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South-North Dialogue in Korea

**International Cultural Society of Korea
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**South-North Dialogue
in
Korea**

South-North Coordinating Committee

South-North Red Cross Conference

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Part One

Road toward Peace And Unification

31st Anniversary of Nat'l Liberation:

**“Inter-Korean Accord” Termed “Essential”;
President Wishes Early SNCC Normalization,
Urges All Nations to Persuade North Korea**

[Following is a verbatim translation of an address of President Park Chung Hee of the Republic of Korea, read by Prime Minister Choi Kyu Ha on August 15, 1976, to a Seoul rally, commemorating the 31st anniversary of the liberation of the country from a 36-year colonial occupation by Japan.] -Ed.

My Dear Fifty Million Compatriots in the South and North!

On this meaningful occasion of the thirty-first anniversary of national liberation, I, together with my dear compatriots, solemnly commemorate this national day and renew our national aspiration for the peaceful reunification of our fatherland.

At the same time, I urge the north Korean Communists to abandon, once and for all, their preposterous and anachronistic daydream of communizing the whole of Korea by force of arms, and to come at an early date to the arena of dialogue to join in our endeavors for easing the state of tension on the Korean peninsula and restoring mutual trust.

My compatriots!

In retrospect, the tragedy of national division and the ordeal of south-north confrontation did not occur in the first place at our own wish.

Nevertheless, the responsibility and the mission of unifying the divided fatherland peacefully, and resuscitating a prosperous nation, rest entirely with ourselves. This is a challenge which can be met only with our own wisdom and self-reliant capability.

In the world today, competitions among nations are fiercer than ever to uphold their right to existence, and to preserve their own national interests. This struggle for national existence appears to be increasing in acuteness.

On our part, it is truly frustrating that we still have to live under the constant threat of war, with the south and the north pointing guns and bayonets at each other, even after the lapse of an entire generation from our national liberation.

Thirty-one years are by no means a short span of time. The infants born at the time of the national liberation of August 15, 1945, have now grown into adults in their thirties.

In that course of time, the international situation has changed greatly, and so has the outward semblance of our fatherland. With changes in the times, people's way of thinking and pattern of conduct have also undergone alterations.

But there is one thing that has not changed at all—the attitude of the north Korean Communists.

The north Korean Communists, still obsessed with old-fashioned dogmatism and heretical fanaticism, are trying to exact unlimited degree of idolatry and adulation for their boss from the north Korean populace, and have perpetrated innumerable acts of atrocity and aggressive provocations against us. Even nowadays, they are seeking an opportune time to invade the south.

Notwithstanding, we have been making many-faceted endeavors by all available means and with utmost sincerity to ease tensions between the south and the north, and to consolidate peace on this land.

After we called for peaceful competition in national development and construction and creative activities between the south and the north in the August 15 Declaration of 1970, we proposed the South-North Red Cross

Conference in 1971. The following year, 1972, we took the initiative in the issuance of the historic July 4 South-North Joint Communique, thereby opening the door of south-north dialogue for the first time.

Again in 1973, we opened the door of our nation to all countries, transcending differences in ideologies and social systems, by proclaiming the June 23 Special Statement on Foreign Policy for Peace and Unification. In 1974, we proposed conclusion of a south-north non-aggression agreement, followed by a declaration of three basic principles for peaceful national unification—non-aggression, mutual exchanges, and free general elections.

It was in this very same spirit that we together with an ally renewed recently our proposal for the meeting of the parties directly concerned to the armistice in Korea.

I am confident that the best and most realistic means for the south and the north to pursue national unification in a peaceful manner, not by means of force, is to strive to solve problems independently between our compatriots through dialogue.

Our policy for peaceful unification already enjoys positive response and support from the majority of the members of international community.

However, the north Korean Communists continue to put forth totally impractical and deceitful propositions, such as “south-north federation system,” “grand national conference” and “peace agreement with the United States.” They are engaged only in deceptive propaganda to serve their machinations for communization of the south, while unilaterally suspending even the south-north dialogue, the very first step toward removal of tensions and improvement of mutual relations.

They have also intensified slander and defamations as well as subversive operations against the south. They have dug invasion tunnels, and have lately gone so far as to infiltrate armed agents into the south across

the truce line, in order to spy on our military facilities and evaluate our defense posture.

On the 5th of this month, they committed another provocative atrocities against the south by surprisingly pouring bullets at our tranquil outposts in the Demilitarized Zone, They flatly rejected our proposal for a joint investigation of this incident.

From these facts, it can well be assessed how frantic the north Korean Communists are about war preparations, intransigently maintaining their schemes for communization of the whole Korean peninsula.

But our north Korean brethren will no longer be deceived by any of the conspiracies or propaganda campaigns by the north Korean Communists.

The Communists will never succeed in dampening the burning desires of our north Korean compatriots for peace and prosperity.

I am positive that any ideology or political system would in the long run be rejected and abandoned by the people if it fails to render positive contributions toward national development, or to provide for the atmosphere and conditions in which people can lead a decent life.

For the past thirty-one years, the south and the north have maintained conflicting ideologies and heterogeneous systems—an open and democratic society in the south and a Communist dictatorial rule in the north.

As a result, I think, a conclusion has already been drawn as to which system is superior to the other in ensuring better lives of people, and safeguarding national traditions and lasting prosperity.

In other words, the consequence of competition in ideology and system between the south and the north can be seen easily when we compare the present status of the development of the Republic of Korea with the actual situation of north Korea.

As my compatriots well know, the economy of our country at the time of our national liberation was in an extremely poor state, beset by a pre-modern industrial structure. Moreover, even the industrial facilities we then possessed were destroyed in entirety during the Korean War triggered by the north Korean Communists.

However, all our people under a free and open system have worked diligently, manifesting creativity, thereby sustaining a high rate of economic growth the like of which has seldom been found elsewhere in the world. From the ruins of yesterday, we have laid today's strong base for prosperity.

Especially, the groundwork of our economic self-reliance has now been solidly cemented through the successful implementation of three Five-Year Economic Development Plans started in the early 1960's.

During the period of the Fourth Five-Year Economic Development Plan that will start next year, social welfare policies will be steadily implemented on the basis of the accumulated national strength, so that all people, whether they live in urban or rural areas, can benefit equally from prosperity. Public health and medical programs will be expanded and electrical facilities installed in all villages, even those in remote mountainous areas and offshore islands. At the same time, efforts shall further be accelerated for greater production, exports and construction to enable the boost of per-capita national income to 1,300 dollars on a solid foundation of economic self-reliance.

We have thus come to harbor high expectations and bright prospects that we would be able to build a modern society in the shortened span of twenty to thirty years, which other peoples took more than a century to construct.

I realize that these worthwhile achievements are the products of the self-awareness and determination of national magnitude that we, too, shall and can live well as other peoples do. I also believe that the achieve-

ments are the fruits of the blood and sweat which we all together have shed while working on the one hand and fighting on the other. Now I take this occasion to express once again my appreciation for my compatriots' perseverance and hard work.

Needless to say, the very fact that all citizens are freely participating in the efforts for national security and prosperity, cooperating with one another and working hard by themselves, constitutes the strength of genuine democracy and the superiority of a free society.

What then can be today's situation in north Korea? As already well known, our north Korean compatriots are even without the freedom of occupation and movement of their residences. In north Korea there is no freedom of thinking, let alone freedom of religion.

Moreover, the north Korean Communists are desperately working toward furthering the national heterogeneity between the south and the north by enforcing idolatry of their chief and shattering the traditional family system.

Nowhere in north Korea today can we find the tradition of our time-honored national culture or the virtuous customs handed down from our forefathers.

They even rejected outright the ardent wishes of the dispersed families for visiting their ancestors' tombs even once during their lifetime through mutual exchange of visitors to ancestral tombs, which we proposed.

Amidst the emotion and tears of joy shown by those compatriots in Japan who have come into the arms of our fatherland for the first time in many decades, we have felt acutely how precious are the human affection and love toward one's family members and relatives. And we have clearly realized once again how cruel is the barbarous crime of the north Korean Communists who have ruthlessly suppressed humanity.

It is widely known in the world, despite its meticulously planned

deceptive propaganda schemes, that the economy of north Korea is now on the brink of bankruptcy, and that north Korea is being frowned on in the world community because of its inability to repay foreign debts.

This is another clear evidence substantiating the fact that the north Korean Communists have squandered their economic resources on military buildup and subversive operations against this Republic, in total disregard of the living standard of the north Korean residents.

If the north Korean Communists continue to reject peaceful coexistence with us, and pursue their policy of aggressive war against the south, they would incur a disruption of their activities in all fields such as political, economic and social. I can foresee that the north Korean Communist system would collapse by itself in not too-distant future.

The north Korean Communists should correctly realize that the times of military adventurism they are dreaming of have already elapsed, in view of the fast-expanding national strength, the mighty self-reliant defense capability, and the watertight total security posture of our Republic.

I take this opportunity to urge once again that the north Korean Communists agree to resume unconditionally the south-north dialogue and normalize the functions of the South-North Coordinating Committee, realizing that problems of the Korean question cannot be settled without understanding or agreement reached between the parties directly concerned.

At the same time, it is my expectation that all those countries which earlier underwent the same experience as our own under alien colonial rule, and are today following the path of resuscitation while pursuing, together with us, the ideal of peaceful coexistence, will persuade the north Korean Communists to resume the south-north dialogue at an early date, so that parties of the south and the north can directly settle the Korean question. I also expect them to cooperate in the efforts to create international conditions conducive to the reduction of tension.

I emphasize that this represents the only way of contribution to the peace of the Korean peninsula and Northeast Asia, and also that of the entire world.

Fellow countrymen!

Today, we are resolutely marching along the path toward peace and prosperity while surmounting one by one many challenges and trials such as the intensified aggressive provocations on the part of the north Korean Communists and the world wide economic recession, which befell us from within and without in the past few years.

We cannot even, for a moment, falter in this rewarding and grand march toward peaceful unification of the fatherland and resurrection of our nation.

I believe that four to five years from now would constitute the most crucial period for us to firmly consolidate the grounds for lasting peace and prosperity.

The north Korean Communists are likely to intensify tensions further in an attempt to escape, even briefly, from their serious internal power struggle and economic crisis. In the worst event, there even exists the possibility that they would provoke an aggressive war against the south as a distraction from these woes.

Whatever challenges and trials we may face, we have nothing to fear, if we cope with them resolutely in concerted efforts with confidence and courage as we do now.

I think that all countries in the world, whether they be advanced or otherwise, are confronted with common problems requiring urgent solution, such as re-establishment of a solid sense of values contributory to national development and furtherance of mankind's happiness, and reconstruction of social discipline based on the spirit of diligent and sincere work, responsibility and cooperation.

I believe that the Saemaul Undong (New Community Movement) which rekindled our nation's spiritual tradition in the contemporary age, plus the clean and efficient management of state affairs, are the genuine spiritual reform movement and a tonic for speeding up the buildup of national strength, with which the nation can play a greater role in the world community.

Herein lies the true significance of the Yushin (Revitalizing Reforms).

In the ancient days of the Silla Dynasty, the driving force behind the accomplishment of the great task of unifying the Three Kingdoms was the Hwarang Spirit. Now, the propelling power with which we can unify our divided fatherland peacefully is none other than this Saemaul spirit.

I emphasize once again that here exist the greatest potential of our nation and a limitless horizon for development.

Looking forward to a brighter tomorrow with pride in the achievements we have thus far made so arduously, let us keep marching onward for the creation of a new history of brilliant national resurrection based upon the continuity of our long national history.

Minister Park Stresses Differences in Ideology; Urges Restoration of Mutual Trust thru Dialogue

[Following is a verbatim translation of a statement issued by Republic of Korea Foreign Minister Park Tong Jin on June 23, 1976, marking the third anniversary of the enunciation of the Foreign Policy for Peace and Unification on June 23, 1973, by President Park Chung Hee.]—Ed.

Three years ago today, President Park Chung Hee of the Republic of Korea, taking into account of the reality on the Korean peninsula, pronounced through a special statement, a new policy on national unification and international relations

In his policy statement of June 23, 1973, the President, stressing the peaceful unification of Korea as the paramount aspiration and objective of the whole Korean people, pledged to continue the south-north dialogue with sincerity and patience in accordance with the South-North Joint Communique of July 4, 1972. In the field of international relations, he declared the open door policy of the Republic of Korea toward all nations of the world regardless of the differences of ideology and social institutions in pursuit of friendly and good neighborly relations based on the principle of reciprocity and equality.

In recognition of the pressing need to create an atmosphere of peace for unification, President Park further stated in clear terms that the South and the North should neither interfere with each other's internal affairs nor commit aggression against each other and also that the Republic of Korea is prepared to enter into the United Nations together with north

Korea as an interim measure pending the ultimate unification. The new foreign policy embodied in seven items in the said statement is the most rational and realistic approach in the light of the prevailing situation Korea and of the relations between the South and the North which have long been in stalemate. This statement was made with the strong desire of substantially improving the conditions for peaceful unification of the fatherland.

Since the opening of the south-north dialogue five years ago which was initiated to facilitate the realization of our national aspiration, that is, the peaceful unification of the country, the Government of the Republic of Korea has exerted every possible effort to expedite the progress of the south-north dialogue. Notwithstanding our sincere and arduous efforts, north Korea unilaterally suspended the dialogue in August, 1973, and returned to the policy of escalating tension on the Korean peninsula, in disregard of the spirit of the South-North Joint Communiqué of 1972. As a result, the prospect for the solution of the Korean problem has become remote as ever. Meanwhile, at the United Nations General Assembly, where the Korean question was deliberated, nothing but unproductive discussions were repeated.

It is recalled with regret that the United Nations General Assembly last year adopted the two contradictory resolutions on the Korean question while the contents of the consensus statement adopted unanimously at the 28th session of United Nations General Assembly have not been fully carried out, thus contributing nothing to the solution of the Korean problem.

I wish to emphasize that, at any international conference on the Korean question, one cannot bring forth any solution unless the debate is conducted with sense of justice and realism accompanied by objective assessment of the following reality that exists on the Korean peninsula:

First of all, there remains the fact that the danger of the recurrence of war continues to exist on the Korean peninsula. The north Korean Com-

munists, in spite of their unsuccessful attempt to unify the whole of Korea by force by launching the Korean War in June 1950, have been concentrating on the military build-up and have not given up their dream of unifying the country under the communist rule by all means.

Under these circumstances, it is the Korean Armistice Agreement of July 27, 1953, that has played a vital role in maintaining peace and in preventing the recurrence of hostilities on the Korean peninsula for over twenty years since the ceasefire in 1953. It should be recalled that the United Nations General Assembly in its Resolution 811 adopted on 11 December 1954 at its ninth session, expressly noted the requirement of the Armistice Agreement which stipulates to the effect that the Agreement shall remain in force until it is superseded by mutually agreed arrangements between the two sides.

Accordingly, the proposal of north Korea and its supporters that the current Armistice Agreement be repealed without mutual agreement on its alternative arrangements is tantamount to a demand for abolishing the vital safety valve for preventing the renewed hostilities between the South and the North. Such irresponsible proposal can not and should not be admitted. Furthermore, considering the fact that some big powers have, either directly or indirectly, been involved in the Korean question ever since the World War II, the importance of consolidating peace on the Korean peninsula cannot be over emphasized. Our proposal at the United Nations General Assembly last year for convening a conference of the parties directly concerned was based on these considerations.

Secondly, due to their tragic division for over three decades, the Republic of Korea and north Korea have become two heterogeneous entities, differing in their respective ideologies and systems which cannot be assimilated at once.

Although Korea was liberated from the colonial rule as a result of World War II, it was divided against the will of its people. In north Korea a communist regime was established and it has rigidly regimented the whole society, while dominating its entire inhabitants under the communist ideology. The

north Korean regime, by strictly limiting contacts with the outside world, has maintained the most secluded society unparalleled in the world today.

On the other hand, the Government of the Republic of Korea, which was established in 1948 as the only lawful government on the Korean peninsula, through a free general election supervised by the United Nations, embracing over two thirds of fifty million of the total Korean population, maintains liberal democracy and an open society. It has been intensifying efforts for promoting the well-being of the people and national development.

Under such a sharply contrasting set of conditions and circumstances, the peaceful unification can only be achieved through gradual steps expanding many-sided exchanges through dialogue and by opening doors to each other aimed at restoring mutual trust. The best approach for restoring national unity and political homogeneity is to avoid any hasty and radical solution which will surely create confusion or may lead even to renewed hostilities in Korea, but rather to faithfully implement the spirit of the South-North Joint Communique of July 4, 1972.

Thirdly, despite international efforts for over 20 years in the past, particularly at the United Nations, there has been no progress in the solution of the Korean question. It is primarily due to the lack of an agreement between south and north Korea, who are the principal parties directly concerned to the question.

In the light of the current status of the south-north relationship and the prevailing international situation, any approach that would impose unilateral proposition on outstanding problems on Korea will only aggravate tension between the South and the North or may even invite armed conflict. Accordingly, it is our belief that resolution of international conferences lacking the prospect of mutual acceptance and unacceptable to either of the parties directly concerned will rather be detrimental than conducive to the solution of the problem. Furthermore, such approach may run counter to the principle of self-determination of the nation. Therefore, the proper role expected of the third countries which are not directly concerned should be to

help create an international atmosphere conducive to an immediate and unconditional resumption of the dialogue which was unilaterally suspended by north Korea, so that the Korean people may resolve their problem in accordance with their own free will. Only this, I believe, is the proper way contributing to the peaceful solution of the Korean question under the present conditions. Without the process of examination of problem, there can be no agreement or solution.

I, therefore, wish to make it clear that the real situations on Korea that have been summarized above must be taken into account as an elementary requirement in dealing with the Korean question at all international conferences.

I wish to emphasize that international conferences dealing with the Korean question, whether it is the United Nations General Assembly, Non-aligned Conference or any other conferences, can be helpful in accelerating the solution of outstanding Korean problems only when they resolve to assist the South and the North of Korea in arranging peaceful settlement through dialogue and mutual agreement between them, parties directly concerned, taking into account of the above-mentioned reality. Should they fail in giving careful consideration to the real situation on Korea accounted above, they will result only in obstructing our effort for consolidating peace in Korea and undermining the national aspiration of the entire Korean people.

Part Two

South-North Dialogue

1. South-North Dialogue 1976 in Retrospect

Throughout 1976, Communist north Korea has continued, like in the previous years of 1974 and 1975, to be uninterested in any meaningful resumption of the long-derailed inter-Korean dialogue on both tracks—the political South-North Coordinating Committee (SNCC) and the humanitarian South-North Red Cross Conference (SNRCC).

The political SNCC, in particular, has remained completely out of order as Communist north Korea continuously turned down, one after another, repeated Republic of Korea initiatives to revive at least some of its normal functions. [It was in March 1975 that the two sides of divided Korea had their last physical contact within the framework of the SNCC, in the form of the tenth SNCC Vice Chairmens meeting in Panmunjom held on March 14. In May that year, in the immediate wake of north Korean president Kim Il Sung's sabre-rattling visit to Peking that coincided with the eventual Communist takeover of the whole of Indochina, north Korea discontinued, again in a unilateral action, even the SNCC Vice Chairmen's meetings in Panmunjom that had survived the SNCC plenary meetings, which featured, among others, reciprocation of visits between Seoul and Pyongyang, the first of its kind in the history of divided Korea.]

Unlike the SNCC, the Republic of Korea National Red Cross (ROKNRC) and the north Korean Red Cross (NKRC) have continued to hold a series of the SNRCC "working-level" meetings in Panmunjom once every two to three months throughout the year. They had their last such meeting, 19th in the series, held on October 19, but they are still found way apart from each other on settlement of the two pending questions—resumption of the full-dress SNRCC meetings that are supposed to reciprocate visits between Seoul and Pyongyang and preliminary deliberations on ways to implement the projects embraced in the SNRCC's five-point agenda. *The SNRCC's five-point agenda reportedly call for*

1) ascertainment and notification of the fate and whereabouts of the separated family members, and relatives, being traced, 2) arrangement of meetings and mutual visits between the separated family members and relatives, 3) exchange of mails between the separated family members, and relatives, 4) reuniting of the separated family members and 5) settlement of other related humanitarian problems.

In her unceasing effort to make use of the two-track inter-Korean dialogue as an instrument to ease the tension and promote the peace in the Korean peninsula and, thus, to pave the way for a peacefully and independently achieved settlement of the question of unification of the divided country, the Republic of Korea had continued, throughout the year, to take a number of serious initiatives to bring the derailed inter-Korean dialogue back to full resumption on both tracks.

Following his New Year Press Conference on January 15 and written interviews with the Yomiuri and the Sankei Shimbuns run by the two influential Japanese dailies in their January 26 and May 30 issues, respectively, President Park Chung Hee of the Republic of Korea made the 31st anniversary of the nation's liberation from Japanese occupation on August 15 again an occasion to renew his oft-repeated appeal for "unconditional normalization" of the long-derailed inter-Korean dialogue. In a commemorative speech on the day, President Park urged Communist north Korea to **"agree to resume the South-North Dialogue unconditionally and thereby normalize the functions of the South-North Coordinating Committee, bearing the fact in mind that there will be no solution to the problems of Korea, unless understanding or agreement is reached to that effect between the parties directly concerned."** At the same time, the President appealed to all world nations **"now treading the same path as ours seeking self-reliant reconstruction of their countries and peaceful coexistence with other nations after the same experiences as ours living under colonial occupation by other countries"** to **"prevail upon Communist north Korea to respond to our call for resumption of the inter-Korean dialogue at an early date"** and to **"cooperate with us to create an international**

climate in this area of the world conducive to easing of the tension.”

In the meantime, Mr. Chang Key Young, Democratic Republican Member of the Republic of Korea National Assembly from Seoul, acting in his capacity as Acting SNCC Co-chairman for Seoul side, filed on April 19 a telephone message to his counterpart in Pyongyang, Kim Young Joo, via the SNCC's Seoul-Pyongyang direct telephone line, proposing that the SNCC, as a means to promote restoration of the sense of national homogeneity between the two Korean societies, sponsor **“exchange of exhibits between the two sides of divided Korea of the works of the old Korean art currently owned separately by them”** and their **“joint exhibits overseas.”** Also on July 3, the Acting SNCC Co-chairman for Seoul side issued a statement marking the fourth anniversary of the announcement of the July 4 South-North Joint Communique of 1972, asking Pyongyang **“immediately to normalize the SNCC operation,”** in order to have **“whatever problems arising in the inter-Korean relations brought up, discussed and settled through dialogue, and agreement, within the framework of the SNCC.”** Chang again made it emphatically clear that Seoul, on its own part, was **“ready, and willing, to openheartedly participate in the discussion on whatever problems that either of the two sides brings up at the resumed SNCC meetings.”**

On the other hand, the ROKNRC, concerned as it was over the absence of any meaningful progress in the discussions in the SNRCC “working-level” meetings in Panmunjom, made use of the appointment of Ambassador Chi Yeon Tai as new ROKNRC Chief Delegate to the SNRCC on March 9 as an occasion to propose a meeting between the chief delegates of the two Red Cross societies in Korea in order to see if they could perform some kind of trouble-shooting role in bringing the inter-Korean Red Cross talk out of the impasse. [Ambassador Chi's predecessor as ROKNRC chief delegate to the SNRCC, Ambassador Lee Bum Suk, was transferred to India as Republic of Korea's chief envoy to that country.] And, in each of the ongoing rounds of the Panmunjom “working-level” meetings, the ROKNRC has continued to press the NKRC for

1) the unconditional holding of the long-overdue eighth full-dress Red Cross meeting due to be held in Seoul by the mutually agreed order of the turns, and thereby normalization of the humanitarian dialogue in the inter-Korean Red Cross talk, and 2) implementation of such “pilot projects,” pending agreement on full-scale implementation of the proposed family members- and relatives-tracing services, as “reunion of aged parents, of over 60 by age, with their sons and daughters living separated in the other side of Korea” and “exchange of mutually agreed member of people wishing to visit their ancestral graves in the other side of the divided country on traditional national holidays.”

North Korea, however, has continued to turn the deaf ear to all these initiatives of the Republic of Korea. The north Korean reaction, in sum, was as follows:

—*North Korea has blocked any meaningful resumption of the inter-Korean dialogue by insisting, as “preconditions,” that either the Republic of Korea opt to cease to be an anti-Communist state, by allowing free Communist movement and cracking down on anti-Communist activities, or the present Republic of Korea government be ousted by violence in order to be replaced by a Communist, or a quasi-Communist, regime, by the name of a “people’s regime.”*

—*North Korea has continued to turn down the repeated calls of the Republic of Korea for normalization of the SNCC operation by holding fast to the impracticable idea of the so-called “grand national congress,” alias “south-north political conference,” while denouncing the SNCC on the ground that its participation was confined to the “authorities concerned” of the two sides.*

—*Whereas, as a means to ease the tension and institutionalize the peace in the Korean peninsula, the Republic of Korea proposed a “south-north mutual non-aggression agreement” and an “international meeting of the parties concerned” either to supplement the existing Armistice Agreement of 1953 or to replace it with a more viable and lasting arrangement, north Korea has*

obstinately held fast to the idea of a "U.S.-north Korea peace treaty," to the exclusion of the Republic of Korea from participation in the arrangement despite the fact that she represents over two-thirds of the total Korean population, with a clear design to dismantle the existing armistice structure even in the absence of a proper successor arrangement to take over, and

—As the RONKRC continued to ask for an early normalization of the inter-Korean Red Cross talk and substantive discussions on the projected agenda items, the NKRC countered it with the improper political demands that, as "preconditions" for normalization of the talk, the ROKNRC force the Republic of Korea government to 1) cancel the declaration on June 23, 1973, of her Foreign Policy for Peace and Unification, proposing acceptance by both sides of divided Korea of a "peaceful coexistence" as an interim measure pending unification and continuation of the inter-Korean dialogue on both tracks for a gradual approach toward eventual reunification, 2) abandon her anti-Communism and to 3) remove the American military presence in Korea.

On March 28, north Korea's Kim Il Sung reportedly met Ryosuke Yasue, editor-in-chief of a Japanese monthly magazine, the "Sekai," to make it pointedly clear that north Korea was still in no mood to consider a dialogue with the Republic of Korea a means for peaceful settlement of the problems arising in the inter-Korean relations.

Kim was quoted as having said that, "so long as the present south Korean regime is concerned," it was his policy "not to have any relations whatsoever with it." "Instead, we must continue to strive to isolate the south Korean regime completely from the rest of the world," Kim was reported to have babbled, according to the verbatim transcripts of the interview broadcast over Radio Pyongyang on May 14 and printed in the July 1976 issue of the Japanese magazine, adding, "we must positively support the 'democratic struggles' of the south Korean 'people' to the effect that a 'democratic regime' is finally established in south Korea."

Kim was reported to have gone even further to make the crazy

allegation that the government of the Republic of Korea was “taking its orders from the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency,” dangling the idea of replacing the Armistice Agreement of 1953 in Korea with a dubious “peace treaty,” concluded between the U.S. and north Korea, excluding the Republic of Korea from participation. “We (north Korea) and the U.S. are the only parties to the question of converting the Armistice Agreement to a ‘peace treaty’,” Kim was quoted as arguing, “and there is no room for anybody else to say anything about it.”

North Korea’s ebbing interest in the inter-Korean dialogue was further witnessed with the Seoul-Pyongyang direct telephone lines, operated separately by the SNCC and the SNRCC, suddenly going out of operation on August 31, 1976, as Communist north Korea began refusing to answer, or return, calls from Seoul on both lines, without any explanations whatsoever. [There was a total of three different telephone lines installed since the initiation of the inter-Korean dialogue in 1971, linking the two sides of divided Korea. A telephone line installed in September 1971 between “Freedom House” in the south Korean sector and “Panmunkak” in the north Korean sector of Panmunjom with the start of the SNRCC’s preliminary talk was the first of its kind to come into being, followed by SNCC line, installed in July 1972, linking the SNCC office in Seoul and Pyongyang, and the SNRCC line, linking the two Korean Red Cross headquarters in the two cities. All of the three direct telephone lines linking the two sides of divided Korea have somehow managed to remain in service, although pretty much in mechanical terms, despite the fact that, on both tracks, the inter-Korean dialogue has remained virtually discontinued since August 1973. Now that these direct telephone lines are also out of operation, it appears that the SNRCC “working-level” meeting in Panmunjom is the only remaining inter-Korean contact to survive the inter-Korean dialogue.]

Major events in the inter-Korean dialogue in 1976 are as follows.

Pyongyang Snubs Swab of Old Korean Works of Art

[For five months from February 24 through July 25, 1976, the artistic talent of the Korean ancestors was the source of admiration of Japan's art community as some several hundred selected pieces of their works were shown to the Japanese public in an exhibit, entitled "Five Thousand Years of Korean Art," that toured Kyodo, Fukuoka and Tokyo, sponsored by the government of the Republic of Korea. Acting SNCC Co-chairman Chang Key Young for Seoul side took the event as an occasion to see if Communist north Korea could be persuaded into considering some kind of inter-Korean artistic exchanges, obviously as a means to promote the cause of the traditional national homogeneity between the two Korean societies. On April 12, Chang filed a telephone message, via the SNCC's Seoul-Pyongyang direct telephone line, to Kim Young Joo, his counterpart in Pyongyang, which read as follows:] -Ed.

"You are well aware that, after more than five thousand years of a proud national history, we Koreans are a people who have inherited, from our brilliant forefathers, countless number of indigenous cultural relics. For many years, excavations have been going on vigorously in such sites of old capitals as Seoul, Kyungju, Kimhae, Kongju and Puyeo, unearthing so many cultural remains of our proud forefathers that make us so impressed as we view them on display in museums.

More often than not, some of these cultural remains of our forefathers were out overseas on displays in other countries, and we are currently having one of those exhibits in Japan, entitled "Five Thousand Years of Korean Art." We have more countries asking us to have

such exhibits held there, too.

It is regrettable, however, that due to our territorial division, we are unable to have all those cultural relics of ours gathered together. It is beyond question that, if only we could have these national historical relics of ours presently possessed separately by the two sides of Korea one half each, the brilliance of our people would shine brighter and we would be able to greatly enhance the cause of achieving unification of our divided country based on the national spirit of ours handed down from our forefathers.

Therefore, I think it appropriate for me to propose that our South-North Coordinating Committee work on an arrangement to the effect that, under the auspices of the South-North Coordinating Committee, the two sides of Korea hold exhibits, in Seoul and Pyongyang by turns on an exchange basis, of the works of the old Korean art as well as archaeological findings presently possessed separately by them and, if agreement could be reached to that effect, hold joint exhibits of them overseas. I am fully convinced that such is one of the missions that our South-North Coordinating Committee is being entrusted with under the July 4 South-North Joint Communiqué and the Agreed Minute on Formation and Operation of the South-North Coordinating Committee.

I am inclined to expect that you will react affirmatively to the proposal of mine which is doubtless constructive. I hope we will call either a plenary meeting of the South-North Coordinating Committee or a meeting between the Committee's Vice Chairmen into session at an early date to discuss the proposal of mine. I believe that we can leave the technicalities of the proposed art exhibits to the experts in that field of the two sides as soon as agreement is reached in the Committee as a matter of principle."

[Pyongyang did not even bother to answer the Seoul side's offer of the inter-Korean art exchange via the Seoul-Pyongyang direct telephone line. Instead, on April 18, Radio Pyongyang broadcast a statement, allegedly issued by an unnamed spokesman of the South-North Coor-

dinating Committee for Pyongyang side, rejecting the Seoul side's proposal, charging that it was a "foolish deceit and ridiculous propaganda gimmick whose purpose is to dodge the responsibility for disrupting the dialogue and to avoid the ever-worsening isolation, both internal and external, by feigning as if Seoul has some sincerity about the dialogue."

Seoul Marks 4th SNJC Anniversary with Statement

[Marking the fourth anniversary of the simultaneous announcement of the South-North Joint Communiqué on July 4, 1972, in Seoul and Pyongyang, Acting SNCC Co-chairman Chang Key Young for Seoul side issued a statement on July 3, 1976, repeating his oft-repeated appeal that Communist north Korea immediately and unconditionally agree to normalize the SNCC operation, paralyzed since August 1973 when north Korea unilaterally announced its boycott of any further SNCC meetings. The full text of Chang's statement is as follows.] -Ed.

"We mark today the fourth anniversary of the announcement of the South-North Joint Communiqué. It was amidst rising hopes and expectations of the fifty million Koreans in both sides of divided Korea as well as all the peace-loving people of the world that, four years ago today, on July 4, 1972, we had the South-North Joint Communiqué announced simultaneously in Seoul and Pyongyang, emanating a ray of hope for a genuinely peaceful settlement of the question of reunifying the country. Four years thereafter today, however, we greet the day to find the hopes and expectations then replaced largely by disappointments now, with the tension in the peninsula found heightened practically to that of the days

that preceded the announcement of the Joint Communiqué. We naturally find ourselves urged to see to it that such a situation is remedied as soon as possible.

As is unequivocally clarified by its own letter, the Joint Communiqué calls for, as a matter of its basic principle, a process in which the two sides of Korea would take appropriate measures to have the tension eased, the deep-rooted misunderstanding and mistrust replaced by understanding and trust and the mutually homogeneous national identity restored between them, in order, finally, to see their divided fatherland reunified peacefully and independently. It was beyond question that it would take both sides of Korea, as parties most directly concerned, to have that process undertaken. And, precisely based on that understanding, the two sides of Korea agreed, and spelled it out in the Joint Communiqué, to have the South-North Coordinating Committee (SNCC) inaugurated as a responsible inter-Korean body to take charge of the proposed dialogue between them. Finally, on November 30, 1972, we saw the formal inauguration of the SNCC.

Regrettably, however, north Korea unilaterally had the normal operation of the SNCC discontinued on August 28, 1973, as the inter-Korean dialogue in the Committee was just about to go into the substance of the inter-Korean relations, in a move clearly intended to betray the counterpart in the dialogue, avoid a genuinely peaceful and independent settlement of the Korean question and to repudiate the very basic principle of the Joint Communiqué.

Notwithstanding such an unruly attitude of north Korea, our side has persistently remained, with patience and sincerity, committed to the original cause of the inter-Korean dialogue in the SNCC, repeatedly asking the north Korean side to reflect on themselves from the standpoint of the national conscience and come back to the table at the earliest possible date. As a result, for some time after the discontinuation of the SNCC's normal operation that, among others, had involved reciprocation of visits between Seoul and Pyongyang, north Korea did respond to a

series of lower-level contacts with us in the form of the SNCC Vice Chairmen's meetings held in Panmunjom. Throughout a total of ten rounds of the Panmunjom meetings, however, north Korea obstinately remained negative to all the constructive overtures made by our side for the earliest possible normalization in full of the interrupted dialogue in the SNCC and, finally in May 1975, in the immediate aftermath of the Indochinese debacle, had even those Panmunjom contacts discontinued, too, again in a unilateral move of simply "notifying" our side of an "indefinite postponement" of the 11th such meeting then slated for May 30, 1975.

We have never been frustrated in our efforts to have the dialogue in the SNCC resumed, nevertheless. In the meantime, I have personally filed a total of four telephone messages in a row to Pyongyang, repeatedly asking that the SNCC's normal operation be resumed immediately and unconditionally. In an effort to create an occasion for resumption of the dialogue, I also have continued to bring up some constructive suggestions aimed to improve the inter-Korean relations that, among others, included a suggestion of implementation of exchange of mails between the two sides of divided Korea and another of either exchange of exhibits of old Korean artistic relics presently preserved scattered in the two divided Korean halves between them or their joint exhibits abroad.

Furthermore, on July 4, 1975, making use of the third anniversary of the announcement of the Joint Communiqué as an occasion, His Excellency President Park Chung Hee issued a Special Presidential Statement, speaking highly of the desired role of the inter-Korean dialogue in preservation of peace, maintenance of security and achievement of unification in Korea. He also made use of a number of other occasions to express his unreserved desire to see a full normalization of the inter-Korean dialogue unconditionally at an early date.

To our profound regret, however, we had to find all these genuinely peace-oriented efforts of ours continuously falling on deaf ears of the

north Korean side. On the contrary, we had to find north Korea trying all out to hold our side responsible for the interruption of the dialogue, attempting to fool, and mislead. the public opinion both at home and abroad with such solely propaganda-minded fake ideas as the offer of a “peace treaty” concluded with the United States to the exclusion of the Republic of Korea, and perpetrating all those provocations and manipulations against us in the unquenched bid for a Communist takeover of this republic under the sumptuous name of a “south Korean revolution.”

The terrorist atrocities of the north Korean Communists against us reached their climax on August 15, 1974, in an attempted assassination of our President. Their continued attachment to a fratricidal war refought in Korea was irrefutably uncovered by the discovery of those infamous underground tunnels under construction by north Korea inside the Demilitarized Zone and also by their ever-intensified military build-up along the Demilitarized Zone in a bizarre demonstration of their so-called “Four Basic Military Lines.” They are currently found avowedly committed to the cause of outright collapse of the existing armistice arrangement in Korea, by calling for the dissolution of the United Nations Command in Korea in the absence of a successor arrangement worked out in advance, obviously with the aim of securing a condition in Korea hopefully favorable for provocation of yet another fratricidal military adventure.

There is, of course, no question that such an attitude of the north Korean Communists as is reviewed in the above doubtlessly amounts to an open challenge to the wishes of the fifty million Koreans in both sides of Korea as a whole, aspiring for a genuinely peaceful settlement of the unification question. And, there is not the slightest possibility that such an impure scheme of the north Korean Communists will ever make any success. They must know for sure that the Republic of Korea does have the capability, and the will, to crush any such impure scheme that threatens peace, security, freedom and prosperity presently being enjoyed by her thirty-five million people. It rather saddens us that, due to all those

recklessnesses of the north Korean Communists', life in that part of Korea inhabited by our fifteen million fellow Koreans is found becoming increasingly more miserable with the passage of time. Besides, we also cannot turn our eyes away from the ever-mounting tensions and the ever-intensifying confrontations of totally unproductive nature that now seem characterizing the inter-Korean relations.

It is because of these profound worries of mine that I intend to make use of this occasion today to renew once again my appeal that the north Korean Communists regain their national conscience and, thus, return to the basic spirit of the South-North Joint Communiqué. In that spirit, I ask the north Korean Communists that:

Firstly, immediately put an end to all those acts of theirs that forebode yet another national tragedy, currently found bent on creating tensions, provoking armed conflicts and disgracing their own national pride, which is ours, too, and, instead, respond to our call for a lasting peace viably institutionalized in Korea, fully in conformance with the basic spirit of the Joint Communiqué.

Secondly, respond, at an early date, to our call for unconditional normalization of the SNCC operation. It is a foregone conclusion that, unless preceded by inter-Korean agreement worked out in a dialogue directly between the two sides of Korea, as parties most directly concerned, there can never be a workable solution to whatever problems that might exist in the inter-Korean relations. And, under no circumstances, there can be an inter-Korean dialogue, and subsequently an agreement, that proves to be workable, unless it is conducted, and worked out, between the "responsible authorities" of the two sides. It was precisely for this reason that the two sides of us originally had our SNCC inaugurated in the first place.

Thirdly, become sincere enough to have all the problems that arise in the relations between the two sides of Korea corralled into the arms of the SNCC, having whatever problems brought up, discussed and settled through

dialogue within the framework of the SNCC, for again that was precisely the very reason why we had agreed to have the body inaugurated at all. So long as the north Korean Communists continue to repudiate this inter-Korean body, notwithstanding its inauguration through mutual agreement to that effect between our two sides, I cannot but consider it as an expression on their part of the lack of a desire to see the problems between the two sides of Korea solved in any peaceful and independent manner. I again make it emphatically clear that our side is always ready, and willing to openheartedly participate in the discussion on whatever problems that either of the two sides bring up at the resumed SNCC meetings.

Lastly, I would like to pledge myself anew, with all my patience and sincerity, to the original cause of the inter-Korean dialogue, with continued efforts for its earliest possible normalization as a means to move continuously toward a peacefully achieved reunification, and, in that spirit, I would like to seek continued understanding and encouragement from all my fellow citizens.”

[On July 3, 1976, Radio Joongang of north Korea broadcast a statement signed “jointly” by the “democratic front for unification of the fatherland” and the “Pyongyang side of the South-North Coordinating Committee,” saying that, “due to the differences in basic positions and postures” of the two sides of Korea, “there is no way of continuing the dialogue.” In the statement, north Korea alleged that, while north Korea was “pursuing unification,” the south Korean “authorities” was interested only in “perpetuating the national division.” There was not a single mention in the statement on the pending question of normalizing the SNCC operation. Instead, north Korea was again out on sale of the dubious idea of convoking a “grand national congress,” a clear indication that north Korea was still all out for what it called a “south Korean revolution”—a communist takeover of south Korea—at the expense of a bilateral inter-Korean dialogue.]

SNRCC:

NKRC Rejects ROKNRC Offer of Chief Delegates' Meet

[On March 31, 1976, Amb. Chi Yeon Tai, new ROKNRC Chief Delegate to the SNRCC, filed a telephone message to Kim Tae Hui, his NKRC counterpart in Pyongyang, via SNRCC's Seoul-Pyongyang direct telephone line, proposing a meeting between the two, as heads of their respective delegations to the inter-Korean Red Cross talk, in an effort to iron out the differences between them in having the long-interrupted SNRCC's full-dress meetings brought back into session. The text of Amb. Chi's telephone message to his NKRC counterpart was as follows.] -Ed.

“As is known to all of us, the full-dress meetings of the South-North Red Cross Conference have remained interrupted now for two years and eight months. It was in July 1973 that we had our last, the seventh in the series, such meeting held in Pyongyang.

We have since had what we call “working-level” meetings held in Panmunjom, instead of Seoul and Pyongyang, in order to settle our differences in calling the full-dress meetings back into session and also to conduct preliminary deliberations on the five agenda items of our humanitarian talk. After a number of such Panmunjom meetings, however, it is regrettably true that we have not made any substantial progress in these “working-level” meetings, either.

As a result, although it is now almost five years since the initiation of our humanitarian effort, we find ourselves still unable to come to the aid of those millions of our fellow Koreans wishing to be reunited with their family members living in separation. Moreover, it has been years since the chief delegates of the two delegations last met.

As I assume the duty of serving as chief delegate of the Republic of Korea National Red Cross delegation to the South-North Red Cross Conference, I cannot help feeling myself awed by the task of mine to prove to be an instrument in helping those fellow Koreans of mine reunited with their separated family members, and relatives. And, in that respect, I cannot but feel it regrettable that we have had our inter-Korean Red Cross talk yet to be normalized for so long a time.

Needless to say, our humanitarian effort to help those separated family members reunited among them corresponds with the fervent aspirations of not only the separated family members themselves but also the entire fifty million Koreans as a whole. If proven successful, such an effort of ours will greatly enhance the cause of mutual understanding between our two sides, by tearing down the artificial barriers between them, and, in turn, lay a base for a genuinely peaceful and independent unification of the country.

It is for these reasons that I feel it imperative for both sides of us to see that the problems of the separated family members are solved unconditionally on the basis of the Red Cross humanitarianism in its purest sense of the word.

In this respect, I am inclined to propose today that the chief delegates of our two delegations meet in person at the earliest possible date, apart from the "working-level" meetings which are presently going on in Panmunjom. It is my belief that, if we meet in person as heads of our two delegations, it will prove to be instrumental in expediting the preliminary deliberations on the agenda items at the "working-level" meetings and also in having our full-dress meetings brought back into session at an early date. It is my pleasure to tell you that I am ready to meet you at any place that we choose to agree on, whether it be Panmunjom, Seoul, Pyongyang or any other place. I will look forward to your affirmative reply at an early date."

[The NKRC filed back a telephone message to the ROKNRC on April 7, rejecting the ROKNRC offer of a meeting between the chief delegates of the two Korean Red Cross delegations. In the telephone mes-

sage, the NKRC went out of its way to accuse the “south Korean authorities” of “creating the root cause” of the impasse in the inter-Korean Red Cross talk, allegedly by “pursuing perpetuation of the national division, criminal war-like policies and fascist policies.” The NKRC flatly said that there was “no use” holding the proposed meeting between the chief delegates, “unless the south Korean Red Cross correct its wrong posture of collaborating with the south Korean authorities,” asserting that normalization of the inter-Korean humanitarian dialogue in the Red Cross talk would come “only when the south Korean authorities stop preparing for a war, give up its fascist policies and cancel its ‘two Koreas’ policies.”]

A General Review of SNRCC “Working-level” Meets

[A total of six rounds (the 14th on January 30, the 15th on February 12, the 16th on April 10, the 17th on June 9, the 18th on August 20 and the 19th on October 19) of the SNRCC “working-level” meetings was held in Panmunjom during the year, with yet another one scheduled to be held on December 10, 1976. In each of these “working-level” meetings, the ROKNRC has continued to press the NKRC for 1) unconditional reopening of the long-interrupted full-dress meetings, 2) preliminary discussions on the substance of the five-point agenda and 3) implementation of such “pilot projects” as reuniting of the aged parents with their offsprings living in the other side of the divided country and exchange of “tomb-worshippers” on traditional national holidays. The NKRC, however, has continued to insist that the two sides in the “working-level” meetings confine their discussions on “legal conditions and social climate in south Korea,” as a “pre-condition” for substantial discussions on ways to implement the agenda items. On occasions, the NKRC insisted that the two sides in the Red Cross talk directly tackle the unification question itself, rather than the humanitarian problems of the separated families per se, alleging that the humanitarian problems of the separated families “will have been solved automatically, once we manage to have the divided country reunified.” The contrast between the two different postures of the two Red Cross societies on the pending issues was quite obvious: The ROKNRC was trying hard to come to the aid of those millions of Koreans living separated from their family members strictly from the humanitarian standpoint, in spite of the ideological, political, legal, social and other differences between the two Korean societies. On the contrary, however, the NKRC was attempting to make use of the humanitarian problems of the separated families as an excuse to prevail upon the Republic of Korea to opt to lay the ground for a Communist, or a quasi-Communist, takeover of south

Korea. Following are excerpts of some of the remarks made by the two sides in some of the "working-level" meetings, quoted in an effort to illustrate the differences in their respective postures on some of the issues discussed at the meetings. -Ed.

***On Nature of Red Cross Talk:**

[ROKNRC]

“The country has remained territorially divided for three full decades and, as a result, we are now confronted with the human agony of the countless number of our fellow Koreans who are living totally incommunicado with some of their beloved family members across the man-made barrier. . . . Therefore, our Red Cross talk should not be an arena for us to indulge in futile discussions on political ideologies and theories or while away the precious time making propaganda statements meddling in the internal affairs of the other side. Instead, it should be a place where the two sides of us work on concrete arrangements to have their human sufferings taken care of strictly from the humanitarian standpoint, with speed transcending what political differences that exist between our two sides. . . . Both in view of their historical backgrounds and the staggering number of people involved, it goes without saying that the humanitarian problems of those separated families are the problems of utmost urgency to which we cannot, and should not, neglect paying our due attention as fellow Koreans. . . . And, it can be said that, if only we succeed in solving the problems of the separated families, it will surely contribute to relaxation of the tension and to promotion of the cause of national concord between our two sides. . . .” (Kim Yeon Joo, Alternate ROKNRC Chief Delegate, at the 17th “working-level” meeting)

“The basic objective, and mission, of the South-North Red Cross Conference is undoubtedly to see that the joy of reunion is brought to the millions of our fellow Koreans yearning to be reunited with their long-separated family members. The humanitarian task being shouldered by us

is to make it possible for them to be reunited among themselves. notwithstanding the existing political differences between the two sides of the divided country that have separated them against their wishes. . . . Therefore, the South-North Red Cross Conference should neither be confused with the South-North Coordinating Committee where political, military, economic and cultural matters in the inter-Korean relations are supposed to be brought up for discussion, nor with the Military Armistice Commission where military disputes are supposed to be handled under the Armistice Agreement of 1953. So long as our talk remains a Red Cross talk, concerned as it is with the humanitarian problems of the separated families, it is a foregone conclusion that neither of our two sides is supposed to bring up politics in our talk, much less to wrangle over military affairs or interfere with the political and legal aspects of the internal affairs of the other side, respectively. . . .” (Kim Yeon Joo at the 18th “working-level” meeting)

[NKRC]

“It may not be the case with other countries. But, it is the case with our country that the humanitarian problems of ours have originated from our national division. Therefore, the humanitarian problems of ours are problems that can eventually be settled only through achievement of unification of the divided country. . . . (Chu Chang Joon, Alternate NKRC Chief Delegate, at the 16th “working-level” meeting)

“Were we to settle the humanitarian problems involving the separated people of our country, we ought first tackle such more basic questions as removal of political barriers and dissolution of the state of military confrontation between our two sides, for they are the obstacles in having the humanitarian problems solved. The humanitarian problems will have been settled of themselves as we succeed in clearing the political obstacles. . . .” (Chu Chang Joon at the 17th “working-level” meeting)

*On Reopening of Full-dress SNRCC Meets:

[ROKNRC]

“As I have stated over and again in the past, it is the unequivocal position of the ROKNRC delegation that the two sides of us in this South-North Red Cross Conference should immediately and unconditionally hold the already long-overdue eighth full-dress meeting of our talk in Seoul, in strict observance of agreements reached between us in earlier meetings, and thereby normalize our humanitarian talk without any further delay. We had our last full-dress meeting, the seventh in the series, held in Pyongyang in July 1973, and, therefore, under our mutual agreement to hold the full-dress meetings in Seoul and Pyongyang by turns, there is no point of argument about the fact that it is now the turn of Seoul to host the eighth full-dress meeting of our Red Cross talk. I must remind you, in this respect, of the fact that I have suggested specific dates of the eighth full-dress meeting five times already in the past: December 19, 1973; April 9, 1974; August 30, 1974; November 6, 1974; and September 30, 1975. One after another, however, your side has continued to reject all of these proposed dates and, thus, refused to have the full-dress meetings brought back into session. Under the circumstances, it seems to me that it is totally up to your side to decide whether to hold the full-dress meetings or not. And, therefore, I now feel it proper to ask your side to consider fixing a date for the long-overdue eighth full-dress meeting. . . .” (Kim Yeon Joo at the 18th “working-level” meeting)

“Your side is found continuously trying to make issue of the so-called “atmosphere” in Seoul, with the allegation of a “terrorist” atmosphere there, as an excuse to refuse to have the eighth full-dress meeting of our Red Cross talk held in Seoul. The allegation of your side as such, however, seems to me too irrelevant and absurd to pay any attention to it. Seoul is the capital city of the Republic of Korea where a population of seven million enjoys a life of total freedom in every aspects of life.

It is also an international metropolis known across the world with hundreds of thousands of foreign visitors, whether on sightseeing tours or business trips, flocking in as they please every year and international gatherings of all natures, political, cultural, academic, economic and other, taking place in succession in an atmosphere of total freedom and openness. There are even people from those countries with political systems different from those of ours, including those from Communist and Non-aligned countries, visiting the Republic of Korea, and her proud capital Seoul, these days as safely and freely as they please. In recent months, in particular, let me remind you, it has been a widely publicized phenomenon that thousands of Koreans living in Japan have safely made their trips to the Republic of Korea, visiting their old hometowns and meeting their old home-folks, despite the fact that they are those belonging, by affiliation, to the "Chochongryon," the pro-Pyongyang organization of Korean residents in Japan . . ." (Kim Yeon Joo at the 16th "working-level" meeting)

"Your side's delegation was in Seoul three times already in the past, during a period between 1972 and 1973, taking part in the full-dress meetings of our Red Cross talk held there. It goes without saying that you will feel as free and safe now in Seoul, and elsewhere in the Republic of Korea, just as you used to do at those times. Believe me, Seoul is as ready and eager as ever to host our full-dress meetings. . . ." (Kim Yeon Joo at the 17th "working-level meeting)

"It has been made amply clear that it does not make sense at all that your side continues to make issue of such things as "atmosphere" or "legal conditions and social environment" in Seoul, as an excuse to make it unable to bring the full-dress meetings back into session. Nor are those allegations of your side's proper issues that are authorized to be discussed in our humanitarian Red Cross talk. I would rather suggest that, if your side wishes to have those political, social, cultural and legal matters discussed between the two sides of Korea, your side agree to have the operation of the South-North Coordinating Committee, disrupted unilaterally

by your side since August 1973, brought back to resumption and have those problems brought up, and discussed, within the Committee. It is foregone truth that, under the South-North Joint Communiqué and the *Agreed Minute on Formation and Operation of the South-North Coordinating Committee*, it is the legitimate task of that Committee to tackle those problems that your side continues to try to raise in our Red Cross talk. I would like to advise your side not to continue to confuse any longer between the two different tracks of our inter-Korean dialogue. If your side wants to discuss political, economic, military and social problems in the inter-Korean relations with us, your side may do so by having the South-North Coordinating Committee called back into session. It is beyond question that our Red Cross talk is a wrong place to have those things discussed . . .” (Kim Yeon Joo at the 18th “working-level” meeting)

[NKRC]

“Were we to normalize our Red Cross talk and expedite solution to the humanitarian problems at issue in our talk, we suggest that your side comply with our side’s demands which are as follows:

—We ask that your side prevail upon your side’s authorities to put an end to its policies pursuing perpetuation of the national division in order to remove a major obstacle to progress in our humanitarian talk. We ask that your side repudiate the efforts of your side’s authorities trying to exploit the humanitarian talk as a tool of its policies pursuing perpetuation of the national division and, instead, make use of the talk as a means to contribute the cause of unification of the fatherland.

—We ask that, in order to resume our full-dress meetings and thereby normalize our humanitarian talk, your side remove the ‘terrorist atmosphere’ in south Korea and replace it with an amicable atmosphere. We ask your side to take measure to force your side’s authorities to replace its anti-Communist ‘fascist’ policies with policies seeking alliance with Communists in order to create an atmosphere of national unity and

concord. We also ask that your side's authorities release the 'democratic personalities,' religious people and students now unduly in prison in south Korea.

—We ask that your side take measures to put an end to the war-like policies of the south Korean authorities and to prevent military exercises staged against our side. Specifically, we ask that your side immediately put an end to the ROK-U.S. joint amphibious mobile exercise currently under way out on the Eastern (Japan) Sea and to expel all the American imperialist military personnel participating in the exercise from the country. We also ask your side's authorities to remove all the American imperialist forces, the ever-present source of war in our country, from south Korea. . . ." (Chu Chang Joon at the 16th "working-level" meeting)

"The main reason why we have been unable to hold the full-dress meetings of our talk for years rests with the fact that the atmosphere in Seoul has become so deteriorated because of the 'fascist' suppressions and war preparations being intensified in south Korea . . ." (Chu Chang Joon at the 17th "working-level" meeting)

"It is a known fact that the so-called home visits by the Korean residents in Japan of 'Chochongryon' (the pro-Pyongyang organization of Korean residents in Japan) affiliation are a crooked political scheme of the south Korean authorities aimed at harassing the patriotic movement of the 'Chochongryon,' sowing the seed of discord among the Korean residents in Japan and at justifying your side's allegation that there is an amicable atmosphere prevailing in Seoul. Your side may think that your side can deceive the world by alleging as if there is an amicable atmosphere prevailing in Seoul. But, your side is not going to succeed in convincing the world because your side is not telling the truth. There is no denying of the fact that Seoul is a living hell where democracy is being strangled, freedom being denied and 'fascist' practices rampant. . . ." (Chu Chang Joon at the 18th "working-level" meeting)

*On Preliminary Deliberations on Agenda Items

[ROKNRC]

“Ever since the third full-dress SNRCC meeting held in Pyongyang in October 1972, the ROKNRC has continued to suggest that the two sides of us immediately begin implementing item 1 of our five-point agenda, ‘ascertainment and notification of the conditions of the separated family members and their relatives being traced,’ through use of the International Red Cross method, featuring exchange of mutually accepted identical letter forms, letter forms requesting the ascertainments and notifying the findings, between the family members and their relatives involved, with our two Red Cross societies acting as legitimate intermediaries, offering their good offices for exchange of mails and investigative activities deemed necessary in areas under their respectively jurisdictions to have those conditions ascertained.

Obstinately, however, your side has continued to refuse the reasonable suggestion of ours and, instead, made it impossible for us to discuss, in a substantial manner, on ways to implement the agenda item at issue, by insisting that certain political and social matters be discussed at our humanitarian talk prior to discussions on the agenda item proper.

I wonder if I have the need to reemphasize the fact that the five-point agenda of our talk is an agreement worked out between us after a year-long hard-won negotiation. Needless to say, our mission now in this humanitarian talk is to work on some mutually acceptable “ways” to have those agenda items implemented, beginning from item 1 down through item 5. Therefore, I cannot help feeling inclined to consider it a deliberate attempt by your side to obstruct implementation of those agenda items, for reasons that are solely yours, that your side so stubbornly insists that we discuss, in this Red Cross talk, those irrelevant political, legal, military and social matters before we go into the substance

of the agenda items at issue.

Your side is aware that, despite the persistent negativity of your side's attitude, our side has done all it could to break the impasse in our talk. We have paid our due consideration to the apparent fact that your side was obviously not in a position to allow implementation of the tracing services envisioned in the five point agenda in full. As a result, we have come out with a couple of modified suggestions that we start with some 'pilot projects' before having full implementation of the five agenda items.

Our side has suggested that the two sides of us exchange, on traditionally observed national holidays, mutually agreed number of people wishing to visit their ancestral graves in the other side of the divided country, respectively. We have also proposed that our two sides, recognizing the urgency of the human sufferings of those "aged parents," over 60 by age, yearning to be reunited, within their diminishing lifetime, with their offsprings in the other side of the country, take measures to arrange their reunion, prior to general implementation of the proposed tracing services. We even suggested that our two Red Cross societies facilitate 'exchange of photographs' among these 'aged parents' and their sons and daughters, in case your side was not ready yet to consider their reunion.

There would have been a number of fellow countrymen of ours who have by now made their tearful homecomings after so many years living away from their hometowns, if only your side had accepted our side's suggestion of 'exchange of tomb-worshippers.' Likewise, there would have been a countless number of fellow countrymen of ours who have rejoiced by now over reunion with their 'aged parents' after so many years away from each other, if only your side had accepted our side's proposal that the dire human sufferings of the 'aged parents' be taken care of before others as a 'pilot project.'

Nevertheless, your side has remained negative to all these genuinely humanitarian suggestions of our side's holding intransigently fast to the

ill-founded position that our Red Cross talk confine its debate to the alleged 'legal conditions' and 'social climate' in our side of the country. I must condemn your side's position as such as an attempt to take advantage of our humanitarian effort in the Red Cross talk as a means to pursue your side's unwholesome political objectives.

I would like to make it irrefutably reemphasized that there are neither such 'conditions' nor such 'climate' in the Republic of Korea as alleged by your side posing obstacles to the humanitarian projects at issue now in our talk. It doubtless is the fervent wish of the entire 35 million people of the Republic of Korea that the humanitarian effort in our Red Cross talk successfully materialize at the earliest possible date. They are eager to see an early normalization of our Red Cross talk and they know that their government is positively in support of the Red Cross talk. . . ." (Kim Yeon Joo at the 16th "working-level" meeting)

"In order to break the impasse in our talk, the ROKNRC proposes that, as a 'pilot project' aimed at expediting settlement of the problems of the separated families and restoration of mutual trust between our two sides, our two Red Cross societies offer our good offices for 'exchanges of tomb-worshippers,' composed of those who have some of their family members living separated in the other side of the divided country, respectively, in a series occasioned around such traditional national holidays as Solar New Year Day, Lunar New Year Day, "Hansik" (April 5 by solar calendar) and Lunar August Full Moon. The ROKNRC suggests that the two sides of us make arrangements to the effect that some five hundred such people each are allowed at a time to cross the Demilitarized Zone to make their proposed trips to the other side of the divided country, respectively, for a period of a week at a time, in order to visit their ancestral graves there. . . ." (Kim Yeon Joo at the 17th "working-level" meeting)

"In case your side does not feel inclined to accept our side's offer of allowing those 'tomb-worshippers' to make the proposed trips to their ancestral graves in the other side of the country, respectively, on an ex-

change basis, our side would like to suggest that those of our side of the country be allowed to make the proposed trips to your side of the country to visit their ancestral graves there . . .” (Kim Yeon Joo at the 18th “working-level” meeting)

“Furthermore, it has been quite some time since our side began suggesting that our two sides initially take up, among others, the cases of those ‘aged parents,’ of ages over 60, considering the urgency of their human sufferings, for implementation of the projected tracing services, including provision of informations about their conditions to their offsprings in the other side of the divided country as well as exchange of mails, meetings in Panmunjom and visits with them. . . .” (Kim Yeon Joo at the 18th “working-level” meeting)

[NKRC]

“I must condemn you for making all those deceptive statements which are nothing any more than unintelligible gibbers about war, gibbers about treason against the nation and gibbers evoking the spirit of deceased anti-Communist crooks. Time and again, our side has irrefutably rebutted all those unintelligible gibbers that your side has continued to utter. And, because they are so unreasonable, so reactionary, so against the people and so treacherous to the nation in their nature, it is already a long time since all those gibbers uttered by your side have become corpses, repudiated not only by our own people, but also all the progressive-minded people of the world. Consequently, they are not worth a damn any longer” (Chu Chang Joon at the 16th “working-level” meeting)

“Your side’s suggestion of so-called ‘exchange of letter forms’ (for ascertainment and notification of the conditions of the separated family members, and their relatives, being traced) totally lacks in relevance as it relates to the humanitarian problems now at issue in our talk. Your side should know that ours is not a big country. You can reach every part of the country within less than a couple of days. Therefore, as it concerns the people who are looking for their separated family members, I don’t think

there is a single one of them who would sit idle waiting for the 'letter form.' They would positively seek to tear down the artificial barriers separating them in order so that they can go to their separated family members in person.

Furthermore, we are not dealing with some thousands of those separated family members. We are dealing with some millions, or more, of them. Considering the staggering number of the people involved, might I not say that it would take some tens of years, or hundreds of years, even to locate the separated family members, and their relatives, being traced, if we rely on the so-called 'exchange of letter forms,' let alone mutual visits, meetings and reunion? Viewed in that context, I must condemn your side's suggestion of the so-called 'exchange of letter forms' as an attempt to maintain the status quo and, thus, leave the divided country as it is indefinitely, whiling away the time playing with the so-called 'exchange of letter forms'." (Chu Chang Joon at the 18th "working-level" meeting)



"Even in these 'working-level' meetings, your side is found creating confusions and obstacles by keeping up raising such suggestions totally irrelevant with the mutually agreed agenda items as prior implementation of tracing services for the 'aged parents,' 'exchange of photographs' and 'exchange of tomb-worshippers" (Chu Chang Joon at the 18th "working-level" meeting)

"It is our side's basic position that, before we start discussing on the substance of the agenda item 1, we must first settle such more basic problems as the 'legal conditions' and 'social climate' in south Korea. . . ." (Chu Chang Joon at the 17th "working-level meeting)

Part Three

Other Developments in Inter-Korean Relations

Sketch Map of Joint Security Area



The poplar tree that provided the scene of the axe-wielding murder on Aug. 18 in Panmunjom is seen in front of the UNC outpost No. 3 at the entrance of the "Bridge of No Return," with north Korean outposts at both entrances of the bridge. (Inside circle: The stump of the tree after UNC's tree-cutting operation on Aug. 21).


Shipwreck of North Korea's Axe Diplomacy:

Axe-wielding Murder in Panmunjom

At about 10:30 a.m., August 18, 1976, five Korean Service Corps (KSC) workers, under protection provided by ten United Nations Command (UNC) guards, composed of one Korean and two American officers leading three Korean and four American soldiers armed only with pistols, started trimming the boughs of a tall poplar tree within the UNC sector of the Joint Security Area (JSA) in Panmunjom, the neutral area where the Military Armistice Commission (MAC) holds its meetings, charged with the mission of policing truce violations between the two sides of Korea.

Within the fan-shaped JSA of about 800 meters in diameter (see map), the UNC has not operated a single guard post within the north Korean sector, confining its five guard posts to within its own area to the south. However, the north Korean side was operating four of its guard posts within the UNC sector, aside from three in its own area to the north, including the two, Nos. 4 and 8, nearby the UNC guard post No. 3, strategically located at the mouth of the "Bridge of No Return," the gateway to north Korea from Panmunjom, with the addition of the two roadblocks that the north Korean side illegally installed within the UNC sector. During summers, in particular, the thickly grown leaves of the tall poplar tree have tended to obstruct the view between two UNC guard posts, Nos. 5 and 3, which is vital to the security of the strategically located guard post No. 3. Not infrequently in the past, when the view from guard post No. 5 to guard post N. 3 was obstructed by the poplar tree during summers, the UNC guards manning guard post No. 3 used to find themselves being harassed in various ways by the north Korean guards who had an easy, undetected, access to the guard post from across the "Bridge of No Return" which was just nearby.


At about 10:45, some seventeen north Korean guards, led by two




North Korean guards surround UNC personnel as a north Korean officer approaches a UNC officer demanding that the KSC workers be ordered to stop trimming the boughs of the poplar tree.




Violence breaks out as north Korean guards suddenly began mobbing UNC personnel at the shout of a north Korean officer to "kill them!"



North Korean guards wield clubs and axes (one appearing in the circle) as they chase after UNC personnel trying to escape the scene.



One north Korean guard aims his axe at the head of a UNC officer from behind in front of the truck as the UNC officer tries to break out of the ring of the north Korean guards surrounding him.



One UNC officer receives clubbings from the north Koreans as another UNC officer is seen lying prostrate in front of the front wheel of the truck. Other UNC personnel are seen attacked by the north Koreans wielding axe-handles and clubs.

officers, approached the scene where the KSC workers were at work trimming the boughs of the poplar tree, quietly watching for a while. All of a sudden, however, the north Korean guards began sacking the KSC workers to stop their work. As the KSC workers kept up trimming the boughs, ignoring the north Korean guards' demand, fifteen more north Korean guards rushed into the scene from across the "Bridge of No Return," with clubs in their hands, and began clobbering the UNC personnel, upon order from one of the north Korean officers to "kill them (UNC personnel)." The north Korean guards forcibly took possession of the axes brought there by the KSC workers for the bough-trimming operation and began wielding them as deadly weapons in their brutal assault on the fleeing UNC personnel. At about 11:05 a.m., the UNC personnel trapped in the incident managed to escape the scene of the tragic bloodshed, only to find that the axe-wielding melee had left the two American officers, Captain Arthur G. Bonifas, 33, Newburgh, N. Y., and 1st Lieutenant Mark T. Barrett, 24, Columbia, S.C., lying mortally wounded. In addition, four Korean and four American soliders, plus the only Korean officer, were found injured, some seriously (see pictures).

[It should not be said, however, that, as one of major violations of the Armistice Agreement of 1953 as well as all safety arrangements in force in the JSA in Panmunjom, the August 18 incident itself was totally unexpected. During the 23 years since the Korean War Armistice Agreement went into effect on July 27, 1953, the UNC has reported a whopping record of 34,755 truce violations perpetrated by the north Korea side on land, on seas and in the air (see the chronological rundown of major truce violations by the north Korean side in Part Four). The most outrageous violation of the Armistice Agreement was reported in 1974 and 1975 with the discoveries of underground DMZ tunnels under construction by north Korea, cutting across the four-kilometer wide truce zone from north down south. Furthermore, north Korea has completed heavily fortifying the two-kilometer wide, 155-mile long north Korean sector of the DMZ, thus making it no longer "de-

militarized," with the northern boundary of the truce zone practically brought down south by two kilometers. Under provisions of the Armistice Agreement, automatic weapons of all types are not allowed to be introduced into the DMZ, unless approved by the MAC, and each side is asked to limit the total number of its troops allowed to be admitted into the DMZ at a time to less than 1,000. As of 1975, however, north Korean fortifications inside the north Korean sector of the DMZ were reported to include 265 heavily fortified bases, 31 76.2mm field artillery pieces, 78 mortars, 27 multi-barrelled guns, 450 recoilless rifles, 675 grenade-tossers, 225 14.5mm anti-aircraft guns and a total of 9,000 combat troops. It was due to mounting apprehensions over this massive arms build-up within the DMZ by the north Korean side that, at the 318th MAC meeting held in July 1971, the UNC put forth a suggestion ultimately aimed at demilitarizing the DMZ and utilizing it for peaceful purposes, suggesting that 1) the joint observer teams of both sides conduct field investigation of the number of armed troops and fortifications inside the DMZ and report the findings to the MAC, 2) remove all the illegally installed fortifications within the DMZ within a month after their presence was reported to the MAC, 3) completely demilitarize the DMZ in its entirety on a step-by-step basis, 4) prohibit all combat troops from entering the DMZ and 5) permit civilian farmers to enter the DMZ for farming there. In the years that followed, the UNC has repeatedly asked the north Korean side to positively consider the suggestion. But, the north Korean side has continued to reject the UNC suggestion, countering with demands that, among others, 1) the U.S. withdraw her troops from Korea and 2) Japanese "militarists" be banned from coming back to Korea.

Although it was supposedly a "neutral" zone patrolled jointly by security guards of both sides, the JSA in Panmunjom was not without recurrence of unwanted accidents. Ever since the Armistice Agreement took effect in 1953, north Korean security guards have continued to harass the UNC guards in various ways more frequently than not. The August 18 incident was preceded by another incident that took place on June 30, 1975, in which Major W.D. Henderson, then a senior UNC security officer in the JSA, was sud-



A north Korean guard tramples Maj. Henderson in his belly as he lies unconscious outside the MAC conference room.



After knocking Maj. Henderson senseless, two north Korean guards turn toward other nearby UNC guards with extended fists.

dently mobbed by north Korean security guards right outside the MAC conference from while the 364th MAC meeting was in session, receiving a serious injury in his larynx as she was brutally trampled by the onrushing north Korean guards lying prostrate on the spot (see pictures on the preceding page). The August 18 incident was yet another evidence of north Korea's lawlessness and brutality that sent a chill to the entire world.]

Kim Il Sung Orders “State of Combat Readiness”

In the immediate wake of the shocking axe-wielding murder that took the lives of two American officers right on the spot, Communist north Korea was shameless as usual enough to try to take advantage of the incident for its own propaganda purposes. While the UNC was still reeling over the magnitude of the incident, Communist north Korea quickly began crying a thief by outpacing the UNC in going public with the incident. At 5 p.m. of the day, Radio Pyongyang broadcast a grossly distorted version of the incident in which north Korea asserted that the August 18 incident was a “deliberate provocation by the American imperialist forces against our (north Korean) side, seriously violating the Armistice Agreement with the purpose of fabricating an excuse to start a war in the Korean peninsula.” North Korea also went on further to take the initiative in calling for a meeting between security officers of the two sides, the UNC and the north Korean army, on the incident.

The UNC, however, could not view the incident so trivial in its nature as could be discussed at the level of security officers. Therefore, the UNC asked that a full MAC meeting be immediately brought into session to discuss the incident. In a formal message addressed to Kim Il Sung, supreme commander of the north Korean army, General Richard G. Stilwell, Commander-in-Chief, UNC/8th U.S. army in Korea, emphasized the gravity of the August 18 incident and asked that the 379th MAC meeting be called into session by 1 p.m. the following day, August 19, at the latest.

After some hours of a tug of war, the north Korean side accepted the UNC demand and, as a result, the 379th MAC meeting finally met in session at 4 p.m., August 19.

At the meeting, U.S. Navy Rear Admiral Mark P. Frudden, senior UNC/MAC member, read a formal protest lodged in the name of General Stilwell over the August 18 incident addressed to Kim Il Sung, which read as follows:

“Yesterday, an unprovoked act of severe hostility was initiated by members of the KPA (‘Korean people’s army’) security force against the UNC security force in the Joint Security Area. This incident of most grave consequences was an open and flagrant act of belligerency by the KPA, resulting in the death of two UNC security officers. This incident not only jeopardized the entire framework of this Commission but it violates the neutrality of the JSA as agreed upon by both sides in July 1953, as well as all internationally recognized conventions in regards to Armistice Agreements. Never before in the twenty-three years since the ceasefire was formally signed has there been the outright and brutal murder of JSA security force personnel. This was not the eruption of an unplanned argument. It was the deliberate murder of two UNC personnel, who, engaged in routine maintenance functions of a type your personnel often perform, were attacked unmercifully by a numerically superior force, wielding axes and clubs. I ask your assurance that an incident such as this will not occur again.”

But, Major General Han Joo Kyung, north Korean senior MAC member, was still a shameless north Korean at the MAC meeting. He insisted that the August 18 incident was a “deliberate and premeditated provocation by American imperialist troops perpetrated against us as part of a scheme to start a shooting war in Korea” and that the north Korean security guards involved in the incident had “acted only in self-defense.”

Moreover, at 5:25 p.m., August 19, at a time when the 379th MAC

meeting was still in session, both Radio Pyongyang and Radio Joongang of north Korea broke their regular programs to announce that, as of 5 p. m. of the day, Kim Il Sung, acting in his capacity as supreme commander of the north Korea army, had ordered a “full combat readiness” to north Korea’s all regular and non-regular forces, specifically including KPA, “Workers and Farmers Red Guards” and “Red Youth Guards.” According to reports reaching Seoul, entire north Korea was found suddenly plunged into a state of war, as air raid sirens were heard blaring and light blackouts were seen enforced during nights. North Korea began asking all foreigners staying in north Korea to leave immediately, saying that north Korea was “unable to provide adequate protection” in time of war, which could “break out any moment.” Reports also had it that those other foreigners waiting to be cleared for their entry into north Korea at the time were all notified to “cancel” or “postpone” their planned trips.

Communist countries were no exceptions in being affected by the north Korean measures closing the door to outside world. A Czechoslovakian sports team was reported to have been asked to leave north Korea upon arrival at Pyongyang airport. Besides, north Korea began refusing to receive foreign missions of all kinds, both diplomatic and non-diplomatic, and stopped sending out north Korean missions. North Korea was found absent from such international functions as the International Parliamentarians’ Union meeting in Madrid, Spain, and the International Atomic Energy Agency meeting in Geneva, Switzerland, when they met in session in the immediate wake of the August 18 Panmunjom incident. Pyongyang also announced that it was skipping all public ceremonies marking the 28th anniversary of the founding of the north Korean “regime,” which was falling on September 9, 1976.

The Background—North Korea’s Non-aligned Diplomacy

Why did the August 18 incident ever take place? Why did north Korea send the chill out across the world by committing such a brutal and

heinous axe-wielding murder?

It seems that answers to all these intriguing questions should be found within the context of the desperate diplomatic maneuvers of north Korea directed at the 31st United Nations General Assembly which was to convene in New York on September 23, 1976.

At its 30th General Assembly last year, the United Nations adopted two mutually contradictory rival resolutions on Korea. One was the resolution co-sponsored by countries friendly to the Republic of Korea, asking that the two sides of divided Korea resume their suspended inter-Korean dialogue and that a "meeting of parties concerned" be held to work out an arrangement either to supplement, or replace, the 1953 Armistice Agreement, as a precondition for dissolution of the United Nations Command in Korea, and the other the resolution tabled by Communist and some Non-aligned nations supporting north Korea, asking for 1) dissolution of the UNC/K without a successor arrangement, 2) unilateral withdrawal of the American troops in Korea and 3) a "peace treaty" concluded between the U.S. and north Korea to the exclusion of the Republic of Korea. It was doubtless clear that the pro-Pyongyang resolution was a reflection of the north Korean desire to 1) exclude the Republic of Korea from participation in the settlement of the Korean question, 2) effect a tilt in the precarious military balance of power in the Korean peninsula in favor of north Korea through removal of the U.S. troops currently stationed in Korea under a bilateral 1954 ROK-U.S. mutual defense treaty, in the absence of an arrangement to maintain the important military balance of power in Korea, 3) eliminate the only legal apparatus underwriting the ceasefire arrangement in Korea through termination of the 1953 Armistice Agreement in the absence of a successor arrangement worked out in advance and, finally, 4) to lay the ground for "Vietnamization" of the Korean situation to the effect that north Korea could pursue either a combined, or an alternate, use of revolutionary violence and military means for a Communist takeover of south Korea, without the fear of intervention by outside forces under the excuse that the attempted

Communist takeover of south Korea belonged to “internal Korean affairs.” Therefore, it was understandable, when viewed in those contexts, Communist north Korea viewed the outcome of the debate on Korea at last year’s 30th United Nations General Assembly adopting both of the two rival resolutions as a “half-won” victory.

After the 30th United Nations General Assembly, in the meantime, the Republic of Korea was feeling it unnecessarily counterproductive, contributing only to the ever-heightening of tensions between the two sides of Korea, to have the futile debates on Korea at the United Nations General Assemblies allowed to go on indefinitely. It had become too obvious that, should there be any workable solution to the Korean problems ever worked out, there ought to be either understanding, or agreement, reached between the two parties most directly concerned, the two sides of Korea, endorsing the solution. It was for these reasons that, since the beginning of 1976, the Republic of Korea had expressed, on a number of occasions, her hope that the United Nations shelve the wasteful and counterproductive debates on Korea, pending some kind of agreement worked out directly between the two sides of Korea, while applying all available pressures on both sides of Korea to have the long-derailed inter-Korean dialogue on two tracks reopened at the earliest possible date.

North Korea, on the other hand, was not in the mood to consider matching with such a conciliatory posture of the Republic of Korea. North Korea was found committed as ever to the cause of seeking a one-way victory in the United Nations—passage of pro-Pyongyang resolution alone at the expense of the pro-Republic of Korea resolution. During a period of eight months between January and August 1976, north Korea played host to a total of 182 delegations invited over to Pyongyang from 69 countries (including heads of state from Mali, Venin, Botswana, Malagasy and Pakistan), while dispatching 147 missions (including 20 high-level “government” delegations that crisscrossed 92 countries with some duplications) out to 82 countries, as part of an all-out diplomatic campaign to lure as many countries as possible, particularly from among those

countries in Africa and Latin America identifying with the Non-aligned Group of Nations, in support of the north Korean cause in the forthcoming duel in the 31st United Nations General Assembly over the Korean question. All the way through, north Korea based its vote-getting drive on the grossly fabricated propaganda allegation that there was the “danger of a war to break out any moment in Korea because of the American scheme preparing for an invasion of north Korea.”

In August, an arena was laid for Communist north Korea to test its muscle before going into the main duel in the United Nations General Assembly, as the 86 members of the Non-aligned Group of Nations met in a summit meeting in Colombo, Sri Lanka, August 16–19.

Admitted into the Non-aligned Group of Nations only in 1975 at its foreign ministers’ conference held in Lima, Peru, it was the first of its summitries for Communist north Korea to take part in. Reports had it that north Korea was determined to set the Colombo Non-aligned summitry as a stage for a grandiose appearance of Kim Il Sung as a “leader of world-wide stature” among the group of nations. Kim was reported as preparing to attend the summitry personally accompanied by no less than some two hundred entourages, while north Korea stepped up its crisis propaganda activities over the presence of “American imperialist forces in Korea preparing a war against north Korea.”

On August 5, a lone Republic of Korea army outpost in the mid-eastern sector of the DMZ was abruptly found under recoilless rifle and machine gun fire from the north Korean side. North Korea promptly began using the incident to act a thief crying thief. On the very same day, the north Korean foreign ministry issued a statement, painting the incident as a “provocation staged jointly by the American imperialist troops and the south Korean ‘puppet’ army,” not without the panicky allegation that, due to the “war preparations” and “aggressive intent” of the American “imperialists,” there was the “possibility of a war to break out any moment now in Korea.”

Communist north Korea, however, was already in trouble with many of the Non-aligned countries even before the Colombo summitry was finally brought into session. Many countries were feeling fed up with the intransigence of the north Korean attitude, trying to mislead them into blindly buying the crisis scenario offered by north Korea, in spite of the fact that it so seriously lacked in relevance and utility as well as in truth.

Obviously, Kim Il Sung began feeling ill at ease with the idea of his presence in the Colombo summitry in person. He apparently decided against the idea and, instead of his own self, dispatched prime minister Park Sung Chul and foreign minister Hoh Dam to Colombo at the head of a delegation of 120 north Koreans, using a north Korean ship, the "Mankyungbong-ho," as their residential quarters while in Colombo.

It was customary during the past years that such radical countries as Cuba and Algeria, would act as self-elected proxies of Communist north Korea, first prevailing upon the Non-aligned Group of Nations to unanimously adopt a resolution endorsing the north Korean position on the Korean question and then, taking advantage of the unanimous endorsement provided by the Non-aligned Group of Nations, sponsoring a draft resolution on Korea for deliberation at the United Nations General Assemblies. It did not turn out to be the case this year, however. Obviously feeling ill at ease with the atmosphere prevailing among the Non-aligned countries, north Korea did not wait for the Colombo summitry to act on a resolution on Korea. Instead, north Korea chose the opening day of the Colombo summitry, August 16, to have a pro-Pyongyang draft resolution submitted to the United Nations, and that, interestingly unlike other precedents, without the aid of such countries as Cuba and Algeria. It was evidently an effort of Communist north Korea to impress those unwilling Non-aligned countries that north Korea was doing a fight with its back against the wall.

Nevertheless, many Non-aligned countries remained cool to the

last-ditch effort of north Korea. The number of countries participating in the co-sponsorship of the pro-Pyongyang draft resolution at the time of its submission this year was found to have dropped to 24, 11 countries short when compared with last year when it topped 35 countries. Besides, one of the Communist countries, Yugoslavia, was not among the countries co-sponsoring the pro-Pyongyang draft resolution. [It was on August 21 that countries supporting the Republic of Korea on the Korean question in the United Nations co-sponsored a draft resolution on Korea of their own, in a move to counter the submission of the pro-Pyongyang one.]

At the Colombo summitry, in the meantime, north Korea was facing a rebellion from a group of nations, known as trying to be impartial on the Korean question, attempting to block a one-way traffic for north Korea by tabling a middle-of-the-road resolution, with its emphasis given to an appeal that the two sides of Korea resolve problems in their inter-Korean relations through dialogue, and agreement thereby, directly between themselves. Still more countries reportedly took the floor calling for resumption of the inter-Korean dialogue in a substantial manner for a genuinely independent and peaceful settlement of the Korean problems.

With these developments in the background, north Korea was seen feeling its frustrations piling up, with its foothold within the Non-aligned Group of Nations found helplessly crumbling apart. Reports from Colombo began describing north Koreans on scene in Colombo becoming so desperate as to break into the press room there to harass newsmen, not only those from Seoul but also others from Western countries, as they were seen filing stories about the north Korean cause increasingly losing its ground at the summit meeting.

Finally, there came the news of the Panmunjom incident. North Korean spokesmen in Colombo were found readily grabbing the incident as an opportunity to argue their case that the incident was a "deliberate provocation by the American imperialist aggressors in south Korea as part of their scheme to use it as an excuse to start a shooting war against us

(north Korea).” North Korean propaganda media began busily painting a crisis picture in Korea of their own making, alleging that the Panmunjom incident was a proof that there was the “danger of war to break out any moment, unless the American imperialist aggressors are removed from south Korea.” All in all, the axe-wielding murder in Panmunjom was obviously a deliberate provocation by north Korea as part of its last-ditch effort to turn the tide at the Non-aligned summitry in Colombo, a highly strategic event for north Korea in the conduct of its avowed diplomatic campaign to make the north Korean cause the sole winner in the debate on Korea at the forthcoming 31st United Nations General Assembly, using the incident as a ploy to silence those impartial Non-aligned countries refusing to accept the crisis situation in Korea unilaterally alleged by north Korea.

The Non-aligned summit meeting came to its close on August 20, one day behind schedule, eventually adopting, in a last-minute rush, a “political declaration” that contained a section on Korea reflecting only the north Korean views. Superficially, north Korea claimed a triumph of its Non-aligned diplomacy. But, in fact, the north Korean triumph was in shambles, as some 25 countries, among the 85 present at the summitry in Colombo, voiced their objection to the Korean section of the “political declaration” on the record after it was announced adopted. The axes north Koreans used in Panmunjom against the UNC personnel evidently failed to fell the tree in Colombo.

Kim Il Sung Voices “Regrets” over Axe Murder

In the uproarious wake of the Panmunjom incident, in the meantime, with the world opinion boiling over the naked expression of the heinous brutality of Communist north Korea, the Republic of Korea and the United States began coordinating an unprecedented firmness in handling the August 18 incident. In Seoul, the Government of the Republic of Korea termed the north Korean brutality an “act of lawlessness of bandits” and placed its army, navy and air force units on alert for possible

future measures to make sure that there would be no recurrence of such a violence. President Park Chung Hee of the Republic of Korea called the National Security Council into session to review the situation and said, in a speech read by Defense Minister Suh Chong Chul at a graduation ceremony at the 3rd ROK Army Officers' School, that there would be "some clubbings to tame the mad dog," when such a violence as occurred in Panmunjom on August 18 recurred. In Washington, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger set the "Washington Special Actions Committee" in motion to work on ways to cope with the new development in Korea. U.S. President Gerald Ford, then in Kansas City, Kansas, attending the Republican Party's presidential nomination convention there, spoke through his spokesman, Ron Nessen, to condemn the "vicious and unprovoked murder" by north Korea of the two U.S. army officers and to ask north Korea to "accept the total responsibility and consequences."

The U.S. immediately began beefing up her military presence in Korea, in a show of determination not to condone the unwarranted provocation by north Korea, with reinforcements that included 1) a squadron of F-4s flying in from Kadena air force base in Okinawa, Japan, 2) one squadron of F-111s flying in from Mountainhead air force base in Idaho, U.S., 3) some 1,800 leathernecks air-lifted from Naha, Okinawa, 4) a wing of three B-52 stratofortresses making a flight daily from Guam and 5) a flotilla of battleships, spearheaded by U.S. aircraft carrier Midway, sailing into Sea of Japan (East Sea) from Yokosuka naval base in Japan.

At 7 a.m., August 21, a "work group" of 16 KSC workers was ordered by the UNC to enter the JSA in Panmunjom, under the coordinated protection provided by 30 light-armed UNC security guards and 60 unarmed ROK army combat troops trained in special warfare on land, plus B-52, F-111s, F-4s and Helicopter gunships hovering up above in the air, to complete the bough-trimming of the poplar tree, which was the cause of the August 18 incident. The operation was completed within 45 minutes, this time unhindered by the north Korean side, as some 150 or so

north Korean troops were seen across the “Bridge of No Return” merely standing by. The work group cut down the three bushy branches of the tree and, at the same time, removed the two roadblocks that the north Korean side had illegally operated within the UNC sector of the neutral zone.

At noon of the day, some four hours after the tree-cutting operation, Kim Il Sung finally succumbed to the mounting pressures, ordering Major General Han Joo Kyung, north Korea’s senior MAC member, to contact his UNC counterpart, U.S. Navy Rear Admiral Mark P. Frudden to have a message in his name, in the capacity as supreme commander of the north Korean army, orally delivered to General Richard G. Stilwell, Commander-in-Chief, UNC/8th U.S. Army, which read as follows:

“It was a good thing that no big incident occurred at Panmunjom for a long period. However, it is regretful that an incident occurred in the Joint Security Area at Panmunjom at this time. An effort should be made so that such incidents may not recur in the future. For this purpose, both sides should make efforts. We urge your side to prevent provocation. Our side will never provoke first, but will take self-defensive measures only when provocation occurs. This is our consistent stand.”

With the delivery of Kim Il Sung’s message of “regret,” the heated atmosphere of confrontation in Korea that had developed following the August 18 incident began rapidly to subside, as the two sides in the MAC, the UNC and the north Korean army, started working on new security arrangements to be applied in the JSA for prevention of recurrence of an incident. On September 6, after several rounds of MAC meetings, the two sides reached agreement on a “Supplement to Agreement on Headquarters Area of Military Armistice Commission, Security in Headquarters Area of Military Armistice Commission and Construction in Headquarters Area of Military Armistice Commission,” providing that the two sides would thereafter restrict their guard duties, including installation of the guard posts, to sectors under their respective jurisdiction. Under the

new arrangements, the JSA in Panmunjom has become practically partitioned into two sectors, one the UNC's and the other the north Korean side's, prohibiting all military personnel of one side from crossing the Military Demarkation Line into the other side's sector.

Pyongyang Scraps Its Draft Resolution from UN Agenda

The Republic of Korea and the U.S. issued a joint statement on September 6, formally closing the August 18 incident. However, the plight of the north Korean diplomacy did not end there. Concerned observers closely watching developments in the Korean situation noted that even Communist bloc countries, including Moscow and Peking, seemed unprecedentedly uninterested in north Korea's rough-and-tumble diplomatic maneuvers. There were no official reactions reported either from Moscow and Peking to the developments that took place in Korea following the August 18 incident. And, what was more, Peking announced the death of Mao Tse-tung on September 9, opening the way for Red China, traditionally north Korea's major mentor in the conduct of its diplomacy, to the eruption of the scramble for power among factions that has resulted in the ouster of four leading radical figures, Chiang Ching, Wang Hung-yen, Chang Chun-chiao and Yao Wen-yuan, with Hua Kuo-feng succeeding Mao as "Chairman" of the Chinese Communist Party. There were also reports that north Korea was increasingly under pressure from some of its influential Non-aligned allies to modify its posture to a more conciliatory one.

On September 22, one day prior to the opening of the 31st United Nations General Assembly, reports from New York said that north Korea had finally asked its co-sponsoring allies to remove the pro-Pyongyang draft resolution from the agenda of the world body. It was indeed a miserable finale for north Korea's notoriously wild axe diplomacy of the year. [The Republic of Korea and her allies immediately countered the north Korean move with withdrawal of their own draft resolution on

Korea on the same day, making the 31st United Nations General Assembly the first General Assembly without the Korean question placed on the agenda in 28 years since the Korean question had begun to be debated in the world body.]

Pro-Pyongyang Koreans in Japan:

Home-coming Tomb-worshippers Exceed 10,000

Throughout 1976, the long queue of Korean residents living in Japan, belonging to “Chochongryon,” a pro-Pyongyang organization of Koreans in Japan, by affiliation, has continued to cross the Korean Straits separating the island country of Japan from Korea, in order to be reunited with their kinsfolk either living in their old hometowns or buried dead in graves there.

In September 1976, marking one year since the Republic of Korea took the humanitarian measure of opening her door to these politically anti-ROK Koreans in Japan, it was announced that the total number of Koreans of “Chochongryon” affiliations who had completed their tearful home-coming trips had exceeded ten thousands within the single year. According to figures put out by the “Committee for Promotion of Home-Visits by Fellow Countrymen in Japan,” some eight thousand such Koreans have visited the Republic of Korea during 1976 alone, occasioning their trips around such traditional national holidays as Lunar New Year Day (January 31), “Hansik” (April 5), “Tano” (June 2) and Lunar August Full Moon (September 8).

The “Committee for Promotion of Home-visits by Fellow Countrymen in Japan” was formally inaugurated on March 25, 1976, as an ad hoc non-governmental organization, headed by Lee Ho, President of the Republic of Korea National Red Cross, charged with the mission of overseeing the use of the fund raised through donations for promotion of such home-visits by those Koreans in Japan.

According to the statistics, there are now about 36 thousand Koreans of pro-Seoul “Mindan” affiliations as against some 26 thousand of pro-Pyongyang “Chochongryon” affiliations. When viewed against these statistical figures, it comes to the fact that one out of every 26 Koreans in

Japan of “Chochongryon” affiliations has completed their home-visits as of September 1976.

The Government of the Republic of Korea, in the meantime, dedicated, in a dedication ceremony held on October 2, 1976, attended by Prime Minister Choi Kyu Ha, an 119-acre spread of hill in Choong Chung Nam Do Province as the final resting place for those Koreans dying in foreign lands. Christened as the “Home-Comers’ Hill,” the hill has been developed as a public graveyard designed to house a total of eight thousand remains.

“Chochongryon” Intensifies Harassment Campaigns

Viewed in the political context, there is no doubt that the steady increase in the number of the Korean residents in Japan of “Chochongryon” affiliations making their home-bound trips to the Republic of Korea has caused Communist north Korea not only a humiliating loss of face but also an irreversible tactical defeat, particularly in the sense it has dealt a fatal blow to the long-standing north Korean scheme to use the pro-Pyongyang Korean community in Japan as a spring-board to mount various kinds of subversive activities against the Republic of Korea.

As the number of the previously pro-Pyongyang Koreans in Japan opting to turn their allegiance to the Republic of Korea increased, it was a natural phenomenon that a growing number of “hard-core” members of “Chochongryon,” at all levels of its tightly controlled organization, was observed included among the home-coming human waves, including, among others, intellectuals, businessmen and young people. According to reports from Japan, maintenance of the “Chochongryon” organization seems to be increasingly in trouble, making the “Chochongryon” leadership ever more desperate in their efforts to reverse the tide in their favor, if possible at all.

According to reports reaching Seoul from Tokyo, “Chochongryon” is

seen frantically intensifying its campaigns designed to discourage its members known desiring to participate in the home-coming programs from actually making the trip, featuring, among others, measures to improve the degree of its surveillance over the day-to-day activities of its members. Throughout the year, "Chochongryon" has been seen organizing various group activities such as "work shops," "group sightseeing tours" and "special study groups" for those of its members regarded as would-be participants in the homecoming tours facilitated by the Republic of Korea. Reports even had it that the female students in the "Chosun College" in Tokyo operated by "Chochongryon" were given the instruction that they should wear black blouses and black skirts only in order so that their movements could easily be observed by the "Chochongryon" cadres. There were also reports of kidnappings and house arrests, as seen in the two widely publicized cases that follow:

The Case of Miss Kang Young Hee:

A daughter of Mr. Kang Ki Byung (54) and his Japanese wife, coming home for the first time in 37 long years, Miss Kang (14) was forcibly kidnapped, while waiting for boarding clearance at the Korean Air Lines ticket counter at Haneda airport on September 2 with the rest of her family members, by a couple of her teachers at the middle school operated by "Chochongryon" to be taken to the school some 60kms away from the airport, obviously as a hostage to discourage her parents from making the planned trip to the Republic of Korea. When Miss Kang's parents decided to defy the intimidation by "Chochongryon" and boarded a Korean Air Lines flight bound for Seoul next day, the "Chochongryon" teachers apparently saw no reason to detain her any longer and set her free after 24 hours of house arrest within the school campus in Omiya. Miss Kang crossed the Korean Straits alone on September 11 to join her parents already in the Republic of Korea and her 76-year old grandmother living in her father's old hometown in Cholla Puk Do Province. Upon return to Japan on September 21 from the home visit, Miss Kang's family sued a



Miss Kang Yung Hee, 14, gets a standing ovation from her fellow Koreans living in Japan as she appears onstage at a National Theatre ceremony in Seoul welcoming their home-visits. Miss Kang has made good her planned trip to Seoul although she was briefly separated from the rest of her home-coming family members, kidnapped by "Chochongryon" roughnecks at Handeda airport.

Bae Kwang Jae (28; a teacher at her school) for "abduction and house arrest," with promises for more suits against more teachers at the school.

The Case of Mr. Uh Tang:

As a professor at the "Chosun College" in Tokyo operated by "Chochongryon" and an honorary associate professor of "Kim Il Sung University," in Pyongyang, Uh (57) was reported politically as a "big shot" within the proPyongyang Korean community, as a member of the central committee of "Chochongryon," while enjoying the recognition of the Japanese academic community for his advanced studies in geography. In 1975, Uh reportedly made a trip to north Korea, where he became disillusioned over the enormous gap between north Korea as a propaganda and north



Mr. Uh Tang

Korean as a reality. After months of soulsearching selfreflections, Uh reportedly concluded in favor of freeing himself from "Chochongryon." On September 15, he mailed his resignation to "Chochongryon" as its central committee member and, on the following day, contacted, through an intermediary, the Republic of Korea Embassy in Tokyo for arrangements necessary for his trip to Seoul, where he has a brother working in the Korea Exchange Bank and a sister living in Inchon. On September 18, the Republic of Korea Embassy in Tokyo granted Uh a passport and he bought a Korean Air Lines ticket that would have taken him to Seoul on September 21. He personally appeared at the Tokyo Quarantine Office and received a small pox vaccination there on September 18. And, that evening, he dined at the "Korean House," a Korean restaurant in Tokyo. When he stepped out from the restaurant that night after the dinner, he had to find himself, all of sudden, a victim of abduction. A group of roughnecks mobilized by "Chochongryon" took him to his home and placed him under house arrest. After more than a month since the abduction, Uh is still found in the state of house arrest, surrounded by a group of "Chochongryon" roughnecks 24 hours a day, reportedly under pressure to change his mind. Reports have it that Uh's father-in-law by his marriage is now a high-ranking official in Pyongyang of a vice ministerial rank, threatening to commit a suicide unless Uh changes his mind.

Part Four

References

A Chronological Review of South-North Dialogue, 1975–1976

- Jan. 6, 1975 Pyongyang notifies Seoul, via Seoul-Pyongyang direct telephone line, that Pyongyang's SNCC Vice Chairman Ryu Jang Shik has been replaced by Cho Myung Il.
- Jan. 8, 1975 9th SNCC Vice Chairmen's Meeting is held in Panmunkak.
- Jan. 14, 1975 President Park Chung Hee of the Republic of Korea calls on north Korea, in a New Year Press Conference, to:
- 1) Accept the offer of a "south-north mutual non-aggression agreement."**
 - 2) Immediately resume the South-North Dialogue on both tracks.**
 - 3) Either join the United Nations separately or let the Republic of Korea join the world body alone.**
 - 4) Accept preservation of the 1953 Armistice Agreement as a condition for dissolution of the United Nations Command.**
- Jan. 24, 1975 7th SNRCC "Working-level" Meeting is held in NNSC conference room.
- Jan. 24, 1975 SNCC's Seoul side lodges a protest, via Seoul-Pyongyang direct telephone line, over north Korea's loudspeaker broadcasts along DMZ.
- Jan. 25, 1975 SNCC's Pyongyang side replies, via Seoul-Pyongyang direct telephone line, that north Korea's resumption of loudspeaker broadcasts along DMZ was a "response" to south Korean side resuming them first.
- Jan. 25, 1975 SNCC's Seoul side lodges its second protest, via the Seoul-Pyongyang direct telephone line, over north Korea's resumption of DMZ loudspeaker broadcasts.
- Jan. 28, 1975 SNCC's Seoul side announces north Korea's discontinuation of the DMZ loudspeaker broadcasts.
- Feb. 5, 1975 SNCC's Seoul side lodges a protest, via Seoul-Pyongyang direct telephone line, over the north Korean electronic operation jamming Republic of Korea's regular radio and television programs.
- Feb. 7, 1975 SNCC's Pyongyang side denies, via Seoul-Pyongyang direct

- telephone line, its complicity in the jamming operation.
- Feb. 17, 1975 SNCC's Pyongyang side lodges a protest, via Seoul-Pyongyang direct telephone line, over the sinking by Republic of Korea's coast guard ships of a "north Korean patrol boat set adrift" on Eastern Sea.
- Feb. 18, 1975 SNCC's Seoul side replies, via Seoul-Pyongyang direct telephone line, that the north Korean ship was sunk in an exchange of fire, while fleeing northward defying an order from the Republic of Korea coast guard ships to stop.
- Feb. 27, 1975 SNCC's Pyongyang side lodges a protest, via Seoul-Pyongyang direct telephone line, over an incident on West Sea in which an alleged north Korean fishing vessel was sunk by a Republic of Korea warship.
- Feb. 27, 1975 SNCC's Seoul side replies, via Seoul-Pyongyang direct telephone line, that the alleged north Korean fishing vessel collided into a Republic of Korea warship, while refusing to obey an order from the warship to stop sailing within the Republic of Korea's naval operation area.
- Feb. 28, 1975 8th SNRCC "Working-level" meeting is held in NNSC conference room.
- Mar. 14, 1975 10th SNCC Vice Chairmen's Meeting is held in Freedom House.
- Mar. 24, 1975 The UNC announces discovery of the second underground tunnel found under construction by north Korea within the UNC sector of DMZ some 1.3 kms northeast of Chorwon.
- Mar. 26, 1975 9th SNRCC "Working-level" Meeting is held in NNSC conference room.
- May 8, 1975 10th SNRCC "Working-level" Meeting is held in NNSC conference room.
- May 29, 1975 SNCC's Pyongyang side unilaterally notifies Seoul, via Seoul-Pyongyang direct telephone line, that the 11th SNCC Vice Chairmen's Meeting, slated for May 30, 1976, is "indefinitely postponed."
- May 29, 1975 SNCC's Seoul side demands, via Seoul-Pyongyang direct telephone line, that the 11th SNCC Vice Chairmen's Meeting be held on May 30 as scheduled.

- May 29, 1975 SNCC's Pyongyang side, via Seoul-Pyongyang direct telephone line, says that it will boycott the 11th SNCC Vice Chairmen's Meeting if Seoul does not consent to its postponement.
- June 2, 1975 SNCC's Pyongyang side issues a statement saying that the 11th SNCC Vice Chairmen's Meeting will "remain indefinitely postponed, pending creation of favorable conditions."
- June 9, 1975 NKRC, via direct telephone line between the two Red Cross societies, proposes postponement of the 11th SNRCC "Working-level" Meeting, slated for June 12, until some time in July.
- June 10, 1975 ROKNRC, via direct telephone line between the two Red Cross societies, asks NKRC to designate a date for the 11th "Working-level" Meeting proposed to be postponed by NKRC.
- June 11, 1975 NKRC, via direct telephone line between the two Red Cross societies, rejects the ROKNRC offer to designate a new date for the 11th "Working-level" Meeting.
- July 3, 1975 SNCC's Pyongyang side, in a statement issued in the name of its Co-chairman:
- 1) Asks ROK to repeal her Foreign Policy for Peace and Unification, terming it a "declaration perpetuating the national division and disrupting the dialogue."**
 - 2) Declares that there is no need for continuation of the dialogue, "so long as south Korea maintains her anti-Communist policies."**
 - 3) Asks that the present government of the Republic of Korea be overthrown, to be replaced by a "democratic regime."**
 - 4) Suggests that a "grand national congress" be held.**
- July 4, 1975 President Park Chung Hee of the Republic of Korea issues a statement marking the third anniversary of announcement of the South-North Joint Communiqué:
- 1) Asking north Korea to stop all its aggressive war preparations against the Republic of Korea.**
 - 2) Urging north Korea to desist from all its covert operations against the Republic of Korea as well as the acts of mud-slinging against the south in overseas activities.**

3) Proposes immediate and unconditional normalization of the two-track inter-Korean dialogue both in SNCC and SNRCC.

- July 5, 1975 SNCC's Seoul side, via Seoul-Pyongyang direct telephone line, proposes to Pyongyang that the 11th SNCC Vice Chairmen's Meeting be held on July 15.
- July 9, 1975 Seoul's Acting SNCC Co-chairman, in a statement:
- 1) Suggests that the long-overdue fourth SNCC plenary meeting be held before August 15 in Pyongyang.**
- 2) Assures Seoul side's willingness to debate, at the resumed SNCC meetings, whatever problems and issues brought up by either of the two sides.**
- July 10, 1975 ROKNRC, via direct telephone line between the two Red Cross societies, proposes July 25 as the date for the 11th "Working-level" Meeting.
- July 14, 1975 NKRC, via direct telephone line between the two Red Cross societies, counterproposes July 21 as the date for the 11th "Working-level" Meeting.
- July 14, 1975 SNCC's Pyongyang side, via Seoul-Pyongyang direct telephone line, rejects Seoul side's proposal to hold the 11th Vice Chairmen's Meeting on July 15.
- July 16, 1975 ROKNRC, via direct telephone line between the two Red Cross societies, accepts the NKRC counterproposal of July 21 as the date for the 11th "Working-level" Meeting.
- July 21, 1975 11th SNRCC "Working-level" Meeting is held in NNSC conference room.
- Aug. 8, 1975 SNCC's Seoul side, via Seoul-Pyongyang direct telephone line, proposes August 25 as the date for the 11th Vice Chairmen's Meeting.
- Aug. 22, 1975 12th SNRCC "Working-level" Meeting is held in NNSC conference room.
- Aug. 25, 1975 SNCC's Seoul side, in a statement, announces that Pyongyang has ignored, even without answering over the telephone, Seoul side's proposal of August 8, suggesting August 25 as the date for the 11th Vice Chairmen's Meeting.

- Oct. 13, 1975 SNCC's Seoul side, via Seoul-Pyongyang direct telephone line, proposes to Pyongyang that the long-overdue fourth SNCC plenary meeting be held in Panmunjom, instead of Pyongyang, if it suits the convenience of Pyongyang side, asking that the 11th Vice Chairmen's Meeting be held on October 20.
- Oct. 17, 1975 SNCC's Pyongyang side, via Seoul-Pyongyang direct telephone line, rejects Seoul side's proposal of October 13, criticizing Republic of Korea's "anti-Communist policies."
- Oct. 23, 1975 13th SNRCC "Working-level" Meeting is held in NNSC conference room.
- Nov. 28, 1975 14th SNRCC "Working-level" Meeting is held in NNSC conference room.
- Jan. 26, 1976 SNCC's Seoul side, in a statement, calls on Pyongyang to come back to the conference table at an early date.
- Feb. 12, 1976 SNCC's Seoul side, via Seoul-Pyongyang direct telephone line, notifies Pyongyang that Lee Yong Hee, a Special Assistant to President Park Chung Hee, has replaced Choi Kyu Ha as one of Seoul side's SNCC members.
- Feb. 12, 1976 15th SNRCC "Working-level" Meeting is held in NNSC conference room.
- Mar. 9, 1976 ROKNRC, via direct telephone line between the two Red Cross societies, notifies NKRC that Amb. Chi Yeon Tai has replaced Amb. Lee Bum Suk as ROKNRC's chief delegate to SNRCC.
- Mar. 31, 1976 ROKNRC, via direct telephone line between the two Red Cross societies, proposes a meeting between the chief delegates of the two sides in SNRCC on ways to break the impasse in the humanitarian talk.
- Apr. 7, 1976 NKRC, via direct telephone line between the two Red Cross societies, rejects the ROKNRC offer of a meeting between chief delegates of their two sides.
- Apr. 10, 1976 16th SNRCC "Working-level" Meeting is held in NNSC conference room.
- Apr. 12, 1976 SNCC's Seoul side, via Seoul-Pyongyang direct telephone line, proposes to Pyongyang a swap of "old Korean art exhibits" between them and their "joint exhibits" overseas.

- Apr. 18, 1976 SNCC's Pyongyang side issues a statement rejecting the Seoul side's offer of "art exhibits."
- May 13, 1975 ROK Foreign Minister Park Tong Jin issues a statement urging north Korea to consent to resumption of the inter-Korean dialogue between the two sides of Korea, as parties most directly concerned with the problems of divided Korea, warning against the north Korean attempt to terminate the 1953 Armistice Agreement in the absence of a successor arrangement.
- May 27, 1975 SNCC's Seoul side lodges, via Seoul-Pyongyang direct telephone line, a protest with Pyongyang over north Korea's partial resumption of loudspeaker broadcasts along DMZ.
- June 9, 1976 17th SNRCC "Working-level" Meeting is held in NNSC conference room.
- July 3, 1976 SNCC's Seoul side, in a statement, calls for:
- 1) Immediate and unconditional normalization of SNCC operation.**
 - 2) Settlement of problems in the inter-Korean relations between the two parties most directly concerned through resumption of the inter-Korean dialogue.**
- July 3, 1976 Radio Pyongyang broadcasts a "joint statement" of "SNCC's Pyongyang side" and "Democratic Front for Unification of Fatherland," calling for convocation of a "grand national congress."
- Aug. 15, 1976 President Park Chung Hee of the Republic of Korea, in his commemorative speech marking the 31st anniversary of the nation's liberation from Japanese occupation, calls on north Korea to "agree to resume the South-North Dialogue unconditionally and, thereby, normalize the functions of the South-North Coordinating Committee, bearing in mind the fact that there will be no solution to the problems of Korea, unless understanding or agreement is reached to that effect between the parties directly concerned."
- Aug. 16, 1976 North Korea submitted its own draft resolution on Korea, co-sponsored by 24 nations.
- Aug. 18, 1976 North Korea commits the axe-wielding murder of two UNC officers in the JSA in Panmunjom.
- Aug. 20, 1976 18th SNRC "Working-level" Meeting is held in NNSC conference

- room.
- Aug. 21, 1976 Countries friendly to the Republic of Korea submits to UN their own draft resolution on Korea.
- Aug. 21, 1976 Kim Il Sung conveys to UNC his message of "regret" over the August 18 axe-wielding murder of two U.S. officers in Panmunjom.
- Aug. 30, 1976 North Korea seizes a Republic of Korea fishing boat found adrift north of Military Demarkation Line off east coast.
- Aug. 30, 1976 North Korea discontinues operation of both of the Seoul-Pyongyang direct telephone lines used separately by the SNCC and the two Red Cross societies. North Korea stops answering call signs from Seoul without explanations.
- Sept. 22, 1976 North Korea withdraws its draft resolution on Korea submitted to UN earlier on August 16.
- Sept. 22, 1976 Allies of the Republic of Korea withdraw their own draft resolution on Korea, too.
- Oct. 19, 1976 19th SNRCC "Working-level" Meeting is held in NNSC conference room.

List of Major North Korean Truce Violations since 1953:

1953:

July 27 *Armistice Agreement goes into effect.

1954:

Aug. 1 North Korean snipers kill two U.S. servicemen patrolling UNC sector of DMZ.

1956:

Nov. 7 North Korean fighter planes open fire at two ROK air force planes.

1957:

May 16 North Korean gunboats kidnap a ROK fishing vessel off the island of Yonpyong-do on Yellow Sea.

July 12 North Korean armed agents exchange fire with ROK policemen in Kapyong, Kyunggi Do Province.

1958:

Apr. 24 North Korean gunboats kidnap a ROK fishing vessel off the island of Yonpyong-do.

June 16 North Korean gunboats open fire at ROK patrol boats on East Sea.

Sept. 8 Six north Korean armed agents exchange fire with ROK marines in Kimpo, Kyunggi Do Province.

Oct. 6 ROK navy seizes a north Korean espionage-transport vessel off Inchon harbour.

Nov. 7 North Korean gunboats kidnap two ROK fishing vessels with 11 fishermen on board.

Nov. 18 ROK maritime patrol boats exchange fire with north Korean gunboats on Yellow Sea.

Nov. 25 ROK navy seizes a north Korean espionage-transport vessel on East Sea.

Dec. 6 North Korean gunboats kidnap seven ROK fishing vessels on East Sea, with 42 fishermen on board.

1959:

May 30 Three north Korean armed agents appear in Sanchung, Kyungsang Puk Do Province.

- July 27 ROK navy sinks a north Korean espionage-transport vessel.
- Sept. 5 An unknown number of north Korean agents appear south of DMZ in Inje, killing a woodcutter.
- Sept. 5 ROK police arrests a north Korean armed agent in Chunguep, Cholla Puk Do Province.
- Nov. 26 ROK navy sinks a north Korean espionage-transport vessel on Yellow Sea and captures four north Korean armed agents alive.

1960:

- Apr. 30 ROK navy spots a north Korean espionage-transport vessel on East Sea and kills two north Korean armed agents on board, while capturing two others alive, in an exchange of fire.
- May 14 Three north Korean gunboats surround a ROK navy patrol boat on East Sea some two miles south of the Military Demarkation Line.
- July 30 ROK navy sinks a north Korean torpedo boat on East Sea, capturing three north Korean seamen on board alive.
- Aug. 24 ROK navy sinks a north Korean espionage-transport vessel off the ilsand of Yonpyong-do.
- Aug. 26 An unknown number of north Korean armed agents appear in Bongwaha, Kyungsang Puk Do Province.
- Sept. 5 Two north Korean armed agents appear in Seoul.

1961:

- Apr. 7 North Korean gunboats kidnap six ROK fishing vessels on East Sea.
- Apr. 21 Three north Korean MIGs attack a ROK air force Sabre jet in the air off Kunsan, Cholla Puk Do Province.
- Apr. 22 UNC and north Korean security guards exchange a ten-minute fist fight in JSA in Panmunjom after one of the UNC guards was slapped on his cheek by a north Korean guard.
- Aug. 25 North Korean army raids a UNC civil police outpost within the UNC sector of DMZ.

1962:

- Mar. 29 An unknown number of north Korean armed agents are found to have landed near Ulsan, Kyungsang Nam Do Province.
- July 7 ROK navy sinks a north Korean espionage-transport vessel on East Sea.

- Sept. 5 ROK army repels a group of north Korean army, killing three of them in exchange of fire, as the north Koreans are found intruding across the Military Demarkation Line.
- Sept. 9 An unknown number of north Korean armed agents appears in Sanchung, Kyungsang Nam Do Province.
- Nov. 23 North Korean troops kill two U.S. servicemen within UNC sector of DMZ.
- Dec. 3 ROK police kills three north Korean armed agents trying to land at a west coast area.
- Dec. 23 ROK navy vessels exchange fire with north Korean gunboats off Yonpyong-do, suffering six casualties.

1963:

- May 17 North Korean ground artillery forcibly brings down a UNC helicopter to the north Korean sector.
- July 29 North Korean army opens fire at UNC servicemen patrolling UNC sector of DMZ, killing three of them.
- July 30 North Korean and UNC troops exchange fire within UNC sector of DMZ, leaving both sides suffering three casualties each.
- Aug. 4 UNC and north Korean troops exchange fire for two hours within DMZ.
- Nov. 13 North Korean army opens fire on UNC servicemen patrolling UNC sector of DMZ, killing one and wounding two of them.

1964:

- Jan. 14 A ROK air force jet is shot down by the north Korean anti-aircraft artillery while flying over DMZ.
- Jan. 26 North Korea kidnaps a south Korean tourist within JSA in Panmunjom.
- Mar. 20 North Korean gun ships kidnap two ROK fishing vessels off the island of Paiknyong-do.
- Sept. 19 An unknown number of north Korean armed agents appear in Yangju, Kyunggi-do Province.

1965:

- Mar. 5 ROK coast guard police captures a north Korean armed agents attempting to land from sea at Samchok, Kangwon Do Province.

- Apr. 26 North Korean gunboats kidnap a ROK fishing vessel off Yonpyong-do.
- Apr. 27 North Korean MIGs open fire at U.S. planes off the east coast.
- July 18 Four north Korean armed agents exchange fire with ROK police in Songchoo, Kyunggi Do Province.
- Aug. 22 Five north Korean armed agents slay four civilian woodcutters in Surak mountains, Kangwon Do Province.
- Spet. 27 An unknown number of north Korean armed agents appear in Andong, Kyungsang Puk Do Province, killing two, and kidnapping two other, civilians.
- Oct. 11 An unknown number of north Korean armed agents make a raid on a U.S. army barrack in Munsan, Kyunggi Do Province.
- Oct. 13 An unknown north Korean armed agents ambush four ROK soldiers, killing all of them, in Yonchon, Kyunggi Do Province.
- Oct. 24 An unknown north Korean armed agents raids the house of a ROK police officer in Yangkoo, Kangwon Do Province, killing the officer and three others of his family.
- Oct. 25 An unknown number of north Korean armed agents kills a ROK serviceman in Inje, Kangwon Do Province.
- Oct. 29 North Korean gun ships kidnap 109 ROK fishermen off the island of Kangwha-do, Kyunggi Do Province.
- 1966:**
- May 17 Three north Korean armed agents appear in Jinyang, Kyungsang Nam Do Province.
- May 24 Three north Korean armed agents appear in Kangneung, Kangwon Do Province.
- July 29 Nine north Korean gunboats open fire on a batch of ROK fishing vessels off east coast, exchanging fire with ROK coast guard ships protecting the fishing vessels.
- Aug. 2 Three north Korean armed agents appear in Myung-ju, Kangwon Do Province, with one of them killed by ROK police search party.
- Nov. 2 North Korean army throws hand-grenades at UNC servicemen patrolling UNC sector of DMA, killing seven U.S. servicemen.
- Nov. 22 North Korean ground artillery opens fire at a group of ROK fishing vessels off east coast.

Nov. 29 Four north Korean gunboats open fire at a group of ROK fishing vessels off east coast, kidnaping one of them.

Dec. 27 North Korean troops open fire on a UNC guardpost south of Panmunjom.

1967

Jan. 19 A ROK navy auxiliary, "Dangpo-ho," sinks off east coast near DMZ hit by fire from north Korean ground artillery while providing protective coverage for ROK fishing vessels in the area.

Apr. 10 North Korean troops suffer four dead in two unsuccessful raids on UNC outposts in DMZ.

Apr. 13 60 to 90 north Korean troops enter UNC sector of DMZ north of Choonchun, Kangwon-do Province, but retreat after exchange of fire with ROK troops in the area, leaving behind three corpses.

Apr. 14 North Korean troops raid a U.S. army outpost in the western sector of DMZ.

Apr. 16 ROK navy intercepts a north Korean espionage-transport vessel off the island of Sunwi-do, killing nine north Korean agents, while six others flee.

Apr. 26 ROK navy sinks a north Korean espionage-transport vessel in Yellow Sea, capturing five north Korean agents.

May 22 North Korean army booby-traps, an American army barrack in the western sector of DMZ, killing two and wounding 69 U.S. servicemen.

June 23 ROK police ambush eight north Korean armed agents in Imsil, Cholla Puk Do Province, killing three of them.

June 28 ROK counter-espionage force kills three north Korean armed agents in Myungju, Kangwon Do Province.

July 1 North Korean armed agents ambush a group of ROK troops, killing seven of them.

July 5 North Korean troops make a surprise attack on a ROK guard post in the eastern flank of DMZ, killing seven and wounding 11 ROK troops.

July 16 North Korean troops raid a UNC bunker near DMZ, killing three U.S. servicemen.

Aug. 10 North Korean troops ambush a UNC truck, killing three and

- wounding 17 UNC troops aboard it.
- Aug. 28 North Korean troops attack a U.S. army engineering unit in the western sector of DMZ.
- Aug. 29 North Korean troops attack a group of UNC troops in the western sector of DMZ. killing three and wounding four U.S. servicemen.
- Sept. 5 North Korean armed agents dynamite a portion of a railway connecting Seoul and Tongduchon, Kyunggi Do Province.
- Sept. 13 North Korean agents dynamite a U.S. army train in Paju, Kyunggi-do Province.
- Nov. 3 North Korean gun ships open fire on a group of some two hundred ROK fishing vessels off east coast, kidnaping twenty vessels with 60 fishermen aboard.
- Nov. 20 North Korean troops attempt to cross Military Demarkation Line in the central part of DMZ.
- Dec. 5 North Korean gunboats open fire on ROK fishing vessels off east coast, killing six and wounding eight fishermen aboard.

1968:

- Jan. 6 North Korean gunboats kidnap seven ROK fishing vessels off east coast.
- Jan. 11 North Korean gunboats kidnap there ROK fishing vessels off east coast.
- Jan. 21 A 31-man north Korean commando team, composed of men of the 124th unit of regular north Korean army is intercepted in the vicinity of "Chong Wa Dae," President Park Chung Hee's Executive Mansion, just a few split minutes before a daring commando attack on the Presidential Executive Mansion. Coming all the way down on foot from DMZ, the north Korean commandos are all killed in running battles with ROK counter-espionage task forces, except one survivor who has surrendered.
- Jan. 23 North Korean gun ships seize the U.S. intelligence ship Pueblo on high seas off east coast.
- Feb. 4 Some 20 north Korean troops unsuccessfully attempt to infiltrate into UNC sector of DMZ.
- Apr. 14 North Korean troops ambush a UNC truck, loaded with an incoming shift of UNC security guards to man UNC guard posts in

- JSA in Panmunjom, within UNC sector of DMZ, killing two U.S. and two ROK servicemen on the spot.
- Apr. 17 North Korean troops surprise a UNC patrol within UNC sector of DMZ, killing five ROK servicemen in addition to one missing.
- June 17 North Korean gun ships kidnap five ROK fishing vessels off Yonp-yong-do.
- Aug. 21 ROK navy spots a north Korean espionage-transport vessel off Cheju Island and kills 12 aboard, capturing two.
- Sept. 3 Some 20 north Korean security guards assault three UNC officers in JSA in Panmunjom.
- Nov. 4 The counter-espionage authorities announce that some 120 north Korean armed agents have landed on the east coast, with the bulk of them killed in exchange of fire with ROK army-police task force elements.
- Nov. 7 North Korean gunboats kidnap four ROK fishing vessels off east coast with 42 fishermen aboard.
- Nov. 8 North Korean gunships kidnap seven ROK fishing vessels off east coast with 52 fishermen aboard.
- 1969:**
- Mar. 16 North Korean armed agents attack a police station in Jumunjin, Kangwon Do Province.
- Mar. 18 ROK maritime police patrol boat sinks a raft carrying nine north Korean armed agents off east coast, killing all of them.
- Apr. 15 North Korean air planes shoot down a U.S. air force EC-121 reconnaissance plane.
- June 12 ROK navy captures a north Korean espionage-transport vessels off Heuksan-do Island off south coast.
- June 14 ROK police kills three north Korean armed agents in Puan, Cholla Puk Do Province.
- June 17 ROK police kills six north Korean armed agents on Heuksan-do.
- July 30 Some 40 north Korean security guards mob U.S. Army Maj. Gen. Adams, senior UNC/MAC member.
- Aug. 17 A UNC helicopter receives a hit near DMZ from north Korean ground fire.
- Sept. 17 A north Korean espionage-transport vessel attacks a ROK maritime

- police patrol boat of Wando Island off south coast, sinking the patrol boat with seven maritime policemen on board.
- Sept. 20 ROK navy sinks a north Korean espionage-transport vessel off Kunsan, Cholla Puk Do Province, killing four north Korean agents aboard.
- Sept. 24 ROK navy sinks a heavily armed north Korean espionage-transport vessel off Heuksando.
- Oct. 14 ROK navy sinks a large north Korean espionage-transport ship off Heuksan-do.

1970:

- Mar. 23 An unknown number of north Korean armed agents exchange fire with ROK police in Yongduk, Kyungsang Puk Do Province, leaving two dead bodies.
- Apr. 4 ROK navy sinks a north Korean espionage-transport vessel off Kunsan, killing fifteen north Korean agents aboard.
- Apr. 29 Some five north Korean security guards unsuccessfully attempt to kidnap a UNC correspondent in JSA in Panmunjom.
- June 5 North Korean naval vessels seize a ROK navy radio ship off Yonp-yong-do, with a crew of 20 aboard.
- June 22 Three north Korean agents unsuccessfully attempt to lay a time bomb at the main entrance of the National Cemetery in Seoul.
- June 28 ROK navy captures a north Korean espionage-transport vessel off Inchon, killing six north Korean agents on board.
- July 9 North Korean gun ships kidnap five ROK fishing vessels off Paikn-yong-do, with 29 fishermen aboard.
- July 28 ROK navy sinks a large north Korean espionage-transport vessel some seven miles down south from Military Demarkation Line off east coast.
- Oct. 10 ROK navy sinks a heavily armed north Korean espionage-transport ships off east coast, killing ten north Korean agents aboard.
- Oct. 12 North Korean security guards and workmen attack UNC guards and workmen at work painting the interior of the MAC conference room in JSA in Panmunjom, with spades wounding eight of the UNC personnel.

1971 :

- Jan. 6 North Korean gunboats sink a ROK fishing vessel off west coast with machine-gun fire.
- May 4 ROK police repulses a north Korean espionage-transport vessel attempting to land a group of north Korean agents clad in ROK reservists' uniform.
- May 14 ROK navy sinks a north Korean espionage-transport vessel off east coast.
- June 1 ROK navy sinks a heavily armed north Korean espionage-transport ship off south coast. A ROK air force plane has been downed in the operation.
- Sept. 17 ROK marines intercept a group of north Korean armed agents in Kimpo, killing two of them.

1972:

- Feb. 4 North Korean gun ships sink one ROK fishing vessels and kidnap five others off west coast.

1973:

- Mar. 4 Three north Korean armed agents appear on a remote island off Cheju Island.
- Mar. 7 North Korean troops open fire on a group of ROK soliders repairing land-marks within UNC sector of DMZ, killing three of them.
- Apr. 17 Two north Korean armed agents are killed while attempting to cross DMZ down south near Yonchon, Kyunggi Do Province.
- May 5 Two north Korean armed agents land on a remote island of Keum-dang-do off Wando and kill a villager before fleeing.
- Dec. 1 At a MAC meeting, north Korea claims territorial rights over the waters surrounding the five offshore island in Yellow Sea.

1974:

- Feb. 15 North Korean gun ships sink one ROK fishing vessel and kidnap another off Paiknyong-do Island.
- Feb. 16 An unknown number of north Korean armed agents appears in Tongyung, Kyungsang Namdo Province.
- Mar. 3 Some 120 north Korean soliders mob a small UNC party escorting a senior UNC officer within JSA in Panmunjom, wounding four

- UNC guards and damaging four UNC vehicles.
- May 9 North Korean ground artillery fires at a U.S. army helicopter flying over the UNC sector of DMZ.
- May 21 ROK police kills one of three north Korean armed agents who have landed on an island, Chuja-do, off Cheju Island.
- June 28 Three north Korean gunboats open fire at a ROK maritime police vessel off east coast.
- July 2 ROK navy sinks a north Korean espionage-transport vessel off Pusan .
- July 18 North Korean anti-aircraft artillery fires at a Korean Air Lines passenger plane landing at the Kimpo International Airport.
- July 20 ROK navy, in a joint operation with air force, sinks a north Korean espionage-transport ship off Kunsan.
- Nov. 15 UNC announces discovery of a north Korea-made underground DMZ tunnel.
- Dec. 15 A north Korean armed vessel explodes itself off Inchon when asked to surrender by ROK naval ships.

1975:

- Feb. 15 ROK navy, in joint operation with air force and ground troops, sinks a north Korean armed vessel off east coast, capturing one of the crew.
- Feb. 26 About a dozen north Korean ships are found within ROK navy's naval operational sea waters.
- Mar. 20 UNC announces second discovery of north Korean-built underground DMZ tunnel north of Chrowon.
- Apr. 29- ROK police captures two north Korean armed agents found in
May 3 Pusan.
- June 9 Two north Korean MIG 21s fly over Paiknyong-do.
- June 30 North Korean security guards mob U.S. Army Major William D. Henderson, a senior UNC security officer, until he becomes unconscious.
- Aug. 26 Two north Korean soldiers infiltrate into the Freedom Village of Daesung-dong and kidnap one villager.
- Sept. 11 ROK police exchanges fire with an unknown number of north Korean armed agents in Kochang, Cholla Puk Do Province, killing

one of them.

Oct. 6 ROK navy sinks a north Korean espionage-transport ship on Yellow Sea off Shinan, Cholla Namdo Province.

1976:

Jan. 23 Two north Korean jet planes fly over Paiknyongdo.

Apr. 7 Two north Korean tanks enter DMZ for a four-hour exercise there.

May 19 ROK army kills all of a three-men north Korean reconnaissance team near Choonchun, Kangwon Do Province, after 15 days of espionage activities within the Republic of Korea.

Aug. 5 North Korean troops fire at a ROK army outpost within UNC sector of DMZ with machine guns and recoilless rifles.

Aug. 18 About 30 north Korean security guards mob a UNC work group, at work trimming the boughs of a tall poplar tree within UNC sector of JSA in Panmunjom, with axes, killing two U.S. army officers.

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South-North Dialogue in Korea

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South-North Dialogue in Korea

- South-North Coordinating Committee
- South-North Red Cross Conference



Delegates of the Republic of Korea National Red Cross urge sincere efforts of the north Korean Red Cross for early resumption of the full-dress meetings, at the 21st working-level meeting of the South-North Red Cross Conference held at Panmunjom on February 11, 1977.—The ROKNRC Photo



As a service for their fatherland, members of the Korean Residents Youth Service Corps plant trees at the "Home-Comers Hill" near Sabang-ri, Songkomyon, Chonwon-kun, Chungchong-namdo.—The Seoul Shinmoon Photo



“This is your homeland. . .” Mrs. Kim Pang-ja who visits her homeland for the first time together with her children to show them their fatherland, waves toward welcoming Red Cross volunteers.—The Chosun Ilbo Photo



Undaunted by her two-day abduction by Chochongryon operatives, Miss Kim Haeng-kang (right) sets foot on the homeland. Miss Kim appreciates warm brotherly love as she, together with her father, receives flowers from a well-wisher.—The Seoul Shinmoon photo

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Part One

Consolidation of Peace and Unification of Korea

President's New Year Press Conference

“Willing to Offer Food Aid to North Korea” “Let Us Conclude Non-Aggression Agreement”

In his New Year message to the nation on January 1, 1977, President Park Chung Hee of the Republic of Korea urged resumption of the South-North dialogue by saying, “We will work patiently toward normalizing the south-north dialogue in an effort to expedite the peaceful unification of the fatherland, an aspiration of all 50 million of our compatriots, on the basis of the increased strength of the nation.” The President then said that “the north Korean side should manifest a sincere attitude toward establishing peace on the Korean peninsula by coming to the conference table at an early date in accordance with the basic spirit of the July 4 South-North Joint Communiqué.”

Again at the New Year press conference held on January 12, President Park asked north Korea “to accept our proposal for conclusion of a mutual non-aggression agreement between the south and north.” The Chief Executive said, “After the proposed non-aggression agreement is formally concluded, then we would not oppose the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Korea.” Calling on north Korea to respond to the call to open a dialogue on a non-aggression agreement, President Park said if north Korea dislikes Seoul and regards it as inadequate to such dialogue, then it may be held at Panmunjom which lies midway between the south and the north, or any third place of mutual agreement.

At the same time, President Park, disclosing that north Korea faces a very serious shortage of food grains, said that the government, from a purely humanitarian standpoint, is ready to offer grain to the brethren in north Korea. The President said that if north Korea expresses its wish to accept the proposed assistance, “we are ready to extend a considerable amount of food grains among the rice surplus of 1.7 million tons and barley surplus of 1.6 million tons.”

The following are extracts of the New Year press conference on the issue of the south-north dialogue. —Editor—

Question: *North Korea suffered an unavoidable diplomatic defeat at the U.N. General Assembly in 1976. Continuing misconduct by north Korean diplomats in the international community gave our diplomacy a decisive advantage. International situations will be in flux as our neighboring nations experience domestic changes. Would you please elaborate on your plans for implementing diplomatic policies?*

President: You may be well aware of the three basic diplomatic policies of our country: efforts for national security, economic cooperation and cultural exchanges and diplomatic efforts to build a basis for eventual unification of Korea.

“Peace before unification” is the realistic principle of our unification policy. I have already made myself clear on the matter of how to implement this principle on several occasions. One was the Declaration of June 23, 1973, and the other was the Three Principles for Peaceful Unification of August 15, 1974. Still another occasion was during my New Year press conference of 1974, when I called on north Korea to join in a mutual non-aggression agreement between the southern and northern zones of Korea.

You may say that the overall goal of our concerted diplomatic efforts is to help nations of the world understand this basic peaceful unification policy and to win the support of as many nations as possible.

Appreciation for and support of our unification policy by the international community increase year by year. There is also a growing awareness in the international community that our unification policy is far more reasonable and realistic than the north Korean policy. We are also aware that our policy is gaining support from other nations because it is basically peace-oriented.

Meanwhile, more and more countries have come to realize how ir-

rational and unrealistic is north Korea's unification policy. North Korea's position is becoming weaker, having lost most of its persuasiveness. North Korea, for example, insists on the absence of south Korean representatives from talks dealing with the Korean question, or demands the pullout of the U.N. forces from Korea without any alternative measures, or vainly campaigns for an impracticable south-north confederation.

These issues are regarded as unrealistic and unconstructive by the world community. North Korea withdrew its own resolution during the 31st U.N. General Assembly. This is a further evidence that north Korea's diplomatic position has been weakened.

Communists retreat whenever expedient due to unfavorable circumstances and advance as circumstances permit. Therefore, it is premature to conclude that north Korea will continue to refrain from submitting their resolution. We are fully prepared to deal firmly with north Korea, whenever and wherever it chooses to challenge our positions.

I would like to emphasize that after all the mainstay of Korea's security diplomacy is its relation to the United States. My government will make even greater efforts to solidify and enhance the traditional friendly relations and the mutual defense system between Korea and the United States.

The basic cooperative relationship with Japan will be further strengthened, and in doing so we will continue common efforts to bring about peace and prosperity in northeast Asia. We will make steady efforts to cement existing ties with friendly nations, and persistently call upon nations of the Communist bloc to accept a mutual open-door policy. We will implement a policy of improving relations with Third World nations, with emphasis on economic and technical cooperation.

Question: *North Korea staged the axe-murder of two American Army officers at Panmunjom in August 1976. What are our national security measures to avoid north Korean provocations in the future?*

President: We conclude that the axe-murder incident of last August

was a premeditated, vicious and inhuman act staged solely for its political propaganda effects. The incident illustrated to the whole world the warlike, barbarous nature of north Korea.

What was the political propaganda purpose north Korea intended to serve? It was to draw world attention to the Korean peninsula first, and then to mislead world opinion in north Korea's favor. In other words, north Korea intended to show the world that such an incident could take place simply because there were U.S. troops in Korea; if the U.S. troops had already been withdrawn from Korea, no such incident could have occurred.

Obviously, north Korea wanted the world to swallow this line. It is also possible to speculate that north Korea's brutal act was motivated by extreme anxiety, frustration, and jealousy over the high economic achievement in the south. I think that impeding economic progress in the south was one of their aims.

What north Korea aimed at completely backfired. The north Korean farce proved a dismal flop. The world learned that north Korea is warlike and barbarous; that it was only north Korea's lip service that was dedicated to peace. After the axe-murder incident in August, several foreigners who had been sympathetic with north Korea in the past came to view north Korea correctly.

The north Korean Communists are now beset with a number of problems. One of the problems is an internal power struggle touched off by nepotism in its worse form. The north Korean economy is in virtual ruins, while its diplomatic misconduct made it the shame of the international community. North Korea, in short, is in big trouble and hardpressed.

The economic situation in north Korea has apparently hit bottom. Except for a handful of "Communist aristocrats," the general populace is having difficulty even to maintain minimum human decency.

Recent foreign wire service dispatches report that Kim Il-sung's

palace is under construction in Pyongyang. According to the reports, the huge structure will occupy a site of over 335 hectares, and will be larger than the Kremlin in Moscow when completed. Begun in 1971, the construction work takes thousands of workers daily to proceed. Given the privations of north Korean economic life, it is only natural that north Koreans become discontented and rebellious.

North Korea's Communists are aware of grievances and discontent among the north Korean people who are driven to such hard labor on the absurd palace for Kim Il-sung and who never have enough to eat. North Korea's Communists scheme to distract the general populace in the north from their grievances.

We must alert ourselves against any north Korean scheme to start a war as a means to provide an outlet for the discontent of the general populace. We are well prepared to cope with any north Korean attempt to start another war. However, when we think about a permanent peace firmly rooted in the soil of our country, we come to the conclusion that to solve problems one by one through south-north dialogue is the only way to bring about such peace and avoid another war.

Every time we propose the resumption of the talks, the other side always makes impossible demands. The north Koreans asked that the Anti-Communist Law of the Republic of Korea be abrogated, that the National Security Law be voided, that persons on trial be released, and that the U.S. troops in the south be withdrawn immediately.

One of the most noteworthy north Korean demands is the call for speedy withdrawal of U.S. troops. North Korea says it will come to the south-north dialogue table if the U.S. troops leave Korea. It claims that it is because of the presence of the U.S. troops in Korea that south-north dialogue is deadlocked, and that reunification of Korea is not materialized. Even a child of three can see through the distortion of facts by north Korea.

Why are the U.S. troops in Korea? North Korea started a war in

1950, and that is why they are here. They are in Korea since the cease-fire because north Korea never ceases to scheme for another war. The U.S. troops are here to restrain north Korea from starting another war.

The most fundamental question is whether north Korea is ready to give up its absurd scheme to communize all of Korea. If it gives up the vicious plan, the question of withdrawal of U.S. troops will be solved simply.

In connection with the question of the withdrawal of the U.S. troops, in an effort to confirm once again the position of north Korea, I would like to take this occasion to make a new proposal.

I ask north Korea once again to accept my proposition that the south and north conclude a mutual non-aggression agreement. After the proposed non-aggression agreement is formally concluded, then we would not oppose the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Korea. We look forward to a sincere response to this proposition from north Korea.

As I mentioned earlier, the proposition for a south-north non-aggression agreement was first made by me during my 1974 New Year press conference.

Since my first proposal, I have repeated it on many occasions. It has been repeatedly refused. If north Korea really wishes for peaceful reunification, and if really believes that the presence of U.S. troops is the greatest obstacle to unification, north Korea should accept my proposal. It has no reason to turn it down.

It seems that north Korea believes that once the U.S. troops are gone, everything will work out fine overnight in its favor. It is about time for north Korea to realize this is only an illusion and fantasy. In the past decade or so, we have persevered under all kinds of adverse circumstances to survive and build up our national strength. We have done so because we knew it was the only way for national survival.

I can only hope that the north Korean Communists, bent on reckless

schemes for communization of the whole of Korea, will take due note of this fact and make no miscalculation about our determination and preparedness.

I ask you to have full confidence in the government and the armed forces, and maintain firm belief and a steadfast posture.

Question: *The south-north dialogue has been continuously stalemated due to the unilateral rejection by the north Koreans. What is your opinion of the prospects for the south-north dialogue?*

President: As I said just before, the south-north dialogue has been suspended. There was a hotline in operation between Seoul and Pyongyang, but after the August 18 incident at Panmunjom the north Koreans cut the line for unknown reasons. The dialogue is at present in a complete state of disruption. We have urged the Communists repeatedly to reopen the dialogue, but they have not yet responded favorably to our offer.

While rejecting our call for resumption of the dialogue, the Communists have from time to time talked immoderately about direct peace negotiations with the United States over the head of the Republic of Korea. The Communists say that they do not want to talk with us but with a third country, in order to solve the Korean question; nevertheless, they harangue us about the “*juche*” ideology or self-reliance whenever they open their mouths. It is beyond our understanding why they shun Koreans in talking about the Korean question, but want to talk to a third nation in spite of their “*juche*” ideology.

Needless to say, the United States will never accept their call for peace negotiations. The U.S. government has made its position clear that it will never accept any dialogue or negotiations with north Korea without the participation of the Republic of Korea.

Even though we know well that the ultimate hidden aim of the Communists is to realize the withdrawal of U.S. troops from south Korea, we proposed, as I have said before, that a south-north non-aggression agreement be concluded. Once the agreement is concluded, I will not ob-

ject to American troop pullout. Let us discuss this agreement first.

To this end, I call on north Korea to respond to our call to open a dialogue on a non-aggression agreement. As I observed before, the Communists seem to loathe visiting Seoul. I do not know the real reason, but they cite the foul air, etc., among other things. But these must be mere excuses.

If they really dislike Seoul and regard it as inadequate, I propose any other place, possibly Panmunjom which lies midway between the south and the north, or any third place of mutual agreement.

Question: It is reported that our brethren in north Korea have been suffering from a state of chronic malnutrition due to an extreme shortage of food grains. Do you have any plan to offer grain aid to north Korea from a humanitarian point of view? It is believed that such aid would serve as a catalyst for accelerating the resumption of the south-north dialogue.

President: Foreign wire dispatches, information provided by former north Korean espionage agents who defected to the Republic of Korea, and reports by foreigners who have been to north Korea indicate a very serious shortage of food grains in the north.

If this is true, our government, apart from all political considerations and from a purely humanitarian standpoint, is ready to offer grain to our brethren in north Korea. I believe that none of our people will object to the idea.

Especially those compatriots who left their family members behind in north Korea will support the aid offer more fervently than others.

Some of our people may ask if we have a surplus of food grains to such an extent that we can provide such assistance to our north Korean brethren. The reality is, of course, that we still import considerable quantities of wheat and corn from foreign countries.

However, as to rice and barley, which constitute our staple food grains, we succeeded in expanding their production and, as a result, we

now have a considerable surplus. Until some years ago we, too, had to endure various difficulties due to the shortage of grains, relying heavily on food aid from the United States in particular.

