


No. 001
July, 1973

South-North Dialogue in Korea

— A Special Issue Marking the First
Anniversary of the July 4 South-
North Joint Communique —



International Cultural Society of Korea
Seoul, Korea

South-North Dialogue in Korea

*South-North Coordinating Committee
South-North Red Cross Conference*

To Readers:

This booklet is a semi-periodical to be published on a bi-monthly basis with the purpose of informing the readers, in greater detail and with accuracy, on what is going on at the two levels of the South-North dialogue in Korea, the South-North Coordinating Committee and the South-North Red Cross Conference.

The first issue of this booklet is edited as a special issue marking the first anniversary of the July 4 South-North Joint Communique, and we hope that it would help the readers obtain a clearer picture of what is debated at, and coming out of, the talks now being conducted between the two divided parts of Korea.

—ED

SOUTH-NORTH JOINT COMMUNIQUE

Recently there were talks held both in Pyongyang and Seoul to discuss problems of improving South-north relations and unifying the divided Fatherland.

Director Hu Rak Lee of the Central Intelligence Agency of Seoul visited Pyongyang from 2 to 5 May 1972 to hold talks with Director Young Joo Kim of the Organization and Guidance Department of Pyongyang. Second Vice Premier Sung Chul Park, acting on behalf of Director Young Joo Kim, also visited Seoul from 29 May to 1 June 1972 to hold further talks with Director Hu Rak Lee.

With the common desire to achieve peaceful unification of the Fatherland as early as possible, the two sides in these talks had frank and openhearted exchanges of views, and made great progress in promoting mutual understanding.

In the course of the talks, the two sides, in an effort to remove the misunderstandings and mistrust and mitigate increased tensions that have arisen between the South and the North as a result of long separation, and further to expedite unification of the Fatherland, have reached full agreement on the following points:

1. The two sides have agreed to the following principles for unification of the Fatherland:

First, unification shall be achieved through independent Korean efforts without being subject to external imposition or interference.

Second, unification shall be achieved through peaceful means, and not through the use of force against each other.

Third, as a homogeneous people, a great national unity shall first be sought, transcending differences in ideas, ideologies, and systems.

2. In order to ease tensions and foster an atmosphere of mutual trust between the South and the North, the two sides have agreed not to slander or defame each

other, not to undertake armed provocations whether on a large or small scale, and to take positive measures to prevent inadvertent military incidents.

3. The two sides, in order to restore severed national ties, promote mutual understanding and to expedite independent peaceful unification, have agreed to carry out various exchanges in many fields.

4. The two sides have agreed to cooperate positively with each other to seek early success of the South-North Red Cross talks, which are underway with the fervent expectations of the entire people.

5. The two sides, in order to prevent the outbreak of unexpected military incidents and to deal directly, promptly and accurately with problems arising between the South and the North, have agreed to install a direct telephone line between Seoul and Pyongyang.

6. The two sides, in order to implement the aforementioned agreed items, solve various problems existing between the South and the North, and to settle the unification problem on the basis of the agreed principles for unification of the Fatherland, have agreed to establish and operate a South-North Coordinating Committee co-chaired by Director Hu Rak Lee and Director Young Joo Kim.

7. The two sides, firmly convinced that the aforementioned agreed items correspond with the common aspirations of the entire people, who are anxious to see an early unification of the Fatherland, hereby solemnly pledge before the entire Korean people that they will faithfully carry out these agreed items.

July 4, 1972

**UPHOLDING THE DESIRES OF THEIR RESPECTIVE
SUPERIORS**

HU RAK LEE

YOUNG JOO KIM

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**Brief Summary
Of Developments in South-North
Relations After Announcement
Of July 4 South-North Joint
Communique**

The fifty million Koreans, living in separation for a quarter of a century between the south and the north, welcomed with applause the advent of a new era on July 4, 1972, when Seoul and Pyongyang simultaneously announced the South-North Joint Communique, attracting a stunned attention of the world to the Korean peninsula once again.

The July 4 South-North Joint Communique stated that, in order to preclude a recurrence of war, to mitigate tensions between the South and the North, to seek a national unity transcending differences in ideology, thoughts and system, and to achieve a peaceful and independent unification, the two sides had agreed:

- 1. Not to slander or defame each other, not to undertake armed provocations and to take positive measures to prevent inadvertent military incidents;**
- 2. To implement various exchanges in many fields;**
- 3. To cooperate positively with each other for an early success of the South-North Red Cross talks;**
- 4. To install and operate a direct telephone line between Seoul and Pyongyang, as a means to prevent inadvertent military accidents and to solve problems arising in the relations between the South and the North promptly and efficiently.**
- 5. To create and operate the South-North Coordinating Committee with Director Lee Hu Rak of Seoul side and Director Kim Young Joo of Pyongyang side as Co-chairmen.**

The July 4 South-North Joint Communique was faithfully in line with a Peace Proposal by President Park Chung Hee of the Republic of Korea earlier on August 15, 1970. In a commemorative address on the day marking the twenty-fifth anniversary of the nation's liberation from the Japanese rule, President Park had made a proposal that south and north Korea enter a new era of peaceful competition in good will, on condition

that north Korea drop the idea of unifying the divided country through Communization of the entire Korean peninsula and cease armed guerrilla and other subversive activities against the Republic of Korea.

President Park noted in the August 15, 1970 speech the irresistible international trend pointing toward a thaw of the Cold War structure that had reigned the post-war period and called on the north Koreans to pay attention to the building of a lasting peace on the Korean peninsula.

President Park's peace initiative prompted the Republic of Korea National Red Cross to initiate, on August 12, 1971, the humanitarian South-North Red Cross talks on the fate of millions of Koreans who have their loving family members living separated across the Demilitarized Zone. The north Korean Red Cross Society had accepted the Red Cross talks and a series of preliminary talks had come to be held at Panmunjom thereafter.

President Park, as part of his effort to improve the relations between the South and the North and to chart the road to an earlier unification of the country, advanced a step further from the humanitarian endeavor at the Red Cross talks in May, 1972, by directing Director Lee Hu Rak of the Central Intelligence Agency secretly to visit Pyongyang and to hold a series of talks with Kim Il Sung, then north Korean premier, and his younger brother Kim Young Joo, director of the powerful Organizational Guidance Department of north Korea's Workers' Party.

Thanks to the sagacious decision made by President Park, the Koreans living in separation in the two divided parts of Korea came to rejoice over the announcement of the historic July 4 South-North Joint Communique, which took the world by surprise.

The July 4 South-North Joint Communique indeed opened a new vista in the relations between the two divided parts of Korea, which had thus far maintained relations that are more hostile than those between two different warring nations.

The July 4 South-North Joint Communique reaffirmed national ties between the two divided parts of Korea, paved the way for establishment of peaceful relations between the two parts transcending thoughts, ideologies and systems, and gave strong expressions to the national aspiration for an independent and peaceful unification of the country.

Thanks to the July 4 South-North Joint Communique, the year-long preliminary talks between the two Korean Red Cross societies at last came to an end. The full-dress South-North Red Cross Conference started in August, 1972, and in November the same year, the political South-North Coordinating Committee was officially inaugurated.

Thus, there came into being two channels of dialogue between the two divided parts of Korea. The twenty-five-member South-North Coordinating Committee delegation and the fifty-nine-member Red Cross delegation began commuting between Seoul and Pyongyang for conferences, witnessing vast differences in social life as well as value systems and talking on the problems of their divided country.

Another year passed from there. And another historic milestone was laid in the new South-North relations pointing toward peace and unification.

On June 23, 1973, President Park made yet another major policy decision with the aim of solidifying the foundation of a lasting peace upon the Korean peninsula and proclaimed a seven-point "foreign policy for a peaceful reunification."

Reviewing the past progress in the South-North dialogue, President Park reaffirmed, in his new seven-point foreign policy, the unification of the divided country "a supreme goal of our nation," and reiterated his desire to "continue maximum efforts to achieve a peaceful unification" of the country.

President Park strongly emphasized, at the same time, that "peace must, by all means, be maintained upon the Korean peninsula," adding that "south and north Korea should neither interfere with each other's domestic politics nor invade each other."

President Park also gave the assurance that the Republic of Korea would “continue her effort, with sincerity and patience, to see secure, concrete results from the South-North dialogue based on the spirit of the South-North Joint Communique of July 4, 1972”

The President’s policy decision was yet another sagacious decision and, at the same time, a demonstration of his great leadership, in that he chose first to build up a lasting peace upon the Korean peninsula, based on the objective realities existing there, and pursue a peaceful unification of the country in genuine peace.

The world acclaimed the sagacious decision by President Park. The world public opinion now came to understand that the Republic of Korea government means to improve relations with north Korea, means to ease the existing tension in that part of the world and means to pursue a peaceful unification of the country, based on hard realities, and through pragmatic means that suit the changing international situation.

Thanks to President Park’s proclamation of the new foreign policy, the July 4 South-North Joint Communique has now increased its historical significance. The President’s proclamation doubtless created a climate in which the two sides could talk on the problems of reducing their mutual misunderstanding and distrust and of replacing them with mutual understanding and trust, based faithfully on the spirit of the July 4 South-North Joint Communique, in a more frank and outspoken manner.

In hindsight, the developments in the relations between the two parts of Korea following the announcement of the July 4 South-North Joint Communique were anything but a satisfactory one.

President Park deplored, while announcing the new foreign policy via radio and television on June 23, that the outcome of the new two year-old South-North dialogue was by far remote from what had been originally expected.

President Park specifically pointed to the fact that north Korea,

while talking on unification on the one hand, continued such diplomatic activities as would practically perpetuate the division of the country on the other hand, and feared that it would “take a great deal of time, with many difficulties expected to arise in the meantime, before the dialogue produce an outcome that we originally anticipated.”

As a matter of fact, the full-dress South-North Red Cross talks that began last August still remains at a standstill over the problem of working out detailed arrangements for the implementation of the Agenda Item One, “the question of tracing, and notifying thereof, the whereabouts and fate of the dispersed families and relatives in the South and the North.”

The tracing services envisioned in the Agenda Item One in fact are very simple projects when they are viewed in the light of the Red Cross family tracing services. Yet, there have already been six rounds of full-dress Red Cross talks on the matter, and no agreement seems to be near in sight.

The case of the South-North Coordinating Committee is neither an exception. The political dialogue between the two parts of Korea did manage to produce some outcome, at the three rounds of Co-chairmen’s meetings before the official inauguration of the Committee last November, such as agreement on the “Agreed Minute on the Formation and Operation of the South-North Coordinating Committee” and agreement to stop radio broadcasts against one another, loudspeaker broadcasts against one another along the DMZ and scattering of leaflets against one another. However, there has been no progress at all after the official inauguration of the Committee itself.

The stalemate in the South-North dialogue, both at the humanitarian Red Cross talks and at the political Coordinating Committee, is due primarily to the fact that the two sides continue to remain in disagreement on how to handle pending issues at both levels of the talks.

The following are brief accounts of how the South-North dialogue

at the two levels has been forced to remain at a standstill, despite the pragmatic and reasonable approaches by the Republic of Korea side on matters at issue.

In the case of the political Coordinating Committee, the Republic of Korea side has made it a basic position that the Committee be assured first of all, all necessary business functions so that the Committee could function, both in name and in substance as well, as a competent organization to tackle all the problems in the South-North relations, fully in consonance with the spirit of the July 4 South-North Joint Communiqué.

For this purpose, the Republic of Korea side has kept on urging the north Korean side to come to an earlier agreement on the working rules for the operation of the Coordinating Committee, the Executive Council of the Committee and the Joint Secretariat of the Committee, and on an early creation of the Joint Secretariat. The Republic of Korea side also proposed that, as a symbol of future cooperation between the two parts of Korea, the two sides jointly construct a Joint Secretariat building at Panmunjom.

The Republic of Korea side noted that the hitherto South-North relations were marked by the deep-rooted mutual misunderstanding and distrust, resulting from the sharp differences in thoughts, ideologies and systems, the internecine Korean War of 1950–53 started by the north Koreans, and subsequent recurrences of armed guerrilla and other subversive activities waged by the north Koreans against the Republic of Korea. The Republic of Korea side, therefore, suggested that the two sides, in order to remove the misunderstanding and distrust, start from small steps first, in fields where the differences in thoughts, ideologies and systems do not pose major obstacles, and escalate the steps to more difficult problems as progress warrant them, rather than taking the attitude of “all at once” or “from difficult problems to easier ones.”

In this regard, the Republic of Korea side suggested that the two sides first start from extensive exchanges and cooperation in economic

and socio-cultural fields, thus “opening their respective societies to each other.” For such extensive exchanges and cooperation in economic and socio-cultural fields, the Seoul side proposed that, out of the five subcommittees, political, military, economic, foreign affairs and cultural, to be created within the Coordinating Committee, the two sides first start from two subcommittees, economic and socio-cultural.

However, the north Korean position ran counter to that of the Republic of Korea side.

The north Korean side came out with a demand that the two sides tackle the military problems first. The north Korean side put forth a five-point military suggestion calling for 1) a halt to the arms race, 2) mutual troop reductions, 3) withdrawal of foreign troops, including United Nations forces in Korea, 4) suspension of arms import from abroad and lastly 5) signing of a peace treaty.

The north Koreans said a solution to the military problems was a “prerequisite” for debates on other matters. “Without a prior solution to the military problems, there could be no progress in the dialogue, no improvement in the South-North relations and no solution to problems related to the unification of the country,” the north Koreans insisted.

At the same time, the north Koreans demanded that, aside from the Coordinating Committee, the South and the North hold a joint meeting of representatives of political parties and social organizations and people of all walks of life in the two parts of Korea for “political negotiations” on the question of unification of the country.

The north Koreans also demanded the five subcommittees of the Coordinating Committee be created all at once.

The north Koreans paid little attention to the suggestion that the two sides first normalize the business functions of the Coordinating Committee by means of adoption of working rules on the operation of the Committee and its subordinate organs, such as the Executive Council and the Joint

Secretariat, and creation of the Joint Secretariat.

The Seoul side had proposed to the north Korean side that the two sides observe a number of principles in order that constructive and productive improvement of the South-North relations is assured through the current South-North dialogue. They were as follows:

- To refrain from negating each other's system;
- To comprehend each other's system;
- To refrain from attacking and interfering in internal affairs of each other's system;
- To work for the improvement of the welfare of the people in respective areas, based on their respective systems;
- To promote cooperative relations between the two parts of Korea in the direction of solidifying the national homogeneity, transcending differences of systems; and
- To continue to develop the dialogue between the two systems, faithfully in consonance with the spirit of the July 4 South-North Joint Communiqué.

Nevertheless, the north Koreans have thus far failed to produce whatever response to these suggestions. They have simply held fast to their demand on the military questions as a “prerequisite.”

The humanitarian South-North Red Cross talks are no exception in that both sides remain wide apart on questions at issue.

The Republic of Korea National Red Cross delegation proposed that the family tracing services envisioned in the Agenda Item One be conducted through exchanges of tracing cards, using common forms, with the two Red Cross societies functioning as legitimate intermediaries.

The Republic of Korea National Red Cross delegation has repeatedly reminded their north Korean counterpart that the International Red Cross has been engaged, time and again, in such humanitarian tracing services as were envisioned in the Agenda Item One, providing the parties con-

cerned with fully tested and qualified practices.

However, there came the “precondition” again from the north Korean Red Cross delegation. The north Koreans demanded that the Republic of Korea first “create such and such legal conditions and social environment” as a “precondition” for the start of debates on the detailed arrangements on how to implement the tracing services embraced in the Agenda Item One. The north Koreans demanded, namely, that the Republic of Korea 1) repeal the Anti-Communist Law and the National Security Law, 2) disband anti-Communist organizations and 3) drop her anti-Communist policy.

Moreover, the north Koreans argued that the Red Cross societies of the two parts of Korea should not necessarily play the role of intermediaries for those who want to trace the whereabouts and fate of their separated family members and relatives. The north Koreans argued that the individuals concerned be allowed “to go directly to the other side’s area and search their separated family members and relatives by themselves, by freely travelling around there in the other side’s area.”

The north Koreans also proposed that each side shall dispatch what they called “Red Cross publicity personnel” to the other side’s area, by one for each Ri or Dong, making a total of somewhere around 35,000 in the case of the Republic of Korea, for activities which were rather of political than humanitarian nature. They also demanded that full freedom of speech, publication, assembly and travel be given to these “Red Cross publicity personnel” as well as the inviolability of their person and belongings.

It was absolutely no doubt that the north Korean Red Cross suggestion on the working arrangements for the implementation of tracing services embraced in the Agenda Item One was clearly intended to politically complicate the humanitarian endeavor at the Red Cross talks.

There was no question about the fact that the north Korean Red

Cross suggestion was a “political suggestion,” infringing upon the domestic policies of the Republic of Korea, and thus a blatant violation of the International Red Cross principle prohibiting entanglement of political, racial, religious and ideological debates in carrying out humanitarian Red Cross relief services.

As a result, the South-North Coordinating Committee and the South-North Red Cross talks alike, it has now become clear that the basic positions of the two sides remain wide apart.

And a close examination of the past proceedings at the two levels of the South-North dialogue leaves one to wonder about the genuine intent of the north Koreans. What are the north Koreans trying to achieve with such impracticable and unrealistic demands at both levels of the dialogue? It appears worth wondering about.

If the current South-North dialogue were ever to be put on the right track and contribute to the improvement of the South-North relations in its true sense, the north Koreans must, first of all, open their own society to the outside world, accommodate themselves with changing international trends and realize the hard fact that their dream of Communizing the entire Korean peninsula through “violent class revolution” and “struggle” is a mere “fanciful illusion,” which can never be translated into reality.

The first task to be achieved through the current South-North dialogue can be said to be to help the north Koreans realize the fallacy of such a “fanciful illusion.”

The South-North dialogue will start making positive progress, contributing to the genuine improvement of the South-North relations, promoting a lasting peace upon the Korean peninsula and opening the road to an eventual unification of the country, only after the north Koreans are awoken from such a “fanciful illusion.”

The trails of the South-North dialogue in the past year following the announcement of the **July 4 South-North Joint Communique** have amply

demonstrated that the South-North dialogue is a hard task to push ahead,

However, for it is the future of the 50 million Koreans now separated between the South and the North, their safety, their prosperity and their freedom, which is at stake, it is our solemn commitment that, just as President Park emphatically said in his June 23 special foreign policy statement, we will continue to make maximum effort, with patience and sincerity, to see constructive and productive results from the South-North dialogue at an earlier date, fully in consonance with the spirit of the **July 4 South-North Joint Communique**.

**A Chronological Review
of
South-North Dialogue**

July 4, '72

Announcement of the South-North Joint Communiqué simultaneously in Seoul and Pyongyang.

- Basic Spirit
 - Prevention of war
 - Pursuit of national unity
 - Unification through peaceful and independent means
- Agreements
 - Suspension of slandering and defamation and military provocation against one another and prevention of military accidents.
 - Implementation of various exchanges.
 - Positive support for an early success of the Red Cross talks.
 - Installation and operation of hot telephone lines between Seoul and Pyongyang.
 - Creation and operation of the South-North Coordinating Committee (with Director of the Central Intelligence Agency Lee Hu Rak of Seoul side and director of the Organizational Guidance Department of north Korean Workers' Party Kim Young Joo of Pyongyang side as Co-chairmen).

Aug. 11, '72

The preliminary Red Cross talks at Panmunjom wind up after 25 rounds of preliminary sessions and 16 rounds of closed-door working-level sessions.

Aug. 22, '72

Seoul and Pyongyang release statements guaranteeing the personal safety of persons who travel across the DMZ to participate in the full-dress Red Cross talks to be held alternately in Seoul and Pyongyang (for Seoul side, Co-chairman Lee Hu Rak of the South-North Coordinating Committee of Seoul side, and for Pyongyang side, ministry of social security of the Pyongyang regime).

Aug. 29–Sept. 2, '72

The first full-dress Red Cross talks convene in Pyongyang (with seven delegates, seven advisors, twenty attendants and twenty reporters participating from each side).

Sept. 12–16, '72

The second full-dress Red Cross talks convene in Seoul.

Sept. 28, '72

Co-chairman Lee Hu Rak of the South-North Coordinating Committee on Seoul side wishes, in letters to five major press organizations in Seoul, that the press handle the South-North dialogue with caution and prudence.

Oct. 12, '72

The first meeting of Co-chairmen of the South-North Coordinating Committee convenes in Panmunjom.

Oct. 23–26, '72

The third full-dress South-North Red Cross talks convene in Pyongyang and start debates on working arrangements for the Agenda Item One, "the question of tracing, and notifying thereof, the whereabouts and fate of dispersed families and relatives in the South and the North."

No. 2–4, '72

The second meeting of Co-chairmen of the South-North Coordinating Committee convenes in Pyongyang.

• Participants

(for Seoul side)

Lee Hu Rak: Co-chairman

Chang Key Young: former Deputy Prime Minister

Choi Kyu Ha: Special Assistant to the President

Kang In Duk: Chief, 9th Bureau, CIA

Chung Hong Jin: Chief, Bureau of Consultation and Coordination, CIA

(for Pyongyang side)

Park Sung Chul: Acting Co-chairman on behalf of the ailing Co-chairman

Kim Young Joo

Yu Jang Shik: deputy director of the organizational guidance department, north Korea's workers' party

Lee Kyung Suk: cabinet councillor, Pyongyang regime

Han Ung Shik: instructor, political committee, central committee, north Korea's workers' party

Kim Duk Hyun: instructor, political committee, central committee, north

Korea's workers' party

- Agreements
 1. Adoption of the Agreed Minute on the Formation and Operation of the South-North Coordinating Committee.
 2. Agreement on suspension of radio broadcasts, loudspeaker broadcasts along the DMZ and scattering of leaflets against one another, to become effective from zero hour, Nov. 11, 1972.
- Other Events

Talks with Kim Il Sung (Kim Il, north Korea's then first vice premier, and Kim Joong Rin, chief of south Korean Bureau, north Korea's Workers' Party, take part in the talks along with other participants of the Co-chairmen's meet)

Nov. 11, '72

The agreement on suspension of radio broadcasts, loudspeaker broadcasts along the DMZ and scattering of leaflets against one another goes into effect by zero hour of the day.

Nov. 22–24, '72

The fourth full-dress Red Cross talks convene in Seoul.

Nov. 30, '72

The third meeting of Co-chairmen of the South-North Coordinating Committee convenes in Seoul.

Nov. 30–Dec. 2, '72

The South-North Coordinating Committee is formally inaugurated and holds its first Committee meeting in Seoul (The two Co-chairmen appoint Chang Key Young of Seoul side and Yu Jang Shik of Pyongyang side as Vice Chairmen, Choi Kyu Ha and Kang In Duk of Seoul side and Lee Wan Ki, a cabinet councillor of north Korean regime, and Han Ung Shik of Pyongyang side as Committee Members and Chung Hong Jin of Seoul side and Kim Duk Hyun of Pyongyang side as Executive Members).

Mar. 10, '73

The first Executive Council meeting of the South-North Coordinating Committee is held at Panmunjom.

Mar. 14–16, '73

The second South-North Coordinating Committee meeting convenes in Pyongyang.

Mar. 20–23, '73

The fifth full-dress Red Cross talks convene in Pyongyang.

April 24, '73

The second Executive Council meeting of the South-North Coordinating Committee is held in Panmunjom.

May 8–11, '73

The sixth full-dress Red Cross talks convene in Seoul.

May 23, '73

The third Executive Council meeting of the South-North Coordinating Committee is held in Panmunjom.

June 10, '73

North Korean side temporarily reopen loudspeaker broadcasts against the South on four points along the DMZ, violating the agreement reached at the second Co-chairmen's meeting last November.

June 11, '73

North Korean side, in the name of acting Co-chairman Park Sung Chul, proposes via the direct telephone line that the two sides once again agree to stop slandering and defaming each other.

June 12–14, '73

The third South-North Coordinating Committee meeting convenes in Seoul.

June 23, '73

President Park Chung Hee of the Republic of Korea proclaims the new foreign policy on the peaceful unification of the country

**Third South-North
Coordinating Committee Meeting**

1. Progress Report

The third South-North Coordinating Committee meeting was held in Seoul June 12-14, 1973.

The Committee met in two sessions, one on June 12 for about half an hour and the other on June 13 for two hours, but failed to make any progress at all.

North Korea sent down to Seoul a twenty five-member delegation, including five Committee members, ten attendants and ten reporters, to take part in the third Committee meeting.

North Korean vice premier Park Sung Chul again led the north Korean delegation, on behalf of the ailing Co-chairman of Pyongyang side Kim Young Joo. Other Committee members of Pyongyang side attending the meeting were Vice Chairman Yu Jang Shik, Members Lee Wan Ki and Han Ung Shik, and Executive Member Kim Duk Hyun.

Representing Seoul side, led by Co-chairman Lee Hu Rak, were Vice Chairman Chang Key Young, Members Choi Kyu Ha and Kang In Duk, and Executive Member Chung Hong Jin.

The north Korean position at the third Coordinating Committee meeting was reported as exactly same as that at the second Committee meeting of last March.

The north Korean side reportedly held fast to the following suggestions.

First, they maintained that the military questions be given top priority over other matters. They insisted that a solution to the five-point military suggestion sponsored by their side was a "prerequisite" for debates on other problems. The five-point military suggestion of the north

Korean side reportedly calls for 1) a halt to the arms race, 2) mutual troop reductions, 3) withdrawal of foreign troops, including the United Nations forces in Korea, 4) a halt to the import of arms from abroad, and lastly 5) signing of a peace treaty.

Second, the north Koreans reportedly proposed that a “political conference” be held between representatives of political parties and social organizations as well as people of all walks of life in the South and the North for “negotiations” on the unification question.

Third, the north Koreans insisted that the five subcommittees, political, military, foreign affairs, economic and cultural, of the Coordinating Committee be created all at once.

The Republic of Korea side, on the other hand, made following suggestions at the third Committee meeting.

First, the Seoul side suggested that the two sides first agree on the working rules for the Coordinating Committee and its subordinate organs, the Executive Council and the Joint Secretariat, so that the business functions of the Committee are bolstered.

Second, the Seoul side suggested that the Joint Secretariat of the Committee be created at an early date and the Joint Secretariat building be constructed jointly by the two sides at Panmunjom.

Third, the Seoul side asked the north Koreans faithfully to observe agreements reached between the two sides and to be frank in handling matters of mutual concern.

Fourth, the Seoul side proposed that the two sides first start with two, economic and socio-cultural, out of the five subcommittees of the Coordinating Committee, and promptly start implementing a wide range of exchanges and cooperation between the two sides in order to promote mutually beneficial interests.

The Seoul side wished that, through these exchanges and cooperation,

the two sides would open their respective societies to each other side.

Heated discussions followed. But the two sides failed to find areas of agreement, as the north Koreans obstinately refused to give in from their demand on a prior solution to the military problems.

After the close of the third Coordinating Committee meeting, Co-chairman Lee Hu Rak of Seoul side disclosed in a special press conference on June 14 that the Seoul side had tried hard to reason with the north Korean side into accepting a more realistic and practical approach to the question of improving relations between the two sides.

Co-chairman Lee said that he had told the north Koreans that the north Korean suggestions were either illogical or unrealistic for following reasons:

First, the military problem is no doubt a major problem awaiting solution in the South-North relations.

However, a solution to the military problem can come about only when the two sides succeed in cultivating, through deeds, a climate in which the people in both areas of the divided country are fully convinced that agreements reached between the two sides mean to be observed.

It is yet a preposterous idea to talk of a peace treaty under the present circumstances where even minor agreements are not fully observed.

Second, the north Korean suggestion of “political negotiations” on the unification between political parties, social organizations and people of all walks of life is an irresponsible political propaganda, for there already is the Coordinating Committee to function as an effective for such political negotiations.

Besides, the Coordinating Committee is expected to create, in due course, the political subcommittee to handle such political affairs.

Third, the north Korean demand of an overall activation of the five

subcommittees runs counter to the Agreed Minute on the Formation and Operation of the South-North Coordinating Committee, which provides that “each subcommittee shall be created as the progress of the undertakings of the Committee warrants it.” This provision calls for a gradual, and not an overall, creation of the subcommittees.

Furthermore, it takes two to negotiate.

And when one side wants five and the other side two of them, there is no reason why we should not agree on two, with the other three to be agreed on later in due time.

2. Dinner Speech by Co-chairman Lee Hu Rak

(Following is a full English text of a speech by Co-chairman Lee Hu Rak of the South-North Coordinating Committee (Seoul side) at a dinner he gave for north Korean delegates attending the third Coordinating Committee meeting on June 12, 1973 in Seoul.

—ED)

Acting Co-chairman Park Sung Chul, our compatriots from Pyongyang and honorable guests!

I think it a great pleasure, and value the meaning, that we of the south and the north are together again here in Seoul tonight for the third meeting of the South-North Coordinating Committee.

It is already almost a year since we saw the July 4 South-North Joint Communique announced.

However, I cannot but express my regret over the fact that there has been little progress in our efforts to improve our South-North relations.

The internecine Korean War that we suffered and the quarter century of total separation have forced us the same Koreans to suffer from mutual distrust, misunderstanding, hatred and suspicion to the degree that might exist between two entirely different peoples.

Indeed, there are too many unhealed wounds between us to simply let bygones be bygones. We can neither ignore our hard reality, nor forget the past overnight to say “past is one thing and future is another.”

As Co-chairman on Seoul side, I would like to make use of this special occasion to express my general views on our South-North relations and ask ourselves what we should do to effectively serve the cause of our country.

To begin with, what I think we should exactly do to serve the purpose is to eliminate the mutual distrust and misunderstanding that exist between our two sides and replace them with mutual understanding and trust as the basis for our new South-North relations.

In order that we meet this demand, I suggest that our two sides:

—Faithfully observe the July 4 South-North Joint Communiqué as our national charter of peace;

—Positively cooperate for an early conclusion of the humanitarian Red Cross talks and an early solution of the problems of the separated families;

—Create the economic subcommittee at an early date and take appropriate economic measures contributing to the common interest of the South and the North, such as;

- a) exchanges of businessmen,**
- b) exchange of goods,**
- c) exchange of scientific technologies,**
- d) joint development of resources,**
- e) holding of commodity fairs in each other side’s area, and**
- f) permitting business firms to be stationed in each other side’s area for business operations;**

—And create the socio-cultural subcommittee at an early date and take measures to serve common social benefits and contribute to the

preservation of our traditional culture, such as ;

- a) exchanges in academic and cultural fields,**
- b) exchanges in sports areas and formation of single teams for International sports events,**
- c) exchanges of film and theatrical arts,**
- d) joint research and development of archaeology and national history,**
- e) joint study for preservation of our indigenous language,**
- f) exchanges of journalists and exchange of resident correspondents to be stationed in each other side's area,**
- g) exchanges in the field of communication, including mail, telephone and telegram services,**
- h) exchanges between social organizations and people, and lastly,**
- i) exchanges in tourism.**

My dear compatriots of the South and the North!

I would like to propose, here and now, that our two sides immediately initiate these exchanges and cooperation and thus “totally open our respective societies to each other.”

I am firmly convinced that this really is the short-cut to the achievement of our prime objective of eliminating our mutual distrust and misunderstanding, and of ushering in a new South-North relationship based on mutual understanding and trust. And for that reason, I am emphasizing once again that to “open our respective societies to each other” is the most urgent task for us to accomplish in order to improve our South-North relations.

I am fully aware that the Pyongyang side has recently been talking of the idea of a package solution, such as signing of a peace treaty, disarmament, joint session of representatives of political parties and social organizations of the South and the North, and the likes.

I do not myself deny the fact that these are the issues that should be discussed between the South and the North sometime in the days yet to come.

However, I feel myself obliged to frankly express the fear that, because our South-North relations are marked by such uniquely tragic past as I have just mentioned, we may to spoil the whole business, if we start discussing such issues outright without having the foundation of mutual understanding and trust cultivated through measures that I listed above.

To say it over again. I'd like to emphasize it again that to "totally open our respective societies to each other" through implementation of extensive exchanges in economic and socio-cultural fields first is indeed the most urgent task for us to accomplish in order to create a basis of mutual understanding and trust. And I believe that such an attitude of ours will no doubt turn out to be an effective way to convince the entire people of the fact that we are truly committed to the improvement of our South-North relations.

In view of the hard realities of our country, there is no question that there is no other desirable way but to start from easier problems and go on to more difficult problems.

The future of our nation hinges on the titanic tasks to which we are now being committed. And there is no reason why we should put easier problems aside and, instead, cling to difficult problems, and thus obstruct the progress of our talks.

Acting Co-chairman Park Sung Chul and my compatriots from Pyongyang!

I do hope that, based on these spirits, we would be able to produce constructive results at our third Committee meeting that we are now holding here in Seoul and thus contribute to the improvement of our South-North relations. And I also wish that your stay in Seoul will turn out to be a pleasant and rewarding one.

Compatriots of the South and the North who are present here!

Let us all toast for the success of our talks, and for the unification of our Fatherland.

3. Press Conference by Co-chairman Lee Hu Rak

〈Following is the complete text of remarks made by Co-chairman Lee Hu Rak of the South-North Coordinating Committee (Seoul side) at a press conference on June 14, 1973. —ED〉

I would first like to give a summary report on what was discussed at third meeting of the South-North Coordinating Committee, and then go on to answer your questions.

To begin with, the north Korean position at the third meeting remained unchanged from the one they had maintained at the second meeting of last March.

First, the north Korean side demanded that a peace treaty be concluded, with provisions for withdrawal of foreign troops, troop reductions and suspension of arms imports from abroad.

Second, they demanded that political negotiations be held between representatives of political parties, social organizations as well as people of all walks of life in the south and north Korea.

Third, they demanded that five subcommittees of the Coordinating Committee be created all at once.

Prior to telling you how I reacted to these north Korean demands, let me tell you the four items that I raised for debate at the third meeting.

They were as follows :

First, I suggested that the two sides, first of all, agree on the rules of the operation of the Coordinating Committee, the Executive Council and the Joint Secretariat.

Second, I suggested that a Joint Secretariat building be constructed in

Panmunjom at an early date, to be used for various conference purposes by the Coordinating Committee. I made this suggestion because I felt that adequate conference facilities in Panmunjom are badly needed to efficiently support the functioning of our Coordinating Committee.

Third, I suggested that both the south and the north faithfully observe agreed items, eliminate the atmosphere of mutual distrust and be honest with each other.

I had specific reasons to raise this issue. As we all know, agreements between the two sides have not been fully observed even after the announcement of the July 4 Joint Communique. Acts contrary to the spirit of the agreements have continued to be committed as are seen in the cases of continued propaganda broadcasts against the South, defamation against the South, dispatches of armed guerrillas into the South and radio instructions exhorting violent class revolution in the South.

I asked the north Koreans to be honest and frank because the north Koreans have been bafflingly dishonest and insincere in handling armed guerrilla and other incidents. Each armed guerrilla incident was duly notified to the north Korean side, only to receive unchangingly dishonest and insincere replies in return. They have always claimed that those armed guerrilla incidents were all "fabrications" by our side.

