in Los Angeles and other international games.

The 1st meeting : April 9, 1984

The 2nd meeting : April 30, 1984

The 3rd meeting : May 25, 1984

*Held at the NNSC conference room.

■ IOC-Sponsored South-North Sports Talks in Lausanne : Four Meetings

- On the issue of co-hosting the 24th Seoul Olympics between South and North Korea.

The 1st meeting : October 8-9, 1985

The 2nd meeting : January 8-9, 1986

The 3rd meeting : June 10-11, 1986

The 4th meeting : July 14-15, 1987

*Held at the International Olympic Committee (IOC) Headquarters in Lausanne.

■ South-North Sports Talks for Forming and Fielding a Single Delegation to the '90 Beijing Asian Games : 15 Meetings
- On the issues of forming and fielding a single inter-Korean delegation to the '90 Beijing Asiad and of realizing relevant sports exchanges between the South and the North.

The 1st meeting : March 9, 1989

The 2nd meeting : March 28, 1989

The 3rd meeting : October 20, 1989

The 4th meeting : November 16, 1989

The 5th meeting : November 24, 1989

The 1st working-level delegates contact : December 1, 1989

The 2nd working-level delegates contact : December 6, 1989

The 3rd working-level delegates contact : December 15, 1989

The 6th meeting : December 22, 1989

The 4th working-level delegates contact : January 10, 1990

The 5th working-level delegates contact : January 15, 1990

The 7th meeting : January 18, 1990

The 6th working-level delegates contact : January 22, 1990

The 8th meeting : January 29, 1990

The 9th meeting : February 7, 1990

*The odd-numbered meetings were held at Peace House, even-numbered meetings at Tongilkak, and working-level delegates contacts at

the NNSC conference room.

■ South-North Sports Talks for Forming and Fielding Single Delegations to Major International Sports Games : Eight Meetings

- An Agreement was adopted on the formation and fielding of single inter-Korean delegations to the 14th World Table Tennis Championships and the 16th World Junior Soccer Games.

The 1st meeting : November 29, 1990

The 2nd meeting : January 15, 1991

The 3rd meeting : January 30, 1991

The 4th meeting : February 12, 1991

*The odd-numbered meetings were held at Tongilkak and even-numbered meetings at Peace House.

■ Meetings of Working-Level Committee on Single Table Tennis Delegation : Two Meetings

- On working-level issues related to the formation and fielding of a single South-North delegation to the 41st World Table Tennis Championships.

The 1st meeting : February 21, 1991, Tongilkak

The 2nd meeting : February 27, 1991, Peace House

■ Meetings of Working-Level Committee on Single Soccer Delegation : Two Meetings

- On working-level issues related to the formation and fielding of a single South-North delegation to the 6th World Junior Soccer Championships.

The 1st meeting : February 22, 1991, Peace House

The 2nd meeting : February 26, 1991, Tongilkak

South-North Red Cross Conference (111 Meetings)

■ South-North Red Cross Messengers Contacts : Five Contacts

- Agree on procedural matters for the South-North Red Cross preliminary talks, and exchange the lists of delegates.

The first meeting : August 20, 1971

The second meeting : August 26, 1971

The third meeting : August 30, 1971

The fourth meeting : September 3, 1971

The fifth meeting : September 16, 1971

*Held at the NNSC conference room.

■ South-North Red Cross Preliminary Meetings : 25 Meetings

- Adopt an agreement on the procedural matters related to and time of the South-North Red Cross full-dress meetings.

The 1st meeting : September 20, 1971

The 2nd meeting : September 29, 1971

The 3rd meeting : October 6, 1971

The 4th meeting : October 13, 1971

The 5th meeting : October 20, 1971

The 6th meeting : October 27, 1971

The 7th meeting : November 3, 1971

The 8th meeting : November 11, 1971

The 9th meeting : November 19, 1971

The 10th meeting : November 24, 1971

The 11th meeting : December 3, 1971

The 12th meeting : December 10, 1971
The 13th meeting : December 17, 1971
The 14th meeting : January 10, 1972
The 15th meeting : January 19, 1972
The 16th meeting : January 28, 1972
The 17th meeting : February 3, 1972
The 18th meeting : February 10, 1972
The 19th meeting : February 17, 1972
The 20th meeting : June 16, 1972
The 21st meeting : July 10, 1972
The 22nd meeting : July 14, 1972
The 23rd meeting : July 19, 1972
The 24th meeting : July 26, 1972
The 25th meeting : August 11, 1972
*Held at the NNSC conference room.