For the past 10 years or so our government and farmers have made extraordinary efforts for the expansion of food grain production. We also concentrated on producing new varieties and improving our farming technique, thus expanding food grain production.

We finally reached the stage of self-sufficiency in rice and barley in 1975. This is an opportune moment to talk briefly about the food grain situation of our country. In the case of rice, we produced 21,300,000 sok (3 million tons) in 1960 before the military revolution. Rice production in 1975 in the same territory of south Korea rose to 32,000,000 sok (4.5 million tons) enabling our country for the first time to realize self-sufficiency in that grain.

Last year, as you know well, we achieved production of 36,200,000 sok (about 5 million tons) of rice, resulting in a small surplus. The figure 36,000,000 sok (5 million tons) means a 58 percent production increase or nearly 60 percent when compared with 21,000,000 sok (3 million tons) in 1960.

For reference, we will examine our rice production during the Japanese rule. Annual rice production in the whole Korean peninsula ranged from 15,000,000 to 18,000,000 sok (2 to 2.4 million tons) during the Japanese occupation on the average. Last year production in south Korea alone amounted to twice the output of the whole peninsula during Japanese rule. It may not be too much to say that this certainly indicates a green revolution.

· According to the government rice supply and demand program for this year, there would be about 45,000,000 sok (6.4 million tons) some 9,000,000 sok (1.3 million tons) carried forward from last year and approximately 36,000,000 tons (5 million tons) we are to produce this year, and it is expected, we will consume 33,000,000 sok (4.7 million

tons) this year. In other words, we will have a surplus of 11,750,000 sok (1.7 million tons) at the end of this year. This much rice we can carry over to next year. This means that we have enough rice to spare.

In the case of barley, 10,950,000 sok (1.6 million tons) were carried over to this year from last year, as surplus. Last year we produced 13,000,000 sok (2 million tons). Of the 23,950,000 sok (3.5 million tons) of barley available this year, we are expected to consume 12,500,000 sok (1.8 million tons). In other words, we will have a surplus of 11,450,000 sok (1.6 million tons) at the end of this year for carryover to next year.

In total, we will have 11,750,000 sok (1.7 million tons) of rice and 11,450,000 sok (1.6 million tons) of barley as surplus at the year-end for carryover to next year, a total of about 23,000,000 sok (3.3 million tons) of surplus staple food grains. The figure I gave you here, of course, include those grains now kept at farming households.

The rice and barley kept by the government alone amount to about 15,000,000 sok (2.1 million tons). In short, we are now about 80 percent self-sufficient in supply of food grains, a rate higher than Japan.

As we have that much to spare, we are ready to extend a considerable amount of food grains as aid to the north Kroean side if it expresses its wish to accept our assistance.

Here we face one thing which we cannot understand. Even though a food crisis is sweeping north Korea at present, the Communists, as I know, have accumulated a considerable quantity of grain stocks for war.

If their food crisis is so acute, the Communists should release the war grains and feed their people. But the Communists are keeping the war grains as before while suffering the food crisis. This I cannot understand at all.

In any case, the fact remains that north Kroea is now suffering a shortage of food grains. If the Communists accept our offer of food aid, we are ready to provide it at any time.

Part Two

South-North Dialogue

South-North Coordinating Committee:

**“Let Us Discuss Steps for Conclusion of
Non-Aggression Agreement”
Seoul Side Urges Early Resumption of SNCC**

Chang Key-young, acting Seoul side Co-chairman of the South-North Coordinating Committee, on January 28, 1977 proposed to the Pyongyang side discussion of arrangements for conclusion of a non-aggression agreement for the sake of consolidation of peace on the Korean peninsula.

To this end, the late Chang, in a statement, urged the Pyongyang side to normalize the operation of the South-North Coordinating Committee at an early date. Acting Co-chairman Chang further asked the Pyongyang side to immediately reopen the Seoul-Pyongyang hotline.

The full text of the statement by the acting SNCC Co-chairman for the Seoul side is as follows—Editor—

As already reported, His Excellency President Park Chung Hee, in his New Year Press Conference on January 12, offered a new and drastic initiative for the consolidation of peace on the Korean peninsula. While renewing his appeal that, as a step to bring about a viably institutionalized peace between the south and the north of Korea, north Korea accept a “south-north mutual non-aggression agreement” proposed by the Republic of Korea, President Park made it clear that the Republic of Korea would not be opposed to the withdrawal of the U.S. troops stationed in Korea, once the proposed non-aggression agreement had been concluded between the two sides of Korea.

Of course, it should doubtless be the case that, in the first place, the U.S. military presence in Korea has its own justifications. Just as President Park properly pointed out in his press conference, it was to repel the north Korean aggression against the Republic of Korea in 1950 that the U.S. troops came back to Korea. And, it has also been to frustrate, and deter, the persistent north Korean attempt to resort to the use of military means in its unquenched pursuit of a Communist takeover of south Korea, and thus to prevent a recurrence of armed hostilities in this part of the world, that the U.S. troops have continued to stay in Korea.

Looking in retrospect, I recall that, when, on January 18, 1974, President Park first proposed the "south-north mutual non-aggression agreement," Communist north Korea rejected it on the ground that, while making the offer of the proposed non-aggression agreement, the President failed to mention the U.S. military presence in Korea.

Therefore, we are now logically led to be convinced that Communist north Korea is not allowed to enjoy any further excuse to reject our offer of the inter-Korean non-aggression agreement, since we have made it clarified that we would not be opposed to the withdrawal of the U.S. troops in Korea, once the proposed agreement had been concluded between the two sides of Korea.

For reasons stated above, I am going to make use of this occasion today to suggest that the two sides of Korea seriously start discussions on procedural and other matters pertaining to the making of arrangements for the proposed non-aggression agreement to be concluded between them, and, in order to make that process possible, normalize the operation of the South-North Coordinating Committee at the earliest possible date.

And, I would also like to call on my counterpart in Pyongyang immediately to take measures to the effect that, the Seoul-Pyongyang direct telephone line operated by the South-North Coordinating Committee, out of service ever since August 31, 1976, when Pyongyang began refusing to answer calls from Seoul without explanation, will

be brought back to normal operation at an early date.

I earnestly hope that my north Korean counterpart will prove to be responsive, without any further delay, to the constructive suggestions that I have made today.

Meanwhile, the Pyongyang side has failed to make any formal response toward this proposition by the Seoul side acting Co-Chairman. In an indirect reaction, however, a broadcast of Radio Pyongyang on February 1 rejected the offer, claiming that the Seoul side's proposal "manifested the divisionistic nature of south Korean authorities."

Kim Dong-jo Replaces Lee Yong-hee as Seoul-Side SNCC Member

Chang Key-young, acting Seoul side Co-chairman of the South-North Coordinating Committee, on January 28, 1977 announced the appointment of Kim Dong-jo, special assistant to President Park Chung Hee, to serve as a Seoul side member of the South-North Coordinating Committee. Mr. Kim replaces Lee Yong-hee who resigned as a Seoul side SNCC member upon his assumption of the duty of Minister of National Unification Board in December 1976.

The new appointee, Mr. Kim Dong-jo, was born in 1918 and graduated from Kyushu University of Japan. Mr. Kim had been in the foreign service for many years after he joined the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1951. His major posts included Ambassadorship to Japan and the United States. Mr. Kim was serving as Foreign Minister in 1976 when he was named Special Assistant to the President.

Acting Seoul-Side Co-Chairman Chang Dies

Chang Key-young, acting Seoul side Co-chairman of the South-North Coordinating Committee, died of a heart attack at his home in Seoul at 8:10 a.m. last April 11. He was 61.

The late acting Co-chairman Chang, born in Seoul, graduated from the Sollin Commercial High School and had served a number of important duties, which included those of vice president of the Bank of Korea in 1950, president of the daily Chosun Ilbo in 1952, founder-president of the daily Hankuk Ilbo in 1954, Deputy Premier-Economic Planning Minister in 1964, member of the International Olympic Committee in 1967, and National Assemblyman in 1973.

The late acting Co-chairman Chang attended the second Co-chairmen's meeting held in Pyongyang on November 2, 1972 as an assistant to Co-chairman Lee Hu-rak. In the formal inauguration of the South-North Coordinating Committee on November 30, 1972, he was appointed as Seoul side vice Co-chairman of the Coordinating Committee.

Named to serve as acting Co-chairman upon the resignation of Co-chairman Lee Hu-rak on December 3, 1973, Mr. Chang had strived until his death for resumption of the south-north dialogue which has been deadlocked since the Pyongyang side's announcement of its boycott of the south-north dialogue on August 28, 1973.

South-North Red Cross Conference:

ROKNRC Urges North Korean Side to Accept Food Aid Offer

Lee Ho, president of the Republic of Korea National Red Cross, issued a statement on January 31, 1977, asking the north Korean side to accept, from a humanitarian standpoint, the assistance of food offered by President Park Chung Hee in his New Year press conference.

The Red Cross leader said that if the north Korean side accepts the offer, the Republic of Korea National Red Cross would be willing to render its utmost services in implementing concretely the food grain assistance project for the north Korean brethren with the authorization of the government.

The full text of the statement by Lee Ho, president of the Republic of Korea National Red Cross, is as follows —Editor—

The Republic of Korea National Red Cross first proposed South-North Red Cross talks in August 1971 in order to solve humanely the problem of dispersed families in south and north Korea.

The Republic of Korea National Red Cross has made continuous and sincere efforts to help to bring about a solution to the humanitarian matters between south and north Korea during past five and a half years since the South-North Red Cross Conference started.

However, as a member of the Red Cross workers and of the same nation, I much regret that I have to say that not only have the plenary talks not been resumed since their discontinuance three and a half years ago but also the working-level meetings which are held once in a while have made no progress.

But, on the other hand, I feel happy that the dispersed-family reunion project, including homeland visits by our brethren in Japan affiliated with 'Chochongryon,' a pro-Pyongyang Korean residents' group in Japan, has been conducted with nation-wide support, positively backed up by our government, and has been a remarkable success.

President Park Chung Hee has made a very timely proposal at his New Year Press Conference that the Republic of Korea is ready to provide food grain assistance to our brethren in north Korea from a genuine humanitarian standpoint, free from any political consideration, taking note of the fact that north Korea is now suffering from a severe shortage of food grain.

Since the primary role of the Red Cross is to realize humanitarianism, protecting human beings from disaster and transcending ideologies and systems, I express my whole-hearted support, from a humanitarian and brotherly love standpoint, for President Park's recent proposal to offer food grain assistance to our brethren in north Korea.

In this regard, I hope that the north Korean side will accept our government proposal without hesitation. At the same time, if and when the north Korean side accepts our government proposal, the Republic of Korea National Red Cross makes it clear that it is willing to render its utmost services in implementing concretely the food grain assistance project for our north Korean brethren with the authorization of our government.

I am looking forward to a favorable response from the north Korean side.

The north Korean side did not make a reply to the statement by the president of the Republic of Korea National Red Cross concerning "urging for acceptance of food aid offer made in a humanitarian consideration."

However, in a Radio Pyongyang broadcast on February 1, the north

Korean side slanderously disputed President Park Chung Hee's proposal for food assistance, thereby making clear its negative response to the urging by the Republic of Korea National Red Cross.

The broadcast maintained that the food aid offer is "a part of anti-Communist farce and a product of the scheme to cover up south Korea's own serious food crisis and to further exploit people for stockpiling of military provisions." The Pyongyang side then unfoundedly insisted, "In south Korea today, lines of begging persons swell day after day, and people die of hunger everywhere."

What is the food situation today in north Korea, which rejected outright the purely brotherly love- and humanitarianism-motivated suggestion by President Park that "we are ready to offer grain to our brethren in north Korea apart from all political considerations and from a humanitarian standpoint," and which distortedly describes south Korea as being hunger-stricken?

A study of reports by foreigners who have been to north Korea, information provided by former north Korean espionage agents who defected to the Republic and foreign wire dispatches, reveals that the north Korean people suffer much from a very serious shortage of food grains.

In effect, north Korea's agriculture still remains heavily backward causing a chronic food shortage despite frantic campaigns to boost farm production and conserve grain consumption begun in the early part of the 1960's. The agrarian backwardness of north Korea is ascribed chiefly to the limited acreage of arable land, short supply of fertilizer and farm chemicals, shortage of farm labor and backward farming know-how.

The "cooperative farms" which north Korea introduced after the 1946 agrarian reform as a "farm management system in a socialistic pattern," have now been turned into a sort of concentration camp designed to exploit farmers in an organized manner. The cooperative system only serves to foment resistance among farmers as well as to reduce their will

to production, leading to declining production.

As for farm-land acreage, north Korea has no more than 2,090,000 hectares of farm lands or merely 17 percent of the total land of north Korea, a heavily mountainous area, whereas arable land accounts for 55.4 percent of the total territory in the Republic of Korea. For the recent few years, north Korea has been mobilizing nearly all of its people in the forced work for creation of terraced farm fields and other reclamation of hilly lands.

At the same time, the chronic shortage of fertilizer is attributable to north Korea's "heavy industry first" policy prompted by its all-out war preparation, which has inevitably compelled the fertilizer industry to remain in a near primitive stage. In addition, the following several factors have further aggravated the agricultural and food conditions of north Korea.

First, north Korea has been exporting considerable quantities of rice to abroad as a means of earning foreign exchanges in an effort to make up for foreign exchange shortage caused by excessive introduction of large plants from Western countries in the hope of achieving the six-year economic plan ahead of schedule and also by the plummeting international prices of mineral ores which are the major export items of north Korea.

Secondly, north Korea has been putting aside a huge amount of grains for stockpile for use in war under the personal instructions of Kim Il-sung, who for instance said at the "rally of dedicated farmers" in January 1975, "We must conserve grains as much as possible for stockpile in preparation for war . . . Let us hold in reserve 1 million tons of grains this year by all means . . . Only through increased farm production, can we have more food reserves enabling ourselves to meet the great event of national unification in better preparation."

Thirdly, inefficient and confused food ration and transportation system add to the food shortage, causing food riots often.

Lastly, north Korea finds itself in unfavorable terrain and weather

conditions for farming. Worse yet, farming in north Korea has been affected seriously by the worldwide weather abnormality featuring severe cold and prolonged drought.

In this situation, the north Korean Communists attempt to smoke-screen their food crisis using false statistical figures in deceptive propaganda, while trying to rationalize their continued food exploitation of the already hunger-stricken people.

A foreign seaman who has recently been to north Korea gave this story pointing to the seriousness of food problem in north Korea: "During our anchor off Hungnam along the east coast of north Korea, we had to hospitalize a fellow seaman affected by dysentery. At the hospital, we encountered unbelievable scenes a few times; nurses there were hungrily devouring what were left over from patients' meals. At a dining hall, we saw the meals for doctors were largely corn boiled together with a small amount of barley, and those for nurses corn and millet."

Another indication of the food problem is shown in letters sent from some of former Korean residents in Japan repatriated to north Korea, to their relatives in Japan, in which they invariably appealed for "food and clothes."

In 1972, north Korea cut food ration in the face of deteriorating food situation. The daily ration of 600 grams of grains for office workers and light laborers was in effect reduced to 500 grams when four days' ration was deducted from a month's.

Again beginning on September 1 last year, north Korea switched from the 15-day ration system to daily ration, under which no ration is given to those who fail to report to work without advance notice while daily ration is cut by 200 grams for those who report to work late. (See the following table)

To the north Koreans, the staple food is corn. Besides, side dishes comprise largely low-calorie pickled vegetable or vegetable soups prepared with such seasoning materials as soy, bean cake and salt. Meat is

Daily Food Ration in North Korea

As of end of 1976

Classification	Amount	Rice-Cereals Ratio
Party leaders and ranking officials	800g	10:0
Military officers	600	4:6
Enlisted men	750	4:6
Professors and highly placed engineers	700	5:5
Manual workers and miners	700	3:7
Ordinary workers	600	3:7
Office workers	600	3:7
College students	500	3:7
High school students	400	3:7
Elementary school pupils	300	3:7
Other dependents	300	3:7
Infants	100	3:7

Remarks: 1) The figures under the column of "Amount" represent the base amounts. In reality, four days' ration is deducted from a month's and in many cases one month's ration is deducted from a year's portion for war stockpile.

2) The rice-cereals ratio differs widely depending on areas and seasons. A two-to-eight rice-cereals ratio is more common than the three-to-seven ratio.

rationed, in a scant amount of course, only on their national holidays.

Despite such under-nourishment, the people of north Korea are being mobilized for forced labor for various projects undertaken to prepare for aggressive war against the Republic of Korea, only to add to their physical exhaustion.

According to a recent defector from north Korea, Mr. Lee Hong-po, more than 60 percent of the entire population of north Korea are known to suffer from malnutrition. Cases of pellegra, stemming from undernutrition, are reported rampant and babies are born in deformation in many

cases, the defector said.

It was against the background of this acute crisis of food in north Korea that President Park resolved to offer food assistance to the north Korean brethren purely from the standpoint of humanitarianism and brotherly love.

In a striking contrast to the pitiful situation of north Korea, the Republic of Korea is now developing itself into the column of advanced countries from the state of semi-developed nation, thanks to the successful accomplishment of the three five-year economic development plans.

As for the food situation, south Korea achieved self-sufficiency in rice and barley, the staple grains, already in 1975. The nation is now about 80 percent self-sufficient in supply of food grains, and will have a total of about 23,000,000 sok (3.3 million tons) of surplus staple food grains at the end of this year.

Through the firm determination to produce more on the part of farmers, the government's proper policies and investment, constant improvement of hybrid seeds, ample supply of fertilizer and farm chemicals, and mechanization of farming, south Korea has managed to increase the per-acre farm yield to 170kg, about the level of the average international yield.

As a result, south Korea harvested roughly 36 million sok (about 5 million tons) of rice last year, an amount representing a 11.7 percent increase over the previous year, despite the severe drought.

Such being the circumstance, north Korea ought to recognize this stark reality and accept President Park's food aid offer made purely from a humanitarian standpoint transcending differences in ideas and systems, rather than making absurd allegations to mislead public opinions at home and abroad.

“Let Us Resume Full-Dress Meeting at Panmunjom or Another Third Place”

ROKNRC Urges Normalization of Talks

Delegates of the South-North Red Cross Conference had the first working-level meeting of the year at the conference room of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission at Pammunjom for one and a half hours beginning 10 a.m. February 11, 1977.

At the meeting, the delegation of the Republic of Korea National Red Cross proposed that 1) agenda topic No. 1 of the full-dress meetings be discussed at an early date without any preconditions, and if the Pyongyang side cannot respond affirmatively to this, then the “aged parents program” and “mutual exchange of groups of visitors to ancestral tombs” be discussed as pilot projects in the first place, 2) the eighth full-dress meeting be held in Seoul at an early date as already agreed upon between the two sides, and if the Pyongyang side rejects it, it be held at Panmunjom or some other third place of mutual agreement on a provisional basis, and 3) the severed direct south-north telephone line and suspended function of the Panmunjom Liaison Office be restored at an early date.

Nevertheless, the north Korean Red Cross delegation showed no concern at all about these reasonable propositions, trying to turn the talks into a propaganda arena by bringing up absurd issues that have nothing to do with the Red Cross conference. The north Korean Red Cross went so far as to defame and slander the other side in the talks and denounce as “a nation-splitting scheme” the Republic of Korea’s Foreign Policy for Peace and Unification.

The north Korean Red Cross delegation then argued that it

cannot go along with the talks unless "the U.S. forces are withdrawn from Korea, nuclear weapons are removed and anti-state criminals are set free." Both sides resolved to hold the next 22nd working-level meeting on April 28.

The following is the text of a speech made by Kim Yeon-choo, alternate chief delegate of the Republic of Korea National Red Cross, at the 21st working-level meeting. —Editor—

The delegation of the Republic of Korea National Red Cross believes that with the turn of the new year of 1977 we must today reaffirm the purport and objective of the South-North Red Cross Conference, and find a way out of the deadlocked situation with fresh determination and attitude.

As our side has emphasized time and again, the basic objective of the South-North Red Cross Conference is to pave the way for reunion between the 10 million family members dispersed in the south and north, and also to ease the tensions existing between the south and north in order to consolidate peace through such a humanitarian program, contributing to independent and peaceful unification of the fatherland.

In order to accomplish such a lofty national mission, our south and north Korean Red Cross workers must transcend mutually conflicting systems and ideas, and carry on the dialogue based on the Red Cross humanitarian spirit and brotherly love.

Our side is convinced that only when both sides come to the conference table with such an attitude can the confrontation and distrust existing between the two sides be overcome, common and mutual interests be found, and the man-made barriers between the south and north be removed peacefully.

It was with such an objective and in pursuit of this spirit that the Republic of Korea National Red Cross earlier called for a "campaign for

searching for 10 million dispersed family members” in proposing the South-North Red Cross Conference. This basic stand in our side has been steadfastly maintained in the entire course of the meetings.

Our side’s basic purpose of removing distrust and misunderstanding between the south and north, of easing tensions and deflecting confrontation, and of removing the barrier of national division peacefully by expediting the reunions between 10 million separated family members, has been clearly manifested in discussion over the issue of resuming the full-dress meetings, as well as in the agenda topics of the full-dress meetings.

As your side well knows, our Republic of Korea National Red Cross delegation proposed at preliminary meetings in the past that full-dress meetings be held in Seoul and Pyongyang in turn, in order to settle more effectively the issue of reunion between the 10 million dispersed family members, pursuing the important historical mission and true significance embodied in the South-North Red Cross Conference.

Consequently, the south and north Korean Red Cross workers were able to carry on the full-dress meetings by traveling to Seoul and Pyongyang seven times, cutting through the artificial barrier that has been separating the south and north for a quarter century.

If the full-dress meetings of the South-North Red Cross Conference had not been suspended, but had enjoyed smooth sailing, the “path of dialogue” between Seoul and Pyongyang could have been transformed into a “path of reunion” between the 10 million separated family members by now, which would be linked before long to the avenue for free travel between south and north by all of us, presaging national resurrection.

Regretfully, however, we have been unable to proceed along the “path of dialogue” which we ourselves have paved so laboriously. Since the road between Seoul and Pyongyang has been sealed off, the south-north dialogue continues to remain deadlocked.

To look back over the past three years since the suspension of the full-dress meetings of the South-North Red Cross Conference, tensions

and confrontation have heightened more than in any other comparable earlier period, and the atmosphere for dialogue, too, has deteriorated greatly.

If this state of deadlocked dialogue and heightening tensions is allowed to continue, then the distrust and enmity between our brethren are bound to deepen, and consolidation of peace in this land, not to speak of independent peaceful unification of the fatherland, to which our 50 million brethren have been aspiring, would inevitably become farther distant.

Our side's position toward discussion of the agenda topics of the full-dress meetings is based on the Red Cross humanitarian spirit and brotherly love, as well as upon the spirit of the South-North Joint Communiqué, in every respect. Our stance is to alleviate substantially the sufferings of the dispersed families according to their own free will.

In discussion of the topic with regard to the issue of concrete realization of reunion between dispersed families, our side has called for solution of the separated family issue in a humanitarian manner, transcending the different systems and ideas of the south and north.

Also for the promotion of a practical solution of the issue of dispersed families, our side proposed that common points be found through a correct examination into the cruel reality of south-north relations, and that favorable experiences as a basis for mutual trust be built up by discussing urgent and practical things first on a step-by-step basis, in accordance with the wishes of the separated families themselves.

It is crystal-clear to the eyes of every person that this alone constitutes the means of realizing the reunion between the 10 million displaced family members as well as progress toward independent peaceful unification of the fatherland, in view of today's south-north relations characterized by different systems and ideas and rampant distrust and hostile feelings.

It is from this very position that our side has striven to solve the issue of dispersed families on a humanitarian and realistic basis in every

respect, and has set forth various reasonable projects and plans.

The “project for searching for separated families,” the “project for reunion between aged parents and their families,” the “project for exchange of groups of visitors to ancestral tombs among dispersed families,” and the “project for exchange of pictures of dispersed families” for implementation between the two Red Crosses. . . all these, which the delegation of the Republic of Korea National Red Cross has long proposed, are urgent programs which the dispersed family members themselves are unanimously longing for, and represent humanitarian programs which can be implemented at any time, regardless of the conflicting systems, conditions and atmospheres of the south and north.

As your side well knows, the German people whose country remains divided for 30 years, like our country, have succeeded in solving the issue of dispersed family members numbering tens of millions in a humanitarian manner, despite the different ideas and systems between the East and West. The “home town and family visit program,” first begun for a small number of aged persons in a pilot project, has now developed to a point where all the German people make free passage today.

Our Korean people, a people who stand superior to any other peoples around the world, would be able easily to accomplish such projects as others do, if only we are determined to realize them.

As our country has come to pursue positive exchanges and cooperation with those countries with different systems and ideas in recent years, after declaring an open-door policy toward all countries of the world, even those of our compatriots who reside in China, the Soviet Union and East European Communist countries now freely exchange communications and letters with their family members and relatives in our country.

Moreover, the fact that the free homeland visits by our brethren in Japan associated with Chochongryon, a pro-Pyongyang Korean residents’ group in Japan, already begun on the Chusok holiday the year before last, are expanding day by day, attests to the fact that there exist no conditions

of atmosphere in the Republic of Korea that impede such exchanges. Rather, it evidences how our government and people are making concerted efforts to implement and guarantee such a humanitarian program.

Therefore, I am obliged to point out that the so-called “theory of atmosphere” or “theory of conditions and atmosphere” which your side has put forth is a contention without any basis or persuasiveness, and is a simple excuse aimed at shunning normalization of the full-dress meetings of the South-North Red Cross Conference and full-fledged discussion of the agenda topics of the full-dress meetings.

I would also like to take this opportunity to point out again that your side has been suspending the normal operation of the direct south-north telephone line between Seoul and Pyongyang and the Red Cross Panmunjom Liaison Office, which had been in smooth operation for five years, and has failed to restore their function up to the present time.

North Korean Red Cross delegates!

As your side well knows, the general trend of the world community today is entering a stage in which all countries and all peoples pursue open-door and mutual cooperation, transcending ideas and systems, discontinuing past days’ cold war confrontation.

At the same time, these changes and developments require all countries and all peoples to reject reckless war policies and policy of violence, and instead solve all disputes peacefully through direct dialogue between the parties concerned.

Nonetheless, a barrier of cold war vintage still remains in our country today, 30 years after national liberation. This man-made barrier that has divided the brethren and blood relatives seldom shows any sign of early removal.

The South-North Coordinating Committee which was inaugurated with a view to solving the issue of national unification on the principles of “independence, peace and national unity,” and mitigating tensions be-

tween the south and north, as made clear in the South-North Joint Communiqué of 1972, has not seen normal operation for the three years since August 1973. During this period, tensions between the south and north have been further heightened.

It is really heart-breaking to see that only our people maintain a hostile barrier rejecting dialogue in the same land at this time when all other countries and peoples around the world open their doors and promote mutual exchanges and cooperation for development, creativity and construction.

The vicious circle of such a situation that runs counter to the trend of the times, as well as the wishes of our 50 million compatriots, should be brought to an end at an early date.

We wish to make clear that we will resolutely reject any idea of settling the unification issue by means of violence or war under the cloak of so-called “liberation” or “revolution,” an idea which goes against the times.

Resorting to violence is anachronistic, and can by no means be justified, nor can it be successfully pursued.

We should realize that today neither side can enforce its system upon the other, and that any “solution of the unification issue without direct participation by the concerned parties of the south and north” cannot be tolerated under any circumstances.

The only way that can lead our people to continued existence, development and prosperity is for us to promote dialogue and exchanges at a national level, transcending systems and ideas.

The invariable world opinion with regard to the Korean peninsula today calls on us to ease the tense situation and seek peaceful unification through direct dialogue between the parties of the south and north at an early date.

The way for our south and north Korean Red Cross workers substantially to contribute to consolidation of peace and unification of the fa-

therland is to resume the suspended full-dress meetings early, in the first place, and to solve the agenda topics of the full-dress meetings one by one.

North Korean Red Cross delegates!

Based on the above-mentioned statement, I am making the following propositions.

First, I propose that agenda topic no. 1 of the full-dress meetings, “the question of tracing, and notifying thereof, the whereabouts and fate of members of dispersed families, and relatives, in the south and north,” be discussed at an early date without any preconditions. If your side cannot respond affirmatively to unconditional and early debate of the agenda topic No. 1 of the full-dress meetings, I wish to propose that the question of carrying out “the mutual exchange of groups of visitors to ancestral tombs between dispersed families in the south and north” and the “aged parents program” be implemented in the first place as pilot projects.

Secondly as to the issue of resuming the full-dress meetings I urge your side to agree at an early date to “holding the eighth full-dress meeting in Seoul” as already agreed on between the two sides. However, if your side adamantly rejects the holding of the Seoul meeting, I, taking into account your side’s position, propose that “the full-dress meetings be held at Panmunjom or some other third place of mutual agreement” on an interim basis.

These proposals of the Republic of Korea National Red Cross delegation are intended to put on the right track our humanitarian talks, which have failed to register any progress in the past, and further to pave the way for reunion between the 10 million dispersed family members at an early date.

Before conclusion, I would like to take this occasion to urge your side once again to restore soon the operation of the direct south-north telephone line between Seoul and Pyongyang and the Panmunjom Liaison Office, normal operation of which has suspended since the end of August last year.

Hoping that this year would become an era in which our dialogue will

be normalized, the delegation of the republic of Korea National Red Cross advises your side to accept the justifiable proposals of our side.

Part Three

Other Developments in Inter-Korean Relations

North Korea Returns to Deceptive Peace Offensive —Proposal of “South-North Political Conference”—

In a joint meeting of its so-called political parties and social organizations held on January 25, 1977 in Pyongyang, north Korea renewed its stereotyped proposal for a “south-north political conference,” a proposition which it made so often in the past that its fictitiousness and underlying motivation have by now been clearly known.

Made in the form of “letters to south Korean political parties, social organizations and compatriots abroad,” the renewed offer was, of course, none other than a repetition of Pyongyang’s deceptive peace offensive, devised chiefly to offset the highly justifiable proposals for early conclusion of a south-north non-aggression agreement and food assistance made by President Park Chung Hee in his New Year press conference on January 12, 1977.

In the proposal, north Korea 1) made clear its rejection of President Park’s suggestion for conclusion of a non-aggression agreement between the south and north, by making a stereotyped allegation that “what we need is not the practice of empty words like ‘south-north non-aggression pact conclusion’ but unconditional withdrawal of American forces, 2) disclosed its true intention of boycotting the south-north dialogue when it asserted, “Judging from past experience, we will have nothing to gain from the dialogue,” and 3) attempted to interfere in the internal affairs of south Korea in disregard of the spirit of the South-North Joint Communiqué of 1972 and also to drive a wedge between the south Korean people and their government, by addressing the proposal not to the south Korean government but to “south Korean political parties and social organizations as well as Korean residents abroad” and by contending that “we will not be opposed to the south Korean side’s participation in the political conference if it gives up its anti-Communist policy.”

It seems, therefore, that the north Korean proposal constitutes a mere

process of implementing a strategy against the south, a stratagem that does not deviate at all from the pattern of its “united front strategy” calling for “downfall of the incumbent government through split of public opinions and social confusion, establishment of a regime sympathetic to communism and finally unification of the whole Korean peninsula under communism through negotiations with Communist sympathizers in power.”

The Pyongyang proposition, premising “it is designed to serve independent peaceful unification of the fatherland,” urged 1) grand alliance between the “socialistic force” of the north and the patriotic and democratic force of the south, 2) alleviation of tensions between the south and north, and elimination of the danger of nuclear war, 3) creation of an atmosphere for a grand national union, and 4) convocation of a “south-north political conference” among all political parties, social organizations and people of all strata in the south and north.

We cannot overlook the fictitiousness of the contents of the overture as well as the schemes lurking in it.

First, the north Korean Communists contend that “unification can be achieved by the united strength of the socialistic force of the north and the patriotic and democratic force of the south, and the two forces can become united for common objectives even though they have different thoughts, political views and systems,” and that “the alliance between these forces would become the most effective propellant in crushing attempts to perpetuate national division and in advancing unification of the fatherland.”

“The socialistic force of the north” mentioned here refers to the force of the north Korean Communists, while “the patriotic and democratic force of the south” needless to say indicate the anti-government or anti-state force as well as Communist elements siding with the north Korean Communists. By calling for realization of “grand alliance” between these two forces, north Korea seeks to translate into action the strategy and tactics for communization of whole Korea, namely; “Communist revolution in

south Korea first and then achievement of unification under communism,” a scheme which the north Korean Communists have persistently been attempting to try.

At the same time, the north Korean Communists indulge in a fictitious propaganda and agitation mentioning “Communist elements” in the south, who are non-existent in reality, in an apparent attempt to help subvert the government of the Republic of Korea. This false allegation must have been designed to estrange the south Korean people from their government and thereby overthrow the government of the Republic of Korea, in view of their past performance of fomenting and encouraging anti-government activities in the south while denouncing the Seoul government for “indulging in nation-splitting policies.”

Secondly, the north Korean proposition demanded that “all murderous weapons including nuclear bases should immediately be taken out of south Korea, and American forces should be withdrawn unconditionally, ” asserting “we propose that pertinent military authorities be asked to open a disarmament conference.” It also said “let us ease tensions between the south and north, and thereby remove the danger of nuclear war.”

Despite the immovable fact that the heightening tension on the Korean peninsula derives solely from the Kim Il-sung regime’s incessant provocations and war preparation against the south, they attempt to shift the responsibility to the Republic of Korea through deceptive propaganda and defamation.

Moreover, by demanding “elimination of threat of nuclear war,” the north Korean Communists seek to mislead the world opinion as if the danger of nuclear war exists on the Korean peninsula and such danger comes from the south.” This demand, needless to say, is motivated by their intent of creating a power vacuum in south Korea so as to facilitate their aggression against the south, by prompting accelerated withdrawal of American forces from Korea.

The U.S. forces presently stationed in Korea were originally brought

here for the purpose of checking the armed aggression by the north Korean Communists during the Korean War and sanctioning them for causing the unprovoked war. The American troops still remain in Korea because the north Koreans ceaselessly stage provocations against the south to date, 24 years after the ceasefire, bent on invading south Korea again to achieve what they failed to do in the 1950 war—communization of the whole Korean peninsula.

The Communists committed more than 35,000 violations of the Military Armistice Agreement so far. Among the truce breaches were the digging of invasion tunnels across the truce line and the brutal axe-murder at Panmunjom in August last year.

Now that the Republic of Korea has fully consolidated the posture of self-reliant national defense, able to cope with whatever threats from the north, the north Korean Communists cannot harbor the wishful thinking that the planned pullout of American ground troops would provide any opportune time for invasion of the south. North Korea, therefore, should show good faith in consolidating peace through elimination of tensions on the Korean peninsula by accepting the Republic of Korea's proposal for conclusion of a non-aggression agreement between the south and north.

Thirdly, in the proposition north Korea proposed "convocation of a 'south-north political conference' among various political parties, social organizations and people's representatives in all walks of life" for the purpose of solving the issues of "eliminating sources of internal discords" and "creating an atmosphere for a grand national unity."

The "creation of an atmosphere for a grand national unity" which north Korea demands, in effect means a series of measures that would leave south Korea defenseless before Communist subversion, such as guarantee of free Communist activities in the south, unconditional release of all anti-state prisoners, and suspension of anti-Communist policy.

In north Korea, there is no freedom of travel, movement of residence

or even rest and recuperation, not to speak of the basic freedom.

Moreover, the north Korean Communists mobilize their people for merciless labor exploitation and idolatry, placing them under double and triple surveillance and control, and build up Kim Il-sung's one-man dictatorial system unprecedented in history.

Here, the north Koreans' demand for release of anti-state prisoners and repeal of anti-Communist policy derives from a sinister scheme to subvert the Republic of Korea by causing their subversive operations to be legalized in south Korea.

Lastly, the part of the proposal that "we consider it necessary to hold a preliminary working-level meeting between liaison delegates at Panmunjom or any other place of mutual agreement at an early date," may appear a new offer.

However, they attach to it an absurd condition that they would resume the south-north dialogue only when the Republic of Korea government repeals the June 23 Special Foreign Policy, set free those imprisoned for their anti-state activities, and abandon a policy of pursuing a self-reliant defense posture. Only in this circumstance, they say, would delegates from the Republic of Korea government be allowed to take part in the so-called south-north political conference. This allegation shows no difference from their past contention that they would not dialogue with the Republic of Korea.

The proposal of so-called "south-north political conference" is a proposition made stereotypedly as part of their deceptive peace offensive ever since they first suggested a "meeting of the representatives of all political parties and social organizations in Korea" in 1948. The proposed "south-north political conference" has nothing different in its contents from those of their past overtures such as "joint conference between south and north Korean political parties and social organizations" and "grand national conference."

As can be seen in the Chronological Listing of North Korea's Proposals for South-North Political Talks in the following, north Korea has been waging deceptive peace offensive against the south incessantly from the time of national liberation to the present.

In effect, deceptive peace offensive means a strategy of the international Communists, designed to mislead the other side through deceptive peaceful propositions when they feel the need for earning time for specific objectives or for keeping the other side off guarded, taking advantage of which they subvert the government of the other side by frontal attack and achieve communization.

We are well aware how all the communized countries around the world have been victimized by such strategy of deceptive peace offensive in the course of their communization. This is especially true of the communization of the Indochina Peninsula in April 1975.

In the course of the Paris peace talks, the North Vietnamese Communists had set forth numerous disguised offers on the excuse of war cessation, which were all in effect intended to expedite American military pullout as well as to undermine the South Vietnamese war efforts. In this way, they on the surface feigned to be peace-oriented, behind which they set in motion a series of wicked schemes such as agitation of anti-government forces by means of the so-called "united front strategy" and neutralization of the South Vietnamese government, all for ultimate communization of South Vietnam. Especially noteworthy is the fact that the North Vietnamese' two-faced propositions for peace talks and U.S. military withdrawal and reduced military capability, aimed in effect at weakening the military ability of the other side, represented the Communists' typical method of armed invasion behind lipservice to peace. This is especially true of the north Korean Communists who today offer talks for "disarmament" and "political conference" while rejecting the proposal for conclusion of a non-aggression agreement.

On the Korean peninsula today, deceptive peace offensive is being

staged by the Communists of north Korea ceaselessly.

On the eve of their unleashing of the fratricidal Korean War, the north Korean Communists, in the name of “Central Committee of the Democratic Front for Unification of the Fatherland,” issued a letter of appeal, proposing that “a meeting of the representatives of all political parties and social organizations be held to discuss and determine conditions and steps for peaceful unification.” They had gone so far as to propose that “the national assemblies of the south and north be merged unconditionally for national unification.” In this way, they propagandized as if they were eager to solve the issue of unification peacefully.

But it was only a few days later that the north Korean Communists committed the irrevocable national crime of provoking the Korean War for the purpose of bringing the whole Korean peninsula under their Communist domain.

Even after the 1953 Armistice Agreement, the north Korean Communists have been seeking an opportune time to swoop down upon the south by tenaciously launching deceptive peace offensive, especially in times of social unrest such as the April 19, 1960 Students’ Uprising.

The fact that Kim Il-sung, who once showed intention of armed invasion of south Korea in the wake of the Indochina debacle in 1975, called for a “south-north confederation system” in an interview with “El Moudjahid,” the Algerian government organ, on May 30 the same year, points to a good example of a disguised peace offensive.

For what purposes do the north Korean Communists, with the records of launching false peace offensive adroitly taking advantage of the situation of the time, bring up the time-worn idea of “south-north political conference” again at this time while rejecting conclusion of a south-north non-aggression agreement proposed by the Republic of Korea? The reason can be boiled down as follows:

First, it was a one-act-drama-like strategem introduced to cover up their belligerence when it became apparent that President Park’s justi-

fiable suggestion that he would not oppose U.S. military withdrawal if a south-north non-aggression agreement is signed.

Secondly, it represented merely another repetition of their stereotyped demand for “grand national conference,” “political conference” and “joint conference among political parties and social organizations” which all have already proved to be fictitious and deceptive, a wicked scheme only to mislead the judgement of the world community.

Thirdly, it was a strategem to mislead the world opinion by attempting to shift the responsibility for tensions on the Korean peninsula to the south Korean side by talking about “removal of the danger of nuclear war,” and also by feigning to cater to U.S. President Carter’s policy for peace on the Korean peninsula.

Lastly, it was a scheme to weaken the national capability through split of national opinions and dispersion of national strength, by touching off social unrest through fomentation of anti-state public opinions within the Republic of Korea.

As was seen in the foregoing, the north Koreans’ proposal for “south-north political conference” was, in essence, a mere repetition of their past deceptive proposition. The only difference was that some of the phrases and words of the latest overture were slightly modified or altered for the apparent purpose of misleading the public opinions at home and abroad.

The basic stand and policy of the Republic of Korea over the issue of independent peaceful unification of the Korean peninsula as well as the south-north dialogue are to systematically guarantee the consolidation of peace and peace system in the first place, which form the backbone of a series of peace-oriented policies announced by President Park over the past several years, such as the ideas on creation of the groundwork for peaceful unification, August 15, 1970; promotion of the south-north dialogue initiated with the proposal for the South-North Red Cross Conference on August 12, 1971; foreign policy for peace and unification, June 23,

1973; proposal for conclusion of a south-north non-aggression agreement, January 18, 1974; manifestation of the three basic principles for peaceful unification, August 15, 1974; non-opposition to U.S. military pullout on the condition of conclusion of a south-north non-aggression agreement, January 12, 1977.

The Republic of Korea hopes to create the basis for mutual trust and restore the national homogeneity by gradually expanding economic, social and cultural exchanges and cooperative relations, and thereby achieve peaceful unification of the nation.

South and north Korea are the two different entities with conflicting ideas and systems, which cannot be reconciled overnight. At the same time, the question of unification of Korea cannot be solved fundamentally without agreement between south and north Korea, the direct parties concerned.

It is against this background that the Republic of Korea urges time and again that the north Korean Communists abandon their negativism at an early date and return to the arena of dialogue based on national consciousness, normalizing the function of the South-North Coordinating Committee and the South-North Red Cross Conference, within the frame of which all problems pending between the south and north can be brought up, discussed and solved.

Chronological Listing of North Korea's Proposals for South-North Political Talks

- March 25, 1948—“26th Central Committee meeting of the Democratic Front for Unification of the Fatherland” proposes that a meeting of the representatives of all the Korean political parties and social organizations be held on April 14, 1948 in Pyongyang to oppose the U.N. resolution on the holding of general elections in south Korea alone, and to achieve unified independence of Korea.
- June 7, 1950—An expanded meeting of “Central Committee of the Democratic Front for Unification of the Fatherland” proposes a meeting of the representatives of political parties and social organizations of south and north Korea at Haeju or Kaesong on June 15–17, 1950 (on the condition of excluding leaders of the south Korean government) to determine all procedures necessary for peaceful unification.
- October 30, 1954—Eighth session of the “First Supreme People’s Council” calls for a joint meeting between the “Supreme People’s Council” and the south Korean National Assembly in *Pyongyang or Seoul within 1954 for solution of the issue of national unification.*
- March 7, 1955—Eighteenth session of “Central Committee of the Demoratic Front” asserts in a statement that the United States and south Korea should shoulder all responsibility for the failure to hold a south-north political conference as well as for the delay in achieving national unification, and that the path leading to a south-north political conference will not be closed forever merely because of south Korean authorities’ boycott.
- August 15, 1955—In an address on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of national liberation, Kim Il-sung proposes a meeting of the representatives of south and north Korean political parties and social organizations to discuss conclusion of an agreement on non-use of arms between the south and north.
- April 21, 1960—North Korea proposes a joint conference of all political parties and social organizations of south and north Korea for solution of the unification issue.
- November 24, 1960—Choi Won-taek, chairman of the “Supreme People’s Council” proposes a south-north conference at Panmunjom or Pyongyang.

- June 20, 1962—Eleventh session of “Second Supreme People’s Council” proposes a south-north conference for narrowing difference over the issue of the nation’s future.
- September 8, 1966—In an address made on the occasion of the 15th anniversary of the founding of the north Korean regime, Choi Yong-kon calls for a south-north conference and joint efforts between the south and north.
- September 8, 1966—Kim Kwang-hyup, deputy premier, proposes a joint conference between all political parties and social organizations or any other form of joint south-north conference for discussion of the issue of national unification.
- October 8, 1969—North Korea’s memorandum submitted to the 24th United Nations General Assembly *calls for a south-north conference.*
- April 12, 1971—At 5th session of the “Fourth Supreme People’s Council,” Huh Dam, foreign minister, proposes a political conference between all south and north Korean political parties, social organizations and people’s delegates to discuss the north’s unification formula.
- August 6, 1971—In an address made at a Pyongyang rally welcoming the visit of Sihanouk, Kim Il-sung expresses willingness to meet any time with individual persons of any political party and social organization of south Korea including the Democratic Republican Party.
- August 19, 1972—Political parties and social organizations of north Korea propose joint meetings with their south Korean counterparts.
- April 5, 1973—Second session of the “Fifth Supreme People’s Council” proposes a *disarmament for alleviation of tensions and removal of the state of military confrontation.*
- April 16, 1973—In an address at a rally welcoming the visit of Sihanouk, Kim Il-sung proposes a south-north political conference between the representatives of all the political parties and social organizations.
- June 23, 1973—In an address at a rally welcoming the visit of Husak, Kim Il-sung proposes a grand national conference among people of all strata, political parties *and social organizations.*
- July 24, 1973—Fifty-ninth expanded session of the “Front for National Unification” proposes to the “people, political parties and social organizations of south Korea” that a “grand national conference” be held in Pyongyang for solution of the issue of national unification.
- July 3, 1975—Kim Young-joo, Pyongyang-side co-chariman of the South-North

Coordinating Committee, issues a statement on the occasion of the third anniversary of the issuance of the South-North Joint Communiqué, demanding immediate convocation of a south-north political conference.

July 3, 1976—The “Front for National Unification” proposes a south-north political conference, in a statement issued on the occasion of the fourth anniversary of the issuance of the South-North Joint Communiqué.

January 9, 1977—In a speech at a report session marking the fifth anniversary of publication of Kim Il-sung works, Chung Chun-ki asserts that every person, aspiring for national unification, should take part in efforts to push through a south-north political conference.

January 25, 1977—A joint session of the north Korean political parties and social organizations proposes a south-north political conference among the representatives of people of all strata as well as all political parties and social organizations of south and north Korea.

Pro-Pyongyang Koreans in Japan

Homeland Visits by Chochongryon-Affiliated Compartriots in Japan

Amidst the mixed feelings of deep emotion and repentance, long columns of home-longing people shuttled forth and back on the “Hanshik Day” of this year along the bridge of humanitarianism laid in 1975 in observance of the 30th anniversary of national liberation.

Despite various obstructive maneuvers such as intimidation and threats mounted by Chochongryon, a pro-Pyongyang Korean residents’ group in Japan, some 1,800 Korean residents in Japan associated with Chochongryon flew into their homeland in six groups from March 31 through April 10 to recover their lost home towns and observe the “Hanshik Day” (April 6) together with their long-separated family members and relatives.

This brings to some 13,000 the number of Chochongryon-affiliated Korean residents in Japan who have been to their homeland after the government of the Republic of Korea took the dramatic, humanitarian step to enable Chochongryon-affiliated residents to bolt from their dark lives of fraud in favor of decent ones, which began to be implemented on the “Chusok Holiday” of 1975.

Especially noteworthy was the fact that among the recent “Hanshik Day” visitors were a number of second-generation Korean residents who wanted to personally compare what they were told about their homeland by earlier visitors with what was described in Chochongryon propaganda.

The visitors invariably repent in tears for the past lives they were forced to lead, taken in by Chochongryon’s deceptive propaganda, while the youthful second-generation residents, deeply moved by the real image of their fatherland, resolved to dedicate themselves to the fatherland’s future.

During their stay in the homeland, they toured Seoul and Pusan, paid homage to the National Cemetery at Tongjak-dong and the Hyun-chungsa Shrine near Asan, and observed such major industrial sites as the Pohang Iron & Steel Co., Hyundai Shipyard and Hyundai Motor.

The visitors from Japan also did commemorative tree-planting and observed a joint internment of remains at the "Home-Comer's Hill" before they proceeded to their respective home towns for visits to their ancestral tombs and reunion with their family members and relatives.

Cruel Repatriation of Residents to North Korea

About 100,000 Korean residents in Japan have been repatriated to the dark land of north Korea to date since such repatriation began on November 12, 1959 under the cloak of choice of residence.

North Korea has been forcibly repatriating innocent Korean compatriots in Japan through seduction, cheating or threats, using the Chochongryon organization as its front man, as a means of solving its acute manpower shortage as well as introducing goods in the form of bringing in family baggages for moving families.

Despite adroit cheating by Chochongryon, a would-be repatriate, Miss Kim Mi-hye, 26, who was to board a repatriation ship at the urging by her father, made a dramatic escape from a joint boarding house on the night of March 31, the eve of her planned departure.

Miss Kim, together with her father, Mr. Kim Yak-han, 66, was scheduled to be repatriated to north Korea aboard the north Korean ship, Mankyongbong-ho, which sailed into Niikata and was to leave there at 5 p.m. April 1. But she managed to run away from the Kohan Hotel which was used as the joint boarding house for would-be repatriates at around 11 p.m. March 31, leaving behind her father. She could leave the



Miss Kim Mi-hye

hotel telling a lie to Chochongryon guards that she wanted to take fish-rice out for the last time in Japan.

While meeting with the Japanese press at 10 a.m. April 2, Miss Kim said she did not know she was going to be forcibly repatriated until she was ordered into the boarding house. This remark shed light on the falsehood of Chochongryon's allegation that repatriation is a humanitarian measure implemented with voluntary individual participation.

Miss Kim appealed for her protection, expressing the fear that Chochongryon, shocked over her escape, may retaliate against her. She said that the lodging house was in a warlike atmosphere with the inmates in the groups of four to five placed under rigid surveillance by Chochongryon operatives.

She further said in the press conference that because she had become acquainted only with Chochongryon affiliates in the past, she didn't know that so many people have been to the Republic of Korea as visitors to their ancestral tombs, adding that she would like to observe the real image of the fatherland.

According to her hope, Miss Kim arrived in Seoul on April 8 for the first time in her life through the good offices of Korean community leaders in Japan, escorted by Mr. Huh In-oh, 59, a friend of her father's, who has been looking after her since her escape.

“Regaining of Freedom It’s too Good to be True”

Miss Kim Mi-hye who regained freedom when she narrowly escaped from planned repatriation to north Korea, leaving behind her beloved father, wrote a note describing the situation that led her to decide on repatriation as well as to escape. The note, contributed to the daily Hankook Ilbo, is presented here to help readers assess even a fragment of the cruelty of the forced repatriation being enforced by Chochongryon—Editor—

Why I, who was born in Japan and deserted from my Japanese mother when I was three, should have to go to north Korea?

My family situation is very complicated. I now feel ashamed of myself who once resolved to go to north Korea, not knowing of the situation of south and north Korea. But, it was a miracle that I could escape shortly before boarding a repatriation ship.

I was raised by my father after my Japanese mother divorced him when I was three years old. I attended a Japanese elementary school and studied for one year at a Chochongryon-operated middle school located near Tachikawa, Tokyo. I was perplexed when I was taught “long live Kim Il-sung” as soon as I enrolled into the school.

My father was not naturalized, but he registered me in the birth register of my mother so that I can live conveniently in Japan. So I came to have my Japanese name, Mieko Aoki.

Although my father affiliated himself with Chochongryon, he did not engage in any particular political activities. After dropping out of a Japanese high school, I attended a night-time high school, upon graduation from which I found a job at the Akishima Department Store in Tokyo.

It was in October last year that my father resolved to go to north Korea. At that time, he couldn't do manual works properly due to his deteriorating health caused by his high blood pressure.

In January this year, the social section chief of Chochongryon's Tachikawa Branch and other Chochongryon leaders came to us to persuade our repatriation to north Korea, saying that in north Korea we can live comfortably without working.

Taken in by such sugar-coated promise, my father wanted me to go to north Korea together with him, saying that if I do not go, he will not go there alone. I who lived together with my father from my girlhood, decided to go to north Korea out of my sympathy for him.

Since I knew nothing about north Korea except for fragmental knowledge, I discussed my possible repatriation with three of my Korean friends. Chochongryon leaders persuaded me that since population of north Korea is small, I would be able to live properly even without any particular skill. But the friends tried to dissuade me, saying that they would surely force me to work forced labor in north Korea due to manpower shortage there.

I, who am irresolute, thought that even if I go through paper works for repatriation, I could retract it whenever I wanted. Ten days before, I completed required paper works at the Foreigners' Section of the Tokyo City Hall. Upon completion of the paper works, Chochongryon handed to us more than ¥1 million in cash, with which my father bought a color television set, a black-white television set and 16 wrist watches. We wanted to sell one of the two T.V. sets while keeping the other. As to the watches, we planned to sell them in north Korea. Chochongryon leaders advised us to take as much daily necessities as possible with us because "goods are scarce there."

When our would-be repatriates got together at the Midaka Station of Tokyo on 29th of last month, surveillance of us was so severe that I felt horror. The Chochongryon side collected ¥60,000 each from us despite

the fact that the express train charge from Ueno, Tokyo to Niikata is ¥4,000 and hotel charge is no more than ¥15,000. I demanded expense specifications. But this only led to severer surveillance of me.

At about 5 p.m. 29th, we arrived at Niikata and checked in at the Kohan Hotel where I had to part from my father because they allotted separate rooms for males and females. They seized all of our jewels, and didn't allow us to make telephone conversations with persons outside. Most of the repatriates seemed resigned, obeying what they were told to do.

It was from this time that the anxiety arose that "in view of the harsh surveillance even here in Niikata, a Japanese town, they would probably put me on forced labor."

When I came across my father on corridor, I whispered him "I cannot go." My father pleaded in tears with me for my obedience, saying if I run away, it would make his position very embarrassing.

Surveillance became more severe as time passed by. Three guards were posted at the front entrance, three on every story and another two at the rear gate. As I was placed under harsher surveillance than other repatriates probably because of my earlier demand for expense specifications, I grew furious, and told the social section chief of the Tachikawa Branch that "if your people behave this way, I will make your position very embarrassing." He simply stared me.

As I was seeking a chance to escape, there took place a final farewell party at each room beginning 9 p.m. 31st. Believing that this would be the opportune time to run away, I asked a female hotel employee aged about 37 to "fetch a taxi for me for a brief walk outside." The employee told me to wait for about 15 minutes. I asked her to see to it that the taxi be parked just outside the rear gate with the engine on. While I was waiting for the taxi, I feigned composure as I watched television. As soon as I heard the sound of car engine in the rear, I quietly slipped out of the room. Not to draw any suspicion from any one, I wore a summer shirts, blue-gene skirt

and hotel slippers on.

After getting in taxi, I asked the driver to run toward any direction. After a while, I discovered a public telephone booth and got off the taxi. There, I telephoned Mr. Huh In-oh, one of the friends of my father, who lives in Tokyo. Mr. Huh advised me to go to the home of Mr. Park Su-chong, former head of Mindan, a pro-Seoul Korean residents' association.

I am now staying at Mr. Park's. I am really happy being able to stay in Japan continuously. If I were repatriated to north Korea, I must have been put to forced labor. Now, in this free Japan, I can do everything at my own will without moaning under forced labor.

But, one thing that keeps worrying me is the safety of my father who looked after me from the years of my infancy. I had sleepless nights worrying about the sufferings my father would certainly undergo in north Korea.

Chochongryon Desperate at Checking Homeland Visits by Youthful Residents

Alarmed by a sharply rising number of Chochongryon-affiliated Korean residents in Japan, especially those youthful second-generation residents, participating in the "homeland visit" program which is spreading like a prairie fire in the Korean communities all over Japan, Chochongryon resorts to inhumane methods such as threat, detention and kidnapping in a desperate effort to brake the growingly popular homeland-bound trend.

Chochongryon, already censured for abducting a 14-year-old girl, Kang Young-hui, last September, again recently kidnapped Miss Kim Haeng-kang, 19, of Niikata, who was about to visit the homeland on the "Hanshik Day" (April 6) together with her father, Mr. Kim



Miss Kim Haeng-kang.

Seung-yol, 52, formerly vice chairman of Niikata Chapter of Chochongryon's Society of Korean Businessmen, who now serves as chairman of Niikata Homeland Visit Promotion Committee.

Miss Kim, expectant of observing the real image of her fatherland and meeting her grandmother, went shopping around 5 p.m. March 31 to prepare for her departure the following day, when she was forcibly taken to the suburbs of Tokyo, about 350km from her home, by three Chochongryon operatives, all her class-

mates of Mitoshi Chosun High School in Ibara Prefecture, from which they graduated last March.

Holding her in captivity at the home of one of the operatives, the Chochongryon abductors told her not to visit south Korea, saying threateningly that if she does, her family will be in a serious trouble. The kidnappers, however, had to set her free two days later after the kidnapping was reported in the press.

Undaunted by the abduction and threats, Miss Kim pushed her planned visit, arriving in the homeland on the afternoon of April 4, escorted by Mr. Lee Won-se, 69, head of Niikata Chapter of Mindan, pro-Seoul Korean Residents' Association in Japan. Together with her father who flew to Seoul two days earlier, she proceeded to her home town near Kosong, Kyongsang-namdo to be greeted by her grandmother whom she wished to see so much.

“Fatherland Cosy Like Grandma’s Bosom”

We shall hear one of the second-generation residents in Japan who have been to the homeland, expose the cruelty employed by Chochongryon in its obstructive maneuvering against the “homeland visit” program. The following is a note by Miss Kim Haeng-kang describing her 48-hour horrible captivity. The note originally appeared in the daily Kyunghyang Shinmoon. —Editor—

Although I was born and grew up in Japan, I always thought of my homeland and wished to meet my grandmother who lives in the homeland alone.

Learning that my father would visit the fatherland as a member of the group of “Hanshik Day” visitors, I badgered my father to take me with him for a few hours before he finally okeyed. At that night, I could not sleep because of joy.

As I spread out the map of Korea and pinpointed the place where my grandmother (Mrs. Kim Yu-sun, 80, of Paemun-ri, Hwihwa-myon, Kosong-kun, Kyongsang-namdo) lives, I told my two brothers—Ki-young, 20, and Ki-hong, 15—and mother that the father would take me to the homeland. We all shared the joy.

The father said to us that he would take the two brothers also to the homeland during their vacation or after they finished their schooling, saying he is going to take me first because I already finished school.

At about 5 p.m. 31st of the preceding month, one day before the departure, I left my home for a nearby department store to buy a small gift for my grandmother. As soon as I was out, I was surrounded by three male classmates of Chosun High School at Mitoshi, Ibara Prefecture,

together with whom I graduated from the high school last March. They told me they had something to tell me, and suggested that we go to a nearby tea room.

I said I don't want to, knowing instinctively that they are trying to stop me going to south Korea. I have known that my family has been the target of Chochongryon operatives: my father, who was once vice chairman of the Niikata Branch of Chochongryon businessmen's club, is now working as chairman of the Homeland Visit Promotion Committee in Niikata Prefecture, while my mother helps the work of Mindan after bolting from the Women's League of Chochongryon.

But, they did not let me go. At the tea room, I hastily telephoned my home. With one of the classmates standing guard near me, I told my mother over the phone that "I won't be able to go to south Korea." When my mother, sensing the trouble, asked me where I am, the nearby man snatched the telephone receiver.

Some minutes later, one of the classmates said they would set me free after I go together with them to Niice by train for some more talks. At about 9 p.m., I was forcibly taken to a train. But they didn't get off at Niice, ride to which takes only about 10 minutes. We rode all the night. The place where we got off at about 6 a.m. the following morning was Tochiki north of Tokyo, about 350km away from my home.

Joined by now by three other classmates in the town, they took me to the home of one their friends, where they kept me in close watch.

During my captivity beginning that day, I was told time and again "not to go to south Korea . . . if you don't listen to us, your family will be in trouble." Another tedious day of my captivity passed.

Seizing the opportunity of a little slackened guard in the following morning, I telephoned home. But, caught by a guard at the very minute the telephone was received, all I could say was that I was going to stay with some of my friends until that night. They snatched the receiver and threw it away.

A while later, however, they came to me saying that information about my captivity had leaked. “We will release you, but do not go to south Korea, and don’t say that you were abducted by us, just say you stayed at the home of one of your friends.” This was the condition attached to my release. At about 8 a.m. that morning, I was let go.

I took a Niikata-bound train alone and arrived home at 4 p.m. I threw myself into the arms of my anxious mother and wept endlessly. I immediately contacted Lee Won-se, 69, head of Mindan Niikata Chapter, and flew to the homeland on my father’s heels.

I finally set foot on the soil of my fatherland. My father who visited the homeland ahead of me, met me at the airport. I sighed a sigh of relief as if I awoke from a nightmare. The scenes of the homeland, and the peaceful sight of rural villages seen along expressways! I really thought I was lucky to be able to come. The Republic of Korea, my fatherland, was as cosy as the bosom of my grandmother.

Upon my return home in Japan, I will boast the fatherland and see to it that my abductors would awaken from their nightmare, with the same enthusiasm as the one shown by my brethren in the homeland in their worry about and care of me.

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International Cultural Society of Korea

I. P. O. Box 4161

Seoul, Korea

No. 013


July, 1977

South-North Dialogue in Korea

**International Cultural Society of Korea
Seoul, Korea**

South-North Dialogue in Korea

- South-North Coordinating Committee
- South-North Red Cross Conference




Conference Hall for South-North Dialogue


This is a hall built exclusively for conferences between Seoul and Pyongyang delegations to the south-north dialogue. The conference hall, symbol of the national aspiration for, and will to, peaceful unification of the fatherland, was opened to the public for the first time on the occasion of the fifth anniversary of the issuance of the South-North Joint Communiqué of July 4, 1972.

Begun to be built on February 15, 1973 with a cost of 385 million won (roughly \$770,000), the hall was dedicated on September 25, 1973, one month after the north Korean side announced its unilateral suspension of the dialogue. With the deadlock, the conference hall remains unused for nearly four years.

The building, in three stories with a combined floor space of about 2,600 square meters, comprises two conference rooms—one for the South-North Coordinating Committee and the other for the South-North Red Cross Conference, a press room and a communications room.



SNCC Conference Room



SNRCC Conference Room

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Part One

Will to Peaceful Unification

“Conclusion of South-North Non-Aggression Agreement Urged”

—North Korea Asked to Give up Aggressive Schemes
and Show Good Faith toward Dialogue—

Foreign Minister Park Tong-jin on June 23, 1977 issued a statement on the fourth anniversary of the Special Statement Regarding Foreign Policy for Peace and Unification of 1973, again urging the north Korean Communists to “consider seriously the conclusion of a mutual non-aggression agreement we have proposed.” In the statement, Minister Park also emphasized that north Korea should make efforts for the establishment of a durable peace which is essential to the happiness and safety of the whole Korean people, while casting away its unrealistic fantasy and wishful thinking on unification by violence.

The full text of the statement by Foreign Minister Park on the occasion of the fourth anniversary of the Special Statement Regarding Foreign Policy for Peace and Unification is as follows. —Ed.

Four years ago today, President Park Chung Hee, upon a careful appraisal of the situations surrounding the Korean peninsula, issued the June 23rd Special statement regarding foreign policy for peace and unification as the most realistic approach to our long-cherished national aspiration of the peaceful unification of our fatherland.

This Special Statement made clear the basic position of our Government concerning the relationship between the South and North of Korea and stressed the urgent need to establish a lasting peace on the Korean peninsula for peaceful unification through South-North dialogue.

As is now widely known, the Government of the Republic of Korea, in the spirit of the Special Statement, has endeavored for the past se-

veral years to create conditions for the relaxation of tension on the Korean peninsula and for unification by peaceful means. In consequence, it is felt that the comprehension of and support for the positions of our Government continue to grow in the international community for their reasonableness. Furthermore, the Republic of Korea is rapidly gaining its rightful recognition internationally through its remarkable economic development, growing national strength and peace-oriented diplomacy. In contrast, North Korea, with its tremendous foreign debts, has become unprecedentedly isolated in every field of international relations. Such a trend is amply illustrated by a series of recent diplomatic failures which have befallen North Korea in Latin America and the Middle East.

The danger of recurrence of war in the Korean peninsula arising from a possible miscalculation by North Korea remains as threatening as ever. The Republic of Korea and North Korea have become two heterogeneous entities, differing in their respective ideologies and systems and these cannot be assimilated all at once, due to three decades of division. Despite our sincere and incessant efforts for the settlement of the unification problem, there has been no substantial progress in the South-North dialogue based on the July 4, 1972 Joint Communique because of its unilateral suspension by North Korea. It is evident that the position of our Government in seeking settlement of Korean unification by solving easier and more practical problems first is widely supported as a very wise approach. The rigidly intransigent attitude of North Korea is in no way conducive to the solution of the outstanding problems.

Moreover, it is well recognized in the international community that the Republic of Korea, with its peace-oriented diplomacy, not only maintains an average GNP growth rate of over 10 percent per annum but is also advancing steadily toward stability and prosperity by forming a wide network of trade with more than 130 countries in Asia, Africa, the Middle East, Latin America and Western Europe.

Therefore, North Korea should face up to the current situation surrounding the Korean peninsula and recognize that its wild ambition to

unify the country by violence and revolution is nothing but a day dream. North Korea should also open its eyes to the stark fact that it is being left further behind the Republic of Korea day by day in national strength and potential, and frankly realize that its inflexible and demagogic diplomatic posture is alienating even the communist and nonaligned countries. North Korea should demonstrate its sincerity for resumption of calm dialogue with the Republic of Korea.

Inasmuch as no political ideology, whatever it is, can turn its back on the destiny of a people, North Korea should make efforts for the establishment of a durable peace which is essential to the happiness and safety of the whole Korean people, while casting away its unrealistic fantasy and wishful thinking on unification by violence. We urge North Korea not to indulge merely in absurd political propaganda but to consider seriously the conclusion of a mutual non-aggression agreement which we have proposed as the primary step toward the establishment of a durable peace.

It is a harsh reality that the Republic of Korea and North Korea, being the very parties directly concerned, are the only ones who can maintain peace on the Korean peninsula and achieve the unification of Korea. It is also a matter of common sense that no substantial progress for peaceful unification can be expected until the tension between South and North Korea is relaxed and mutual trust is fully restored. Moreover, if the withdrawal of the U.S. ground troops stationed in Korea were to increase the chances for a second Korean War breaking out, this would be a national tragedy. In this spirit, I wish to reiterate today to North Korea the proposals contained in President Park's June 23rd, 1972, Special Foreign Policy Statement: mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs, abstention from aggression against each other, resumption of the South-North dialogue for unification, admission to the United Nations, and the open door principle. At the same time, I reaffirm that our Government will continue to promote its realistic foreign policy for peace in accordance with the above Statement and further strengthen its con-

structive efforts for expansion of trade and international cooperation that have already resulted in outstanding achievements.

Part Two

South-North Dialogue

South-North Coordinating Committee:

**Soul Side Names Dr. Min Kwan-shik as
Acting Co-Chairman**

The Seoul side of the South-North Coordinating Committee on May 9, 1977 announced the appointment of Dr. Min Kwan-shik as vice co-chairman and concurrently acting co-chairman of the Seoul side of the South-North Coordinating Committee. Dr. Min succeeded the late Chang Key-young who died of a heart attack on last April 11. New Vice Co-chairman Min acts as the Seoul side Co-chairman of the South-North Coordinating Committee.

Dr. Min, born in 1918, graduated from Kyodo University of Japan in 1942, and received a doctorate in law from Kyodo University in 1963 and an honorary doctorate in political science from Findlay University of the United States in 1974. Entering politics, Dr. Min had been elected a National Assemblyman in four consecutive terms beginning 1953. He also contributed much to development of the nation's sports programs during his service as chairman of the Korean Amateur Sports Association and concurrently chairman of the Korean Olympic Committee from 1964 to 1971. In 1971, Dr. Min was appointed as Minister of Education, a post which he held until 1974.

Dr. Min authored a number of books which included "Legislative Process in United States," "Travelogue on America—How do they live so well?," "Reform and Path of Education in Korea," "A Dropout," "An Endless Hill" and "A Propout's Writing and Painting."

“Call for Early Resumption of South-North Dialogue Reiterated”

**—Acceptance of Non-Aggression Agreement and Reopening
of Direct Seoul-Pyongyang Line also Urged—**

The Seoul side of the South-North Coordinating Committee issued a statement on July 4, 1977 on the occasion of the fifth anniversary of the issuance of the South-North Joint Communiqué of 1972, urging the Pyongyang side again to agree to 1) discussion of various issues conducive to the consolidation of peace on the Korean peninsula, such as steps to promote the conclusion of a mutual non-aggression agreement, 2) early resumption of the South-North Coordinating Committee, and 3) early reopening of the direct south-north telephone line.

The following is the full text of the statement by the Seoul side of the South-North Coordinating Committee:—Ed.

Today we observe the fifth anniversary of the issuance of the South-North Joint Communiqué amidst the failure, regrettably, to normalize as yet the operation of the South-North Coordinating Committee, which has been suspended by the north Korean side.

It was four years ago that the north Korean side unilaterally suspended the operation of the South-North Coordinating Committee. And, two years have already passed since it put off indefinitely for no justifiable reason even the Vice Co-Chairmen’s Meeting at Panmunjom designed to normalize the South-North Coordinating Committee.

In conformity with the 50 million compatriots’ aspirations to alleviate tensions on the Korean peninsula and promote peaceful unification, we, with sincerity and patience, have urged the north Korean side time and again to return to the basic spirit of the South-North Joint Communiqué and to respond affirmatively to resumption of the dialogue.

Nevertheless, the north Korean side has not only continued to reject our side's justifiable urgings, but has also endlessly perpetrated various provocative acts, building up a state of tension between the south and north. In August 1976, moreover, it severed completely even the liaison channel existing between the two sides by cutting off the direct south-north telephone line.

"To accelerate peaceful unification of the fatherland by removing the misunderstandings and mistrust and mitigating tensions," is the basic spirit of the South-North Coordinating Committee agreed upon between the two sides, and is also the invariable aspiration of the 50 million compatriots.

The most pressing task for the realization of peaceful unification of the fatherland is to remove misunderstanding and mistrust, mitigate tensions between the south and north, and consolidate peace, by normalizing the suspended south-north dialogue at an early date.

In order to consolidate peace between the south and north, the north Korean side should give up reckless schemes for achieving unification under communism, respond affirmatively to the call to open both societies to each other, and agree to the conclusion of a non-aggression agreement calling basically for non-interference, non-aggression and the maintenance of the validity of the Armistice Agreement.

As we proposed early this year, we once again wish to urge the Pyongyang side on the occasion of the fifth anniversary of the issuance of the South-North Joint Communiqué, to respond affirmatively to the following propositions:

First, we again propose discussion of various issues conducive to the consolidation of peace on the Korean peninsula, such as steps to promote the conclusion of a mutual non-aggression agreement.

Second, to this end, we again urge early resumption of the South-North Coordinating Committee.

Third, we again urge an early reopening of the direct south-north telephone line which remains closed after being cut off by the Pyongyang side in August last year.

We hope that the north Korean side will make a wiser judgement of the situation at home and abroad and affirmatively respond to our renewed urging in the attitude of caring for the nation's future and prosperity.

South-North Red Cross Conference:

**“Let Us Hold Full-dress Red Cross Meeting at Panmunjom”
—ROKNRC Urges Early Resumption of Full-dress Meeting—**

The 22nd working-level meeting of the South-North Red Cross Conference was held at the conference room of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission at Panmunjom at 10 a.m. April 28, 1977.

At the meeting which lasted until 12:00 p.m., the delegation of the Republic of Korea National Red Cross proposed to the north Korean Red Cross side that 1) the eighth full-dress meeting of the South-North Red Cross Conference be held at Panmunjom at an early date, and 2) the operation of the direct south-north telephone line between Seoul and Pyongyang which remains closed since August last year be normalized.

However, the north Korean Red Cross delegates showed no response to such propositions set forth by the Republic of Korea National Red Cross side and instead persisted in stereotyped political slander and defamation demanding immediate and unconditional release of anti-state criminals, prompt withdrawal of American forces from Korea, and repeal of the June 23 Special Foreign Policy.

Both sides decided to hold the next 23rd working-level meeting on July 15.

The following is the text of a speech made by Kim Yeon-choo, alternate chief delegate of the Republic of Korea National Red Cross, at the 22nd working-level meeting. —Ed.

At the preceding 21st working-level meeting, held for the first time since the turn of the year, the delegation of the Republic of Korea National Red Cross made the following proposals with a view to renewing progress in this deadlocked conference and thereby giving to the 10 million dispersed family members the joy of reunion at an early date. The proposals were:

First, that agenda topic No. 1 of the full-dress meetings, “the question of tracing, and notifying thereof, the whereabouts and fate of members of dispersed families, and relatives, in the south and north,” be discussed at an early date without any preconditions. If unconditional and early debate of agenda topic No. 1 of the full-dress meetings cannot be accepted affirmatively, the question of carrying out “the mutual exchange of groups of visitors to ancestral tombs between dispersed families in the south and north” and the “aged parents program” in the first place as pilot projects should be discussed.

Second, as to the issue of resuming the full-dress meetings, “holding of the eighth full-dress meeting in Seoul” as already agreed upon between the two sides should be decided at an early date. If your side adamantly rejects the holding of the Seoul meeting, the meeting can be held at Panmunjom or some other third mutually acceptable place, taking into account your side’s position.

As the Republic of Korea National Red Cross delegation has been urging from the time of the full-dress meetings, the five agenda topics agreed on between the two sides should naturally be discussed and solved one by one, beginning with topic No. 1.

Inasmuch as your side has refused any substantial debate of agenda topic No. 1 from March 1973 to the present, our delegation has proposed the “aged parents’ project,” “mutual exchange of groups of visitors to ancestral tombs” and “exchange of family pictures” as pilot projects which can expedite a breakthrough in the discussion of agenda topics.

The purport of these proposals made by the delegation of the Republic of Korea National Red Cross was that if the situation of your side cannot allow substantial debate of agenda topic No. 1 as yet, then pilot projects to which the dispersed family members themselves aspire, and which can be executed easily, should be discussed and settled first, thereby preparing a breakthrough in the stalemated talks.

Holding of the full-dress meetings in Seoul and Pyongyang by turn

is a matter of mutual agreement. Moreover, shortly after adjournment of the seventh full-dress meeting held in Pyongyang, we promised each other to hold the eighth full-dress meeting in Seoul.

However, the projected full-dress meeting has failed to take place since July 1973 to date because your side did not honor the agreed matter.

In due course, our delegation urged the holding of the full-dress meeting in Seoul, suggesting a time for the meeting on no fewer than five occasions. We have gone so far as to ask your side to determine the time of the meeting many times. But your side did not respond. Under the circumstances, the Republic of Korea National Red Cross delegation suggested that if your side cannot agree to the convening of the eighth full-dress meeting that should naturally be held in Seoul, the full-dress meeting could be held at Panmunjom or a third place on which both sides can agree, pending the time when your side's situation permits a Seoul meeting.

At the same time, our delegation urged early restoration of the direct south-north telephone line between Seoul and Pyongyang and the function of the Panmunjom Liaison Office, whose normal operation has been suspended since the end of August last year.

These proposals of the delegation of the Republic of Korea National Red Cross are not only in accord with the wishes of the dispersed family members, and matters of agreement reached between the two sides, but also represent broad, realistic propositions made even with your side's situation taken into consideration.

Further, these constitute a manifestation of the brotherly love with which our side strives to achieve the joy of reunion for the families dispersed in the south and north by all means, and also part of our side's incessant and sincere efforts to contribute to preparation of the foundation for peaceful unification of the fatherland by normalizing our stalemated dialogue.

North Korean Red Cross delegates!

Since the Republic of Korea National Red Cross proposed the campaign for search for separated families in the south and north in August 1971, our side has endeavored with zeal and sincerity to realize the humanitarian program designed to link the severed affections of blood relatives.

These humanitarian efforts of the Republic of Korea National Red Cross have been greatly supported and acclaimed in the world community, resulting in various achievements at many places around the world in reality.

Even those compatriots residing far away in the Soviet Union, China and East European Communist countries placate their grief over family dispersion through free exchange of correspondence with their family members and relatives in the homeland. And compatriots in Japan associated with Chochongryon, a pro-Pyongyang Korean residents' group in Japan, who in the past could not visit their families and home towns although they were so near, now travel to their homeland freely to share the affection of blood relatives.

On "Hanshik Day" this year alone, as many as 1,800 Chochongryon-affiliated brethren in Japan came to us to be embraced in the warm bosom of the fatherland and to repent for their past days spent idly. Among these visitors were some persons who brought the remains of their parents with them and buried them at the "Garden of Home-Longing" in accordance with their parents' will that they wished to be buried in the soil of the fatherland.

Now, the number of the Chochongryon-linked compatriots who have been to the fatherland has exceeded 12,000. And it is not only the Chochongryon-affiliated brethren who are visiting the fatherland now. As has been well known through press reports, one of our compatriots residing in Norilsk in the Soviet Union, Mr. Chang Chon-tu, who was born on Cheju-do, set his feet on his homeland last February 14 via Japan after leaving Moscow by Aeroflot last January 30 with a Russian passport.

Mr. Chang Chon-tu, who visited the fatherland for the first time in 38 years, stayed for 47 days, sharing the emotional joy of reunion with his mother, brothers, a daughter and relatives.

The 84-year-old mother of Mr. Chang, who had given up her son as dead, held him tightly in her arms and burst into tears, saying "I have nothing to regret even if I did now." The son in his late 50's apologized for his past undutifulness as he wept in the arms of his mother.

In addition, Chinese seamen in distress were warmly looked after in the Republic of Korea before they were repatriated, while our seamen adrift on the sea could return home safely thanks to rescue by China.

In the recent earthquake in Romania, relief funds and goods from the Korean people were donated with their best wishes. Romania expressed its appreciation through the International League of Red Cross.

The free visits to the fatherland by compatriots in Japan affiliated with Chochongryon, who have different thoughts and ideas from ours, indicate that no thoughts or ideas can ever block the flow of the affection of blood relatives. Also, the recent visit from Moscow by Mr. Chang Chon-tu, a compatriot in the Soviet Union, evidences that any difference in systems political environmental conditions cannot separate the affection of blood relatives.

Despite the fact that information about families can be exchanged everywhere around the world, and Red Cross humanitarian programs are carried out actively with any country of the world, the only place where people are denied the knowledge of even the fate of their parents and brothers, is not a remote place but south and north Korea, the same land where the same people, not strangers, reside.

The cause of this national misfortune lies in the fact that your side continuously disregards the loftiness of humanitarianism, brotherly love and the affection of blood relatives to date, nearly six full years after the Red Cross talks began.

Beginning with the third full-dress meeting when the substantial discussion of agenda topics started, your side has stalemated the talks by attaching to the debate of agreed topics undue political prerequisites, such as the so-called "statutory conditions and social atmosphere." Moreover, from the seventh full-dress meeting on, your side has rejected the holding of the full-dress meeting for absurd reason of the "atmosphere of Seoul."

And throughout the 20 or so rounds of working-level meetings, your side has undermined the conference atmosphere by bringing up political and military issues that have nothing to do with the Red Cross conference, and even defaming and slandering the other side in the talks, without showing any good faith in the discussion of agenda topics or in the issue of resuming the full-dress meetings.

Red Cross humanitarian programs, however, can be undertaken transcending differences in political systems and thoughts, as can be seen in the free visits to the homeland by Chochongryon-affiliated compatriots in Japan and the brethren in the Soviet Union, as well as in the humanitarian contacts made with China and Romania. It is through such contacts at the humanitarian level that a friendly atmosphere of mutual trust can be promoted and the differences in systems and ideas can be removed.

The deepening confrontation and heightening tensions that characterize today's south-north relations are due to the very attitude of your side which does not strive to settle at an early date the issue of dispersed families which can be easily solved, transcending differences in ideas and systems.

If one disputes or denounces the other's political or social system, born of mutually differing thoughts and ideas, it would only add to the confrontation. On the contrary, if they settle humanitarian issues steadily, transcending differences in ideas and systems, and thereby broaden the avenue of dialogue and exchanges, a confrontation like the one we have today would be removed, while an atmosphere can be prepared for national unity with which the nation's homogeneity can be restored.

The attitude your side has maintained to date since the initiation of

the conference is that your side sets forth undue excuses, namely, “difficulties ahead of the talks,” insisting that your side cannot go along with humanitarian programs unless such protests are met.

However, this is an attitude which disregards the basis of Red Cross humanitarianism. The Red Cross exists only because there are human sufferings. The Red Cross is an organization designed to solve human disasters and sufferings in a humanitarian manner, transcending political or military issues.

Your side delays indefinitely discussion of the dispersed family issue, arguing that the dispersed family issue would be solved when unification is achieved, while indulging in slandering the other side of the talks. This is an act of aggravating the sentiments of the south and north, fomenting division and obstructing independent peaceful unification of the fatherland, rather than spurring national unity.

If your side is really interested in removing the danger of war from this land and achieving peaceful unification of the fatherland, your side should show a sincere attitude, beginning with this Red Cross conference in the first place.

Your side, which brings up political and military problems at the Red Cross conference while suspending the South-North Coordinating Committee, which boycotts a Red Cross meeting that should be held in Seoul, and which rejects a South-North Coordinating Committee meeting supposed to be held in Pyongyang, will never be able to deceive public opinions at home and abroad no matter how carefully feigning sincerity about the south-north dialogue.

Moreover, the attitude of trying to negotiate with a third party over national issues which ought to be solved through sincere efforts among all the 50 million brethren while showing no good faith in dialogue between the compatriots, is an attitude lacking the proper national self-reliance and integrity, and will hardly escape the charge of being a “scheme for national division.”

North Korean Red Cross delegates!

National harmony and unity and peaceful unification of the fatherland cannot be given to us by any other party but should be achieved solely by our 50 million countrymen through their own endeavors.

And this can be expected only from a rational attitude of accepting the stern reality as it stands, from a self-reliant stance dedicated to solving national problems among the same people, and from a sincere posture to seek something in common rather than elements of conflict.

If we deny each other and dig into each other's points of difference, it would only lead to aggravating tensions and confrontation, as well as encouraging national division rather than national unity.

The situation is that the Red Cross conference is stalemated around working-level meetings without any substantial achievements, and the Coordinating Committee fails even to meet today, six years after the initiation of the south-north dialogue, so we must from now on exert concerted endeavors to normalize the south-north dialogue.

Only normalization of the south-north dialogue can constitute a means of solving today's tensions and lessening confrontation, of removing the state of acute military confrontation and thereby transforming heavy military burdens into economic construction, of forestalling the tragedy of internecine conflict, and of achieving peaceful unification. Such normalization of the dialogue should be realized beginning with this Red Cross conference.

At the previous meeting, the delegation of the Republic of Korea National Red Cross set forth a new proposal with regard to discussion of agenda topics and the issue of resuming the full-dress meetings.

Our proposals suggested that although it is desirable to discuss the agenda topics one by one beginning with agenda item No. 1, still pilot projects could be undertaken first, and although the eighth full-dress meeting should be held in Seoul, the site can be Panmunjom or another third place on an interim basis. These were flexible propositions made with your

side's situation duly taken into account. If your side is truly interested in solution of the issue of dispersed families, these are proposals you can accept easily.

It is quite natural in every respect that we demand that the direct south-north telephone line between Seoul and Pyongyang and the function of the Panmunjom Liaison Office, which remain paralyzed since August last year, be restored.

If your side is really prepared to listen to the urgent wishes of the 10 million dispersed family members in the south and north, and truly wishes to prevent the tragedy of internecine war in this land and achieve peaceful unification of the fatherland, your side should accept our proposals readily.

As already suggested at the 21st working-level meeting, the Republic of Korea National Red Cross delegation hereby proposes that "the eighth full-dress meeting be held at Panmunjom initially at an early date."

This proposal of the delegation of the Republic of Korea National Red Cross is:

First, intended to accord the joy of reunion to the 10 million dispersed family members by resuming the full-dress meetings at an early date and thereby speeding up the debate of topics, inasmuch as no achievements have been made from these working-level meetings which met 20-odd times over a period of three full years;

Second, designed to normalize the full-dress meetings at an early date for the purpose of easing the strained relations between the south and north, thereby contributing to peaceful unification of the fatherland, although solution of the dispersed family issue itself is a lofty and crucial challenge; and

Third, constitutes a reasonable and just proposition made in full consideration of the situation of your side, since your side rejects the holding of the eighth full-dress meeting in Seoul, which has already been agreed upon between the two sides.

I believe that if our side's proposal is accepted and implemented, this would serve as an impetus to the deadlocked Red Cross conference, providing an epochal turning point for the solution of the separated family issue and creation of an atmosphere for trust between south and north.

I look forward to a sincere response from your delegation to this proposal by the delegation of the Republic of Korea National Red Cross.

Part Three

Other Developments in Inter-Korean Relations

Homeland Visits on “Tano” Holiday

Some 500 Korean residents in Japan affiliated with Chochongryon, a pro-Pyongyang Korean residents’ group in Japan, have been to the homeland in five groups from last June 13 through 20 despite persisting and knavish obstructive maneuvering by Chochongryon, to observe the real image of their fatherland and to get reunited with their family members and relatives for the first time in several decades on the occasion of the traditional “Tano” holiday that fell on last June 21.

As was the case with many of the homeland visitors on the previous occasion of the “Hanshik” holiday last April, a majority of the visitors were youthful second-generation Korean residents who resolved to visit their fatherland after learning from earlier visitors about something quite different from what they used to be told by Chochongryon propagandists: impressive development of the fatherland and warm brotherly affection extended to such visitors by the people in the homeland.

The fact that the number of homeland visiting compatriots swells despite deceptive propaganda and intimidation by Chochongryon and that second-generation residents occupy a growing portion of the homeland visitors, explains that the fervent desire to visit and see the real state of the fatherland departing from the yoke of deceptive and dark lives enforced upon them by the Communist organization spreads deeply and broadly among the Korean residents in Japan, pointing to a firm congelation of the “affection of blood relatives,” strong enough to demolish any political barrier.

The visitors paid homage to the “Home Comers’ Hill” and the “Hyunchungsa Shrine” and toured major tourist and industrial sites such as Kyungju, Pohang and Ulsan before they observed the pleasant “Tano” holiday together with their beloved family members and relatives in their respective hometowns.

Seoul Side of SNCC Sponsors Seminar in Observance of Fifth Anniversary of July 4 Joint Communique

It is already five years since the historical South-North Joint Communique was issued with a view to restoring the severed national unity, promoting mutual understanding and achieving peaceful unification independently, amidst wild emotions and high expectation for national unification among all the compatriots.

Looking back, the Joint Communique constituted an irrevocable great national charter calling for improvement of the hostile south-north relations through dialogue and exchanges as well as for realization of the reunification of the nation on the principles of self-reliance, peace and great national unity.

Regrettably, however, these emotions and expectation have now faded in the face of the insincerity on the part of the north Korean side, with the south-north dialogue still remaining deadlocked after the north Korean side boycotted it unilaterally in August 1973.

It was against this background that the Seoul side of the South-North Coordinating Committee held a seminar in observance of the fifth anniversary of the issuance of the South-North Joint Communique of 1972 at a conference hall near Waryong-dong, Chongno-ku, Seoul which has been built exclusively for the south-north dialogue. The seminar was intended to help provide an impetus for early normalization of the suspended south-north dialogue by contributing to policy formulation through reviewing of the past performance of the south-north dialogue and obtaining of opinions from various circles about its future prospects, in the face of the persisting attempts by the north Korean side to mislead the public opinions at home and abroad by deliberately disrupting the dialogue and engaging in deceptive peace offensive.

Acting Co-chairman Min Kwan-shik, in an opening address read

at the seminar, by Kim Dong-jo, a Seoul side member of the Coordinating Committee, said that “the South-North Joint Communiqué embodies the historical aspirations of our nation, reflecting objective requirements in the relations between south and north Korea. Nevertheless, the acting Co-chairman said, the south-north dialogue remains deadlocked because the south-north relations are being jeopardized by the conflicting ideologies and systems and also by the opposing senses of value with regard to the issue of national unification.

Pointing out that area of mutual approach has not been found because the Pyongyang side pursues “confrontation” rather than “dialogue,” “violence” rather than “peace,” and “ideology” rather than “nation,” acting Co-chairman Min stressed that the key to improvement of the south-north relations lies in enabling the Pyongyang side to abandon its “policy for violent revolution” and to agree to consolidation of peace and peaceful coexistence. “This question emerges as the most pressing task today in the relations between south and north Korea,” the Seoul side acting Co-chairman said.

At the seminar attended by about 300 scholars and other persons from all walks of life, four papers were presented. They were “Significance of South-North Joint Communiqué” by Dr. Ku Pom-mo, a member of the National Assembly; “Causes of Stalemate of South-North Dialogue, and Conditions for its Normalization” by Prof. Park Pong-shik of Seoul National University; “Possibility of Economic Exchanges between South and North Korea” by Chung Wun-hwak, a staff member of the East Asian Affairs Institute; and “Task for Restoration of National Homogeneity” by Sonu Whie, editor-in-chief of the daily Chosun Ilbo.

The papers described that a chapter for our national unification would be opened when the north Korean side, which they said has unilaterally suspended the south-north dialogue and has not abandoned the scheme for communization of the whole Korean peninsula, returns to the Three Major Principles for Unification embodied in the South-North Joint Communiqué of 1972.

The following are the full texts of two of the four papers presented at the seminar—"Significance of South-North Joint Communique" by Rep. Ku Pom-mo and "Causes of Stalemate of South-North Dialogue and Conditions for Its Normalization" by Prof. Park Pong-shik.

Significance of South-North Joint Communiqué

—Comparison of Unification Policies of South and North Korea—

Dr. Ku Pom-mo
Member of the National Assembly

In this paper, Dr. Ku Pom-mo stresses that the north Korean side should return to the Three Major Principles of self-reliance, peace and great national unity, stipulated in the South-North Joint Communiqué. Dr. Ku says the three principles can be embodied only when the north Korean Communists give up their day dream for achieving unification under communism.—Ed.

Chapter I. Foreword: Presentation of the Problem

Some thirty years have already passed since the Korean peninsula was divided and victimized by the international power politics of the United States and the Soviet Union against our nation's will. Ever since the government and people of the Republic of Korea, with a high expectation of, and strong determination for, unification, have done their utmost to seek just solution to this question, which can be likened to the Gordian knot. However, all such endeavors have been restrained, sometimes by the barriers of power politics, sometimes by the violent, anti-national policy of north Korea, which remains prepossessed with its day-dream of communizing south Korea, and occasionally by a combination of the two. Under the circumstances, the relations between south and north Korea were frozen in a state of military confrontation, with the exception of brief periods of rather decorative dialogue, until the end of the 1960's.

The term "state of military confrontation" here refers to the state of the Korean peninsula brought about by north Korea's constant armed

provocations against the south and the defensive military measures taken by the Republic of Korea to counter those provocations. In effect, south-north Korean relations during the latter half of the 1960's were characterized by military strains caused by a series of serious military provocations by the north Korean Communists, which included a commando raid directed at Chong Wa Dae in January 1968; the seizure of the USS Pueblo, January 1968; the infiltration of a large number of armed guerrillas into the east coast area, November 1968; and the shooting down of a U.S. Navy EC-121 reconnaissance plane, April 1969.

Subsequently, initiative was taken by the Republic of Korea government to forestall a fratricidal war and lay the foundation for national unification by replacing the military confrontation with peaceful coexistence. The initiative was the proposal for "good-intentioned competition" between the systems of south and north Korea, which was made by President Park Chung Hee in his Liberation Day message on August 15, 1970. In the address, President Park stated that if north Korea abandons its scheme to communize the whole Korean peninsula by force of arms or violent revolution, "I will be willing to set forth epochal and more realistic measures that can contribute to laying the groundwork for national unification and can remove step by step the artificial barrier lying between south and north Korea." The President then challenged the north Korean Communists to "take part in a competition of development, construction and creation to prove which system—democracy or Communist dictatorship—can enable the people to live better and which is a society with conditions for better living."¹⁾

It was upon the basis of the spirit embodied in this address that Choi-Tu-son, then president of the Republic of Korea National Red Cross, proposed in a special statement on August 12, 1971, that a family searching campaign be launched to find, and inform thereof, the state of 10 million separated family members and to arrange their reunions."²⁾ This proposal was interpreted as an epochal proposition intended to begin the solution of the frozen relations between south and north Korea with an

endeavor in the humanitarian field.

North Korea could not reject this overture. The most important reason was the detente between the United States and Communist China. At that time, the United States and Communist China were seeking a conciliation to end their 20 years of hostile relations, for which U.S. President Richard M. Nixon was scheduled to visit Peking.

This Sino-U.S. approach inevitably required north Korea to modify at least its policy toward south Korea, which, exploiting the international tension in Northeast Asia in the interests of its internal politics and southward strategy, had led to a tightly closed totalitarian system internally, and called for fomenting a violent revolution against the government in the south.

The South-North Red Cross Conference, opened against that background, paved the way for a high-level secret political conference between the south and north in May 1972, which in turn led to the issuance of the South-North Joint Communiqué on July 4 of that year. The Joint Communiqué, which set forth three principles for unification—*independence, peace and national unity*—represented the solemn pledge of the south and north Korean political leaders before 50 million people aspiring for unification. It also constituted a new milestone in the national history, laying the track and direction for a dialogue between the south and north.

We have been dealing with the issue of national unification on the basis of this South-North Joint Communiqué. It was this Joint Communiqué that we adopted as the norm in our policy and conduct during a series of south-north contacts such as the South-North Red Cross Conference and the South-North Coordinating Committee meetings. The Republic of Korea government's three basic principles for peaceful unification, announced in President Park's Liberation Day message on August 15, 1974, were also prepared in line with the Joint Communiqué.

Notwithstanding, the north Korean Communists engage in distortion of the contents and spirit of the South-North Joint Communiqué, and stray from the framework it established. Against the principle of

“independence” calling for the solution of the unification issue through the South-North Red Cross Conference and South-North Coordinating Committee, the established channels for dialogue between our own people, they show an anti-independent attitude by attempting to sever dialogue with us, bringing the Korean issue before international meetings that have nothing to do with our national question, or trying to settle it through meetings with a specific third country. Against the principle of “peace”, which provides that the issue of unification should be solved through dialogue without recourse to another war, they are engaged in belligerent conduct, perpetrating numerous armed provocations, small and large, against the south, such as digging offensive tunnels under the Demilitarized Zone and ax-murdering American officers in the Panmunjom Joint Security Area. And, against the principle of “national unity,” calling for the promotion of great national unity as a single nation, they show anti-national behavior, indulging in unfounded slander and defamation of us at various overseas conferences and through press media.

Against this background, an attempt is made in this paper to deal with the following inter-related issues.

First, how can we interpret the South-North Joint Communiqué, the content and spirit of which are distorted by the north Korean Communists, and from the frame of which they go astray?

Second, how can the Republic of Korea government’s Three Basic Principles for Peaceful Unification be logically linked to the South-North Coordinating Committee?

Third, how can the unification policies of south and north Korea be compared in the light of the content and spirit of the South-North Coordinating Committee? What is the true intention of north Korea’s peace offensive?

And fourth, in view of such comparisons of the unification policies of south and north Korea, how can we foresee the future of south-north Korean relations? What are the prospects for the consolidation of peace

between south and north Korea through conclusion of a south-north non-aggression agreement?

Chapter II. Background of the South-North Joint Communiqué

In order to grasp accurately the meaning of the South-North Joint Communiqué of July 4, 1972, we shall first study the course leading to its issuance, touching on the following three aspects,

1. August 15 Declaration of President Park

In his Liberation Day message on August 15, 1970, President Park demanded that, to create the groundwork for peaceful unification, north Korea promptly cease all acts of aggressive provocation such as the infiltration of armed guerrillas into the south, declare before the world that it “will abandon its policy of pursuing unification under communism by force of arms or overthrow of the Republic of Korea through violent revolution,” and prove this intent by its deeds. President Park said that if and when this was done, the Republic of Korea would be “willing to set forth epochal and more realistic measures that can contribute to laying the groundwork for national unification, and can remove step by step the artificial barrier lying between south and north Korea.” The President also asked in the message if north Korea has the “intention of taking part in a competition of development, construction and creation to prove which system—democracy or communist dictatorship—can enable the people to live better and which is a society with conditions for better living.”

What, then, can be the spirit of this August 15 declaration? The spirit can be summed up as 1) forestalling the recurrence of war and 2) inducing well-intentioned competition in the relations between south and north Korea.

1) Forestalling the Recurrence of War

At the beginning of the 1960's, the north Korean Communists began to intensify their armed provocations against the south under the so-called

“theory of revolution in south Korea” and the “four major military paths,” fomenting a very dangerous tension in which war could break out at any moment on the Korean peninsula. Typical of such acts of provocation were, as pointed out in the foreword, a commando raid directed at Chong Wa Dae in January 1968; the seizure of USS Pueblo, January 1968; the landing of a large number of armed guerrillas in the Uljin and Samchok areas, November 1968; the shooting down of an EC-121 U.S. Navy reconnaissance plane, April 1969; and the skyjacking of a Korean Air Lines plane, December 1969.

It was under these circumstances that the Republic of Korea government placed a top priority on preventing the recurrence of war. The aspirations of the Republic of Korea government for forestalling of recurrence of war, embodying national righteousness, were well described by President Park in his August 15 declaration: “No matter how urgent the national challenge for the realization of unification may be, we must avoid war and its demands of bloodshedding from the people. No matter how rugged the road to unification may be, we must settle it peacefully with patience and reason. . . Since a peaceful approach to unification cannot be pursued without the alleviation of tension, there should be in the first place a clear expression of such an attitude and its practice by north Korea.”

2) Inducement to Well-Intentioned Competition in the Relations Between South and North Korea

In the 1960's, economic development in south and north Korea showed contrasting characteristics. Whereas the seven-year economic development plan ended in failure in north Korea, forcing it to extend the plan's period by three years, the Republic of Korea government successfully implemented the First and Second Five-Year Economic Development Plans. Accordingly, the South Korean government became confident of passing ahead of north Korea in a economic competition. It can be said that this sense of confidence was embodied in the proposal to north Korea for “a well-intentioned competition between the two systems.”

2. The opening of the South-North Red Cross Conference

On August 12, 1971, one year after the August 15 Declaration was made, Choi Tu-son, as president of the Republic of Korea National Red Cross, proposed in a special statement the opening of a south-north Red Cross meeting to 1) confirm the state of dispersed families in south and north Korea, 2) inform the respective parties and arrange their reunion, and 3) discuss a concrete campaign for searching for the dispersed families. This proposal, of course, was based on President Park's August 15 Declaration which said in part, that the Republic of Korea would be willing to set forth epochal and more realistic measures that can contribute to laying the groundwork for unification, and can remove step by step the artificial barrier lying between south and north Korea."

Two days later, the north Korean Red Cross accepted our proposal. After some contacts between messengers from the respective Red Cross organizations, a preliminary south and north Korean Red Cross meeting opened on September 20, 1971. The preliminary meetings, which lasted secret until August 11, 1972, served as the direct channel that led to high-level political contacts between south and north Korea.

3. High-Level Secret Political Conferences

Based on the experience gained during secret contacts between south and north Korean Red Cross delegates from November 20, 1971 through April 26, 1972, our side became confident that a high-level political conference could be arranged between south and north Korea. Accordingly, a visit to Pyongyang by Lee Hu-rak, then director of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency, took place for three days beginning May 2, 1972.

Prior to Director Lee's visit to Pyongyang, President Park handed down a set of guidelines to be observed in the discussions of unification, asking that the guidelines be discussed at a meeting in Pyongyang. The highlights of the guidelines were as follows:

First, unification should be realized peacefully.

Second, the issue of unification should be solved step by step in view of the fact that the south and north had remained under different systems for over a quarter of a century.

Third, the South-North Red Cross Conference should be given top priority so as to insure an early solution to the humanitarian problem, namely, the family search campaign, after which a meeting should be held to deal with non-political issues such as those involving the economy and culture. In the final stage, a south-north political conference should be established to discuss political matters between the south and north.

Fourth, since it is important to improve the atmosphere in which south and north Korea would communicate to the greatest possible extent, both sides should refrain from engaging in the following acts, at least while dialogue and contacts are going on between the south and north:

(1) Any outward, propagandizing proposal of unrealistic, unilateral unification formulas;

(2) Reciprocal slander or defamation between south and north Korea; and

(3) Any harassment of the other side through armed action, direct or indirect.

In his meetings with Kim Young-joo, director of the north Korean Workers' Party Organization and Guidance Department, and Kim Il-sung, Director Lee discussed south-north issues in terms of the guidelines for unification laid down by President Park. North Korea agreed to them almost in their entirety except that whereas our side advocated a gradual unification theory, the north insisted on a solution of all issues in one stroke. In other words, against our suggestion that unification issues be handled step-by-step, beginning with humanitarian and non-political matters, the north Korean side placed a priority on political negotiations, clinging to the position that the successful conclusion, of political negotiations would lead to a satisfactory resolution of the dispersed family problem and material exchanges by themselves.⁵⁾ This

stand was reiterated during the visit to Seoul (May 29-June 1, 1972) by Park Sung-chol, vice premier of north Korea, and his audience with President Park.⁶⁾ During this reception, the two agreed that a south-north joint communique would be issued on July 4 in Seoul and Pyongyang.

Finally, the historic South-North Joint Communique was issued on July 4, 1972, simultaneously in the two capitals. As will be pointed out below, President Park's guidelines for unification formed the core of the Joint Communique. It can be said with certainty, therefore, that the South-North Joint Communique was prepared on the initiative of our government.

Chapter III. The Significance of the South-North Joint Communique

The South-North Joint Communique, under Item 1, set forth the Three Major Principles for Unification as follows:

First, unification shall be achieved through independent efforts without being subject to external imposition or interference.

Second, unification shall be achieved through peaceful means, and not through the use of force against each other.

Third, as a homogeneous people, a great national unity shall be sought above all, transcending differences in ideas, ideologies, and systems.

1. Principle of Independence

The first of the Three Major Principles for Unification is the principle of independence. That principle, of self-determination of peoples or of seeking a solution by the parties directly concerned, is a principle which our government supports and advocates. As will be shown later, it is upon this principle of independence that we have been calling for the resumption of south-north dialogue, which has been suspended by north Korea's unilateral boycott, as well as for a meeting of the direct parties involved

in the armistice.

Nevertheless, Communist north Korea not only misinterprets this principle of independence itself, but also persists in behaving in violation of the principle. Above all, north Korea describes as “external forces” those foreign troops who are stationed in Korea in the name of the United Nations Command. However, the U.N. forces are here for the mission of preventing armed clashes between the south and north, or more accurately, of forestalling a reinvasion by north Korea. They never obstruct an “independent solution” of the unification issue. This point is self-evident in view of the historical fact that the U.N. forces came to be stationed in this land through a United Nations resolution adopted for the purpose of checking north Korea’s invasion of south Korea, initiated on June 25, 1950.⁷⁾ This is true of the American military forces, in particular. The U.S. forces, which have no territorial ambitions whatsoever in our country, are stationed here under the Korea-U.S. Mutual Defense Agreement, acting as a deterrent against any reinvasion by the north Korean Communists.

If north Korea, nevertheless, insists that the withdrawal of U.N. or American forces must be a prerequisite to an independent solution, while rejecting any dialogue with the south Korean government, it would naturally give rise to suspicions that the “independent solution” north Korea advocates involves is, in fact, a solution by means of force of arms.⁹⁾ In fact, north Korea has consistently called for the withdrawal of U.N. or American forces under the cloak of as “independent solution” for the purpose of speeding the condition for the communization of the whole Korean peninsula by force of arms.

Because the north Korean Communists are interested only in unification under communism, they are always harping on “independence” while shunning the south-north dialogue, a logical first step toward the easing of tensions on the Korean peninsula and eventual peaceful unification. Moreover, they tour third countries slandering and defaming the Republic of Korea with deceptive propaganda.¹⁰⁾

As is well known, the Republic of Korea is in a close alliance with the United States and maintains cooperative relations with Japan, receiving economic and military assistance from the former. North Korea, meanwhile, is a close ally of China and the Soviet Union, enjoying economic and military assistance from both of them. In other words, south and north Korea, alike, maintain relations with “external forces” (to use north Korea’s expression) and remain under the influence of “external forces.” Therefore, the problem lies in whether to solve the issue of national unification with recourse to “external forces” or through dialogue only between the direct parties of the south and north. Whereas we adopt the latter method and are thus urging the resumption of the south-north dialogue as well as a meeting of the parties directly involved in the armistice, north Korea rejects the dialogue, holding to its stand to solve the issue through the conclusion of a so-called peace agreement with the United States.

What, then, is the “independent solution of unification?” This is interpreted to mean the establishment of a unified government through the exercise of sovereign rights by the 50 million compatriots in the south and north; that is, through free and democratic elections.

The third item of the Korean government’s Three Baic Principles for Peaceful Unification declares that, based on this very interpretation, “. . . unification shall be achieved through free general elections held in south and north Korea under fair management and supervision in proportion to the indigenous population.”

2. Principle of Peace

The second of the Three Major Principles for Unification is the principle of peace. Here, we shall define the concept of peace.¹¹⁾

According to “Oxford English Dictionary,” peace in terms of international relations means “freedom from, or cessation of, war or hostilities.” The Soviet Union’s official interpretation of the word “peace” is

similar. "The Dictionary of Russian Contemporary Literature" defines peace as "the absence of war or armed conflict between peoples or states." Therefore, judging from these two definitions, there seems to be the same notion of peace in both the West and the Communist Bloc.

Nonetheless, there exists a great difference in the view of peace from those two disparate perspectives. When the word "peace" is employed in the West, it is taken to imply not only the passive meaning given in the "Oxford English Dictionary," but also a positive meaning referring to the will to achieve better things based thereon. In the West, therefore, the word "peace" is usually followed by words carrying positive associations, such as prosperity, goodwill, cooperation or development. When the word "peace" is employed, it presupposes a good intention.

The same does not apply to the Communist Bloc. To the Communists, the word "peace" is sufficiently described by its passive meaning, "the absence of war or armed conflict." Moreover, they believe that peace will come in the long run only when the capitalistic system completely ceases to exist. Since Communist countries seek such a goal, the word "peace" employed by the Communists carries its passive meaning plus the implication of ill intentions toward the West. Therefore, when the Communists use the expression "peace policy," it may well be taken to mean "a policy to shun armed conflict" or "a policy to expand communism" or a policy combining the two. They never use "peace" to express "peace and good intentions toward capitalistic countries."

We shall now compare the method of approach toward peaceful unification employed by south and north Korea, keeping in mind such conceptual differences. The basis of our government's unification policy lies in peace. When we say "peace" here, it encompasses both the passive meaning, that is, "freedom from, or the cessation of, war or hostilities" between south and north Korea and the positive meaning, that of "goodwill, cooperation and development" pursued between the south and north, based on the state of peace defined by the passive meaning. In accordance with this concept of peace, we are advocating the conclusion

of a non-aggression agreement between south and north Korea in order to guarantee this “freedom from, or cessation of, war or hostilities” between the south and north, and are also calling for “multi-faceted exchanges and cooperation” between the south and north in order to pursue *common prosperity and development based thereon*. The first of the Three Major Basic Principles for Peaceful Unification spells out the former goal by saying, “Peace Should be consolidated on the Korean peninsula—to this end, the south and north should conclude a mutual non-aggression “agreement.” The second of the Basic Principles—“The south and north should open their doors to each other and restore their mutual trust.—to this end, the south-north dialogue should be carried on sincerely and multi-faceted exchanges and cooperation should be realized”—expresses the heart of the latter purpose.

In contrast to, such attitudes on our side, north Korea regards the issue of unification basically as one of revolution. Therefore, the concept of peaceful unification it holds is quite different from that which we perceive. Then how do the north Koreans explain the issue of unification from the angle of revolution?

Kim Il-sung has asserted that to achieve the unification of the fatherland, a triple revolution must be staged, in north Korea, south Korea and the world.¹²⁾ Revolution in north Korea means the construction of “a strong revolutionary base” in north Korea, namely, the buildup of its economic and military capability and the consolidation of Kim Il-sung’s monolithic dictatorial system. Revolution in south Korea means that American forces must be withdrawn and the government of the Republic of Korea overthrown. To accomplish this “task,” Kim Il-sung has urged the organization of a Marxist-Leninist party, with workers, farmers and progressive-minded intellectuals of south Korea playing key roles and a majority of people participating, to stage an effective struggle against both the American forces and the Republic of Korea government. The revolution in the world is connected with these two Korean revolutions. In other words, they insist that the expulsion of the “American imper-

ialists,” who they say are “a major obstacle” to revolution, is possible only through a united front joining all socialistic nations and “oppressed peoples” of the world.

This “theory of revolution in Korea” of Kim Il-sung logically contradicts the “theory of peaceful unification” which north Korea has generally advocated.¹³⁾ The “peaceful unification” north Korea mentions refers to a state in which a “people’s democratic revolution” is staged in south Korea, largely by workers and farmers spurred on by a Communist party, to establish a revolutionary regime that “serves the interests of the workers’ and farmers’ class,” after which unification is to be achieved in collaboration between this revolutionary regime and that is north Korea. Because they view peaceful unification this way, the north Koreans themselves state that to look forward to peaceful unification under the present situation is no more than wild fancy. By reconfirming such a unification formula even the very day before the issuance of the Joint Communique in 1972, they manifested clearly that their purpose for engaging in a south-north dialogue was not to accelerate genuinely peaceful unification but to contribute to the communization of the whole Korean peninsula by means of revolution.

In this way, when north Korea says “peaceful unification,” it is meant to refer to unification through revolution. And, inasmuch as they believe that unification through revolution can be achieved only by violent means, their idea of peaceful unification cannot mean a genuinely peaceful unification. Herein lies the reason north Korea rejects our proposal for a south-north non-aggression agreement.

3. The Principle of a Great National Unity

The third of the Three Major Principles for Unification is the principle of a great national unity. Our nation has retained its homogeneity throughout 1,300 years beginning with the era of the Unified Silla Dynasty, with the exception of a brief period when it came under foreign rule. According to a description by one scholar, “When we add up the periods

in which our people have lived on the Korean peninsula based on the commonness of their history, language, blood relations and culture, we find that our people have maintained a national homogeneity and the identity of the state over a longer period than anywhere else in the world.”¹⁴⁾

Under the circumstances, we accept national division as an interim situation only, recognizing the issue of achieving a great national unity as the nation’s most urgent challenge.

It was to lay the groundwork for a great national unity that we proposed to north Korea a “family searching campaign” to reunite dispersed families, urged the restoration of a national homogeneity to north Korea which is becoming heterogenous in the midst of a Soviet political system and Marx-Leninism, and promoted a program for homeland visits by Korean residents in Japan affiliated with Chochongryon, a pro-Pyongyang group of Korean residents in Japan.

In order for us to understand the principle of a great national unity correctly, we must take due note of the phrase “transcending differences in ideologies, ideas and systems,” which serves as a premise for such a great national unity. The phrase “transcending ideologies and ideas” means to recognize and respect mutual differences in ideologies and ideas from the standpoint that no matter which ideology or ideas a man might harbor, it is his concern alone, since the freedom to choose ideologies or ideas falls in the category of basic human rights. Similarly, to “transcend differences in systems” is meant to promote a great national consensus for unification, which is the greatest interest of our Korean people, regardless of the recognizable respective differences in systems inevitably born of the national division after national liberation.

When we interpret the clause “transcending differences in ideologies, ideas and systems” this way, it naturally provides a logical foundation for the “principle of non-interference in each other’s internal affairs,” which is advocated by our government. That attitude was demonstrated clearly in a press conference held by Lee Pom-sok, senior Republic of Korea National Red Cross delegate, upon his return from Pyongyang where

he had attended the first full-dress meeting of the South-North Red Cross Conference in September 1972. Replying to a question as to whether his delegation could imbue the “wind of freedom” into the hearts of the north Korean people, Lee said his delegation had no intention of doing any such thing, adding that “none of us hopes to see the north Korean Red Cross delegates instill the wind of communism into this land.” His remark, “Let them sow the seeds of communism in their land. . . . we, in our part, shall plant the tree of freedom here in the Republic of Korea,” reflected the stand of our government that “differences in ideologies, ideas and systems” must be recognized for the moment and a great national unity should be pursued based on the prosperity and development of each’s own system.

Whereas we adhere thusly to the clause “transcending differences in ideologies, ideas and systems,” north Korea repeats unreasonable and contrary demands. For example, the north demands that we “remove all social, political and statutory obstacles” on the pretext of “creating an atmosphere” for the south-north dialogue. Specifically, it demands the repeal of the National Security Law and the Anti-Communist Law, both our internal laws, and further presses us to adopt a pro-Communist policy. On January 25, 1977, for instance, a joint meeting of all political parties and social organizations of north Korea demanded that, “in order to uproot the sources of discord within the nation and to create an atmosphere for a great national unity, south Korea 1) guarantee the freedoms of speech, publication, assembly, organization and demonstration, 2) unconditionally set free imprisoned patriotic people and democratic personages, and 3) stop pursuing an anti-Communist policy,” thus distorting our domestic situation and interfering in our internal affairs.

North Korea cries for a great unity of the nation, but it should not overlook the fact that the theory of communism itself denies any national unit. In the Communist indoctrination of its people, north Korea has rejected the sense of the nation that “we all represent a single nation before being a class.” Instead, the north has adopted, as a concept superior to

the national sense, the Communist idea of class identity: “we are the same body not in terms of nation but in terms of class.” In other words, the sense of class replaces that of nation.

When the sense of class stands above the sense of nation this way, the destruction of the bourgeoisie by the proletariat becomes a top priority task. Accordingly, the majority of the south Korean population emerges as a target for destruction, not as one for great unity. In the sense that the north Korean Communists regard the nation as classified into the proletariat as the agent of destruction and the bourgeoisie as the object of destruction, north Korea’s unification policy can hardly escape being branded as nation-splitting.

In conclusion, to “promote a great national unity transcending differences in ideologies, ideas and systems,” is meant to promote that unity in a democratic manner regardless of such differences in the ideologies, ideas and systems of south and north Korea, although they are recognized to exist. The word “democratic manner” here indicates, as explained in the analysis of the “principle of independence,” free general elections among the entire population in south and north Korea. The declaration in the third of our Three Major Principles for Peaceful Unification, that “unification shall be achieved through free general elections in the south and north in proportion to the indigenous population under fair election management and supervision,” can be taken as a concrete method for founding a great national unity based upon just that interpretation.

Chapter IV. Comparison of the Unification Policies of South and North Korea

—An Analysis of the Righteousness of Our Unification Policy and the Fictitiousness of North Korea’s Unification Formula—

This Chapter, written against the background of the meaning of the South-North Joint Communiqué, shall compare and study the unification policies of south and north Korea, chiefly by looking into the unification

formulas proposed by south and north Korea after the establishment of the South-North Coordinating Committee. However, for the sake of continuity with the preceding chapter, the “Three Principles for Unification of the fatherland” agreed upon in the Joint Communique shall be used here as a basis for the comparison and analysis.

1. North Korea's Unification Formula and Its Fictitiousness

The major cause behind the failure to solve the nation's unification issue lies in north Korea's unification formula, namely, its strategy for communizing the south.¹⁸⁾ Its unification formula is far from being realistic and rational enough to bring about national unification amid the reality of national division. It constitutes merely a strategy intended to communize south Korea.

That strategy of Kim Il-sung is being pursued on two flanks—indirect aggression and direct aggression. The indirect aggression includes all types of schemes for communizing south Korea without recourse to the force of arms, such as psychological warfare designed to touch off a “people's democratic revolution” within the Republic of Korea, exploitation of the south-north dialogue, the infiltration of agents, propaganda warfare abroad and maneuvers at the United Nations. Since its unification formula has been drawn up with an eye toward psychological operations against the south, the presentation of the formula itself falls in this category. Direct aggression, of course, means armed action against the south. One thing which must be emphasized here is that the ultimate method in the strategy for the communization of the south which north Korea is pursuing is the use of military strength. Kim Il-sung did not overlook the situation in which the Vietnamese Communists, who had previously waged struggles chiefly through guerrilla and psychological warfare, mounted a military frontal attack upon the withdrawal of the allies' forces from Vietnam under the 1973 Paris Peace Agreement, ending the 30-year Vietnam War in a mere 50 days. Kim Il-sung hopes to repeat the pattern of Vietnam's communization on the Korean peninsula.

In general, north Korea's unification strategy calls for the realization of a so-called "people's democratic revolution" by disturbing the social and political order within the Republic of Korea, causing the withdrawal of American forces from Korea and, at the same time, securing a diplomatic edge, or else simply communizing the whole Korean peninsula in a single stroke by launching an armed attack a propitious time.¹⁹⁾

What is a "people's democratic revolution?" The strategy for the "people's democratic revolution" has become the backbone of north Korea's policy toward south Korea since the fifth convention of the Workers' Party held in November 1970 designated the immediate objective of "revolution in south Korea" as a "people's democratic revolution."²⁰⁾ And, according to a publication of the Workers' Party entitled "Report on the Overall Programs of the Central Committee given at the Fifth Convention of the Workers' Party held on November 2, 1970," a "people's democratic revolution" aims at the following:

1) Anti-American imperialism campaigns, anti-fascist and anti-democratic struggles, anti-feudal struggles.

2) A revolution for national liberation.

3) The establishment of a people's regime through an alliance among the workers, farmers, progressive-minded youths and students, some patriotic soldiers, national-minded capitalists and petit-bourgeoisie with a view to destroying land owners, comprador capitalists and reactionary bureaucrats.

4) A bolstering of revolutionary forces through the strengthening the organization of underground parties.

5) The overthrow of the south Korean regime by means of violent revolution.

6) The accomplishment of revolution through the mobilization of all available forces such as in political and economic struggles, legal, semi-legal and illegal struggles, and violent and non-violent struggles.

7) Assistance for the revolution in south Korea.

In essence, a “people’s democratic revolution” is meant to foment an anti-government uprising and destroy the existing government by launching psychological warfare to incite and agitate those who are considered to be anti-government elements, such as workers, farmers and national-minded bourgeoisie. The Communists adopt the theory of step-by-step revolution, so that where there is no mature proletariat class to serve as the core of the socialistic revolution, the “people’s democratic revolution” can be realized first through a “united front” assembled from various social strata.

A typical example of the success of a “people’s democratic revolution” is, of course, Vietnam. It was only after the Communists successfully mounted their “united front” strategy in the course of the Vietnam war, organizing the “National Liberation Front” in 1960, the “Alliance of National Democratic Peace Forces” after the Tet offensive in 1968, and the “Third Forces” in the final years of the war, that they managed to create the atmosphere which led to the overall military offensive in April 1975. Of course, this success of a “people’s democratic revolution” presupposed Vietnam’s unique historical, military and political conditions, such as the sense of war reared in the sentiments of the Vietnamese people beginning with the anti-French liberation struggles, the terrain conditions favoring guerrilla warfare, and opposition in Buddhist circles which represented more than 80 percent of the population, to a regime composed chiefly of Catholics. Under these particular conditions, the Communists could maintain the initiative in politico-psychological warfare.²¹⁾

On the Korean peninsula, where there exist none of those conditions which aided Vietnam’s “people’s democratic revolution,” Kim Il-sung’s strategy for the communization of south Korea, which anticipates a “people’s democratic revolution” in the south, is merely a daydream. A “people’s democratic revolution” can succeed basically only when people can be misled and mental restlessness can be stirred among them. But, north Korea has no means whatsoever by which to captivate the hearts of the

Republic of Korea's people. According to a thesis which diagnosed the possibility of the application of north Korea's "people's democratic revolution" strategy to the south, the advantages which south Korea can exploit to cope successfully with such a strategy include a strong, popular anti-communist sentiment, a strong administrative structure, a strong national defense force, successful economic development and a relatively small land area.²²⁾

Nevertheless, north Korea proposes theories of "immediate unification" or "solution in one stroke," both totally infeasible in view of the realities of a divided country, while manipulating the issue of unification as a weapon of politico-psychological warfare, with the "people's democratic revolution" always in mind.

The basic stand that underlies all the so-called unification formulas of north Korea, such as a "south-north confederation system," a "grand national conference" and "political conference," a "peace agreement" with the United States and entry into the United Nations under the single designation, "Koryo Confederation Republic," is the theory of "immediate unification" being advocated with its psychological impact on the south in mind.

1) The Idea of a South-North Confederation System

North Korea has included a south-north confederation system among its unification formulas since the beginning of the 1960's. The proposal was repeated in Kim Il-sung's so-called "five major unification policies" made public in 1973. North Korea mentioned vaguely only its title and the need for such a system, failing to explain anything concrete with regard to its conditions and contents, such as the nature of its central government or the distribution of power between its member states.²³⁾

Since a confederation system can be feasible only on the basis of an identical national ideology, it can hardly be possible realistically or even theoretically in a state where, as in the case of south and north Korea, there are completely different ideologies and systems and where

mutual distrust and tensions are still accumulating. Moreover, not even a single case can be found throughout human history where a confederation was established amidst such conflicting ideologies and systems.

Thus seen, the confederation system north Korea has proposed is in fact intended to serve its scheme to cause the withdrawal of American forces from Korea on the premise that they constitute an obstacle to the creation of a single unified state under a confederation system, rather than to realize unification by forming such a confederation. Another motive would be to exploit the proposal for their propaganda purposes, as they know full well that a confederation system can never be established in the case of south and north Korea, which have such different ideologies and systems.

At the same time, their idea of a confederation system is no more than an excuse to reject our side's unification formula calling for the restoration of national homogeneity through coexistence and mutual exchanges between south and north Korea, and the holding of free general elections based on the proportions of the indigenous populations of south and north Korea.²⁴⁾

It goes without saying that as a means of insuring "great national unity," our government's formula for "free general elections in the proportion to the populations of the south and north" is more reasonable and realistic than north Korea's idea of a confederation system.

2) Grand National Conference and Political Negotiations

North Korea also demands the convocation of a "grand national conference" as one of its so-called five major policies.

According to their contention, a grand national conference would be designed to enable representatives of all strata of south and north Korea, numbering in the thousands, to get together and discuss the issue of national unification. It is because they have something else altogether in mind that the north Korean Communists, who suspended the meetings of

the South-North Coordinating Committee and South-North Red Cross Conference where south and north Korea were represented by small numbers of selected delegates, insist on resolving the unification issue—which requires a high-degree of rationality and cool judgment—at a kind of public rally attended by thousands of people.

Professor Amitai Etzioni, who established a comprehensive theory by comparing and analyzing the systems of the United Arab Republic, the West Indies Federation and the European Economic Community, concluded, “The smaller the elite unit promoting integration is, the easier such integration becomes.”²⁵⁾

This means that the body promoting such integration should be a small organization with the effective power to promote integration.

In view of that theory of integration, north Korea’s proposal for a grand national conference cannot be accepted as reasonable.

That being the case, north Korea suggested a grand national conference in order to create an excuse to render even the South-North Coordinating Committee defunct, aware that the south-north dialogue was detrimental to its strategy to achieve violent revolution in south Korea. At the same time, should such a conference have been convened, they schemed to bring up the issue of a U.S. military withdrawal for propaganda’s sake, and to foment political restlessness by agitating among people of all stratas in south Korea.

3) The Proposal for a “Peace Agreement” with the U.S.

North Korea advocates the conclusion of a “peace agreement” with the United States as part of its “united front” strategy. It asserts that such an agreement could include the following clauses:

First, a mutual pledge of non-aggression against each other, the elimination of the danger of unification by force of arms, and vows of non-support for the provocation of war and the persecution of people in south Korea and non-impediment of efforts toward independent peaceful uni-

fication.

Second, the cessation of any military buildup or arms race, stopping the introduction of weapons, equipment and military supplies.

Third, an end to the use of the U.N. insignia by alien forces and the withdrawal of alien forces with all of their weapons in a short period of time.

Fourth, a promise not to use south Korea for alien forces' military bases after withdrawal.

A glance at this proposition for a "peace agreement" with the United States quickly reveals that it contains the following defects:²⁷⁾

First, the proposal fails to conform with the general theory and concept of a peace agreement.

A peace agreement means an agreement signed with a view, in general, to ending hostilities and restoring peace between warring parties. The agreement, therefore, can be described as an inter-state instrument aimed at converting hostilities into peaceful relations. Seen from this perspective, none of the clauses cited above deals with any disposition of war. In this respect, Pyongyang's proposed "peace agreement" is far from being a genuine peace pact that can replace the Armistice Agreement.

Second, it lacks the balanced content required for international agreements.

The majority of the clauses are intended to impose onesided obligations upon the United States or to weaken the position of the Republic of Korea.

Third, it is so full of arms-related clauses that it rather gives the impression of being a disarmament agreement. Only Article 1 deals with something related to peace (non-aggression and elimination of the danger of an armed clash), with the remainder concerning the reduction or freezing of military strength.

In fact, it would be a mistake to make any attempt to analyze north Korea's "peace agreement" according to the Western concept of a peace agreement or peace treaty, the Communists' view of a peace agreement differs considerably from the West's.

According to Lenin's description made at the 7th Soviet Communist Party Congress in 1918, the communists perceive a peace treaty as "a means of gathering strength." A good example is the Brest-Litovsk Treaty which the Soviet Union concluded with Germany in 1918. Lenin never considered that war with Germany was permanently ended by the treaty. He always believed that what was conceded to Germany in the treaty should be regained at the moment when Russia's power grew sufficiently strong. However, the Soviets, according to Lenin, needed the time to "breathe" and therefore had to sign the treaty at the costly price exacted by the Germans. He emphasized that war would be renewed when Russia regained its strength.

To Lenin and all the Communists who followed him, peace was "an interim and precarious ceasefire between two wars (namely the war about to be concluded and the war which the Communists would provoke in the future: author)."28)

This aspect strongly underlies the "peace agreement" north Korea proposed to the United States. North Korea's offer of a "peace agreement" to the United States was motivated by its attempt to disintegrate the joint Korea-U.S. defense system as well as our security posture by causing the withdrawal of the American forces in Korea, which have been an effective deterrent against a north Korean armed invasion of the south, and the reduction in the capability to support south Korea, thus facilitating pyongyang's unleashing of another war.

In conclusion, north Korea rejects our just proposal for the conclusion of a south-north mutual non-aggression agreement and instead persists in demanding a "peace treaty" with the United States in an attempt to make the existing Armistice Agreement null and void and there-

by create an opportunity to achieve its goal, that is the communization of the whole Korean peninsula by force of arms.

As explained above, each and every proposition which the north Korean Communists put forth from time to time for their convenience is unrealistic and unreasonable, ignoring the reality of south-north Korean relations and disregarding the differences in ideologies and systems that clearly exist between the south and north. None of their offers, therefore, in any way serves the peaceful unification of the fatherland. It is crystal-clear that none of their proposals conforms with any of the three major principles of “independence,” “peace” and “great national unity.” North Korea has proven by itself that all its propositions are no more than politico-propaganda moves full of falsity and deception, designed to cover up its schemes for communizing the whole Korean peninsula.

2. The Unification Policy of the Republic of Korea Government and its Righteousness

1) A Summary of Proposals

The Republic of Korea government, which took the initiative in the issuance of the South-North Joint Communiqué of 1972 and succeeded in establishing the South-North Coordinating Committee, announced its seven-point Special Foreign Policy for Peace and Unification on June 23, 1973, about one year after the issuance of the Joint Communiqué, laying down conditions for achieving the consolidation of peace on the Korean peninsula as a prerequisite to peaceful unification. In the Special Foreign Policy, it was emphasized that the peaceful unification of the fatherland is the nation’s supreme challenge for the maintenance of peace on the Korean peninsula, that south and north Korea should pledge not to interfere in each other’s internal affairs, that the south would not oppose the simultaneous entry into the United Nations of south and north Korea if it would contribute to the alleviation of tensions as well as to international cooperation and if it would not undermine unification efforts, and that the Republic of Korea would open its doors to all countries including Communist bloc nations, regardless of their ideologies and systems, under

the principles of reciprocity and equality.²⁹⁾ On January 18, 1974, President Park proposed the conclusion of a south-north mutual non-aggression agreement, setting forth a realistic method of systematizing peaceful coexistence between south and north Korea. Making the offer at a press conference, the President said that if a new agreement were needed for the consolidation of peace on the Korean peninsula, a non-aggression agreement should be concluded which contained the followings provisions: that the south and north pledge before the world that they will not, under any circumstances, invade each other; that the south and north refrain from interfering in each other's internal affairs; and that the existing Military Armistice Agreement remain in force under any circumstances.³⁰⁾

The basic stand of the Republic of Korea regarding unification, which has been made clear on numerous occasions, was summed up again by President Park in his "Three Major Principles for Peaceful Unification" declared in his Liberation Day message on August 15, 1974. The Principles called for 1) the consolidation of peace on the Korean peninsula through the conclusion of a non-aggression agreement; 2) the sincere conduct of the south-north dialogue, and the opening of mutual doors and restoration of trust between the south and north through multi-faceted exchanges and cooperation; and 3) the realization of unification by means of free general elections held according to the proportions of the indigeneous populations in the south and north under fair election management and supervision.

These three, staged principles for peaceful unification represent the most realistic and rational unification formula that could bring about a great national unity and national unification in an independent and peaceful manner, given the state of territorial division.³¹⁾ In the following, we shall look into the concrete theory of our unification policy based on the Three Major Principles.

2) The Logic of the Three Major Basic Principles for Peaceful Unification

The first stage of the unification policy being pursued by the Republic of Korea government is the consolidation of peace on the Korean peninsula. Since unification of the fatherland can never be achieved if a fratricidal national tragedy like the Korean War recurs, the prevention of the recurrence of war constitutes the surest road to unification. Therefore, since the prevention of recurrence of war and the unification of the fatherland are in essence so closely inter-related as to be nearly identical, there emerges the logic of "consolidation of the peace first, and then unification."

How, then, can peace be consolidated on the Korean peninsula? Professor Kenneth N. Waltz said, "peace is one of the various objectives that should be met simultaneously," explaining that there can be numerous methods of pursuing peace.³²⁾ However, even if there are various ways to reach peace, "peace can," to quote Professor Etzioni once more, be born of the combination of various forces, various systems and various individuals."³³⁾ This indicates that peace can by no means be achieved by any unilateral effort or any single method.

This is especially true of today's situation in south and north Korea. The friction between the south and north has been strained to the extreme due to the intransigence of north Korea, which refuses to abandon its policy of war and revolution. The situation now can be compared to the Richardson Process of Mutually Increasing Hostility.³⁴⁾

In other words, if north Korea builds up its arms and consolidates its mobilization system, south Korea, too, is bound to do likewise in parallel. Such mutual incitement is apt to snowball, leading to increased danger of an armed clash.

Therefore, a systematic apparatus to check such danger is needed. It was to establish just such an apparatus that the Republic of Korea proposed the conclusion of a "south-north non-aggression agreement." Whereas a peace agreement is a measure for post-war disposition a non-aggression agreement is a preventive measure. Since a non-aggression agreement is signed between parties which feel acutely that no war should be

allowed to erupt between them, it naturally requires as an important prerequisite the abandonment of the use of arms between them. Accordingly, a non-aggression agreement is a treaty between the parties concerned based on the logic of coexistence.³⁵⁾

In the following, we shall analyze the contents of our “south-north non-aggression agreement” item by item on the basis of such general logic.³⁶⁾

The prohibition of armed aggression in the first item is the key clause of any non-aggression agreement. This carries the implication that the tasks, issues or disputes existing between the south and north should be solved peacefully without recourse to military action. It accordingly means that there should never be any exercise of arms as a means of achieving one side’s unification policy.

The non-interference in each other’s internal affairs stipulated in the second item concerns political affairs more than military, implying the rationalization of peaceful coexistence. North Korea attempts to interfere in our internal affairs, endlessly instigating and abetting rebellion, riot; revolution, strikes, etc. In the South-North Joint Communiqué of 1972, the south and north agreed “not to slander or defame each other in order to ease tensions and foster an atmosphere of mutual trust between the south and north.” Again at the co-chairmen’s meeting of the South-North Coordinating Committee held on November 2, 1972, it was agreed that the two side would stop slandering or defaming each other effective November 11 of the same year. Nevertheless, only a few months later north Korea resumed its interference in our internal affairs for the purpose of waging psychological warfare.

The continued preservation of the Armistice Agreement provided for in the third item is meant to establish the truce line as a criterion for regulating aggression, and to keep the ceasefire line in force. The continued existence of the truce agreement constitutes a condition essential to the political and legal checking of the danger of the recurrence of war. This

means that only when the Armistice Agreement continues to be enforced can the threat of a military clash or the recurrence of war be removed.

Non-aggression and non-interference in internal affairs can be practiced and effectively guaranteed while the Armistice Agreement remains in force. For, although the truce line is an interim setup, it functions as a kind of “border” in effect separating south and north Korea in a strict sense.

Our proposed south-north non-aggression agreement carries a guarantee for the future in that it stipulates the continued implementation of the Armistice Agreement, while at the same time pursuing the final cessation of the Korean War which occurred in the past. Therefore, the south-north non-aggression agreement we have proposed can be interpreted to embody both a peace agreement closing the door on the past and a non-aggression agreement to prevent war in the future.

Meanwhile, the Republic of Korea government does not oppose the simultaneous entry into the United Nations of both south and north Korea as an additional measure to internationally guarantee the consolidation of the peace on the Korean peninsula. The north Korean Communists denounce our idea of simultaneous U.N. entry as perpetuating the national division. However, simultaneous entry into the U.N. and national division are quite separate issues.

Simultaneous entry into the United Nations by divided countries becomes an effective tool in a peace agreement since it represents both sides mutual acceptance of the international peace order. In the “General Theory of Divided Nations” which seeks solutions to the problems of divided countries through international law, simultaneous entry into the U.N. by divided nations is advocated as an indispensable condition.³⁷⁾

The second stage of our unification policy calls for multi-faceted exchanges and cooperation between south and north Korea. “Exchanges” means the “communication” via materials, personnel and of all other sorts between south and north Korea, while “cooperation” indicates the

course in which such exchanges are implemented through the establishment of a reciprocal system. The realization of such exchanges and cooperation would represent concrete progress in peaceful coexistence between south and north Korea, and serve as an impetus to accelerate national development through the promotion of their common interests. If humanitarian, economic and social exchanges and cooperation materialized between south and north Korea, they would lead to a state similar to de facto unification which, although there would not yet be any unified government, would markedly alleviate the national suffering arising from division. This would also imply that “unification as a continuously progressing process,” if not “unification as a completed state,” was gradually materializing.

The unification policy of the Republic of Korea is that “unification in a feasible sense” be achieved first while putting off, for the time being, “difficult unification,” inasmuch as unification in the sense of establishing a single government could hardly materialize under present circumstances.

Professor Johan Galtung of the International Peace Institute in Oslo once classified the functions of a state into an “upper structure” comprising national defense, finance and foreign policy, and a “lower structure” consisting of other non-political and socio-cultural fields, suggesting the feasibility of exchanges and cooperation within the “lower structure” as a means of gradual realization of the unification of divided countries.

Professor Galtung, applying this theory to the relations between south and north Korea, viewed the unification of Korea “as a course with numerous steps involved in it, rather than as a jump from two beings into a single being.”³⁸⁾

If and when multi-pronged exchanges and cooperation materialize between south and north Korea this way, north Korea would inevitably find itself attracted by our system. The reasons are that, first, the Republic of Korea inherits the historical continuity of the nation; second, it has already been shown in the course of contacts between systems of the East

and West that in the event there emerge exchanges and other contacts between capitalistic systems and the socialistic systems, the socialistic systems tend to be influenced by the superior capitalistic system; and third, north Korea's tightly closed social system has already reached a limit so that it would be obliged to reform either the premodern monolithic ideological system or the self-supplying economic system.

In an international situation in which even the major Communist powers of China and the Soviet Union are obliged to gravitate toward the West, Kim Il-sung's monolithic ideological system would face no alternative but to adopt some modifications, while the north Korean economy, which must be conscious of south Korea's phenomenal economic growth, would be compelled to promote more links with the West.

If the national homogeneity becomes restored this way through multi-pronged exchanges and cooperation between the systems of south and north Korea, then a single government should be established through free general elections in south and north Korea as the third stage in the policy to fulfill the nation's aspirations for unification.

Chapter V. Prospects for South-North Relations

—The Consolidation of Peace in South and North Korea—

The peaceful unification of divided countries means the realization of unification in a peaceful manner, that is, eliminating thoroughly any attempt by either of the two divided parties to absorb or annex the other side by violence or force of arms and resolving the issue of national division so as to realize unification through dialogue and negotiations between the two sides. Therefore, no matter how difficult and long the course of peaceful unification may be, any unification achieved through the conquest of one side by the other through violence or force of arms must be precluded.

Since such peaceful unification, ruling out any violence or force of

arms, is supposed to be achieved by reaching a reasonable mutual consensus through dialogue and negotiations between the two parties, based on the objective realities of their relations, the method employed for such unification should be a peaceful one that does not create any disadvantage for either of the parties and that can aid the common interests they share.

On the Korean peninsula, therefore, the issue of peaceful unification should be “discussed in a way that can invite common responses from both south and north Korea, and that does not cause any sensitive repercussions to either’s national security.”³⁹⁾ In order to build a structure for peace on the Korean peninsula, “the authorities of south and north Korea should at first reach an agreement to prevent war, not to invade each other and to maintain peaceful coexistence effectively, and also should, as a prerequisite, adjust south-north relations in a realistic manner.”⁴⁰⁾ To insure peaceful unification, therefore, the danger of the recurrence of war should be limited to the greatest extent possible, with south and north Korea going through an extended era of peaceful coexistence.

What the Republic of Korea government advocates to this end is a consolidation of the peace through the conclusion of a south-north non-aggression agreement. However, as discussed in the preceding chapter, north Korea refuses to accept this proposition since its adoption would abate the need for “revolution” in south Korea, which constitutes the *raison d’être* of the north Korean workers’ Party.

If all this is so, will north Korea persist in rejecting the consolidation of peace to the end? In the following, the prospects for south-north Korean relations shall be examined with an emphasis on this issue.⁴¹⁾

Since the efforts of the Republic of Korea government to found a secure peace are in accord with the surrounding powers’ detente policy in North-east Asia, those efforts can be interpreted as enjoying the support of the surrounding powers.

Let us look first at the attitude of the United States. Former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger proposed a meeting of the direct parties

to the Korean truce at the 30th U.N. General Assembly session in September 1975, and again on July 22, 1976, suggested a meeting of south and north Korea, the U.S. and Red China, thus appearing to seek an international means of implementing the south's Special Foreign Policy for Peace and Unification of 1973. In his July 1976 address,⁴²⁾ in particular, Secretary Kissinger suggested that "tension should be eased in Asia by producing a lasting legal structure in place of the Armistice Agreement so as to preserve the truce on the Korean peninsula." This was interpreted as an effort to consolidate south-north Korean relations in a stabilized state from the standpoint of international law.

After the inauguration of President Jimmy Carter, no meeting of direct parties to the truce has been discussed by responsible United States policy makers. The Carter Administration rather seems to be handling north Korea as an independent variable for the time being, while maintaining existing relations with south Korea.⁴³⁾

In February 1977, the Carter Administration announced its desire to seek improved relations with north Korea and 13 other countries viewed as potentially hostile or with which the U.S. has yet to enter into diplomatic relations. In March 1977, it lifted the ban on travel to north Korea and several other areas by American citizens. With regard to north Korea's demand for the conclusion of a "peace agreement" with the United States, the new Administration said it would be willing to hold such discussions provided south Korea is invited. All these measures differ in form from the idea of a four-party conference on Korea which the United States had proposed in the past.