If our talks were to proceed on satisfactorily, I told the north Koreans, our two sides should be that much honest and frank as to accept facts as facts, and feel sorry for whatever misdeeds that are committed.

I brought up the problem because I felt the credibility problem was an essential problem for the success of our talks.

Fourth, I suggested that the two sides first start with two subcommittees, economic and socio-cultural.

The Agreed Minute on the Formation and Operation of the South-North Coordinating Committee provides for the creation of five subcom-

mittees. But it provides at the same time that “each subcommittee shall be created as the progress of the undertakings of the Coordinating Committee warrants it.”

The prime reason that I suggested we start from economic and socio-cultural subcommittees was because the two subcommittees could cover fields where we could easily implement various exchanges and cooperation.

I told the north Koreans what we could and would do when the two subcommittees are at last created, and I am now going to let it be known to you, wishing that it would help you understand how ardently we want these exchanges initiated.

I told them that, when the economic subcommittee is created, we would implement

- 1) exchanges between businessmen,**
- 2) exchanges of goods,**
- 3) exchanges in the scientific and technological areas,**
- 4) joint development of resources, and**
- 5) holding of commodity fairs in respective areas.**

I also told them that, when the socio-cultural subcommittee is created, we would implement

- 1) exchanges in academic and cultural fields,**
- 2) exchanges in various sports areas and formation of single teams for international events,**
- 3) exchanges in the field of film and theatrical arts,**
- 4) joint research and development of archaeology and national history,**
- 5) Joint study for preservation of our indigenous language,**
- 6) exchange of Journalists and respective stationing of Journalists in the other side’s area,**
- 7) exchanges in the field of communication, including letters, telephone calls and telegrams,**
- 8) exchanges between various social organizations and individuals,**

- 9) exchanges in tourist areas, and
- 10) speedy settlement of the humanitarian problems now being discussed at the Red Cross talks.

Military question is urgent and political question is urgent too, but let us start from exchanges in these fields which are closely related to the everyday life of the people in general, I told the north Koreans.

I emphatically told the north Koreans that to open our respective societies to each other side through exchanges in these fields was possibly the only means to make it possible to eliminate our mutual distrust, foster mutual trust, and to cultivate an atmosphere of mutual understanding.

Now, I will tell you how I reacted to the north Korean suggestions. In the first place, I made it very clear that I was not categorically opposed to the idea of peace treaty.

However, I made it equally clear that the time for us to discuss the peace treaty was yet to come. I told them that a peace treaty could be discussed between our two sides when the two sides have succeeded in cultivating an atmosphere of mutual trust, in which the people of the south and the north are fully assured that once there is a peace treaty, there would really be no war.

To make it repeatedly clear, a peace treaty could come about when the two sides have amply proved through deeds that agreements between the two sides are observed at all cost, and when the people in the south as well as the north are thus at ease.

However, under the circumstances where even a minor agreement is not kept, it is out of the question that we hastily sign a peace treaty, knowing that it is directly related to the life and death of the people.

I told them once and again that I was not categorically opposed to the idea of a peace treaty, but thought the time was yet to ripe to discuss such a grave matter.

In the meantime, I had to take note of a part of the remarks of my north Korean counterpart, in which he said that “if things continue to go on like this, it is feared that a ‘two Korea’ could become a fact.”

On this point, I expressed my fear, that judging from recent developments, north Koreans appeared as pursuing a “two Korea” version themselves.

For instance, I asked about the genuine intent of the recent north Korean drive to enter into formal diplomatic relationship with nations which already have diplomatic relations with the south.

I also cited as an example that the north Koreans are recently trying to enter into various international organizations, and furthermore, the World Health Organization, a specialized agency of the United Nations that they have traditionally detested so much, despite the fact that the south is already a full member there.

“Does such an attitude of north Koreans not indicate that it is you, the north Koreans, who are in fact pursuing a ‘two Korea’ version?” I asked the north Koreans.

To this question, the north Koreans simply replied that they were not pursuing a “two Korea” policy.

Next, I went on to the question of political negotiations between the political parties, social organizations and people of all walks of life.

I termed the north Korean suggestion as unreasonable on account of a number of reasons.

First, I told them that the general purpose of such contacts could be achieved when the economic and socio-cultural subcommittees are created, and when our two respective societies become open to each other through contacts with each other.

Second, I also told them that we were expected to create the political subcommittee in due course, with the ultimate purpose of handling poli-

tical contacts between our two sides.

Thirdly, I told them that I felt it to be no more than a political slogan under the present circumstances to attempt “political negotiations” with people of various walks of life attending there. I frankly told them that I thought it to be a dangerous idea to simply assemble a large number of people and let them talk idly about the question of our country, if we were ever to sincerely pursue a solution of the question of our country. I told my north Korean counterpart that the general purpose of the north Korean suggestion could well be satisfied if our two sides at the South-North Coordinating Committee faithfully represent the genuine wishes of the people in the South and the North.

As you are all aware, the South-North Coordinating Committee is designed to function as a sort of a “mid-wife,” giving birth to the subcommittees and other conferences. What would be achieved at the subcommittees and other conferences are naturally entirely up to them.

I suggested on my part we operate our Coordinating Committee in the direction that it plays the role of a “mid-wife,” giving birth to various conferences as well as subcommittees, without insisting on making all the major decisions by itself.

If there arises a need for a political conference, I said, it must be dealt with at the political subcommittee after it is activated. It was my idea that the political subcommittee should be given the full leverage to decide on whether to conduct the proposed negotiations by itself or to activate political conference for such negotiations,

In conclusions, I told the north Koreans that it was not the political negotiations, as was suggested by the north Koreans, but our mutual effort to set our Coordinating Committee on its right track, that we badly need at the present moment.

On the next question regarding the creating of five subcommittees, I reminded the north Koreans of the conversations we had with our Presi-

dent Park Chung Hee as well as the highest leader of the north on the matter.

President Park and the north Korean leader were in agreement on the need to start from easier problems first in order to make sure of success in our talks.

In that respect, I told the north Koreans that any such hasty idea of starting from military and political subcommittees could ruin the whole business. And furthermore, we could rightly agree to start from the economic and socio-cultural subcommittees because our two sides are practically in agreement on the need to have the two subcommittees activated at an early moment. It takes two to negotiate. And as long as there are fields of agreement as well as disagreement, we should be wise enough to start from the field of agreement. Other subcommittees would be activated in due course, as the progress in the economic and socio-cultural subcommittees warrant it.

Basically, the north Korean idea was that the tension on the Korean peninsula was only due to the rifles and swords. They said, "Let us drop our guns and swords, and there will be no mutual misunderstanding."

However, I told the north Koreans that I was looking at the matter from different angle. "I do not buy your idea that 'if we drop our guns and swords, our mutual misunderstanding and distrust will automatically fade away' " I told the north Koreans, "I think, instead, that if we do away with our mutual misunderstanding and distrust, our guns and swords will become totally useless, and we will be able to convert them into spades and hoes."

This is an illustration of how our two sides differed on the basic concept on the South-North relations.

For we have our counterparts at the negotiating table and for we are earnestly committed to further progress at the talks, I do not think it proper to go further on the contents of the talks. And I have thus far kept

myself to a summary report on what was discussed at the third meeting of the Coordinating Committee.

I fear that there might be dissatisfaction over the fact that we failed to produce agreement at the third meeting. But I do not agree to such an observation.

As is understood by all of us, the South-North problems are not that easy as to be solved through one or two rounds of meetings. An agreement does not necessarily mean substantial progress in the talks, and, on the other hand, no agreement does not necessarily mean that there was no progress at all.

Our two sides succeeded in frankly and seriously exchanging respective views on major issue that we were being confronted with. And I am fully convinced that the results of the frank exchange of views will no doubt turn out conducive to future progress of our talks.

I am confident that we will eventually succeed in producing constructive results through our future meetings. We may let the position of one of our two sides carry in the end, or we may have to compromise our respective positions, that I cannot tell yet.

As Co-chairman of Seoul side, I would like to make it known once again that I and the Coordinating Committee members of my side will continue to exert maximum effort to see constructive results of our talks within the shortest possible time.

Now, let me answer to your questions.

Question: The north Koreans have recently been committing acts contrary to the spirit of the July 4 Joint Communiqué and other agreements, as are seen in the cases of continued dispatches of armed guerrillas and reopening of loud-speaker broadcast across the DMZ. Was there serious discussions on this matter?

Answer: There were profound and earnest discussions on the matter at the

talks. And besides, there had been an offer from the north Koreans on the eve of the third Coordinating Committee meeting through the direct telephone line that “both sides’ cease slandering each other side,” and I instantly had given them my approval. Anyway, there were serious discussions on the matter at the meeting, and once again, we obtained the assurance that such acts would be stopped. So, I think what we would do from now on is just to wait and see.

Question: Would you tell us how the north Koreans reacted to our proposals—proposals to open our respective societies to each other side, to start from the economic and socio-cultural subcommittees and to implement various exchanges?

Answer: I am afraid I can hardly relate the north Korean reaction as it was on a word-by-word basis. They simply insisted that we start from the military question first. They said that our proposal was good in principle, but then insisted on beginning from the military problems.

Now, let me take a few minutes to tell you how I personally view the problems of our country on an overall basis.

I have a firm conviction that, unless our two sides succeed in opening our respective societies to each other side and come to understand each other side, there could be no solution to our South-North problems.

It is quite easy to talk of dropping guns and swords. However, unless we know of the systems, internal conditions and the society of the other side and unless our two respective societies are open to each other side, it is simply impracticable to talk of dropping guns and swords.

“Let us drop our guns and swords, and that, now,” so said the north Koreans. And I replied, “If we consider the realities of our country as they truly are, we can easily come to the conclusion that to talk of dropping guns and swords right at the moment is rather a sentimental and poetic expression than a political suggestion.

Therefore, I think what is now urgently needed of our two sides is to

to answer.

Let me first give you an illustration.

As we all know, a law goes into effect only after an enforcement decree is worked out.

Let us take a look at our Coordinating Committee. The Committee indeed has a "law"—the Agreed Minute on the Formation and Operation of the South-North Coordinating Committee—governing its formation and operation. However, detailed working rules on the operation of the Committee and the Committee's subsidiary organs like the Executive Council and the Joint Secretariat are yet to be worked out. Naturally, I do not think the functioning of our Committee has been normalized.

Naturally again, I was of the belief that, if we were to run this Coordinating Committee satisfactorily, what we should do in the first place was to produce detailed working rules and activate the Joint Secretariat.

Nevertheless, the north Koreans seemed paying little attention to the matter, and confined their argument on the military and political questions.

As a matter of fact, our two sides have thus far succeeded, through behind-the-scenes contacts, in narrowing differences of opinion on all major points of the said detailed working rules, and formal signing on them between our two parties can take place any moment. But, the north Koreans payed little attention to the matter, and appeared primarily interested in the political and military problems only.

I did strongly demand that, if we were to normalize the functioning of our Coordinating Committee, we should first of all agree on the detailed working rules on the operation of the Committee itself and other subsidiary organs as well as on the joint construction of the Joint Secretariat building at an early date.

If there is no more question to ask, let me finish this press conference with a few more remarks.

It is my assumption that next Coordinating Committee meeting will be held sometime around coming September.

Until then, I think our two sides will take a deeper look at each other's position. And I think our recent meeting has turned out quite productive in that our two sides could make use of the occasion to sincerely exchange our respective views on outstanding matters. And for that reason, I am hopeful that we will be able to make some progress when we meet again for our next Committee meeting.

I am not disappointed because we have not succeeded in producing some agreement at our recent meeting.

Agreement or no agreement, we will continue to press our points, and, at the same time, will continue to attentively listen to what the other side say. It may take some time. But, I remain determined as ever to seriously pursue our national goal—a goal to usher in an era of peace upon this peninsula and to bring about a peaceful unification—with patience and sincerity

make our respective societies become completely open to each other side, if we were ever to improve our South-North relations and thus expedite the long-sought unification of our country.

Question: Would you tell us if there was any discussion on the Red Cross talks? And if there was any, please tell us what was discussed on the matter.

Answer: Well, we did have discussions on the Red Cross talks in general terms. Our side suggested that our two sides seriously cooperate with each other to see an early conclusion of the humanitarian talks, and the north Koreans replied that they wanted that too. As you see, the seventh full-dress Red Cross talks are slated for next month, we will see how the result of the talks will turn out.

Question: You have already mentioned on the issue, but may I ask you about details of discussions on the recent north Korean attempts to seek diplomatic relations with countries which already have diplomatic ties with our country. You said that you had expressed the fear that the north Korean attempts themselves were indicative of a pursuit of a “two Korea” policy itself. What was the north Korean reaction to that?

Answer: As a matter of fact, that was not exactly a “topic” of our recent talks. However, I invited the attention of the north Koreans to the matter because somehow the north Koreans mentioned so-called “two Korea” policy while they spoke at the meeting.

I said that it was indeed true that we were committed against a “two Korea” theory and, instead, committed for unification, but, on the other hand, it was altogether true that, in fact, things were not going exactly in that direction.

For instance, I asked the north Koreans if the recent north Korean attempts to enter into diplomatic relations with countries who have formal diplomatic ties with the Republic of Korea was not aimed at fixing “two Korea” as a fait accompli. Furthermore, I cited the north Korean attempts

to enter into a number of international organizations where the Republic of Korea is already a member, and asked the north Koreans if they did not think it proper to cease such attempts, if the north Koreans did not really want our country represented in the international society in the form of "two Koreans."

They simply answered that they were not going in that direction. However, I have the feeling that, despite their awkward explanations, our press is somewhat dubious about the genuine intent of the north Korean attitude on the matter, and I think I should say that I am dubious myself too.

The north Koreans said they were not headed for adoption of a "two Korea" policy, even if they were still trying to establish diplomatic ties with countries who already have ties with our country and to enter into international organizations where the Republic of Korea is already a member.

Nevertheless, I feel the impression that the questioner seems to have found the fact that the north Korean explanation failed to have both ends meet each other, I do not feel inclined to make a direct answer to the question.

Question: The Co-chairman of Pyongyang side, Kim Young Joo, was again absent from the recent meeting. Have you ever heard anything about him recently?

Answer: I have been officially informed that he was still not well, and there was no more information given to me except that. I was told that he was sick in bed and that was all.

Question: would you please tell us the north Korean reaction to the suggestion that the rules on the operation of the Coordinating Committee, the Executive Council and the Joint Secretariat be agreed upon at an early date?

Answer: Well, I really don't want to accuse the other side, nor intend to drive the other side into corner.

But, since a question is raised on the point, I think I should be very frank

1. Progress Report

The Republic of Korea National Red Cross (ROKNRC) and the north Korean Red Cross (NKRC) delegations held their sixth full-dress talks on the fate of the millions of Korean families and relatives separated across the DMZ in Seoul May 8–11, 1973.

The two sides held two sessions, one on May 9 for an hour and forty minutes and the other on May 10 for two hours, and continued discussions on detailed arrangements for the implementation of tracing services embraced in the Agenda Item One, “the question of tracing, and notifying thereof, the whereabouts and fate of the dispersed families and relatives in the South and the North.”

However, the sixth full-dress Red Cross talks again failed to make some progress, reportedly due to the obstinate demand of the NKRC delegation on what they called “*creation of such and such legal conditions and social environment*” as a prerequisite for debates on the Agenda item proper.

The NKRC delegation, led by head of the delegation Kim Tae-hui, comprised seven delegates, seven advisors, twenty attendants and twenty five accompanying reporters.

At the sixth full-dress talks, the NKRC delegation reportedly put forth what they said a “revised proposal” on the detailed arrangements for the implementation of the humanitarian projects of the Agenda Item One.

However, the revised NKRC proposal reportedly remained almost intact as the one they had originally put forth at the third full-dress talks last October.

The revised NKRC proposal was reported to contain the following contents:

First, the NKRC proposal again asked the Republic of Korea “*create so and so legal conditions and social environment,*” as a “prerequisite” for debates on the agenda item proper; namely, 1) abrogation of the Anti-Communist Law and the National Security Law, 2) dissolution of anti-Communist organizations and ban on their activities and 3) ceasing of anti-Communist policy.

Second, the NKRC proposal suggested that the two Red Cross societies respectively dispatch tens of thousands “*Red Cross Publicity personnel,*” by one for each Ri or Dong, the lowest administrative unit, with “full freedom of speech, publication, assembly and travel as well as inviolability of their person and articles they carry” granted to them, for purposes which have very little to do with the tracing services envisioned in the agenda item.

Third, the NKRC proposal suggested that the Red Cross societies concerned should not necessarily intervene in the implementation of the tracing services. The NKRC side maintained, instead, that “the individuals concerned be allowed to go freely to the other side’s area and locate their separated families and relatives by themselves by freely travelling there.”

Chief ROKNRC Delegate Lee Bum-suk took most of his time to point out the impropriety of the NKRC proposals.

The ROKNRC Chief Delegate reminded his NKRC counterpart that the ROKNRC delegation had put forth, earlier at the third full-dress talks, a four-point proposal on the working arrangements for the Agenda Item One, which suits practices and precedents of the International Red Cross family tracing services.

The ROKNRC proposal reportedly suggested the use of common tracing cards for the tracing, and notifying thereof, of the whereabouts and fate of the separated families and relatives, with the two Red Cross societies concerned playing the role of legitimate intermediaries in the

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I declared that the family tracing services to be conducted under agreement between our two Red Cross societies will not be hindered by any existing legal and social conditions in the Republic of Korea, because the Red Cross humanitarianism stands high above politics, laws and ideologies. I also told them that it was the policy of the Republic of Korea Government to positively support the execution of projects to be agreed on at our talks, purely from humanitarian standpoint.

I particularly invited their attention to the fact that I have never myself mentioned the legal and social conditions prevailing in north Korea, mindful of the Red Cross principle prohibiting political debates in carrying out Red Cross humanitarian projects.

Q: Would you define the basic ROKNRC position at the sixth talks?

A: The ROKNRC Delegation was ready to accept whatever suggestions raised by the NKRC side, in so far as they are reasonable and constructive.

For instance, the NKRC side demanded that the problems of Korean residents in Japan be debated within the scope of "dispersed families and relatives in the South and the North." I accepted the idea basically. And I suggested that the problems of the Korean residents in Japan be debated when we come to the Agenda Item Five, "*other humanitarian problems to be solved,*" together with problems of Korean residents living abroad separated between ideologically different countries.

Q: Would you elaborate on the NKRC suggestion that "*Red Cross publicity personnel*" be dispatched to each other side's area?

A: At the sixth talks, the NKRC Delegation suggested that the "*Red Cross publicity personnel*" be dispatched to each other side's area by one for each Ri, or Dong, respectively and that they be granted the freedom of all activities, including publication, assembly and travel, and the inviolability of their person and articles they carry. The suggestion means that our two sides

exchange some thirty-five thousand or so “*publicity personnel*” with each other. As to what they were intended to do when they come down here, I would rather reserve my comment.

Q: What was the result of discussions on the scope of “dispersed families and relatives?”

A: The NKRC side held fast to the idea that the scope be determined by the unilateral appeal by those who want to trace their separated families. I, on my part, suggested that the kinship be determined after it is confirmed by those who are being traced.

Q: Were there discussions on detailed methods to conduct the tracing services?

A: Of course, we did. The ROKNRC Delegation offered the suggestion that the tracing services be conducted by means of exchange of tracing cards, as have been generally done in other countries as a part of Red Cross activities. The NKRC side, on the other hand, suggested that the tracing services be conducted directly by those individuals concerned themselves. The NKRC suggestion was, in other words, that those who want to trace their separated family members and relatives simply go to the other side’s area and search them themselves. If things are that easy and simple, we don’t have to stick around this Red Cross talks, and, naturally, the NKRC suggestion tells by itself how ridiculous and unreasonable it is.

exchange of the tracing cards and the investigation into the fate of the separated families who are being traced.

The Chief ROKNRC Delegate repeatedly noted that the tracing services envisioned in the Agenda Item One were more or less simple services of inquiring into the fate of the separated families and relatives and reporting back the results of the findings to those who initiate the tracings, and noted that the International Red Cross has a long history of handling such a humanitarian project, with established practices and precedents.

Chief ROKNRC Delegate Lee also assured the north Koreans of the resolute will of the Republic of Korea government to see an early solution to the problems of the separated families and relatives, from purely humanitarian standpoint.

“The implementation of the humanitarian projects to be agreed upon at our Red Cross talks and their derivative projects will not be hindered by whatever existing legal and social conditions in the Republic of Korea, and that exactly is the Republic of Korea government policy on this issue,” the Chief ROKNRC Delegate was quoted as having told his NKRC counterpart at the talks.

The Chief ROKNRC Delegate also invited the attention of the NKRC delegation to the fact that the current Red Cross talks had originally been initiated by the Republic of Korea National Red Cross and to the fact that members of the ROKNRC delegation had never been persecuted for their travels south and north, and instead drawn popular respect for the meritorious missions they were committed to.

The Chief ROKNRC Delegate emphatically told the north Korean side that the NKRC demand on the so-called “creation of such and such legal conditions and social environment” was clearly an interference in the domestic politics of the Republic of Korea and expressly a political demand that blatantly violates the principle of the Red Cross prohibiting

political, racial, religious and ideological entanglement with the humanitarian Red Cross activities.

The sixth full-dress Red Cross talks thus wound up without any substantial progress on the question at issue.

The two sides agreed, however, to hold the seventh full-dress talks from July 11, 1973, in Pyongyang.

2. Press Conference by ROKNRC Chief Delegate

(After the close of the sixth full-dress South-North Red Cross talks, Chief ROKNRC Delegate Lee Bum-suk met with local as well as foreign newsmen on the morning of May 11, 1973, to brief them on the outcome of the latest talks. Following are the gist of the question-and-answer session at the press conference between Chief Delegate Lee and newsmen. —ED)

Q: Was there any progress made at the talks?

A: Frankly speaking, there was little progress made at the talks. However, I think our latest talks would turn out helpful to our humanitarian endeavor in the end in that it would help us understand each other more deeply.

Q: Was the NKRC demand for the creation of such and such legal and social climate brought up again at the talks?

A: The NKRC demand for what they termed “elimination of all social and legal obstacles in the Republic of Korea” remained unchanged. I repeatedly asked the NKRC side to withdraw such an unrealistic demand, for the NKRC demand was clearly aimed at inducing political debates into our humanitarian talks, blatantly violating the spirit and tradition of the Red Cross.

Published on July 4, 1973

The Public Relations Association of Korea

I. P. O. Box 2171

Seoul, Korea

No. 002
September, 1973

South-North Dialogue in Korea

— A Crisis in the Dialogue —

International Cultural Society of Korea
Seoul, Korea

South-North Dialogue in Korea

— *South-North Coordinating Committee*—

— *South-North Red Cross Conference*—

TO READERS:

A new crisis is currently in the offing in the relations between the two divided parts of Korea, following the abrupt announcement by north Korea on August 28, 1973, of a unilateral decision to break off the political dialogue with the Republic of Korea at the South-North Coordinating Committee.

The unexpected decision by north Korea to cut off the dialogue unilaterally, announced in the name of Kim Young Joo, the Co-chairman of the South-North Coordinating Committee on Pyongyang side, came to the complete surprise of most Koreans, as well as the world, who had so much at stake in the progress of the dialogue.

The Second Issue of this booklet, "South-North Dialogue in Korea," deals primarily with background motivations of various aspects that have presumably played key roles in forcing the north Koreans to walk out of the dialogue, together with a presentation of issues that are pending in the relations between the two sides.

The Editor sincerely hopes that this booklet will offer a chance for the readers to obtain an accurate, up-to-date picture of recent developments in the relations between the two sides of Korea. —Ed.

SOUTH-NORTH JOINT COMMUNIQUE

Recently there were talks held both in Pyongyang and Seoul to discuss *problems of improving South-north relations and unifying the divided Fatherland.*

Director Hu Rak Lee of the Central Intelligence Agency of Seoul visited Pyongyang from 2 to 5 May 1972 to hold talks with Director Young Joo Kim of the Organization and Guidance Department of Pyongyang. Second Vice Premier Sung Chul Park, acting on behalf of Director Young Joo Kim, also visited Seoul from 29 May to 1 June 1972 to hold further talks with Director Hu Rak Lee.

With the common desire to achieve peaceful unification of the Fatherland as early as possible, the two sides in these talks had frank and openhearted exchanges of views, and made great progress in promoting mutual understanding.

In the course of the talks, the two sides, in an effort to remove the misunderstandings and mistrust and mitigate increased tensions that have arisen between the South and the North as a result of long separation, and further to expedite unification of the Fatherland, have reached full agreement on the following points:

1. The two sides have agreed to the following principles for unification of the Fatherland:

First, unification shall be achieved through independent Korean efforts without being subject to external imposition or interference.

Second, unification shall be achieved through peaceful means, and not through the use of force against each other.

Third, as a homogeneous people, a great national unity shall first be sought, transcending differences in ideas, ideologies, and systems.

2. In order to ease tensions and foster an atmosphere of mutual trust between the South and the North, the two sides have agreed not to slander or defame each

other, not to undertake armed provocations whether on a large or small scale, and to take positive measures to prevent inadvertent military incidents.

3. The two sides, in order to restore severed national ties, promote mutual understanding and to expedite independent peaceful unification, have agreed to carry out various exchanges in many fields.

4. The two sides have agreed to cooperate positively with each other to seek early success of the South-North Red Cross talks, which are underway with the fervent expectations of the entire people.

5. The two sides, in order to prevent the outbreak of unexpected military incidents and to deal directly, promptly and accurately with problems arising between the South and the North, have agreed to install a direct telephone line between Seoul and Pyongyang.

6. The two sides, in order to implement the aforementioned agreed items, solve various problems existing between the South and the North, and to settle the unification problem on the basis of the agreed principles for unification of the Fatherland, have agreed to establish and operate a South-North Coordinating Committee co-chaired by Director Hu Rak Lee and Director Young Joo Kim.

7. The two sides, firmly convinced that the aforementioned agreed items correspond with the common aspirations of the entire people, who are anxious to see an early unification of the Fatherland, hereby solemnly pledge before the entire Korean people that they will faithfully carry out these agreed items.

July 4, 1972

**UPHOLDING THE DESIRES OF THEIR RESPECTIVE
SUPERIORS**

HU RAK LEE

YOUNG JOO KIM

**Agreed Minute
on
Formation and Operation
of
South-North Coordinating Committee**

Both parties agree on the formation and operation of the South-North Coordinating Committee as follows:

1. The South-North Coordinating Committee aims at the solution of the problem of unifying the fatherland on the basis of such agreed principles for the unification of the fatherland as furtherance of the execution of agreed items in the South-North Joint Communique of July 4, 1972, developing of increasingly improved relations between the South and the North and joining efforts and working together in various fields.
2. The functions of the South-North Coordinating Committee are as follows:
 - A. To consult about, and settle, the question of realizing an independent and peaceful unification of the country on the basis of the agreed principles for the unification of the fatherland and to guarantee its implementation.
 - B. To consult about, and settle, the question of effecting a wide range of political exchanges between political parties, social organizations and individuals in the South and the North and to guarantee its implementation.
 - C. To consult about, and settle, the questions of economic, cultural and social exchanges as well as of joining efforts and working together between the South and the North, and to guarantee their implementation.
 - D. To consult about, and settle, the questions of easing tensions, preventing military clashes and dissolving the state of military confrontation between the South and the North, and to guarantee their implementation.
 - E. To consult about, and settle, the question of taking joint steps in overseas activities between the South and the North, enhancing accordingly the

national prestige as a homogeneous nation, and to guarantee its implementation.

3. The South-North Coordinating Committee shall be organized as follows:

- A. The South-North Coordinating Committee shall be composed of one Co-chairman, one Vice Chairman, one Executive Member and two Members from each party. The number of the Committee Members may be increased as necessary. Director Hu Rak Lee of the Central Intelligence Agency and Director Young Joo Kim of the Organizational Guidance Department are hereby designated as the Co-chairmen. Vice Chairmen, Executive Members and Members shall be of ministerial or vice ministerial rank and shall be appointed respectively by the Co-chairmen through prior consultation.
- B. An Executive Council shall be created within the South-North Coordinating Committee.

The Executive Council shall consult about, and settle, when the authority is so delegated by the Co-chairmen of both parties, various problems that arise in the south-north relations while the South-North Coordinating Committee is in recess, and shall guarantee their implementation. The Executive Council shall be composed of the Executive Member and two Secretaries from each side.

- C. Political, Military, Foreign Affairs, Economic and Cultural Subcommittees shall be created within the South-North Coordinating Committee. Each subcommittee shall be created as the progress at the South-North Coordinating Committee warrants it. The functions and the formation of the subcommittees shall be regulated separately through mutual agreement.
 - C. The South-North Coordinating Committee shall have its Joint Secretariat at Panmunjom. Both parties shall respectively appoint Co-directors of the Joint Secretariat one from each party and shall staff necessary number of personnel to work under Co-directors.
4. The South-North Coordinating Committee shall operate as follows:
- A. The South-North Coordinating Committee shall make it a principle to hold

its meetings in Seoul and Pyongyang by turns, and may hold them at Panmunjom, if necessary.

- B. The South-North Coordinating Committee shall convene once every two to three months, and the Executive Council once every month. Extraordinary meetings can be held through mutual agreement.
 - C. The South-North Coordinating Committee meeting shall be held either in public or behind the closed door.
 - D. Necessary number of specialists and staffs of the Joint Secretariat shall be allowed, through mutual agreement, to attend the South-North Coordinating Committee and the Executive Council meetings.
 - E. A final agreement of the South-North Coordinating Committee shall take effect as soon as the Co-chairmen of both parties put their initials on the note of agreement and the agreed items shall be simultaneously announced through the Joint Secretariat upon mutual agreement.
 - F. Detailed operational procedures for the South-North Coordinating Committee shall be worked out separately.
5. This Agreed Minute shall be revised and supplemented through mutual agreement.
6. This Agreed Minute takes effect upon exchange of the texts with initials of both parties on them.

November 4, 1972

(Signed)

Director Hu Rak Lee

Co-chairman (Seoul side)

**South-North Coordinating
Committee**

(Signed)

Director Young Joo Kim

**Co-chairman (Pyongyang
side)**

**South-North Coordinating
Committee**

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Part One

A Crisis in the South-North Relations

—an appraisal of new developments in the relations between south and north Korea following the abrupt announcement of the north Korean statement in the name of Kim Young Joo, north Korean Co-chairman of the South-North Coordinating Committee, on August 28, 1973—

1. North Korean Decision to Suspend the Dialogue

At 6 p.m., August 28, 1973, north Korea all of a sudden interrupted its routine radio programme and put on the air an unexpected statement, in the name of Kim Young Joo, the reportedly ailing Co-chairman of the South-North Coordinating Committee on Pyongyang side, whose aim obviously was to bring the on-going political dialogue between the two divided parts of Korea to an abrupt halt.

The statement, issued in the name of one of the two co-signatories of the historic July 4 South-North Joint Communiqué of last year, dumb-founded many Koreans, for it practically turned out to be an announcement of north Korea's unilateral decision to break off the dialogue.

Kim hurled in the statement many ill-disposed and unfounded accusations against Co-chairman Lee Hu Rak of the Coordinating Committee on Seoul side in person, and the Republic of Korea government as well, in connection with the national security and unification policies of the Republic of Korea government, and unilaterally declared that he would "no longer continue" the dialogue with Co-chairman Lee as his counterpart.

The statement was marked, in particular, with an unprecedented ferocity and malice in the selection of words employed to muckrake the man who represents the Republic of Korea in the dialogue. Kim did not hesitate to use such indecent expressions like a "hooligan," a "ringleader," a "traitor," a "fascist" and "clique" to throw mud at his counterpart in the dialogue.

The north Korean accusations against Co-chairman Lee and the Republic of Korea government included charges:

—*That the Republic of Korea Central Intelligence Agency masterminded the recent abduction of Mr. Kim Dae Jung.*

—That, as Co-chairman of the Coordinating Committee, Lee opposed to the enforcement of agreed items in the Joint Communiqué, and, while vocally clamoring for a “complete opening of respective societies,” opposed to measures to effect it through an “incorporation” and interexchanges between the two sides.

—That the Republic of Korea government has “persecuted patriotic elements” through strengthening of its anti-Communist policy and attempted to perpetuate the division of the country by pursuing a “two Korea” policy.

North Korea said in the statement that it “recognizes the need to continue” the dialogue. However, a perusal of the statement reveals that the north Koreans do not mean what they say.

North Korea said in the statement that it would continue the dialogue if Co-chairman Lee of Seoul side was “replaced” by somebody else. The north Koreans, at the same time, asked the “new” Co-chairman of Seoul side to be a man “who has the national conscience, who truly aspires for a peaceful unification and who opposes to perpetuation of the national division.”

These are no doubt good words. But, it becomes different when they are spoken by the north Korean Communists. It has long been known to most Koreans that, by saying “one who has the national conscience and truly aspires for a peaceful unification,” north Koreans usually mean “one who supports the unification formula ‘taught’ by Kim Il Sung.” Besides, by saying “one who opposes to the perpetuation of the national division,” the north Koreans are understood to mean “one who opposes to June 23 policy announcement by President Park Chung Hee of the Republic of Korea that expressed willingness to enter into the United Nations along with north Korea.”

There is no question about the fact that such a condition is unaccept-

able by the Republic of Korea side. Undoubtedly, the north Korean condition was rather for “disagreement” than for “agreement,” and was thus a mere excuse to conceal north Korea’s true intention to cut off the dialogue.

There were more conditions for a resumption of the dialogue. The north Koreans went on to ask, as conditions for a resumption of the talks:

—*That the Republic of Korea withdraw her “two Korea” policy.*

—*That the Republic of Korea stop “persecution of those ‘who struggle for the national unification,’ ” and guarantee the ‘people’s democratic freedoms’, such as freedom of speech, publication, assembly, association and demonstrations, and freedom of activity for political parties and social organizations.*

—*That the Republic of Korea release imprisoned “partioti.”*

Here again, we have the need to do some interpretation to get the precise meaning of the north Korean message contained in these ‘conditions.’

By ‘*people*,’ they mean people belonging to a class that include ‘*workers*,’ ‘*farmers*,’ ‘*soldiers*’ and ‘*working intelligentsia*’ only.

By ‘*those who struggle for the national unification*,’ they mean ‘*those who work underground in the Republic of Korea to topple the legitimate government by force, under instructions from the north Korean workers’ party*.’

By ‘*patriot*,’ they mean ‘*whoever engages in illegal anti-government activities in the Republic of Korea for whatever causes*.’

When we peruse the north Korean ‘conditions’ for the resumption of the dialogue with these definitions in mind, the north Korean message becomes quite clear.