■ Working-Level Meetings on the Wording of the Agenda Topics
of Full-Dress Red Cross Meetings : 13 Meetings
- Discuss and adjust the wording of the agenda topics of full-
dress meetings in accordance with an agreement made at the 19th
preliminary meeting.

The 1st meeting : February 21, 1971
The 2nd meeting : February 24, 1972
The 3rd meeting : February 28, 1972
The 4th meeting : March 6, 1972
The 5th meeting : March 10, 1972
The 6th meeting : March 17, 1972
The 7th meeting : March 24, 1972
The 8th meeting : April 17, 1972
The 9th meeting : May 9, 1972
The 10th meeting : May 12, 1972

The 11th meeting : May 19, 1972

The 12th meeting : May 22, 1972

The 13th meeting : June 5, 1972

*Held at the NNSC conference room.

■ Working-Level Meetings for the Discussion of Procedural Matters Related to Full-Dress Meetings : Three Meetings
- Discuss matters related to the procedure of full-dress meetings in accordance with an agreement made at the 24th preliminary meeting.

The 1st meeting : July 27, 1972

The 2nd meeting : August 3, 1972

The 3rd meeting : August 9, 1972

*Held at the NNSC conference room.

■ South-North Red Cross Full-Dress Meetings : 10 Meetings
The 1st meeting : August 29-September 2, 1972
- Confirm and adopt five-point agenda topics.
- Agree that the two sides would strive to dispel the pains of dispersed families and to lay a stepping stone for national unification based on the spirit of the July 4 Joint Communique and the Red Cross principles.

The 2nd meeting : September 12-16, 1972

- Agree to embody the principle of democracy, the principle of liberty, the spirit of the South-North Joint Communique and brotherly love, and the spirits of the Red Cross and humanitarianism.

The 3rd meeting : October 23-26, 1972

- Begin to discuss the agenda topic No. 1, the question of finding out, and informing thereof, the whereabouts and fates of families and relatives dispersed in the South and the North.

The 4th meeting : November 22-24, 1972

- Agree to establish a South-North Red Cross Joint Committee and a South-North Red Cross Panmunjom Joint Project Office.

The 5th meeting : March 20-23, 1973

The 6th meeting : May 8-11, 1973

The 7th meeting : July 10-13, 1973

The 8th meeting : May 27-30, 1985

- Agree on the exchange of hometown visitors groups among dispersed families and art troupes.

The 9th meeting : August 26-29, 1985

The 10th meeting : December 2-5, 1985

*The odd-numbered meetings were held in Pyongyang and even-numbered meetings in Seoul.

■ South-North Red Cross Delegates Meetings : Seven Meetings

- Discuss the question of holding the eighth South-North Red Cross full-dress meeting.

The 1st meeting : November 28, 1973

The 2nd meeting : February 25, 1974

The 3rd meeting : March 11, 1974

The 4th meeting : April 3, 1974

The 5th meeting : April 29, 1974

The 6th meeting : May 22, 1974

The 7th meeting : May 29, 1974

*Held at the NNSC conference room.