How does north Korea respond to such moves by the Carter Administration? As it watched the advent of the Carter Administration, north Korea began around mid-December 1976 switched its terminology for the United States from the previous "American imperialists" or "American imperialist aggressor army" to simply the "United States," "United States of America" or "American forces." In his talks with Japanese Rep. Kuno on January 27, 1977, Kim Il-sung said, "Carter's pledge to pull out

American troops is something desirable.” In February, it was reported that Kim Il-sung sought contacts with Carter through Prime Minister Bhutto of Pakistan. Meanwhile, in a press interview on March 18, 1977, one day after America’s mission to Vietnam arrived in Hanoi, Lee Kye-paek, vice chairman of Chochongryon, a pro-Pyongyang group of Korean residents’ in Japan, said, “The time has come for the United States to review its policy toward Korea.” Nothing that no official contacts had been made between the U.S. and north Korea, Lee said, “We shall attach no conditions to dialogue with the United States. We propose that the two countries discuss all the pending issues including the conclusion of a final peace agreement, the withdrawal of American troops and the improvement of relations between the peoples of the two countries.”

Thus there appears the possibility of a considerable qualitative change in U.S.-north Korea relations. At the moment, however, the United States is maintaining its position that any improvement in its relations with north Korea should be coupled with a parallel improvement in the dialogue and relations between south and north Korea, since the U.S. apparently feel that tensions on the Korean peninsula should be eased through the normalization of relations between south and north Korea. This U.S. policy in essence conforms with the principle of our Special Foreign Policy for Peace and Unification of 1973.

However, north Korea rejects the idea that the conclusion of a peace agreement with the United States should be linked with a normalization of south-north Korean relations. North Korea adheres to the position that signing a “peace agreement” between the U.S. and north Korea represents terminating war on the Korean peninsula, whereas south-north relations are a purely internal matter.

The United States would hardly be able to accept such a contention by north Korea. For it would grow difficult for the United States to maintain or alter the existing Armistice Agreement without south Korea’s participation since, especially given the projected withdrawal of American ground troops from Korea, the status of the Republic of Korea as a

de facto direct party to the Armistice Agreement cannot be denied.

Seen in this context, improved relations between the United States and north Korea could be beneficial to the consolidation of peace on the Korean peninsula, provided that the United States persists in linking its contacts with Pyongyang, to the normalization of south-north Korean relations, and demanding reciprocal recognition of the Republic of Korea by the Soviet Union and China. At the same time, unless north Korea modifies its policy of rejecting the south Korean government, and its scheme to communize the whole of the Korean peninsula, there is a limit to any improvement in U.S.-north Korean relations.

What is the stand of the Soviet Union concerning the consolidation of peace on the Korean peninsula?⁴⁴⁾ If the Soviet Union still adheres to the theory of collective Asian security, calling primarily for the maintenance of the status quo regarding changes in territories made at the end of World War II, it may well be claim that the Soviet Union remains interested in implanting peace on the Korean peninsula. On December 4, 1974, in particular, Soviet Ambassador Malik, in a speech before the U.N. General Assembly, pointed out that north Korea had proposed a “peace agreement” to the United States and another “peace agreement” at the South-North Coordinating Committee, adding that these offers would contribute to the collective security of Asia as well as to the solution of the Korean question. When the Panmunjom axe-murders occurred in August 1976, the Soviet Union did not support north Korea’s position. At the same time, although the Soviet press played up the Non-aligned Summit Conference held that same month, they did not cover the Pyongyang-proposed resolution there. We can also find a sign of the Soviet Union’s concern about the consolidation of peace between south and north Korea in the fact that Premier Kosygin discussed the alleviation of tensions on the Korean peninsula during north Korean premier Park Sung-chol’s visit to Moscow in late January 1977.

Now we shall look at the attitude of Red China.⁴⁵⁾

In August 1971, then Chinese Premier Chou En-lai suggested “de-tente” between the south and north in an interview with James Reston of the New York Times.

Nevertheless, in a joint communique issued by north Korea and Communist China during Kim Il-sung’s visit to Peking in May 1975, north Korea was described as “the only legitimate government” on the Korean peninsula. Still, since Red China is today pursuing full diplomatic relations with the United States in a move to cope with the Soviet Union, Peking is expected to keep pace with the U.S.’s formula for the consolidation of peace on the Korean peninsula. In this respect, our concerns are attracted to how the situation on the Korean peninsula might be taken up or disposed of during the scheduled visit of U.S. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance to China in August.

In conclusion, the United States, China and the Soviet Union share the position that establishing a sound peace on the Korean peninsula will contribute fundamentally to peace in Asia as well as to detente between the United States and the Soviet Union and/or between the United States and China. But, due to the continuing Sino-Soviet dispute, neither the Soviet Union nor Red China is in a position to pressure north Korea onto the track of detente.

Thus seen, the Republic of Korea’s policy for the consolidation of peace cannot help but be accepted internationally, and north Korea will eventually be compelled to submit to it.

Chapter VI. Conclusion

Unification of the nation is a historical challenge which we can never abandon. If the diligent and brilliant homogeneous 35 million south Koreans and 15 million north Koreans achieve unification and work vigorously for development at home and abroad, we shall never fall behind any other Asian country, and shall rather be able to assume a leading role in the Asian region.

Still, we can hardly accept national unification as a supreme order that must be achieved at any cost, even another tragic fratricidal war. Here, then lies the logical basis on which the theory of “one generation’s sacrifice” for unification must be rejected.

Therefore, south-north Korean relations and national unification must be regulated by peace in every respect. In other words, unification should be achieved not by war but by peaceful means. Our Republic of Korea, maintaining the nation’s historical continuity, shall pursue the road to peaceful unification with wisdom and courage, guided by a firm determination to reach the final goal. To this end, the guarantee of peace on the Korean peninsula and the restoration of mutual trust must receive the first priority.

All in all, north Korea should return to the Three Major Principles for Unification—“independence,” “peace” and “great national unity”—solemnly spelled out in the South-North Joint Communique of 1972. Only when north Korea returns to this starting point shall the chapter of national unification begin.

Footnotes:

- 1) National Unification Board, “Will to Peaceful Unification,” 1975, p. 10.
- 2) Ibid, p. 135.
- 3) For an analysis of this series of incidents, see B.C. Koh, “The *Pueblo* Incident in Perspective,” *Asian Survey*, Vol. IX, No. 4, April 1969, pp. 264–280.
- 4) President Park Chung Hee’s “Instructions Concerning Temporary Duty in Special Zone,” April 26, 1972, issued in response to Central Intelligence Agency Director Lee Hu-rak’s “Application for Special Temporary Duty,” April 24, 1972, pp. 1–3.
- 5) “Comparison of the Two Sides’ Speeches at the Pyongyang Meeting,” May 2–5, 1972.
- 6) “Comparison of the Two Sides’ Speeches at the Seoul Meeting,” May 29–June 1, 1972.
- 7) For the full text of this Resolution, see United Nations *Bulletin*, August 1, 1950, p. 94.
- 8) Hahm Pyong-choon, “From A Client-State to An Ally: U.S. Korean Relations,” *Journal of Korean Affairs*, Vol. III, No. 3 (October 1973), p. 39.
- 9) For unfolding of similar logic, see Kim Sam-kyu, “A Formula for Accelerating National Conciliation as Seen from the Perspective of Overseas Residents,” *Unification Policy*, Vol. I, No. 3, October 1975, p. 83.

- 10) President Park's Special Statement on the Occasion of the Third Anniversary of the South-North Joint Communiqué, "Will to Peaceful Unification," pp. 29-30.
- 11) For the following discussion, see: P. H. Vigor, *The Soviet View of War, Peace and Neutrality* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1975).
- 12) This contention of Kim Il-sung was well revealed in his address at the Ali Arehan Social Science Academy in Indonesia on April 14, 1965. For the full text of the speech, see *Juche! The Speeches and Writings of Kim Il Sung*, Foreword by Eldridge Cleaver, Edited and Introduced by Li Yuk-sa (New York: Grossman Publishers, 1972), pp. 21-64.
- 13) The following can be cited as a sharp logical analysis of that contradiction: Young C. Kim, "North Korea's Reunification Policy: A Magnificent Obsession?" *Journal of Korean Affairs*, Vol. III, No. 4, January 1974, pp. 20-21.
- 14) Lee Young-il, "A Basis for the Promotion of the Unification of Korea," Report: *The first Joint Conference of the Korean Political Science Association and the Association of Korean Political Scientists in North America*, 1975, p. 567.
- 15) For the unfolding of similar logic, see Kim Sam-kyu, "Formula for Accelerating National Conciliation as Seen from the Perspective of Overseas Residents," p. 85.
- 16) Radio Pyongyang broadcast, January 25, 1977. m
- 17) Kim Chang-sun, "The Strategic Meaning of the Proposal for a 'Political Conference,'" *Pukhan*, No. 63, March 1977, pp. 43-44.
- 18) North Korea's strategy toward the south has been analyzed in numerous documents. This paper used the following as its primary references: B.C. Koh, *The Foreign Policy of North Korea* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1969), Ch. 4; Hak-joon Kim, *The Unification Policy of South and North Korea, 1948-1976: A Comparative Study* (Seoul: National University, 1977), pp. 207-226.
- 19) The Unification Training Institute of the National Unification Board, "Democratic Unification" (1976), p. 346 or Min Byung-suk, "A Study of North Korea's Unification Policy: Hostility or Rapprochement?" *Reprot: The First Joint Conference of the Korean Political Science Association and the Association of Korean Political Scientists in North America*, Seoul, 1975, pp. 276-280.
- 20) After the 81-nation Communist Party Congress held in Moscow in December 1960 defined Communist movements in underdeveloped countries as "national democratic revolutions," the Workers' Party of north Korea, in its Fourth Party Convention, defined the nature of the "revolution in south Korea" as a "national liberation democratic revolution." There is no difference whatsoever between the two. For a comparison, see Yu Se-hui, "A Diagnosis of the Possibility of North Korea Applying a People's Revolutionary Strategy to South Korea," *Unification Policy*, Vol. I, No. 2, June 1975, pp. 197-199.
- 21) The Unification Training Institute of the National Unification Board, "Democratic Unification," p. 347.
- 22) Yu Se-hui, "A Diagnosis of the Possibility of North Korea Applying a People's Revolutionary Strategy to South Korea," pp. 210-214.
- 23) For the proposed confederation system of north Korea, see "Rodong Shinmun," August 16, 1960; *The People's Korea*, June 27, 1973.
- 24) For criticism of north Korea's proposed confederation system, see Pyong-choon Hahm, "Federalism: A Means for the National Unification of Korea," *The Journal of Asiatic Studies*, Vol. VIII, No. 4, December 1970, p. 352; Kang Young-hun, "The Theory and Reality of North Korea's Peaceful Unification Policy," Report at a Seminar Evaluating North Korea's Peaceful Unification Policy, held

- under the sponsorship of the Far East Affairs Research Institute, Kyungnam University, June 1977.
- 25) Amitai Etzioni, *Political Unification: A Comparative Study of Leaders and Forces*, New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965, pp. 93-94.
 - 26) It was in a resolution of the Supreme People's Council on March 25, 1974, that north Korea first proposed the conclusion of a "peace agreement" with the United States.
 - 27) Min Pyong-chon, "North Korea's Approach to the U.S. and Its Peace Offensive," *Pukhan*, No. 46, October 1975, pp. 77-78; Park Chae-kyu, "Underlying Motives of North Korea's Proposal for Conclusion of a Peace Agreement with U.S.," Report at a Seminar Evaluating North Korea's Peaceful Unification Policy, held under the sponsorship of the Far East Affairs Research Institute, Kyungnam University, June 1977.
 - 28) Vigor, *The Soviet View of War, Peace and Neutrality*, pp. 170-173.
 - 29) National Unification Board, "Will to Peaceful Unification," pp. 16-18.
 - 30) Ibid, pp. 19-22.
 - 31) Each of these Three Major Principles were analyzed in the following theses: Kim Young-jun, "Analysis and Prospects of Three Principles for Peace," *Sedae*, No. 135, October 1974, pp. 160-169; Kim Hak-joon, "The Holding of Free General Elections and the South-North Issue," *Sedae*, No. 135, October 1974, pp. 170-179; Lee Ki-taek, "Principles for Peaceful Unification and the U.N. General Assembly," *Sedae*, No. 135, October 1974, pp. 180-187.
 - 32) Kenneth N. Waltz, *Man, The State and War: A Theoretical Analysis* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1954), p. 2.
 - 33) Amitai Etzioni, *The hard Way to Peace: A New Strategy* (New York: Collier Books, 1962), p. 12.
 - 34) Kenneth E. Boulding, *Conflict and Defense: A General Theory* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1960), p. 143; L. F. Richardson, *Arms and Insecurity* (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1960)
 - 35) Min Pyong-chon, "A Study of the Logic of a South-North Non-Aggression Agreement," Unification Policy, Vol. III, No. 1 (Spring 1977), pp. 61-62.
 - 36) Ibid, pp. 65-66.
 - 37) Kim Jun-hui, "The Statutory Nature of the Korean Unification Issue Seen from the General Theory of Divided Countries," Unification Policy, Vol. I, No. 2 (Summer 1975), pp. 85-115.
 - 38) Johan Galtung, "Divided Nations as a Process: One State, Two States, and In-between: The Case of Korea," a paper presented at the International Conference on the Unification of Korea, Kyoto, August 14-17, 1972, p. 5.
 - 39) Lee Tong-bok, "The Significance of a South-North Non-Aggression Agreement See from Negotiation Theory," Unification Policy, Volume III, No. 1 (Spring 1977), p. 74.
 - 40) Yun Kyung-tae, "The Rationality of the Proposal for a South-North Non-Aggression Agreement," Unification Policy, Vol. II, No. 2, 1970, p. 50.
 - 41) Here the author relied chiefly on the following study: Park Pong-shik, "An Evaluation of South and North Korean Attitudes toward Methods of Consolidating Peace," Unification Policy, Vol. III, No. 1, 1977, pp. 52-53 and pp. 57-59.
 - 42) "Proposal of Secretary of State Henry Kissinger for a Four-Power Korean Conference, July 22, 1976," *Korean Unification: Source Material with an Introduction* (Seoul: Research Center for Peace and Unification, 1977), pp. 416-418

- 43) For the development of U.S.-North Korean relations after the inauguration of the Carter Administration, see Park Pong-shik, "Prospects for U.S.-North Korean Relations," Third Unification Forum Theme Thesis, May 26, 1977, pp. 2-8.
- 44) Park Pong-shik, "An Evaluation of South and North Korean Attitudes toward Methods of Consolidating Peace," p. 58; Kim Hak-joon, "A Discussion of Policy toward Korea by the USSR," *Seoul Pyongnon*, No. 98, October 2, 1975, pp. 10-15.
- 45) Kim Hak-joon, "The Korean Question and International Politics," Seoul, Pak-yongsa, 1975, pp. 215-218.

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Causes of Stalemate of South-North Dialogue, and Conditions for Its Normalization

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In this paper, Prof. Park Pong-shik maintains that the north Korean side first regarded the south-north dialogue as a means of facilitating their policies for so-called "three major revolutionary capabilities" and for bolstering "revolutionary capability in south Korea." According to the professor, however, the north Koreans have begun to shun the dialogue after the inferiority of their system was exposed through the south-north contacts. Prof. Park predicts that the north Korean side will return to the forum of dialogue only when it sees no chance for victory in war—Ed.

Chapter I Dialogue Seen from the South and the North

In the world of politics, the definition of terminology differs depending on the realm to which it belongs.

The meaning of the word "dialogue" is no exception. Whereas we regard "dialogue" as "a means of facilitating gradual removal of the artificial barrier existing between south and north Korea,"¹⁾ north Korea seeks to exploit it as "a means of bolstering the revolutionary force of south Korea by awakening politically and binding together strongly the south Korean people."²⁾

As can be perceived here, the south, for the moment, recognizes the existence of the north, its counterpart, whereas the north is acting upon a theory that denies the existence of the south. This has been the very cause of the fatal difficulties through which the "dialogue" between the south and north has had to proceed.

The same applies to such terminology as “peace,” “freedom,” “democracy” and “unification.” It is not known in many cases that these words, more commonly used in the north, carry different concepts from those we understand.

Let us take, for example, the word “unification.” We believe that if and when the people divided in the south and north can live together, they will represent a unified state. The north, however, does not accept this simple definition, arguing that “the issue of unification of the fatherland cannot be solved merely by mechanically unifying the divided land and people, but should carry the characteristics of revolution for people’s liberation in which the American imperialists’ colonial rule of south Korea can be done away with and the entire land can be liberated completely.”³⁾ In this way, north Korea defines unification as a state in which the incumbent system of south Korea is destroyed, and in which the north Korean system controls both south and north Korea.

In the case of the “south-north confederation system,” also, there are many instances in which people become prepossessed with the general theoretical interpretation of this terminology, the very trend which north Korea is exploiting. The term “south-north confederation system” in use in north Korea is employed in connection with their concept of the “unification” of the present states of south and north Korea. That is, north Korea uses this terminology as an interim step toward its version of “unification,” providing no room for any other interpretation. In other words, the north’s stand is that the “south-north confederation system” is by no means designed to maintain the coexistence of two systems or perpetuate division,⁴⁾ but is an interim state directed toward the north’s version of “unification,” and since it is only interim, the shorter it is, the better.

In this way, the “confederation system” the north advocates is not an optional confederation, but a system designed in every respect to serve the single goal of the unification of the whole Korean peninsula under communism. Under the circumstances, even if there is a more reasonable federal system in theory, the north is bound to reject it outright if it is not

serviceable for its cause. It is basically for this reason that the north Koreans have been boycotting the operation of the South-North Coordinating Committee.

Thus seen, our experience in contacts with the north, though they be short and limited, has enabled us to realize keenly that their terminology, particularly that in frequent use, contains intense political demands and, at the same time, carries political implications quite different from our usages.

Chapter II The South-North Dialogue in the Peace and Unification Policy of the Republic of Korea

The unification policy of the Republic of Korea should first be explained with respect to two aspects.

The first is whether our unification policy is fully realistic to the extent that it can foster our nationalism in the reality of the two-tier system of politics on the Korean peninsula. The other is whether our peace and unification policy can be a formula that can satisfy the nation's will for unification.

Above all, the problem is with the realistic nature of our peace and unification policy, and we shall discuss its highlights.

In essence, our unification policy calls for peaceful coexistence based on bona fide competition between south and north Korea.

The policy for coexistence based on lasting peace, and for peaceful unification, is spelled out in the Special Foreign Policy for Peace and Unification announced June 23, 1973 and the Three Basic Principles for Peaceful Unification declared by President Park Chung Hee in his Liberation Day message on August 15, 1974.

The Special Foreign Policy for Peace and Unification places emphasis on the creation of international conditions for lasting peace and coexistence between south and north Korea, while the Three Basic Principles for

Peaceful Unification propose the conclusion of a mutual non-aggression agreement between the south and north as a basis for the recognition of each other's existence, the opening of doors to each other and restoration of mutual trust through multi-pronged exchanges and cooperation, and free general elections between south and north Korea as a means of unification.

An analysis of this peaceful unification policy shows that it is designed 1) to forestall a recurrence of fratricidal tragedy through the consolidation of peace, 2) to insure and foster a sense of national unity and homogeneity through exchanges and cooperation, and 3) to create a realistic opportunity for national unification in the midst of the two-tier system of politics on the Korean peninsula.

Thus seen, the south-north dialogue plays an important role in our unification policy.

If we view this with the understandings that politics on the Korean peninsula are developing amidst the reality of Big Power politics, symbolized by the nation's division along the 38th Parallel, and of the hostile relations existing between south and north Korea, the hopes for peaceful unification lie only in an easing of power politics and a switch in south-north relations from hostility to friendship.

The hostility between south and north Korea has tended to become more restrained at time, accordings to the demands of power politics. Should power politics become too rigid on the Korean peninsula, the politics of the Korean people would inevitably become restricted. On the other hand, if power politics were eased unilaterally, still leaving the hostility between south and north Korea or encouraging such hostility, fratricidal conflict would recur. Ideally, therefore, if the pressures of power politics were to recede in parallel with a reduction in south-north hostility and movement foward peaceful coexistence, the Korean people's political contacts through dialogue and exchanges would be enhanced.

Under the circumstances, if we wish to shun a war, there is no alternative

but to promote peaceful coexistence through dialogue and exchanges based on lasting peace, in view of the reality of the two-tier system of politics on the Korean peninsula. Of course the major powers having a stake in the Korean peninsula will not wait indefinitely for the time when south and north Korea can prepare a basis for their peaceful coexistence, but will move rather in accordance with their own political logic. Sino-Soviet strife, changes in the U.S.-China relations and the projected withdrawal of American ground forces from Korea . . . all these will inevitably affect the basic frame of the politics on the Korean peninsula.

In this respect, the consolidation of peace on the Korean peninsula is not for the purpose of conforming to the policies of the major powers, that merely to maintain the status quo, but rather represents a method for south and north Korea—which would emerge as the new political heroes on the Korean peninsula with the flexibility of policy of the world powers—to safeguard the national entity of their own accord. At the same time, a deep-rooted peace on the peninsula is indispensable to maintaining and further developing a firm sense of national self-determination and self-reliance, a stance that cannot be shaken by any vagaries of world politics. For a war between south and north Korea, caused by the schemes of power politics or confrontation between south and north Korea, would certainly lead to a new type of power politics on the Korean peninsula or the destruction of the national entity.

As seen in the foregoing, our peace and unification policy embodying the consolidation of peace and peaceful coexistence is the most realistic stand in view of the two-tier structure of politics on the Korean peninsula and the reality of south-north relations.

Now we shall study the second issue—whether the method for the consolidation of peace is satisfactory to the pursuit of the national determination for unification.

This question has already been answered in part in the discussion of the aspect of the method's reality. While the consolidation of peace is not

the shortest route to national unification, it is definitely the best path available to avoid the destruction of the nation.

Nevertheless, the north perceives the consolidation of peace as stagnation, denouncing it as an attempt to eternalize national division. But such negativism derives from its rejection of the Status quo that would come in the form of dialogue and exchanges based upon the consolidation of peace. The fact that a consolidated peace will not lead to perpetual national division can be evidenced by the following two points.

First, even if south and north Korea join the United Nations simultaneously, it would not perpetuate the national division, and second, if dialogue and exchanges could be developed upon the consolidation of peace, really dynamic relations of a national dimension might develop between south and north Korea.

The north rejects the Special Foreign Policy for Peace and Unification as nation-splitting. But the fact that the south and north's simultaneous entry into the United Nations would not perpetuate the national division can be buttressed by the case of Syria and Egypt, which encountered no problems at all when they inaugurated the United Arab Republic in a peaceful manner in every respect.

If the north is really interested in peaceful unification, there is no reason why it cannot join the United Nations together with us. Were peaceful unification to be realized after simultaneous entry, a unified government could be created with the blessings of all U.N. member countries.

Now we shall see that the consolidation of peace does not represent a stagnation of the nation's will to reunify.

The consolidation of peace means peaceful coexistence between south and north Korea, and peaceful coexistence, in turn, means a competitive coexistence through exchanges and cooperation between the south and north. In other words, if a non-aggression agreement is concluded with both south and north abiding by it sincerely, peace would be consolidated with the military sector having been stabilized. In this event, we could ex-

pect peaceful competition in all other fields as well. This peaceful competition might sometimes get too heated, jeopardizing its good intentions. If this state were to too far, we can even foresee the non-aggression agreement losing its force. Going a step further, we can also anticipate events in which one side, feeling defeated in peaceful, bona fide competition, might attempt to resort to the force of arms.

In this way, the consolidation of peace means a discontinuity between the south and north so far as the military is concerned, namely the checking of any military clash between south and north Korea. But in all other sectors, it would lead to maximized exchanges and cooperation. Logically, therefore, the sense of national integrity could be enhanced to the greatest extent possible, and all fields except politics would see personal and other exchanges realized nearly to the extent seen in a single state.

Few would deny the logic that with the realization of territorial and political integration put off till a later date, the integration, or unification, of all other sectors could be realized within the frame of a consolidated peace. Were common national sentiments between south and north to become intense through exchanges and cooperation, the possibility exists that the sense of national integration would become so firmly rooted in all fields except politics and the military that a side which abandoned exchanges and cooperation in to order to resort to arms would be condemned as traitorous. In this event, the side trying to cut off the systematized exchanges and cooperation by force of arms would have to be prepared to face considerable resistance.

Inasmuch as, in this way, the consolidation of peace represents competitive coexistence embodying dialogue and systematized exchanges and cooperation, it is obvious that such a peace would by no means lead to perpetual national division or any stagnation in the progress of national Unification.

Moreover, the point cannot be overlooked that the pursuit of a policy of peaceful unification would broaden the avenue of national self-deter-

mination. In other words, the consolidation of peace between south and north Korea is indispensable not because of the maintenance of the status quo by world powers. Rather, a consolidated peace and peaceful coexistence would weaken the *raison d'être* for the world powers' presence on the Korean peninsula, and thus contribute to the lessening of their confrontation here.

Consequently, dialogue and the systematization of exchanges and cooperation by means of the consolidation of peace would contribute that much more to national unification, and further represent a broadened realm of national self-reliance and self-determination.

Chapter III. South-North Dialogue in North Korea's Unification Policy

As was pointed out in the preceding Chapter, the term "south-north dialogue" here refers to all possible peaceful contacts between south and north Korea.

The standing of the south-north dialogue in the unification policy of north Korea, as discussed in the beginning, is linked to their policy for a so-called "people's democratic revolution" in south Korea, as was made clear in the policy for "base for democracy" and the concept of "three major revolutionary capabilities," and at the Fifth Party Congress held in November 1970.

In a speech at Indonesia's Ali Aluham Social Science Academy in April 1965, Kim Il-sung stated, "The basic policy for revolution in south Korea at the present stage is to preserve revolutionary forces from the enemy's persecution and to constantly accumulate and develop them to prepare for the upcoming great revolutionary program." A north Korean radio commentary in October 1968 also said, "Unification of the fatherland in our country means unification contingent on a revolution in south Korea. Revolution in south Korea would flare up on account of the contradictions within south Korea itself, and it is up to the south Korean people to accomplish such a revolution . . . Therefore, revolution in south

Korea cannot be replaced by socialistic construction in the northern half, nor can the people of the northern half wage the south Korean people's struggles on their behalf . . . Inasmuch as the issue of revolution in south Korea is raised separately, it should be distinguished from the unification of the fatherland.”⁵⁾

“Revolution in south Korea” in this reference means a “people’s democratic revolution” in south Korea. This concept was made clear at the Fifth Congress of the Workers’ (Communist) Party, where it was stated, “Revolution in south Korea would be a struggle by the south Korean people intended to free themselves from class persecution and exploitation. Persecuted and exploited people can achieve freedom and liberation only through their own revolutionary struggles. Therefore, revolution in south Korea should be waged mainly by the south Korean people themselves.” The Congress was quick to suggest that revolutionary struggles in south Korea would of course be aided by the revolutionary base in north Korea, asserting that, “The people of the southern half will not be alone in their revolutionary struggles . . . They have a great revolutionary base in the northern half. The people of the northern half, as the same people, have the obligation and responsibility for positively assisting revolutionary struggles by the south Korean people.”⁶⁾ In this way, the north made clear its strategy for instigating a people’s democratic revolution in south Korea with assistance from the revolutionary base in the north.

It was in this strategic stance that “Comrade Kim Il-sung appraised the fast changing situations within and without, set forth epochal formulas for unification of the fatherland again, and wisely guided our party and people, registering fresh progress in the struggles for the independent and peaceful unification of the fatherland. . . . The stand of our party is to achieve south-north unification peacefully and independently on the principle of democracy.” A concrete policy formula based on this guideline came on April 12, 1971 in the form of an eight-point unification formula announced by Huh Dam, foreign minister, at the Fifth Plenary Session of

the Fourth Supreme Council. On August 6 the same year, Kim Il-sung argued in his speech at a Pyongyang citizens' rally welcoming Cambodia's Prince Sihanouk, "Apart from the issue of whether or not south Korean authorities accept our eight-point formula for peaceful unification, why are they afraid of south-north contacts and negotiations if they are really interested in unification of the country?" By discussing "south Korean authorities" as an object of negotiations, the north came to respond to our repeated appeals for dialogue and negotiations made ever since President Park's first such proposal in his Liberation Day message in August 1970.

Of course, Huh Dam's eight-point formula and Kim Il-sung's speech above, as the north itself explained, were intended to promote "revolution in south Korea" as a prelude to unification under communism, while responding to detente between the United States and Red China,⁷⁾ so as to achieve unification "peacefully" by forming a confederation system in collaboration with a "people's democratic regime" to be born of a revolution in the south. This is the current unification policy of north Korea, and the north believes that the south-north dialogue should serve this objective.

Chapter IV. South-North Dialogue as Southward Strategy of North Korea

In this Chapter we shall study north Korea's unification policy and strategy against the south as revealed in the south-north dialogue, with emphasis on the north's attitudes revealed in the course of the dialogue.

The north's political stance during the course of the south-north dialogue was best manifested in the South-North Red Cross Conference. This is because the issue of reuniting the families is basically a humanitarian problem, and therefore the north's political scheming was relatively difficult to conceal at those meetings.

The north's strategy at the Red Cross talks was best manifested in its lack of interest in the humanitarian program. In this connection, a few

examples can be cited as follows:

First, in the course of the preliminary meetings of the South-North Red Cross Conference, the northern side sought to include friends in the scope of the “family searching campaign” as a topic at the full-dress meetings.

When the historic first preliminary meeting of the south and north Korean Red Cross delegations was held on September 20, 1971, the north suggested the following three issues as topics for the full-dress meetings:

“First, the issue of facilitating free travel and mutual visits by families, relatives and friends dispersed in the south and north,

“Second, the issue of facilitating the free exchange of letters between families, relatives and friends dispersed in the south and north, and

“Third, the issue of finding and reuniting the families dispersed in the south and north.”⁸⁾

It was not reasonable to include friends in the scope of the talks in view of both the original purport of the proposal made by the Republic of Korea National Red Cross on August 12, 1971, for a campaign to search for dispersed families in the south and north, and prevailing international Red Cross practices in searching for missing persons.

The preliminary meeting stalled for more than six months over the north’s insistence on including “friends” practically unrelated to the concept of Red Cross programs.

A second example is the attitude of the north Korean Red Cross delegates. Kim Tae-hui, chief north Korean delegate, made the following remarks in a press conference held in Pyongyang on September 16, 1972, upon his return from Seoul, where he had attended the second South-North Red Cross Conference meeting:

“Seoul’s citizens and all other south Korean people whom we met invariably held the Leader in high esteem, receiving us warmly not as mere Red Cross delegates but as a mission for unification personally sent

by the Leader. They welcomed us heartily everywhere.”

As can be seen here, they behaved not as Red Cross delegates, but as emissaries for unification sent by Kim Il-sung. From the beginning, therefore, they expressed no interest in a humanitarian solution of the issue of 10 million dispersed family members in the south and north.

The third example concerns an issue related to the so-called prerequisites which the north set forth in connection with the Red Cross talks.

At the third full-dress meeting held in Pyongyang on October 24, 1972, the north Korean Red Cross side offered the following four demands in connection with Topic No. 1, “the issue of finding and informing thereof the whereabouts and fate of the families and relatives dispersed in the south and north.”

1. That south Korea remove all statutory and social obstacles and create such conditions and atmosphere as can enable all persons concerned and assistants to express views and behave democratically and freely.

2. That both sides send proper numbers of Red Cross exponents, to each others’ sites.

3. That the scope of the families and relatives dispersed in the south and north be determined at the request of those involved, and that the method of finding their whereabouts and fate, and of informing others thereof, be determined according to the democratic requests and freely expressed views of those involved.

4. That a joint south-north Red Cross committee be formed and Red Cross representative offices be established at necessary places.⁹⁾

These propositions by the north Korean Red Cross had nothing to do with a concrete discussion of the topics. The north laid down social and political conditions as prerequisites. Inasmuch as the Red Cross’ programs, being purely humanitarian, can be carried out even between warring parties, it was quite unreasonable to demand social and statutory conditions as prerequisites.

In particular, to demand repeal of the Anti-Communist Law, for example, as a statutory condition, and the discontinuation of anti-Communist policies, anti-Communist education and anti-Communist activities and propaganda in order to remove social obstacles, was an apparent act of interference in internal affairs, and ran counter to the spirit of the South-North Joint Communiqué of 1972, which called for transcending differences in ideologies, ideas and systems.

Again at the sixth full-dress meeting held in Seoul May 9–10, 1973, the north Korean side made a four-point proposal for “the improvement of environmental conditions” which included: 1) repeal of the Anti-Communist Law, National Security Law and other existing anti-Communist provisions; 2) a ban on anti-Communist activities and dissolution of anti-Communist organizations; 3) guarantees of freedom and convenience for delegates and assistants and the granting of inviolable rights concerning personal belongings; and 4) guarantees of cooperation by political parties, social organizations, public organizations and individuals.¹⁰⁾

If things had reached such a stage, they would have moved beyond the realm of the Red Cross talks, no longer able to pursue a solution to the original humanitarian question.

The north Korean Red Cross moved a step further at the seventh full-dress meeting in Pyongyang July 11–12, 1973, when it suggested that the south and north Korean Red Cross delegations issue a “joint statement” calling for the repeal of the Anti-Communist Law and National Security Law as well as the dissolution of anti-Communist organizations.¹¹⁾

A fourth example of north Korea’s lack of humanitarian concern is the suggestion to send Red Cross exponents to each other’s respective sites.

As mentioned above, this proposition was made at the third full-dress meeting of the South-North Red Cross Conference. At the sixth full-dress meeting, held in Seoul May 9–10, 1973, the north Korean Red Cross

delegation, putting aside the Topic No. 1 program, proposed that one “exponent” be sent to each *ri* or *dong* for the purpose of “explaining Red Cross programs,” demanding that such persons be assured of freedom of all activities such as speech, publication, assembly and travel, and that inviolable rights be granted them regarding their own safety and that of their personal belongings.¹²⁾

If one exponent were to be sent to each *ri* or *dong*, it would mean that some 33,000 such persons would be needed to cover south Korea alone. Granting such a large number of persons complete freedom of conduct would be tantamount to repealing the anti-Communist laws.

Lastly, we shall look into the north Korean side’s suggestion that the scope of families and relatives subject to the family searching campaign be determined at the request of those involved, and that the search for the whereabouts and fates of dispersed families and relatives be made directly by those involved traveling freely to the other side.¹³⁾

Although this point was raised at the sixth full-dress meeting, the question of “free travel” was first suggested at the preliminary meetings.

The problem here was that the northern side denied the practical necessity for Red Cross procedures such as confirmation in addition to the request by those directly involved. The idea of “free travel” in the other’s area may sound plausible, but it was because the reality of the situation did not allow such free travel that the Red Cross talks were initiated.

North Korea itself well knows that due to its abolition of the family registration system and the frequent movement of residents, one would require assistance from local official even if he were to go “freely” to his hometown of 20 or more years before. This is why the Republic of Korea Red Cross proposed that the task of finding persons, whereabouts and fates be undertaken by the other side’s Red Cross. Notwithstanding, the north rejected any intervention by the Red Cross and stuck to the unrealistic and unfeasible demand that those involved be allowed to find the whereabouts and fate of their families or relatives in person.

The examples cited above do not by any means represent all of the problems encountered in the course of the Red Cross talks. What these examples unarguably point to, however, is that the north in effect denied the other side in the course of the talks despite the condition established at their outset that the authorities of the two sides or the Korean peninsula be recognized as the direct parties to the talks, and despite the northern side's affirmative response to our side's proposal for the talks specifically under such conditions.

A typical example was the north's demand that the Republic of Korea National Red Cross, its opposite party in the Red Cross talks, agree to the north's call for the repeal of the Anti-Communist Law. At the same time, by asserting that "the supreme humanitarianism in our country is the unification of the fatherland. . . unification would settle everything once and for all. The Red Cross should exert all efforts to this end,"¹⁴ the north made it abundantly clear that, from the outset, its objective lay not in the Red Cross talks but in a "project to advance unification of the fatherland" (press interview by Kim Tae-hui on July 13, 1973), that is, to support a so-called people's democratic revolution in south Korea.

The attempt to exploit the south-north dialogue as a means to a political end, namely, "unification under communism," applied to the meetings of the South-North Coordinating Committee as well.

Contrary to the Seoul side's call for the dissolution of distrust and the restoration of national homogeneity between south and north through the opening up of their respective societies and the gradual expansion of personal and material exchanges, the Pyongyang side came up with a theory for the prior settlement of military issues aimed at laying the groundwork for another armed invasion of the south.

Since the early 1960's, north Korea has been building up its military strength under its "four major military paths," seeking a "decisive opportunity" to unleash an armed attack against the south. In parallel with the arms build up, it has been demanding the withdrawal of American forces from Korea, a ban on the introduction of weapons and military

reduction to less than 100,000 men on each side, steps that would leave us unilaterally disarmed.

As can be assessed from the foregoing, north Korea's strategy has been to accept south Korean authorities as the other side during talks and then to enforce the disarmament or dissolution of the system of the other side in the course of the dialogue. By coming to the conference table, the north sought to foster a "people's revolutionary force" in south Korea through the dialogue, while making itself appear responsive to a change in the situation, namely, the change in U.S.-Red Chinese relations.

The conditions and atmosphere which the north has insisted on creating are not for Red Cross humanitarian programs but for "revolution in south Korea."

Chapter V. Internal and External Causes of the Suspension of the South-North Dialogue

The south-north dialogue was suspended by the so-called "Kim Young-ju Statement" of August 28, 1973. The statement concluded by attacking the Special Foreign Policy of June 23, 1973 as a "two-Korea policy" which it said violated the principles of the South-North Joint Communiqué, and demanded the replacement of Seoul's delegates to the dialogue with others who "oppose the perpetuation of national division and are genuinely interested in peaceful unification."

It is apparent that north Korea must have believed, first that, apart from the content of the dialogue, the mere fact that a dialogue was in progress and that the incumbent south and north Korean authorities themselves were involved in that dialogue could have been viewed externally as having made the coexistence of south and north Korea a fait accompli, and, second, that the Special Foreign Policy of June 23, 1973, coupled with the dialogue, could speedily create an atmosphere facilitating the simultaneous entry into the United Nations of both south and north Korea. The concern of world opinion over the south-north dialogue

in Korea can be perceived by the fact that the 28th General Assembly of the United Nations in November 1973 adopted a Consensus Statement urging the resumption of the dialogue.

Not long after the initiation of the dialogue north Korea concluded that in view of the method involved and the nature of the other side, the dialogue was hardly a feasible means to advance its strategy toward the south; that is, to bring about the withdrawal of American forces from Korea and foster revolutionary elements in south Korea. The north thus began to seek an opportunity and an excuse to break off the dialogue.

North Korea originally believed that if a south-north dialogue began, it would be able to remove the *raison d'être* of the U.S. military in Korea and, in the course of the dialogue, establish the appropriate legal conditions and atmosphere for bolstering revolutionary forces designed to overthrow the south Korean system. However, the north was not of a mind to carry on the dialogue once such wishful thinking dissipated, apparently believing that the dialogue served only to consolidate an understanding of south-north coexistence in the world community, all to the detriment of its basic strategy.

In fact, north Korea had to suspend the dialogue at the earliest possible opportunity: the north had no interest in humanitarian projects from the outset of the South-North Red Cross Conference; it feared that the structure of the South-North Coordinating Committee might eliminate the grounds for its long-standing proposal for a south-north confederation system; and, as pointed out above, a functional dialogue between south and north Korean authorities would make coexistence a *fait accompli*.

A thread of life remains in the South-North Red Cross Conference to date, although at a rather perfunctory "working-level" echelon, because the north believes the Red Cross talks may well be regarded as non-governmental contact; it fails to find any convincing excuse to break them off completely because it is a Red Cross contact; and it feels the need to maintain a channel for the resumption of the dialogue, should that become necessary or unavoidable as a result of future changes in the situation.

We shall observe the north's attitude toward the dialogue by looking into its attempts to torpedo the south-north talks prior to the Kim Young-joo Statement.

In his speech at the rally welcoming Sihanouk on April 6, 1973, Kim Il-sung said, "Originally coexistence was an issue to be raised between different peoples with different social and political systems. If coexistence is applied to the same people, it will bring about naught but the perpetuation of the split." In this way, Kim Il-sung cautioned against the possibility of continued south-north dialogue leading to a system of coexistence between south and north Korea.

Since he believed that the South-North Coordinating Committee, as a tool of the dialogue, would not serve his objectives and would eliminate the basis for his strategy as well, Kim Il-sung presented the following way to suspend or paralyze the functions of the Coordinating Committee.

"We believe that if the present south-north dialogue does not progress smoothly, it would be better for persons in broader fields of the south and north to get together and solve the unification issue rather than raising pros and cons between only the authorities of the north and the south. In this connection, we can either expand the scope of the program of the South-North Coordinating Committee to include representatives of all political parties and social organizations as well as persons in all walks of life, or convene a separate political conference between the representatives of all political parties and social organizations and persons of all walks of life in the south and north, apart from the South-North Coordinating Committee."

Again on June 23 of the same year, when he was meeting with Czechoslovak Party Secretary Husak, Kim Il-sung said, "The south-north dialogue is not progressing smoothly, and great difficulties lie ahead of unification. The south-north dialogue should not be limited to the south and north Korean authorities only; it should rather be carried out on a nationwide scale, for which a grand national conference should be called

with people of all walks of life and representatives of political parties and social organizations of the south and north participating.”

Since a political conference or a grand national conference presupposes participation of people of all walks of life as well as organizations, here it requires a removal of the sense of distinction between the south and north. Therefore, this may well be the application of a sort of class theory, with north Korea playing a kernel role, a system basically different in structure from the South-North Coordinating Committee, which was formed between the south and north as independent political units on the same footing.

Therefore, such a proposal should be taken to suggest an overall boycott of the south-north dialogue taking place largely through the South-North Coordinating Committee. It was against this background that Yun Ki-pok, vice chairman of the north Korean External Cultural Liaison Committee (and concurrently senior consultant for the north Korean side of the South-North Red Cross Conference), went so far as to say, in an August 4, 1973, dinner speech at the Japanese Press Club, while the dialogue was still going on, albeit perfunctorily, that “The People’s Democratic Republic of Korea is the only constitutional government for whole Korea, and the south Korean authorities are a puppet regime.”

Finally, it is noteworthy that Kim Il-sung asserted in his speech at the afore-mentioned rally for Sihanouk that “coexistence is an issue for different peoples.”¹⁵⁾ Apart from his becoming buoyed by encouraging external factors, such as the conclusion of the Paris peace agreement in January, 1973 which called for the departure of American forces from Vietnam within six months and followed the virtual ignorance of the stand of the Thieu government in the course of the Paris peace talks, Kim Il-sung must have believed that continuing the dialogue would have been inimical to the north’s interests in every respect, while only contributing to south Korea’s peace-oriented policy. Accordingly, the north Koreans resolved to suspend the dialogue and reconsider their strategy toward the south in hopes of following the strategic success achieved by the Hanoi regime.

In addition, they also knew that any opening of north Korean society, even though limited, combined with exposure to the true state of south Korea, represented a threat to their system. In fact, they had paid close attention to this problem from the beginning. The north first suggested that the full-dress meetings be held at Panmunjom in closed sessions, and hesitated before reluctantly agreeing to our side's offer that the full-dress meetings be held alternately in Seoul and Pyongyang.¹⁶⁾ As we can see, it was a great risk to them to come into contacts with the south through the travels back and forth between Seoul and Pyongyang.

Thus seen, the Kim Dae-jung incident was exploited as an excuse to extract north Korea from the embarrassing position in which it found itself as a result of the initiation of the south-north dialogue.

Chapter VI. From the South-North Dialogue to an Overture for a Peace Agreement with the U.S.

There is a plausible reason for north Korea's escape from the south-north dialogue and proposition of a peace agreement with the United States. As already stated, the south-north dialogue had failed to serve the north's cause.

The change in north Korea's strategy, characterized by its proposal for a peace agreement with the United States, was seemingly conceived in order to manifest its stand not to deal with south Korea any further, as well as to seek the withdrawal of American forces from Korea. The north must have believed that even if it failed to push through its demand for the U.S. military's departure, such a proposition would facilitate contact with the United States. That in turn would enable the north to improve relations with both the United States and Japan, as Red China had done, and exploiting such improved relations to aid its economic development, which still lags substantially behind south Korea's.

Thus seen, the policy switch amounted to expanding the scope of the north's external policy while still retaining its strategy toward the south.

In its various propositions to the south, north Korea suggested the conclusion of a peace agreement between the two. Until the U.N. General Assembly of 1973, north Korea had called for the withdrawal of American forces from Korea, and the dissolution of the United Nations Command to facilitate the withdrawal.

On March 25, 1974, north Korea formally proposed to the United States a bilateral dialogue to solve all issues between the two, including the conclusion of peace agreement. The north asserted that the proposed peace agreement could contain the following clauses:

First, both sides—the United States and north Korea—shall not invade each other and shall remove all danger of a direct armed clash. . . The United States shall not interfere in the internal affairs of Korea.

Second, both sides shall cease building up armed strength and shall not introduce any weapons into Korea.

Third, alien forces in Korea shall not use the U.N. flag, and shall withdraw from Korea with all of their weapons at the soonest possible date.

Fourth, after the withdrawal of alien forces, Korea is not to become a military or operational base for alien forces.

At the 29th U.N. General Assembly in 1974, north Korea's draft resolution calling for the withdrawal of alien forces was rejected. At the 30th U.N. General Assembly, the north's draft resolution stipulating, among other things, that a peace agreement be concluded between the United States and north Korea because they are direct parties to the Armistice Agreement was approved by the Assembly with the votes of Third World countries, but a pro-south Korean draft resolution was also adopted.¹⁷⁾

For a long period, north Korea has sought to develop south and north Korean relations in the Vietnam pattern, even in the military arena. Especially after the United States brought peace to Vietnam, the north has been

hoping that a Vietnam-style peace could be applied to Korea as well, believing that a peace offensive toward the United States could be waged successfully.

North Korea assumed that its boycott of the south-north dialogue was timely because the United States, defeated in the Vietnam War, no longer seemed to have the will to fight in Asia, capitalistic economies all over the world had been disrupted by the oil crisis in October 1973, and the downfalls of Nixon and Tanaka in the U.S. and Japan were thought to have created a situation more favorable to north Korea in the year of 1974.

In his address before a meeting of industrial leaders held from February 18 through March 4, 1975, Kim Il-sung asserted, "The overall international situation shows that a great revolutionary event may come in the foreseeable future. Whether a war flares up or a revolution takes place in south Korea, we must exploit it advantageously for our revolution so as to unify the fatherland and achieve a nationwide victory for the revolution."¹⁸⁾

This is an attitude of "meeting a revolutionary great event with victory," a pledge representing a step further away from its 1967 attitude, which was, "Let's meet a revolutionary great event actively."

This latest attitude was based on wishful thinking that if the United States were to leave Korea upon the conclusion of a peace agreement with the north, the issue of unification would become "an issue within the nation," and that unification under communism could then be achieved in conjunction with the completion of the tunnel digging begun by the "September 25 instructions" in 1971.

North Korea's peace offensive toward the United States was rather sluggish in 1976. Following its failure at the Non-aligned Summit in August and the axe-murder of two American officers on August 18, north Korea withdrew its draft resolution from the agenda of the 31st U.N. General Assembly on September 21, 1976.

However, north Korea is full of great expectations following the advent of the Carter Administration in the United States, for the United States has since professed its intention to 1) pull its ground troops out of Korea, and 2) try to normalize its relations with north Korea.

In particular, Warren Christopher, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State, said in a speech at Occidental University in Los Angeles on June 11, 1977, that the United States hopes to normalize diplomatic relations with about 10 countries including north Korea, Communist China, Vietnam, Cuba, Iraq and Mongolia, adding that all the governments that have yet to enter diplomatic ties with the United States should perceive the U.S.-Vietnam contacts for diplomatic normalization as evidence of President Carter's desire to ameliorate hostile relations with all countries.¹⁹⁾

A typical north Korean reaction toward that move by the United States was an interview which Lee Kye-baek, deputy chairman of Chochongryon, a pro-Pyongyang Korean residents' group in Japan, had with U.S. reporters on March 17, 1977. Meeting the press on a carefully chosen day, shortly after Carter announced the lifting of the ban on travel to countries with which the U.S. has no formal ties, including north Korea, and one day before the arrival in Hanoi of an American mission, Lee said that the time has come for the U.S. administration to review its Korea policy, asserting "our President Kim Il-sung has a great concern about the pledge of the Carter Administration to withdraw American forces from south Korea. . . . President Carter is a man of justice." He went on to say that "the United States and north Korea should normalize their relations. In our dialogue with the United States, we shall attach no conditions—whether military withdrawal or any other. We propose that the two countries discuss all pending issues including an ultimate peace agreement, military withdrawal and improved relations between the peoples of the two countries."²⁰⁾

It remains to be seen how north Korea will cope with such developments and exploit them to aid its schemes against south Korea.

Since December 1976, north Korea has endeavored to exclude

hostile expression from its references to the United States and U.S. forces. Lately, however, north Korea seems to have begun to restore the old hostile expressions to its vocabulary probably because it is dissatisfied with the nature of the projected withdrawal of U.S. ground forces from Korea.

All in all, north Korea should be obliged to readjust its stand now that the suggestion has been made to normalize diplomatic ties. Of course, the normalization of relations suggested by the United States is apparently quite different from the exclusive peace agreement which north Korea advocates. But, this does not exclude the possibility of a diplomatic normalization between the U.S. and north Korea.

To north Korea, the U.S.'s policy to withdraw its ground troops from south Korea and to seek diplomatic normalization with north Korea represent an opportunity to enhance its international standing and lessen its economic difficulties and also a victory in its strategy toward the south.

At a joint meeting of political parties and social organizations held in Pyongyang on January 25, 1977, north Korea proposed a "south-north political conference" for a "grand alliance between unification-oriented socialistic forces of the north and patriotic, democratic forces of the south" for the purpose of "eliminating the danger of a lasting split and war fomented in our country, and advancing the time of independent, peaceful unification of the country" (phraseology similar to that of north Korea's draft resolution submitted to the 31st U.N. General Assembly).

Thus seen, it is not likely that north Korea will modify its southward strategy and return to the interrupted dialogue, despite the new U.S. Administration's approaches toward north Korea.

Chapter VII. For Resumption of the South-North Dialogue

The resumption and normalization of the south-north dialogue can be realized when the north Korean side comes to the arena of peaceful coexistence by giving up its policy for unification under communism and

participates in bona fide competition with the south.

To make this possible, north Korea's scheme to sign a peace agreement with the United States at the expense of abandoning the south-north dialogue, that is, the attempt to dismiss the principle that the Korean question should be solved between the direct parties of south and north Korea, must end in failure, with north Korea realizing the fact that there is no way to settle the Korean question except through peacefully coexistence with the Republic of Korea. This will require a long period of time.

However, inasmuch as north Korea has shown a desire to have contacts with the United States by offering a so-called peace agreement, north Korea's awakening to reality may be advanced depending on the attitude of the United States. Or, and this, too, depends on how the United States behaves toward Pyongyang, north Korea may attempt to turn its face away from south Korea forever.

At any rate, the withdrawal of U.S. ground forces from Korea will result in an uplifted position for the Republic of Korea in the political and military fields on the Korean peninsula, regardless of whether the Armistice Agreement is retained or not. The withdrawal will inevitably usher the Republic of Korea to the forefront as a direct party concerned in the Korean question.

Therefore, north Korea will have to face south Korea in war or in peace. We cannot expect the United States, in the course of its contacts with Pyongyang, to be able to bring about a substantial modification of north Korea's policies toward south Korea. One possibility is that the United States may reaffirm the strength of its security commitment to south Korea. But even if such declaration is made orally, its effect would be reduced by half should an American ambassador be posted in Pyongyang.

Under the circumstances, a resumption of the south-north dialogue can hardly come about through any persuasion of north Korea by the United States. It will come only under conditions in which north Korea

has been driven into a position where it cannot wage war against us and where, therefore, it will have no choice but to maintain the peace. Here, there can be no illusions whatsoever.

If it succeeds in contacts with the United States, north Korea will attempt to exploit that success first to win financial, technical and economic gains from the West, and then to compete with us in the economic, military and technical fields. In this respect, the attitude of the United States and other Western countries will likely affect north Korea's conduct to some extent. Basically, however, it is apparent that north Korea will return to the dialogue only when it concludes either that our capability is so superior to the north's that it can never dare to challenge us, or that it can once again exploit the dialogue for its southward strategy.

If the United States were to sway north Korea in the course of its diplomatic normalization with Pyongyang, the possibility exists that Pyongyang could return to the dialogue as part of some altered strategy toward the south.

In this case, north Korea will no longer be able to cry for anything like "collaboration between the south's agriculture and the north's industry." All it will possibly be able to do is direct its strategy toward undermining the south's defense industry and social system by political means.

There are no specific measures to bring about the resumption of the south-north dialogue. Rather, the only course we can pursue is to safeguard the "road to peaceful unification" while maintaining an indefatigable posture and principles based on just causes.

Footnotes:

- 1) A clause of the "South-North Composition of Goodwill" (Liberation Day message, August 15, 1970), *Toward Peaceful Unification* (collection of President Park Chung Hee's speeches), The Secretariat for the President, March 1976, p. 18.
- 2) *Compendium of North Korea*. Vol. II, Far East Research Institute, 1974, p. 29.
- 3) "Policy and Activities of the Workers' Party for the Independent Peaceful Unification of the Fatherland," Lecture on the *Policy* History of the Workers' Party Vol. I, Kim Il-Sung Correspondence Colleg Textbook, Far East Research Insti-

- tute, 1974, p. 228.
- 4) Ibid., p. 273.
 - 5) Compendium of North Korea, Vol. II, p. 32.
 - 6) Ibid.
 - 7) North Korea described Kim Il-sung's speech on August 6, 1971, as a historical address, adding, "At that time the internal and external situations of our country were very complicated and delicate." *Lecture on the Policy History of the Workers' Party* Vol. II, p. 260.
 - 8) White Paper on Dispersed Families, Republic of Korea National Red Cross, 1976, p. 278.
 - 9) Ibid., p. 317 and Park Pong-shik, "Course and State of the South-North Red Cross Conference," *Unification Policy*, Peaceful Unification Institute, April 1975, p. 239.
 - 10) Ibid. p. 240.
 - 11) Compendium of North Korea, Vol. II, p. 141.
 - 12) Ibid., p. 140.
 - 13) Ibid., p. 140.
 - 14) White Paper on Dispersed Families, pp. 351-352.
 - 15) Ibid., pp. 355-357.
 - 16) Ibid., pp. 278-281.
 - 17) A/10191, August 8, 1975 Annex II, pp. 1-2 and "The Memorandum of the Ministry of Foreign affairs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea," Pyongyang, August 17, 1975.
 - 18) "Kim Tae-suh, "Enforcement of the Four Major Military Paths and the Strategy for Revolutionary War," *Pukhan*, North Korean Research Institute, October 1975, pp. 136-144.
 - 19) Daily newspapers in Seoul, June 13, 1977.
 - 20) Andrew H. Malcolm, "North Korean Aide Suggests Normalizing Ties with U.S.," *International Herald Tribune*, March 19-20, 1977.

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Professor Park Pong-shik, born in 1932 near Yangsan, Kyongsang-namdo, received his B.A. in 1955, an M.A. in 1957 and a Ph. D. in political science in 1975, all from Seoul National University. Prof. Park, who has been teaching at the Liberal Arts and Sciences College of Seoul National University since 1958, was a teaching fellow at the Yenching Institute, Harvard University, from 1964 to 1966.

In 1973, Prof. Park was appointed a consultant to the Republic of Korea National Red Cross side of the South-North Red Cross Conference, and attended the 28th U.N. General Assembly in 1973 as a consultant to the Korean delegation. He has written "External Policy of Red China" and a number of theses.

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Part One

Road toward Peaceful Unification

“National Unification through Free and General Elections”

—President Park Calls for Expanded Dialogue and Exchanges First—

In his commemorative address on the occasion of the 32nd anniversary of national liberation on last August 15, President Park Chung Hee stated that “the only road toward independent unification of the fatherland is for the south and north to restore mutual trust and expand exchanges as they share an open-hearted dialogue at a face-to-face meeting, thereby achieving unification through free general elections in the long run”. The President emphasized, “peace is the basis for unification of the fatherland, and only national strength ensures peace.”

The full text of the commemorative address by President Park on the 32nd anniversary of national liberation is as follows.—Ed.

Fellow Countrymen!

On the occasion of the 32nd anniversary of national liberation today, I share with you, my fellow countrymen, heartfelt celebration of this inspiring day.

In retrospect, the developing countries which, like our nation, were liberated from colonial rule at the end of World War II have undergone numerous trials in the course of their unending pursuit of, and struggles for, better lives.

Of these nations, our Korean people in particular was forced to endure the tragedy of territorial division at the time of national liberation, and, worse yet, suffered the tremendous ravages of the north Korean Communist aggression in 1950. Even thereafter, we continued to experience social disturbances and vicious circles of poverty under the con-

stant danger of recurrence of war.

Beginning with the early 1960's, however, we have awakened ourselves as a nation and consolidated our national will to achieve self-reliance. Rising up like the phoenix, we have accomplished an unparalleled, remarkable development in the short period of less than 15 to 16 years.

Construction of heavy and chemical industries has resulted in a highly developed industrial structure and an epochal boost in exports. Through acceleration of the Saemaul Undong (New Community Movement) and modernization of farming, the countryside has been rapidly transformed and self-sufficiency has been attained in staple grains. Moreover, with the construction of expressway networks, all parts of the country have been integrated into a single day's travel zone. We have now solidly cemented the grounds for a modern industrial nation.

Today, our Republic of Korea, as the proud bearer of our national history, has grown up an honorable member of the international community.

I wish to share a boundless dignity and pride with you, my fellow countrymen, as I see our generation, despite all the difficulties arising from the south-north confrontation, successfully carry on the programs for modernization, which our forefathers failed to accomplish for a long time.

However, we cannot rest content with today's achievement. We must speed up the cultivation of our national strength, united more firmly with one another and working harder than ever.

Needless to further emphasize, it is our pressing task to build an exemplary democratic welfare society upon the foundation of peace and prosperity. Furthermore, it is also a historical mission entrusted to us to achieve peaceful unification of the fatherland on the basis of our legitimacy in the national history.

We are thus confronted with the urgent task of securing a strong self-sufficient defense capability and thereby stabilizing peace on this

land.

Only through consolidation of peace and national security, we can sustain continuous economic development, ensure the survival of democracy, and expedite peaceful unification of the fatherland.

In firm unity, our government and people have made all efforts to prevent the recurrence of war on this peninsula and safeguard the nation's right to existence. We have inaugurated the Homeland Reserve Forces and the Civil Defense Corps. We have constructed defense industries, and have steadily been promoting other multi-faceted projects to further bolster the Armed Forces.

Consequently, we have come to achieve a mighty self-defense capability which the north Korean Communists can never dare to slight. On the strength of our growing economy which is already superior to theirs, we shall fully overwhelm them in four to five years in the military field as well.

We must continue to maintain a total security posture and accelerate the development of defense industries, exerting all our endeavors for completion of a firm self-reliant defense capability.

Another exigent task for us is to establish a self-supporting economy.

As you well know, we have successfully completed three five-year economic development plans. This year, we launched the fourth plan on the self-supporting grounds laid and consolidated in the years of the preceding plans.

The goals of this latest plan are to secure our economy's infrastructure for its further self-reliant expansion, expedite social development, and step up technological innovation and efficiency thereby uplifting our economy to join the ranks of the advanced industrial countries.

In view of our economy's great potential proven in our past experiences and our people's wisdom and determination, I am convinced that the targets envisaged in the fourth five-year plan will be successfully accomplished ahead of schedule.

This year, which is the first year of the fourth plan, we shall accelerate our economic growth, achieving the long-awaited annual export goal of 10 billion dollars. In addition, we will also be able to promote export of capital goods such as plants to other developing countries, owing to our rapid construction of heavy and chemical industries.

At the same time, the introduction of the national medicaid and medical insurance systems has provided an impetus to expand social welfare programs in a way best suited to our situation.

Moreover, our youths proudly emerged victorious against those from advanced nations in the recent International Skill Olympics, manifesting once again our people's high competence and boundless potential for development.

The prospects of our economy are so bright that in the early part of the 1980's when the fourth five-year plan will be completed. I foresee our per-capita gross national product and exports will be much more than what we now estimate—1,500 dollars in per-capita GNP and 20 billion dollars in exports.

By that time, our industries will be transformed into the advanced types of those in industrial countries, and a state of complete economic self-sufficiency will be achieved. And, a society will be created in which all people will live well equally enjoying happiness in urban and rural areas alike upon the firm basis of peace and prosperity.

Herein lies the reason why I have repeatedly emphasized that the next four to five years will be a very crucial period in accomplishing our long-cherished goals of self-reliant defense and self-supporting economy.

No matter what ordeals and difficulties may lie ahead of us, we must surmount them with a united strength and advance the advent of an era of self-reliance and self-support.

On the same occasion today a year ago, I stated that the winner in a competition of ideas and systems between the south and north of Korea

had already been determined. I also warned that in view of the brilliant development of our Republic of Korea and the pitiful reality of north Korea, the north Korean Communists would invite a catastrophe on themselves in the not too distant future if they continued to reject peaceful coexistence with us and pursue a policy of aggression against the south.

As you, my fellow countrymen, well know, the residents in north Korea, which has been afflicted with extreme economic difficulties in the past few years, are subject to unimaginable persecution and infringements on human rights. They are denied even the basic freedom to own their homes and farmlands. Their ages for marriage are officially restricted. They are forced to practice fanatic personality cult.

Never under such circumstances, can the residents of north Korea work hard, and enshrine hope and the will to live.

The north Korean Communists are a heretic group who run counter to the mainstream of our national culture dedicated to peace and human dignity.

However, no reckless mischief whatsoever will ever be able to destroy the time-honored homogeneity of our nation and the continuity of our national culture.

As a blood-compatriot, I feel sorry for the inhumane hardship enforced upon the north Korean brethren. Together with you, my fellow countrymen, I renew our common aspiration for a unified fatherland.

To emphasize again, peace is the basis for unification of the fatherland, and only national strength ensures peace.

Moreover, the only road toward independent unification of the fatherland is for the south and north to restore mutual trust and expand exchanges as they, once again at a face-to-face meeting, share an open-hearted dialogue, thereby achieving unification through free general elections in the long run.

Today, it is the general trend of international politics to settle disputes

by means of dialogue. Even Communist countries tend to place more emphasis on economic construction than on empty ideological struggles.

Nevertheless, only the north Korean Communists, in an attempt to go against such a flow of the times, continue to suspend the south-north dialogue and adamantly reject even our proposals for simultaneous entry of the south and north of Korea into the United Nations and for conclusion of a south-north non-aggression agreement.

Despicably, they have lately staged another provocative warlike act all of a sudden by unilaterally establishing a so-called “military boundary line” on the high seas in total disregard of international practices.

This represents a clear proof manifesting that they have yet to abandon their wild scheme to achieve unification under communism by force of arms.

But we shall smash in the initial stage whatever vicious provocations they may perpetrate. At a time when our national strength overwhelms that of north Korea in every field, the north Korean Communists will be obliged to give up their anachronistic daydream for unification under communism, and will find no way in the end but to agree to resume the south-north dialogue.

In order to advance that time, we are working hard with sweat struggling against difficulties, while living in an era with more hope and vitality than at any other time in our nation’s history.

In the past, our forefathers surmounted countless national crises with dauntless determination, safeguarding successfully our five-thousand year tsro.iyy

We are vigorously marching forward in our endeavors to overcome all internal and external challenges with our inherited will to save the nation, and to bequeath to our posterity a glorious fatherland strengthened as a rock in national consensus.

In order to accomplish such a lofty mission of the times, we have

adopted as our action guideline the maximization of efficiency and consolidation of national strength in all fields of our life, public and private.

The Saemaul Undong (New Community Movement) based on the spirit of diligence, self-help and cooperation, constitutes the prime mover expediting our spiritual reform, economic construction and development of democracy. It is the nation's spiritual property to be handed down with pride to our descendants.

Where there is a will, there is a way.

So long as our 36 million people continue our march forward shaping the destiny of our nation under our own responsibility, the dawn of national unification will surely break in the midst of peace and prosperity buttressed by mightily national strength.

Let us all make our utmost efforts with greater sincerity in our respective duties, bearing in mind that we compose a generation that create a great new history of national resurrection.

This is the obligation and reward entrusted to our generation, and we must constructively sublimate the emotion of the 1945 National Liberation into national development.

Part Two

South-North Dialogue

South-North Coordinating Committee:

**“Let Us Discuss ‘200 Mile Waters’ at
Coordinating Committee”**

—Seoul Side Also Urges Early Resumption of Direct Telephone Line—

Dr. Min Kwan-shik, Seoul side acting Co-chairman of the South-North Coordinating Committee, issued a statement directed to north Korea on last July 22 through the Korea Broadcasting System (KBS) radio in connection with the Pyongyang side's decision to establish a so-called “200-mile economic zone,” proposing that a meeting of the South-North Coordinating Committee be held at an early date for the purpose of settling difference in opinions between the south and north over the issue. Dr. Min suggested that to this end, a meeting of vice Co-chairmen be held at Panmunjom before the end of July.

In addition, Acting Co-chairman Min urged the Pyongyang side to restore immediately the operation of the direct Seoul-Pyongyang telephone line, which has been suspended by the Pyongyang side unilaterally, and thereby agree to discussion of smooth procedural matters. The Seoul side acting Co-chairman warned that “if the Pyongyang side causes trouble on the waters surrounding the Korea peninsula, ignoring our peaceful and constructive propositions, the Pyongyang side should be held entirely responsible for any consequence arising therefrom.”

The following is the full text of the statement by Acting Co-chairman Min Kwan-shik: —Ed.

On last July 15, our government issued a statement concerning some press reports on July 1 that the Pyongyang side decided to establish a so-called 200-mile economic zone. In the statement, our government made it

clear that "if the said reports are true, we cannot recognize it because it will endanger the safety of fishing operations by our fishermen on the waters surrounding the Korean peninsula, and also because it will not only increase the danger of creating serious disputes between the south and north of Korea, but also bring about the possibility of causing a change in the status quo which has so far been maintained in the Korean peninsula since the armistice in 1953."

Our government also let it be known in the statement that "in the event safe fishing operations of our innocent fishermen on the waters adjacent to the truce line in the Yellow Sea and Eastern Sea is interrupted by intentional provocations by north Korea, whatever measures necessary shall be taken to protect our fishermen."

In connection with this issue, I wish to remind that the Republic of Korea government has maintained certain voluntary fishing limit lines, providing proper guidance to our fishermen, for the purpose of preventing disputes over fishery on the waters adjacent to south and north Korea. At the same time, I cannot help but express deep concern about consequences that may result from future deliberate provocations by the Pyongyang side on the Yellow and eastern seas adjacent to the truce line.

Feeling acutely, therefore, that there must be mutual consultations to remove difference in opinions between the south and north and solve these issues peacefully in accordance with the spirit of the South-North Joint Communique of 1972, and thereby contribute to consolidation of peace on the Korean peninsula, I hereby propose to the Pyongyang side as follows:

First, it is proposed that a meeting of the South-North Coordinating Committee be held at an early date for the purpose of settling difference in opinions between the south and north.

Second, it is proposed that a meeting of vice Co-chairmen be held at Panmunjom before the end of July at the latest to discuss the issue of holding a South-North Coordinating Committee meeting.

Third, it is urged that the direct south-north telephone line, of which operation has been suspended by the Pyongyang side, be reopened imme-

diately, and the Pyongyang side agree to discussion of smooth procedural matters.

I look forward to an affirmative response from the Pyongyang side to these proposals. At the same time, I make it clear that if the Pyongyang side causes troubles on the waters surrounding the Korean peninsula, ignoring our peaceful and constructive propositions, the Pyongyang side should be held entirely responsible for any consequence arising therefrom.

All these proposals by the Seoul side were rejected by Pyongyang outright. In a Radio Pyongyang broadcast on July 25, the Pyongyang side contended "it is ridiculous to call a meeting of the South-North Coordinating Committee over the 200-mile economic waters." The Pyongyang broadcast then turned to its stereotyped propaganda demands that the Seoul side withdraw the June 23, 1973 Special Foreign Policy, stop "pursuing a war policy," and release anti-state criminals.

Moreover, in a speech at a reception held in Pyongyang on last August 9 for a visiting government mission of Sao Tome Principe, north Korea's premier Park Sung-chol stated that "north Korea will allow needy south Korean fishermen to engage in peaceful fishing in the north Korean economic waters from the standpoint of brotherly love." Park went on to say that "it has been disclosed repeatedly in the past that south Korean fishermen would be allowed to engage in fishing in the north Korean waters."

Contrary to this superficial generosity, however, a look into Pyongyang's deeds instantly reveals that this is a mere treacherous, propaganda lip service. In areas along the Yellow and eastern sea extension of the truce line and even south of them, the north Korean side has been kidnaping south Korean fishermen at random. Since 1954 to date, a total of 3,487 south Korean fishermen have been forcibly taken to the north together with their boats numbering 449. Of them, 405 fishermen with 32 boats are still being held in captivity in north Korea.

Nevertheless, the Pyongyang side resorts to such a crafty lip service

in a wicked scheme to appeal to needy fishermen of south Korea by giving the false impression that “they are more humanitarian-minded.”

In the meantime, following its announcement that the “200-mile economic zone” would be established effective August 1, 1977, the north Korean side had declared that it would in addition establish what is called “military boundary lines” and apply it also beginning August 1, 1977.

According to a Radio Pyongyang broadcast quoting an announcement by the so-called “People’s Army Supreme Command,” the “military boundary” reaches out up to 50 miles from its coastal line in the eastern sea and to the limit of the “200-mile economic zone” in the Yellow Sea to the west. The Pyongyang announcement said that “all activities by foreign nationals, foreign military vessels and foreign military planes will be prohibited on the sea, in the sea and in the sky within the military boundary.” It further maintained that private foreign ships or planes can sail or fly within the “military boundary” only with advance permission from north Korean authorities, and that all activities by private foreign vessels or planes that carry military purposes or violate the economic interests would be prohibited.

The declaration of the “military boundary lines” by north Korean side sheds light anew on its belligerency and represents its determination to resort to the force of arms in case there flare up disputes with regard to the ambiguous “200-mile economic zone” in areas contiguous to the sea extension of the truce line in the Yellow and eastern seas where tensions still hover.

This intransigency contrasts strikingly with the Republic of Korea government’s position that though the “200-mile economic zone” cannot be recognized in principle, it is willing to discuss the issue through the existing machinery of dialogue for its realistic solution, and that a meeting of the South-North Coordinating Committee be held to this end.

The establishment of the “200-mile economic zone” and “military boundary lines” seems to carry dual purposes: to find an excuse to make a

political and economic approach to Japan; and to provide the grounds for causing disputes in the Yellow and Eastern seas contiguous to the sea extension of the truce line so as to use them as a means of changing the status quo.

The north Korean side has at no time so far declared its territorial waters externally. The only times it mentioned the existence of territorial waters were in 1968 when it contended that it seized USS Pueblo because it violated its “three-mile economic waters,” and in September 1975 when it said “Shosei Maru” of Japan intruded its “12-mile territorial waters” before she was attacked by its gunboats. In the latter incident, the Pyongyang side explained that there exists “50-mile security patrol waters” off its costal lines.

Besides, the north Korean side has from time to time laid a claim to the waters adjacent to the five islands in an area near the western sea extension of the truce line. Once in 1973, Pyongyang even dared to secure that unjust claim by force of arms, but only to be thwarted by the firm stand of the south Korean side.

For 24 years since the Korean Armistice, the five islands, together with their contiguous waters and sea routes leading to them, have been placed under the control of the United Nations Commander pursuant to the provisions of Paragraph 13, Article 2 of the Military Armistice Agreement. Upon the signing of the Armistice Agreement, the United Nations Commander, in an operations order, drew a northern military limit line running through halfway between the five islands and the north Korean zone to safeguard the area of the five islands as well as to forestall any armed clash in the area with north Korea.

Nevertheless, the north Korean side has established the “200-mile economic waters” and “military boundary lines” in an apparent scheme to foment disputes and tensions in the sea areas with a view to destroying or altering the status quo, namely, the existing truce system.

References

The following are the texts of statements issued by the Republic of Korea government regarding north Korea's unilateral establishment of the "200-mile economic waters" and "military boundary lines:" —Ed.

Statement by the Spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

(July 15,1977)

1. *The north Korean authorities concerned reportedly announced on July 1, 1977 that north Korea established a "200 mile Economic Zone", effective August 1, 1977.*

2. *If the said report is true, such north Korean attempt will endanger the safety of fishing operations of our fishermen who have long engaged in fishing for their livelihood on the waters surrounding the Korean peninsula, particularly the waters immediately adjacent to the south and north of Korea. Furthermore, this attempt will not only increase the danger of creating serious disputes between the south and north of Korea, but also bring about disruption of the status quo which has so far been maintained in the Korean peninsula since the Armistice in 1953. We, therefore, cannot recognize such announcement for the establishment of a "200 mile Economic Zone" by north Korea.*

3. *The Republic of Korea Government has maintained for its part certain voluntary fishing limit lines, for the purpose of preventing disputes over fishery on the said adjacent waters, to provide guidance to its fishermen to refrain from their fishing operations north of the said lines. If the peaceful fishing operations of our fishermen on the adjacent waters to the truce line in the Yellow Sea and the Eastern Sea (Sea of Japan) is interrupted by the intentional provocations of north Korea, the Korean Government will take whatever measures necessary to protect the safety of our fishermen and their fishing*

operations.

4. In this connection, the Republic of Korea makes it clear that, if there arises difference of views between the South and North, the Republic of Korea side is prepared to hold talks with the north Korean side through the existing machinery of South-North dialogue in the spirit of the South-North Joint Communiqué of July 4, 1972.

5. We, therefore, strongly warn north Korea that, if north Korea causes any trouble on the waters surrounding the Korean peninsula by ignoring such peaceful and constructive position of the Republic of Korea, the north Korean side should be held entirely responsible for any consequence that may arise therefrom.

Statement by ROK Government Spokesman (Minister of Culture & Information) on August 1, 1977

With regard to the reports that the Pyongyang side planned to establish a so-called 200-mile economic zone, our government, pointing out the danger that such an attempt may create various disputes, proposed last July 15 the early resumption of the machinery of the south-north dialogue in order to settle this problem peacefully.

Nevertheless, the north Korean side has not only rejected such a peace-oriented and constructive proposal of our side, but has gone so far as to announce again on August 1 the establishment of so-called military boundary lines.

Inasmuch as this may bring about some change in the status quo that has been maintained on the Korean peninsula ever since the armistice in 1953, causing especially the danger of jeopardizing the safe operations of our fishermen and safe voyages of our vessels in the waters of the Yellow and Eastern seas adjacent to the armistice line, our government makes it clear again that it does not recognize their so-called 200-mile economic zone or so-called military boundary lines.

At the same time, we make it explicit that our government will continue to abide by the existing armistice system and its practices in order to continuously maintain peace on the Korean peninsula.

We again urge the north Korean side to abandon its provocative conduct designed to create new tensions on the Korean peninsula—the scheme of establishing a so-called 200-mile economic zone and military boundary lines—and to respect sincerely the existing armistice system and its practices.

We serve a strong warning that if the north Korean Communists reject our approach and create a state of provocation, the north Korean side should assume the entire responsibility for consequences arising therefrom.

Statement by Spokesman for Culture and Information Ministry

(August 10, 1977)

Park Sung-chol, premier of north Korea, made another fraudulent and propaganda remarks in a speech at a reception on last August 9 that north Korea has been allowing south Korean fishermen to engage in fishing inside the so-called “economic zone” of north Korea.

The allegation is nothing more than a stereotyped, deceptive propaganda aimed at saving the north Korean Communists from their isolation from the rest of the world community, caused by their unilateral declaration of the so-called “military boundary lines” which has come under angry denunciation from all peace-loving countries and peoples around the world.

If north Korea is truly willing to allow free fishery operations, north Korea should return unconditionally and immediately the 405 south Korean fishermen whom it is holding in captivity as of this

time together with their fishing boats totaling 32, and accept our proposal for mutual consultation through the existing machinery of dialogue over the issue of safe fishing operations.

We once again urge the north Korean Communists to make faithful acts rather than engaging in fraudulent propaganda.

Chronological Listing of Major Sea Provocations by North Korea
(1955-1976)

May 10, 1955—North Korean gunboats attack a fleet of south Korean fishing boats, sinking one boat and causing the missing of four others.

November 7, 1956—North Korean fighters attack two south Korean airplanes in the air above the Yellow Sea.

May 16, 1957—North Korean gunboats hijack a south Korean fishing boat near Yonpyong-do.

April 24, 1958—North Korean gunboats hijack a south Korean fishing boat from near Yonpyong-do.

August 19, 1959—North Korean naval vessels intrude south Korean territorial waters in the Yellow Sea.

August 24, 1960—A north Korean gunboat intrudes the sea adjacent to Yonpyong-do, and sinks in an exchange of fire with south Korean vessels.

December 23, 1962—North Korean naval vessels attack a United Nations Command patrol boat 6 miles north of Yonpyong-do, killing three UNC personnel and injuring three others.

March 20, 1964—Armed north Korean vessels hijack two south Korean fishing boats near Paengnyong-do.

April 26, 1965—North Korean gunboats hijack a south Korean fishing boat, "Taeyong-ho," near Yonpyong-do.

October 29, 1965—A north Korean naval vessel hijacks 109 south Korean fishermen near Kanghwa-do.

January 26, 1966—North Korean gunboats attack five south Korean fishing boats catching pollack south of the sea extension of the truce line near Taejin along the east coast, and hijack two of the five, "Tong-

myong-ho” and “Yongpung-ho.”

November 24, 1966—North Korean patrol boats attack a fleet of 300 south Korean fishing boats catching pollack in the eastern sea.

November 3, 1967—North Korean gunboats attack a fleet of 300 south Korean fishing boats near the northern fishery limit line in the eastern sea, hijacking five of them.

December 25, 1967—North Korean gunboats hijack five south Korean fishing boats with 30 fishermen aboard while they were engaged in fishing 5 miles south of the eastern sea extension of the truce line.

January 4, 1968—North Korean armed vessels hijack two south Korean fishing boats, “Hongik-ho” and “Pokin-ho,” with 14 fishermen in an area adjacent to the eastern sea extension of the truce line.

January 6, 1968—North Korean gunboats hijack “Shinkwang-ho” and four other south Korean fishing boats with 34 fishermen south of the northern fishery limit line in the eastern sea.

June 17, 1968—“Yangsong-ho” and four other south Korean fishing boats with 44 fishermen aboard hijacked by north Korean gunboats in an area west of Yonpyong-do in the Yellow Sea.

October 30, 1968—North Korean armed vessels hijack “Kilsong-ho” and six other south Korean fishing boats with 53 fishermen aboard south of the northern fishery limit line in the eastern sea.

November 7, 1968—Thirty south Korean fishermen aboard “Chun-ho” and three other fishing boats hijacked by north Korean gunboats near the northern fishery limit line in the eastern sea.

November 8, 1968—Ten south Korean fishing boats catching pollack near the northern fishery limit line in the eastern sea hijacked by north Korean armed vessels together with their fishermen numbering 72.

June 5, 1970—A south Korean Naval broadcasting ship attacked and sunk by two north Korean speed boats in high seas northwest of Yonpyong-do.

July 9, 1970—Five south Korean fishing boats with 29 fishermen hijacked

by north Korean gunboats near Paengnyong-do.

January 6, 1971—Three north Korean naval vessels attack two south Korean fishing boats near Paengnyong-do, sinking one of the pair.

August 31, 1971—A south Korean fishing boat, "Taksong-ho," hijacked by north Korean armed vessels together with 30 fishermen aboard near the northern fishery limit line in the eastern sea.

February 4, 1972—North Korean gunboats attack ten south Korean fishing boats in high seas south of the northern fishery limit line 40 miles west of Taechong-do in the Yellow Sea, sinking one of them and hijacking five others.

July 27, 1973—A south Korean fish transport ship was attacked and sunk by north Korean armed vessels near Paengnyong-do in the Yellow Sea.

October 23, 1973—North Korean naval vessels deliberately intrude in the south Korean territorial waters about 600 times in the Yellow Sea, touching off the "western sea event."

November 19, 1973—Nine north Korean naval ships violate the south Korean territorial waters adjacent to Taechong-do, Sochong-do and Yonpyong-do in the Yellow Sea.

November 28, 1973—Two north Korean patrol boats approach Sochong-do as close as 300 yards.

December 1, 1973—At the 304th and 306th meetings of the Military Armistice Commission, north Korea lays claim to the waters contiguous to Paengnyong-do and four other islands in the Yellow Sea.

December 7, 1973—About ten north Korean naval vessels and patrol boats intrude in the waters adjacent to Yonpyong-do, Taechong-do and Paengnyong-do 11 times.

February 15, 1974—In high seas west of Paengnyong-do in the Yellow Sea, north Korean naval vessels attack two south Korean fishing boats, "Suwon-ho No. 32" and "Suwon-ho No. 33," sinking the former and hijacking the latter together with her 14 fishermen.

April 9, 1974—Six north Korean naval vessels cruise south of the western sea extension of the truce line six times. (Such provocative cruise

continues until July 1, 1974)

February 26, 1975—Ten north Korean vessels intrude in the south Korean territorial waters west of Sochong-do. Other north Korean naval vessels and MIG fighters also infiltrate into the area.

March 24, 1975—Thirty north Korean planes make threatening flights in the vicinity of Paengnyong-do. Six of the planes penetrate deep into the airspace of the south Korean operational area.

June 9, 1975—Two MIG-21's intrude in the air above Paengnyong-do.

July 12, 1975—One north Korean naval ship intrudes in an area northwest of Paengnyong-do. At warning shots from south Korean Naval vessels, five other north Korean gunboats infiltrate into the area to escort the first ship toward the north.

January 23, 1976—Two north Korean planes violate the airspace above Paengnyong-do.

February 27, 1976—Two high-speed north Korean fighter-planes intrude in the airspace above Paengnyong-do.

South-North Red Cross Conference:

“Let Us Exchange Tomb Visitors on Chusok Holiday”

—ROKNRC Also Urges Early Resumption of Full-dress Meeting—

At the 23rd working-level meeting of the South-North Red Cross Conference held at the conference room of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission at Panmunjom from 10 to 11:47 a.m. July 15, 1977, the delegation of the Republic of Korea National Red Cross again urged the north Korean Red Cross side to agree to 1) hold the eighth full-dress meeting of the South-North Red Cross Conference at Panmunjom at an early date, and 2) restore early the operation of the direct Seoul-Pyongyang telephone line and the two sides' liaison offices at Panmunjom, which has been suspended by the north Korean side since August last year.

However, the north Korean Red Cross delegates, showing no concern about the proposals by the Republic of Korea National Red Cross delegation, simply persisted in unfounded slander against the south, accusing it of pursuing “nation-splitting schemes” or arguing “brotherly love is one thing and humanitarianism is another.”

At the meeting, the Republic of Korea National Red Cross delegation proposed that the next 24th working-level meeting be held on August 24. The north Korean Red Cross, however, rejected it, counter-proposing that the 24th meeting be held on October 14 instead, to which the Republic of Korea National Red Cross delegation agreed.

The following is the text of a speech by Dr. Kim Yeon-choo, alternate chief delegate of the Republic of Korea National Red Cross, at the 23rd working-level meeting. —Ed.

Today we are holding the 23rd working-level meeting, which is our third meeting since the turn of the year.

At the preceding 22nd working-level meeting, the delegation of the Republic of Korea National Red Cross, urging your side's concurrence, laid down concrete and well thought out proposals to normalize the long-suspended South-North Red Cross Conference and to pave the way for early reunion between the families and relatives dispersed in the south and north.

As to the issue of resuming the full-dress meeting first, we proposed that since your side continues to refuse to hold the eighth full-dress meeting in Seoul, although it should naturally be held in Seoul as agreed upon between us both, "the eighth full-dress meeting be held at Panmunjom at an early date" in consideration of your side's position on the matter.

This proposal of our side was intended to provide a breakthrough in the talks by allowing for the resumption of the suspended full-dress meeting unconditionally, so that we might discuss the agenda topics inasmuch as the working-level meetings failed to register any achievement during 20 or so meetings over the course of three full years.

As for the preliminary discussion of the topics of the full-dress meetings, our side again suggested, while at the same time calling for discussion and solution of the "question of tracing, and notifying thereof, the whereabouts and fate of members of dispersed families and relatives in the south and north" without any condition, that if your side cannot discuss agenda topic No. 1 at an early date, the issue of carrying out "the mutual exchange of groups of visitors to the ancestral tombs of the dispersed families in the south and north" and the "aged parents program" be discussed initially as pilot projects.

In addition, we again urged your side to normalize early operation of the direct Seoul-Pyongyang telephone line and the Panmunjom Liaison Office, which remains paralyzed since August last year.

These propositions of our side represent the tasks which this working-level meeting must settle by all means, and which can be solved even today if only your side shows sincerity. They also represent part of our side's serious effort to contribute to the independent and peaceful unification of the fatherland by normalizing our suspended dialogue by all means.

As I look forward to thoughtful discussion of our side's reasonable proposals at today's meeting, I wish to explain carefully once again our stand toward and the importance of this issue.

North Korean Red Cross delegates!

The question of the early resumption of the full-dress meetings which have been suspended for four full years is the most important task facing us. Since it has already been agreed upon solemnly to hold full-dress meetings in Seoul and Pyongyang by turn, we have the obligation above all to translate this agreed principle into action faithfully. And, it is proper to hold the eighth full-dress meeting in Seoul inasmuch as the seventh full-dress meeting was held in Pyongyang. Such being the case, your side has no reason whatsoever to oppose the holding of the eighth full-dress meeting in Seoul.

So far, our side has proposed to hold the full-dress meeting in Seoul and has even scheduled it no fewer than five times. We even suggested several times that your side determine the time. However, your side has agreed to none of these suggestions. Under the circumstances, our side has come to propose that if the situation does not allow your delegation to come to Seoul, the "full-dress meetings be held at Panmunjom or another third place of mutual agreement for the time being" until such time as your side is able to implement the agreed matter. As a more concrete measure, our side suggested at the preceding 22nd working-level meeting that "the eighth full-dress meeting be initially held at Panmunjom at an early date."

In this way, our delegation of the Republic of Korea National Red Cross stands always ready to solve problems in the hope of faithfully

carrying out the agreed matters between the two sides and resuming the suspended full-dress meeting at an early date. Contrary to such sincere and positive position of our side, however, your side has not only unilaterally violated the agreed matters and suspended the full-dress meetings, but while setting forth political prerequisites such as the so-called “issue of atmosphere” or “issue of environmental conditions” that have nothing to do at all with the humanitarian conference, your side has also attempted to shift the responsibility for the failure to resume the full-dress meetings to our side just as in the case of a robber crying “thief.”

The question of resuming full-dress meetings has nothing to do with the “political conditions” your side adheres to. This is something which all the 50 million compatriots, the whole world and your side itself know well. The issue of resuming the full-dress meetings, after all, is a question of whether or not your side is willing to develop today’s south-north relationship to that of a genuine dialogue, and whether or not your side has a humanitarian interest in paving the way for reunion between the families and relatives dispersed in the south and north, as solemnly pledged before the 10 million dispersed family members and 50 million compatriots.

If your side is really interested in carrying on the humanitarian conference and solving the issue of dispersed families, there would be no reason for your side to boycott the full-dress meetings halfway or oppose resumption of the full-dress meetings on the excuse of various political conditions. Red Cross talks and humanitarian projects must not become subject to political conditions. They rather start with the lofty spirit to transcend and surmount such conditions. Therefore, normalization of the South-North Red Cross Conference could be achieved easily after all if only your side, keeping in mind the lofty humanitarian spirit, abides by the matters agreed upon between the two sides and manifests brotherly love and a humanitarian spirit.

The stalemate of the dialogue over the past four years can by no means be beneficial for either of the two sides; it, rather, only furthers a

deeper mutual distrust and confrontation between the south and north.

If the objective and significance of the south-north dialogue lie in the elimination of such distrust and confrontation, your side should not reject resumption of the dialogue any further and refrain from indulging in unnecessary political propanganda and slanderous defamation beginning with this very working-level meeting. Your side should thus accept our side's proposal that the eighth full-dress meeting be held even here at Panmunjom at an early date.

As to the issue of the discussion of the agenda topics of the full-dress meetings, the stand of the Republic of Korea National Red Cross delegation is that the reunion of the 10 million dispersed family members should be realized at an early date according to their own free will, and that this project should be implemented in a humanitarian manner in every respect transcending differences in the systems and ideologies of the south and north. It was from this standpoint that we have laid down a formula to discuss and solve the five agenda topics agreed on between the two sides one by one in their order, and proposed many times pilot projects aimed at solving the pressing issues facing the dispersed families as well as at finding a breakthrough in the dialogue.

The "method of exchanging letters to search for missing persons" which the delegation of the Republic of Korea National Red Cross proposed at the third full-dress meeting is a realistic formula designed to carry out topic No. 1: "the question of tracing, and notifying thereof, the whereabouts and fate of members of dispersed families and relatives in the south and north" first under the supervision of the two Red Cross societies. The "solution of aged parents' problem" and "the mutual exchange of groups of visitors to ancestral tombs of the dispersed families in the south and north" which our side subsequently proposed are not only the urgent issues that should be solved at an early date but are also epochal pilot projects that can provide a fresh breakthrough in the deadlocked conference.

These projects are all humanitarian programs clearly envisaged in

the five agenda topics agreed upon between the two sides. The dispersed families themselves aspire for early implementation of these programs which can be carried out at any time under mutual agreement.

However, these exigent and practicable humanitarian programs have yet to be even debated concretely, thereby causing great disappointment to the dispersed families and compatriots. The cause of such a delay in discussion of the agenda topics of the full-dress meetings lies in the fact after all that your side slanders and defames the other side of the conference and averts its eyes from “the campaign to search for 10 million dispersed family members” on the excuse of so-called “theory of environmental conditions” and political prerequisites.

In view merely of the fact that the numbers of our compatriots in Japan affiliated with Chochongryon, a pro-Pyongyang Korean residents’ group, visiting their homeland, swell year after year ever since the homeland visit program was begun with the Chusok holiday the year before last, it can be easily understood how unjust is your position which rejects normalization of the dialogue on the excuse of political preconditions, and how misleading it is.

As your side well knows, these Chochongryon-affiliated compatriots in Japan had in the past thoughts and ideologies different from our’s, keeping themselves away from their hometowns and blood relatives against their real intention. Nevertheless, we are welcoming them warmly with brotherly love and a humanitarian spirit regardless of their past activities. We have thus paved the way for them to visit their homeland and native places and meet their blood relatives for the first time in many decades. In this year alone, several thousands have already been to the homeland on lunar New Year Day, Hanshik Day and Dano Day. The columns of such homeland visitors will continue to swell in the days ahead.

As our Republic of Korea pursues an open-door policy toward all countries under the Special Foreign Policy for Peace and Unification of June 23, 1973, we allow even the citizens of those countries with different ideologies and systems to visit our country freely, while maintaining

postal exchanges and communication networks and promoting broad exchanges in the fields of economics, social life and culture, with Communist countries as well. Lately, moreover, our compatriots residing in the Soviet Union, Communist China and other Communist countries freely exchange letters with their families and relatives in their homeland. Some compatriot has even been to the homeland, a place several thousand miles away.

As your side already well knows through press reports, Mr. Chang Chon-du, one of our compatriots who were forcibly taken to Sakhalin by the Japanese imperialists, set foot on the land of the Republic of Korea last February 14 arriving here via Moscow and Japan.

After failing to visit his hometown and blood relatives for many decades after the liberation of the fatherland, he finally met his aged mother and daughter on Cheju-do, his hometown, for the first time in 38 years, thanks to a humanitarian measure by the Soviet government.

In this way, Chochongryon-affiliated compatriots in Japan, with different ideologies, ideas and systems, make free visits to their hometowns, and even our compatriot residing in the remote Soviet Union came here to see his hometown and blood relatives.

North Korean Red Cross delegates!

We are today living in a close and open world where we can travel to and exchange letters with those in every part of the world. Nevertheless, only one place, the artificial barrier between the south and north, still remains remote and uncrossable. It is self-evident that this barrier, being a transitory one created artificially across the land of one country, cannot last long.

Our humanitarian dialogue carries the mission and responsibility for opening this very barrier at an early date. Both of our two sides solemnly agreed to do so in the South-North Joint Communiqué of 1972. However, your side's posture and attitude toward the talks so far show that

your side is moving in a direction quite opposite thereto, and is deviating far from the proper track and purpose of the dialogue. Your side distort the true meaning of our humanitarian talks, turning your back on the solution of the dispersed family issue.

Despite the fact that your side agreed with our side to alleviate the sufferings of displaced families, your side now rejects resumption of the full-dress meetings and even boycotts discussion of the agenda topics, contending that “the issue would be settled automatically once unification is achieved.” Such a contention of your side is tantamount, in fact, to arguing the uselessness of the Red Cross talks.

Moreover, your side has unilaterally paralyzed the direct “Seoul-Pyongyang” telephone line and the “Panmunjom Liaison Office” which were established under mutual agreement. Your side has not, to date, even considered restoring their function, almost one year after their suspension.

Lately, in addition, your side has shown no interest in the issues of “resuming full-dress meetings” or in the “agenda topics of the full-dress meetings,” engaging only in slander or defamation of the other side of the dialogue for the purpose of political propaganda. Your side has gone so far as to denounce the homeland visit program for overseas compatriots as a “nation-splitting scheme.”

This represents nothing but your intention to carry on the talks perfunctorily while undermining mutual trust by violating those matters already agreed upon, disputing differences rather than trying to find areas of mutual agreement, and conducting political propaganda rather than dealing with the issue of dispersed blood relatives.

Your side should now examine carefully the changes taking place in the world community, the situation of the Korean peninsula and the growth of our Republic of Korea’s national capability realizing accurately what is the aspiration of our 50 million compatriots and what is the public opinion of the world. In the world community today, the East and the

West, as can be seen in the Helsinki Declaration, seek to settle all disputes peacefully rejecting ideological confrontation and war, with all countries pursuing mutual cooperation through openness and exchanges. Contrary to such a general trend in the world community, a critical and abnormal development continues to prevail in today's south-north relationship. No signs have ever been seen of an early improvement of this situation.

Our Republic of Korea earlier declared at home and abroad the Special Foreign Policy for Peace and Unification of 1973, and has taken concrete measures to ease tensions and consolidate peace on the Korean peninsula, contributing positively to the peace of the international community. And, our side has urged your side time and again to abandon its scheme for achieving unification under communism and to agree to the "conclusion of a south-north non-aggression agreement" embodying the basic spirit of mutual non-interference, non-aggression and maintenance of the existing Armistice Agreement between the south and north.

If your side is really interested in the south-north dialogue as well as in pursuing peaceful unification, your side should give up the day dream of so-called "unification under communism" and the time-worn policy of violence, and instead adhere faithfully to the South-North Joint Communiqué of 1972 normalizing the South-North Coordinating Committee and the South-North Red Cross Conference. Furthermore, in order to root lasting peace on this land and lay the foundation for independent unification, your side should agree to the "conclusion of a south-north mutual non-aggression agreement" and promote mutual opening and exchanges between south and north Korea.

North Korean Red Cross delegates!

A while ago, we marked the fifth anniversary of the historical South-North Joint Communiqué. Next month, we shall observe the sixth anniversary of the August 12 Proposal in which the Republic of Korea National Red Cross proposed "a campaign to search for 10 million dispersed

family members." Looking back over the past period after the suspension of the South-North Coordinating Committee and the South-North Red Cross Conference, tensions and confrontation have built up between the south and north more than any other time.

If this stalemate in the dialogue and state of tension continues, it would inevitably prolong the distrust and enmity between brethren rather than to remove them, and would delay indefinitely the consolidation of peace on this land or the independent peaceful unification of the fatherland, which the 50 million compatriots long for so much. The path for us to take to settle the present deadlock in the talks and ease tensions between the south and north lies first of all in the early realization of reunion of the 10 million dispersed family members transcending differences in ideologies and systems, based on brotherly love and a humanitarian spirit.

Thus seen, the "campaign to search for 10 million dispersed family members in the south and north" proposed by the Republic of Korea National Red Cross is a national project practically solvable, transcending ideologies and systems. The various formulas which our side has set out so far are all humanitarian programs that can be realized at any time if only your side demonstrates sincerity.

Hoping that this meeting today will earnestly discuss the opinions and proposals of the Republic of Korea National Red Cross I wish to explain once again the proposals our side has laid down at the preceding meeting, urging your side's serious consideration.

First, although the eighth full-dress meeting should logically be held in Seoul as agreed upon between us, your side does not respect the agreed matter. In consideration of your side's position, therefore, we propose that the eighth full-dress meeting be held at Panmunjom at an early date.

Second, agenda topic No. 1 of the full-dress meeting, "the question of tracing, and notifying thereof, the whereabouts and fate of members of dispersed families and relatives in the south and north, "should be discussed early without any preconditions. If your side cannot agree to

concrete discussion of agenda topic No. 1, we propose that the question be discussed as to means to carry out first, as pilot projects, such humanitarian programs as the “exchange of groups of visitors to ancestral tombs of the dispersed families in the south and north” and the “aged parents program.”

We hope that these pilot humanitarian projects will be realized on the Chusok holiday this year without fail, so that it can give to joy the dispersed families and provide a steady breakthrough in the South-North Red Cross Conference also.

Thrid, we again ask your side to restore at an early date the direct “Seoul-Pyongyang” telephone line and the function of the two sides’ liaison office at Panmunjom, which have been suspended by your side since August last year.

I look forward to your side’s sincere and affirmative response to these proposals and demands by our side.

Resumption of South-North Red Cross Full-dress Meeting Urged

—ROKNRC Vows Its Utmost for Solution of Dispersed Family Issue—

Lee Ho, president of the Republic of Korea National Red Cross, issued a statement on August 12, 1977 on the occasion of the sixth anniversary of the "proposal for south-north Red Cross talks on August 12, 1971," in which he urged the north Korean Red Cross side to agree to early normalization of the full-dress meetings of the South-North Red Cross Conference based on the spirits of brotherly love and Red Cross humanitarianism, while pledging himself before the 50 million people that the Republic of Korea National Red Cross would do its best with perseverance and sincerity for the early solution of the issue of facilitating reunion between the 10 million family members dispersed in the south and north.

The full text of the statement by Lee Ho, president of the Republic of Korea National Red Cross, is as follows: —Ed.

Today we observe the sixth anniversary of the proposal for the South-North Red Cross Conference intended to solve the wishes of the 10 million family members separated in the south and north.

The proposal by the Republic of Korea National Red Cross for a campaign for searching for dispersed families between the south and north, was the manifestation of the lofty humanitarian spirit that the rejoice of reunion should be realized between blood relatives, which the 50 million compatriots, let alone the 10 million separated family members, have been longing for during the quarter-century period of the division of the fatherland. The proposal was also in the hope of eliminating step by step the artificial barrier lying between the south and north by means of such

humanitarian talks, and further contributing to peaceful unification of the fatherland.

However, the full-dress meetings of the south-north red cross conference, which had been held with both delegations traveling forth and back between Seoul and Pyongyang, have been suspended since July 1973. Despite our strenuous efforts for the normalization of the dialogue made while holding delegates' meetings six times and 23 meetings of working-level officials at Panmunjom for four years thereafter, there has been no substantial progress in the discussion of the agenda topics nor have the full-dress meetings been resumed. This is really regretful.

As to the issue of resuming the full-dress meetings, the Republic of Korea National Red Cross, considering the fact that the north Korean Red Cross side continues to reject the holding of the eighth full-dress meeting in Seoul, proposed that the South-North Red Cross full-dress meetings be resumed at an early date at Panmunjom or another third place of mutual agreement.

At the same time, for substantial progress in the issue of agenda topics, our side has shown by deeds its sincerity and endeavors by proposing realistic and reasonable propositions such as "mutual exchanges of groups of 'chusok' tomb visitors," "implementation of aged parents' project first," and "exchange of family pictures."

In our country today, there are not only endless visits to the homeland by our compatriots in Japan affiliated with Chochongryon, a pro-Pyongyang Korean residents' group in Japan, but even those separated families living in the Soviet Union, Communist China and other Communist countries freely exchange letters with their families and relatives in the Republic of Korea. This clearly evidences that a humanitarian project intended to link the affection of blood relatives can be and is realized transcending ideas, systems and national boundaries.

I am in the conviction that the solution of the displaced family issue between the south and north does not end only in the settlement of the ardent wishes of the 10 million dispersed family members, but also constitutes a project laying the grounds for mutual trust between the south

and north, alleviating tensions, and preparing a firm stepping stone for peaceful unification of the fatherland.

As I remind that there has been no substantial progress in the dispersed family searching campaign between the south and north although south and north Korean Red Cross working-level meetings have been held for more than three years since July 1974 at Panmunjom, I cannot help but emphasize that early resumption of the full-dress Red Cross meetings alone constitutes a shortcut to alleviation of tensions between the south and north, and to normalization of the south-north dialogue.

I believe that by successfully implementing the South-North Red Cross Conference, we must prove and demonstrate at home and abroad that we are able to settle humanitarian issues pending between the same people through dialogue and cooperation between the same people.

Today, which marks the sixth anniversary of the proposal by the Republic of Korea National Red Cross for the South-North Red Cross Conference, I again urge the north Korean Red Cross side to agree to early normalization of the full-dress meetings of the South-North Red Cross Conference based on brotherly love and Red Cross humanitarian spirit. The Republic of Korea National Red Cross pledges before the 50 million people that no matter whatever difficulties it may face, it will do its best for the solution of the issue of finding the whereabouts of the 10 million dispersed family members in the south and north with patience and sincerity.

Lastly, I extend my sincere appreciation to fellow countrymen, government authorities, concerned persons and those of the press at home and abroad who have showed their unreserved support and encouragement for the successful implementation of the South-North Red Cross Conference as well as humanitarian projects. I look forward to their redoubled encouragement and cooperation in the future.

Part Three

Other Developments in Inter-Korean Relations

1. One Year's Interruption of Direct South-North Telephone Line

Last August 30 marked the elapse of one full year since the north Korean side unilaterally cut off the direct south-north telephone line that had assumed an important role in forestalling unexpected clashes and facilitating exchange of views between the south and north in the dialogue that was materialized for the first time in the quarter century of the national division.

Subsequently, the Seoul side called for the early restoration of the interrupted direct telephone line time and again, but it still remains out of operation due to insincerity on the part of the Pyongyang side.

The direct south-north telephone line was formally installed on September 20, 1971 when the first preliminary meeting of the South-North Red Cross Conference opened. On that day, the two sides agreed to establish their permanent liaison offices at the Freedom House and Panmungak at Panmunjom, respectively, and install two circuits of direct telephone line linking between the two liaison offices.

Later, at secret contacts between working-level officials on the proposed visit to Pyongyang by a ranking south Korean official after the need arose for political contacts parallel with the Red Cross talks, the Seoul side proposed to the northern side the installation of a direct Seoul-Pyongyang telephone line. Under a mutual agreement, the historical direct telephone line linking Seoul and Pyongyang was inaugurated on April 29, 1972 on an informal basis.

During his meeting with Kim Il-sung, Lee Hu-rak, former director of the Central Intelligence Agency, who visited Pyongyang soon thereafter, emphasized the need for "a permanent channel of dialogue between the south and north" with a view to forestalling unexpected incidents

between the two sides. With Kim Il-sung's nodding, the temporary direct line was formalized and this was announced along with the South-North Joint Communiqué on July 4, 1972.

Afterwards, the number of circuits of the direct telephone line between the south and north had swelled to 23 which included two circuits between the central offices of the south and north Korean Red Cross, 18 circuits for the South-North Red Cross Conference, two circuits between the Liaison Offices at Panmunjom, and one circuit between the respective offices of the South-North Coordinating Committee.

The direct south-north telephone line has been highly conducive to preparation of procedural matters in south-north meetings, the materialization of the mutual secret visits by south and north Korean ranking officials (Lee Hu-rak from the south and Park Sung-chol from the north), and the issuance of the South-North Joint Communiqué. It also rendered a valuable service by facilitating prompt contacts between the south and north when there occurred unexpected incidents such as shooting in the Demilitarized Zone and kidnapping of fishermen in the Yellow and eastern seas, and thereby enabling them to keep such incidents from further aggravation.

As for the operation of the direct south-north telephone line, the Seoul-Pyongyang line of the South-North Coordinating Committee used to be in operation between 9–12 a.m. and 4–8 p.m. every day, another Seoul-Pyongyang line between the head offices of the south and north Korean Red Cross 10–12 a.m. to 4–6 p.m. every day, and the one linking the Freedom House and Panmungak from 9 a.m. to 4 p.m. every day excepting holidays.

During the two year's operation of the direct south-north telephone line until its suspension, there were a total of 5,637 trial conversations over the line (1,108 by the Coordinating Committee, 1,850 by the Red Cross and 2,679 by the Panmunjom Liaison Offices) and 1,051 business conversations (238 by the Coordinating Committee, 45 by the Red Cross and 768 by the Liaison Offices). In addition, when meetings of the Co-

ordinating Committee or the Red Cross talks were held in Seoul or Pyongyang, the direct telephone line was in frequent use for press purposes. Even after the north Korean side unilaterally suspended the dialogue on August 23, 1973, the direct telephone continued to be operational for a considerable period.

On August 30, 1976, shortly after the axe-murder of two American officers at Panmunjom on August 18, the Republic of Korea Red Cross tried to send a telephone message to the north Korean side to discuss the issue of securing repatriation of a fishing boat, "Shinjin-ho No. 3," which was hijacked by the north Korean while she was in a peaceful fishing operation in the eastern sea. The north Korean Red Cross side refused to accept the telephone message, and, in addition, cut off all the 23 circuits of the direct south-north telephone line.

The Seoul side has been urging the Pyongyang side to restore the severed direct south-north telephone line repeatedly either in statements by the acting Co-chairman of the South-North Coordinating Committee or at the working-level meetings of the South-North Red Cross Conference but in vain due to the intransigence on the part of the Pyongyang side.

— *The following are the editorials of some major newspapers, denouncing the Pyongyang side for the unilateral interruption of the direct telephone line and calling for its early normal operation, on the occasion of marking the first full year after the interruption of the direct south-north telephone line. —Ed.*

Channel of Dialogue Should be Restored

Chosun Ilbo (August 31, 1977)

It is already one full year since the direct south-north telephone line was suspended due to the north's boycott of telephone conversation with the south for no reasons. Soon after the axe-murder at Panmunjom on August 18 last year, the north Korean Communists refused to make telephone communications with the south, interrupting the direct telephone line altogether.

On August 30 last year, north Korean gunboats hijacked one of our fishing boats, "Shinjin-ho No. 3," which was engaged in fishing peacefully in the eastern sea. To discuss the incident, the Republic of Korea National Red Cross sought to send a telephone message to the northern side promptly. But the north Korean Red Cross refused to receive the message for no reason, compelling the Republic of Korea National Red Cross to try to negotiate for the repatriation of the hijacked fishermen through radio broadcast.

Thereafter, our side, time and again, called for the early restoration of the operation of the direct south-north telephone line either in statements by the acting Co-chairman of the South-North Coordinating Committee or at the working-level meetings of the South-North Red Cross Conference. The north Korean side has invariably shunned such repeated calls by ignoring them or raising irrelevant arguments.

The direct south-north telephone line was opened on September 22, 1971 for the first time in the quarter-century of national division. At the first preliminary meeting of the South-North Red Cross Conference opened at our side's "August 2 proposal," the two sides agreed to establish their respective liaison offices at the Freedom House and Panmunkak at Panmunjom and to install two circuits of direct telephone between the

two liaison offices, thereby realizing the historical inauguration of the direct south-north telephone line.

On April 29, 1972 at our side's suggestion, a full-fledged direct telephone line linking Seoul and Pyongyang was installed informally, which was formalized after Lee Hu-rak, former director of the Central Intelligence Agency, emphasized before Kim Il-sung the need for a permanent channel of dialogue between the south and north in order to forestall any unexpected incident, during his visit to Pyongyang. The existence of such direct telephone line was made public when the South-North Joint Communique was issued on July 4, 1972.

On August 25, 1972, 18 more circuits were installed between the south and north for use in the Red Cross talks, bringing to 23 the total circuits installed between the two sides. An agreement reached between the south and north concerning the installation and operation of direct south-north telephone line states, "A direct telephone line between Seoul and Pyongyang shall be installed and operated in order to solve directly, promptly and accurately the task of realizing peaceful unification of the fatherland independently as well as those issues arising between the south and north or the question of preparing for unexpected incidents."

With this purpose, the direct telephone line had assumed an important role in facilitating prompt contacts between the two sides whenever unexpected incidents such as shooting in the Demilitarized Zone or hijacking in the Yellow and Eastern seas occurred. Moreover, provisions of the agreement concerning the operation of the direct telephone line for the central offices of the south and north Korean Red Cross say, "This agreement may be discarded, revised or supplemented by mutual agreement." Nevertheless, the north Korean side unilaterally refused to receive a telephone message from the south intended to discuss the urgent incident in which "Shinjin-ho" was hijacked by the north, thereby violating even the basic agreement on the operation of the direct telephone line. Since then, the north persists in the interruption of the direct telephone line.

In addition, the north Korean side seems intent on further reducing the frequency of Red Cross working-level meetings which have been barely sustained. There must be something to do between such intention and the refusal to normalize the operation of the direct telephone line for as long as one year. As we urge the north to restore the severed telephone line even in compliance with the wishes of the nation, mindful that doing so would serve their interests also in every respect, we would like to follow carefully what their unilateral and insincere attitude would result in.

One Year's Interruption of Direct Telephone Line

Hankuk Ilbo (August 31, 1977)

It is one full year since the direct south-north telephone line turned deaf and mute. It is not that it has become deaf and mute by mistake. Such a deplorable state has resulted from the cut-off of the line by the north Korean side. The north Koreans cut off the line as they came under furious attacks at home and abroad over the Panmunjom axe-murder on August 18 last year.

Since they cut it off in their cross temper, there can be no justifiable reason to present for their action. This is why they have failed to produce any reason in the face of our side's persistent demand for explanation.

For one year, our side has asked for its restoration, but failed to obtain any response. At the meeting site, it seems as if they are adopting an uncivilized manner such as hunger strike or the right to be silent.

What is the background against which they are so intransigent? The answer is self-evident. They are not interested in liaison, dialogue, project or unification. They are aware that since their strength lags behind ours and they lack any theory to present, the danger exists that they would be dragged into our pace and their scheme to communize the south by violence would end in smoke if they allow telephone conversation with the south to go on. Here, they resolved to break up the telephone line.

The severed line between the liaison offices at Panmunjom was an exclusive channel through which all preparations for Red Cross talks were arranged, while the two circuits linking the Red Cross central offices in Seoul and Pyongyang were designed to help facilitate successful Red Cross talks and various projects related thereto. The direct telephone line between the offices of the South-North Coordinating Committee carries an objective of a higher dimension, that is, “to solve directly, promptly and accurately the task of realizing peaceful unification of the fatherland independently as well as those issues arising between the south and north, and the question of preparing for unexpected incidents.”

Their severance of the direct telephone cannot escape accusation all the more because it runs counter to all these lofty ideas and objectives. Because the ideas and objectives of the telephone line were so extraordinary that a regulation governing its operation sets forth a “mutual agreement” before it can be discontinued. In fact, the direct Seoul-Pyongyang line had been in frequent use during its four years’ operation, with the number of conversations over the line reaching some 1,300 including testing conversations by the Coordinating Committee and about 2,000 by the Red Cross.

Now, beginning with one year ago yesterday, no conversation can ever be made over the direct line. Pyongyang does not answer to repeated calls from Seoul. This reveals that the north Korean side is no longer interested in any dialogue or projects with the south nor has it the willingness to solve with reason unexpected incidents or abrupt clashes between the south and north.

In other words, they do not care about the occurrence of clashes or other unexpected incidents. It may well be said that they are interested only in fomenting provocations or disputes rather than promoting peace and peaceful unification.

We would like to again call for the north Koreans’ repentance. If they are really interested in “independent and peaceful unification” as

they trumpet so often, they should agree to restoration of the severed direct telephone line, which can enable the south and north to share dialogue peacefully and independently. We look forward to the north's reflection and apology.

Pyongyang's Interruption of Direct Line

Kyunghyang Shinmun (August 31, 1977)

One year has already passed since the direct south-north telephone line that had been in use so valuably for five years beginning with the initiation of the South-North Red Cross Conference, was cut off by the north Korean side soon after the axe-murder in August last year.

On August 30, 1976, the Republic of Korea National Red Cross called the north Korean Red Cross over the direct line to send an emergency telephone message. The north Koreans at the other end said they would bring papers to take down the message. This was the last word heard from the north over the Seoul-Pyongyang telephone. They have never returned.

At that time, the Republic of Korea National Red Cross wanted to contact its north Korean counterpart over the issue of "Shinjin-ho No. 3," a south Korean fishing boat which was hijacked by north Korean patrol boats. Consequently, the message intended to be sent over the telephone had to be broadcast by a broadcasting network. Even today, some messages are sent to the north by means of radio inasmuch as there is no way of contact other than the Red Cross working-level meetings.

The fact that it was the north Korean side which torpedoed the south-north dialogue in the so-called "August 28 statement" by Kim Young-joo, and it was also the north Koreans who cut off the direct telephone line unilaterally without any advance notification, well explains what their hidden motivation is. They have clearly showed at home and abroad that they feign to take part in the dialogue only when they think

doing so would serve the accomplishment of their strategy to communize the whole Korean peninsula, and boycott it at the very minutes they believe it is against their policy of forming a “united front” for that strategy.

An agreed matter concerning the operation of the direct Seoul-Pyongyang telephone line regulates that the agreed matter can be “discarded, amended or supplemented by mutual agreement.” Nevertheless, the north Korean side deliberately keeps the telephone line out of operation for one full year despite the south’s repeated calls for its restoration. This clearly shows how insincere are the north Koreans toward the south-north dialogue.

As we see even the Red Cross working-level meetings take place at a reduced frequency due to the north’s evasive tactics, nobody can tell what schemes or provocations they may perpetrate in the next.

As is well known, the direct south-north telephone line, a noticeable achievement made, together with the establishment of the liaison offices at Panmunjom, at the South-North Red Cross Conference, was opened on September 22, 1971 for the first time in a quarter century of national division.

Few persons can deny that the direct line had been a valuable channel through which the south and north could exchange their views at any time. Needless to say, the need for its existence is absolute either in that it can serve to forestall unexpected incidents between the two sides or that it is highly conducive to preparing procedural matters. In fact, the direct line had played an important role in defusing crises whenever there flared up grave incidents such as shooting in the Demilitarized Zone and hijacking of fishing boats in the Yellow and eastern seas.

To sever such an important telephone line constitutes an act of trampling down upon an agreed matter reached between the south and north, and giving disappointment to all the peoples around the world. Because of the interruption, there even arises the danger of fresh mis-

understanding, distrust, confrontation and clash between the two sides.

Such danger can be eloquently substantiated by the recently stepped-up deceptive propaganda against the south, anti-Seoul activities abroad and kidnap attempts.

We hope that the north Korean Communists will restore the operation of its Panmunjom liaison office and the direct south-north telephone line, and thereby show sincerity toward forestalling unhappy consequence. We also urge north Korea to agree to normalize the dialogue without any further delay.

North Korea's Kidnap Attempts

Dong-A Ilbo (August 31, 1977)

It was belatedly learned that prior to the attempted kidnap of Pianist Paik Kun-woo last July, the north Korean Communists unsuccessfully attempted to kidnap a south Korean coach, Kim Chang-je, in Iraq.

It was around the end of last July that north Korean agents tried to kidnap Mr. Paik and his family in Yugoslavia. In mid-July, north Korean agents attempted to kidnap Kim Chang-je, a coach for pingpong players of Libya, in Bagdad, the capital city of Iraq. The kidnap attempt was thwarted only when the Iraqi police were called in and Libyan team officials intervened. But for the cooperation from the Iraqi police and Libyan officials, Kim Chang-je would certainly have been forcibly taken to Pyongyang where he would have been put up as a "heroic defector" for the Communist propaganda.

There is nothing surprising in such kidnap attempts by the north Korean Communists who do not hesitate even to commit smuggling through their diplomatic networks abroad. By nature, they employ whatever means available to accomplish their goals. In fact, we have experienced numerous incidents in which they kidnapped innocent citizens

to the north and hijack fishermen openly in the seas. The problem is that the arena of such atrocities has begun to spread to abroad rather than being confined to the Korean peninsula.

Those living in a country, domestic or foreign alike, are subject to the law of the land. Therefore, law violation between foreigners cannot be condoned and is subject to legal discipline as a challenge to the statutory order of the country. Even if the north Koreans can shun legal sanction through sophistry and disguise at the moment, the day will surely come when they will be brought to the justice and yield under the pressure of world opinion.

However, this does not mean we can sit idly by simply waiting for that day to come. In the first place, we can expose their atrocities before world opinion and appeal to proper U.N. agencies for prevention and sanction of such activities that violate the basic human rights. Concentrated efforts should also be made to form an international cooperative system through all available diplomatic channels.

In this connection, we would like to discuss the issue of restoring the suspended direct south-north telephone line which the north Koreans unilaterally cut off one year ago. Inasmuch as the atrocities perpetrated abroad, apart from those committed on the Korean peninsula, were the results of Pyongyang's directives, the fundamental solution of the problems cannot help but depend on dialogue and rapprochement between Seoul and Pyongyang. In view of their attitude, we cannot look forward this overnight. Still, it is important to restore the severed telephone line in the first place and exchange opinions in a dialogue. Even at battle fields where fire is exchanged, there are some means of communications between enemies. It is hardly understandable what has prompted the north Koreans, who love to trumpet "same people," to cut off even such telephone line. North Korea should first agree to our suggestion for restoration of the avenue of dialogue.

2. Path of South-North Dialogue

The Seoul side of the South-North Coordinating Committee sponsored a seminar on issues related to the south-north dialogue last July 1 on the occasion of the fifth anniversary of the issuance of the South-North Joint Communique, with a view to contributing to future policy-making by looking back over the past course of the dialogue and obtaining opinions from those of various circles on its future prospects, and also to providing an impetus to early normalization of the south-north dialogue. In the seminar, a due attention was paid especially to the fact that the north Korean side, having deliberately suspended the dialogue, now indulges in a deceptive peace offensive, attempting to mislead public opinions both at home and abroad.

The following are the full texts of two of the theme papers presented at the seminar—"The Task of Restoring National Homogeneity" by Sonu Whie, editor-in-chief of the daily Chosun Ilbo, and "The Possibility of Economic Exchange Between South and North Korea" by Chung Wun-hwak, a staff member of the Institute for East Asian Studies.

The Task of Restoring National Homogeneity

By Sonu Whie

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Chapter I. Foreword

When we discuss the issue of restoring national homogeneity, we inevitably presuppose the cruel reality that this divided and estranged nation sitting on a divided peninsula has already become, and will continue to grow more, heterogeneous in the political, social, economic, cultural and other fields of life.

Seldom has this homogeneous nation become so heterogeneous in the past as it has today. Even during the age of the Three Kingdoms that preceded the Unified Silla Dynasty, there existed among them common elements much more homogeneous than any cultural identity that can be found between south and north Korea today. Of course, we ought to take into account the fact that at that time, the social structure was much less dense than now.

The decisive factor contributing to the heterogeneity of south and north Korea is that north Korea has introduced Marxism, a carefully woven, revolutionary ideological system.

Here, we shall put aside the issue of whether north Korea's Marxism is orthodox or heterodox, or whether it was right or wrong to introduce it. For, in the comparison of south and north Korea, a preeminent point is the negative view of Marxism toward the established order, or the ideo-

logical effect of the revolutionary view of history upon the conservative view.

So far as north Korea, characterized by such Marxist ideological system, is observed on its own terms, the pursuit of homogeneity in the nation becomes meaningless, since the more such a pursuit is made, the more heterogeneity becomes revealed. This is because the very national homogeneity being pursued constitutes itself a repulsive element which north Korea attempts to reject.

Under the circumstances, a juncture we can barely arrive at when we deal with the issue of national homogeneity is the South-North Joint Communiqué issued on July 4, 1972. Still, this Joint Communiqué is not without problems.

The South-North Joint Communiqué, of course, carries unifying phrases. But their interpretations can vary and contradict one another, thus exhibiting already the tragedy of heterogeneity or confrontation between south and north Korea. When this tragedy is viewed from a different angle, it becomes transformed into a comedy.

North Korea remains convinced that the spirit and contents of the Joint Communiqué do not in the least run counter to Pyongyang's revolutionary goal. It is true, at the same time, that we firmly believe that the spirit and contents of the Joint Communiqué by no means represent any acceptance of north Korea's revolutionary goals, but rather should facilitate the absorption of the north Koreans into the historical continuity of the nation, which our side has been maintaining.

Therefore, one point stands out clearly in the assumption of unification: one side's inevitable submission to the other by means of revolution or war. Since the restoration of homogeneity over heterogeneity would be achieved in that case, there would be no need for separate observations other than actual approach.

Under the circumstances, a study and observation of the issues related to the nation's homogeneity would be necessary only in the follow-

ing:

1. Determining the type of step-by-step exchanges through which heterogeneity could be checked and homogeneity could be restored in the course of a dialogue directed toward national unification in line with the 1972 Joint Communique, and

2. Determining what should be done to dissolve heterogeneity and restore homogeneity in the event of the realization of peaceful unification.

Thus seen, neither of the two cases has any historical precedents which can be used as models or references.

Therefore, what this text can present is not a challenge for the restoration of national homogeneity, but simply a subjective opinion that may be used as a reference in seeking such a challenge.

At the same time, this opinion can serve as preparation for case (2) rather than (1), and can be viewed as material of which we in our society should take due note in ordinary times, and which we should consider constantly in such preparation.

Chapter II. Main Discourse

1. Concerning Religion

Today in north Korea, freedom of worship is guaranteed by the Constitution. In effect, however, all religious activities have been thoroughly stifled, with religion branded as a taboo.

Christian churches have either been destroyed or converted for other purposes. Buddhist temples are barely maintained, with no substantial repairs being made. Reports have indicated that until about ten years ago, small numbers of Christians who refused to abandon their faith offered prayer services in grave yards only, resembling the catacomb prayers. But in view of a defector's testimony that a housewife and her daughter in Hwanghae Province were sent to a concentration camp in the remote

mountains of Hamkyong Province after being found keeping a Bible left by the woman's husband before he fled south several years ago, it seems there are no traces of religion left in north Korea today.

There must, however, be more than a few persons fifty or order in north Korea who still cherish the memory of practicing religion.

Judging from religious phenomena in the Soviet Union and East European countries, the Eastern Orthodox Church still has many clergymen and followers, although it is subject to control by the Communist Party and it assumes an external political role. Considering the fact that man becomes more religion-oriented when he suffers from political persecution or family hardships, it is presumed that the permeant power of religion among the north Korean people would be surprisingly great in the event of the development of case (2) above.

The fact that the statutory centripetal force of Israel lies in the faith of Judaism, which plays a decisive role in enabling racially different Jewish peoples with varying skin colors and languages to seek homogeneity by becoming united in their faith, and Hinduism's assumption of a profound role in imbuing a similar sense of homogeneity into Indians of different races and languages, serve as valuable references to us.

In view of the general tendency that persons who have given up religion in favor of materialistic way of living, tend to return to faith more thirstily, when they come to enjoy sufficient material comforts, and oppressed people tend to console their lives through religion, the craving for religion among the north Korean people could be great in the future.

We can find in Kim Il-sung's idolatry an instance of the north Korean Communist authorities exploiting man's religion-oriented nature, unable to ignore such a trend altogether.

If an inference can be permitted, Kim Il-sung's portraits and statues can be compared with religious pictures and images of Buddha. The gilding of Kim Il-sung's statues can be linked to that of Buddha's images, and it is apparent that the title of Kim Il-sung, "Our respected father and

leader,” must have been derived from the Christian address, “My Lord and Father.”

Although Kim Il-sung’s deification and personality cult are, of course, being carried on for political purposes, it cannot be denied that such practices in a sense rouse man’s religious nature.

It seems apparent that on the day when freedom is granted to the north Korean people, a majority of them will switch the object of their worship from a deified man to a genuinely religious one.

2. Concerning Kinship and Family

In north Korea there is no traditional family registration system. That age-old system was abolished in favor of a new method under which only limited records are kept on each family’s situation for census purposes. The reason for the change was that the traditional system would be detrimental to the people’s abandonment of the remaining vestiges of feudalism.

Notwithstanding, Kim Il-sung practices nepotism. This is evident in the tendency of Kim, who claims to be a Communist, to feel throughout a series of power struggles that he can trust none but blood relatives.

According to testimony by defectors from the north, even ordinary party members in the north tend to privately recommend their relatives first for newly opened or otherwise available posts. This indicates that even the Communists have realized that the trustworthiness of one’s relatives can be higher than that of others in the event of some emergency.

Nevertheless, it is true that in north Korea the kinship notion which grants blood relatives preferential status is totally rejected.

For our people who have been living under strong Confucian and geomantic influences over a long period, this sense of kinship can be likened to British historian Arnold Toynbee’s remark: “The influence of an old system lasts for one hundred years.”

Under the circumstances, we had better to include those relatives residing in north Korea in our kinship records whenever possible to prepare for case (2).

The family system collapsed long ago in north Korea. The affection between parents and children is described as a feeling of puce blue, and there is little opportunity for families to enjoy happy occasions together. The north Koreans even depend on “rice factories” to provide the dietary need for efficient labor, while trustworthiness among family members is seriously damaged by one’s loyalty to the party, as can be seen in the encouragement of ideological accusations between parents and children. But affection between fathers and sons and between mothers and daughters is an inborn human instinct not easily turned “puce blue.”

In our society today the nuclear family system is evolving in general not through systematic enforcement as in north Korea but through the influence of Western individualism, and there remains a basic difference between family relations in the south and collapsed family system of north Korea.

Moreover, we are encouraging “filial piety” as a means of revitalizing our traditional virtues. This will become one of the kernel subjects in future education.

Inasmuch as communism is a mutational illegitimate child of Western capitalism, there is some linkage between the Western nuclear family system and the impersonalized family of the Communist society. Although the Oriental family system, as a traditional vertical cultural phenomenon, was once disturbed by the alien Western horizontal system, inasmuch as the Oriental system itself contained inherent defective elements, efforts are now being made to restore the original nature of our family system by propelling an inverted vertical phenomenon. The revitalization of the modern definition of “filial piety” represents the restoration of a natural virtue, which would be much welcomed by the north Korean people in the event of the realization of case (2) above.

3. Concerning History

The history which is taught in north Korea is described from the standpoint of class struggles as a party history, based on materialistic conceptions. The national history preceding the formation of the party is treated only as a pre-history, auxiliary to the party history.

In such an approach, therefore, any traits of the mystical colors or wisdom of our nation were simply dismissed, along with the human sorrows and frailty of life.

Struggles alone exist, not unity, and only events are described, without any reference to their heroes. The only man who is conspicuously described in the north's history is Kim Il-sung.

The historical figures who were interpreted and evaluated in the class struggles of the "pre-history" are all treated as no more than "guides" who "only paved the way for the advent of Kim Il-sung."

It goes without saying that the north Korean people who must study such crooked and biased history are unfortunate. But history proves that such distorted records will some day be judged by a fair authority and scrapped altogether.

Needless to say, therefore, our orthodox, fair and multi-sided approach toward history would certainly awaken the north Korean people should case (2) come to pass.

4. Concerning Language and Letters

If there is any bond, even a small and fragile one, that retains the homogeneity of the nation beyond the limits of time and space imposed by the current state of confrontation and struggle, as well as in dialogue or in the event of the afore-mentioned case (2), it is our "language" and "letters."

It is surprising to see that our people managed to safeguard the

nation's language, letters, customs and culture despite the influence of Chinese ideas throughout our many thousand years of history. This is evidence of our people's marked individuality.

In other words, it is because we stuck to our language and used our own letters ever since their invention during the era of King Sejong that we have been able to retain the heritage of a culturally independent people without becoming overwhelmed by China, as were so many peoples bordering The Middle Kingdom.

The language being used in south and north Korea is the same because it is our language, and so are the letters in both sides's alphabets.

Still, heterogeneous traces are appearing the language and letters.

For example, the word "tongmu" is one of the most aesthetic words, referring to friend. But we are no longer able to use the word as warmly as in the past because the Communists in the north have changed it into political terminology, meaning "comrade."

In Chinese characters, the north follows the usage prevailing in China in many cases, and some politicized terminology carries a completely different meaning. For instance, the word "chojik" (organization) is used to denote love affairs between the two sexes in the north. More striking difference can be found in concepts and interpretations of specific terminology.

The tragedy or comedy of the South-North Joint Communiqué mentioned earlier applies to this very aspect. Item No. 1 of the Principles for Unification of the Fatherland embodied in the Joint Communiqué, stipulates, "Unification shall be achieved through independent Korean efforts without being subject to external imposition or interference."

To the north Korean side, the word "external" naturally means the United States and other free world countries, but not the Soviet Union or Communist China. North Korea, which is under the influence of both the Soviet Union and Red China, and which wanders along sandwiched in

the Sino-Soviet strife, brings both Moscow and Peking into its account only so far as the “chuche” concept is concerned. In terms of the South-North Joint Communiqué, however, the Soviet Union and Communist China, on which the north depends heavily, constitute blood-brother countries adhering to the same ideology, which could never be “external.”

“External interference” thus refers only to the “American imperialists’ interference.” Any interference by the Soviet Union or Communist China represents the mere manifestation of the friendship of its comrades and brotherly countries.

Item No. 2 of the Principles for Unification provides, “Unification shall be achieved through peaceful means, and not through the use of force against each other.”

The problem here is that north Korea considers revolution not to be the use of force, but to be peaceful means. Therefore, it can be said that north Korea regards its “policy for revolution in south Korea” as a peaceful method, not a conflict.

Even though “revolution” in the “policy for revolution in south Korea” requires the use of arms and the killing or wounding of a number of people, it still is a peaceful means in north Korea’s view.

It is apparent that even if a limited war were to take place, north Korea would not describe it as any exercise of arms. Here we recall the perverted terminology in a totalitarian country, namely, “war is peace,” which was ironically described in George Orwell’s 1984.

Item No. 3 of the Principles for Unification says, “As a homogeneous people, a great national unity shall be sought above all, transcending differences in ideas, ideologies, and systems.”

North Korea does not include the Communist ideology, ideas and system in the list of the ideologies, ideas and systems that are to be transcended. North Korea restricts the ideologies, ideas and systems referred to in Item No. 3 only to our ideology, concept of democracy and capitalistic system.

Some people may view this interpretation as revealing excessive distrust of north Korea and as damaging the significance of the South-North Joint Communiqué. But if north Korea were to allow its own Communist ideology, ideas and system to be included in the list of those mentioned in Item No. 3, the meaning of its very existence would be shaken to the core.

It has long been stipulated in the Communist ideological system that a “nation” cannot transcend its ideology, ideas and system. Therefore, as long as north Korea believes in communism, it will never transcend its ideologies, ideas and systems in the interests of national unity.

We can see in the above brief illustrations how different the two sides’ definitions of the same terminology are, and can thus sense that, due to their different political ideas, astonishingly heterogeneous trends are developing in south and north Korea with regard to their language and letters, although both languages are the same on the surface.

When we think that man’s words represent his spirit and actions, and his actions in turn reflect his spirit and words, the difference in the usages of words between south and north Korea may well be said to be deepening the south-north confrontation.

This heterogeneous usage of language stems from the fact that in north Korea words are used so as to place excessive emphasis on their ideological meanings, distorting their original definitions.

Therefore, in order to recover the original beauty and meanings of words, we must liberate them from their political slavery, and place them on the aesthetic level. When this is realized, the homogeneity of language and letters between south and north Korea will again be realized.

It is said that when one of our stewardesses sang a song entitled “Tongshimcho” (like-minded grass) in a bus carrying north Korean delegates back home after a South-North Red Cross Conference meeting in Seoul, they, who had disputed almost every thing they encountered in the south, became quiet and solemn. What does this point to?

Of course, the melody of the song could have impressed them as the song is one of our favorites. Still, it is certain that its lyrics, which they could understand of course, struck them and transformed their political sentiments into aesthetic ones. The lyrics of “Tongshimcho” are loosely translated as follows:

Petals fall idly in the wind,
The time of reunion is far away, sans promise,
Why heart and heart can't be linked together.

In a political whirlwind, aesthetic things can hardly prevail. But what destroys the suffocating state of a political mechanism and injects fresh air into it is an aesthetic sympathy and the strength deriving from such sympathy.

Here, we may need to reappraise the allegory that it was not a strong wind but warm sunshine that took off a traveler's coat.

Even in the grammar of the Korean “Hangul” alphabet, there is a substantial difference between south and north Korea. But it does not pose a serious problem, since the basic structure of the alphabet was established very firmly at the beginning. With regard to the usage of Chinese characters, the difference would not constitute any major problem either; even in the south there are varying opinions as to their proper usage.

5. Concerning Literature

Although it is said that the literature of north Korea follows the socialistic realism of the Soviet Union, the north's literature in fact is of a different pattern. It is rather closer to Chinese literature. One of its distinguishing features is the tendency not to recognize the personality of creation.

Whereas our literature is regarded as the product of an individual's ability, to the extent that we say, “all a writer absolutely needs is his desk,”

north Korea's attitude toward the production of literature works is that "writers should have common desks (Simonov)". In this posture, the north encourages collaboration among several writers, or workshop unit collaboration. In other words, it attaches a greater importance to multiple participation by people than to the emergence of individual talents.

However, the neglect of personality by such multiple participation renders works non-personal, and since a single work then suffices for one issue, the variety of literature ceases to exist. In consequence, literary activities end in framing of works only through bureaucratization, a trend that ultimately denies the creation of literature.

In north Korea, the subjugation of literature to politics even exceeds the degree of the government-patronization of Russian literature at the peak of Stalin's personality cult. All literary works end in a universal implication that the irregularities or troubles of human lives can be solved through Kim Il-sung.

Literature and art works are produced in such a simple and easy pattern in north Korea.

Art—stage performances, music and film—is not allowed to go beyond the bounds of the realism of Kim Il-sung's personality cult.

In the case of Korean classical songs, north Korea tends to apply its realism improperly, having them sung softly in an ordinary voice. This may seem plausible at first glance, but classical songs, which in most cases describe the Korean people's grudges, cannot move listeners unless they are sung in a unique, husky voice that can be attained only through arduous training.

The literary art of north Korea rarely rises above a realism of small dimensions, intended for plain understanding by the people. Under the circumstances, literature can hardly escape from the confines of indoctrination texts and propaganda.

Under such conditions, those writers from the south who went to

north Korea in the post-liberation years or who were forcibly taken there by the Communists during the Korean war have long ceased to be active in literary circles, with the sole exception of Kim Sun-nam, a composer.

The reason is that when Park Hon-yong and his political colleagues, all hailing from the south, were purged in the north for their alleged failure to incite a revolution in south Korea soon after the end of the Korean War, those writers and artists who were from the south were purged together with the politicians. Another reason is that with literary and artistic sentiments nurtured in the south, they could hardly stand the cruel political situation in the north.

If there is anything homogeneous in the field of literature and art between south and north Korea, it is only in the most fundamental sense that novels are fiction, that films are made with actors playing, that paintings depict things using a brush and colors, and so forth.

Since a qualitative change in literature and art is possible if only the circumstances change, our literature and art should prepare for the possibility of case (2) by consolidating the original subjective climate in literature and art, exclusive of any political influence.

It is a natural consequence that literature and art which exist only for specific purpose lose the significance of their existence if that purpose ceases to exist.

Therefore, it is certain that if our literature and art introduce a variety of patterns based upon our precious traditional culture and develop them to the greatest possible extent, they will contribute to restoring the national homogeneity while retaining national characteristics reflecting a universal generality.

During and after World War II, it was said, British and Japanese troops shared human sentiments through a few British folk songs they had both learned in their elementary school days. Do our children in south and north Korea learn our traditional folk songs? If they do, it could constitute a small foundation for restoring the homogeneity of our

people's sentiments in the future.

If north Korea rejects all our traditional folk and children's songs and does not allow children to sing them, it would mean that as far as sentiments are concerned, we would be more likely to find homogeneity with Americans or Japanese instead of the north Koreans. This would be a deplorable circumstance from the standpoint of the nation.

One thing that can be determined from the available information is that both south and north Korea seem to be preserving folklore traditions with sincerity, whatever their motivation.

Since the impact of folklore upon the nation's homogeneity cannot be ignored, this is a welcome phenomenon.

The work that can exercise the greatest influence in the field of literature and art is a huge national drama, namely the emergence of a literary work that can spiritually impress people of all walks of life.

The creation of such a masterpiece would be much more feasible in our situation than in the tightly closed society of north Korea.

When a literary work emerges that can "transcend differences in ideologies, ideas and systems," as expressed in the South-North Joint Communique, its emotion would certainly serve as a stimulant for the grand unity of the nation.

We sincerely look forward to creation of a great literary piece that can yield a profound spiritual impact toward insuring national unity, an effect comparable to the influence of Moses's *Ten Commandments* or Fichte's *Declaration to the German People*.

6. Concerning Customs

We cannot overlook the fact that travels between south and north Korea several times during the Red Cross talks have touched off something of a competition in fashions.

According to the observations of our delegates, the costumes of the

north Korean women grew more colorful and their style shifted from traditional Korean dress to more Western style as time passed. It is said that north Korean personnel privately sought the reactions of our delegates over the changing styles.

Similarly, the sedge mats on the floors of the hotel rooms allotted to our delegates in Pyongyang were replaced by carpets and the size of Japanese refrigerators in the rooms increased gradually, while Omega watches appeared suddenly and uniformly on the wrists of the north Korean personnel dealing with our delegates. In all these instances, we can perceive evident signs of competition in fads and fashions.

Of course, north Korea's growing interest in consumer goods may be assessed negatively as a violation of Communist asceticism. Still, we cannot overlook the steady rise of such trends as the demand for more stylish and convenient manners everywhere around the world, which affect even political propensities.

As for our own manners, the latest modes of Paris reach Seoul's Myong-dong district in less than one month, and blue jeans are sweeping the world at a pace faster than the spread of any contagious disease.

Rampant changes in such fashions as hair style, makeup, high heels, stockings and panties are no exception.

It is said that in Soviet society, one of the marked problems is the political activity by anti-government dissidents. Still, what harasses the Soviet authorities more is said to be the popular fashions that infiltrate into the Soviet Union with irresistible force from Western societies.

Of course, north Korea, along with Communist China, thoroughly controls any change in fashions. But it is questionable how long such control can remain effective.

North Korea is also very strict in dealing with the sex mores. There is no denying that sexual morality is being strictly controlled. One of the most pressing reasons is that north Korea fears if sexual permissiveness

would lead to a loosening of overall social control.

At any rate, it may become more and more difficult to control sex by means of iron-firm discipline in Red China or north Korea amidst the contemporary, universal sexual revolution.

Compared with north Korea, our state of sexual morality is so free as to be nearly corrupt. Some persons may deplore this situation. But, a careful review of the social process from the time of the Korean War to date shows that sexual freedom has rather prompted restraint, which in turn is developing into a moral virtue. It is believed that in three to four years, which is a stage of economic development, sexual morality will be firmly established upon free personalities.

When this is realized, our sexual mores will surely become sounder, whereas in the north they will remain regulated for control's sake.

Commercial radio and television programming is rather sounder than bureaucratic control, and is more in conformity with human nature.

Even in the restoration of homogeneity in such trends, it is self-evident which side should approach the other to accomplish such homogeneity.

Chapter III. Conclusion

As stated in the foreword, this text is no more than an extremely vague and subjective private opinion intended for use as a reference in seeking the restoration of national homogeneity, rather a presentation of that task. What is felt acutely in the above limited observations is that the more the issue of homogeneity is observed, the more heterogeneity is exposed in all fields involving south and north Korea. This indicates how difficult a task it would be to restore the national homogeneity in the future.