The north Korean 'conditions,' when translated into our own expressions, include demands:

- That the Republic of Korea withdraw the June 23 declaration of new foreign policy for peace and reunification.*
- That the Republic of Korea give up her anti-Communist policy, by repealing the Anti-Communist Law and the National Security Law, by disbanning all anti-Communist organizations and by prohibiting their anti-Communist activities.*
- That the Republic of Korea release all those who are serving prison terms for crimes against the state.*

The north Korean 'conditions' undoubtedly were an equivalent of a demand that the Republic of Korea become communized before the dialogue was resumed, for they were explicitly aimed at asking the Republic of Korea to legalize activities of those who operate to overthrow the Republic of Korea government by force, under instructions from north Korea.

It was beyond question that these north Korean 'conditions' were all 'impossible demands,' impossible because it called for a unilateral surrender on the part of the Republic of Korea.

Besides, the north Korean demands constituted a major violation of the spirit of the July 4 South-North Joint Communiqué, which envisioned the dialogue between the two divided parts of Korea in terms of a dialogue "between two entirely different systems, one representing a free democracy and the other a Communist proletarian dictatorship." The Communiqué, therefore, called on the two sides to "conduct the dialogue, transcending differences in thoughts, ideologies and systems."

Moreover, the August 28 statement of north Korea went on further to demand, as an additional condition for a resumption of the dialogue, a sweeping reorganization of the South-North Coordinating Committee.

The north Koreans demanded that the Committee be reorganized, recruiting as members representatives of the 'people' of various walks of life as well as political parties and social organizations.

Here again, however, the north Koreans were not respecting an existing agreement between the two sides. The two sides now had the 'Agreed Minute on the Formation and Operation of the South-North Coordinating Committee,' a basic rule to govern the formation and operation of the Committee, agreed upon last November between the two sides. And the Agreed Minute says that any reorganization of the Committee be decided upon by the Committee itself.

The Committee has so far failed to reach a point where it can normalize its functions, due to steadfast obstruction by the north Korean side, as will be discussed in detail later in this booklet. And now, the north Koreans are making issue of the reorganization of the Committee outside the framework of the Committee, and terms it a 'precondition' for the resumption of the dialogue.

As have been discussed above, the north Korean message contained in the abrupt statement of August 28 in the name of Kim Young Joo is now crystal clear.

The north Koreans wanted the on-going South-North dialogue broken off. The north Korean 'conditions' for the resumption of the dialogue were all 'excuses' to conceal their true intention and to escape the blame.

The plain fact was that the South-North dialogue, which has been going on for the last two years now came to a new, unexpected crisis point, despite the fervent expectations of Koreans in both sides of the divided country, who so ardently wanted the dialogue eventually to lead to the cultivation of a lasting peace upon the peninsula and to the achievement of a peaceful unification.

2. Co-chairman Lee Asks Withdrawal of NK Statement, Pledges Anew Patience and Sincerity

Co-chairman Lee Hu Rak of the South-North Coordinating Committee on Seoul side called a special press conference in Seoul on August 29, 1973, to demand that north Korean authorities *“once again come back to reason and immediately withdraw the August 28 statement that so violently trampled upon the spirit of the July 4 South-North Joint Communiqué.”*

Co-chairman Lee analyzed in a statement the contents of the August 28 statement of north Korea on a point-by-point basis to reveal its deceptive nature and warned that “if there is anybody who attempts to destroy the spirit of the July 4 South-North Joint Communiqué against the wishes of the entire people, he would certainly be brought before the history to be condemned as a traitor.”

Co-chairman Lee reiterated in the statement that the basic aims the Republic of Korea pursued in the dialogue with north Korea was to “insure a lasting wellbeing and prosperity” of the entire fifty million Koreans by 1) cultivating a lasting and stable peace upon the peninsula, 2) developing a steady improvement of a peaceful relationship with the North and 3) by achieving an independent and peaceful unification of the country, “with the July 4 South-North Joint Communiqué as a national charter to govern the future relationship between the two divided parts of the country.”

He pledged anew that, “despite whatever difficulties,” the Republic of Korea would stand firm in the determination to continue the dialogue with north Korea, with patience and sincerity, faithfully in consonance with the spirit of the July 4 South-North Joint Communiqué.”

Co-chairman Lee interpreted the north Korean statement of August 28 as a “makeshift measure,” designed to express their diehard opposition to the new foreign policy for peace and unification of the country announc-

ed on June 23 by President Park Chung Hee of the Republic of Korea in consternation over the fact that the new foreign policy of the Republic of Korea was appealing increasingly domestically as well as internationally, weakening the north Korean position to be presented at the forthcoming United Nations General Assembly. The Co-chairman of the Seoul side deplored that the north Korean move was evidently an attempt to “break off, at least temporarily, the dialogue, whose cause is promotion of peace.”

Co-chairman Lee said in the statement that, when he first visited Pyongyang at the risk of his own personal safety to meet with Kim Il Sung in May last year, he did not conceal his own identity.

“I made it emphatically clear to them,” the Co-chairman said, “that I was Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, the national security organization whose mission was to crack down hard on those who violate national security laws, such as the Anti-Communist Law and the National Security Law.” “ Kim Il Sung at that time understandingly accepted my own introduction,” Co-chairman Lee went on to say, quoting Kim Il Sung as having said, *“I have confidence in you because you are the very man who cracks down on the Communists. I might not have trusted if it were anybody else.”*

Lee said it did not make sense at all that, only a year from then, the north Koreans now make issue of his identity as Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and label him what they called “a traitor who persecutes ‘patriots,’ ” for reasons that he cracks down on the Communist who violate the Anti-Communist Law and the National Security Law.

As to various charges levelled at him by the north Koreans in connection with the operation of the Coordinating Committee, the Co-chairman of the Seoul side had the following counterquestions to ask. They were:

—*The Seoul side had repeatedly suggested that the two sides promptly agree on working rules for the operation of the Coordinating Committee,*

the Executive Council and the Joint Secretariat, promptly activate the Joint Secretariat and jointly erect a Joint Secretariat building, as measures to insure an early normalization of the functions of the Committee and its subordinate apparatuses. However, these repeated suggestions of the Seoul side had gone completely unheeded by the north Koreans.

Then, who is to be blamed for the delay in the enforcement of the agreed items in the Joint Communique?

—The two sides agreed in the July 4 South-North Joint Communique not to slander or defame each other. And the two sides also agreed last November to suspend radio programmes aimed to harass the people in the other side's area with hostile broadcasts against the internal affairs of the other side. Although the Republic of Korea had faithfully observed these agreements, the north Korean side had simply ignored these agreements by continuing hostile broadcasts against the Republic of Korea, with increased hatred and hostility.

Then, who is responsible for the violation of the spirit of the Joint Communique?

—The Seoul side had suggested, at every Coordinating Committee meetings in the past, that the two sides, in an effort to promote mutual understanding and trust, "open their respective societies to each other side." And the Seoul side had illustrated many fields of possible "exchanges" and "cooperation" between the two sides, to be implemented upon arrival at agreement between the two sides. However, these suggestions of the Seoul side had been repeatedly ignored by the north Koreans likewise.

Then, who should be blamed for the disrupted improvement of the relations between the two divided parts of the country?

—Kim Young Joo, one of the two co-signatories of the July 4 South-North Joint Communique and Co-chairman of the South-North Coordinating Committee for the Pyongyang side, had never showed up at the Coordina-

ting Committee meetings, under the pretext that he was sick in bed, with obscure explanations as to the exact diagnosis of his illness.

Then, who was it to blame for the lack of sincerity?

Co-chairman Lee also disclosed remarks he exchanged with Kim Il Sung last November. "I told him that, as a country which is committed to the cause of free democracy, the Republic of Korea wants to have a situation where such laws as the Anti-Communist Law and the National Security Law, are no longer necessary," Lee said, adding, "however, I told him that there was a 'precondition,' the condition that your side stop dispatching espionages and stop sending instructions calling for a violent uprising by the "poor" for the cause of a "class revolution" in the Republic of Korea."

"Had the north Koreans faithfully abided by the spirit of the Joint Communique and refrained from dispatching spies down to the South, there would certainly have been no reason for the arrest of spies," Co-chairman Lee said, "and, had there been no secret instructions from the North instigating violent class revolution in the Republic of Korea, there would have been no arrests of those who violate the national security laws."

"If the north Korean logic can stand," the Co-chairman emphatically said, "I can say that a parallel logic could be applied to the north Koreans themselves too."

"I have my own right to refuse to meet with Kim Young Joo, who is director of the powerful organizational department of north Korea's workers' party," Lee said, "for the north Korean workers' party was responsible for the outbreak of the tragic Korean War, which caused the unwarrantable massacre of millions of Koreans, responsible for the inhuman persecution of millions of innocent bona fide 'patriots,' accusing them as 'counterrevolutionaries,' and responsible for the maintaining of forced labor camps at Aoji coal mine, where they still keep countless number of patriots at labor of death."

"I am of the belief, however," Lee continued, "that, in coping with the

problems of national interest, personal emotion is a factor that should be kept away. And, it was exactly for that reason that I have so far conducted this dialogue, transcending all my past sentiment, with patience and sincerity only.”

3. Genuine Motivations of NK Statement of Aug. 28

At his special press conference on August 29, Co-chairman Lee of the Seoul side gave expression to his own evaluations on the genuine motivations of the north Korean statement of the day before. They were as follows:

First, north Koreans did not really want the dialogue to go on.

Second, the north Koreans were in a state of shock and confusion, as the new foreign policy of the Republic of Korea announced on June 23 by President Park strongly appealed to the international community.

Third, as was evidenced in the case of the recent ‘Moscow Universiad,’ where the Republic of Korea players were warmly greeted by the Soviet public and which the north Koreans boycotted at the last moment, the hardline position of north Korea was getting more and more isolated in the international community. And north Korea’s relations with Soviet Russia was no exception.

For these reasons, the north Koreans have, for quite a while, been in pursuit of a chance to break off the dialogue with the Republic of Korea and to express their displeasure over recent developments in international situation.

There came the case of Mr. Kim Dae Jung. And news media abroad carried wild speculations linking the Republic of Korea Central Intelligence Agency with the mysterious case. North Koreans now decided to capitalize on it.

North Koreans viewed the situation exceptionally favorable to them in that, they must have believed so, they could evade the blames for their uni-

lateral breakoff of the dialogue and at the same time shake the Central Intelligence Agency, a backbone of the national security of the Republic of Korea in her fight against the north Korean scheme to communize the entire peninsula, by capitalizing on the wild speculations linking the ROKCIA with the case of Mr. Kim Dae Jung.

The north Korean intention to capitalize on Mr. Kim's case was obvious, judging from the fact that the August 28 statement of north Korea was filled mostly with slanderous and defamatory accusations levelled at the Central Intelligence Agency, and Co-chairman Lee as head of the security organization, in connection with Mr. Kim's case.

However, the north Korean attempt to "justify" their unilateral decision to break off the dialogue was doomed to failure, for a close follow-up of recent developments in the South-North relations would prove that such a "justification" of the north Koreans was only a "cover."

The Agreed Minute on the Formation and Operation of the South-North Coordinating Committee calls for a meeting once every month of the Executive Council of the Committee. The north Koreans, however, refused to hold the Executive Council meeting in last July, despite repeated requests by the Republic of Korea side. And that was well before the occurrence of Mr. Kim's case. With the start of the month of August, the Republic of Korea side again suggested that the two sides hold the Executive Council meeting at an early date. And the north Koreans again refused to pay heed to the suggestion.

The north Korean reluctance to hold the Executive Council meeting well before the occurrence of Mr. Kim's case, in contravention of stipulations in the Agreed Minute, was one evidence that discredited the north Korean allegation that Mr. Kim's case was the cause of the breakoff of the dialogue.

All the evidences gathered from the recent developments in the South-North relations indicate that north Korea had long been contemplating,

from as early as the beginning of this year, a suspension of the on-going dialogue with the Republic of Korea. The north Koreans had failed to do so, simply because they had failed to find “plausible excuses” to “justify” their doing so.

The north Koreans became increasingly impatient with the approach of the month of September, the month in which they were to play the host of the fourth Coordinating Committee meeting in Pyongyang, according to stipulations in the Agreed Minute. The north Koreans were greatly disturbed because they had no intention of having any more Coordinating Committee meetings held at least for the time being.

There now came the mystery case of Mr. Kim’s abduction. North Koreans felt that they now had “good excuses.” They decided to capitalize on it. And there came the breakoff of the dialogue.

Then now, why were the north Koreans so determined to bring the dialogue with the Republic of Korea to a sudden rupture? This question deserves a close examination, in order to bring all the facts to the public eyes.

We can get answers to this question by tracking down the causes and reasons that had motivated the north Koreans to start a dialogue with the Republic of Korea.

Let us start from a review of the Republic of Korea’s own cause of taking the initiative in the dialogue between the two divided parts of Korea.

At his special press conference on August 29, Co-chairman Lee of Seoul side emphatically explained that the Republic of Korea had started the political dialogue with north Korea, back in 1972, with the great cause of the nation, the cause of peace, prosperity and unification.

The Republic of Korea’s cause enjoyed good, justified reason, because it primarily aimed at reducing the prevailing tension in the Korean peninsula, created by the continued military provocations and subversive activi-

ties against the Republic of Korea by north Korean authorities. The world in those days worried so much about the relations between the two divided parts of Korea that many people regarded the Korean peninsula as one of the “most vulnerable powder kegs” in the world.

The Republic of Korea decided to initiate a political dialogue with north Korea with the aim of improving the general situation of the Korean peninsula. The Republic of Korea started the political dialogue with north Koreans with the hope that it would lead to the reduction of the tension in the relations between the two divided parts of Korea, lay the foundation for a lasting peace on the Korean peninsula and to the eventual unification of the divided country.

A final solution to the problems involving relations between the two divided parts of Korea should eventually come in the form of a unification. There was no question about that.

However, that was a remote possibility, considering the hard reality that one side represents a system which is totally negative to that of the other side, the South speaking for a free democracy and a capitalist economy while the North for a Communist proletarian dictatorship and a socialist economy.

Due to these categorical differences between the two systems, a legacy of the Cold War confrontation following the end of the World War II, the two divided parts of Korea had thus far failed to work out a unification formula that was acceptable to both sides at the same time. No unification formula could be conceived, under the circumstances, except the unworkable one that means a “choice between the two systems.”

It was not that there was not a unification formula that could meet the principle of universality as well as reasonableness, as was seen in the case of a unification formula advocated traditionally by the past governments of the Republic of Korea. The traditional unification formula of the past Republic of Korea governments called for a “*national election throughout*

Korea, under the United Nations supervision, with representations to be made proportionate to the difference in the number of population” in the two divided parts of Korea.

Viewed from an objective standpoint, the Republic of Korea’s traditional unification formula undoubtedly was a reasonable one, in that it called for a choice of the system according to the principle of majority rule.

North Koreans, of course, had steadfastly rejected the unification formula, because they knew that, if the choice of a system were made according to the principle of majority rule, they would certainly fail to achieve a Communist takeover of the entire peninsula.

Due to these situations, a dialogue between the two parts of Korea had to start first from a dialogue of a system versus a system. So, that was precisely what the Republic of Korea had in mind when she initiated the current dialogue with north Korea, envisioning a series of developments in terms of a number of stages, involving the creation of the foundation of a lasting peace, the improvement of a peaceful relationship between the two systems through a steady increase in the interexchanges and cooperation and lastly achievement of a peaceful unification in due course.

Then, what has been the north Korean objective in connection with the problems involving the unification of the divided country?

From the very moment when north Korean Communists gained the control over the northern half of the Korean peninsula back in 1945, they have nurtured the sole objective of a Communist takeover of the southern half of the peninsula through violent means. North Koreans have never ceased talking aloud about the “independent and peaceful” unification of the country. But, the only unification formula that they have had in store was the one that could eventually assure them of a Communist takeover of the entire peninsula at all cost.

North Korea once attempted a military takeover of the southern half of the peninsula back in 1950, when they so wrongly miscalculated that the

Republic of Korea was so insufficiently prepared militarily that she could not withstand a full-scale military invasion.

However, the north Korean attempt was foiled, in a vicious three-year war that raged across the breadth and length of the peninsula, in the face of the might of the international justice acting upon the United Nations ruling condemning north Korea as “aggressor,” as well as the firm determination of the Korean people to protect the freedom at any cost.

Even after the 1953 truce that ended the Korean War, the north Koreans continued to talk about an “independent and peaceful” unification.

Now, north Korea’s return to the “peace offensive” signified a shift only in the strategy, and not in their objective, to pursue a Communist takeover of the country. They obviously made the shift upon recognition of the hard fact that they could not attain their objective through a full-scale war against the Republic of Korea.

North Korea now began resorting more to indirect means of instigating a “popular uprising” in the Republic of Korea, with the purpose of achieving what they call a “people’s democratic revolution” through an overthrow of the legitimate government of the Republic of Korea by force.

North Korea now began infiltrating more espionages into the South with instructions to stir social unrest among the poor, including laborers, farmers and fishermen, namely, and organize them into an “anti-government revolutionary force.” North Korea began operating a clandestine radio station up there in the North, under the false guise of an underground outfit existing in the Republic of Korea, with programmes appealing to the people of relatively poor class in the Republic of Korea to “rise for the revolutionary cause.”

North Korea also began training and dispatching to the South bands of armed guerrillas with the obvious aim of creating crisis-consciousness among the people of the Republic of Korea.

North Korea adopted, in April, 1971, what they termed an “*eight-point peaceful unification formula*” at their supreme people’s congress, in the form of a “report by foreign minister Huh Dam.” However, one could easily find that that was no more a “peaceful unification formula” than a dog was never a cat; when one closely examined the “preamble” of the “formula.”

The north Korean “peaceful unification formula” and its “preconditions” spelled out in the “preamble” of the formula, stating that the “formula” could become effective “*only in the event where either a ‘regime of genuinely people’s’ is established, or ‘patriotic and democratic persons’ seize the power, in south Korea, after an overthrow of the present government there.*”

It was a clear message that north Koreans did not consider a peaceful unification, “unless a proletarian regime seizes the political power in the Republic of Korea.”

North Korea’s self-styled “peaceful unification formula” was unquestionably not a genuinely peace-oriented suggestion, in so far as it called for an overthrow of the legitimate government of the Republic of Korea by force as a “precondition.”

North Korea’s basic position on the unification problem did not change even after the South-North dialogue was started in 1971.

There was a telltale evidence that substantiated the unchanged north Korean pursuit of a Communist takeover of the southern half of the peninsula by force, despite the on-going dialogue with the Republic of Korea.

It came out in the form of a policy thesis, entitled, “*On the Mutual Relationship between the Unification of the Fatherland and the Revolution in south Korea,*” released by north Korean workers’ party on the very eve of the simultaneous announcement of the South-North Joint Communiqué in Seoul and Pyongyang on July 4, 1972.

North Korea elaborated in the thesis on its basic policy on the question of the unification as following:

“The unification of the fatherland will be achieved through joint efforts of the ‘socialist force’ in the northern half and the ‘democratic force’ in south Korea, when the American troops are withdrawn from south Korea and the ‘people’s democratic revolution’ is achieved there, vesting the political power in the hands of the ‘people.’

“The common denominators in the mutual relationship between the revolution in south Korea and the unification of the fatherland are:

- That the revolution in south Korea and the unification of the fatherland are the two revolutionary tasks that should be fought for to secure a final victory of the Korean revolution, and they are the ‘prerequisites’ for a final victory of the Korean revolution.*
- That the unification of the fatherland can be achieved on condition that the revolution in south Korea is achieved. The unification can be achieved on the sole condition that an ‘anti-imperialist, national liberation and people’s democratic’ revolution is achieved in south Korea.*
- That the major object of the struggle for the revolution in south Korea and the unification of the fatherland is the presence of the American troops, and to drive the American troops out of south Korea has the top priority in the struggle.*

“The differences in the relationship between the revolution in south Korea and the unification of the fatherland are:

- That the revolution in south Korea involves south Korea only, whereas the unification of the fatherland involves the south and north alike.*
- That the revolution in south Korea calls for an ‘anti-imperialist, national liberation and people’s democratic revolution,’ in order to liberate the ‘people’ nationally and by classes, whereas the unification of the fatherland calls for an accomplishment of a ‘revolution of national liberation’*

on a national scale under the flag of the 'people's democratic republic of Korea.'

—That there can be both peaceful and non-peaceful means to achieve the unification of the fatherland, but there are 'violent means only' to achieve the revolution in south Korea."

This indeed was a pronouncement of a grotesquely terrible policy. And it was all the more terrible because of the choice of timing for the pronouncement.

As a result of the secret visit to Pyongyang in early May last year by Director Lee Hu Rak of the ROKCIA, the two sides of Korea had reached agreement, as early as the latter part of June, to make the simultaneous announcement of the South-North Joint Communiqué on July 4. The north Korean choice of the eve of the announcement of the Joint Communiqué for the release of the bizarre "thesis" was a deliberate one, unmistakably carrying the meaning that north Korea was going to pursue the "Communist takeover" of the southern half of the divided country by means of a violent class revolution in south Korea, in disregard of the Joint Communiqué, which was to be made public on the following day.

Then, what were the factors that motivated the north Koreans to accept the dialogue, despite their unchanged scheme of seeking a Communist takeover of south Korea by force?

The answer is very simple. It was because they arrived at a conclusion that the dialogue would offer a chance to promote conditions for a violent class revolution in south Korea.

What were then the concrete aims of the north Koreans in the dialogue?

First, they aimed at the weakening of the dominant anti-Communist sentiment of the people of the Republic of Korea. The north Korean demand at the humanitarian Red Cross talks that, as a precondition for a serious debate on the Agenda items proper, the Republic of Korea 1) abro-

gate the Anti-Communist Law and the National Security Law, 2) disband anti-Communist organizations and prohibit their activities and 3) formally give up her anti-Communist policy was the living proof of the north Korean scheme. The purpose of the north Korean demand was to make use of the dialogue as an instrument to weaken the anti-Communist sentiment of the people of the Republic of Korea and thus secure a room for what they call "revolutionary force," operating under instructions from Pyongyang, to engage legally in subversive activities in south Korea.

Second, they aimed at forcing the American troops out of Korea. North Koreans produced a five-point military proposal at the South-North Coordinating Committee as a "prerequisite" for progress in the political dialogue. Without a prior solution of the military question, north Koreans argued, "there can be no progress in the dialogue, no improvement in the South-North relations and no solution to problems related to the unification."

The key item of the five-point north Korean military proposal was unmistakably the question of the withdrawal of American troops stationed in Korea under the United Nations flag on a peace-keeping mission.

North Koreans attempted to fabricate the presence of the American troops in Korea as the "major obstacle" to the improvement of relations between the two divided parts of Korea and hoped to create an international pressure in favor of the withdrawal of the American troops.

North Koreans had still another motivation of their own to accept the dialogue. By accepting the dialogue, they wanted to improve their image abroad. North Korea had long been a notoriety in the international community, due to the fanatical personality cult, idolizing the person of Kim Il Sung, the ideological dogmatism that refuses accommodation with the changing world situations, the continued aggressive policy against the Republic of Korea that had kept the Korean peninsula constantly shrouded by the cloud of tension, and the attempted export of violent revolutions to countries like Mexico and Ceylon.

North Koreans now wanted to exploit the dialogue to play a wolf in the guise of a sheep. The north Koreans hoped that their acceptance of the dialogue could convince the world public opinion that they were now indeed pursuing a peace-oriented policy. Such a design of the north Koreans' became evident when, with the start of the political dialogue with the Republic of Korea, north Korea sent a dozen diplomatic missions out to scores of countries around the world on a full-scale "peace offensive," begging for an "equal treatment" with the Republic of Korea and knocking at the door of such world organizations as the International Parliamentarians' Union and the World Health Organization.

However, with the passing of time, north Koreans were soon to find that they were committing some gross miscalculations.

As the South-North dialogue trailed on without progress, with the north Korean side holding fast to their demands whose purposes were all but clear, the people of the Republic of Korea were alerted anew against hidden designs of the north Koreans.

As a result, the dialogue with north Koreans helped Koreans in the South increase their vigilance against the schemes of the north Korean Communists. The necessity of the continued presence of the American troops under the United Nations flag, as a peace-keeping force and at the same time a deterrence against possible recurrence of a full-scale war, was reaffirmed. And, furthermore, the world public opinion would stay clear of the dialogue, watching intensely the progress in the dialogue, praising it as "welcome efforts of Korean people to solve their problems through their own efforts."

These were developments that, by and large, betrayed the original expectations of the north Koreans.

Besides, there came an additional factor that made the north Koreans worry a lot more. The dialogue with the Republic of Korea unexpectedly surfaced a factor that began threatening the security of the north Korean regime itself.

The fanatical personality cult in north Korea, almost unprecedented and unparalleled in the history of mankind, came into being as a result of a rule by absolute deception. The north Korean populace had been completely cut off from the international community in the flow of information. The completely isolated north Korean society became a north Korean version of George Orwell's Animal Farm, where the populace was compelled to believe in the "infallibility" of Kim Il Sung and in the "absolute superiority" of the socialist economy over the capitalist economy. The north Korean populace was given a picture of south Korea as a "colony of American imperialists and Japanese militarists, where poverty is so prevailing that streets are filled with beggars and the jobless, with luxuries confined to a handful of puppets of the American imperialists and Japanese militarists."

The dialogue between the two sides of Korea involved exchanges of people, although in a limited number, as the dialogue of both levels, the Red Cross talks on the one hand, and the Coordinating Committee meetings on the other, held meetings commuting between Seoul and Pyongyang. In the course of these exchanges, the north Korean leaders could not keep the eyes of the Koreans coming to Seoul from the North completely away from the prosperity that was being enjoyed by the people of the Republic of Korea. The deception had to become apparent in the eyes of those north Koreans who were taking part in the dialogue, endangering the "infallibility" of the teachings of Kim Il Sung and shaking the belief in the "absolute superiority" of the socialist economy over the capitalist economy. No doubt, the interim consequences turned out to be seriously detrimental to north Korea's own security.

Gains were too little, if any, whereas the risks were too great for the north Korean Communists. There were good evidences indicating that north Koreans reached precisely that conclusion, when they completed a thorough appraisal on the gains and losses in their venture in the dialogue with the Republic of Korea, as part of their routine annual year-end audit of their policy in general. North Koreans found themselves in a position where they could neither broaden the scope of the dialogue, nor allow progress

in the dialogue. The north Korean ardour for progress of the dialogue was visibly decreased with the beginning of the year of 1973.

In June this year, a new situation began developing, following the announcement by the Republic of Korea government of new foreign policy for peace and unification on June 23. The new seven-point foreign policy of the Republic of Korea declared by President Park Chung Hee was markedly a positive initiative of the Republic of Korea in her persistent effort to secure a lasting security and peace on the Korean peninsula. The world acclaimed the new foreign policy declared by President Park as a “foresighted decision” for the cause of peace upon the peninsula and eventual unification of the divided country.

North Koreans had to find their position in an increasingly serious dilemma.

The north Koreans choice was obvious from the beginning. Had they accepted the new Republic of Korea foreign policy, it was certain that it would have assured of a lasting peace upon the Korean peninsula. However, that involved the risk for the north Koreans of losing “justifications” for the kind of rule that they had thus far imposed upon the north Korean populace, the kind of rule that “rationalized” the hard economy with the excuses that it is indispensable for the cause of a “Communist unification” of the entire peninsula. And, naturally, the only choice open for the north Koreans was to break off the dialogue. By breaking off the dialogue, the north Koreans must have concluded, they could at least protect the closed society of north Korea from “being infected” by the open society of the Republic of Korea and could tell the whole world at the same time that they would never buy the new foreign policy of the Republic of Korea.

However, they were in trouble to find good excuses to cut off the dialogue. Because of the lack of good excuses, the north Koreans had to while away the months of July and August, repeatedly ignoring the Republic of Korea suggestion to call the Executive Council into session, without offering plausible reasons.

Then, there came the case of Mr. Kim Dae Jung. And the north Koreans decided that Mr. Kim's case was worth capitalizing on to "justify" their unilateral breakoff of the dialogue.

The north Koreans also counted on the possibility that the breakoff of the dialogue and the consequent hardened relations between the two sides of Korea could hamper the gathering international effort to see the Republic of Korea admitted into the United Nations along with north Korea.

These now were the factors that motivated north Korea to issue the abrupt statement of August 28 in the name of Kim Young Joo, ailing Co-chairman of the South-North Coordinating Committee on Pyongyang side.

4. Serious Efforts to Expedite the Dialogue

The Republic of Korea, as a matter of fact, had been aware that north Korea was probably seriously contemplating a breakoff of the dialogue. There were a number of symptoms in the air indicating the possibility.

The Republic of Korea could read the mind of north Koreans from the north Korean effort to stall progress at the humanitarian Red Cross talks, with the obstinate demand on a prior agreement on the so-called "creation of legal conditions and social environment" in the Republic of Korea, and could sense the north Korean trouble from their reluctance to keep the dialogue going on even on a nominal basis.

With the probability of a breakoff of the dialogue in mind, the Republic of Korea started, in July, taking new initiatives to expedite the dialogue.

Among these initiatives were the proposal made by the Republic of Korea National Red Cross, at the seventh Red Cross talks held in Pyongyang in July, of an exchange of tomb-worshippers between the two divided parts of Korea during the Lunar August Full Moon holidays this year and the efforts

of the Seoul side of the South-North Coordinating Committee to materialize an invitation for north Korean volleyball leaders to attend an international volleyball seminar held in Seoul in August.

The humanitarian South-North Red Cross Conference had continued to be tied up helplessly over ways to implement the Agenda Item One, “the question of tracing, and notifying thereof, the whereabouts and fate of the dispersed families and relatives in the South and the North,” with little sign of progress in sight.

Mindful of the situation, the ROKNRC delegation proposed at the seventh talks that, as a measure to break the long-standing deadlock, the two sides agree to “facilitate an exchange of a group each of separated families and relatives during the Lunar August Full Moon holidays this year, so that they can visit the graves of their ancestors in their home towns in the other side of the country and pay their homage to their ancestors lying there.”

It has been one of the time-old customs of Korea that people go to the graves of their ancestors during the Lunar August Full Moon holidays to offer the year’s new crops, and pay their homage, to the dead in the graves.

The timing of the ROKNRC proposal was perfect because the Lunar August Full Moon this year, falling on September 11 by solar calendar, was only two months away.

However, the ROKNRC offer was outrightly rejected by the north Korean Red Cross delegation. The NKRC delegation rejected the ROKNRC offer on the ground that no such exchanges could be considered, unless the ROKNRC delegation first accept the NKRC demand that the Republic of Korea repeal the Anti-Communist Law and the National Security Law, disband anti-Communist organizations and prohibit their activities, give up her anti-Communist policy, and thus “create favorable legal conditions and social environment.”

As a matter of fact, had the proposed exchange of tomb-worshippers materialized, although in limited numbers, it would certainly have offered an opportunity to prove that the north Korean demand on the so-called "creation of legal conditions and social environment," as a precondition for implementation of the humanitarian Red Cross projects at issue at the talks, was, in fact, a futile argument. North Koreans might have feared precisely that consequence and have had no other choice but to reject the offer.

On the other hand, the Republic of Korea Volleyball Association asked Co-chairman Lee Hu Rak of the South-North Coordinating Committee on Seoul side, in late July, to relay an invitation to the north Korean volleyball association inviting their volleyball leaders to the Second Asian Volleyball Leaders' Seminar to be held in Seoul. The international volleyball seminar was scheduled to be held in Seoul August 10-20, in accordance with a unanimous resolution at the plenary meeting of the Asian Volleyball League in Manila in May.

North Korean volleyball association being a member of the League, the Republic of Korea Volleyball Association decided to invite the north Koreans too to the international event and asked the South-North Coordinating Committee to offer good offices to see the invitation materialize.

Co-chairman Lee of Seoul side thought highly of the decision by the Republic of Korea Volleyball Association to invite north Korean volleyball leaders in view of the hope that it could open the way for a larger scale of exchanges in the sports field between the two sides of Korea, and gladly accepted the role of a messenger.

Co-chariman Lee duly relayed the invitation, together with a message of his own guaranteeing the personal safety and necessary accommodation for the north Korean volleyball leaders while they stay in south Korea, to Kim Young Joo, Co-chairman of the South-North Coordinating Committee on Pyongyang side on August 2, asking him to transmit the invitation to the north Korean volleyball association.

However, north Korea again refused even to receive the invitation formally. The north Koreans sent the invitation back to Seoul on the following day, under ambiguous excuses that it was “no time to handle such trivial matters like the invitation of volleyball leaders, when major problems like the military questions are still waiting to be solved.”

In consequence, the repeated efforts of the Republic of Korea to break the current deadlock in the dialogue had continuously been turned down by the north Korea.

Then, why did the north Koreans so persistently turn down the sincere efforts of the Republic of Korea?

The answer is quite simple here again.

The north Koreans did not want the South-North relations evolve into a stage, at least under the present circumstances, where the two sides actually enforce interexchanges and cooperation.

It is an undeniable fact that the present South-North relationship envisions a kind of coexistence, at least for the time being, between the two entirely different systems, committed to the cause of developing a peaceful relationship between the two sides. It, therefore, calls for a “*competition in good faith*” between the two systems, leaving the choice of a system that would better serve the cause of future prosperity and wellbeing of the country to the people themselves.

President Park Chung Hee of the Republic of Korea gave precisely that picture of a future relationship between the two divided parts of Korea when he asked the north Koreans, in a speech on August 15, 1970, to discard the scheme of a Communist takeover of south Korea by force and, instead, *to start a “competition in good faith,” a competition of “development constructiveness and creativity” between the two systems, in order that the people can determine which of the two systems, one democracy and the other Communist dictatorship, will provide better living for them.*

However, north Korea was reluctant to accept that kind of a peaceful relationship, reluctant because they now knew that such a competition with the Republic of Korea would certainly cause serious problems of their own for the security of the north Korean regime.

North Korea feared, in that connection, to have the relationship between the two sides go beyond a certain limit. The north Korean leadership viewed the proposed exchange of tomb-worshippers and invitation to north Korean volleyball leaders in that context, and rejected them for the fear that acceptance of the proposals would make the personnel exchanges a fait accompli.

5. Prospects of Dialogue

At his press conference on August 29, Co-chairman Lee of Seoul side emphatically said that the dialogue between the two parts of Korea "should continue by any means." The Co-chairman of Seoul side said the continuation of the dialogue was "necessary because it is the only means to remove the misunderstanding between the two sides and avert the danger of war."

It appears that there is no question about the fact that, with the August 28 statement of north Korea now out to the public, the dialogue is broken off, at least temporarily, if not completely.

It is true that the August 28 statement of north Korea did not refer to the humanitarian Red Cross talks, and thus left room for speculations that the Red Cross talks were to go on, despite the interruption in the operation of the Coordinating Committee.

However, it seems unlikely that the Red Cross talks would produce any substantial progress, even if the sessions continue to be held, because the north Koreans have been pursuing the same objective in both levels of the dialogue.

Then, we now come to the question of the future of the dialogue. And Co-chairman Lee of Seoul side was definitely optimistic about it, when asked to give his own prediction at the press conference.