■ South-North Red Cross Working-Level Meetings : 25 Meetings

- Discuss the issue of holding the eighth Red Cross full-dress

meeting in accordance with an agreement made at the South-North Red
Cross 7th delegates meeting of May 29, 1974

The 1st meeting : July 10, 1974

The 2nd meeting : July 24, 1974

The 3rd meeting : August 28, 1974

The 4th meeting : September 25, 1974

The 5th meeting : November 5, 1974

The 6th meeting : November 29, 1974

The 7th meeting : January 24, 1975

The 8th meeting : February 28, 1975

The 9th meeting : March 26, 1975

The 10th meeting : May 8, 1975

The 11th meeting : July 21, 1975

The 12th meeting : August 22, 1975

The 13th meeting : October 23, 1975

The 14th meeting : November 28, 1975

The 15th meeting : February 12, 1976

The 16th meeting : April 10, 1976

The 17th meeting : June 9, 1976

The 18th meeting : August 20, 1976

The 19th meeting : October 19, 1976

The 20th meeting : December 10, 1976

The 21st meeting : February 11, 1977

The 22nd meeting : April 28, 1977

The 23rd meeting : July 15, 1977

The 24th meeting : October 14, 1977

The 25th meeting : December 9, 1977

*Held at the NNSC conference room.

■ Working-Level Contact on the Delivery and Receipt of Flood

Relief Goods

- Discusses procedural matters related to the delivery and receipt of flood relief goods of North Korea.

September 18, 1984, NNSC conference room

■ Preliminary Contacts for the Resumption of South-North Red Cross Full-Dress Meetings

- Discuss the question of resuming the eighth South-North Red Cross full-dress meeting.

November 20, 1984, NNSC conference room.

■ Working-Level Delegates Contacts on the Exchange of Hometown Visitors Groups among Dispersed Families and Art Troupes : Three Contacts

The 1st contact : July 15, 1985

The 2nd contact : July 19, 1985

The 3rd contact : August 22, 1985

*Held at the NNSC conference room.

■ Working-Level Delegates Contacts on the Resumption of Red Cross Full-Dress Meetings and the Exchange of Hometown Visitors Groups among Dispersed Families : Ten Contacts

- Discuss the issues of resuming the South-North Red Cross full-dress meetings suspended since the 10th full-dress meeting in December 1985, and implementing the second exchange of hometown visitors groups among dispersed families and art troupes.

The 1st contact : September 17, 1989

The 2nd contact : October 6, 1989

The 3rd contact : October 16, 1989

The 4th contact : November 8, 1989

The 5th contact : November 13, 1989

The 6th contact : November 21, 1989

The 7th contact : November 27, 1989

Exclusive chief delegates contact : December 4, 1989

Exclusive chief delegates contact : November 7, 1990

The 8th contact : November 8, 1990

*Held at the NNSC conference room.

■ Working-Level Delegates Contacts on the Exchange of Aged Parents Visitors among Dispersed Families : Eight Contacts
- Discuss the question of exchanging aged parents visitors among dispersed families and art troupes on the occasion of the National Liberation Day of August 15, 1992 in accordance with an agreement made at the 7th South-North high-level meeting.

The 1st contact : June 5, 1992

The 2nd contact : June 12, 1992

The 3rd contact : June 22, 1992

The 4th contact : July 8, 1992

The 5th contact : July 14, 1992

The 6th contact : July 20, 1992

The 7th contact : July 25, 1992

The 8th contact : August 7, 1992

*Held at the NNSC conference room.

South-North Coordinating Committee Meetings : 22 Meetings

■ Coordinating Committee Co-Chairmen's Meetings : Three Meetings

- Adopt an agreement on the formation and operation of the South-North Coordinating Committee.

The 1st meeting : October 12, 1972, Freedom House

The 2nd meeting : November 2-4, 1972, Pyongyang

The 3rd meeting : November 3, 1972, Seoul

■ Coordinating Committee Meetings : Three Meetings

The 1st meeting : November 30-December 2, 1972, Seoul

The 2nd meeting : March 14-16, 1973, Pyongyang

The 3rd meeting : June 12-14, 1973, Seoul

■ Coordinating Committee Executive Council Meetings : Three Meetings

- Discuss three draft agreements including the operational rules of the South-North Coordinating Committee.

The 1st meeting : March 10, 1973, Panmungak

The 2nd meeting : April 24, 1973, 1973, Freedom House

The 3rd meeting : May 23, 1973, Panmungak

■ Coordinating Committee Vice Chairmen's Meetings : Ten Meetings

The 1st meeting : December 5, 1973

The 2nd meeting : December 19, 1973

The 3rd meeting : January 30, 1974

The 4th meeting : February 27, 1974

The 5th meeting : March 27, 1974

The 6th meeting : April 24, 1974

The 7th meeting : June 28, 1974

The 8th meeting : September 21, 1974

The 9th meeting : January 8, 1975

The 10th meeting : March 14, 1975

*The odd-numbered meetings were held at Panmungak and even-numbered meetings at Freedom House.