That difficulty is felt all the more acutely because of the danger that north Korea, which has suspended the south-north dialogue in viola-

tion of the spirit of the South-North Joint Communiqué, may resort to war and revolution without abandoning its daydreams of revolution in south Korea or communization of the whole Korean peninsula by force of arms, taking advantage of developments in the world situation.

Of course, we are not afraid of the north's strategy for revolution or armed aggression. Our internal order and national unity are firm enough to defeat it. We have also prepared ourselves fully against any war scheme intended to bring the whole Korean peninsula under Communist domain, and such preparation will grow firmer and stronger as time passes.

But what we are worried about is that such daydreams and ventures by north Korea further aggravate the hostile feelings between the south and north which rose out of the Korean War, and postpone even longer the time of peaceful unification envisioned in the South-North Joint Communiqué. Under the circumstances, the progress of heterogeneity is picking up momentum and the restoration of national homogeneity, being nearly hopeless at the moment, becomes a more and more difficult task delayed until a more and more remote date. Therefore, what we should exact from north Korea in the name of the nation is a return to the spirit of the South-North Joint Communiqué and to the table of dialogue.

As observed above, it is apparent that north Korea had no trust in the Joint Communiqué from the outset, responding to it merely from the standpoint of its longterm strategy. Even so, the Joint Communiqué serves a constructive role as a milestone for national integration. In addition, a confrontation with dialogue is preferable to a confrontation without dialogue. So far as unification is concerned, contacts of any nature are welcome. Of course, we must call upon north Korea to acknowledge the national conscience and reopen the dialogue on the strength of the principles and spirit embodied in the South-North Joint Communiqué. It is important that we employ all reasonable means and methods available to encourage north Korea to return to the arena of dialogue. It is clear in the light of the principles of the South-North Joint Communiqué that the north Korea's unilateral suspension of the dialogue cannot under any

circumstances be justified.

North Korea had something else in mind when it boycotted the dialogue. It panicked when it found itself assimilating our pace, even in inconsequential fields, through mutual contacts, travels and observations. It is no secret that the Communists make it a rule to initiate or abandon war or dialogue depending on whether it seems to be in their favor at a given time.

As discussed above, any restoration of homogeneity through contacts and dialogue between the south and north, without recourse to violence, means unequivocally that north Korea has been assimilated to our pace.

For communism, being a political heretic of human history, is bound to see its influence fade some day, and the realization of the return to orthodoxy represents the abandonment of its dogma.

However, a heretic always attempts to bring down orthodoxy by whatever means are available so as to become the new orthodoxy. However, in the name of the nation, we cannot tolerate this. When the pledge to promote a great national unity transcending differences in ideologies, ideas and systems is about to be accomplished by the abandonment of communism, this will by no means be endorsed by north Korea. In such a case, north Korea would probably uphold the slogan that "war is peace," If it could foresee any chance of success, the north would not hesitate to renew war in Korea.

Therefore, to prevent north Korea from perpetrating war, we must achieve economic prosperity and do our best to ensure national security. North Korea will participate in dialogue only when it is convinced that there is no chance to communize the entire Korean peninsula by force of arms.

If we have anything to ask of the United States for our national security and the resumption of dialogue, it is that the United States ensure that the Soviet Union and Communist China, both military allies of north Korea, exercise their influence over Pyongyang so that it abandons its

policy of unifying the Korean peninsula by force. If north Korea does not give up that policy even under such influence, then a pledge should be exacted from the two Communist giants not to support any armed venture by north Korea. If this happens, north Korea should be discouraged.

What we ardently wish to see from a national standpoint is for north Korea to become disappointed, disappointed in the ideology of communism that undermines national harmony as well as in its allied comrades in the Soviet Union and Communist China. This is so not because we want to see north Korea shattered but because we believe only under such circumstance can north Korea regain its national conscience. And the degree of our unity and our spiritual, economic and military strength will determine whether the United States can successfully persuade the Soviet Union and Red China to restrain north Korea, or at least obtain their guarantee of non-intervention on the Korean peninsula. Therefore, to so discourage north Korea would be most advantageous in achieving national unification peacefully through dialogue, in the course of which national homogeneity can certainly be gradually restored. Only when we settle the issue of unification independently, without being subject to external impositions or interference, will our nation be able to achieve national confidence, namely, a genuine national integrity and national pride.

Of course, unification cannot be realized by sentimental aspirations, prayers of desk-top designs. Our political and economic systems and social order, which have developed over a period of 30 years, carry a distinct nature that does not allow easy harmony with those of north Korea, which have developed separately over the same period. It would be a miracle if the two systems of south and north Korea were abolished dialectically overnight. We lack the confidence and pride to realize such a miracle unprecedented in world history. If we had such confidence and pride, they would merely be expansive delusions. Even though unification is hardly achievable, south and north Korea can guarantee a dialogue, the maintenance of peace without interference by external forces (we can imagine well-intentioned interference, but any expectation of such inter-

ference would be wild fancy), and the compatibility of south and north Korea in international politics. And such compatibility can be expected to lead gradually to the restoration of the homogeneity of south and north Korea and, in the long run, the realization of peaceful national unification. Seen from the national point of view, Korea's division and its increasing heterogeneity over 30 years are by no means only today's national tragedy. We need not and cannot apply a hasty shock treatment to deal with this tragedy.

For a period of 36 years, we were deprived of our country by the Japanese imperialists, during which time the territory was not divided nor families dispersed, but we can't say the people did not become heterogeneous. If we had any homogeneity during that period, it was merely that of colonial slavery, maintained under a thoroughly oppressive state whose value therefore cannot even be discussed. In the final years of the Yi Dynasty, too, there was no territorial division. Still, a heterogeneous trend could be perceived in the flunkeyism before the country fell into the hands of the Japanese. If we view the territorial division and the resultant south-north confrontation from the standpoint of national homogeneity, south and north Korea alike should regard the division and confrontation not as a national tragedy but as a national trial imposed upon us by Providence. It is proper to think this way. If we view the situation this way, we can check the further progress of heterogeneity, speed up the restoration of homogeneity, and advance the realization of peaceful unification that much more. But if, on the contrary, we do not regard them this way, heterogeneity will be exploited politically, far from achieving the restoration of homogeneity, bringing about the danger that we may encounter another destructive national tragedy. We are convinced that after becoming disillusioned and frustrated dealing with so many challenges in a 30-year period—challenges equivalent to those we experienced over the previous 100 years, we have rejected the defeatist notion that it has been an unfortunate tragedy, and instead have come to regard it as a trial thrust upon the people by Providence. Regrettably, however, in north Korea, which mistakenly believes it was the first to recognize history by

adopting communism, such precious spiritual experience seems lacking. Pyongyang's is the attitude of not accepting illusion as illusion and frustration as frustration, but rousing only savage hostile sentiments and fanatically proclaiming the Marxist theory that communism society will inevitably succeed capitalism. When they see things this way, we can hardly look forward to the restoration of national homogeneity.

Still, we cannot give up our pursuit. Even if it is to end only in a mere illusion, we must make it a matter of constant consideration. Thinking is the design for achievement. But, there are a couple of things which we must make clear in putting the issue of restoring the national homogeneity into our account. First, we must not allow our belief in the principle of restoring the national homogeneity to be shaken in the least. Second, inasmuch as restoration of the national homogeneity is by nature rather a spiritual matter, we must be careful lest we should make it too emotional through excessive sentimentality. In the first case, the danger exists that we may be dragged into the pace of north Korea if we allow the principle and our confidence to be shaken in our hastiness to restore national homogeneity. In the latter case, generosity prompted by allowing excessive sentimentality in restoring national homogeneity is taboo. Such generosity would also cause us to be taken spiritually into north Korea's pace, resulting in the danger of becoming homogeneous through anti-national communization, rather than through the restoration of the proper national homogeneity. I would like to serve the warning that the more intellectual one is, the more prone he is to be exposed to such dangers. Therefore, if north Korea, clinging to the end to its scheme to communize the whole Korean peninsula, brands the restoration of national homogeneity as an element detrimental to revolution, and forces through a policy of heterogeneity, we will have cause to maintain eternal vigilance.

The principle of motion is that all of those motion intended to reach its destination must arrive there, When it reaches the final destination,, it is bound to reverse, moving back to its original starting point. The reverse of heterogeneity means the restoration of national homogeneity. We

don't need to be impatient about that restoration. All we have to do is to follow our own path, based on our own principles and confidence. We cannot become frustrated and give up the issue of restoring our national homogeneity.

※ **About the Author:**

Mr. Sonu Whie graduated from Seoul Normal School in 1943 and studied at the Graduate School of Tokyo University, in Japan, in 1965. Mr. Sonu began his career in journalism in 1946 as a reporter for the daily Chosun Ilbo. He joined the Army during the Korean War and was placed on reserve status in 1957 as an Army colonel, after which he was appointed as an editorial writer of the Hankuk Ilbo in 1959, as Managing Editor of the Chosun Ilbo in 1961, and finally, as Editor-in-Chief of the Chosun Ilbo, which he remains to date. Concurrently a novelist, Mr. Sonu has authored a number of novels published in three collections titled *Fire Flower*, *Home Longing* and *Treason*.

One thing that should be taken into account is that economic exchanges or collaboration between the south and north can become a practical means of eliminating the mutual distrust accumulated over the past 30 years as they constitute an initial attempt to bolster non-political relations. In this connection, such economic exchanges or collaboration require sincere and practical efforts.

At the same time, neither of the parties to the dialogue can make any attempt to enforce its political ideology or system upon the other side, or to interfere in the internal affairs of the other side. This means that at least at the present stage, the issue of contacts between the south and north should be strictly distinguished from the respective internal affairs of the two parties, presupposing that the political ideology to be adopted at the time of unification, or the system by which a unified Korea is to be governed, must be left to the determination of the people. In this respect, the realization of genuine economic exchanges between the south and north can become a practical means of overcoming the decisive factors behind the territorial division, namely, political and military restrictions. Such exchanges further become a powerful method of removing distrust and misunderstanding and restoring mutual trust in their place. Also, at the stage of national amalgamation, they can help facilitate the free selection of a political system through the political awakening of the sovereign people, rather than an imposed selection by an exclusive, absolute power.

In this way, economic exchanges provide an important means of eliminating hostile distrust, from the time of the initial approach through amalgamation, as well as an aid to solving various difficult problems in the fields of politics, the military and culture under the present situation on the Korean peninsula. Therefore, the significance of economic exchanges between south and north Korea should be assessed not only through the economic gains, if any, obtained therefrom, but also through the extent to which such exchanges contribute to the efforts for mutual approaches.

Since economic exchanges between the south and north would represent the manifestation of endeavors exerted from a unification-oriented standpoint, and could become a means of indirectly settling difficult problems in other sectors, such exchanges could belie the negative sentiment that “no economic exchanges can be carried out due to pending issues,”

What can be the reason for the suspension of the south-north dialogue and the absence of exchanges in the economic field today? Contacts and exchanges between two conflicting entities are promoted on the premise of the possibility of ultimate amalgamation or at least coexistence, and out of the need for coexistence, be it transitional or permanent, rather than confrontation, and eventually for amalgamation rather than mere coexistence. Therefore, the initiation of contacts and exchanges begins with the acceptance of the need for amalgamation.

For the two sides to jump into a state of overall amalgamation directly from one of extreme confrontation, either the prevailing conditions (political, diplomatic, military, economic and social) must be rendered nil or an armed conflict must occur. In either event, contacts and exchanges between the two existing political entities become irrelevant.

However, when peaceful means are to be employed to resolve a confrontation between two such entities, there exists a need for a gradual improvement based on the extent conditions as discussed above. When such an improvement is based on a possible understanding between two political entities, the south and north may mutually approach a practical amalgamation.

When approach by means of dialogue is adopted as a policy from the two methods of approach given above, the concept of approach through armed conflict or the retraction of the existing conditions becomes unrealistic, evidencing only a negative attitude toward amalgamation.

Under the circumstances, the only practical method of solving the Korean question is for the authorities of south and north Korea to engage in sincere dialogue and exchanges between their two differing political

entities, and endeavor to consolidate the peace, in particular by promoting exchanges in the economic field. When the south and north Korean authorities respond to such a method of gradual amalgamation, the accumulated political and military restrictions will be removed step by step in parallel with the progress of such economic exchanges. It is apparent that in such an event, the scope and content of the economic exchanges would become expanded and bolstered.

In other words, when a basic agreement is established upon which south and north Korea can participate actively in exchanges for their pragmatic economic interests, while striving to restore their mutual trust, it is expected that:

1) Economic collaboration will be carried out with an emphasis on cooperation in mining, manufacturing, agriculture, fishing and other fields;

2) The exchanges and cooperation involving materials, manpower, capital and knowhow will be expanded; and

3) Supplementary measures will be taken to accelerate economic development by intensifying the regional division of labor between the two economic spheres of south and north Korea.

In this respect, a changeover from the present relations of confrontation to a system of well-intentioned economic competition aimed at the gradual consolidation of peace on the Korean peninsula would represent a realistic method of propelling the state of south-north relations from confrontation toward amalgamation.

However, the reason for the lack of any progress in the south-north dialogue seems to lie in the differences shown by the south and north in their interpretations of the dialogue as well as in the conflicting objectives the two sides pursued in the dialogue.

With the issuance of the South-North Joint Communiqué in 1972, south and north Korean authorities agreed on the principles of freedom,

peace and a great national unity through which to seek national unification. It was upon these principles that the South-North Coordinating Committee was inaugurated as an official consultative organization of the two sides aimed at discussing and solving concrete problems pending between them.

The Coordinating Committee was entrusted with the function of effecting a wide range of political exchanges between political parties, social organizations and individuals in the south and north; settling the questions of economic, cultural and social exchanges as well as of joint efforts between the south and north; and settling the questions of military and overseas activities.

Accordingly, the South-North Coordinating Committee has become the highest such organization recognized by the south and north. The north Korean authorities, however, endeavored to undermine the committee's functions by proposing, in addition to the Coordinating Committee, a "political conference" among all the political parties and social organizations in the south and north. Moreover, the north has persisted in raising disputes over methods of improving south-north relations.

In contrast to the stand of the Republic of Korea, that "south-north relations should be improved by settling the issues pending between the two sides one by one, beginning with practically resolvable fields, with the emphasis on restoring mutual trust based on national sentiments and common sense," north Korea has insisted on settling all issues in one package deal. Specifically, the south Korean side proposed the discussion of economic and cultural exchanges as an initial step, whereas the north Korean side demanded the simultaneous establishment of five subcommittees with the aim of settling all disputes, in the fields of the military, politics, the economy, culture and foreign policy, at one and the same time.

In other words, north Korea sought to convert the state of confrontation into one of amalgamation in a single stroke on the premise that all issues pending between the south and north would be settled automatically as soon as the political problems were settled. Can the efficacy of a

south-north political conference be acknowledged at a time when even the South-North Coordinating Committee, the supreme coordinating organ established by the two political entities, is unable to facilitate a mutual approach between the south and north? It is apparent that north Korea was deliberately trying to settle a south-north approach for some political or military reasons of its own or because of its internal situation.

Due to that basic stand of the north Korean side, numerous propositions which north Korea sets forth for its strategic purposes lack logical consistency. The south-north confederation system suggested by north Korea and the present dialogue structure are identical so far as their operational aspects are concerned.

According to north Korea's contentions, the proposed south-north confederation system is an interim step pending national unification, under which the existing governments of south and north Korea continue to remain distinct, with matters of national concern jointly discussed and determined through a supreme national committee composed of delegates from the two sides.

The contents of this interim measure are worthy of attention. The north fails to state clearly how long such a transitional system should last, and thus the term of this interim measure may vary depending on efforts made by the south and north.

Besides, can there be any functional difference between a supreme national committee, formed with both sides' delegates upon the recognition of the two existing governments, and the South-North Coordinating Committee, organized on the basis of the South-North Joint Communiqué?

If no functional difference exists, then the north-proposed south-north confederation system is simply a structure with the essential contents of the existing dialogue plus the title "south-north confederation system." What objective, then, is the north Korean side pursuing? Ostensibly, north Korea argues that it is striving to settle the nation's in-

ternal issues through dialogue. Basically, however, north Korea is exploiting the dialogue to create conditions instructive to its dual strategy.

In other words, the conclusion can be drawn that north Korea strived to create the foundation for a “people’s democratic revolution” in south Korea by exploiting the peaceful atmosphere born of the dialogue, while, at the same time, counting on the method of armed conflict to bring about the unification of the Korean peninsula by creating circumstances in which the use of violence could be facilitated.

Thus seen, it becomes clear that north Korea is pursuing a war as a means of achieving the unification of the Korean peninsula, rejecting all other unification formulas. What, then, compels north Korea to refuse south-north exchanges and contacts, even including economic exchanges? We shall review and analyze this question in the following chapter.

Chapter III. Gains and Losses in Economic Exchanges

1. North Korea’s Offers for Exchanges

At the Political Conference held in Geneva immediately after the signing of the Korean Armistice Agreement, the north Korean side came up with a call for overall exchanges, especially economic exchange, between the south and north. At that meeting, Nam Il, then Pyongyang’s foreign minister, demanded immediate measures to establish and develop economic and cultural exchanges between south and north Korea, namely, exchanges in trade, finance, transportation, transit, mail and science and technology. A more concrete idea for south-north exchanges appeared in the proposal for a “south-north confederation system” made by Kim Il-sung in a speech at a ceremony marking the 15th anniversary of national liberation.

The highlights of the “south-north confederation system,” which presupposes that “the most reasonable and realistic path to accomplishing unification in a peaceful manner is to hold free and general elections upon

a democratic basis without any interference by outside forces,” are as follows:

First, if free and general elections cannot be held in the south and north as yet, a south-north confederation system should be introduced as an interim measure for the solution of urgent national problems.

Second, if even a south-north confederation system cannot be formulated, mutual cooperation and assistance in trading goods and economic development could be conducted by organizing a purely economic committee consisting of business representatives from the south and north.

Third, to this end, discussions should be held in Pyongyang or at Panmunjom.

Contending that, if the unification issue cannot be settled at the moment, at least a genuine economic committee should be formed for the discussion of issues concerning economic exchanges and cooperation not related to political problems, north Korea specifically suggested that 1) a joint chamber of commerce be set up to encourage trade between the south and north, 2) direct passenger service be inaugurated between Seoul and Wonsan and between Shinuiju and Pusan, 3) the north Korean ports of Nampo, Chongjin and Hungnam and south Korea's Inchon, Mokpo and Kusan be opened to each other, 4) a direct communications circuit be installed between Pyongyang and Seoul, and 5) south and north Korean delegates meet at Panmunjom, Pyongyang or Seoul to discuss these issues.

In general, these suggestions from north Korea invariably embodied prerequisites similar to those attached to the political-oriented offers for a confederation system and a south-north political conference. At the same time, such economic suggestions were usually timed with 1) the south's adoption of successful policies toward north Korea or 2) states of political instability in the south. In fact, the propositions for economic exchanges and cooperation were made in the immediate post-Korean War years when the south-north relations were extremely strained; immediately after the outbreak of the April 19, 1960 Students' Uprising; and around

the time when government control was turned over to civilian hands from the military government established after the May 16, 1961 Military Revolution.

It was apparent that north Korea chose these times to offer the economic proposals with the following in mind:

First, knowing that south Korea would never agree to its suggestions in view of their highly strained relations and south Korea's firm stand against the north, north Korea made the offers to demonstrate that it was on the same footing as south Korea. In fact, the north was not interested in genuine economic cooperation from the outset. It is also worth note that the wording and contents of the economic proposals were prepared so as to anger the south Korea leadership in an apparent scheme to preclude any chance of their accepting the plans.

Second, north Korea reiterated its proposals for economic exchanges and cooperation in the 1960's in a bid to create an atmosphere for a "negotiation strategy" through the so-called "united front" by exploiting to the maximum extent a "weakened" south Korean government and the prevalent public mood favoring peaceful unification prompted by the then-restless political situation in the south. North Korea never actually intended to contribute to the realization of peaceful unification through increased understanding between the south and north achieved by economic exchanges and cooperation.

Contrary to south Korea's stand that south-north Korean issues should be settled beginning with practically feasible matters, north Korea sticks to a package solution of all issues pending between the south and north. Moreover, when signs appear of some agreement on a minor point, the north tends to be quick to raise other difficult issues, thereby precluding any solution.

Viewing such practice of north Korea, it becomes apparent that even though Pyongyang outwardly calls for non-political, economic exchanges first, in order to facilitate improved understanding and a closer approach

between the south and north which remain pitted against each other in hostile relations, north Korea in reality rejects any solution of such problems by attaching political preconditions to the non-political issues.

North Korea may well believe that the realization of any economic exchange between the south and north does not serve its political and military goals. The possibility ever exists that the north see economic exchanges as a threat to its system. In other words, north Korea feels that any efforts to improve understanding, economic exchanges and cooperation between the south and north could have a profound and damaging impact on its political policy that unification should be achieved based on a proletarian dictatorship, resulting in the danger of the collapse of its own political system.

2. Economic Exchanges and the Opening of Society

Economic exchanges can form the grounds for common bonds between the two sides in that both can enjoy practical gains from such exchanges. In the course of the exchanges, both sides would find it inevitable to open their societies to each other inasmuch as various factors in trade, visible or invisible, such as materials, personnel and know-how, would have to be exchanged between them.

Of course, even if economic exchanges were to materialize, the opening of societies would certainly be restricted in part due to the political situations in south and north Korea. Still, efforts to open the societies, gradually or immediately, should be continued, and there would likely be some impact from outside influences.

Moreover, both in the south and north, the sentiment prevails that unification must be achieved some day, though the two have remained hostile to each other for more than 30 years. Because of such hostile relations, the two societies of the south and north are completely sealed off from each other without, of course, any opportunity for judging their relative merits or demerits. Under the circumstances, economic exchanges

are considered a threat to the maintenance of the status quo because such exchanges might reverse the prevailing character of one side's system.

In particular, the degree of such a threat differs depending on whether one's society is of an open type or a closed one. In an open social system, such impacts is minimal since its adaptability to new knowledge from outside is strong. A closed society, however, is unreceptive to new knowledge from outside, as it sees the danger that its people might become skeptical about their existing knowledge if they awaken to the ability to make comparisons. Thus, the impact on a closed society is bound to be great.

Thus seen, the merits and demerits of economic exchanges between the south and north have to be assessed by different criteria, given the confrontation between the north's closed atmosphere and the south's openness. In fact, north Korea, exercising its strong control, has intensified its grip on society thoroughly denying the north Korean people any access to the outside world.

By indoctrinating the north Korean people on the dictatorship of the proletariat, north Korea has uprooted the freedom of political options, forcing its people to believe that the socialistic system is the most advanced and superior system in the world. At the same time, south Korea is described as a living hell groaning under an imperialistic colonial policy. with these allegations, north Korea instills "the sense of mission"—that struggles must be waged to liberate the south—into the hearts of the north Korea people. In an attempt to restrain man's instinctive desire for a better life, the north Korean Communists have imbued their eople with the value that political and moral incentives must supersede material incentives.

These endeavors derive from an attempt to safeguard the Communist system introduced into north Korea by educating the people to be faithful to the historical view of Marx-Leninism, to realize the "justness" of the Communist revolution, and further to spread the Communist system throughout the entire Korean peninsula. Nevertheless, in north Korea

today, frictions and contradictions difficult to overcome are spreading deep within the society.

In the first place, an anti-Marxist-Leninist class, which Pyongyang believed had been thoroughly destroyed by the dictatorship of the proletariat, still survives as a potential force. Kim Il-sung repeats his warning that elements among the overthrown, exploiting class's children are still trying to reestablish the old system.

In a state where no private ownership of any kind is recognized, a new current of opportunism, inattention and formalism is emerging, and skepticism about the Communist revolution is spreading all over north Korea. This trend is becoming a serious political and social issue as the younger generation moves into society.

Moreover, highly restrained consumption weakens the claims of the Communist system's superiority, with the people demanding a society in which they can physically feel an improving living standard. To eliminate such negativism, it is important to maintain constant tension. However, the south-north dialogue has become an impetus further stimulating the people's longing for peace.

Under the circumstances, the realization of economic exchanges between the south and north will make economic competition between the south and north a reality. And it is apparent that competition in standards of living, which will determine which system brings a better life, will take place when businessmen's exchanges become common.

In other words, the materialization of economic exchanges between the south and north would yield pragmatic gains contributing to the economic development of both the south and north, but would be accompanied by the disadvantage—to the north—of offering the north Korean people an opportunity to compare living standards in the north and south.

The revision of the existing attitude and understandings prompted by such comparisons would result in an increase in the people's desire for political options, thus making it inevitable that south-north economic

exchanges would sooner or later face political restrictions.

It seems that north Korea has already suffered quite a profound impact through the exchange of a limited number of people during the South-North Red Cross Conference and South-North Coordinating Committee meetings. South-North economic exchanges are bound to face even greater restrictions because of the political need to minimize the opening of society and to prevent economic or other competition between the south and north from developing into a competition of systems.

Since the beginning of the 1970's, a campaign has been under way in north Korea to insure further ideological integration and unity based on Marx-Leninism. The extent of that campaign's success will become a factor in evaluating any future economic exchanges. The fact that north Korea has taken a series of steps to bolster the Communist system during the period of the dialogue, in connection with restrictions on economic exchanges, carries an important meaning.

North Korea has launched a fundamental, sweeping campaign to perfect the absolute authority of Pyongyang's leadership, centered around Kim Il-sung. By promulgating a new constitution in December 1972, north Korea introduced the system of a state presidency, laying the foundation for consistent policy programs through a joint party-administration structure.

This constitutional revision can be seen as a reaffirmation of the political condition that the systematic basis already existing in north Korea cannot be shaken or crumbled by any economic or cultural exchanges or political approaches between the south and north. Important meaning can also be attached to the fact that, in the new constitution, north Korea identified Pyongyang as its capital, whereas in the old constitution, it had designated Seoul as the true capital and Pyongyang as temporary capital pending national unification.

In north Korea, a drive is under way to streamline a new power structure to continue pursuit of a revolution on the strength of Kim Il-

song's absolute authority. This drive is considered to be aimed chiefly at checking the anti-establishment trend emerging with the emergence of a new generation. In this connection, the problem of intensifying class indoctrination within north Korea emerges as an exigent issue. The importance of this issue is emphasized by north Korea's assertion that "in a situation where revolution is in progress and a generational change of revolution takes place, the target of the revolution remains unchanged whereas the generations do change."

The north Korean authorities cannot help but caution against the danger that although the dialogue remains suspended now, its progress may not be checked in the future, and that a change in understanding which could be brought about by exchanges might upset the hypothesis that has so far been buttressing north Korean society.

Believing that such a danger would stem from the people's distrust in the Pyongyang leadership, north Korea has kicked off a campaign to deify Kim Il-sung, following the establishment of Kim's monolithic ideological system. This can be described as an ideological warfare in which Kim Il-sung's instructions constitute law and must be implemented absolutely and unconditionally.

All these measures are considered part of a comprehensive drive designed to remove crucial weak points characteristic of a closed society on the theory that opening the society would be unavoidable should exchanges in economic and other fields become actively promoted.

Meanwhile, south Korea, too, cannot altogether eliminate the shock of such exchanges. As long as north Korea's attitude toward the dialogue is to accomplish a people's democratic revolution in line with the united front strategy, or to depend, ultimately, on armed conflict, taking advantage of the characteristics of south Korea's open society, rather than striving to restore mutual trust and promote mutual understanding, south Korea faces the need to removing all factors which could contribute to such schemes of north Korea.

It also is true that the elimination of politically-oriented activities in each other's area, in accordance with the condition of the dialogue that neither of the two sides is to enforce its political conditions or system upon the other, will contribute substantially to the expansion of exchanges between the south and north.

As can be seen above, the realization of economic and other exchanges between the south and north is bound to be considerably restricted by the secondary requirement that their societies be opened to each other. In particular, inasmuch as the impact of such exchanges upon the closed society of north Korea would be more profound, north Korea is compelled to weigh more critically the practical gains from such exchanges versus the losses it might suffer from opening of its society. Such being the case, it should be held that economic gains are being withheld by political reservations.

3. Objectives of Economic Exchanges and Confrontation in Understanding

Throughout the course of the dialogue, the Republic of Korea side has adhered to the view that, for the restoration of mutual trust between the south and north and the promotion of understanding, the issues pending between the two sides should be handled beginning with the most feasibly manageable matters, pointing out that economic exchanges for practical gains would most certainly be among those.

The north Korean side, however, regards such exchanges only as auxiliary to the solution of the major issues, contending that all issues pending between the south and north will be solved automatically once political solutions are realized. This attitude derives from the fact that they attempt to create conditions advantageous to the formation of a united front by fully exploiting the social openness and the foundations of freedom in south Korean society. Thus they recognize the need for economic exchanges only as a means of pursuing political gains through

the strategy of negotiations.

For this reason, the south Korean side has eliminated any grounds for the formation of a united front in order to block north Korea's double strategy, and persisting in its stand that economic exchanges should be carried out first as a means of bringing about a change in north Korea's unrealistic dependence on armed conflict to solve the Korean issue.

As a result, south and north Korea have come to share conflicting views regarding the objectives of economic exchanges. In other words, the Republic of Korea holds that economic exchanges, based purely on economic gains, would represent an effort to promote mutual understanding and trust, and also a key to consolidating peace on the Korean peninsula, whereas north Korea believes that economic exchanges constitute a means of laying the groundwork for the formation of a united front in order to pursue its strategy for negotiations, and also of creating conditions facilitating an armed conflict. These clashing views emerge as a factor delaying any mutual agreement on the acceleration of economic exchanges.

If it is assumed that economic exchanges can be carried out on the strength of both sides' economic development, such exchanges are bound to touch off economic competition, direct or indirect. In such a situation, the different economic climates in the south and north prompt differences in the recognition of a need for economic exchanges.

During first half of the 1970's, a dialogue was initiated between the south and north, through which a mutual approach was sought. At the same time, that era can be characterized by the fact that it was then that economic competition between the south and north could be reviewed. This was all the more true in view of the fact that both the six-year economic development plan of north Korea and the Third Five-Year Economic Development Plan of south Korea were to be completed in 1976.

North Korea wound up a seven-year economic development plan, which it had implemented throughout the 1960's (the plan period was extended by three years to cover the period from 1961 through 1970), in

1970, after which it launched the six-year plan. During that period, however, it was revealed that there is a specific limit in the method of north Korea's economic development. In other words, according to hot debate within the north Korean Workers' (Communist) Party itself, it was acknowledged that when a socialistic economy reaches a certain stage, its yearly growth rate stands in the neighborhood of 3 to 4 percent, or perhaps 6 to 7 percent at best. Moreover, the military buildup policy pursued beginning in 1962 has considerably slowed the pace of economic development. In addition, the Sino-Soviet split in the international Communist movement has resulted in a marked decrease in Communist bloc assistance to the economic development of north Korea.

Under the circumstances, north Korea strived to increase its industrial and agricultural production by mobilizing its potential to the greatest possible extent. To this end, the so-called "three major revolutionary squads" dedicated to "the renovation of ideology, culture and know-how" were dispatched in large numbers to production units to oversee and supervise production activities. Nevertheless, the six-year economic plan undertaken during the first half of the 1970's ended in failure.

On the other hand, the Republic of Korea, having successfully completed its Second Five-Year Economic Development Plan, undertook its Third Five-Year Economic Development Plan with great success during the first half of the 1970's. As a result, south Korea registered phenomenal real economic growth averaging 9.8 percent a year during the 1971-75 period.

As this return of economic competition between the south and north became apparent during the first half of the 1970's, it served as an impetus to judging the relative merits of the systems of south and north Korea. As factors contributing to the failure of north Korea's six-year plan, the following can be cited: internally, plan targets were set too high; the dogmatic method of economic development in which only political and moral incentives were emphasized at the expense of material ones, substantially decreased the workers' will to produce; the policy of giving pri-

ority to heavy industries, especially defense industries, led to a wide unbalance among industries; the rigidity of the controlled economy barred any flexibility; and the introduction of a strict production competition system adversely affected labor efficiency.

Among external factors, assistance from Red China and the Soviet Union were sluggish; the effects of the resources crisis and world recession since 1973 were profound; prices of north Korea's major export items plummeted; and north Korea lacked sufficient transportation for export cargoes. During the first half of the 1970's when the south-north dialogue was in progress and when the issue of south-north economic exchanges had emerged, north Korea's economic infrastructure was in its worst condition. Faced with such economic difficulties, north Korea was obviously not in a position to be eager about economic exchanges that would inevitably stimulate economic competition between the two sides.

This dilemma in north Korea seemed to be related to Pyongyang's scenario to suspend the dialogue altogether, demanding a single package solution of all pending issues and disregarding the appropriateness of economic exchanges.

From this time on, even though realistic measures have been suggested for the restoration of mutual trust and promotion of understanding between the south and north, and eventually for unification, north Korea has viewed the recognition of the justness of such measures as one thing and of implementation of them as quite another. At the same time, as an excuse to dismiss some such issues, north Korea would produce other, totally extraneous issues apart from the matters at hand, to try to shift responsibility for failure to the south.

4. Diplomatic Issues within the Communist Bloc

The north Korean side insists that the Korean issue is an internal question, and therefore unification should be achieved independently and peacefully upon a democratic basis, without interference by alien forces.

However, north Korea is unable to eliminate altogether the intermingling interests of the surrounding countries—the United States, China, the Soviet Union and Japan—so that Pyongyang’s unification strategy must be viewed against the confrontation between the triangular pro-north bloc of China, the Soviet Union and north Korea and the corresponding pro-south bloc of south Korea, the United States and Japan.

It was obvious that the south-north dialogue implemented in the first half of the 1970’s could not ignore those inter-related triangular relations. The four major powers having a stake in the Korean peninsula’s status could hardly be indifferent to the Korean question since each of them is wary of the possible formation of a joint front among the rest of the countries, or of other’s attempts to expand their influence in Asia unilaterally.

Amidst those inter-connected relations among the four surrounding countries, Communist China and the Soviet Union are constantly in dispute although they both claim to pursue communism based on Marx-Leninism. Specifically, the Soviet Union’s concept of a collective Asian security system designed to blockade Communist China remains pitted against China’s anti-supremacy policy.

Such friction and discord between China and the USSR profoundly influence north Korea’s foreign policy, military, politics and economy in that pro-northern triangle, with China and the Soviet Union both factors in determining the strength of the north’s voice toward the pro-southern triangle.

Due to the Sino-Soviet dispute throughout the 1960’s, north Korea suffers profound troubles. The south-north dialogue in the early 1970’s, which seemed to provide the seeds of a solution to the Korean question, cannot necessarily be regarded as being in accord with the interests of both China and the USSR. In other words, both the Communist giants probably approved of the dialogue on the Korean peninsula, but reserved the option to reconsider its approval depending on which side of the two the progress of the dialogue seemed to favor.

Since we have to recognize the fact that the south-north dialogue began together with the Sino-U.S. approaches inevitably compelling north Korea to come under greater influence from Red China, we cannot rule out altogether the possibility of Soviet discontent with the dialogue.

In this connection, what does Pyongyang's unilateral suspension of the south-north dialogue in August 1973 point to? We can find one of the factors in the triangular relations of the pro-north bloc.

It is possible that developments in the northern triangular relations around the time of U.S. Secretary of State Kissinger's visit to Peking had a considerable effect on the south-north dialogue. We can suspect this possibility all the more because of the preposterousness of the reason for Pyongyang's boycott of the dialogue.

A series of movements at that time show that Huh Dam, north Korea's foreign minister, visited Peking around the time of Secretary Kissinger's tour of China, and again traveled to Pakistan as the special envoy of Kim Il-sung during Kissinger's stay in Peking.

One week after Huh Dam returned to Pyongyang, Kim Tong-kyu, director of the Party's International Affairs Department, left for Moscow. On the same day, Huh Dam, too, embarked on a tour that took him to the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, Algeria and Mauritania. In view of such diplomatic travels, diplomatic moves concerning the Korean peninsula might well have flowed through the two channels of "China—Pakistan—U.S." and "Soviet Union—Czechoslovakia—Algeria—U.S."

At the same time, attention can be drawn to the fact that during his visits to Peking and Czechoslovakia, Huh Dam made slightly conflicting remarks. In a speech to a reception welcoming his visit to Peking on the afternoon of February 9, Huh Dam said in essence that a bright prospects were unfolding for unification of Korea but that the United States was impeding peaceful unification. On the other hand, the joint north Korea-Czechoslovakia communique issued on March 2 explained their stand over north Korea's formula for "peaceful unification," touching on some

factors detrimental to the South-North Joint Communiqué of 1972.

It was five months after these diplomatic maneuvers that north Korea formally suspended the dialogue in a statement issued on August 28 in the name of Kim Young-joo, the Pyongyang-side co-chairman of the South-North Coordinating Committee.

Thus seen, the south-north dialogue and economic exchanges based thereon are not dependent on the situations in south and north Korea alone. It must be recognized that they are also affected to some extent by the interests of the four regional powers, especially those of the pro-northern triangle.

Chapter IV. Review of Possibility of Economic Exchanges

As discussed above, the realization of economic exchanges between south and north Korea constitutes the most realistic and effective means of restoring mutual trust, promoting understanding and approaching a unification-oriented amalgamation between south and north Korea.

However, economic exchanges become subject to political constraints because such exchanges would inevitably lead to the opening of the societies, accompanied by bona fide competition in economic development as well as living standards between south and north Korea.

Therefore, since north Korea is wary even of practically feasible and non-political economic approaches because of the political effects of the resultant opening of its society, the south Korean side might well make some concession so that north Korea can accept economic exchanges but still minimize their impact upon its domestic politics.

On the other hand, in order to enable north Korea to give up its schemes to exploit economic exchanges in order to achieve its political objective of forming a united front or its military objective of armed conflict, south Korea should demonstrate a strong deterrent based on its powerful political, economic and military capabilities, and, at the same

time, patiently persuade north Korea to modify its policies.

From such a realistic standpoint, south Korea faces the need to make a concession in determining a method for implementing economic exchanges which can conform to north Korea's reality, as well as to show, based on its strengths, what and how much it can offer to the north Korean side.

Here, apart from political and military capabilities, the strong economic foundation which south Korea has built provides very encouraging possibilities for taking the initiative in such economic exchanges based purely on economic interests.

A review of the respective economic development programs under, taken by south and north Korea during the first half of the 1970's, shows that the Republic of Korea registered high economic growth by successfully implementing its Third Five-Year Economic Development Plan, whereas north Korea failed in its sixth economic plan, compelling it to designate 1976 and 1977 as years for readjustment. As a result, south Korea achieved an annual real economic growth rate averaging 9.8 per cent during the 1971-75 period, compared to north Korea's yearly growth in the neighborhood of 6 per cent during the same period.

The gap in economic competition widened further in 1976 when south Korea's Gross National Product was 3.4 times as much north Korea's, yielding a per-capita GNP for the south of \$698, \$246 more than north Korea's \$452.

At the same time, the 1976 production of major commodities in south and north Korea reveals that the south produced roughly 3.3 times as much as north Korea in all fields, with the exception of coal, pig iron and chemical fertilizer.

As for external trade, north Korea's volume increased roughly 50 per cent from around \$1 billion in 1971 to \$1.5 billion in 1976, whereas south Korea's trade jumped nearly 480 per cent, from about \$3.5 billion to \$16.9 billion. In exports alone, south Korea recorded about a 7.5-fold

Comparison of Major Production Indices in South and North Korea

Classification		Unit	1970	1975	1976	South-North ratio as of the end of 1976
Electricity (output)	South	100 million KWH	91.72	198.37	231.0	1.08
	North	100 million KWH	165.00	212.98	213.10	
Coal	South	10,000 tons	1,239.4	1,759.5	1,640.1	0.39
	North	10,000 tons	2,750.0	3,830.0	4,250.0	
Oil (Refining capacity)	South	10,000 tons	882	1,514	1,832	18.32
	North	10,000 tons	—	97	100	
Pig iron	South	10,000 tons	1.9	118	198.0	0.69
	North	10,000 tons	202.8	285.7	285.7	
Pig steel	South	10,000 tons	48.0	230	344.9	1.00
	North	10,000 tons	220.0	243.1	344.8	
Automobiles	South	Each	29,147	36,265	49,095	4.09 North Korea in 1975 level
	North	Each	9,000	12,000	—	
Chemical fertilizer	South	10,000 tons	127.7	181.2	187.8	0.68
	North	10,000 tons	150	250	275.5	
Cement	South	10,000 tons	578.2	1,198	1,278	2.05
	North	10,000 tons	400	575	625	
Fabrics	South	100 million meters	6.01	15.71	17.33	3.56
	North	100 million meters	4.00	4.7	4.9	
Grains	South	10,000 tons	694.2	767.2	820.6	1.52
	North	10,000 tons	347.9	521.0	539.0	

increase from \$1.07 billion in 1971 to roughly \$8.1 billion in 1976. During the same period, north Korea saw its exports rise only about 2.3-fold, from the \$300 million level to \$700 million.

This economic performance by south and north Korea clearly show

that the Republic of Korea was leading in economic competition during the first half of the 1970's. This economic edge has provided south Korea with a fundamental capability with which to continue outperforming north Korea throughout the second half of the 1970's. And that economic ability constitutes a potential that will enable south Korea to take the initiative in any economic approach between the south and north on the basis of "bona fide competition."

External Trade Volumes of South and North Korea

Unit: \$1 million

Classification		Year						
		1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976
Exports	South Korea	835	1,068	1,624	3,225	4,460	5,081	8,115
	North Korea	331	314	364	512	772	696	728
Imports	South	1,984	2,394	2,522	4,240	6,852	7,274	8,774
	North	398	690	625	749	1,196	298	800
Total	South	2,819	3,462	4,146	7,465	11,312	12,355	16,889
	North	729	1,004	989	1,261	1,968	1,624	1,528

In this respect, the competition between south and north Korea in economic development during the latter half of the 1970's is of particular importance. The present Fourth Five-Year Economic Development Plan of south Korea covers the period from 1977 to 1981, and north Korea's seven-year economic plan the period from 1978 to 1984. Major indices envisaged in these economic plans show that south Korea's economic standing in 1981 should be roughly comparable to that of north Korea in 1984.

Comparing expected future overseas trade, south Korea's trade volume is likely to rise from \$16.9 billion in 1976 to \$39.1 billion in 1981, while if the 1971-76 growth rate continues, north Korea's trade should increase from \$1.5 billion in 1976 to about \$3.4 billion in 1981. This means that south Korea's trade volume will be 11.6 times greater than north Korea's in 1981.

**Comparison of Major Indices in Target Years of New Economic Plans
of South and North Korea**

Classification	Base	South Korea	North Korea
Period		1977-81(5years)	1978-84(7years)
Steel	Capacity	11.5 million tons	12 million tons (7 to 8 million tons)
Non-ferrous metal	Production	365,000 tons	1 million tons
Coal	Production	24 million tons	100 million tons (70 to 80 million tons)
Electricity	Production	43.4 billion KWH	50 billion KWH (60 billion KWH)
Cement	Capacity	19,660,000 tons	20 million tons (12 to 13 million tons)
Machine-processing	Production	\$4.4 billion	5 million tons
Chemical fertilizer	Capacity	3,131,000 tons	5 million tons
Fish products	Harvest	3,562,000 tons	5 million tons
Grains	Harvest	9,838,000 tons	10 million tons (unpolished)
Reclamation			100,000 hectares

Remarks: 1) Represents the total amount of copper ore, lead ore and zinc ore for South Korea.

2) Figures in parentheses represent north Korea revisions of original amounts.

Source: For figures on south Korea, *Major Economic Indices for 1977-81*.

Prospects for Foreign Trade Volume for South and North Korea

Unit: \$1 million

Classification		Year					
		1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981
Exports	South Korea	8,115	10,000	11,970	14,519	17,292	20,242
	North Korea	728	846	983	1,142	1,327	1,542
Imports	South Korea	8,774	10,133	11,975	14,033	16,345	18,873
	North Korea	800	933	1,112	1,311	1,546	1,823
Total	South Korea	16,889	20,244	23,935	28,562	33,637	39,115
	North Korea	1,528	1,789	2,095	2,353	2,873	3,365

Meanwhile, south Korean exports are expected to reach about \$20.2 billion in 1981, whereas north Korea's exports should amount to some \$1.5 billion in the same year, putting south Korea's total 13 times that of north Korea.

Thus, the economic capability of south Korea is expected to be further bolstered in the latter half of the 1970's, a development which is likely to contribute much to consolidating the peace on the Korean peninsula on the basis of bona fide competition.

In order to induce economic approaches between the south and north based on that powerful economic capability, the following factors should be taken into consideration:

Concerning social systems, north Korea has built its economy on a centralized and controlled system based on totalitarian principles, adopting the method of production competition among public enterprises in a state where no private ownership is recognized.

Since production, consumption and prices are determined in accordance with long-term economic development plans, any economic cooperation between south and north Korea must take into account north Korea's economic plans and policy directions.

Another point which must be taken into account is that the north Korea economy relies basically on a socialistic market under the principle of the international division of labor within the socialistic bloc. North Korea, accordingly, attaches only a secondary and supplementary importance to capitalistic markets.

Since north Korea employs a strict compensation trade system in commodity trade, it produces locally only basic items or those demanded in large quantity, while depending on imports for those for which there is limited demand, which are in short supply or which cannot be produced locally.

Under the circumstances, the government must control and manage trade exclusively, carrying it out as part of the so-called people's economic plan. To facilitate such controlled trade, there inevitably follow short- and long-term trade agreements.

Thus north Korean trade is characterized by these features: the volume and composition of exports and imports are fixed ahead of time;

a trade plan is prepared before other programs in the people's economic plan; and priority is given to imports rather than to exports.

Since import factors embodied in north Korea's long-term economic plans must be taken into account first in considering economic exchanges with north Korea, on-the-scene market surveys would hardly be an effective approach.

In pursuit of economic exchanges between the south and north, therefore, concern should be directed toward those objects which north Korea is unable to produce itself, at the same time as consideration is being given to the nature of the north's involvement in the international division of labor among socialistic economies as well as the import demands envisaged in the north's long-term economic plan.

From the viewpoint of the import and export markets of south and north Korea during the period from 1970 to 1975, the items suitable for exchange in the initial stages would be extremely limited, although they could become more diversified as barter trade goes into full swing.

Primary Item for Exchange

South Korean Goods	North Korean Goods
Petroleum product, chemical products, rubber goods, tires and tubes, electrical appliances, edible fats, tools, paper, sewing machines leather goods, other daily necessities and foods item.	Iron ore, pig iron, steel, non-ferrous metals.

Inasmuch as there is no free market in north Korea, barter trade, if it materialized, would have to take place from time to time when the need arised or when planned beforehand.

At the same time, there are several fields that should be explored before economic exchanges are achieved between the south and north. The south and north could undertake the following programs before initiating economic exchanges if both sides agree that they can bolster their cooperation through bona fide economic competition based on mutual trust:

- 1) The exchange of advanced industrial know-how which the south

and north have introduced into their respective economies.

2) Mutually beneficial participation in economic development through a regional division of labor between the south and north.

3) The positive promotion of development projects all over the Korean peninsula, using the abundant manpower resources of south Korea.

4) A triangular trade system toward the respective markets which the south and north have already secured.

5) Increased interlocking transportation along the roads and sea-lines which would be reopened between the south and north in the course of such exchanges, resulting in closer, though limited, linkage of the divided halves of the peninsula as well as bolstered maritime transportation along the east, south and west coasts.

If and when these actually take place, they would provide the momentum for north Korea to solve the transportation difficulties which face it now. All in all, careful studies must precede the implementation and bolstering of economic exchanges and cooperation between the south and north.

Chapter V. Conclusion

A transformation of these two confronting political entities into an amalgamation is rather unrealistic at the moment, since it would require either a return from the present state to that of the pre-confrontation years or a resort to armed conflict. If south and north Korea agree on the principle of peaceful unification, they should strive to develop their relations toward amalgamation by promoting mutual trust and understanding through contacts and exchanges, thereby gradually resolving the present state of confrontation.

The need for contacts and exchanges represents the will toward unification, while the consolidation of peace constitutes a precondition

for the realization of that will.

If the de facto national division can be explained in terms of political and military confrontation, the efforts to cope with that confrontation should begin with a strengthening of non-political contacts.

Such being the case, economic approaches between the south and north based on mutual interests can be an effective means not only of creating an impetus for the restoration of mutual understanding and trust but also of guiding a state of confrontation toward peaceful amalgamation.

The north Korean side, however, has completely blocked even the practicable road to economic cooperation by groundlessly denouncing as expressing a lack of hope for unification the south's call for the consolidation of peace on the Korean peninsula as a prerequisite to unification, and also by unilaterally suspending the dialogue between the south and north.

In view of that attitude, it seems self-evident that north Korea agreed to the dialogue not to pursue "peaceful unification" based on mutual understanding and trust, but to lay the groundwork for the formation of a "united front" in order to communize the whole Korean peninsula or create an atmosphere leading to an eventual armed conflict.

In the event the quest for peace or the dialogue becomes subordinate to such political or military objectives, the question of economic exchanges between south and north Korea cannot even be considered. But, north Korea can be regarded as having rejected economic exchanges after carefully studying their merits and demerits.

In this regard, the following factors can be cited as causing north Korea's rejection of economic exchanges:

First, economic exchanges between south and north Korea cannot be regarded as anything but practicable, but economic interests cannot supersede political purposes.

Second, the original strategic objective in the scheme to foment a

Communist revolution, taking advantage of the openness of the south Korean society, had no chance for success due to the south's internal consolidation reinforced in the course of the dialogue.

Third, north Korea could directly confirm the fact that it had underestimated the economic capability of south Korea, and further realize that in view of problems such as its own economic deterioration during the period of the dialogue, it had no chance to gain an edge in economic competition.

Fourth, the impact of economic exchanges, stemming from the closed character of north Korean society, would probably have endangered the maintenance of the present political system of north Korea, rather than serving any economic interests.

Fifth, in view of the fact that the south-north dialogue was promoted through the influence of the United States and Red China, the dialogue could possibly have engendered a sense of alienation from the Korean peninsula in the U.S.S.R., which might, therefore, have applied brakes to the dialogue indirectly.

In view of these points, a need arises to modify the north's strategy for communization in order to achieve economic cooperation between the south and north.

However, when this issue is viewed from the grand premise that the Korean question must, under any circumstances, be solved in a peaceful manner, it can still be seen that economic exchanges are more feasible than any other option. For approaches in other fields would require greater concessions and understanding from both the south and north.

Under the circumstances, it can be presumed that the current situation both in and around the Korean peninsula is not yet so ripe as to facilitate economic approaches between south and north Korea based on pragmatic interests. Still, neither is it a time for efforts toward such approaches to be given up altogether.

※ About the Author:

Mr. Chung Wun-hwak, who majored in political science at the Liberal Arts and Sciences College of Seoul National University, began a research career in 1961 when he became a staff member of the International Research Institute. In 1968, Mr. Chung moved to the Institute of East Asian affairs. He has concurrently served as a commentator at the Korea Broadcasting System (KBS) since 1968. A leading Pyongyang watcher, Mr. Chung has participated in the compilation of publications on north Korea as well as on the Communist bloc as a whole. He has written a number of theses, including “The Trend of north Korea’s Operations against the South” and “Post-War Generations of north Korea.”

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- South-North Red Cross Conference

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Part One

Will to Peaceful Unification

**“German-Style Solution Suitable for Coexistence
between South and North Korea”**

—Basic Principles for Unification—

- 1. Conclusion of Non-Aggression Agreement between South and North Korea**
- 2. Mutual Opening of Doors, and Implementation of Exchanges and Cooperation**
- 3. Free General Elections in Accordance with Indigenous Population**

President Park Chung Hee has stated that the Republic of Korea is absolutely opposed to unification by force of arms, and expressed the conviction that peaceful unification will be realized by all means in the long run. “In order for south and north Korea to coexist until a favorable basis for reunification has been worked out, relations such as those existing between the two Germanys would suit us perfectly,” the President said.

In an interview with Andre Fontaine, editor in chief of Le Monde, a leading French daily, which appeared in the newspaper’s October 19, 1977 issue in full, President Park laid down three fundamental principles for unification: 1) In order to establish solidly peace on the Korean peninsula, south and north Korea should conclude a mutual non-aggression agreement; 2) South and north Korea must mutually open up their doors and restore a climate of reciprocal trust. To this effect, the south-north dialogue must be pursued in a spirit of sincerity. Exchanges must take place and cooperation must be established in a variety of areas; and 3) Once such bases have been laid, reunification must take place by means of free general elections in the south and north in accordance with the indigenous population.

Urging the north Koreans to agree to resume the south-north dialogue, the Chief Executive said, "In an attempt to lessen a certain pressure from international public opinion calling for resumption of the south-north dialogue, north Korea has proposed a meeting with the United States, knowing fully well that the latter wouldn't accept it," adding that south and north Korea should coexist on the basis of the status quo through simultaneous admission into the United Nations.

(The following is the full text of President Park's interview with Le Monde.)— Editor —

Question: Mr. President, I believe your greatest concern is the reunification of Korea. Do you believe it can be accomplished by peaceful means?

Answer: Even if it takes a long time to achieve reunification, we are absolutely against its taking place through violence. But the regime in north Korea insists on its intention to use the force of arms to lead the entire country to communism, and there is little probability that it will change its course overnight. This is why peaceful reunification does not appear practicable in the short term. We feel sure, however, that in the long term it can be brought about. It is impossible to put a date on it, but we will never give up.

Several factors favor this view. With the growth in power of the Republic of Korea, the north Korean Communists, whether they want to or not, find it impossible to attempt reunification based on the use of armed force. Inevitably they will have to change their basic policy.

Q: Don't you think that the visit to New York of the north Korean minister of foreign affairs and the invitation addressed to the United States by Kim Il-sung, through the intermediary of Presidents Bongo and Tito, to engage in direct meetings, indicate that such a revision is already under

way?

A: Such initiatives in no way alter the factors pushing the north Koreans to seek reunification by force. We have continually urged them to resume the dialogue started in 1972 and they have consistently refused. Since the Koreans are a homogeneous people, I do not see why the north Koreans should have direct discussions with the Americans rather than with ourselves. If they really want peaceful reunification, they should not be trying for direct conversations with the Americans without our participation. In any case the Americans have already indicated clearly that they will not accept discussion in such circumstances. There is nothing to indicate then that the advances made by Pyongyang are inspired by good faith.

Q: Will you explain yourself?

A: I see at least two reasons. In the first place the north Koreans could be looking for a Vietnam-like solution to the Korean problem. The north Vietnamese have successfully communized all of Vietnam by undertaking talks with the Americans behind the back of the government of Saigon. The north Korean Communists could hope to do likewise. In the second place, we have on several occasions suggested resuming the dialogue with them, and they are under a certain pressure from international public opinion in this direction. In order to lessen the pressure, they have tried to have discussions first with the Americans, knowing fully well that the latter wouldn't accept them. This, however, enables them to claim that it is the United States that won't respond to their goodwill gesture.

Q: But don't you think that as relations between the two governments are as bad as those currently between Seoul and Pyongyang, the recourse to intermediaries could be the only solution? After all, its the method being used to try and resolve the Israel-Arab conflict. And don't you think that the more people meet with north Korean leaders, the greater the chances of your influencing them?

A: As you must know, the United States suggested four-way conversa-

tions in which she would take part together with Communist China and the two Korea. Pyongyang refused and insisted on having bilateral discussions with Washington.

Q: A moment ago you mentioned other factors that backed up your hopes for the long-term reunification of Korea.

A: Yes, I wanted to add that I was convinced that the great powers neighboring the Korean peninsula would not wish for reunification by violence. Thus, sustained by the hope of the peaceful reunification of the nation, there remains for us to do all in our power to foster the development of national strength.

So long as the conditions for the peaceful reunification of the country are not available, our basic line of conduct remains that however long it may take, the south and north must coexist peacefully until the day when the right conditions are met. I am fully convinced that the coexistence of the two parts of the peninsula remains the fastest way to achieve peaceful reunification.

I take this occasion to lay down three fundamental principles:

1) Peace must be solidly established in the peninsula. To this effect, the south and north of the country must conclude a nonaggression agreement.

2) Both parts of the country must mutually open up their doors and restore a climate of reciprocal trust. To this effect the south-north dialogue must be pursued in a spirit of sincerity. Trade exchanges must take place and cooperation must be established in a variety of areas.

3) Once such bases have been laid, reunification must take place by means of free general elections in the south and north, in accordance with the indigenous population. The elections must be run in the compass of an impartial administration under impartial supervision.

Q: Do you believe there is the least chance of having the north Koreans accept such a proposal? Having regard to the respective proportions of their

population, this would spell the end of their regime. This could be one of the reasons for their refusal. You can't ask them to capitulate.

A: No capitulation is involved: The proposal just formulated is the most democratic and the most peaceful. But the north Korean Communists have made us used to the rejection of any proposal that might counter their interests.

The fact is that they always want to reunify the country by force because they have no other way of achieving it.

Since they refused the reasonable proposals, we have offered them to coexist along with us until a favorable basis for reunification has been worked out. But this they have also refused. Relations such as those existing between the two Germanys would suit us perfectly. We must absolutely abstain from intending to impose our solution on the north Korean Communists. But we can't accept that they try to impose theirs on us. There remain only two ways: either war, or peaceful coexistence pending a propitious point of time for reunification. We must avoid a fratricidal war at any price. This being so, we must coexist on the basis of the status quo consolidated by the simultaneous admission of the south and north to the United Nations. But Pyongyang has refused.

Q: South Korea has twice the population of north Korea. It has the most powerful army in Asia. The Americans have considerable armed forces stationed here. This being the case, why do you fear aggression from the north which would expose the towns they have rebuilt to destruction?

A: It is true that the Republic of Korea has twice the population of the north and a powerful army. Nevertheless, for the past 20 years, north Korea has not ceased preparing for war. The preparation is now completed, and I feel sure they are in a condition to start a war. In the event of a new conflict in the peninsula, naturally there would be a great deal of destruction in north Korea, and I must admit I do not understand Pyongyang's obstinacy in following a line of conduct which in our age is obsolete. But the north Korean Communists keep on committing acts of pro-

vocation. They are just waiting for the opportunity once again to invade the south of the peninsula. Their behavior compels us to unremitting vigilance. Common sense is appalled by it, but the north Korean Communists are capable of the most irrational acts and for us this is the cause of a constant headache.

Q: Is, in your opinion, the U.S. decision to withdraw its land troops gradually from south Korea likely to facilitate, or rather to jeopardize, a peaceful solution? Generally speaking, what do you think of Mr. Carter's policy?

A: Considering the present situation, I would not qualify as wise the policy to withdraw the American armed forces. Not only does the stationing of the United States armed forces in the Korean peninsula help preserve the security of Korea, but by keeping peace and stability in Northeast Asia, it contributes to safeguarding the interests of the United States. Everyone knows that hitherto, the U.S. forces stationed in Korea have played an important part in maintaining the stability and peace in Northeast Asia.

If we are worried, it is because we wonder if the departure of those troops is not likely to create the destabilization of Northeast Asia, which in turn would entail the likelihood of threatening the stability and peace of the world.

Q: Some of your opponents are still held in the south Korean prisons. The Western, especially the American, press often accuses you of violations of human rights committed in your country. How do you justify this, while affirming you are defending freedom in face of the Communists?

A: It is true that some persons opposed to the policy of the present government are being held.

If such persons are currently in prison, it is by virtue of the verdicts pronounced by the courts in the due process of law. The real reason is that those persons had committed illegal acts and violated the positive law of

the country. To talk about the human rights in such cases is not an objective manner of looking at things.

Whenever the existence of the state or the life of the nation are at stake, all countries may on occasion be faced with the necessity to restrict the rights of the people to a certain extent. Our country, based on its constitution, has also taken restrictive measures limiting the rights of the people to some extent, in order to preserve the existence of the state and the life of the nation.

The sole purpose of such measures is to preserve the life of the entire Korean people, and to punish, in due process of law, any acts that endanger it. Thus it is impossible to point to such measures as being contrary to the human rights.

Identical cases may be found in other countries. During the events in Algeria, did not President De Gaulle proclaim on the basis of the constitution emergency measures that restricted the rights of the citizens?

If I recall correctly, no one in any foreign country spoke at the time about any violation of human rights in France.

Q: What is your opinion on the alleged corruption with which well-known American personalities in Washington have charged your government?

A: This is a regrettable affair which does no honor to Korea, the more so since a Korean is implicated. My information is that Mr. Pak Tong-sun is a Korean resident in the United States who was engaged in rice trading. He is said to have had certain contacts with well-known people in the United States, which got him into trouble. I admit I am not well informed on the affair.

Some people say that Mr. Pak Tong-sun was employed by the Korean government. Such a statement is absolutely untrue. He never has been employed by our government. My hope is that the American authorities entrusted with the inquiry and the Congress of the United States will

quickly be able to clarify this matter. It will enable us to sift the true from the false.

Q: The south Korean economy is run along totally different lines from that in north Korea. In the event that reunification should become possible, how do you see it actually happening? Do you think the Socialist structure of north Korea can ever be put in question again?

A: The differences between the two parties on the Korean peninsula are indeed considerable in regard to both social systems and institutions. The further the day of reunification is postponed, the wider the rift is likely to grow. That's one of my main worries.

However, if only peaceful reunification could be realized, I believe that assimilation within a single and united nation would pose no great problems, due to the ethnic unity and profound cultural identity among the Korean people. In past history, Korea was once divided into Three Kingdoms. It took 700 years to unite them. But then it was possible to unite all the Koreans into a single nation.

Our institutions and system are superior to those of the north as they respect the creative spirit and the freedom of the individual and foster both efficiency and the spirit of cooperation.

I am sure that such a system and institutions are compatible with the cultural tradition of the Korean people. This is why I am fairly optimistic as regards assimilation after reunification.

Q: Do you favor political, economic and cultural ties with the people of Western Europe in general and with France in particular? What precisely are those ties at the present time? What does France mean to you?

A: We wish to foster closer political, economic, cultural and other relations with the countries of Western Europe, in particular France.

That is why the Korean government and people want to accept anything in Western civilization that can contribute to the development of our culture and to the progress of our country.

France has a long, proud history and a great cultural tradition. Korea also has a history going back several thousand years and a tradition which has enabled its own culture to bloom among its people.

Certainly there are cultural differences between France and Korea. But if the two countries could select and impart what is best in their respective traditional values, I think such exchanges would be the source of a new cultural advancement for both countries. We wish very sincerely to benefit from the values of the cultural tradition created by the French people.

Q: What would be your reaction if France decided to recognize the government of Pyongyang?

A: We are convinced that France, which sent us troops during the Korean War to help repel the north Korean Communist aggressors, would not commit an action that would be inimical to us. Of course, this is a matter on which the French government must make a decision. But I would like to remind you that following our declaration of June 23, 1973, in which we opened our doors to all Communist countries, several friendly countries established relations with north Korea, while not a single Communist country established ties with us. This is contrary to the principle of equity manifested in the declaration.

Therefore, we sincerely hope that our main allies during the war will not open their doors to the north Korean Communists as long as the Communist countries keep their doors closed to us.

Q: Don't you fear that the growth of your exports of low-priced industrial products will lead one day to a trade war with Western Europe?

A: Since we are still a developing country, we export many light industry products at relatively low prices. We are, however, currently concentrating our efforts on heavy and chemical industries, as well as the machinery industry. Exports of products from these new industries are currently increasing. As a result, the exports in the light industry field and the low-cost products are on the decrease.

Therefore, I do not believe it will come to a trade war between the highly industrialized countries of Western Europe and my country.

Q: What are the achievements of which you are most proud? What are the main difficulties you are encountering, and how do you propose to overcome them?

A: Among the accomplishments made during my tenure of office, I don't think there is one I can really take credit for. I will simply say I have always tried to carry out my obligations and any tasks entrusted to me to the best of my ability.

The most difficult question I am faced with is to prevent the recurrence of war and stabilize a durable peace in the peninsula, and thereby to step up the march of the Korean people toward reunification.

I am sure the best approach to resolving this difficult problem is to continue with patience, our efforts to build up national strength.

Q: What are your views on the future of Asia in general and on that of Korea in particular?

A: I find it difficult to predict the future of Asia. But as regards Korea, I dare say that the future is very bright.

We still have many difficulties to overcome. However, the Korean people work hard, inspired by a highly independent spirit, and they are resolved to make their country prosper for the achievement of their ardent aspiration for reunification. These are the reasons why I am optimistic about the future of Korea.

(Commenting on this interview of President Park with Le Monde, major domestic daily newspapers carried the following editorials.)

—Editor—

Principles of Unification and Detrimental Factors

The Chosun Ilbo (October 20, 1977)

The government has recently made public two noticeable viewpoints with regard to the unification issue of our country. One was President Park Chung Hee's interview with Andre Fontaine, editor in chief of *Le Monde* of France, on October 18, and the other was the Reality of Heterogeneity between South and North Korea made public by the Board of National Unification on the occasion of the Symposium on Heterogeneity between South and North Korea held under the auspices of the Board on October 18 and 19. As the contents of the President's interview was publicized around the time of the symposium, we can assess clearly and comprehensively the government's position about the unification issue.

Among the contents of President Park's interview with *Le Monde*, those parts related to the issue of unification are nothing new as they have been discussed time to time in the past. The President laid down in the interview the three basic principles for unification: first, conclusion of a non-aggression agreement between south and north Korea; second, restoration of mutual trust by opening doors between the two sides; and third, holding of fair and free general elections in accordance with indigenous populations of south and north Korea.

These were presented as a procedural method of achieving national unification. In connection with the principles, it was stressed that unification should be realized in a peaceful manner no matter how long a time it may take, that south and north Korea should coexist peacefully until unification is achieved, and that relations such as those existing between the two Germanys would best suit Korea. This, of course, is based on the frank assumption that unification will hardly be achievable in the foreseeable future. And, it is well known that no progress has been registered in the issue of unification due to Kim Il-sung's stubborn rejection of them.

Why then has Kim Il-sung been opposed to such principles set forth by the Republic of Korea government, blocking a road to national unification? The presentation of the elements of such impediment represented an analysis by the Board of National Unification of the heterogeneity taking place between south and north Korea. The analysis presents fairly in detail the reality of how deep has heterogeneity progressed between the south and north in the fields of ideology, system, traditional culture and mode of living. Minister Lee of the Board of National Unification had laid down as a national challenge the issue of how to restore the national homogeneity. The Symposium on Heterogeneity between South and North Korea was part of the efforts to find a solution to this challenge.

The essence of a political system, no matter in which pattern it may be, is formed by the characteristics of political power, socio-economic system, ruling ideology and the made people's living. The analysis by the Board of National Unification has showed clearly the deepening heterogeneity progressed between the two divided parts of our nation, and held Kim Il-sung's one-man dictatorship entirely responsible for the heterogeneity. The analysis thus, showed that the unification issue has been facing a considerable difficulty, in spite of ardent national aspirations for unification. To those looking forward to early unification, the analysis, of course, sounds dismal, casting a dark cloud upon the prospect for unification.

However, the more we aspire for unification, the more accurately we must assess the reality of heterogeneity. If we are unaware of the reality, our pursuit of unification may end in a mere sentimentality or illusion, with our cries for unification becoming an empty slogan. In this aspect, the analysis made by the Board of National Unification can be taken as a considerable contribution to a realistic approach toward the issue of unification.

As the analysis has disclosed, north Korea is a totalitarian society ruled by Kim Il-sung's personality cult. Its political, economic and social

system, based upon communism, has undergone a specific deformation in the direction of further strengthening and perpetuating his dictatorship. In the north, our modern history has been much distorted or fabricated so as to glorify his family tree; the view of the world, sense of value and literature have been altered at his dictation; and even language has undergone changes to an astonishing extent. It is needless to say that under the circumstances, the pattern of people's living, aspects of family life, and traditional culture and customs all have undergone considerable heterogeneity.

Unlike the case with Europe, south and north Korea have so far maintained a homogeneity formed through a common life over a long period of history. Nonetheless, Kim Il-sung, following Stalin's method of classification, has classified the people into two categories: a bourgeois people and a socialistic people. In an attempt to turn the north Korean people into a socialistic people different from us, he calls for resolute struggles for a socialistic revolution and socialistic construction. Although they pay a lip service to the national culture, they reject as "reactionism" the efforts to discover and foster objects of the national cultural heritage and tradition.

Granted that it was an inevitable phenomenon that new words have been coined in the north Korean society, some words like democracy, socialism, peace, freedom and nation, the same words in use both in south and north Korea, carry quite different meanings in the north. The Communists increasingly grip their ideological and cultural controls with a view to further tightening Kim Il-sung's dictatorial system as well as the closedness of their society. They have stifled the creative thinking of intellectuals and the masses with all available means, while denouncing all thoughts and culture other than Marx-Leninism which Kim Il-sung interprets in his own manner, as feudal or capitalistic ideas or rotten Yankee culture.

Under the slogans of "revolutionarization of all society" or "transformation into labor class," Kim Il-sung attempts to make all the north

Korean people look like himself. He goes so far as to order all people to think and behave as his “juche” ideas dictate. It is no wonder that Kim Il-sung whose behavior resembles Orwell’s Animal Farm, refuses to accept free elections for unification. No free elections have ever been held in north Korea which boasts 100 percent turnout and 100 percent affirmative votes for single candidates as “the most advanced type of democracy.” It is well known that Kim Il-sung continuously rejects the proposal that south and north Korea conclude a non-aggression agreement and coexist peacefully until the time of national unification.

His diametric opposition to peaceful coexistence and conclusion of a non-aggression agreement is part of his carefully woven strategy. He, too, uses the word “peaceful unification” for a strategic purpose because he cannot ignore the nation’s popular mandate totally. But, the meaning of his “peaceful unification” is quite different from ours since he means something else when he utters “peaceful unification.” The question of where we can find a clue to peaceful national unification under such a choking state, cannot but be a national agony. No matter how remote and rugged this road may be, our people must explore it, pooling our wisdom and further consolidating our determination. So far as Kim Il-sung and his group cannot represent our nation, we cannot abandon our quest for unification simply because of them.

Fundamental Objective is Peaceful Unification

Hankook Ilbo (October 20, 1977)

Le Monde, an influential newspaper of France, played up in the front page of its October 18 issue an interview of President Park Chung Hee with Andre Fontaine, its editor in chief.

In the interview, President Park discussed important and wide-ranging issues such as Korea’s unification problem, south-north relations, human rights issue and decision to withdraw U.S. forces in Korea, and diplo-

matic aspects including Korea's relations with the Great Britain and other West European countries.

Le Monde, which previously covered Mr. Fontaine's visit to north Korea, should take note of the fact that in the Korean question, south Korea retains a superiority and carries a greater weight as more than two thirds of the Korean people reside in south Korea, and as the uninterrupted national cultural heritage rests unquestionably with the south.

It is also believed that in a contrast to the "well-organized guided tour" he must have experienced during his visit to north Korea, Mr. Fontaine could recall that his travel to south Korea and his exchanges of opinions with people of various walks of life could have taken place more freely and spontaneously. Moreover, President Park's interview with Le Monde would be conducive to a substantial extent to the assessment of the surrounding situation as the President discussed wide-ranging issues.

Asked about the possibility of peaceful unification, President Park replied that the prospects are by no means pessimistic although the north Korean Communists continue to pursue the goal of communizing the whole Korean peninsula by force of arms. Noting, as an encouraging sign, that the national capability of the Republic of Korea keeps expanding, the President foresaw that north Korea will in the long run realize they will never have a chance to unify the peninsula by force.

As for the heterogeneity taking place between south and north Korea, an element considered to be detrimental to peaceful unification, President Park opined that even though a profound difference has appeared in the economic and social bases of south and north Korea, he is optimistic about national assimilation after unification in view of the traditional racial and cultural integrity.

As the basic principles for national unification, the Chief Executive set forth 1) conclusion of a non-aggression agreement for firm consolidation of peace, 2) opening of mutual doors and progress in the south-north dialogue, and 3) holding of free general elections in accordance with in-

digenous population. These principles are endorsed by a popular consensus of the Republic of Korea. We do not demand north Korea's surrender but are laying down a rational method of approaching toward unification before the realization of peaceful unification, a method that can remind one of the East-West German solution.

The questions raised in the interview somewhat seemed to reflect the easy-minded mentality of some foreign personages who are unaware of the situation of the Korean peninsula, especially the nature of Communist north Korea.

President Park pointed out that the motive of north Korea's call for "direct negotiations with the United States" instead of dialogue between the same people, lies in its pursuit of a Vietnam-like solution. These remarks by the President has brought one's attention to the fact that north Korea, which boasts "battle readiness," has the ability to provoke a war.

Touching on a few issues pending between Korea and the United States, President Park criticized as "not a wise step" the decision to withdraw U.S. ground forces from Korea. He stressed that the presence in Korea of the American troops is not only to buttress the security of Korea, but is also directly linked to the U.S. interests with regard to the issue of maintaining power equilibrium for peace and security in Northeast Asia. As for the human rights issue, President Park expressed the political conviction that when the national survival and the lives of people are endangered, restriction on the rights to some extent is unavoidable.

The Chief Executive further expressed the hope for closer political, economic and cultural relations with West European countries, especially France. We totally agree to the President's view. We want to believe that France, one of the Korean War allies, will not normalize relations with north Korea unless Communist bloc countries establish diplomatic relations with south Korea.

Lastly on the question about the future of Asia, in particular Korea, President Park showed the optimism that Korea will bring about a greater

prosperity in the future. The base of the President's optimism is our Koreans' diligence, spirit of self-reliance and will to prosperity. Of course, the Koreans are a people greatly concerned about and highly sensitive to developments of the international situation.

We wish to take this occasion to convey our Koreans' friendship and esteem to the French people reputed for their creation of a brilliant culture. What we hope to turn to the sagacious intellect of France in connection with the question of south and north Korea is that France makes a fair assessment of the situation on the Korean peninsula. We hope for the maintenance and development of close friendly relations between the peoples of Korea and France:

Will and Conditions to Peaceful Unification

Kyunghyang Daily News (October 20, 1977)

The interview of President Park Chung Hee with *Le Monde* has manifested once again the nation's will to peaceful unification. President Park said in the interview that south and north Korea should be reunified peacefully no matter how long a time it may take; the south and north should coexist until the day when right conditions are met; and the two Germans' solution is suitable to the method of coexistence. This is a rational and realistic method of approach to national unification.

Needless to say, the common aspirations of the 50 million Korean people is reunification. This has been and will be a great and irrevocable national challenge.

Nevertheless, no matter how urgent the task of unification may be, it cannot and must not be achieved by force of arms. We have already set forth three basic principles for national unification: free general elections in accordance with indigenous population, preceded by conclusion of a non-aggression agreement and mutual opening of doors. These principles are meant to suggest that unification, though being a paramount national

challenge, should be achieved by a peaceful manner under all circumstances, for the basis of which durable peace should be brought about on the Korean peninsula and issues pending between the south and north must be settled beginning with easy ones first.

What is more important in facilitating peaceful unification is to discourage the recurrence of war and consolidate lasting peace. The principle of non-use of arms or of non-interference in internal affairs which we have laid down as a method of “peace first and unification later,” is part of our efforts to form the order of such peaceful coexistence.

As for our proposal for simultaneous entry into the United Nations by south and north Korea, we have made it as an interim step pending national unification, never with the intention of perpetualizing the national division. North Korea, nevertheless, rejects it as a “nation-splitting scheme.”

Here, we can realize that the Korean issue can hardly be solved without removal of mutual distrust and misunderstanding in view of the heterogeneity brought about in ideas and systems in the course of the protracted state of national division. Therefore, the exigent task is to create the base for unification through mutual dialogue, expansion of personal or material exchanges and cooperative projects.

The “method of the two Germanys’ solution” calls for maintenance of the integrity of a nation while realizing peaceful coexistence and exchanges between the divided people even before national reunification.

Despite the fact that our efforts for unification and our method of rooting peace are so realistic and practicable, the north Korean Communists turn their back to our efforts and pursue communization of the entire Korean peninsula. North Korea has exposed its double-facedness and treachery by proposing negotiations with the United States over our head. The proposal comes at a time when Pyongyang is engaged in a deceptive peace offensive outwardly and internally in an all-out preparation for aggressive war. To prepare against such bellicosity, we must build

up our national capability with our own efforts and through a firm national unity.

President Park once stated, “the best step for the national security is to forestall the recurrence of war.” One of the effective ways of forcing north Korea to abandon its anachronistic dream for war is for us to build up our self-reliant capability and demonstrate our strength at the multi-polarized international community.

Nation’s Alarming Heterogeneity

Dong-A Ilbo (October 20, 1977)

Heterogeneity of this nation is said to have deepened because the north Korean Communists have destroyed the nation’s homogeneity in such fields as our indigenous tradition, culture and arts, and language, let alone the areas of thoughts and ideas, in the 32 years of the national division.

Commenting on this, President Park Chung Hee stated in an interview with Andre Fontaine, editor in chief of Le Monde of France, “because the political and social systems of south and north Korea differ basically, it is feared that the more unification is delayed, the deeper national heterogeneity may become. Details about the heterogeneity existing between south and north Korea were disclosed at a seminar on heterogeneity between the south and north held at the Board of National Unification.

At the seminar, Minister Lee Yong-hui of the Board of National Unification said, “heterogeneity between the south and north has emerged as a serious obstacle to peaceful unification,” adding that it is anticipated that the issue of heterogeneity may remain as a lingering internal problem blocking a genuine national integrity even after national unification.

In the history of the world, numerous small countries had risen and fallen. Nevertheless, our nation has survived amidst big powers in

surroundings because we have maintained our unique nationality. The nationality means the homogeneity and characteristics of our people who have shared the same language, tradition, culture and the style of living throughout our 5,000-year history.

However, under the anachronistic basic goal of communization of the whole Korean peninsula, Kim Il-sung and his clique, advocating class struggles among the same people, have altered the view of the nation into the materialistic conception of history, turning the north Korean society into a totalitarian Communist organization. Moreover, north Korea has rewritten the national history from the standpoint of the materialistic conception of history, showing as if a nation was born only at the time of Kim Il-sung's so-called anti-Japanese struggles.

The unforgivable crime is that they have fabricated the history in a way that would rationalize Kim Il-sung's one-man dictatorship. For examples, they claim that it was Kim Il-sung's grandfather who sank American merchantship "Sherman" in the final years of Yi Dynasty; that it was Kim Il-sung's father who led the van of the Samil Independence Movement; and that national liberation in 1945 was the result of Kim Il-sung's "anti-Japan struggles" despite the fact that it was gained through our people's anti-Japanese struggles as well as through the victory of the allies in World War II.

In addition, north Korea describes the standard language as "cultural language" and destroys our indigenous language structure, contending that even language, designed to convey man's pure sentiments and thoughts, is a "powerful weapon for revolution and construction." Besides, they did not hesitate to commit anti-civilization acts of denying the uniqueness of our national culture and arts, degrading them into the tools of communism.

How north Korea has altered its society can well be showed in family rituals. When young men and women want to marry, they must obtain advance permission from the head of the workshops or the chairman of the party cells they belong to. Beginning in June last year, north Korea

restricted the mandatory marriage age to 32 for men and 28 for women. Funeral must in principle be held on the same day one dies, while death anniversary can be observed only as an occasion to discuss the late person's achievements in revolutionary programs.

These phenomena of national heterogeneity are only a few examples. As was pointed out in the recent seminar sponsored by the Board of National Unification, the deepening heterogeneity emerges as another element detrimental to unification, of which feasibility already remains remote as ever. The only way to check such heterogeneity is for the south and north to resume dialogue and gradually improve the conditions to unification through exchanges and cooperation, as President Park stressed.

Even in Germany where Marx, the founding father of communism, was born, East and West Germany are engaged in growing personal and materials exchanges as well as art, music and other cultural exchanges between them. North Korea should not avert its face from today's flow of the times.

Kim Il-sung and his clique should abandon their aggressive schemes against the south in the first place. Our government, too, is asked to work out steps to restore the homogeneity of the nation with the recent symposium on heterogeneity as momentum.

President Park's Interview with Le Monde

Shin-A Ilbo (October 20, 1977)

The contents of the interview President Park Chung Hee had with Le Monde have been made public. Together with the readers of the French newspapers, we are deeply concerned about the interview all the more because the President touched on wide-ranging issues such as prospects for unification, north Korea's attempt to come in contacts with the United States, south-north dialogue, projected withdrawal of American troops from Korea, heterogeneity developing between south and north Korea and Korea-French relations.

In the first place, President Park, reiterating the government stand that unification should be achieved in a peaceful manner under all circumstances, laid down three principles for achieving unification: 1) conclusion of a non-aggression agreement between the south and north, 2) mutual opening of doors, and 3) free general elections between the south and north.

These principles show a striking contrast to the basic policy of north Korea which ever seeks a chance to bring the entire Korean peninsula under their Communist domain by force of arms. Moreover, President Park disclosed in the interview highly reasonable and persuasive formulas based upon his conviction that national unification, though facing a slim chance at the moment, would be realized in the long run.

As to the issue of north Korea's attempt to approach toward the United States, the President stated that the north Koreans are attempting to apply the Vietnam-style solution to Korea, taking note of the fact that the direct negotiations between North Vietnam and the United States had led to the communization of South Vietnam.

The Chief Executive then reiterated the government stand that war should be avoided at all cost and that the south and north coexist on the basis of the status quo consolidated by their simultaneous entry into the United Nations, pending a propitious point of time for reunification. In this connection, President Park said that relations such as those existing between the two Germanys would suit us perfectly.

Commenting on the projected withdrawal of American troops from Korea, the President pointed to the unwisdom of the withdrawal plan, stressing that not only does the stationing of the U.S. armed forces in the Korean peninsula help preserve the security of Korea, but by keeping peace and stability in Northeast Asia, it contributes to safeguarding the interests of the United States. We feel these remarks should be listened to by the Carter Administration before any one else, which has come under criticism over the withdrawal issue.

President Park further said, "Our institutions and system are superior to those of the north as they respect the creative spirit and the freedom of the individual and foster both efficiency and the spirit of cooperation. As they are compatible with the cultural tradition of the Korean people, I am fairly optimistic as regards assimilation after unification."

The President's interview with Mr. Andre Fontaine, editor in chief of *Le Monde*, seems carrying a particular weight, inasmuch as Mr. Fontaine is an influential journalist and the interview was had on the heels of his visit to Pyongyang.

National Aspirations for Peaceful Unification

Joong-Ang Daily News (October 20, 1977)

In his interview with Mr. Andre Fontaine, editor in chief of *Le Monde* of France, who visited here at the invitation of this newspaper, President Park Chung Hee expressed his opinions about peaceful unification as well as the nation's future.

With regard to the means of unification of the Korean peninsula, the President rejected the Vietnam-style solution in favor of the German method. President Park meant to favor peaceful coexistence and exchanges, and eventual unification through free general elections, instead of war and revolutionary policies.

As concrete principles for achieving unification, President Park set forth three fundamental principles for peaceful unification once again. The three principles, originally laid down three years ago, were 1) consolidation of durable peace by means of conclusion of a non-aggression agreement, 2) mutual opening of doors and restoration of mutual trust through the south-north dialogue, exchanges and cooperation, and 3) realization of unification through free general elections held in accordance with indigenous population.

It appears there are no other ways than these to reunify the fatherland and bring about the grand unity of the people under the present condition of national division.

Let us take a look at the Vietnam-style solution which north Korea advocates staunchly. This method, based on revolution and war, may materialize physical unification. In this method, however, nearly an entire generation has to be wiped out as can be seen in Vietnam today. Moreover, the heterogeneity and hatred born in its course among the same people, would be handed down to the posterity for a long time to come.

We are fed up with such anti-human and anti-national conducts as we had them enough during the Korea War. If this is so, then the course we can pursue is none but peaceful unification.

A peace can be born from the integration of all forces, systems and individuals, but never by the efforts of any single side.

Unfortunately, however, hostile feelings are now piling up between the south and north due to north Korea's warlike and revolutionary policies. The war preparation by north Korea touches off our side's counter steps, and the multiplication of such mutual instigation leads to the possibility of clash in force.

Under the circumstances, a systematic step to defuse such danger becomes necessary, and a non-aggression agreement can be such step. If a peace agreement is intended for postmortem solution of a war, a non-aggression agreement is a step designed to forestall war beforehand.

Only when a durable peace is consolidated through the conclusion of a non-aggression agreement, can there be full-fledged exchanges and cooperation between the south and north. Once exchanges and cooperation are materialized in the humanitarian, economic and social sectors, then the sufferings deriving from the national division would be alleviated substantially even though a unified government had not been established. This is the way the two Germanys are adopting now.

Regarding this method, there appeared some criticism contending that such method brings about the danger of perpetualizing the division or allowing a too long a time to materialize reunification.

But, we have already lived in the state of national division for more than a generation's period. And the chance for unification still remains as remote as ever. It may take a long time to integrate the two conflicting systems peacefully. If the north did not resort to war from the outset, we may have been drawn closer to the realization of unification by now.

Still, it is not too late. Even from now, we must choose the road of waiting with patience. Our aspirations for peaceful unification have been manifested many times through the three major principles for unification. The remaining issue is for north Korea to return to national conscience.

Part Two

South-North Dialogue

**“Restoration of National Assimilation through
Reunion of Dispersed Families”**

—ROKNRC Suggests Exchange of Tomb Visitors on New Year’s Day—

(The 24th working-level meeting of the South-North Red Cross Conference was held at the conference room of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission at Panmunjom on October 14, 1977 for one hour and 20 minutes beginning 10 a.m.

At the meeting, the Republic of Korea National Red Cross delegation again urged 1) holding of the eighth full-dress meeting at Panmunjom at an early date, 2) unconditional discussion of the agenda topics of full-dress meetings, and 3) normalization of the direct south-north telephone line.

The delegation of the Republic of Korea National Red Cross also proposed at the meeting that as pilot projects “mutual exchange of groups of visitors to ancestral tombs of separated families” and “reunion with aged parents” be realized by all means on the coming New Year’s Day so as to provide a new breakthrough in the humanitarian conference. The ROKNRC delegation stressed that through such humanitarian projects as “reunion with aged parents,” the tensions existing between the south and north should be eased, and the national homogeneity restored, contributing to independent peaceful unification of the fatherland.”

Nevertheless, the north Korean Red Cross delegation, showing no interest at all in the proposed resumption of the talks and discussion of the agenda topics of the full-dress meetings, persisted in a time-worn political propaganda demanding withdrawal of American forces, repeal of anti-Communist policy and the Special Foreign Policy for Peace and Unification of 1973, release of anti-state

criminals, and abrogation of the Korea-Japan Continental Shelf Agreement.

(The two sides agreed to hold the next 25th working-level meeting on December 9.

The following is the text of a speech made by Kim Yeon-choo, alternate chief delegate of the Republic of Korea National Red Cross, at the 24th working-level meeting.) —Editor—

We are holding our 24th working-level meeting today, three full months after the preceding meeting.

At the 23rd working-level meeting held last July 15, the delegation of the Republic of Korea National Red Cross, urging your side's affirmative response, set forth two methods for cooperative solution in resuming soon the full-dress meetings which have remained suspended or nearly four full years, and paving the way to reunion between the 10 million dispersed family members in the south and north.

First, as to the question of resuming the full-dress meetings, we proposed that although the eighth full-dress meeting should naturally be held in Seoul in accordance with an agreed matter reached between the two sides, the eighth full-dress meeting be held here at Panmunjom at the earliest possible date, in consideration of the position of your side, which insists it cannot come to Seoul.

With regard to the issue of discussing agenda topics for the full-dress meetings, our side also suggested that all the humanitarian projects covered by agenda topics Nos. 1 through 5 be discussed and settled concretely one by one without any prerequisites. We further proposed that if the position of your side does not allow overall and substantial discussion of the five agenda topics, then the most urgent and practicable issues among the problems related to the 10 million separated family members, such as "reunion between aged parents and their families" and

“south-north exchange of groups of visitors to ancestral tombs of dispersed families,” be undertaken first as pilot projects.

These proposals by the Republic of Korea National Red Cross delegation, being reasonable means to deal with the two topics adopted by our working-level meetings, namely, “issue of resuming full-dress meetings” and “preliminary discussion of the topics of full-dress meetings,” are questions which ought to have been settled long ago.

As your side, too, well knows, our two sides agreed as we embarked on these working-level meetings three years ago to resume the suspended full-dress meetings at an early date, and to carry out preliminary discussion of the agenda topics for full-dress meetings. Therefore, the important tasks we must settle at the working-level meetings are first the issue of “when and where to hold the eighth full-dress meeting,” and then to discuss, at the level of working officials, the question of how to implement “finding out the fate and whereabouts of the 10 million dispersed family members,” and their free “exchange of letters” and “mutual visits.”

Now that such objective and topics of the meeting have been expressly determined, we believe that the proper way of the dialogue is for us mutually to respect the agreed matter, as well as to engage in discussing and settling one by one the determined topics.

If we deviate from the rightful path of the dialogue as we do now, and engage in unnecessary pros and cons which do not serve the objective of the meeting, obstructing the meeting with one-sided speeches, our dialogue will hardly have any meaning in the long run.

Such unprincipled proceedings, will ultimately lead the dialogue to total rupture by causing only confusion and difficulties, and fomenting mutual confrontation and distrust rather than becoming conducive to the solution of the problems.

From now on, we must employ all wisdom and efforts to see to it that the humanitarian dialogue between the south and north Korean Red Cross personnel is not degraded into such meaningless talk.

North Korean Red Cross delegates!

Today we should ruminate over the original purport and objective of the South-North Red Cross Conference, and deeply reflect on our attitude toward the conference, and thereby try to normalize the dead-locked South-North Red Cross Conference at an early date.

As the Republic of Korea National Red Cross delegation has been persistently maintaining from the early stage of the talks, our humanitarian conference is, above all, intended to open an avenue toward reunion between the 10 million dispersed family members in the south and north. By way of such humanitarian programs, at the same time, the tensions existing between the south and north should be alleviated and national trust restored, contributing to eventual independent peaceful unification of the fatherland.

In order to accomplish these lofty national tasks, the two sides must above all maintain an open-hearted spiritual posture with which we, with a cool sense of reality, can remain above the different systems and ideas of south and north, producing a dialogue based on brotherly love and humanitarian spirit.

Under circumstances in which the south and north remain severed from each other, and political ideologies and systems are so different as is the case now, it is not easy to develop a dialogue for the restoration of national homogeneity, and it is difficult to expect its achievement in a short span of time.

However, if we carry on the dialogue patiently with a broad-minded attitude, transcending each other's differences and areas of disagreement, the long-standing discontinuation and confrontation between the south and north can surely be overcome peacefully.

This broad-minded attitude toward the conference constitutes the basic "starting point" and a "common feature" that make possible our dialogue.

On the strength of such a “starting point” and “common feature,” our two sides could open a humanitarian conference with a view to paving the way for reunion between the 10 million separated family members. At the time of the initiation, we all valued the contact and dialogue that were realized after a long period of isolation, striving hard mutually to put it on its normal path.

We pledged to each other our mutual efforts to transcend differences in political ideologies and systems, and promised to engage in the humanitarian project intended to open the avenue for reunion between the 10 million dispersed family members in the south and north. At the same time, we brightened the prospects of the dialogue by exhibiting broad-mindedness and perseverance in not imposing the contentions of one upon the other, nor interfering in the other’s internal affairs.

I believe that to carry on the dialogue continuously with this attitude constitutes a shortcut to realizing the humanitarian project and improving today’s disrupted south-north relations in a peaceful manner.

Nevertheless, your sides posture toward the conference began to deviate from the proper path of a humanitarian undertaking after the issuance of your “statement on suspension of the conference” on August 28, 1973.

Apart from bygone matters, your side lately only repeats political propaganda, slandering and defaming the other party to the dialogue, while showing not a bit of interest in the “issue of resuming full-dress meetings” and “preliminary discussion of the agenda topics for full-dress meetings,” questions which must be solved at these working-level meetings. This is an act ignoring the basic purport and objective of the South-North Red Cross Conference.

I hope that this attitude of your side will be rectified at an early date, allowing the talks to regain their rightful path.

Next, we must hasten our discussion of the question of holding the eighth full-dress meeting at an early date. In fact, there is a good method

by means of which, if only your side accepts it, we can settle the issue of resuming the full-dress meetings at any time. Therefore, this is not an issue of any difficulty, nor does this require any lengthy discussion. From the beginning, the eighth full-dress meeting was set to be held in Seoul as a matter of course, as agreed upon between the two sides. Inasmuch as your side, however, refused adamantly to come to Seoul, our side, seeing not alternative, suggested that the eighth full-dress meeting be held here at Panmunjom at an early date in consideration of your side's position. Therefore, it is proper that your side should accept our side's proposition as it stands now: our side proposes that the eighth full-dress meeting be held at Panmunjom. Otherwise, your side should open-heartedly produce your side's opinion with regard to the issue of resuming the full-dress meetings.

If your side is really interested in the normalization of the South-North Red Cross Conference and solution of the issue of 10 million dispersed family members in a peaceful manner, there will be no reason why your side should oppose the holding of the eighth full-dress meeting at Panmunjom.

Now in order to carry on "preliminary discussion of the agenda topics for full-dress meetings," there should be concrete discussion of rational methods as set forth by our side.

Already at the time of the third full-dress meeting, the Republic of Korea National Red Cross delegation concretely proposed the "methods for a project of searching for dispersed families" to be carried out under the auspices of Red Cross people of the two sides, south and north, as a means of implementing agenda topic No. 1, "the question of tracing, and notifying thereof, the whereabouts and fate of members of dispersed families and relatives in the south and north." However, this has yet to be implemented because your side opposed such discussion, setting forth political prerequisites.

We hope that your side will withdraw such unreasonable prerequisites,

so that the method of the project laid down by our side can be discussed and agreed upon at an early date.

Since the initiation of the working-level meetings to date, we have proposed many urgent pilot project methods with a view to providing a breakthrough in the deadlocked conference and accelerating a humanitarian solution of the issue of dispersed families.

In other words, taking into account the position of your side which continues to shun any substantial debate of the agenda topics for full-dress meetings, we proposed prior solution of the “issue of reunion between aged parents and their families” which emerges as one of the most urgent questions among the issues related to the 10 million separated family members, and also the “method of mutual exchange of groups of visitors to ancestral tombs of the dispersed families” as a pilot project the implementation of which is relatively easy. These projects are the very ones whose early realization is being hoped for by the 10 million dispersed family members themselves, and represent the embodiment of the humanitarian projects incorporated into the overall topics of the full-dress meetings agreed upon between the two sides. If only these projects are implemented, it would become a positive impetus as well as rich experience for our humanitarian programs.

These humanitarian programs can be expanded to cover even free visits between the entire 10 million family members dispersed in the south and north, after they are initiated as small-scale pilot projects in the early stage. And such free travels back and forth between the south and north by the 10 million dispersed family members will help overcome the isolation and confrontation between the south and north, accelerating material exchanges. Such developments in the south-north relations will pave the way to independent peaceful unification of this land.

Therefore, the solution of the dispersed family issue, namely, our humanitarian project, may well be said to constitute a shortcut to and impetus for “national conciliation” and “peaceful unification.” These

humanitarian projects, therefore, require a humanitarian spirit surmounting, above all, the difference in ideologies and systems, and upholding the value of men's lives and dignity.

As your side, too, well knows, in Germany, like our country, where the territory remains divided and millions of dispersed family members live separated between east and west, free exchange of letters and mutual visits by separated families were realized long before, transcending the differences in ideas and systems.

They first embarked on a pilot project in which aged persons of more than 60 were allowed to visit their home towns and families at year-end and Christmas holidays. The home-visit program, carried out in a genuinely humanitarian perspective transcending systems and ideas, has now developed to a point where more than three million people of East and West Germany freely cross back and forth over the boundary of division each year.

We, a sagacious people who have safeguarded our purity and integrity for several thousand years, care for peace and unity more than any other people in the world. It is a matter of extreme shame that our people, attached to peace and unity, have been unable to realize the kind of humanitarian program that has been successfully materialized elsewhere long ago. Today's state of discontinuity, in which parents and children have no way of learning each other's fate, let alone undertaking mutual exchange of letters between families and relatives dispersed in the south and north, should be rectified at an early date.

North Korean Red Cross delegates!

Today the overall course of international society pursues a policy of solving all problems peacefully through dialogue among the parties concerned and seeking mutual cooperation by means of door-opening and exchanges among countries, doing away with the past practice of ideological and exclusionary confrontation.

By declaring at home and abroad the Special Foreign Policy for Peace

and Unification of June 23, 1973, our Republic of Korea has been pursuing a positive policy of actively contributing to the international community's line of peaceful coexistence, and, at the same time, of improving south-north relations into relations of dialogue and cooperation.

As we pursue an open-door policy toward all countries around the world, even citizens of those countries with different ideas and systems can have free access to our country. And our citizens can travel everywhere around the world.

We have opened postal and communication relations with all the Communist countries around the world, accelerating exchanges with them in the fields of economy, culture and sports. As of the end of August this year, the number of postal items exchanged with China, the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and other Communist countries reached as many as 29,000.

As your side already knows, one of our compatriots residing in the Soviet Union, Mr. Chang Jon-too, has visited the fatherland with a Soviet passport early this year for the first time in 38 years to see his aged mother and daughter living in Cheju-do.

In addition, the number of our compatriots in Japan affiliated with Chochongryon, a pro-Pyongyang Korean residents' group, who have been to the fatherland under the homeland-visit program initiated on the Chusok holiday three years ago, has now surpassed 15,000. Their visits to their home towns and reunions with their blood relatives have become ever more free and frequent, as if they were making neighborhood calls.

On the Chusok of the past month alone, some 2,500 compatriots visited their homeland, meeting with their blood relatives and visiting ancestral tombs for the first time in many decades.

In this way, we live in a very close and open world where we can travel and communicate with every part of the earth. However, we have yet to cross the artificial barrier separating the south and north.

We are convinced that if only we all manifest a humanitarian spirit

and brotherly love, transcending systems and ideas, we will be able to overcome the artificial barrier between the south and north easily.

We so pledged in the course of the past preliminary and full-dress meetings, and so promised expressly in the South-North Joint Communiqué of 1972.

Although five years have already passed since the issuance of the historic South-North Joint Communiqué, and despite the fact that the South-North Red Cross Conference is entering the seventh year since its initiation, south-north relations remain in a state of tension as ever, unable to register any improvement. So far, our dialogue has failed to make any strides of progress, repeating only fruitless efforts. There is no way to tell when the eighth full-dress meeting can be held, while even the topic No. 1 of the agenda topics for the full-dress meetings has failed even to be discussed. The state of such deadlocked dialogue, as showed by past developments, results in heightening of tensions and confrontation between the south and north, undermining efforts for independent peaceful unification of the fatherland. Therefore, we must employ all available means to break through the present stalemate of the dialogue and alleviate the tensions and confrontation between south and north. We must carry on the dialogue in a way fitting the basic purport and objectives of the South-North Red Cross Conference by returning to the open-minded posture of the early stage of the conference.

And we must accomplish the two tasks entrusted to these working-level meetings by scheduling the eighth full-dress meeting at an early date and discussing and solving the agenda topics for full-dress meetings without any preconditions.

I hope that the following proposals which our Republic of Korea National Red Cross delegation has maintained repeatedly in the past will be discussed sincerely, so as to find a clue to a breakthrough in the long-stalemated South-North Red Cross Conference.

First, the Republic of Korea National Red Cross delegation urges

that the eighth full-dress meeting be held in Panmunjom at an early date. The eighth full-dress meeting should naturally be held in Seoul, as agreed upon between the two sides. Since your side has failed to respect this agreed matter, we were obliged to suggest that Panmunjom be the place for the eighth full-dress meeting. Our suggestion is the best means of solving smoothly the issue of resuming the full-dress meetings under the present circumstances in which the path between Seoul and Pyongyang has remained blocked for more than four full years.

Second, the Republic of Korea National Red Cross delegation urges the concrete discussion and solution of the agenda topics for the full-dress meetings without any preconditions. And we urge that, as a means of solving agenda topic No. 1, “the question of tracing, and notifying thereof, the whereabouts and fate of members of dispersed families and relatives in the south and north,” the “methods for a project of searching for dispersed persons under the auspices of both Red Cross societies,” which our side proposed at the third full-dress meeting, be adopted.

However, if your situation is such that your side cannot agree to concrete discussion of agenda topic No. 1, we urge that the issue of undertaking, as pilot projects, such humanitarian programs as “mutual exchange of groups of visitors to ancestral tombs of separated families” and “reunion with aged parents,” be discussed. It is desirable to conduct these pilot projects simultaneously between the south and north. But if your side’s situation does not allow the implementation of these right away, our side can carry them out initially on a demonstration basis.

We hope that these urgent and humanitarian projects will be realized on the coming New Year’s day without fail, so as to rejoice the separated families and provide a new breakthrough in our humanitarian conference.

Lastly, we again urge that the function of the direct Seoul-Pyongyang telephone line and that of both sides, liaison offices at Panmunjom, paralyzed since August last year, be restored at an early date.

As your side knows better than anyone else, these two means of

liaison between the south and north had been established jointly under mutual agreement between the two sides in the initial stage of the conference, and had been in operation without any accident in a way favorable to both sides.

Your side should restore this function soon, realizing deeply how great are the inconveniences and unnecessary misunderstandings and tension caused to both sides due to the paralysis of these two methods of liaison so far.

I look forward to your side's sincere response to the above urging and demands of our side.

Part Three

Other Developments in Inter-Korean Relations

〈Homeland Visit by Pro-Pyongyang Koreans in Japan〉

A total of 2,300 Korean residents in Japan affiliated with Chochongryon, a pro-Pyongyang Koreans residents' group in Japan, visited their homeland in four groups from September 17 through 20 on the occasion of the Chusok Holiday (September 27) for the first time in about 30 years. They were the largest group to come to the homeland since the homeland visit program began in 1975.

Aged persons who returned home white-haired and second and third-generation youths who set foot on the land of their parents' hometowns they never saw before . . . They all could hardly control their emotions.

“Tomb Visit after 47 Years' Absence”

A man who left his parents at the age of 22 made a repentant return home as an aged man of 69 for the first time in almost half a century. Mr. Kim Man-yong of Osaka, Japan, together with his younger sister, Mrs. Kim Su-nam, shed the tears of remorse before their parents' tombs which they were visiting after 47 years' absence.

Mr. Kim, bald headed and wrinkled deep on the forehead, could not visit home earlier because he joined Chochongryon, taken in by sugar-coated persuasion by the pro-Pyongyang organization.

Recently Mr. Kim shifted his allegiance from Chochongryon to Mindan, the pro-Seoul Korean Residents' Association in Japan, at the urging of his sister, Su-nam, who bolted from Chochongryon a few years earlier realizing the falsehood of Chochongryon propaganda.

The Kim brother and sister, who have regained their fatherland and hometown away from the dark life under Chochongryon full of deception, vowed “a life of atonement” during the rest of their lives before their dead parents as they were paying their belated homage to the tombs.

“First Chusok Family Reunion in 37 Years”

To a homcomer from Japan, this year's Chusok holiday was a special occasion for celebration. Mr. Kim Yong-su, 59, of Niikata Prefecture, Japan, was received into the warm bosoms of his fatherland and his family members comprising his wife, sons, daughters and grandchildren after having had a rough time in an alien-ountry for about half of his life.

Mr. Kim had the emotion-filled holiday surrounded by the newly met families at the home of one of his sons, Kim Chong-kil, 36, of 510-96 Kileum-dong, Songbuk-ku, Seoul. It was their first reunion in 31 years.

Mr. Kim, who had to leave the rest of his family members around the time of national liberation, was once a cadre official of Chochongryon's Niikata Prefecture.

Remarking that he had to give up planned visits to Seoul several times in the past because of Chochongryon's allegation that "because south Korea is an anti-Communist country, they will imprison you as they know you are a Chochongryon official," Mr. Kim said he now feels quite secure in the free society of the Republic of Korea.

The homeland visitors invariably repent for their past anti-national acts wrought as they were taken in by crafty schemes by Chochongryon, and pledged themselves to contribute to the fatherland's development as proud citizens of the Republic of Korea.

〈Joint Rally for Adoration of Parents in North Korea〉

“Home-Longing Bowing and Incense-Burning”

The Joint Rally for Adoration of Forefathers in North Korea, a home-longing rite for those hailing from north Korea, was held on September 27, 1977 (Chusok Holiday) at the Imjingak Square along the Imjin River. The Rally was to offer homage on the occasion of the Chusok Holiday to the forefathers whom, despite their being just north of the truce line, they could not meet during the quarter-century period of national division.

The 2,000 attendees, after paying homage at the altar prepared in the Square, adopted a message addressed to the north Korean people, which said in part, “We pray that the day will come soon when we will be able to meet our parents and brothers in the north and visit our ancestral tombs on holidays.”

(The following is an address read at the rite by Lee Hui-seung, chairman of the Rally.) — Editor —

Today we have assembled here to express and share together our adoration of the forefathers, parents and brothers whom we have left in the north.

In retrospect, it is already 30-odd years since we were embraced by the bosom of the free Republic of Korea away from the yoke of the Communist rule in the whirlpools of national division and fratricidal conflict. It was really a long period, a time laden with the grief that we are unable to visit our home towns and meet our missing parents and brothers even for a single time.

Even migratory birds return to their home nests in seasons. How can we describe the sentiments of us who only stare into the northern sky, unable to visit our hometowns? A single post stamp can bring information to anywhere around the world. But, we have no way to know even the

fate of our parents and brothers who are in the same land.

Whenever traditional holidays like the New Year's Day or Chusok Holiday come, we especially miss our hometowns greatly where our forefathers rest in peace.

We have prepared this Rally today to express a fraction of our respect and filial duty to our forefathers and parents to whom we have been unable to pay homage for such a long time in this cruel state of national division.

Let us all take this rare occasion today to see to it that the echo of our burning affection for our parents and other blood relatives reaches the northern sky.

The grieves, sufferings and loneliness we are experiencing today no doubt stem from the failure to unify our fatherland. We realize the truth of the north Korean Communists better than any others. To be frank, we, nevertheless, harbored some expectation when the south-north dialogue seemingly made a brisk headway in the wake of the initiation of the South-North Red Cross Conference and issuance of the South-North Joint Communiqué.

As we anticipated, however, the north Korean Communists had come to boycott the dialogue altogether, ignoring the ardent wishes of the 50 million people. They have even rejected exchange of letters which themselves proposed in the past, let alone the proposals for exchange of tomb visitors on the Chusok Holiday and for reunion of aged parents and their children dispersed in the south and north at Panmunjom on the New Year's Day, which our Republic of Korea National Red Cross laid down from the humanitarian standpoint.

The north Korean Communists, who do not hesitate even to perpetrate inhuman violence or atrocities if only it serves their goal of communizing the entire Korean peninsula, attempted to exploit the south-north dialogue for their wicked objective from the outset.

This unforgivable act of betrayal caused unutterable disappointment

and frustration to us. The north Korean Communists have destroyed our nation's indigenous traditional family system and virtuous customs. Any expectation from the north Korean Communists of the humanitarian sense of respect for forefathers and national conscience would be something tantamount to seeking fish from trees.

We are the very victims who experienced the bitter scene of national division personally, and, at the same time, the living witnesses who had the first-hand experience in the living hell of north Korea. This is why we aspire for unification of the fatherland more than any other persons, shouldering the important mission of advancing the time of national unification.

In this respect, we should realize that this Rally carries another meaning in that we take this occasion to reiterate our determination again to materialize unification so that we can do away with this kind of rally.

Our government has declared at home and abroad the "Three Fundamental Principles for Peaceful Unification" calling for consolidation of durable peace on the Korean peninsula first and then achieving national unification on the basis of peace. In this policy, the government strives to actively create conditions for unification so as to force north Korea to give up its anti-national policies for violence and revolution for itself.

The concerted efforts of all of our people are being made to build up our national strength to a point where we can overwhelm north Korea not only in the fields of economy and military, but also in the spiritual and moral sectors.

All of us who have gathered here today must actively take part in such government policies and do our best in reinforcing a strong national security posture and firm national unity which the north Korean Communists will never dare to look down upon.

“North Korea’s Heterogenous Schemes That Sever Blood Vein of Nation”

Despite the long 32-year period of national division, no signs can be seen of early realization of the national aspiration, namely, peaceful unification. Rather, heterogeneity is deepening between south and north Korea in all fields such as ideas, systems, tradition, culture and the way of living.

Such circumstances notwithstanding, the Republic of Korea has been exerting all efforts with sincerity for the materialization of national unification: on August 15, 1970, President Park Chung Hee proposed a good-intentioned competition between south and north Korea; in 1972 the government took the initiative in announcing the South-North Joint Communique of July 4; on June 23, 1973, the government made public the Special Foreign Policy for Peace and Unification; and in 1974 President Park proposed the conclusion of a non-aggression agreement and laid down the Three Fundamental Principles for Peaceful Unification.

In 1971, moreover, the Republic of Korea National Red Cross, by suggesting a campaign for searching for dispersed families, endeavored to restore mutual trust and national homogeneity and alleviate tensions through mutual dialogue and implementation of humanitarian projects, thereby trying to create conditions and foundation for peaceful unification of the nation.

However, the north Korean communists were busy asking for non-sensical negotiations with the United States without showing any interest in humanitarian projects and restoration of the nation’s homogeneity. They reject our proposal for simultaneous entry into the United Nations and the 1973 Special Foreign Policy for Peace and Unification, contending that they were aimed at “perpetualizing” the national division.

In addition, the north Korean side has distorted the “three major principles for national unification” envisaged in the South-North Joint Communique of 1972, exploiting the principle of self-reliance for its demand for withdrawal of U.S. forces from Korea; the principle of peace for its demand for disarmament in south Korea only; and the principle of grand national unity for its demand for abandonment of the anti-Communist system in south Korea. Going a step further, they have been fanning heterogeneity of the nation in all fields of the life.

The scope of this heterogeneity ever deepens due to the carefully woven and intentional heterogenous policies by the north Korean Communists. The heterogeneity has become a serious internal element hindering peaceful unification of the country.

The Board of National Unification held the “Symposium on Heterogeneity between South and North Korea” for two days beginning October 18, 1977 for the purpose of looking into the reality of the heterogeneity between the south and north, and exploring measures to cope with the situation.

A report on “Reality of Heterogeneity between South and North Korea” published by the Board of National Unification in connection with the symposium indicated that since heterogeneity in all fields such as view of the nation, history, language, culture and arts, education, religion, way of thinking, sense of value and individual life, let alone politics, economy and society, has deepened to an alarming extent, the pressing issue now is how to overcome this trend of heterogeneity and restore homogeneity before creation of any political integrity.

In the report, the Board of National Unification pointed out that “from the time of national unification to date, the national aspirations for unification remain unchanged but discords and national heterogeneity have ever deepened due to the north Korean Communists,” adding that the internal element of national heterogeneity that has been created north of the truce line has become more detrimental to realization of

unification than the external element of super powers' meddling.

Stressing that an exigent and fresh task is to inquire into the present state of heterogeneity between the south and north, and to explore measures to overcome it at an early date, the Board stated that "the final iron barrier separating south and north Korea can be removed not by force of arms or violence but through pursuit of peaceful unification with both sides resuming the south-north dialogue and improving the conditions for unification by means of mutual exchanges and cooperation as envisaged in our Three Fundamental Principles for Peaceful Unification.

At the symposium, four theme papers were presented. They were "Tradition and Political System" by Professor Cha Ki-byok of Songkyunkwan University; "National Homogeneity and Heterogeneity" by Professor Sohn Je-suk of Seoul National University; "Culture and Structure of Character" by Professor Ko Young-bok of Seoul National University; and "Overcome of Heterogeneity and Nationalism" by Professor Hwang Sung-mo of Chungnam University.

(The following is the "Reality of Heterogeneity between South and North Korea" made public by the Board of National Unification.) —Editor—

Reality of Heterogeneity Between South and North Korea

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Preface

The Koreans had been a homogenous people originally with the same language, culture and history until the nation was divided into the south and north against their will at the end of World War II. The national division was a product of big-power politics brought about in the course of the ideological polarization of the East and West, as well as the result of anti-national, traitorous acts by the north Korean Communists.

From the time of the national division to date, the Korean people's aspirations for national unification remains unmitigated. However, frictions and national heterogeneity between south and north Korea have ever deepened owing to the intransigent north Korean Communists.

To review today's internal and external conditions with respect to the issue of national unification, the internal element of national heterogeneity that has emerged north of the truce line has become more detrimental to realization of unification than the external element of super powers' meddling.

Moreover, prospects are that the issue of national self-reliance will

carry a greater weight than any intervention by super powers in bringing about peace on the Korean peninsula or in the realization of unification of the fatherland. In other words, the question of national unification is expected to gradually shift from the hands of the four big powers having stakes in the Korean peninsula to the direct parties of south and north Korea.

We are pursuing national unification on the premise that the people of south and north Korea are the same compatriots. However, if the present state of national heterogeneity is left unchecked for a protracted time, it may lead to the danger that we may give up the hope for national unification altogether.

Under the circumstances, a pressing and fresh task facing us is to inquire into the reality of the heterogeneity existing between the south and north and to explore measures to overcome it at an early date.

1. Areas of Ideology and System

a. Political Sector

North Korea puts forth Kim Il-sung's "juche" thoughts as its supreme guiding ideas. Article 4 of the Constitution stipulates, "the Democratic People's Republic of Korea adopts as its guiding principle the Korea Workers' Party's 'juche' thoughts to which Marx-Leninism has been creatively applied in a way that fits to the reality of our country." The political ideology of north Korea lies in the accomplishment of a socialistic revolution in north Korea as well as a Communist revolution on the Korean peninsula as claimed in the Preamble of the Party Platform and Article 5 of the Constitution.

North Korea also advocates a struggle against a hostile class within the same people as it adheres to class and popular roads by means of the proletariat dictatorship. The subject of politics is restricted to workers, farmers, soldiers and working intellectuals. Their sense of the state is that, as Kim Il-sung insists, the state is an establishment empowered to execute

the function of the proletariat dictatorship, and also an object obtained through party struggles. In this way, they try to rationalize their invented tradition of revolution. In north Korea, the constitutional order has been degraded into a mere norm subordinate to the party platform which enjoys a supra-constitutional standing. In the face of the unconditional and absolute enforcement of Kim Il-sung's instructions, the Constitution has no way but to be reduced to a mere scrap paper.

b. Economic Sector

As in other Communist countries, north Korea adheres to the socialistic economic concept based on Marx-Leninism. One feature is that north Korea stands by the "juche" idea in economy also.

All means of production have been either nationalized or transferred to the possession of cooperatives. Private properties of whatever forms have ceased to exist in the latter half of the 1950's through the three steps of exploitation—"utilization," "restriction" and "reformation." Even in the circulation system today, centralized and planned production and supply are being utilized as a means of control of people. Under the situation, the bases for our traditional right to proper ties and livelihood have completely been destroyed in the north.

c. Social Sector

The difference in the political and economic ideas and systems is more conspicuous in the social sector. In the first place, the activities of all organizations must be based upon Kim Il-sung's "juche" thoughts as prescribed by the Constitution. In fact, the "juche" thoughts rule literally every activities and slogans in north Korea.

Article 11 of the Constitution provides for the principle of "revolutionalizing and turning into the labor class of the entire society."

Since the social system is based on the principle of totalitarian collectivism which requires "individuals to serve the total," the Communists have

transmuted the entire area of north Korea into a single organized society.

Since, therefore, all residents are required to live up to the revolutionary air by caring for the collectivities and organizations in their social lives, individuals are either ignored or forced to be absorbed into the total, with even the human nature uniformalized. Under the situation, a feature of north Korea's social sector is that a collective society has been created where individual desires, creativity and ability have been forced to give way for the total.

2. Area of Traditional Culture

a. View of Nation

The Koreans boast their homogeneity as a people as they have shared the same language, tradition, culture and sentiments of life throughout their 5,000-year history. North Korea, however, regulates separately the concepts of bourgeoisie and socialistic peoples in disregard of the universal concept of a people. In other words, north Korea adheres to the idea of socialistic people, a concept which brands nationalism as a capitalistic class thought regarding class interests as those of the entire people. In this idea, north Korea believes in the concept of a socialistic nation, which advocates eradication of all other classes than the labor class, insisting that the labor class should be the sovereign, that the means of production should be based upon socialistic ownership, and that the economic base and political ideas should be equal.

Moreover, north Korea upholds a concept of people quite different from ours, claiming that people are the prime mover in socialistic revolution. Today, north Korea regulates people as components of the proletariat socialistic class, arguing that a new nation has been born from the time of Kim Il-sung's anti-Japan struggles.

b. History

The view of history is bound to differ between south and north Korea

as the two parties carry different ideas and systems. North Korea, however, undermines the national history to a greater extent than other Communist countries.

Contrary to the position of us who regard as their major historical mission the inheritance and development of the historical legitimacy of the nation, north Korea has rewritten the 5,000-year history from the standpoint of the materialistic conception of history, showing as if the history in its entirety is the records of struggles between the ruling and ruled classes.

North Korea not only rejects the histories of dynasties, but also makes the overall flow of the historical course incomprehensible by restricting the subject of the history to the propertyless class and masses only. This indicates that north Korea fabricates the history as a means of rationalizing its Communist system. In the modern history, moreover, north Korea heavily distorts or fabricates the history with a view to establishing a historical phenomena conducive to the one-man dictatorship of Kim Il-sung. This cannot but be an insult to the traditional national history of our country.

Method of Historical Interpretation—Here, we shall see concretely how north Korea explains itself in the history from its own standing.

Inasmuch as north Korea attempted to analyze our history from the viewpoint of the materialistic conception of history, there arose much controversies among north Korean historians after national liberation in the course of streamlining the history.

Especially, it cannot but be unreasonable to classify the period of our history based on the materialistic conception of history into the ages of primitive communal society, medieval feudal society, modern capitalistic society and contemporary Communist society.

In 1949, the history was classified into the four stages in accordance with the materialistic conception of history. Thereafter, however, a controversy developed as to the interpretation of ancient slave society.

On the strength of the contention that slave society must be included in our history also in accordance with Marx's five-stage history of economic development, the step of ancient slave society has been inserted into north Korea's official history of Korea.

The way of north Korea's interpretation of the national history can be featured by an exceptional emphasis placed on the Koguryo Kingdom in an attempt to provide for "historical legitimacy" to the Pyongyang regime; ignorance of the dynasty sector in a move to emphasize the history of class struggles by workers and farmers; and playing up of Kim Il-sung's partisan struggles with a view to fabricating Kim Il-sung's past conducts and rationalizing the Kim Il-sung system.

Alteration of National History—Faced with the need for a history centered around the history of the Korean Communist Party, with which it could interpret the history in line with the materialistic conception of history and provide a theoretical backing to its Communist regime, north Korea produced the so-called History of Korean People's Struggles in 1949 patterned after the USSR's History of Bolshevik Party.

Subsequently north Korea rewrote the entire national history from the standpoint of the materialistic conception of history. The book thus rewritten was the first volume of the History of Korea. Later when the so-called History of Korean People's Struggles for Liberation by Lee Ra-young offered a prominent coverage of Kim Il-sung's alleged anti-Japan struggles, the book was recognized as reflecting the party's view of history. It was based upon this book that the History of Korea was prepared in 1958 with emphasis on the modern and contemporary phases.

Still, there developed controversies over the way of classifying historical stages until the ancient slave society was officially recognized as recommended by the party's History Institute, and this recognition allowed the final adoption of the two volumes of the History of Korea as the official national history in 1962.

Examples of Fabrications of History—Now we shall observe some

examples of such fabrications and alteration of the national history by the north Korean Communists.

Our historical records clearly indicate that when American merchant-ship Sherman appeared along the Taedong River near Pyongyang in the final years of the Yi Dynasty, she was repelled by troops led by the then magistrate of Pyongyang. In connection with Kim Il-sung's personality cult, however, north Korea insists that it was Kim Il-sung's grandfather, Kim Eung-woo, who oversaw the attack on Sherman.

With regard to the Samil Independence Movement which, as is well known, was led by 33 leaders representing various walks of life, who read manifesto of independence, declaring before the world the independence of Korea, north Korea claims that it was a movement staged by the so-called People's Society alleged to have been led by Kim Il-sung's father, Kim Hyung-jik, under the influence of Russia's October Revolution. Also concerning the provisional government in exile in Shanghai which was established and operated by patriots who sought political asylum in China in the wake of the Samil Independence Movement, north Korea denies its being a provisional government in exile, contending it was a mere fabricated organization that betrayed the people.

As for the interpretation of national liberation, north Korea contends that national liberation was obtained as a result of Kim Il-sung's anti-Japan struggles, whereas it was an irrevocable product of our people's independence struggles and also the allies' victory in World War II. In this connection, it is interesting to note that north Korea described the Soviet Union as a benefactor in its history books in the 1950's. In the 1970's, however, north Korea has begun to insist that national liberation was solely the result of Kim Il-sung's anti-Japan struggles.

c. Language

We regard language as a means of conveying man's thoughts or sentiments by means of voice or letters, setting as the standard language

the words used by the contemporary middle class in Seoul.

Contrary, however, north Korea not only regulates even language as a “powerful weapon for revolution and construction,” but also rejects the definition of standard language. Instead, north Korea adopts as its “cultural language,” namely, standard language, the words spoken in Pyongyang and its vicinity, in accordance with “Kim Il-sung’s ‘juche’ thoughts of language.”

In north Korea, therefore, words have been reformed in line with party policies instead of being improved customarily and spontaneously. In other words, Kim Il-sung’s instructions and party’s policies lead to the formation of words.

Changes in Language Policies—As for changes in north Korea’s language policies, north Korea began to use Hangeul exclusively in September 1949, and in September 1954 made public the Grammar of Korean Language. This new grammar features its complete ignorance of the past grammar that had been in use since 1933, and the adoption of 40 consonants and vowels instead of the standard 24 consonants and vowels.

In 1966, north Korea prepared the so-called Manual of Korean Language, shifting the base of its “cultural language” from the words spoken in the Hamkyong-do area to those in the Pyongyang area. In September 1968, north Korea compiled the so-called Dictionary of Contemporary Korean Language with an emphasis on the “distribution of a language in accord with the idea of socialism.”

The characteristics of the north Korean language, as shown in the course of these changes in the language policy, are that Kim Il-sung’s instructions and words of praise are quoted repeatedly, while combative and revolutionary slogans and words are used very often.

Heterogeneity of Language—Now, we shall see some examples of the heterogeneity of language between south and north Korea.

First as for the cases of different words for the same meanings, the word for disorderliness is “mujilso” in the south whereas it is “muyon” in the north; the word for exhibits is “chonsimul” in the south, and “chikkwanmul” in the north; and the word denoting example to others is “solsonsubom” in the south, and “ishinjackchik” in the north.

There are also a number of cases of the same words carrying different meanings in the south and north. For instances, “uhboyi” denotes one’s real parents in the south whereas it refers to Kim Il-sung in the north; and the word “agassi” means a girl in the south, but north Korea does not use this word, rejecting it as a “residual word of the feudal society.”

Similarly, the word “partisan” is meant to be Communist guerillas in the south, but it refers to revolutionary heroes in the north.

e. Culture and Arts

North Korea totally denies the purity of the national culture and arts. Furthermore, it has destroyed our traditional culture and arts in favor of the construction of communism.

In other words, north Korea has made it clear that the nation’s culture and arts can exist only for the sake of Communist revolution. To substantiate this, Article 37 of north Korea’s Constitution stipulates, “The national cultural heritage shall be protected and developed in a way suitable to the socialistic reality.” Article 45 of the Constitution states more concretely, “Revolutionary culture and arts that carry socialistic contents in a nationalistic form shall be developed.”

View of Contemporary Culture and Arts—In its rejection of the nation’s traditional culture and arts, north Korea asserts it should foster the kind of culture and arts that can beautify the interests of the labor class; rationalize forced labor; urge faithful implementation of party policies; contribute to ideological indoctrination of people; and instill revolutionary and combative senses into the mind of people.

Evaluation of Classics—Such view of culture and arts by north

Korea also applies to the evaluation of the classics.

For example, north Korea distributes widely the Tale of Hungbu, interpreting the story as a confrontation between the exploiting class and the people, with a view to emphasizing the need for class struggles. At the same time, it insists that the Tale of Hong Kil-dong is a description of farmers' uprising against the feudal system.

North Korea also analyzes and alters foreign classics and other novels only from the standpoint of socialistic culture and arts. Wide distribution of *Les Miserables* is one example.

Alteration of the Trend of Literature—In the post-liberation years, north Korea placed emphasis on the party, class, people and ideas in its literary activities. During the Korean War, however, the emphasis was shifted to combativeness and revolutionary ideas in its advocacy of so-called war literature.

Beginning in the mid-1950's, north Korea has opposed revisionism largely in fear of the permeation into north Korea of liberal literature. With the third convention of the party in 1956 as a momentum, north Korea laid down the guideline for field literary work activities, stressing the importance of descriptive literature.

From the early part of the 1960's, however, north Korea came to place a stress on economic agitation at Kim Il-sung's instructions with a view to embodying the so-called Chonrima spirit. In another attempt to accelerate Kim Il-sung's personality cult, north Korea has begun to value the figuration of the so-called revolutionary tradition.

Music and Dance—North Korea has been encouraging only rough and violent songs and combative and collective dances in an attempt to emphasize the socialistic ideas while feigning to model after the nationalistic style of songs and dances.

Until the 1950's, many of the songs and dances in north Korea were patterned after those of Russia, but in the 1960's and thereafter, those

modeled after China's were predominant. Under the circumstances, all our traditional music and dances have ceased to exist in north Korea today.

Recognition of Cultural Assets—The time-honored Confucian and Buddhist culture as well as the Christian culture that had flourished since the dawn of the modern age have all been denied or eradicated. North Korea rejects any culture that does not describe class struggles, namely, discords between people, advocating only those considered conducive to Communist revolution. Today, moreover, north Korea has come to value and preserve those so-called relics necessary for the personality cult of Kim Il-sung.

Classification of Cultural Heritage—Under such cultural policy, north Korea does not open to the public historical relics though it keeps them at museums or field scenes. They are used only for viewing by foreign visitors. Displayed at general museums are only those so-called modern relics that have allegedly something to do with revolution as well as with Kim Il-sung's anti-Japan struggles. Field monuments linked to Kim Il-sung's conducts are made sacred precincts.

Major Cultural Assets—For example, the house and its area where Kim Il-sung was born have been made a holy ground, while the region of Mt. Paektu has been designated as "revolutionary base area." Displayed at the so-called revolutionary museums at Shinchon and Haeju, are "horrible scenes" of the Korean War. As part of its policy of idolization of Kim Il-sung's family tree, the tombs of Kim Il-sung's former wife, Kim Chong-suk, and his other relatives have been declared "holy grounds."

3. Area of Way of Life

a. Education

Now we shall observe the heterogeneity developing in the way of life between south and north Korea.

In the south education, as in elsewhere, is designed to foster one's character properly and produce able citizens who can serve the development of a democratic country and can contribute to the realization of the idea of mankind's co-prosperity. In this policy, the south completely guarantees the purity and autonomy of education.

In a striking contrast, however, the education of north Korea is intended to produce devoted Communists who can contribute to the construction of a socialistic state, serving the interests of the party and the total. Under the situation, no purity and creativeness of education can be found.

Alteration of Educational Policies—As a result, it would be no exaggeration to say that in north Korea today genuine education has given way to the one designed merely to promote publicity of Kim Il-sung's "juche" ideas and Kim Il-sung's personality cult. This can be seen clearly in north Korea's educational policies.

In September 1948, the Supreme People's Council adopted the compulsory elementary educational system as envisaged in the so-called First Constitution. In March 1952, north Korea promulgated the obligatory student labor system under which students are forcibly taken to manual works at factories or farms for many months every year.

In August 1953, educators across the country were ordered in a special instruction to place greater emphasis on Marx-Leninistic indoctrination and thereby arm students with firmer sense of internationalistic patriotism. In the early 1960's, however, the emphasis was shifted to Communist ideological education as well as to the linkage to the so-called revolutionary tradition.

Beginning in the mid-1960's, priority has been given to the establishment of Kim Il-sung's monolithic ideas, allotting more hours to the teaching of Kim Il-sung's "revolutionary anti-Japan struggles."

Reality of Education—North Korea's education today can be characterized, as reflected on all text books, firstly by Kim Il-sung's personality

cult.

The idea of Kim Il-sung's personality cult is instilled into students' minds beginning at elementary schools. Its text books are full of the phrases of eulogy of Kim Il-sung, such as "the leader whom we always wish to see. . ." and "with the portrait of the leader hanging on our classrooms. . ."

The secondly, the education of north Korea is geared to foster the sense of struggles against Japan and the United States.

Text book phrases in this regard include "there will be no reward of the south Korean people as long as the American imperialists remain there," and "the only way we can live better is to fight the Japanese imperialists."

Thirdly, north Korea's education attaches a particular importance to the party, the fatherland and totalitarianism.

Examples are "we shall not spare even our lives for the party and the fatherland," and "the people and the fatherland are more important than our lives."

Fourthly, the education features a stress laid on the north's "superiority" and socialistic construction.

In this connection, text books in the north carry phrases like "our new school where we don't have to pay tuitions," and "ahead of us, there lies the bosom of the flower-garden Republic."

Fifthly, the education is devoted to fostering the tradition and spirit of revolution.

Examples are "let us follow the Pochonbo spirit and equip ourselves with firm revolutionary spirit," and "let us achieve victory by taking over the revolutionary spirit demonstrated in anti-Japan armed struggles."

Under this educational system devoted merely to promoting Kim Il-sung's personality cult and monolithic ideas, no free academic studies or

genuine character building can ever be expected in north Korea.

Comparison of Text Books—In connection with these contents of the text books of north Korean schools, it would be interesting to compare the contents of the Korean language text books of the elementary schools of the south and north.

A study of the 12 text books of south Korea's elementary schools shows that there appear a number of historical figures, reflecting our stand of inheriting the nation's historical legitimacy. For instances, Admiral Yi Sun-shin is quoted 36 times, King Sejong 32 times and Madam Shin Saim-dang 17 times. Besides, there are also many important foreign figures like French painter Jean Millet who is cited 34 times.

Contrary, however, no historical figures are ever used in north Korea's primary school text books. Those which appear in their books often are invariably for political purposes. For example, Kim Il-sung is quoted 744 times, socialism 270 times and American imperialists 139 times. No foreign figures appear in the north Korean text books.

b. Way of Thinking and Sense of Value

Idea—As for the definition of human consciousness, south Korea recognizes the independence of consciousness, believing that the consciousness of man is a independent subject that stands above all materialistic conditions. North Korea, however, contends, as maintained in a book titled "Dialectic or Historical Materialism," that human consciousness is the mere reflection of material.

Under the circumstances, north Korea attaches the highest value to the struggles intended to produce the revolutionary and Communist mode of man, creating the kind of man lacking individual creativity and spontaneity.

View of the World—As regard the view of the world, north Korea, adhering to the scientific and materialistic view of the world, brands the idealistic view of the world as a reactionary view created in the direction

of upholding interests of the exploiting class.

In north Korea, therefore, efforts are concentrated upon fostering a view of life loyal to “the leader,” a view of the world for communist revolution, and a view of revolution for communization of the entire Korean peninsula, forcing the people to believe only in the “juche” ideas of Kim Il-sung.

Sense of Value—Since north Korea regards individuals merely as heroes dedicated to the accomplishment of Communist revolution or as subjects designed to implement Kim Il-sung’s “juche” ideas or as tools geared to realize Communist revolution as well as Kim Il-sung’s thoughts, individuality is totally denied with the people trained in and accustomed to the collective and totalitarian way of thinking.

Structure of Consciousness—In the course of establishing the Communist idea of morality, the north Korean people have come to form in their conscience the characteristics of combative, revolutionary and fanatic conducts, harboring the dictative and exclusive way of thinking.

Traditional Thoughts—In the field of traditional ideas, the so-called old generation of those in their forties or older tend to be unable to discard totally the traditional practices as they still retain the ideas of respecting the aged or their forefathers.

Besides, as the sense of cooperation lies dormant, there still remain the idea of mutual help based on the traditional practice of neighborly cooperation. In contrast, the younger generation of those in their twenties or thirties regard older people simply as revolutionary comrades rather than respecting them. The younger generations tend to be highly individualistic, and their respect is directed solely to Kim Il-sung instead of their forefathers.

Ownership—Under the Constitution in north Korea, no private ownership is recognized at all. In 1946, all major properties were nationalized, and all farm lands were confiscated without compensation in an agrarian reform of March 1946. In August 1946, all industries were

nationalized.

In October 1946, private land ownership was partially recognized, but under a Cabinet decision of March 1954, agriculture was collectivized. In 1958, private ownership ceased to exist totally.

Article 22 of the Constitution as amended in 1972 stipulates that “private ownership is only for individual consumption by workers,” indicating that in north Korea there is no private properties whatsoever with the only exception of those supplied under the ration system.

Idea of Ownership—In this state of ownership, the old generation of persons in their forties or older still carry the notion of private ownership, while indifferent toward the sense of management.

The younger generation of those born after national liberation, however, are strong in the sense of common ownership of properties, upholding the sense of management.

c. Religion

Basic Stand—In south Korea, the freedom of religion is recognized and guaranteed by the Constitution. Article 16 of the Republic of Korea Constitution provides for the freedom of religion, making it clear that religion stands separate from politics.

In a sharp contrast, north Korea rejects religion from the materialistic point of view. The old Constitution of north Korea did not recognize the freedom of religion at all. In the new Constitution, however, north Korea feigns to recognize the freedom of religion, following the system of the Soviet Constitution. The same Constitution of north Korea, nevertheless, states there is also the freedom of anti-religion, and north Korea carries out a full-fledged campaign against religion based thereon.

The Dictionary of Political Terminology of north Korea argues that religion has already ceased to exist in the northern half, but it still remains in the southern half “paralyzing the popular sense of revolution.”

Despite such state of non-religion, north Korea often uses bogus religious organizations such as the Federation of Christians and the Buddhist Association in their external propaganda, making a ridiculous suggestion that a unified front be formed among the religious leaders of the south and north.

Eradication of Religious System—We shall now look into the course of north Korea's eradication of religion.

When farm lands were confiscated in the 1946 agrarian reform effected at the time of the Russians' occupation, all the forests and farm-lands owned by religious establishments were confiscated without compensation. Soon thereafter, the properties of all religious foundations were nationalized. Upon the establishment of the Communist regime, north Korea denied the freedom of religion under its Constitution.

Some of the major Buddhist temples destroyed during the Korean War were restored, with the remainder removed completely. By 1958, north Korea continuously persecutes former religious leaders, branding them as those of a "complicated stratum."

State of Religion—There are about 10 contemporary religions in the Republic of Korea, including Buddhism, Christianity and Confucianism. According to statistics compiled by the Ministry of Culture and Information, the number of the followers of various religions totaled more than 20 million and the number of temples and churches stood at some 26,000 as of the end of 1976.

In north Korea, however, no religion does exist now as seen in the foregoing. The remaining facilities of former religion-related establishments are being used either as rest centers for ranking party officers or as children's homes or as the warehouses of agriculture cooperatives.

d. Individual and Family Life

Denial of Individual Rights and Destruction of Family System—By promulgating regulations on children's homes in June 1946; north

Korea made it a rule to raise all children aged from one month to three years collectively at children's homes.

In March 1950, the labor quota system was adopted for all residents under the Cabinet Decision No. 72, facilitating the compulsory labor mobilization of the north Korean people. In August 1953, the Supreme People's Council adopted a law prohibiting any movement of employment by the people. In July 1958, Kim Il-sung instructed the "five-house surveillance system" designed to keep individual lives, thoughts and conducts under constant surveillance. In these measures, individual rights have been completely denied in north Korea.

As for instances of family destruction, the law on equality between male and female, promulgated in July 1946, set the stage for women's labor, reducing women's family role as mothers and wives. In September 1948, north Korea abolished the traditional birth registration system in favor of the citizens' certificate system on an individual basis, thereby severing the traditional family trees and denying the idea of family itself.

Again in April 1976, north Korea legislated the so-called law on children's nursery and teaching with an eye at enabling children to harbor the blind sense of Kim Il-sung's personality cult through repetitious and conditioned-reflexive training from their infancy. In this way, no traces of individual rights or the traditional family system can be found in the north Korean society today.

Reality—In north Korea where there can be no respect for individual rights as seen above, individual activities are allowed only as part of collective projects and as tools for revolutionary struggles.

With respect to the family life, north Korea brands the traditional sense of ethics as a feudal residue and affection for blood relatives as a capitalistic residue. Article 63 of the Constitution describes home as the unit of labor production. North Korea goes so far as to encourage members of a family to spy on each other, destroying the autonomous atmosphere of home.

e. Social Life and Mode of Living

As Article 10 of its Constitution provides, north Korea enforces the class dictatorship in accordance with the policy of proletariat class. This is why north Korea recognizes only workers, farmers and working intellectuals as social components, it has also legislated a law prohibiting any individual activities as well as anti-socialistic parties or social organizations.

Besides, under the collective guiding method, all individuals have to join various organizations compulsorily, and to behave as dictated by the collective organizations they belong to. In these measures, individuals are totally subjugated to collective organizations.

Meanwhile, through censuses held in May 1958 and again April 1966 all the north Korean people were classified into three strata depending on their loyalty to the Communist system for more effective surveillance of them. The three strata are the kernel stratum, basic stratum and a hostile stratum called "complicated masses."

Moreover, the so-called "five-house system" has been introduced as a means of placing the people under tighter control, while the surveillance body called the Political Security Department has been further strengthened for intensified control of the entire people let alone the "complicated masses."

Citizens' Life—The lives of the north Korean people differ depending on the strata they belong to. They rely on rations for major daily necessities.

Since garment production has been uniformalized in north Korea, only white shirt "chogori" and black skirt "chima" are rationed to women, while men are supplied largely with the so-called Lenin suits and Lenin caps.

Grain rationing is applied to the entire urbanites, who are forced to obtain boiled rice from rice factories instead of cooking their meals at

home. In this way, north Korea adroitly keeps people from visiting their relatives on holidays or occasion of family rituals, a step that appears to have been designed to destroy the traditional family practices. Besides, a majority of the people have been allotted collective housing estates for more effective control and surveillance. Worse yet, the people have to live in areas assigned to them by authorities with no freedom of the movement of residence allowed.

Family Rituals—North Korea may well be said to have completely shattered the traditional system of family rituals. In a campaign for simplification of family rituals, staged between 1955 and 1960, all family rituals have been reduced to mere formality's events.

As for marriage, young men and girls are not allowed to choose their spouses at their own discreditation, but have to obtain advance approval from the heads of the organizations or workshops they belong to before they can marry. Marriage itself is described in north Korea as the birth of a red revolutionary home, and even the marriage ages are restricted by the party. Since July 1976, the compulsory marriage ages were raised to 32 for men and 28 for women. No party members are allowed to marry non-party members.

Meanwhile, funeral in north Korea is handled as an administrative step of burying a dead rather than as an occasion to mourn for the dead and pray for the dead's repose, since in north Korea funeral is considered as a simple procedure of disposing of an item of which labor value has vanished.

Therefore, funeral is simplified to the most possible extent, and in principle dead is buried or cremated on the same day he or she died. The casket is carried to cemetery or crematory by funeral sections attached to convenience cooperative unions in cities. Under the circumstances, the traditional funeral procedures have all disappeared partly because such funeral is denounced as an act of superstition and partly because respect for forefathers is criticized as an evil practice of reactionalism.

One's death anniversary can be recognized only as an opportunity to review the revolutionary achievement the dead made during his or her life time.

Holidays—North Korea, which rejects all traditional holidays, does not recognize memorial services and tomb visiting on the New Year's Day, Chusok Holiday and Hanshik Day, denouncing such services as empty forms and wastes, whereas new holidays have been designated and observed colorfully as part of the efforts to promote the Communist ideology and Kim Il-sung's personality cult.