“I am not pessimistic about the future of the dialogue, in spite of the statement of Kim Young Joo, my north Korean counterpart,” Co-chairman Lee said, adding, “that is because the unanimous wishes of the entire Koreans are for the dialogue to continue.”

It seems true that there are a number of factors that indicate that a resumption of the dialogue is a matter of time, despite possible interruptions. To list some of them:

First, it is evident that, as was rightly pointed out by the Co-chairman of Seoul side, the bulk of Koreans, regardless of where they belong, south or north, eagerly wants to see the dialogue continued. They are clearly of the thought that the dialogue is one of the major contributing factors in keeping the Korean peninsula clear of a possible recurrence of full-scale armed hostilities among the same Koreans. For many Koreans, the mere continuation of the dialogue, although without much progress, had been, in fact, a source of relief and security.

Second, there are internal factors of north Korea’s own, many observers believe, that would sooner or later force the north Koreans back to the dialogue. They believe that, considering the already existing economic disparity between north Korea and the Republic of Korea, and considering the tendency that the gap is going to grow ever wider, the north Koreans will soon find it hard to continue compromising the “people’s economy,” and refuse uplifting of the living standard of the general public, by returning to the “dark era where there is no dialogue” with the Republic of Korea.

As a matter of fact, there were traces, clearly visible in the eyes of those who go north from the Republic of Korea, that, after a number of exchanges between the two sides, the north Korean leadership was trying real hard to do some uplifting of the living standard in the north. Many observers believe that it will be a pretty hard job for the north Korean leadership to turn the

tide. This is one of the internal factors of north Korea's own, the observers believe, that will soon start persuading the north Korean leadership to consider a resumption of the dialogue a serious matter.

The changing international situation is still another factor that indicate an early resumption of the dialogue. Present-day international relations are generally understood to pursue an easing of tension by maintaining the status quo, developing relations among nations rather on the basis of "national interests," than on "revolutionary motivations."

Considering this overriding tendency in the international situation, it is unthinkable that the dogmatic obstinacy of the north Koreans that insists on the pursuit of a "violent class revolution" in the Republic of Korea and the subsequent "Communist takeover" of the southern half of the peninsula, refusing establishment of a peaceful relationship, and development of a steady improvement in the relations, between the two divided parts of Korea, will be tolerated much longer by the fairness of the world public opinion. It is all the more unthinkable in that the dogmatic and war-like policy of north Korea runs counter to the combined international efforts to bring in a "new order" in the international society.

Therefore, it now becomes clear that the optimism expressed by Co-chairman Lee Hu Rak of Seoul side about the future of the dialogue has sufficient justifications.

However, we now have one condition of our own that we ask the north Koreans to honor in order to get the dialogue resumed. We ask the north Koreans to drop the fanciful idea of dreaming of a "Communist takeover" of the southern half of the peninsula by means of a "violent class revolution" in the Republic of Korea, and accept the concept that the dialogue is a "dialogue between two entirely different systems."

This is the minimum condition for us to make, for, unless that condition is met by the north Korean side in advance, we see no hope of an eventual normalization of relations between the two systems, even if the dialogue were resumed.

References

Co-chairman Lee's Statement of August 29, 1973

(Co-chairman Lee Hu Rak of the South-North Coordinating Committee on Seoul side called a nationally televised special press conference at 10 a.m., August 29, 1973, in Seoul to ask the north Koreans in a statement to withdraw the unjustified statement of the preceding day. Following is a full English text of Co-chairman Lee's statement.—Ed.)

Fellow countrymen!

At 6 p.m., August 28, Kim Young Joo, Co-chairman of Pyongyang side of the South-North Coordinating Committee suddenly issued a statement, declaring unilaterally that he would no longer conduct the South-North Coordinating Committee with me, Lee Hu Rak, as his counterpart.

He gave a number of reasons, including charges:

- that the Republic of Korea Central Intelligence Agency under my command had masterminded the abduction of Mr. Kim Dae Jung,*
- that I, as Co-chairman of Seoul side of the South-North Coordinating Committee, had obstructed enforcement of agreed items of the July 4 South-North Joint Communiqué and, while arguing for a “total opening of respective societies, had refused to take concrete steps to that end,*
- that I, in the capacity of the CIA Director, had arrested and suppressed many Communists, had murdered many espionages and had arrested and imprisoned many people on national security charges, and,*
- that His Excellency President Park's announcement on June 23 of the new foreign policy for peace and unification was a scheme designed to perpetuate the division of the country.*

Due to the sudden, unilateral statement of the north Korean side, the South-North dialogue, that has been carried on with the sublime objective of establishing a lasting peace on the Korean peninsula, developing a steady improvement of the South-North relations, seeking an independent and peaceful unification of the divided fatherland and thus paving the way for an everlasting wellbeing and prosperity of the fifty million fellow Koreans, has now come to a critical stage.

The abrupt change of attitude on the part of north Koreans may have its own explanations. However, the north Korean move obviously is a makeshift measure to cope with the latest developments in which they have found that President Park's new peace initiative in the form of the June 23 foreign policy for peace and unification was gaining increased support both domestically and internationally, weakening the north Korean position to be presented at the forthcoming United Nations General Assembly. It is definitely clear that the north Korean move was aimed at hampering the progress of the peace-oriented dialogue.

Fellow countrymen!

In retrospect, I went to Pyongyang on May 2 last year to carry out instructions of His Excellency President Park, at the risk of my own life, and managed to open the dialogue by persuading the north Korean side with all my sincerity.

His Excellency President Park gave me specific instructions. They were 1) to avert the danger of recurrence of war, 2) to develop a peaceful relationship between the two divided parts of Korea and 3) to seek workable programs for a peaceful unification of the fatherland.

I did not hide my identity from the beginning. I made it amply clear, when I first visited north Korea, that I was in charge of the Republic of Korea Central Intelligence Agency. And I also let it be known to Mr. Kim Il Sung himself that my duty as CIA Director was to head an organization

whose mission was to deal with state criminals, who violate the Anti-Communist Law and the National Security Law.

I do recall now that Mr. Kim Il Sung himself had told me, quite meaningfully at that time, that he trusted me because I was the very man who cracks down on Communists. "If it were not you, and somebody else, who has come here, I might not have trusted him," Kim told me then.

In view of these past events, I think it is self-contradictory and does not make sense at all that the north Koreans now condemn me as a "national traitor who persecute patriots," because I handle cases of Communists who violate the Anti-Communist Law and the National Security Law.

If such a logic of north Koreans can stand now, I think a parallel logic can stand likewise for the north Koreans themselves too. I must say I have the right, if I accept their own logic, to argue that Kim Young Joo of Pyongyang side does not enjoy the credit to become my counterpart himself, for he is director of organizational guidance department of the north Korean workers' party, which was responsible for the outbreak of the tragic Korean War and subsequent massacre of millions of fellow countrymen, which mercilessly persecuted countless number of bona fide patriots, by labeling them as "anti-revolutionaries," and which, up until now, keeps a great number of patriots at forced labor of death at the Aoji coal mine.

It is extremely dangerous to let personal sentiment affect matters of great national interests, and it was for that reason that I have so far conducted our South-North dialogue, solely with patience and sincerity, transcending all my past sentiments.

North Korea, in yesterday's statement, makes various accusations, like I, and the Republic of Korea, violated the agreed items of the July 4 South-North Joint Communiqué and obstructed enforcement of concrete programs aimed at developing an improved South-North relationship.

Then, let me ask a few questions.

Our side has repeatedly urged, in an effort to ensure a fruitful and effective operation of the South-North Coordinating Committee, that the two sides promptly agree on working rules on the operation of the South-North Coordinating Committee, the Executive Council and the Joint Secretariat. Our side also suggested that the Joint Secretariat be created at an early date and that the two sides jointly construct the Joint Secretariat building at Panmunjom. And I now ask which side it was that obstructed these pragmatic suggestions. It was the north Koreans themselves.

The two sides agreed in the July 4 South-North Joint Communiqué to stop slandering and defaming each other. And the two sides agreed, later at the second Co-chairmen's meeting in last November, to suspend radio broadcasts against each other. And, which side was it that outrightly violated these agreements by continuing all kinds of slanderous broadcasts against the other side? It was the north Koreans themselves again.

Our side had proposed that our two sides totally open our respective societies to the other side and that, in order to do so, our two sides enforce extensive exchanges and cooperation, first in economic and socio-cultural fields. And, let me ask which side it was that refused to pay any heed to these positive suggestions. It was the north Koreans themselves again.

What was more, the lack of sincerity and seriousness on the part of the north Koreans was best demonstrated by the fact that the so-called Co-chairman of Pyongyang side had never taken part in the conferences under the pretext that he was ill.

Now, let me ask once again. Which side was it that violated the spirit of the July 4 South-North Joint Communiqué, as well as agreements between the two sides? Which side was it that obstructed enforcement of concrete programs aimed at developing an improved South-North relationship? The answer now is too self-evident, and it is now amply clear that the north Korean allegations are comparable to a thief crying thief.

The north Koreans, at the same time, argue that President Park's

June 23 foreign policy declaration on peaceful unification was a scheme designed to promote a "two Korea" policy. However, the north Korean accusation is ill-founded there again, for the June 23 foreign policy declaration is possibly the only practicable peaceful unification formula, fully consistent with the spirit of the July 4 South-North Joint Communique, whereby we can implant a lasting peace on the Korean peninsula and expedite the unification through peaceful means.

Fellow countrymen!

Had the north Koreans faithfully abided by the spirit of the Joint Communique and refrained from dispatching armed agents into the Republic of Korea, there would have been no reason for us to arrest them, and there would have been no arrests of those who violate anti-Communist and security laws, had there been no radio instructions transmitted from Pyongyang instigating violent class revolutoins in the Republic of Korea.

I had personally told Mr. Kim Il Sung, when I had met him in Pyongyang last November, that "it is our hope that we eventually have a society where there is no need for such laws as the Anti-Communist Law and the National Security Law." "However, whether we could have such a society or not hinges largely on your side," I made it perfectly clear to him, adding, "your side must, first of all, stop sending instructions instigating a violent revolution in the South."

For these reasons and others, I dare say that the seeds of all the problems referred to in yesterday's statement issued in the name of the Co-chairman of Pyongyang side was all sown by none other than north Koreans themselves.

Fellow countrymen!

I am firmly convinced that the fifty million Koreans both in the South and the North all want the spirit of the July 4 South-North Joint Communi-

que to remain intact as a grand national character for a peaceful unification of their fatherland.

If there is anyone who attempts to destroy the spirit of the July 4 South-North Joint Communiqué, disregarding the ardent desires of the people for peace and unification, he will surely be brought before the court of history to be condemned for his treachery.

I, in my capacity as Co-chairman of Seoul side, hereby strongly demand that the north Korean authorities come back to reason once again and immediately retract their August 28 statement, which so violently tramples upon the basic spirit of the July 4 South-North Joint Communiqué.

I would like to make use of this occasion to pledge once again before my fellow countrymen and the world that there will not be a slightest change in my firm determination to carry on ahead with the current South-North dialogue, in line with the spirit of the July 4 South-North Joint Communiqué, no matter what difficulties we may face, and thus to meet the expectations of the people.

Thank you.

Co-chairman Lee's Answers to Questions at the Press Conference

(Following is a full English copy of remarks made by Co-chairman Lee in response to questions by reporters at the press conference on August 29, 1973.—Ed.)

Q. *The north Koreans appear these days increasing defamatory propaganda attacks against the Republic of Korea, in violation of the spirit of the July 4 South-North Joint Communique. What do you think are the motivations of such a rashness in the north Korean behavior?*

A. As a man in charge of the dialogue, I have a few judgments of my own. First, I feel that they do not really want this dialogue to go on. And second, it appears that some kind of serious confusion is developing up there in the North over the international appeal of our new peace initiative in the form of President Park's new foreign policy for peace and unification of June 23. The north Korean statement of yesterday, in my view, was a makeshift measure to get over with the present confusion over their foreign policy.

Another aim of yesterday's north Korean statement, it appears to me, is to shake the Central Intelligence Agency, which is the main pillar of our national security, by capitalizing on the recent newspaper speculations abroad, linking the CIA with the abduction of Mr. Kim Dae Jung. That is quite understandable because that is the kind of a tactic that Communists usually resort to.

And, I can think of a fourth motivation arising from the fact that north Korea recently is getting ever more isolated internationally. North Korea's relations with Soviet Russia appear quite troublesome these days, as were evidenced in north Korea's recent boycott of the Moscow Universiad. North Korea may have been feeling that the international situation is

becoming more and more out of control for them and, as a consequence, is becoming more and more anxious. It is possible, at least in my view, that yesterday's north Korean statement was an expression of such an anxiety.

Q. In your statement, Mr. Co-chairman, you stated that you had made the secret trip to Pyongyang in May last year at the risk of your own life. As one who opened the dialogue, risking your own life, what would you have to say about the recent developments that show that the dialogue is in critical stage?

A. The dialogue should be kept going on by any means. I say this because I am firmly convinced that the dialogue is the only effective means to preclude the danger of war. As I said earlier, I had made the secret trip to Pyongyang, armed with such a conviction of my own and President Park's instructions.

It is true that I now have a mixed feeling, now that there is that north Korean statement of yesterday.

If one is truly a patriot and really want the unification, one cannot resort to such a mean act and suspend the dialogue, even if one may have certain dissatisfactions. As a man of normal common sense, I can hardly understand the north Koreans.

This is merely a passing word. However, when I first went to Pyongyang in May last year, Kim Il Sung praised me, not only once but repeatedly, by saying, "Mr. Director, you are a national hero." Yet, after little over a year from then, the same Kim Il Sung is now calling me a "national traitor." Such an abrupt change seems hardly understandable in terms of common sense.

I personally wonder what motivated such a ghastly change in the mind of Kim Il Sung, and I have my own observation as to the motivations. I think I can put forth three options as to the motivations.

First, Kim Il Sung might have lacked the ability to look into the heart

of a man.

Second, Kim Il Sung might have conceived the idea of exploiting me, but later found that such an attempt was to no avail.

And third, Kim Il Sung was none other than one of those Communists who believe in the philosophy that ends justify means.

Anyway, yesterday's north Korean statement was an outburst of emotion and I take it simply as that.

Q. What do you think is the true intention hidden behind north Korea's unilateral statement that they would not continue the dialogue with you as their counterpart?

A. Well, I think I have already answered to that question. However, as I come back to the question, I think the north Korean statement, in the first place, was an expression of objection to our June 23 foreign policy declaration. . . . And frankly speaking, with all kinds of wild guesses running around about possible involvement of the CIA in the abduction of Mr. Kim Dae Jung, the north Korean Communists must have thought it an opportunity to get on the neck of the CIA.

Q. Would you comment on the speculations linking the CIA with the abduction of Mr. Kim Dae Jung?

A. Well, it will take time before the public will get all the facts out.

I am fully aware myself that wild speculations are being circulated about. Many news media abroad are putting those speculations into print.

However, now that the question is being asked on the matter, I am going to make one thing very clear.

According to what I have confirmed so far, there is not a single CIA personnel who had any link with the incident, and that is very clear. . . . In view of the international situation of these days, the CIA is definitely not an organ that would commit such a reckless act, and I can personally boast

that my CIA enjoys good common sense at least to that extent.

Now, I understand that there is a special investigation team created and a thorough investigation into the case is now being conducted. . . . And there will be the outcome of of the probe coming out soon.

Anyway, I am making it emphatically clear that, if, as a result of the probe, it turns out that one single CIA personnel was involved in the incident, you have my word that I will take the whole responsibility, whatever it is, for it.

Q. There seem to be some pros and cons over Mr. Kim Dae Jung's overseas activities. As CIA Director, do you have anything to say about Mr. Kim's overseas activities?

A. As Director of the CIA, I think I have the duty to report to the public on Mr. Kim's activities abroad. . . . But, wisdom tells me that it is not the time and place for such a report. You will please excuse me.

Q. There is much controversy going on in Japan in the wake of Mr. Kim's abduction. And the controversy seems to be pretty much heated over the question of the sovereignty there. Do you have anything to say about it?

A. I am going to withhold my comment on Mr. Kim's case because, as I said earlier, a vigorous probe is being conducted into the case. . . . And I am not also inclined to be involved in the said controversy over the question of the sovereignty involving specific cases.

However, I feel inclined to attempt a few comments on the question of the sovereignty, in general terms and as my personal, strictly personal, view.

I know that there is a strong public sentiment over there in Japan favoring the idea that the sovereignty of a nation should be respected. . . . In general terms, I would say that I am personally in support of such a public sentiment. . . . And I would say I welcome such a public sentiment that asks the sovereignty of a nation to be respected. . . . And I have some re-

trospect coming across my mind in that regard. . . . and let me put it this way.

If only the people of Japan, our ally, had recognized the value of the sovereignty of other nations somewhat earlier, there would have been no such misfortunes that befell Korea in the past years, no tragic division of the country and no need for me to conduct this somewhat awkward press conference on the South-North relations. . . . I feel myself sorry about it and I would like to make use of this chance to let it be known to you all in general terms, as a personal view.

Q. Would you let us know how do you view on the "confederation" as is advocated by the north Koreans?

A. As you see, I am Director of the CIA, which oversees the national security of the Republic of Korea. To speak on it in my capacity, the idea of a "confederation" as is being advocated by the north Koreans is in a word a program to achieve a Communist unification. The logic of the north Korean version of a "confederation" is to force the Republic of Korea to abdicate her security treaty with the United States, abrogate her treaties with Japan and other allies, and force the withdrawal of foreign troops from the Republic of Korea, and thus achieve a Communist takeover of the southern half of Korea all at once. It definitely is no more than a propaganda gimmick in which they try to present themselves as advocating a coexistence between the two different systems, that now exist in Korea, within the framework of what they call a "confederation."

Q. Would you generalize your feelings about the dialogue with the north Koreans?

A. It would take hours and days to give expression to my feelings in their entirety, and that seems impossible at the moment.

Briefly speaking, it's been a real hard job for me to conduct a dialogue with those representing an entirely different system. The public may easily think that an agreement could be worked out by having both sides com-

promise some of their respective positions. But, this does not apply to our dialogue with the Communists.

The simple fact is that, when we engage ourselves in a dialogue with the Communists, there is little that we can compromise with them, gain or loss.

The only choice is to develop some kind of peaceful relationship with them and, in due time, let the people make their own choice of a unification formula.

What pains you most, while conducting a dialogue with Communists, is the fact that they are primarily concerned about the propaganda effect rather than a solution to the pending problems.

I myself have been to Pyongyang quite several times and talked in length and width with the north Korean Communists. And what I learned from my experience is that it is real hard to talk to a Communist and that it is ever more so when it comes to the north Korean Communists.

Q. You pledged anew in your statement that you are determined to continue the dialogue with the north Koreans, despite whatever difficulties. As a matter of fact, we were expecting the fourth South-North Coordinating Committee meeting sometime in September. But, with the north Korean statement of yesterday in mind, that seems an unlikely prospect. In this connection, would you tell us how you view the future of the South-North dialogue?

A. I am not pessimistic about the future of our dialogue, in spite of the statement of Co-chairman Kim Young Joo of Pyongyang side. I am not pessimistic because I know that the fifty million Koreans, both in the South and the North, are all for this dialogue to continue. And, for that reason, I am confident that this dialogue will continue for sure, despite interruptions.

In my personal view, there are now two options for the resumption of this dialogue. The first, and the best, option is that north Koreans with-

draw the unilateral statement of yesterday, as I strongly demanded in my statement. And the second option is that, through agreement, the two sides reshuffle all the members and activate a new Coordinating Committee. These are only possibilities, but I am fully confident that, at any rate, the dialogue will be resumed sooner or later. . . .

Q. The United Nations General Assembly is slated to open some twenty days from now. North Korea is participating in the world body for the first time in the history of the UN on an observer status and a fierce South-North confrontation is expected to take place there over the Korean question. In this connection, how do you think the north Korean statement of yesterday would affect the UN debate on the Korean question?

A. Well, I gather that the north Koreans have their own calculations and tabulations that have prompted them to announce such an unusual statement, and I have no knowledge of what calculations and tabulations they have. One thing for sure for me is that the abrupt announcement of the statement of yesterday was unquestionably part of their strategy aimed at the forthcoming United Nations General Assembly. And, yet, I do not know whether their calculations and tabulations will prove to be justified, or not.

Q. You mentioned a lot on Mr. Kim Dae Jung's case. And we know that in connection with controversies over Mr. Kim's case over there in Japan, the ministerial conference between the two countries originally slated for the early part of September was put off. As a man who once served as our country's ambassador to Japan, would you tell us how you see the prospect of relationship, and particularly the economic ties, between the two countries?

A. The questioner says that I have talked a lot over Mr. Kim's case. But, that is not so. I have offered my answers briefly, because there were questions raised over the matter. And, I also made it emphatically clear that I did not want to get involved in any specific cases. What I said earlier was strictly my personal view, expressed in general terms, without regard to any specific cases, and I made that amply clear while answering to those

questions.

I said in general terms that I was personally in favor of the idea that the sovereignty of a nation should be respected. And I am not in a proper position to speculate on the future relationship between my country and Japan in connection with certain specific problems.

As a former ambassador to Japan, I think I am entitled to express my personal wish that Korea and Japan continue to develop the kind of relationship closer than that among other nations. That is the farthest and I don't think I am in a rightful position to discuss such specific questions like the economic ties that you mentioned in your question.

Q. Judging from the tone of the north Korean statement of yesterday, the immediate prospect of the South-North dialogue seems to be a grim one. On the other hand, we have news reports quoting American Secretary of Defense Schlesinger as forecasting that there would soon be developments in Korea quite similar to those between East and West Germany. Mr. Schlesinger was also quoted as saying that such developments could take place within 12 to 18 months. In this connection, do you have anything to say about how the United States view the current South-North relations?

A. As you see, the developments in the South-North relations, and particularly the South-North dialogue, are closely watched by any nation that has any interest in Korea. And that undoubtedly is a source of our moral support in our endeavor to continue the dialogue with patience and sincerity.

However, it takes two to conduct a dialogue. And, for that matter, no matter how one side is sincere, the dialogue cannot produce any progress, unless the other side is as much sincere likewise.

We cannot predict the future course of our dialogue at this point of time. But our position on the question of the dialogue is expressly clear, and I have made it known time and again. We do not care whoever take charge of the dialogue. We only want the dialogue to continue. And that

is our basic position.

Nevertheless, we have no intention of dealing with the north Koreans from a low profile, nor have we intention to make excessive concessions.

We want the dialogue to continue on a reciprocal basis. Mutual understanding, in my view, is one outstanding factor in our South-North relations, and I believe that our dialogue should start anew from this mutual understanding. I am stating once again that we will remain to be as sincere and serious as ever to get the talks restarted in that spirit.

Thank you, gentlemen.

Part Two

Questions at Issue in South-North Relations

*—An examination of the logicality as well as practicality of
President Park Chung Hee's new foreign policy for peace and
unification vis-a-vis the fictitiousness of north Korea's "five-point
program on unification"—*

1. A Review of South-North Relations

As was briefly referred to in Part One, Korea had been divided into two halves, back in 1945, following the end of the World War II, as a result of the bipolar reshaping of the World Structure. Following the tragic division of the country, the two divided parts of Korea have developed two entirely different systems, respectively, the free democratic society in the South and the Communist proletarian dictatorship in the North.

Korea, in the meantime, had been subjected to a number of major events that had contributed to a steady increase of tension and a deepening of misgivings of the people in both parts of Korea.

The catastrophic Korean War of 1950–1953, that caused a havoc of manslaughter and destruction across the breadth and length of the peninsula, was the greatest tragedy that the divided Korea had to undergo.

However, the tension upon the Korean peninsula has been on a steady increase, even after the 1953 truce that ended the Korean War in the form of an armistice, as north Korea continued to wage military provocations as well as subversive activities against the Republic of Korea.

The steady increase of tension, no doubt, was the major factor that seriously hampered the efforts to improve the living of the people in both parts of Korea.

The situation in Korea became increasingly deteriorated as north Korea pursued the completion of a diehard personality cult, a fanatical idolization of the person of Kim Il Sung. In an effort to keep critical elements off the road, and at the same time to give the populace the cause for the idolization of Kim Il Sung, north Korea has pursued a policy of keeping that part of Korea constantly on a war-footing, arming the populace with a bitter hatred against the fabricated "imminence of an aggression by the American imperialists and their 'puppets' in south Korea against north Korea." The north Korean populace was constantly told that a south Korean 'debacle.' was imminent, due to the

“popular discontentment there in the South over the colonialization of south Korea by American imperialists and Japanese militarists,” and that a “Communist takeover” of the southern half of the country was a “matter of time.” The north Korean leadership continued to smuggle into the Republic of Korea bands of armed guerrillas, saboteurs and Communist organizers in order to create the false impression that there were “popular struggle going on constantly in south Korea against the ‘puppet regime’ there.”

The tension in Korea, created by the terrorist policy pursued by the north Korean leadership, climaxed in 1968, about the time when the idolization of Kim Il Sung was by and large completed.

A series of unsavory incidents took place in that year, including the attempted assassination of Republic of Korea President Park Chung Hee by a band of 30 armed guerrillas sent from north Korea, the landing of some 120 armed guerrillas from north Korea on the eastern coast of the peninsula, the seizure of the American intelligence ship SS Pueblo and the downing of EC 121, an American reconnaissance plane, bringing the ever-present tension in Korea to a new height.

It was apparent that the situation had worsened to a point where it could be tolerated no longer. Measures were urgently asked to be taken to ease the tension.

A final solution could come if the divided country were united again. But, that was a remote possibility, if not an impossibility, because it called for a choice between the two entirely different systems. North Koreans were categorically opposed to every conceivable unification formula that could assure a choice of the system on the basis of the principle of majority rule.

North Koreans had never ceased talking about an “independent and peaceful unification,” in the meantime. However, it had unchangingly meant a “Communist takeover” of the southern half of Korea. The north Korean version of a “peaceful unification formula” always rested on the achievement of a “unification in south Korea” in the form of what they

call a “people’s democratic revolution.” The “people’s democratic revolution” calls for a violent “popular uprising” by the “working class” to overthrow by force the legitimate government of the Republic of Korea.

The north Korean version of a “peaceful unification formula” was by no means a measure that could expedite the unification of the country. On the contrary, it had made the unification a still remoter possibility.

Under the circumstances where the unification itself was such a remote possibility, what was urgently needed was a second best means to secure a lasting peace in this part of the world. Efforts were asked for to stabilize the relationship, in terms of a “peaceful relationship,” in the first place, developing a steady improvement of relations between the two sides through peaceful means.

Moreover, there was the tendency in the making in the international community pointing toward a replacement of the old Cold War confrontation with a “new order,” which called for an ease of tension, through solution of outstanding international disputes on the basis of the status quo, and a general improvement of relations among nations rather on the basis of “national interests,” than on “ideological” or “revolutionary” motivations.

Republic of Korea President Park Chung Hee, grasping the circumstances full well, began taking positive measures aimed at coping with the changing international situation actively and at promoting the cause of peace in the Korean peninsula, from as early as 1970.

President Park’s peace efforts began to shape with his commemorative speech on August 15, 1970, at the 25th anniversary of the nation’s liberation from the Japanese occupation, where he called for a “peaceful competition in good faith” between the two systems that divided the country.

President Park’s peace initiative led to the start of the humanitarian dialogue in 1971, between the Red Cross societies of the two divided parts of Korea, to be succeeded by effort to start a “political dialogue” with the north Korean leadership on peace and unification. The secret visit to Pyong-

yang by Director Lee Hu Rak of the Republic of Korea Central Intelligence Agency in May, 1972, led to the simultaneous announcement in Seoul and Pyongyang of the historic South-North Joint Communiqué on July 4, 1972, and to the creation of the South-North Coordinating Committee in November that year. The “political dialogue” was at last started between the two divided parts of Korea, to the expectations of the fifty million Koreans.

However, the political dialogue has reportedly failed to produce much progress. North Koreans deadlocked the dialogue, upon knowing that their aim of using the dialogue as a means to expedite a revolution in south Korea hit the wrong target.

President Park took still another step forward on June 23, this year, by announcing the new foreign policy for peace and unification, climaxing his persistent efforts to promote a lasting peace in this part of the world, cultivate a peaceful relationship with north Korea and thus to expedite a peaceful unification of the divided country.

2. New ROK Foreign Policy for Peace & Unification

On June 23, 1973, President Park Chung Hee of the Republic of Korea called a nationally televised special press conference in Seoul to announce the new seven-point foreign policy for peace and unification.

The contents of the new foreign policy were as follows:

- 1. The peaceful unification of the fatherland is the supreme task of the Korean people. We will continue to exert every effort to accomplish this task.**
- 2. Peace must be maintained in the Korean peninsula by all means. The South and the North should neither interfere with each other's internal affairs nor commit aggression against each other.**
- 3. We will continue to make efforts with sincerity and patience to secure**

concrete results from the south-north dialogue based on the spirit of the South-North Joint Communiqué of July 4, 1972.

4. We shall not oppose north Korea's participation with us in international organizations, if it is conducive to the easing of tension and furtherance of international cooperation.
5. We shall not object to our admittance into the United Nations together with north Korea, if the majority of the member-states of the United Nations so wish, and provided that it does not cause hindrance to our national unification.

Even before our admittance into the United Nations as a member, we shall not be opposed to north Korea also being invited at the time of the U.N. General Assembly's deliberation of the "Korean question" in which the representative of the Republic of Korea is invited to participate.

6. The Republic of Korea will open its door to all nations of the World on the basis of the principles of reciprocity and equality. At the same time, we urge those countries whose ideologies and social institutions are different from ours to open their doors to us.
7. Peace and good-neighborliness are the firm basis of the foreign policy of the Republic of Korea. It is reaffirmed that we will continue to further strengthen the ties of friendship existing between friendly nations and our country.

President Park also made it emphatically clear that clauses in the new foreign policy that involve north Korea were "interim measures effective during the period pending the achievement of our national unification" and that they "do not mean by all means a recognition of north Korea as a nation-state."

The Republic of Korea President declared, in a special presidential message to the nation, that Republic of Korea's new foreign policy was "the only short-cut to the achievement of a peaceful unification through our

own self-reliant efforts without impairing the dignity and pride of our nation amidst the international currents pointing toward a relaxation of tension.”

The new Republic of Korea foreign policy was undoubtedly one of the outstandingly fore-sighted and sagacious policy decisions of the time, for it was a telling expression of a will to serve the cause of world peace in that it removed one of the major causes of international tension by opening the way for a simultaneous representation at the United Nations, as well as a simultaneous participation in other international organizations, by the Republic of Korea and north Korea. The new foreign policy also opened the way for the establishment and development of a peaceful relationship between the Republic of Korea and north Korea by conferring a de facto recognition on north Korean regime as a “political body.”

President Park laid general principles for a peaceful future relationship between the two entirely different systems in Korea by declaring in Item Two of the new foreign policy that the two sides “shall neither interfere with each other’s internal affairs nor commit aggression against each other.”

In his new foreign policy, President Park clearly envisioned a future relationship between the Republic of Korea and north Korea, to be the kind of relationship in which the two sides pursue evolution of their respective systems without interferences from the other side, for the time being pending the achievement of the unification, averting the danger of war and creating the foundation of a lasting and stable peace in the meantime.

The world unanimously acclaimed the new peace initiative of the Republic of Korea in the form of the new foreign policy for peace and unification. President Park’s fore-sighted and practical approach toward a solution of problems involving the south-north relations, his devoted efforts for an ease of tension and his unswerving commitment to the cause of peace forcefully appealed to the fairness of world public opinion.

Responses of Socialist nations to Republic of Korea's new foreign policy were mild ones too, albeit some exceptions. It was apparent that the open-door policy of the Republic of Korea to all nations, regardless of ideologies and systems, must have appealed forcefully to the Socialist countries too, because of its peace-oriented cause.

The world took it as a tacit expression of an approval of Republic of Korea's new foreign policy by Soviet Russia when Soviet Russia recently granted visas for Republic of Korea athletes participating in the Moscow Universiad game and when the Russian citizenry as well as authorities extended warm hospitality for the Republic of Korea players during their stay in Moscow.

North Korea reacted violently against the new Republic of Korea foreign policy. North Korea termed Republic of Korea's new foreign policy a "plot to perpetuate the national division through creation of 'two Koreas.'" "

The last-minute north Korean boycott of the recent Moscow Universiad game was a "protest" against Soviet Russia's warm reaction to Republic of Korea's new foreign policy, and the August 28 statement of north Korea in the name of Kim Young Joo an outburst of emotion designed to show the world that they were so violently upset by the new foreign policy of the Republic of Korea.

3. North Korea's Five-Point Unification Program

At 8 p.m., June 23, some ten hours after the announcement of Republic of Korea's new foreign policy in Seoul by President Park Chung Hee, north Korean president Kim Il Sung took the occasion of a welcome rally in Pyongyang for the visiting Czechoslovakian Communist party head Gustav Husak to give expression to what the north Koreans now claim to be a "new five-point unification programme."

The contents of the "five-point programme" are as follows:

First, the two sides remove the state of military confrontation between the two sides and ease the tension.

Second, the two sides implement various "incorporation" and exchanges in such fields as political, military, foreign affairs, economic and cultural fields.

Third, the two sides convoke a "grand national congress" in order to solve the question of unification.

Fourth, the two sides form a "confederation," under the name of "confederated republic of Koryo," leaving the two different systems in the two divided parts of the country to function as they are for the time being.

Fifth, the two sides do not seek admittance into the United Nations separately and seek the United Nations admittance as a single member after the two sides achieve the "confederation."

The north Korean "five-point unification programme" was, in a word, a makeshift suggestion, fictitious and hypothetical in its contents by and large, with each of the five items of the "programme" lacking consistency with the others. It was, in effect, none other than another propaganda gimmick, designed to confuse the world public opinion, with the scheme of pursuing a Communist takeover of the Republic of Korea down to the end hidden between the lines.

Following is a close examination of each of the five items, whose purpose is to show what an irresponsible, impracticable and fictitious "unification formula" the north Korean "five-point unification programme" is.

First, the north Korean suggestion of a removal of the state of military confrontation in the form of item one of the "programme" is a mere reprint of the north Korean demand at the South-North Coordinating Committee on a prior solution to the military question, featuring the withdrawal of American troops stationed in Korea under the United Nations flag, as a "prerequisite for progress in the south-north dialogue, improvement of south-north relations and solution to problems related to the unification."

North Korea proposed at the Coordinating Committee meetings a “five-point military suggestion,” featuring 1) a halt to the arms race, 2) reduction of forces scale down to a level below 100,000, respectively, 3) withdrawal of all foreign, namely American, troops, 4) a ban on the import of arms from abroad, and lastly 5) signing of a peace treaty.

The Republic of Korea fully acknowledged the importance of a solution to the military problems, during the debate on the north Korean demand at the Coordinating Committee meetings, as a necessary step for promotion of peace in Korea.

“However, exactly because of the great importance that it carries,” Co-chairman Lee Hu Rak of Seoul side told the north Koreans, reflecting Republic of Korea’s view on the matter, “the military question is not a question whose solution can be sought on easy terms.”