■ Anomalous Contacts : Three Contacts

- Contacts between Seoul-side members of the South-North Coordinating Committee and delegates from the North's Democratic Front for the Unification of the Fatherland.

The 1st contact : February 17, 1979

The 2nd contact : March 7, 1979

The 3rd contact : March 14, 1979

*Held at the NNSC conference room.

Working-Level Delegates Contacts for South-North Prime Ministers Talks (Ten Contacts)

- Discuss working-level matters related to proposed South-North prime ministers talks.

The 1st contact : February 6, 1980

The 2nd contact : February 19, 1980

The 3rd contact : March 4, 1980

The 4th contact : March 18, 1980

The 5th contact : April 1, 1980

The 6th contact : April 18, 1980

The 7th contact : May 6, 1980

The 8th contact : May 22, 1980

The 9th contact : June 24, 1980

The 10th contact : August 20, 1980

*The 1st contact was held at the NNSC conference room.

Of the subsequent contacts, the odd-numbered contacts were held at Freedom House and the even-numbered at Panmungak.

South-North Economic Talks (Five Meetings)

The 1st meeting : November 15, 1984

The 2nd meeting : May 17, 1985

The 3rd meeting : June 20, 1985

The 4th meeting : September 18, 1985

The 5th meeting : November 20, 1985

*Held at the NNSC conference room.

South-North Parliamentary Talks (13 Meetings)

■ Preliminary Contacts : Two Contacts

- Discuss the topics of, and various procedural matters related to, the proposed South-North parliamentary talks.

The 1st contact : July 23, 1985

The 2nd contact : September 25, 1985

*Held at the NNSC conference room.

■ Preparatory Contacts : 11 Contacts

The 1st contact : August 19, 1988

The 2nd contact : August 20, 1988

The 3rd contact : August 22, 1988

Exclusive chief delegates contact : August 24, 1988

The 4th contact : August 26, 1988

The 5th contact : October 13, 1988

The 6th contact : November 17, 1988

The 7th contact : December 29, 1988

The 8th contact : October 25, 1989

The 9th contact : November 29, 1989

The 10th contact : January 24, 1990

*The odd-numbered contacts were held at Tongilkak, even-numbered contacts at Peace House, and exclusive chief delegates contact at Peace House.

South-North High-Level Talks (112 Meetings)

■ Preliminary Meetings for the South-North High-Level Talks : 10 meetings

- Adopt an agreement on holding South-North high-level talks.

The 1st meeting : February 8, 1989

The 2nd meeting : March 2, 1989

The 3rd meeting : October 12, 1989

The 4th meeting : November 15, 1989

The 5th meeting : December 20, 1989

The 6th meeting : January 31, 1990

The 7th meeting : July 3, 1990

The 1st working-level delegates contact : July 6, 1990

The 2nd working-level delegates contact : July 12, 1990

The 8th meeting : July 26, 1990

*The odd-numbered meetings were held at Peace House, even-numbered at Tongilkak, and working-level delegates contacts at the NNSC conference room.

■ South-North High-Level Talks : Eighth Meetings

The 1st meeting : September 4-7, 1990

- Agrees on holding South-North working-level delegates contacts on the issue of entry into the United Nations and calling for the resumption of the Red Cross conference.

The 2nd meeting : October 16-19, 1990

The 3rd meeting : December 11-14, 1990

The 4th meeting : October 22-25, 1991

- Agree on the adoption, name and contents of a single document of agreement.

The 5th meeting : December 10-31, 1991

- Adopts the "Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression, and Exchanges and Cooperation between the South and the North."

The 6th meeting : February 18-21, 1992

- The Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression, and Exchanges and Cooperation between the South and the North; Joint Declaration of Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula; and Agreement on the Formation and Operation of the Subcommittees of the South-North High-Level Talks go into force.