The new holidays are February 16, the birthday of Kim Chung-il, the son of Kim Il-sung; April 15, the birthday of Kim Il-sung; May 1, the May Day; September 9, the founding anniversary day of the north Korean regime; and October 10, the founding anniversary of the Workers' (Communist Party).

On these holidays, commemorative rallies and festive games take place everywhere in the north, and on the birthdays of Kim Chung-il and Kim Il-sung, campaigns are organized to send "congratulatory gifts" to the two Kim's. The people, too, look forward to these politically oriented holidays. For these are the rare occasions on which they can be freed from hard labor and provided with special rations of some liquor and meat.

Conclusion

In the above, we have observed the heterogeneity taking place between south and north Korea in all sectors of ideas, systems, tradition, culture, etc. Inasmuch as the issue of national unification can hardly be solved by an overnight political integration under this alarming state of heterogeneity brought about in the course of the 30 years of national division, the need is felt acutely to settle the issue of this heterogeneity as a step toward unification.

In the world today, iron curtains between the East and West, the

Cold War remnants, have almost disappeared. No iron curtains exist today between the United States and USSR, between the United States and Red China, and between the East and West in Central Europe.

The only iron curtain on the earth is on this Korean peninsula, whose removal hangs on the wisdom and efforts of the Korean people. Under the situation, the only way to surmount the heterogeneity is for the south and north to resume the south-north dialogue on the basis of a durable peace and pursue peaceful unification, with the two sides improving conditions for unification steadily through mutual exchanges and cooperation, doing away with the idea of achieving unification by force or violence, as embodied in the Three Fundamental Principles for Peaceful Unification set forth by the Republic of Korea.

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- South-North Coordinating Committee
- South-North Red Cross Conference

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Part One
Will to Durable Peace and Unification

President's New Year Press Conference:

“Our Unification Formula is Peace First and Unification Next”

“Expanded Exchanges and Door Opening through Dialogue”

At his New Year press conference on January 18, 1978, President Park Chung Hee stated that the basic policy for unification is that the south and north should not fight each other but co-exist peacefully until such time that the various conditions for unification are ripe. “Our policy for unification is peace first and unification next, that is; settlement of peace is the prerequisite to unification,” said the President. For durable peace, President Park said, the south-north dialogue should be resumed so that the two sides can solve their problems one after another beginning with easy things first. By so doing, the two sides would be able to expand exchanges and open their doors to each other, thereby steadily recovering the national homogeneity, the President said.

The following are extracts of the New Year press conference on the issue of the south-north dialogue. — Editor —

Question: *The north Koreans continue to reject dialogue with us who are their compatriots despite our consistent persuasion. On the other hand, they are engaged in such a far-out scheme as offering to conclude a peace treaty with the United States. Under these circumstances would you please present the new formula for reduction of tension and settlement of peace on the Korean peninsula ?*

The President: Frankly speaking, I do not have any novel design or magic solution to the problem. Twenty-five years have already passed since the Korean War ended in a cease-fire agreement. A quarter of a century has elapsed. Our basic posture and faith is that we must never repeat the fratricidal war that we experienced then and that we must achieve

unification by peaceful means even though it might be delayed. It was in this belief that we have tested every available means during the past 25 years putting up with all sorts of reckless and flagrant provocations committed by the north Korean Communists.

Our basic policy for, or basic attitude toward, unification is, as I have repeatedly stressed, that the south and north should not fight each other but co-exist peacefully until such time that the various conditions for unification are ripe.

In the meantime the south and the north each should pursue economic development, national development, assure that the people in their own areas live more happily and peacefully, and then reunite when the environment for unification matures. If unduly forced when the circumstances are not ripe, any attempt at unification will inevitably lead to confrontation, and a war will break out with all its casualties... Thus our policy for unification is peace first and unification next. Firm settlement of peace is the prerequisite to unification. Without a firm peace, unification is not feasible. In any war there is bound to be a winner and a loser. We want to avoid this situation, and we will have to tackle the problem of unification only after peace is firmly rooted. What are we supposed to do in order to plant peace? Whether we like to or not, the south and the north will have to sit down for a dialogue.

Through dialogue we propose to solve our problems one after another beginning now, and tackling easy things first. By doing so we hope to begin to expand exchanges between the south and the north, and steadily open our doors wider. At a certain point of time we hope to open the doors completely. If things go well, the deep-seated distrust between the south and the north will be dispelled, and our homogeneity as a race will be steadily recovered. Only then will we be able to tackle the problem of political integration.

This approach of ours is the most rational and realistic of all formulas for unification that we can imagine. This approach may appear time-consuming but, we think, it is the only short cut.

Therefore, we have proposed a number of concrete formulas. I will not

enumerate all of them; we wanted to settle the easier things first. We proposed that separated members of families in the south and the north meet each other, or exchange letters and photos if reunion is impossible. We suggested that they visit their ancestral tombs on such public holidays as Chusok (traditional autumn festival). We told the north Koreans nothing is impossible or difficult in realizing these overtures.

The north Koreans have not responded to our call in any way. They witnessed many members of Chochongnyon (pro-north Korean federation of Korean residents in Japan) paying visits to their ancestral tombs and returning to Japan following reunions with their relatives here. We suggested exchanging visits between south and north Korea just across the truce line, but they still did not listen to that simple proposal. We made many overtures to them, calling for conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the south and north, simultaneous admission into the United Nations and south-north exchanges, but they rejected all these. Now, they even refuse to carry on a dialogue with us. They go so far as to try to enter into direct negotiations with the United States.

We well know the reason for the negative attitude of the north Koreans. Their basic approach to reunification is fundamentally different from ours. Our approach is to avoid war and fratricidal conflict at all costs.

Our position is to deal with the question of unification by peaceful means, but they are thinking of unifying the country under Communist terms even by resorting to war and bloodshed. They are bent on attaining unification by force of arms at any opportunity. So dialogue is impossible.

They just come to the dialogue table to engage in senseless talk, for their outright boycott of the dialogue would have brought them to task for the rupture in the tribunal of world public opinion. They keep showing up for some ulterior purpose, putting their preposterous ideas in absurd language. I think that unless and until they give up their outrageous ways and mind their manners thoroughly, the prospects of peace in the Korean peninsula are very dim. They will not respond to our bid for dialogue in good faith.

We continue to exhort them to join the dialogue. Sometimes they may

pretend to be responding to the call, but they keep uttering the old nonsense. No results can be expected as long as they act in that fashion. We have to prevail over their fantastic and absurd bigotry. But how can we do it? There is only one way. Our strong national power holds the key to the solution. If and when our national strength turns out to be far superior to theirs, they will abandon the thought of subduing and taking over the Republic of Korea..

This clearly illustrates the nature of the Communists.

The Communist strategy is to trample upon and take over the other side by all means when they think the other is weaker. On the other hand, when they believe the other side is stronger, and they therefore see no chance to conquer it by force, then they come out for negotiations. Why can't we call their bluff?

If they judge that we are strong and they cannot subdue us by force, they will probably think it over. In other words, we must maintain a national strength superior to their's in the economic, military and all other sectors.

In terms of economy, we believe, the competition is already over. To compare the south and north economically now, we are at least 10 to 15 years ahead. In other words, they are 10 to 15 years behind us. In 10 to 15 years more, our Republic of Korea will become a major economic power. This is why I say that economically the victor has already emerged.

As for military ability, it appears to me that presently the military standing is about the same between the south and north. However, since our basic policy is to avoid war, we must stand far superior to them if we want them to give up their aggressive policy in the belief that they will have no chance to win.

We presume that it will be a few more years before we arrive at such a stage. In other words, we expect that the time will come in the early 1980s.

I believe, therefore, that the only way for us to maintain peace and thwart war is to concentrate all our available resources on the buildup of national strength in concerted endeavors by all our people.

However, this does not mean that we plan to give up the hope for dialogue between the south and north. In the future also, we shall continue

to call for dialogue with patience. But, unless they reconsider their position basically, they will hardly respond to any dialogue affirmatively. And, even if they do, we cannot expect any results from it. I am convinced, nevertheless, that a time will surely come when they will renounce their aggressive design and agree to a dialogue.

I expect that such a time will come in the not-too-distant future.

President Park's Interviews with Fuji T.V. :

“Easing of Tensions and Consolidation of Peace Prerequisites”

“South-North Dialogue Should be Resumed Unconditionally”

In an exclusive interview with Nobudaka Sikanai, president of Fuji Television of Japan, on December 23, 1977, President Park Chung Hee stated that the matters that require the most exigent solution now on the Korean peninsula are to alleviate tensions and consolidate peace. President Park said, “Although our brethren in the south and north ardently wish to see their divided fatherland unified at an early date, unification is an issue that is as remote as ever in view of various conditions.” Under the circumstances, the President stressed, the tasks that must be undertaken immediately are to alleviate the sharply strained relations between the south and north and consolidate peace on the Korean peninsula. “Indispensable to this end is for the two sides to resume the face-to-face dialogue,” the Chief Executive said.

Urging the north Korean side to agree to unconditional resumption of the dialogue, President Park said, “to demand a dialogue on conditions totally unacceptable to the other party amounts to rejecting dialogue.” The President also said he believes that it would be of no avail even if he meets Kim Il-sung at the present juncture when north Korea shows no interest in the dialogue and continues to pursue armed provocative acts. President Park then said that even if a dialogue takes place, it would be a mere disguise or a thinly veiled tactic until the north Korean Communists abandon their scheme to communize south Korea by force of arms.

The following are extracts of President Park's interview with Fuji. T.V. on the issue of the south-north dialogue. — Editor —

Question : *Do you, Your Excellency, believe that a south-north dialogue is a prerequisite to easing of tensions and maintaining peace on the Korean*

peninsula?

Would you explain if south Korea can take some initiatives toward north Korea, what can be the preconditions to a dialogue between the south and north, and if there isn't any possibility of a meeting between Your Excellency and Kim Il-sung?

Answer: As you may well know, the priority issues that should be settled most urgently now on the Korean peninsula are to alleviate tensions and consolidate peace.

Our brethren both in the south and north ardently aspire for early unification of their divided fatherland. In view of various problems, however, unification still remains a very remote issue. Therefore, the tasks we should undertake immediately are to abate the sharply strained situation and bring about durable peace.

And, what is indispensable to consolidating this peace is for the south and north to sit down together face to face and begin dialogue.

I believe there can't be any precondition whatsoever to such a dialogue. For, if preconditions are attached to a dialogue, it never can sail smoothly. Our off-again and on-again dialogue now remains suspended. We have been exerting many-sided efforts to resume the dialogue. But, whenever we call for a resumed dialogue, the northern side responds with a set of preconditions.

They come up with very difficult conditions which we cannot accept under any circumstance.

For example, they assert that they will not talk with the incumbent south Korean government. They say they will enter a dialogue with south Korea only when the incumbent regime steps down and a new regime takes office. This is sheer nonsense.

In addition, they clamor for the repeal of several laws of the land. "Repeal the Anti-Communist Law, National Security Law, etc," and "release all those under arrest for violating the Anti-Communist Law, National Security Law and Emergency Measures..." These are the difficult problems which can by no means be accepted by us.

They put forth these conditions, well aware that we will not accept them. We consider such acts of theirs as an indication of their rejection of the dialogue. This is why I say that to set forth any preconditions in the south-north dialogue amounts to a boycott of dialogue. Under the circumstances, there can be no dialogue.

As to the question of our willingness to take any initiatives in the south-north dialogue in the days ahead, I believe that thus far it has been our side that has taken the initiatives in the dialogue.

As you may remember, I first proposed to north Korea on Liberation Day of August 15, 1970 that we mutually renounce war and engage in a bona fide competition between the south and north until the time of national unification. In August 1971, a proposal was offered for a Red Cross conference for the reunion of dispersed family members numbering 10 million in the south and north. In the following year, 1972, the South-North Joint Communique was issued, based on which the South-North Coordinating Committee was established. All these, I am sure, were the results of the initiatives our side has taken.

Afterwards, in August 1973, they informed us all of a sudden that they would no longer participate in the dialogue for reasons unknown to us. Since then the dialogue has in effect been stalemated. We have urged the north in many ways to resume this. But, as I stated before, everytime they come out with various difficult conditions.

We don't accept them, and no dialogue ensues.

There were working-level contacts at Panmunjom several times. But, aren't their conditions unacceptable to us? Sometimes we say to them, "Can you accept it if we demand as prerequisites to the dialogue that your Kim Il-sung regime steps down in favor of a new regime, your side repeal those laws which persecute those opposing communism, and all those purged or imprisoned for their anti-Communist activities be reinstated or set free?" They simply remain mute before such pressing.

We believe, therefore, to press for a dialogue with strings attached that can never be accepted by the other party, in effect represents a rejection of dialogue.

Moreover, we have made constructive proposals in an effort to bring them back to the dialogue table. Among such propositions were complete opening of the door between the two sides, the same brethren, even if a political unification could be achieved in the remote future; many-sided exchanges in non-political areas beginning with easy problem step by step; conclusion of a non-aggression agreement with an aim at forestalling recurrence of war, the danger of which hangs low between the south and north; and simultaneous entry into the United Nations pending the time of ripen conditions for unification. However, the only answer they give to these offers is "no." They simply keep rejecting our proposals.

Going a step further, they have perpetrated various new provocative acts against the south after the suspension of the dialogue.

For example, they mounted armed threats to the five islands close to north Korea in the western sea; sent a terrorist on August 15, 1974 for an attempt on the life of the President; committed, as is well known, the axe-murder at Panmunjom on August 18 last year; infiltrated armed agents to the south numerous times; and perpetrated the provocative act of drawing an unparalleled military boundary line on the high seas this year. All these were the acts of their provocation committed after the suspension of the dialogue,

In view of this situation, even if I meet and talk with Kim Il-sung at this juncture when north Korea does not rectify its basic stand and carries on such provocative acts, it would be meaningless and would hardly prove to be of avail.

What is important is that they should alter their basic stand. Before they give up their design to communize the south by force of arms, any dialogue, even if it takes place, would be nothing more than a thinly veiled disguise and tactic intended to mislead the world.

Question: North Korea pursues a direct peace agreement with the United States. What is the basic stand of south Korea over this issue?

Answer: That is another folly. We urge that the same people divided in-

to the south and north talk together first. But, they insist that they will not talk with us, the same people, and instead talk only with the United States across the Pacific over our head. We are basically opposed to such a venture, of course. In effect, any direct dialogue between Pyongyang and Washington is hardly realizable. The U.S. government has made clear its opposition to such talks.

The U.S. government has expressly stated that it will not have any dialogue or negotiations with north Korea without participation by the delegates of the Republic of Korea. Pyongyang's insistence in a direct dialogue with the United States notwithstanding cannot help but be taken as an indication that it is not interested in any peaceful settlement of the Korean question. We cannot overlook the fact that they not only lack sincerity but have some hidden motives behind such an offer.

They demand a direct dialogue with the United States over the head of south Korea because they know that during the Vietnam War, Hanoi could succeed in ultimately communizing South Vietnam in direct negotiations with the United States leaving the Saigon government out.

They have an eye to such a tactic. Because we judge that they are scheming to cook the Korean question in their own way under the so-called Vietnam method, we are basically opposed to such a dialogue. Since the U.S. government, too, has penetrated north Korea's motive, it has made it clear that it will under no circumstances accept any dialogue with north Korea where south Korea is not represented.

Question: Do you, Your Excellency, think that some international guarantee is necessary for the maintenance of a lasting peace on the Korean peninsula?

What do you think of the idea of improved relations among the United States, Japan and north Korea, and among the Soviet Union, Red China and south Korea?

Can the method of cross recognition, being discussed in some sectors in the United States and Japan, become a realistic solution? And, how do you view future improvement of relations between Japan and north Korea?

Answer: On the Korean peninsula presently there is the Armistice Agreement. This is a ceasefire agreement concluded between the United Nations Command and the Communist side. To supervise the enforcement of the agreement, a neutral nations' supervisory commission is presently stationed near Panmunjom. Since the commission has been dispatched by the United Nations, this, I think, is one international guarantee.

I believe that there must be one precondition to this international guarantee.

The precondition is that above all south and north Korea should primarily sit down face to face and reach some fundamental agreement, through a dialogue, on the basic issues pending between the south and north.

Only in such circumstance can an international guarantee be efficacious, a guarantee in which the world powers surrounding the Korean peninsula guarantee such an agreement, and make common efforts to see to it that the agreement is respected. Otherwise, any international guarantee sans a fundamental agreement between the south and north on their basic problems will hardly be of avail.

I believe that this same principle can be applied to the various questions arising lately between Israel and the Arabs in the Middle East.

And, as is well known, we offered a proposition to the Communist side a while ago for a meeting of the four parties directly related with the armistice.

The four parties are south Korea and the United States on our side and north Korea and Red China on the Communist side. Our idea was that these four parties sit together and hold discussions, for peaceful solution of the Korean question.

This offer was rejected by the Communist side, of course. In such a meeting, should it be held, our aim, I think, was for us to seek several fundamental agreements on some basic issues pending between the south and north.

As for cross recognition you mentioned, we issued the Special Foreign

Policy Statement for Peace and Unification on June 23, 1973, which, though it did not use specifically the words “cross recognition,” said in part:

“The Republic of Korea shall open its doors to all countries including Communist nations on the principle of reciprocity, and it is hoped that all those countries with ideas and systems different from ours will do likewise toward us.” This, an important clause contained in the Statement, means that Red China, the Soviet Union and other Communist countries should open their doors to us since we are opening ours to them.

If our call were accepted and Red China and the Soviet Union open their doors to and enter into diplomatic ties with south Korea, then we would not oppose Japan or the United States opening its doors to and establishing diplomatic relations with north Korea. This, we believe, was the purport embodied in the clause of the Statement.

Although we didn't use the terminology of “cross recognition” there, the purport was essentially same. After the issuance of the Statement, a number of countries of our free world consequently opened their doors to and entered into diplomatic ties with north Korea based thereon.

Contrary, however, no single Communist country has ever opened its door to us. This runs counter to the principle of equality. In consequence, north Korea has benefitted from the Special Foreign Policy Statement while we suffered from it. Our hope is that our major allies — the United States, Japan, the United Kingdom and France— which have not entered into any diplomatic ties with north Korea, will continue to refrain from doing so with Pyongyang one-sidedly or hastily at least until Communist countries open their doors to us under the principles of reciprocity and mutuality.

I know that presently in Japan there are some opinions advocating diplomatic normalization with north Korea, reasoning that Japan maintains diplomatic relations with south Korea.

Meanwhile, the Republic of Korea sees no reason why we should oppose it if Japan opens its doors to or enters into diplomatic ties with north

Korea on the condition that Red China and the Soviet Union reciprocate by opening their doors to and concluding diplomatic relations with south Korea.

If Japan enters into diplomatic relations with north Korea unilaterally without such a guarantee, it would consequently bolster the position of north Korea only and weaken the stand of the Republic of Korea that much.

We cannot tolerate such a situation. We hope that Japan and our other major allies will take this point into account and refrain from taking any hasty steps.

Question: Just now you have stated that the most appropriate thing is for the south and north to engage in a direct dialogue and open a path leading to peace.

A while ago, Egyptian President Sadat astonished the world by visiting Israel, transcending the historical religious confrontation and the grudge prompted in a 30-year-long war.

Don't you, Your Excellency, plan to take some drastic step in a direct effort for peace between the south and north?

Answer: We tried it once in 1972. Prior to the issuance of the South-North Joint Communiqué, we managed to have some talks behind the curtains and even secretly sent to Pyongyang the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.

That was a highly perilous mission. The Central Intelligence Agency, in fact, is an organization dedicated to crush the Communists. Therefore, it was something like throwing the 'man into a tigers' den.

At that time we took the risky attempt with the knowledge that they were genuinely accepting our offer as they informed us that they were willing to accept our proposal and begin a dialogue with us. Subsequently the Joint Communiqué was issued, the South-North Coordinating Committee was established, and a dialogue was held several times. Afterwards, however, we came to know that they had something else up their sleeve.

They did not start the dialogue out of the national consciousness that war should be prevented and the Korean question must be settled peacefully. We believe that they had responded to the dialogue in an attempt to exploit the dialogue as a means of accomplishing what they call "unification under communism."

We have much evidence substantiating this. We have obtained evidence showing that north Korea handed out instructions as to the dispatch of a terrorist named Mun Se-kwang against me soon after the initiation of the south-north dialogue. More evidence is that experts conclude that north Korea must have started digging the underground tunnels beneath the truce line around the time of the start of the dialogue.

Also from statements by defectors — soldiers and agents — from the north, we learned that those provocative acts began after the initiation of the dialogue.

It is extremely difficult to take at face value what they say when we see them calling for a solution of the Korean question peacefully through mutual dialogue on the surface while, behind our backs, sending terrorists, digging underground tunnels and making other war preparations.

I regard it as a very courageous act for President Sadat of Egypt to visit the enemy country.

Of course, we have no way of knowing what talks were exchanged or what backstage negotiations were conducted between Israel and the Arabs. Still, I believe that President Sadat must have made such a risky visit because he could sense the sincerity of the other side, the good faith on the part of the Israelis that recurrence of war should be prevented to the most possible extent and that even though the two countries are faced with conflicting interests, such disputes should be solved peacefully but not through war.

Of course, this is my speculation since we don't know the truth behind the visit.

As I stated before, we made a similar venturesome measure in 1972 for solution of the Korean question. Now that we know that the other side

does not respond to such things sincerely, we cannot repeat such a risk hastily.

Part Two

South-North Dialogue

South-North Coordinating Committee :

**“Joint Utilization of Resources and Knowhow”
“Switch to Era of Exchanges and Cooperation”
—Seoul Side Urges Unconditional Resumption of Coordinating
Committee—**

Seoul side Acting Co-chairman Min Kwan-shik of the South-North Coordinating Committee issued a statement addressed to Kim Young-joo, Pyongyang side Co-chairman of the Coordinating Committee, at 10 a.m. last March 3 through the Korea Broadcasting System (KBS), proposing that 1) the function of the South-North Coordinating Committee be resumed unconditionally at an early date to discuss the pending issues such as economic, social, cultural and sports exchanges as well as the questions of easing tensions and consolidating peace between the south and north, and 2) in order to discuss the issue of resuming the business of the Coordinating Committee, the direct south-north telephone line be reopened immediately and vice co-chairmen's meeting of the Coordinating Committee be held promptly.

Acting Co-chairman Min said that “once the south-north dialogue is normalized, lasting peace is ensured and exchanges and cooperative relations are promoted, although we are in a tragic state of national division today, our nation would be able to do something substantial in projecting an unbounded national prosperity by pooling the resources, technology and wisdom in the possession of the two sides.” He said this will advance the time of independent and peaceful unification of the fatherland.

Noting that if the north Korean side, rather than suspending the south-north dialogue, had joined south Korea in the efforts to pursue co-prosperity and national interests, peace would have already taken root on the Korean peninsula and the south and north Korea relations would have entered an age of exchanges and cooperation, the Seoul side acting Co-chairman called for unconditional and prompt resumption of the

suspended function of the South-North Coordinating Committee, stressing that “various issues pending between the south and north must be settled openheartedly inside, not outside, the dialogue room.”

The following is the full text of the statement by Acting Co-chairman Min Kwan-shik :

Our side has time and again called for the early normalization of the south-north dialogue which has been suspended for a protracted time. We have put forth concrete steps for normalization, urging your side's affirmative response thereto.

For the alleviation of tensions and removal of the distrust and misunderstanding that have accumulated between the south and north, the dialogue should be normalized in the first place. The immediate and urgent task is to settle one by one the issues pending between the south and north at the table of a resumed dialogue.

However, your side has rejected our side's call for the normalization of the dialogue to date, almost five years since your side unilaterally broke off the south-north dialogue, disregarding the South-North Joint Communiqué and various other agreements reached between the south and north. Moreover, your side has been moving toward heightening the tensions between the south and north by forcing through the policy of diplomatic and military confrontation, as well as toward deepening national split and heterogeneity by emphasizing the need for struggles and violence through all propaganda media.

Looking back, we are convinced that if your side, rather than suspending the south-north dialogue, had joined us in the efforts to pursue co-prosperity and national interests, peace would have already taken root on the Korean peninsula and the south-north Korean relation would have entered an age of exchange and cooperation.

In this respect, the past five years' suspension of the dialogue could not have but delayed the time of national prosperity and independent peaceful unification of the fatherland that much.

But, it still is not too late. We must resume the south-north dialogue

right away, and discuss and solve openheartedly all issues pending between the south and north inside — not outside — the conference room of the dialogue.

We must find ways and means at the resumed dialogue to ease tensions and consolidate peace, and strive to promote exchanges and cooperative relations by opening the two societies to each other and finding something in common that can be of mutual interest in the fields of economy, social, culture and sports.

The flow of today's international situation characterizes the maintenance of peace and promotion of exchanges and cooperative relations transcending the difference in thoughts, ideas and systems. The reality is that all countries thereby address themselves to the pursuit of their national prosperity and world peace.

I am positive that once the south-north dialogue is normalized; lasting peace is ensured; and exchanges and cooperative relations are promoted, though we are in a tragic state of national division today, our nation with a time-honored history and great cultural tradition would be able to do something substantial in projecting an unbounded national prosperity by pooling the resources technology and wisdom in the possession of the two sides. This will certainly advance the time of independent and peaceful unification of the fatherland, contributing greatly to world peace as well.

On this conviction, I propose the following to your side, looking forward to unconditional resumption of the suspended dialogue at an early date this year for openhearted discussion of the pending issues between the south and north.

First, the South-North Coordinating Committee be resumed unconditionally at an early date to discuss the pending issues such as economic, social, cultural and sports exchanges as well as the questions of easing tensions and consolidating peace between the south and north.

Second, in order to discuss the issue of resuming the South-North Coordinating Committee, the direct south-north telephone line be reopened immediately and vice co-chairmen's meeting of the Coordinating Committee be held promptly.

I look forward to your side's affirmative response to those proposals by our side.

This statement by the Seoul side of the South-North Coordinating Committee, calling for immediate resumption of the south-north dialogue, sets forth the direction of a new dimension that ought to be pursued within the framework of the dialogue. The statement was epochal in that, by suggesting that the south-north relations be transformed into "an age of exchange and cooperation," it represented one step ahead of the proposal for easing of tensions between south and north Korea. The statement concretely proposed mutual pursuit of interests between south and north Korea.

It was persuasive, realistic and positive an action for the Seoul side to offer possible cooperation between the south and north by proposing, from a far-reaching point of view, "joint utilization of the resources, knowhow and wisdom of the two sides, while pursuing alleviation of tensions and rooting of lasting peace through dialogue, under the present international circumstances in which all countries respect peace and seek exchanges and cooperation transcending thoughts, ideas and systems.

Today north Korea's economic situation is so deteriorating that Pyongyang would be obliged to find some outlet sooner or later. In the north, foreign exchange coffers are almost empty, causing one moratorium after another in the payment of external debts, and the structure of economy as a whole remains backward due largely to excessive emphasis on defense industries.

If the south and north would be able to pool their resources, knowhow and wisdom together, this may well be taken as a humanitarian step intended to save the north Korean people from their sufferings from economic difficulties prompted by backwardish technology, lack of capital and other economic shortcomings. Such exchange, if materialized, would further constitute a shortcut to the restoration of homogeneity between the south and north, and to ultimate national unification.

Nevertheless, the north Korean side has failed to show any affirmative response to such realistic proposal of the Seoul side.

After the south-north dialogue came to a virtual suspension with the unilateral boycott by Kim Young-joo, Pyongyang side co-chairman of the Coordinating Committee, on August 28, 1973, ten rounds of the vice co-chairmen's meeting were held until March 1975 at the initiative of the Seoul side trying to normalize the suspended dialogue. Even this vice co-chairmen's meeting was torpedoed by the Pyongyang side for no clear reasons. The Pyongyang side went to the extreme of cutting off the direct Seoul-Pyongyang telephone line, the only line linking the south and north, on August 30, 1976.

For three years since the door of the Coordinating Committee was closed with the 10th co-chairmen's meeting as its final program on March 14, 1975, the Seoul side urged resumption of the dialogue no fewer than 20 times, but only to be rejected by the Pyongyang side.

The north Korean side was turning down as "war preparation scheme" or "attempt to exploit the dialogue for anti-national purposes" the Republic of Korea's repeated calls for dialogue resumption. At times, they were insisting that they would agree to resumption of the dialogue only on the condition that south Korea repeals the Anti-Communist Law and the National Security Law. While refusing to return to the dialogue, Pyongyang demanded so-called "grand national conference," "conference for political negotiations" and "Koryo confederation system."

Whereas the Republic of Korea is pursuing a policy of solving, through the Red Cross talks, issues pending between the south and north beginning with easy and practicable non-political fields such as reunion between aged parents and their children and exchange of letters, and is endeavoring for the easing of tensions and consolidation of peace through simultaneous entry into the United Nations and conclusion of a south-north non-aggression agreement for the sake of peaceful coexistence, the north Korean side averts its face from these efforts, preoccupied with the machination to bring the whole Korean peninsula under its Communist rule.

(The following are editorials of major domestic newspapers on the statement by the Seoul side of the Coordinating Committee calling for early resumption of the dialogue.)

—Editor—

North Korea Should Promptly Agree to Resumed Dialogue

The Kyunghyang Shinmoon (March 4, 1978)

Min Kwan-shik, Seoul side acting Co-chairman of the South-North Coordinating Committee, March 3 proposed to the Pyongyang side that the function of the South-North Coordinating Committee be resumed unconditionally at an early date to discuss and solve the question of easing tensions and rooting peace on the Korean peninsula, exchanges in the fields of economy, social, culture and sports, and other issues.

The Seoul side acting Co-chairman further suggested that in order to discuss the issue of resuming the business of the South-North Coordinating Committee, the direct south-north telephone line be reopened promptly and a vice co-chairmen's meeting be held immediately.

The proposal by the Seoul side of the South-North Coordinating Committee was significant in that it was the first formal urging for the resumption of the suspended south-north dialogue made toward the Pyongyang side since the turn of the year.

As Acting Co-chairman Min pointed out in his statement, our side has made repeated calls for early resumption of the long-suspended dialogue. We have set forth concrete measures for its resumption, asking the Pyongyang side to respond to the call affirmatively.

Nevertheless, the Pyongyang side has continued to reject our calls for dialogue resumption to date, nearly five years after the Pyongyang side torpedoed the dialogue with the nonsensical "August 28 statement."

Moreover, they have unilaterally cut off the direct south-north

telephone line in the wake of the notorious axe-murder at Panmunjom on August 18, 1976, and engaged in various provocative acts, building up tensions.

It is really sad when one considers the fact that if the Pyongyang side joined us in the efforts to pursue national interests without suspending the south-north dialogue, the relations between the south and north would have been different from what they are today.

Under the circumstances, we really hope that the Pyongyang side will accept our side's proposal for lasting peace on this land and national development and agree to resume the suspended dialogue without fail this year.

We wish to strongly urge the Pyongyang side once again to realize that dialogue alone can bring a solution to the Korean question and respond affirmatively to our peace-oriented efforts.

Meanwhile, the recent statement by our side was very epochal in that it provided the unbounded possibility of cooperation through dialogue from a far-reaching standpoint.

Acting Co-chairman Min said in the statement, "the south and north can contribute to projecting an unbounded national prosperity by pooling the resources, technology and wisdom of the two sides."

The proposal, in effect, provides no room for any excuse for the north Koreans to turn down the offer. It represents the manifestation of our firm will to peace.

President Park Chung Hee proposed a food assistance for north Korea in his New Year press conference last year. The recent proposition for cooperation, also, constituted the revelation of the spirit of mutual assistance among the same people, as it amounts to extending a helping hand to the economically hard-pressed north Korean people. The Pyongyang side is urged to accept this bona fide proposal and thereby better look after the livelihood of its people.

This is the very spirit incorporated in the South-North Joint Communiqué in which the south and north pledged to enhance the national prestige in the world community through mutual cooperation.

The Pyongyang side, however, had begun to trample down on the Joint Communiqué even before the ink of the signatures had dried. Rather than to cooperate with the south, the north has been discrediting the national prestige by engaging in various provocative and defamative acts.

It is easy to realize for what purpose does north Korea shun the dialogue regardless of the aspirations of the whole brethren.

From the outset, the north Koreans sought to exploit the south-north dialogue for their machination to communize the entire Korean peninsula. Later, however, they severed the channel of the dialogue when it became apparent that their scheme had misfired and that the dialogue was shedding light on numerous shortcomings of their system.

The time has long passed when they can achieve communization of the whole Korean peninsula by force of arms. We wish to take this occasion to serve a stern warning that if north Korea engages in anti-national activities any further, it would surely be brought before the judgement of history.

North Korea Should Return to South-North Dialogue

The Dong-A Ilbo (March 4, 1978)

Dr. Min Kwan-shik, Seoul side acting Co-chairman of the South-North Coordinating Committee, urged the Pyongyang side by radio broadcast on March 3 to agree to unconditional resumption of the suspended function of the South-North Coordinating Committee.

In the statement, acting Co-chairman Min proposed that the south and north pool their resources, technology and wisdom, and laid down two substantial propositions: to resume the function of the South-North Coordinating Committee immediately and unconditionally to discuss and solve the issues of easing tensions and bringing about lasting peace as well as other pending questions such as exchanges in the fields of economy, social, culture and sports; and to reopen the direct south-north telephone line and hold a vice co-chairmen's meeting promptly to discuss

resumption of the Coordinating Committee business.

Five years have already passed since north Korea unilaterally suspended the function of the Coordinating Committee. With the third meeting held in Seoul in June 1973 as watershed, the business of the Coordinating Committee had slowed down until it came to a total standstill with a unilateral statement of boycott by Kim Young-joo, Pyongyang side co-chairman of the Coordinating Committee, on August 28, 1973. Kim Young-joo's reasoning was preposterously that he could no longer attend the south-north dialogue with Lee Hu-rak, the then Seoul side Co-chairman because of the Kim Dae-jung incident.

It was ridiculous for Pyongyang to link the Kim Dae-jung incident to the south-north dialogue. Thanks to our side's efforts, vice co-chairmen's meeting was held twice toward the end of that year to discuss the question of resuming the business of the Coordinating Committee. But, the north Korean side had refused to normalize the Coordinating Committee, setting forth a set of absurd demands such as repeal of the Special Foreign Policy for Peace and Unification of June 23, 1973, release of Anti-Communist Law and National Security Law violators, and reorganization of the Coordinating Committee with the representatives of political parties and social organizations.

Whenever it could find times thereafter, north Korea has been repeating its stereotyped offers for a south-north disarmament talk, a south-north political negotiation, etc. in an obvious attempt to shun responsibility for breaking off the dialogue.

One thing ridiculous is that the north Korean Communists suggested a south-north "political negotiation" between the political parties and social organizations of the south and north, trying to drive a wedge between our government and people by saying that success of such political negotiation depends on "anti-government struggles" by the people of south Korea. This well indicates that north Korea is not interested in a dialogue, but still adheres to such subversive policy. North Korea also seems to expect that the Carter Administration of the United States may make exclusive contacts with them. However, the Carter Administration

has made it clear time and again that it will not enter into any dialogue with Pyongyang without our participation. It appears that north Korea's Kim Il-sung is still flashing some signals to Washington through third countries. But, it would be wise for him to give up such wild fancy at an early date.

It seems to us that the relations between south and north Korea will some day enter an age of dialogue resumption. And it would be only such time when north Korea will have no choice but to accept our path leading to peaceful unification through south-north dialogue on a step-by-step basis. The north Korean Communists attempt to follow the Hanoi strategy in pursuit of a Vietnamization of the Korean peninsula. But, it would cause less trouble for their people if they give up their wild scheme early, taking a correct look at south Korea now emerging as a powerful industrial society as well as at the geo-political location of Northeast Asia.

It is a national shame that south and north Korea, the same people, are unable to dialogue with each other at this time when even those hostile peoples of the Arabs and Israeli talk each other in search of peace. We urge north Korea to have a correct view of the reality.

South-North Coexistence and Arena of Cooperation

The Seoul Shinmun (March 4, 1978)

Min Kwan-shik, Seoul side acting Co-chairman of the South-North Coordinating Committee, issued a statement on March 3 urging the Pyongyang side to agree to resume the south-north dialogue unconditionally. Why has the south-north dialogue, necessary for the improvement of south-north relations as well as for the peaceful solution of the unification issue, been deadlock for nearly five years? Before asking which side is responsible for the stalemate, we would like to ponder over again if there can't be some way to bring it back to normalcy.

One thing that should be pointed out first is the nature of the south-north relations. Since south and north Korea adhere to diametrically con-

flicting thoughts, ideas and systems, and this reality cannot but be reflected on each side's stand on the unification issue. Both sides consider as a death-or-life matter the issue of at which side's initiative would the unification be achieved. Moreover, the inter-relations among the world powers having stakes in the Korean peninsula constitute a heteronomous factor affecting our unification question.

These subjective and objective elements stand in the way to the solution of the unification issue. The South-North Joint Communiqué of 1972 and subsequent south-north dialogue had revealed the seriousness of the issue.

In view of the nature of the relations between south and north Korea, it appears impossible to achieve unification by means of negotiations in the foreseeable future under the present circumstances. Such being the case, we feel that the south and north would have to accept their peaceful coexistence whether they like it or not, and in due course create conditions for peaceful solution of the unification issue through efforts for overcoming national heterogeneity and ensuring harmony between the two sides' sense of value.

The proposals like conclusion of a south-north non-aggression agreement, simultaneous entry of south and north Korea into the United Nations and cross recognition of south and north Korea by the Western and Communist blocs, they stemmed from the correct knowledge of the nature of the south-north relations.

Meanwhile, we believe that peaceful coexistence between south and north Korea should be centered around mutual cooperation. Only when there is cooperation, can the south-north relations be improved in a desirable manner and can peaceful coexistence be conducive to peaceful unification. Of course, since a competition for hegemony in the solution of the unification issue would be unavoidable between south and north Korea even in their peaceful coexistence, such cooperation would have to be controlled by special principles unlike the case with the good neighborliness of international relations. Still, the area of cooperation between the south and north can by no means be narrow if only either south or

north Korea does not dare to seek national unification through non-political means, namely, force of arms or violence.

To believe that what is in one side's favor disfavors the other part, is a way of thinking deriving from the extreme sense of confrontation in a circumstance where peaceful coexistence is denied. In peaceful relations in which either side does not threaten the existence of the other, many areas of cooperation where both can mutually benefit can naturally be found. A good example of this can be found in the relations between West and East Germany. In fact, if economic cooperation is realized between south and north Korea right away, we would be able to purchase, say, their mine resources whose declining prices seriously affect north Korea's international payments position while north Korea may import from us needed capital goods.

In this respect, the Seoul side's call for early normalization of the south-north dialogue and for the pooling of the two sides' resources, technology and wisdom, was highly persuasive and in accord with the realistic mandate of the south-north relations. If only the Pyongyang side renounces its wild schemes for communization of the entire Korean peninsula, there can be no reason why they cannot agree to our proposal.

Exchanges and Cooperation between South and North

The Shin-A Ilbo (March 4, 1978)

The Seoul side of the South-North Coordinating Committee on March 3 issued a statement in which it urged the Pyongyang side to resume the suspended function of the South-North Coordinating Committee, reopen the direct south-north telephone line immediately, and agree to convene a vice co-chairmen's meeting. In the statement broadcast by the Korea Broadcasting System, Min Kwan-shik, acting Co-chairman of the Coordinating Committee, stressed that the south and north should mutually open their societies to the other side, and endeavor to promote exchanges and cooperation in the fields of economy, social, culture and sports. The Seoul side acting Co-chairman further said that the south-north relations

should be allowed to enter an "age of exchanges and cooperation" and contribute to national prosperity by jointly utilizing the resources, technology and wisdom of the two sides.

The statement was epochal in that it spelled out concrete means of mutually beneficial programs, going a step further from our past propositions for alleviation of tensions and consolidation of peace. Since the proposal called for the resumption of the function of the South-North Coordinating Committee for the purpose of discussing matters of actual interests such as joint utilization of the two sides' resources and technology, the north Koreans will hardly be able to find any ground to turn it down .

As is well known, north Korea finds itself in a very difficult economic situation. All indications are that the economic strength of south Korea is more than three times as strong as north Korea's. Considering the north's backward technology, insufficient capital and other economic weak points, there would surely be some way to bring about economic co-existence and co-prosperity if north Korea is willing to introduce our advanced knowhow and brains. Viewed from the national standpoint, such cooperation would constitute a humanitarian step to save the north Korean brethren from their economic hardships.

Similarly if we are able to jointly use the resources of north Korea, we can do without using large amounts of foreign exchanges in importing such materials from elsewhere. In this way, both sides would benefit from this sort of cooperation.

Apart from political questions, it would be proper for north Korea to agree to discuss openheartedly various easy and non-political issues pending between the south and north, such as exchanges in the economy, social, culture and sports areas. They should realize that this is the only way they can survive.

If north Korea rejects even this offer which is based on practical interests, and continues to insist in its absurd demands for a "grand national conference," "political negotiations" and "repeal of the Anti-Communist Law," it would mean that they are putting forth difficult

conditions only to shatter the dialogue.

We are confident that if exchanges are materialized in the most practicable fields of sports, culture and economy with the south and north basically pursuing the solution of the Korean issue through dialogue, broad mutual understanding and cooperation will be made possible, leading to the creation of an atmosphere in which we can ensure lasting peace first and national unification later as we have been urging.

The north Korean side is urged to accept our proposal promptly and agree to reopen the direct south-north telephone line and convene a vice co-chairmen's meeting. We also feel it significant that we have become able to make such offer as we now afford to help north Korean economically.

Let Us Open New Age of Exchanges and Cooperation

The Hankook Ilbo (March 4, 1978)

How would the Pyongyang side come out this time? We had this question in our mind when we learned of yesterday's statement by Min Kwan-shik, Seoul side acting Co-chairman of the South-North Coordinating Committee, in which he urged Kim Young-joo, Pyongyang side Co-chairman, to agree to the unconditional resumption of the function of the South-North Coordinating Committee, and to reopen the direct south-north telephone line and hold a vice co-chairmen's meeting to discuss the normalization of the Coordinating Committee.

For five years, their invariable answer to our proposals has been "no." The small sincerity they showed toward the south-north dialogue ceased to exist with Kim Young-joo's "August 28 statement." During last year alone, the Seoul side acting Co-chairman urged the Pyongyang side to reopen the severed direct telephone line and normalize the Coordinating Committee no fewer than three times. But, the north rejected it indirectly without bothering even to issue denial statements.

Their typical tactics is to do away with any official response to our propositions. They seem to have become determined dialogue dodgers.

Nevertheless, acting Co-chairman Min made another call in an elder-brother-like generosity and attitude. What the statement called for was not only the resuming of the meeting or reopening of the direct telephone line.

The proposal was that the Coordinating Committee be resumed so as to discuss and solve the issues of easing tensions between the south and north and bringing about durable peace, as well as solving the question of exchanges in the fields of economy, social, culture and sports. It also embodied the hope that from the national point of view, the two sides' resources, technology and wisdom will be jointly utilized.

Of course, concrete topics were presented in our previous calls for the normalization of the Coordinating Committee. Such topics included the proposed conclusion of a south-north non-aggression agreement or review of problems related to north Korea's "200-mile economic zone."

But, the recent statement may well be said to have marked a turning-point of a higher dimension since it was aimed at exploring an age of exchanges and cooperation between the same south and north Korean people rather than at tackling any political questions. For, it is self-evident that if and when such exchanges prompt mutual opening of their societies, it would lead to the restoration of national homogeneity and laying grounds for peaceful unification.

Herein lies the significance of the recent statement. The statement clearly manifests the unchanging sincerity on the part of the Seoul side toward the dialogue, the spirit of the South-North Coordinating Committee and agreed matters. It also embodies a new chapter looking forward to common interests and wellbeing between south and north Korea.

This, needless to say, represents an advanced form of our ideas, and at the same time, the product of our national strength and confidence. In fact, north Korea's recovery from its serious difficulties would be accelerated if it accepts support from our economic power, technology and brains. In the event economic resources of south and north Korea are exchanged, our national prosperity will become more brilliant. This would also be true of exchanges in the social, cultural and sports areas.

Nevertheless, the Pyongyang side has steadfastly turned them down. Leaders in Pyongyang should realize how vast the quantities of our national energies and wealth have to the squandered due to their persisting policy of confrontation.

If they had come to the table of dialogue and strived for south-north cooperation, our 50 million people must have been much better off than now. If there were such cooperation between the south and north, peace would have already been consolidated on the Korean peninsula, and an age of exchanges and cooperation must have been brought about.

Yesterday's statement represented the year's first call for dialogue and also another advice for the design of a hopeful future of the nation. The Pyongyang side should bow to this fresh proposal, parting away from its typical negative posture.

Pursuit of Common National Interests

The Chosun Ilbo (March 5, 1978)

Min Kwan-shik, Seoul side acting Co-chairman of the South-North Coordinating Committee, on March 3 urged the Pyongyang side by radio to resume the suspended function of the South-North Coordinating Committee to "discuss and solve openheartedly various issues pending between the south and north inside, not outside, the room of dialogue."

In the urging, acting Co-chairman Min asked the Pyongyang side to agree to normalize the Coordinating Committee unconditionally and early to discuss various pending issues such as alleviation of tensions, consolidation of peace and exchanges in the fields of economy, social, culture and sports. The Seoul side acting Co-chairman suggested that to discuss the Coordinating Committee's normalization, the direct south-north telephone line should be reopened and a vice co-chairmen's meeting be held immediately.

As is well known, the function of the South-North Coordinating Committee has been suspended to date after Kim Young-joo, Pyongyang side Co-chairman, boycotted it in a statement on August 28, 1973, about one

year after the full-fledged dialogue began. Owing to our efforts to normalize the dialogue, nevertheless, vice co-chairmen's meetings were held at Panmunjom ten times until March 1975 when the Pyongyang side averted its face from it for no justifiable reasons. Even the direct south-north telephone line was cut off all of a sudden by the Pyongyang side in the wake of the Panmunjom axe-murder incident in August 1976.

We are not ignorant of the Pyongyang side's motive behind its boycott of the dialogue and severance of the telephone line. But the history will never tolerate their scheme. If they are really interested in the co-prosperity of the 50 million nations, solution of the Korean question, as Acting Co-chairman Min pointed out, must be sought through dialogue in a most reasonable manner, not by physical strength outside the room of dialogue.

The key to this end is for the south and north to abide by agreed matters, true to the spirit of the historical South-North Joint Communiqué of 1972 that facilitated the inauguration of the South-North Coordinating Committee. In the Joint Communiqué, the two sides pledged to "ensure a grand national unity as a single nation transcending thoughts, ideas and systems," and to "faithfully carry out agreed matters." What constructive proposals and attitude has the Pyongyang side showed for approach between the south and north transcending thoughts, ideas and systems? Was there anything among Pyongyang's urging such as the absurd reasoning for the boycott of the dialogue and prerequisites to dialogue resumption, that had nothing to do with demand for reform of the south Korean system? Not counting the north Koreans' start of digging invasion tunnels around the time of the initiation of the dialogue, their attitude of rejecting national unity, approach and dialogue as well as their obstinacy, unreasonableness and self-righteousness have become clear beyond doubts.

In his statement, acting Co-chairman Min urged Pyongyang "to jointly utilize the resources, technology and wisdom of the two sides and thereby project an unbounded national prosperity." Can there be any clause or element in this urging that runs counter to the provisions of the South-

North Joint Communiqué? Does it include any demand for abandonment of communism in north Korea? Or is there any demand that they set free anti-Communist political prisoners? The statement incorporates only a pressing national appeal for pursuit of common national interests transcending thoughts, ideas and systems.

For instance, can the tremendous military outlays enforced upon the south and north presently do any good to the common national economic development? The national expectation is to shift such resources and energies to common economic development. To this end, “wild fancy for another Korean War” should be completely erased from the nation’s sense of crisis. This should naturally be proved by the Pyongyang side by actual deeds. In this way, trust should be restored between the same people.

We are calling for a dialogue for the sake of this approach. To reject the dialogue proves their adherence to the “wild fancy.” We are witnessing clearly that the history has reached a stage where it would tolerate no such “wild fancy.”

Five Years’ Suspension of South-North Dialogue

The Joong-Ang Daily News (March 6, 1978)

It is almost five years since the Pyongyang side unilaterally suspended the south-north dialogue. The period after the suspension can be characterized by the shrinking channel of the dialogue.

Even the vice co-chairmen’s meeting of the South-North Coordinating Committee that had been held ten times, has failed to meet for three full years. And, one and half a years have already passed since the direct south-north telephone line was cut off.

The only remaining link of the dialogue between the south and north is the working-level meeting of the South-North Red Cross Conference, that meets once in a while.

The atmosphere of the south-north relations has long ago reverted to the state of pre-dialogue stiffness due to north Korea’s persisting bellicose policy. The atmosphere is so strained today that any talk about the south-

north dialogue sounds like something sentimental.

However, we have no other choice but to carry out dialogue, though it may seem unrealistic now, to achieve peace and unification without going through the havoc of war. Therefore, we cannot give up our expectation of dialogue even if the other side rejects it.

Seoul side acting Co-chairman Min Kwan-shik's statement calling for unconditional resumption of the dialogue as well as exchanges and cooperation between the south and north, was the manifestation of such expectation.

One of the major differences in opinions between the south and north, that have emerged in the course of the dialogue, was the confrontation between "solution of whole issues with a single stroke" and "step-by-step solution."

The north Korean side has insisted in the prior solution of political and military problems, ignoring the difference that has deepened between the two sides since national division.

On the other hand, our side has called for consolidation of peace first, restoration of mutual trust through steady exchanges and cooperation, and then ultimate realization of unification.

What did they gain by rejecting our reasonable stand and suspending the dialogue? The result was: the south-north relations have reverted to the pre-dialogue confrontation state, with considerable part of our national energies consumed for war preparation.

If they did not suspend the dialogue and agreed to exchanges and cooperation, peace would have taken root and an age of exchanges and cooperation would have opened between the south and north by now.

In consequence, the suspension of the south-north dialogue has brought about squandering of national energies and delay in peaceful unification of the fatherland.

The longer the period of dialogue suspension is, the deeper national heterogeneity and mutual distrust grow, moving farther away from the time of peaceful unification.

If the south-north dialogue is resumed and mutual exchanges and

cooperation are carried out, it would bring great benefits to both south and north Korea, enabling them to pour their national energies into construction and prosperity, which are otherwise squandered in their confrontation.

We are worried how our contemporary generation can shun history's censure if they continue to reject such path to national prosperity. This is one reason why we feel compelled to urge them again to awake from their wild fancy and return to the path to national prosperity through dialogue between the south-north.

No matter how the reality is gloomy, we shall patiently await without closing our door.

South-North Red Cross Conference:

“Humanitarian Talks is Touchstone for Peaceful Unification”

—ROKNRC Again Urges Early Resumption of Full-Dress Talks—

The 25th working-level meeting of the South-North Red Cross Conference was held at 10 a.m. through 11:20 a.m. December 9, 1977 at the conference room of the Neutral Nations' Supervisory Commission at Panmunjom.

At the meeting, the Republic of Korea National Red Cross delegation, stressing that the humanitarian talks between the south and north constitute a touchstone for peaceful unification and an important factor determining the future of the nation, again made clear its position that it will try to solve the dispersed family issue based on the Red Cross humanitarian spirit, brotherly love and the spirit of the South-North Joint Communique, and, on the basis of thus created trust between the south and north, contribute to independent and peaceful unification of the fatherland.

The ROKNRC delegation also urged the north Korean Red Cross side to 1) agree to hold the eighth full-dress meeting at Panmunjom at an early date, 2) join in efforts to find a breakthrough in the stalemated discussion of the topics of the humanitarian talks by first undertaking pilot projects such as “aged parents’ project,” “mutual exchange of groups of tomb visitors” and “exchange of family pictures,” and 3) reopen the direct south-north telephone line and normalize the function of the Panmunjom liaison office at an early date.

However, the north Korean Red Cross delegation, without showing any concern about the resuming of the full-dress meeting, discussion of the topics of full-dress meetings and reopening of direct south-north telephone line, merely indulged in a stereotyped political slander and defamation against the south, demanding withdrawal of American forces from Korea, repeal of all agreements between south Korea and Japan, unconditional

release of all anti-state prisoners, discontinuation of the buildup of self-reliant defense posture, and retraction of the Special Foreign Policy for Peace and Unification of 1973.

The two sides agreed to hold the next 26th working-level meeting on March 20.

The following is the text of a speech made by Kim Yeon-choo, alternate chief delegate of the Republic of Korea National Red Cross, at the 25th working-level meeting. — Editor—

Today we are holding the 25th working-level meeting. We have already had four meetings this year, but another year is about to pass without any achievement.

The 10 million family members dispersed in the south and north are still eagerly looking forward to their reunion, and the entire 50 million brethren of the south and north ardently hope that this conference will end in success at an early date, contributing to peaceful unification of the fatherland.

Nevertheless, the South-North Red Cross Conference, begun in August 1971, has failed to discuss even Topic No. 1 of the agreed agenda while simply including in fruitless debates here at Panmunjom, with the full-dress meetings held in Seoul and Pyongyang no fewer than seven times, having been completely suspended.

It is an issue of man's fundamental nature beyond any conditions of ideology, system or politics to provide information for and arrange reunions between those parents, children, brothers and sisters who, dispersed in the south and north, have no knowledge even about the fates of their missing kin.

It was for this reason that the Republic of Korea National Red Cross proposed a campaign to search for displaced persons in the south and north regardless of the division of the peninsula, and that your Red Cross, we understand, agreed to the proposal. Ever since the conference began, our delegation of the Republic of Korea National Red Cross has displayed the utmost sincerity in the efforts to solve the dispersed-family

issue based on the Red Cross humanitarian spirit and brotherly love. Such sincerity and efforts of our side have been shown expressly through the entire period of the conference and in the records of the four working-level meetings held this year.

At the 21st working-level meeting which was the year's first meeting, the Republic of Korea National Red Cross delegation proposed that though the eighth full-dress meeting should naturally be held in Seoul as mutually agreed, it be held at Panmunjom or any other third place of mutual agreement in consideration of your side's situation.

Also for the discussion of the agenda topics, the delegation of the Republic of Korea National Red Cross suggested that although the agreed-upon five agenda items ought to be discussed beginning naturally with Item No. 1, a few urgent projects be carried out first as pilot undertaking, in view of the situation in which your side refuses substantial discussion of the agenda items.

The aged parents' project; mutual exchange of groups of visitors to ancestral tombs in the south and north; exchange of family pictures.... all these are the exigent problems, the solution to which is ardently hoped for by all the dispersed families. These projects are easy and practical issues which can be launched at any time if only your side is interested in alleviating the sufferings of the dispersed families.

Despite the four working-level meetings we held this year, none of the reasonable proposals by the Republic of Korea National Red Cross delegation has been realized, causing only disappointment to the displaced families in the south and north, and also to the entire Korean people. We believe that at today's working-level meeting taking place in the final month of 1977, we must straighten our attitude once again and ponder how we can provide the joy of reunion to the dispersed families and thereby contribute to the peaceful and independent unification of the fatherland.

We are confident that the attitude we should mutually assume in order to resume this deadlocked Red Cross conference is that we must, in the first place, be faithful to the spirit of Red Cross humanitarianism and

brotherly love.

Today we are sitting face to face in this conference room as Members of the same Red Cross. We are sitting together not to impose one side's ideology upon the other nor to slander and defame the other side in the conference, but to relieve the sufferings of the 10 million dispersed family members in the south and north at an early date.

We believe that looking back over the course of the past talks, we must reflect on whether we have been faithful to the spirit of Red Cross humanitarianism and brotherly love. We must reflect on whether we haven't plunged the conference into confusion by bringing political and military issues to this humanitarian meeting while ignoring the dispersed family issue which ought to be settled at the talks; whether we haven't damaged the atmosphere of Red Cross humanitarianism by slandering and defaming the other side in the conference; and whether we haven't delayed the solution of the displaced family issue by attaching to it statutory and social preconditions.

Although your side has urged many times that "the present difficulties lying ahead of the humanitarian talks should be removed and the deadlocked Red Cross conference should be normalized at an early date," the truth is that in actual deeds your side has rather been continuously fomenting difficulties for the humanitarian conference.

Aside from past performance, your side has not even shown any interest lately in the original mission of the south-north Red Cross working-level meetings, namely, "issue of resuming full-dress meetings" and "preliminary discussion of the agenda items of full-dress meetings." Moreover, your side merely repeats political propaganda at this sacred conference, slandering and defaming openly the other side in the talks while putting forth as "proposals" for the Red Cross talks such political, diplomatic and military demands as "retraction of the June 23 Statement for the peaceful unification and the proposal for a "south-north non-aggression agreement," "withdrawal of U.S. forces," "repeal of the Korea-Japan Continental Shelf Agreement," and "halt to arms buildup and introduction of weapons."

Many times in the past, I have asked your side to rectify such an insincere attitude toward the conference.

If your side wants to propose and discuss wide-ranging issues pending between the south and north in the political, diplomatic, military and social sectors, your side should agree to normalize the function of the South-North Coordinating Committee at an early date. At a normalized Coordinating Committee, we can raise and discuss as many political, diplomatic and military problems as we want to.

Nevertheless, your side refuses to normalize the South-North Coordinating Committee that ought to have been normalized, postponing indefinitely the meeting of the South-North Coordinating Committee for more than two years since 1975, while creating difficulties blocking any progress even of the Red Cross talks by preposterously raising political, diplomatic and military issues at the humanitarian conference.

If the south and north, which have existed under different ideas and systems in the past 30 or so years, discuss at this meeting, designed to solve humanitarian questions, those political, military and social issues deriving from mutually different ideas and systems, it will become all the more difficult to find a clue to the solution of the humanitarian questions, and the tension and confrontation will be worsened between the south and north.

However, if we first solve humanitarian issues one by one based on the Red Cross spirit and brotherly love transcending ideas and systems, the nation's homogeneity will be restored and tension and confrontation will be removed with mutual distrust and misunderstanding replaced with trust and understanding, thereby bringing about a clue to the gradual settlement of political, military and social problems.

We are convinced that inasmuch as we are at a Red Cross humanitarian conference and the task we must settle is to alleviate the sufferings of the 10 million dispersed family members, no miscellaneous issues other than the question of searching for missing families can be allowed to be brought up at this conference and from now on we must be faithful to the Red Cross humanitarian spirit and brotherly love.

North Korean Red Cross delegates!

Our humanitarian conference is the very touchstone for peaceful unification and represents the key to determining the future of our people.

When our south and north Korean Red Cross personnel successfully complete this conference based on the Red Cross humanitarian spirit, brotherly love and the spirit of the South-North Joint Communiqué of 1972, then the distrust and misunderstanding, that have been accumulated between the south and north, will give way to harmony and trust, promising a blessed future for the nation.

Nevertheless, if the Red Cross talks continue to be stalemated and slander and defamation are not stopped at this sacred conference aimed at discussion of purely humanitarian issues, then the talks will only result in furthering the national split rather than narrowing the distance between the south and north.

When the disruption of dialogue leads to mutual distrust which in turn results in the heightening of tensions, there would ensue the danger of military clashes in the long run. In today's relations between the south and north, tensions and the sense of confrontation are more rampant than at any other time because the South-North Coordinating Committee has been needlessly suspended and even the humanitarian talks remain deadlocked. Because of this situation, the vast portion of national strength, which can otherwise be used for economic construction, is being consumed for unproductive confrontation.

Today, all the countries and peoples of the world have mutually opened their doors and are intensifying their exchanges and cooperation for the sake of development, creation and construction. Coexistence is being discussed in a dialogue even between the Arabs and Israelis who have had hostile relations for several thousand years. In this universal trend there can be no reason why only we, the same people living on the same land, have to continuously pile up the barrier of confrontation.

The persisting world opinion with regard to the Korean peninsula calls for alleviation of tensions and pursuit of peaceful unification by means of

dialogue between the direct parties of the south and north. This opinion is endorsed even by Communist countries let alone non-aligned nations.

The avenue of exchange between our country and Communist countries is being broadened and will be expanded further in the future, as tens of thousand of postal items are exchanged annually and there are frequent trips back and forth among academic, athletic and cultural personnel. Lately our government officials even entered the Soviet Union, Romania and Bulgaria.

In addition, as your side well knows, our brethren in Japan affiliated with Chochongnyon, a pro-Pyongyang Korean residents' group, have visited their homeland at their own free will and experienced the joy of reuniting with their missing parents, brothers and sisters. The number of these homeland visitors has already exceeded 15,000 and is increasing day by day.

It is an act of sheer waste and self-defamation to take the nation's internal problems out of the nation, running counter to the trends of the times.

The persisting stand of the Republic of Korea National Red Cross is to solve the dispersed-family issue in line with the Red Cross humanitarian spirit, brotherly love and the spirit of the South-North Joint Communiqué, and on the basis of the mutual trust thus created between the south and north, to contribute to self-reliant and peaceful unification of the fatherland.

This is why the Republic of Korea National Red Cross delegation has been sparing no efforts to overcome all difficulties and normalize the conference with patience and sincerity throughout the entire course of the past talks.

Pursuant to our conference stance, the Republic of Korea National Red Cross wishes to make its stand clear once more and again urge your side's acceptance.

First, it is again proposed that the eighth full-dress meeting be held at Panmunjom at an early date.

We believe that in the present situation in which your side fails to

respect an "agreed matter," that is, to hold the eighth full-dress meeting in Seoul, it is most reasonable to hold the meeting at Panmunjom.

Second, it is proposed that urgent, easy and practicable humanitarian projects be undertaken first.

We believe that in the present situation in which your side fails to respond affirmatively to substantial discussion of the agreed agenda, it is proper to meet the expectation of the dispersed families and find a breakthrough in the discussion of the agenda items by first undertaking such pilot programs as the aged parents project, mutual exchange of groups of visitors to ancestral tombs and exchange of family pictures.

Third, the function of the direct south-north telephone line and the Panmunjom liaison offices should be normalized at an early date.

Your side's act of paralyzing the function of the direct south-north telephone line and the Panmunjom liaison offices cannot but be regarded not only as deceiving the other side in the dialogue but also as a deliberate measure intended to create an obstacle to the conference.

If your side is really interested in normalizing the humanitarian talks, your side should show sincerity first by normalizing the function of the direct south-north telephone line and the Panmunjom liaison offices.

At today's meeting held in the final month of this year, the delegates of the Republic of Korea National Red Cross hope that your side will accept our proposals and, at the same time, hope that the dawning new year of 1978 will signal an era in which joy and relief can be granted to the dispersed families in the south and north by resuming the full-dress meetings and bringing discussion of the agenda items to fruition.

Part Three

Other Developments in Inter-Korean Relations

Pro-Pyongyang Koreans in Japan Visit Homeland on Lunar New Year Day

Braving intimidation, threat and other tenacious obstructive maneuvering by Chochongnyon, a pro-Pyongyang Korean residents' group in Japan, 400 more Korean residents in Japan affiliated with the pro-Pyongyang setup visited their homeland on the lunar New Year that fell on last February 4 to have the first look at their fatherland and hometowns in 30 to 40 years.

The latest group of homeland visitors comprised mostly youthful second-generation Korean residents who had resolved on their own to visit their homeland after learning about the image of a developed fatherland from their fellow residents who had visited south Korea earlier. Most of the visitors were Chochongnyon-linked businessmen and graduates from Chochongnyon-operated high schools and college in Japan residing in the areas of Tokyo, Yokohama, Kanto, Osaka, Fukuoka and Nagoya.

The lunar New Year day visitors bring to some 16,000 the number of homeland visitors among Koreans in Japan since the program started on the Chusok holiday in 1975 to provide opportunities to Korean residents in Japan to reunite with their long missing families and relatives and pay homage to their ancestral tombs in Korea regardless of their affiliation or past conducts.

One recent feature of the homeland visit program is that a swelling number of second-generation residents volunteer to visit Korea to have a first-hand observation of their proud fatherland.

This trend may well indicate that the homeland visit program for the Chochongnyon-affiliated residents has been expanding in a new dimension in terms not only of quantity but also of quality

North Korea Stages Deceptive Propaganda Piece Again

“Prerequisite to Unification is Consolidation of Peace”

—The Government Denounces Pyongyang’s Memorandum—

(North Korea issued a memorandum on last February 1 in the name of its foreign ministry and made another stereotyped and deceptive propaganda attempt to mislead world opinion by slandering and labeling the peace-oriented foreign policy of the Republic of Korea as “a scheme to perpetuate the division of the Korean peninsula.”

In a comment, a Republic of Korea Foreign Ministry official in charge of U.N. affairs accused that Pyongyang’s denouncement as “an attempt to perpetuate national division” south Korea’s calls for simultaneous entry into the United Nations, cross recognition of south and north Korea and conclusion of a non-aggression agreement, represented “a good example of self-inconsistency and a proof of the treacherousness of north Korean policies.” The official said that “entry into the United Nations by both south and north Korea or at least by the one side wishing entry as a transitional measure before the achievement of peaceful unification, constitutes the way to contribute to world peace.”

Noting that a prerequisite to peaceful unification of Korea is to consolidate peace on the Korean peninsula, the official said that north Korea’s leveling as “divisionistic attempt” the proposed conclusion of a south-north non-aggression agreement intended to facilitate lasting peace, reveals their total lack of sincerity toward the promotion of peace as well as its adherence to a scheme to bring the whole Korean peninsula under communism.

The following is the comment by the Foreign Ministry official in charge of U.N. affairs, rejecting Pyongyang’s memorandum of February

— Editor —

The north Korean regime, in its memorandum of February 1, 1978, made another attempt at misleading international public opinion by slandering and labeling as “a scheme to perpetuate the division of the Korean peninsula” the peace-oriented foreign policy of the Republic of Korea.

North Korea's repetition of its stereotyped propaganda makes it imperative to reflect on what has dictated the regime to do so once again at this time.

First, the regime is covertly striving to cover up the fact that it is being rapidly alienated from the rest of the world community on account of a series of events which have taken place in the past two or three years — mounting defaults in foreign debts, near economic bankruptcy, smuggling by its diplomats, digging of underground invasion tunnels beneath the Demilitarized Zone, the axe-murders of two unarmed United Nations officers at Panmunjom, and its persistent refusal to reopen the south-north dialogue.

Second, the north Korean regime has become increasingly vexed as our peace-oriented and realistic foreign policy is steadily winning understanding and support in the international arena.

If one pauses a moment and looks back on the history of Korea since its national liberation in 1945, one cannot fail to see clearly how absurd and nonsensical north Korea's assertion is as formulated in its memorandum.

First, it was north Korea which opposed the general elections designed for the whole Korean peninsula, which the United Nations General Assembly resolved in 1947 with a view to establishing a unified, independent and democratic Korea. North Korea instead went its own way in creating perforce a Communist regime in Pyongyang, thus sowing the seeds of a permanently divided Korea.

Second, north Korea made a specious proposal for a south-north negotiation for peaceful unification on the eve of the Korean War in 1950, but the proposal turned out to be a ruse to start that tragic fratricidal war which lasted three long years and brought United Nations forces to the defense of the south.

Third, it was also north Korea which, having agreed to open a dialogue in the South-North Joint Communiqué issued on July 4, 1972 in keeping with the worldwide trend toward the reduction of tension, declared unilaterally for no justifiable reasons to break off the dialogue on August 28, 1973 and has since exacerbated the tension in Korea.

Fourth, north Korea, while opposing simultaneous entry into the United Nations by south and north Korea, has been all-out to gain its admission to special agencies of the United Nations and to other international organizations.

Fifth, north Korea has, since 1973, established diplomatic relations with the countries that already had diplomatic relations with the Republic of Korea, and asserted its being an independent and separate entity. As a result, the international community has come to have a dim view of an early achievement of Korean unification.

Moreover, twice in 1949 and 1951, north Korea applied, through the Soviet Union with which it maintains relations of alliance, for membership in the United Nations. This came only four to five years after the division of the Korean peninsula when the two halves of Korea were far less heterogeneous than they are today. This indicates that north Korea has been pursuing a policy of national division from the very beginning.

Even from these few examples, it is evidently self-contradictory and double dealing for north Korea to assert that our Policy for Peace and Unification of June 23, 1973 is "a scheme to perpetuate the division of Korea."

The consolidation of peace on the Korean peninsula is a prerequisite to unification. Our proposal for conclusion of a non-aggression agreement between the south and the north is a great step toward this aim. By rejecting our proposal, however, north Korea is revealing its total lack of sincerity toward the promotion of peace and its obstinate adhesion to unification on its own terms.

If the south-north dialogue was carried on smoothly pursuant to the spirit of the July 4 communiqué, considerable progress would have now been made toward creating a climate favorable to peaceful unification.

However, north Korea has turned a deaf ear to our repeated appeals for resumption of the dialogue.

It is said that the background of the territorial division of Korea differs from that of Germany. But, in the current international situation where the spirit of peaceful co-existence among nations with different ideologies dominates, it is an unblockable trend that the desirability and rationality of the admission of both the south and the north of Korea to the United Nations are winning growing attention in the international community. Our June 23 Policy for Peace and Unification and Three Basic Principles for Peaceful Unification foresaw this sort of change in international thinking.

It is our belief that as a transitional measure before the achievement of peaceful unification, both the south and the north of Korea or at least the one side wishing its entry should be admitted to the United Nations. We are confident that this is the way we, together with the 149 Member States of the United Nations, can contribute to the promotion of world peace and the welfare of mankind.

In view of these facts, we cannot but conclude that the north Korean regime's memorandum of February 1, 1978 fails to make any practical contribution to the solution of the Korean question under the present circumstances.

(The following are the editorials of some major daily newspapers, denouncing north Korea's memorandum and urging the Pyongyang side to show sincerity toward bringing about durable peace on the Korean peninsula and achieving peaceful unification.)

—Editor—

North Korea's Scheme for Communist Takeover

The Kyunghyang Shinmoon (February 8, 1978)

Our concern is naturally drawn to a series of north Korea's propaganda offensives aimed at distorting our peace-oriented foreign policy.

In a memorandum issued on last February 1, north Korea denounced as "a scheme to eternalize national division" our suggestions for simultaneous entry into the United Nations by south and north Korea and cross recognition of south and north Korea by the four world powers having stakes in Korea — the United States, Japan, the Soviet Union and Red China. The so-called memorandum also warned against any improvement of relations with south Korea, apparently directed to the Soviet Union and Communist China.

This absurd demand is nothing more than part of their obsolete deceptive propaganda staged every year in the hope of favorably influencing United Nations General Assembly or non-aligned nations' conferences. However, the recent memorandum attracted our particular concern because it was an official paper of the north Korean regime. In the past, propaganda was made mostly through party propaganda organs or broadcast means.

The idea of simultaneous entry into the United Nations by both south and north Korea is being supported by the world community as a means of consolidating peace on the Korean peninsula pending realization of national unification. Simultaneous admission to the world organization is necessary all the more because of the present tense circumstance in which south and north Korea remain pitted against each other and in which both sides refuse to recognize the existence of the other. To reject this reasonable proposal represents a proof that north Korea is not interested in consolidating peace on the Korean peninsula.

No matter how pressing the issue of unification of the fatherland may be, it can by no means be achieved by force of arms. The Korean question should be solved in a peaceful manner through direct dialogue

and exchanges among the parties concerned. In this respect, simultaneous entry of south and north Korea into the United Nations and conclusion of a south-north non-aggression agreement are very realistic and proper.

The question of cross recognition of south and north Korea by the four powers having stakes in Korea also is one of the reasonable approaches to the Unification issue when we consider the reality of the south-north situation.

Why does north Korea oppose such reasonable proposals to the end? The reason is that they regard them as obstacles to their strategy for communization of south Korea. North Korea's unification formula calls for takeover of the south by force of arms or violence after implanting anti-government forces inside south Korea and isolating the south from the rest of the world so that the Western world may reduce or withdraw its support for south Korea in the event of emergency. Because they are preoccupied with revolutionary unification ideas, they are rejecting our Three Major Principles for Peaceful Unification or the Special Foreign Policy Statement for Peace and Unification of 1973, and instead repeat such absurd demands as confederation system.

We cannot overlook the fact that there lurks in such deceptive peace propaganda their outward psychological warfare designed to mislead the world that north Korea alone is eager about solving the unification problem. The north Korean Communists denounce our unification formula at an accelerated pace because of their fretfulness at our peace-oriented diplomacy enjoying greater support and understanding in the world community, and also as part of their desperate attempt to recover from the diplomatic blunders they have suffered in the past few years.

Our peace-oriented policy made public in the Special Foreign Policy Statement for Peace and Unification in 1973 has drawn a widespread affirmative reaction in the world community, whereas even non-aligned countries dismiss the disguised peace-oriented approach of the north Korean Communists as its fictitiousness has become widely known. Frequent military provocations against the south, inhumane atrocity at

Panmunjom and boycott of the south-north dialogue... all these constitute factors contributing to north Korea's isolation from the rest of the world.

The problem, however, is that such revolutionary strategy of north Korea is being supported by the Soviet Union and Communist China. A high-powered Soviet mission has been to Pyongyang last week. Red China, in a party organ article on last February 6, disclosed an official stand denouncing the unification formula of south Korea and the United States. The two Communist giants are asked to be circumspect in their policy on the Korean question, mindful that otherwise their attitude will only result in a further delay in the solution of the Korean question.

We urge the north Korean Communists to agree to our proposal for consolidation of peace on the Korean peninsula, and realize the fact that unification cannot be achieved by force of arms under any circumstance.

Active Steps Should be Taken to Counter North Korea's Propaganda

The Dong-A Ilbo (February 8, 1978)

In a comment issued on February 7 to refute Pyongyang's so-called memorandum, the Foreign Ministry pointed to the treacherousness of the Kim Il-sung regime and again called for simultaneous entry of south and north Korea into the United Nations.

Pyongyang's foreign ministry, in the memorandum of last February 1, charged that three countries of south Korea, the United States and Japan are attempting to perpetuate the division of Korea, contending that the ideas of cross recognition of south and north Korea by the United States, Japan, Red China and the Soviet Union and of simultaneous entry of south and north Korea into the United Nations, are schemes to legalize the Korean division. There is nothing new in their assertion. But there must be some scheme behind the release of such a propaganda piece unusually at this time, unusual because they used to make public such papers prior to the opening of U.N. General Assembly in the past.

It seems that the scheme is to defuse the lately emerging opinions in the

United States opposing the projected withdrawal of U.S. ground troops from Korea, and thereby give support to pro-withdrawal opinions by trumpeting "eternal division," etc. This is easily known by the fact that in the memorandum, north Korea insisted that the Carter Administration, too, is simply following the past U.S. policy for "permanent division" of the Korean peninsula.

As some reports from Washington indicated recently that the Carter Administration would "quietly abandon" the withdrawal plan before long, a substantial change or flexibility is expected in the original withdrawal plan of the Carter Administration. It is apparent that the north Korean Communists feel fretful at this development. The Pyongyang regime, which had pinned much expectation on Carter's withdrawal plan, must have been disappointed much when the U.S. government's intention to bolster the equipment of the Republic of Korea Armed Forces before the withdrawal has become clear beyond doubt.

Another motive behind the abrupt release of the memorandum seems to lie in Pyongyang's attempt to mount a fresh propaganda abroad in its bewilderment over the consolidating relations between south Korea and Japan and the growing call for rearmament in the conservative circles in Japan in connection with the planned American troop withdrawal, as well as over the expanding relations between the Republic and non-aligned countries. It would be very much childish and foolish for the Pyongyang regime to believe that its machination for entry into the United Nations under a single title like "Koryo confederate republic," as suggested repeatedly in the memorandum, would have any appeal to the international community. The common sense in the world community is the principle of the universality of the United Nations.

We call for simultaneous entry of south and north Korea into the United Nations as an interim step pending the time of national unification. There is no reason at all why such simultaneous entry should stand in the way to peaceful unification of the Korean peninsula. When we see the precedence in which Egypt and Syria which had seats at the world organization together, were merged in 1958 and remained so until 1961, we can realize

it clearly tells that U.N. seats have nothing to do with the unification issue.

It goes without saying that it is a mere diplomatic machination intended to serve communization of south Korea for the north Korean Communists who call for an international solidarity among proletariats before striving for any unity between the same people, to trumpet for something like national unification. If north Korea is truly interested in peaceful unification, it should strive for the alleviation of tensions between south and north Korea first. To call for “unification” while boycotting dialogue and opposing even simultaneous entry into the United Nations, well reveals their hidden intention.

It was natural for the government to refute north Korea’s deceptive propaganda in time. But, one thing that should be noted is that we must launch a more positive diplomatic offensive against the north Korean Communists. Rather than merely ending in refuting north Korean Communists. Rather than merely ending in refuting north Korea passively, incessant efforts should be made to put forth new proposals to north Korea continuously. We have to cope with propaganda with a propaganda.

South and North Korean Relations and Red China And Soviet Union

The Seoul Shinmun (February 6, 1978)

On last February 1, north Korea released an unusual “government memorandum.” The memorandum was boiled down to its opposition to simultaneous entry into the United Nations and cross recognition of south and north Korea by the Western and Communist blocs, and a warning that no country should improve relations with south Korea, apparently with Red China and the Soviet Union in its mind.

Such contention by north Korea seems to have stemmed from its sense of crisis prompted by the fact that our suggestions for simultaneous entry into the world organization and cross recognition of south and north Korea, both aimed at bringing about peaceful relations between south and north Korea, have drawn broad affirmative response in the international com-

munity. In a sense, it may also imply the existence of some dispute between north Korea and the two Communist giants of Red China and the Soviet Union over the issue of south-north Korean relations.

Communist China and the Soviet Union remain in the relations of deep-rooted ideological and national disputes. Such relations are bound to influence international relations. However, so far as the Korean question is concerned, both countries are known to hope that war will not recur and peaceful relations will develop between south and north Korea. The reason seems to be that if war breaks up again on the Korean peninsula, the two Communist giants, being in the ties of military alliance with north Korea, would inevitably be dragged into a war with the United States. If this is so, then both Red China and the Soviet Union ought to exercise their influence against the adventurism of Kim Il-sung who dreams of invading south Korea.

But what appears strange to us is that both Red China and the Soviet Union fail to speak up about the Korean question, trying, instead, to cater to the Kim Il-sung regime. In other words, even though Kim Il-sung's attitude and conducts with regards to the south-north relations run counter to those of the two countries, they simply defend Pyongyang without airing any displeasure at least on the surface.

Even about the "government memorandum," Communist China and the Soviet Union aired their support for it by citing some of its clauses in their reports. In addition, after a high-powered Soviet mission visited Pyongyang in last January, Red China and the Soviet Union repeatedly confirmed their support of north Korea's unification formula as if they were competing each other for the heart of Pyongyang. Of course, we are not ignorant of the fact that Peking and Moscow have been waging a fierce competition for the hegemony of north Korea. Therefore, the support of Pyongyang's unification formula by Red China and the Soviet Union is intended primarily to enlist Pyongyang to their respective sides apart from the question of whether the unification formula is in accord with their policies.

Since August 1973 when the south-north dialogue was suspended, Red

China and the Soviet Union branded contacts with south Korea as a "taboo." Whenever there were some indications of one of the two countries coming in some contacts with Seoul, the other was quick to denounce it.

The attitude of Communist China and the Soviet Union reminds us of the fable that several lions were taken around by one pig because the lions could not see a mountain screened by a nearer hill. There would be no reason why Red China and the Soviet Union can't know the fact that Pyongyang's unification stand opposing peaceful relations between the south and north on the grounds of "perpetualization of national division," constitutes a factor detrimental to improvement of the south-north relations and fomenting tensions on the Korean peninsula.

We would like to advise Communist China and the Soviet Union not to defend but strongly restrain the Kim Il-sung regime's act of threatening peace on the Korean peninsula, by reconsidering their relations with north Korea on a broader and far-sighted basis.

Theme Theses of Symposium on Heterogeneity Between South and North Korea

In the following pages are the theme theses presented at the Symposium on Heterogeneity between South and North Korea held for 20 days beginning October 18, 1977 under the auspices of the Board of National Unification. The theses were about some internal areas considered detrimental to peaceful unification of the country. — Editor—

Tradition and Political System —Political Aspects of Heterogeneity—

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I. Foreword

The issue of heterogeneity between the south and north has begun to draw greater concern lately. This may well be ascribable to a fresh self-awakening to the changes taking place in the situations surrounding the Korean peninsula. In principle, the question of south-north heterogeneity presupposes peaceful unification of the country. It now seems that the issue of peaceful unification of the Korean peninsula hinges more on internal factors than on external ones. The four world powers having stakes in Korea tend to shun any direct confrontation, whereas the two heterogeneous political forces, having consolidated the grounds for their

respective influences in the past 30 years, stand fiercely pitted against each other on the Korean peninsula. Today, the Korean unification issue appears to have become a problem between the two heterogeneous forces, namely, our people's own question rather than being an international political question requiring the adjustment of interests among the four powers.

Under the circumstances, the ever-deepening heterogeneity between the south and north represents a tremendous obstacle to peaceful unification. The nature of such serious heterogeneity between the south and north, however, is bound to differ depending on its criterion, that is, whether the criterion is the pre-division Korean society, the present south Korean society or the image of the fatherland after peaceful unification. Here, the issue of south-north heterogeneity shall be studied, keeping in mind the image of a peacefully unified fatherland, namely, a Korea that maintains non-hostile relations with the four powers having stakes in Korea internationally and that has created a free welfare society internally. And, the two political systems of the south and north shall be observed in the two periods of "imitation" and "pursuit of independent road" in accordance with the theoretical frame under which societies are classified into two categories depending on their attitude toward tradition. We shall begin with the presentation of what can be the theoretical frame based on one's attitude toward tradition. However, since the question of tradition is closely related to the issue of recreation of history, the question of recreation of history, too, shall be discussed when theoretical frame is presented.

II. Theoretical Frame

A newly born nation may well be said to pursue modernization in the sense of the formation of a modern state no matter whether it seeks to create a democratic modern country or a Communist one. However, the possibility of a new-born country becoming modernized can be reviewed

in two major categories depending on its attitude toward its past tradition.

One is the case in which modernization is considered to be a discontinuation of the past. In this case, new-born countries, whether they pursue Western modernization or Communist one, model after the development pattern of other countries without any review.

The other is the case in which the continuity of the past is recognized. In this case, a new development pattern is created through intergration of alien and indigenous elements.

Which one shall have a bigger chance for success?

In his "Method for Development," Chester Bowles says, "Those new-born countries trying to find a solution to their complex problems from a certain idea already put in order clean, will mostly fail." Bowles then argues that since both classic capitalism and orthodoxy communism are "a far cry from the complex present world," it is believed that new-born countries should solve the great task of national development in their own manner based on their respective experiences and traditions.

So long as the traditions they were handed down and the situations in which they find themselves differ, the pattern and path of the modernization of new-born countries are bound to differ not only from those of advanced countries but also from those of other new-born countries. Therefore, new-born countries should follow their own independent roads of modernization with a firm sense of integrity based on their tradition. In fact, efforts to restore their integrity and rediscover their tradition have lately become a common phenomenon among newly born nations.

It can be seen that in the course of their modernization, south and north Korea are switching over to the stage of "recognition of the continuity of tradition" = "pursuit of independent road" from the stage of "discontinuity from tradition" = "imitation."

Rediscovery of tradition is necessary for the pursuit of an independent road, and recreation of history is required for the rediscovery of tradition.

We often say that "the present is the product of the past." On the contrary, we also can say that "the past is the product of the present." Definitely the past survives in the midst of the present, and regulates our

thinking and conducts knowingly or unknowingly. On the other hand, we sometimes produce the history of the past in accordance with the present's need and objective.

When efforts exist to project future wishes on the past or to find from the past what is going to be created in the future, we call this "the recreation of history." In most cases, the recreation of history is made through the reinterpretation of the past's historical facts. We see many historical instances in which the strength created through the recreation of history had charted the course of history.

One thing that is closely related to this issue of the recreation of history is the issue of tradition. Tradition is the beliefs and customs handed down from the past. Here arises the issue of whether the various values or customs coming down from the past should be safeguarded as they are or modified. In this respect, we can see the difference between 19th century China and Japan of the Meiji Era.

Many Chinese leaders were hostile to the reforms that were going against their past practices, whereas the Japanese were trying to re-evaluate their past in a manner suitable to their efforts to modernize their country.

In fact, the sense of "family country" which was the spiritual base of the Emperor's state system, the prime mover behind the Japanese modernization, was partly based on the ancient tradition of Japan and partly discovered newly after the Meiji era.

Japan is definitely a typical country which accelerated its modernization through recreation of its tradition. On the other hand, however, the recreation of its tradition had led Japan to a total disruption. The recreation of tradition or history is always accompanied by risk to a certain extent.

III. Period of "Imitation"

The "save-righteousness-and-repel-evil" campaign, enlightenment drive and the Tonghak Uprising, which were all staged in the course of coping

with the shock of outside forces during the final years of the Yi Dynasty when the waves of Western capitalism were onrushing furiously, were integrated into the two branches of voluntary armed resistance and patriotic enlightenment campaign after the Eulsa Protectorate Treaty, and again into a single campaign during the time of the Samil Independence Movement. Thereafter, the national movement was split into the rightists and leftists under the influence of the Russian revolution, followed by repeated searches for, and failure in, collaboration between the rightists and leftists amidst the conflicting nationalistic and class senses until the time of national liberation.

Unfortunately, as Korea was liberated largely by outside forces and as the fatherland was divided into two owing to the Russo-U.S. Cold War, the democratic and Communist camps within the independence movement were separated into the south and north in search of their respective courses. In other words, south and north Korea sought the formation of modern states, the former in the pattern of Western democracy and the latter Soviet communism.

1. South Korea

One of the reasons for the introduction of Western democracy into south Korea was the pro-Western propensity which the Korean people had come to harbor due to the flow of the times at the time of the end of World War II and also as a repercussion to the Japanese rule. Still, the more realistic reason was, above all, the fact that largely those intellectuals who had undergone Western democratic education participated in the government with the initiation of the U.S. military administration.

John Morley once stated, "A people who have the best chance to shun catastrophe are those who find a way to expand their present hope most freely without breaking off the entire tradition of the past too drastically." However, the Westernized elites of new-born countries, out of their fascination in the Western civilization, tended to regard the "universal ideas" already penetrated by the historical characteristics of advanced Western countries as "something universal" naively, and for the sake of

their realization, to detach themselves from their traditional culture, the product of their countries' historical characteristics.

The political elites of south Korea were no exception. Even in the debris of the Korea war, they attempted to transplant Western democracy as it was, which could hardly be grafted on our political tradition, even under the destruction of the Korean War. However, the Western democracy transplanted in south Korea failed to take root properly, undergoing various difficulties. The fundamental cause seems to lie in the fact that the south introduced the system rather rashly without preparing conditions necessary for the consolidation of democracy. In fact, south Korea had hastily brought in democratic systems such as parliament and elections without any political systems such as parliament and elections without any political culture capable of consolidating democracy, socio-economic basis and especially autonomous ability. The consequence was either charismatic one-man dictatorship or anarchistic chaos. Finally a military revolution took place, a phenomenon common among new-born countries.

2. North Korea

The basic cause behind the introduction of a Communist system modeled after Soviet-style Communism into north Korea seems to lie in the policy of the Russian military government to sovietize north Korea. As was the case with East European countries, the sovietization of north Korea followed a specific pattern: bringing in of leaders who sought and was granted political asylum and underwent political training in the Soviet Union; creation of government system around such leaders; establishment of a coalition government based on people's democracy; and eventual seizure of power by Communist party.

The ideological base introduced in the laying of a Communist system in north Korea under such pattern was Marx-Leninism as reinterpreted by Stalin.

Marx-Leninism contained an idea for communization of the world, but did not make clear the idea that the Soviet Union should have the hegemony of a world communization movement or that other Communist

countries should be subject to the sovereignty of the Soviet Union.

However, Stalin revived Tasar's aggressive nationalism, placing all Communist parties of the world under the control of the Soviet Union and establishing master-servant relations between the Soviet party and the Communist Parties of other countries.

Meanwhile, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union under Stalin's rule carried the nature of one-man dictatorship. Originally, Marx called for proletariat dictatorship, and Lenin who followed Marx converted proletariat dictatorship into Communist dictatorship.

This Communist Party dictatorship was transformed into the idea of Stalin's personal dictatorship in Stalin's age. But, it was the politics of inhumane terror and violence, which used personal idolization as the basis of power politics.

Since Stalinism was employed as its ideological base, north Korea completely subjugated itself to the Soviet Union while carrying out a project to make Kim Il-sung a junior Stalin. And, north Korea was ordered to accomplish communization of the whole Korean peninsula.

In order to become a junior Stalin, Kim Il-sung embarked on bloody purges, and to ensure satellitization of north Korea, reminded his people of "favorable conditions brought about by great Soviet troops" and praised "the almightiness of great Comrade Stalin."

Kim Il-sung's early-stage Communist system, modeled basically after the Stalin system, was without any traits of national independence and could not go along with the political tradition of our nation.

The then historical consciousness of north, dedicated to the denial of national tradition, held valueless all national heritages prior to communization, and plunged into self-denial in terms of culture by serving the Soviet Union as "fatherland."

IV. Period of "Pursuit of Independent Road"

The post-World War II history entered its second stage around the mid-

dle of 1950s. As the control by the United States and the Soviet Union had weakened, the state of the Cold War underwent a substantial alteration. The international power nucleus was multi-polarized, giving rise to neo-democracy in both the East and West which features the placement of national interests above ideology.

Owing to the facts, however, that the East-West Cold War not only ended in bringing about the national split but also caused the unprecedented tragedy of fratricidal war, and that the Sino-U.S. cold war rather grew intensified accompanied by local hot war, neo-democracy could hardly emerge on the Korean peninsula.

But, when Western democracy introduced into new-born countries began to suffer setback toward the end of the 1950s, the symbol of Western civilization shifted from parliament to steel mills. The situation, however, had to change after the Sino-USSR dispute had surfaced in the early part of the 1960s and U.S.-China approach began to take place around the end of the 1960s.

1. South Korea

What had drawn the public concern most in the initial stage of the May 16 Military Revolution was that it placed an emphasis on national integrity and showed a nationalistic tendency. This meant a reflection on our past attitude of placing the international mission of the free world above the historical tasks of our nation under the banner of democracy. This self-awakening of our people, namely, the discovery of the sense of integrity, has emerged in the form of pursuit of practical national interests and modernization, especially economic construction. The phenomenon represented the development of the sense of practical national interests in place of ideology influenced by the shake in the Cold War ideology prompted by the multi-polarization of international politics.

However, due to the then Asian situation characterized by a heated Cold War between the United States and Communist China, coupled with the fading original passion of the revolution, our nationalism had given way to the slogan of modernization. Five-year economic development plans were

launched in succession under the banner of “modernization of the fatherland.” Consequently, industrialization has taken place speedily; industrial structure has improved markedly; and the scale of economy expanded tremendously. All these were really encouraging phenomena.

But this fast economic growth was not without any sacrifice. Since the industrialization pursued in the wake of the May 16 Revolution was external-oriented, carried out with emphasis on large industries financed with foreign capitals, rather than being internal-oriented, implemented with the absorption and mobilization of domestic resources, the gap between industries and strata has deepened internally while economic reliance on abroad has increased externally.

Inasmuch as the effective industrialization of a country requires voluntary and positive participation by its whole people, our industrialization should be carried out in such a way as to ensure national unity. To this end, national integrity must be established first. This need is also true of the area of national security. The thawing mood prompted by the Sino-U.S. approach spread to the Korean peninsula, paving the way to the south-north dialogue for a time. However, Communist threats from the north have not abated. Worse yet, the United States is planning to reduce the U.S. forces in Korea as part of its appeasement policy toward Communist China. Under the circumstances, we must prepare a self-reliant security system whether we like it or not.

One effective way to establish national integrity is to restore national pride and confidence by recovering correctly the lost or distorted national tradition.

Today's worldwide trend is to review the issue of tradition as against the conventional attitude of regarding the departure from tradition as modernization. Even on this land where spiritual reliance on abroad had increased influenced by superior alien cultures, various steps are taken lately to safeguard traditional culture with a view to establishing nationalistic integrity while study of tradition prevails in the academic circles. As a result of such active study of the question of tradition as a nationality issue or an issue of the sense of value or of the structure of conscience, the features or

the merits and demerits of the tradition of Korea have been discovered, and, at the same time, measures to deal with the merits and demerits are discussed concretely. In addition, reinterpretation of so-called flunkeyism or specific historical facts such as factional disputes is being sought. National tradition with regard to national security is also emphasized.

Such utilization of tradition is intended to follow an independent road to modernization based on national integrity. However, the south Korean government that has come to pursue an independent road, effected a constitutional amendment by declaring "emergency martial law" for the establishment of the Yushin (Revitalizing Reforms) System in view of peculiar conditions within and without. The Yushin System was designed to bolster the political system keeping pace with north Korea's constitutional amendment. Following the introduction of the Yushin System, the south Korean government is going all-out to build up the national security posture and develop economy.

2. North Korea

It was December 1955, two years after the death of Stalin, when Kim Il-sung began to emphasize the need for the establishment of integrity in his party ideology. And, this policy of integrity, namely, so-called "road of independence," was declared in August 1955 after the Sino-USSR ideological dispute had estranged the two countries decisively.

International communism, that began to crack earlier with Tito's aboutface, underwent an accelerated internal disruption within the framework of Marx-Leninism due to the historical Sino-USSR dispute. Professor Yang Ho-min once explained this phenomenon, "The secular church called communism saw its centralization cease to exist with the disruption of a single doctrine after Stalin's era, and has come to try to build its own church upon a new (or re-interpreted) doctrine that can justify its power."

The pursuit, according to such trend of the times, of its own ideology, church (party) and political power was Kim Il-sung's process of establishing the so-called "juche" idea.

Opinions are split among domestic and foreign scholars as to the nature of "juche" idea. Some foreign scholars interpret it as a form of resistant nationalism. As the basis of their theory, the foreign scholars point out that Kim Il-sung began to introduce "juche" idea toward the end of 1955 before Khrushchev made a de-Stalinization speech in 1956 and the Sino-USSR dispute grew serious. Other scholars try to define its nature in connection with Kim Il-sung's efforts to adapt himself to changes in the Communist bloc characterized by the Sino-USSR dispute, and to establish and maintain his own power system.

In the case with north Korea, in fact, the demand for external independence came in parallel with the strengthening of internal dictatorship. The course of Kim Il-sung's pursuit of an independent road calling for "complete equality" among socialistic countries, small or large, in their relations with China and the Soviet Union; non-interference in domestic affairs; and mutual respect, coincided with the process of consolidating his one-man dictatorial system, during which his political foes or "discontented elements" were purged after they were branded as "revisionists" or "dogmatists."

Seen from internal aspects, Kim Il-sung put forth "juche" idea as a cover to purge the anti-Kim Il-sung forces such as the Yonan faction, to retain his Stalinistic dictatorship by fending off the spread of the de-Stalinization movement initiated by Khrushchev, and to prepare against possible stoppage or reduction of military and economic assistance from the Soviet Union. In this scheme, Kim Il-sung further consolidated the centralized bureaucratic system, emphasized the need for "renovative spirit for resuscitation with one's own efforts" launching such popular movements as "chollima drive" and "chongsanri drive," and pushed through a plan to national-historicize humanities and social sciences.

The basic objective north Korea has been pursuing is "construction of a socialistic state" and "unification of the entire Korean peninsula under communism." To this end, Kim Il-sung has implemented a plan to turn the whole north Korean region into a "revolutionary democratic base" by speeding up economic and military construction. Internal objectives have

been pursued in close linkage with the external revolutionary goal of communizing south Korea.

In north Korea, tradition of heritage considered harmful to the achievement of these basic objectives has been totally destroyed, while the national history has been altered or rewritten in such a way as to provide some bases for justifying the one-man Communist dictatorship or to buttress a personality cult intended to bolster and maintain the dictatorial system.

Under the Communist system, politico-socialization by means of propaganda and education carries an especially important function. In north Korea, Kim Il-sung's independent road is instilled into all residents and students in the name of "monolithicism."

Having consolidated its system by promulgating the so-called "socialistic constitution" toward the end of 1972, which put forth, among others, the "juche" idea (Article 4), contending that north Korea has "creatively applied Marx-Leninism to its reality," north Korea suspended the south-north dialogue on the excuse of the Kim Dae-jung incident and has frantically been carrying out projects to build up further its military strength and expand economy.

As an ideological step to overcome the sacrifice, friction and confusion stemming from such implementation, north Korea attempts to further heighten Kim Il-sung's personality cult from the state of his idolization to that of deification, and from the state of his national leadership to that of worldwide leadership.

V. Conclusion

In the foregoing study, we have realized that in the period of "pursuit of independent road," both south and north Korean societies utilized tradition or recreated history. In conclusion, we shall evaluate the state of respective recreation of history in the light of the image of a peacefully unified fatherland.

To this end, it is necessary to review the sense of history in the two societies of the south and north.

As was pointed out by Professor Park Song-pong, "it is true that the circles of national history science in south Korea in the post-liberation years, have made a great stride taking over progressively various trends such as nationalistic history science, socio-economic history science and positive history science." But, mostly they were centered around individual research activities. Therefore, the basic direction of the new national history science of independent system is now about to be sought.

In order to achieve national unification, history should be recreated with a peacefully reunified fatherland as the ultimate objective. At the same, I believe that various policies should be sought in such a way as to link the short-term objective of national security to the far-sighted objective of unification.

Meanwhile, the case with north Korea has clearly showed the characteristics and limitation of the north Korean history science. In other words, in north Korea "the right to interpret the history is in the hands of the party, and the history of the past is restructured depending on political needs of the present."

To make the national history appear to be in consonant with the materialistic conception of history, our history has been distorted and made a history of class struggles. Similarly, the history of our independence struggles against Japan has been fabricated to serve Kim Il-sung's personality cult.

Therefore, "integrity means only Kim Il-sung's own personal integrity, and creative application indicates Kim Il-sung's personal creative application only."

In addition, family function has become minimized while the collectivity role of cooperative farms and industries has been maximized, prompting near destruction of our traditional family-oriented culture. In this state, Kim Il-sung's family alone has loomed large, leading to the rampancy of Kim Il-sung's nepotism.

This phenomenon of the discontinuation of tradition is true not only of

the family system but also of religious aspects.

If north Korea is really interested in national unification, it should recreate history in the light of future need, namely, peaceful unification, rather than recreating history for its present needs.

National Homogeneity and Issue of Heterogeneity

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I. Foreword

Many people believe that a nation is something eternal and unchanging. This view seems deriving from the fact that our nation has been a single people with time-honored history and tradition. Accordingly, some people tend to believe that although our people live divided in the south and north against their will, there cannot be any substantial change in the view of brethren.

Can this be true? The south-north dialogue, on which we had pinned our so much expectation, has been closed. And, the national heterogeneity that has been taking place north of the truce line for the past 30 years, has emerged as a serious factor detrimental to our national unification.

In this paper, we shall study the various characteristics that intermediated the view of singularity of our nation from the standpoint of regulating the core of the concept of a nation as the view of singularity, and regarding a people not as something given but as something formed, namely, as a process. We also shall look into how such characteristics were altered or obliterated in the north Korean society after national division, and then shall review what significance does national heterogeneity bear toward the unification issue.

II. Essence of Nation and Intermediaries

1. Concept of People

The definition of the concept of a nation varies. But, it means a group of people united sharing the view of singularity.

Therefore, the view of a nation is accompanied by the sense of belonging and brotherly love, and, at the same time, gives birth to the attitude of distinguishing "I" from others and placing my people above others.

It is a well known fact that such concept of a nation or nationalism emerged in Western Europe in modern ages, and was universalized over the whole world with the anti-colonial drive in the 20th century as a momentum.

A problem here is on which criterion has a nation of such concept been formed in reality. In the past, there were two schools of opinions — one was an objective theory based on objective features such as language, region, history, customs and blood relationship, and the other a subjective theory that places emphasis on subjective elements like spirits, will and sentiments.

These theories face limitation each as they fail to offer full explanation. For example, although such subjective elements as national conscience and sentiments reflect the essence of a nation, they cannot be irrelevant to objective environmental conditions. Similarly, oft-discussed objective elements like language and history may enhance national conscience but can by no means be decisive characteristics of a nation.

A new approach that draws our interest in this connection is to link national phenomena to a process called social communication.

The concept of social communication was polished up largely in the works of Karl W. Deutsch. The core of the concept is that a nation does not have specific characters from the beginning, but its characters are the results of social studies and customs formation. According to the theory, such social studies and customs formation are realized through the growth of frequent and sustaining social communication networks

such as trade, travel and communications. In other words, it represents a view that the single social communications networks is the basis of nation forming.

Deutsch's views are in accord with the contention of earlier nationalistic scholars like H. Kohn. The national conscience that emerged in Western Europe in the 18th century settled down on the sustained political ruling since the medieval times. However, the national conscience that could not be linked to political tradition as was in Central and Eastern Europe, remained in an uneasy state. Some scholars like K. Roebenstein argued, "In the past, nation formed state. Today, however, state forms nation."

2. Intermediaries

Even if we have to assume that nation is formed upon specific objective conditions, nation can bear actual meaning only when the existence of nation is subjectively felt by the nation itself.

Therefore, if the view of singularity can be said to be the essence of a nation, objective characteristics such as language and history may well be its intermediaries.

Despite the fact that we are a single nation sharing a unique language and time-honored history and cultural tradition, the north Korean society today undergoes heterogeneity to a great extent. This is because such various characteristics of our nation are being distorted or obliterated in the north Korean society.

III. Difference in View of Nation

The north Korean Communists' view of nation is basically different from ours.

When we discuss nation, we place emphasis on its history and spirit. The north Koreans, however, adhere to Stalin's view of nation, that is; nation is a historical product that came into being with the advent of

capitalism, and bourgeoisie nation ceases to exist with the collapse of capitalism.

North Korea rejects nationalism because nationalism, it argues, is a thought that only defends bourgeoisie rule and exploitation within a nation, and upholds nation's interests alone in violation of the principle of proletariat internationalism.

Although the north Korean Communists call for the theory of one nation on the surface in the issue of our nation, they in effect pursue the theory of two nations so long as capitalism persists in the south, the two nations being "socialistic nation" in north Korea and "bourgeoisie nation" in the south.

Meanwhile, in the application of the Communist theory on the view of nation, it would be difficult to believe that there are no other characteristics in north Korea's subjective and objective conditions. For, there were objective changes in situations such as Stalin's classification of bourgeoisie nation and socialistic nation, support for "national liberation struggles" based thereon, demand for "national communism" among East European countries, and Sino-USSR disputes, as well as subjective environmental restrictions that included growing influence of neutral forces and the Korean people's acute national conscience characterized by anti-Japan struggles.

Especially the Sino-USSR dispute seems to have been much contributory to the bolstering of north Korea's independence. The so-called "juche" idea and "system of monolithic thought" appear not irrelevant to these developments.

IV. Reality of Heterogeneity

1. Language

During the heyday of European nationalism, language was considered more important than any other criterion. Today, however, language fails to become a proper criterion for a nation due to several reasons.

First, language is not something fixed. Just like language has an effect on politics, politics alters language. Switzerland forms a single nation though it uses four languages. English is the official language of six sovereign peoples while Spanish is used by 20 nations.

These are the situation of other nations. What, then, is the case with our nation? Our language the single language preserved throughout many thousand years of our history, has undergone an unprecedented extent of heterogeneity in mere 30 years of national division. According to language specialists, vocabularies and literary styles have been altered substantially though the phonetic and grammatical systems underwent no substantial heterogeneity. This is not due to the general principle of language alteration, but is attributed to north Korea's deliberate political language policy.

The north Korean Communists have introduced the so-called "cultural language," and assert "even if blood tree is same and they live in the same land, they cannot be a single nation if their languages are different," suggesting that they are attempting to perpetuate national division.

2. History

J. S. Mill once said, "the most strong sources for national sentiments are the confirmation of political history, possession of national history and joint reflection based thereon, collective pride, humiliation, rejoice and regret linked to identical acts of the past." E. Renan said, "one of the two essential factors forming the spirit of a nation is the sharing of a rich heritage of remembrance as well as the heritage of glory and resentment."

Today, however, the brethren of south and north Korea are unable to share the same historical heritage nor can they feel together their glory and resentment. This is because of the tremendous alteration of our history taking place in north Korea. The north Korean Communists further deepen national heterogeneity by imposing a fabricated and distorted national history upon their people. They have rewritten the history in

such a way as to emphasize the “revolutionary tradition” of Kim Il-sung’s family tree as well as Kim Il-sung’s “revolutionary struggles” in the modern period, and the materialistic conception of history before the modern era.

3. National Cultural Heritage

The time-honored history and cultural heritage are among the important factors that characterize our nation.

Although Kim Il-sung argues that the inheritance and development of the national cultural heritage is a mandate based on the essence of socialistic cultural construction, and that if a culture is to be built on the mandate of principle, the superior cultural heritage of a nation, rather than others’ cultural heritage, should be developed, north Korea’s cultural policy in effect results in the discontinuation of tradition due to the precondition that “culture should be in a nationalistic form with socialistic contents.”

For example, the traditional holiday of “chusok” is no longer a holiday to them whose most important holiday is now Kim Il-sung’s birthday of April 15. Most of the historical relics in north Korea have been left ruined while “relics of Kim Il-sung’s struggles against Japan” have been invented in the vicinity of Mt. Paektu.

It is natural that our traditional customs and way of living and the existing sense of value cannot be accepted under the Communist system.

V. Conclusion

In the above, we have looked into how serious the issue of heterogeneity between south and north Korea is. And it was known beyond doubt that the north Korean Communists are to be blamed for the heterogeneity. It is clear that they are pursuing two nations’ policy in effect, though they pretend to advocate national unification.

North Korea’s exclusive social communication sphere, the absolute

ruling power, and comparatively stabilized political unit... all these facilitate the formation of a separate heterogenous culture.

We expect that north Korea, influenced by changes in its international situation and new international political developments, would someday accept our policy to achieve peaceful unification through dialogue, exchanges and cooperation. But, nobody would be able to tell when such time could be.

But we don't need to be disappointed. J. J. Rousseau once said, "Creator of a commonwealth has to endeavor for a century, and it takes another century to reap its results."

Heterogeneity of Culture and Character Structure

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I. Factors of Cultural Heterogeneity

Since the word “culture” is a terminology describing the pattern of life as a whole, it incorporates far-reaching and diverse aspects. Customarily in many cases, culture is restricted to the pattern of life as distinct from the political, economic and social structures. The former is the broad concept of culture and the latter its narrow concept. In either case, however, culture is characterized by the fact that it points to the pattern of life that permeates into the components of a specific society in general. In the broad concept, culture is the comprehensive pattern of life permeating into the all areas of a society, while in the narrow concept, culture is viewed with specific functions of a society as criterion.

When it comes to the culture of south and north Korea, it indicates the life pattern of the south and north Korean peoples, namely; the patterns of thinking, feeling and conducts, in most cases. But, in this paper, all the heterogenous features of the pattern of life that can be found in respective social units are made the objects of a study.

Originally only the same quality culture exists to the same people. Their language is same and so is the way of thinking. They share the identical mode of conducts. Until around the time of national liberation, the peoples of south and north Korea, with the same national culture, were homogeneous and solidary as a single livelihood community.

However, the tragedy of national division has formed separate two living spheres with different political units and economic systems, thereby implanting two heterogeneous cultures and destroying the homogeneity of the nation. What can be the factor behind the division of one culture into two and enforcement of two mutually heterogeneous cultures upon the people of Korea?

First, the rule by alien cultures can be cited. The occupation of south and north Korea by American and Soviet forces in the wake of national liberation had provided the momentum for the American and Soviet cultures to infiltrate south and north Korea, respectively. Our attachment to independence was strong. But, we failed to maintain our cultural self-reliance in the face of merciless weakening of our national culture by the Japanese culture under the colonial rule by Japan. So, we lacked the wisdom and sense of judgement to introduce on the selective basis the alien cultures that were swarming the country in the post-liberation years.

In both south and north Korea, the introduction of alien cultures was made without any clash with the conventional culture, the kind of clash found rather naturally under similar circumstances elsewhere. As a result, a state of cultural disorder had developed in which alien cultures were unilaterally imposed upon the existing culture without providing to the conventional culture any momentum for its dissolution or restructuring. In south Korea, therefore, the American-style free democratic culture was received as an ideal, while in north Korea the Soviet Communist culture was taken as something absolute. Lately, however, signs have emerged of rectification of such trend in both south and north Korea. Still, it is difficult to uproot from the bottom an already established cultural influence.

Second, the division of political power can be given. The inauguration of separate governments in south and north Korea, and the subsequent Korean War had led to a divisional phenomenon in which rightist political forces were consolidated in the south and leftist forces in the north. The failure to foster political immunity each other and the hostile

relations between the south and north have brought about a fierce division of political powers as well as sharp struggles, which in turn has led to a state of extreme antagonism and confrontation between north Korea's communization policy and south Korea's stand against communism. This division of political powers, split to an extent where they can hardly be compromised, has deepened the difference in the cultures of life amidst the rule of conflicting political ideologies, causing the two sides to have different systems of thoughts.

Third, the effect of different economic systems can be given. South Korea has introduced the partially controlled and planned capitalistic economic system under the principle of market economy, whereas in the north a radical socialistic economic system has been brought in under which all lands and industries were nationalized, private commercial and industrial activities brought to an end, all farmlands communized, and the entire people organized. Such difference in economic systems has guided people's feelings of life and their sense of value in different manners. In south Korea, economic activities are operated under individual responsibility, while in north Korea the state is responsible for the economic activities of individuals. In this way, heterogeneous atmospheres for living have been created in south and north Korea. Man who cannot help but be dependent on economic structure, is bound to be controlled by such economic structure in the end. In the course of adapting himself to atmospheres, his character is made to be formed differently according to the atmosphere.

Fourth, features of different social structure can be given. The social system of south Korea is in principle based on an open and class structure. In north Korea, however, the social system carries an intentionally controlled class structure, the road to the top class of which is singularized by the degree of one's loyalty to the party and records of struggles. The comparatively simple class order that can be classified into ranking cadre party members, basic class and assortment of other classes, has been systematized in the north. One's position at workshop is considered identical to his class status. To compare with the class structure of

south Korea, the upper class comprises ranking political cadres and party members, the middle stratum the basic class people, and the lower stratum assortment of the people of other classes. While one's status prestige is determined largely by his economic position in the south, it depends solely on one's political standing in the north.

The problem is with the peculiar difference in class structures rather than with the aspect of class structures. The capitalistic class which is the target of attack in north Korea constitutes the important class elements of the middle and upper strata in south Korea, while the labor class, a component of the capitalistic society, is pushed up as a ruling class in the north. North Korea persists in a class policy in which all middle strata have been turned into the labor class. In south Korea, however, the middle class has become a pivotal force that restrains and adjusts the capitalistic and labor classes. From the standpoint of social structure, the confrontation between south and north Korea is a confrontation between the middle class and labor class, and also a struggle between the trend of the middle class toward a welfare society and that of the labor class toward a Communist society. The difference between the north Korean society where only the culture of labor class is unilaterally enforced, and the social life in south Korea where the culture of middle class forms the center of the culture of life while different class cultures are allowed to coexist, functions as the source of cultural heterogeneity between south and north Korea.

Fifth, cultural activities and apparatus can be cited. In north Korea, all mass communications media are monopolized by the state. All publications and even academic books, let alone newspapers, radio, television, films and magazines, are controlled. Monopolization of mass communications media enables a regime to block in advance the emergence of undesirable critical attitude by sealing off the source of information detrimental to the maintenance of its system. In south Korea, however, private ownership of mass communications media is allowed. In north Korea, the function of mass communications, quite different from that of south Korea, is to play the role of collective propagandist, collec-

tive agitator and collective organizer.

Even literature or arts are totally mobilized for ideological indoctrination in north Korea. Only those literary works that are "nationalistic in form and socialistic in contents" on the basis of the so-called socialistic realism, are permitted in north Korea. In literary activities also, loyalty to the party and class idea is emphasized, while the ideological aspect of works is regarded more important than its artistic value.

Themes of literary or artistic works are dictated by the party, and combative literary works are produced on a quota basis. A rigid literary control is enforced, denying room for any culture other than the Communist culture and uniformizing the entire people's way of thinking.

Sixth, due attention should be paid to the difference in socialization. In north Korea, socialization requires the total and organized mobilization of the method of planned socialization, demonstrative socialization, collective socialization, and one-side demonstration. The same contents are infused repeatedly with strictly controlled consistency between the socialization at home and at organization. The effect of ideological infusion is bolstered through various indoctrination meetings, while human reform is forcibly demanded through practice. This has a powerful effect on the young generation, mass-producing a completely different kind of people.

II. Aspects of Cultural Heterogeneity

The cultural heterogeneity has already been fixed in south and north Korea both structurally and systematically. Such prerequisites contain the possibility of further deepening the cultural heterogeneity with the passage of time. However, the question of how deep cultural heterogeneity has the 30-year-long national division brought about remains a problem requiring much study. For, since a national culture is an ultra-organic being condensed socially with time-honored historical

experiences accumulated, it carries the traits of independent objectivism and constraint.

National culture is often understood as a universal culture. It means the way of living common among the members of a nation. Our people has a common universal culture in the fields of language, clothes, dietary life, housing, folk tales, way of living, way of baby care, filial duty, close relations among family members, family rituals and holiday practices. It seems they are still shared by the south and north today. North Korea does not deny the pattern of national culture. No matter where they meet, the people of south and north Korea can know their being the same people from their outlook and can freely communicate their thoughts. If only the barrier of political ideology were removed, there would be no difficulty in mutually recognizing their being the same brethren.

If such is the situation, then must the cultural heterogeneity of south and north Korea be interpreted as the division of the national culture into unique cultures? There are many problems here. Originally unique cultures mean the phenomenon of cultural division arising within the same society. However, south and north Korea have two independent societies due to political barrier, forming separate units of the sphere of living. There is a universal culture that transcends the two societies, but this universal culture is simply something of the past. At the moment, the universal culture lacks a strength to incorporate the unique cultures of south and north Korea. Besides it is about to be rather encroached by the unique cultures. The universal culture is without any strength to prevent the encroachment.

However, there is little possibility that the cultures of south and north Korea would be developed only with the unique cultures, leaving behind the universal culture as it is. South and north Korea have their own separate pivotal cultures. They can be boiled down to the free democratic culture and the Communist culture. The two cultures have more conflicting elements than common ones. The Communist culture attempts to destroy the free democratic culture, while the free democratic culture

view the Communist culture perilously as something destructive. Such confrontation involves the danger of downgrading national culture into surrounding cultures under a critical circumstance. For, they would attempt to find different cultural grounds under the cloak of hostile feelings and hatred between the peoples of south and north Korea.

In south Korea, low-grade unique cultures are encouraged. There are numerous cultural divisions — man's culture, woman's culture, aged persons' culture, juvenile culture, rural culture, urban culture, upper-class culture, low-class culture, and assortment of occupational cultures. In north Korea, however, culture is singularized and uniformalized. All people — men and women, young and old — are forced to lead their lives under the same quality of culture. The same thoughts, the same ideas and the same mode of conducts are praised as Communist virtues. In addition, they thoroughly eliminate any room for heterogenous culture. In north Korea, therefore, the strong possibility exists that universal culture and special culture do not distinguish from each other and instead disperse when north Korea is seen as a single social unit. In effect, the cultural policy is moving toward such direction. In south Korea, however, an independent universal culture is consolidated while a special culture is developed thereunder. Under the circumstances mutually different universal cultures may take root in south and north Korea before long, giving rising to the tragedy of two completely different national cultures being consolidated in the two respective zones. If this really happens, the language would be divided into different dialects, popular customs of life would undergo different changes, and aspirations for national unification would inevitably become diluted.

Some Western sociologists foresee that capitalism and socialism would converge in the same direction in the future. These scholars contend that the trend toward welfare society in the capitalistic society would give birth to capitalistic socialism while the liberalization trend in the Communist society would lead to socialistic capitalsim. But this is a theory based excessively on future wishes. Its realization remains sceptic. For, although it calls for a system mixed with capitalism and socialism, heterogeneity

would still remain depending on which system would serve as its basis.

There are even those sociologists who describe that organization men in capitalistic society carry similar social status. They maintain that organization men have the common characters — trend toward others and type of automatic persons. From the organizational point of view, the structure of same-quality organizational character may be discovered. But, we can see that this theory is limited when we consider the restriction that organization men can by no means be the same in a circumstance where social structures are different.

Therefore, it would be nothing more than a romantic dream to expect that the homogeneity of social character may be found when capitalism and socialism reach a highly advanced stage in south and north Korea, respectively. Even though it may be achieved, it would be a story of a remote future and can hardly appeal to the contemporary people. The fact that development methods differ or conflict with one another depending on national characteristics even in the socialistic society which emphasizes cultural commonness, tells that the life unit called “nation” serves as the ultimate base of culture.

In the case with south and north Korea also, compromise would be possible and unification would be expected only when national homogeneity is retained. In this respect, we feel the need to look into how far has cultural heterogeneity progressed and what do they have in common.

A culture can be divided into three sub-cultures depending on the structural pattern of division, namely; ideal culture, action culture and tool culture. Ideal culture is a value-oriented culture which regards social growth as something desirable, and action culture is the culture of the mode or custom which people are following. And tool culture is the one related to the means of living such as tools and facilities for life. In this classification of culture, the heterogeneity that looks most outstanding between south and north Korea starts from ideal culture.

The ideal culture of north Korea is based on Kim Il-sung's interpretation of Marx-Leninism. Monolithicism, “juche” idea, collec-

tivism, socialistic patriotism, and proletariat revolutionary road... all of these show a striking contrast with modernization thought, welfare social idea, free democracy, individualism, and steady improvism of south Korea. In north Korea, achievement of collective goals is emphasized whereas in south Korea individual prosperity and happiness are held important.

As a means of coping with north Korea's revolutionary road, the Yushin (Revitalizing Reform) System has been added to the list of ideas of south Korea. However, it seems that there is no room for compromise for the difference in these ideal cultures. Still, it is not that there is no element in common in such difference. That is the trend toward nationalism. Of course, the two sides' interpretation of nationalism differs. But, we can find the common base in such areas as protection of cultural heritage, uplift of national prestige, promotion of self-reliant capability, and establishment of the basis of Korean standard.

Greater similarities can be found in action culture. Both south and north Korea share the conventional characteristics of Korea in such matters as pastoral sentiments, community ties, traditional family relations, practice of mutual assistance, seniority, warmness to others, and reverentialism. In north Korea, however, these are used for collectivistic organized life. In the south, they are practiced for individual needs.

In tool culture, both south and north Korea pursue the achievements of modern mechanical civilization. Since technology or machinery is something universal that stands above ideology, it seems there is little difference in tool culture between the south and north with the exception of the difference in production form, that is; capitalism versus socialism.

Things in south Korea can be used in north Korea, and vice versa. The absolute pattern of garments, dietary life and housing, that embodies the essence of a nation, has not changed. Difference is small even in their contents. Kimchi, the hot-floor system of "ondol" and the traditional garments of "hanbok" would persist as long as the nation survives.

Thus seen, we may arrive at the conclusion that the systematic closed-

ness of the south and north Korean society has given rise to heterogeneity in the surface culture, but in the depth culture, there is only small difference. In the way of talking, human relations and folklore, etc., surface changes take place. But, we can see that depth changes have yet to occur. This is the conclusion drawn at the moment, and few persons can tell how long this homogeneity would continue.

III. Socialization and Personality Structure

Culture is instilled into individuals in the course of socialization. Therefore, cultural heterogeneity reveals in the form of difference in individual personality structure.

The difference in such personality structure is most evident in the youths of south and north Korea. In any society, socialization is carried out primarily among families, friends and neighbors in general. The families of south and north Korea undergo respectively different courses of socialization.

Most important in the course of socialization is the method of family nursing. South Korean families adopt a mixed form of nursing in which the method of Western-style socialization is introduced on one hand and the conventional method of nursing is retained on the other. Accordingly, the Confucianistic traditional norm is safeguarded with the tendency to expand the norm in the direction of modern nature. South Korea, under the circumstances, pursues the character pattern of integrating and sublating traditional closedness and modern openness.

It seems that north Korea, too, does not completely eliminate conventional systems. For, in the social activities in north Korea, importance is still attached to family background. Traditional closedness still exists. But it is being transformed into a group disposition that is in complete accord with the collectivistic norm.

In the case with south Korea, both tradition and modern openness coexist in the family life. In north Korea however, tradition is revealed

in a more strengthened form linked to collectivistic disposition.

This sort of propensity appears well in the kind of people who enjoy popularity in the colleague group of children. In south Korea, those children who can best adapt themselves to their respective world are popular among their colleagues, whereas in north Korea, those who are strong in the sense of revolutionary struggles as encouraged by the state are led to become pivotal figures. This policy is clearly embodied in children's mass communications media and educational tools.

In south Korea, young persons are easy to get acquainted with one another. Still, they all conceal their bases deep in themselves. They become familiar with one another and their sense of integrity deepens as they exchange their hoped-for rewards.

The youths of north Korea can come in contacts with one another only when they can commonly meet specific official criterion. Before they get acquainted with one another, they have to go through the procedure of confirming whether they can meet the given criterion. The relations between friends carry a very important significance in the course of socialization. The problem is that in south Korea, the world of children may differ from that of adults. In north Korea, however, things are deliberately manipulated so that the two worlds become identical. In south Korea, colleague groups, especially student groups, have functions of their own, and such functions assume an important role, bringing about the possibility of forming a youth culture.

The children of north Korea have to compulsorily join organized establishments. In south Korea, however, any affiliation is left to their own discretion. In other words, children are thoroughly trained in organized life in north Korea from their early years, and personality is moulded in a specific direction through collective pressure.

But, in south Korea children accept collective pressure on their own on a selective basis. In this way, the organization-oriented pattern of social superiority is consolidated as an ideal mode in one side, and the internal-oriented pattern based on individual in the other.

In south Korea, the effect of families on the process of socialization is

profound. In north Korea, however, the effect families have on the process of socialization is limited. In south Korea, people are reprimanded when they betray family expectation. In north Korea, however, harsher punishment is meted out when they betray social expectation rather than family one. These features are reflected on personality structure, making the north Korean pattern stiff on the surface, and the south Korean pattern soft. And, the north Korean pattern may well be said to carry many common aspects, whereas the south Korean pattern has a broad area of individual aspects. Since common aspects form the surface of personality structure, the common area of the north Korean pattern is stiff while the south Korean pattern has a flexible common area.

What forms the nucleus part in the social character of the youths of both south and north Korea may well be said to be the conventional Korean character. For, this character functions with the traditional features of the two systems of families and villages, though the degree of such function varies.

What has changed is the surrounding part of the personality of people. Of course, we have to presume that changed in depth have been taking place to a considerable extent among the young generation who have grown amidst such changes in the surrounding part. However, it can be said that as a whole, the south Korean pattern is "conventional character + internally oriented" while the north Korean pattern is "conventional character + organization oriented." The conventional character of south Korea is revealed in the form of norm oriented, while its internal-oriented character is shown in the form of value-oriented. In north Korea, both its conventional character and organization oriented are norm oriented. Therefore, no pluralism can be found there.

It seems that this constitute a factor determining the pattern of human relations in the societies of south and north Korea. It is often said that the Korean-style human relations were vertical human relations. This still exists in both south and north Korea. Due to changes in social character, however, the scope of vertical human relations is being reduced in south Korea, whereas in north Korea, vertical human relations have been tran-

sformed for the efficiency of the maintenance of organization.

These features carry some problems in either side. In south Korea the sense of direction is somewhat obscure because human relations themselves are the goal, whereas in north Korea human relations are regarded too lightly simply as a means of achieving specific objectives.

In south Korea, considerable importance is attached to aesthetic sentiments. Therefore, human and personal passions can get by. This is a factor detrimental to efficiency. On the other hand, such trend is utilized as a means of securing social solidarity. One feature is that family atmosphere, human understanding and aesthetic solidarity are favorably received in south Korea.

In north Korea, however, these are denounced as individualistic residues. Only objective and rational conducts conducive to socialism are tolerated. The unit and contents of conducts should follow the standardized and systematized frame. Only when productive efficiency is raised can the aesthetic fulfilling be rewarded. In this respect, the north Korean pattern is system-oriented while the south Korean one is human-oriented.

With regard to the sense of value among the people, importance is attached to freedom and democracy on the basis of human universality in south Korea. In north Korea, equality and cooperation are established as ultimate values on the basis of social universality. In south Korea, amassment of private properties serves as the yardstick of one's success, but, in north Korea, those who effectively manage the common properties of the society are accorded social recognition.

In south Korea, the sense of inward collective competition is encouraged and promoted, whereas in the north the sense of outward competition is strongly fostered. Emphasis on the sense of individual competition sometime gives birth to renovative egoists. But, emphasis on the sense of outward collective competition produces blind sympathizers. In principle, however, it may well be said that south and north Korea are engaged in a competition between the pursuit of individual efficiency and that of collective efficiency.

In south Korea, individual waste is tolerated, though creativeness is demanded as the price of such sacrifice. In north Korea, social waste caused by the setback of plans is permitted, but no individual waste can be tolerated.

In north Korea, thoroughly futuristic sense of life is encouraged with a call that present sacrifice be accepted for the sake of a better future. In south Korea, a harmony directly linking the present and future is pursued. In other words, the people are aspiring for future hope and stability based on the betterment of the present.

There appears a conspicuous difference between the sense of psychology of south and north Korea. In south Korea, human conducts are understood through the process of heredity, environment and adaptability. But in north Korea, importance is placed on the relations among environment, heredity and training. In north Korea, therefore, training, especially self-training, is emphasized rather excessively.

In other words, the work on taming human psychology totally constitutes one of the important tasks in north Korea. Debate sessions and self-criticism are methods for human reform taking advantage of collective effect. This collectivistic education has inseparable relations with north Korea's social structure. The social character that coincides with social structure forms the nucleus variable that makes possible socialistic plan and calculation.

The frustration of the north Korean people is the derivation of the process of excessive training. The mechanism for its solution is found primarily in the efforts for retraining. Therefore, consciousness and sense of obligation are extremely emphasized. And, a path has been prepared for the people to let out the sentimental instability caused by their frustration against anti-socialistic "enemy." Under the circumstances, patriotism, dedication to the party and heroic intrepid spirit are considered ideal as factors of motivation.

The mechanism for self-control of the north Korean people is a disgrace for backwardness, and this disgrace causes the people to be wary of their colleagues. Therefore, extreme vigilance emerges as mechanism for self-

protection. The people tend to find the criterion for conducts or value not from their inner part but from the outwardly party policy or the direction of the power.

The people tend to avoid political involvement for their safety, and to adapt themselves to the developments of situation outwardly only, leaving their inner side in vacuum. They create their own unofficial words and fill their inner side with them.

Under this political circumstance, self-safety serves as the only criterion for all social activities, with the people striving not to politically get involved. They are naturally obliged to be indifferent to politics because political aspects change always with praised revolutionary leaders and heroes being purged overnight as "the enemy of people" or "anti-party elements." Concern about the direction of political changes becomes keen, and there develops the method of cooperation designed to head off any danger to their safety. They pretend to be faithful to the power outwardly, but internally they intentionally maintain some distance from politics. Thereby, there only remain system-oriented cooperatism, giving rise to such ill practices as formalism, authoritarianism, bureaucratism, pretensionism, ostentationism, false reports and shift of responsibility to others.

In south Korea, however, the method of direct adaptation is pursued through unceasing trial studies of environments. The frustration that has failed in adaptation prepares a preparatory state for re-adaptation through the mechanism of various self-obliteration. In this course, the degree of aspiration is gradually adjusted. Therefore, the degree of aspiration in south Korea has functional relation with various rewards accorded by environment. This may well be called a kind of mechanism of market-oriented adaptation.

In south Korea, frustration derives from the insufficient conditions of an environmental world where an uplifted degree of aspiration fails to be met. In other words, it stems from the distance between the degree of expectation and actual fulfillment. Therefore, frustration demands the readjustment of the degree of aspiration, awaiting for a new opportunity.

In south Korea, an acute concern is drawn to the missing of a momen

tum to seize opportunities. This links to the mechanism of self-control, and leads people to adjust themselves with the sense of uneasiness over loss of their status. Therefore, they tend to fully utilize the opportunity for self-ostentation. Means are mobilized of obtaining the greatest rewards with the least sacrifice.

Such difference in the types of man results from the difference in cultural environment, and the difference in the types of man can become a factor contributing to the formation of different cultural structures.

Overcoming of Heterogeneity and Nationalism

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I. Foreword

At the time we observed in newspapers or newsreels the scenes of Seoul and Pyongyang destroyed during the Korean War, we received them as the tragic look of the two cities that had grown in the single history of our Korean people, rather than as the manifestation of any difference between the south and north. However, the appearance of Pyongyang as reported during the mutual visits to Seoul and Pyongyang by south and north Korean Red Cross delegates in 1972, gave us the feelings of how it had changed and become a city strikingly different from Seoul. Frankly we couldn't receive the changed look without some sense of incongruity that Pyongyang is a city that exists on the Korean peninsula. Whenever the fractions of the shape of north Korea were exposed thereafter, that sense of incongruity changed into the sense of difference. Street scenes of Pyongyang, children marching in columns, women's costumes, sparse automobile traffic, streets without signboards, skinny people and tense conducts.... all these made us feel that north Korea is really a world quite different from the southern side.

When we sensed audio-visually the existence of another world in the northern sector of the Korean peninsula, we couldn't deny the fact that it was the actual results of the 30-year-long ideological confrontation and the naked heritage of the hot war between the south and north. Still, it expresses comprehensively that the south and north have produced different answers respectively to the tasks imposed upon us from the moment our na-

tion was divided by outside forces – we called this moment naively as “liberation.”

What were the tasks? Since they were given with national liberation, such tasks were bound to be produced by “liberators.” Since World War II was an ideological war, the tasks imposed on us by the victors were destined to be ideological. It was true that our Korean people had no political reason whatsoever to reject such tasks. It was also true that our socio-economic conditions had yet to be ripen to such an extent as to carry out the tasks properly. Therefore, to solve the tasks was something “completely new” to us. In other words, we had to undertake what we have never experienced in our history.

What then were those tasks? They can be boiled down to political independence and socio-economic modernization. Needless to say, these were the basic prerequisites to the facilitation of a modern state.

At the same time, they were the tasks which the south and north, divided along the 38th Parallel, had in common. However, the breakup of the Joint U.S.-USSR Committee had divided these common tasks. Both the south and north had begun to carry out the divided tasks in manners their respective “liberators” had dictated.

Almost simultaneously in Seoul and Pyongyang in 1948, there emerged role players for the accomplishment of these tasks. Naturally the role players were not necessarily be nationalistic and democratic. For, the primary approval of the ruling right was granted by Washington or Moscow. However, their continued existence could be guaranteed only by the ability as the proxies of the super powers.

At the same time, they couldn't be free from the role of task executors. But, as power holders they had to promote socio-economic development first under the given methods.

Under the circumstances, political independence had no choice but to be pushed aside as a secondary task. As time passed, however, the prospects had begun to become clear that the method and achievements of socio-economic modernization would become the contents of political independence. The worldwide thawing mood that started to emerge in the latter

half of the 1960s, had converted these prospects into a reality.

Such being the case, our concern was how two societies could develop from a single nation even though there was some difference in the methods of creating their respective societies in the south and north in the past 30 years. This was truly a great concern to sociologists. But the pains of those who were involved in the swirl of such process, ought to be the sufferings stemming from the experience of national division and split.

It was the pain of the split of what had been one society until 1945 into two. Despite the fact that we had gone through even the Japanese rule, retaining basically that we had gone through even the Japanese rule, retaining basically the social structure we had in the final stage of the Yi Dynasty, our single society was split into two because of the confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union.

More important is to analyze which approachable areas of the society does the process of the two societies' development – the process of heterogeneity – carry in its changes, and which areas can cease to exist with the sublimation of the political confrontation. Why is such analysis necessary? This is because the question of peaceful unification of the Korean peninsula is a social issue involving ourselves rather than being a political problem featuring mutual accusation between the south and north. No third party can assume the proxy in the role execution.

II. Sociological Reality of Heterogeneity (North Korea)

When the process of social changes in north Korea after 1945 is taken as the process of heterogeneity, four most important factors of such social changes can be given as follows:

- 1. Changes in social relations.***
- 2. Formation of new leadership.***
- 3. Establishment of the sense of social value (political ideology).***
- 4. Construction of political nucleus.***

But, these alone are not enough to explain everything about social

changes in north Korea. For example, what effect the mass exodus of north Korean people to the south around the time of the Korean War had on the integration of the north Korean society? How has the north Korean society handled tradition? To what extent had the north Korean people accepted the Russian occupation forces' mode of life? Or, what phenomenon of cultural transplantation did the presence of Chinese troops during the Korean War prompted the north Korean people to bring about? These questions are interesting aspects in the understanding of the north Korean social changes. But, they cannot be any leading factors behind the social changes in north Korea.

1. Changes in Social Relations

It was on February 8, 1946 when Kim Il-sung formed a government organization against the background of the armed strength of the Soviet forces. This was the "north Korean provisional people's committee." Kim Il-sung became its chairman as a result of the then objective circumstances.

Kim Il-sung declared that the immediate objective of the committee is to "destroy reactionary forces and liquidate landowners through fierce struggles against pro-Japanese or anti-democratic elements, who are the people's enemies, and confiscate lands from them for distribution to farmers." 1) This declaration was very important in that it presented the base of the social changes that had taken place in north Korea thereafter. For, the speech had an actual binding force. On March 3 of the same year, a "north Korean farmers' convention" adopted a resolution concerning agrarian reform featuring confiscation of landowners' lands without compensation, distribution of the confiscated lands to poor farmers free of charge, effacement of farmers' debts to landowners, and confiscation of irrigation facilities and forests without confiscation for nationalization. 2) On the other hand, the Law Concerning North Korean Agrarian Reform stipulated that the lands exempt from confiscation were those owned by schools, science institutes and hospitals, and "those owned by the persons who struggled for the freedom and independence of Korea and their

families, and by those persons who made specific achievements to the development of national culture and their families.”³⁾

The seemingly inconsistent provisions on land confiscation were intended to deny the land-owning class any material ground and bring the farming class closer to the north Korean regime. The clauses were also designed to bring down undesirable production relations and bolster desirable social relations by guaranteeing material ground for those elements behind the Pyongyang regime.

Needless to say, the north Korean Communist Party was the strategic center for the re-establishment of social relations. Their concrete policies were to 1) increase assistance for the working class, 2) implement programs with emphasis on the wellbeing of poor farmers, 3) maintain alliance with middle-class farmers, 4) isolate rich farmers, and 5) crush landowners if they resist.

Actually, however, “rural committees” consisting of five to nine persons, became the core bodies in the dissolving and reforming the existing social relations. The “rural committees” numbering some 12,000 enabled about 90,000 past tenant farmers⁵⁾ to hold an absolute authority over landowners and rich farmers. In this way, 52 per cent of the total farmlands in north Korea were seized in mere 20 days. This means that 80 percent of the total acreage held by landowners were confiscated. Since part of the lands possessed by middle-class and rich farmers could be considered as “landowners’ lands,” the agrarian reform indicates that 65 percent of tenant farmers were handed lands.⁶⁾ One important assumption here is that the remaining 35 percent of the tenant farmers must have left their rural homes to join government organizations.

This was an unprecedented vertical class movement. At the same time, about 350,000 former landowners and their dependents were reduced to “counter-revolutionary class” without any grounds for materials necessary for their subsistence.⁷⁾

On the heels of the purge of the land-owning class, Kim Il-sung called on laborers and office workers to root out the residues of imperialistic and colonial exploitation, by basically improving working conditions and uplift-

ting the level of material life, emphasizing that “the residues of imperialistic exploitation and feudal exploitation relations implanted by the Japanese imperialists have yet to be eradicated.”⁸⁾ The call was embodied in detail in the “Law on Service of North Korean Laborers and Office Workers” promulgated on June 24, 1946, four days after the speech of Kim Il-sung. In view of the fact that up to 95 to 97 percent of the industries located in north Korea at that time were invested by Japanese,⁹⁾ it was apparent that the law was intended to keep the industrial capitalistic class, considered a reactionary class, away from the sphere of politics, rather than to reform production relations. This was all the more so considering the fact that a total of 1,034 major industries, transportation, communications and banking establishments were nationalized six months earlier. The political implication of the law was conceded at the second congress of the north Korean Workers’ (Communist) Party, during which a report said in part, “The economic grounds of the reactionaries betraying the nation and the fatherland were forfeited while the political eagerness and the will to production on the part of the leading working class were promoted to a great extent.”¹⁰⁾

They called this reform of production and social relations as “anti-imperialistic and anti-feudal democratic revolution” (early in 1946 — end of 1946). As a result, the industries that were operated in the socialistic economic pattern accounted for 90.7 per cent of the entire industries of petit commodity economic type or private capitalistic pattern dwindled to 9.3 percent of the total. ¹¹⁾

The “democratic revolution” had turned upside down the past of the north Korean society wholly. The traditional pattern of agricultural structure was collapsed, and the agrarian reform only meant the equalization of land ownership in preparation for the forthcoming agriculture collectivization. Even remote farm families let alone urban homes were swept into this turbulent social process. No exceptions were allowed. “Comrades” had emerged in place of “yangban (nobility)” and landowners to accelerate the changes. The north Korean Community Party called this a “democratic revolution” but it was in effect the totalitarian modernization of lands. If

modernity means replacement of tradition, we cannot help but call it a revolution intended to equalize the feudal, colonial and social structures. And its essence had to be totalitarian modernization. Since totalitarian modernization is to equalize all sectors of society, there cannot be any "isolated island" there. That this equalization had taken an extreme form, can be known by the fact that already in 1958 the entire farmlands were not only absorbed in agriculture collectivization but also turned into complete cooperative system of a third type, 12) and that in the same year petit commodity capitalistic form or private business completely disappeared in north Korea. 13) In other words, the year 1958 saw the completion of "socialistic base" in north Korea. This indicated the laying of the foundation for totalitarian modernization, its political and social implication being that in the course of this modernization, all people could not remain as citizens but simply as beings identical to organization, namely, "comrades."

The traditional society of Korea was transformed into a different society which is evaluated only on the political and productive base. There is no denying the fact that such society is an efficient society. Efficiency and modernity are the attributes of anti-tradition. In contrast, the concept of freedom may not be an internal attribute of anti-tradition. It cannot help but be said that the change of the north Korean society represented a typical pattern of a totalitarian modernization carried out while eliminating freedom structurally. The characteristics of such modernization arise from the ruling party's lust for power that no discords would be allowed in all areas of society.

This is rationalized by the theory of proletariat dictatorship, which fosters the belief that party monopolizes all decisions and only party can translate decisions into action, and which provides that any opposition should be suppressed and party alone can have absolute ruling. Now "democratic revolution" and "construction of socialistic base" see their stereotypes hardened under the exclusive control by party.

Therefore, the characteristics of the north Korean society are determined in the nature of the ruling class with the party as its core. What is

important above all is the fact that the sociological characteristics of the components of the "Korean Workers' Party" boasting two million membership are that they have parted from their individual historical background (influence of tradition), and have nothing in common with the political and economic ruling classes of south Korea. With no single exception, they are the kind of people obedient to the criterion set forth by the party. Having emerged as "new class" and "new elites," they were the people who couldn't help but thank the party and its government organizations for their privileged status. Herein lies the social base of political uniformity. Still, the political uniformity itself of the ruling class does not point to the stability of social structure. A totalitarian rule can cease to resort to intimidation and coercion only when surface uniformity is filled with internal ties and commonness of contents (modes of life and thinking).