Emphasizing the fact that the proposed military suggestion was directly related to the security of respective parties at the dialogue, the Co-chairman of Seoul side pointed to the fact that there was a “serious problem of credibility gap” existing between the two divided parts of Korea, and said that a solution to the military problems “should be preceded by a general improvement of relations between the two sides.”

“It requires the people’s trust in whatever agreement that has been reached between the two sides to see a solution to the military problems, for it has so much to do with their own security,” Lee later quoted himself as having told his north Korean counterpart, adding, “I made it clear to the north Koreans that it was premature to talk of a solution to the military problems, under the circumstances where even a minor agreement was not strictly observed, premature because it is none other than a mere propaganda gimmick.”

As a matter of fact, history tells no past instance of a successful armistice agreement that was honored by parties concerned for a considerable length of time. Korean people, in fact, have a bitter memory that, immediately

following a total withdrawal of American troops out of south Korea back in 1950, north Korea attempted to exploit the power vacuum by waging the full-scale invasion of the Republic of Korea.

An armistice negotiation between hostile parties, if it were ever to produce an agreement at all, normally calls for a series of delicate control and inspection systems. Yet, north Koreans have nothing to say about the control and inspection systems, except the demagoguery that “the two sides have no need to maintain large forces because they are same Koreans.”

Such a demagoguery of north Koreans’ was sure to raise the question of sincerity and seriousness of the north Korean demand on a solution to the military problems prior to other problems in other fields.

In this regard, Co-chairman Lee of Seoul side pointedly told the north Koreans that it was “not the size of troops, that each side has, that accounts for the tension that now exists upon the Korean peninsula.” “It is the will of the leaders of both sides to avert the danger of war at all cost, and not the size of troops, that counts in our effort to ease the tension in our country,” Lee emphatically told the north Koreans.

Taking all the related factors into consideration, the north Korean demand on a prior solution to the military problems proves itself to be a mere propaganda gimmick, designed to play a wolf in the guise of a sheep.

Second, the north Korean suggestion of “various ‘incorporation’ and exchanges in such and such fields,” the second item of the programme, is again a reprint of an earlier north Korean demand at the Coordinating Committee meetings on a “simultaneous creation of the Committee’s five subcommittees, political, military, foreign affairs, economic and cultural.”

This item precisely is a telling proof that north Korea’s so-called “five-point unification programme” is merely a deception, a deception of a thief crying thief.

The north Korean suggestion at the Coordinating Committee meetings of the “simultaneous creation of five subcommittees” was a suggestion for “disagreement,” and definitely not one for “agreement.”

The Agreed Minute on the Formation and Operation of the South-North Coordinating Committee calls for the creation of the five subcommittees. However, the Agreed Minutes clearly stipulates that “each” subcommittee shall be created independently “as the progress at the South-North Coordinating Committee warrants it.”

At the Coordinating Committee meetings, the Seoul side proposed that the Committee start its work first by tackling problems in the fields “where the differences of thoughts, ideologies and systems do not pose major obstacles.”

The Seoul side, therefore, suggested that the Committee start with the creation of two subcommittees, economic and socio-cultural, first. The Seoul side wished that a sweeping exchanges and cooperation, like exchange between businessmen, of goods and scientific technologies, joint development of some natural resources, exchanges of trade fairs and business firms, exchanges in academic, cultural and theatrical fields, joint study of the indigenous language, exchanges among people and various social organizations, including the press, and exchanges in communication and tourist areas, could take place, as soon as the two subcommittees were created.

The Seoul side proposed that the two sides “open their respective societies to each other,” by vigorously pursuing a steady widening of the scope of exchanges and cooperation, first in the fields where political differences have less to do.

The north Korean side countered Republic of Korea’s suggestion with a demand that the five subcommittees be created all at once.

The north Korean suggestion unquestionably was a dangerous idea, based on the concept of “all or nothing.” It was obvious that the north

Korean suggestion was a makeshift countermeasure, designed primarily to neutralize the serious proposal of the Seoul side.

Third, the north Korean suggestion of a "*grand national congress*" was a manifestation of the north Korean pursuit of a "Communist take-over" of south Korea through an overthrow of the legitimate government of Republic of Korea in the form of what they call a "people's democratic revolution."

In the first place, the north Korean demand on a "*grand national congress*" was an inexcusable violation of the spirit of the July 4 South-North Joint Communiqué. The July 4 South-North Joint Communiqué called for the creation of the South-North Coordinating Committee, empowering it to handle all the problems arising in the relations between the two divided parts of the country, including the settlement of the question of unification.

The South-North Coordinating Committee was duly created last November, in accordance with the agreements in the July 4 South-North Joint Communiqué and has held three rounds of plenary meetings, plus three rounds of Executive Council meetings.

The Coordinating Committee has thus far failed to secure a normal functioning, due to the north Korean refusal to adopt working rules for the operation of the Committee, the Executive Council and the Joint Secretariat, and to put the Joint Secretariat into operation. And, now, the north Koreans are asking that the Coordinating Committee is put aside to give way to the "*grand national congress*" for a solution to the question of unification.

What, then, exactly is the "*grand national congress*" in the north Korean version?

North Korea began calling for a "joint meeting of representatives of political parties and social organizations in south and north Korea" from as early as early 1950s, as a forum for a "solution to the question of

unification.”

The north Korean suggestion of a “joint meeting of representatives of political parties and social organizations” started as a deception from the very beginning.

For instance, on June 7, 1950, north Korea put on the air an open proposal that “representatives of political parties and social organizations in both parts of Korea meet in a joint session from June 15 through 17 either in Haeju or in Kaesung, both situated along the 38th Parallel, in order to discuss and determine terms and procedures necessary to achieve a peaceful unification of the country.”

However, it so turned out that north Koreans waged a pre-dawn Sunday morning blitzkrieg against the Republic of Korea on all points along the 38th Parallel on June 25, only three weeks after the proposal, to start the tragic Korean War that lasted for three years.

The north Korean proposal three weeks earlier on what they called a “joint meeting.” was only a deception designed to camouflage their imminent all-out invasion of south Korea.

After the 1953 truce, north Koreans continued to grab at every available occasion to make a suggestion of the same “joint meeting” as a “panacea” for the unification of the country.

With the passing of time, the north Koreans redressed the suggestion in the form of a “conference for political negotiations,” with the scope of the suggested participants now broadened to embrace “representatives of the ‘people’ of all walks of life as well as representatives of political parties and social organizations.”

Interpreting the term, ‘people,’ in terms of their own ideology-oriented vocabulary, embracing workers, farmers, soldiers and working intelligentsia only, the north Korean suggestion was clearly intended to “disqualify” the bulk of the Republic of Korea citizenry, representing the various social

strata, ranging from government officials down to entrepreneurs and the sweeping middle-class populace, as “participants” of the “*conference for political negotiations*” on the question of unification. The north Korean suggestion signified an undercover north Korean scheme of organizing a “*united anti-government front of working class people in south Korea,*” with the ultimate aim of using them as a tool to achieve an overthrow of the legitimate government of the Republic of Korea through a “*violent popular uprising.*”

In the item three of the so-called five-point “unification programme, Kim Il Sung further elaborated on the north Korean suggestion of the “*conference for political negotiations*” by renaming it as a “grand national congress.”

In this newest explanation, Kim Il Sung ventured to bare the designs hidden in the north Korean suggestion more explicitly by redefining the “qualifications” for those to take part in the “*grand national congress.*” Kim Il Sung proposed that the “*grand national congress*” be attended by “*workers, farmers, working intelligentsia, working farmers, youthful students and soldiers of the northern half and workers, farmers, youthful students, intellectuals, solidiers, ‘nationalist capitalists’ and ‘petitbourgeois’ of south Korea, together with political parties and social organizations of both parts of Korea.*” Kim Il Sung’s own elaboration was an unchallengeable manifestation that the north Korean suggestion of a “*grand national congress*” was unquestionably a part of the north Korean campaign to organize a “united anti-government front of working class people” within the Republic of Korea.

Let alone the vindictive purpose and aggressive intent of the suggestion, it was just as much inconceivable to think of such a meeting of disorganised mass of people, with “authorities” of both sides strictly kept out of the way, to work out a workable programme for a “peaceful unification.”

Co-chairman Lee Hu Rak of Seoul side precisely pointed to this question at a Coordinating Committee meeting and termed the north Korean

suggestion of a “*conference for political negotiations*” a mere “political slogan with an eye on propaganda gains only.”

Fourth, north Korea suggested that the two parts of Korea get “*confederated*” into one political body, under the name of “*confederated republic of Koryo*.”

The north Korean suggestion that the new “*confederated*” Korea be named as “*confederated republic of Koryo*” was no more than a propaganda gimmick, with an eye to an appeal to the Good-Old-Dayism of a certain segment of the people, to whom the name, “Koryo,” is a reminder of a memory of an ancient kingdom that unified the Korean peninsula, way back in the tenth century.

The question at issue was whether the north Korean suggestion of a “*confederated*” Korea was a workable and practicable programme or not. The naming of the “*confederated*” Korea was a matter of trivial importance when compared with the weight of importance that the substance of the suggestion carried.

What, again, was the true picture of the north Korean version of a “*confederated*” Korea? We need some retrospective study of past references by north Korea to the matter, if we are to find a correct answer to that question.

North Korea first presented its own version of a “*confederated*” Korea on August 14, 1960, in a speech by Kim Il Sung. Kim explained in the speech that his idea of a “*confederation of south and north Korea*” was “*to let the two parts of Korea maintain their respective political systems, with each government guaranteed to pursue its independent activities and, at the same time, to establish a ‘supreme national commission,’ with representatives of both governments as members, with the aim of coordinating a concerted development in the economic and cultural fields between the two parts of Korea.*”

Kim Il Sung’s idea of a “*confederated Korea*” at that time fell, in fact,

by far short of a “*confederation*,” in that it meant to allow the two sides to pursue independent policies in political, diplomatic and defense fields, while calling for a concerted policy in economic and cultural fields only. Kim Il Sung was suggesting, in effect, a “*coexistence*” between the two entirely different systems that existed in Korea.

With the start of 1970s, north Korea reinvigorated its “peace offensive,” in the international community in particular, with a call for a “*confederated*” Korea as the key proposal.

However, the definition of the “*confederated*” Korea was slightly modified by then. Kim Il Sung personally gave the modified definition of the “*confederated*” Korea in a press interview on September 17, 1972, with the Mainichi Shimbun of Japan.

Kim said that a “*confederated*” Korea meant to “*let the two parts of Korea maintain their present systems, respectively, and, in the meantime, to organize a ‘supreme national congress’ with representatives from the ‘democratic people’s republic of Korea’ and the Republic of Korea, with the purpose of solving problems arising in political, economic, military and cultural fields.*”

And, now, in the so-called “five-point programme,” north Korea demands that the two parts of Korea seek a concerted policy even in the *diplomatic* field, by insisting that south and north Korea seek an entry into the United Nations as a “single member” in the form of a “confederation.”

North Korea’s repeated modification of the definition of a “*confederated*” Korea is a telling manifestation that the suggestion lacks consistency, and credibility as well.

North Korea envisions a “*confederation*” in terms of a state in which the two sides of Korea are allowed to “*maintain their respective political systems.*” However, this part of the north Korean suggestion, in particular, is a telling proof that the north Korean suggestion of a “*confederated*” Korea is nothing else but a deception.

One can easily discover it to be nothing but a deceptive suggestion, if one carefully examines the present circumstances, where the sharp differences between the two systems that now exist in Korea even hamper the progress in the dialogue between the two sides.

It is simply inconceivable that the two extremely antagonistic systems can develop a concerted policy in such vulnerable fields as *political, military* and *diplomatic* fields, where conflicting elements are so predominant, let alone the question of practicability of a “*confederation*” of the two systems, one a free democratic society and the other a Communist proletarian dictatorship.

The north Korean suggestion of a “*confederated*” Korea is marked for its lack of plausible explanations on “*how*” to make the “*confederation*” a fact. And many observers believe that precisely that is where the north Koreans want the Republic of Korea walk into a trap.

At his press conference on August 29, Co-chairman Lee Hu Rak of the South-North Coordinating Committee on Seoul side warned against the trap contained between the lines in the north Korean suggestion of a “*confederation*” in the form of certain “preconditions.”

“The north Korean scheme is quite clear,” the Co-chairman of Seoul side warned, “they are certainly going to ask the Republic of Korea to abrogate her security pact with the United States, to repeal her normalization treaty with Japan, to liquidate all her existing ties with her allies and to get rid of the American troops stationed in Korea under the United Nations flag.”

In other words, the north Korean suggestion of a “*confederated*” Korea is a suggestion that the Republic of Korea place her security and development at the mercy of the north Korean Communists.

The north Korean suggestion of a “*confederated*” Korea is a suggestion that much presumptuous and fictitious, when one closely examines the contents as well as the hidden motivations.

Lastly, north Korea vehemently opposed to separate entities into the United Nations by south and north Korea, respectively, and advocated the idea of having south and north Korea admitted into the world body as a “single member” under the name of the “confederated republic of Koryo.”

Here again, we arrive at the conclusion that the north Korean position on the matter lacks both consistency, and rationale as well.

North Korea accused Republic of Korea’s new foreign policy for peace and unification of June 23, in connection with Republic of Korea’s expressed willingness to enter the United Nations together with north Korea, of being a “plot to fix the state of ‘two Koreas’ and thus perpetuate the national division.”

However, we find the north Koreans too forget-minded to make such a claim.

First, north Korea seems to have deliberately forgotten the historical fact that north Korea had applied for a separate entry into the United Nations for twice in the past, once in 1949 and next in 1951. In the view of legal experts at the United Nations headquarters, the north Korean application still retains its effect as of now, for north Korea has never retracted the application in the meantime.

Second, while proposing a “confederated” Korea, north Korea suggests that the two sides of Korea “maintain their respective political systems.” In this respect, north Koreans duly have the obligation to answer the question if there is any difference between the “maintaining of the two political systems existing in Korea,” which they so fervently advocate, and a “coexistence between the two political systems existing in Korea,” which they so vehemently pretend to hate.

Third, north Koreans cannot fool the world about the fact that it has been the north Koreans themselves who have steadfastly pursued a “two Korea” policy in their drive to get diplomatic recognition from countries with which

the Republic of Korea already has diplomatic relations and to get entries into international organizations where the Republic of Korea is already a member, contrary to their vocal opposition to the “two Korea” concept.

Kim Il Sung himself admitted the contradiction in his speech on June 23, by saying, *“of course, we have been ourselves developing national ties with all the nations around the world that are friendly to our republic on the basis of principles of reciprocity and equality.”* The contradiction was more vividly felt in the recent north Korean entreaties with countries like Japan “to treat north Korea on equal terms with the Republic of Korea.”

Needless to say, separate entries into the United Nations by south and north Korea do not necessarily create a major obstacle to the accomplishment of the national unification. And in his June 23 special message to the nation, announcing the new foreign policy, President Park Chung Hee of the Republic of Korea had specifically emphasized that the Republic of Korea would consider a separate entry into the United Nations, together with north Korea, under the condition that “it does not cause hindrance of our national unification.”

In sum, the vehement north Korean opposition to separate entries into the United Nations by south and north Korea appears to be an expression of their anxiety over the fact that, should they accept the competence and authority of the peace-oriented United Nations Charter, they would have to abandon their scheme of pursuing a Communist unification of the country through a “violent class revolution” in the Republic of Korea.

As a result of the close, analytic examination of all the factors that are involved, we have now come to the conclusion that north Korea’s self-styled “five-point unification programme” was nothing else but a fictitious political slogan, whose sole aim is to exploit propaganda gains, against the fervent wishes of the fifty million Koreans in both parts of Korea, aspiring for an easing of tension and peace above all.

4. Conclusion

We have now become fully aware that the dialogue between the two divided parts of Korea has been broken off, to our disappointment, at least for a while, if not for good. And we also have come to know where the causes of the breakoff are.

And we have also come to be convinced that, considering all the related domestic and international factors, the dialogue would have to be resumed sooner or later, despite interruptions.

Then, what are we supposed to do during this intermission?

It is no doubt true that the fifty million Koreans in both parts of Korea truly want the dialogue to continue. We also know that the world wants to see the continuation of the dialogue too. The continuation of the dialogue is the unanimous wish of all mankind who are interested in the developments in Korea.

A resumption of the dialogue at an early date is unanimously hoped for by all those who have any stake in the security of the Korean peninsula. The continuation of the dialogue is a unanimous wish of all people because the continuation signifies hope, whereas the breakoff signifies unrest and insecurity.

As a party to the dialogue, what we are asked to do under the circumstances is quite clear. We are asked to bring the north Koreans back to the dialogue by all means, the sooner the better. It is true that we cannot do the dialogue alone. We have our counterparts to do the talking. And, naturally, we may have to wait for some time before the dialogue is at last resumed.

The truth is that we cannot compromise our principles. But, we are asked to be ever more patient and sincere in our efforts to get the dialogue resumed.

As was pointed out by Co-chairman Lee of Seoul side at his press conference on August 29, we have found the north Korean Communists to be one of the uniquely hardest counterparts to talk to. That is one of our valuable experiences, because, by improving our understanding of the north Korean Communists, and their way of thinking, we have now become alert anew and better prepared to cope with them in the future dialogue.

The experience has told us that we could not rest on the sentimental side of our emotion in reasoning with the north Korean Communists and that patience is the outstanding factor that would eventually assure us of a success in our efforts to cultivate and develop a peaceful relationship with north Korea.

In order to bring this difficult dialogue to a success, we must first have a firm belief in our own values, an unswerving trust in our own system, and concentrate our efforts to the maximization of our national strength. The maximization of our national strength and the consolidation of our national consensus are undoubtedly the key factors that would eventually force the north Korean Communists to do away with the “fantasy” of a Communist “takeover” of the Republic of Korea and come back to the dialogue.

In order to secure conditions for an early resumption of the dialogue, we must solidify the foundation of the October Revitalizing Reform. We must pursue a maximization of our efficiency through diligent and strenuous efforts of our own, domestically, and pursue a steady improvement of relations with all nations, regardless of differences in ideologies and systems, on the basis of the new foreign policy for peace and unification, internationally.

In the meantime, we are asked to be mindful of the fact that our own efforts are not the only factors that count to expedite a resumption of the dialogue.

Many observers now view the ever-worsening conflict between the two major Socialist Powers, Soviet Russia and Red China, as one of the major

factors that played the key role in forcing north Korea to arrive at a decision to break off the on-going dialogue with the Republic of Korea unilaterally.

In view of the fact that the relationship between Soviet Russia and Red China is currently steadily on a deterioration course, it is highly questionable that the two major Socialist countries can ever find the two of them in agreement over their interests in the Korean peninsula. In the view of some observers, such a deteriorating relationship between the two major Socialist countries is reflected as one of negative factors that would hamper progress in the dialogue between the two divided parts of Korea.

It was precisely in this connection that north Korea recently drew a worldwide attention, when it eventually chose to stand by Red China by boycotting the Moscow Universiad game at the last moment.

We must keep a close watch on the constantly changing relations among nations that surround us. It is necessary for us to follow the changing international situation closely, in order that we positively cope with developments in the international situation and, at the same time, make use of the newly developing international situation, to the fullest possible extent, in our efforts to promote peace in this troubled part of the world.

This certainly is the way for us to secure a continuation of the dialogue with the north Koreans and, at the same time, a short-cut to the success of the dialogue.

Published on September 20, 1973

The Public Relations Association of Korea

I. P. O. Box 2147

Seoul, Korea

No. 003
December, 1973

South-North Dialogue in Korea

— A Perspective of the Dialogue —

International Cultural Society of Korea
Seoul, Korea

South-North Dialogue in Korea

— *South-North Coordinating Committee*—

— *South-North Red Cross Conference*—

TO READERS:

Fresh contacts are currently underway between the two sides of Korea for prompt reopening of the South-North Dialogue which has now been discontinued for a long time. Scarce possibility is seen yet, however, for fruition of the efforts initiated by the Republic of Korea for resumption of the dialogue. The north Korean reaction seems to indicate that they are not ready yet for full resumption of the dialogue at an early date.

The year-end of 1973, the third year of the South-North Dialogue, is now about to elapse with the prospect for reopening of the two-way dialogue, one the political South-North Coordinating Committee meetings and the other the humanitarian South-North Red Cross Conference, at an early date still remaining grim.

The Public Relations Association of Korea publishes the Third Issue of the South-North Dialogue in Korea, covering, through questions and answers, the entire aspects of developments in the two-way dialogue during the last one-and-half years following the historic announcement of the July 4 South-North Joint Communique in 1972, with the purpose of keeping the public accurately informed of facts about the dialogue, in perspective.

The editor also wishes that this booklet would be found instrumental in conveying our message to the north Korean communists that they show more sincerity for a speedy success in the dialogue. The editor looks forward to constant guidance and support from the readers. —Ed.

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Part One

Developments in the South-North
Dialogue

*—questions and answers on the entire
aspects of the two-way dialogue following
the July 4 South-North Joint Communique,
including the breakoff of the dialogue and
recent efforts to resume the dialogue—*

1. What Do We Want to Achieve in the Dialogue?

What are the objectives that we seek to achieve in the on-going South-North Dialogue? The ultimate objective, undoubtedly, is the long-sought reunification of the country.

President Park Chung Hee of the Republic of Korea made that objective emphatically clear, when he stated, in the first item of the new seven-point foreign policy of the Republic of Korea for peace and unification announced on June 23, 1973, that “the peaceful unification of the fatherland is the supreme task of the Korean people. We will continue to exert every effort to accomplish this task.”

However, there is the hard reality that, although the ultimate objective of the Korean people, the unification of the country is conditioned by obstacles unusually harassing. The outstanding obstacle comes from the fact that the country has been divided, for a full generation now, into two categorically different political and social systems, sharing extremely antagonistic ideologies, value systems and historical view-points; free democracy and communism. We have the reality in which both sides of Korea are resolved to sustain their own systems by all means, respectively.

Considering this stark reality, we chose, as the second best means, the dialogue, with the hope that it would eventually lead to the long-awaited realization of the peaceful reunification. We chose the dialogue because we thought that, by continuing the bilateral dialogue between parties directly concerned, we would be able to improve the relations between the two sides, through preclusion of the danger of recurrence of war and easing of tension, removal of misunderstandings and distrust and promotion of mutual understanding and trust, and would eventually be able to achieve an independent and peaceful reunification of the country on the basis of improvement of relations through the dialogue.

We have manifestly embodied these aspirations of ours in the historical

July 4 South-North Joint Communique.

The two sides of Korea agreed in the Joint Communique that the unification of the country should be brought about through independent efforts and peaceful means and also agreed that, in order to facilitate the independent and peaceful reunification, the two sides would "first" seek "a grand national unity, as one homogeneous nation, transcending differences in thoughts, ideologies and systems," by undertaking a series of positive measures to ease the tension and promote understanding and trust.

What would we do to ease the tension and promote understanding and trust? The Joint Communique provided for measures to serve the purpose as follows:

- To stop slandering and defaming each other; stop undertaking military provocations, large or small, against one another; and prevent inadvertent military incidents.*
- To enforce various exchanges in many fields.*
- To expedite the South-North Red Cross Conference.*
- To install and operate a direct telephone line between Seoul and Pyongyang.*
- To create and operate the South-North Coordinating Committee, with the purpose of enforcing agreed items, solving problems arising in the relation between the two sides and solving the question of the unification in accordance with the agreed principles.*

The purpose of the South-North Dialogue was now expressly defined in the Joint Communique. The dialogue was committed to establishment of a stable peace upon the Korean peninsula through preclusion of war and easing of tension; to steady improvement of the relations between the two sides through removal of misunderstandings and distrust and promotion of mutual understanding and trust; and, eventually, to broadening of the road to peaceful and independent reunification of the country.

President Park Chung Hee praised highly the purposes of the South-North Dialogue, as were defined in the South-North Joint Communique,

and pledged, in the third item of the new seven-point Republic of Korea foreign policy for peace and unification of June 23, 1973, that the Republic of Korea “would continue to make efforts with sincerity and patience to secure concrete results from the South-North Dialogue based on the spirit of the South-North Joint Communiqué.”

2. What Are the Reasons for the Deadlock in the Dialogue?

The rails were laid for the South-North Dialogue with the announcement of the July 4 South-North Joint Communiqué. The two sides now had mutually agreed objectives brilliantly defined in the Joint Communiqué and they now also had the much needed organ to supervise their joint efforts to pursue the objectives, the South-North Coordinating Committee. However, one-and-half years have elapsed thereafter without seeing concrete outcome of the dialogue.

It was not only lack of progress at the dialogue that we have observed during the last one-and-half years. We have also observed such annoying developments as violations of agreements, increase in the tension and, moreover, suspension of the dialogue, all done by one side unilaterally. The relations between the two sides of Korea have become steadily deteriorated, rather than improved, to the extent where the general situation could be likened to that of the time before the announcement of the Joint Communiqué.

Where were the reasons? In order to find an answer to this question, we must conduct a thorough examination of all the relevant factors both within and without the framework of the dialogue.

A. The “Inside” Factors

The stalemate in the dialogue has been primarily due to the insincere attitude on the part of the north Korean side, who has kept on ignoring and trampling upon agreements at will, intentionally and purposefully.

Let us now take a brief look at how the north Korean side has kept on ignoring and trampling upon agreements.

The north Korean campaign to stalemate first and then suspend the dialogue was spearheaded by their persistent effort to alter the channels of dialogue even before they were fully normalized.

The north Korean side began talking about reorganization of the South-North Coordinating Committee, a south-north joint political body instituted in November, 1972, to cope with all the problems, including the question of reunification, arising in the relations between the two sides, although it had not yet had time to go into full operation.

The inception of the south-north joint political body was based on the Item 6 of the July 4 South-North Joint Communique, a document signed jointly by Mr. Lee Hu Rak, the then Director of the Republic of Korea Central Intelligence Agency, and Mr. Kim Young Joo, director of the organization guidance department of the north Korean Workers' Party, both "upholding the desires of their respective superiors."

The two sides also agreed, in the "Agreed Minute on the Formation and Operation of the South-North Coordinating Committee," which was adopted between the two sides in November, 1972, too, to organize the Committee with a Vice Chairman, two Committee Members and an Executive Member from each side, all of "ministerial" or "vice ministerial" ranks, in addition to a Co-chairman from each side. The South-North Joint Communique had already provided that the Co-chairmanship would be assumed by Mr. Lee Hu Rak and Mr. Kim Young Joo, respectively.

In sum, these provisions made it amply clear that the south-north joint political body was being instituted between the "authorities" of the two sides.

The "Agreed Minute" also provided that the South-North Coordinating Committee would cope with questions such as 1) reunification of the country 2) political exchanges between political parties, social organizations

and individuals between the two sides, 3) exchanges and cooperation in economic, cultural and social fields, 4) easing of tension, prevention of military incidents and removal of the state of military confrontation, and, finally, 5) coordination of joint steps in overseas activities.

Scarcely had the Committee been activated in late November, 1972, than the north Korean side began insisting upon changes in the functions as well as the composition of the Committee.

At the second meeting of the Committee held in Pyongyang in March, 1973, the north Koreans demanded that the Committee be "reorganized" in order that "military questions are solved first," and also demanded that a "political conference" be convoked, with the participation of "representatives of political parties, social organizations and 'people' of all walks of life" for the purpose of "solving the question of reunification."

On April 16 of the same year, Kim Il Sung, north Korean president, proposed that "either the South-North Coordinating Committee be reorganized so that political parties and social organizations are represented there, or a south-north political conference be convoked, separate from the South-North Coordinating Committee, for the purpose of solving the question of reunification."

The north Koreans were now beginning to talk about reorganization as well as changes in the functions of the Committee from outside the Committee. It was evidently an intentional disavowal of the "Agreed Minute" which provided that any revision of the "Agreed Minute," including changes in the number of the Committee members, be considered within the Committee itself. The message was clear. The north Koreans were not inclined to observe agreements faithfully.

Throughout the three rounds of the Committee meetings, the Republic of Korea side took the stand that the Committee first start with normalizing its business functions, including establishment of a Joint Secretariat, and then begin implementing agreements from "easier ones," leaving

“more difficult ones” aside for now for future solution. However, the north Korean side was intransigent on their demand that the question of reorganization of the Committee be handled first. A deadlock in the dialogue was an unavoidable matter.

The north Korean side, at the same time, put forward untimely and impracticable demands, and obstructed progress in the dialogue by asserting that their demands were “prerequisites.” The north Korean insistence upon “prior solution of military questions” was the typical of such north Korean demands. “As long as the south Korean aide does not agree to solve the military questions first,” the north Koreans argued, “there can be no progress in the dialogue, no improvement in the relations between the two sides and no solution to problems related to the reunification.”

The July 4 South-North Joint Communique provided for a wide range of “interim measures,” all designed to serve the purpose of removing the existing tension and promoting an atmosphere of mutual understanding and trust between the two sides, to be undertaken to create a climate favorable for achievement of a peaceful reunification eventually. This, undoubtedly, was an “indispensable phase” for the eventual objective to be achieved.

However, it so turned out that the north Koreans would not recognize the necessity of that “indispensable phase.” They tried to create the “illusion” that the reunification could be achieved even without such a “process.” They tried to put the cart before the horse by arguing that “once the unification is achieved, everything will be automatically solved.” The north Korean demand on “prior solution of military questions” reflected exactly such a way of thinking, and was thus a proposal more for propaganda effects than for agreement with the other side.

The north Korean proposal at the South-North Coordinating Committee meetings was marked for contradiction between items, let alone their impracticableness. The north Korean proposal read as follows in sum:

- That the key to the improvement in the relations between the two sides lies in the removal of the military confrontation. It is, therefore, imperative to give the priority to the discussion on military questions, which involve 1) a halt to arms race, 2) mutual troop reduction, 3) withdrawal of all foreign troops, 4) a ban on import of war materiel, and 5) signing of a peace treaty. For this purpose, we demand that either the South-North Coordinating Committee be reorganized so as to have the participation of military leaders, or the military subcommittee of the Committee be created prior to other subcommittees.*
- That the five subcommittees of the Committee, political, military, diplomatic, economic and cultural, be created all at once.*
- That a political conference of representatives of political parties, social organizations and “people” of all walks of life be convoked, with the purpose of solving the question of reunification.*

One can easily see that the underlined parts of the first and second items contradict sharply with each other. And the suggestion contained in the third item did not make sense at all, because the July 4 South-North Joint Communique and the Agreed Minute on the Formation and Operation of the South-North Coordinating Committee all provide that the Committee itself was fully authorized to tackle the problem of reunification. It so becomes evident that the north Korean proposal was designed more to serve certain propaganda purposes than to qualify itself as an issue for serious debate.

The typical case of violations of agreements by the north Korean side is presented in the case of the continuation of the slanderous and defamatory broadcasts by the north Korean side against the Republic of Korea.

The July 4 South-North Joint Communique provides for a stop of slandering and defamation against one another between the two sides, and the two sides agreed at a Co-chairmen’s meeting in Pyongyang in November 1972, to stop, effective as of zero hour, November 11 that year, radio broadcasts against one another, loudspeaker broadcasts along the Demilitarized

Zone against one another and scattering of propaganda leaflets into the other side's area.

However, it did not take a long time for the north Koreans to break the agreement in the case of suspension of the radio broadcasts against one another, in particular. It may indeed have been true that the Communists could not survive with their propaganda and agitation media checked. No sooner had the agreement gone into effect, than the north Koreans began reopening hostile broadcasts against the Republic of Korea.

There was a total of 10,282 cases of hostile broadcasts put on the air through north Korea's regular radio and TV networks during the period from November 11, 1972 through November 30, 1973.

The north Korean radio broadcasts were mostly of such a poor taste as to find fault with virtually all of the domestic and foreign policies of the Republic of Korea Government as well as society news, by grossly distorting them. Particularly in the latter part of 1973, the north Korean radio broadcasts reopened intensive personal attacks on leaders of the Republic of Korea Government with all kinds of dirty libelous accusations based on groundless stories.

Furthermore, the north Korean side is presently operating a clandestine underground radio station, under the bogus name of the "Voice of the Revolutionary Unification Party," from a spot in the north Korean territory which put on the air mostly broadcasts calling for violent class uprisings against the legitimate government in the Republic of Korea. North Korea has put on the air a total of 10,764 such cases of broadcasts, under the guise of the "Voice of the Revolutionary Unification Party," during the period from November 11, 1972, through November 30, 1973.

The above is an examination of the "inside" factors that contributed to the deadlock in the dialogue. north Korea finally broke off the dialogue unilaterally through a statement on August 28, 1973, in the name of Kim Young Joo, Co-chairman on the Pyongyang side of the South-North Coordinating Committee.

B. “Outside” Factors

Why was north Korea motivated to stalemate and then discontinue the dialogue? We can find the answer by examining the outside factors.

The reason for the north Koreans to deadlock and then cut off the dialogue was primarily because of north Korea’s unchanged pursuit of what they call a “south Korean revolution,” an interim target of their struggle for an eventual Communist takeover of the southern half of Korea.

The unchanging aim of the north Korean leadership has remained to be a “Communist unification” through a “south Korean revolution,” without regard to the South-North Dialogue, whose commitment was something else. We can find evidences, in quantity, of such an aim of the north Korean leadership both in north Korean publications and in the words of the very north Korean leadership.

For example, we have the case of the policy thesis, published on the very eve of the announcement of the July 4 South-North Joint Communiqué in 1972, under the title: “The Mutual Relationship between the South Korean Revolution and the Reunification of the Fatherland.”

The thesis boldly declares that the reunification of the fatherland “can be achieved when the American troops are withdrawn from south Korea and when the ‘people’s democratic revolution’ triumphs in south Korea so that the ‘people’ seize the political power there.”

The thesis sets it as a “precondition” for the reunification that “an anti-imperialist, national liberation and people’s democratic revolution is accomplished in south Korea,” and emphasizes that “there are violent means only for accomplishment of a south Korean revolution.” The thesis supports the idea of the north Korean version of a Communist unification of Korea by declaring that “the unification of the fatherland should be achieved under the flag of the ‘people’s democratic republic of Korea,’” and admits that the north Korean version of a “peaceful unification” is no

more than a wolf in the guise of a sheep by arguing that “although there are both peaceful and non-peaceful means for unification, a peaceful unification can be achieved under the condition that a south Korean revolution is achieved through violent means.”

The theme of the thesis was confirmed by none other than Kim Il Sung, north Korean president, on October 5, 1973, when he gave a commemorative speech on the sixth anniversary of a meeting of delegates of the north Korean Workers' Party.

In this speech, Kim Il Sung reaffirmed that the unification of the fatherland could be achieved only under the condition that a south Korean revolution was achieved. Urging that the “south Korean revolution” should be accomplished “through violent means,” Kim stressed that “in order to defeat the counterrevolutionaries and achieve a triumph of revolution in south Korea, we must be prepared with strong revolutionary potential.”

What north Korea means by a “south Korean revolution through violent means” is a pursuit of what they call a “people’s democratic revolution” in south Korea.