- Joint Announcement on the schedules of the Political, Military and Exchanges-Cooperation Subcommittees and the Nuclear Control Joint Commission is released.

The 7th meeting : May 5-8, 1992

- Adopts and puts into effect an Agreement on the Formation and Operation of the South-North Military Joint commission and South-North Exchanges and Cooperation Joint Commission, and an Agreement on the Creation and Operation of South and North Liaison Offices.

- Announces an agreement on the exchange of aged parents visitors groups among dispersed families and art troupes.

The 8th meeting : September 15-18, 1992

- Adopts and puts into force the Agreement on the Formation and Operation of South-North Reconciliation Joint Commission; adopts and puts into force supplementary agreements of the Basic Agreement on reconciliation, non-aggression, and exchanges and cooperation.

- Announces an agreement on the times of the first meetings of the joint commissions on reconciliation, military, economy-exchanges-cooperation, and sociocultural exchanges and cooperation.

*The odd-numbered meetings were held in Seoul and even-numbered meetings in Pyongyang.

■ Working-Level Delegates Contacts on the Issue of Entry into the United Nations : Three Contacts

- Discuss the issue of South and North Korea joining the United Nations.

The 1st contact : September 18, 1990

The 2nd contact : October 5, 1990

The 3rd contact : November 9, 1990

*Held at the NNSC conference room.

■ Working-Level Delegates Contacts for the Preparation of the 3rd High-Level Meeting : Three Contacts

The 1st contact : November 21, 1990, Tongilkak

The 2nd contact : November 27, 1990, Peace House

The 3rd contact : December 1, 1990, Tongilkak

■ Working-Level Delegates Contacts for the Preparation of the
4th High-Level Meeting : Three Contacts

The 1st contact : August 5, 1991, Peace House

The 2nd contact : August 10, 1991, Tongilkak

The 3rd contact : August 16, 1991, Peace House

■ Delegates Contacts for the Adjusting and Wording of a Single
Agreement : Four Contacts

The 1st contact : November 11, 1991

The 2nd contact : November 15, 1991

The 3rd contact : November 20, 1991

The 4th contact : November 26, 1991

*The odd-numbered contacts were held at Tongilkak and even-numbered at Peace House.

■ Delegates Contacts for the Discussion of the Nuclear Question
: Three Contacts

- Agree on and initial the Joint Declaration of the
Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

The 1st contact : December 26, 1991, Tongilkak

The 2nd contact : December 28, 1991, Peace House

The 3rd contact : December 31, 1991, Tongilkak

■ Delegates Contacts for the Exchange of the Copies of the Joint
Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula :
Two Contacts

The 1st contact : January 14, 1992

The 2nd contact : January 21, 1992

*Held at the NNSC conference room.

■ Delegates Contacts on the Question of Forming and Operating Subcommittees : Three Contacts

- Agree on and initial the Agreement on the Formation and Operation of the Subcommittees of the South-North High-Level Talks.

The 1st contact : January 23, 1992, Peace House

The 2nd contact : January 29, 1992, Tongilkak

The 3rd contact : February 7, 1992, Peace House

■ Delegates Contacts on the Question of Forming and Operating the South-North Joint Nuclear Control Commission : Seven Contacts

- Agree on and initial the Agreement on the Formation and Operation of the South-North Joint Nuclear Control Commission.

The 1st contact : February 19, 1992

The 2nd contact : February 27, 1992

The 3rd contact : March 3, 1992

The 4th contact : March 4, 1992

The 5th contact : March 6, 1992

The 6th contact : March 10, 1992

The 7th contact : March 14, 1992

*The 1st contact was held in Pyongyang. Of the subsequent contacts, the even-numbered contacts were held at Tongilkak and the odd-numbered at Peace House.

■ South-North Political Subcommittee : 15 Meetings

- Agree on and initial the Supplementary Agreement on the

Implementation of and Respect for the provisions of the Chapter I
“South-North Reconciliation” of the Basic South-North Agreement.