This means that a considerable extent of stability has been secured. However, this is not the expression of liberalization. But, it is an inevitable result of totalitarian modernization that they are in the authoritarian form. This point requires some explanation. In the course of a totalitarian modernization such as the one undertaken in north Korea, rationality for political and productive purposes has been excessively emphasized. On the contrary, however, radical (revolutionary) leap from tradition has made it impossible to accompany, and has rather oppressed, development of the modern and rational way of thinking. For this reason, the traditional area has remained in man's psychological sector. This becomes a hotbed for the exercise of the traditional way of thinking that holds power identical to authority in the stability of totalitarian rule. From the standpoint of the operation of political control, this may be judged to have the effective value of utilization. But, the fact that this very point becomes the starting point of medievalizing totalitarian modernization, constitutes the fundamental base for the understanding of the essence of north Korea's political and social development.

As is widely known, north Korea's ruling is carried out by Kim Il-sung's exclusive and sovereign decisions. Still, his power is executed through the channels of various functional elements. The function of this new order is

the product, in pattern of modern rationality. But, it is exercised in the direction of prolonging and expanding the traditional absolute rule of Korean style. The phrasal distinction between the words “tongji” and “tongmu”(both referring to comrade) represents the traditional order of ranks.¹⁴⁾ In consequence, the change in the north Korean society represents the transformation of the entire society into a “modern form embodying totalitarian contents” while being insulated from tradition, in the course of the construction of socialistic base.¹⁵⁾ However, the continuation of Kim Il-sung’s monolithic rule has so conservatized this that we cannot deny the advent of a distinct trend toward being transformed into an authoritarian form carrying rather totalitarian contents.

2. Formation of New Leadership

The establishment of the “north Korean bureau of the Korean Communist party” between October 10-13, 1945 amidst heated debates, represented Soviet military authorities’ intention of creating a new Communist party under Kim Il-sung’s leadership away from the Korean Communist movement staged with Seoul as its center. The pressing task for the Russian occupation forces was to artificially produce new political elites without any ties with south Korea.

This marked a watershed for the different courses of the changes in the south and north Korean societies. The notion that the plural party system existed in north Korea, also, since various political parties and social organizations emerged together with the Communist Party in the so-called bourgeoisie revolutionary stage, soon proved to be an illusion when the north Korean Workers’ (Communist) Party was inaugurated on August 29, 1947 through the merger between the New Democratic Party and Communist Party.

Some ups and downs inevitably ensued. In consequence, however, the north Korean Workers’ Party, enjoying support from the Soviet forces, came to exercise influence over the south Korean Workers’ Party to a certain extent. The political intention behind the creation of the north Korean Workers’ Party was made clear in Kim Il-sung’s address delivered

at its inauguration convention. He said, "The most decisive task in achieving the great democratic tasks facing our Korean people is to consolidate an integrated general staff of the working masses, the only combative vanguard unit of the working people. This problem can be solved by establishing a workers' party." 16)

The integration of political elites seen in the inauguration of the Workers' Party was no more than the first step toward forming a new political class. However, the task of regulating the characteristics of the north Korean society from a more substantial dimension began with the second step at which the leadership groups in all sectors of the society were rendered the dential entity with the Workers' Party under control by the Party. Means of production and distribution have been placed under state control; administration and military control reverted to the party; and even the task of revising the education and legislation systems were placed under the control of the party. In north Korea, resistance to the control by the Workers' Party had ceased long ago with the religious forces being the last to mount such resistance.

As resistance by social groups to party control has dwindled, new membership of the party has increased. It was natural that parallel with the establishment of the party's monolith, the formation of a new political class had taken place in all areas of the society systematically. The new political class has maintained a political uniformity in that it would be obedient to Kim Il-sung no matter how Kim Il-sung's ideology would change. Needless to say, we cannot overlook the fact that countless men were purged until uniform obedience to Kim Il-sung was shaped.

Many elites have disappeared and in their place new elites have emerged on the scene. And such replacement of elites has accompanied some political changes, which have always been solved in the direction of bolstering Kim Il-sung's position. Under the circumstances, the question of whether one can remain in the ruling class depended entirely on whether one followed Kim Il-sung's ideology.

But this does not mean the entirety of truth. As industrialization progressed even in the north Korean society, there exist the technical elites

who can maintain a comparatively neutral stand toward political changes. Even so, they cannot be heterogeneous beings in the midst of the characteristics of a new political class. Here, the characteristics are that one cannot become the member of a new political class without ambition, ability (technical and ideological), almightiness, reliance in the state, and belief in planning rationality rather than in market rationality, the kind of elements which one must have in the course of totalitarian modernization. 17)

These characteristics constitute a base on which north Korea's political system grows decisively different from that of south Korea. The distinctions further produce a stereotype which the entire people should follow and take after with the commodity called Kim Il-sung ideology alone no matter whether the "creative application" of Marx-Leninism is proved or not. This stereotype serves as the criterion for overcoming internal friction (purge) and determines the scope of power struggle. Already inside the political class, one immovable criterion has been created. Only those issues that can be discussed within the criterion and can be raised without violating the criterion, become the world of political class.

In the 30-year history of north Korea, there were various policy changes such as "theory of democratic base," "four major military paths," and "people's democratic revolution." But, they can hardly become sociological subjects because they all are the theories that do not run counter to the criterion. For, the implication of the north Korean ideology toward the social reality is mostly indirect and appealing. 18)

3. Establishment of View of Social Value (Political Ideology)

Needless to say, the formation of north Korea's privileged class is the direct product of party ideology.

And, in a totalitarian society this ideology has the function of formalizing stereotypically given conditions rather than becoming helpful to people in their efforts to grasp the epistemological ground toward objects. Therefore, ideology ends in a simple contention in many cases (false consciousness) because ideology tends to foment an idealistic structure only

toward the reality from the ideological point of view rather than reflecting the reality. However, ideology becomes the criterion for overcoming internal frictions either by accompanying persecution or by means of persuasion. Therefore, the possessor of power should always carry the ideology he has raised. This is because such ideology becomes the pivotal issue in all debates, and not only concentrates people's concern but also binds people's conducts in reality. It is said that in an ideological society, man cannot exist without organization. But, the vitality of such organization is ideology. If social norm can be the fixed point of man's living society, ideology becomes the fixed point in place of norm in ideological society. With this, man can have his own position whether he agrees or disagrees to that fixed point.

The fact that for the political class of north Korea (though we cannot call it a totalitarian society), Kim Il-sungism has been made their fixed point for the establishment of direction, indicates that it can become a lasting fixed point under one single condition, namely, identifying Kim Il-sungism to socialistic construction.

In other words, if socialism is the kind of philosophy which denies man's individuality, dispersiveness, autonomy and selfishness and instead bases itself on collectivity, organization and solidarity, then the objective of socialistic construction cannot help but be the product of the way of thinking that believes in planning rationality. Kim Il-sung tried this for the first time in his "democratic reform." Once a plan has been prepared, its weak points can be replaced with a better plan. Although the "chollima movement" was introduced in the guise of ideology, it in effect was a social policy intended to supplement the weak points of an economic plan. Similarly, the "chongsan-ri method," "taean management system" or "three major revolutionary squads' drive" were all designed to maximize the function of economic development.

But, one important aspect in the understanding of the north Korean society is that when ideology is emphasized in various campaigns geared to supplement weak points of economic plan, it already is the time when belief in certainty about the achievement of already announced plan or the

need for recruit of planning experts are considered to have an ill effect on political aspects. Advocacy of “ideological revolution” and emphasis of “integration under ‘juche’ idea” were the original contentions. But, when some detrimental elements arise (though this points to the inconsistency of the party’s decision or Kim Il-sung’s intention itself), such unwelcome elements were solved in the form of creating a new order with the introduction of a new fixed point.

This confusion seriously disturbs the autonomy and independence of the attitude of the north Korean people. This disturbance is so thorough that it leaves no area of privacy at all. In inverse proportion to the extent of the private area disturbed, participation in the social (public) area is demanded forcibly. People have to attend various meetings beginning with “people’s neighborhood meeting” and expose themselves at numerous forums. Social area means organizational area, and this is an area which controls individuals rather than contributing to spontaneous development of individuals. In consequence, people are made to be equalized depending on the fixed point of ideology under these conditions. The function of fixed point switches the traditional role of family to the social area (day-care center system, etc.), and constitutes the reason for the existence of no area beyond the reach of state power. This fixed point represents the starting point where change in the north Korean society is cut off from the historical continuity, and the mile-stone of a direction different from the change in the south Korean society.

4. Erection of Political Nucleus

The drawing of the 38th Parallel by alien troops has separated the north Korean region from the south Korean zone geographically. But, it goes without saying that the establishment of the “north Korean bureau of the Korean Communist Party” was carried out with the intention of making Pyongyang the political center in Korea.

The instructions on the direction (fixed point) of a series of social integration courses, such as change in social relations, formation of a new leadership, and the view of social value (political ideology), were handed

down from Pyongyang.

The basic structure of the north Korean society was established in 1958 when the restructure of agriculture into the cooperative system and eradication of individual commercial business were in effect completed. And this was the very juncture when the north Korean society began to undergo a decisive and final heterogeneity from the south Korean society. Addition of other various aspects of the change of the north Korean society thereafter would only contribute to emphasizing the essence different from the south Korean society.

Pyongyang has become the political center while Kim Il-sung who has become the fixed point of ideology has distinguished even language by calling his Pyongyang dialect as “cultural language.”

A modernization accompanied by the equalization of people; expansion of social (organizational) area; forums held under the control of the party; and totalitarianism promoted in the name of the leader and the party..... all these contributed to building a political center in a geographical vacuum separated at the outset by alien forces. when the new Constitution stipulated on December 27, 1972 that “the capital of the Korean Democratic People’s Republic is Pyongyang,” it represented the whole results of the social change (heterogeneity) made in the past 30 years.

III. Possibility of Nationalistic Overcoming

It is an undeniable objective fact in international relations, in politico-economic aspects, and in the historical or cultural field that for 30 years since the national division, the south and north Korean societies have been developed in mutually different directions under different methods. But, the actual substance of the heterogeneity between the south and north may well be the difference in the social structures and the sense of value, which have been formed as a result of the dismemberment and reformation of the societies prompted by political motivations. Sociological analysis may be the one way that can shed light on this difference. It is said that the social difference as a fact can be grasped in the sociological method of study.

But, the question of how to narrow that difference falls on the category of political issues.

Therefore, the question of overcoming heterogeneity itself has to be a political issue. To discuss formal-logically, the course of south-north heterogeneity has been the produce of the international power relations called the “cold-war system.” For this reason, nationalism as a theory of de-international-power-relations may emerge as a principle for south-north homogeneity or narrowing the social gap between the south and north. In fact, despite the fact that the friction and confrontation between the south and north have been unprecedentedly fierce ever since the division of a single nation into the south and north, the two sides have been calling for national unification. This is nationalism as ideology. Sociologically, however, neither side has been nationalistic. The place where ideology manifests most typically the nature of its “non-content form” — we call this moral obligation — is the whole area of the Korean peninsula. Only the color is different.

So, the difference between the south and north is serious to such an extent as to render the concept of homogeneity meaningless. Under such situation, they tend to discuss nation more often, contributing only to formalizing nationalism. For, nationalism (or unification) is the one raised out of his own stand of being politically bound. It was known in a series of Workers’ Party policies against the south that nationalism raised for political slogans’ sake was by no means serviceable to national unification.

Therefore, the task to sociologically evaluate the social gap, social incongruity and structural difference between the south and north apart from respective political bindings, emerges as a problem that should be solved before any political determination (unification). However, even if sociological evaluation of heterogeneity can be made, it should be used as the basis of a political determination. Otherwise, it should be remembered, that kind of nationalism cannot be taken as the form of political determination free from the influence of the cold-war system.

Here, let us find a clue to the problem by diagnosing presumptively how far has the process of heterogeneity in north Korea come to have an im-

munity toward heterogeneity.

As a result of the above analysis of the change of the north Korean society, we have realized that four factors (aspects) have formed an autonomous political entity through their inter-related operations. In the course of the analysis, however, we have come across two implications based on probability. One is: it is true that the north Korean society has come to have its own structure in the course of "socialistic construction." But, how is its stability? The other: if, on the contrary, there is any social area where structural basis has yet to be established even in the course of heterogeneity in the north Korean society, which area can this be? If such area exists, can it carry a positive implication in future formulation, that is, unification?

Needless to say, the social context at the time of political decisions by Kim Il-sung or the Workers' Party has always been the same. And, as one such decision after another were enforced, the north Korean society drifted away from the tradition that much. But, this does not mean that all social areas undergo changes at the same time and in the same manner. In the same process of heterogeneity, there emerged two layer and formative differences.

In one layer, totalitarian modernization was carried out perfectly. The area in which attempts are made to regimentalize a whole society with "juche" idea, belongs to this category. In other words, this is the area which approaches the core of ideology. And, in this area, some structures of its own are formed. It is apparent that these structures, being in a heterogeneous area, would negatively affect unification sociologically. They carry an authoritarian wrapping based on tradition although they are totalitarian and therefore excludes the structure of freedom.

In the other layer, on the other hand, social conditions have been prepared on which all people can exist as average people away from tradition as a result of totalitarian modernization. In principle, all people not only live in accordance with the norm of social life dictated by the party, but also are given equally the opportunity to move up to the privileged class. Clearly this is the affirmative aspect of totalitarian modernization

manifested in socialistic dimension. The reason is that even in the future image of unification, there cannot exist the structure of status, traditional and social inequality.

The function of these layers has reformed the north Korean society into a single independent society. An independent society indicates that the existing society does not collapse merely because of the replacement of the leadership. This means that although the north Korean society was the work of the Russian troops in the early stage, the Soviet label is no longer attached to the society of north Korea. Further, this tells the possibility that if and when the north Korean society is merged with the south Korean society through general elections, the former would face many changes, and, still, it would find a considerable residue in its frame.

Then the problem is which areas would remain comparatively unchanged until the time of unification, and which areas would undergo rapid self-alteration.

Let us look into this question concretely. The possibility of fall of the political leadership formed by the Workers' Party is more obvious than the possibility of extinction of the 11-year compulsory education system. At the same time, the possibility of the considerable part of the completely nationalized or collectivized means of production and exchange system slackening and reverting to private hands, is bigger than the possibility of the pattern of social life of urban and rural people reverting to the pre-national liberation state.

It can be fully presumed that the pace at which the north Korean people depart from their reliance in economic plan would be slower than the pace at which the people abandon the practice of mutual debates. The accuracy of this assumption depends on the actual extent of the totalitarian modernization of the north Korean society. But, one thing clear is that if the negative areas cited here are filled with totalitarian contents fully, then this "modern social pattern" would remain even when unification is realized.

Under the circumstances, the problem emerges of how we can absorb this "modern social pattern" into the idea of our peaceful unification. It is

certain that this would pose a new task to us.

Even if we have made this sociological analysis and evaluation, this is basically something accomplished under the condition of reservation. In other words, this was an analysis made on the condition that there will never be war.

Outward political offensive or military attack would be able to turn upside down the social context of the south and north Korean societies overnight. However, such possibility is a question whose answer cannot be found in the analysis of internal factors.

Therefore, the national (nationalistic) task of unification necessitates the rightfulness that sociological analysis should be used as the essential base of political decisions.

Foot notes:

1) Kim Il-sung's speech "Report on Contemporary Korean Political Situation and on Issue of Organization of North Korean Provisional People's Committee" made at "expanded meeting of representatives of secretariats of various north Korean democratic parties and social organizations, and peoples' committees," Kim Il-sung, *For Unified Independence and Democratization of Fatherland*, Vol. I, 1919, p. 8; Kim Nam-shik, "Process of Communization and Class Road in north Korea (I)," *Asiatic Studies*, No. 3, Vol. XIV, 1971, p. 99.

2) *Historical Materials on Korean Workers' Party (Party History)*, 1964, p. 161.

3) Article 12 of Law on Agrarian Reform. The "One-Year History of Korean Liberation" published in 1946 by the "Democratic National Front" states that leftist elements in various areas were exempt from the confiscation of lands.

4) *Historical Materials on Korean Workers' Party (Party History)*, 1964, p. 162.

5) *Korean Central Yearbook*, 1950, p. 198.

6) *One-Year History of Korean Liberation*, Democratic National Front, 1946, p. 436.

7) Kim Il-sung, *For Unified Independence and Democratization of Fatherland*, Vol. II, 1949, p. 122.

8) A speech made an expanded meeting of the "north Korean Provisional People's Committee," June 20, 1946.

9) Kim Nam-shik, *Ibid*, p. 108.

10) Kim Il-sung, *For Unified Independence and Democratization of Fatherland*, Vol. I, p. 112.

11) *Historical Materials on Korean Workers' Party (Party History)*, 1964, p. 217.

12) *General Yearbook of North Korea*, 1968, p. 349 and 340.

13) *Korean Central Yearbook*, 1959, p. 324 and 335.

14) Horst Kurnisky, *Chollima Korea: Ein Besuch im Jahre 23*, in: *Kursbuch 60*, pp. 93-4.

15) A remark made by R. Dahrendorf in the conclusion of an analysis of the change of the East Germany society. His thesis, *Die beiden Deutschland: Die Deutsche Demokratische Republik*, in: *Gesellschaft und Demokratie in Deutschland*, 1965 Munchen, p. 461.

16) Kim Il-sung, "For the Inauguration of a Unified Party for Working Masses," *Collection of Kim Il-sung Works*, Vol. I, Shin Nihon Publishing Co., p. 66.

17) In this connection, R. Dahrendorf said that in East Germany there is modern non-freedom (eine modern Illiberalita't). *Ibid.*, p. 458.

18) In this regard, Ch. Lutz used the description of "non-content formula" (Leerformel). His thesis, *Theorie totalitar verfasster Gesellschaft*. in: *Studien und Materialien Zur Soziologie der DDR*. Koln, 1964, pp. 34-8.

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South-North Dialogue in Korea

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South-North Dialogue in Korea

- South-North Coordinating Committee**
- South-North Red Cross Conference**

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Part One

Realistic Approach toward Durable Peace

June 23 Special Statement:

President Park Proposes Creation of Private South-North Economic Cooperative Body

In a special statement issued on last June 23 on the occasion of the fifth anniversary of the June 23 Declaration Regarding Foreign Policy for Peace and Unification, President Park Chung Hee proposed the creation of a "consultative body for the promotion of south-north economic cooperation" comprising representatives of civilian economic circles of both sides in order to open the path for, and promote effectively, mutual trade and technical and capital cooperation. President Park further disclosed that "we are ready to hold a pertinent ministerial conference with the north, if necessary."

Saying he is convinced that should this proposal materialize, it could significantly contribute not only to the welfare of all Koreans but also to the peace and prosperity of the Korean peninsula and to peaceful unification of the fatherland, the President said he expects the north Korean authorities to respond to it open-mindedly.

President Park also urged the north Korean side to respond affirmatively to the call for unconditional reactivation of the existing channels of dialogue and conclusion of a mutual non-aggression agreement, and thereby join in the efforts to relieve tension between the south and the north and to promote coexistence and coprosperity.

The following is the full text of the special statement by President Park on the occasion of the fifth anniversary of the June 23 Declaration Regarding Foreign Policy for Peace and Unification:

Dear Fellow Countrymen.

It was five years ago today that I announced to the world the Special Statement Regarding Foreign Policy for Peace and Unification.

The basic spirit of the Statement was, in sum, that while coexisting peacefully pending maturity of various conditions essential to the

peaceful unification of our fatherland, the south and the north would engage in dialogue: would strive together, through exchanges and cooperation, to promote the welfare and prosperity of all our compatriots, in both the south and the north; and would, step by step, lay a solid foundation for peaceful unification.

It is with this objective uppermost in our minds that we have endeavoured unremittingly to ease tension and establish a lasting peace on this peninsula.

In the same spirit, we proposed bona fide competitions between the south and the north in the August 15 Declaration in 1970 and a south-north Red Cross conference in 1971, and we opened the door for the south-north dialogue by initiating the historic South-North Joint Communiqué of 4th July, 1972.

Further in January 1974, in order to add substance to the June 23 Declaration, I proposed to the north Korean side the conclusion of a south-north mutual non-aggression agreement. In August that year, I put forward three basic principles for peaceful unification which, in essence, are mutual non-aggression, exchanges and cooperation, and, ultimately, free general elections throughout Korea.

However, the north Korean Communists not only rejected our peace proposals but went so far as to unilaterally break off the south-north dialogue which was to meet the aspiration of the 50 million compatriots.

In recent months, the north Korean Communists are repeating preposterous insistence upon the so-called direct negotiations with the United States, while refusing dialogue between the south and the north of Korea which are the directly concerned parties to the Korean problem.

It cannot but be assumed that their ulterior motive is still to achieve unification by the communization of the whole of Korea by force.

Let me emphatically reiterate that the unification of the fatherland must be achieved only by peaceful means and that the most realistic and feasible means of establishing a lasting peace is to solve one by one the easier and more practical issues while building up mutual trust through dialogue.

It is in this context that we proposed in the June 23 Declaration the simultaneous entry of the south and the north into the United Nations as an interim measure pending the maturity of those conditions essential to unification and that we have opened our door even to those countries which differ from us in political ideology and institution.

This, and this alone, is the short-cut to peaceful unification.

The prevailing trend today in the international society is to solve problems through dialogue, and it is the general tendency to pursue ways to expand mutual exchanges and cooperation for practical economic development, transcending political ideology and institution.

I once again urge the north Korean side to abandon its delusion of unification by forceful means, to respond to our call for unconditional reactivation of the existing channels of dialogue and to conclude a mutual non-aggression agreement, and thereby to join us in efforts to relieve tension between the south and the north and to promote coexistence and coprosperity.

For the sake of the future history of our nation and of the welfare of the 50 million compatriots who share one blood, I propose the creation of a "consultative body for the promotion of south-north economic cooperation" comprising representatives of civilian economic circles of both sides in order to open the path for, and promote effectively, mutual trade and technical and capital cooperation. Further I make it clear that we are ready to hold a pertinent ministerial conference with the north, if necessary.

Convinced that, should this proposal materialize, it could significantly contribute not only to the welfare of all Koreans but also to the peace and prosperity of the Korean Peninsula and to the peaceful unification of our fatherland, I expect the north Korean authorities to respond to it open-mindedly.

My Dear Compatriots,

It is our national aspiration and the cherished desire of the 50 million Koreans to build a prosperous welfare society and to achieve peaceful unification of our fatherland.

It is for the sake of the early accomplishment of these tasks that we, in the face of numerous trials and difficulties, have devoted ourselves to the build-up of our national strength and exerted every effort to ease tension and establish peace.

Heart-breaking indeed is the reality today that the threat of war remains unabated on this peninsula in spite of all our ardent desires, and it behooves both the south and the north to respond humbly to the call of the nation and to make joint efforts to clear the dark clouds away.

The path toward peaceful unification will certainly open if all our people are firmly resolved and united in the quest for peace and prosperity of the fatherland, no matter whatever trials and challenges may come.

Let us all stride along the royal road toward peaceful unification and national renaissance.

This fresh proposal by President Park constitutes the manifestation of more positive efforts to embody realistically a set of peace and unification endeavors which we have steadily made for the normalization of the south-north dialogue and realization of various matters of agreement reached between the south and north such as the South-North Joint Communiqué of 1972.

Since President Park urged the north Korean Communists to engage in a competition for development, construction and creativity instead of committing the crime of war preparations at the sacrifice of the welfare of the north Korean people, in his historic August 15 Declaration in 1970, we have exerted all available endeavors to realize peaceful unification. Among such efforts were the proposal for a south-north Red Cross conference; taking of the initiative of the south-north contacts that led to the South-North Joint Communiqué; Special Foreign Policy for Peace and Unification of June 23, 1973; proposal for conclusion of a south-north non-aggression agreement; and pronouncement of the Three Major Principles for Peaceful Unification made in 1974.

Nevertheless, the north Korean Communists have rejected all of these

our peace-oriented offers. They have gone to the extreme of unilaterally torpedoing even the south-north dialogue that embodied the 50 million compatriots' aspiration. Due to the boycott of the south-north dialogue by the north Korean Communists and their pursuit of a policy of communizing the whole peninsula of Korea by force of arms, tensions still persist and the danger of war hovers around the Korean peninsula.

The latest proposal was made as a means of facilitating peaceful coexistence between south and north Korea through dialogue and promoting the welfare and prosperity of all the 50 million Korean people through exchanges and cooperation, pending realization of conditions conducive to peaceful unification. In this regard, the proposition can be taken to represent the pursuit of a dialogue in a fresh dimension for the sake of realization of peaceful unification, and also the revelation of the brotherly love with which welfare and prosperity for the entire compatriots have been sought.

The prevailing trend in international relations today is to solve problems between countries through dialogue, and a universal tendency is to pursue and expand mutual exchanges and cooperation in order to promote substantive economic development transcending differences in political ideology and system. Therefore, the proposal for an economic cooperative body was the most realistic and feasible one compatible also with the prevailing trend in international relations.

The objective of our latest proposal was to promote the welfare of the south and north Korean compatriots, to stabilize the people's lives, and improve the mutual standard of living. The proposal, if accepted by the north Koreans, would have the effect of 1) resuming the suspended south-north dialogue as representatives from the south and north would sit together to promote mutual trade and economic cooperation, and 2) contributing much to the general welfare of the 50 million Korean people through economic cooperation between south and north Korea.

And, promotion of welfare of the south and north Korean people would serve as a momentum to restore the national homogeneity and mutual trust.

If and when the north Koreans accept our proposal, the specific items of trade would be determined at the meetings of the proposed "consultative body for promotion of south-north economic cooperation." But, we enjoy a substantial surplus in rice and produce excellent manufactured commodities to support a comfortable and affluent life style, while lacking anthracite, iron ore and some of other underground resources, which we import from other countries but abound in the north. The interchange of rice and manufactured goods with anthracite and iron ore would contribute much to the welfare and living standards of the people in both the south and north.

Technical and capital cooperation must also be implemented in such fields as are conducive to the promotion of the welfare of both the southern and northern compatriots.

If the advanced technology of south Korea is provided and used in the construction of factories as well as in the production of items that can be helpful to the promotion of the living standard of the north Korean people, it would be a great contribution toward the promotion of the welfare of the north Korean compatriots.

The same thing is also true of capital cooperation. For instance, if the north Korean authorities face the shortage of funds in the construction of factories designed for the stability and improvement of the north Korean people's living, we can extend them capital cooperation, namely, provision of credits.

Such technical and capital cooperation will significantly contribute to the promotion of dialogue and the recovery of mutual trust.

But, the government's offer for trade and technical and capital cooperation with the north, does not call for any cooperation with north Korea as a state. It simply aims at exchanges between the same people in a national dimension.

Therefore, the expression of our willingness to form a south-north economic cooperative body comprising private economic representatives and to hold, if necessary, ministerial conference does not envision north Korea as a state. But, in order for us to solve national problems

realistically, we cannot help but recognize north Korea as a partner of dialogue or object of consultation. The offer was the reflection of our positive and sincere attitude toward even governmental contacts for solution of those which cannot be settled at private-level discussion, in order to realistically facilitate south-north economic cooperation aimed at bringing about welfare and prosperity of the 50 million compatriots.

At the same time, the proposed "consultative body for the promotion of south-north economic cooperation" is not incompatible or contradictory but mutually coexistent and parallel with the South-North Coordinating Committee and other existing channels of the south-north dialogue.

In other words, the proposal for this new consultative body is not to deny the South-North Coordinating Committee and other channels of dialogue previously agreed on between the south and the north, but drives from our new, more magnanimous stance intended to induce a sincere response from the north Korean authorities by any means possible including a private economic consultative body or a ministerial conference.

How, then, is the state of the south and north Korean economies today, eight years after the proposal was made in August 1970 for a bona fide competition, namely, competition in construction, development and creativity, between the south and north?

The economic gap between south and north Korea has steadily widened in favor of the south since 1969. Until as recently as 1968, north Korea was one step ahead of the south in terms of per-capita GNP. With the successful implementation of the first and second economic development plans, however, south Korea began to outpace the north beginning in 1969. The gap has been deepening at an accelerated pace since 1972 when the Third Five-Year Economic Development Plan was launched. In 1976, Our per-capita GNP stood at 700 dollars, nearly twice as much as the north's 363 dollars. In 1967, south Korea's GNP was 4,240 million dollars, slightly more than twice the north's 2,110 million dollars. Ten years later in 1976, the gap widened to whopping 4.3 times with the

south's GNP reaching 25,070 million dollars and the north's 5,810 million dollars.

In the production of foods, rice accounts for only 40 percent of the north's total grain production. Corn represents 55 percent and miscellaneous grains the remaining 5 percent. In a contrast, south Korea has achieved a complete self-sufficiency in staple grains. With a substantial amount of surplus rice on hand, the south offered an assistance of rice to north Korea in 1977. Some grains were even exported to some friendly nations.

In fact, north Korea has concentrated efforts on farm production through a series of reformative agrarian policies, such as a sweeping agrarian reform in 1946 and the subsequent introduction of a socialistic collective agricultural system based on cooperative farms. During the seven-year economic development plan period in the 1960s, north Korea poured 2.6 billion won or 19.7 percent of the total basic construction investment of 10.7 billion won into the sector of agriculture, forestry and fishery. However, the share of agricultural production in gross national product was no more than 5 percent. Also during the six-year economic development plan period in the 1970s, more than 20 percent of the total investment was put into the agricultural sector. But, the weight of farm production remained at about 5 percent.

The agricultural infrastructure itself shows a wide difference between south and north Korea. In the south, the arable land totals 2,241,000 hectares or 24.1 percent of the total national land, whereas in the north farm land extends 2,071,000 hectares or only 16.6 percent of the total land. Moreover, the south has much more rice paddies than the north. In the south, the total acreage of rice paddies stands at 1,263,000 hectares and that of upland at 978,000 hectares, while in the north, rice paddies total only 697,000 hectares with the remaining 1,374,000 hectares being upland. The south also excels in farming knowhow. The unit production of rice stands at 5 tons per hectare on the average in the south, whereas it remains at no more than 3.6 tons in the north.

In the sector of mining and manufacturing, north Korea had the

decisive upper hand of the south at the time of national division. More than 90 percent of the country's total iron ore deposits, 87 percent of briquette coal deposits and 98 percent of bituminous coal deposits were in north Korea. In addition, the north virtually monopolized electricity production.

On the strength of the favorable distribution of underground and energy resources, north Korea had maintained an edge in the area of metal industry until the 1960s. With the realization of a rapid economic growth based on the open economic system, however, south Korea has begun to outpace north Korea even in the sector of heavy industry. In 1976, for instance, the iron and steel production capacity, which serves as a scale weighing a country's national strength, amounted to 4,530,000 tons whereas it stood at 2,800,000 tons in the north.

In the field of trade balance also, north Korea suffers from heavy trade deficits and mounting foreign debts beginning the turn of the 1970s. The volume of the north's external trade itself is very small. In 1976 when south Korea saw the amount of its external trade reach 16.5 billion dollars, north Korea's trade volume was mere 1.5 billion dollars.

All in all, in a sharp contrast to south Korea's miraculous economic growth, north Korea's economy is in a critical state due to various factors such as excessive military outlays that represent more than 15 percent of gross national product, imbalance among industries caused by over-emphasis on munitions industry, and reckless introduction of foreign capital. Today, north Korea faces a serious shortage even of major consumption items whereas the south has grown so confident economically as to liberalize the import of some finished consumption goods.


Despite this deepening economic gap between the two sides, the north Korean authorities have rejected even this humanitarian proposal aimed at extending a helping hand to the north Korean people. In an editorial of the Rodong Shinmun, the organ of the Workers' (Communist) Party, the north Korean Communists slandered President Park's latest proposal, calling it "a ridiculous political face," and renewed its call for "repeal" of the June 23 Declaration itself, thereby making it clear that they are not in-

Major Economic Indicators of South and North Korea as of 1976

Classification	Unit	S. Korea (A)	N. Korea (B)	B/A (%)
Population	1,000 persons	35,860	16,006	44.6
Population growth rate	%	1.64	2.4	146.3
Size of land	km ²	98,477	122,370	124.3
GNP	\$100 million	251	58.1	23.1
Per-capita GNP	\$1	700	363	51.9
Ratio of military burden	%	5.3	14.9	281.1
Investment ratio	%	25.0	35-40	140-160
Growth rate	%	15.5	4-5	25.8-32.3

Source: South Korea - Economic Planning Board; north Korea - National Unification Board

Trend of GNP Growth of South and North Korea (In U.S. \$100 million)



interested in south-north exchanges and further peaceful unification regardless of the ardent aspirations of the 50 million compatriots of the south and north.

Nevertheless, we shall carry on our peace-oriented efforts patiently until the north Korean side accepts our sincere offers and returns to the south-north dialogue for the sake of alleviation of tensions, durable peace and peaceful unification of the fatherland.

We urge once again the north Korean side to accept our latest proposition so as to lay the basis of dialogue and cooperation between south and north Korea and thereby advance the time of peaceful unification.

(The following are editorials of major domestic newspapers on President Park's Special Statement that set forth the method of realistic approach to durable peace on the Korean peninsula, on the occasion of the fifth anniversary of the June 23 Declaration Regarding Foreign Policy for Peace and Unification.)

— Editor —

Welfare of 50 Million Compatriots

The Kyunghyang Shinmoon (June 23, 1978)

Today marks the fifth anniversary of the June 23 Declaration by President Park Chung Hee Regarding Foreign Policy for Peace and Unification.

The objective of the June 23 Declaration was for the south and north to, while coexisting peacefully, create concrete conditions conducive to peaceful unification of the fatherland, and consolidate the foundation for peaceful unification by promoting the welfare of the 50 million people of the south and north through exchanges and cooperation.

In more advanced and concrete forms of the June 23 Declaration, President Park has proposed the conclusion of a south-north non-aggression agreement and declared at home and abroad the Three Major Principles for Peaceful Unification.

However, the north Korean Communists have unilaterally shut the barely opened door of the south-north dialogue, cut off the direct south-north telephone line, and criticized the June 23 Declaration as a “nation

splitting scheme.”

It is well known that no matter how they feign to love peace outwardly, their underlying objective is to bring south Korea under their domain by force of arms. Even so, we cannot ignore the people’s aspirations for unification of the fatherland.

And, our immovable conviction is that no matter how pressing the issue of national unification may be, it should be achieved in a peaceful manner by all means. All sensible persons know that the barrier of distrust should be dismantled first, followed by consolidation of peace and removal of the danger of war pending the time of peaceful unification. Few persons can dispute the fact that to this end, the south and north should tackle their pending problems beginning with easy and practicable areas such as dialogue and exchanges.

In this respect, it was epochal for President Park to propose that the south and north pave the way to their trade, and technical and capital cooperation, in his special statement on the occasion of the fifth anniversary of the June 23 Declaration Regarding Foreign Policy for Peace and Unification. It was all the more significant because it represents a concrete endeavor for the consolidation of peace in preparation for ultimate peaceful unification of the fatherland.

In the South-North Joint Communiqué, of course, the two sides agreed on mutual dialogue and exchanges, and resolved to speed up the campaign for search for dispersed family members in the south and north. Subsequently we also called for mutual exchanges in the June 23 Declaration and proposed the conclusion of a south-north non-aggression agreement. Besides, we offered reunion between aged parents and exchanges of tomb visitors, sportsmen and scholars, while President Park in his press conference in January 1977 disclosed the willingness to extend food assistance to the north Korean side suffering from food shortage.

The latest proposal for economic exchanges was a developed form of the offers we have made previously. This was so because the proposition was directly linked to people’s livelihood. The overture was highly realistic, flexible and important in that it suggested the creation of a cooperative

body comprising private representatives for the effective implementation of economic exchanges, and that it should the willingness even to hold a ministerial conference to support such economic exchanges.

Details of the proposed trade have yet to be known. But, we can think of exchange of our foods and manufactured goods with the north's iron ore and coal, and also of the provision of our knowhow and capital for the promotion of the living, welfare and prosperity of our 50 million compatriots.

In our June 23 Declaration, we opened our door to the whole world, paving the way to trade with non-hostile Communist countries. And, it is an open secret that north Korea hopes to trade with or obtain technical and capital cooperation from Japan and other capitalistic countries. If this is the reality, then there can be no reason why north Korea cannot cooperate with the same people.

If the north Korean side is truly interested in peaceful unification, it should agree to cooperate with the south beginning with easy and practicable fields, rather than indulging in propaganda on such empty ideas as a confederation system or a grand national conference. And, if they really care for the wellbeing of their people, they should strive to improve the living standard of their people. In this respect, we sincerely urged the north Korean side to respond affirmatively and openheartedly to President Park's latest proposal.

Idea of Economic Cooperative Organ

The Dong-A Ilbo (June 23, 1978)

President Park Chung Hee June 23 proposed to the north Korean side that a path be opened for mutual trade, and technical and capital cooperation, and to this end a "consultative body for the promotion of south-north economic cooperation" comprising private economic representatives be formed between the two sides.

In a special statement issued on the occasion of the fifth anniversary of

the June 23 Declaration Regarding Foreign Policy for Peace and Unification, President Park showed the willingness to hold a pertinent ministerial conference, if necessary, in connection with the formation of an economic consultative body. The President also urged the north Korean authorities in the statement to abandon its delusion of unification by force of arms and join in efforts to relieve tension and promote coexistence and coprosperity between the south and north.

We have already made a number of propositions to the north Korean side for durable peace on the Korean peninsula. They included President Park's proposal for a bona fide competition between the south and north, made in his National Liberation Day address in 1970; offer for a south-north Red Cross conference in 1971; opening of a door to a south-north dialogue by taking the initiative in the issuance of the South-North Joint Communique; promulgation of the June 23 Declaration in 1973; proposal for the conclusion of a non-aggression agreement in 1974; issuance of the Three Major Principles for Peaceful Unification in 1974 featuring non-aggression, exchanges and cooperation, and free general elections; exchanges of exhibitions of cultural relics in April 1976; and proposal for food assistance to north Korea in January 1977.

All these justifiable propositions were rejected by the north Korean side, as can be seen in their blunt suspension of the south-north dialogue in August 1973. After the Carter Administration was sworn in and adopted a policy to withdraw American ground troops from Korea, the north Korean Communists have been going all out to open an avenue to direct negotiations with the United States in their miscalculation of the world situation. Behind their clamorous lip service to peace, they have been constantly seeking a chance to swoop down upon the south. They have no interest at all in peaceful unification by means of dialogue between the south and north.

If they are really interested in national unification in a peaceful manner as they trumpet, they should agree to dialogue and exchanges so as to facilitate easing of tensions and restoration of mutual trust. To this end, the easiest means is for the south and north to engage in economic ex-

changes and cooperation transcending their mutual systems in a way that can bring mutual benefits and contribute to the wellbeing of the 50 million people.

President Park did not disclose details about the proposed trade, and technical and capital cooperation. This is an issue that can be reviewed after a response, if any, came from the north Korean side. But, we can think of a number of items subject to trade between the south and north. Among them are our side's foods and manufactured goods, and the north's iron ore and coal. President Park suggested the formation of a private organ as an economic cooperative body, and expressed the willingness to hold a meeting of concerned ministers. This willingness points to our side's sincere attitude of endeavoring to realize economic exchanges through an organ no matter it is of private or governmental level.

We shall carefully follow how the north Korean authorities would respond to this sincere proposal. They cannot reject this even if to show that their oft repeated propaganda for "peace" is not deceptive. We look forward to a sincere response from the north Korean side.

New Overture for Economic Cooperation

The Seoul Shinmun (June 24, 1978)

In a special statement issued on the occasion of the fifth anniversary of the June 23 Declaration Regarding Foreign Policy for Peace and Unification, President Park Chung Hee proposed the creation of a "consultative body for the promotion of south-north economic cooperation" comprising representatives of private economic circles of both sides in order to open the path for, and promote effectively, mutual trade and technical and capital cooperation. The President also disclosed the readiness to hold a meeting of concerned ministers. This was a new proposition intended to break through the present strained state in which the south-north dialogue remains deadlocked and the south-north relations are reverting to the pre-Joint Communique state.

Since the conflicting ideas and social systems of the south and north are bound to reflect upon the question of national unification, the reality, as can be seen in the 30-year-long national division, is that unification cannot be achieved easily no matter how the people aspire for its early realization. Therefore, the south and north should strive to lay conditions conducive to unification before discussing the unification issue. And, the objective requirement is that the south and north should coexist peacefully whether they like it or not until the time of unification. If one side demands a hasty solution of the unification issue ignorant of this reality, it is bound to contribute only to the strains of the south-north relations. Our recent proposal for the creation of a “consultative body for the promotion of south-north economic cooperation” is meant to suggest that the two sides should try to find a clue to the solution of the Korean question while fostering an atmosphere of mutual cooperation and trust without posing any threat of war to each other by ensuring peaceful relations between them. Of course, it should be noted that the arena of exchanges and cooperation can be opened only when such exchanges and cooperation do not pose any danger to their respective ideas and systems. This is because of the fact that in view of the special nature of the south-north relations, even economic and other non-political exchanges and cooperation tend to be evaluated in the light of their respective political interests. Therefore, if either side attempts to manipulate exchanges and cooperation for its political gains, it would only touch off vigilance from the other side. And, offers for unrealistic and fictitious cooperation would only lead to intensified propaganda without contributing any to the improvement of the south-north relations.

Even when we take these factors into account, the genuineness and sincerity embodied in the latest proposal should be correctly evaluated. Of course, the overture is inter-connected with a series of our previous propositions urging the north Korean Communists to abandon the scheme for unification by force of arms and agree to peaceful unification by means of good-intentioned competition. Among such proposals were the August 15 Declaration regarding Foreign Policy for Peace and Unification, proposal for a non-aggression agreement, and the declaration of Three

Major Principles for Peaceful Unification. Yet, the latest offer was significant in that it was a more concrete form of offer tailored to fit for the reality of the south-north relations, and, therefore, is easy to be agreed on. If only the Pyongyang side takes an interest in economic cooperation between the south and north, the two sides would be able to find many methods and forms of cooperation in various fields through mutual discussion, from which the two sides can mutually benefit.

We would like to urge the Pyongyang side to carefully study and affirmatively respond to our recent proposal aimed at easing tensions between the south and north and at securing peaceful relations between the two sides. We see no reason why they, if really interested in peace and peaceful solution of the Korean question, cannot accept the offer. The south-north relations are presently in a fluid state incorporating both the possibility of peace and danger of war. Our position, of course, is to strive for the solution of the pending issues in a peaceful way. We also believe that we must maintain a strong defense posture in order to prevent war. We shall see how the Pyongyang side would react to the latest proposal. We expect that this offer would serve as a momentum to improve the south-north relations.

South-North Dialogue and Economic Cooperation

The Shin-A Ilbo (June 24, 1978)

President Park Chung Hee June 23 proposed to the north Korean side the creation of a “consultative body for the promotion of south-north economic cooperation.” In a special statement issued on the occasion of the fifth anniversary of the June 23 Declaration Regarding Foreign Policy for Peace and Unification, President Park also said, “We are ready to hold a pertinent ministerial conference with the north, if necessary.” This proposal, which can be taken to have made more concrete our basic stand toward peaceful unification, is highly evaluated because it represents the positive efforts of the government to seek the embodiment of

the matters agreed on in the South-North Joint Communiqué of 1972 as well as the resumption of the south-north dialogue unilaterally suspended by the north Korean Communists. The offer is also significant in that it embodies a sincere attitude toward opening the way to trade, and technical and capital cooperation. The proposal, as our many previous propositions, reveals strong hope for the stability of the livelihood of the 50 million compatriots and coexistence between the south and north in peace and prosperity.

Since the reality of the Korean peninsula requires both the south and north to consolidate peace first through dialogue and changes, especially in the field of economy, while keeping their respective systems, it is important for both sides to strive for the restoration of mutual trust and actively promote economic exchanges. The latest proposal provides that when the south and north pursue wide-ranging exchanges and cooperation covering materials, manpower, capital and knowhow, the benefits gained therefrom can be linked directly to the stability of the livelihood of the south and north Korean compatriots.

Of course, we are not ignorant of the fact that the north Korean Communists consider such economic exchanges as a factor threatening their political and military objectives. It is also true that there has been no change in the north Koreans' belief that if and when exchanges take place between the south and north, the openness of the south Korean system would have a devastating effect on the unparalleled closedness of their society. Still, there cannot be any reason why they cannot agree to exchanges between the same compatriots. This is all the more so because north Korea pursues trade, and technical and capital cooperation with other free world nations and third world countries.

If the north Korean authorities are interested in peaceful coexistence with the south, they should openheartedly agree to our concrete proposal for economic exchanges. Affirmative response to the proposed creation of an economic consultative body would be a way to contributing to normalization of the suspended south-north dialogue as well as to the fostering of bright prospects for a south-north coexistence system.

For the Sake of Nation's Prosperity

The Chosun Ilbo (June 24, 1978)

President Park Chung Hee made another epochal proposal to the north Korean side on last June 23 on the occasion of the fifth anniversary of the June 23 Declaration Regarding Foreign Policy for Peace and Unification. Pointing out that the prevailing trend today in the international society is to solve problems through dialogue, and it is the general tendency to pursue ways to expand mutual exchanges and cooperation for practical economic development, transcending political ideology and system, President Park urged the north Korean side to abandon its delusion of unification by force of arms, to respond affirmatively to the call for unconditional normalization of the existing channels of dialogue and to conclude a mutual non-aggression agreement, and thereby to join in the efforts to relieve tension between the south and north and to promote coexistence and coprosperity.

The President then said, "For the wellbeing of the 50 million compatriots, the same people sharing one blood, I propose the creation of a 'consultative body for the promotion of south-north economic cooperation' comprising representatives of private economic circles of both sides in order to open the path for, and promote effectively, mutual trade and technical and capital cooperation. Further, I disclose our willingness to hold a conference of pertinent ministers if necessary." This proposition was made in his special statement issued to mark the fifth anniversary of the June 23 Declaration.

This was the reflection, in a more concrete and realistic form, of our untiring endeavors to create conditions conducive to peaceful unification by means of mutual approach, exchanges and cooperation.

President Park's latest proposal is an advanced form of the June 23 Declaration Regarding Foreign Policy for Peace and Unification of 1973. As is well known, the June 23 Declaration has embodied the pressing national challenge to pave the way to peaceful unification of the

fatherland by doing away with the hostile relations on the Korean peninsula in line with the flow of the world situation toward peaceful coexistence away from the post-World War II Cold War, and thereby creating a new order in the relations between the south and north. To elaborate further, the basic spirit of the June 23 Declaration called on the south and north to coexist peacefully, have dialogue, engage in exchanges and cooperation, strive together for the promotion of wellbeing and coprosperity of the south and north Korean people, and consolidate the basis for peaceful unification until the time when conditions become ripe for unification of the fatherland.

Before and after the June 23 Declaration, we have made other consistent efforts for the creation of peaceful south-north relations. Among such endeavors were the August 15 Declaration on the idea of peaceful unification made in 1970; proposal for a campaign for search for dispersed families on August 12, 1971; the south-north dialogue begun with the South-North Joint Communique of 1972; June 23 Declaration in 1973; proposal for the conclusion of a non-aggression agreement; and announcement of the Three Major Principles for Peaceful Unification in 1974. In addition, we have showed our willingness to resume at Panmunjom or any other third place the south-north dialogue unilaterally suspended by the north Korean side in its so-called August 28 Announcement of 1973. We further made it clear that we are willing to extend food assistance to north Korea if it accepts it.

The latest proposal by President Park represents another milestone in the improvement of south-north relations, erected upon these our consistent efforts. The south and north, and the 50 million people should take a correct look at the reality of the world community. Today all nations strive to seek their own interests and prosperity. Even the Arabs and Israeli, who had been in hostile relations for many thousand years, pursue a path to coexistence through negotiations rather than with gun. East and West Germany, a divided nation like us, seek their common national interests through peaceful coexistence and wide-ranging exchanges.

It is only the Korean people who, despite being the same people, are in a

state of extreme distrust and hostile relations. This is a tragic relation that may led to national extinction, not national prosperity. The south and north should realize correctly this tragic reality in which acts of national self-torture and self-injury are perpetrated. A way to come out of this tragedy should be found through common efforts. The south and north solemnly pledged before the entire people six years ago to ensure a grand national unity as a single people transcending ideas, thoughts and systems.

This pledge should be translated into action. To promote a grand national unity, the two sides should trust each other, carry out various exchanges and accelerate the enhancement of the wellbeing of our compatriots. This will be the only path leading to peaceful unification, the supreme task of the nation.

President Park's proposal for economic exchanges was the reflection of the mandate of times calling for the realization of such exchanges between the south and north. We sincerely expect that the north Korean side will respond affirmatively to this proposal with the national conscience, and thereby share the pride of unfolding a new chapter of the national history in concerted endeavors. To this end, resumption of the south-north dialogue is essential.

Economic Cooperation between South and North

The Joong-Ang Daily News (June 24, 1978)

President Park Chung Hee took another epochal initiative in the relations between south and north Korea on the occasion of the fifth anniversary of the June 23 Declaration Regarding Foreign Policy for Peace and Unification.

The proposal was for the creation of a "consultative body for the promotion of south-north economic cooperation" comprising representatives of private economic circles of both sides in order to open the path for, and promote effectively, mutual trade and technical and capital cooperation. The President further disclosed the willingness to hold a con-

ference of pertinent ministers if necessary.

The proposal was a step that has made more concrete our basic stand toward peaceful unification as made clear in a series of our earlier declarations such as the August 15, 1970 Declaration; July 4, 1972 South-North Joint Communiqué; June 23, 1973 Declaration; and the announcement of the Three Major Principles for Peaceful Unification.

Our invariable approach toward the issue of national unification is to restore mutual trust and national homogeneity by solving easy and practicable problems first, and settle, based thereon, such basic questions as political and military issues.

This is a steady and step-by-step method of achieving unification. It was under this steady and gradual method that the humanitarian issue of reuniting dispersed families was brought up in the course of the south-north dialogue. Both the dispersed family issue and the latest offer for economic cooperation are focused on the solution of humanitarian problems, namely, the sufferings coming from the separation of families and the living standard of the 50 million compatriots.

If some humanitarian questions can be settled through mutual cooperation, it would serve as a basis for the solution of more fundamental questions. The latest proposal itself is, of course, important. Yet, what is more significant is the fact that the proposition, if accepted, can provide a clue to the realization of removal of mutual distrust, restoration of national homogeneity, and peaceful unification. Seen from a standpoint of economic cooperation, there is much room for the south and north to supplement mutually.

Originally, south and north Korea were within a single economic sphere. North Korea where underground and energy resources were abundant had been developed as an industrial zone while the south which has larger agrarian lands than the north had been an agricultural and light industrial district. The national division created two limping economic zones on the Korean peninsula. But, the mutual reliance has been reduced substantially in the course of pursuing independent economic spheres in the past 30 years.

However, there still exist the advisability of the two sides gaining benefits through mutually supplementary economic relations. First, trade between the south and north is advantageous because of small transportation cost involved in it compared with other external trade. As trade items, we can think of our fabrics, shoes, electric appliances, medicines, petroleum products and papers, and the north's briquette coal, iron ore and zinc.

In the area of technical and capital cooperation, the object of cooperation can be found in numerous fields such as exploration of Mt. Diamond and Mt. Paektu as tourist attractions and manufacturing of consumption goods that can contribute to the promotion of people's living standard. In the first stage, all economic cooperation will have to be restricted to the scope directly related to the life of people. But, once mutual distrust is eliminated, it would be possible to expand the objects to other areas as well.

Our sincerity toward south-north economic cooperation was manifested clearly as we suggested the creation of an economic consultative body and even disclosed the willingness to have a meeting of pertinent ministers with the north. This was the indication of our flexible attitude that if economic cooperation can be realized, we will not be particular about the kind of implementation body. The general tendency today is to pursue ways to expand mutual exchanges and cooperation for practical economic development, transcending political ideology and institution. We see no reason why they cannot agree to a basic cooperation designed to improve the living standard of the same people. The proposition cannot be rejected even in view of the fact that meeting of representatives from the south and north can become a momentum to resume the suspended south-north dialogue.

If the north Korean Communists reject the proposition, it would amount to an act of ignoring the aspirations of the 50 million people. This is the kind of proposal which cannot go unheeded by for a long period simply because one side denies it at the moment. In this sense, we must continue to take such concrete and practical initiatives no matter what will be the immediate response from the north Korean side. We

look forward to the restoration of realistic sense and affirmative response to the proposal by the north Korean side.

Appropriateness of South-North Economic Cooperation

The Hankook Ilbo (June 24, 1978)

We are at a juncture where we must prepare against the dark cloud of war on one hand and exert our all available efforts for ultimate realization of national unification through consolidation of peace on the other.

From the standpoint of national conscience, it is desirable to restore mutual trust in a peaceful manner and seek the restoration of a great national family through alleviation of tensions. This is achievable if only we make efforts. The first thing the two sides can do is to renounce use of force of arms, and develop dialogue, exchanges and cooperation. To our regret, however, the south-north dialogue remains suspended, and the South-North Coordinating Committee and the South-North Red Cross Conference fail to function. Our 50 million people's wish has been that some momentum should be provided for the two side to sit together.

In a special statement on the occasion of the fifth anniversary of the June 23 Declaration Regarding Foreign Policy for Peace and Unification, President Park Chung Hee urged the north Korean side to abandon its wild fancy for achieving unification by force of arms, to agree to unconditional normalization of the existing channels of dialogue and to conclude a mutual non-aggression agreement, and thereby to join us in efforts to ease tensions and promote coexistence and coprosperity. This was not all. In the statement, President Park proposed the creation of a "consultative body for the promotion of south-north economic cooperation" comprising representatives of private economic circles of both sides in order to open the path for, and promote effectively, mutual trade and technical and capital cooperation. The President also said "we are ready to hold a meeting of pertinent ministers if necessary."

The new proposal concerns economic aspects linked directly to the stability of the people's lives, whereas the June 23 Declaration concerned diplomatic issues such as a call for simultaneous entry by south and north Korea into the United Nations and opening of the nation's door to Communist-bloc countries on the principle of reciprocity. The latest overture embodies our realistic approach favoring "solution of easy and practicably things first" rather than the settlement of political issues overnight.

Looking back, one of the immediate problems caused by the national division 33 years ago was a threat to the people's lives prompted by the artificial division of a single economic sphere. Ever since, the task of removing such threat has persisted. It appears this is the time to promote economic cooperation between the south and north, which will surely contribute to the promotion of welfare of the south and north Korean people and further the creation of better conditions conducive to peaceful unification.

Political insistence or ambition has virtually nothing to do with the lives of the majority of our innocent people. The north Korean side is urged to regain national conscience and agree to our proposal for economic cooperation.

Part Two

South-North Dialogue

South-North Red Cross Conference:

North Korean Red Cross Boycotts Even Working-Level Meeting

The north Korean Red Cross side has suspended even the working-level meeting of the South-North Red Cross Conference by indefinitely postponing the 26th working-level meeting scheduled to be held at the conference room of the Neutral Nations' Supervisory Commission at Panmunjom at 10 a.m. last March 20.

At 7 p.m. March 19, one day before the scheduled meeting, the north Korean Red Cross side, in a notification to the Republic of Korea National Red Cross, said it was putting off the meeting because of a joint Korea-U.S. field military maneuver which it argued runs counter to the Red Cross spirit. In the notification that was broadcast by Radio Pyongyang, the north Korean Red Cross side charged that the joint military exercise "Team Spirit '78" held from last March 7 through March 17 had "created an artificial difficulty to the Red Cross talks," and "strained the south-north relations to an extreme extent," asserting that holding of meeting under the circumstance would be against the spirit of the Red Cross.

Reacting furiously to Pyongyang's notification of unilateral postponement, the Republic of Korea National Red Cross charged that such unjustifiable postponement amounts to an act of violating a matter of agreement already reached between the two sides. In a notification addressed to the north Korean Red Cross and broadcast by the KBS (Korean Broadcasting System) at 8 a.m. March 20, the Republic of Korea National Red Cross urged the north Korean side to reconsider the matter, telling it that the Republic of Korea National Red Cross delegation would nevertheless attend the scheduled meeting. The full text of the notification sent by the Republic of Korea National Red Cross to the north Korean Red Cross side was as follows:

Your Red Cross Society informed us through Radio Pyongyang at

7 p.m. March 19, 1978 that your side is unilaterally postponing the 26th working-level meeting of the South-North Red Cross Conference scheduled to be held at 10 a.m. March 20, 1978 at the conference room of the Neutral Nations' Supervisory Commission at Panmunjom on the ground of the joint Korea-U.S. field exercise held recently.

We are in the conviction that the joint Korea-U.S. exercise cannot be an excuse for postponing the working-level meeting of the South-North Red Cross Conference, and that such notice of unreasonable postponement of the meeting by your Red Cross society represents an act of violating the agreed matter between the two sides as well as going back on the lofty ideas of the Red Cross humanitarianism and the wishes of the 10 million dispersed family members.

The Republic of Korea National Red Cross, therefore, urges that the 26th working-level meeting of the South-North Red Cross Conference be held without fail at 10 a.m. today at Panmunjom as agreed upon between the two sides.

We hereby inform your side that the Republic of Korea National Red Cross delegation will attend the 26th working-level meeting as scheduled. Your side's delegation, too, should attend it by all means.

Dr. Kim Yeon-choo, alternate chief delegate, and other members of the Republic of Korea National Red Cross delegation proceeded to the conference room at Panmunjom. But, the north Koreans did not appear until well over 10 a.m., the scheduled time of the meeting.

Here, Chung Choo-nyon, spokesman for the Republic of Korea National Red Cross delegation, in a statement released at the Freedom House at Panmunjom at 10:20 a.m., charged that the boycott even of the working-level meeting by the north Korean Red Cross side was tantamount to rejecting the wishes of the 10 million dispersed family members and violating the humanitarian spirit of the Red Cross. The spokesman then called for early resumption of the working-level meeting. The full-text of the statement was as follows:

The north Korean Red Cross Society said via Radio Pyongyang at 7 p.m. March 19, 1978 that it is postponing unilaterally the 26th working-level meeting of the South-North Red Cross Conference agreed between the two sides to be held at 10 a.m. March 20, 1978 at the conference room of the Neutral Nations' Supervisory Commission at Panmunjom, on the excuse of the joint Korea-U.S. military exercise held recently. The Republic of Korea National Red Cross, in reaction, pointed out in a message that the north Korean Red Cross cannot put off the working-level meeting for such an absurd reason, informing them that the meeting should take place as scheduled in accordance with the mutual agreement. Accordingly, our delegation has come to the conference site, but the north Korean side did not attend.

The north Korean Red Cross's negative attitude toward dialogue constitutes an act not only of violating the agreed matters reached between the south and north, but also of going against the spirits of Red Cross humanitarianism and the South-North Joint Communiqué of 1972. Moreover, such attitude runs counter to the efforts for peaceful unification of the fatherland as well as to the aspirations of the 10 million separated family members and 50 million compatriots.

It is doubtful if they are really interested in alleviating the sufferings of the dispersed family members in the south and north when we see that in the course of the talks, the north Korean Red Cross suspended the full-dress meetings on the grounds of "atmosphere of Seoul;" rejected the substantial discussion of full-fledged topics on the excuse of so-called "political prerequisites;" severed the direct Seoul-Pyongyang telephone line; and, moreover, has now postponed unilaterally the working-level meeting of the South-North Red Cross Conference.

The proper attitude is to settle problems, if any between the south and north, through peaceful dialogue rather than postponing or suspending dialogue unilaterally. Nevertheless, the north Korean

side's boycott even of the working-level meeting of the South-North Red Cross Conference cannot but be taken as the revelation of its intention of building up tensions between the south and north without any interest in peaceful solution of problems between brethren.

The north Korean Red Cross society should return to the original posture of the Red Cross and agree to hold the 26th working-level meeting of the South-North Red Cross Conference, aware of the important mission imposed upon the South-North Red Cross Conference and the wishes of the 50 million compatriots. If the north Korean Red Cross society continues to reject dialogue and deny peace, it would amount to committing a national blunder, and the north Korean side should be held wholly responsible for all consequences resulting therefrom. The Republic of Korea National Red Cross delegation pledges that no matter whatever difficulties it may face, it will do its utmost with patience and sincerity for reunion between the 10 million dispersed family members and solution of other humanitarian problems pending between the south and north.

The south-north dialogue, begun when the north Korean side accepted the proposal made on August 12, 1971 by the Republic of Korea National Red Cross for a campaign designed to remove the sufferings of those families and relatives dispersed in the south and north, has been in a state of virtual suspension since August 1973 when the north Korean side unilaterally boycotted it. With the suspension of the dialogue the function of the South-North Coordinating Committee and the full-dress meeting of the South-North Red Cross Conference has since been at a standstill. The north Korean side's intransigent maneuvering did not end here. On May 29, 1975, Pyongyang put off indefinitely the vice co-chairmen's meeting which had been held from time to time to discuss the question of normalizing the operation of the South-North Coordinating Committee. Again in the wake of the ax-murder at Panmunjom on August 18, 1976, the north Korean side torpedoed the operation of the direct south-north telephone line and the Panmunjom Liaison Office. And, this time, the Pyongyang

side unilaterally suspended even the working-level meeting of the South-North Red Cross Conference, the only remaining thread in the south-north contacts, casting a dark cloud upon the future of the south-north dialogue and causing disappointment and anger to the 50 million compatriots, much less the 10 million dispersed family members who now see their expectations of family reunion totally jeopardized.

From the standpoint that the dispersed family issue must be solved in accordance with genuine brotherly love and the Red Cross humanitarian spirit, the Republic of Korea National Red Cross had persistently proposed at working-level meetings that the eighth full-dress meeting be held in Seoul as agreed upon previously, or at Panmunjom if the north Koreans could not agree to hold the meeting in Seoul.

Nonetheless, the north Korean Red Cross society has shunned resumption of the full-dress meeting, putting forth such absurd preconditions as "repeal of the Anti-Communist Law," "stoppage of arms buildup," "release of anti-state criminals," and "retraction of the June 23 Declaration Regarding Foreign Policy for Peace and Unification." The north Korean side was making at the Red Cross meeting an absurd political demand interfering in the south's internal affairs — "the south abolish the Anti-Communist Law and the National Security Law, deactivate anti-Communist organizations, and stop pursuing anti-Communist policies and anti-Communist education."

Against this insistence, the Republic of Korea National Red Cross has emphasizing that the so-called "conditions and environment" of Seoul cannot be any obstacle to the implementation of the south-north dialogue, taking note of the fact that since the June 23 Declaration, the Republic of Korea has opened its door to all countries regardless of systems and ideas, carrying out active exchanges with those countries in all fields such as academy, sports and entertainment, let alone exchange of letters, and that home visits by Korean residents in Japan affiliated with Chochongryon, a pro-Pyongyang Korean residents' group in Japan, has been carried out extensively to date since the home visit program began on the Chusok holiday of 1974.

As for the preliminary discussion of the topics of full-dress meetings, the Republic of Korea National Red Cross called for unconditional discussion and solution of Topic No. 1, namely, "the question of tracing, and notifying thereof, the whereabouts and fate of members of dispersed families and relatives in the south and north," and emphasized time and again that if the north Korean Red Cross side cannot discuss Topic No. 1 at an early date, urgent humanitarian projects which can be implemented at any time irrespective of the different systems, conditions or environments of the south and north, such as "mutual exchange of groups of visitors to ancestral tombs of the dispersed families in the south and north," "reunion between aged parents and their families," and "exchange of family pictures of dispersed families" which all are being hoped for by the dispersed family members themselves, should be carried out as pilot projects.

However, the north Korean Red Cross side has blocked any progress of the south-north dialogue while indulging only in political propaganda, laying down various prerequisites such as the "issue of conditions and environment" that has nothing to do with the humanitarian conference.

(The following are editorials of major domestic newspapers, accusing the north Korean Red Cross side of boycotting the working-level meeting and demanding early resumption of the meeting.)

—Editor—

Intentions Behind Conference Boycott

The Kyunghyang Shinmun (March 21, 1978)

The 26th working-level meeting of the South-North Red Cross Conference, scheduled to be held at Panmunjom on March 20 under mutual agreement, failed to be held after the north Korean Red Cross side

unilaterally announced it was postponing the meeting indefinitely because of the recently held joint Korea-U.S. military exercise.

The Republic of Korea National Red Cross delegation, stating that the working-level meeting cannot be put off due to such nonsensical reason and therefore should be held as scheduled, proceeded to the conference site. But, the north Korean Red Cross side did not attend.

As even the working-level meeting, the only remaining thread of dialogue between the south and north, has been lost in darkness, the south-north relations now seem to have entered a new phase.

Looking back, the Pyongyang side put off indefinitely the 11th vice co-chairmen's meeting slated for May 30, 1975, which was designed to discuss the question of normalizing the function of the South-North Coordinating Committee that was suspended by the so-called August 28 statement of Pyongyang's Kim Young-joo.

in addition, they cut off one-sidedly the direct south-north telephone line in the wake of the notorious axe-murder at Panmunjom in August 1976.

The latest act of suspending the working-level meeting is very serious because it represents their fundamental boycott of dialogue with the south. The likeliness is that with the suspension of all channels of dialogue, they plan to build up tensions further.

We denounce the north Korean Red Cross side for the inhumane and anti-national act of unilaterally postponing the agreed-on meeting on the excuse of a joint Korea-U.S. military exercise. We believe that their boycott shows they are not interested in the removal of the sufferings of the dispersed family members.

The "Team Spirit '78" at issue was a mere defensive training designed to prepare against possible invasion by the north Korean Communists. In other words, the military exercise was nothing more than a routine test of our defense ability to cope with threats from the north Korean Communists who, rejecting our efforts to create conditions conducive to peaceful unification through south-north dialogue and exchanges, have been perpetrating various provocations true to their basic strategy for

communization of the entire Korean peninsula by force of arms.

Military exercises like the recent "Team Spirit '78" would have not been need after all if military tensions are removed after north Korea agreed to our peace-oriented efforts such as the proposal for the conclusion of a non-aggression agreement. Moreover, it is ridiculous for the north Korean Red Cross side to boycott the humanitarian meeting on the excuse of a military exercise. For, military issue has nothing to do at all with Red Cross talks based on humanitarian spirit.

Granted that such military exercise poses some problem, they should try to settle it through peaceful dialogue rather than postponing or suspending the dialogue unilaterally. This should be the kind of attitude supposed to be assumed between the same people, a posture that stands compatible with the spirit of the July 4 South-North Joint Communiqué.

Nevertheless, the north Korean side has boycotted even the working-level meeting of the Red Cross conference. This clearly indicates that the Pyongyang side has no interest in the peaceful solution of issues pending between the same people.

Here, we would like to serve a strong warning to the north Korean Communists that this is no time for them to solve south-north issues by force of arms or fulfill their scheme to communize the entire Korean peninsula. The north Korean Communists are urged to return to the original posture of Red Cross and meet the aspirations of the 50 million people before it gets too late.

If they continue rejecting the dialogue and cement their war policy, they should be held responsible entirely for all consequences arising therefrom.

Meanwhile, we would like to ask the Republic of Korea National Red Cross side to continue to make efforts for the lofty project of settling the wishes of 10 million dispersed family members and broadening the basis for peaceful unification.

For, we are confident that if we strive to build up our national strength based on a firm national unity while pursuing patiently dialogue, the day will surely come when the Pyongyang side would be obliged to respond

affirmatively to our humanitarian and peace-oriented efforts.

Nonsensical Excuse

The Dong-A Ilbo (March 21, 1978)

The working-level meeting of the South-North Red Cross Conference, the only remaining channel of south-north contacts, has been suspended after the north Korean Red Cross side postponed indefinitely the 26th working-level meeting set to be held at Panmunjom on March 20.

As is well known, south and north Korea pledged in the July 4 South-North Joint Communique of 1972 to "agree on the principle of peaceful unification and promote a grand national unity transcending differences in ideas, ideologies and systems." However, the north Korean Communists attempted to interfere in our internal affairs by demanding repeal of the Anti-Communist Law, etc. One year later in August 1973, they suspended the South-North Coordinating Committee on excuse of some of our internal issues. Here, the People's expectations of peaceful solution of the unification issue had dissipated with the south-north relations reverting to the pre-dialogue state. In a firm conviction that non-political and humanitarian projects should continue to be carried out, we, as is well known, made various proposals at the Red Cross talks with a view to removing the sufferings of separated family members.

Such propositions, however, were rejected by the north Korean side which was setting forth absurd prerequisites such as the "theory of conditions and environment." Going a step further, they cut off even the direct south-north telephone line in the wake of their axe-murder atrocity in August 1976. They have now come to boycott the last remaining channel of contacts, the working-level meeting of the South-North Red Cross Conference.

Posing of absurd excuses is one of the typical tactics of the Communists. This time, they are insisting that the joint Korea-U.S. military exercise, "Team Spirit '78," has formed an artificial barrier. What con-

nection, on earth, can a military exercise have with Red Cross talks? Does this mean they do not hold any military training?

Unceasing contacts and talks are going on between NATO and Warsaw Treaty Organization. Even though the other side conducts extensive military exercises, they do not care about this, carrying on their contacts and talks.

Everybody knows that north Korea itself remains in the relations of military alliance with the Soviet Union and Communist China and engages in various military exercises endlessly. Besides, they have massed troops along the truce line, dug invasion tunnels and continue dispatching saboteurs to the south. Do they insist that they have every right to take any provocative steps against us as they please, while we cannot even conduct military training? This is a childish and nonsensical assertion.

We strive for a continued dialogue even under the circumstances because we aspire for peaceful unification of the nation. The north Korean Communists should not miscalculate our true intention and capability.

Red Cross Talks Cannot Be Suspended

The Seoul Shinmun (March 21, 1978)

The 26th working-level meeting of the South-North Red Cross Conference, scheduled to be held at Panmunjom on March 20, failed to be held because the north Korean Red Cross side postponed it indefinitely. Fifteen hours before the scheduled time of the meeting, the north Korean Red Cross side asserted through Radio Pyongyang that the joint Korea-U.S. military exercise "Team Spirit '78" has formed an "artificial barrier straining extremely the south-north relations," contending that "to hold meeting under this circumstance would run counter to the Red Cross spirit."

The problem is whether the excuse put forth by the north Korean Red Cross side can be convincing. As was pointed out in a statement by the Republic of Korea National Red Cross, the allegation is sheerly nonsensical. If there is any problem between the two Red Cross sides, they should try to settle it through dialogue, rather than boycotting meeting.

The north Korean Communists have been very sensitive to the joint Korea-U.S. military exercise. But, few persons will support their postponement of the meeting designed to fulfill the wishes of the dispersed family members merely because of the military training exercise. Their action simply tells that they have been attempting to exploit the South-North Red Cross Conference for their political gains, and that they have no sincerity at all toward the solution of humanitarian questions. We want to ask if they do not conduct military exercises. They have perpetrated unbearable provocations against us, such as the axe-murder atrocity at Panmunjom two years ago, but we have never asked for postponement of the talks on the ground of such provocations.

At any rate, we must study carefully what has prompted them to put off the meeting. We recall that the Pyongyang side unilaterally postponed the eleventh vice co-chairmen's meeting of the South-North Coordinating Committee slated for May 30, 1975. The meeting has never resumed despite our repeated call for its resumption. The reason they gave for the boycott was so-called "anti-Communist drive" allegedly going on inside south Korea. We can easily presume that they have put off the working-level meeting to torpedo the Red Cross talks, as was the case with their suspension of the vice co-chairmen's meeting.

The last thread of the south-north dialogue has been maintained in the form of working-level meeting of the South-North Red Cross Conference. If the Pyongyang side has resolved to suspend even the Red Cross working-level meeting, they of course should be held responsible for overall breakup of dialogue. We would like to advise them that suspension of the dialogue can by no means be in their interests. It appears that the Pyongyang side boycotted the operation of the South-North Coordinating Committee and the full-dress meetings of the South-North Red Cross Conference because they believe the south-north dialogue proved harmful instead of being useful to their scheme to communize the entire Korean peninsula.

But, was there any gain for the Pyongyang side from its rejection of the south-north dialogue? The overburden of military outlays, that have become necessary for their war preparation, has driven the north Korean economy into near bankruptcy, which in turn has prompted a political crisis. They seem trying to find a path to communization of the whole peninsula in the destruction of the joint Korea-U.S. defense system as well as in an unrest in our political circles. They may believe that the

south-north dialogue stands in the way to these objectives. We are sure, however, that they can awaken from an anachronistic illusion once they observe the flow of situation objectively.

The Pyongyang side should realize that they can find a path to their survival in the improvement of the south-north relations, not in the undermining of it. We would like to urge them again that they should not make the mistake of suspending even the Red Cross working-level meeting designed to solve humanitarian questions.

Breakup of Last Channel of Dialogue

The Shin-A Ilbo (March 21, 1978)

The last remaining thread of the south-north dialogue is in the danger of total disruption due to the north Korean Red Cross's unilateral postponement of the 26th working-level meeting of the South-North Red Cross Conference originally scheduled for March 20, 1978 at Panmunjom.

According to a statement by a spokesman for the Republic of Korea National Red Cross, the north Korean Red Cross side boycotted the working-level meeting on the ground of the recent joint Korea-U.S. military exercise "Team Spirit '78." In fact, all propaganda machinery of north Korea denounced the "Team Spirit '78" furiously, climaxing in the boycott of the dialogue based strictly on Red Cross humanitarianism.

It is an utterly nonsensical reason, and the north Korean side will hardly escape the responsibility for the suspension of the dialogue. The boycott, seemingly intended to disrupt the dialogue altogether which has in effect been in a stalemate since the so-called Kim Young-joo statement issued on August 28, 1973, represents an act of deliberately blocking reunion between the dispersed family members in the south and north.

It is widely known that we have exerted untiring efforts for the solution of the dispersed family issue in line with the brotherly love and humanitarian spirit. At the Red Cross talks, our side has made such practicable offers as exchanges of letters, scholars and sportsmen, whereas the north Korean Red Cross side posed a set of political demands at the humanitarian meeting, such as repeal of the Anti-Communist Law, release of anti-state criminals and dissolution of anti-Communist organizations.

In one word, the north Korean side, which only insists in fictitious, political and absurd demands, has proven to lack any sincerity toward the dialogue. All it sought was an opportune time to deal a coup de grace to the already deadlocked dialogue.

Of course, the unilateral boycott must have derived from their overall policy of intransigence. Still, it appears there was some delicate internal situation which obliged Pyongyang to boycott the working-level meeting on the excuse of the "Team Spirit '78" exercise. The situation we can presume is a series of serious trials and uncontrollable internal confusion caused by a failure in their policy toward non-aligned nations, reported paralysis of Kim Jong-il, serious economic difficulties and rising discontent among people.

They should realize that the breakup of the last thread of the south-north dialogue will hardly escape criticism from world opinions and thus lead to further isolation of north Korea from the rest of the world community. It also represents a foolish act that makes consolidation of peace more difficult and that amounts to digging its own grave. This is a grave anti-national blunder, and north Korea alone should be held responsible for all consequences arising therefrom. North Korea should refrain from splashing cold water upon the 50 million people's expectations.

New Phase in South-North Relations

The Chosun Ilbo (March 21, 1978)

North Korea has given rise to a sign of intensifying tensions between the south and north. The 26th working-level meeting of the South-North Red Cross Conference, set to be held at 10 a.m. March 20, 1978 at Panmunjom, was torpedoed by the north Korean Red Cross side. The conference, the first working-level meeting set for this year, was agreed upon at the 25th working-level meeting held at the end of last year.

The Republic of Korea National Red Cross reported that the north Korean Red Cross side sent a radio message at 7 p.m. March 19 by Radio Pyongyang saying that it was postponing the 26th working-level meeting because of the joint Korea-U.S. military training exercise held recently. At 8 a.m. the following day, the Republic of Korea National Red Cross stressed in a radio message addressed to the north Korean Red Cross side that the meeting must be held as scheduled, and proceeded to the con-

ference site. But, the north Korean Red Cross side did not show up.

This is not the first time for the north Korean Communists to violate already agreed matters. But, it draws our particular concerns because it may be a sign of driving the south-north relations into a serious state.

The south-north dialogue, that went on in full swing with the 1972 South-North Joint Communiqué as momentum, has been stalemated overnight in August 1973 when the Pyongyang side bared its intention of boycotting it in the so-called Kim Young-joo statement. Together with the suspension of the business of the South-North Coordinating Committee, the full-dress meeting of the South-North Red Cross Conference has remained deadlocked after the north Korean Red Cross side refused to attend the eighth full-dress meeting slated to be held in Seoul on the excuse of so-called "atmosphere of Seoul." The vice co-chairmen's meeting, designed to discuss the question of normalizing the deadlocked function of the South-North Coordinating Committee, too, was suspended when the Pyongyang side notified the Seoul side of its decision to postpone the 11th meeting indefinitely one day before its scheduled meeting on May 30, 1975. And, this time, they have come to torpedo the working-level meeting, the last remaining thread of south-north contacts. We fear if this doesn't mean the total disruption of the south-north dialogue.

The north Korean sides's negative attitude does not end here. In the wake of the axe-murder at Panmunjom on August 18, 1976, they cut off even the direct south-north telephone line. Moreover, they did not show any response to the call for resumption of the dialogue made by acting Seoul-side co-chairman Min Kwan-shik on last March 3. At the scheduled meeting on March 20, the Republic of Korea National Red Cross delegation attended the meeting after notifying the north Korean side of its intention to attend it, but the north Korean Red Cross side did not show up.

Where do they plan to steer the south-north dialogue to? No questions other than humanitarian ones can be discussed at Red Cross meetings. If they have something to discuss, then they should try to solve them through peaceful dialogue as a spokesman for the Republic of Korea National Red Cross delegation pointed out in a statement. Nevertheless, they have shunned even the working-level meeting, the last remaining channel. What can be their motivation?

If the working-level meeting of the Red Cross talks becomes suspended as has been the case with the vice co-chairmen's meeting of the Coor-

dinating Committee, due to the north Korean side's one-sided intransigence, the south-north relations will revert to the pre-dialogue state and the tensions between the two sides will outpace in ferocity those in the pre-dialogue period. Is the north Korean side prepared to assume the responsibility for it?

The Republic of Korea National Red Cross delegation has pledged to continue to make patience and sincerity for reunion of the 10 million dispersed family members and solution of other humanitarian questions pending between the south and north. This is the aspirations of the 50 million people. As we expect much from, and extend support to the sincerity of the Republic of Korea National Red Cross side, we would like to watch reaction from the north Korean side.

Boycott of Dialogue is Enemy of Peace

The Hankuk Ilbo (March 22, 1978)

As if to extinguish the last remaining candle light of the south-north dialogue, the north Korean side boycotted the 26th working-level meeting of the South-North Red Cross Conference scheduled to be held on March 20. In a notification broadcast, the north Korean Red Cross side said it would postpone the meeting indefinitely because of the recent joint Korea-U.S. military exercise "Team Spirit '78." The notification came only about 10 hours before the scheduled opening of the meeting.

This is simply another wicked scheme of the north Korean Communists. They themselves have conducted numerous military exercises since the beginning of the dialogue. After all, it was after we held a military exercise dubbed "Freedom Bolt Airborne Exercise" that the north Koreans agreed to begin dialogue with us in 1971. So, there can be no ground on which they can insist that they cannot attend the Red Cross working-level meeting because of the "Team Spirit '78" military exercise. We can easily assume that their boycott derives from their frustration in an attempt to exploit the dialogue for their revolutionary purposes. The whole world knows that the Pyongyang has kept scaling down the dialogue, driving the south-north relations into a path to discontinuation.

Since Kim Young-joo's statement of boycott in August 1973, they have boycotted or torpedoed unilaterally virtually all channels of dialogue—the South-North Coordinating Committee and its vice co-chairmen's meeting,

full-dress meeting of the South-North Red Cross Conference, the direct Seoul-Pyongyang telephone line, and the Panmunjom Liaison Office. Now they have posted a signboard of "indefinitely closed" to the last remaining door. They chose the expression "postponement," but it in effect represents "indefinite closure."

Their boycott of the dialogue represents a violent infringement upon the matters of agreement reached previously as well as upon the Red Cross humanitarianism and the spirit of the South-North Joint Communiqué. It was an act of betrayal of the 10 million dispersed family members, and an act of ignoring the aspirations and expectations of our 50 million compatriots.

What are they going to do after the disruption of the dialogue? The boycott itself has fomented tensions to a certain extent. If the dialogue had continued to date, the Korean peninsula must have found itself in a "spring of peace."

To put it in short, their rejection of the dialogue means rejection of peace. It is a matter of common sense that dialogue is the only available fundamental means of engineering the south-north relations toward consolidation of peace and further peaceful unification in a state where the two divided parts have been hostile to each other for no fewer than 30 years.

It was for this reason that the people of south and north Korea and all the peace-loving peoples around the world have been asking for the resumption of the dialogue, and that the Republic of Korea National Red Cross and the Seoul side have exerted all available endeavors for the normalization of the dialogue.

Few persons will consider the north Koreans' boycott of the peace-oriented dialogue as an attempt intended to promote peace. This clearly sheds light on the fictitiousness of their call for "peace" or "peaceful unification." If we realized that their idea of peace does not hold valueless or oppose war but embodies the bellicosity of advocating "a progressive war," we can easily perceive what they are after behind their boycott of the dialogue. They must be still aiming at the playing with fire of war for the sake of "revolution" and "liberation." They have not given up the worn-out idea of "revolution (war) first and peace later." There always exists the danger that if they believe the time has come, they would attempt to translate their idea into action.

This year we are going to hold general elections. Externally signs have been shown of upsurging tensions in the world situation as characterized by

the recently strained relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. Disputes and confrontation escalate in the Middle East, on the African continent and over maritime interests.

The north Korean warlovers may attempt to take advantage of this situation and take actions against the south. And, the boycott of the working-level meeting may stem from such overall strategy.

The Republic of Korea National Red Cross already pledged in a statement that “no matter whatever difficulties it may face, it will do its utmost with patience and sincerity for reunion between the 10 million dispersed family members and solution of other humanitarian problems pending between the south and north.”

The Pyongyang side should reciprocate this and modify its stand. We all should join together and maintain a resolute posture in persuading the north Koreans. We are positive that the peace-loving world community will support our endeavors.

Call for Unconditional Dialogue and Exchanges at National Level

(As explained in the preceding chapter, the 26th working-level meeting of the South-North Red Cross Conference, scheduled to be held on March 20, 1978 under mutual agreement, failed to be held due to the north Korean Red Cross side's boycott. Here, we present a prepared speech which the Republic of Korea National Red Cross delegation planned to deliver to the north Korean Red Cross delegation at the abortive meeting. In the speech, the north Korean Red Cross side was to be urged again to respect matters of agreement already reached between the two sides so as to meet the wishes of the 10 million dispersed family members who are longing for their re-union ardently. We call on the north Korean Red Cross side to return to the conference table without further delay.) — Editor

Today we meet for the first time since the turn of the year to hold the 26th working-level meeting.

During the last year, we held five rounds of working-level meetings and discussed repeatedly the issue of resuming the suspended full-dress meetings as well as the problem of preliminary discussion of the topics of full-dress meetings.

Nonetheless, we passed the last year without solving either of these questions.

It really is a matter of shame before our 50 million compatriots that we, who have pledged to contribute to advancing the time of peaceful unification of the fatherland by smoothly settling the humanitarian project of finding the 10 million family members dispersed in the south and north, have failed to register any achievements to date, seven full years after we began our meetings. We have only been wasting the valuable time.

North Korean Red Cross delegates!

Today's world is at an age not of war and destruction, but of peace and coexistence, and in an era not of closure and isolation but of exchange and cooperation.

This is why all the countries of the world open their doors to one another and expedite exchanges and cooperative relations in all fields from the humanitarian area to economy, social, culture and sports, transcending differences in thoughts, ideas and systems.

Alone in our country in this age of co-existence and co-prosperity, the same people have yet to surmount the barrier of national division, unable to solve even humanitarian questions let alone the issue of promoting mutual exchanges and cooperative relations. This really is a defamation of the pride of our people with a time-honored cultural tradition.

I feel that we cannot delay any further the task of restoring the severed national ties between the south and north nor can we sacrifice the solution of humanitarian issues in the interests of thoughts and ideas.

North Korean Red Cross delegates!

As today we have the first working-level meeting of 1978, we'd better look back together over that emotional time when we opened the path of dialogue between Seoul and Pyongyang with south and north Korean Red Cross representatives dedicated to "brotherly love and humanitarian spirit."

In addition, we ought to recall the agreed matters concerning the Red Cross humanitarian talks, which we vowed before the 50 million compatriots in the south and north, to carry out and reaffirm here those matters which should naturally be solved at Red Cross humanitarian meetings.

To this end, we must above all resume unconditionally the suspended full-dress meetings of the South-North Red Cross Conference at an early date.

The full-dress meetings of the South-North Red Cross Conference, which were suspended in the wake of your side's so-called "statement on boycott of the dialogue" on August 28, 1973, have not been held for six years. The path for travels back and forth between Seoul and Pyongyang has been closed, and tensions are piling high day after day between the south and north.

The primary duty imposed upon the working-level meetings of the south and north Korean Red Cross societies is, above all, to resume the suspended full-dress meetings, reopen the path between Seoul and Pyongyang, and ease the tensions between the south and north.

From the very first day of these working-level meetings, the Republic of Korea National Red Cross delegation has urged that the eighth full-dress

meeting be held in Seoul as agreed upon between the two sides. We have even suggested concrete dates for the eighth meeting many times, calling for early resumption of the full-dress meetings.

Your side, however, has turned down all of these propositions based on something about "the atmosphere of Seoul," and refused to hold the eighth full-dress meeting.

Our side even proposed that if your side cannot come to Seoul due to some unavoidable situation, then the full-dress meeting be held here at Panmunjom or any other place of mutual agreement.

But your side has failed to give any clear response to date, thereby continuing to turn your face from the issue of resuming the full-dress meetings.

Such an insincere posture by your side amounts to an act of going back on the wish of the 10 million dispersed family members expecting much from the Red Cross humanitarian talks, and of delaying the creation of the grounds for lasting peace on this land and national unification.

In fact, the issue of resuming the full-dress meetings is by no means difficult, nor does it require lengthy debates.

It is just a simple question which can be settled only if the matters agreed upon and solemnly pledged between the two sides before the people are translated into action faithfully.

This is an issue that depends solely on whether your side is interested in the normalization of the Red Cross humanitarian conference.

It is very important to implement what has been agreed upon between the two sides when we feel that our dialogue can smoothly progress on the basis of mutual reliance.

Since what the two sides agreed on at their meeting constitutes a pledge made before our 50 million compatriots, we have the duty and obligation to carry it out.

Therefore, as the Republic of Korea National Red Cross delegation has been persistently urging, the eighth full-dress meeting should naturally be held in Seoul according to the mutual agreement.

However, in order to rectify the indefinite suspension of the South-North Red Cross Conference caused by your side's diehard refusal to hold the full-dress meeting in Seoul, we proposed last year that the eighth full-dress meeting be held here at Panmunjom.

This proposal of our side was intended to resume the suspended full-dress meetings at an early date, shelving the original agreement con-

cerning the place of the full-dress meeting for the time being in consideration of your side's reluctance to come to Seoul.

I think that if your side really hopes for the normalization of the South-North Red Cross Conference and is interested in the solution of the humanitarian issues pending between the south and north, your side won't have any reason not to accept our side's proposal that the eighth full-dress meeting be held at Panmunjom at an early date.

Next, we have the duty and obligation to solve the issue of finding the whereabouts of the dispersed families at an early date by discussing and settling concretely one by one the topics of the full-dress meetings.

The basic stand of our side today toward the discussion of the full-dress topics is that humanitarian projects should be expanded and developed step by step by solving urgent and easy issues first in such a manner as to be in accord with the urging of the dispersed families themselves in every respect.

The agenda topics of the full-dress meetings we prepared through our studies and debates at the preliminary meetings are all very reasonable for this purpose.

For this reason the Republic of Korea National Red Cross delegation proposed the concrete "method of searching for missing persons" with regard to Item 1 of the topics when the full-fledged debate of the agenda topics began at the third full-dress meeting, urging that the method be discussed and adopted at an early date.

The project to find out the fate and whereabouts of those families and relatives separated in the south and north is the very issue for which a solution is most urgently hoped for by the dispersed families. Such a project is customarily given top priority in the solution of dispersed family issues elsewhere in international circles.

If an elementary "project for searching for missing persons" like Item 1 of the agenda topics were carried out satisfactorily, subsequent projects like "free visits and reunion," "free exchange of letters" and "reunion of families" can be settled easily as follow-up matters.

From such a substantial and reasonable point of view, our side has been urging the discussion and solution of the issues one by one beginning with humanitarian projects which can be agreed to easily by both sides while satisfying the wish of the separated families.

Nevertheless, your side has rejected our proposals from the outset of the substantial discussion of the agenda topics on the excuse of so-called

“statutory conditions” and “social atmosphere.” Even the full-dress meetings held many times thereafter failed to register any progress due to your side’s insistence in ridiculous “political prerequisites.”

Throughout the entire 25 rounds of the subsequent working-level meetings, our side urged the initial undertaking of those pilot projects that can be implemented relatively easily such as “an exchange of groups of visitors to ancestral tombs among dispersed families of the south and north” “the issue of reunion between aged parents and their families” and an “exchange of family pictures.” as a means of finding a breakthrough in the stalled talks and expediting the substantial discussion of the topics.

But these sincere efforts by our side have failed to come to a fruition to date as your side did not respond to them affirmatively.

It is really frustrating to note that we, who have already set up the concrete projects of five agenda topics in order to realize the reunion between the 10 million dispersed family members, are merely repeating fruitless meetings for several years, unable even to ascertain their fate and whereabouts.

Your side has been turning your face away from the solution of humanitarian issues, contending that the separated family issue “will be solved automatically once national unification is achieved” while only defaming our system and trying to bring up the issue of war as if your side is mistaking the Red Cross talks for a political or military conference.

Such a conference posture by your side amounts to insulting the Red Cross humanitarian spirit as well as to abandoning your side’s own duty pledged before the compatriots. The major mission of the humanitarian talks is to open the avenue of reunion for the 10 million dispersed family members in accordance with brotherly love and humanitarian spirit. Under the circumstances can there be more important issue than this?

The problem which we should settle urgently is to discuss concretely and implement one by one the humanitarian projects embodied in the topics of the full-dress meetings as promised before the brethren.

Therefore, we must see to it that the families separated in the south and north find out the fate and whereabouts of their missing members, and free exchange of letters and free reunion between them be realized at an early date.

These humanitarian projects are not impeded by the heterogenous atmosphere between the south and north as your side is insisting, but contribute much to easing and overcoming the difference in the atmosphere.

If the dispersed family reunion project had been solved concretely one by one beginning with the agenda topic No. 1, then free travel back and forth between the families and relatives dispersed in the south and north could have been realized; confrontation and distrust removed; and lasting peace consolidated on this land and the time of national unification advanced that much by now through expanded personal and material exchanges.

Germany, which remains divided like our country, steadily pursues national reconciliation by solving humanitarian issues transcending ideas and systems, and expediting personal and material exchanges even in the situation of conflicting political systems and a tense atmosphere between the East and the West.

The project for reunion between separated families, first launched as a pilot program for a limited number of aged persons, is successfully carried out today. Every year, millions of families and relatives freely visit their home towns and blood relatives across the barrier of division.

As your side already knows, our country has long been pursuing an open-door policy toward all countries in the world. By accelerating positive exchanges and cooperation even with those countries with ideas and systems different from ours, some one million foreigners including those from Communist countries like China and Soviet Union visit our country each year.

And the columns of countless numbers of our oversea compatriots visiting their homeland are growing ever larger year after year.

In this world community which is becoming closer day by day thanks to the development of transportation and communication, we can freely travel to any destination around the world and exchange letters with our blood relatives there. But, only those dispersed families and relatives in the south and north have yet to share such joy.

Today's world community rejects the cold-war confrontation or exclusionary violence of the past. Every country pursues door-opening and mutual cooperation transcending ideas and systems.

Under these changes and development of the times, all countries and peoples hope to see that all disputes be settled peacefully through dialogue between the direct parties concerned.

Contrary to this progressive trend of the international society, however, our compatriots have yet to overcome the barrier of national division, a cold-war vintage, finding themselves in an abnormal atmosphere in which

they are unable to send and receive letters between parents and children in the same land.

At the time the historical South-North Joint Communique of July 4, 1972 was issued and the full-dress meetings of the South-North Red Cross Conference were held with delegates traveling back and forth between Seoul and Pyongyang, our brethren were buoyant with expectations, looking forward to the prospects of durable peace and unification of the fatherland.

However, after the function of the South-North Coordinating Committee was suspended and even the Seoul-Pyongyang path was closed with your side's so-called "August 28 statement," the relations between the south and north have in effect fallen back to the conditions prevalent before the issuance of the South-North Joint Communique.

Today when all countries of the world are absorbed in the creation of welfare societies, only our people are wasting tremendous national capabilities and economic resources in the confrontation between them, the same brethren, unable to utilize such capabilities and resources for national prosperity.

This really is an unfortunate situation.

The only path for our people to ensure continued survival and prosperity in today's turbulent international society is for the south and north to consolidate durable peace on this land by promoting dialogue and exchanges on the national level, transcending their respective systems and ideas.

We must, thereby, open an "era for full-fledged exchanges and cooperation" in which the south and north mutually open their societies, develop south-north exchanges step by step beginning with the reunion of dispersed families, and other easy areas such as economy, social, culture and sports, and jointly explore and utilize them resources and knowhow.

That we promote mutual cooperation through mutual development, construction and creation, represents the very path leading to the construction of a unified fatherland on the bases of "independence, peace and national unity," and also the path to the nation's boundless development and world peace.

For this purpose, we have already opened the South-North Red Cross Conference intended to solve the issue of 10 million separated family members in a humanitarian manner, and inaugurated the South-North Coordinating Committee with a view to discussing extensively political, economic, military and other issues related to national unification.

Therefore, if your side is really interested in easing tension between the south and north and forestalling war between the same compatriots, your side should reopen the Seoul-Pyongyang dialogue by normalizing the South-North Red Cross Conference and the South-North Coordinating Committee rather than to continue to block such channels of dialogue.

North Korean Red Cross delegates!

As I take this occasion of the 26th working-level meeting today to express the hope that our humanitarian dialogue will be normalized without fail this year in accordance with the wish of our 50 million compatriots in the south and north, I would like to disclose the position of our Republic of Korea National Red Cross delegation as follows:

First, we must concentrate all our efforts upon, above all, normalizing the suspended full-dress meetings at an early date.

In principle, the eighth full-dress meeting should naturally be held in Seoul as agreed upon between the two sides.

However, since your side continuously refuses to come to Seoul, our side is willing to shelve this agreement and urge that the eighth full-dress meeting be held here at Panmunjom.

We believe that this urging of our side represents the most reasonable means of settling the issue of urgently resuming the full-dress meetings under the present circumstances in which the path between Seoul and Pyongyang has remained blocked for five years.

If your side cannot come to Seoul nor join full-dress meetings here at Panmunjom, then we suggest that this time your side state clearly where and when you want to hold the eighth full-dress meeting.

Second, we urge that the topics of the full-dress meetings be discussed and solved concretely without any preconditions.

We hope that in the order of the agenda, topic No. 1 “the question of tracing and notifying thereof, the whereabouts and fate of members of dispersed families and relatives in the south and north” will be first discussed and solved, and based thereon other projects will be discussed and settled in succession.

In this respect, we concretely proposed at the third full-dress meeting the “method of the project of searching for missing persons” to be implemented jointly between the two Red Cross societies.

However, if your side has some situation which prevents you from carrying out topic No. 1 right away, we urge that urgent humanitarian projects such as “exchange of groups of visitors to ancestral tombs among

dispersed families between the south and north,” “reunion between aged parents and their families” and “exchange of family pictures” be undertaken initially as pilot projects.

It is desirable that these pilot projects be carried out simultaneously between the south and north. But if your side’s situation does not permit it, they may be undertaken in our side first.

If only these pilot projects were carried out, it would provided an impetus to spur the discussion of the agenda topics, easing the tensions between the south and north gradually.

Lastly we urge that the function of the direct telephone line between Seoul and Pyongyang and the Panmunjom Liaison Office, which has been suspended for more than one and a half years since August 1976, be normalized at an early date.

As your side well knows, these two means of contacts, established in our mutual agreement, had operated without any incident for five full years.

Therefor, the two means of contacts should continue to be operated sincerely under the responsibility of both sides.

Your side should show sincerity toward the humanitarian talks first in normalizing these channels of contacts.

I sincerely hope that the above urgings of our side will be discussed carefully one by one at today’s meeting, so that the full-dress meetings can be resumed and new hope be given to the 10 million dispersed family members without fail this year.

Part Three

Other Developments in Inter-Korean Relations

Home Visits by Pro-Pyongyang Koreans in Japan

Visits on Tano Holiday

More than 1,300 Korean residents in Japan, affiliated with Chochongryon, a pro-Pyongyang Korean residents' group in Japan, visited their homeland, the Republic of Korea, in four groups on last June 4 through 9 to pay homage to their ancestral tombs on the occasion of our traditional holiday, Tano, which fell on June 10.

The visitors were chiefly cadre members and businessmen of Chochongryon and key officers of various organizations under chochongryon's control, and young second-generation residents who have studied at Chochongryon-operated schools, in the regions of Osaka, Tokyo, Sapporo, Sendai, Kobe, Kyodo, Fukuoka and Yokohama. A majority of them said they wanted to visit Korea from long ago as they were told by earlier visitors about the brilliant development their homeland achieved and the warm reception given in Korea to Chochongryon visitors, but could find no chances to visit earlier because of the tenacious obstructive maneuvering by Chochongryon operatives.

According to the visitors, Chochongryon has lately grown frantic about trying to block the seemingly endless columns of its members visiting south Korea. They have called their members into a series of meetings such as "central devoted-members' conventions" to demand their bigger and determined roles in subverting south Korea and obstructing the "homeland visit program." Besides, businessmen who visit Korea are denied any financial support in retaliation.

Despite such determined harassment by Chochongryon, the number of our compatriots in Japan visiting the fatherland has been on a steady increase. The recent visitors on the Tano holiday brought to whopping 20,000 the total number of Chochongryon-affiliated Korean residents in Japan who have visited the Republic of Korea since the "homeland visit program" was initiated on the Chusok holiday in 1975.

Chochongryon Abducts Would-be Visitor

One of the Tano holiday visitors, Mr. Kim Seung-pil, 58, of Towyo City of Ehime Prefecture, Japan, said upon arrival in Seoul that he regrets

deeply that he, taken in by Chochongryon operatives, was late visiting the homeland. Kim, who had a tearful reunion with his 38-year-old son, Kim Tae-soo, at the Kimpo airport, said that when Chochongryon operatives learned of his planned visit to Korea, they forcibly carried him away to somewhere where they held him under tight surveillance. Kim said he managed to escape from captivity in the predawn hours of the day of his scheduled departure and narrowly took a plane bound for Seoul later in the day.

Another visitor, Mr. Kim Su-kil, 27, who he said graduated from a Chochongryon-operated high school ten years ago, said he was visiting south Korea because he wanted to make a first-hand observation of his fatherland. Noting that during his high school days he and his fellow students were told by Chochongryon teachers that “south Korea is full of starving people, and vicious crimes such as homicide take place in succession.” But, some of his ex-classmates who have been to Seoul earlier told him that “Chochongryon propaganda was false, and south Korea undergoes brilliant development.”

Saying that there are still many compatriots in Japan who blindly follow Chochongryon propaganda, unable to witness the real image of south Korea, Kim said that when he returns to Japan he would tell the people there what he saw in the Republic of Korea.

The Tano holiday visitors proceeded to their respective hometowns and enjoyed reunions with their family members and relatives after visiting the “Garden of Home Longing” and touring major industrial areas in three days.

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- South-North Coordinating Committee
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Part One

Will to Peace and Prosperity

“Pyongyang Should Agree to Dialogue Resumption and Economic Cooperation”

“Positive Steps to be Worked Out for Lasting Peace If North Korea Accepts Seoul Offers”

President Park Chung Hee, in his commemorative address delivered on the occasion of the 33rd anniversary of national liberation on August 15, 1978, strongly urged north Korea “to respond to our efforts for the unconditional resumption of the south-north talks and the promotion of economic cooperation and to realize the fact that the time when they can dream about unification by means of force has already gone.”

Disclosing that “in the eventuality that the north Koreans accept our proposals and there is progress, we will be able to work out more positive measures to bring peace to this territory and to lay the groundwork for peaceful unification,” President Park emphasized, “The unification of the fatherland should be accomplished by peaceful means. I believe that the best way to assure this is to pursue mutual prosperity through increased exchanges and cooperation through dialogue.” The following is the full text of the commemorative address by President Park on the occasion of the 33rd anniversary of national liberation.—Editor—

My fellow countrymen!

On this 33rd anniversary of our national liberation, I would like to join you in celebrating the occasion with pride and enthusiasm. This day is also significant for us because we mark the 30th anniversary of the establishment of the Government of the Republic of Korea.

We are immeasurably proud and confident when we look back over the struggle of the past 30 years and know that we have overcome all

hardships to achieve the great progress of today.

This pride is all the more well-deserved and precious because we have built and defended the fatherland with our own blood and sweat even though we had no natural resources worth mentioning nor any modern industrial facilities and even though we had to endure the tragic division of the nation and the ceaseless provocations from the north Korean Communists.

The Republic of Korea today is not the same country that lived off the aid of foreign countries. We achieved economic development and modernization at a most rapid rate, in spite of extraordinarily adverse circumstances. As a result, Korea is now a new country with great potential, one that is now able to help other countries in spite of the intense international competition which has developed throughout the six continents and five seas.

Furthermore, the Korean people today are no longer the same people who once depended on other countries for national defense and feared the threat of aggression from the north Korean Communists. We are now a very strong nation, full of self-confidence, courage and ambition, able to cope firmly with any change in the surrounding international situation and to smash the aggressive provocations of the north Korean Communists in a single blow.

Our nation's strength will grow at an increasing speed in the future, and with the attainment of a self-reliant economy and defense, the day is drawing nearer when the lasting peace will be established on this land and a prosperous welfare society will be realized.

As we have, for the past 30 years, advanced steadily toward our own salvation by our own might, using the internal and external challenges as steppingstones. Korea has come to take on the aspect of a strong modern industrial state.

Furthermore, contacts between nations have undergone changes from the mutual confrontations of the cold war between the East and the

West to diversified relations which seek a reduction of tension.

Through such changes, the era of competitive coexistence is opening, in which countries of different ideologies and systems open their doors for the pursuit of mutual benefit such as economic development and national security, and enlarge the range of exchange and cooperation.

Nevertheless, in spite of these changing circumstances, we cannot but regret the situation in which we find ourselves; in which people of the same blood point guns at each other like mortal enemies from the two halves of the country divided for 30 years.

Furthermore as we look to the future of the nation, we can think of no greater tragedy than that our north Korean compatriots are on the verge of losing their national identity because of alien ideologies and social systems which are quite incompatible with our national tradition.

We have steadily exerted efforts to ease tensions between the south and the north and to lay the foundation for peaceful unification. We proposed the south-north Red Cross talks out of brotherly love and humanitarian considerations, and also firmly pledged in the July 4th South-North Joint Communique, to work for the solidarity of the nation and for unification. We further announced our Foreign Policy for Peace and Unification on June 23rd, 1973 in hopes of consolidating peace on this land and of promoting the mutual prosperity of the south and the north and we even proposed to sign a mutual non-aggression agreement. On the 23rd of June this year, we proposed the creation of a civilian consultative body for the promotion of mutual trade, technology, and capital cooperation between the south and the north.

All these proposals were to expedite the peaceful unification of the fatherland which is the long-cherished desire of our 50 million people. However, the north Koreans have not only turned down all these most realistic proposals, but they have even gone so far as to refuse to talk with us for several years.

As I emphasized several times before, the unification of the fatherland

should be accomplished by peaceful means. I believe that the best way to assure this is to pursue mutual prosperity through increased exchanges and cooperation through dialogue.

On this occasion, I strongly urge the north Koreans to respond to our efforts for the unconditional resumption of the south-north talks and the promotion of economic cooperation and to realize the fact that the time when they can dream about unification by means of force has already gone.

In the eventuality that the north Koreans accept our proposals and there is progress, we will be able to work out more positive measures to bring peace to this territory and to lay the groundwork for peaceful unification.

My beloved fellow countrymen!

Our imminent goal is to build a wealthy and powerful country as soon as possible by accelerating the cultivation of our national strength.

Only with great national strength, can we defend our country, enjoy prosperity, and take the initiative in bringing about the peaceful unification of our fatherland.

In order to be a wealthy and strong nation, it is very important to be self-reliant in economy and national defense, but it is more important to establish a sound national morality and social discipline. A country which has lost its sense of morality and where there is no social justice—like a house built on sand—cannot maintain economic prosperity even if it once had it. One can say that a country is really wealthy and powerful only when its people respect law and order, work diligently, and help one another with neighborly affection.

That is why we hold dear the values of diligence, self-help and cooperation, which are central to the Saemaul Movement, and this is why we are resolutely pushing the anti-corruption movement.

Now, as we are on the threshold of becoming a highly industrialized

country, we should exert all efforts toward the promotion of spiritual culture as well as toward economic prosperity.

Dear compatriots!

Step by step, we are now constructing the wealthy and strong fatherland we have dreamt of since national liberation. Our devotion and efforts will continue until the task of the peaceful unification of the fatherland and the national revitalization is completed.

The day of glory is bound to come as we are marching forward with strong determination and the power of unity.

1

Part Two

South-North Dialogue

South-North Coordinating Committee:

“Let’s Resume South-North Dialogue Promptly”

—Seoul Side Urges Pyongyang to Agree to Proposed Creation of Economic Cooperative Body—

Seoul side Acting Co-chairman Min Kwan-shik of the South-North Coordinating Committee issued a statement on the occasion of the sixth anniversary of the issuance of the July 4, 1972 South-North Joint Communiqué on July 4, 1978, strongly urging north Korea to 1) normalize at an early date the south-north dialogue that remains suspended since 1973, 2) conclude a mutual non-aggression agreement between the south and north in order to bring about durable peace; and 3) accept the proposal for the creation of a consultative body for the promotion of economic cooperation for the sake of the 50 million compatriots’ welfare and co-prosperity.

Stressing that the proposal made by President Park Chung Hee for the creation of a south-north economic consultative body represented the presentation of an epochal prospect in today’s south-north relations, the Acting Co-chairman said that “the paving of such way by the south and north would be the shortest way for our people sharing the same blood to make an approach toward peaceful unification of the fatherland transcending thoughts, ideas and systems. I presume that there can be no reason why the north Korean side should reject it.” The full text of the Statement is as follows.

—Editor—

Today marks the sixth anniversary of the issuance of the historical South-North Joint Communiqué of 1972.

In one word, the spirit of this South-North Joint Communiqué is based on the common national aspirations for eliminating the distrust accumulated between the south and north, easing tensions, and advancing, even for a day, the time of peaceful unification of the fatherland.

It was upon this basic spirit that the south and the north agreed, in the Joint Communique, on the principle of peaceful unification of the fatherland calling for independence, peace and grand national unity, and reached an agreement on the stoppage of slander and defamation, prevention of armed provocations, various exchanges and cooperation in many areas, installation of direct south-north telephone, and the establishment and operation of the South-North Coordinating Committee.

In compliance with such basic spirit and various agreed matters embodied in the South-North Joint Communique, we have exerted incessant efforts to ease tensions, consolidate peace, and expedite various exchanges between the south and north by all means.

As is well known, President Park's August 15 Declaration calling for bona-fide competition between the south and north, and the August 12, 1971 proposal for a south-north Red Cross conference, served as the base for the birth of the July 4 South-North Joint Communique.

During the period of the south-north dialogue, we urged the opening of mutual societies between the south and north, and set forth concrete measures for exchanges and cooperation. Subsequently in 1973, we issued the Special Foreign Policy Statement Regarding Peace and Unification on June 23; proposed the conclusion of a non-aggression agreement between the south and north in January 1974; and declared the Three Principles for Peaceful Unification—consolidation of peace, exchanges and cooperation between the south and north, and ultimate realization of unification through free general elections.

Nonetheless, the north Korean side has rejected all of these our efforts and rightful and realistic peace-oriented propositions. Pyongyang has unilaterally suspended the south-north dialogue incorporating the wishes of the 50 million people and even cut the direct south-north telephone line, which was the only means of contact remaining between the south and north.

Behind the dialogue, moreover, they fomented tensions on the Korean

peninsula by digging invasion tunnels along the truce line, building up their military strength, and massing troops in the frontline. They have rejected dialogue with the same people and shunned efforts for independent national unification while urging “negotiations” with the United States.

To emphasize once again, unification of the fatherland should be realized in a peaceful manner under any circumstances. To this end, problems should be settled one by one beginning in practicable areas.

Our people, with great ability and talent, have wisely overcome numerous alien invasions and other national difficulties throughout our history. If the south and north unite and cooperate with each other, pooling their wisdom, peace will take a firm root on this land, and we will be able to build a welfare society oriented toward a national prosperity.

In this sense, the proposal made by President Park on last June 23 for the creation of a “consultative body for the promotion of south-north economic cooperation” was the presentation of an epochal prospect in today’s south-north relations.

The proposed consultative body would discuss matters related to trade and technical and capital cooperation between the south and north.

The paving of such way by the south and north would be the shortest cut for our people sharing the same blood to move toward peaceful unification of the fatherland transcending thoughts, ideas and systems. I presume that there can be no reason why the north Koreans should reject it.

I wish to take this occasion today of the sixth anniversary of the issuance of the July 4 South-North Joint Communiqué to urge the north Korean side to:

—Normalize unconditionally the south-north dialogue at an early date, which Pyongyang has suspended for no fewer than five years since 1973;

—Conclude a mutual non-aggression agreement between the south

and north in order to eliminate the fear of war and bring about durable peace; and

—Accept the proposal for the creation of a “consultative body for the promotion of south-north economic cooperation” for the sake of the promotion of wellbeing and co-prosperity, through which the 50 million people of south and north Korea can live well together, away from isolation and closedness.

I am convinced that the north Korean side’s early affirmative response to this urging would contribute toward consolidating peace on this land, facilitating co-prosperity for our people, and advancing the time of peaceful unification of the fatherland.

(The following are editorials of major domestic newspapers on the occasion of the sixth anniversary of the issuance of the South-North Joint Communique, calling for north Korea’s good faith and efforts for the normalization of the south-north dialogue.)—Editor—

Pyongyang Should Return to Spirit of Joint Communique

The Kyunghyang Shinmoon (July 4, 1978)

The July 4 South-North Joint Communique was a historical document intended to surmount, with our subjective determination, the territorial division which has been imposed upon us by outside forces. This is why the Joint Communique had given much expectations to the 50 million compatriots and enjoyed broad international recognition and support.

The idea of the Joint Communique was to eliminate, in the first place, the misunderstanding and distrust existing between the south and north by means of the three principles for unification—self-reliance, peace and grand national unity. Misunderstanding and distrust between the two di-

vided parts of a people are apt to build up confrontation and tension, leading to a war. Even in private dealings, lack of trust would reduce such dealings into mere scrap papers.

In the Joint Communiqué, the two sides promised to stop making slander and armed provocations against each other. Following this agreement, meetings of the South-North Red Cross Conference and South-North Coordinating Committee were held in Seoul and Pyongyang by turn, and a direct telephone line was installed between Seoul and Pyongyang.

Four months later, it was agreed at a Coordinating Committee meeting held in Pyongyang to suspend propaganda operations along the truce line by means of the public address systems, and to stop scattering propaganda leaflets toward each other's areas. A series of these rapid developments had given the impression that the south-north relations had reached a dramatic turning point.

But, how are the south-north relations today, six years later? Kim Young-joo's unilateral statement has blurred the ideas of independence, peace and grand national unity. The reality is that due to the north Korean Communists' incessant provocations, the south-north relations have reverted to the pre-dialogue, tension-packed state.

Pyongyang has even cut the direct Seoul-Pyongyang telephone line. No signs have been seen of early normalization of the direct telephone line and the suspended Red Cross talks designed to solve humanitarian problems.

In one word, north Korea interpreted the spirit of the Joint Communiqué at its own discretion, trying to link the principle of independence to the withdrawal of American forces, the principle of peace to disarmament in south Korea alone, and the principle of grand national unity to repeal of the south's anti-Communist policy.

They even reject the June 23 Special Foreign Policy for Peace and Unification as a "nation-splitting" scheme. On the other hand, they call

for so-called grand national conference or a confederation system, and try to have a direct talk with the United States.

The July 4 Joint Communiqué has thus become a dead paper because the north Koreans had an eye at something else from the beginning. Looking back, it has become clear that Kim Il-sung had sought to utilize the south-north dialogue as a tactical means of achieving communization of the whole Korean peninsula, not for easing of tensions nor for the consolidation of peace on the Korean peninsula.

North Korea's basic strategy toward the south is to overthrow the Republic of Korea government by force of arms or violence. To this end, north Korea tries to bolster the so-called revolutionary forces within and without. The recent manifestation of seemingly close relations between Peking and Pyongyang, Peking's allegation that the Pyongyang regime is "the only legitimate government" on the Korean peninsula, Pyongyang's intensified propaganda abroad against south Korea, and sea infiltrations. . . all these are carefully orchestrated maneuvers designed to serve their strategy for communization. North Korea attempted to achieve through a dialogue what it failed to gain in the Korean War.

But, we have learned clearly through the 30 years of national division that unification can be achieved only through direct talks between the parties concerned. For the sake of peaceful unification, north Korea should agree without any conditions to our offers for simultaneous entry into the United Nations, conclusion of a non-aggression agreement, and south-north exchanges, which can be instrumental to peaceful coexistence and alleviation of tensions between the south and north. We emphasize again that the north Koreans Communists should show good faith for dialogue and exchanges, aware that unification can by no means be achieved by force of arms.

North Korea Should Abide by July 4 Spirit

The Shin-A Ilbo (July 4, 1978)

The Defense Ministry has reported that of the five crewmen of a north Korean vessel sunk after infiltrating our territorial sea near Pyongyong-do in the western sea on the night of last June 27, four were returned to the north through Panmunjom on July 3 and the remaining one was allowed to stay in the south as he requested.

This is the second time that we have sent north Korean crewmen back to the north. The eight crewmen of a north Korean ship which was sunk after it intruded the sea off the east coast on last May 19 were also returned from a humanitarian point of view. The second ship that was discovered in our waters off the west coast was found to have entered our zone due to a navigational error. Its crewmen pledged before their repatriation that they will not violate our waters again. All of them were found to be fishermen.

The prompt repatriation of those fishermen by our side well contrasts the inhumane act by the north Korean Communists of holding 440 south Korean fishermen in captivity after they hijacked the fishermen while they were peacefully engaged in fishing on the high seas.

Our humanitarian act of returning the north Korean fishermen without delay was all the more significant because the repatriation was timed roughly with the sixth anniversary of the issuance of the South-North Joint Communiqué. It well points to the fact that our government has steadfastly been faithful to the spirit of the Joint Communiqué.

In the Joint Communiqué, the south and north agreed to stop slandering or launching armed provocations against each other, to engage in many-sided exchanges, to expedite the Red Cross talks, to install a south-north direct telephone line, and establish and operate a south-north coordinating committee, based on the three principles for national unifica-

tion—independence, peace and grand national unity.

Nevertheless, the north Korean Communists have kept infiltrating espionage agents and perpetrating armed provocations along the truce line and sea infiltrations in violation of the Joint Communiqué. Contrary, our side has made series of humanitarian offers such as reunion between separated families in the south and north, exchanges of groups of tomb visitors and economic cooperation.

It is believed that north Korea shuns dialogue and rejects our justifiable propositions for fear that any contacts with the free society of the south may lead to a shake of its unprecedentedly closed totalitarian system. However, the north Koreans should realize that their boycott of dialogue and exchanges would further deepen their isolation from the rest of the world as well as their economic troubles, thus ultimately leading to the fall of the Kim Il-sung's one-man system.

The north Korean Communists are strongly urged to reciprocate our humanitarian stand by returning our fishermen and agreeing to unconditional resumption of the south-north dialogue.

On Sixth Anniversary of Joint Communiqué

The Chosun Ilbo (July 4, 1978)

Today marks the sixth anniversary of the issuance of the historical South-North Joint Communiqué of July 4, 1972. On this meaningful day, however, we find ourselves in a difficult situation in which we recall the time of its issuance amidst suffocating tensions and bitter frustration, rather than with elated emotion and bright prospects. After the suspension of the south-north dialogue, the relations between the south and north have reverted to the tension-packed state prevalent before the dialogue, with the south and north at odds over yet another issue, the question of responsibility for the disruption of the dialogue.

The common mission facing the south and north must be to put an

end to this endless national tragedy and set the national history on a fresh track. However, the current situation does not move in this direction. After north Korea suspended the function of the South-North Coordinating Committee, curtailed even the working-level meetings and cut the direct Seoul-Pyongyang telephone line in the wake of the unilateral statement by Kim Young-joo on August 28, 1973, prospects for national unification have turned from brightness to darkness while hope has been replaced with hopelessness, and atmosphere of trust with the confirmation of distrust.

We don't know the true reason why Pyongyang refuses to make any contacts with us, rejects all propositions by Seoul, and makes unfounded slanders against the south in its persistent acts of intransigence. On the surface, the north Koreans charge that "Seoul does not strive to drive American imperialistic forces out of Korea despite its pledge to independent unification," that "Seoul bolsters its military strength while talking peaceful unification," that "Seoul does not legalize Communist activities while calling for grand national unity," and that "Seoul conspires to perpetuate national division by calling for simultaneous entry of south and north Korea into the United Nations."

Pyongyang's unilateral, dogmatic and subjective allegations well explain that these excuses can at no time be justified. Kim Il-sung insists that obstacle to independent unification should be eliminated by removing from Korea all American troops because, he argues, the United States, the ally of south Korea, is an external force. He asserts that the Soviet Union and Red China, north Korea's allies, are not external forces.

Kim Il-sung's contention is that he would maintain the relations of alliance with the two super powers—USSR and China, but south Korea should sever its ties with the United States and remain isolated from the rest of the world. We don't need to explain what this strategic contention is intended for. At the same time, Kim Il-sung says that for the sake of peaceful unification, south Korea, in addition to the withdrawal of American troops, cannot increase its military manpower nor can introduce

additional weapons and equipment. Nevertheless, north Korea does not mention about its own military buildup which is being made to an extent that by far outpaces south Korea's.

North Korea's formula for peaceful unification calls for the establishment of a kind of Communist regime, a people's democratic regime, in south Korea through a revolution, and then achieve unification peacefully through collaboration between this Communist regime and the socialistic forces in north Korea.

Is Pyongyang willing to accept it if Seoul insists that for peaceful unification, Pyongyang should sever military ties with the Soviet Union and Red China because both of them are outside forces whereas Seoul intends to keep its ties with the United States intact? Or, can Pyongyang receive it as reasonable if Seoul insists that unification should be achieved by setting up an anti-Communist regime in Pyongyang through a revolution?

At the same time, Pyongyang maintains that Communist activities should be legalized in south Korea transcending the difference in ideas and systems for the sake of grand national unity. Is Kim Il-sung willing to accept it if Seoul demands that north Korea allow liberal democratic parties to engage in political activities in north Korea and liberalize anti-Communist activities? This will never happen to Kim Il-sung who has purged countless party members branding them as rightistic revisionists, dogmatists, anti-party and counter-revolutionary elements, conservatives and bureaucrats.

Pyongyang has torpedoed the south-north dialogue to obstruct what south Korea tried to do for independent and peaceful unification and what north Korea could not do. Pyongyang's demand, in one word, is that Seoul should take such steps as to leave south Korea defenseless militarily and to neutralize its system politically. And, north Korea denounces it as "opposing to unification" when the south naturally rejects such unilateral demand.

These contentions of north Korea constitute its scheme to threaten peace under the cloak of peace and oppose unification under the name of unification. The method of approaching the question of unification under the present situation of the south and north is for the two sides to explore constructive conditions which can be instructive and acceptable to both sides. There cannot exist the kind of unification method that weakens the other side while strengthening one's own position.

What is and will be true is that national unification cannot be achieved by means of war or a revolution or a propaganda or a deceptive peace offensive or a diplomatic isolation or infiltration of agents. If either side attempts to realize unification by absorbing the other side, the time of unification will drift farther away.

We want to watch the attitude of north Korea on the basis of this concept. If Pyongyang continues to boycott the dialogue and resist all contacts and exchanges between the south and north, it would surely represent their shunning of unification. If north Korea tries to find excuses for boycott of the dialogue by producing some conditions which the south cannot accept unless it is prepared to give itself up wholly, it would, in effect, mean north Korea's avoidance of contacts with the south due to its external weak points.

We understand that Seoul has not set forth and will not offer any conditions that cannot be accepted by Pyongyang. On the occasion of the sixth anniversary of the issuance of the South-North Joint Communiqué, we urge Pyongyang to return to reason above all others.

North Korea Should Not Betray People

The Hankuk Ilbo (July 4, 1978)

Today marks the sixth anniversary of the issuance of the July 4 South-North Joint Communiqué. We feel it would have been better if the spirit of the Joint Communiqué were prepared in a more forward-looking man-

ner. The Joint Communiqué called for consolidation of peace, and peaceful and independent unification. In the Communiqué, the two sides pledged to eliminate national division steadily and expedite national conciliation and unity transcending ideas, thoughts and systems.

To this end, the Communiqué urged successful completion of the South-North Red Cross Conference, cessation of mutual slander, and prevention of armed clashes, small or large.

To facilitate these national programs, the South-North Coordinating Committee was established and a direct Seoul-Pyongyang telephone line installed. In addition, the two sides solemnly pledged before the people their faithful implementation of these agreements, aware that “the aforementioned agreements correspond with the common aspirations of the entire people eager to see early unification of the fatherland.”

All the people realize today that this great historical document has almost become a dead paper due to Pyongyang’s deliberate violations and betrayal. It has blocked all routes of dialogue for one reason and another. North Korea continues to infiltrate agents to and perpetrate provocations against the south while mounting slanderous propaganda abroad.

North Korea insists in negotiations with a third country in disregard of the pledged independent efforts for unification of the fatherland. On the other hand, it attempts to interfere in our internal affairs, unable to transcend the difference in thoughts and systems, a precondition to grand national unity.

Pyongyang has rejected all of our peace-oriented proposals. It has said “no” to the offers for cooperation and exchanges in practicable and non-political areas, which is a realistic short-cut to approach to unification and peace. North Korea has even turned down the June 23 Special Foreign Policy for Peace and Unification, the Three Principles for Peaceful Unification, and the latest proposal for the creation of an economic cooperation body.

It is easy to realize why they have been rejecting all of these proposi-

tions. At the outset, they intended to shake the south Korean society and achieve their goal of communization of the south, taking advantage of the dialogue. However, as the dialogue progressed, they saw no chance for their scheme. They knew that the dialogue only served to expose the weakness of their system. Here they resolved to suspend the talks altogether.

As is the case with a thief crying thief, Pyongyang, nevertheless, tries to dispute our system. As to system, the whole world knows that the Kim Il-sung regime is the most terroristic, dictatorial, anti-national, criminal and anti-peace clique in the world.

No matter how hard they try to shun the responsibility for the stalemate of the dialogue, they will surely be brought to account before long. For, all of our 50 million people are witnessing clearly who is the devastator of dialogue.

We are positive that the day will surely come when the Joint Communique will be translated into action. North Korea should desist from violating the spirit of the Joint Communique and instead show sincerity toward its embodiment.

South-North Red Cross Conference:

“Let’s Hold South-North Red Cross Heads’ Confab”

—In Seoul, Pyongyang, Panmunjom or Any Other Place—

The Republic of Korea National Red Cross President Lee Ho on last August 12 proposed to the north Korean Red Cross that “a meeting between the Presidents of the Republic of Korea National Red Cross and the north Korean Red Cross be held at Panmunjom, Seoul, Pyongyang or any other place on which both sides can agree, in order to work out ways and means for a speedy normalization of the suspended South-North Red Cross Conference.”

In a special statement issued on the occasion of the seventh anniversary of the proposal by the Republic of Korea National Red Cross for a south-north Red Cross conference, the Red Cross President said, “The Republic of Korea National Red Cross is resolved that no matter what obstacles might exist ahead it will continue every possible effort with all sincerity and patience for the realization of the ardent aspiration of the ten million separated family members in the south and the north.”

This proposal by the Republic of Korea National Red Cross represented an effort to find a means for the resumption of the suspended South-North Red Cross Conference, and the manifestation of a determination to carry through the humanitarian talks by all means.

The dialogue between the south and north has fallen in a state of complete suspension to date, seven years after it was begun with the proposal for a south-north Red Cross meeting made by the Republic of Korea National Red Cross on August 12, 1971 in the wake of President Park’s 1970 declaration of the “August 15 idea for the laying of foundation for peaceful unification.”

The South-North Red Cross Conference, which opened in the midst of the people's great expectation and jubilation, was suspended when north Korea boycotted the south-north dialogue in a statement issued by Kim Young-joo, Pyongyang side Co-chairman of the South-North Coordinating Committee, on August 28, 1973, barely two years after it was initiated. The direct Seoul-Pyongyang telephone line was cut by north Korea on August 30, 1976 for no known reasons.

Besides, north Korea went so far as to break off even the working-level meeting of the South-North Red Cross Conference, the last straw of the dialogue, on last March 20 on the excuse of the "Team Spirit" joint Korea-U.S. military exercise, an annual military training.

Even after north Korea suspended the dialogue in August 1973, the Republic of Korea National Red Cross has made incessant efforts for the removal of the sufferings of the dispersed families in the south and north, proposing to the north Korean Red Cross, engaged only political propaganda in disregard of humanitarian questions, that easy and practicable projects such as "exchange of groups of visitors to ancestral tombs," "reunion between aged parents and their families," and "exchange of the pictures of dispersed families," be carried out first as pilot projects. The north Korean Red Cross, however, rejected all these suggestions, setting forth absurd prerequisites which included "improvement of environmental conditions," "repeal of the Anti-Communist and National Security Laws" and "withdrawal of the June 23 Special Foreign Policy."

The latest proposal made against this backdrop by the Republic of Korea National Red Cross for a meeting of the south and north Korean Red Cross heads, demonstrated the eagerness and sincerity of the Republic of Korea National Red Cross toward the question of the resumption of the Red Cross talks. This is all the more so in view of the fact that the place of the proposed meeting was offered flexibly—either Seoul, Pyongyang, Panmunjom or any other place the north Korean Red Cross prefers.

The north Korean Red Cross should show good faith toward the solution of the humanitarian issues by agreeing unconditionally to the sincere and realistic overture by the Republic of Korea National Red Cross, and thereby meet the aspirations of the people.

The following is the full text of the statement by Lee Ho, president of the Republic of Korea National Red Cross:

Seven years have passed since the Republic of Korea National Red Cross (ROKNRC) proposed on Aug. 12, 1971 to the north Korean side the South-North Red Cross Conference (SNRCC) with a view to realizing reunion of the ten million separated family members in the South and the North.

Since then, the ROKNRC continued to make strenuous efforts to help arrange reunion of the ten million separated family members long dispersed in the South and the North in the belief that such a humanitarian undertaking will expedite peaceful unification of the fatherland.

It is recalled that following twenty-five preliminary and sixteen working-level meetings, first started on Sep. 20, 1971 at Panmunjom, seven full-dress meetings were held at Seoul and Pyongyang alternately since Aug. 30, 1972. After suspension of the full-dress meeting in July 1973, seven deputy representative and twenty-five working-level meetings took place at Panmunjom.

After the 7th South-North full-dress meeting held at Pyongyang in July 1973, the North Korea Red Cross(NKRC) side unilaterally suspended the SNRCC and on Aug. 30, 1976 disconnected the direct telephone line which had been in operation for 5 years between the South and the North. To make it even worse, the NKRC rejected on Mar. 20, 1978 without any justification the working-level meeting, which was then the sole channel of communication between the two sides for the normalization of the full-dress meeting, bringing about a complete stalemate of the SNRCC.

For the success of the SNRCC, the ROKNRC has exerted diversified

efforts throughout the course of the various meetings.

It is to be noted that in order to obtain humanitarian solution of the problem of separated family members in the South and the North, the ROKNRC has suggested various concrete proposals to the north Korean side such as the notification of whereabouts and informations of the family members by means of exchanging universally accepted Inquiry Sheet of the Red Cross, the mutual exchange of visits to the ancestral tombs, the exchange of informations on the aged parents as a pilot project, the exchange of family pictures and so forth.

In order to resume the full-dress meeting as early as possible, the ROKNRC repeatedly proposed to the north Korean side to fix dates for holding the 8th full-dress meeting, and it also suggested various possible means including a request to the International Committee of the Red Cross(ICRC) in Geneva to render its good offices for the resumption of the meeting and direct talks between the chief delegates of the two sides.

The NKRC, however, rejected all these sincere proposals by the ROKNRC.

It is deeply regrettable that the NKRC side, totally disregarding fraternity and humanitarianism and refusing the solution of the problem of the ten million separated family members, unilaterally rejected the SNRCC, thus breaching the mutual agreement by both sides.

Today, in the international community, all countries are pursuing mutual exchange and cooperation in spite of differences of thoughts, ideologies and social institutions, thus enabling us to live in the world where men are getting closer to each other day by day and in an open age in which all countries enjoy mutual communication as intimate neighbours.

Presently, in our country, the homeland visit programme by the Korean residents affiliated with Chochongryon (Pro-Pyongyang Korean residents association in Japan) is continuing, and even those separated families residing in the Soviet Union, China and other communist countries are

freely exchanging letters with their families in Korea.

Indeed, the situation in Korea divided into the two parts of the South and the North where parents and their sons and daughters are denied of exchanging even a single letter between them is nothing but a real tragedy.

I believe the time is already gone when the differences of ideologies and social institutions between the South and the North should block the reunion of the ten million separated family members.

The nation will celebrate soon the 33rd anniversary of the national liberation. At this juncture, I urge the NKRC side not to disregard the ardent wishes of the ten million separated family members in the South and the aspirations of the fifty million compatriots any longer and to show good faith in humanitarian solution of the dispersed family problem by promptly responding to our proposal for the resumption of humanitarian Red Cross Conference.

I, hereby, propose that a meeting between the Presidents of the ROKNRC and the NKRC be held at Panmunjom, Seoul, Pyongyang or any other place on which both sides can agree, in order to work out ways and means for a speedy normalization of the suspended SNRCC. I look forward to a positive response from the NKRC side to this sincere proposal.

The ROKNRC is resolved that no matter what obstacles ahead might exist it will continue every possible efforts with all sincerity and patience for the realization of the ardent aspiration of the ten million separated family members in the South and the North.

Also, I would like to avail myself of this opportunity to express my heartfelt gratitude to the nation and the authorities concerned and particularly to the press, domestic and overseas, who rendered their cooperation and support in various ways for the success of the SNRCC which the ROKNRC has been striving for. At the same time, I expect their further encouragement and support for fulfillment of our lofty cause.

(The following are editorials of major domestic newspapers calling for early resumption of the South-North Red Cross Conference on the occasion of the seventh anniversary of the proposal for the Red Cross talks by the Republic of Korea National Red Cross on August 12, 1971.)

—Editor—

Our Sentiments on Seventh Anniversary of August 12 Offer

The Kyunghyang Shinmoon (August 12, 1978)

The ditch of discontinuation cutting across the land beneath the same sky remains deep as ever today. Only dead quietness and tensions heavily hang along the 155-mile truce line where even the last straw of dialogue has been severed. How long would this suffocating state last?

In three days, we observe the 33rd anniversary of national liberation. One generation has already passed since the nation was divided into two, following the short-lived jubilation over national liberation. Those who have parted their beloved families, expecting to be back in a few months, are unable to return to their homes in northern Korea for more than 30 years.

The Yalu River where log rafts were flowing leisurely; the snowy winter scenes of the northern border towns of Onsong and Hoeryong; Samsu and Kapsan surrounded by thick primitive forests . . . these are typical of the northern scenes we are missing acutely.

Today marks the seventh anniversary of the proposal by the Republic of Korea National Red Cross for a campaign for searching for separated families. The emotion with which we observed the south and north Korean Red Cross delegates shuttling forth and back has now cooled down. The surliness with which the Pyongyang delegates walked

out of the conference table designed to arrange the reunion of dispersed families, has not faded but grows worse today, five years later.

Two years ago, they cut the direct Seoul-Pyongyang telephone line. Five months ago, they even broke off the working-level meeting aimed at discussing the question of resuming the dialogue. They now try to shift the responsibility for the suspension of the dialogue to our side.

“It was a windy day when acacia flowers were falling like snow. On this day, my husband passed away like falling flower . . . One day, my husband in bed whispered low. I barely understood it. It was ‘mom.’ He was calling his mother, that is, my mother-in-law in the north . . .”

This is part of a letter by some housewife, which was selected as best from among a number of letters on “missing families” entered in a contest sponsored by the Republic of Korea National Red Cross in commemoration of the seventh anniversary of its proposal for a family searching campaign. This was a story about a man who died calling his mothers.

The three-story stone building built at Samchong-dong exclusively for the South-North Red Cross Conference has had no chance for use ever since it was dedicated five years ago. We do not know when an end will be put to the atrocity of blindfolding and earmuffing their 15 million people.

Let us meet and talk openheartedly. There is nothing to be afraid of in a meeting with the same people. Let us return to the emotion of seven years ago and start our discussion over again.

The North Should Agree to Dialogue Resumption

The Seoul Shinmun (August 12, 1978)

What kind of barrier it is that prevents the exchange of even family letters much less reunion between dispersed families? How and when can this barrier be eliminated? We are obliged to ponder over this question on the occasion of the seventh anniversary of the proposal by our Red Cross

for a family searching campaign.

According to the proposal, the south-north Red Cross preliminary meeting opened on September 20, 1971 and the full-dress meetings of the Red Cross talks were held in Seoul and Pyongyang by turn beginning in August 1972 amidst a great joy among the dispersed families looking forward to reunion with their missing families and wholehearted support by all the people.

However, the meetings failed to register any progress due to the thick political barrier. The full-dress meetings were suspended altogether by Pyongyang after the seventh meeting was held in July 1973. Even the working-level meeting of the Red Cross conference, designed to discuss resumption of the full-dress meeting, was suspended in last March when the north Korean Red Cross delegation failed to show up at the 26th working-level meeting.

The course of the Red Cross talks clearly tells which side has been obstructing reunion between dispersed families. At the meetings, our side maintained that the question of displaced families should be solved strictly from the standpoint of the Red Cross humanitarian spirit without any political consideration. The north Korean side, however, insisted that south Korea must repeal the Anti-Communist and National Security Laws as a precondition to the settlement of humanitarian issues. In other words, north Korea attempted to obtain political gains, rather than to meet the long-charished hope, through the Red Cross talks.

At the same time, while our side urged that humanitarian questions should be solved first, with the results therefrom contributing to the peaceful settlement of the unification issue, north Korea argued that the immediate objective of the south-north Red Cross meeting should lie in the realization of unification, contending that all humanitarian issues pending between the south and north would be solved when unification is realized. In this manner, Pyongyang attempted to politicize the Red Cross talks, posing such absurd conditions as suspension of anti-Communist education

and activities in south Korea. North Korea has deliberately ignored the fact that the south-north Red Cross meeting was to settle pressing humanitarian issues at a stage before unification where no conditions for unification are ripe.

The north Koreans' attempt to manipulate the Red Cross talks for their political gains was well evidenced when they unilaterally put off a scheduled full-dress Red Cross meeting indefinitely following the boycott of the South-North Coordinating Committee in the August 28 statement in 1973. They have concluded that the Red Cross talks and any other with the south are valueless and unprofitable unless they serve their goal to communize the south.

Nevertheless, we cannot give up or shelve such pressing issue as the question of displaced families. We must continue to strive for the resumption of the Red Cross talks with sincerity and patience. Lee Ho, president of the Republic of Korea National Red Cross, proposed to the north Korean Red Cross on the occasion of the seventh anniversary of the proposal for a family searching drive that the presidents of the south and north Korean Red Cross societies meet at Panmunjom, Seoul, Pyongyang or any other place of mutual agreement to discuss the question of resuming the Red Cross talks at an early date. This shows the attitude of our side which spares no efforts for early solution of the dispersed family issue.

North Korea should agree to our repeated calls for early resumption of the South-North Red Cross Conference, realizing how the world opinion thinks of its obstruction of the reunion between displaced families.

Seven Years after August 12 Proposal

The Shina -A Ilbo (August 12, 1978)

Seven years have already passed since Dr. Choi Tu-son, the then president of the Republic of Korea National Red Cross, issued a statement on August 12, 1971, proposing a south-north Red Cross meeting to dis-

cuss the issue of dispersed family issues. After the north Korean Red Cross accepted it, south and north Red Cross delegates' contacts began on August 20, which soon developed into the south-north Red Cross preliminary meeting begun on September 20 and then into full-dress meetings, drawing wholehearted support from the people.

After the seventh full-dress meeting held in Pyongyang in July 1973, however, north Korea, through the "August 28 statement" by Kim Young-joo, unilaterally suspended the talks. We note with regrets that although there were Red Cross delegates' meetings and then working-level meetings to discuss the question of holding the eighth full-dress meeting, no agreement has been reached to date. The north Koreans have gone to the extreme of torpedoing even this working-level meeting early this year, severing the last straw of contact between the south and north.

As is well known, the south-north dialogue has been stalemated because north Korea attempted to handle the dispersed family issue in a political manner. They have been shunning the discussion of agenda topics, setting forth ridiculous preconditions such as repeal of the Anti-Communist Law and release of anti-state criminals.

This attitude of north Korea strikingly contrasts the stand of our side which has persistently been trying to ease the sufferings of the dispersed families based on brotherly love and the Red Cross humanitarian spirit. The fact that they even reject our reasonable and practicable propositions such as "reunion between aged parents and their families," "exchange of groups of tomb visitors" and "exchange of family pictures," bespeaks they were not interested in a dialogue from the outset. Even during the period of the dialogue, north Korea mounted numerous provocations against the south, digging invasion tunnels and perpetrating the notorious axe-murder of two American officers.

It has been only because of brotherly love that we have been trying to deal with such bellicose fanatics. The fact that the homeland visit program enabling our brethren in Japan affiliated with a pro-Pyongyang organiza-

tion there, has been carried out successfully, tells clearly that nothing can stand in the flow of affection between blood relatives. Pyongyang should realize that is political scheme disregarding this humanitarian program would only increase the sorrows of our divided people.

Despite north Korea's boycott of the dialogue, we have not ceased our efforts for resumption of the talks. We have proposed a food assistance in January 1977 and economic cooperation between the south and north in the June 23 special statement. On the occasion of the seventh anniversary of the August 12 proposal, we hope that north Korea will return to the attitude it showed seven years ago once again and exert sincere efforts for the solution of dispersed family issues one by one. The Republic of Korea looks forward to affirmative response from north Korea.

New August 12 Proposal

The Chosun Ilbo (August 13, 1978)

In a press conference on August 12, Lee Ho, president of the Republic of Korea National Red Cross, proposed to the north Korean Red Cross that the heads of the south and north Korean Red Cross societies meet at Panmunjom, Seoul, Pyongyang or any other place of mutual agreement to discuss the issue of normalizing the South-North Red Cross Conference at an early date.

On the significant day of August 12 when our Red Cross first proposed a family searching campaign seven years ago, the Republic of Korea National Red Cross again laid down an epochal proposition aimed at meeting the wish of the dispersed families in the south and north.

We cannot forget the day, August 12, 1971, when the family searching campaign was proposed to find out the whereabouts of dispersed family members and arrange reunions between them, with a view to solving a genuinely humanitarian question pending between the two divided parts.

The August 12 proposal resulted in a new chapter of the history of the

south-north relations, featuring shuttles between Seoul and Pyongyang by south and north Korean delegates, which were the first travels to be made across the truce line in the quarter-century history of national division, issuance of the July 4 South-North Joint Communiqué, and birth of the South-North Coordinating Committee.