North Korea would consider the legitimate government of the Republic of Korea and her constitutional order a “target of outright overthrow by force,” and pursue their “overthrow” by means of a violent uprising by the people of the Republic of Korea, by organizing and instigating the people of the Republic of Korea ideologically and by class through all available legal and illegal methods.

North Korea has recently become more and more outspoken with their demand on withdrawal of American troops stationed in the Republic of Korea. But they now admit that their demand on withdrawal of American troops is more for aggressive purposes than for peace purposes by declaring the withdrawal of American troops as a “prerequisite” for the “south Korean revolution.”

It now becomes quite evident that the theme of the north Korean

policy toward south Korea, and toward the unification, sharply contradicts with that of the July 4 South-North Joint Communiqué, both in terms of the objectives and the methods to pursue the objectives.

Now, there naturally arises one doubt. Why did then the north Koreans accept a dialogue between “authorities” of the two sides and agree to the South-North Joint Communiqué?

We are not in a position to offer a precise answer to the question, for north Korea only can offer one.

We can only guess, with a few options. There is one guess that goes along this line. north Korea has been suffering badly economically, probably due to malfunctioning of economic cooperation among the socialist nations and more possibly due to shortcomings in the north Korean economic policy, featuring poor technology, labor shortage and unbearably heavy burden on the economy of excessive military expenditures. Thus, north Korea may have thought of making a breakthrough in the economy, by capitalizing on the dialogue in the direction of easing the tension between the two sides of Korea.

This guess undoubtedly reflects the wishful and affirmative side of the coin. If this guess proved to be correct, there must have been some steady progress in the dialogue, some steady improvement of relations between the two sides, in other words.

It now appears, however, that this guess failed to prove to be correct. It is so because the past developments in the dialogue, and in the relations between the two sides, do not necessarily support the guess.

So, there now comes the second guess. It is based on the probability that the north Korean leadership, perhaps because of the uniquely north Korean rigidity in the way of thinking and dogmatic decision-making process, may have made some grave miscalculations, miscalculations that the dialogue would turn out conducive to the promotion of a climate in south

Korea favorable for the “south Korean revolution.”

It is now a well-known fact that the north Korean social system is based on a complete indoctrination of the inhabitants, indoctrination of beliefs in the fanatical idolization of Kim Il Sung and in the “absolute superiority” of the north Korean socialism over the south Korean capitalist economy. South Korea has long been pictured in the eyes of the north Korean inhabitants as a society, suffering from prevailing poverty, unemployment and starvation.

With the picture of south Korea presented as that, it might have been possible that the north Korean leadership might have thought that they could “sugar-coat” the south Korean “authorities,” on the one hand, and find a chance to reach the “poor and underprivileged” people of south Korea and drive them onto the path to a “south Korean revolution,” on the other.

A turn in the behavior of the north Korean side in the dialogue was sensed with the turn of the year from 1972 to 1973. The year 1973 dawned with the north Korean side appearing definitely reluctant to keep the rhythm and tempo of the previous year in the dialogue.

Why was there the change? We can find explanation by going along on the second guess on why they had accepted the dialogue in the beginning.

The South-North Dialogue resulted, although in limited scale, in the opening of respective societies to the other side. The dialogue involved exchanges of people and at least the participants were given the opportunity to take a first-hand look at the society of the other side.

These exchanges and observations, it is highly probable, might have given rise to certain uncertainties and uneasiness in the minds of the north Korean leadership, for what was observed on the spot in south Korea by those north Koreans participating in the dialogue proved that they had been given grossly wrong indoctrinations. There was no denying of the hard fact that south Korea was enjoying much better economic prosperity.

when compared with the north Korean economy. It might have posed some potential danger to the security of the north Korean regime.

Besides, it was not long after that the north Korean leadership found that the dialogue was not necessarily going to create a climate favorable for the “south Korean revolution,” as they had wished to at the start.

Now, north Korea began closing the door again with the dawn of the new year, 1973. The dialogue has become deadlocked.

The north Korean side began purposefully distorting the basic spirit of the July 4 South-North Joint Communiqué. They began using the South-North Joint Communiqué for propaganda purposes and began intensifying their efforts to paralyze the functioning of the South-North Coordinating Committee.

North Korea began their efforts to disengage the dialogue from the “authorities,” and intensified their efforts to formulate a new channel of dialogue on a “people-to-people” level. North Korea now started again talking openly of what they call a “political conference” between “representatives” of political parties, social organizations and ‘people’ of all walks of life, virtually renouncing the South-North Coordinating Committee. In a speech on June 23, 1973, Kim Il Sung redressed the “political conference” into what he called a “grand national congress,” and said that that was the place where the question of unification should be handled, instead of the South-North Coordinating Committee.

North Korea now seemed determined to return to the classic Communist strategy of forming a “unified front,” a strategy designed to “isolate” the legitimate government from the “people” and lure the “people” to speak and rise against their own government.

3. What was the Meaning of Aug. 28 N Korean Statement?

Many people tended to over-simplify the meaning, when north Korea

cut off the on-going political dialogue between the two sides of Korea at the South-North Coordinating Committee on August 28, 1973, through a statement issued in the name of Co-chairman Kim Young Joo of the Committee on the Pyongyang side. There were even some people who viewed the statement as merely declaring Mr. Lee Hu Rak, then Co-chairman of the Committee on the Seoul side, a “persona non grata.” Some even argued that, if Co-chairman Lee was replaced by somebody else, the disrupted functioning of the Committee would be normalized instantly. There was a number of major foreign news media who so lightly shared this view.

However, such a view was a totally misled conclusion, coming from inadequate examination of the contents of the said August 28 statement of north Korea. And the inaccuracy of such a view was very well pointed out by Mr. Lee Hu Rak himself at a special press conference he summoned on the following day, August 29, in Seoul.

Ironically enough, it was evidently true that, when the Republic of Korea first probed the possibility of a political dialogue with north Korea through the person of Mr. Lee Hu Rak back in early part of 1972, Kim Il Sung, the north Korean leader, accepted the offer because of the fact that Mr. Lee was then Director of the Republic of Korea Central Intelligence Agency.

Substantiation of the truth of the matter came when, on two occasions, one during his first and the other during his second visit to Pyongyang, in May and November, respectively, Mr. Lee was praised by Kim Il Sung himself as the “hero of the people” and the “hero of the unification.” Kim also told Mr. Lee that he was “trusting” the latter because the latter was “the man who cracks down on the Communists in south Korea.” “I might not have trusted him”, Kim was later quoted as having said, “if it were anybody else.”

Mr. Lee, who resigned as Director of the Republic of Korea Central Intelligence Agency on December 3, 1973, also resigned as Co-chairman of

the South-North Coordinating Committee on the Seoul side for health reasons. Vice Chairman Chang Key Young was named to act as acting Co-chairman for the Seoul side in the meantime.

However, despite these developments, the north Korean side has not agreed on resumption of the dialogue at the South-North Coordinating Committee and, instead, laid further obstacles to an early resumption of the talks in the form of “preconditions.”

Then, what really was the meaning of north Korea’s August 28 statement?

In order to obtain an answer to this question, we had better see what the north Koreans had said in the same statement about resumption of the South-North Coordinating Committee.

North Koreans laid in the statement “conditions” for resumption of the Committee as follows:

First, they demanded an overall reshuffle of the Committee members of the Seoul side. North Korea demanded that the Republic of Korea replace the Seoul side’s Committee members with those who 1) oppose to the June 23 new foreign policy of the Republic of Korea for peace and unification and 2) who favor the north Korean version of “peaceful unification formula.”

Second, they laid conditions, which constituted unjustifiable interference in internal affairs of the Republic of Korea. They demanded that 1) Republic of Korea repeal the June 23 new foreign policy, 2) the Anti-Communist Law and the National Security Law be abrogated and punishment of violators of the security statutes be stopped and 3) those serving prison terms for violation of the security statutes be released.

Third, they demanded that the South-North Coordinating Committee be reorganized. North Korea demanded that the Committee be reorganized so as to have the participation of “representatives of political parties, social

organizations and 'people' of all walks of life" in addition to "authorities."

These north Korean demands, without exception, constituted violation of existing agreements between the two sides and destruction of rules for the south-north dialogue.

The north Korean demands were a direct challenge to the spirit of the July 4 South-North Joint Communiqué and a total renunciation of the "Agreed Minute on the Formation and Operation of the South-North Coordinating Committee."

The north Korean statement of August 28 carried the message that north Korea 1) wanted unilaterally to cut off the dialogue, 2) wanted to have the dialogue kept closed for the time being until certain conditions of their own are met and 3) wanted to force changes in the channel of dialogue, including reorganization of the Coordinating Committee, in their own terms.

4. Why was the S-N Red Cross Conference Disrupted?

There has been a total of seven rounds of the South-North Red Cross Conferences held so far in Seoul and Pyongyang by turns. Despite the seven rounds of talks, however, the humanitarian talks have failed to produce any concrete outcome in the discharge of the mission of working out the ways to ease the suffering of the ten million dispersed families and relatives in the two parts of the divided country.

What is more, the humanitarian talks have not been held for five full months now, following the last meeting held in Pyongyang in last July.

The lack of progress in the humanitarian Red Cross talks is due in the main to the differences in the basic positions of both sides on the nature of the talks.

The Republic of Korea National Red Cross has maintained the position that the suffering of the dispersed families and relatives is the most

serious problem among problems that have arisen between the two parts of the country due to the division of the country. In that respect, the Republic of Korea National Red Cross has maintained that the problem of the dispersed families and relatives should be solved before all the other problems, based on the Red Cross humanitarianism, the Red Cross principle of political neutrality and the established tracing service practices for the dispersed families, as are advised by the International Committee of Red Cross and League of Red Cross Societies.

The north Korean Red Cross society, on the other hand, has refused to distinguish the humanitarian dialogue at the Red Cross talks from the political dialogue at the Coordinating Committee. The north Korean Red Cross society has refused to recognize the urgency of solution of the humanitarian suffering of the dispersed families and relatives and insisted instead on solution of the humanitarian problem as part of the question of unification at the political Coordinating Committee. The north Korean Red Cross society even volunteered to express the view that “the ultimate humanitarianism in Korea is the unification and there is no humanitarianism apart from the unification.” The north Korean Red Cross society has thus refused to observe Red Cross principles and, instead, kept on raising suggestions of categorically political nature.

The South-North Red Cross Conference has five agenda items for debate, including 1) confirmation and notification of whereabouts and fate, 2) mutual visits and meetings, 3) correspondence, 4) reunion of families and 5) other humanitarian problems.

Debate on ways to enforce projects envisaged in the agenda item 1) began at the third Red Cross talks in October last year. But the debate on the agenda item 1) has dragged on without achieving any progress at all, because of the differences in the basic positions between the two sides.

The projects envisaged in the agenda item 1) are generally thought to be relatively simple ones, in view of the precedents and practices in the Red Cross family tracing services.

The Republic of Korea National Red Cross made a proposal on the agenda item 1), featuring measures fully consistent with generally accepted practices of the international Red Cross. It called for exchanges of tracing cards, in the form of letters of inquiry and return cards, with the Red Cross societies of the two sides functioning as lawful intermediaries.

However, the north Korean Red Cross society came out with a proposal of unexpected nature, reading in sum as follows:

—That the Republic of Korea take following measures in order to create legal conditions and social environment favorable for implementation of agreements at the Red Cross talks:

- 1) To abrogate the Anti-Communist Law and the National Security Law.*
- 2) To disband anti-communist organizations and to ban all anti-communist activities.*
- 3) To guarantee freedom of speech, assembly, publication and travel as well as accommodation, and inviolability of the person and articles they carry, for those who travel south and north.*
- 4) To secure positive participation of political parties, social organizations and public authorities in the implementation of agreements at the talks.*

—That both sides exchange “Red Cross publicity personnel,” by one for each Ri, or Dong, with full freedom of speech, assembly, publication and travel as well as accommodation, and inviolability of the person and articles they carry, guaranteed for them.

—That, as to the methods for confirmation and notification of the whereabouts and fate, the individuals concerned be allowed to do the confirmation and notification by themselves, by freely traveling in the other side’s area, without the Red Cross societies necessarily intervening.

There is no need for argument that the bulk of the north Korea Red Cross proposal are suggestions of political nature, which cannot be debated at the Red Cross talks.

However, progress in the Red Cross talks has been delayed because the north Korean Red Cross side has held fast to their suggestions.

In an effort to make a breakthrough in the deadlocked talks, the Republic of Korea National Red Cross delegation suggested at the seventh talks in Pyongyang in last July that the two sides exchange a group each of dispersed families and relatives during the Lunar August Full Moon holidays this year so that they can visit their ancestral graves in the other side of the divided country and pay homage to their deceased forefathers. However, the north Korean Red Cross delegation rejected the suggestions too.

The north Korean side did not mention the Red Cross talks in the August 28 statement that unilaterally suspended the political dialogue at the Coordinating Committee, apparently out of the consideration of justifications. Nevertheless, the Red Cross talks too have in fact been interrupted following the statement, because the north Korean Red Cross kept mum to repeated calls of the Republic of Korea National Red Cross to resume the humanitarian talks as soon as possible.

5. What are Prospects for Normalization of the Dialogue?

A series of contacts is currently underway at Panmunjom between the two sides of Korea in an effort to resume the interrupted two-way dialogue. The Republic of Korea took a renewed initiative to resume the talks as soon as possible, preferably before the end of the year. However, prospect for an early resumption of the dialogue remains grim, despite the continued contacts, because of the evasive attitude of the north Korean side.

Recent developments in the renewed efforts to reopen the two-way dialogue and long-range prospect for the resumption of the talks are as

follows:

A. South-North Coordinating Committee

The Seoul side of the South-North Coordinating Committee sent a telephone message, via the Seoul-Pyongyang hot telephone line, on November 15, 1973, calling for an early opening of the long-overdue fourth Coordinating Committee meeting. The Seoul side proposed that the two sides hold a meeting of Executive Members of the Committee to "discuss openheartedly" all the matters deemed necessary for an early normalization of the functions of the Committee. The Seoul side also expressed willingness to "talk on the reorganization of the Committee, if the Pyongyang side thinks it a necessary step before opening of the fourth Committee meeting."

The Pyongyang side responded to the suggestion of the Seoul side with a letter in the name of Vice Chairman Yu Jang Shik of the Pyongyang side forwarded to Vice Chairman Chang Key Young of the Seoul side.

However, the Pyongyang letter was in fact refusal of the Seoul side's call for an early resumption of the political dialogue. The Pyongyang side stuck fast to the positions taken in the August 28 statement and produced demands that the Republic of Korea cease punishment of violators of the Anti-Communist Law and the National Security Law and that the Coordinating Committee be reorganized with "representatives of political parties and social organizations."

The Seoul side now proposed a meeting of Vice Chairmen of the two sides, and, as a result, two rounds of Vice Chairmen's meetings have been held at Panmunjom so far, on December 5 and 19, respectively. After the close of the second Vice Chairmen's meeting on December 19, the spokesman for the Seoul side said that there was "some progress made at the meeting in narrowing differences of opinions as regards the question of expanding the scope of composition of the Committee." It was announced that the third Vice Chairmen's meeting will take place sometime in the

middle of January next year.

B. South-North Red Cross Conference

The Republic of Korea National Red Cross also sent a message on November 15, 1973, via the Seoul-Pyongyang direct Red Cross telephone line, and asked a meeting of liaison officers on the following day, November 16, at Panmunjom, to discuss procedural matters concerning opening of the long-delayed eighth Red Cross Conference within the year in Seoul.

Following this proposal, two rounds of working-level contacts were made at Panmunjom, one on November 22 between liaison officers, and the other on November 28 between one Conference delegate each from the two sides, in addition to the liaison officers.

At these contacts, the Republic of Korea National Red Cross suggested that the eighth Red Cross Conference be held from December 19 this year in Seoul, because it was now turn of the Seoul side to host the occasion in accordance with the previously arranged agreement to hold the conferences in Seoul and Pyongyang by turns.

However, the north Korean Red Cross rejected the Republic of Korea National Red Cross suggestion by counterproposing that the eighth Conference be held in Pyongyang, instead of Seoul. The north Korean side also demanded that the Republic of Korea cease "suppressing" violators of national security statutes and remove "non-Red Cross members" from the Republic of Korea National Red Cross delegation.

Judging from the north Korean reaction, it does not seem likely that the humanitarian talks would be resumed at an early date.

C. Long-range Prospect

Judging from the reluctant attitude of the north Korean side, prospect for full resumption of the two-way dialogue at an early date does not appear

bright.

However, a closer analysis of all the related factors indicate that the dialogue is going to be resumed sooner or later. It is the prevailing understanding that formidable pressures, both domestic and international, are now being mounted on the north Korean side to reconsider their position and seek easing of tension and promotion of a stable peace upon the Korean peninsula through continuation of the dialogue.

It now seems that a certain period of time is being needed for the north Koreans to be awakened from the "illusion" that a "south Korean revolution" and a subsequent Communist takeover of the southern half of the peninsula is ever a likely matter.

The consensus statement on the Korean question adopted at the 28th General Assembly of the United Nations this year was widely regarded as a specific development in the international scene, urging the two parts of Korea to reinvigorate their dialogue and produce concrete results as soon as possible.

6. What Does the UNGA Consensus Statement Mean?

For the two successive years, 1971 and 1972, the United Nations ruled to shelve the Korean question. The UN action was made in consideration of the fact that the Koreans of the two sides of the divided country were now talking between themselves. It was wise of the United Nations to stay clear of the Korean debates, because any rash action by the UN on the Korean question would certainly affect the progress in the dialogue in one way or another.

Situation remained much the same this year. There was no substantial progress made yet in the South-North Dialogue.

However, the United Nations took up the Korean question, this year, and subjected the question to full debate at the political committee of

the General Assembly. The United Nations had no other choice but to take up the issue, because there was a strong demand from countries, supporting north Korean position, spearheaded by Algeria.

It was north Korea's own doing. The adoption of a pro-north Korean resolution on the Korean question at the summit conference of non-aligned countries in Algier in the early part of September apparently made the north Korean leadership become over-confident of a "triumph" in a confrontation of vote with the Republic of Korea at the United Nations General Assembly this year.

The Republic of Korea had to meet the challenge. The Republic of Korea had her own draft resolution on the Korean question submitted before the General Assembly, through a group of allies who co-sponsored it, and fully prepared for a confrontation of vote.

However, it was not the desire of the Republic of Korea to press for the confrontation of vote, because it was evident that, whatever the outcome, the consequence of the confrontation of vote would not turn out constructive for future developments in the relations between the two parts of Korea. Therefore, the Republic of Korea pressed for compromise, with the primary aim of avoiding the confrontation of vote, successfully enough to produce the "consensus statement" to be adopted without vote at both the political committee and the General Assembly.

North Korea withstood the compromise endeavor to the last minute, but had to give in, when even Algeria began persuading her protegee to discard the unconvincing idea of winning in a confrontation of vote.

At last, the United Nations decided not to have the two draft resolutions pressed to vote and, instead, unanimously approved a "consensus statement," expressing satisfaction over the announcement of the South-North Joint Communique of July 4, 1972, and urging the two sides of Korea to "continue the dialogue and enforce many-sided exchanges and cooperation on the basis of the spirit of the Joint Communique in order to expedite

an independent and peaceful unification of the country.”

The “consensus statement” of the United Nations reflected the prevailing opinions of the international community, pressing for a speedy progress in the South-North Dialogue.

The United Nations also established a precedent that, by approving the dissolution of the UNCURK, a measure long pressed by north Korea, upon the recommendation of the UNCURK with the consent of the Republic of Korea, will limit its actions to matters on which the two sides of Korea are not in disagreement, so far as they are Korean questions.

7. What Are the Conditions for Progress in the Dialogue?

President Park Chung Hee of the Republic of Korea declared, in the second item of his June 23 foreign policy for peace and unification, that “peace must be maintained in the Korean peninsula by all means, the South and the North should neither interfere with each other’s internal affairs, nor commit aggression against each other.”

In order that the South-North Dialogue finally succeed and achieve the objectives, there are certain “rules of the game,” that both sides should observe by all means. The rules require, exactly as President Park pointed out so appropriately in the above paragraph, that peace must be preserved on the Korean peninsula at all cost and that neither side interfere in the internal affairs of the other side, nor commit aggression against the other side.

It goes beyond question that the dialogue can never succeed, when peace is endangered, internal affairs of one side is interfered in and aggression is committed against one side, by the other side.

At the second Coordinating Committee meeting in last March in Pyongyang, the then Co-chairman of the Seoul side Mr. Lee Hu Rak laid a six-point “code of ethics” to be observed by the two sides in order to have the South-North Dialogue succeed eventually. They were:

- To avoid denying each other's system.*
- To understand each other's system.*
- To avoid interfering in internal affairs of each other's system.*
- To exert efforts for promotion of the welfare of respective people, based on their respective systems.*
- To create cooperation between the two sides in the direction of consolidating the national homogeneity, transcending their respective systems.*
- To continue the dialogue between the two systems faithfully in accordance with the July 4 South-North Joint Communique.*

It was a comprehensive expression of the basis spirit of the South-North Joint Communique, defining the South-North Dialogue as a dialogue between systems.

The most important matter in the present relations between the South and the North is that the two side should face the facts as they are, and allow no “illusions” to become a factor bearing upon those relations.

What are the realities of the Korean peninsula? That is the fact that the peninsula has been divided into two systems, for a full generation now, sharing categorically antagonistic thoughts, ideologies, social systems, value systems and historical view-points. There can be neither camouflage nor make-up which can deface these realities. The South-North Dialogue is now committed to the formidable task of seeking adjustment of these vast differences through a series of tension-easing and confidence-building processes by virtue of the national homogeneity of the people of the two systems.

However, it is now being observed that the north Korean side deliberately pretends ignorance of these hard realities of the Korean peninsula and tries to justify their unwarranted interferences in the internal affairs of the Republic of Korea with the illusory image of “one nation,” overlooking the time and processes required for the liquidation of the hard realities. The on-going north Korean radio broadcasts, finding fault with virtually all the

aspects of life in the Republic of Korea, are one example of such inadmissible behaviors of the north Korean side.

North Korea also accuses the Republic of Korea of “creating two Koreas” and “perpetuating national division,” by making issue of the item five of the new foreign policy of the Republic of Korea for peace and unification, in which the Republic of Korea said she would not oppose to simultaneous admission into the United Nations with north Korea, “if the majority of the member states so wish, and provided that it does not cause hindrance to our national unification.”

This is yet another example of the inadmissible north Korean attempt to exploit the sentimental and illusory face of the realities of Korea for their own propaganda gains only.

To make it repeatedly clear, it can never be denied that the Korean peninsula is now unfortunately divided into “two divided parts,” and it is nothing any more than a mockery to argue that we are presently “one.” The fact is that we are now committed to the task of working “one system” out of the “two systems.” It is never an easy thing to achieve the task of unifying the “two systems,” of entirely different ideologies, value systems and historical viewpoints, into “one system.” And we must approve of the fact that it requires some considerable length of time and processes to work out the miracle of unifying the “two systems.”

North Korea is deliberately trying to ignore these undeniable facts. The north Korean idea of a “confederated Korea” is another bogus idea, for it does not offer workable arrangements with which to work out a “real confederation,” between the free democratic institutions and the communist systems. North Korea now talks about entry into the United Nations as a “single member-state” by the two sides of Korea in the form of a “confederated Korea.” But, north Korea has yet to furnish explanations on how the free democratic system in the South and the communist system in the North could work out a “unified foreign policy” to become a “single member-state” in the United Nations, when the two parts of Korea are “con-

federated” overnight, without due processes, as the north Koreans so adamantly advocate now.

It is desired that north Korea had better give some convincing explanations on their activities overseas, which are actually committed to the creation of “two Koreas,” while vocally denouncing it. It was north Korea herself that pleaded with a number of nations which already had diplomatic ties with the Republic of Korea for what they called “equal diplomatic treatment” with the Republic of Korea. Kim Il Sung himself declared on June 23, 1973, while announcing his vehement opposition to the “two Korea” concept, that north Korea would “develop diplomatic relations with all nations favorable to north Korea based on the principle of reciprocity and equality.”

North Korea is now a member of the World Health Organization and the International Parliamentarians’ Union, together with the Republic of Korea. North Korea has recently entered into a full diplomatic relationship with India and Bangladesh, respectively, simultaneously with the Republic of Korea. What explanations do they have to justify their own acceptance of the “two Korea” concept, as have been examined above?

An objective examination of these realities convinces one of the forwardness and foresightedness of the June 23 foreign policy for peace and unification of the Republic of Korea.

It is desired that, in order to see a success of the South-North dialogue, north Korea discard the deceptive and self-contradictory attitude of denying the realities that they now so vehemently adhere to.

Part Two

References

The Special Statement Regarding Foreign Policy for Peace and Unification by President Park Chung Hee

Dear Fifty-million Fellow Countrymen!

Today, I wish to announce the guide-lines of our foreign policy for peace and unification to improve substantially conditions for the attainment of our long-cherished national aspiration—the unification of our fatherland. I make this announcement, taking into account our experiences in the south-north dialogue and the recent developments in international situation.

At the conclusion of World War II, Korea was liberated, but our land was divided and our people were separated against their will.

The 38th Parallel, originally known as a military demarcation line for disarming Japanese forces, turned later into an Iron Curtain. As a result, the south and the north were cut off from each other in political, economic, social, cultural and all other fields.

In the meantime, negotiations were conducted at the meetings of the US-USSR Joint Commission to remove the barrier of the 38th Parallel and to establish a unified democratic government. Yet, these negotiations ended in failure due to basic differences in the positions of the two parties. The Korean question was, then, submitted to the United Nations.

At the Second Session of the United Nations General Assembly convened in 1947, a resolution was adopted calling for free general elections throughout the whole of Korea. The United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea (UNTCOK) was then dispatched to Korea to facilitate this objective.

However, the general elections were held only in the southern part of Korea because of the negative attitude on the part of north Korea. Thus, the Government of the Republic of Korea was established on 15th August, 1948 and was subsequently recognized by the United Nations as the only lawful government in Korea.

On 25th June, 1950, the north Korean Communist forces launched an unprovoked aggression against the Republic of Korea. During the Korean War thus caused, an innumerable number of our brethren lost their lives and the whole country was subjected to destruction by warfare. An armistice was put into effect after three years of war, but the country still remained divided and the prospect of unification of the divided country became even dimmer.

In my Commemorative Address delivered on the occasion of the 25th Anniversary of National Liberation on 15th August, 1970, I called for a relaxation of tension between the south and the north with a view to alleviating the sufferings of our compatriots arising from the division of the country and also to building the foundations for a peaceful unification of the fatherland. On 12th August of the following year our side proposed the South-North Red Cross talks, and on 4th July last year the South-North Joint Communique was issued.

The south-north dialogue was thus started. Yet, the results of these dialogues lasting for almost two years since their beginning have been far from our expectations.

In our talks with the north, we have taken the position that both sides should endeavor to gradually remove the artificial barriers between the south and the north by solving easier and more practical problems first and to phase out feelings of mutual distrust and replace them with those of mutual confidence through concrete results. We further pointed out that such an approach would best serve to make the talks productive and would also serve as a short-cut to the eventual unification of the country by peaceful means.

The north Korean side, in disregard of the existence of deep-rooted feelings of distrust between the south and the north, insisted that military and political problems, which might endanger the security of the Republic of Korea, must first be dealt with, as a package, in the talks. While the very problem of reunification was being discussed at the talks, the north Korean

side was continuously engaged in such external activities as would practically perpetuate the division of the country.

In view of the current status of south-north relationship, it is anticipated that not only many difficulties lie in the way of the dialogue, but a considerable length of time will also be required before the results of the dialogue originally expected can be attained.

Moreover, if the present state of affairs were to be left as it is, the existing feelings of distrust might be deepened and even the tension between the south and the north might be aggravated.

Now, as for the recent developments in the international situation, it may be said that the era of Cold War after World War II came to an end. We have embarked upon a new era of peaceful coexistence, based on the status quo, through the balance of power among the major Powers.

Judging also from a series of events witnessed in this part of the world, it seems unlikely that the unification of our fatherland can be attained within a short period of time.

These international trends give rise to a most serious problem in the history of our nation. The problem is how to pursue the national unification—the supreme aspiration and objective of the entire Korean people—in the face of the stark realities of international situation.

My dear Fifty-million Fellow Countrymen!

We must tackle these realities in an active and positive way.

We must formulate wise and firm policies for attaining the goal of national unification in the face of internal and external realities. Then, we must assiduously implement such policies.

We should have peace rooted firmly in this land and should achieve, without fail, the ultimate goal of peaceful unification by our own self-reliant efforts.

With these considerations in mind, I now declare the following policies:

1. The peaceful unification of the fatherland is the supreme task of the Korean people. We will continue to exert every effort to accomplish this task.

2. Peace must be maintained in the Korean peninsula by all means. The south and the north should neither interfere with each other's internal affairs nor commit aggression against each other.

3. We will continue to make efforts with sincerity and patience to secure concrete results from the south-north dialogue based on the spirit of the South-North Joint Communique dated 4th July, 1972.

4. We shall not oppose north Korea's participation with us in international organizations, if it is conducive to the easing of tension and the furtherance of international cooperation.

5. We shall not object to our admittance into the United Nations together with north Korea, if the majority of the member-states of the United Nations so wish, provided that it does not cause hindrance to our national unification.

Even before our admittance into the United Nations as a member, we shall not be opposed to north Korea also being invited at the time of the U.N. General Assembly's deliberation of "the Korean question" in which the representative of the Republic of Korea is invited to participate.

6. The Republic of Korea will open its door to all the nations of the world on the basis of the principles of reciprocity and equality. At the same time, we urge those countries whose ideologies and social institutions are different from ours to open their doors likewise to us.

7. Peace and good-neighborliness are the firm basis of the foreign policy of the Republic of Korea. It is reaffirmed that we will continue to further strengthen the ties of friendship existing between our friendly nations and our country.

I wish to make it clear that matters concerning north Korea in the policies

enumerated above are interim measures during the transition period pending the achievement of our national unification and that the taking of these measures does not signify our recognition of north Korea as a state.

My dear Compatriots in the South and the North!

Upon an objective and realistic appraisal of the internal and external situations surrounding our fatherland, I have a firm conviction that these policies are the only short-cut to the achievement of peaceful unification by our own self-reliant efforts amidst international currents of relaxation of tension without impairing the dignity and pride of our nation.

There can be no despair or frustration for a wise and courageous people.

Let us march together, with hope, courage and wisdom, toward the attainment of peace in the Korean peninsula, prosperity of the nation and unification of our fatherland.

South-North Joint Communiqué

Recently there were talks held both in Pyongyang and Seoul to discuss problems of improving South-North relations and unifying the divided Fatherland.

Director Hu Rak Lee of the Central Intelligence Agency of Seoul visited Pyongyang from 2 to 5 May 1972 to hold talks with Director Young Joo Kim of the Organization and Guidance Department of Pyongyang. Second Vice Premier Sung Chul Park, acting on behalf of Director Young Joo Kim, also visited Seoul from 29 May to 1 June 1972 to hold further talks with Director Hu Rak Lee.

With the common desire to achieve peaceful unification of the Fatherland as early as possible, the two sides in these talks had frank and open-hearted exchanges of views, and made great progress in promoting mutual understanding.

In the course of the talks, the two sides, in an effort to remove the misunderstandings and mistrust and mitigate increased tensions that have arisen between the South and the North as a result of long separation, and further to expedite unification of the Fatherland, have reached full agreement on the following points.

1. The two sides have agreed to the following principles for unification of the Fatherland:

First, unification shall be achieved through independent Korean efforts without being subject to external imposition or interference.

Second, unification shall be achieved through peaceful means, and not through the use of force against each other.

Third, as a homogeneous people, a great national unity shall first be sought, transcending differences in ideas, ideologies, and systems.

2. In order to ease tensions and foster an atmosphere of mutual trust

between the South and the North, the two sides have agreed not to slander or defame each other, not to undertake armed provocations whether on a large or small scale, and to take positive measures to prevent inadvertent military incidents.

3. The two sides, in order to restore severed national ties, promote mutual understanding and to expedite independent peaceful unification, have agreed to carry out various exchanges in many fields.

4. The two sides have agreed to cooperate positively with each other to seek early success of the South-North Red Cross talks, which are underway with the fervent expectations of the entire people.

5. The two sides, in order to prevent the outbreak of unexpected military incidents and to deal directly, promptly and accurately with problems arising between the South and the North, have agreed to install a direct telephone line between Seoul and Pyongyang.

6. The two sides, in order to implement the aforementioned agreed items, solve various problems existing between the South and the North, and to settle the unification problem on the basis of the agreed principles for unification of the Fatherland, have agreed to establish and operate a South-North Coordinating Committee co-chaired by Director Hu Rak Lee and Director Young Joo Kim.

7. The two sides, firmly convinced that the aforementioned agreed items correspond with the common aspirations of the entire people, who are anxious to see an early unification of the Fatherland, hereby solemnly pledge before the entire Korean people that they will faithfully carry out these agreed items.

July 4, 1972

UPHOLDING THE DESIRE OF THEIR RESPECTIVE
SUPERIORS

HU RAK LEE

YOUNG JOO KIM

Agreed Minute on Formation and Operation of Coordinating Committee

Both parties agree on the formation and operation of the South-North Coordinating Committee as follows:

1. The South-North Coordinating Committee aims at the solution of the problem of unifying the fatherland on the basis of such agreed principles for the unification of the fatherland as furtherance of the execution of agreed items in the South-North Joint Communiqué of July 4, 1972, developing of increasingly improved relations between the South and the North and joining efforts and working together in various fields.

2. The functions of the South-North Coordinating Committee are as follows:

- A. To consult about, and settle, the question of realizing an independent and peaceful unification of the country on the basis of the agreed principles for the unification of the fatherland and to guarantee its implementation.
- B. To consult about, and settle, the question of effecting a wide range of political exchanges between political parties, social organizations and individuals in the South and the North and to guarantee its implementation.
- C. To consult about, and settle, the questions of economic, cultural and social exchanges as well as of joining efforts and working together between the South and the North, and to guarantee their implementation.
- D. To consult about, and settle, the questions of easing tensions, preventing military clashes and dissolving the state of military confrontation between the South and the North, and to guarantee their implementation.

- E. To consult about, and settle, the question of taking joint steps in overseas activities between the South and the North, enhancing accordingly the national prestige as a homogeneous nation, and to guarantee its implementation.