The 1st meeting : March 9, 1992

The 2nd meeting : March 27, 1992

The 3rd meeting : April 23, 1992

The 1st members contact : April 29, 1992

The 4th meeting : May 19, 1992

The 5th meeting : June 9, 1992

The 6th meeting : July 2, 1992

The 1st chairmen's contact : July 10, 1992

The 2nd members contact : July 18, 1992

The 3rd members contact : July 30, 1992

The 4th members contact : August 5, 1992

The 5th members contact : August 19, 1992

The 7th meeting : August 28, 1992

The 2nd chairmen's contact : September 4, 1992

The 3rd chairmen's contact : September 8, 1992

*The odd-numbered meetings were held at Peace House, even-numbered meetings at Tongilkak, and members contacts at the NNSC conference room.

■ South-North Military Subcommittee : 12 Meetings

- Agree on and initial the Supplementary Agreement on the Implementation of and Respect for Part II “South-North Non-Aggression” of the Basic Agreement.

The 1st meeting : March 13, 1992

The 2nd meeting : March 31, 1992

The 3rd meeting : April 30, 1992

The 4th meeting : May 25, 1992

The 5th meeting : June 9, 1992

The 6th meeting : July 16, 1992

Chairmen's contact : July 23, 1992

The 1st members contact : August 3, 1992

The 2nd members contact : August 12, 1992

The 3rd members contact : August 20, 1992

The 7th meeting : August 26, 1992

The 8th meeting : September 5, 1992

*The odd-numbered meetings were held at Tongilkak, even-numbered meetings at Peace House, and members contacts at the NNSC conference room.

■ South-North Exchanges and Cooperation Subcommittee : 14 Meetings

- Agree on and initial the Supplementary Agreement on the Implementation of and Respect for Part III "South-North Exchanges and Cooperation" of the Basic Agreement.

The 1st meeting : March 18, 1992

The 1st members contact : March 25, 1992

The 2nd members contact : April 2, 1992

The 3rd members contact : April 10, 1992

The 2nd meeting : April 18, 1992

The 3rd meeting : April 27, 1992

The 4th members contact : April 28, 1992

The 4th meeting : May 20, 1992

The 5th meeting : June 26, 1992

The 6th meeting : July 28, 1992

The 5th members contact : August 10, 1992

The 6th members contact : August 21, 1992

The 7th meeting : September 3, 1992

Chairmen's contact : September 7, 1992

*The odd-numbered meetings were held at Peace House, the even-numbered meetings at Tongilkak, and members contacts at the NNSC conference room.

■ South-North Joint Nuclear Control Commission : 22 Meetings

- Discuss the question of working out rules for mutual South-North nuclear inspections and carrying out mutual South-North inspections.

The 1st meeting : March 19, 1992

The 2nd meeting : April 1, 1992

The 3rd meeting : April 21, 1992

The 4th meeting : May 12, 1992

The 1st members contact : May 15, 1992

The 2nd members contact : May 20, 1992

The 3rd members contact : May 23, 1992

The 5th meeting : May 27, 1992

The 6th meeting : June 30, 1992

The 7th meeting : July 21, 1992

The 8th meeting : August 31, 1992

The 4th members contact : September 19, 1992

The 5th members contact : September 30, 1992

The 6th members contact : October 14, 1992

The 9th meeting : October 22, 1992

The 7th members contact : October 29, 1992

The 10th meeting : November 18, 1992

The 11th meeting : November 27, 1992

The 12th meeting : December 10, 1992

The 8th members contact : December 14, 1992

The 13th meeting : December 17, 1992

Chairmen's contact : January 25, 1992

*The odd-numbered meetings were held at Tongilkak, the even-numbered meetings at Peace House, members contacts at the NNSC conference room, and the chairmen's contact at Tongilkak.

■ Delegates Contacts on the Issues of Li In-mo and Dispersed Families : Two Contacts

The 1st contact : October 1, 1992, Tongilkak

The 2nd contact : October 5, 1992, Peace House

■ Communications Working-Level Officials Contact on the Installing and Operation on Direct South-North Military Telephone Line

- Discuss the installing and operation of a direct South-North military telephone line as the Supplementary Agreement on the Implementation of and Respect for Part II "South-North Non-Aggression" of the Basic Agreement took effect at the eighth South-North high-level meeting.