The recent August 12 proposal by Lee Ho reminds us of the emotion we experienced seven years ago this day. We want to see how Pyongyang would respond to the sincere proposal by our Red Cross President who said he is willing to go any place to discuss the question of meeting the wish of the dispersed families.

The South-North Red Cross Conference incorporates an ardent and solemn public desire which even a regime cannot ignore. To our disappointment, however, the Red Cross talks have been suspended. Did we make any excessive demand? No. All we did was that we have offered a carefully prepared method of achieving what the Red Cross talks were intended for.

The north Koreans, however, torpedoed the talks overnight in August 1973, setting forth absurd conditions. In 1976, they cut the direct Seoul-Pyongyang telephone line without any notification. Early this year, they suspended even the working-level meeting for unknown reason. Thus, the channel between the south and north was shut off as it had been before the August 12, 1971 proposal. This cannot be left unchecked. In fact, the Republic of Korea National Red Cross has made strenuous efforts to restore the severed channel of dialogue.

Our Red Cross made a concession as to the site of the full-dress meeting. To find a breakthrough by means of pilot projects, the Republic of Korea National Red Cross proposed an aged parents' project, exchange of displaced families' pictures, and reunion at Panmunjom.

But, no echo has returned from the north. The recent proposal by the President of the Republic of Korea National Red Cross offered another valuable opportunity for the north Korean Red Cross to join efforts to

ease the sufferings of the displaced families. The significance and objective of the Red Cross talks represent a national mandate that stands above the political interests of a regime.

Beacon of August 12 Proposal

The Hankuk Ilbo (August 12, 1978)

Today marks the seventh anniversary of the proposal which the Republic of Korea National Red Cross made for a campaign for searching for the 10 million dispersed family members. The proposition said in substance that "the Republic of Korea National Red Cross proposes that the south and north Korean Red Cross societies jointly initiate a campaign for finding out the whereabouts of and arranging reunion between dispersed families in the south and north with a view to settling genuine humanitarian issues based on the Red Cross spirit."

In the wake of the proposal, there were delegates' contacts, preliminary meetings and then full-dress meetings until the talks were stalemated with Kim Young-joo's August 28 statement in 1973. Even the working-level meeting aimed at resuming the full-dress meeting was suspended by Pyongyang.

We are inclined to accuse the north Koreans again for their disruption of the talks all the more because of the importance of the meeting. The boycott represents their betrayal of the 50 million people's aspirations and the basis of humanitarianism. We can also realize that beneath their intransigence there lurks a wicked scheme to renew a fratricidal conflict.

The Red Cross talks had another function of bringing about an overall dialogue and improved relations between the south and north. When the Red Cross preliminary talks were in full swing in 1972, high-level secret talks were made, followed by the issuance of the July 4 South-North Joint Communique and the establishment of the South-North Coordinating Committee. It was only owing to the organization of Red Cross and its

humanitarian mission that the south and north entered a stage of dialogue, putting an end to the 27-year-old discontinuation overnight.

Nonetheless, the north Koreans committed the crime of paralyzing the dialogue. In fact, they have openly declared that they will not have any dialogue with south Korean authorities. The reason is crystal-clear. Once in Seoul, they knew that they lag far behind the south in terms of national development, and that as the dialogue progressed, the inevitability had loomed large that the Korean question has to be dealt with in the formula of peaceful coexistence between the two entities.

Nothing would have embarrassed more the north Korean Communists adhering to a policy of communizing the south. In bewilderment, they hastily resolved to destroy the dialogue because peaceful coexistence would obliterate their aggressive goal and endanger the existence of their Communist system.

This is why the north Koreans have repeated political slanders against the south while refusing to discuss agreed agenda topics and degrading or disrupting altogether various channels of the dialogue.

The beacon of the dialogue has now been extinguished by their conspiracy. But, this must be a mere physical extinction. The beacon of the Red Cross conference, ignited by the Republic of Korea National Red Cross in 1971, and that of other south-north meetings will never cease to burn in the minds of many peoples around the world.

Part Three

Other Developments in Inter-Korean Relations

Seoul Side of Coordinating Committee Holds Second Seminar to Mark Sixth Anniversary of Joint Communique

Six years have already passed since the July 4 South-North Joint Communique was issued amidst the excitement and expectation that the sorrowful quarter century of national division would be brought to an end and the dawn of unification would be broken soon.

And, it is five years since north Korea unilaterally declared its boycott of the south-north dialogue on August 28, 1973 in disregard of the aspirations of all the people let alone the dispersed families in the south and north.

The Republic of Korea has made untiring efforts to resume the suspended dialogue, offering various propositions which included the proposal by President Park on last June 23 for the creation of "a south-north consultative body for economic exchanges." The north Koreans, however, rejected all of the offers, trying to mislead public opinions at home and abroad in unfounded slander, defamations against the south and deceptive peace propaganda.

Against this backdrop, the Seoul side of the South-North Coordinating Committee held a seminar on the south-north relations on June 30, 1978 in commemoration of the sixth anniversary of the issuance of the South-North Joint Communique. The seminar, second of its kind to take place following the first seminar held in 1977, was designed to help form a national consensus by further enhancing the concern and participation by various circles in the unification issue and other south-north relations.

At the seminar attended by 20 leading figures from various walks of life, Min Kwan-shik, acting Co-chairman of the Coordinating Committee, said in his opening speech that "we have exerted all endeavors to improve the south-north relations and prevent any further fratricidal war on the Korean peninsula by means of dialogue in the spirit of the Joint Communi-

que, and also to solve the unification issue peacefully through ‘bona fide competition’ and ‘competition in development, construction and creation.’ ”

In a contrast, the Seoul side Co-chairman said, the north Korean Communists attempted to manipulate the south-north dialogue as a means of communizing the entire Korean peninsula in an ideological strategy placing violence above peace and ideology above nation. “When they saw no chance for a success in this strategy, they broke off the dialogue and began to pursue a policy of open confrontation.

A total of five papers were presented to the seminar on the three themes—South-North Joint Communique and South-North Dialogue, Question of Consolidating Peace on Korean Peninsula, and Exchanges and Cooperation between South and North Korea. The seminar papers were “Standing of South-North Joint Communique in South-North Relations” by Yang Ho-min, an editorial writer of the Chosun Ilbo; “National Contribution of South-North Joint Communique” by Hwang Sung-mo, a professor of Chungnam University; “Pursuit of Practicable Models for Consolidation of Peace” by Lee Sang-woo, a professor of Sokang University; “National Contribution of Lasting Peace” by Cho Chaekwon, a professor of Konkuk University; and “Necessity for Economic Exchanges and Cooperation between South and North Korea” by Lee Seung-yun, a National Assemblyman.

Of the seminar papers, Rep. Lee Seung-yun’s “Necessity for Economic Exchanges and Cooperation between South and North Korea” is presented in the following pages:

Necessity for Economic Exchanges and Cooperation Between South and North Korea

**By Lee Seung-Yun
National Assemblyman**

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I. Foreword

Easing of tensions on the Korean peninsula constitutes a prerequisite to the nation's co-prosperity and development, and further forms the decisive key to world peace and development of Asia. Earlier, we sought dialogue and exchanges between the south and the north in many ways for the sake of alleviation of tensions and condition of peace on the Korean peninsula. But few achievements were registered. Nevertheless, since the present hostile confrontation and tensions between south and north Korea cannot be allowed to go on indefinitely, we are now at a

juncture where we must exert greater endeavors for the promotion of dialogue and exchanges between the south and the north.

Attempts were made in this paper to study and analyze more concretely the necessity and feasibility of economic exchanges between south and north Korea.

The necessity for south-north economic exchanges between south and north Korea.

The necessity for south-north economic exchanges shall be studied first with emphasis on 1) changes in the economic policies of south and north Korea as a supplement to a change in the foreign policy for unification, 2) vast benefits to be gained through economic integration on the Korean peninsula, and 3) the significance of economic exchanges and cooperation as a step toward peaceful unification.

Next, the present state of the economies of south and north Korea shall be reviewed, followed by analysis of the atmosphere for south-north economic exchanges. Problems that should be solved prior to economic exchanges shall be studied, and then an evaluation shall be made of the feasibility of economic exchanges between south and north Korea. Lastly, a study shall be made based on the above analysis on the question of in which direction and through what procedures can economic exchanges be sought between the south and the north.

II. Necessity for Economic Exchanges Between South and North Korea

1. Changing Situation and Adaptability to New Age

Prompted by the multi-polarization of the world, characterized by the emergence of the Third World and the rapid expansion of the mood for East-West detente since the 1960s, the world has now entered an age when economic interests stand above ideology. In particular, this trend picked up momentum after the end of the Vietnam war. Today, trade and econo-

mic cooperation between the East and West are being carried out more actively than at any other time in the past. Even the economic exchanges taking place among countries which were hostile to each other once, do not incur any moral criticism in international politics.

This phenomenon is attributable largely to an accelerated competition in the area of international economy caused by swift post-war economic construction in many countries, birth of a number of independent states in the under developed areas and the growing recognition of the fairly successful economic development of the new-born nations. This pragmatic trend is defined a little differently between the advanced and the backward areas. In the backward areas, nations, politically with the tendency toward strong nationalism are inclined in general to seek the maximization of their national interests as they float between the two blocs of the East and the West in pursuit of economic gains such as economic assistance, technical aid or better trade relations. On the other hand, advanced countries like European nations have been promoting large and powerful economic units that stand above political units of states, with a view to retaining their economic edges which have been declining with the loss of their past colonies. In other words, the concept of patriotism is being interpreted in the sense of uplifting national welfare, away from exclusive and idealistic nationalism. This trend is well reflected in the preference of economic integration achieved at the cost of partial political control as in the case of the EC. Both advanced and the backward countries have something in common, that is, pursue maximization of economic interests before any other national goal. This changing situation has led the formation of a fresh world order.

On one hand, such change in the world situation has prompted the world powers surrounding the Korean peninsula to re-evaluate their stakes in Korea. As a result, the idea that the Korean peninsula is the point where the East and West confront each other, with south and north Korea as their respective spearheads, has retreated substantially. Moreover as the increased tensions on the Korean peninsula in the wake of the

Vietnam war were taken as a threat to the world powers' stakes in the Korean peninsula, the world powers have come to hope strongly for the status quo and lasting peace on the Korean peninsula.

Our foreign policy had to adapt itself to such a change in the situation surrounding Korea, and the efforts for such adaptation were embodied in the August 15, 1970 Declaration, the South-North Joint Communiqué of 1972 and the Special Foreign Policy for Peace and Unification of 1973.

Such a series of efforts, together with the government's new peace and unification policies, reflects our realistic approach to the changing world situation.

In the past, we pursued a passive foreign policy for national unification, under which we, from the standpoint that the Republic of Korea government is the only legitimate government on the Korean peninsula, opposed north Korea's entry into the United Nations, prevented north Korea from joining any specialized agencies of the world organization, and blocked attempts to invite the representatives of both south and north Korea to the United Nations when it debated the Korean question.

With the Special Foreign Policy for Peace and Unification of 1973 as a momentum, however, we introduced a fresh foreign policy for peace and unification under which we have done away with the past position and come to pursue unification without war through open dialogue and peaceful confrontation with north Korea.

Parallel with these new policies, the Seoul-side co-chairman of the South-North Coordinating Committee has proposed many-sided exchanges in non-political areas between south and north Korea. The proposal featured mutual exchange of businessmen and permanent posting of company representatives in each other's areas. Besides, if we are to pursue the simultaneous entry of south and north Korea into the United Nations and other international organizations, then the issue of exchanges and cooperation in the limited economic area, too, should be interpreted from a new angle. For, the questions of such exchanges, contacts and com-

petition ultimately form prerequisites to economic integration.

Influenced by the recent changes in international politics and economic trends characterized by East-West detente, signs have emerged that the relations between south and north Korea may possibly switch from the relations of political and military confrontation to those of economic competition. This trend points to the possibility of trade between south and north, while implying competitiveness in their external economic transactions. It also necessitates an amendment to our existing strategy toward the north in the economic area as well.

2. Korean Peninsula as Ideal Economic Unit

As a new order of international competition has been formed, as discussed in the above, on the basis of the realistic sense of value that attaches importance to the actual interests of states or nations, there has emerged, along with economic nationalism and neo-protectionism, a strong trend toward regional economic integration or cooperation among countries having common interests. This is because the advantage of large economic units in international competition has been proven clearly.

In economic logic, trade of commodities and free movement of production elements are profitable for all the countries involved in the sense of efficient utilization of resources. The profits accruing from such trade can be maximized when control or obstructive elements posed by political units called states are removed completely, that is, when complete economic integration is realized. The E. C. is in the process of achieving economic integration for the sake of such maximized profits. What they pursue is a complete economic integration. They intend to achieve a thorough economic integration by going through such steps as elimination of tariff and non-tariff barriers, guarantee of free movement production elements, and integration of economic policies and currencies. So long as economic interests are pursued, gradual political integration becomes unavoidable whether they like it or not. The basic position of the EC member nations is that even if such political integration runs counter

to their respective political goals they have no choice but to accept it for the sake of economic gains.

The Korean peninsula which had traditionally maintained an integrated economic zone, saw its economic sphere split into two at the end of World War II. The trade in commodities, the most fundamental stage of economic exchanges, has since been suspended altogether, as south and north Korea have refit their respective economic systems in such a way that they can survive as separate economic units. But, the economic losses suffered thereby must have been enormous.

South and North Korea together have a population of about 50 million, a size ideal for an economic unit. This scale is comparable to those of Western world powers like Great Britain, France, West Germany and Italy. South and North Korea form an ideal harmony as they have their own merits in terms of resources and terrain. Although the Korean peninsula itself is an area comparatively lacking in resources, north Korea fairly abounds in major mineral resources and energy such as hydro-electric-power and coal, while south Korea enjoys comparatively favorable agricultural conditions. If south and north Korea were integrated geographically, the Korean peninsula would find itself in a strategic location linking the Eurasian continent to the Pacific. In the present state of discontinuation, however, the optimum route for south Korea to approach the Asian continent and for north Korea to advance to the Pacific remain blocked. The question of economic size is very important. If there were no economic discontinuation, both south and north Korea could have done without the difficulty of limited domestic market or other inconveniences caused by a small economy.

At the moment it may seem wishful thinking, but it is self-evident that if the Korean peninsula emerged as a single integrated economic zone, Korea, located at a strategic point in Asia, would have a middle-sized economy and, with a strong international competitiveness, and would enjoy a more efficient growth and prosperity than now.

3. Significance of South-North Economic Exchanges as a step toward Peaceful Unification

In order to adapt ourselves to the changing world situation, we face the need to modify our attitudes both political and economic, toward north Korea as was already suggested.

Purely in an economic sense, the economic integration of the south and north is highly desirable and is expected to bring vast profits to both sides.

Still, the biggest factor behind the need for economic exchanges is that such exchanges are highly significant that they become a step toward achieving peaceful unification of the Korean peninsula.

Today, East and West Germany have much brighter prospects for unification than Korea largely because of the economic exchanges going on between the two.

Of course, the course of approach between East and West Germany was basically different from ours. In Germany, material exchanges have by far preceded political relations, whereas in Korea there have been no exchanges of materials at all except for brief unofficial exchanges in the early stage of the division.

It should be noted in this connection that East Germany adopted the socialistic economic movement placing emphasis on the heavy industrial sector in its early years, and later leaned toward an economic system linked considerably to the Western market economy. This is important since it can definitely be a factor conducive to possible economic integration between the two divided countries. The momentum that facilitated the conclusion of a basic treaty and expedited dialogue and exchanges between East and West Germany since the turn of the 1970s, was that East Germany whose economy had lagged far behind that of West Germany, has undergone a fast economic development in the past several

years to the extent of becoming one of the ten top economic powers in the world. To achieve and sustain such a fast economic expansion, East Germany has found indispensable economic exchanges with highly advanced West Germany on privileged terms.

The key to north Korea's economic development lies in whether it can remove various obstacles to its economic growth. If such factors are removed satisfactorily, north Korea can possibly achieve a fairly successful industrialization by the mid-1980s.

In other words, if north Korea maximizes its economic development by shifting its policy priority from politics to economics, then we cannot rule out the possibility that today's East-West German pattern of approach can be applied to the Korean peninsula to a certain extent. On the other hand, if north Korea persists in building up its war economy while retaining the rigidity of its system, north Korea's economy will become further stagnant, causing the imbalance between the capability of the south and north to worsen and the tensions to persist.

In essence, economic exchanges constitute an important course which we have to go through in the process of achieving peaceful unification, and the extent of economic exchanges itself can become a milestone on the road to unification. Economic exchanges, whether spontaneous or arranged through negotiations, represent one of the most important and realistic means to bring about dialogue and further peaceful coexistence.

III. Feasibility of and obstacles to Economic Exchanges

1. State of South and North Korean Economies

South Korea, maintaining an export-oriented and open economic system, has economically outpaced north Korea which has been pursuing economic self-sufficiency. The superiority of the south Korean economy over the economy of north Korea has been shown in all areas: in the south labor productivity has shot up steadily; modern technology has

been introduced and properly digested; and financial credibility has been recognized in the international monetary market. In the post-liberation years, the north Korean economy overwhelmed that of south Korea. Not only in the overall quantity but also in terms of industrial structure, north Korea was in a far more favorable position than south Korea. Moreover, north Korea's industries were quite modern as most of them were left behind by defeated Japan. However, today, same 30 years later, south Korea, with the comparable acreage of land and twice the population, has begun to outpace north Korea substantially in terms of per-capita GNP. Despite disadvantageous conditions, south Korea shows clear edges not only in the field of light industries but also in the area of heavy and chemical industries.

Since 1965, the industrial growth of north Korea has registered less than 14 percent a year. As a whole, north Korean industry has been so unstable that the industry marked minus growth rates in three years. In striking contrast, south Korea has maintained an industrial expansion of about 23 percent a year. Whereas north Korean industry is centered around mining based on underground resources and primary processing of mineral goods, south Korea depends more on technology-intensive industries such as intermediary and final processing. In the agricultural sector also, north Korea still faces a serious food shortage, though it has expanded farm productivity through mechanization and heavy use of fertilizer. South Korea, on the other hand, has drastically boosted grain production through the development of farming know-how and distribution of high-yielding hybrid grains as well as use of much fertilizer. Today, south Korea produces rice in a quantity more than enough to meet the domestic need with a considerable amount of surplus exported.

There are several factors behind south Korea's surpassing of the economy of north Korea. First, the theoretical socio-economic system: a social system which offers various incentives such as amassment of private property and opportunities for consumption and which guarantees free competition, is more efficient and productive than a social system

which is uniform and which is centered around a planned and controlled economy. Besides, north Korea has consumed a much greater portion of its national energies than south Korea for the buildup of armed forces without the ability of production. In the educational area also, north Korea has been investing more in ideological education than productive education, and in north Korea the compulsory military service period for young men of the most productive age group is twice or thrice as long as in south Korea.

In economic policies, south Korea has from the outset exposed its domestic industries to international competitiveness through a bold shift to an open economic system, whereas north Korea has been pursuing an economy of self-sufficiency, retaining various elements of inefficiency characteristic of a closed and small-scale economy. Under such a system, investment is improperly distributed, with a lion's share going to arms production industries, thereby reducing the overall efficiency of the economy.

In particular, alarmed by the fast development of south Korea, north Korea attempted in the early part of the 1970s to introduce the south Korean-style economic development strategy. In other words, they sought to achieve a drastic economic growth with sharply increased investments met with foreign capital introduction. Due to inexperience in the international economic sector and low international credibility, however, most of the foreign capital introduced turned out to be hard-term credits. Even such hard credits were inefficiency invested. Besides, introduction of up-to-date know-how from the Western world was sluggish due largely to the closedness of north Korean society as well as to the lack of ability to absorb modern technology properly.

As a result, it has become difficult for them to repay the introduced foreign credits. The foreign exchange situation of north Korea, which had depended greatly on the export of primary goods, has gone from bad to worse as the world primary goods market plummeted in the wake of the oil crisis.

For these and other reasons, the north Korean economy is in a critical situation today. South Korea, however, registers an uninterrupted fast growth despite of the universal business slowdown following the oil crisis. The failure of the north Korean economy has rendered north Korea an orphan in the world economy.

2. Atmosphere for Economic Exchange

In general, economic exchanges cover all items listed in international balance sheets, such as commodity transaction, service, capital transaction, grants and all other personnel and material transactions. In a narrow sense, however, economic exchanges mean only commodity transaction in many cases.

In order to facilitate commodity trade, which is the basic form of economic exchanges, the industrial structures of the countries involved in trade should undergo changes in such a way as to fit such trade, in addition to the need for price difference caused by the difference in the availability of natural resources or in industrial structure. If there is any case in which change in one's industrial structure cannot be tolerated, then exchanges undertaken in such conditions cannot be genuine economic exchanges but mere "political economic exchanges."

Therefore, if economic exchanges are to be carried out between the south and the north in a genuine sense (in the form of genuine division of economy), there should be political decisions on both sides to accept such changes in their respective industrial structures. But, since the external trade of north Korea is merely intended to offset surpluses or shortages in their planned demand and supply, it basically differs from the trade of the market economic system, which can be interpreted as a course of adjustment by means of price function.

Moreover, north Korea has preferentially constructed heavy industries related to munitions production from the angle of bolstering the so-called socialistic industrialization policy. Top priority has been placed

especially on the machinery industry centered around the production of machine tools. In this way, north Korea has pursued a course of moving from heavy industry to light industry, a pattern contrary to the general economic development course inherent in the capitalistic economic system. Besides, in a condition of dull external cooperation under the closed system, north Korea has been demanding an extremely austere life from its people by forcing them to make savings equivalent to 35 percent of GNP and putting aside a large amount of military out lay accounting for 15 percent of GNP.

As a result, a wide gap has emerged in the consumption level and pattern between the peoples of south and north Korea.

Meanwhile, the items which north Korea lately hopes to import from non-Communist countries for the implementation of the so-called socialistic industrialization include hydro-electric generating facilities, oil refinery facilities, synthetic resin, detergent, acrylic, and aluminium plants, shipbuilding facilities, and diesel engine, synthetic rubber and petro-chemical plants. Already, north Korea has introduced from European countries power plants, steel and petro-chemical plants, tetron plant and a cold rolling mill.

To raise funds to finance the import of these industrial facilities, north Korea exports mineral goods like iron ore, briquette coal, pig iron, rolling steel materials, tools, cement, metallic products and fishery goods. Excluding iron ore and briquette coal, many of north Korea's export items are in competition with south Korea's.

A look into the trade structure of north Korea shows that their major import items are mostly plant facilities required for the so-called socialistic industrialization, not consumption goods in the light industrial field nor raw materials. Therefore, full-fledged commodity exchanges between south and north Korea may be explored under the assumption that south and north Korea consider their respective industrial structures as part of an integrated economy, transcending the confrontation of systems and

ideas. In this case, it is expected that broad commodity and other economic exchanges are possible between south and north Korea from the angle of reorganizing the industrial structure and disposition all over the Korean peninsula.

3. Prerequisites

However, in consideration of north Korea's current pursuit of socialistic industrialization focused on munitions industries with the ultimate goal of communizing the entire Korean peninsula, they are hardly expected to accept the aforementioned basic change in their economic structure. Therefore, broad economic exchanges between south and north Korea based on the principle of the division of labor is practically infeasible. And, unless north Korea undergoes a policy change designed to improve its people's consumption level by importing south Korea's light industrial products and unless the south Korean government is willing to engage in an exchange in a way that extends help to north Korea's socialistic industrialization, the scope of any economic exchanges is bound to be extremely limited.

If commodity exchanges were realized under the circumstances, they would be strictly limited to the exchange of those items which can give no help to each other's economic development in any form.

Thus viewed, south and north Korea should first solve sweeping political problems if they want economic exchanges at the present stage. From the standpoint of economic structure, those exchanges and cooperation which are implemented in the form of mutual supplement and horizontal division of labor in a state of different economic structures, can provide the least friction and transcend politically hostile relations in the area of economic profit seeking.

However, in the case of south and north Korea which confront each other in terms of idea and system, one's economic capability is considered more important as a criterion of the judgment of conditions for economic

exchanges or cooperation. When there is a wide imbalance in the level of economic development between regions, there in general emerge relations in which one side physically rules, or is ruled by, the other. In this case, the economically weaker region would not agree to economic integration through negotiations if it faces the danger of being ruled by the other. This is especially true of the backward regions which are relatively impervious to the pursuit of economic profits. In such a case, in general, political ideology stands above economic gains with such regions maintaining the state of divisional independence while adhering to their own causes.

Therefore, if the south Korean economy proves to be superior to north Korea's in the course of economic exchanges and cooperation, the approach to economic integration could come depending on the possibility of expanding the scope of south Korea's concession at the time of approach toward exchanges and cooperation. On the other hand, if economic superiority is held by north Korea, they may provoke aggression to achieve their political goal of communizing the whole Korean peninsula by force of arms.

In consequence, the feasibility of peaceful coexistence and approach for economic exchanges and cooperation would increase when both south and north Korea maintain comparable economic development, industrialization and overall standard of living.

4. Are Economic Exchanges between South and North Korea Possible?

Considering the various conditions discussed above and numerous non-economic problems which must be settled prior to the full-fledged implementation of economic exchanges, it is difficult to provide an outright answer to the question of whether economic exchanges between south and north Korea are practically feasible.

Seen from the aspect of economic structure, the trend toward mutual supplement in terms of natural resources is not as strong as is generally

known. North Korea by no means abounds in resources. The resources in north Korea would not be sufficient even for its own use when further industrialization gets under way and when its economy reaches a more advanced stage.

Since south and north Korea have been promoting their industrialization with their own independent economies irrespective of each other and since both sides have been concentrating their efforts on the development of heavy and chemical industries for strategic reasons, their industrial structures are quite similar and carry strong mutual competitiveness, though the two sides approaches to industrialization have differed.

But the possibility of trade and other economic exchanges between the two sides cannot be eliminated merely on the ground of the competitiveness of their long-term industrial structures. According to the fundamental logic of trade, trade can take place simply for geographical reasons apart from the difference in natural resources, industrial and technical structure and the pattern of consumption. Moreover, since today's economy is extremely complex, opportunities for trade that gives benefits to both parties can be found abundantly if only the situation so permits.

As was discussed before, the biggest factor standing in the way of economic exchanges between south and north Korea is not something economic but north Korea's closedness and adherence to the policy of communizing the entire Korean peninsula. The closedness of north Korea derives from the various political ill-effects that may appear when the north Korean people who suffer from oppression and destitution are exposed to the south Korean society where people enjoy freedom and a high living standard.

However, the north Korean economy, as already seen in the foregoing, has now reached a point where it can no longer persist in the closed system of self-sufficiency. The north Korean economy has far passed the stage where it could cure only with internal prescription such various prob-

lems as foreign exchange crisis, backward technique and sluggish growth caused by inefficiency of investment distribution. Today, north Korea needs more material assistance and technical advice from outside than at any other time in the past. A shift to pragmatic road and gradual opening are unavoidable for north Korea.

In view of the reality and external credibility of north Korea, however, it is not likely that there would be any rescuers who are willing to offer assistance to north Korea. Neither the Soviet Union nor Communist China, both north Korea's allies, are in a position to provide any. North Korea already owes more than one billion dollars in outstanding credits to the Soviet Union, while Communist China, which has shifted to a pragmatic road, is preoccupied with its own economic development.

South Korea, on the other hand, can assist north Korea in the areas of foreign exchange, industrial know-how, economic planning and development strategy. In view of the fact, however, that the south and the north have had a hostile relationship ever since national liberation, and that south Korea can hardly be of any substantial assistance to north Korea so long as Pyongyang, driven into a corner, refuses to renounce its strategy of military provocations in a narrow sentiment of competition, it remains to be seen whether the north Korean leadership, no matter how difficult their situation may be, would respond to economic exchanges favorably for the sake of their immediate economic gains and of the co-prosperity of the entire Korean people.

In brief, the prospects are that economic exchanges between south and north Korea can hardly be realized despite the fact that such exchanges would not only provide immediate benefits to both sides but also bring about the enormous gain of increasing common efficiency for balanced development of the land, namely, regional specialization or division of labor, for the sake of future integration. It is evaluated that economic exchanges will be possible only through a patient step-by-step approach.

IV. Direction of Approaches to South-North Economic Exchanges

The ultimate objective of economic exchanges between south and north Korea, as discussed earlier, is to establish an integrated economy on the Korean peninsula and achieve co-prosperity and development of the nation. But, a more realistic and immediate aim is to extend substantial help to the poverty-stricken north Korean compatriots from a humanitarian standpoint, and to provide a momentum to open a new age of co-prosperity by consolidating peace through exchanges and dialogue.

Economic exchanges can be sought in three areas-economic cooperation by means of trade, capital cooperation and technical cooperation. We shall now look at the direction of concrete implementation of economic exchanges in these three fields.

1. Trade of Commodities

Trade of commodities is the most fundamental stage of economic exchanges and cooperation. In reality, therefore, it carries the highest feasibility and should be implemented on a priority basis. A state of total economic discontinuation has persisted between the south and the north over the period of a generation due to their hostile relations. However, since economic exchanges between south and north Korea presuppose the inauguration of a consultative organization, it is believed that trade of commodities can be realized with least-required concession between the two sides. But, so long as there is no distinct change in the present extreme hostile relations, full-fledged trade based on economic benefits cannot be realized easily. A step-by-step approach appears unavoidable.

In the initial stage, exchanges must be limited to a nominal level. To provide a greater chance for the realization of economic cooperation, the items subject to exchanges would have to be restricted to non-strategic items such as consumer products and primary goods. If direct trade is in-

feasible, exchanges may be made by way of third countries like Japan. And, if north Korea cannot allow its people to use goods with south Korean labels, items may be shipped without labels. Of course, in the initial stage, economic gains from such exchanges would be negligible. But, their symbolic implication that the discontinuation between the south and the north has been overcome, cannot be too emphasized. Moreover, an actual cause can be provided for the continuation of dialogue and negotiations between the south and the north. Since the amount of the items subject to exchange in the initial stage would be very small, it seems there would be no need to be concerned about the existing trade structure. In nature, such exchanges would take the form of government-managed trade.

After this stage, economically lucrative items may be selected as the quantity and number of items are gradually expanded. Various mineral goods and ores which north Korea is exporting could be used by the south, while various consumption items of the south can be shipped to the north.

If and when mutual trust and recognition of common interests between the two sides are built up parallel with the growing trade volume, south and north Korea may engage in intermediate trade on the basis of the world markets the two sides have explored respectively. North Korea may use south Korea as the intermediary for its export to, and import from, the free world market, while south Korea can use the north as a relay post for advance to the market of Asian continent.

In this stage, south and north Korea may feel the need to open specific ports to the other side or build direct south-north expressways or railroads. At Panmunjom, a permanent trade exhibition hall can be established. At this point, many private industries of south Korea may take part in south-north trade.

2. Economic Cooperation through Capital Exchange

As seen briefly in the above, the direct cause of north Korea's

economic crisis is shortage of capital. Due to the lack of ability to settle outstanding foreign credits. Pyongyang's overseas credibility has been substantially damaged. As a result, north Korea is denied any new loans, causing inevitable stagnation in investment and growth.

In his speech on the launching of the second seven-year economic development plan early this year, Kim Il-sung emphasized the need for north Korea will be able to obtain from our Export-Import Bank mid-and long-term capital in the form of trade credits. Although direct investment in north Korea on a private basis may be impossible at the present stage, long-term and low interest credits taking the form of assistance or grant-type aid may be offered. If we use only 0.5 percent of our Gross National Product for our north Korean compatriots, it would mean a vast amount of about 150 million dollars this year and a whopping 300 to 400 million dollars in 1981. If this is not enough, south Korea could arrange foreign credits for north Korea from the international monetary market taking advantage of its own credibility. In other words, we can guarantee the repayment of credits north Korea obtains from elsewhere.

In reality, however, such capital exchange faces many problems. First, international capital transactions, undertaken purely from a profit-seeking standpoint, do not find north Korea attractive. This indicates that provision of our capital cannot be realized if we contemplate economic gains. Such capital cooperation will succeed only when it is motivated from a higher goal of coming to the aid of our compatriots and laying the foundation for an age of peaceful co-prosperity. Another problem is that it remains to be seen whether north Korea would accept our good-intentioned offer readily.

Of course, our capital offer should be materialized from a standpoint of reciprocity and mutual respect. And, at least we must obtain a guarantee that the capital we provide to them must be used for the improvement of the living of the north Korean people and recovery of the troubled north Korean economy. Even if north Korea gave such a guarantee, it would be difficult for us to trust such a promise at its face value in view of their past

attitude and conduct.

As in the case with trade, capital cooperation should be carried out in a step-by-step and gradual approach. In the initial stage, we can offer grains in grant-type aid or long-term and low-interest credit, and also major daily necessities on a private or governmental basis. In addition, we can make conditional guarantees for the repayment of principal and interest of the debts north Korea presently owes to other countries.

In the next stage as mutual understanding and trust build up, provision of credits or joint-venture projects can be contemplated. Among the possible joint-venture projects will be development of underground resources and tourism potential in north Korea. Besides, depending on the stability of north Korea, joint advancement to third economic self-reliance by means largely of the minerals industry. This well points to their lack of capital, especially foreign capital. The minerals industry can have the effect of increased production simply with the input of labor without new investment or advanced know-how. The industry also becomes the easiest export industry for a technically backward country since its products enjoy a broad and steady demand at world markets.

In fact, the debts north Korea owes to foreign countries are not so large in amount, but are definitely in an amount hardly bearable to north Korea's ability to repay. Already in 1975, north Korea's foreign debt servicing ratio stood at more than 100 per cent. It is noted in this connection that north Korean diplomats were expelled from Scandinavian and other European countries after they were found involved in narcotics smuggling taking advantage of their diplomatic prerogatives.

In contrast, south Korea's foreign debt servicing ratio which once amounted to the 20 percent level, decreased to as low as 10 percent in 1977, the lowest among non-oil producing countries, and keeps declining today. South Korea enjoys high credibility in the international monetary market.

The depth of north Korea's economic plight can be perceived in a

speech made by Lee Chong-ok, north Korean premier, in which he called for "a sweeping popular campaign" to conserve materials in all fields such as electricity, fuel, raw materials and equipment under the slogan 'let us conserve and again conserve materials.' The campaign was part of their efforts to solve the issue of foreign exchange shortage in self-reliant efforts in the course of carrying out the second seven-year economic plan.

If the present trend continues, north Korea's economic position is bound to deteriorate at an accelerated pace, showing a widening gap with south Korea. South Korea has already entered a stable stage of current account surplus, and is expected to emerge as a capital-exporting country before long. According to a long-term forecast by the Korean Development Institute (KDI), the current account surplus is projected to reach 1 billion dollars in 1981 and 2.8 billion dollars in 1986. This surplus, together with accumulated foreign exchanges, is set to be offered to developing countries around the world in mid-or long-term trade credit, loan, aid or direct investment.

North Korea is in dire need of foreign capital. And, south Korea is willing to use its surplus savings for the benefit of the same compatriots. In case trade is carried out normally between south and north Korea, countries can be pursued.

3. Economic Cooperation through Technical Exchanges

Technical exchange can be carried out in part in the process of commodity trade and capital cooperation. In international economic cooperation, technical exchanges are particularly significant because they require personnel exchanges. In other words, technical exchanges inevitably accompany close and sustained human contacts, and the friendly relations formed therefrom carry a significance more important than economic exchanges. Technical exchanges can assume a decisive role in cementing the foundations for national co-prosperity through promotion of mutual understanding and elimination of hostile feelings.

For this reason, technical exchanges would face greater difficulties in reality, and, therefore, can be implemented only after mutual trust has been restored to a certain extent through trade or capital cooperation.

The scope of know-how which south Korea can offer to north Korea is extensive. South Korea boasts first-rate technology in textiles, food processing and plywood making. Besides, drugs, steel products and electronics can be included in the list of the fields where south Korea's advanced know-how can be extended to north Korea. Also as in the case with trade, south Korea can serve as an intermediary in the introduction by north Korea of Western technology, while south Korea can have access to East Europe's special know-how by way of north Korea.

Technical cooperation is not limited to concrete production technology only. Included here can be preparation of economic development plans, special project plans, feasibility surveys, basic scientific and technical information and cooperation in the area of research. Especially our accumulated experience and knowledge in the technical service sector would be of much help to north Korea.

For concrete exchanges, the two sides can begin with comparatively short and easy contacts such as joint south-north seminars on basic science and technology or industrial know-how in which both the south and north take an interest.

Next can come the dispatch of technical trainees and technical advisors, which can be made parallel with such capital cooperation as joint-venture investment and export of capital goods and plant on a deferred-payment basis. In the final stage, technical service teams can be sent for economic development plans or feasibility surveys of major projects while students and professors can be exchanged mutually.

V. Conclusion

Seen from the angle of economic exchanges between south and north Korea, the proposal made by President Park Chung Hee on June 23,

1978 for the creation of a south-north consultative organization for economic exchanges between the two sides was a realistic policy proposition incorporating our consistent principle for unification.

The latest overture came on the heels of a series of south Korean proposals designed to bring about durable peace and peaceful coexistence on the Korean peninsula, which included the August 15, 1970 Declaration for a bona fide competition between the south and the north; June 23, 1973 Special Foreign Policy Statement calling for simultaneous entry into the United Nations and opening of the nation's doors to all countries regardless of their ideologies and social systems; the January 18, 1974 Proposition for the conclusion of a south-north non-aggression agreement; and August 15, 1974 Declaration setting forth the three basic principles for peaceful unification.

The proposal for the promotion of economic exchanges between the two divided parts of Korea was the product of our consistent efforts to embody the spirit of the 1972 South-North Joint Communiqué through economic cooperation, elimination of mutual distrust and pursuit of coexistence and co-prosperity of the nation.

Our realistic policy efforts constitute a shortcut to realizing the economic integration of the Korean nation, through which the entire Korean peninsula can be explored and developed more effectively, they also form an effective means of achieving ultimate peaceful unification.

North Korea should accept sincerely these realistic and step-by-step propositions for the sake of the co-prosperity of the Korean nation.

※About the Author:

Before being elected a National Assemblyman. Rep. Lee Seung-yoon taught economics at the Commerce and Economics College of Yonsei University, the College of Commerce of Seoul National University, and at the Economics and Commerce College of Sokang University. He also served as Dean of the Economics and Commerce College of Sokang

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Rep. Lee earned his Ph. D. in economics at the Graduate School of Wisconsin University, before which he studied economics at Colorado State University (B.A.), at the Missouri State University (M.A.), and also at the Graduate School of Chicago University. He went to the United States during in his study at the Liberal Arts and Sciences College of Seoul National University.

His writings included New Theory of Money and Banking, Determinants of Money Supply and Monetary Policy, Money and Capital in Economic Development, Monetary System and Policy in Korea. Process of Economic Modernization in Korea (co-authorship), and How Can We Accomplish Revitalizing Economic Tasks?

ROKNRC Publishes “Records of Home Longing,” Collection of Notes of Separated Families

The Republic of Korea National Red Cross, which has been taking the initiative in the South-North Red Cross Conference aimed at arranging reunion between the 10 million dispersed family members in the south and north, has sponsored a contest among dispersed families for letters and notes on their missing families.

In the contest designed to arouse public concern anew about the dispersed family issue and thereby help bring about their reunion at an early date, a total of 190 entries—136 letters and 54 notes—were received. Of them, 13 letters and eight notes were selected as winning pieces. The prize presentation was held at the National Red Cross on August 12 as part of the activities commemorating the seventh anniversary of the proposal for the South-North Red Cross Conference. The selected entries were published in book form titled “Records of Home Longing.”

The letters, addressed to the writers’ parents, wives, brothers or relatives, were invariably about inquiry after their missing blood relatives and about the hope that they will be reunited in the not too distant future. The notes, on the other hand, were mostly writers’ own experiences of how they managed to flee to the south despite the tight Communist control.

The top-prize-winning entry was “To my Parents-in-Law in North” by Mrs. Kim Hoe-shin of Second Togok Apartments 15-503, Kangnam-ku, Seoul in the letter sector, and in the sector of notes, “Thirty Years’ Pray” by Mrs. Kwon Maria of 698-3 Chongneung 3-dong, Songbuk-ku, Seoul.

(In the following pages are the top three letters selected—“To My Parents-in-Law in the North” by Mrs. Kim Hoe-shin, “To My Dear Mother” by Lee Su-young

and "To Mom" by Kang Mu-song. The letters vividly show the heartbreaking home longing and desire for reunion with their missing families.)

—Editor—

To My Parents-in-law in North

By Kim Hoe-shin

It was a windy day when acacia flowers were flying like snow. The wind brought the fall of flowers, and like the falling flowers, my husband closed his eyes for good. No, he did not close his eyes. He simply breathed his last breath in this world. His eyes were kept open, looking at somewhere in the air.

It was 11 p.m. Even after the last breath was breathed, warmth remained in my husband's wrist. I looked at his hands for a while, imagining that during his younger years, he must have held his mother's hands with these hands exchanging the affection of blood relatives through skins and blood veins.

My husband was Kim Yong-hwa hailing from Sonchon in Pyongan-pukdo. He joined the police in his early years and retired as Investigation Section chief of Yangpyong Police. He now rests in peace at a cemetery near Kumgok, Kyonggi-do.

Mother and Father! This man I refer to as my husband was your only son. This daughter-in-law of yours, who has never met you and who has never had a chance to offer bows to you, has committed yet another sin of having buried my husband ahead of me.

I believe, however, that you two would forgive me, realizing that his sin is not ascribable to my personal mistake.

I was told that you parents, who had owned large farmlands near Sonchon of Pyongan-pukdo, sent your son to the south hastily, telling him

that you would follow him to the south shortly upon disposal of the lands and house. This, it turned out, was the last conversation you had with your son in this life.

The name of my father-in-law is Kim Pok-sul, so I was told by my husband. Whenever he told me about his hometown, I could see tears in his eyes. He was very lively and a man of strong will. He seldom showed tears. Strangely, however, tears appeared in his eyes almost every time he discussed something about his hometown.

Hometown is perhaps the kind of place which is more vividly remembered in one's mind as he gets old. I often saw even those who can visit their home towns in several hours' rides become sentimental during talks about their hometowns. Such being the case, we can well imagine the feelings of those who are denied access to their hometowns which are in the same land beneath the same sky. It would be unnecessary for me to describe the sentiments of those who have their parents in inaccessible lands, and are unable to find out even the fate and whereabouts of them.

I saw my husband's tears near him. But, how much tears have you parents shed somewhere in the north? People often show tears over trivial worldly things. But, no tears would be more bitter than those shed from the hearts of those families separated in the south and north. They represent a great sorrow of all of our people and our historical pain. When, on earth, can these sufferings be removed?

"Our ancestors had enjoyed exceptional longevity." My husband said this to me one day when his health was good. He was confident that his parents would remain alive until the time of national unification.

But my husband closed the door of his life before unification came. The barrier along the truce line remains as firm as ever.

Coming May 20th is the first anniversary of his death. He had been in bed for one year due to cerebral haemorrhage before he died. He could not speak after he was struck and he violently refused to take food for one week before his death.

It was around the time he began to reject food when he showed a faint smile in his face for the first time in a long time and whispered some word.

“What did you say now?” I brought my ear close to his mouth. “Mom,” said he clearly. I can hardly describe the mixed feelings of excitement, joy and sorrow I had at the moment I heard him say “mom.”

Who was this “mom?” Did he mean to refer to me who is the mom of our children? No. He didn’t call me that way. He definitely meant to call his mother who gave birth to him or my mother-in-law. He mustered all his energy to break one year’s silence and uttered this one word to call his mother in a way he was accustomed to call her in his childhood. I took it something like a soul’s cry, not as a simple word.

I believe that in my husband’s eyes which were kept open when he died, there were scenes of Sonchon towns where he played with his friend in his childhood and the image of the church where he attended on Sundays hand in hand with his mother.

These days, I, too, often stare into the air in tears recalling the scenes of my old hometown. Strangely, I find that my memory of my hometown scenes grow clearer lately.

My hometown is Kaesong. It is also a place we cannot go to. One thing fortunate was that I could come to the south together with my parents. Both of my parents have passed away and were buried at Wondang, Kyonggi-do.

I often feel lonely because neither my husband nor myself has relatives. One of my daughters has reached the marriage age, and when I imagine her wedding without any relatives attending, it makes me shrink up. How happy I would be if my parents-in-law are around here so that I can turn to.

Mother and Father:

How do you get along in the cold northern land?

I heard that one-time land owners are coolly treated in the society

there. I fear if you aren't suffering much. If you are alive, both of you must be more than eighty now. If you were dead, when are your death days and who takes care of your tombs?

Please accept this letter as my big bow to you. And, when acacia flowers blossom and fall in May, please pause a minute and look at the southern sky. For, somewhere beneath the southern sky, your only son rests in peace.

I wish you a continued health at least until the time of national unification. Please live long.

To My Dear Mother

By Lee Su-young

My father-in-law said with a smile that no single day had passed without thinking of you, mother-in-law, all the more because of the trouble he had to undergo raising small three boys singlehandedly. Some times he felt like remarrying, but he gave up for fear that remarriage might adversely affect the raising of his three sons.

Father is now on a neighborhood visit and I and our eldest son, Hyon, are alone at home. Hyon works hard preparing for an examination due in several days, and I am writing this letter taking advantage of a quiet Sunday.

"If she were alive, she must be 65 this year. She is two years older than I." Time to time, my father talks about you whom he had left in the north. When I open the door of father's room, the first thing that enters my eyes is your picture hanging on the opposite wall. You in the picture looks about two years younger than I.

"I never saw her getting angry. Though she herself was born as the youngest daughter of a family, she knew how to manage a family in harmony," father used to say.

Mother.

The woman who is writing this letter is the wife of your youngest son, that is, I am your third daughter-in-law. I am a woman who cannot see you and hold your hands even for one time. This is so despite the fact that you are a very important lady to me as you gave birth to Hyon's father who is the most important man to me.

Do you know what father said as he was looking at just-born Hyon soon after I delivered him? His remarks were, "Uh, this one just looks like his grand ma." To my eyes also, Hyon bears a more and more resemblance to you in the picture as he grows up.

Mother!

You sent your husband and three sons first to the south from your hometown called Angok near Anak, Hwanghae-do, and you, I was told, remained behind to look after your ailing mother-in-law. How can we describe the difficulties you must have suffered there?

Father had worked as a teacher and raised his three sons well. The eldest brother married when he was 29 and now works as a manager of a certain paper mill. They have two sons. The second brother went abroad together with his family two years ago. We have two sons, Hyon and Ung.

Mother!

Father is well. He goes to play "go" and meets his friends, sometime inviting them to the home. "Why don't you marry, belated though it is," some of father's friends say in joking.

On every fifth of the eighth month in lunar calendar, we go to a temple to offer prayer. We make the birthday of father's mother, that is, my grand mother-in-law, her death anniversary.

Next the father, the person who talks about you most is the eldest brother. Even Hyon's father, who has the least memory of you, says he vividly remembers your baking of the cooky, "kulkyongdan". The three

brothers said you were especially good in “kulkyongdan” baking, stating that the “kulkyongdan” you made cannot be a match to today’s “kulkyongdan.”

I was told that there is a steep mountain behind the home in Angok and a river to the left. In the back garden there was a big well which, it was said, produced water of good taste. There was a road beside the home, which led across a mountain pass to the home of the only sister of father. Even though I have never been there, I can imagine the hometown vividly as was told about it time and again by father and three brothers. I also can see the image of you mother who is rather short in height.

· Mother, it has been a succession of long agonizing days. It seems that father refused to remarry because of his heart-aching thought of you who suffers tremendously, left behind alone. Father said he wished you were remarried, adding that you must be living alone in view of your uprightness. We are afraid if you haven’t been harrassed by the bad people there because of your being a family of those who fled to the south.

Mother, if only I could visit you, I would take you to our home here. I miss you all the more because my own mother has been dead. I want to make a deep bow before your knees. I would like to vow myself before your presence to be an amiable and faithful housewife.

I do not know why we should miss each other so much, unable to make visits. Don’t you want to see your grand sons and daughter who number no fewer than nine? Aren’t you worried about your husband whom you used to look after so tenderly in the past?

Mother!

I calmly look up at your picture. Although the times pass, you remain the same.

“This is my grand mother.”

“It’s funny. Why your grandma has no wrinkles in the face and no gray hairs.”

“Well, grandma is still grandma.”

This was a dialogue seven-year-old Ung had with a friend of his. Hyon also had this sort of argument with his friends. I feel that our children would recognize their grand mother easily when they see you because of their exceptional concern about the picture.

Father now seems looking for fishing kits. He must have found a folding chair missing. I cleaned it the other day and put it in attic.

Mother! Please be in good health for a long time. I have to meet you before you die and offer my apology for the failure to serve you. I want to help you prepare “kulkyongdan” cookies near you. I wish you a good health ever, mother.

From your third daughter-in-law
in Seoul

To My Mom

By Kang Mu-song

Mom!

Your image is still clear in my mind, so vivid that if I call “mom” loudly I feel as if you would show up from nowhere right away and hold me tight in your warm bosom.

Many seasons have come and gone, and many years have passed. The acute yearning has snowballed into a large rock which has now sunk deep in my mind.

Mom!

How are you, mom, and are other families alright?

You must have missed me terribly somewhere beneath the northern sky. I, who was a small middle school boy at the time of our departure, have now become the father of four children. Father must now be more than sixty, and small kid brothers and sister—Sujon, sumok and Suok—must have grown into adults of more than 30 years old.

It was a few months after the January 4 withdrawal during the peak of the Korean War that you, unable to stand the hunger-stricken sight of me, took me to some farmer’s near Changdan, Kyonggi-do, and left for home carrying my youngest brother in your back. How could I imagine that this was the last sight I could have of you.

A lot have changed in the world. Man can now travel to the moon, and several stamps can take letters to almost everywhere around the world. Lamentably, however, we cannot share the affection of blood relatives despite the fact that we are just short distance away. We just resent the truce line and the ideological barrier that cut off the flow of the warm affection of blood relatives and that reject our ardent wish.

On the day when the Berlin Wall was built, it was said that a German,

seeing wet cement mortar falling from a just built wall, cried, "This is tear." Well, the resentful iron barriers erected along the 155-mile truce line must be the barrier of tears.

Mom!

Twenty seven years have already passed since I, a fourteen-year-old boy, left your bosom for no fixed destination in the south. I have now grown into an adult in my forties, but I still like to call you "mom" rather than "mother," as I called you in my childhood.

I married in Taegu in 1964, and we have four daughters. We live in affluence, which contrasts our difficult days before my departure. I remember that one day you brought home a small bowl of soy bean which you bartered with our second-hand goods and which you distributed to starving us in equal numbers of bean grains after you toasted them. I feel guilty for being unable to share this affluence with you.

Well-fed and care-free my children won't believe it even if I tell them the difficult days we had, when we took soy sauce and bean paste and then drank water to fill our empty stomach. Here, we live well. But I cannot sleep well when I think of you who must be suffering much in a society where there is no guarantee for decent living nor is there any freedom.

When my daughters ask me about their grand father and mother, and say they miss uncles and aunt, I can hardly control my fears thinking of the pitiful state of you and my younger brothers and sister.

I can also remember this episode. One day, a next door family gave us a small bowl of boiled rice, saying it was a grandma's birthday. Seeing the rice, the hungry brothers jumped at it. But, "mom," you gave it to the youngest brother only. When five-year-old Suok picked and ate several rice grains which the youngest dropped while eating, he cried complaining Suok ate his rice. Unable to control your emotion before this pitiful sight, you wept holding all of us in your arms.

Last year, the rice production here surpassed the 40 million sok level,

an amount more than enough to feed the people with a considerable surplus for export. President Park Chung Hee proposed that he is willing to donate rice to the north Korean people, but the north Korean Communists refused to accept it despite their critical shortage of grains.

Mom!

How is Won Chang-soo who was living in our neighborhood. I remember the days when I, together with Chang-soo, sold doughnut at the market area just before the January 4 withdrawal. I presume few neighbors we had at that time still live there.

Mom!

This is April when all plants grow fast toward fruition. Like the steady growth of this spring, there must be some day when our separation will be put to an end. This is an age in which even those peoples with different skins, words and living patterns, work and live together hand in hand. Can our people who had shared the same joy and sorrows remain separated long simply because ideologies and systems are different?

Mom!

I was told that the original residents of Kaesong were all moved away after Kaesong was made a special zone. Where do our families live now?

I am sure that the glorious day will certainly come when the south and north get unified. Please live long, mom, at least until we can share the emotional rejoice of reunion.

April 1978

From Your Son in Taegu

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South-North Dialogue in Korea

- South-North Coordinating Committee
- South-North Red Cross Conference

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Part One

National Conciliation is Road toward Unification

“Improved Relations with Korea Beneficial to USSR and Red China”

—Dialogue and National Conciliation for Unification Called for—

President Park Chung Hee has stated that it would be excessively optimistic to predict that the conclusion of a treaty between Japan and China would drastically and immediately improve the chances for peace of the Korean peninsula.

In an exclusive interview with *Alain Vernay*, deputy editor-in-chief of *Le Figaro*, an influential French newspaper, on October 25, 1978, President Park said, “Since the principal cause of tension on the Korean peninsula is the refusal by the north Korean Communists to renounce their avowed objective of achieving national unification through communization of south Korea by force of arms, it would be an excessively optimistic view if any one believes that the Sino-Japanese peace and friendship treaty would promote peace on the Korean peninsula immediately and drastically.”

President Park said it would be difficult to expect that the belligerence and closedness of the north Korean Communists will be restrained and eased by the treaty signed between Japan and Red China.

President Park said that “in view of the generally changing situation in northeast Asia, the Soviet Union and China will after all come to recognize the reality of the Korean peninsula, and understand that it is in their best interests to establish normal relations with the Republic of Korea which has developed into a modern industrial power.”

Turning to the issue of national unification, the President stated, “the best approach to unification is through national reconciliation attained by dialogue, contacts, and the dissolution of distrust through many-sided

exchanges between the two parts of the country,” adding that “in pursuit of this goal, we will continue to urge north Korea to respond to our call for dialogue.”

(The following are extracts of the remarks made by President Park in his interview with Le Figaro with regard to the south-north relations and the situation surrounding the Korean peninsula.)

—Editor—

Q: As the leader of a country, situated in one of the world's most sensitive strategical region, may I ask how you view the long term consequences of the Sino-Japanese peace and friendship treaty, signed last August? Do you think it will evolve or not into a far reaching alliance?

Answer: We cannot but be deeply interested in the question of how the Japan-China treaty for peace and friendship will affect the equilibrium in northeast Asia inasmuch as the Korean peninsula is situated in a vitally strategic position where the interests of the United States, Japan, China, and the Soviet Union mingle with one another.

But it is difficult to predict with certainty at this moment exactly what results the treaty might bring forth in the long run.

Our position in this regard is that this treaty ought not to cause new misunderstanding or tension among the nations of northeast Asia, and that the treaty is to be welcomed if it can indeed be conducive to reconciliation, cooperation, peace and stability in the region.

Q: How does this affect South Korea? Could it have a restraining influence on north Korea, since a Chinese-Japanese rapprochement, backed by the States, may demand to endure at least an undisturbed co-existence between north Korea and your country?

Answer: It would be excessively optimistic to predict that the conclusion of a treaty between Japan and China would drastically and immediately im-

prove the chances for peace on the Korean Peninsula.

This is because the principal cause of tension is the refusal of the north Korean Communists to renounce their avowed objective of achieving national unification through the armed communization of south Korea.

Convinced that the only road to peaceful unification is the firm establishment of peaceful coexistence between the south and north, we have proposed that we maintain dialogue, open our doors to each other, promote mutual exchanges, enter the United Nations simultaneously, and lately create, either privately or governmentally, a south-north consultative body to pave the way for south-north trade and technological and capital cooperation.

The Communists in north Korea still continue to reject all these proposals for peace. They refuse to talk with us, and have even gone the length of cutting off the telephone circuit which was the sole channel of communication existing between the south and north.

Communist China and the Soviet Union, which are in military alliance with north Korea, seem to have failed so far to exercise effective enough influence to restrain the warlike, paranoiac north Korean Communists. Much less might the peace and friendship treaty signed between Japan and China, in spite of our ardent hope, be expected to become a substantial restraint on the north Korean Communists.

Q: Do you expect the improvements in relations between Peking and Washington to endure and grow in spite of the power struggle in China and the non unnumerous changes in American strategy?

Answer: I think it is inappropriate for me to comment on the improvement of relations between the United States and China so long as it is a bilateral affair of the countries concerned.

I hear that many experts in international ploitics and international economics have concluded that U.S.-China relations will be continually improved and expanded.

As to the position of Korea, the government made it clear in its June 23 Declaration on Foreign Policy for Peace and Unification in 1973 that the country would open its door to countries that differ from us in ideology or social system.

I would like to emphasize once again that under this basic policy we are fully prepared to open the door to, and to promote mutual relations with, the Soviet Union, China and East European countries.

Q: Are you now fully satisfied with the White House's determination not to take away its atomic umbrella from South Korea in spite of the phased-out withdraw of most American forces?

Answer: The U.S. troops in Korea were originally deployed here to repel the north Korean aggression that began on June 25, 1950. After an armistice was signed in 1953, the strength of the U.S. troops in Korea was gradually reduced, but they remained a vital deterrent against another north Korean invasion.

It is also true that the U.S. troops stationed in the strategically sensitive Korean peninsula have helped maintain equilibrium in northeast Asia and safeguard peace and stability in the region.

In this context, it is quite natural that the United States intends to maintain its nuclear umbrella over Korea. Continued security cooperation between Korea and the United States will remain as essential as ever to the peace of the northeast Asian region.

I think Korea will in the future contribute more actively to the maintenance of equilibrium and stability in the northeast Asian region on the strength of its rapidly growing self-defense capabilities.

Q: Does north Korea's opportunity of playing the Russians against the Chinese and conversely neutralize any eventual pressure from one of them to come to better terms with your country?

Answer: It is certain that north Korea has been capitalizing on the Sino-Soviet dispute. If Moscow or Peking ever wanted to see a peaceful settle-

ment of the Korean Peninsula issue, we can only deduce that their consideration for Pyongyang prevented them from openly supporting initiatives for detente on the peninsula.

But I think there will be an eventual limit to north Korea's ability to capitalize on Sino-Soviet relations. This is because north Korea, owing to its extreme militancy and economic backwardness, will eventually become an "inconvenient ally," that is an economic or political burden to China and the Soviet Union.

Even though the Soviet Union and China will come to regard north Korea as an inconvenient ally, they will have at least to give the appearance of supporting north Korea, and may find it difficult to play a restraining role.

Nevertheless, in view of the generally changing situation in northeast Asia, the Soviet Union and China will after all come to recognize the reality of the Korean peninsula and understand that it is in their best interests to establish normal relations with the Republic of Korea which has developed into a modern industrial power.

Q: Do you expect to see in your life-time the reunification of Korea? In spite of your efforts, might not the present situation last 30, 60 or a 100 years?

Answer: It is very difficult to predict the future, all the more so to foretell the future course of action of north Korea which is the most isolated and irrational of all the countries of the world.

One thing is very clear, though. It is that the Koreans are a homogeneous people sharing the same culture and same long history. I believe that we must be reunited and that we can be eventually.

I also believe that it is our moral duty to provide our brethren in the north with an opportunity for a better life. These people are living under a Communist rule which has deprived them of even minimum freedoms and dignity as human beings. This is why I proposed in 1970 to remove the artificial barriers existing between south and north Korea.

I still think that the best approach to unification is through national reconciliation attained by dialogue, contacts, and the dissolution of distrust through many-sided exchanges between the south and north of the country. In pursuit of this goal we will continue to urge north Korea to respond to our call for dialogue.

Q: Can any effort for reunification be productive when it would mean for the north Korean government the loss of its ideological battle and the loss of its hold on a much smaller population which is falling back further and further from South Korean prosperity? Doesn't South Korea's increasing advantage in development in a perverse way dim the hope of reunification?

Answer: I do not share that view. The north Korean Communists will try to overrun us militarily, when they decide they stand a good chance, and they will offer to talk when they think they are in a weaker position. This is their standing modus operandi.

When we achieve a firm superiority over north Korea in such areas as economic development, military strength, and political viability, the north Korean Communists will be induced to reconcile themselves to the futility of a military takeover of the south and will have no alternative but to respond to our peaceful unification formula.

As is well acknowledged, we have already begun to assume an increasing superiority vis-a-vis north Korea in the economic field, and the prospects are good that this gap will widen further over the years to come. I believe that this state of affairs will increase rather than diminish the chances for our efforts for peaceful unification to bear fruits, as is so ardently desired.

Part Two

Suspension of South-North Dialogue and Its Cause

1. Suspension of South-North Dialogue

On August 28, 1973 north Korea issued a statement in the name of Kim Young-joo, Pyongyang side co-chairman of the South-North Coordinating Committee, placing a roadblock on the south-north dialogue carried on through the Coordinating Committee.

In the statement broadcast by Radio Pyongyang, Kim Young-joo, who was the Pyongyang side signatory of the July 4 South-North Joint Communique and who had shunned his personal participation in the dialogue on the excuse of sickness, sought to break off the dialogue, setting forth impractical and unacceptable conditions such as 1) replacement of the Seoul side co-chairman, 2) retraction of the June 23 Special Foreign Policy for Peace and Unification, 3) repeal of the Anti-Communist Law and National Security Law, and release of the violators of the two laws, and 4) reorganization of the South-North Coordinating Committee in such a way as to involve the delegates of various political parties and social organizations and personages from all walks of life.

Subsequently, north Korea called off not only the fourth meeting of the South-North Coordinating Committee scheduled to be held in Pyongyang but also the eighth full-dress meeting of the South-North Red Cross Conference slated in Seoul, thereby applying a brake to the Seoul-Pyongyang shuttle by south and north Korean delegates and suspending the dialogue.

Nevertheless, the Republic of Korea had continuously called for the normalization of the dialogue. As a result, 10 times of vice co-chairmen's meeting of the South-North Coordinating Committee (73.12.5-75.3.14) and 7 times of delegates' contact (73.11.28-74.5.29) and 25 times of working-level meeting (74.7.10-77.12.9) of the South-North Red Cross Conference began to take place at Panmunjom respectively, to discuss the issue of resuming the suspended full-fledged meetings of the Coordinating Committee and the Red Cross Conference.

The attitude of north Korea, however, grew stiff suddenly after the

Indochina debacle in which Phnompenh fell to the Communists on April 17, 1975 and Saigon two weeks later on April 30. An emboldened north Korea suspended even the vice co-chairmen's meeting by notifying the Seoul side of its decision to unilaterally put off indefinitely the 11th vice co-chairmen's meeting of the Coordinating Committee slated for May 30, 1975.

In addition, north Korea cut the direct south-north telephone line on August 30, 1976, which was installed for the first time in a quarter century around the time of the initiation of the south-north dialogue as a direct channel of communications intended largely to forestall unexpected clashes or other incidents between the two sides.

For two years from the time of the cutoff to date, the Seoul side has asked on numerous occasions for the normalization of the direct telephone service through the Coordinating Committee and the Red Cross Conference, and tried to make testing calls every day except holidays, but to little avail.

The working-level meeting of the South-North Red Cross Conference which replaced the delegates' meeting as the south-north Red Cross channel in July 1974, became the only contact between the south and north. But, north Korea has come to break off even this last straw of the contact. North Korea notified Seoul that it decided to postpone indefinitely the 26th working-level meeting of the Red Cross Conference scheduled to be held on March 20, 1978. Arguing that the "Team Spirit '78," a routine joint Korean-U.S. military field exercise, caused "an artificial difficulty to the Red Cross talks and extremely strained the south-north relations," north Korea contended that "to hold a meeting under such circumstance runs counter to the Red Cross spirit." This way, north Korea torpedoed even the humanitarian talks designed to arrange the reunion between dispersed families, splashing cold water upon the ardent desire of the families displaced in the south and north.

With the suspension of the Red Cross talks, the two channels of the dialogue—South-North Coordinating Committee and South-North Red

Cross Conference—have plunged into total disrapture without registering any concrete achievement to date, seven years after the Republic of Korea National Red Cross proposed the Red Cross talks on the displaced family issue.

The South-North Red Cross Conference has failed to undertake any projects to arrange reunion between dispersed families and relatives, while the South-North Coordinating Committee remains paralyzed without being able to explore any undertakings.

2. Cause of Suspension of South-North Dialogue

A look into the whole course of the shortlived south-north dialogue reveals that a substantial change appeared in the operation of the dialogue around the turn of 1973. Before this watershed, the dialogue drew a surging curve, and after it a declining one due to a shift in the attitude of north Korea. This means that north Korea was responsive to some extent toward the dialogue until toward the end of 1972, but took a sharp aboutface and grew negative after the turn of 1973.

To correctly understand the cause of the deadlock of the dialogue, it will be worth studying why the attitude of north Korea has changed so and where does the cause lie.

a. Difference in Basic Positions of Two Sides

The ultimate objective of the south-north dialogue is to realize reunification of the divided Korean peninsula. Therefore, the basic stands of the two sides over the dialogue naturally reflect their respective unification policies.

One thing clear here is that originally the Republic of Korea proposed to north Korea a dialogue for the consolidation of peace on the Korean peninsula by means of dialogue. North Korea, too, agreed to the dialogue in the belief that a dialogue would be conducive to the pursuit of its own

unification strategy, so-called “south Korean Revolution.”

(1) Basic Position of Republic of Korea

The objective which the Republic of Korea tries to pursue in the dialogue is to prepare a set of interim steps helpful to the realization of peaceful unification of the divided fatherland.

Immediate tasks in the promotion of reunification are to work out and translate into action a series of conciliatory measures aimed at removing differences—the differences in historical view, in the system of value, in the way of thinking and in the method of living—that have deepened in the two extremely heterogeneous systems existing in south and north Korea.

The reality of the south-north relations shows that there lies a tremendous barrier of distrust between the two sides. This deep-rooted distrust derives from ideological confrontation, Korean War, incessant acts of indirect aggression against the south by north Korea, the difference in south Korea’s open system and north Korea’s closedness, and hostile sentiments against each other.

Under the circumstances, effort for conciliation between south and north Korea should be the one that can primarily serve the removal of such distrust and restoration of mutual trust.

It is evident that this course of conciliation and assimilation can hardly be achieved unless they are preceded by the rooting of durable peace on the Korean peninsula. In other words, if any one denies the need to consolidate peace on the Korean peninsula while calling for “peaceful unification,” this sort of “peaceful unification” cannot but be a mere propaganda call lacking any substance.

The primary objective which the Republic of Korea seeks to attain in a dialogue with the north Korean Communists is to secure a durable peace on the Korean peninsula as a prerequisite to the realization of

genuine peaceful unification.

More concretely, in a dialogue and mutual consent with the north Koreans, the Republic of Korea wants:

1) To remove all factors contributory to war by restraining irregular warfare such as guerrilla war and acts of indirect aggression by means of spy infiltration, much less allout war, on the Korean peninsula.

2) To establish the relations of interim peaceful coexistence between the two heterogeneous systems of south and north Korea.

3) To promote the restoration of mutual trust and national homogeneity by carrying out, and expanding the scope of, exchanges and cooperation between the two sides.

4) To secure, thereby, a set of steps for conciliation and assimilation, through which the groundwork for peaceful unification can be enriched steadily.

This basic stand of the Republic of Korea over the south-north dialogue had been made known on many occasions during the course of the dialogue. The "Special Foreign Policy Regarding Peace and Unification" promulgated by President Park on June 23, 1973 was a good example.

In the special policy, President Park emphasized that peaceful reunification of the divided Korean peninsula is the immutable supreme objective of the Republic of Korea government. The President pledged that the Republic of Korea will exert incessant efforts to achieve this goal.

Foreseeing that it would take a long period of time to achieve a peaceful unification in view of the reality of the south-north relations, President Park:

1) Emphasized the need for the south and north to maintain durable peace on the Korean peninsula by refraining from interfering in each other's internal affairs and from mounting aggression against each other.

2) Proposed that the south and north strive to produce concrete

results from the south-north dialogue by carrying on the dialogue sincerely based on the spirit of the South-North Joint Communiqué.

3) Declared that the government of the Republic of Korea will not oppose simultaneous entry of south and north Korea into the United Nations and other international organizations.

In short, President Park suggested in the special policy declaration that lasting peace be brought about on the Korean peninsula through establishment of the relations of peaceful coexistence between the south and the north of Korea as an interim measure pending national unification.

President Park again made clear the Republic of Korea's peace-oriented approach toward unification by proposing the conclusion of a non-aggression agreement between the south and north in his New Year press conference on January 18, 1974. The President said that a mutual non-aggression agreement can contain the following key points:

1) South and north Korea shall pledge before the world that they will not under any circumstances stage armed aggressions against each other.

2) South and north Korea shall at no time interfere in each other's internal affairs.

3) The validity of the existing Military Armistice Agreement shall be maintained under all circumstances.

President Park then stressed that "with the conclusion of a non-aggression agreement, south and north Korea can coexist peacefully as an interim measure pending the time of unification and, at the same time, consolidate the groundwork for peaceful unification one by one by engaging in dialogue, exchanges and cooperation actively.

Also in his commemorative address made on the 29th anniversary of national liberation on August 15, 1974, President Park laid down the basic principles for peaceful unification as follows:

1) Peace should be firmly established on the Korean peninsula. For this purpose, a mutual non-aggression agreement should be concluded

between the south and north.

2) The south and north should open their doors to each other and mutual trust should be restored between them. For this purpose, they should pursue rapid progress of the south-north dialogue with sincerity, and many-sided exchanges and cooperation should take place between them.

3) Based on these groundworks, free general elections should be held throughout Korea under fair election management and supervision, and in direct proportion to the indigenous population, thereby achieving the unification of the nation.

In a New Year press conference held on January 18, 1978, President Park stated that the basic direction of the Republic of Korea's unification policy is to "achieve peace first and unification next," noting that the government has firmly maintained and will steadfastly pursue the policy basis calling for the consolidation of peace first and realization of unification on the basis of this peace.

Again in his special statement issued on June 23, 1978 on the occasion of the fifth anniversary of the declaration of the Special Foreign Policy for Peace and Unification, President Park made the dramatic proposal for the creation of a "consultative body for the promotion of south-north economic cooperation" comprising representatives of private economic circles of both sides in order to open the path for, and promote effectively, mutual trade and technical and capital cooperation.

The President urged north Korea to respond to the overture affirmatively for the sake of peace and prosperity on the Korean peninsula and peaceful unification of the fatherland, much more the promotion of welfare of the brethren in south and north Korea.

(2) Basic Position of north Korea

To realize the basic position of north Korea toward the south-north dialogue, it is important to apprehend correctly north Korea's "policy

for unification.” For, to the north Korean Communists, the dialogue has been one of the means of promoting their unification strategy.

With regard to the question of reunification of Korea, north Korea, too, calls for “peaceful unification” on the surface. However, one thing that is clear beyond doubt is that north Korea’s “peaceful unification” by no means indicates any peaceful unification in a genuine sense.

North Korea’s formula for “peaceful unification” demands a unilateral prerequisite to the realization of “peaceful unification.” This prerequisite is a “revolution in south Korea.”

A “revolution in south Korea,” north Korea advocates, means the “overthrow of the constitutional order of the Republic of Korea in a violent revolution engineered by north Korea after American forces are driven out of south Korea which is a colony of the American imperialists, and the establishment of a Communist regime.” This is what they call “people’s democratic revolution.”

In essence, north Korea’s “peaceful unification” indicates that “peaceful unification” would be possible only after the Republic of Korea is communized in the so-called “revolution in south Korea.” The deceptiveness of this north Korean version of peaceful unification was publicly made known by Kim Il-sung himself.

In an “overall project report” he gave to the fifth convention of the north Korean Workers’ (Communist) Party held on November 2, 1971, Kim Il-sung argued that the precondition of unification of the fatherland is the “execution of a revolution in south Korea,” explaining that “revolution in south Korea” is a component part of “revolution in entire Korea,” namely “unification of the fatherland,” and that the duty of “revolution in south Korea” is to “carry out ‘an anti-imperial national liberation revolution’ and ‘a people’s democratic revolution’ in south Korea.”

According to the Political Terminology Dictionary (1970 edition) published by the “Academy of Social Science” of north Korea, “people’s democratic revolution” means the establishment of “people’s democratic

system” by setting up “people’s government” (after overthrowing the existing system of a specific non-Communist society through violence) under the leadership of a Marx-Leninism party (Communist party) and workers’ class. It goes on to say that under “people’s government,” agrarian reform and industrial nationalization are carried out, and a socialistic economic form characterized by new class relations assumes a guiding position, where landowners, capitalists and national reactionaries are liquidated and working people become the hero of a country. In short, the definition of “people’s democratic revolution” is “revolution under communism.”

Kim Il-sung further says that the basic position of north Korea toward the question of national unification is to accomplish unification of the country through completion of “revolution in south Korea” by “making north Korea a base for revolution of Korea” and, at the same time, “assisting revolutionary struggles of the south Korean people.” (Selection of Kim Il-sung Works, Vol. IV, p. 196).

The object which north Korea seeks to overthrow is not the government itself but the “system” of the Republic of Korea, namely, its “constitutional order.” They make it clear that the precondition north Korea attaches to its “peaceful unification” is the “communization of the system of south Korea” rather than the “overthrow of a specific government of south Korea.”

The truth of north Korea’s deceptive “peaceful unification” formula was clearly laid bare in policy commentary entitled “On Inter-relations between Revolution in south Korea and Unification of Fatherland,” which was released through Joong Ang Radio on July 3, 1972, one day before the issuance of the July 4 South-North Joint Communiqué.

In the commentary, north Korea claimed that “unification of the fatherland can be realized only on the condition of a revolution in south Korea,” contending that “unification can be accomplished through people’s democratic revolution in south Korea by all means.” Here, north Korea let it be known that the words “revolution in south Korea” and

“people’s democratic revolution” are used as synonyms.

More terrible phrases were that “there are peaceful and non-peaceful means in the realization of unification, but there can only be violent means in the accomplishment of revolution in south Korea.”

If this is so, then the only means of unification available to north Korea is a “non-peaceful one,” namely, unification under communism by force for arms.

This was the conclusion drawn in the north Korean policy commentary, “On Inter-relations between Revolution in south Korea and Unification of Fatherland.”

Because the kind of unification north Korea pursues is the one achievable only under violent means, it is in principle unthinkable from the standpoint of north Korea’s position to solve the question of national unification in a peaceful manner like dialogue or negotiations with the Republic of Korea.

North Korea’s initial affirmative response to the proposal by the Republic of Korea for south-north dialogue did not mean that Pyongyang had modified its traditional violence-oriented stand and resolved to settle the unification issue in a sincere dialogue with the Republic of Korea.

Quite contrary, they agreed to the dialogue after concluding that a dialogue would be worth trying as a means of creating conditions conducive to unification under communism by force of arms or to formentation of “revolution in south Korea.”

This is why, after the initiation of the dialogue, north Korea insisted as prerequisites to continued dialogue in 1) dissolution of the United Nations Command in Korea, 2) withdrawal of American forces from Korea, and 3) prior solution of military issues. These demands, needless to say, were intended to create conditions helpful to their scheme to communize the south by force of arms by onesidedly weakening the base of south Korea’s security and thereby causing a military unbalance between the south and north.

The north Korean Communists' demand for the abandonment by the South of its anti-Communist policy, such as the repeal of the Anti-Communist and National Security Laws and stoppage of anti-Communist activities, was also aimed at securing an area for legal or semi-legal Communist activities in the Republic of Korea by slackening the south's vigilance against the north and its anti-Communist system, and thus creating a circumstance ripe for the fomentation of a violent Communist revolution called "revolution in south Korea."

Therefore, the fundamental cause of the suspension of the south-north dialogue should be found in this negative attitude of north Korea toward the dialogue.

b. Misjudgement by North Korea

If north Korea was truly interested in the solution of the unification issue by means of dialogue when it accepted the Republic of Korea's proposal for dialogue in 1971, north Korea should have given up the policy of "revolution in south Korea." By so doing, Pyongyang could have paved the way to overcoming its self-contradiction that was forthcoming. Nonetheless, north Korea agreed to a dialogue with the south in a grave "miscalculation" that it would exploit a dialogue for tactical purposes without abandoning its violent strategy against south Korea.

This "miscalculation" was the very cause that had led north Korea to stalemate and finally suspend the south-north dialogue. This miscalculation was based on a series of "misjudgements."

First, they made a "misjudgement" of the international situation. North Korea had begun to entertain a sort of illusionary expectation in the latter half of the 1960s when the Nixon Doctrine was announced in the midst of serious split in the U.S. public opinions over the deteriorating Indochina situation and when the possibility of Nixon's visit to Peking was foreseen.

North Korea was engrossed in the wishful thinking that the impact of

the United States' defeat and the victory of "people's liberation war" in Indochina would spread to Korea and elsewhere in Asia, and as a result, the United States would be compelled to disengage itself from the whole Asian region including Korea. North Korea saw President Nixon's visit to Peking as a "loser's diplomacy" symbolic of America's "inevitable" departure from Asia.

In a speech at a public rally welcoming the visit of Prince Norodom Sihanouk of Cambodia to Pyongyang on August 6, 1971, Kim Il-sung, likening the United States to the setting sun, ridiculed Nixon's visit to Peking describing him as "a loser calling at the conqueror's camp carrying a white flag." Kim Il-sung, then, said that north Korea is willing to discuss the question of unification with the Democratic Republic Party and all other south Korean political parties and social organization.

This was a thinly veiled gesture, which was in effect, designed to speed up U.S. military withdrawal by relaxing America's vigilance. Kim Il-sung's policy of "revolution in south Korea" demands U.S. military withdrawal on a priority basis. When the Republic of Korea proposed the South-North Red Cross talks six days after this speech of Kim Il-sung, north Korea, weighing the impact of south-north dialogue on the possible withdrawal of American forces, arrived at another "miscalculation" that a dialogue could be exploited as a stimulant of U.S. military pullout.

Second, they made a misjudgement of the situation of the Republic of Korea. North Korea's policy of "revolution in south Korea" is based on the pursuit, as an interim step, of the so-called "unified front" with opposition or anti-government forces in the Republic of Korea.

North Korean tactics are to agitate for violent anti-government struggles by dissident forces while trying to form a "coalition front" with such anti-government movement through deceptive offensive for "peaceful unification." North Korea's ultimate objective, of course, is to communize south Korea. But the immediate tactical goal lies in the overthrow of the Republic of Korea government.

Naturally, however, such scheme of north Korea could not work as

planned. The reason was that the sense of anti-Communism and vigilance against north Korea on the part of the people of the Republic of Korea were watertight. Besides, they realized the deceptiveness of the north Korean version of "peaceful unification" so well that they did not allow themselves to be swayed by such conspiracy.

When the Republic of Korea made a proposal for dialogue in August 1971, north Korea sought a change in its strategy, in which it altered its past tactic of pursuing a "united front" only at the "people to people" level and tried to form a dialogue line of "authorities to authorities" through "high-level united front." Once this was achieved, the "high-level united front" was to be led into "low-level united front" formed with anti-government forces by instigating split in public opinions.

What north Korea attempted to score primarily at the stage of so-called "high-level united front" were the slackening of the anti-Communist system of south Korea, split in public opinions and securing of an area of legal or semi-legal activities for underground Communist forces. And, at the "low-level united front" stage, they planned to form an extensive "anti-government coalition force" by strengthening deceptive peaceful unification front activities, and to induce anti-government activities into violent ones under the leadership of underground Communist elements.

As the dialogue was in progress, north Korea started to realize its "miscalculation." It had become increasingly apparent that the south-north dialogue did not move in the direction they expected nor did the dialogue bring about any impact they hoped for. The U.S. forces in Korea, rather than having been withdrawn, had their war deterrent and peace-keeping role freshly recognized and appreciated. The anti-Communist system of the Republic of Korea, rather than having become slackened, was further consolidated as north Korea's intention was laid bare.

Since north Korea had come to the table of dialogue motivated by such miscalculation, it was obliged to pose problems in a unilateral and unjust manner in the course of the dialogue.

In the July 4 South-North Joint Communiqué, south and north Korea agreed to carry out the dialogue based on the principles of equality, reciprocity and mutualism. Nevertheless, north Korea persisted in the attempt to dispute internal problems of the Republic of Korea only in complete disregard of such agreement.

In a hasty attempt to slacken the sense of anti-communism on the part of the south Korean people, north Korea set forth and adhered to the so-called “creation of statutory conditions and social environment in south Korea” as a prerequisite to the continued implementation of the South-North Red Cross Conference. North Korea tried to raise pros and cons over the Republic of Korea’s anti-Communist policy while itself wiping out mercilessly all those who did not allow themselves to be assimilated into Kim Il-sung-ism under its unprecedentedly closed system.

At the same time, in an attempt to weaken the security preparedness of the Republic of Korea, north Korea demanded the prior settlement of “five military issues” calling, among others, for the suspension of the Republic of Korea Armed Forces modernization plan and withdrawal of American forces from Korea, insisting that unless these military matters are solved, it won’t proceed with the programs of the South-North Coordinating Committee. Without paying any attention to peace-keeping devices on the Korean peninsula, such as the issues of military balance between the south and north, and the maintenance of the Military Armistice Agreement, north Korea simply attempted to dispute the presence of the U.S. forces in Korea and the equipment modernization plan of the south Korean Armed Forces.

Aware, belatedly though, of its miscalculation, north Korea had begun to steer the south-north dialogue toward disrapture as it realized that the dialogue was leading the south-north relations in a direction different from it planned.

By exposing its scheme openly in the initial stage of the south-north dialogue, north Korea had brought about a boomerang effect as the south Koreans elevated their sense of anti-communism and built up their vigi-

lance against Pyongyang's conspiracy, rather than slackening their anti-Communist posture, after they learned of the north's intention.

Moreover, north Korea's miscalculation of the Asian policy of the United States had prompted the United States to reconsider its troop withdrawal plan and carry it out very carefully lest it should undermine peace-keeping efforts on the Korean peninsula. At the same time, the bolstering of the security system of south Korea in the wake of the introduction of the Yushin (Revitalizing Reforms) System had dealt a crushing blow to north Korea's scheme to foment "revolutionary ability" in south Korea.

c. Internal Situation of North Korea

As the south-north dialogue progressed, there emerged some factors in north Korea that threatened north Korea's system seriously.

The south-north dialogue, carried out in earnest in the wake of the issuance of the South-North Joint Communiqué on July 4, 1972, was highly significant in that it realized, to a limited extent though, a personal exchange between the south and north for the first time in the quarter-century division. As meetings were held in Seoul and Pyongyang by turn, delegates had shuttled between the two cities.

The number of the persons who participated in the south-north shuttle was 59 from each side in the case of the South-North Red Cross Conference, which broke down to seven delegates, another seven consultants, 20 attendants and 20 pressmen (the number of pressmen was increased by five beginning with the fourth full-dress meeting), and 25 each for the South-North Coordinating Committee, who included five Committee members, 10 attendants and another 10 pressmen.

Thanks to this shuttle by delegates and other participants, both south and north Korea were able, for the first time after the Korean War, to directly look, though on a limited basis, into the situation of each

other and compare it with one's own.

In the course of this south-north shuttle, north Korea had come to confirm an agonizing truth—truth that north Korea lags far behind south Korea in terms of economic development.

The Republic of Korea was pursuing an ambitious economic prosperity registering an astounding economic growth through successful implementation of the first, second and third five-year economic development plans begun in the early 1960s.

North Korea, on the other hand, sees its heavy industrial structure remain in a pre-modern state due largely to its failure to introduce rapidly developing up-to-date industrial knowhows because of the peculiar closedness of the north Korean society and the lack of the proper sense of international cooperation, though north Korea managed to rehabilitate war damages to some extent through forcible mobilization of work forces mostly in labor-intensive projects.

Besides, north Korea has concentrated its economic resources on defense industries and those heavy industries related thereto in line with its aggressive policy of communizing the whole Korean peninsula by force of arms. As a result, general consumption economy has been virtually ignored, leaving the people's living standard literally in the same state as in the 1950s.

Nonetheless, the people of north Korea believe that their society is the "most advanced and blessed society in the world." For, ever since the national division at the end of World War II, the north Korean Communist regime, setting up an unparalleled closed system, has brainwashed its people and made them believe "the absolute superiority of the north Korean social system." The north Korean people have been told repeatedly that south Korea is "a colony of American imperialism and Japanese militarism, which is being governed by no more than 500 landowners, comprador capitalists and reactionary bureaucrats." It is understood in north Korea, therefore, that "all the people in south Korea suffer from

hunger, poverty and unemployment.” This is what people in the north are taught in intensive ideological indoctrination, and this is one of the ideological basis of Kim Il-sung’s personality cult.

To the horror of the north Korean leaders, however, the fictitiousness of this claim had begun to be uncovered in the course of the south-north dialogue. The north Korean delegates and others who have been to Seoul realized that the reality of south Korea disproves what they have been told about south Korea in indoctrination.

On the other hand, south Korean delegates were shocked in Pyongyang to witness the dark, lethargic and pre-modern state of life in the north. And, they felt something exotic from the north Koreans’ way of living, system of value, historical view and language.

Contrary, the north Korean visitors hardly believed their eyes at the sight of the brilliant economic development, animated and energetic life of peoples and abundance of goods in the Republic of Korea.

If and when words about this reality of south Korea would spread among the north Korean people, it would certainly damage Kim Il-sung’s idolization and the “myth” of the “absolute superiority of north Korean socialistic superiority,” which in turn would shake from the bottom the dictatorial system of north Korea. This would have emerged as a serious threat to Pyongyang’s power system itself.

The Seoul-Pyongyang shuttle provided a momentum to bring about a shakeup of such a “myth,” causing the north Korean Communists to realize the “danger” of the mutual opening of the two societies.

Moreover, progress in the south-north dialogue had resulted in a relaxed discipline among the north Korean people and the uncovering of the deceptiveness of north Korea’s propagandas that South Korea is a “living hell.”

All these factors converged into the cause behind the decision of north Korea to break off the south-north dialogue.

d. Rejection of Peaceful Coexistence

Although no substantial progress had been registered in the south-north dialogue, the dialogue itself had begun to cause an unexpected burden to north Korea. Pyongyang realized the fact that the continuation of the dialogue would have the effect of making peaceful coexistence between south and north Korea a fait accompli and thereby contributing, against its policy, to the consolidation of a peace structure on the Korean peninsula.

Institutionalization of peaceful coexistence between south and north Korea would inevitably accompany a peaceful competition between the south and north, which would in due course determine which system is superior. At the same time, if north Korea agreed to the institutionalization of peaceful coexistence, Pyongyang would naturally have to give up its policy for so-called "revolution in south Korea." This is something north Korea cannot accept.

However, the continuation of the dialogue had contributed toward making the order of peaceful coexistence a fait accompli regardless of whether north Korea wanted it or not. Moreover, if the south-north dialogue would reach the stage of "project undertaking" beyond the stage of "dialogue," it would certainly accelerate the turning of the order of peaceful coexistence into a fait accompli by speeding up "social opening" between the south and north.

Here, north Korea felt the need to keep the dialogue from entering the stage of "project undertaking" and to seal off the door between the south and north.

Addressing a rally held in Pyongyang to welcome Cambodia's visiting Prince Sihanouk on April 6, 1973, Kim Il-sung categorically rejected the idea of peaceful coexistence contending that "peaceful coexistence will only perpetuate national split." Kim Il-sung then aired his rejection of

the South-North Coordinating Committee, a body established under the provisions of the South-North Joint Communiqué to take charge of a dialogue between the south and north, by insisting, "The south-north dialogue cannot be entrusted to the authorities of the south and north alone. A political conference should be convened among the delegates of various political parties and social organizations of the south and north and people from all walks of life."

In fact, north Korea started to slow down the talks early in 1973 even before Kim Il-sung publicly disclosed his skepticism about the dialogue. Pyongyang resumed infiltrating armed agents to the south, a provocation which it restrained throughout 1972, and stepped up its propaganda broadcasts against the south, which it had toned down before. North Korea had begun to veer toward the negativism of the south-north dialogue.

Later, as Republic of Korea issued special Foreign Policy for Peace and Unification of June 23, 1973, the north Korean Communist took it as a immediate excuse for the suspension of the dialogue.

The June 23 Special Foreign Policy imposes two conditions upon north Korea. One is that north Korea agree to the rooting of durable peace on the Korean peninsula as a fundamental condition for new south-north relations oriented toward genuine peaceful unification. In other words, this calls, as an interim measure pending the time of peaceful unification, for the establishment of peaceful coexistence in which south and north Korea would not interfere in each other's internal affairs nor would mount aggression against each other.

The other condition is that north Korea abandon the policy of "revolution in south Korea," namely, a violent Communist revolution, which it steadfastly pursues as a means of communization of the whole Korean peninsula.

These two conditions that form the basic spirit of the June 23 Special Foreign Policy are factors indispensable to lasting peace and genuine peaceful unification. Nevertheless, north Korea could not accept them. This was because if peaceful coexistence is instituted between south and north

Korea, it would deepen the gap between the two systems in north Korea's disfavor, and peaceful competition that may be waged in peaceful coexistence would threaten the survival of the north Korean system itself.

Moreover, abandonment of the policy of "revolution in south Korea" would not only relatively contribute to the political and social stability of the Republic of Korea but also amount to erasing the opportunity for communization of south Korea on itself, an act unthinkable to north Korea which finds the legitimacy of its regime in the pursuit of national unification under communism. Also, acceptance of peaceful coexistence and abandonment of "revolution in south Korea" would have removed the justification of Kim Il-sung's personality cult.

It was because of this dilemma that the north Korean Communists could not accept the June 23 Special Policy nor could it tolerate its recognition by the rest of the world community. North Korea realizes that if south and north Korea join the United Nations separately, it would imply that the relations of peaceful coexistence between south and north Korea are systematized in the world political scene. This is why north Korea attacks the June 23 Special Policy so vehemently.

North Korea, which began to take a negative posture toward the south-north dialogue beginning early in 1973, was looking for a proper excuse to take a final action against the dialogue when the June 23 Special Policy was announced. Pyongyang promptly jumped on it and announced the unilateral suspension of the south-north dialogue on August 28, 1973. North Korea denounced the June 23 Special Policy as a "nation-splitting policy," insisting that "we cannot discuss the issue of unification with advocates of national split."

Part Three

Efforts of Republic of Korea for Resumption of Dialogue

1. Efforts of Republic of Korea for Peaceful Unification

In all cases of divided countries, there can be two methods of ending the state of division and achieving reunification. One is violent unification in which one party overthrows and absorbs the other by force of arms. The other is peaceful unification in which the two divided parties remove factors detrimental to unification one by one through exchanges and cooperation and thereby lay the groundwork for unification.

The fundamental objective of the unification policy being pursued by the Republic of Korea is to construct a unified and independent fatherland in a peaceful manner. For this purpose, the Republic of Korea has steadfastly maintained the basic stand that a unified, independent and democratic government should be established through general elections held in proportion to indigenous population in south and north Korea, which can fully reflect the free will of the 50 million people. In order to create conditions conducive to the pursuit of this stand, the government of the Republic of Korea has taken a series of measures for peaceful unification in parallel with new developments of situations at home and abroad since the turn of the 1970s.

The efforts of the Republic of Korea for the realization of peaceful unification, begun with the “declaration of idea of peaceful unification” by President Park on August 15, 1970, led to the initiation of the south-north dialogue with the proposal by the ROKNRC for south-north Red Cross talks on August 12, 1971, climaxing in the issuance on July 4, 1972 of the South-North Joint Communique in which the south and north agreed on the principles that unification of the fatherland will be achieved in an independent and peaceful manner and that a grand national unity will be promoted.

Two channels of dialogue were thus opened between the south and north, enabling the two sides to consolidate the groundwork for unification by having an insight into each other’s social systems and sense of value

that had drifted apart from each other in the quarter-century discontinuation and by discussing national problems.

One year later, another historical milestone was laid in the new south-north relations. It was the seven-point “Special Foreign Policy Regarding Peace and Unification” declared by President Park on June 23, 1973.

Stating that “peace should be preserved by all means on the Korean peninsula,” President Park emphasized in the declaration that south and north Korea should not interfere in each other’s internal affairs nor attempt to invade the other side, adding that “peaceful unification of the fatherland is the supreme task of the nation, for the realization of which we shall exert our all available efforts.” The special Foreign Policy was a wise and heroic decision aimed at recognizing the objective situation of the Korean peninsula as a reality, bringing about durable peace based thereon, and pursuing unification of the divided fatherland in genuine peace.

Notwithstanding these sincere efforts exerted by the Republic of Korea for peaceful unification, north Korea announced its boycott of the dialogue in the so-called “Kim Young-joo statement” on August 28, 1973, driving the national aspirations for unification on the rocks.

Even after the suspension of the dialogue by north Korea on August 28, 1973, the Republic of Korea has repeatedly called upon north Korea to strive for peaceful unification of the fatherland, setting forth a series of reasonable and realistic propositions.

a. Proposal for South-North Non-Aggression Agreement (January 18, 1974)

In order to consolidate peace on the Korean peninsula and facilitate peaceful unification of the fatherland, the south and north should first stop attempting to invade each other and interfere in the other’s internal affairs.

It was under this concept that President Park proposed the conclusion of a south-north non-aggression agreement in his New Year press conference on January 18, 1974. The proposition featured renouncement of attempt for invasion, non-interference in one another's internal affairs and continued preservation of the truce agreement.

The first clause, "the south and north pledge before the world that they will by no means invade the other," represents the most basic condition of the restraint of war.

North Korea insists that "shooting incidents occur because they have guns, and the danger of war persists and tensions pile up because the two sides build up their arms." contending that "to restrain war, therefore, the south and north should reduce their armament and military manower."

But, this is a mere insensible sophistry. With the same logic, it can be argued that all tools with which man may be killed, let alone weapons, should be eliminated from the world, and that war will not take place one should be eliminated from the world, and that war will not take place only when there are no soldiers or policemen who can be mobilized as combatants in emergency. Even if the present armament were curtailed drastically or military manpower were reduced to 100,000 as they demand, it cannot mean the elimination of the cause of war. Outbreak of war depends on whether a country has the intent of invasion.

If the south and north firmly promise not to invade each other and guarantee before the world that they will at no time violate each other by force of arms, peace can be take root on the Korean peninsula. Only when such guarantee is secured, can the two sides reduce armament and military manpower to an extent where the equilibrium of strength can be maintained between them.

What is important, therefore, is for north Korea to agree to the conclusion of a non-aggression agreement before demanding disarmament or military manpower reduction. The pledge "not to invade each other" is something most desirable in view of today's reality of the south-north

relations. Here, we can find the practicability and justness of a non-aggression agreement.

The second clause, “the south and north will refrain from interfering in each other’s internal affairs,” is a condition essential to a party’s recognition of others’ right to existence and also to one’s peaceful coexistence with others.

Even if one party does not invade the other by force of arms, it would amount to sowing the seed of new disputes if one side interferes in and defame the other’s ideas, systems or various policies “without recognizing the other’s right to existence and with the intent of annexing or absorbing the other side some day.”

In other words, the elimination of all factors behind aggression, direct or indirect, should be in the core of a non-aggression agreement. What is most essential to eliminating distrust and tensions is for the south and north to remove direct factors of war by renouncing aggression and, at the same time, get rid of the danger of indirect invasion—cause of disputes and tensions—by agreeing on the principle of mutual non-interference in each other’s internal affairs. Since this is an indispensable road toward peaceful unification also, the conclusion of a non-aggression agreement is most desirable for the improvement of the current relations between the south and north.

The third clause of the proposed agreement, “the existing Military Armistice Agreement will remain in force under all circumstances,” is necessary for the south and north to strive to remove the causes of clash and eliminate the danger of the recurrence of war through termination of their hostile relations and cessation of the acts of aggressive provocation.

The south and north are presently in a state of suspended war under the Armistice Agreement. If any side refuses to recognize the validity of the truce agreement by unilaterally abrogating it or by refusing to abide by its provisions, it would mean that the relations between the south and north revert to the state of war. Therefore, even if the two sides pledge

renouncement of aggression and non-interference in each other's internal affairs, no danger of war can be removed in effect unless the parties recognize the validity of the Armistice Agreement. The present truce line dividing south and north Korea is a boundary governed by the Armistice Agreement. If the truce agreement loses its validity, there may ensue a dispute over the location of this boundary.

There was good evidence of this danger. The waters contiguous to Paengryong-do and four other islands in the western sea have undisputedly been under the control of the Republic of Korea for more than 20 years since the ceasefire. A while ago, however, north Korea from nowhere laid claim to the waters, perpetrating armed intrusions into the area.

From the time of ceasefire to date, north Korea committed some 43,000 violations of the Armistice Agreement. They have even built offensive fortifications in, and introduced heavy weapons and troops into, the Demilitarized Zone. These violations of the truce agreement constitute one of the largest factors threatening peace on the Korean peninsula. Peace can be guaranteed in Korea only when the Armistice Agreement is strictly observed.

Therefore, a non-aggression agreement that calls for the continued preservation of the truce agreement and pledges the continued recognition of its validity is essential to the preservation of peaceful relations between the south and north.

Under the circumstances, it was most timely and appropriate for President Park to propose a south-north non-aggression agreement. The proposed agreement can be an interim device and basic condition that would facilitate peaceful coexistence between the south and north:

In his New Year press conference held on January 12, 1977, President Park again urged north Korea to agree to his proposal for the conclusion of a non-aggression agreement between the south and north. The President said that "once a non-aggression agreement is signed, south Korea would not oppose the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Korea." President Park,

then suggested that “if north Korea regards Seoul as not proper for conference, we can meet either at Panmunjom, a midway location, or any other place of mutual agreement.”

In the wake of the renewed proposal by President Park for the conclusion of a non-aggression agreement, Chang Key-young, acting Seoul side Co-chairman of the South-North Coordinating Committee, proposed in a statement on January 28, 1977 that a meeting be held between the two sides to discuss arrangements for conclusion of the proposed non-aggression agreement for the sake of consolidation of peace on the Korean peninsula. But, north Korea has made no response.

b. Announcement of Three Basic Principles for Peaceful Unification (August 15, 1974)

In his Liberation Day address on August 15, 1974, President Park, stressing again that unification of the fatherland should be achieved in a peaceful manner by all means, made public the Three Basic Principles for Peaceful Unification, laying down the basic stand of the Republic of Korea over the question of achieving peaceful unification. The three principles are:

First, peace should be firmly established on the Korean peninsula. For this purpose a mutual non-aggression agreement should be concluded between the south and north.

Second, the south and north should open their doors to each other and mutual trust should be restored between them. For this purpose they should pursue rapid progress of the south-north dialogue with sincerity, and many-sided exchanges and cooperation should take place between them.

Third, based on the above foundations, free general elections should be held throughout Korea under fair election management and supervision, and in direct proportion to the indigenous population, thereby achieving the unification of the country.

President Park then stated that “if the north Korean Communists persist in their opposition to our proposal for a non-aggression agreement, I would be obliged to point out that their opposition reveals before the world that the unification they advocate is not peaceful unification but unification by arms.”

Let us look into the implication of the Three Basic Principles for Peaceful Unification.

The first of the principles emphasizes the need for lasting peace.

The proposal for the conclusion of a south-north non-aggression agreement was the manifestation of south Korea’s positive approach toward peaceful unification of the Korean peninsula, and also the most realistic and reasonable method of achieving peaceful unification.

North Korea unfoundedly insists that tensions on the Korean peninsula are due to “threats of northward invasion” and also to the presence in Korea of U.S. military forces. However, the fact that they do not accept the south’s proposition that it would not oppose U.S. military withdrawal once they sign a mutual non-aggression agreement, clearly indicates that their demand for the pullout of American forces is no more than a strategy intended to serve their deceptive propaganda.

When durable peace is brought about, the north Koreans’ indulgence in reckless armed provocation will be eliminated and the danger of war will be reduced that much. If and when these are realized, the south and north would be able to do away with unnecessary arms race and instead concentrate resources upon national welfare and development, pursuing more positive economic growth.

The second of the three principles calls for mutual opening of doors and restoration of national trust.

Like the consolidation of peace, the mutual opening of their doors and restoration of national trust constitute the most realistic and reasonable road toward peaceful unification. Restoring of mutual trust and national homogeneity by means of alleviation of tensions and removal of mis-

understanding through dialogue, serves as the fundamental condition conducive to the realization of peaceful unification of the fatherland.

To restore national trust and homogeneity as part of efforts for national unification, represents a course of expanding south-north exchanges aimed at solving non-political requirements such as mutual visits by separated families. When exchanges and cooperation can be promoted, national homogeneity will be restored steadily and groundwork for peaceful unification will ripen.

The third of the principles calls for the establishment of a unified government by means of free general elections.

The people will aspire for the establishment of a unified government at a stage where durable peace is brought about, dialogue goes on, hostile feelings give way to national trust and homogeneity, and the sense of national integrity prevails in the south and north.

The method of forming a unified government and a unified assembly upon such foundation will be to conduct free general elections in proportion to the indigenous population under fair election management and supervision. In this manner, a unified government can be formed at the 50 million people's own choice, realizing the nation's cherished aspirations for national unification.

Our people can thus participate in the world community as a proud and peace-loving member, further enhancing their national glory and pride in the progression of the world history. Our unified 50 million people will maintain foreign relations based on peace and good neighborliness and will be able to contribute much to the creation of an international order upholding world peace and prosperity of mankind.

d. Proposal for Creation of Private Economic Cooperative Body (June 23, 1978)

The Republic of Korea, pursuing peaceful unification, made another constructive proposal to north Korea on June 23, 1978 on the occasion of

the fifth anniversary of the declaration of the June 23 Special Foreign Policy Regarding Peace and Unification. The proposal, designed to embody more substantially the spirit of the June 23 Foreign Policy, was for the creation of “a cooperative body for the acceleration of economic cooperation between the south and north” and for the holding of “a meeting of concerned cabinet members.”

The new proposal made by President Park represented positive efforts of south Korea to give concrete shape to a series of offers which it has made with a view to materializing various agreements made between the south and north such as the July 4 South-North Joint Communiqué and to normalizing the suspended south-north dialogue.

The overture was made in the conviction that economic cooperation between the south and north would contribute to the promotion of welfare and prosperity through mutual economic supplement between the south and north transcending political system and ideas. Economic exchanges, if and when materialized, would create a single economic sphere on the Korean peninsula, playing a substantial role in removing mutual distrust and restoring national homogeneity, thus helping lay the groundwork for peaceful unification.

Nevertheless, north Korea rejected this proposal, too, proving itself once again to be the “advocate of national split” standing in the way to peace and unification.

2. Efforts of Republic of Korea to Resume South-North Dialogue

〈South-North Coordinating Committee〉

- a. Proposal for Exchange of Exhibitions or Joint Exhibition of Ancient Artifacts between South and North Korea

The government of the Republic of Korea held an exhibition of

“5,000 Years of Korean Art” in Kyodo, Fukuoka and Tokyo of Japan from February 24 to July 25, 1976. The oversea display of the ancient artifacts embodying the peace-loving spirit and artistic creativity of the Korean people drew enthusiastic reaction everywhere it was held in Japan.

On the occasion of the exhibition of “5,000 Years of Korean Art,” Chang Key-young, acting Seoul side Co-chairman of the South-North Coordinating Committee, proposed in a telephone message sent to Kim Young-joo, Pyongyang side Co-chairman, on April 12 that exhibitions of ancient artifacts be exchanged or held jointly between the south and north.

The forefathers of Korea have handed down countless and proud cultural relics in the 5,000-year history. The number of these relics increases as they are excavated in succession from tombs and other historical sites in what were once ancient capitals such as Kyongju, Kimhae, Kongju and Puyo, giving the Koreans a fresh pride in their national culture. Viewers of ancient artifacts at museums are enchanted by the brilliance of the ancient culture.

Regretfully, however, the people cannot observe all of the precious cultural relics because of national division. If they are able to view the cultural relics preserved separately in the south and north, it would enable them to display their brilliance abroad more efficiently while contributing to bringing about national conciliation.

Here, the Seoul side of the South-North Coordinating Committee proposed that exhibitions of south and north Korean ancient artifacts and other archaeological materials be held in Seoul and Pyongyang by turn and that a joint exhibition of them be held at some foreign cities of mutual agreement under the auspices of the South-North Coordinating Committee.

North Korea turned this reasonable proposal down. In a long statement signed by a spokesman for the Pyongyang side of the Coordinating Committee and broadcast by Radio Pyongyang on April 18, the Pyongyang side viciously slandered the overture, contending that “the Seoul

side attempts to shun the responsibility for the disruption of the dialogue by feigning to be sincere about the dialogue” and calling the proposal as “a farce intended to serve their propaganda purpose.”

b. Statement by Seoul Side on Fourth Anniversary of South-North Joint Communique

On the occasion of the fourth anniversary of the issuance of the South-North Joint Communique, the Seoul side of the South-North Joint Communique issued a statement on July 3, 1976 urging north Korea to return to the original spirit and purport of the Joint Communique and agree to unconditional resumption of the south-north dialogue which it has suspended onesidedly. The statement specifically urged north Korea;

(1) To stop fomenting tensions and committing armed provocations and other vicious acts detrimental to the nation’s interests in line with the basic spirit of the South-North Joint Communique, thereby responding affirmatively to the efforts for the consolidation of peace on the Korean peninsula.

(2) To agree early to the unconditional normalization of the function of the South-North Coordinating Committee, the principal organization charged with dialogue between the south and north. It should be noted that no solution can be found to various issues pending between the south and north unless there are dialogue and consensus between the direct parties. And no validity of dialogue and consensus can be expected unless they are made between proper authorities that can be responsible for their preservation and implementation.

(3) To assume such a sincere posture as to bring up, discuss and settle all problems between the south and north at the meeting of the normalized Coordinating Committee. To reject a dialogue body already agreed on and established indicates that they are not interested in the independent and peaceful solution of south-north questions.

Meanwhile, on July 3 north Korea issued a “joint statement” in the

name of the so-called Central Committee of the Democratic Front for Unification of Fatherland and the Pyongyang side of the South-North Coordinating Committee, in which it argued arbitrarily that “north Korea aspires for unification whereas south Korean authorities pursue perpetual national division,” contending that “because of this difference in the basic stand and posture, no dialogue can continue to take place between the two sides.” Here, north Korea made clear its negative stand toward the issue of resuming the dialogue.

In the “joint statement,” Pyongyang simply renewed its call for the convocation of “grand national conference” without mentioning anything about the question of normalizing the operation of the Coordinating Committee. Considering the fact that the “grand national conference” north Korea advocates demands as a prerequisite the communization or quasi-communication of south Korea, it becomes self-evident that what north Korea aims at is not dialogue but a Communist revolution in south Korea, namely, communization of the south.

c. Proposal for Discussion of Arrangements for Conclusion of Non-Aggression Agreement

The Seoul side of the South-North Coordinating Committee in a statement on January 28, 1977 proposed to the Pyongyang side discussion of arrangements for the conclusion of a non-aggression agreement for the consolidation of peace on the Korean peninsula.

Earlier on January 12, President Park reiterated in his New Year press conference his proposal for the conclusion of a south-north non-aggression agreement. The President stated that if north Korea signs the proposed agreement, the Republic of Korea will not oppose the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Korea.

Here, the Seoul side of the Coordinating Committee, recalling that when President Park first made the proposal on January 18, 1974, the north Korean Communists rejected it on the grounds that the overture

did not mention the question of the withdrawal of American forces, stressed, "Now that we have made it clear that once a non-aggression agreement had been concluded, the Republic of Korea would not be opposed to the withdrawal of the U.S. forces, north Korea should accept the Republic of Korea proposal for a non-aggression agreement."

The Seoul side also urged the Pyongyang side to reopen at an early date the direct south-north telephone line which north Korea had severed unilaterally.

d. Statement by Seoul Side on Fifth Anniversary of South-North Joint Communique

In a statement issued on July 4, 1977 on the occasion of the fifth anniversary of the issuance of the South-North Joint Communique, the Seoul side of the Coordinating Committee stressed that in order to realize peaceful unification of the fatherland, the suspended dialogue should be resumed first of all so as to remove mutual misunderstanding and distrust, ease tensions between the south and north, and consolidate peace. The Seoul side stated in the statement:

First, we again propose discussion of various issues conducive to the consolidation of peace on the Korean peninsula, such as steps to promote the conclusion of a mutual non-aggression agreement.

Second, to this end, we again urge early resumption of the South-North Coordinating Committee.

Third, we again urge an early reopening of the direct south-north telephone line which remains closed after being cut off by the Pyongyang side in August last year.

e. Seoul Side Proposes Meeting of Coordinating Committee to Discuss "200 Mile Waters"

The Seoul side of the South-North Coordinating Committee on July

22, 1977 proposed to the Pyongyang side that a meeting of the Coordinating Committee be held at an early date for the purpose of settling difference in opinions between the south and north over the issues of Pyongyang's decision to establish a so-called "200-mile economic zone."

Earlier the government of the Republic of Korea made it clear that it cannot recognize the "200-mile waters" because it will endanger the safety of fishing operations by south Korean fishermen on the waters surrounding the Korean peninsula, and also because it will not only increase the danger of creating disputes between the south and the north of Korea, but also bring about the possibility of causing a change in the status quo which has so far been maintained in the Korean peninsula since the armistice in 1953."

The government also let it be known that in the event safe fishing operations of south Korea's innocent fishermen on the waters adjacent to the truce line in the Yellow Sea and Eastern Sea are interrupted by intentional provocations by north Korea, whatever measures necessary shall be taken to protect the fishermen.

Emphasizing that there must be mutual consultations to remove difference in opinions between the south and north and solve these issues peacefully in accordance with the spirit of the South-North Joint Communiqué of 1972, and thereby contribute to consolidation of peace on the Korean peninsula, the Seoul side of the Coordinating Committee proposed to the Pyongyang side that:

First, a meeting of the South-North Coordinating Committee be held at an early date for the purpose of settling difference in opinions between the south and north.

Second, a meeting of vice co-chairmen be held at Panmunjom before the end of July at the latest to discuss the issue of holding a South-North Coordinating Committee meeting.

Third, the direct south-north telephone line, of which operation has been suspended by the Pyongyang side, be reopened immediately, and the

Pyongyang side agree to discussion of smooth procedural matters.

The Seoul side of the Coordinating Committee said that it looks forward to an affirmative response from the Pyongyang side to the proposals, and, at the same time, warned that if the Pyongyang side causes troubles on the waters surrounding the Korean peninsula, ignoring these peace-oriented and constructive propositions, the Pyongyang side should be held responsible for any consequence arising therefrom.

In a reaction to the proposals, the Pyongyang side, in a Radio Pyongyang broadcast on July 25, contended that “the establishment of ‘200-mile economic zone’ is a justifiable step of our sovereign right and it is ridiculous to call a meeting of the Coordinating Committee to solve the difference in opinions over the issue.” The Pyongyang broadcast then turned to its stereotyped propaganda demands that the Seoul side withdraw the June 23, 1973 Special Foreign Policy, stop pursuing a “war policy” and release anti-state criminals.

Moreover, in a speech at a reception held in Pyongyang on August 9, 1977 for a visiting government mission of Sao Tome Principe, north Korea’s premier Park Sung-chol stated that “north Korea will allow needy south Korean fishermen to engage in peaceful fishing in the north Korean economic waters from the standpoint of brotherly love.” Park went on to say deceptively that “it has been made known repeatedly in the past that south Korean fishermen would be allowed to engage in fishing in the north Korean waters.”

The truth, contrary to this “generosity,” is that north Korea has been kidnapping south Korean fishermen at random in areas along the eastern and western sea extension of the truce line and even south of them. Since 1954 to date, a total of 3,487 south Korean fishermen have been forcibly taken to the north together with their boats numbering 448. Of them, 405 fishermen with 32 boats are still being held in captivity in north Korea.

Notwithstanding, the Pyongyang side resorts to such a crafty lip service in a vicious scheme to appeal to needy fishermen of south Korea

by giving the false impression that “they are more humanitarian-minded.”

f. Seoul Side Calls for Switch to Era of Exchanges and Cooperation

Seoul side Acting Co-chairman Min Kwan-shik of the South-North Coordinating Committee issued a statement addressed to Kim Young-joo, Pyongyang side co-chairman of the Coordinating Committee, on March 3, 1978, charging that north Korea has not only jeopardized the function of the South-North Joint Communiqué and various other agreements reached between the south and north by rejecting the Seoul side's call for the normalization of the dialogue to date, almost five years since the Pyongyang side unilaterally broke off the south-north dialogue, but also is moving toward heightening the tensions between the south and north by forcing through the policy of diplomatic and military confrontation, as well as toward deepening national split and heterogeneity by emphasizing the need for struggles and violence through all propaganda machineries.

Looking back, it is certain that if the Pyongyang side, rather than suspending the south-north dialogue, had joined the Seoul side in the efforts to pursue coprosperity and national interests, peace would have already taken root on the Korean peninsula and the south and north Korean relations would have entered an age of exchanges and cooperation.

The Seoul side is convinced that once the south-north dialogue is normalized; lasting peace would be ensured; and exchanges and cooperative relations would be promoted. Though Korea is in a tragic state of national division today, the nation with a time-honored history and great cultural tradition would be able to do something substantial in projecting an unbounded national prosperity by pooling the resources, technology and wisdom in the possession of the two sides. It is believed that this, when realized, will certainly advance the time of independent and peaceful unification of the fatherland, contributing greatly to world peace as well.

Here, the Seoul side made the following proposals to the Pyongyang side:

First, the South-North Coordinating Committee be resumed unconditionally at an early date to discuss the pending issues such as economic, social, cultural and sports exchanges as well as the questions of easing tensions and consolidating peace between the south and north.

Second, in order to discuss the issue of resuming the South-North Coordinating Committee, the direct south-north telephone line be reopened immediately and vice co-chairmen's meeting of the Coordinating Committee be held promptly.

This statement by the Seoul side of the South-North Coordinating Committee set forth the direction of a new dimension that ought to be pursued within the framework of the dialogue. The statement was epochal in that, by suggesting that the south-north relations be transformed into "an age of exchange and cooperation," it represented one step ahead of the proposal for easing of tensions between south and north Korea.

It was realistic and positive an action for the Seoul side to offer possible cooperation between the south and north by proposing, from a far-reaching point of view, "joint utilization of the resources, knowhow and wisdom of the two sides, while pursuing alleviation of tensions and rooting of lasting peace through dialogue, under the present international circumstances in which all countries respect peace and seek exchanges and cooperation transcending thoughts, ideas and systems.

Nevertheless, the north Korean side has failed to show any affirmative response to such realistic proposal of the Seoul side.

g. Seoul Side Issues Statement on Sixth Anniversary of South-North Joint Communiqué

In a statement issued on July 4, 1978 on the occasion of the sixth anniversary of the issuance of the South-North Joint Communiqué, the Seoul side of the South-North Coordinating Committee charged that north Korea has turned down all the steady efforts and just and realistic

peace overtures made by the Republic of Korea with a view to easing tensions between the south and north, consolidating peace on the land and expediting exchanges between the two sides by all means under the basic spirit of the South-North Joint Communiqué and all other agreed matters. It was also noted that Pyongyang onesidedly suspended the south-north dialogue incorporating the aspirations of the 50 million people and cut even the direct south-north telephone line, the only means of contact between the south and north.

The statement by the Seoul side also said that the proposal made by President Park on June 23, 1978 for the “creation of a consultative body for the expedition of economic cooperation between the south and north” represented the laying down of epochal prospects in today’s south-north relations. It stated that the pursuit of such economic cooperation by the south and north as a single nation sharing the same blood constitutes the shortest approach toward peaceful unification of the fatherland transcending ideas, thoughts and systems. The Seoul side then urged the Pyongyang side:

First, to normalize early and unconditionally the south-north dialogue which Pyongyang has suspended for no fewer than five years since 1973.

Second, to conclude a mutual non-aggression agreement between the south and north with a view to removing the horror of war and bringing about durable peace.

Third, to accept the proposal for the “creation of a consultative body for expedition of economic cooperation between the south and north” for the promotion of welfare and co-prosperity through which the 50 million people of the south and north can live well away from isolation and closedness.

Despite all these calls of the Seoul side of the South-North Coordinating Committee for the normalization of the dialogue, north Korea, engaging only in unfounded slander and defamation against the south, has showed no good faith toward the south-north dialogue which it suspended unilaterally on August 28, 1973.

〈South-North Red Cross Conference〉

a. ROKNRC Proposes Meeting of South and North Korea Red Cross Chief Delegates

With the appointment of Chi Yeon-tai as vice president of the Republic of Korea National Red Cross on March 9, 1976 in place of Lee Bum-suk who was appointed as Ambassador to India, the Republic of Korea National Red Cross sought to find a breakthrough in the deadlocked Red Cross talks.

New ROKNRC Chief Delegate Chi proposed on March 31, 1976 that the south and north Korean Red Cross chief delegates, keenly aware of their significant duty to remove the sufferings of dispersed families in the south and north, meet in person at an early date separate from the working-level meeting of the South-North Red Cross Conference.

Expressing the belief that the chief delegates' meeting, should it be realized, will serve as a momentum to expedite the deliberation of agenda topics at the working-level meeting and normalize the humanitarian talks between the south and north at an early date, the ROKNRC Chief Delegate suggested that the place of such meeting can be either Panmunjom, Seoul, Pyongyang or any other place of mutual agreement.

However, the north Korean Red Cross, in a telephone message sent to the Republic of Korea National Red Cross on April 7, rejected the proposal for chief delegates' meeting by ridiculously claiming that the cause of the deadlock of the south-north Red Cross talks lies in the fact that "south Korea pursues criminal war and fascistization policies while seeking perpetual division of the nation in violation of the basic mission of the humanitarian talks."

In the telephone message, the north Korean Red Cross insisted that "no problems can be settled even if the chief delegate meet unless the south Korean Red Cross corrects its wrong posture," thus making it

clear that north Korea attaches political implications rather than humanitarian ones to the Red Cross talks.

b. ROKNRC Urges North Korea to Accept Food Aid Offered by Republic of Korea

Lee Ho, president of the Republic of Korea National Red Cross, issued a statement on January 31, 1977 concerning the announcement by President Park in his New Year press conference of the south's willingness to provide the assistance of food to the north Korean compatriots.

In the statement, the ROKNRC president, noting that the primary role of the Red Cross is to realize humanitarianism protecting human beings from disaster transcending ideologies and systems, expressed his support, from the standpoint of humanitarianism and brotherly love, for President Park's proposal to offer food grain assistance to the brethren in north Korea.

The ROKNRC president expressed the hope that north Korea would open-heartedly accept the south Korean government proposal, making it clear that if and when the north Korean side accepts the proposal, the Republic of Korea National Red Cross would be willing to render its utmost services in implementing concretely the food grain assistance project for the brethren in north Korea with the authorization of the government.

North Korea did not make a reply to the statement by the president of the Republic of Korea National Red Cross concerning "urging for acceptance of food aid offer made in a humanitarian consideration."

However, in a Radio Pyongyang broadcast on February 1, 1977 north Korea slanderously disputed the food aid offer, thereby making clear its negative response to the proposal.

The broadcast maintained that the proposal for food assistance was "a part of anti-Communist farce and a product of the scheme to cover up

south Korea's own serious food crisis and to further exploit people for stockpiling of military provisions." The Pyongyang side then unfoundedly insisted, "In south Korea today, lines of begging persons swell day after day, and people die of hunger everywhere."

c. ROKNRC Issues Statement on Sixth Anniversary of August 12 Proposal for Red Cross Talks

Lee Ho, president of the Republic of Korea National Red Cross, issued a statement on August 12, 1977 on the occasion of the sixth anniversary of the proposal for the Red Cross talks, calling for early normalization of the full-dress meeting of the South-North Red Cross Conference.

The statement said that it is truly regretful that despite strenuous efforts for the normalization of the dialogue made while holding delegates' meetings six times and 23 meetings of working-level officials at Panmunjom for four years after the full-dress meeting was suspended in July 1973, there has been no substantial progress in the discussion of the agenda topics nor have the full-dress meetings been resumed.

It then took note of the fact that as to the issue of resuming the full-dress meetings, the Republic of Korea National Red Cross delegation, considering the fact that the north Korean Red Cross continued to reject the holding of the eighth full-dress meeting in Seoul, has proposed that the meeting be held at an early date at Panmunjom or another third place of mutual agreement.

Reminding that there has been no substantial progress in the dispersed family searching campaign between the south and north although south and north Korean Red Cross working-level meetings have been held for more than three years since July 1974 at Panmunjom, the ROKNRC president emphasized that early resumption of the full-dress Red Cross meetings would constitute a shortcut to alleviation of tensions between the south and north, and to normalization of the south-north dialogue.

In the statement, he also urged the north Korean Red Cross to agree to early normalization of the full-dress meetings of the South-North Red Cross Conference based on brotherly love and Red Cross humanitarian spirit, adding that the Republic of Korea National Red Cross pledges before the 50 million people that no matter whatever difficulties it may face, it will do its best for the solution of the issue of finding the whereabouts of the 10 million dispersed family members in the south and north with patience and sincerity.

d. ROKNRC Proposes Meeting of South and North Korean Red Cross Presidents

On August 12, 1978 Lee Ho, president of the Republic of Korea National Red Cross, proposed a meeting of the presidents of the south and north Korean Red Cross societies to discuss the question of normalizing the suspended South-North Red Cross Conference at an early date.

In a statement issued on the occasion of the seventh anniversary of the proposal for south-north Red Cross talks on the issue of realizing reunion between dispersed families in the south and north, the ROKNRC proposed that a meeting between the presidents of the ROKNRC and NKRC be held at Panmunjom, Seoul, Pyongyang or any other place of mutual agreement in order to discuss the issue of normalizing the suspended South-North Red Cross Conference at an early date, expressing the hope that the NKRC would show a positive response to this sincere proposal.

At the same time, the ROKNRC said that it is resolved that no matter what obstacles might lie ahead, it will continue every possible effort with all sincerity and patience for the realization of the ardent aspiration of the ten million separated family members in the south and north.

The proposal by the ROKNRC for a meeting of the south and north Red Cross presidents was a realistic means of finding a breakthrough in the deadlocked south-north Red Cross talks. It represented the south's

another determination to pursue by all means the success of the humanitarian talks. The NKRC, however, rejected all of these sincere propositions of the ROKNRC.

Part Three

Other Developments in Inter-Korean Relations

1. North Korea Urged to Take Part in Seoul World Shooting Championships

Park Chong-kyu, president of the Korea Shooting Federation, on September 9, 1978 issued a statement urging north Korea to take part in the 42nd world shooting championships that was held in Seoul on September 24 through October 5.

In a press interview held at the Taenung International Shooting Range, Park said that if north Korea sends shooters to the Championships, his Federation is willing to offer a series of conveniences including a guarantee of a safe entry for its delegates directly through Panmunjom.

However, north Korea did not participate in the world match. If north Korea participated, it would have become a good opportunity for south and north Korea to demonstrate their exceptional marksmanship, manifesting before the whole world the excellency of the Korean people. It could have also served as a significant milestone in the efforts to restore the sense of national homogeneity and to promote cultural exchanges between south and north Korea. The statement by the president of the Korea Shooting Federation was as follows:

I am pleased to see that the 42nd World Shooting Championships take place in Seoul on September 24 with some 70 teams from many countries in Asia, Oceania, Europe, North and South America, the Middle East and Africa participating.

However, north Korea has not yet disclosed its intention to take part in the shooting championships. If north Korea notifies us of its decision to participate not later than one week before the opening of the championships, we shall welcome and accept it. For procedural matters, we are willing to offer a series of conveniences including a guarantee of a safe entry for its delegates directly through Panmunjom.

I am urging their participation in the conviction that mutual trust must be restored and an atmosphere of conciliation should be fostered

between the same people through exchanges between the south and north beginning in the field of sports. I look forward to affirmative response from north Korea.

2. Third North Korean Tunnel Found near Panmunjom 2 Meters Wide and High, 73 Meters Beneath Surface

The United Nations Command (UNC) in Korea announced on October 27, 1978 that another north Korean tunnel has been detected under the UNC sector of the Demilitarized Zone.

Colonel Robert C. Reed, spokesman for the U.N. Command, announcing the discovery of the third tunnel dug by the north Koreans near Panmunjom, said that the entrance to the tunnel is believed to lie about 1,200 meters west of the Military Demarcation Line in the north Korean Zone, and extend at least 435 meters east of the Demarcation Line into the Republic of Korea area.

“The tunnel was another grave violation of the Armistice Agreement and further indication that north Korea continues to seek military advantages which it could use to support offensive forces,” he said.

The spokesman stated that extensive efforts had been underway to locate additional tunnels since the discovery of two other north Korean tunnels in 1974 and 1975, and the location near Panmunjom was suspect after a north Korean defector, Kim Pu-song, said in September 1974 that he had worked in the digging of a tunnel in that area.

According to Colonel Reed, continued search there had been unsuccessful until June 10, 1978 when an underground explosion occurred near an exploration bore hole drilled by the Republic of Korea Army in 1975, causing the casing lining in the old bore hole to be ejected along with water under high pressure.

The new tunnel, the third to be discovered following the uncovering of the first two in 1974 and 1975, is located four kilometers south of Pan-

munjom, two kilometers southwest of Camp Kittyhawk, an advance camp for UNC personnel who support truce talks, and mere 44 kilometers from Seoul.

Having obtained decisive proofs of the north Korean tunnel, an intercept tunnel was dug, which finally broke through the north Korean tunnel 73 meters below the surface on October 17, 1978.

The third tunnel, dug through solid granite rock in an arch form, was 2 meters high and 2 meters wide, large enough to let pass fully armed troops three or four abreast. Its total length was estimated at 1,635 meters.

In their press conference in Seoul on March 21, 1975, two north Korean defectors exposed that the north Korean army units deployed along the truce line began to dig tunnels under the responsibility of respective army corps in September 1971 at the personal instructions of Kim Il-sung. The defectors, who crossed the truce line into the freedom of the Republic of Korea in 1974, were Kim Pu-song, a Workers' (Communism) Party member, and Yu Dae-yun, a north Korean army lieutenant.

The uncovering of the third tunnel has again shed light on north Korea's adherence to its basic strategy for armed invasion of south Korea. The third tunnel was received by the south Korean people as a greater shock because the tunnel, barely 44 kilometers from Seoul, suggested that north Korea has chosen Seoul as the primary target of its attacks.

Seen from military aspects, the Munsan-Seoul route provides the shortest approach to Seoul, which the north Koreans would surely use in the event of their invasion. Merely 4 kilometers away from the Freedom Bridge across the Imjin River, the tunnel could effectively be used in infiltrating a large number of invasion forces undetected behind the foremost positions of the south Korean Army, who then could overrun the Imjin River area, have control of the Munsan-Seoul corridor by surprise, and pose an immediate threat to Seoul.

The new tunnel was of much significance also in that it was dug near

Panmunjom, the site of the south-north dialogue. Since the south-north dialogue got off the ground in September 1971, Panmunjom has emerged as a symbol of the Korean people's pursuit of peace. It was via Panmunjom that south and north Korean delegates shuttled back and forth between Seoul and Pyongyang beginning in August 1972. It has been known that the north Koreans began to dig infiltration tunnels around the time of the initiation of the dialogue.

Defense authorities and military experts believe that the third north Korean tunnel, which was comparable in size to the second tunnel discovered north of Chorwon in the central frontline area in March 1975, could allow the passage of division-strength heavily armed troops with field guns, vehicles and various other equipment in an hour.

The tunnel digging was a clear act of military offensive because such tunnels could be used in both regular and irregular warfares.

In particular, the digging of the new tunnel has alarmingly indicated that north Korea has resumed the tunnelling operation which it had suspended before. North Korea stopped digging tunnels when it came under universal condemnation following the uncovering of the first and second tunnels in 1974 and 1975. The resumption of the tunnel digging well testifies that north Korea has resolved to push through the digging of tunnels as scheduled.

With the uncovering of the third tunnel near Panmunjom, the suspect of the United Nations Command that north Korea must have been digging many other tunnels all along the truce line has proved true.

Meanwhile, at the 391st meeting of the Military Armistice Commission held at Panmunjom on the morning of October 27, 1978, the United Nations Command lodged a strong protest with the north Koreans over the third north Korean tunnel.

Rear Admiral Warren C. Hamm, senior member of the UNC Component of the Armistice Commission, told his north Korean counterpart that the discovery of the underground passage vividly shows that north

Korea still harbors a plot to reinvade the Republic of Korea.

Presenting charts and videotapes revealing details of the north Korean tunnel, Admiral Hamm said, "This is not an indication of someone who wants peace. The magnitude of your efforts and the planning involved provide hard evidence of aggressive and deceitful intentions, far different from the peace gestures your side has been making."

"Peace cannot and will not come to the Korean peninsula until your side ceases these aggressive acts and begins to take positive steps toward finding a peaceful solution to the problems facing both sides," the Admiral said.

Admiral Hamm then proposed that a joint investigation of the underground tunnel. But, the north Korean delegates rejected the offer, contending that the tunnel discovery is a fabrication.

Republic of Korea Defense Minister Roh Jae-hyun, in the meantime, issued the following warning in October 27 against the belligerence of the north Korean Communists on the occasion of the uncovering of the third north Korean tunnel:

〈We have recently discovered another large tunnel which the north Korean Communists have dug beneath the truce line into our sector of the Demilitarized Zone. The tunnel, dug through solid rock 73 meters below the surface, measures 2 meters in both height and width, large enough for soldiers in full combat gear to pass through three or four abreast.

The tunnel draws our particular concern and attention for the following two reasons.

First, the point where the tunnel was uncovered was located in an area which offers the shortest approach to our capital from anywhere along the truce line. The tunnel, penetrating no less than 435 meters south of the Military Demarcation Line into our sector of the Demilitarized

Zone 4 kilometers south of Panmunjom, is barely 4 kilometers northwest of Imjingak and 3.5 kilometers from the Unification Village, a strategic point which represents the northern gateway to Seoul.

Second, the north Koreans had suspended work on the tunnel after Kim Pu-song, who had worked in a tunnel in the area, defected to the Republic of Korea in 1974. However, they resumed the tunneling shortly after the turn of the year.

The north Korean Communists have illegally brought troops and heavy arms into, and built fortifications in, the buffer zone. We have on many occasions urged them to withdraw. But, they have not only rejected our requests but have gone on to dig invasion tunnels beginning in 1972.

With the uncovering of the first north Korean tunnel north of Korangpo in November 1974 and the second near Chorwon in March 1975, the belligerence of the north Korean Communists has been revealed to the whole world.

The discovery of yet another tunnel is additional proof that the north Koreans still adhere to the policy of communizing the entire Korean peninsula by force of arms.

From a military point of view, the tunnels could be used to infiltrate a large number of troops behind our main defense positions and thereby seize strategic points and major command facilities within a matter of hours.

In addition, they could use the tunnels as infiltration routes through which irregular warfare troops could be sneaked into the south.

Lately, the north Korean Communists have been going all out to strengthen their offensive military power by importing or producing modern weapons as well as building up their surprise attack ability by fortifying forward naval and air force bases and deploying additional weapons while all the time talking about peace.

We have reliable information that in addition to the third tunnel, the north Koreans have been digging many other tunnels in the west-

central part of the forward area which provides a direct approach to Seoul, and also in the mountainous area of the eastern sector.

We shall intercept and neutralize these tunnels in joint Korea-U.S. efforts employing the latest scientific equipment. And we are fully prepared to deal with any infiltration by way of these tunnels.

As the Defense Minister of the Republic of Korea, I urge the north Korean Communists to stop making war preparations, stop tunneling into the south, and abandon their invasion scheme.

I once again warn them that our Armed Forces shall not tolerate any act of military adventure. I make it clear that if the north Korean Communists persist in their aggressive acts it will only result in bringing about their self-destruction, and that they alone will be held responsible for all consequences arising therefrom.>

『Now I Can Repay My Indebtedness to Freedom.』

The credit of the discovery of the third north Korean tunnel near Panmunjom goes to a large extent to Mr. Kim Pu-song, 38, a north Korean defector. Kim, who, assigned to the 53rd Liaison Office of the north Korean Workers' (Communist) Party Liaison Department, served as a guide for infiltrating north Korean agents, defected at the Republic of Korea in September 1974 and exposed that north Korea had been digging an invasion tunnel near Panmunjom, thus providing a decisive clue to the uncovering of the third tunnel.

Kim once worked in the tunneling as a surveyor and designer. In an interview with the Kyunghyang Shinmoon, Kim said, "I now can feel relieved since I believe I could have repaid the kindness given me by the people of the Republic of Korea." He described the tunneling operation in which he himself took part as follows:

Q.—*When did the digging of the third tunnel begin?*

A. The work began in February 1972 under the overall supervision of the Workers' Party Liaison Office. The field supervisor was Chong Chong-

hun, chief of staff of the 53rd Liaison Office. We faced much difficulties in the initial stage due to the lack of tunnel expertise at the Liaison Office. We needed mine and construction technicians. But, we couldn't invite them from elsewhere because of security reasons.

Q. When were you mobilized for the tunnel digging?

A. I was asked to take part in the tunneling operation in September 1972 because of my academic background of graduating from Machine Manufacturing Department of Hamhung Chemical Engineering College. Initially I was assigned to a team responsible for the designing of parts of machines used in tunneling. Afterwards I took part in surveying and designing of the tunnel digging itself. I also translated into Korean the manuals of foreign excavators imported. I did the land survey together with Kim Chong-hui who was the senior mine engineer. The survey work was very laborious because we could not allow even two one hundredths error.

Q. Can you describe the situation in which the tunneling was begun?

A. First, we dug with hoes and shovels only. But when we reached solid rock, we used 200 horsepower compressor by bringing in high-voltage electricity. As the hole grew deeper and the digging became difficult that much, they imported up-to-date equipment.

Q. What machines?

A. Swedish-made puncturers valued at 70,000 dollars, automatic excavators, and French-made compressors and motors. Automatic excavators were high-performance machines capable of drilling 20-meter-deep holes of 13cm diameter. Kim Il-sung once told officials not to spare even gold ingot in the construction of what he described 'large passages for the great event of national unification.'

Q. How did the work progress?

A. After we completed the entry, we drilled 20 to 25 holes on rock wall and placed 200 to 400 grams of dynamite on each hole to explode solid


rock. About four to five meters were dug a day. For fear that the south Korean Army should detect the underground explosion, we exploded one kilogram dynamite on the surface in our zone every time underground blasts took place. When the tunnel neared the south Korean military post across the Military Demarcation Line, we didn't work at night when sounds are easily heard.

Q. *We understand there were many accidents during the tunneling.*

A. Yes, a number of accidents were reported during the work. Some workers had their eyes blinded when dynamites went off behind time. Many others had their eardrum broken at the sound of explosion. Those who were injured or sick were denied evacuation for hospital treatment due to security reasons.

Q. *What is your feeling on the discovery of the new tunnel?*

A. In fact, I have been looking forward to this day more eagerly than any one else. I felt a little fretful because of the failure to locate the tunnel earlier. Although I myself took part in the land survey of the tunnel, I couldn't pinpoint the exact location from the other side. It seems to me that people of the Republic of Korea do not properly understand the viciousness of the north Korean Communists probably because of the comfortable living they enjoy. It should be known that their way of thinking differs completely from ours.



Comparison of 1st, 2nd and 3rd Tunnels

	No. 1	No. 2	No. 3
Discovery	November 15, 1974	March 19, 1975	Confirmed, October 17, 1978
Location	8km northeast of Korangpo	13km north of Chorwon	4km south of Panmunjom
Depth	45cm below surface	50 to 160m below surface	About 73m below surface
Size	120cm high, 90cm wide	2m high and 2m wide	
Structure	Concrete, slab	Solid rock, arch form	
Total length	About 3.5km	About 3.5km	About 2km
Length in Southern Sector	About 1km	About 1.1km	435m
Features	Use of rail carts, sleeping places, drainage, electric facilities	Southern terminals were so designed as to have several exit mouths so that they could infiltrate troops into several areas simultaneously in hostilities.	
Capacity	Passage of large numbers of regular and irregular troops	Passage of large numbers of heavily armed regular or irregular troops with heavy weapons in columns of three or four within a matter of hours.	
Approach direction	Korangpo→Ui-jongbu→Seoul (65km)	Chorwon→Pochon Seoul (101km)	Munsan→Seoul (44km)

(The following are editorials of major domestic newspapers on the discovery of the third north Korean tunnel near Panmunjom, condemning the endless acts of provocation by the north Koreans.)—Editor—

Shock of Third Tunnel

The Kyunghyang Shinmoon (Oct. 28, 1978)

The Korean peninsula has proved once again to be, as former U.S. Senator Mansfield once described, a time-tomb with detonation unre-moved. What does it mean that north Korea had dug another tunnel beneath one of our guard posts near Panmunjom, the birth place of the Korean armistice and site of the south-north dialogue?

In one word, this cannot but be clear evidence that there is no change in the north Koreans' basic strategy for communization of south Korea by force of arms no matter how the surrounding situation of the Korean peninsula does change.

Our attention is especially drawn to the fact that the latest tunnel much differs in tactical and strategic concepts from both the first tunnel discovered near Korangpo in November 1974 and the second tunnel detected north of Chorwon in March 1975.

The Munsan-Seoul Route, barely 44 kilometers, offers the shortest offensive corridor necessary for the north Korean Communists to mount a blitzkrieg attack on the capital zone. We are shuddered at the thought that north Korea could infiltrate a large number of heavily armed troops to the south through the tunnel. In fact, military experts believe that the north Koreans intended to secure footholds in the Imjin River area in the early hours of a war taking advantage of the tunnel and concentrate their thrust toward the Seoul area along the Munsan-Seoul corridor.

Another dreadful possibility was that they could conspire an excuse to unleash an invasion of the south by dispatching large troops in south Korean military uniform south of the truce line undetected through the tunnel and having them mount an attack on the north to make it appear as if it was the south Korean forces that provoked war first.

Despite these clear acts of belligerence, north Korea's Kim Il-sung feigns to care for peace, contending that it is south Korea that prepares

for an invasion of the north.

The credit for the uncovering of the third invasion tunnel goes to a former north Korean soldier, Kim Pu-song, who defected to the Republic in 1974 after he took part in tunnel digging. A survey based on a statement by the defector led to the discovery of the tunnel 73 meters beneath the surface on last October 17, shedding to light on the persisting aggressive scheme of the north Korean Communists.

The digging of the second and third tunnels, unearthed in 1974 and 1975, respectively, was an act of betrayal committed around the time when the south and north solemnly signed the July 4 South-North Joint Communiqué in which the two sides pledged to refrain from perpetrating any acts of provocation and to achieve peaceful unification of the nation in self-reliant efforts.

It should be noted that north Korea, which suspended tunnelling operations after it incurred accusation from the rest of the world community over the first and second tunnels, resumed digging tunnels last year.

This is a time when the mood of detente is being created among those world powers having stakes in the Korean peninsula, a mood that can be characterized by mutual approach between the United States and Red China and between Japan and Red China. It is only an insane act to dig invasion tunnels at this time. But, it is not totally illogical if north Korea intended to exploit such reconciliatory mood for unleashing of an invasion of south Korea at a decisive time.

In view of this scheme of Kim Il-sung, we find ourselves in a juncture when we must further consolidate our iron-firm security preparedness against possible outright provocation by the north Korean Communists. In order to awaken the north Koreans from their daydream for communitization of south Korea, all of us should unite with one another firmly and build up our ability to cope with any eventuality.

One thing important is for us to demonstrate our solid resolution

and strong ability so that the north Koreans can get the message that even if they provoke war, it would only lead to their own destruction. In this sense, we fully endorse the warning by Defense Minister Roh Jae-hyun that “we are all prepared not to tolerate any act of provocation by the north Korean Communists.”

Another North Korean Tunnel

The Dong-A Ilbo (October 28, 1978)

Another north Korean invasion tunnel has been discovered recently in the United Nations Command sector of the Demilitarized Zone 4km southwest of Panmunjom and 44km north of Seoul.