3. The South-North Coordinating Committee shall be organized as follows:

- A. The South-North Coordinating Committee shall be composed of one Co-chairman, one Vice Chairman, one Executive Member and two Members from each party. The number of the Committee Members may be increased as necessary. Director Lee Hu Rak of the Central Intelligence Agency and Director Kim Young Joo of the Organizational Guidance Department are hereby designated as the Co-chairmen. Vice Chairmen, Executive Members and Members shall be of ministerial or vice ministerial rank and shall be appointed respectively by the Co-chairmen through prior consultation.
- B. An Executive Council shall be created within the South-North Coordinating Committee.
The Executive Council shall consult about, and settle, when the authority is so delegated by the Co-chairmen of both parties, various problems that arise in the south-north relations while the South-North Coordinating Committees in recess, and shall guarantee their implementation. The Executive Council shall be composed of the Executive Member and two Secretaries from each side.
- C. Political, Military, Foreign Affairs, Economic and Cultural Subcommittees shall be created within the South-North Coordinating Committee. Each subcommittee shall be created as the progress at the South-North Coordinating Committee warrants it. The functions and the formation of the subcommittees shall be regulated separately through mutual agreement.

- D. The South-North Coordinating Committee shall have its Joint Secretariat at Panmunjom. Both parties shall respectively appoint Co-directors of the Joint Secretariat one from each party and shall staff necessary number of personnel to work under Co-directors.
4. The South-North Coordinating Committee shall operate as follows:
- A. The South-North Coordinating Committee shall make it a principle to hold its meetings in Seoul and Pyongyang by turns, and may hold them at Panmunjom, if necessary.
- B. The South-North Coordinating Committee shall convene once every two to three months, and the Executive Council once every month. Extraordinary meetings can be held through mutual agreement.
- C. The South-North Coordinating Committee meetings shall be held either in public or behind the closed door.
- D. Necessary number of specialists and staffs of the Joint Secretariat shall be allowed, through mutual agreement, to attend the South-North Coordinating Committee and the Executive Council meetings.
- E. A final agreement of the South-North Coordinating Committee shall take effect as soon as the Co-chairmen of both parties put their initials on the note of agreement and the agreed items shall be simultaneously announced through the Joint Secretariat upon mutual agreement.
- F. Detailed operational procedures for the South-North Coordinating Committee shall be worked out separately.
5. This Agreed Minute shall be revised and supplemented through mutual agreement.

6. This Agreed Minute takes effect upon exchange of the texts with initials of both parties on them.

November 4, 1972

(Signed)

Director Hu Rak Lee

Co-chairman (Seoul side)

**South-North Coordinating
Committee**

(Signed)

Director Young Joo Kim

**Co-chairman (Pyongyang
side)**

**South-North Coordinating
Committee**

Consensus Statement on Korean Question

After consultations with the co-sponsors of the two draft resolutions on the Korean question, the President is authorized to announce an agreement that the two draft resolutions on the Korean question will not be put to the vote at the current session of the General Assembly.

The President is further authorized to make the following statement :

It is noted with satisfaction that a joint communique was issued by the north and the south of Korea on 4 July 1972, which provides for the following three principles on the reunification of Korea:

- (a) The reunification of the country should be achieved independently, without reliance upon outside force or its interference,*
- (b) The reunification of the country should be achieved by peaceful means, without recourse to the use of arms against the other side,*
- (c) Great national unity should be promoted.*

It is the general hope that the north and the south of Korea will be urged to continue their dialogue and realize their many-sided exchanges and cooperation in the above spirit so as to expedite the independent, peaceful reunification of the country.

The General Assembly decides to dissolve immediately the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea.

A Chronological Review of South-North Relations

July 4, 1972

Simultaneous announcement of the South-North Joint Communiqué in Seoul and Pyongyang

August 11

Conclusion of the South-North Red Cross preliminary talks

August 22

Statements released by Seoul and Pyongyang to guarantee personal safety of the persons crossing the DMZ to participate in the Red Cross talks

Seoul side: Lee Hu Rak, Co-chairman, the South-North Coordinating Committee

Pyongyang side: ministry of social security

Aug. 29– Sept. 2

The 1st full-dress Red Cross talks in Pyongyang (7 delegates, 7 advisors, 20 attendants and 20 reporters from each side; the Republic of Korea National Red Cross headed by Lee Bum Suk and the north Korean Red Cross headed by Kim Tae-hui)

Sept. 12–16

The 2nd full-dress Red Cross talks in Seoul

Sept. 20

- A. The IPU board meeting decides to postpone the discussion of north Korean application for entry for a year
- B. The U.N. Steering Committee decides to postpone the discussion of the Korean question for a year

Sept. 22

The 27th U.N. General Assembly decides to postpone the discussion of the Korean question for a year

Sept. 28

Co-chairman Lee Hu Rak of the Seoul side, the South-North Coordinating Committee, sends messages to five home press organizations urging prudent news coverage of South-North dialogue.

Oct. 12

The 1st Co-chairmen's meeting of the South-North Coordinating Committee at Panmunjom

Seoul side: Co-chairman Lee Hu Rak

Pyongyang side: Acting Co-chairman Park Sung Chul

Oct. 23-26

The 3rd full-dress South-North Red Cross talks in Pyongyang to discuss working arrangements on the Agenda Item One, "the question of tracing, and notifying thereof, the whereabouts and fate of dispersed families and relatives in the South and the North."

Nov. 2-4

The 2nd Co-chairmen's meeting of the South-North Coordinating Committee in Pyongyang

Participants

Seoul side;

Lee Hu Rak; Co-chairman

Chang Key Young; former Deputy Prime Minister

Choi Kyu Ha; Special Assistant to the President

Kang In Duk; Chief, 9th Bureau, CIA

Chung Hong Jin; Chief, Bureau of Consultation and Coordination,
CIA

Pyongyang side:

Park Sung Chul; Acting Co chairman

Yu Jang Shik; deputy director of the organizational guidance department, north Korean Workers' Party

Lee Kyung Suk; cabinet councillor, Pyongyang regime

Han Ung Shik; instructor, political committee, central committee,

north Korean Workers' Party
Kim Duk Hyun; instructor, political committee, central committee,
north Korean Workers' Party

Agreements

1. Adoption of the Agreed Minute on the Formation and Operation of the South-North Coordinating Committee

2. Agreement on Suspension of radio broadcast and loudspeaker broadcast along the DMZ and dispersion of leaflets against one another, to become effective from zero hour, Nov. 11, 1972

Nov. 11

The agreement on the suspension of radio broadcast, loudspeaker broadcast along the DMZ and dispersion of leaflets against one another takes effect starting zero hour of the day

Nov. 22-24

The 4th full-dress Red Cross talks in Seoul

Nov. 30

The 3rd meeting of Co-chairmen's of the South-North Coordinating Committee in Seoul

Nov. 30- Dec. 2

The 1st meeting of the South-North Coordinating Committee in Seoul

Dec. 28

Kim Il Sung, north Korean president, says north Korea "will seek diplomatic ties with all capitalistic nations which treats south and north Korea equally."

March 4, 1973

Three armed agents kill a guard at the seaweed drying lot, U-do, Cheju-do, and flee

March 7

North Korean soldiers open fire at south Korean soldiers repairing the military demarcation line marks in the central front, DMZ, killing one officer and one enlisted man

March 10

The 1st Executive Council meeting of the South-North Coordinating Committee at Panmunjom

March 14-16

The 2nd South-North Coordinating Committee meeting in Pyongyang

March 20-23

The 5th full-dress Red Cross talks in Pyongyang

April 17

Three armed agents appear in the southern part of the military demarcation line in the central front, DMZ; two were killed and one escapes

April 24

North Korea joins IPU

May 5

Two north Korean armed agents infiltrate into Kumdang-do, Cholla Namdo; one was killed and one escapes

May 8-11

The 6th full-dress Red Cross talks in Seoul

May 18

North Korea joins WHO

June 10

North Korea temporarily resumes loudspeaker broadcast against the South at four points along the DMZ, violating the agreement made at the 2nd Co-chairmen's meeting.

June 11

North Korea again proposes via the direct telephone line to cease slandering each other; Seoul accepts the proposal

June 12–14

The 3rd South-North Coordinating Committee meeting in Seoul

June 23

President Park Chung Hee of the Republic of Korea proclaims the new foreign policy for peace and unification

June 26

Kim Il Sung of north Korea opposes simultaneous entry to U.N.

June 27

North Korea submits applications to establish a standing observer's office at U.N. Headquarters

June 29

U.N. Secretary-General notifies north Korea of the permit for establishing the observer office

July 10–13

The 7th full-dress South-North Red Cross talks in Pyongyang; north Korea rejects the ROKNRC proposal to exchange family grave visiting teams

Aug. 1

Lee Nak Sun, chairman of the Korean Volleyball Assn., invites through the South-North Coordinating Committee the north Korean coaches to the 2nd Asian volleyball coach training program

Aug. 2

North Korea rejects Lee's invitation

Aug. 28

Kim Young Joo, Pyongyang side Co-chairman of the South-North

Coordinating Committee, unilaterally declares the discontinuation of the South-North dialogue

Aug. 29

Lee Hu Rak, Seoul side Co-chairman of the South-North Coordinating Committee, denounces the absurdities in the August 28 Kim Young Joo statement, asking retraction of the statement and reopening of the dialogue

Nov. 14

Lee Jong Mok, north Korean deputy foreign minister, demands disembodiment of the United Nations Command at the political committee of the U. N. General Assembly, and rejects the simultaneous entry to U.N. of south and north Korea

Nov. 15

Foreign Minister Kim Yong Shik tells at the political committee, U.N. General Assembly, that (1) withdrawal of U.N. Forces cannot be executed without procuring substitute measures for securing peace, (2) unification must be achieved through peaceful means, and (3) south Korea will achieve the success of the South-North dialogue with patience and sincerity

Nov. 15

Seoul side of the South-North Coordinating Committee proposes to hold an Executive meeting for resumption of the dialogue

Nov. 15

ROKNRC proposes a liaison officers' meeting at Panmunjom on Nov. 16 to discuss opening of the 8th Red Cross talks before the year-end

Nov. 16

Pyeongyang side of the South-North Coordinating Committee delivers a message signed by the Pyongyang side Vice Chairman Yu Jang Shik to the Seoul side Vice Chairman Chang Key Young

The Message demands the following prearrangements to resume the dialogue;

(1) South Korea must withdraw the June 23 statement,

(2) South Korea cease punishing violators of the Anti-Communist Law and the National Security Law,

(3) South Korea consent to reorganization of the South-North Coordinating Committee to include representatives from various political parties and social organizations.

Nov. 16

NKRC sends no response to the ROKNRC proposal of Nov. 15

Nov.17

The NKRC counterproposes the liaison officers' meeting for Nov. 21

Nov. 17

The ROKNRC accepts the NKRC counterproposal

Nov. 21

Seoul side of the South-North Coordinating Committee proposes a Vice Chairmen's meeting on Nov. 27, for discussion on reorganization and of the Coordinating Committee

Nov. 21

ROKNRC proposes the 8th Red Cross talks for Dec. 19 in Seoul

Nov. 21

The political committee adopts a "consensus statement" on the Korean question.

Nov. 22

ROKNRC proposes to the 2nd liaison officers' meeting for Nov. 24

Nov. 22

North Korean Red Cross counterproposes the meeting for Nov. 28.

Nov. 22

ROKNRC accepts the NKRC counterproposal

Nov. 27

Pyongyang side of the South-North Coordinating Committee consents to the Seoul proposal to hold a Vice Chairmen's meeting and revises the meeting date to Dec. 5

Nov. 27

Seoul side of the South-North Coordinating Committee accepts the revised proposal of Pyongyang side

Nov. 28

NKRC rejects ROKNRC proposal to hold the 8th talks in Seoul on Dec. 19

Nov. 28

U.N. General Assembly unanimously adopts the "consensus statement" on the Korean question

Dec. 1

North Korea insists at the Armistice Commission meeting that the waters surrounding five islets including Paengnyong-do are north Korean territory, declaring the right to interrogate and search the ships sailing in the area

Dec. 1

Ministry of Defense warns against the north Korean aggressive acts, reporting six occasions in the period of Nov. 19–Dec. 1 of the north Korean naval ships intruding the south Korean waters in the vicinity of five islets including Paengnyong-do and Yonpyong-do

Dec. 3

Lee Hu Rak, Seoul side Co-chairman of the South-North Coordinating Committee resigns for health reasons

Dec. 5

The 1st Vice Chairmen's meeting of the South-North Coordinating Committee at Panmunjom. Seoul side proposes 2nd meeting for Dec. 12

Participats:

Seoul side; Vice Chairman **Chang Key Young**

Pyongyang side; Vice Chairman **Yu Jang Shik**

Dec. 11

Pyongyang proposes to revise the Vice Chairmen's meeting date to

Dec. 19

Dec. 11

Seoul side consents to the revised proposal of Pyongyang side

Dec. 13

Chief ROKNRC Delegate **Lee Bum Suk** sends a message to **Kim Tae-hui**, NKRC Chief Delegate, demanding early resumption of the Red Cross talks

Published on December 24, 1973

The Public Relations Association of Korea

I. P. O. Box 4161

Seoul, Korea

South-North Dialogue in Korea

*South-North Coordinating Committee
South-North Red Cross Conference*

To Readers:

Prospects for early resumption of the South-North Dialogue, unilaterally disrupted last August by the north Korean side, still remain dim, despite strenuous efforts by the Republic of Korea side.

There have been a series of South-North meetings recently at the level of Vice Chairmen of the South-North Coordinating Committee, with the question of reorganization of the Committee on the agenda as a means to expedite early reopening of the Committee. However, progress at the meeting is still at snail's pace because of the unrealistic attitude of the north Korean side on the question at issue. The overall aspects of the relations between the two parts of Korea today, on the other hand, resemble those before the issuance of the July 4 South-North Joint Communiqué of 1972, due to the north Korean campaign to undermine the basic fabric of the South-North Dialogue and ever aggravate the existing tension in this part of the world.

The Fourth Issue of the South-North Dialogue is designed to present to readers the Republic of Korea's strenuous efforts to see early normalization of the dialogue, north Korea's renewed armed provocations and the Republic of Korea's new initiative for institutionalized peace on the Korean peninsula, President Park Chung Hee's call for a non-aggression agreement namely. -Ed.

SOUTH-NORTH JOINT COMMUNIQUE

Recently there were talks held both in Pyongyang and Seoul to discuss problems of improving South-north relations and unifying the divided Fatherland.

Director Hu Rak Lee of the Central Intelligence Agency of Seoul visited Pyongyang from 2 to 5 May 1972 to hold talks with Director Young Joo Kim of the Organization and Guidance Department of Pyongyang. Second Vice Premier Sung Chul Park, acting on behalf of Director Young Joo Kim, also visited Seoul from 29 May to 1 June 1972 to hold further talks with Director Hu Rak Lee.

With the common desire to achieve peaceful unification of the Fatherland as early as possible, the two sides in these talks had frank and openhearted exchanges of views, and made great progress in promoting mutual understanding.

In the course of the talks, the two sides, in an effort to remove the misunderstandings and mistrust and mitigate increased tensions that have arisen between the South and the North as a result of long separation, and further to expedite unification of the Fatherland, have reached full agreement on the following points:

1. The two sides have agreed to the following principles for unification of the Fatherland:

First, unification shall be achieved through independent Korean efforts without being subject to external imposition or interference.

Second, unification shall be achieved through peaceful means, and not through the use of force against each other.

Third, as a homogeneous people, a great national unity shall first be sought, transcending differences in ideas, ideologies, and systems.

2. In order to ease tensions and foster an atmosphere of mutual trust between the South and the North, the two sides have agreed not to slander or defame each

other, not to undertake armed provocations whether on a large or small scale, and to take positive measures to prevent inadvertent military incidents.

3. The two sides, in order to restore severed national ties, promote mutual understanding and to expedite independent peaceful unification, have agreed to carry out various exchanges in many fields.

4. The two sides have agreed to cooperate positively with each other to seek early success of the South-North Red Cross talks, which are underway with the fervent expectations of the entire people.

5. The two sides, in order to prevent the outbreak of unexpected military incidents and to deal directly, promptly and accurately with problems arising between the South and the North, have agreed to install a direct telephone line between Seoul and Pyongyang.

6. The two sides, in order to implement the aforementioned agreed items, solve various problems existing between the South and the North, and to settle the unification problem on the basis of the agreed principles for unification of the Fatherland, have agreed to establish and operate a South-North Coordinating Committee co-chaired by Director Hu Rak Lee and Director Young Joo Kim.

7. The two sides, firmly convinced that the aforementioned agreed items correspond with the common aspirations of the entire people, who are anxious to see an early unification of the Fatherland, hereby solemnly pledge before the entire Korean people that they will faithfully carry out these agreed items.

July 4, 1972

**UPHOLDING THE DESIRES OF THEIR RESPECTIVE
SUPERIORS**

HU RAK LEE

YOUNG JOO KIM

**Agreed Minute
on
Formation and Operation
of
South-North Coordinating Committee**

Both parties agree on the formation and operation of the South-North Coordinating Committee as follows:

1. The South-North Coordinating Committee aims at the solution of the problem of unifying the fatherland on the basis of such agreed principles for the unification of the fatherland as furtherance of the execution of agreed items in the South-North Joint Communiqué of July 4, 1972, developing of increasingly improved relations between the South and the North and joining efforts and working together in various fields.
2. The functions of the South-North Coordinating Committee are as follows:
 - A. To consult about, and settle, the question of realizing an independent and peaceful unification of the country on the basis of the agreed principles for the unification of the fatherland and to guarantee its implementation.
 - B. To consult about, and settle, the question of effecting a wide range of political exchanges between political parties, social organizations and individuals in the South and the North and to guarantee its implementation.
 - C. To consult about, and settle, the questions of economic, cultural and social exchanges as well as of joining efforts and working together between the South and the North, and to guarantee their implementation.
 - D. To consult about, and settle, the questions of easing tensions, preventing military clashes and dissolving the state of military confrontation between the South and the North, and to guarantee their implementation.
 - E. To consult about, and settle, the question of taking joint steps in overseas activities between the South and the North, enhancing accordingly the

national prestige as a homogeneous nation, and to guarantee its implementation.

3. The South-North Coordinating Committee shall be organized as follows:

- A. The South-North Coordinating Committee shall be composed of one Co-chairman, one Vice Chairman, one Executive Member and two Members from each party. The number of the Committee Members may be increased as necessary. Director Hu Rak Lee of the Central Intelligence Agency and Director Young Joo Kim of the Organizational Guidance Department are hereby designated as the Co-chairmen. Vice Chairmen, Executive Members and Members shall be of ministerial or vice ministerial rank and shall be appointed respectively by the Co-chairmen through prior consultation.
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The Executive Council shall consult about, and settle, when the authority is so delegated by the Co-chairmen of both parties, various problems that arise in the south-north relations while the South-North Coordinating Committee is in recess, and shall guarantee their implementation. The Executive Council shall be composed of the Executive Member and two Secretaries from each side.

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 - E. A final agreement of the South-North Coordinating Committee shall take effect as soon as the Co-chairmen of both parties put their initials on the note of agreement and the agreed items shall be simultaneously announced through the Joint Secretariat upon mutual agreement.
 - F. Detailed operational procedures for the South-North Coordinating Committee shall be worked out separately.
5. This Agreed Minute shall be revised and supplemented through mutual agreement.
6. This Agreed Minute takes effect upon exchange of the texts with initials of both parties on them.

November 4, 1972

(Signed)

Director Hu Rak Lee

Co-chairman (Seoul side)

**South-North Coordinating
Committee**

(Signed)

Director Young Joo Kim

**Co-chairman (Pyongyang
side)**

**South-North Coordinating
Committee**

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Part One

Continued Efforts to Reopen the Dialogue

1. North Korean Policy Shifts after Aug. 28 Statement

North Korea's domestic and foreign policy posture following the Aug. 28 statement of last year, which broke off the two-lane South-North Dialogue, the South-North Coordinating Committee (SNCC) and the South-North Red Cross Conference (SNRCC), clearly indicates that north Korea has now made a sharp turn in her policy on the South-North relations in the direction of refusing to institutionalize the precarious peace on the Korean peninsula and of trying, instead, to undermine the basic fabric of the South-North Dialogue.

On September 9, 1973, the day of the founding of the north Korean Communist regime, north Korea's 'president' Kim Il Sung last spoke of the South-North Dialogue, by saying that continuation of 'contacts' and 'dialogue' between the two parts of Korea was 'still necessary.'

However, on the very same day, north Korea's 'premier' Kim Il came out advocating an entirely different theory. Speaking at a rally in Pyongyang on the day, Kim Il declared that the question of unification **"can no longer be handled by individuals or particular ruling authorities alone."** He asserted that the question of unification **"should now be handled at a forum of the entire people, and not between authorities,"** and demanded that a 'grand national congress' in north Korea's version be summoned to handle the unification question.

By his remarks, Kim Il was making it amply clear that north Korea was definitely losing her interest in honoring any further the spirit of the July 4 South-North Joint Communiqué as the basic fabric of the South-North Dialogue. It was an awesome pronouncement of north Korea's policy decision not to respect the role and functions of the SNCC, the all-embracing South-North negotiatory body created in November 1972 pursuant to agreement in the July 4 South-North Joint Communiqué, any longer.

North Korea then moved to plot a “confrontation of vote” on the ‘Korean question’ at the United Nations General Assembly, where the question had been shelved for the two previous years, consecutively, due to considerations on the on-going dialogue between the two parties directly concerned, by submitting the question, in the form of an ‘Algerian draft resolution,’ for debates at the 28th General Assembly.

In her memorandum submitted to the 28th General Assembly, north Korea returned to the typical ‘Cold War’ rhetoric of the past days, featuring, among others, brutal fabrication of well-established historical facts, with the kinds of false claims 1) that north Korean Communist ‘regime’ had been ‘legitimately’ created through an “all-Korea election,” 2) that the Korean war of 1950 “was started by the Republic of Korea, in collaboration with the American ‘imperialists,’ ” and 3) that the cause of the deadlock in the South-North Dialogue “lies in the ‘occupation of south Korea’ and ‘interference in internal affairs’ by ‘American imperialists.’ ”

These claims of north Korea, of course, were all preposterous distortion of the historical facts and unwarrantable defamation against the Republic of Korea, at the same time, constituting flagrant violation of provisions of the July 4 South-North Joint Communiqué prohibiting slanderings and defamation against one another.

On October 28, 1973, speaking at a dinner in Pyongyang given for the visiting Bulgarian government delegation, Kim Il Sung, in the meantime, categorically declared that **“the unification of the fatherland can be achieved only through ‘struggles,’ and there can be no compromise of whatsoever nature with ‘separatists.’ ”**

In November, 1973, the 28th United Nations General Assembly acceded to the Republic of Korea proposal to head off “confrontation of vote” and adopted unanimously, brushing aside north Korea’s last-ditch efforts against the move, a **“Consensus Statement,”** which called on the two sides of Korea to **“continue their dialogue and realize their many-sided exchanges and cooperation in the above spirit (of the July 4 South-North Joint Com-**

munique) so as to expedite the independent, peaceful reunification of the country.”

North Korea, however, turned a deaf ear to the unanimous advices of the world body.

Starting in the latter part of October 1973, north Korea began creating a new tension off the west coast of the peninsula by claiming ‘right to search’ Republic of Korea vessels sailing between the Republic of Korea’s ports and five isolated islands off the west coast nearby the military demarkation line that cuts the peninsula into two halves.

Under the Armistice Agreement, the five islands are indisputably under the Republic of Korea control, with access to the islands both from air and sea not to be challenged by any means. And, for the last two decades, Republic of Korea vessels continued to sail freely between the islands and the southern part of the peninsula proper, with no protests of any kind raised by north Korea over the matter.

However, north Korea now came out claiming “territorial rights” over the waters surrounding the islands, and indeed began sending gunboats into the contested waters, physically threatening Republic of Korea vessels sailing to the islands. Tension duly began mounting in the area.

Besides, informed specialists on north Korean affairs were increasingly wondering recently about possible changes in north Korea’s leadership hierarchy, changes involving strengthening of hard-liners and weakening of those who had taken leading role in the now suspended South-North Dialogue, soft-liners, so to speak.

It has also been observed, ever since the latter half of 1972, when the South-North Dialogue was in full swing, that north Korea has been hard at work strengthening her military capability, of offensive nature, in particular. According to informed specialists, north Korea has substantially increased, during the years 1972 and 1973, her armaments, featuring, among others, up-to-date types of fighter planes, guided-missile boats of OSA and KO-

MAR classes and submarines, together with pontoon bridges for river-crossing operation. The specialists also made it known that north Korean air force has recently put into operation a couple of originally reserve airfields in the far southern parts of north Korea.

The mounting tension off the west coast, in the meantime, finally broke out into open hostilities on February 15, 1974, when north Korean gunboats opened fire at unarmed civilian Republic of Korea fishing boats, fishing on the high seas some 30 miles off the west coast, sinking one of them and towing another to the north. In view of the recent north Korean efforts to create tension off the west coast, the north Korean piracy against the Republic of Korea's fishing boats on February 15, 1974, was never an isolated incident.

In his 'New Year message,' on January 1, 1974, north Korea's Kim Il Sung kept a total silence over the South-North Dialogue and, instead, vowed that north Korea would "staunchly fight, in conjunction with all the 'progressive elements' of south Korea, against the 'separatists,' both at home and abroad, who are 'trying to perpetuate the national division.'" Kim went on further to allege that "youthful students and people of south Korea are presently fighting fiercely against the south Korean authorities' 'national treachery' of 'exterminating' democracy, of 'mercilessly persecuting' people and of 'selling' the country to American and Japanese 'aggressors.'"

Furthermore, on February 8, 1974, general Lee Yong Moo, political commissar of the north Korean army, asserted, while speaking at a rally marking the north Korean version of the army day, that "the tension in Korea will never be removed and the people of Korea will never be free from aggression and war, so long as the 'troops of the American imperialist aggressors' remain in south Korea." Lee further issued the gruesome declaration that "there will be no compromise at all with the 'separatists' and the unification of the fatherland will be achieved through 'struggle' only."

The evident shifts in north Korea's policy on the South-North relations, as have been scanned through official remarks of the north Korean leaders

and north Korea's behaviours, clearly indicate what the problems of Korea are and where they are today. They clearly show us that north Korea's leadership is grossly dissatisfied over the progress at the South-North Dialogue so far and is currently hard at work trying to revive the 'Cold War confrontation' upon the Korean peninsula, by turning the clock back to the time before the July 4 South-North Joint Communiqué. And that exactly is the backdrop against which the Republic of Korea now exerts her maximum efforts to get the suspended dialogue resumed.

2. SNCC Vice Chairmen's Meetings

A. Debates on Committee Reorganization

On November 15, 1973, the Seoul side of the SNCC, in a renewed bid to have the suspended South-North Dialogue resumed at an early date, proposed, via the Seoul-Pyongyang hot telephone line, that the two sides of the SNCC make preliminary contacts on ways to reopen the SNCC meetings.

North Korea reluctantly responded to the proposal and there came a series of South-North meetings at Panmunjom, in the form of 'SNCC Vice Chairmen's Meetings.'

So far, Vice Chairmen Chang Key-young (Seoul side) and Yu Jang-shik (Pyongyang side) have held three rounds of the 'Vice Chairmen's Meetings,' first on December 5, 1973, second on December 19, 1973, and third on January 30, 1974. The fourth meeting was held on February 27, 1974.

On the agenda at the Vice Chairmen's Meeting was the question of determining whether reorganization of the Committee was a necessity to reopen the Committee meetings, and, if found necessary, of determining a new formula on the composition of the Committee.

The question of reorganization of the Committee had originally had

started with the north Korean statement of August 28, 1973, which had announced north Korea's unilateral decision to break off the political dialogue between the two parts of divided Korea at the SNCC.

In the statement, north Korea had demanded, as "preconditions" for resumption of the dialogue, among others:

- That the Seoul side reshuffle its five-man delegation on the Committee, removing Central Intelligence Agency personnel and replacing them with those who "oppose" to the new foreign policy of the Republic of Korea advocating simultaneous admission into the United Nations by both sides of Korea and those who "oppose" to 'persecution' of Communists.
- That the Republic of Korea withdraw her new foreign policy, on the ground that it was "aimed at perpetuation of the national division."
- That the Republic of Korea cease 'persecuting' Communist agents dispatched by north Korea with instructions to operate underground in south Korea, describing them as "patriotic elements fighting for democracy and peaceful unification."
- That the Seoul side agree to reorganize the SNCC in order to allow it to have the participation of representatives of "political parties, social organizations and people of various classes and strata."

The north Korean demands, as whole, were tantamount to a suggestion that the Republic of Korea turn into a Communist state before the SNCC meetings were resumed, a price the Republic of Korea could never, and would not, pay, under whatever circumstances.

The north Korean demands constituted, at the same time, a flagrant violation of general rules of negotiation, in view of the fact that negotiation is an instrument to iron out the differences, taking both sides to do the negotiation. Negotiation can never be instituted when one of the two parties demands a unilateral surrender of the other party, as a 'precondi-

tion' for the negotiation.

Resumption of the South-North Dialogue had to remain a distant possibility for a good while, for north Korea persistently held fast to the unreasonable and unacceptable 'preconditions.'

However, on second thoughts, the dialogue was the first efforts of their kind, that had ever taken place in this long-troubled part of the world in the last quarter century, to institutionalize a stable and lasting peace upon the Korean peninsula, with the prospect of leading to eventual reunification of the divided country, and was, thus, worth saving at all cost.

The Seoul side, under these considerations, suggested, in its telephone message to the Pyongyang side on November 15, 1973, that the Seoul side was "willing to discuss reorganization of the SNCC," among others, as a means to bring the SNCC back to operation at an early date, "if the Pyongyang side insists upon it as a 'precondition.' "

The Pyongyang side, in its telephone reply transmitted to the Seoul side via the hot line the following day, reiterated the north Korean demand that the SNCC be "reorganized so as to comprise representatives of political parties and social organizations," and added that the Pyongyang side was "willing to discuss the matter" with the Seoul side, provided that the latter "accepts" the former's idea.

It was thus fixed that the Vice Chairmen's meetings were to discuss the question of reorganization of the SNCC.

B. Proposals on Committee Reorganization

Seoul side:

To expand the size of the presently five-man delegation from each side to somewhere around ten from each side, comprising representatives of the 'authorities,' political parties and social organizations of each side.

Pyongyang side:

To have each side represented at the Committee by over five representatives of the 'authorities,' some five to twenty representatives from each of some 60 to 70 political parties and social organizations, plus individuals representing various classes and strata of people (making the size of the delegation of one side going up to an undetermined number from 350, at the least).

At 11:30 a.m., January 31, 1974, Lee Dong-bok, spokesman for Seoul side of the SNCC, called a special press conference in Seoul to make a statement, which read as follows:

“After the close of the third SNCC Vice Chairmen’s Meeting at Panmunjom yesterday, January 30, the Pyongyang side disclosed, through Radio Pyongyang, a unilaterally distorted version of the contents of the third Vice Chairmen’s Meeting, which was a closed-door session.

“The contents of the disclosure made by the Pyongyang side through Radio Pyongyang were not an impartial and factual account of the discussions that had taken place at the third Vice Chairmen’s Meeting. It was, instead, a sheer distortion, fabricating parts of speeches made by Vice Chairman of Pyongyang side as if they were the entire contents of the discussions at the meeting, and I do not personally feel inclined to comment on the details of the disclosure.

“On the question of reorganization of the SNCC, in particular, the Seoul side had proposed, earlier at the second Vice Chairmen’s Meeting on December 19, 1973, an expansion of the Committee through an increase in the number of Committee members from the present five to around ten, from each side, allowing the participation of representatives of political parties and social organizations in addition to representatives of the ‘authorities.’

“However, the Pyongyang side came out, at the third Vice Chairmen’s Meeting held yesterday, with a ridiculous proposal suggesting that each of the two sides be represented at the Committee by over five representatives of the

‘authorities,’ some five to twenty each from some 60 to 70 political parties and social organizations and an undetermined number of ‘individuals’ representing ‘various classes and strata,’ making the total number of Committee members from one side somewhere way up from 350, at the least.

“The north Korean attitude, judging from the so-called ‘reorganization proposal,’ clearly indicates that the Pyongyang side is definitely not going to keep the SNCC to function as coordinator of the South-North relations, in the good sense of the word, and indicates, instead, that they are now hard at work trying to make the SNCC an arena for a war of propaganda by converting it into the so-called ‘grand national congress.’

“Judging from the attitude of the Pyongyang side, we cannot help having the impression that the Pyongyang side has no intention of pursuing the objectives of the July 4 South-North Joint Communiqué through successful operation of the SNCC, and, instead, is either undergoing some untold internal troubles of its own or only trying to exploit the SNCC for other political purposes due to gross miscalculation of situations in the south.

“We would like to ask the Pyongyang side to come back to reason at once and agree to normalize the South-North Dialogue at an early date, by discarding the unreasonable ‘reorganization proposal,’ in order to contribute to peaceful reunification of the country through steady development of improved relations between the two divided parts of the country. We would like to emphasize anew that our side is ever more determined to push ahead with the South-North Dialogue with sincerity and patience.”

It was truly an extraordinary event that the Seoul side ever make such a disclosure of the contents of the closed-door sessions. The spokesman for the Seoul side gave the following account, in his background session, to explain why the disclosure was a necessity. They were:

First, the Vice Chairmen’s Meetings had been held behind the closed doors at the request of none other than the Pyongyang side itself for the sake of what it called ‘an atmosphere of secrecy.’ The Pyongyang side had

even forced reporters away from Panmunjom on the days of the meetings by rejecting the Seoul side's repeated suggestion to allow the reporters to make at least on-the-spot coverages of the meetings, if not the contents of them.

Second, at 4:20 p.m., January 30, some two and half hours after the close of the third Vice Chairmen's Meeting, Radio Pyongyang put on the air what it called a 'statement by the spokesman of the SNCC for Pyongyang side,' without identifying his person, disclosing what it said the 'contents of the third Vice Chairmen's Meeting.' However, the alleged 'contents' of the meeting, in fact, were the full copy of the opening remarks at the meeting by the Pyongyang side's Vice Chairman, mostly unfounded and unrelated accusations against the Republic of Korea, which were refuted on the spot point by point by the Seoul side's Vice Chairman. Furthermore, the Radio Pyongyang broadcast maliciously distorted some of the remarks made by the Seoul side's Vice Chairman at the meeting.

Thirdly, the Pyongyang side, while proposing the ridiculous "reorganization proposal," made it all the more impracticable by demanding that, among 'political parties and social organizations' of the Republic of Korea "those who 'oppose' to unification be excluded." To make such an ambiguous criterion a 'condition' for the other side to keep was a telltale evidence that the Pyongyang side's proposal on the Committee reorganization was designed only to meet the propaganda demand of north Korea.

3. Meaning of Pyongyang's 'Reorganization' Proposal

In order that we correctly examine the true meaning of the so-called 'proposal' on reorganization of the SNCC of Pyongyang side, and, at the same time, the question of its validity, we must first carefully study related provisions of the July 4 South-North Joint Communiqué, which constitute the legal basis of formation and operation of the SNCC.

The Joint Communiqué, in its Item 6, provides that "**both sides have**

agreed that they organize, and operate, the South-North Coordinating Committee (SNCC).....in order to enforce agreed items as such, solve various problems arising in the relations between the South and the North and to settle the question of unification on the basis of the agreed principles on unification of the fatherland.'