October, 29, NNSC conference room.

Working-Level Delegates Contacts for the South-North Exchange of Special Envoys(Eight Contacts)

- Discuss procedural matters related to the exchange of special envoys of the top leaders of the South and the North.

The 1st contact : October 5, 1993

The 2nd contact : October 15, 1993

The 3rd contact : October 25, 1993

The 4th contact : March 3, 1994

The 5th contact : March 9, 1994

The 6th contact : March 12, 1994

The 7th contact : March 16, 1994

The 8th contact : March 19, 1994

*The odd-numbered meetings were held at Tongilkak and the even-numbered meetings at Peace House.

Preliminary Contacts for the South-North Summit Meeting(Five Contacts)

■ A Preliminary Contact for the Proposed South-North Summit Meeting

- Adopts an agreement on the holding of South-North summit talks.

June 28, 1994, Peace House

■ Delegates Contacts for the Discussion of Working-Level Matters Related to South-North Summit Talks

- Adopt an agreement on working-level matters related to the holding of a South-North summit meeting.

The 1st contact : July 1, 1994, Tongilkak

The 2nd contact : July 2, 1994, Peace House

■ Communications Working-Level Officials Contact for South-North Summit Talks

- Discusses communications matters in connection with visit to

Pyongyang in accordance with an agreement on working-level matters related to South-North summit talks.

July 7, 1994, Peace House

■ Security Working-Level Officials Contact for South-North Summit Talks

- Discusses security matters in connection with visit to Pyongyang in accordance with an agreement on working-level matters related to South-North summit talks.

July 8, 1994, Tongilkak

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No. 22(1979. 10. 31.)

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2. Substance and Significance of Proposal
3. Negative Response from North Korea and Its Underlying Motive
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 - a. “Four-Party Talks” and “Six-Party Talks”
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5. "Let Us Resume Red Cross Meeting in Seoul on October 28"

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No. 26 (1981. 7. 31.)

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No. 27 (1981. 11. 30.)

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No. 28 (1982. 2. 28.)

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No. 30 (1982. 12. 10.)

- Part One : Opening of Each Society to Advance National Reconciliation
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- Part Three : Eleventh Anniversary of Proposal for South-North Red Cross Talks
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No. 31 (1983. 3. 30.)

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 - Renewed Call for Acceptance of Meeting between Top Leaders of South and North Korea, and Expression of Welcome to North Korean Delegates' Participation in Seoul IPU Meeting -
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NO. 33 (1983. 10. 31.)

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1. President Chun's Commemorative Speech on the 38th Anniversary of National Liberation
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No. 34 (1984. 4. 30.)

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- National Unification without Recourse to Violence
- 2. President Chun's Policy Statement and the Nation's Belief in Peace
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- 3. Prime Minister Chin Issues Statement Calling for Direct Inter-Korean Dialogue
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No. 35 (1984.8.25.)

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No. 36 (1984. 11. 30.)

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No. 37 (1985. 3. 10.)

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Part Two : Inter-Korean Economic Talks and Preliminary Contacts for a Full-Dress Red Cross Meeting

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No. 39 (1985. 11. 15.)

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No. 40 (1986. 3. 25.)

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No. 41(1986. 8. 25.)

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No. 42 (1987. 4. 30.)

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No. 46 (1988. 12. 15.)

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No. 49 (1990. 4. 21.)

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 - b. Proceeding of the Meeting
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No. 52 (1991. 4. 30.)

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 - b. The Outline of Conference
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No. 54 (1992, 3, 30.)

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2. President Roh Tae-woo's Announcement on Non-nuclear
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3. President Roh Tae-woo's Special Statement on the Effec-
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19, 1992
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No. 55 (1992. 6. 30.)

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No. 56 (1992. 10. 3.)

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No. 57 (1993. 4. 20.)

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No. 58 (1993. 9. 28.)

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No. 60 (1994. 10. 10.)

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