Here, our side called a meeting of the Military Armistice Commission on October 27 and lodged a strong protest with the north Koreans against this violation of the Armistice Agreement, proposing that a joint observer team investigate the tunnel without delay. The north Koreans, however, rejected this proposition in their stereotyped propaganda tirade, making themselves a laughing stock in world opinions.

North Korea started to dig invasion tunnels in 1972 when the south-north dialogue was in full progress following the issuance of the historical South-North Joint Communique. Of the tunnels, the first discovered was the one uncovered near Korangpo in November 1974.

In March the following year, the second tunnel was found north of Chorwon in the central frontline area. For the tunnels, north Korea, as is well known, came under severe worldwide condemnation. Early in 1975, General Hollingsworth, the then commander of the 1 Corps, stated that “there are about ten north Korean tunnels in addition to the discovered ones.”

With the uncovering of one tunnel after another, the General’s contention turned out to be true. We must further increase our vigilance and fully prepare ourselves against the unending acts of provocation by the north

Korean Communists who are going all out to prepare for war without giving up the scheme to bring the whole Korean peninsula under their Communist control. The third tunnel, which extended some 435 meters into our sector of the Demilitarized Zone, was unearthed 73 meters beneath the surface and measures two meters high and two meters wide, about the same size and shape as the Chorwon tunnel.

The new tunnel could allow the passage of division strength fully armed troops in one hour. Field guns, vehicles and other heavy equipment can also pass through it. The third tunnel is located at a point that provides the shortest approach to Seoul. As they did during the Korean War, the north Koreans are certain to use the Munsan-Seoul Route 1 for attack on the capital area in the event of another invasion. The third tunnel must have been intended to allow invasion forces to secure a quick control of the important corridor.

If our side failed to detect the tunnel beforehand, the rear of our major forward positions would have been endangered. We also can see the probability that many guerrillas, dispatched through the tunnel, could have caused unrest in the rear areas as was the case with the landing of a large number of north Korean guerrillas on the east coast area or the daring intrusion into Seoul of a north Korean commando team in 1968.

According to military authorities, north Korea started to dig the third tunnel around the same time as the first tunnel near Korangpo. But, following the uncovering of the first tunnel in 1974, it stopped the tunnelling until last year when they resumed it.

The persisting tunnel operation well testifies that their propaganda for peaceful unification is nothing more than a farce, that their policy toward the south calls for communization of the south by force of arms, and that there has been no change in their so-called four major military roads. It may well be said that the north Koreans attempt to speed up their schemes at this time when a mood of detente prevails among world powers surrounding the Korean peninsula, as characterized by the projected withdrawal of American ground troops from Korea, and the ap-

proach between the United States and Red China and between Japan and Red China.

As President Park Chung Hee pointed out in his interview with *Le Figaro* of France, the north Koreans' belligerence and cruelty are unprecedented.

Moreover, the discovery of the tunnel shows how unrealistic was the comment made by Red China's Teng Hsiao-ping during his meeting with Japanese Prime Minister Fukuda that "there is no tension on the Korean peninsula."

In the face of these cruel reality, we must further bolster our security stance. North Korea, in its part, should refrain from nonsensical armed provocations and respond affirmatively to our efforts to the consolidation of peace.

Third North Korean Tunnel

The Seoul Shinmun (October 28, 1978)

We were shocked and alarmed at the report of the discovery of a new north Korean tunnel in the Demilitarized Zone along the true line. This was the third tunnel discovered, two others being the ones uncovered near Korangpo in November 1974 and north of Chorwon in March 1975. The new tunnel is located in our sector of the Demilitarized Zone 4 kilometers south of Panmunjom and 4 kilometers northwest of Imjingak. It was said that the digging of the third tunnel, begun around the time when the two other tunnels started to be dug, was suspended in the wake of the uncovering of the first tunnel in 1974, and resumed early this year.

In a warning to the north Korean Communists, Defense Minister Roh Jae-hyun stated on October 27 that the new tunnel was intended to infiltrate a large number of troops behind our major defense positions so that they could seize or destroy key military facilities, and also to sneak irregular warfare troops such as guerrillas to the south.

What is most shocking is that the north Korean tunnels are for use in their invasion of the south, and that the third tunnel, in particular, is located at a point which provides the shortest approach to the Seoul area from anywhere along the truce line.

Here, we feel the need to correctly assess why the north Koreans have resumed the tunneling operations this year, which they had suspended in the past. North Korea is said to pursue a blitzkrieg tactic. And, Kim Il-sung has openly stressed since the 1960s that both regular and irregular warfares should be employed to achieve their military objectives. It is upon this strategy that north Korea trains and maintains 100,000 non-regular troops such as commandoes. It is beyond doubt that the tunnels which they have been digging along the truce line have something to do with such scheme.

It is interesting to note that the tunneling operation was begun around the time when the south-north dialogue was launched following the issuance of the South-North Joint Communique on July 4, 1972. In other words, the “peaceful unification” they are calling for is a mere deceptive slogan all the time. Behind such lip service, they conspire a scheme to communize the whole Korean peninsula by force of arms.

Lately, the north Koreans have stepped up their propagative contention that the early withdrawal of American forces from Korea and repeal of the Yushin (Revitalizing Reforms) System of south Korea serve as the only road to peace and peaceful unification of the Korean peninsula, while denouncing as “splitism” opposed to unification our efforts to bring about peaceful relations between south and north Korea. The uncovering of the third tunnel has showed that north Korea is interested only in invasion of the south, not in peace in the least.

North Korea now faces an economic crisis as a natural result of war preparation over a long period and excessive military outlays. They are trying to find a way out of their difficulties not from peaceful south-north relations but from their reinvasion of south Korea. Of course, no matter how bellicose Kim Il-sung may be, he won't be able to launch a war unless

he is sure of victory. But, what we cannot overlook is the fact that even if Kim Il-sung would shun an outright war until he is confident of his victory, he will attempt to intervene in the form of irregular warfare if and when political and social unrest flares up in south Korea. In fact, Kim Il-sung has repeatedly vowed that if the situation of south Korea demands it, north Korea will not sit idly by and will extend all available helps to insurgents. It appears certain that the north Korean tunnels have something to do with this objective.

Needless to say, irregular warfare is prone to be developed into all-out war. Our retaliatory attacks would inevitably ensue, which would surely invite counter-attacks from the north. Thus, any irregular warfare may escalate into an all-out war. In the face of express evidence that north Korea seeks an opportune time to communize south Korea by means of force or so-called “revolution in south Korea,” we must further consolidate our security stance not only in the military area but in the political and social fields also so as not to show any loophole to the warlike north Korean Communists.

Underground Provocation of North Korea

The Shin-A Ilbo (October 28, 1978)

Another invasion tunnel of north Korea has been detected. According to an announcement by the United Nations Command, the new tunnel was twice as large as the first tunnel discovered near Korangpo in 1974 and about the same in size as the second one unearthed north of Chorwon in 1975. The third tunnel was 2 meters high and 2 meters wide with its total length extending some 1,635 meters.

The new tunnel, whose entrance is believed to lie in the north Korean sector of the Demilitarized Zone about 1,200 meters west of the Military Demarcation Line, penetrates 435 meters east of the Demarcation Line into the south Korean area. The tunnel was dug through solid granite rock 73 meters beneath the surface.

Military experts believe that the third tunnel was large enough to allow the passage of combat troops armed with heavy firearms through it three to four abreast. The tunnel was evidently an offensive structure in view of the fact that it was located at a point which provides the shortest approach, no more than 44 kilometers, to the capital zone, and was thus intended to facilitate early control of the Munsan-Seoul corridor which the north Koreans would surely choose in their thrust toward Seoul in invasion.

In fact, the third tunnel was large enough to serve these wicked purposes. Needless to say, these invasion tunnels are telling evidence that north Korea still adheres to a strategy for achieving unification under communism. This is a clear violation of the Armistice Agreement and express proof of their threat of reinvasion. We are enraged at their persisting provocation which clearly tells that they have never given up the scheme for reinvasion behind their cry for "peace" and "peaceful unification." Since the ceasefire in 1953, north Korea has continuously introduced troops and equipment into the Demilitarized Zone in violation of the Armistice Agreement, adding infiltration tunnels lately to the long list of their fortifications in the buffer zone. Intelligence reports indicate that there are about ten more tunnels along the truce line.

However, the north Koreans should realize that the digging of invasion tunnels is a senseless undertaking especially in this age of advanced weaponry. Our strong defense system bolstered by missiles and the people's staunch sense of anti-communism will not tolerate such pre-modern tunnel operations.

Reckless playing with fire such as the digging of infiltration tunnels will only bring about personnel and material waste to north Korea which is already on the brink of economic bankruptcy.

North Korea should realize that continuous aggressive acts will result in its own destruction. It should stop digging senseless tunnels as urged by Defense Minister Roh Jae-hyun. We, in our part, should guard against the unabated aggressive scheme of the north Korean Com-

munists and go all out to build up a national strength to a point where we can continue to overwhelm north Korea.

Third North Korean Tunnel

The Chosun Ilbo (October 28, 1978)

Another tunnel dug by the north Koreans has been discovered 4km south of Panmunjom. This is the third discovered out of a number of tunnels the north Koreans have dug beneath the truce line.

The United Nations Command invited a group of domestic and foreign reporters to the scene of the tunnel in the mid-western frontline area and briefed them on details of the new tunnel.

The entrance of the third tunnel is believed to lie some 1,200 meters west of the Military Demarcation Line in the north Korean sector of the Demilitarized Zone, and it penetrated 435 meters east of the Demarcation Line into our sector of the buffer zone. The total length of the tunnel is approximately 1,635 meters and runs through solid granite rock 73 meters beneath the surface. Two meters high and two meters wide, the new tunnel is in the same size and shape as the second tunnel uncovered near Chorwon in March 1975.

The United Nations Command said that 1) it obtained the information that the north Koreans resumed the tunneling operation from around the end of last year to the middle of this year, which they suspended in 1975, 2) an extensive search has been made based on a statement by a north Korean defector in September 1974 that he had personally worked in tunnel digging in the area, 3) on June 10 an underground blast by the north Koreans sent a casing lining of a bore hole drilled in 1975 high into the air together with water, and it was determined that the north Korean tunneling team inadvertently intersected the bore hole, and 4) an intercept tunnel was dug toward the direction to confirm the existence of the north Korean tunnel.

Having thus confirmed the third north Korean tunnel, the United Nations Command charged at a meeting of the Military Armistice Commission on October 27 that the tunnel was a grave violation of the Armistice Agreement and that it served as clear evidence that north Korea continues to seek military advantages that can be used in supporting offensive forces.

In a stern warning to north Korea, Defense Minister Roh Jae-hyun said that 1) the tunnel draws particular concern because the point where the tunnel was uncovered was located in an area which offers the shortest approach to the capital zone and because north Korea resumed the tunneling early this year, which it suspended before, 2) authorities have firm information that in addition to the third tunnel, north Korea has been digging many other tunnels in the mid-western and eastern sectors of the truce line, and 3) we are fully prepared to deal with any north Korean infiltration made by way of these tunnels.

We fully trust the firm statement made by our top defense officer on the occasion of the uncovering of the third tunnel. On the other hand, we reaffirm the reality in which we find ourselves confronted with cruel and incessant acts of provocation by the north Korean Communists.

The digging of the first and second tunnels which were uncovered in November 1974 and March 1975, respectively, began around the time when the July 4 South-North Joint Communiqué was issued in which south and north Korea pledged to achieve unification of the fatherland peacefully and independently by means of grand national unity.

The first tunnel was discovered by a DMZ patrol which accidentally encountered vapor arising from surface, while the second tunnel was unearthed largely through detection of underground blasts. The uncovering of the third tunnel was made possible after the north Koreans to our luck inadvertently intersected one of the bore holes drilled earlier by our side. We are shuddered to imagine what would happen if the north Korean tunneling team avoided that bore hole and successfully completed the third tunnel.

The second tunnel was dug through solid granite rock 50 meters beneath the surface, and so was the third tunnel 73 meters below the ground level. The two tunnels, 2 meters wide and high, were large enough to allow the passage of division-strength troops in an hour. They can also accommodate vehicles and field guns. Especially the third tunnel was for surprise thrust to the capital area of Seoul.

It seems apparent that north Korea intended to infiltrate a large number of troops through the tunnel into behind our forward military positions to seize or destroy them or to instigate or touch off civil war with a view to creating a decisive time for communizing the entire Korean peninsula. The north Koreans might have also sought to kidnap key figures travelling to Panmunjom taking advantage of such secret passages.

In fact, north Korea has been beset with a number of difficulties that may prompt north Korea to find a breakthrough in a military adventure against the south, such difficulties including persisting economic difficulty, the growing trend of world powers having stakes in Korea seeking the order of peaceful coexistence, increasing military edge of south Korea over the north, and serious power struggle within the north Korean leadership.

This can be evidenced by the fact that the north Koreans have resumed once-suspended tunneling and dug a tunnel near Panmunjom, the symbolic scene of peace efforts. Besides, the third tunnel eloquently testifies how fictitious and deceitful their lip service to peace is.

In the face of this vicious belligerence of the north Korean Communists, we must crush their scheme with an iron-firm security posture and make them realize that consolidation of peace through dialogue is the only solution, which can also serve the interests of north Korea.

Another North Korean Invasion Tunnel

The Joong-Ang Daily News (October 28, 1978)

The third offensive tunnel of north Korea was found 4km south of Panmunjom in the western sector. The new tunnel is comparable in size to the second tunnel discovered in the central frontline area in 1975. According to military experts, the tunnel, measuring 2 meters in height and width, is large enough for soldiers to pass through three or four abreast.

Such tunnels can be used in both regular and irregular warfares, and may allow the infiltration of division-strength enemy troops or light infantry brigade behind our forward positions.

North Korea was known to have begun to dig invasion tunnels in 1972, and there are about ten more tunnels either under construction or completed.

Generally three purposes can be cited for the north Koreans' digging of infiltration tunnels. First, they intended to use the tunnels as an invasion route. They planned to secure an advantage for the launching of a blitzkrieg warfare by sneaking a large number of troops into behind our frontline positions and thereby cutting the forward area from the rear zone.

The tunnels could also be used as an infiltration route through which they could send the Eighth Special Corps members or other irregular warfare troops into our rear area undetected for a guerrilla warfare. Another possibility is that north Korea could infiltrate agents to the south and supply weapons to insurgents in south Korea through the tunnels.

These are the suspected purposes of the tunnels. But, the third tunnel draws our particular attention for the following several factors.

The discovery of yet another tunnel serves as evidence that no matter how outsiders may think of the situation of the Korean peninsula,

north Korea has not given up its scheme for communization of the whole Korean peninsula by force of arms.

It was believed that the digging of the third tunnel was suspended after a north Korean defector, Kim Pu-song, exposed the tunneling after his defection to the south in 1974. But they resumed the digging early this year, and an underground blast that sent a casing lining of one of the bore holes drilled earlier by our side into the air, showing us the exact location of their tunnel.

The fact that they resumed the suspended tunneling operation clearly indicates that north Korea intensifies aggressive designs against the south rather than having given them up. Moreover, the point where the third tunnel was discovered is only 44km away from Seoul. From a military point of view, the Munsan-Seoul route provides the shortest approach to the capital zone from anywhere along the truce line, which is certainly an anticipated corridor for aggressors' thrust to Seoul in an invasion.

Their resumption this year of tunneling with an eye at Seoul eloquently testifies how deceptive their lip service to peace has been.

Faced with such unabated aggressive schemes of the north Koreans, we have no alternative but to consolidate our security preparedness with our own efforts. Aggressive designs are generally dependent on the extent of defensive preparedness of the other side. This is the time when we must reaffirm our watertight security posture so as to repel any provocation by the bellicose north Korean Communists.

Third Invasion Tunnel Aiming at Capital

The Hankook Ilbo (October 28, 1978)

The third invasion tunnel of the north Korean Communists has been laid bare. The United Nations Command in Seoul officially announced its discovery and lodged a strong protest with the north Koreans over the tunnel at the 391st meeting of the Military Armistice Commission.

According to the U.N. Command, the third tunnel was found 2km southwest of Camp Kittyhawk, an advance camp for UNC personnel supporting the Military Armistice Commission talks, and its entrance is believed to lie about 1,200 meters west of the Demarcation Line. The new tunnel penetrated 435 meters into our sector.

On June 10, 1978, an underground blast occurred in an area where our side had drilled some bore holes based on an information provided by a north Korean defector, Kim Pu-song, who said after his defection in September 1974 that he personally took part in tunneling near Panmunjom. More drilling followed, and on October 17 an intercept tunnel dug by the United Nations Command broke through the north Korean tunnel.

An investigation has showed that the new tunnel was comparable in size and shape to the second tunnel discovered near Chorwon in March 1975. The U.N. Command said the new tunnel was an indication that north Korea continues to seek military advantages which it could use to support offensive forces.

The United Nations Command was correct in this assessment in view of the terrain and strategic location of the planned terminal of the tunnel. It is certain that north Korea sought to secure the shortest approach to Seoul. To everybody's eyes, it appears apparent that the latest tunnel was designed for them to infiltrate a large number of troops behind our key forward positions for seizure or destruction of our military facilities or for creation of a "decisive time" and conditions for their commando actions against or overall invasion of south Korea. We can also imagine the possibility that north Korean troops in south Korean Army uniform would sneak into the south undetected through the tunnels and mount a disguised attack on the north, thus providing an excuse to the warlike north Korean Communists for provoking an outright war.

It is also significant that such an invasion tunnel was dug near Panmunjom, the birthplace of the truce. The fact that they had dug tunnels beneath the Demilitarized Zone into an area south of the Military De-

marcation Line is an express violation of the Armistice Agreement. It also shows how fictitious their cry for peace has been.

To cut it short, they sharpen their sword and dig invasion tunnels behind their loud trumpet for “peace.” It has been known in the course of search for the tunnel that north Korea has resumed the tunneling early this year which it suspended in the wake of the uncovering of the first and second tunnels.

This indicates that there is no change in Pyongyang’s basic strategy toward south Korea, that is, to bring south Korea under its control by force of arms. It also tells that some contentions that “there is no tension on the Korean peninsula” or “north Korea’s belligerence has been eased” are unfoundedly optimistic views.

We cannot allow ourselves to be dragged into this sort of irresponsible opinions. The only thing we should do is to further bolster our security preparedness and expedite our efforts for the promotion of self-reliant security ability.

We also hope that the world community will correctly realize this reality in which the north Korean Communists alone dream for war in this universal mood for detente. We would like to warn north Korea that their reckless and unending acts of provocation will only lead to their own destruction. The north Koreans should stop tunneling and other war preparation immediately and discuss the issue of peaceful future of the nation at the table of dialogue. They should know that this is the only road they can choose.

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Part 1

Efforts of Republic of Korea to Resume Dialogue

1. January 19 Proposal to North Korea

In his New Year press conference on January 19, 1979, President Park Chung Hee made a fresh and positive proposal to north Korea, urging that the authorities of south and north Korea have talks unconditionally at any time, at any place and at any level to discuss the issue of resuming the stalled south-north dialogue. The proposal of President Park read in substance:

However, we are still firm in our belief that the tragedy of fratricidal war in this country must be prevented by all means. We proposed a set of most reasonable and realistic ways of achieving reunification of the divided land by peaceful means.

I am convinced that these proposed ideas will best serve the interest of the survival and prosperity of our 50 million compatriots. However, they have all been rejected by north Korea, and the short-lived south-north dialogue was unilaterally suspended by the north Korean side.

We have a mission to reunite the divided territory and separated people in both parts of the peninsula. We cannot and should not shirk the responsibility no matter how difficult and rough the road to fulfilling it may be.

I would like to take this occasion to renew my proposals to the north Koreans.

I call upon north Korea to come to the dialogue table at any place, at any time and at any level, with an open mind and without any preconditions, to discuss with us all problems pending between the two sides—the ways to prevent a fratricidal war on the Korean peninsula, to assure prosperity for all our 50 million people and to achieve peaceful unification.

I expect the north Korean authorities to affirmatively respond to this proposal that embodies the aspirations of the entire people.

Today, I address this proposal again to the north Koreans.

2. Call for Dialogue and North Korea's Reaction

Towards this epochal proposition by President Park, the responsible authorities of north Korea did not show any response. But, a sort of north Korean reaction came four days later on January 23 when a mere social organization called "Democratic Front for Unification of the Fatherland" referred to as "Democratic Front" issued a statement in response to the proposal. The gist of the statement was:

"... In the first place, we propose as follows to people in various strata in south Korea, our brethren abroad, various political parties and social organizations in south Korea and south Korean authorities.

"First, the south and north should return to the original ideas and principles of the July 4 South-North Joint Communiqué.

"... We propose that effective 10 a.m. February 1 the authorities of the two sides reaffirm the ideas and principles of the July 4 Joint Communiqué and officially declare their intention of observing them.

"Second, the two sides should stop making slanders and defamation against each other immediately. As we believe that the sooner such step is taken, the better it would be, it would be the extremely important first step toward a dialogue and national unity between the south and the north should the two sides, together with the reaffirmation of the July 4 Joint Communiqué, stop slanders and defamation through all and every ways and means including government-operated and private media.

"Third, all military actions that threaten and hold in enmity the other side should be stopped immediately and unconditionally.

"... To this end, we urge that the military authorities of the two sides stop hostile military actions such as buildup of military

forces, military operations and construction of military installations and cease to conduct military exercises unconditionally in the forward area along the Military Demarcation Line effective 10 a.m. March 1.

"Fourth, we propose the convocation of a whole nation conference attended by the delegates of various political parties and social organization in the south and north.

"... This conference should be attended by the representatives of various political parties and social organizations of the north, the representatives of all the political parties, including the Democratic Republican Party, and social organizations, and patriotic personages in all walks of life in south Korea, and representatives of organizations of our brethren as well as individual personages abroad.

"... We propose that this conference be held in either Pyongyang or Seoul in early September this year, and that for the successful preparation of the conference, a bilateral or multi-lateral preliminary meeting be held in Pyongyang in early June among working-level representatives of various political parties and social organizations at home and abroad."

This incoherent north Korean reaction could not be taken as an official response inasmuch as it was a statement by the "Democratic Front," an organization without any power of representation and so obscure that even its substance is questionable. This is all the more so in view of the fact that President Park's proposal ought to have been responded to by the responsible authorities of north Korea.

Putting forth the "Democratic Front" in response to the Republic of Korea proposal for dialogue between the responsible authorities, north Korea contended that the "Democratic Front" comprises the north Korean Workers' (Communist) Party and all other political parties and social organizations in north Korea. On the heels of a statement issued on January 25 by Park Song-chol, a Political Commissar of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party and concurrently Vice President of the Administration Council, in

support of the proposal of the "Democratic Front," an assortment of social organizations in south Korea issued statements defending, and urging the realization of, the proposition.

Here, the government of the Republic of Korea, in a statement issued by the government spokesman on January 26, urged the north Korean authorities to make a responsible answer to the position of the Republic of Korea, reasoning that the south-north dialogue can be carried out successfully only when it is held between the responsible authorities of the two sides. The statement read:

The government of the Republic of Korea, taking note of the statements which were broadcast by the north Korean side on January 23 and 25, 1979, in response to our proposal of Jan. 19, 1979, with regard to the issue of the South-North dialogue, wishes to state the following position.

It has been our consistent stand to improve the relations between the South and the North with a view to achieving independently the peaceful unification of Korea by promoting the South-North dialogue with all sincerity in accordance with the spirit, principles and agreements contained in the South-North Joint Communique, dated July 4, 1972.

We assume that the north Korean statement is an indication of its willingness to reaffirm the spirit and principles of the July 4 Joint Communique, and also to faithfully adhere to the agreed provisions of the said Communique which among other includes refraining from defaming and slandering each other, preventing armed provocations against each other and taking positive measures to prevent military incidents.

Inasmuch as all the agreements between the South and the North including the July 4 Joint Communique have been made through talks by the responsible authorities concerned of both sides, the future South-North dialogue can achieve desired objectives if the dialogue is conducted by the responsible authorities of both sides.

Accordingly, we propose that a preliminary meeting be held

as soon as possible either in Seoul or Pyongyang between the authorities concerned of the South and the North for the purpose of discussing all the problems raised so far by north sides, not necessarily waiting until June 1979 as suggested by the north Korean side.

It is hoped that a sincere response will be made by the directly responsible authorities of north Korea to our position as stated above.

Responding to this suggestion by the Spokesman of the Republic of Korea government that a preliminary meeting between the "authorities of south and north Korea" be held even before June, north Korea made a reaction of highly propaganda nature. In a statement released by the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the "Democratic Front" on January 27, north Korea counter-offered that the "working-level preliminary meeting" be held in early April instead of early June as proposed in the January 23 statement of the Central Committee of the "Democratic Front." The gist of the January 27 statement was:

"... The south Korean side said that a working-level delegates' meeting be held before June. We, too, believe that the sooner it is, the better it would be.

"In this connection, we propose that a working-level delegates' meeting be held in early April ahead of the originally given time.

"We have already foreseen that, as to participants in the meetings between working-level delegates, not only representatives of all political parties and social organizations as well as individuals both within and outside the country, but also representatives of the authorities of both the south and the north would attend the meetings.

"If such working-level meetings actually take place, various parties, social organizations, individuals in all walks of life, and the authorities of the south and the north would be able to discuss, through bilateral or multilateral negotiations, the

question of convening a whole nation conference and a series of issues raised in the relations between the south and the north.

"In due course of time, we shall send invitations for such working-level meetings to all the political parties, social organizations and individuals in various fields in the south and the north, as well as the representatives of all the organizations and individuals abroad."

As can be seen here, north Korea, refusing to respond in the name of its responsible authorities to the call for a dialogue between the responsible authorities, manifested clearly its attempt to manage an inter-Korean dialogue on a scenario of its own, namely, at times and at places it selects one-sidedly, on topics it dictates at its option, and with attenders it hand-picks by itself. On February 10, north Korea unlawfully mailed letters containing the January 23 statement of the Central Committee of the "Democratic Front" to various organizations and leading figures in the Republic of Korea. By attempting, thus, to launch a fresh propaganda taking advantage of its proposals related to the inter-Korean dialogue, north Korea let it be known that such various offers were part of its deceptive peace offensive against the south.

Meanwhile, in a statement issued by the Spokesman of the Ministry of Culture and Information on January 29, the government of the Republic of Korea pointed out that "the north Korean authorities have not made any responsible response to the Republic of Korea proposal, while a mere social organization continues to make an impracticable demand, indulging in political propaganda."

Urging that the directly responsible authorities of north Korea make a sincere response, the statement also said, "The basic position of the Republic of Korea, as was already made clear, is that a preliminary meeting be held between the responsible authorities of the two sides at a place agreed on between the two sides at any time before June this year without any preconditions so as to discuss all the problems raised between the two sides." It then expressed the regret that the north Korean authorities did not make a sincere

response although a considerable span of time has lapsed since the Republic of Korea made the proposal.

Despite this call for a sincere response the responsible authorities of north Korea continued to shun any response. On January 31, on the other hand, the "(north) Korean Central News Agency" issued a statement declaring one-sidedly that pursuant to the proposal made in the January 23 statement of the Central Committee of the "Democratic Front," north Korea would stop making slanders and defamation against south Korea effective 10 a.m. February 1.

The Republic of Korea, in its effort to resume that stalled south-north dialogue with President Park's January 19 proposal as a momentum, time and again urged that the north Korean authorities to make a responsible response. Nevertheless, north Korea ignored the call, demanding, in the name of the "Democratic Front," the "fulfillment" of the spirit of the July 4 Joint Communique instead. The only thing the north Koreans agreed on was the south's suggestion that preliminary contacts be held earlier than originally suggested.

In the meantime, inasmuch as north Korea raised the question of "fulfilling" the spirit of the July 4 Joint Communique, the Republic of Korea felt the need to terminate the unnecessary "war of statements" by resuming early the business of the South-North Coordinating Committee (SNCC), an organization established and operated for the purpose of embodying the basic spirit of the July 4 Joint Communique, and also by restoring the severed direct telephone line between the south and the north.

Here, Min Kwan-shik, Seoul-side Acting Co-chairman of the SNCC, called upon north Korea in a statement on January 31, 1979 to commit itself to the fulfilling of the spirit of the Joint Communique not in words but in deeds by agreeing to resume the SNCC operation. The full text of the statement of the Seoul-side acting co-chairman was:

1. It has been our persistently held position that we want to improve the relations between the south and the north (of

Korea) and achieve an independent and peaceful unification through faithful continuation of the South-North Dialogue in accordance with the spirit, principles and agreements of the July 4 South-North Joint Communiqué.

Lately, the north Korean side has reportedly expressed its desire to have the spirit, principles and agreements of the South-North Joint Communiqué reaffirmed and, in that regard, I would like to expect the north Korean side to substantiate such an expression of desire with an effective demonstration of sincerity for the resumption of the South-North Dialogue. I must also take note of the fact, however, that the north Korean side has yet to make any specific reference to that end on the question of an overall implementation of the agreements spelled out in the South-North Joint Communiqué.

2. As is well known, the South-North Joint Communiqué provides that the south and the north (of Korea) have agreed;

- 1) on the principles for unification of the fatherland,
- 2) to suspend all acts aimed at slandering and defaming each other, stop armed provocations and to prevent military incidents,
- 3) to implement many-sided exchanges in various fields,
- 4) to positively cooperate for an early success in the South-North Red Cross Conference, and
- 5) to install a telephone line directly connecting Seoul and Pyongyang for operation on a permanent basis,

while further agreeing to create and operate the South-North Coordinating Committee for the purpose of implementing the above-listed agreements, settling all the problems arising between the south and the north in order to improve the relations between them and of resolving the question of unification.

3. With the above-listed agreements in mind, I would like to state that it is my belief that the most effective and correct way to assure a rededication to the spirit and principles, as well as a faithful implementation of the agreements, of the South-North Joint Communiqué is to have the operation of the South-

North Coordinating Committee brought back to normalcy, for it is this Committee which is entrusted with the authority to preserve, and implement, the spirit, principles and agreements of the Joint Communiqué. Therefore, I urge to the Pyongyang side that it agree to normalize the heretofore interrupted operation of the South-North Coordinating Committee at the earliest possible date.

4. Furthermore, for the evident reason that the bilateral issues and problems arising in the relations between the south and the north can in no way be resolved simply by serving unilateral notifications or by making one-sided allegations, I also urge to the Pyongyang side that it agree to have the Seoul-Pyongyang direct telephone line, presently out of operation having been unilaterally disconnected by the Pyongyang side, brought back to normal operation immediately in order to have the communication between the south and the north conducted speedily and in a productive manner.

5. In my capacity as Acting Co-chairman of the South-North Coordinating Committee for the Seoul side, I look forward to a sincere response from the Co-chairman of this Committee for the Pyongyang side to the suggestions that I made in the above.

A series of north Korean reactions to these calls of south Korea could be boiled down to a demand that "the authorities of south and north Korea officially reaffirm, and pledge their observance of, the ideas and principles of the July 4 South-North Joint Communiqué." This was the persisting stand of north Korea which was steadfastly refusing to make responsible reactions to Seoul-side overtures.

The ideas, principles and agreed matters of the South-North Joint Communiqué, in nature, ought to be practiced and fulfilled not partially but as a whole.

Nevertheless, north Korea raised the issue of the ideas and principles of the Joint Communiqué, attempting to make it appear as if it alone is faithful to the spirit of the Joint Communiqué. The truth,

however, is that north Korea was shunning the discussion of substantial questions related to the Joint Communique, as can be seen in its failure to agree to the repeated calls for the normalizing of the business of the SNCC, the operation of the several Seoul-Pyongyang telephone line and the stalled South-North Red Cross Conference, as well as for implementing multi-pronged exchanges between the two sides.

If north Korea is truly willing to fulfill the spirit of the Joint Communique sincerely, it ought to carry out faithfully what were agreed on between the south and north Korean authorities in the Joint Communique and to join, based thereon, the Republic of Korea effort for peaceful unification.

In the South-North Joint Communique and the Agreed Minute on Formation and Operation of South-North Coordinating Committee, the two sides of divided Korea expressly stated that they agreed to solve all the issues related to the question of national unification as well as to the improvement and development of south-north relations through mutual discussion and agreement made at the SNCC.

Therefore, all problems pending between the south and north naturally become subject to discussion at the SNCC. None of such problems can be prerequisite to the normalization of the operation of the Coordinating Committee, as argued by the north Koreans.

Under the circumstances, the most effective means of pledging the faithful fulfillment of the July 4 Joint Communique is to reopen the business of the SNCC without any preconditions and raise, discuss and solve all questions at the SNCC.

However, despite this call for the faithful implementation of the Joint Communique and its unilateral declaration of "cessation of slanderous and defamatory propaganda against the south effective 10 a.m. February 1," the north Koreans made harsh slanderous allegations against the south on this very day of February 1 through their propaganda radio, "Voice of Unification Revolutionary Party." The defamatory propaganda harangue, targeted against the January 31 proposal of the Seoul side of the SNCC, shed light of the

fact that their announcement of the stoppage of slanders and defamation was a mere political gimmick.

3. Position of Republic of Korea toward South-North Dialogue

The government of the Republic of Korea has proposed a "dialogue between the responsible authorities of south and north Korea" calling for an affirmative response from the responsible authorities of north Korea in a bid to forestall the recurrence of a fratricidal war on the Korean peninsula, improve the relations between the south and north, achieve the co-existence and co-prosperity of the 50 million people in both sides of Korea and realize peaceful unification of the fatherland.

North Korea, however, refused to make any responsible answer to this sincere proposal of the Republic of Korea. Instead, it called for the convocation of a "whole nation conference" in the name of a mere social organization without any power, "Democratic Front for Unification of the Fatherland, ("Democratic Front"). North Korea, thus, showed insincerity by attempting to use the rare momentum for dialogue as a means of its political propaganda.

From the basic standpoint that dialogue should be resumed between the south and north by all means, the Republic of Korea is in the firm belief that if a dialogue is to be made, it must be efficient talks held between the responsible authorities of the two sides, never a repetition of irresponsible talks as in the past.

The Republic of Korea is convinced that despite the insincere attitude of north Korea, the stalled south-north dialogue must be resumed, only through which, it believe, tension can be eased and durable peace instituted on the Korean peninsula, paving the way to ultimate peaceful unification.

In order to resume the dialogue at an early date, south Korea promoted, as the easiest way, the normalization of the operation of the SNCC, the existing machinery for dialogue established in a mutual agreement.

On February 17, 1979, the Republic of Korea sent a delegation of the SNCC Seoul side to Panmunjom for a contact between the two sides' vice chairmen of the Coordinating Committee with a view to discussing the issue of resuming the business of the Coordinating Committee.

North Korea, however, sent to this contact a delegation of the "Democratic Front," a mere social organization by no means qualified for the discussion and solution of the question of national unification and other issues pending between the two sides of divided Korea. Thus began abnormal contacts at Panmunjom between south and north Korea.

From the moment north Korea, ignoring the just position of the Republic of Korea, one-sidedly demanded liaison delegates' contacts between the two sides to "discuss the formation of a 'preparatory committee for national unification,' " the Republic of Korea foresaw the danger of upcoming contacts becoming a "dialogue of deaf."

Nevertheless, south Korea sent a delegation of the SNCC Seoul side to the contacts in the hope that the interest of the Republic of Korea in a constructive and productive dialogue in the form of either responsible authorities' meeting or normalization of the business of the Coordinating Committee could be conveyed to north Korean authorities through Pyongyang-side delegates coming to the contacts, thereby leading in due course to the materialization of a normal and efficient dialogue between the south and north.

Despite the effort of the Republic of Korea to provide an impetus to a renewed dialogue, however, north Korea displayed an irresponsible attitude by disputing even the existence of the SNCC born of express provisions of an agreed minute duly agreed on and signed between the two sides. This utter insincerity on the part of north Korea had rather an adverse effect on the south-north relations, for the improvement of which south Korea has been striving.

Concluding, therefore, that such abnormal and unproductive contacts should no longer be allowed to go on, the government

of the Republic of Korea proposed a meeting of working-level delegates of the two sides' responsible authorities, which can be trusted by each other, and sent such delegates to Panmunjom on March 28, 1979.

But, north Korea rejected this suggestion, too. It was arguing that if there should be any dialogue between the two sides, it should be a "whole nation conference," not "talks between authorities" which it described as "unnecessary."

These contentions indicated that north Korea was still sticking to its scheme to handle the south-north dialogue as part of its attempt to create conditions ripe for "revolution in south Korea," that is, Communist takeover of the south.

As is well known, the two sides of divided Korea agreed in the July 4 South-North Joint Communique that unification of the fatherland should be achieved with independent efforts and in a peaceful manner by all means and that to this end, a grand national unity should be promoted in the first place transcending the difference in thoughts, ideas and systems. The consistent position of the Republic of Korea is that all the agreed matters including this principle of unification embodied in the provisions of the South-North Joint Communique should be sincerely observed and implemented.

The most exigent task facing the two sides of Korea today is to ease tension by bringing about durable peace on the Korean peninsula, and to lay the groundwork for mutual trust by means of mutual exchanges, cooperation and opening of societies.

In order to solve these problems substantially and effectively, agreement should be reached between the two sides, and it is self-apparent that such agreement must be made between the responsible authorities which have the full power to implement in their respective zones what have been agreed on.

It is from this standpoint that the government of the Republic of Korea exerts every efforts with sincerity and patience to improve the south-north relations and pave the way to eventual unification. The Republic of Korea looks forward to a time when north Korea

returns to an open-hearted posture and when its responsible authorities show an affirmative response to the call for a dialogue intended to discuss and achieve the 50-million nation's paramount objective, namely, peaceful unification of the divided fatherland.

Part II

Abnormal South-North Contacts at Panmunjom

1. Initiation of Abnormal Contacts

Despite the call of the Republic of Korea for a "dialogue between the responsible authorities of south and north Korea at any time, any place and at any level" or the normalization of the operation of the SNCC, the existing machinery for dialogue, North Korea denied the existence of the SNCC and instead demanded the establishment of a "preparatory committee for national unification" as a preliminary discussion body for a "nation-wide dialogue and negotiation." In a statement issued on February 5 by Secretariat of the Central Committee of the "Democratic Front," north Korea, referring to the January 31 statement of the SNCC Seoul side, argued, "With an extremely limited organization like the SNCC, we cannot accomplish the great national task in a way fitting the opinions of the entire people. The SNCC has already become an irrational body. In effect, the SNCC could not function and failed to meet the people's expectation because it was unable to reflectfully the consensus of the nation. In consequence, the SNCC has lost its *raison d'etre*." The gist of the north Korean statement was as follows:

"We propose the establishment of a preparatory committee for national unification in place of the SNCC as a preliminary consultation body to prepare for a nation-wide dialogue and negotiations.

"The preparatory committee for national unification can be participated by the representatives of those political parties and social organizations at home and abroad which are pursuing national conciliation and peaceful unification, and the authorities of the south and north. It may consist of a small number of persons.

"At the preparatory committee, the issue of convening a whole nation conference and other questions related to the preparation of the ultimate unification of the country can be dis-

cussed.

“If and when the preparatory committee for national unification is formed and operated, it would overcome the kind of limitedness found in the SNCC and would pave the way to the most efficient solution of the unification issue in the most democratic manner reflecting fully the thought and interests of the whole nation in accordance with the ideas and principles of the July 4 Joint Communiqué that embodies the nation’s common aspiration.

“We propose that the liaison delegates of the north and the south meet at 12 noon February 20 at Panmunjom.”

In a “press release” of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the “Democratic Front” on February 12, North Korea made public the list of its delegates to the discussion of the formation of the “preparatory committee for national unification” as disclosed in its February 5 statement. The “press release” read:

“We proposed in the February 5 statement that the liaison delegates of the north and those of the south meet at 12 noon February 20 at Panmunjom to prepare for the formation of the preparatory committee for national unification.

“In this connection, we have decided to send the following persons as our side’s liaison delegates to the proposed place at the proposed time.

“1. Representing the Democratic Front for Unification of the Fatherland, Kwon Min-jun, a Vice Director of the Central Committee of the Korean Workers’ Party, the delegate of the Workers’ Party.

“2. Representing the Democratic Front for Unification of Fatherland, Lee Chang-son, a Minister of the Administration Council, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, the delegate of the government of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.

“3. Representing the Democratic Front for Unification of the Fatherland, Kim Sok-jun, Vice Chairman of the Central Committee of the Korean Democratic Party, the delegate of

the Korean Democratic Party.

"4. Representing the Democratic Front for Unification of the Fatherland, Paek Jun-hyok, Deputy Director of the Secretariat of the Central Committee, Democratic Front for Unification of the Fatherland."

By making it clear, this way, that the four delegates, selected from the Workers' Party, Administration Council, "Korean Democratic Party" and the Secretariat of the "Democratic Front" each, represented the "Democratic Front," north Korea showed clearly that its decision to send the delegates was part of the phased attempt to push through its idea of "whole nation conference."

Reacting to this obstinate policy of north Korea, the government spokesman of the Republic of Korea emphasized in a press conference on February 12 that the SNCC function has to be restored now that north Korea raised a dispute on the SNCC charged with the duty of overseeing the implementation of the July 4 South-North Joint Communique and all other agreed matters reached on between the two sides.

Reaffirming that there is no change in the January 19 proposal for talks between the authorities of the south and the north at any time, any place and at any level without any conditions to discuss all issues raised between the two sides, the government spokesman said that the doors to dialogue under the January 19 proposal remain open always, and, at the same time, the SNCC based on the July 4 South-North Joint Communique and other agreed matters between the two sides continue to have its *raison d'être* apart from the proposal.

Meanwhile, Lee Dong-bok, spokesman for the SNCC Seoul side, in a statement issued on February 12, proposed to the Pyongyang side that in order to normalize the operation of the SNCC by holding the fourth SNCC meeting unconditionally, the vice chairman of the two sides meet at the "Freedom House" at Panmunjom at 10 a.m. February 17 to discuss the issue of holding the fourth meeting. The Seoul-side statement read:

The Seoul side of the South-North Coordinating Committee (SNCC), taking note of the seriousness of the implications of the reference made by north Korea as regards the SNCC operation in a statement broadcast over Radio Pyongyang on February 5, 1979, states its views and positions on the subject as follows:

1. North Korea asserts in the statement that the SNCC "has lost reason for existence."

We cannot but observe, in this regard, that the north Korean assertion as such is tantamount to an expression of its intention unilaterally to abrogate and nullify the essential part of the agreements stipulated in the South-North Joint Communiqué of July 4, 1972, by renouncing the SNCC's very existence. For it would flagrantly belie its own words of recent days on observance and implementation of the Joint Communiqué and go one step even further from merely refusing to normalize the SNCC's operation.

Therefore, we cannot but be obliged to ask north Korea about its genuine intentions in making such an assertion.

As is well-known, the July 4 South-North Joint Communiqué is an important document agreed upon between the south and the north (of Korea) in which representatives of the two sides, upholding the wishes of their respective superiors, solemnly pledged before the whole nation faithfully to implement agreements therein.

Item 6 of the Joint Communiqué stipulates that the two sides have agreed to create and operate the SNCC for the purpose not only of "implementing agreements contained in the Joint Communiqué by setting all problems that arise in the relations between the two sides to improve their relations" but also of "resolving the question of unification of the country based on the agreed principles for unification of the fatherland." Thus, it is perfectly clear that the two sides have agreed to operate the SNCC as an inter-Korean body solely entrusted with the authority to have the Joint Communiqué observed and implemented.

It is only too natural, therefore, for us to regard the north Korean assertion unilaterally proclaiming the SNCC as having “lost reason for existence” as an expression of the north Korean desire unilaterally to renounce the Joint Communiqué itself, for the agreement in the Communiqué cited in the above makes it amply clear that the bilateral agreement on operation of the SNCC constitutes the core element of the Communiqué.

2. North Korea asserts also in the statement that the SNCC is a “machinery of only a limited scope.”

On the contrary, we have the “Agreement on Formation and Operation of the SNCC,” signed by the two sides on November 4, 1972, stipulating it as the SNCC's mission to “discuss and settle” the problems of 1) achieving an independent and peaceful unification of the fatherland, 2) realizing political exchanges on a broad scope among political parties, social organizations and individuals in the south and the north, 3) implementing exchanges and cooperation in economic, cultural and social fields between the south and the north, 4) easing tensions, preventing military accidents and dissolving the state of military confrontation between the south and the north and 5) seeking joint steps in the conduct of overseas activities, and to “ensure implementation” of agreements reached thereof between the two sides.

Therefore, unlike the north Korean assertion that the SNCC is a “machinery of only a limited scope,” it is self-evident that the SNCC, in fact, offers an all-embracing forum of dialogue with a view to dealing, on a far-reaching scope, with the full range of problems that may arise in the process of reaching an independent and peaceful unification.

3. Furthermore, north Korea unilaterally asks that the SNCC be replaced by a so-called “Preparatory Committee for National Unification.”

In this respect, we are obliged to observe that, if the sides of Korea are indeed engaged in a serious effort to achieve an independent and peaceful unification, it is the mutual trust

between them that counts most to make it possible for such an effort to succeed. In that sense, it should be stressed that the mutual trust can be promoted when the two sides are faithful in observing agreements reached between them, making it imperative for either of the two sides, when it finds itself in disagreement over some of the contents of the agreements already reached, to bring them up on the table for discussion, and resolution through agreement, with the other side at the table.

We cannot but point out, in this context, that the north Korean attitude of demanding acceptance by us of a new and one-sided proposition, while renouncing the operation of the SNCC in disregard of the earlier agreement to launch it into operation, directly contravenes the very spirit of the July 4 South-North Joint Communiqué.

4. We must emphasize that, as stated in the above, the existence of the SNCC cannot be disowned by one side alone and that, as is expressly stipulated in the documents agreed upon, and signed, between the two sides, we can have all outstanding problems in the relations between the south and north, including those problems allegedly raised by a north Korean social organization, effectively and extensively discussed within the machinery for dialogue already provided by the SNCC, if only the inter-Korean body is brought back to normal operation.

In that respect, we urge the Pyongyang side of the SNCC to display sincerity in its attitude on resumption of the South-North dialogue, in compliance with the wishes of the entire nation, by responding forthwith to the statement of Mr. Min Kwan-shik, our side's Acting Co-chairman of the SNCC, on January 31, 1979, in which Mr. Min asked that the SNCC operation be brought back to normalcy as soon as possible and the Seoul-Pyongyang direct telephone line of the SNCC be connected again for normal operation without any further delay.

5. Emphasizing once more that the easiest way for the two

sides of Korea to bring the South-North Dialogue back to resumption is to normalize the SNCC operation by calling, without any precondition, the SNCC's fourth plenary meeting into session in Pyongyang, in accordance with the agreement to hold the SNCC plenary meetings in Seoul and Pyongyang alternately, putting an end to the long interruption since the SNCC's third plenary meeting held in Seoul in June 1973, we propose today that the vice chairman of the SNCC of the two sides meet at the Freedom House in Panmunjom at 10 a.m., February 17, 1979, in order to discuss procedural matters deemed necessary to have the proposed fourth SNCC plenary meeting brought into session in Pyongyang.

We ask that the responsible person in charge of the Pyongyang side of the SNCC respond with sincerity to our proposal as stated in the above.

In response, north Korea asserted in a statement on February 13 that it would send the four delegates whom it had already chosen for the discussion of establishment of a "preparatory committee for national unification" to the conference room of the Neutral Nations' Supervisory Commission (NNSC) at Panmunjom at 10 a.m. February 17. The statement released in the name of the Secretariat of the Central Committee, "Democratic Front," was as follows vice chairman

"In relation with our February 5 statement regarding a meeting between southern-side liaison delegates and northern-side liaison delegates at Panmunjom on February 20, south Korea showed the willingness to have the meeting on February 17.

"As we take note of this, we shall send to the NNSC conference room at Panmunjom at 10 a.m. February 17. our side liaison delegates, the list of whom we have already announced for the discussion of the issue of creating a preparatory committee for national unification.

"No matter whatever persons under whatever titles may

represent south Korea, we shall consider them as the liaison delegates of the south for liaison delegates' contacts between the south and the north we have proposed, and shall meet them in the first place."

After north Korea released this self-seeking statement, Lee Dong-bok, spokesman for the SNCC Seoul side, issued the following statement on February 15, making public the list of the four delegates of SNCC Seoul side who would attend the Panmunjom contact slated for February 17:

1. The Seoul side of the South-North Coordinating Committee (SNCC) proposed to the Pyongyang side on Feb. 12, 1979, that the vice chairman of the SNCC of the two sides meet at the Freedom House in Panmunjom at 10 a.m., Feb. 17, 1979, in order to discuss procedural matters necessary for calling into session the fourth SNCC plenary meeting. In response, the Pyongyang side made it public on Feb. 13, 1979, that it would send several persons to the conference room of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC) in Panmunjom at 10 a.m., Feb. 17, 1979. In view of the fact that both the Freedom House and the NNSC's conference room are located within the Panmunjom area, we shall not be inflexible about the suggested contact points.

2. We are currently engaged in an effort to reopen the South-North Dialogue in accordance with the principles and agreements stipulated in the South-North Joint Communique of July 4, 1972, and, therefore, it is naturally our primary concern to have the SNCC operation brought back to normalcy. We intend to make use of the Panmunjom contact of Feb. 17 to have our aforementioned position conveyed to the Pyongyang side through those persons whom the Pyongyang side dispatches to the south-north contact at Panmunjom.

3. We earnestly hope that the Panmunjom contact will prove to be a turning point in the inter-Korean relations in

normalizing the SNCC operation in consonance with the wishes of the 50 million Koreans in the two divided parts of Korea for an early resumption of the South-North Dialogue.

4. The Seoul side of the SNCC will be represented at the Panmunjom contact of Feb. 17 by the following persons:

Mr. Min Kwan-shik, SNCC Vice Chairman for the Seoul side;
Mr. Hahm Byoung-choon, SNCC Member for the Seoul side;
Mr. Chung Hong-jin, SNCC Executive Member for the Seoul side; and

Mr. Lee Dong-bok, SNCC Spokesman for the Seoul side.

(Mr. Hahm Byoung-choon was appointed as a SNCC Seoul-side member on February 8, 1979 in place of Mr. Kim Dong-jo who had resigned for personal reasons.)

Thus, with a proposal by the SNCC Seoul side for a meeting of vice chairman on February 17, and with the north Korean decision to send the four liaison delegates of a "preparatory committee for national unification" to Panmunjom on the same date, abnormal contacts were set to take place at Panmunjom between two delegations with different nature and qualifications.

2. Abnormal Contacts

Three rounds (February 17, March 7 and March 14) of abnormal contacts were held at the NNSC conference room at Panmunjom between the SNCC Seoul side calling for a meeting of the vice chairman of the two sides to discuss the issue of holding the long-delayed SNCC fourth meeting, and a delegation of north Korea's "Democratic Front" insisting on contacts between "liaison delegates" of the two sides to discuss the formation of a "preparatory committee for national unification" aimed at preparing for a so-called "whole nation conference."

The abnormal contacts were attended from the Seoul side by Min Kwan-shik, vice chairman; Hahm Byoung-choon, a Member; Chung Hong-jin, Executive Member; and Lee Dong-bok,

spokesman, and from the north Korean side by Kwon Min-jun, a Deputy Director of the Central Committee, Workers' Party; Lee Chang-sun, Culture and Art minister of the "Administration Council; "Kim Sok-jun, vice chairman of the Central Committee, "Korean Democratic Party;" and Paek Jun-hyok, Deputy Director of the Secretariat of the "Democratic Front," all in the capacity of liaison delegates of the "Democratic Front" with the mission of discussing the formation of a so-called "preparatory committee for national unification."

The south-north contacts drew keen concern from within and without inasmuch as they were the first talks - - realized as a result of President Park's January 19 proposal - - ever taken place between the two sides of divided Korea since north Korea put off indefinitely the 11th vice chairmen's meeting of the South-North Coordinating Committee originally slated for May 30, 1975, and then the 26th working-level meeting of the South-North Red Cross Conference set to be held on March 20, 1978.

However, the contacts turned out to be a "dialogue of deaf," failing to register any achievements due to conflicting stands of the two sides with the Republic of Korea advocating substantial and effective talks either between the two sides' responsible authorities or through resumption of the SNCC business, and with north Korea demanding "liaison delegates' meeting" aimed at discussing the establishment of a "preparatory committee for national unification."

The nature of these abnormal contacts could be seen by the fact that for the contacts the Republic of Korea sent officials of the SNCC, taking the talks as an opportunity to discuss the issues of resuming a constructive and productive inter-Korean dialogue based on the spirit and principles of, and agreed matters contained in, the July 4 South-North Joint Communique, as well as of normalizing early the operation of the South-North Coordinating Committee, which remains paralyzed due to north Korea's one-sided boycott. In a sharp contrast, north Korea dispatched to the talks those representing a mere social organization, the "Democratic Front."

The two sides even had different views of the qualification of the other's delegation. North Korea considered the delegates of the Seoul side of the SNCC as the south's "liaison delegates" with the duty of discussing the formation of a so-called "preparatory committee for national unification, while the Republic of Korea regarded the north Korean delegates of the "Democratic Front" as the "messengers" of the Pyongyang side of the Coordinating Committee.

Though in essence a "dialogue of deaf," the contacts held between the two sides of Korea in early 1979 could in some way be significant in that the inter-Korean dialogue was resumed for a while.

a. February 17 Abnormal Contact

The first contact was held at 10 a.m. February 17, 1979 at the conference room of the NNSC at Panmunjom between four delegates of the Seoul side of the SNCC and four north Korean delegates in the capacity of the liaison delegates of the "Democratic Front."

At the contact that lasted one hour and 34 minutes, the two sides exchanged opinions on the question of resuming the stalled south-north dialogue.

At this first abnormal contact, the Seoul side, welcoming the Pyongyang-side delegates who came to the contact in response to the Seoul side's sincere efforts to resume the south-north dialogue, explained its basic stand with regard to resumption of the dialogue, urging the Pyongyang side to make a study of it in a positive manner.

Pointing out that the fourth plenary meeting of the SNCC is yet to be held since the third meeting was held in June 1973, that the vice chairmen's meeting, aimed at discussing normalization of the operation of the SNCC, has been suspended due to the Pyongyang side's negativism since the 10th meeting was held in March 1975, and that the Pyongyang side even cut the direct Seoul-Pyongyang telephone line on August 30, 1976, the Seoul side pro-

posed the early normalization of the operation of the SNCC. In the proposal, the Seoul side said:

First, to hold the fourth plenary session of the South-North Coordinating Committee in Pyongyang on April 3, 1979.

Second, to reinstate the direct south-north telephone circuit of the Coordinating Committee at 09:00 hours, February 20, 1979, for smoother communication of the intents of both sides.

Third, to renew a contact between SNCC officials of both sides at Panmunjom at 10 a.m., March 7, 1979, in order to discuss ways to normalize the SNCC operation.

At the same time, the Seoul side of the SNCC stated that if the need exists to expand the SNCC in terms of size and organization, it is willing to discuss this question. Reminding, in this connection, the Pyongyang side that at the second vice chairmen's meeting held on December 19, 1973 the Seoul side proposed a plan to expand the organization of the SNCC by increasing the number of each side's members from the existing five to ten or so and by enabling some members of political parties and social organizations to participate in it, the Seoul side said, "Our side makes it clear that it is still willing to agree to discuss the expansion and reorganization of the SNCC at any time within the framework of rationality and efficiency."

Min Kwan-shik, SNCC Seoul-side vice chairman, said that consolidation of peace and restoration of trust between the two sides must be based on mutual agreement, and that a substantial and effective solution can no doubt be expected only when such agreement is made between the responsible authorities of the two sides with the due power to guarantee the implementation of agreed matters under their responsibility in their respective areas.

Emphasizing that it is for this self-evident reason that the Republic of Korea has been calling for a dialogue directly between the responsible authorities of the two sides, the Seoul-side vice chairman urged the Pyongyang side to agree to talks between the

responsible authorities of the south and the north.

He also charged the Pyongyang side in showing an insincere attitude by responding to the Seoul-side call ambiguously in the name of the "Democratic Front" which he said cannot be regarded as the responsible authorities of the Pyongyang side and which, therefore, cannot be the other side in an inter-Korean dialogue.

On the other hand, the Pyongyang side contended at the first contact that "this is no time to merely coordinate the south-north relations as it was at the incipient stage of the dialogue... In order, instead, to solve the unification issue substantially, we must create a new organization like preparatory committee for national unification so as to take necessary working-level steps." The Pyongyang side, then, proposed the discussion of working-level measures for the inauguration of a "preparatory committee for national unification" as follows:

1) The number of delegates attending liaison delegates' contacts shall be four from each side, and attendants shall be three each;

2) The site of talks shall be the NNSC conference room at Panmunjom or, under agreement, Panmungak or the Freedom House by turn;

3) Contacts shall be held once in a week;

4) Recording of talks shall be made by either tape recording or stenography at each side's convenience;

5) Contacts shall be opened to the public in principle, or may be held in closed-door sessions under agreement;

6) Press materials shall be adjusted by both sides in such a way as to ensure mutual unity and trust, or may be released separately;

7) Agreed matters shall be jointly announced; and

8) The number of pressmen covering the talks shall be about ten from each side. In the event of closed-door contacts, pressmen shall be allowed in to take picture at the beginning of such contacts."

In addition, the Pyongyang side proposed the "restoration of a

direct telephone line effective 10 a.m. February 18 for exclusive use by both sides' liaison delegates for the purpose of facilitating their contacts aimed at preparing for the inauguration of a preparatory committee of national unification." The north Koreans suggested that this issue of telephone restoration be discussed between working-level officials.

The first contact was adjourned after the two sides agreed to meet again on March 7.

Meanwhile, Lee Dong-bok, spokesman of the Seoul side of the SNCC, and Paek Jun-hyuk, deputy director of the Secretariat of north Korea's "Democratic Front," had a closed-door meeting at the NNSC conference room at Panmunjom for one hour and 30 minutes to discuss working-level problems related to the reopening of the severed direct south-north telephone line. However, the meeting broke up after north Korea refused the reopening of the telephone line installed between the two sides of the SNCC.

After this working-level contact, spokesman Lee explained about the meeting as follows:

"At the working-level contact aimed at reopening the direct south-north telephone line, we urged that the direct line installed between the two sides of the SNCC should be reopened. The north Korean side, however, insisted that the "Democratic Front" shall be the northern side in telephone conversation.

"Here, we made clear the policy not to recognize the "Democratic Front" as the other side in any dialogue. We stressed that since the direct telephone lines agreed on are those linking the two sides of the SNCC and the South-North Red Cross Conference (SNRCC), the one between the Seoul and Pyongyang sides of the SNCC should be reopened with the Pyongyang side of the SNCC at the northern end of the line.

"Nevertheless, north Korea repeated its insistence that the northern side in telephone conversation shall be the "Democratic Front." Such being the case, the meeting ended with-

out any agreement.”

In the meantime, the Seoul side of the SNCC tried to make a test call to the Pyongyang side over the direct line of the SNCC at 10 a.m. February 18 and 19 in the presence of domestic and foreign pressmen. However, the Pyongyang side, which earlier suggested that the direct line be reopened on February 18, did not answer.

b. March 7 Abnormal Contact

As was at the previous February 17 abnormal contact, the four-man delegations of the two sides of divided Korea met in their second contact on March 7 at the NNSC conference room to discuss the issue of resuming the suspended south-north dialogue. But, the two sides failed to narrow their differences.

At the meeting that lasted about two hours, the Seoul side of the SNCC stated, “We cannot but express deep regret over the fact that the Pyongyang side of the SNCC failed to make any response to our side’s three-point proposal made at the February 17 contact, and that as was at the February 17 contact, the Pyongyang side is represented at this contact, prepared as talks between the two sides’ officials of the SNCC, by a social organization which we do not recognize as the other side in a dialogue.”

The Seoul side of the SNCC, then, citing the 1973 edition of the “*Political Dictionary*” of north Korea, gave the reason as follows why the “Democratic Front for Unification of Fatherland” (DFUF) can not be recognized as the other side in a dialogue, stressing that this position of the Seoul side remains irrevocable.

Firstly, we are opposed to accepting the DFUF as a counter part in a dialogue because of the fact that the DFUF makes it its avowed objective to pursue a Communist takeover of the Republic of Korea, committed as it is to the cause of a so-called “south Korean revolution” based on what is called a “united front” strategy. According to the 1973 edition of the “*Political Dictionary*” published by north Korea’s official “Social Science

Publishing House," the DFUF "is currently positively engaged in a struggle aimed at achieving unification of the fatherland and a (Communist) Korean revolution, on a nationwide scale, through mobilization of a combined strength of the socialist forces in the northern half and all anti-imperialist forces in the southern half...."

Secondly, we are opposed to accepting the DFUF as our counterpart in a dialogue because of the fact that we can hardly consider the DFUF as a responsible authorities of north Korea when viewed on the basis of its composition. We are aware that the DFUF is admittedly a "front organization" providing an "umbrella" for a motley of 3 "political parties" and 14 "social organization," dubious in most cases in terms of both their nature and their existence.

For example, there are the cases of a "Korean League of Christians" and a "Korean League of Buddhists," allegedly DFUF member organizations, in a society where there are avowedly neither Christians nor Buddhists allowed to exist. According to the aforementioned "*Political Dictionary*" of north Korea, Buddhism is declared to "have already ceased to exist in the northern half of the republic, while it still continues to play a major harmful role in south Korea in neutralizing the anti-American struggle of the people under the protection of landlords, comprador capitalists, pro-Japanese and pro-American elements and reactionary bureaucrats." According to the same dictionary, Christianity is denounced as a "vanguard of colonial exploitation devoted to the cause of neutralizing the class consciousness of the working class, opposing the people's revolutionary struggle and their socialism and of rationalizing exploitations and oppressions as well as aggressions and warlike policies of the imperialists, notably including the American imperialists."

Thirdly, we are opposed to accepting the DFUF as a counterpart in a dialogue because of the historical fact still vividly remembered by most Koreans in the Republic of Korea. On

June 7, 1950, we recall that the DFUF issued an “appeal” calling for a “joint session of representatives of all political parties and social organizations in the south and the north of Korea” to be held either in Haeju (in north Korea) or Kaesung (then in south Korea) between June 15 and 17, 1950. But, it was only 18 days thereafter that, in the early morning of a Sunday on June 25, 1950, Communist north Korea launched an allout invasion of the Republic of Korea.

I must emphasize again that our position on the DFUF is clearout and irrevocable. In coping with this issue, it is not our intention to interfere with either the internal affairs or the internal problems of north Korea. We do not want to care what it does or how it is composed, so long as the DFUF limits its scope of activities to within north Korea. So long as the DFUF limits its activities to within north Korea, we do not feel it proper for us to comment on them because they are the problems of north Korea’s own and obviously not ours. However, I have to make it pointedly clear that, for reasons stated in the above, we are not going to accept the DFUF as our counterpart in any inter-Korean dialogue as we are committed to the task of developing peaceful south-north inter-Korean relations.

Min Kwan-shik, Seoul-side vice chairman of the SNCC said that not a few agreed matters have been produced and amassed in the course of the south-north dialogue so far, the July 4 South-North Joint Communique being the most valuable agreement of them. Noting that other agreed matters include the “Agreed Minute on Formation and Operation of South-North Coordinating Committee,” “Agreed Minute on Installation and Operation of Direct South-North Telephone Line” of the SNCC, “Agreement on Operational Procedures for Direct Telephone Line between the Central Offices of South and North Korean Red Cross Societies,” “Agreement Reached at Communication and Technical Working-Level Meeting for Full-Dress Meetings of South and North Red Cross Conference” and “Agreement on Establishment and Opera-

tion of Permanent Liaison Offices at Panmunjom for Red Cross Talks,” the Seoul-side vice chairman stressed that each of these agreed matters between the south and the north represents an important document duly agreed on and solemnly signed by the pertinent authorities of the two sides, and also a valuable milestone created in the course of a pursuit of independent and peaceful unification of the divided fatherland.

The Seoul side of the SNCC also denounced north Korea for raising a dispute over the existence of the SNCC, stating that the easiest way to resume the stalled dialogue on the basis of mutual trust is to resume the normal operation of the SNCC. The Seoul side then pointed out the unreasonableness of the north Korean contentions as follows:

The role of the SNCC is important above all in the inter-Korean relations. It is so because the fate of the SNCC is directly linked to that of the South-North Joint Communiqué of July 4, 1972. The South-North Joint Communiqué provides in its Item 6 that the two sides of Korea have agreed to create and operate the SNCC with the aim of making it the inter-Korean machinery exclusively in charge of having agreements listed in Items 1 through 5 of the Communiqué, improving the inter-Korean relations through settlement of all the problems arising in the inter-Korean relations and of resolving the question of unification on the basis of the agreed principles for unification of the fatherland. Therefore, it is a natural conclusion that denial of the SNCC’s existence would be tantamount to making it impossible for the agreements spelled out in the Joint Communiqué to be implemented and, thus, would force the Joint Communiqué to result in a mere scrap of paper.

The SNCC is not merely a machinery designed only to coordinate the inter-Korean relations as alleged by some people in Pyongyang. The “Agreement on Formation And Operation of the SNCC” has charged the SNCC with the overall mission of “discussing and settling” the problems of 1) an independent

and peaceful unification of the divided country, 2) political exchanges among political parties, social organization and individuals in the south and the north of Korea, 3) economic, cultural and social exchanges and cooperation between the two sides, 4) relaxation of the tensions, prevention of inadvertent military accidents and dissolution of the state of military confrontation and, lastly 5) joint steps in the conduct of overseas activities, and of “ensuring implementation of the agreements reached.”

The SNCC is not a machinery of limited scope again as alleged by some people in Pyongyang. The SNCC is designed to create and operate, in due course of time, five Subcommittees – political, military, foreign relations, economic and cultural – within its framework and we have been foreseeing a broad-scoped participation by a large number of people of both sides specializing in each of the areas to be covered by the five Subcommittees, respectively, as we launch them into operation through mutual agreement. Besides, we have already made it public that we are perfectly willing to open the door of the SNCC for some representatives of political parties and social organizations in both sides of Korea by working out an expanded reorganization of the SNCC.

I am convinced that there would be no difficulties for the two sides of Korea to reach a mutually satisfactory agreement on the proposed expanded reorganization of the SNCC, should we normalize the operation of the SNCC. Furthermore, I am convinced that, once the SNCC operation is normalized, it would assure, from that very moment, an automatic resumption of a meaningful inter-Korean dialogue, clearing the road wide open for the inter-Korean relations to develop toward a constructive and productive outcome.

On the other hand, north Korea, claiming that “the SNCC failed to register any bit of progress in the substantial discussion of the unification issue and broke up after only indulging in arguments,”

contended that if the Seoul side continues to stick to the SNCC which it said "has already lost its function five years ago and which no longer exists," it cannot but be bound to repeat past blunders. North Korea then pointed to the "need" to inaugurate a "preparatory committee for national conference" so as to "reflect public opinion and promote great national unity for unification.

Asserting that "the road to unification cannot be discussed reasonably with a small number of persons and a limited scope of authorities," north Korea insisted that the so-called "preparatory committee for national unification" can discuss a series of problems related to the question of national unification while performing its function as a preliminary discussion body for the convocation of a "whole nation conference." North Korea went on to argue that the proposed committee would cover the authorities of the south and the north and various political parties and social organization at home and abroad, but could consist of a relatively small number of persons. North Korea, thus, continued to adhere to the idea of forming a "preparatory committee for national unification," rejecting the call of the Republic of Korea for the normalization of the operation of the SNCC which it claimed no longer exists.

At the contact on March 7, the Seoul side of the SNCC proposed another contact of officials of both sides of the SNCC at 10 a.m. March 14 to discuss the question of resuming the business of the SNCC. North Korea agreed to the suggestion only on the understanding that "liaison delegates" would meet on the proposed date.

c. March 14 Abnormal Contact

The third contact was held at the NNSC conference room at Panmunjom on March 14, 1979. Attending the still abnormal contact were from the SNCC Seoul side Min Kwan-shik, Hahm Byoung-choon, Chung Hong-jin and Lee Dong-bok, and from the north Korean side Kwon Min-jun, Lee Chang-sun, Kim Sok-jun and Paek Jun-hyuk all representing the "Democratic Front."

By attending this contact too under the name of the "Demo-

cratic," north Korea ignored the south Korean demand that the contact be attended by the representatives of either the Pyongyang side of the SNCC or the responsible authorities of north Korea. Here, the Seoul side of the SNCC, denouncing north Korea for its insincerity, again made clear its policy of not recognizing the "Democratic Front" as the other side in dialogue.

At the contact, the Seoul side of the SNCC made the following remarks in connection with the allegation made by north Koreans at the March 7 contact to the effect that "there does not exist the Coordinating Committee:"

As is known, we now have an inter-Korean agreement, entitled the "Agreement on Formation and Operation of the SNCC," signed in Pyongyang on November 4, 1972, by Lee Hu-rak, SNCC Co-chairman for the Seoul side, and Park Sung-chul, then north Korea's "Second Vice Premier" acting on behalf of the Pyongyang side's SNCC Co-chairman Kim Young-joo. The Agreement stipulates in its Item 5 that the Agreement "may be revised or supplemented through mutual agreement between the two sides."

Therefore, under the manifest provision of the Agreement, it goes beyond question that, unless revised or supplemented through mutual agreement between the two sides in the SNCC, all the items in the Agreement should remain in force intact, making the two sides bound by the duty to continue to observe them.

And, besides, we have the South-North Joint Communiqué of July 4, 1972, which makes it irrevocably clear that the SNCC is inseparably linked to the Joint Communiqué itself.

The South-North Joint Communiqué stipulated in its Item 6 that the two sides of Korea have agreed to "set up and operate" the South-North Coordinating Committee with the aim of "implementing the aforementioned (Items 1 through 5) agreements, improving the inter-Korean relations through settlement of all the problems arising in the relations between the south

and the north and of resolving the question of unifying the country based on the agreed principles for unification of the fatherland.”

To put it in other words, because the SNCC is stipulated by a manifest provision of the Joint Communiqué as the inter-Korean body solely in charge of implementation of all the agreements spelled out in the Communiqué, it is inevitable that the Joint Communiqué itself would result in a mere scrap of paper, should the SNCC be denied its existence.

As I comment on this specific issue, I must also point out the fact that those persons from Pyongyang who made the irresponsible remark at issue are not those who are legitimately in a position directly responsible for the question of the SNCC operation.

It is a known fact that the South-North Joint Communiqué is an inter-Korean document signed by the representatives of the two sides of Korea “upholding the wishes” of their respectively “superiors,” meaning their highest authorities, respectively, in other words. In the meantime, the “Agreement on Formation and Operation of the SNCC” was signed by the Seoul side’s SNCC Co-chairman, on the one hand, and a highly-placed “government” official of north Korea acting as a proxy for the Pyongyang side’s SNCC Co-chairman, on the other.

It is all too clear, therefore, that, in case the Pyongyang side had anything to say about the SNCC operation, the Pyongyang side would have to do so in the name of either one of those on the Pyongyang side of the SNCC or one representing the responsible authorities of north Korea, for they are the parties signatory to the two pertinent agreements reached between the two sides of Korea — the South-North Joint Communiqué and the “Agreement on Formation and Operation of the SNCC.”

Reminding the north Koreans that the Seoul side has made a set

of constructive suggestions such as 1) the fourth plenary meeting of the SNCC be held in Pyongyang on April 3 to normalize the SNCC operation, 2) the SNCC is by no means so limited in function as only to coordinate the south-north relations, and 3) the SNCC be expanded in a way that can provide an opportunity for the representatives of political parties and social organizations in addition to those of authorities to participate, and when five sub-committees of the SNCC are set up, efforts be made to see to it that broader-ranging persons take part in them in respective areas, the Seoul side of the SNCC made the following proposal suggesting that the unproductive abnormal contacts, held three times without any achievements, be done away with and instead contacts be held between working-level delegates who can be mutually trusted, in order to prepare for a normal inter-Korean dialogue:

“1. These contacts shall be attended by three working-level delegates from each side.

2. The site of the contacts shall be the NNSC conference room at Panmunjom.

3. The time of the first contact shall be 10 a.m. March 28, 1979.

4. At these contacts, the two sides may discuss:

a. The question of normalizing the operation of the SNCC.

b. The question of convening a meeting between the authorities of the south and the north.

c. Other issues raised between the two sides.

I look forward to affirmative response from the Pyongyang side. From our side, three working-level delegates will come to the site given above on March 28.”

On the other hand, north Korea, at the contact, proposed that future contacts be called “meetings of liaison delegations of political parties, social organizations and authorities.” The north Koreans said in the proposal:

“First, on the ground that there does not exist the SNCC,

our northern side will not use the name, "Democratic Front for Unification of the Fatherland," for our liaison delegates on the condition that the southern-side liaison delegates withdraw their representation of the SNCC.

"Second, the name of the two sides' delegations shall be the liaison delegations of political parties, social organizations and authorities of the south and the north.

"Third, in conformity with the new name of liaison delegations, the northern-side liaison delegation shall consist of the existing representatives of the Workers' Party, Korean Democratic Front for Unification of the Fatherland and the government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The southern side, too, shall correspondingly from its delegation.

"Fourth, based on the recognition that these measures cannot have a fundamental effect on the contacts of liaison delegates already held, our side acknowledges that all the proposals made and steps taken by our side since January 23, 1979 continue to remain effective. The two sides shall affirm the position that they would normalize the contacts of liaison delegates already begun, and shall confirm the original mission of the contacts of liaison delegates, namely, to discuss and solve the question of forming a preparatory committee for national unification.

This seemingly fresh overture might have well represented a step closer to the demand of the Republic of Korea that north Korea cannot be represented by the "Democratic Front" in any contacts with the south. In essence, however, there was no change in the attitude of north Korea that it would continue to deal with the south in the name of political parties and social organizations.

North Korea demanded that the delegation from the south withdraw its representation of the SNCC, insisting that the SNCC does not exist in reality. But, the issue of whether to retain or disband the SNCC ought to, in its nature, be determined through mutual agreement not by any unilateral pronouncement by either of the two sides. There can be no reason, therefore, why north Korea

should insist on the discontinuation of the use of the name of the SNCC by the south simply because it has decided not to use the name of the "Democratic Front" for its delegation.

The March 14 contact ended without agreeing on the time of a future contact, thus bringing an end to the abnormal contacts or a "dialogue of deaf." At the final contact, the Seoul side of the SNCC suggested that working-level delegates' meeting be held on March 28, whereas north Korea struck to the idea that another contact of the same nature be held on April 5 to discuss its "new proposal."

3. Miscarriage of Working-Level Delegates' Talks

On March 26, 1979, the spokesman of the government of the Republic of Korea, recalling that at the March 14 contact, the Seoul side of the SNCC proposed a meeting of working-level delegates on March 28 at Panmunjom in place of the abnormal contacts the two sides had in the past, made public in a statement the list of the working-level delegates of the authorities of the Republic of Korea for the proposed contact. The statement of the government spokesman also said:

It has become very clear through the recent three meetings at Panmunjom that it is necessary for the responsible authorities of both sides to sit down and talk directly and sincerely if there is to be a normal and meaningful dialogue.

Accordingly the Government of the Republic of Korea has decided to send three working-level representatives to Panmunjom on March 28, 1979, and we expect the north Korean side to do the same.

We hope that at this working-level contact an early normalization of the south-north dialogue will be realized by an open-minded discussion, in closed sessions, if necessary, of all the issues raised by both sides so far.

The working-level delegation to go to Panmunjom on March

28, 1979, is composed of:

Chief Delegates: Mr. Dong Hoon (Vice Minister of the Unification Board)

Delegate: Mr. Roe Chang-hee (Minister at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs)

Delegate: Mr. Rhee Kyung-sik (Deputy Spokesman of the Ministry of Culture and Information)

Answering to a press question after the issuance of the statement, the government spokesman, Culture and Information Minister Kim Seong-jin, said, "The position of the government of the Republic of Korea is that a dialogue should be held between the responsible authorities of south and north Korea, and if north Korea is not prepared for such talks between the authorities, it be held through the SNCC, the existing channel of inter-Korean talks. But, north Korea has not answered thereto. Our side has proposed working-level delegates' meeting. But, this does not mean in any way that the SNCC ceases to exist. The SNCC shall remain intact and continue to function. Our suggestion is that working-level delegates' meeting be held before representatives' meeting between the authorities of the two sides. For, in order to secure fruition of talks as can be seen in many international practices or in the case with East and West Germany, the first step should be working-level talks. The government of the Republic of Korea has proposed working-level delegates' meeting not for propaganda purpose but for a sincere dialogue. If necessary, we are willing to agree to closed-door session."

On the following day, March 27, meanwhile, north Korea reiterated its stand in a statement of a "liaison delegation of political parties, social organization and authorities." It then suggested that the fourth contact be held at Panmunjom on April 2, which, it said, would be attended from Pyongyang by the same four delegates who took part in the previous contacts. The statement read in part:

"... We elucidate our stand advocating the continued contacts of liaison delegates as follows:

1) *Our side proposes that the fourth contact of liaison delegates be held at 10 a.m. April 2 at the NNSC conference room at Panmunjom.*

2) *At the fourth contact of liaison delegates, our side will be represented by the already known persons who shall attend it in the name of the liaison delegation of political parties, social organizations and authorities.*

3) *No matter whoever come to the contact under whichever name from the south, we shall recognize them as the liaison delegates from the south and shall meet them in the first place."*

In the meantime, the working-level delegation of the authorities of the Republic of Korea entered the NNSC conference room at 10 a.m. March 28 as announced and waited for a north Korean working-level delegation. But, the north Korean delegation did not appear, causing the miscarriage of the working-level delegates' talks.

Dong Hoon, the chief delegate of the working-level delegation of the authorities of the Republic of Korea, issued a statement as follows concerning the miscarriage to hold the working-level delegates' contact:

We came here today to meet the corresponding representatives from the north Korean government authorities and to discuss with them how best we can pave the way for a normalized and effective dialogue between the South and the North. This is in accordance with the proposal by Mr. Min Kwan-shik, the Acting Chairman on the ROK side of the South-North Coordinating Committee, which was made at the occasion of the South-North contact held here in Panmunjom on March 14 and reiterated in the official announcement made by the spokesman of the Government of the Republic of Korea on March 26. As you have all witnessed this morning, the north Korean authorities did not send their representatives here and it is, therefore, apparent that there will be no contact between the two sides here today. It is, of course, a matter of deep regret

that north Korea has decided to take such an attitude.

In an effort to resume meaningful dialogue, our side made an epochal proposal on January 19, calling for a meeting between the competent authorities of the South and the North at any time, any place and at any level. We are here today based on that proposal. And this channel of direct dialogue between the two authorities are, and will remain, open for both sides.

In this connection, we wish to emphasize once more that the South-North Coordinating Committee which is the product of a bilateral agreement cannot be negated unilaterally. It is, therefore, obvious that by normalizing the functions of the Committee, the two sides can always utilize it as an appropriate channel for dialogue.

We call upon the north Korean side to respond positively to the aspiration of the 50 million Korean people and the demand of the public opinion throughout the world, and to come out to the table of dialogue between the competent authorities without any further delay.

Again in a press conference at 10 a.m. April 2, the time north Korea set for a contact of "liaison delegations of political parties, social organization and authorities," Dong Hoon, the Chief Delegate of the Republic of Korea working-level delegation, emphasized it is the irrevocable position of the Republic of Korea that the responsible authorities of the south and the north should have a dialogue in order to improve the south-north relations and pursue peaceful unification of the fatherland.

Chief Delegate Dong went on to say that if and when a delegation appointed by the Pyongyang authorities comes forward, the working-level delegation of the authorities of the Republic of Korea will meet it at any time and discuss with it openheartedly and problems raised between the south and the north, namely, the issue of realizing peaceful unification and all other problems raised by the two sides.

Stressing that what is most important at this juncture for a nor-

mal and efficient dialogue is for the responsible authorities of the two sides to meet and talk each other directly in a sincere attitude, the Chief Delegate said the Republic of Korea keeps the doors open to, and is anxious for, the resumption of the stalled south-north dialogue by means of a dialogue between the authorities of the south and the north and normalization of the SNCC operation.

On the other hand, after the abortive "fourth Panmunjom contact" on April 2 which it called one-sidedly, north Korea again issued a statement in the name of the so-called "liaison delegation of political parties, social organizations and authorities" at Kaesong at 11 a.m. the same day, proposing that a liaison delegates' contact be held at the NNSC conference room at Panmunjom at 10 a.m. April 10.

In response, Rhee Kyung-sik, spokesman of the working-level delegation of the authorities of the Republic of Korea, in a statement on April 7, 1979, urged that the responsible authorities of north Korea should take part in a dialogue with sincerity. The full-text of the statement was:

Stressing that the peaceful unification of the fatherland can be achieved only through a dialogue between the responsible authorities of south and north Korea, we once again urge the north Korean authorities to come back to the conference table at an early date.

The Government of the Republic of Korea truly seeks a dialogue with the north. Thus our government spokesman proposed on March 26 to hold a conference of working level delegates representing the authorities of both sides, and subsequently our delegation went to Panmunjom on March 28, 1979, but as is now well known no contact was made due to the absence of the north Korean delegates.

Our delegation has been appointed by the Government of the Republic of Korea, and in its capacity as a responsible authorities working level delegation hopes to hold substantial discussions on various issues pending between the south and the

north with north Korean delegates of corresponding status.

The north Korean side has used different names for their delegations. Names do not matter. What matters and we make this very clear, is that any north Korean delegation that comes to the conference table must be appointed by the responsible authorities of north Korea.

We believe that there would be no reason whatsoever for north Korea not to respond to a dialogue between the responsible authorities were it seriously interested in improving south-north relations and achieving the peaceful reunification of the fatherland, and were it not intent on using the dialogue for political and propaganda purposes.

We avail ourselves of this opportunity to reaffirm that our door remains open both for a dialogue between the authorities of the two sides and between the delegations of the South-North Coordinating Committee. We look forward to an official reply from the responsible authorities of north Korea.

This way, the Republic of Korea keeps the doors wide open to a south-north dialogue through talks between the authorities of the two sides and the resumption of the business of the SNCC. As it calls upon north Korea to show a sincere response, the Republic of Korea looks forward to a time when north Korea comes to the forum of dialogue in a positive manner.

4. Truth of “Democratic Front” and “Whole Nation Conference”

--“Democratic Front”--

The so-called “Democratic Front for Unification of the Fatherland” (“Democratic Front”) which north Korea is putting forth lately in dealing with the south, is a mere front organization of the north Korean Workers’ (Communist) Party, whose function is to extend under the guidance of the Party, a blind support to the

revolutionary and unification policies of north Korea as well as to organize and mobilize the whole people on the pretext of "united front."

North Korea contends that this organization covers the entire political parties and social organizations (three and 14 in all, respectively) in north Korea. As "*the Political Dictionary*" (1973 Edition) published by the "Social Science Publishing House" in north Korea expressly describes, the mission of the "Democratic Front" is to "struggle positively for the support and realization of the roads and policies of the Workers' Party and for the materialization of unification."

"The Democratic Front for Unification of Fatherland was formally inaugurated on June 25, 1949 The KWP is the dominant force within the Front The Front has successfully carried out an anti-imperialist, anti-feudalist democratic revolution by strongly uniting all the patriotic democratic forces in the south and the north of Korea around the Leader..... The Front has greatly contributed to the cause of a successful achievement of a socialist revolution in the northern half of the republic, expulsion of the American imperialists and an independent unification of the fatherland. The Front is currently positively engaged in a struggle designed to achieve unification of the fatherland and a (Communist) Korean revolution, on a nationwide scale, through a combined strength of the socialist forces in the northern half and all anti-imperialist forces in the southern half under the wise guidance of beloved leader Comrade Kim Il Sung" (pp. 771-772, "Political Dictionary," 1973 edition, published by the "Social Science Publishing House" in Pyongyang).

This role can be substantiated by a series of proposals north Korea had made to the south in the name of the "Democratic Front."

--On June 7, 1950, barely 19 days before the provoking of the Korean War, north Korea made public the so-called "Appeal for Peaceful Unification" in the name of the "Democratic

Front," in which it proposed that general elections be held on August 5 through 8, 1950 for the purpose of establishing a unified "supreme legislative organ" and that a "conference between south and north Korea political parties and social organization" be held June 15-17 in the same year in either Haeju or Kaesong to discuss the question of achieving peaceful unification of the nation.

However, this appeal of the "Democratic Front" turned out to be a smoke-screen tactic intended to cover up the forthcoming invasion: at 4 a.m. June 25, 18 days later, north Korea launched an armed aggression against the south all along the 38th Parallel.

--Again during the time of social confusion following the April 19 Student Uprising and a period after the May 16 Military Revolution, north Korea laid down a so-called "formula for peaceful unification" as adopted on December 10, 1963 in a joint meeting among the so-called Standing Committee of the north Korean Supreme People's Assembly, the "Central Committee of the "Democratic Front" and the "Central Committee of the Committee for Peaceful Unification of the Fatherland."

--On July 24, 1973, north Korea, at the 59th expanded meeting of the "Central Committee of the "Democratic Front," proposed the convocation of a "grand national congress" among all the political parties and social organizations in the south and north, including the Democratic Republican Party, New Democratic Party and the Democratic Unification Party in south Korea, the so-called "Unification Revolutionary Party" and Korean residents' organizations abroad. The proposal was intended to create conditions for "revolution in south Korea" taking advantage of the south-north dialogue that was going on then.

Apart from the question of its actual existence, the "Democratic Front" is, as the definition contained in the *Political Dictionary* tells, a vanguard organization entrusted with the mission of accomplishing a "revolution in south Korea" as a means of com-

munizing the whole Korean peninsula through violence, which is one of the policy goals of the Workers' Party.

More important, the political parties and social organizations which north Korea claims are affiliated with the "Democratic Front" are in a strict sense not political parties and social organizations with the single exception of the Workers' Party. In substance, most of the political parties and social organizations north Korea talks about do not exist now. They exist only in signboards. The two "political parties" other than the Workers' Party -- the Chondokyo Chongu Party and the Korea Democratic Party -- were taken over by the Workers' Party long ago. Today, they are ghost political parties which exist only in name and which are operated by a few self-styled party members dispatched by the Workers' Party.

North Korea alleges that the "Democratic Front for Unification of Fatherland" is an umbrella organization, comprising three "political parties"—the KWP, the "Korean Democratic Party" and the "Chondokyo Chongu Party"—and 14 social organizations—the "Committee for Peaceful Unification of Fatherland," the "Korean League of All Vocations," the "Korean Socialist League of Working Youths," the "Korean League of Farm Workers," the "Korean Democratic League of Women," the "Korean League of Literature and Arts," the "Korean League of Christians," the "Korean League of Buddhists," the "Korean League of Journalists," the "Korean Association of Democratic Lawyers," the "Korean Committee of Students," the "Korean Committee for Solidarity with the People of the World," the "Korea-Asia-Africa Solidarity Committees" and the "National Committee for Preservation of Peace of Korea."

Social organization are no exception. The Political Dictionary of north Korea defines social organization as follows:

"The workers' organizations of our country, being the affiliated organizations of the Party, play a significant role in strongly arming the extensive masses with the Leader's revolutionary

thought and Juche ideas, rallying them rightly around the Leader, and in organizing and mobilizing them for the accomplishment of the Leader's instructions."

(Political Dictionary, 1973, p. 529)

The fictitiousness of the "Democratic Front" consisting only of the ghost parties controlled by the Workers' Party and those organizations existing simply as the "affiliated bodies" of the Party, can be proven clearly by official documents in north Korea.

For instance, north Korea contradicts itself by stating that today there do not exist Christianity and Buddhism in north Korea, while, on the other hand, alleging that the so-called "Korean Christian League" and the "Korean Buddhists' League" have been affiliated with the "Democratic Front."

The Political Dictionary of north Korea explains about Christianity and Buddhism as:

"Christianity is a spiritual tool of the exploiting classes designed to obliterate the liberation struggles of the exploited working classes as well as to perpetuate the exploiting system... Christianity justifies exploitation by capitalist rascals, paralyzes the class sentiments of the working class, oppose people's revolutionary struggles and socialism.... It further justifies exploitation, persecution, aggression and war policies of American imperialism and other imperialists, and has become a guide to colonial plunder... In order to uproot the fantasy about the United States among the people of south Korea and to arm them with the sense of nationalism, it is important most of all to launch vigorously a campaign to arm the people with the juche ideas and to expose the reactionary substance, unscientific nature and fictitiousness of Christianity."

(Political Dictionary, 1973, p. 122)

"Buddhism is a religion which has been utilized by successive rulers in the past as an ideological tool to cheat, oppress and exploit the people... Today, Buddhism has already ceased to exist in the northern half of the Republic, whereas in south Korea it plays a harmful role in paralyzing the people's comba-

tive struggles against the United States under the protection of landowners, comprador capitalists, and pro-Japanese, pro-Americans, and reactionary bureaucrats."

(Political Dictionary, 1973, p. 502)

As can be seen here, the "Democratic Front" is a "front organization" of the Workers' Party, entrusted with the mission of accomplishing so-called "revolution in south Korea," namely, Communist takeover of south Korea. Even in the light of its organizational structure, it is clear that the "Democratic Front" is a deceptive and disguised organization formed mostly of fictitious political parties and social bodies without any substance.

Under the circumstances, it is more than apparent that the Republic of Korea cannot deal with a bogus organization like the "Democratic Front" in a dialogue intended to achieve the paramount task of national unification.

--"Whole Nation Conference"--

In a statement issued on January 23, 1979 by the Central Committee of the "Democratic Front," north Korea said,

"We propose that a 'whole nation conference' be convoked with the participation of representatives of political parties and social organizations both in the south and the north. The 'conference' should be attended by representatives of political parties and social organizations in the north and representatives of all political parties and social organizations as well as patriotic individuals of all walks of life in south Korea, including the president of the Democratic Republican Party, with the addition of representatives of overseas organizations and individuals. We propose that this 'conference' be convoked sometime in the early part of September this year either in Pyongyang or in Seoul, sponsoring, in the meantime, bilateral and multilateral preliminary meetings sometime in early June to be attended by representatives of political parties and social organizations both at home and abroad..."

Again in a statement released by the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the "Democratic Front" on January 27, north Korea maintained,"

"We have already foreseen that, as to participants in the meetings between working-level delegates, not only representatives of all political parties and social organizations as well as individuals both within and outside the country, but also representatives of the 'responsible authorities' of both the south and the north would attend the meetings... We will extend, in due course of time, our invitations for the meetings between working-level delegates to all political parties and social organizations as well as individuals of various walks of life both in the south and the north, representatives of all overseas organizations and to the responsible authorities of the two sides...."

To put it in short, the "whole nation conference" north Korea talks about means a sort of mass rally attended by the representatives of all the political parties and social organizations and individuals in the south and the north of Korea and abroad plus, concomitantly, the authorities of the two sides.

The fundamental question is how negotiations can be made and settlement reached on matters related to the inter-Korean question at such a large public assembly.

A questionable point cannot but be raised with regard to the north Korean idea especially from the standpoint of the reality of south Korea, a multiple society where numerous political parties and social organizations, formed on the basis of separate political views of social interests, enjoy the guarantee of their free activities, unlike north Korea where the one-party dictatorship of the Workers' Party reign and where anyone opposing Kim Il-sung's ideas is dealt with harshly as a reactionary.

In reality, if so many political parties and social organizations send their delegates to a conference, such meeting will hardly be able to make any headway after all. There would also arise many difficult problems: how and on which criterion the delegates of

south and north Korea would be selected; how Korean residents' organizations abroad -- interest groups formed on the basis of residential areas -- would be chosen for participation; on which basis individual participants would be selected out of the people totaling more than 50 million in the south and north, etc.

In effect, the "whole nation conference" north Korea talks about is only the latest version of the kind of a mass assembly north Korea has been advocating since long ago in different names from time to time such as "grand national congress," "south-north political negotiations" and "joint meeting of south and north Korean political parties and social organizations."

The size of the so-called "whole nation conference" could be assessed from the remarks made by Ryu Jang-shik, Pyongyang-side vice chairman of the South-North Coordinating Committee, during the third vice chairmen's meeting on January 30, 1974, demanding the expansion of the SNCC. According to Ryu's insistence, the "whole nation conference" is supposed to be a mass assembly attended by at least 350 or upward 1,500 delegates from each side.

The fundamental problem with this "whole nation conference" is that as can be seen in their assertion that they would send "invitations" to all the would-be attendants, the idea is based on Pyongyang's intention of selecting the delegates even of the other side at its option. Moreover, by arguing for "patriotic personages," north Korea openly let it be known that it would apply one-sided restrictions to the qualification of the delegates of the other side.

At the third vice chairmen's meeting of the SNCC on January 30, 1974, Ryu Jang-shik of the Pyongyang side asserted that those political parties, social organizations and individuals "opposed to communism" cannot be allowed to take part in south-north talks. He was reasoning that "to oppose communism means opposing national unity, and to oppose national unity means opposing unification. Therefore, any act of opposing communism amounts to rejection of national unification. For this reason, anti-Communists cannot be allowed in a forum for the discussion of unification."

In sum, north Korea's idea was to hold a sort of public rally among 350 to 1,500 Workers' Party members feigning to be the representatives of different political parties and social organizations and another 350 to 1,500 individuals and representatives of various political parties and social organizations in south Korea with different political views. In effect, the idea of "whole nation conference" was the latest version of Pyongyang's demand for a "grand national congress" which north Korea used as an excuse to torpedo the south-north dialogue in June 1973. The persistent demand of north Korea for such a conference is only part of the united front tactics the Communists employ as a dogma for communization.

Part III

Ping-Pong Talks Between the South and the North

1. Initiation of Ping-Pong Talks

While contacts abnormal though, were going on between the south and the north following the epochal January 19 proposal of President Park Chung Hee, north Korea suddenly proposed on February 20, 1979 that the two sides discuss the issue of forming a single team for the 35th World Table Tennis Championships slated for April 25, 1979 in Pyongyang. The proposal was made in a letter broadcast in a north Korea radio, which was signed by Kim You-soon, chairman of the north Korean Sports Guidance Committee, and Kim Deuk-jun, president of the north Korean Table Tennis Association (NKTTA). The letter, addressed to Park Chong-kyu, chairman of the Republic of Korea Amateur Sports Association, and Chae Yoeng-cheol, president of the Republic of Korea Table Tennis Association (ROKTTA), read:

"To Park Chong-kyu, chairman of the Republic of Korea Amateur Sports Association:

"To Chae Yeong-cheol, president of the Republic of Korea Table Tennis Association:

"The 35th World Table Tennis Championships is scheduled to be held from April 25 to May 6, 1979 in Pyongyang, the capital city of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

"Today, our people have a keen concern about the Championships taking place in our country for the first time, and are looking forward to the opening of the Championships.

"The Championships will be a great opportunity to demonstrate the great and united strength of our people at home and abroad as well as to promote the national harmony and unity between the south and north.

"We believe that in order to make the Championships a significant event that can fit the common national wishes, it would be good if the players of the south and the north can take part in it under a unified team in concerted efforts rather than under separate teams.

"If and when the south and the north participate in it under a unified team, we shall achieve wonderful results without fail in a united strength, further boasting and resounding our nation's wisdom and high-mindedness.

"This would serve as an affirmative effect in the promotion of collaboration and unity between the south and the north, and would provide rejoice to our people aspiring for national unification.

"In such hope, we already proposed unified teams between the south and north for international sports events a long time ago.

"We again propose to your side that the south and the north form a unified team for the 35th World Table Tennis Championships to be held in Pyongyang.

"We hope that the delegates of the two sides' table tennis associations will meet at 10 a.m. February 27 at Panmunjom to discuss concrete issues related thereto.

"Believing that your side will agree to our proposal meeting the wishes of the people, we look forward to an affirmative response from your side."

Here, reminding the north Korean side of the fact that the Republic of Korea has, at every opportunity, proposed to north Korea practicable exchanges and cooperation in the conviction that removal of mutual misunderstanding and distrust and improvement of south-north relations by means of expanded personal and material exchanges would be a shortcut to the restoration of national homogeneity, the Republic of Korea Amateur Sports Association and the ROKTTA decided to send four delegates to Panmunjom at 10 a.m. February 27 to discuss with north Korean delegates the question of forming a single south and north Korean table tennis team for the 35th World Table Tennis Championships taking place in Pyongyang. The two south Korean associations then made public the following radio notification to north Korea on the afternoon of February 24 concerning south-north ping-pong talks:

“We listened to a Radio Pyongyang broadcast at 17 hours February 20, 1979, in which it was said that a message was sent to the south proposing the formation of a single team between south and north Korea for the 35th World Table Tennis Championships slated for April 25 through May 6 in Pyongyang.

“Materialization of exchanges of athletes between south and north Korea beyond the barrier of national division is a question being aspired for by the 50 million people of the south and the north. Such exchanges would also contribute much to the establishment of peaceful relations between the south and the north.

“As we remind your side of the fact that we have already proposed many times the early realization of various exchanges including sports exchanges between the south and the north, and has striven consistently to this end, we consider it good for the north Korean side to respond, belatedly though, to our proposal affirmatively.

“Our table tennis delegation has completed all preparation for the participation in the 35th World Table Tennis Championships to be held in Pyongyang, and has applied for visas through the International Table Tennis Federation.

“Under the authorization of the Seoul side of the SNCC, we hereby notify your side that our delegates as given below shall be sent to the NNSC conference room at Panmunjom at 10 a.m. February 27.

Delegation of the Republic of Korea Table Tennis Association

Delegate: Chae Yeong-cheol, president, Republic of Korea Table Tennis Association

Delegate: Lee Chong-ha, vice chairman, Republic of Korea Amateur Sports Association

Delegate: Chon Yong-sok, managing director, Republic of Korea Table Tennis Association

Delegate: Chung Choo-nyon, director, Republic of Korea Table Tennis Association" (Spokesman)

Meanwhile, the NKTТА, in a statement by its spokesman, announced on February 24 that for the discussion of the issue of forming a single south-north ping-pong team, it would send a delegation consisting of four men -- Kim Deuk-jun, president of the NKTТА, chief delegate; Park Mu-song, vice president of the NKTТА; Kim Dock-ki, chief secretary of the NKTТА; and Kim Sun-il, member of the NKTТА. Thus, the first meeting of the south and north Korean Table Tennis Associations was set to be held at Panmunjom at 10 a.m. February 27, 1979.

2. Course of Ping-Pong Talks

While abnormal contacts were going on one way, four rounds (February 27, March 5, March 9 and March 12) of talks between the south and north Korean Table Tennis Associations were held at the NNSC conference room at Panmunjom to discuss the issue of forming a single south and north Korean team for the 35th World Table Tennis Championships.

The meetings were attended from the south by Chae Yeong-cheol, president of the ROKTTA; Lee Chong-ha, vice chairman of the Korea Amateur Sports Association; Chon Yong-sok, managing director of the ROKTTA; and Chung Choo-nyon, director of the ROKTTA. Attending the ping-pong talks from the north Korean side were Kim Deuk-jun, president of the NKTТА; Park Mu-song, vice president of the NKTТА; Kim Duck-ki; chief secretary of the NKTТА; and Kim Sun-il, member of the NKTТА.

a. February 27 Meeting

The four-man delegations from the south and north Korean Table Tennis Associations met at 10 a.m. February 27, 1979 at the conference room of the NNSC at Panmunjom to discuss the issue of

forming a single team of south and north Korea for the 35th World Table Tennis Championships.

At the meeting that lasted one hour and 46 minutes, the ROKTTA delegation expressed the hope that with the discussion of the question of forming a single south-north ping-pong team as a momentum, sports exchanges will be realized in all fields between the south and the north. Noting that the Republic of Korea has on many occasions proposed sports exchanges between south and north Korea as well as the formation of single south-north teams for international games, the ROKTTA delegation expressed its basic positions with regard to the question of forming a single table tennis team as follows:

First: The question concerning the formation of a single table tennis team of south and north Korea must abide by the spirits and provisions of the International Table Tennis Federation's charter.

Second: All question inevitably related to the formation of a single table tennis team of south and north Korea have to be amicably resolved and agreed upon.

Chae Yeong-cheol, president of the ROKTTA, said that in view of the fact that the time for making the draw of the game schedule of the 35th World Table Tennis Championships had already been set for March 14 and 15, and that selection and training of players and various other problems incidental to the formation of a single team, the single team issue should be settled by March 12 at the least.

Stressing that the participation of a Republic of Korea table tennis delegation in the 35th World Table Tennis Championships cannot be hampered due to any delay in the solution of the issue of forming a single team, Chae said that should no agreement be reached on the single team issue by March 12, the NKTTA should guarantee the participation of a south Korean team in the world ping-pong matches, and take all necessary steps to enable a south Korean team to enter Pyongyang by way of Panmunjom.

Based on this position, the ROKTTA delegation made the following suggestion in connection with the formation of a single south-north ping-pong team:

**Proposals of the Korea Table Tennis Association
for the Formation of a Single Table Tennis Team
of South and North Korea**

Table Tennis Associations of south and north Korea concur as followings:

1. Table Tennis Associations of south and north Korea do their utmost to reach an agreement on the formation of a single table tennis team of south and north Korea by March 12, 1979.

2. Table Tennis Associations of south and north Korea each refer to the International Table Tennis Federation as to whether or not the formation of a single table tennis team of south and north Korea corresponds with spirits and provisions of the charter of the International Table Tennis Federation.

3. The north Korea's Table Tennis Association assures the participation of south Korea's table tennis players in the 35th World Table Tennis Championships in case no agreement is reached on the formation of a single table tennis team of south and north Korea by March 12, 1979.

The ROKTTA delegation also suggested procedural matters necessary for the operation of the ping-pong talks. They were 1) the site of the talks shall be the NNSC conference room at Panmunjom, 2) the two sides shall be represented by four delegates each, and the number of attendants shall be three or less, 3) meetings shall be opened to the public, but under mutual agreement, they may be held in closed-door sessions, 4) records of the talks shall be made separately by each side, and 5) press materials shall be released separately by each side. The ROKTTA delegation then proposed that the second round of the talks be held at 10 a.m. March 5.

On the other hand, the north Korean side tried from the outset

to display a seemingly positive posture by calling for an agreement on the basic principle of the formation of a single team, and, at the same time, suggested a series of procedural matters.

As for the formation of a joint team, north Korea was suggesting: "1) a joint team shall consist of 18 players who, on the basis of selecting the best qualified players, would include those in the list of the world's best players as announced by the International Table Tennis Association, with the rest to be filled from the two sides in an equal number each, 2) the selected players shall undergo joint training in Pyongyang prior to the matches, and all conveniences shall be provided to south Korean players during their stay in Pyongyang, 3) the co-head system shall be employed, under which the head of a joint delegation shall be two, one from each side, and 4) the name of a single team shall be "Koryo," a name which neither side has ever used in the past."

At a glance, these suggestions may seem plausible. In effect, however, they all were trivial matters void of any key and substantial questions and intended for use only in their propaganda.

Emerging from the meeting, Chung Choo-nyon, spokesman for the ROKTTA delegation, issued the following statement:

The Republic of Korea Table Tennis Association elucidated its basic stand that an authoritative interpretation of the International Table Tennis Federation (ITTF) should be first obtained formally on the question of whether the formation of a single ping-pong team between south and north Korea would be in conformity with the spirit and provisions of the ITTF Charter.

The Republic of Korea Table Tennis Association also emphasized that the formation of a joint south-north table tennis team would be feasible in reality only when the issue of selecting and training players and other technical matters that would inevitable arise from the issue of forming a joint team are discussed and solved by March 12 at the latest in view of the fact that draw of the game schedule of the 35th World Table Tennis Championships has already been set to be made on

March 14 and 15.

However, the north Korean Table Tennis Association, judging from its basic stand and attitude, failed at today's meeting to produce principal, comprehensive and concrete measures for the formation of a joint ping-pong team between the south and the north Korea.

To analyze the position and view of north Korea, it appears that the north Korean Table Tennis Association set forth only a partial plan. It seems that north Korea failed to lay down principled and overall contents. Therefore, at the second meeting of the south and north Korean Table Tennis Associations slated for March 5, north Korea should set forth more concrete measures for the formation of a single ping-pong team between the south and the north.

In the legal aspect, in particular, the north Korean Table Tennis Association should first refer to the ITTF for its official and authoritative interpretation on whether the formation of a single team would be conformity with the spirit and provisions of the ITTF Charter.

The north Korean Table Tennis Association should produce more principled and concrete plans at the next meeting. We also look forward to their concrete and affirmative response to the proposal of the Republic of Korea Table Tennis Association.

At the first round of the ping-pong talks, the two sides presented only their respective stands and proposals, revolving to discuss concrete matters at the second-round talks. They agreed to meet again on March 5 as suggested by the ROKTTA delegations.

b. March 5 Meeting

The second-round meeting between the south and north Korean Table Tennis Associations was held at the NNSC conference room at Panmunjom at 10 a.m. March 5, 1979. But, the meeting had a rough going from the beginning due to conflicting views.

At the meeting, Chae Yeong-cheol, president of the ROKTTA, said that it is highly significant for the two sides of Korea to have the ping-pong talks, and emphasized that the issue of a single ping-pong team should be tackled as part of overall sports exchanges between the south and the north. He said this is all the more so considering the fact that had sports exchanges been materialized between the two sides, participation in international sports events under joint teams could be settled much more easily.

At the same time, the delegation of the ROKTTA reiterated its basic position as follows:

First: The bilateral consultation on the formation of a single south-north Korean table tennis team can in one ways affect the de facto right of the table tennis team of south Korea to participate in the 35th World Table Tennis Championships. Therefore, the Table Tennis Association of north Korea, as the host of the Championships, is urged to assure the participation of the south Korean table tennis team in the 35th World Table Tennis Championships.

Second: Formation of a single south-north Korean table tennis team be agreed upon at the latest by March 12 in the light of the drawing of game schedule for the 35th World Table Tennis Champinships already set on March 14 and March 15 and in view of various indispensable questions related, most of all, to the selection and training of players for the single south-north Korean table tennis team.

Based on this fundamental stand, the ROKTTA delegation made the following proposal:

Proposal of the Korea Table Tennis Association

“The Table Tennis Association of north Korea, recognizing the de facto right of the Korea Table Tennis Association duly accorded as a member of the International Table Tennis

Federation, announces a statement, by the next meeting, to assure the participation of the south Korean table tennis team in the 35th World Table Tennis Championships.”

As the north Korean delegation made it plain at the meeting that it won't guarantee the de jure right of the ROKTTA to take part in the world championships as a due member of the International Table Tennis Federation, the delegation of the ROKTTA, questioning if the north Korea offer for a single team wasn't intended to block a south Korean team's participation, strongly demanded that the NKTTA first guarantee the de jure right of a south Korean delegation to participate in the Pyongyang championships separately.

The north Korean delegation, however, shunned to answer this challenge, and instead merely repeated its insistence on a prior agreement on the principle of the formation of a single south-north table tennis team. North Korea, thus, itself added to the suspicion that Pyongyang is determined to keep a south Korean team from taking part in the World Championships.

The NKTTA delegation, then, made the substantially same proposal as the one it made at the previous meeting: 1) the training of a joint team shall be conducted at the Pyongyang Gymnasium in Pyongyang, 2) during the training period, the players and officials from south Korea shall be accommodated at the Potonggang Hotel for free and other conveniences shall be provided to them for free of charge, 3) a joint team shall be headed by two co-heads, one each from the two sides, and for meetings of the International Table Tennis Federation, a joint delegation shall be formed consisting of two each from the two sides, 4) the insignia of a joint team shall be the map of the Korean Peninsula with the word "Koryo" on it, 5) commemorative medals for the joint team shall be three, each without the design of any national flags and symbolizing purely table tennis matches, 6) the formal, training and game uniforms shall be prepared by each side in a way that can fit national customs and modern senses, selection of actual players and other activities

shall be determined through agreement between the co-heads.

With these suggestions, north Korea was repeating its one-sided demand for “unconditional agreement on the formation of a single team” while emphasizing the “significance” of its proposals for a “unified team.” In this way, north Korea was attempting to cover up its intention of blocking a south Korean team’s participation in the Pyongyang Championships as well as to gain the propaganda effect that “Pyongyang is truly interested in south-north collaboration and realization of national unification.”

c. March 9 Meeting

The third meeting of the south and north Korean Table Tennis Associations was held for one hour and 40 minutes on March 9, 1979 at the NNSC conference room at Panmunjom.

Chae Yeong-cheol, president of the ROKTTA, stressed at the meeting that formation of a single table tennis team should be realized on the principle of overall sports exchanges between south and north Korea, urging that north Korea, based on this spirit, should first guarantee the participation of a south Korean team in the Pyongyang Championships.

Nevertheless, north Korea’s chief delegate Kim Deuk-jun, shunning this guarantee, simply renewed a call that the two sides discuss various procedural matters related to the formation of a joint team, thereby making it evident again that north Korea remains resolved to prevent a south Korean delegation from taking part in the Pyongyang Championships. Here, the ping-pong talks between south and north Korea stumbled without any progress.

Chae Yeong-cheol of the ROKTTA again urged that the ping-pong talks between the south and north should be held from the standpoint of realization of overall sports exchanges between the two sides of Korea. His remarks were as follows:

Recently athletes from other parts of the world have recognized new developments in the international community and opened their arms wide towards each other as good neighbors.

Yet athletes of south and north Korea, who are of the same country, have not so far been able to contact each other.

This is why we must do our utmost to make this an opportunity to bring about comprehensive sports exchanges between the south and north in order to improve the until now broken south-north relationship.

Accordingly, we believe that this meeting should not be limited to mere gathering for arranging a one-shot event, but to become a forum to enable athletes of the south and north alike to visit each other and participate in all kinds of games.

It should therefore be obvious to anyone that the question of forming a joint south-north team must be resolved as an integral part of the problems of promoting south-north exchanges of athletes and sports events.

If we consider the nature of the existing south-north relationship, which has been severed for so long, the problem of sports exchanges and joint teams is essentially one and the same problem.

In other words, we must secure and promote south-north sports exchanges if we are to succeed in forming and sending a joint athletic team to international sport events. If we do not accomplish this smoothly, then we cannot materialize the other goal either.

It is contrary to the fundamental purpose of this meeting to try to separate the question of organizing a joint team from that of south-north sports exchanges. To do so is also to betray the ardent wishes of the entire Korean people who are duly entitled to expect frequent and comprehensive exchanges of athletic teams between the south and north.

Let us see what a logical sequence should be like: first of all athletes from the south and north are allowed to travel freely to both parts of the country in mutual trust and be able to participate in all athletic events together, and then it is only natural that they will form joint teams to be sent to participate in international athletic events.

Regretably, our side's feeling is that your position ignores this basic principle of south-north athletic exchanges completely. You have so far maintained that we can discuss the problem of athletic exchanges only in connection with the forthcoming Pyongyang Table Tennis Championships. Moreover, our side cannot understand how you can insist that our table tennis team can participate in that event only by adhering to your "joint team" proposal.

Our side cannot agree with such an obviously unreasonable position.

The delegation of the ROKTTA, then, challenged north Korea to elucidate clearly whether it has the intention of guaranteeing the de jure right of a south Korean team to take part in the Pyongyang Championships. The ROKTTA delegation said that if north Korea refuses to give the guarantee, it cannot but be taken to indicate that the north Korean proposal for a single ping-pong team was a mere trick intended to keep a south Korean team from participating in the world matches. The remarks made by Chae in this regard were:

The fact that we are now trying to form a south-north joint table tennis team on the eve of the 35th World Table Tennis Championships is based on the premise that the two table tennis associations, one from the south and another from the north, exist and are duly admitted separately to the International Table Tennis Federation.

Our side therefore demands that your side acknowledge our right to participate as an independent team in the Pyongyang Championship and guarantee the exercise of this right regardless of the outcome of this meeting where an effort is being made to organize a joint south-north team. Otherwise, the entire Korean people will continue to question whether your side has proposed the formation of joint team in order seriously to have such a team or only to keep our players from participating in the Championships. If your side has been sincere in

proposing that a joint team be organized, then we believe that you must first agree to our request to acknowledge our de jure right to participate in the Championships.

On the other hand, the north Korean delegation asserted that the fresh initiation of a dialogue between the south and the north for the establishment of a "preparatory committee for national unification" has provided a rare momentum for collaboration and exchanges between the two sides in the field of sports by means of the formation of a single national team for the World Table Tennis Championships. North Korea also charged the ROKTTA with "producing a roadblock at the first meeting by raising the issue of authoritative interpretation of the provisions of the Charter of the International Table Tennis Federation, and casting a dark shadow upon the talks at the second meeting by bringing up the issue of de jure right that has nothing to do with the question of forming a unified team."

Demanding an immediate endorsement of a draft agreement on creation of a joint team, north Korea contended, "South Korea's insistence that it would take part in the Pyongyang matches separately if the ping-pong talks fail to reach an agreement on the single team issue by March 12, represents its attempt to seek a separate participation by dragging on the ping-pong talks by then."

Here, the delegation of the ROKTTA gave as follows the reason why it is demanding the prior guarantee of the de jure right of a south Korean team to participate in the Pyongyang Championships.

The first reason is that the de jure right of a Republic of Korea table tennis delegation to participate in the 35th World Table Tennis Championships is a *fait accompli* which your Association already recognized in March 1977 when your Association obtained the right to host the 35th Championships. Therefore, this de jure right should naturally be reaffirmed prior to the discussion of the question of forming a joint ping-pong team between south and north Korea, which your side

has proposed recently.

The second reason is that your side should remove our peoples skepticism about the fact that despite your side acquired the right to host the World Championships two years ago in March 1977, your side raised the issue of a single team all of a sudden only recently, barely two months before the Championships, and that your side drags on the solution of the issue of a single team by refusing to guarantee the de jure right of a south Korean team to take part in the Championships.

In other words, our people should know the true intention behind your side's calling of this meeting, and our delegates have the obligation to make this clear.

Therefore, if your side is really interested in the formation of a single team between south and north Korea, your side should promptly guarantee the participation -- the de jure right of all the member associations of the ITTF -- of a south Korean table tennis delegation in the Pyongyang Championships before entering discussion of various procedural matters for the creation of a joint team.

Meanwhile, Chung Choo-nyon, spokesman for the delegation of the ROKTTA, made the following statement after the end of the third ping-pong meeting:

The Korea Table Tennis Association can only assume that if the north Korean Table Tennis Association cannot assure our de jure right to participate in the 35th World Table Tennis Championships, by the attitude which it has shown throughout three meetings, it proposed the South-North Korean Table Tennis Associations' series of meetings not in order to form "a joint team" of south and north Korea, but to make it impossible for the Korea Table Tennis delegation to participate independently in the said Championships.

The Korea Table Tennis Association has emphasized the fact that the matter of forming "a joint team" should be dealt

with within the framework of sports exchanges between south and north Korea.

We are always ready to enter into substantive discussions on the formation of "a joint team" provided that the north Korean side recognizes the Korea Table Tennis delegation's de jure right to participate independently.

Recalling that our people are suspicious of the north Korean side's casual proposal to form "a joint team", put forward less than two months before the Championships, we urge the north Korean side to first guarantee our de jure right to participate in the Pyongyang Championships.

At the March 9, the ROKTTA delegation emphasized the need that the meetings between the south and north Korean Table Tennis Associations should become a momentum to realize overall sports exchanges between the south and the north so that they can contribute to the improvement of the strained south-north relations. On the other hand, north Korea showed an unrealistic posture by simply demanding the formation of a single team while opposing overall sports exchanges between the two sides.

d. March 12 Meeting

The fourth meeting of the south and north Korean Table Tennis Associations was held at the NNSC conference room at Panmunjom on March 12, 1979. The meeting lasted three hours and 29 minutes beginning 10 a.m., but the two sides failed to reach any agreement, thus bringing an end to the talks between the south and north Korean Table Tennis Associations.

At the meeting, the ROKTTA delegation, reminding the north Koreans of its stand that the issue of a joint team should be solved by March 12 at the latest because the time for making the draw of the game schedule has already been set for March 14 and 15 and because the time needed for the selection and training of players and various other matters that would inevitably ensure, pointed out

that north Korea's rejection of a prior guarantee for a south Korean Table Tennis team's participation has made it impossible to form a single team. The ROKTTA delegation noted that even the International Table Tennis Federation has called for such prior guarantee for the ROKTTA which has the every right to take part in any world table tennis matches as a rightful member of the International Table Tennis Federation.

Chae Young-cheol, president of the ROKTTA, said that no further talks will be no longer necessary under the circumstances in which north Korea refuses to guarantee without condition the de jure right of a south Korean team to participate in the matches. Chae said it would be in conformity with the wishes of sportsmen and all other people if a dialogue between the sportsmen of the south and the north can be begun on a new level. He then elucidated the position of the ROKTTA as follows:

“First: the fact that a discussion has been held between the south and north Korean Table Tennis Associations on the eve of the thirty-fifth World Amateur Table Tennis Championship Contest is based on the understanding that both Associations are duly admitted to the International Table Tennis Federation and that the failure to reach an agreement between the south and north Korean Table Tennis Associations has no effect on any Korean players' de jure right to participate in the Pyongyang Championships.

“Accordingly, it is incumbent upon the north Korean Table Tennis Association to carry out all the duties assigned to it by the organization committee of the Championships, in particular issuing visas to the south Korean Table Tennis Team so that our team's participation in the Pyongyang Championships will not be hampered.

“Second: participation by the south Korean Table Tennis Team in the forthcoming Table Tennis Championship is of historical significance as would be participation by a joint south and north Korean team, since it is a step towards starting ex-

changes of athletic teams between south and north Korea.

“All athletes from south and north Korea must continue a dialogue in order to promote comprehensive exchanges of athletic teams starting with the south Korean Table Tennis Team’s participation in the Pyongyang Championships.”

In order to develop, from such standpoint, the south-north ping-pong talks into a higher-dimensional dialogue, the delegation of the ROKTTA made the following proposal, urging north Korea to show an affirmative response thereto:

Proposals by the Republic of Korea Table Tennis Association

1. Following the 35th World Table Tennis Championships, the south and north Korean Table Tennis Associations should hold in June and July this year, in Seoul and Pyongyang respectively, a south-north Korean Friendship Table Tennis Contest.

2. The south and north Korean Table Tennis Associations should hold a preparatory meeting in May this year at Panmunjom in order to coordinate arrangements for holding this Friendship Contest.

At this point, north Korea, in an attempt to shift the responsibility for the breakup of the ping-pong talks to the ROKTTA, produced another version of its deceptive offer that was substantially the same as the original demand for “unconditional prior agreement on the principle of forming a joint team.”

The new overture of north Korea was that the draft “agreement” it laid down at the second-round talks be rewritten to include the clause that the de jure right of the ROKTTA to take part in the 35th World Table Tennis Championships would be “recognized” but only on the condition that this de jure right would be used for pur-

poses that “run counter” to the formation of a single team, and that such “recognition” of the de jure right would take effect only from the time the two sides sign and exchange the letter of agreement on the formation of a joint team.

Here, the ROKTTA delegation stressed that the meeting between the south and north Korean Table Tennis Associations ought to be held in such a way as to strive for the realization of overall sports exchanges between the two sides. It said it is erroneous for north Korea to attempt to one-sidedly restrict the function of the meeting only to the Pyongyang Championships. It then urged as follows that the two sides first agree on a joint statement guaranteeing the de jure right of a Republic of Korea delegation to participate in the 35th World Table Tennis Championships. But, north Korea rejected it outright.

The south and north Korean Table Tennis Associations agreed as follows:

The north Korean Table Tennis Association hereby announces on March, 1979 that it has recognized the de jure right of a Republic of Korea Table Tennis Delegation to participate in the 35th World Table Tennis Championships taking place in Pyongyang from April 25 to May 6, 1979, and guaranteed all matters necessary for its participation therein.

March xx, 1979

Chae Yeong-cheol, president of the Republic of Korea
Table Tennis Association
Kim Deuk-joon, president of the north Korean Table
Tennis Association

In the meantime, Chae Yeong-cheol, president of the ROKTTA, emerging from the final round of the ping-pong talks, issued a statement, in which he maintained that the rejection by north Korea of a just proposal of the ROKTTA amounts to substan-

tiating north Korea's undue denial of the participation of a south Korean team in the World Championships. In the statement he also called upon north Korea to agree to overall south-north sports exchanges. The statement read:

The south and north Korean Table Tennis Associations, after a series of meetings, reached no agreement on the formation of "a joint team" to participate in the 35th World Table Tennis Championships in Pyongyang scheduled from 25 April to 6 May, 1979.

The south Korea Table Tennis Association asserted its position and requests:

Firstly, recalling that our people are suspicious of the north Korean side's casual proposal to form "a joint team", put forward less than two months before the 35th World Table Tennis Championships in Pyongyang, the south Korea Table Tennis Association urged the north Korean side to make clear its real intention.

Secondly, the south Korea Table Tennis Association asked the north Korean Table Tennis Association to make public a statement to ensure that the north Korean side would take all necessary steps, including issuing visas, for the south Korea Table Tennis delegation, in accordance with its de jure right duly accorded as a member of the International Table Tennis Federation, to participate in the 35th World Table Tennis Championships in Pyongyang.

Thirdly, now that the date for making the draw of the game schedule of the 35th World Table Tennis Championships has been set for March 14 and March 15, and in the light of various arrangements inevitably related, most of all, the selection of, and training for players of "the joint table tennis team of south and north Korea", we proposed that the question concerning "a joint team" should be agreed upon at the latest by 12 March, 1979.

Fourthly, the south Korea Table Tennis Association made

it clear that it would enter into substantive discussions on the formation of "a joint team" provided that the north Korean Table Tennis Association makes public a statement assuring our right to participate in the forthcoming Championships.

Fifthly, the south Korea Table Tennis Association emphasized that the formation of "a joint team" should be realized within the general framework of sports exchanges between south and north Korea. We also strongly insisted that, first of all, athletes from south and north Korea should be allowed to travel freely to both parts of the country in mutual trust and be allowed to participate in all athletic events together: then it is only natural and realistic to form joint teams to be sent to participate in international athletic events.

However, the north Korean Table Tennis Association rejected our just and reasonable proposals and requests.

Considering the attitude shown by the north Korean side throughout all four meetings, it became very clear that from the very beginning, the north Korean Table Tennis Association's sudden proposal to form "a joint team" less than two months before the Championships was made in order to make it impossible for the south Korea Table Tennis Delegation to participate in the said Championships.

Recognizing that it is impossible for us to have substantive discussions on the formation of "a joint team" due to the north Korean side's unjust approach, the south Korea Table Tennis Association proposed a realistic proposal to materialise sports exchanges between south and north Korea.

Proposals by the Republic of Korea Table Tennis Association

1. Following the 35th World Table Tennis Championships, the south and north Korean Table Tennis Associations should hold in June and July this year, in Seoul and Pyongyang respectively, a south-north Korean Friendship Table

Tennis Contest.

2. The south and north Korean Table Tennis Associations should hold a preparatory meeting in May this year at Panmunjom in order to coordinate arrangements for holding this Friendship Contest.

It is regrettable that we could not reach agreement on the formation of "a joint team."

The south Korea Table Tennis Association make it crystal clear that we cannot, for any reason, allow the north Korean Table Tennis Association to oppose our de jure right to participate in the 35th World Championships.

Accordingly, the south Korea Table Tennis Association again urges the north Korean Table Tennis Association to issue a statement assuring us that the north Korean side, with the spirit of sportsmanship and brotherhood, will take all necessary steps for the south Korea Table Tennis Delegation to participate in the forthcoming Championships.

The south Korea Table Tennis Association hopes that the north Korean side will show an affirmative response to our new and realistic proposal to have friendship ping-pong games as a way of realizing sports exchanges between south and north Korea to which all the Korean people are looking forward, in connection with the 35th World Championships in Pyongyang.

The south Korea Table Tennis Association respectfully calls upon the International Table Tennis Federation to render its utmost assistance to enable the south Korea Table Tennis Delegation to participate in the 35th World Table Tennis Championships in Pyongyang.

Moreover, despite the breakup of the four-round talks between the south and north Korean Table Tennis Associations over the issue of forming a joint team for the Pyongyang Championships, north Korea, in yet another statement co-signed by the so-called north Korean Sports Guidance Committee and the NKTTA on March 24, proposed that the fifth round of the ping-pong talks be

held at 10 a.m. March 27 at the NNSC conference room to discuss again the question of forming a joint table tennis team.

In the statement, north Korea argued that its consistent position is that south and north Korea should participate in the 35th World Table Tennis Championships under the same ticket, contending that there still is time for the formation of a single team. In this way, north Korea attempted to the end to cover up its intention of blocking a Republic of Korea delegation's participation in the international matches.

Retorting this deceptive maneuver of north Korea, Chae Yeongcheol, president of the ROKTTA, in a statement on March 26, again challenged north Korea to guarantee first the de jure right of a south Korean team to take in the Pyongyang Championships. The statement said:

The Republic of Korea Table Tennis Association, taking note of the fact that a statement under the name of the north Korean Table Tennis Association was broadcast by Radio Pyongyang on March 24 calling for the resumption of a meeting between the two table tennis Associations on the issue of forming a single south and north Korean team for the 35th World Table Tennis Championships due in less than one month, hereby elucidates its position as follows:

The fundamental stand of this Association over the issue has been clearly made known through the four rounds of the recent Panmunjom meeting. The irrevocable position is that unless a joint team is formed during the remaining period up to the time Championships opens, a Republic of Korea table tennis delegation should be able to take part in the Pyongyang Championships as a separate team under the de jure right which the Republic of Korea Table Tennis Association already retains as a member organization of the International Table Tennis Federation (ITTF). To this end, the north Korean Table Tennis Association should issue a statement guaranteeing the right of our delegation to enter north Korea. We have made it

clear that if the north Korean Table Tennis Association makes such guarantee, we are willing to consult with them about the proposed formation of a joint south and north Korean team. This basic position of our Association remains unchanged today.

The fact that the north Korean Table Tennis Association again called for a meeting between the south and north Korean Table Tennis Associations over the question of forming a single team while refusing to guarantee the de jure right of a Republic of Korea team to participate in the Pyongyang Championships, despite the repeated demand by the Republic of Korea Table Tennis Association, once again reveals before the whole world their intention of blocking participation by a Republic of Korea table tennis team in the Pyongyang Championships to the end.

The north Korean Table Tennis Association should stop this farce intended to allow them to shun the responsibility for refusing a Republic of Korea table tennis team to participate in the Championships and to mislead public opinion at home and abroad. It should see to it, instead, that a Republic of Korea team will face no difficulties in participating in the Pyongyang Championships by fulfilling its obligations such as the issuance of visas, which it ought to do as the organizing committee of the Championships.

If the north Korean Table Tennis Association is really interested in the formation of a single south and north Korean table tennis team and if the proposal for a joint team is not a veiled scheme for blocking a Republic of Korea table tennis delegation from participating in the 35th World Table Tennis Championships, the north Korean Table Tennis Association should announce without any further delay a statement guaranteeing the de jure right of a Republic of Korea table tennis team in the Pyongyang Championships.

Again on March 27, Kim Deuk-jun of the NKTТА suggested in a press conference that another meeting of the south and north

Korean Table Tennis Associations be held on April 3. But, Chae Yeong-cheol, president of the ROKTTA, on April 2 rejected this north Korean proposal as an event attempt to smoke-screen its intention and to escape the mounting denouncement by many of the member countries of the International Table Tennis Federation for its undue action.

Thus, the controversy developing over north Korea's overture for the formation of a single south-north ping-pong team aimed at keeping a south Korean delegation from entering Pyongyang was brought to an end, only leaving behind the blur of pure sportsmanship having been trampled down upon and exploited for propaganda again.

3. Fictitiousness of North Korean Call for Single Team

Four rounds of talks were held until March 12 between the south and north Korean Table Tennis Associations following the north Korean proposal on February 20 for the formation of a joint south-north Korean team for the 35th World Table Tennis Championships. The meetings, however, ended in a failure without and achievements after the Pyongyang offer turned out to be a mere gimmick intended to block a south Korean team's participation.

Summing up, north Korea proposed the formation of a single team simply as a means of finding an excuse to reject a south Korean team's participation in the international matches. The deceptiveness of the north Korean offer can be known clearly from the following fact:

First, formation of a single sports team between different entities is by no means a simple question. Even if they agree on the general principle of forming a joint team, there remain a lot of complicated procedural matters to be discussed and settled.

They include the issues of 1) determining the number of joint team members and the method of their selection, 2) setting

the method of joint training of players, 3) solving lodging and security problems, 4) determining the title of joint team, 5) settling national flag and national song issues, 6) determining the number of support personnel, 7) setting the number of pressman, determining the scope of their activities, and ensuring their security, 8) solving problems arising from south Korean members' stay in Pyongyang, 9) settling the issue of south Korean members' passage through Panmunjom, and 10) fixing the scope of individual activities of south Korean members during their stay in Pyongyang. Nevertheless, north Korea raised the issue of forming a single team only three weeks before the time, March 14, set for making the draw of the game schedule with the obvious intention of deliberately shortening the time available for the discussion of procedural matters and thereby posing a de facto obstacle to the solution of the matters.

Second, any formation of a single team ought to have been authorized by the International Table Tennis Federation beforehand inasmuch as the Federation allows only one team from each regional Association. However, north Korea was demanding an unconditional agreement on the formation of a single team in disregard of this rule of the Federation.

* Charter of International Table Tennis Federation

Article 11: In regional societies, the delegations of only those areas where table tennis Associations are active will be allowed.

Article 12: In case two or more Associations apply for a single membership, it shall be acted on at general meeting.

Third, despite its contention that the formation of a single team represents the first step toward facilitating the solution of the unification question, north Korea was rejecting overall sports exchanges and cooperation between the two sides as well as a south Korean team's participation in the Pyongyang

Championships, while, nevertheless, attempting to link the single team issue directly to the question of national unification. The north Koreans were simply indulging in propaganda in a jump of logic, claiming that south Korea's refusal to agree to their stand points to the south's disinterest in unification.

Fourth, it was obvious that their suggestion for a single team was a political gimmick in view of the fact that north Korea suddenly suggested it despite its rejection of a series of the south's proposals for sports exchanges. Their political motivation becomes all the more evident because north Korea, which ignored Seoul's invitation to take part in the World Shooting Championships and the World Women's Basketball Championships held in Seoul in August 1978 and April 1979, respectively, came up with the single team overture for the championships taking place in Pyongyang.

Moreover, in a contrast with the call for a single ping-pong team, north Korea has applied for its separate participation in other world matches (junior soccer games and Universiade) without raising any suggestion for joint participation in them between south and north Korea.

- * South and north Korea took part separately in the World Figure Skating Championships held in Vienna, Austria March 13-18, 1979.
- * North Korea participated separately in making the draw of the game schedule for the second Junior Soccer Championships slated for August 1979 in Tokyo despite the fact that both south and north Korea have the right to take part in it and, therefore, they can negotiate for a single team.
- * South and north Korea have applied for their separate participation in the 1979 Universiade taking place in Mexico September 2-13, 1979.

Fifth, north Korea caused a controversy by exploiting pure sports for politics. Taking advantages of the contacts going on between the two sides for resumption of the stalled dialogue, north Korea raised the impracticable single team offer, on the excuse of which it blocked a south Korean team's participation.

This political gimmick hidden behind the north Korea proposal for a joint table tennis team has become clearer after north Korea refused to issue visas for a south Korean delegation to the end.

Following the breakup of the talks on the issue of a joint ping-pong team, the south Korean delegation left for Geneva on April 17 as originally scheduled in an effort to obtain visas there and enter Pyongyang together with other delegations.

In Geneva, the south Korean team made all available efforts to have their visas issued by the north Korean mission there until the time chartered planes took off for Pyongyang. However, north Korea refused to issue visas for the south Korean delegation, thereby proving it beyond any doubt that its proposal for a single ping-pong team for the Pyongyang Championships was a mere trick intended to keep the Republic of Korea team from entering Pyongyang.

Part IV

Chronology of South-North Dialogue

Chronology of South-North Dialogue (January - May, 1979)

- January 19, 1979 -- President Park proposes in a New Year press conference that authorities of south and north Korea meet at any time, at any place and at any level without preconditions to discuss all issues pending between the two sides.
- January 23, 1979 -- The Central Committee of north Korea's "Democratic Front" issues a statement, proposing that:
- The two sides officially declare their decision to observe the July 4 South-North Joint Communique effective 10:00 hours February 1.
 - The two sides stop all hostile activities along the Military Demarcation Line beginning March 1.
 - A whole nation conference be held in either Seoul or Pyongyang in early September.
 - Working-level preliminary meetings be held in Pyongyang in early June.
- January 25, 1979 -- Park Sung-chul of north Korea issues a statement endorsing the statement of the "Democratic Front."
- January 26, 1979 -- The government spokesman (Culture and Information Minister), in a statement, calls for a dialogue between the responsible authorities of south and north Korea.
- January 27, 1979 -- Secretariat of the Central Committee of north Korea's "Democratic Front," in a statement, proposes convening of a working-level preliminary meeting in early April to discuss the convocation of a "whole nation conference."
- January 29, 1979 -- The spokesman of the Ministry of Culture and Information urges the north Korean authorities to make a responsible response.
- January 31, 1979 -- The Seoul-side co-chairman issues a statement calling for:
- Early resumption of the operation of the South-North Coordinating Committee.
 - Immediate restoration of the direct Seoul-Pyongyang telephone line.
- January 31, 1979 -- The north Korean Central News Agency issues a statement:
- Supporting the January 23 statement of the "Democratic Front."
 - Announcing that all slanderous activities against the south would be stopped in the entire area of north Korea effective 10:00 hours February 1, 1979.
- February 5, 1979 -- Secretariat of the Central Committee of north Korea's "Democratic Front" propose the inauguration of a "preparatory committee

for national unification" in place of the South-North Coordinating Committee.

February 8, 1979 -- The Seoul side of the South-North Coordinating Committee announces the appointment of Hahm Byoung-choon as a Seoul side member in place of Kim Dong-jo.

February 12, 1979 -- Secretariat of the Central Committee of north Korea's "Democratic Front" announces:

-- The appointment of north Korean-side liaison delegates for the formation of a "preparatory committee for national unification."

-- The decision to send the delegates to the NNSC conference room at Panmunjom at 12:00 hours February 20.

February 12, 1979 -- The government spokesman, in a news conference, says that the "Democratic Front" of north Korea cannot be considered as responsible authorities, adding that there is no change in the stand calling for a "dialogue between authorities."

February 12, 1979 -- The spokesman of the Seoul side of the South-North Coordinating Committee, in a statement, proposes a meeting of the vice chairman of the two sides at the Freedom House at Panmunjom at 10:00 hours February 17 to discuss the issue of holding the fourth plenary meeting of the Coordinating Committee.

February 13, 1979 -- Secretariat of the Central Committee of north Korea's "Democratic Front" issues a statement saying that:

-- It would send the delegates of the "Democratic Front" to Panmunjom at 10:00 hours February 17 to discuss the formation of a "preparatory committee for national unification."

-- It would consider whatever delegation of the south under whichever name as the south's liaison delegation for the formation of a "preparatory committee for national unification."

February 15, 1979 -- The spokesman of the Seoul side of the South-North Coordinating Committee announces that the Seoul side will send its delegation to Panmunjom on February 17.

February 17, 1979 -- First abnormal contact takes place between the south and the north.

February 20, 1979 -- In a message co-signed by Kim Yu-soon, chairman of the north Korean Sports Guidance Committee, and Kim Deuk-jun, chairman of the north Korean Table Tennis Association, north Korea proposes the formation of a single table tennis team between the south and the north.

February 24, 1979 -- In response, the Republic of Korea Amateur Sports Association and the Republic of Korea Table Tennis Association, in a radio message, say they will send a delegation to the NNSC conference room at Panmunjom at 10:00 hours February 27 under the authorization by the

Seoul side of the South-North Coordinating Committee.

- February 27, 1979 -- First meeting takes place between the south and north Korean Table Tennis Associations.
- February 28, 1979 -- Spokesman for the People's Armed Forces Ministry of north Korea announces it is withholding a clause of the January 23 statement of the "Democratic Front" concerning the suspension of hostile activities effective 0 hours of March 1, due to a joint Korea-U.S. military training exercise in the south.
- March 5, 1979 -- Second ping-pong meeting takes place.
- March 7, 1979 -- Second abnormal contact held.
- March 9, 1979 -- Third ping-pong meeting takes place.
- March 12, 1979 -- Fourth ping-pong meeting takes place.
- March 14, 1979 -- Third abnormal contact held.
- March 24, 1979 -- North Korea's Sports Guidance Committee and Table Tennis Association propose that the fifth table tennis be held on March 27.
- March 26, 1979 -- Spokesman for the north Korean Table Tennis Association says a north Korean delegation will go to the NNSC conference room at Panmunjom at 10:00 hours March 27 as scheduled.
- March 26, 1979 -- The Republic of Korea government spokesman announces:
-- A three-man working-level delegation headed by Dong Hoon, Vice Minister of the National Unification Board, will be sent to Panmunjom at 10:00 hours March 28.
-- Working-level delegates' contacts may be held in closed-door sessions if necessary.
- March 27, 1979 -- The "liaison delegation of political parties, social organizations and authorities" of north Korea proposes that the fourth liaison delegates' contacts be held at the NNSC conference room at Panmunjom 10:00 hours April 2.
- March 27, 1979 -- A delegation of the north Korean Table Tennis Association appears at Panmunjom, and proposal that a delegates' contact between the two sides' Table Tennis associations be held at the NNSC conference room at Panmunjom at 10:00 hours April 3.
- March 28, 1979 -- The "working-level delegation of the authorities of the Republic of Korea" issues a statement (following the miscarriage of a working-level delegates' contact):
-- Urging north Korea to come to the forum of dialogue between authorities without any further delay.
-- Stating that the doors to the resumption of the south-north dialogue by means of the normalization of the business of the South-North Coordinating Committee, too, remain open.

- April 1, 1979 -- The "liaison delegation of political parties, social organizations and authorities" of north Korea, in a statement, asks the south to inform it whether the south would attend a proposed meeting.
- April 2, 1979 -- The chief delegate of the "working-level delegation of the authorities of the Republic of Korea," in a press conference, makes it clear that it will meet only those delegates of political parties and social organizations appointed by the authorities of Pyongyang.
- April 2, 1979 -- The "liaison delegation of political parties, social organizations and authorities" of north Korea, in a statement, proposals a liaison delegates' contact at the SSNC conference room at Panmunjom at 10:00 hours April 10.
- April 2, 1979 -- Spokesman of the north Korean Table Tennis Association, in a statement, suggests the holding of individual contacts to discuss the issue of resuming the south-north ping-pong talks, and announces that to this end, it will send a delegate and an attendant to the NNSC conference room at Panmunjom at 10:00 hours April 3.
- April 3, 1979 -- The president of the Republic of Korea Table Tennis Association, in a press conference, stresses that the issue of a single team is one thing and the question of a south Korean team's participation in the World Championships is another, urging that north Korea should take all necessary steps for a south Korean team's participation.
- April 3, 1979 -- The spokesman of the north Korean Table Tennis Association contends that the ping-pong talks should be resumed so far as there remains the time for the formation of a "unified team."
- April 7, 1979 -- The spokesman of the "working-level delegation of the authorities of the Republic of Korea," in a statement, emphasizes:
-- His delegation is interested in substantial talks with a delegation appointed by the responsible authorities of north Korea.
-- The doors always remain open to a dialogue between the authorities of the south and the north as well as to the resumption of the operation of the South-North Coordinating Committee.
- April 10, 1979 -- The "liaison delegation of political parties, social organizations and authorities:" of north Korea, in a statement, says it has done all available efforts for the progress of liaison delegates' contact, declaring that the question of whether a dialogue would continue to go on or not is how up to the attitude of the south.
- May 1, 1979 -- The Republic of Korea National Red Cross announces the appointment of Soh Sang-yung as chief delegate to the South-North Red Cross Conference in place of Chi Yeon-tai.

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