The "agreed items as such" in this provision refer to the Items 2 to 5 of the Joint Communiqué, providing for 1) suspension of defamation and slandering against one another, 2) suspension of armed provocations, large and small, and prevention of inadvertent military accidents, 3) implementation of various exchanges in many fields, 4) expediting of the South-North Red Cross Conference, and lastly, 5) installment, and operation, of a direct telephone line between Seoul and Pyongyang.

The Joint Communiqué has also empowered the SNCC to "settle" the question of unification of the country, in accordance with "agreed principles on unification of the fatherland," the three principles provided for in Item 1 of the Communiqué, namely.

The Joint Communiqué has envisioned the SNCC, in other words, as an authoritative body between the two sides with the supervisory function of negotiating detailed terms of enforcement of the agreed items provided for in the Communiqué, and their very enforcement.

In view of these irrefutable provisions of the Communiqué, it goes logically beyond question that, if it were to carry out the given functions effectively, the SNCC should be organized, and operated, with the constituted authorities of both sides playing the key role in the Committee, exercising adequate authority for the negotiation.

In discussing this matter, we can by no means bypass the hard reality that the two sides of Korea presently have entirely different and contradictory political systems. We should not bypass the substantial structural differences between the Republic of Korea government and the north Korean 'regime.'

The Republic of Korea has a representative form of government based on free democracy, while north Korea's political structure is professedly a one-party system run by the Workers' Party, north Korean version of what they call a 'proletarian' class dictatorship.

In the Republic of Korea, like other western countries, political parties are voluntary organizations, comprising people of age sharing common political credos, bying for the wheel of power through popular elections. In north Korea, however, there exists one party only, in the name of the Workers' Party, the nucleus of north Korea's political power structure, towering over the 'government.' In north Korea, like other Communist states, 'government' is merely an executioner of policy decisions made by the party.

Furthermore, the Republic of Korea grants the civil rights to all the people of age, without regard to sexes, religions and social status, unless otherwise disqualified by law. However, north Korea confines the civil rights, professedly under her 'constitution,' to only four 'classes' of people, 'workers' 'farmers,' 'soldiers' and 'working intelligentsia,' namely.

Considering these structural differences of the political institutions of the two sides of Korea, it becomes crystal clear that there is no other way for the South-North Dialogue but to be conducted between the 'constituted authorities' of the two parties. The most idealistic way is for the dialogue to be conducted directly between the constituted authorities of the two sides. But there also is the mean way of having the two constituted authorities authorize a delegation each, each comprising delegates appointed respectively by the two parties in their own way, to conduct the dialogue, with the full power given by their respective authorities. When there are such vast differences in the definition of 'sovereignty,' in the structure of 'government' and political parties, and in the nature of social organizations, it simply is meaningless to expect a common denominator to regulate the formation of the delegations. In other words, one side is never in the position to tell the other how to organize the latter's delegation.

Exactly under these considerations, the two sides of Korea had originally agreed to run the SNCC as a body between the two constituted authorities of Korea, the Republic of Korea government and the north Korean regime, by providing in the Agreed Minute on Formation and Operation of SNCC that the Committee would be composed of five delegates each from the two sides, 'of the rank of ministerial and or vice ministerial level.'

Of course, it was quite natural that the SNCC, having the authority to deal with the overall relations between the two sides of Korea, had to envision a certain stage where there was the necessity for specialization of the works of the Committee and for broadening of the scope of participation in order to cope with the progress to be made at the Committee. And, with an eye to this future necessity, the two sides of Korea have already agreed in the Agreed Minute on Formation and Operation of the SNCC that the SNCC would, in due course, have five subcommittees, political, military, economic, cultural and diplomatic, to be created separately as the progress at the Committee warrants it.

Then, let us now examine what exactly north Korea's 'proposal' on the Committee reorganization is.

North Korea now proposes that the SNCC be rather converted to a political rally, comprising 350, or more, members from each side, than remain as a workable negotiating body, composed of a limited number of delegates from the two sides. In its 'reorganization proposal,' north Korea suggests that the SNCC be organized with five, or more, 'representatives' of the constituted authorities, five to twenty 'representatives' from each of some 'sixty to seventy political parties and social organizations' and an undetermined number of 'individuals representing various classes and strata,' from each side, thus making the total size of the Committee somewhere well over 700 members.

North Korea's so-called 'reorganization proposal' simply is not worth serious consideration because it is all too evident that it can never be anything other than a sham proposal, lacking substance in all respects.

However, we have to consider it, anyhow, for the north Korean side

has formally submitted the 'porposal' with the Vice Chairmen's Meeting and for north Korea is now determinedly holding to the 'proposal.'

North Korea's so-called 'reorganization proposal' is merely a fiction, in the first place, because it simply is an impracticable and unworkable formula.

North Korea suggests in the proposal that the two sides of Korea be represented at the SNCC by 'some sixty to seventy' 'political parties and social organizations,' in addition to representatives of the constituted authorities and 'individuals representing various classes and strata.'

However, such a suggestion of north Korea suggests that the so-called 'reorganization proposal' is only a fiction, because it is practically doubtful that north Korea, priding her 'one-party system of the Workers' Party,' has ever had the plurality of 'political parties' and 'social organizations' in their true sense.

The north Korean suggestion of 'some sixty to seventy' political parties and social organizations to be represented at the SNCC from each side may have been based on north Korea's hitherto allegation that there is an alleged 'confederation of some seventy political parties and social organizations' in north Korea, under the name of 'Democratic Front for Unification of Fatherland.'

If north Korea's 'reorganization proposal' is, in fact, based on the alleged existence of the 'Front,' it is an additional proof that north Korea's 'reorganizational proposal' is only a political farce. It is a political farce because the so-called 'Democratic Front for Unification of Fatherland' is only a 'ghost' organization itself.

North Korea first announced the founding of the organization way back in 1949, claiming that it embraced some 'seventy' 'political parties' and 'social organizations,' as its components. However, it was known from the beginning that most of its component 'political parties' and 'social organizations' were names only, either non-existent at all or without infrastructures.

Now after a quarter century from the alleged inception of the ghost organization, most of the 'some seventy' are no longer in existence, and there now are only those 'political parties' and 'social organizations' which play the role of satellites of the 'Workers' Party,' the 'only party' in north Korea, in the actual custody of 'first deputy chairmen,' who normally are camouflaged members of the 'Workers' Party' dispatched by the party.

We can take, for example, the cases of the 'Chondokyo Chong-u Party' and the 'Chosun Democratic Party,' the two 'political parties' which north Korea now claims their existence besides the 'Workers' Party.' It is beyond question that they are merely 'headquarters-only' parties, without local infrastructures, because there is no need for them. There reportedly are a list each of party officials. Yet, it is undeniably true that the 'Workers' Party' is the master of these 'ghost' political parties, dictating their activities through 'first deputy chairmen' of the parties at issue, actually the 'Workers' Party' members now on temporary duty.

'Social organizations' are by no means exceptions.

In other words, the fact is that all the alleged 'political parties' and 'social organizations' in north Korea today, with the sole exception of the 'Workers' Party, the real master of north Korea's political power, are mere 'puppets,' designed to delude outside world, as well as the north Korean populace, into believing in the existence of plurality of political parties and social organizations. It exactly is the truth about the so-called 'one-party system of the Workers' Party' of north Korea today.

We have by now come to the conclusion that the alleged plurality of political parties and social organizations in north Korea is only a fiction. And north Korea's so-called 'reorganization proposal' based on the assumed plurality of political parties and social organizations in north Korea, likewise, is only a fiction, too.

Aside from the fictitiousness of the 'proposal' itself, north Korea's so-called 'reorganization proposal' deserves a close examination because of 'traps' north Korea evidently lays in the 'proposal.'

In the first place, we must note the north Korean suggestion that the Republic of Korea keep the political parties and social organizations 'opposing' unification out of the SNCC.

It is, of course, simply ridiculous that north Korea unilaterally assume that there are political parties and social organizations in the Republic of Korea which "are opposed to unification."

It is not difficult to detect the true intention of north Korea making such a ridiculous suggestion. The north Korean suggestion carries the indication that, even in case debates are made over north Korea's so-called 'reorganization proposal,' north Korea still wants to reserve the excuse to delay an early agreement on the question by refusing her approval of particular political parties and social organizations of the Republic of Korea that she does not like, on the ground that north Korea considers those political parties or social organizations 'opposed' to unification.

North Korea's 'reorganization proposal' carries still another trap in the form of the north Korean demand that 'individuals representing various classes and strata' be allowed participation in the SNCC as its members.

What is the north Korean definition of 'various classes and strata?' North Korea's president Kim Il Sung personally gave the north Korean version of the definition on June 23, 1973, while making the proposal of the so-called 'grand national congress.'

Kim Il Sung named 'workers,' 'farmers,' 'farm laborers,' 'working intelligentsia,' 'youthful students' and 'soldiers' of north Korea and 'workers,' 'farmers,' 'youthful students,' 'intellectuals,' 'soldiers,' 'nationalistic capitalists' and 'petit bourgeois' of south Korea as component elements of the north Korean version of 'various classes and strata' of the people of Korea.

It certainly is a nonsense, to begin with, to assume that there are 'classes' and 'strata' of people that are not represented, in a nation-state of modern sense, by the legitimately instituted government authorities. We are well aware that such an assumption has traditionally been a piece of

now obsolete Cold War rhetoric of the old guard Stalinist Communists around the world.

Obsolete as it is, the problem here in the relations between the two sides of divided Korea today lies in the fact that north Korea today is virtually the only remaining Communist regime in the world which still adheres to the kind of Communism of Stalinist era.

It does not make a point of argument that the north Korean Communists divide the north Korean society according to their own class theory. However, it is likewise true that north Korean Communists do not have the right to ask the Republic of Korea to divide the free society in south Korea into 'classes' and 'strata' on the basis of the Communist class theory. If north Korea insists upon it, it certainly is tantamount to a demand that the Republic of Korea turn into a Communist society, a total ideological surrender, which the free people of the Republic of Korea will never think of.

It is now crystal clear that the north Korean demand that the Republic of Korea produce 'representatives of classes and strata' of people according to the Communist class theory is tantamount to a demand that the Republic of Korea give up free democracy and turn into a Communist state. It unquestionably is an open denial of the existing constitutional order of the Republic of Korea and thus an unforgivable encroachment upon the internal affairs of the Republic of Korea. It also gives a clue to an answer to the question why north Korea has come out with such a fictitious 'proposal' on the reorganization of the SNCC.

In sum, north Korea's so-called 'reorganization proposal' is yet another telltale evidence that there has been no change whatsoever, dialogue or no dialogue, in north Korea's pursuit of what they call a 'south Korean revolution,' as the sole means to achieve a Communist unification of the divided country. North Korea has no intention of using the South-North Dialogue as an instrument to stabilize a lasting peace upon the Korean peninsula and to seek unification of the country with the lasting and stable peace as its foundation. North Korea, instead, sees the value of the South-North Dialogue only

in terms of an instrument to serve the purpose of achieving the avowed goal of a 'south Korean revolution.'

North Korea's so-called 'reorganization proposal' clearly mirrors the hidden north Korean scheme to apply the now obsolete Communist strategy of 'unified front' to the Korean situation, in that it suggests that the SNCC be converted to a massive political rally, another form of the 'grand national congress,' to use north Korea's own terminology.

The north Korean idea of a 'grand national congress' does not in the least springs up from the belief in peaceful settlement of the Korean question, through negotiation and compromise between the two sides directly concerned.

The north Korean idea of a 'grand national congress' is rather a north Korean version of the so-called 'unified front' strategy of world Communism, which calls for implementation of a combination of both legal and illegal undercover activities within the 'enemy force,' with the aim of undermining the infrastructure of the 'enemy force,' as an interim measure to attain communization of a certain society, by isolating the 'enemy force' from the mass through combined use of penetration tactics and propaganda and agitation.

The north Korean idea of a 'grand national congress,' first advocated by Kim Il Sung on June 23, 1973, has originated from the earlier proposal of a 'joint session of political parties and social organizations in south and north Korea,' which was later redressed into the name of a 'south-north conference for political negotiation.'

It was taken for granted that, with the announcement of the July 4 South-North Joint Communique of 1972, north Korea had practically denounced her proposal of either the so-called 'south-north conference for political negotiation' or the 'joint session of political parties and social organizations in south and north Korea,' for the Communique provided for the creation of the SNCC, authorizing it to tackle problems ranging

from improvement of relations between the two sides to settlement of the question of unification.

Nevertheless, scarcely had the SNCC started functioning, when Kim Il Sung began speaking of disfiguration of the Committee, in its composition and its functions as well. On April 16, 1973, Kim Il Sung first spoke of disfiguration of the SNCC by suggesting, at a rally in Pyongyang, that either the SNCC have an expanded scope of participation by allowing participation of representatives of political parties and social organizations as well as individuals representing various classes and strata in the two sides of Korea, or convoke a south-north conference for political negotiation, separately from the SNCC meetings, to be attended by representatives of political parties and social organizations as well as individuals representing various classes and strata in the two sides of Korea, in order to solve the question of unification.”

Later on June 23, 1973, Kim Il Sung redressed what he then called a ‘south-north conference for political negotiation’ into the name of a ‘grand national congress,’ and, now at the third SNCC Vice Chairmen’s Meeting, the north Korean side came out with a proposal suggesting that the SNCC be converted straightly to the so-called ‘grand national congress.’

The purpose of the north Korean suggestion of having the SNCC converted to a ‘grand national congress’ is doubtless clear.

North Korea is fully aware of the difference between the two societies in Korea, the ‘closed society’ of north Korea featuring the monolithic structure of the ‘one-party system of the Workers’ Party’ and the ‘open society’ of the Republic of Korea featuring consensus politics based on pluralism, and is eager to exploit the difference to her advantage. The north Korean ambition is to create a split between the people and the government of the Republic of Korea through application of the so-called ‘unified front’ strategy in the form of the so-called ‘grand national congress.’ and thus create internal disorder within the Republic of Korea, with the hope that it would eventually lead to what the north Korean Communists term a ‘people’s democratic revolution’

North Korea may have still other reasons to insist upon such an impracticable and unwholesome 'proposal' on reorganization of the SNCC.

By doing so, north Korea may feel it a good excuse to have the South-North Dialogue continue to remain in stalemate over the issue of reorganization of the SNCC, with north Korea extricated from unavoidable blames. This evaluation is quite plausible, considering the speculations that north Korea has been undergoing serious internal troubles, in economic fields in particular, not allowing the north Koreans to see normalization of the South-North Dialogue any time soon.

4. SNRCC Working-level Contacts

There have been three rounds of working-level contacts at Panmunjom between the Republic of Korea National Red Cross (ROKNRC) and the north Korean Red Cross (NKRC), twice in November last year and the last on February 25 this year, on ways to reopen the suspended humanitarian talks at an early date.

The two sides will meet again on March 11 in their fourth round of working-level contacts.

However, the prospect for an early agreement on the reopening of the South-North Red Cross Conference appears as dim as ever, as the NKRC side continues insisting upon a number of 'preconditions' for resumption of the talks.

At the second working-level contact on November 22, the ROKNRC made a proposal that the long-overdue 8th South-North Red Cross Conference be held on December 19 in Seoul, only to be turned down outright by the NKRC side. The NKRC side rejected again a ROKNRC proposal at the third working-level contact on February 25 this year that the 8th

Conference be held April 9–10 this year in Sepul.

North Korean Red Cross continued to demand, that as ‘preconditions’ for resumption of the humanitarian talks dealing with the fate of the millions of Korean families living in forced separation in the two divided parts of the country, first, the ROKNRC “remove non-Red Cross elements from its delegation to the talks” and, second, the Republic of Korea “cease persecution of ‘patriotic elements’.”

The NKRC side also demands that the 8th Conference be held in Pyongyang, instead of Seoul, violating hitherto honored agreement that the Conferences would be held in Seoul and Pyongyang by turns. It was in Pyongyang that the Conference was last held in July last year and thus there is no point of argument about the fact that it is now the turn of Seoul to host the 8th Conference.

Part Two

New North Korean Armed Provocations

1. NK Gun Ships Sink & Capture ROK Fishing Boats

It was in the foggy morning of February 15, 1974. Two fishing boats of the Republic of Korea were on the high seas off the west coast of the Korean peninsula, some 30 miles west of Paiknyung-do Island (38° 05' N., 124° 01' E.), peacefully engaged in fishing.

It was at around 10 a.m., when the two unarmed civilian fishing boats, with the same tonnage of 84.4 tons, respectively, suddenly found themselves under fire from north Korean patrol boats, which came out of the fog unnoticed.

Within three minutes of the attack, one of the two fishing boats, Suwon-ho No. 32, went down into the bottom, with 13 of the 14 fishermen then on board. Only one fisherman, later identified as Kim Keun-shik, was saved and taken aboard the north Korean patrol boat. The other fishing boat, Suwon-ho No. 33, was captured and towed away, together with the 14 fishermen aboard, to an unknown place in north Korea.

The case was indeed a horrifying act of piracy, dramatically climaxing the recently mounting tension in Korea, following the much publicized north Korean demonstration of naval might during the past several months off the west coast over the fate of five off-shore islands, including Paiknyung-do Island.

The case was a bitter reminder of repeated warnings recently by the Republic of Korea Government that north Korean Communists were deliberately trying to create a new tension off the west coast by illegally claiming, with a show of naval might, the territorial rights over the waters surrounding the five islands there.

The case also was a flagrant violation of the Item 2 of the July 4 South-North Joint Communique, which provides that the two sides of Korea would thereafter "refrain from armed provocation of any kind, large or

small, against one another” and “take positive measures to prevent inadvertent military incidents.”

It has also clearly demonstrated which side of Korea was really threatening the precarious peace in Korea.

North Korea is now clearly under pressure to make a choice over what she should do about the incident. And that choice of north Korea is undoubtedly going to tell the world whether north Korea is really committed to the cause of peace, as she so vocally claims that she is, or she is playing the dangerous game of brinkmanship.

2. ROK Presses NK for Just Settlement of Incident

Upon the outbreak of the open sea piracy by the north Korean gun ships against the unarmed fishing boats of the Republic of Korea on February 15, the Republic of Korea quickly began taking measures to remedy the situation.

The Republic of Korea National Defense Ministry formally asked the Military Armistice Commission (MAC), on the very day of the incident, to take up the matter at a MAC meeting at Panmunjom, holding it as a serious violation of the armistice agreement.

On February 16, the Republic of Korea National Red Cross (ROK-NRC) sent an urgent telephone message to the north Korean Red Cross society, asking for the latter's cooperation to solve the case from the humanitarian standpoint.

The ROKNRC also sent a telegram, followed by a message detailing the incident, to the International Committee of Red Cross (ICRC) in Geneva on the same day, urgently asking for the intervention by the international Red Cross organization for a speedy settlement of humanitarian problems arising from the incident.

On the other hand, Mr. Chang Key-young, Acting Co-chairman, Seoul side, of the South-North Coordinating Committee (SNCC), took to the "hot" telephone line linking Seou. and Pyongyang to protest, in a string of telephone messages, with his north Korean counterpart, Co-chairman Kim Young Joo, over the outbreak of the inhumane and illegal piracy by the north Korean gun ships and to demand a just settlement of the case.

The incident also became the major topic of debate at the SNCC Vice Chairmen's Meeting held on February at Panmunjom, with the Seoul side demanding 1) due apology by the north Korean side, 2) immediate release of detained fishermen and fishing boat, 3) proper compensation for the ddad fishermen and sunken fishing boat, 4) strict punishment of north Korean officials responsible for the attack and 5) guarantee against recurrence of such armed provocations.

However, north Korea came out with outrageous reactions. North Korea asserted that the fishing boats sunken and captured by the north Korean gun ships were 'espionage ships.' North Korea asserted that the north Korean gun ships "had exercised the right of self-defense." North Korea even produced an alleged 'confession,' a 'confession' obviously made through torture and under duress, by the captain of the kidnapped fishing boat, Mr. Park Jong-ju, insisting that he was a 'spy' because he had 'admitted' it.

At the fourth SNCC Vice Chairmen's Meeting, Vice Chairman Chang Key-young of Seoul side made the following remarks to positively substantiate the hard fact that those fishing boats and fishermen aboard the boats now at issue were only fishing boats and fishermen, and neither 'espionage ships' nor 'spys' as north Korea claims that they were. They were:

First, the two fishing boats attacked by the north Korean gun ships were equipped with equipments solely for fishing only. Even the radio of Suwon-ho No. 33, the ship now under north Korean custody, could not reach the Incheon Fishery Radio Station directly at the time of the incident, because of weak generating capacity of the battery. While

the unprovoked attack on her and her sunken sister ship, Suwon-ho No. 32, by the north Korean gun ships was in progress, the ship could maintain radio contacts with the Bureau with the help of a third fishing boat, Moran-ho No. 31, then a few miles from the scene of the attack, acting as a relay station.

Second, the two fishing boats were in fact superannuated ships, aging 15 years, with top speeds of eight miles an hour.

Thirdly, the fishermen killed or captured in the incident were all bona fide fishermen, and their families left behind in south Korea are living witnesses of the fact. Fourthly, the two ships, after sailing out of Inchon Port on February 7, continued to report to the Inchon Fishery Radio Bureau on their present positions every 12 hours, complying with the fishing safety regulations, in plain non-coded messages, an uncommon behavior for a 'spy ship.'

Fifthly, the progress of events during the incident of February 15 betrays the north Korean allegation that north Korea "had exercised the right of self-defense against spy ships." The first encounter between the Republic of Korea fishing boats and north Korean gun ships took place sometime around 10 a.m., Within minutes, Suwon-ho No. 32 was sunk on the spot and the north Korean patrol boats began towing Suwon-ho No. 33 away to the north. However, after sailing for three hours with Suwon-ho No. 33 in tow, the north Korean gun ships suddenly released the fishing boat, promising that the only fisherman taken alive aboard the north Korean patrol boat out of those drowned with the sunken Suwon-ho No. 32 "would also be released later at Panmunjom." It did not take an hour, nevertheless, for the released fishing boat to be captured again by north Korean gun boats, to be taken away to the north for good now.

Such a progress of events raises a number of serious questions for the north Koreans to answer. In the first place, if north Koreans were to insist that they had made the initial attack on the fishing boats be-

cause they had recognized them as 'spy ships' at their first encounter, they then had to explain the reason why they released the captured fishing boat some three hours afterwards. If north Koreans, on the other hand, were to assert that they had recaptured the boat, in less than an hour after the temporary release, because they now came to know that the fishing boats were 'spy ships,' they then had to find some plausible reasons to justify their initial armed attack on the fishing boats some four hours earlier.

Lastly, the north Koreans have produced 'written confessions' allegedly of the captain and the chief deck man of the captured boat, brandishing them as 'material evidences' supporting their allegation that the fishermen were actually 'spys.' However, the north Koreans had to be shocked to find the fact that their sole 'material evidences' were working to their own disadvantages. Anyone who had a glance at the so-called 'written confessions' could tell that they were merely pieces of forgery, and that done very awkwardly.

The 'written confessions' were filled with terminologies which are in use only in the northern part of Korea today and thus totally alien to those living in south Korea. It was sufficient proof that the alleged 'written confessions' had not been documented actually by the captain and the chief deck man themselves, of their own volitions. It was all too evident that the so-called 'written confessions' were 'forged documents,' signed by the two obviously under the threat of torture.

Furthermore, radio reports to the Incheon Fishery Radio Bureau from the kidnapped fishing boat, Suwon-ho No. 33, shows that it took more than five hours for the north Korean gunboats, sailing at a speed of eight nautical miles an hour, to tow the fishing boat to the land of north Korea, thus making it unquestionably clear that the attack on the fishing boats by the north Korean gunboats had actually taken place indisputably on high seas more than 30 miles, at the least, from the land.

Mr. Chang Key-young also reminded his north Korean counterpart, Yu Jang-shik, at the fourth Vice Chairmen's Meeting, of the fact that, during the early stage of the South-North Dialogue, Kim Il Sung, north Korea's president, had volunteered an apology for a north Korean commando attempt to assassinate President Park Chung Hee of the Republic of Korea in January 1968 and demanded that the north Koreans admit their wrongdoings in the recent incident in the same spirit.

However, north Koreans have persistently refused to pay any heed to the Republic of Korea demand for a just settlement of the incident of February 15, insisting that the fishermen were 'spys' because "they had admitted it."

There seems to be little likelihood that north Koreans will ever consider a just settlement of the incident in a near future, not even repatriation of those fishermen alive under their custody.

Following is a documentation of full texts of telephone messages, telegrams and letters sent by the Seoul side of the SNCC and the Republic of Korea National Red Cross to the Pyongyang side of the SNCC, the north Korean Red Cross and the International Committee of the Red Cross following the incident of February, asking the latters' help for a speedy and just settlement of the case.

3. First Telephone Message Sent to Kim Young Joo, Co-chairman (Pyongyang side) of SNCC, by Mr. Chang Key-young, Acting Co-chairman (Seoul side)

February 15, 1974

1. I hereby warn against the grave and premeditated armed provocations in which the naval gunboat of your side shelled two of our unarmed fishing boats on high seas at a point about 30 miles west of Paiknyong-do

in the West Coast starting at 10:10 a.m., February 15, sinking one of them and towing the other away to the north.

2. This incident is the perpetration of a unlawful and inhumane armed attack against unarmed fishing boats which were engaging in peaceful fishing activities, and thus constitutes a direct violation of paragraph 2 of the July 4th South-North Joint Communique, in which the two sides have agreed, among others, "not to undertake armed provocations whether on a large or small scale." I, therefore, lodge a stern protest with you against this incident while urging once again the strict observance on your part of the South-North Joint Communique.

3. In this connection, I am obliged to call on you to account for the real intention in committing such a flagrant violation of paragraph 2 of the July 4th South-North Joint Communique, and make it unmistakably clear that the total responsibility will fall on your side for all the consequences that may arise from such a grave unlawful act.

4. I request as a first step the immediate repatriation of the damaged boat and fishermen.

4. Second Telephone Message Sent to Kim Young Joo, Co-chairman (Pyongyang side) of SNCC, by Mr. Chang Key-young, Acting Co-chairman (seoul side)

February 16, 1974

I am in receipt of your reply dated 16th February to my protest message sent to you on 15th February with regard to the tense situation newly created between the south and the north by the unlawful armed attacks by your side's gunboats on the same date on our un-armed fishing boats on the high seas off the west coast.

I take very grave note of the facts from the content of your reply that

your side is attempting to cover up the unlawful acts of your side by falsifying the truth and branding the un-armed fishing boats as 'espionage' vessels. Under the circumstance, I cannot but conclude that such irresponsible acts are deliberate attempts on your part to threaten peace on the Korean peninsula by creating unwanted tensions in the relationship between the south and north which should be developed on the basis of July 4th Joint Communique.

The plain fact is that your gunboats shelled our un-armed fishing boats peacefully engaged in fishing activities on the high seas at the point of $38^{\circ} 05' N$ and $124^{\circ} 01' E$ off the west coast, sinking one of them with the loss of many innocent lives and forcibly abducting the other. I would like to ask you whether such an unlawful act as this can be permissible from the humanitarian point of view, not mentioning the July 4 Joint Communique.

In this connection, I strongly urge that your side withdraw at once the unlawful, unjust and self-serving assertion. It is also demanded that your side return immediately the abducted fishing boat and its crew and the bodies of the sacrificed fishermen, together with proper compensation for the loss of vessel and innocent lives and also an apology for the whole incident. I also demand that you take severe punitive measures against those who are connected with the act of outrageous piracy.

Taking note of the fact that the incident closely coincides with your side's stepped-up activities of defaming against us through the renewal of slanderous broadcasts and the spreading of propaganda leaflets aimed at creating an explosive situation internally, I hereby issue a stern warning to you that your side will be held solely responsible for the grave situation which may develop out of the irresponsible act of provocations.

5. Third Telephone Message Sent to Kim Young Joo, Co-chairman (Pyongyang side) of SNCC by Mr. Chang Key-young, Acting Co-chairman (Seoul side)

February 19, 1974

I have lodged, in my two earlier separate telephone messages, stern protests with you over the incident of February 15, involving unlawful and inhumane piracy by gunboats of your side of attacking unarmed civilian fishing boats of our side, while they were peacefully engaged in fishing on the high seas off the west coast, sinking one of them and towing another away to the north.

I have also strongly demanded in the messages that, for a just settlement of the incident, your side make due apology, frankly admitting that the incident was unlawful and inhumane piracy, undeniably done by your side, immediately repatriate the kindapped fishing boat and fishermen, together with the remains of the fishermen who lost their lives in the incident, and take whatever measures that are deemed necessary for settlement of the incident.

Nevertheless, in your replies to my messages, your side has rather continued to commit a double crime, intolerable even from the humanitarian standpoint, of falsifying the innocent fishermen, living on fishing, as 'espionages' and the fishing boats 'espionage ships,' than to reflect on the wrongdoings of your side.

Furthermore, in apparent bewilderment over the mounting criticism, both at home and abroad, over the unlawful and inhumane piracy by your side, your side is now engaged in a series of diversionary efforts, with the unmistakable aim of diverting the public attention from the truth of the matter, of hurling such ungrounded and unrelated accusations against us as

that the incident was both a 'political farce to pursue national estrangement' and a 'premeditated military provocation,' all created, according to your allegation, by our side.

What does, allow me to ask you, fishing on the high seas have anything to do with what you call 'national estrangement,' and how on earth unarmed civilian fishing boats, while peacefully engaged in fishing on the high seas, "militarily provoke" anyone? Such a nonsensical assertion as is made by your side is only a laughing stock to world opinion.

It is an unmistakable truth that the fishing boats victimized by the unlawful piracy by your side are indeed 'fishing boats,' and not 'espionage ships' as your side alleges, and the fishermen aboard the boats 'fishermen' indeed, and again not 'espionages' as your side alleges.

We have here in the south the grief-stricken families of the fishermen who met the unexpected tragedy due to the piracy by your side, and they are the living witnesses to disprove your allegation that the victims were 'espionages.'

We also have records of on-the-spot reports radioed to the Inchon Fishery Radio Station from the 'Suwon-ho No. 32,' until the last moment of her sinking, and the 'Suwon-ho No. 33,' while she was being towed away by your gunboats, until the moment when the boat was physically taken and the radio room of the boat was forcefully occupied by the armed personnel of your side. The records clearly show that the gunboats of your side opened their fire at the fishing boats knowing that they were indeed unarmed civilian fishing boats, and not because they recognized them as 'espionage ships.' The records also show that, in the case of the kidnapped boat, your gunboats at one time released her and, a short while later, recaptured her with the obvious scheme of falsifying her as 'espionage ship.'

I want to make it very clear that, with whatever efforts your side at-

tempts to make to distort the hard facts, your side can neither cover up the truth of the unlawful and illegal piracy done by your side, nor escape the all too clear responsibility for the misdeed.

Moreover, your side can in no way escape the censure of all the peace-loving free people of the world, as well as our own people, for the inhumanity and unnational behavior of failing, even after the passing of a considerable length of time from the day of the incident, to provide such preliminary information as the names and number of victims and the place where the kidnapped fishermen and their boat are presently detained.

I would like hereby to warn you that waves of indignation are presently surging among our people in the south, denouncing the barbarity of your side endangering peace and the shamelessness of your side of refusing to undo the wrongdoings and demanding, at the same time, strong punitive measures.

I once again demand, in order for the future of our South-North Dialogue and peace on the Korean peninsula, that your side hesitate no more to admit and apologize for the wrongdoings; immediately repatriate the kidnapped fishermen and their boat, together with the remains of the fishermen whose lives were lost; properly compensate for the loss of lives and damages in the property; severely punish those who were responsible for the unlawful piracy; and make guarantees against recurrence of the unlawful acts.

I hereby warn you once again that, in case your side continues to disregard the just demand that I repeatedly make here, your side will alone be held responsible for whatever consequences resulting therefrom.

6. Text of Telephone Message Sent to NKRC by ROKNRC

**To: Mr. Son Song Pil
Chairman
North Korean Red Cross**

**From: Dr. Yong Woo Kim
President
The Republic of Korea National Red Cross**

February 16, 1974

I have been shocked by the news that our two fishing boats, Suwon-ho No. 32 and No. 33, were sunk and abducted by the gunboats of your side, while the fishers were engaged in peaceful fishing on the high seas, 30 miles west of Paiknyung-do Island, around 10:10 a.m. on the fifteenth of February 1974. I cannot help but express my deep regrets at such inhumane and illegal act.

In a desire to alleviate the suffering of the fishermen involved and their families caused by this incident, I request that the north Korean Red Cross cooperate in making efforts to take following actions immediately:

1. Immediate notification on the fate and conditions of the fishermen.
2. Immediate repatriation of the 12 fishermen aboard Suwon-ho 32 and the 14 fishermen aboard Suwon-ho No. 33.
3. Immediate repatriation of the remains of the dead, if any.
4. Humanitarian treatment for fishermen under the custody of your side, while they remain in that condition.
5. Immediate repatriation of Suwon-ho No. 33, which is presently held by your side.

7. First ROKNRC Telegram to ICRC

**To: President Eric Martin
International Committee of the Red Cross**

**From: Dr. Yong Woo Kim
President
The Republic of Korea National Red Cross**

February 16, 1974

Wish to inform that two south Korean fishing boats, named Suwon-ho No. 32 and 33, while peacefully engaged in fishing, were shelled by north Korean gunboats around 10 a.m., February 15, on the high seas 30 miles west of Paiknyung-do Island (38° 05' N., 124° 01' E.).

One vessel with 14 fishermen aboard was sunk and the other with 14 fishermen was taken to the north. Fate of these hapless fishermen not known since.

Families are shocked and pleading Red Cross intervention.

We request ICRC render its good offices to settle this inhumane and illegal incident committed by north Korean gunboats, by intervening to obtain the fate of fishermen and safe return of those survived, together with the fishing boat and the remains of the dead, if any.

Will deeply appreciate your Committee's immediate action.

This telegram will be followed by a letter detailing the incident of February 15, 1974.

8. ROKNRC Letter to ICRC

Dr. Eric Martin
President
International Committee of the Red Cross

February 16, 1974

Dear Mr. President:

Following our cable today we take liberty to invite your immediate attention to the unfortunate incident happened to two South Korean fishing boats named Suwon-ho No. 32 and 33 which were attacked by North Korean gunboats while peacefully engaged in fishing on the high seas, 30 miles west of Paknyung-do Island, 38 degrees 05 minutes of north latitude and 124 degrees 01 minute of east longitude, around 10 a.m. on the 14th of February, 1974.

It has been confirmed that Suwon-ho No. 32 with 14 fishermen aboard was sunk and the other crippled vessel was taken to North Korea with its 14 fishermen aboard. The list of all fishermen involved is attached for your information.

This unfortunate incident came as a shock to the families of these fishermen, who pleaded this Society to work for the settlement of the problem in cooperation with the International Committee of the Red Cross. Although this Society has made efforts for direct approach to North Korean Red Cross, we request the ICRC that it renders its good offices in intervening to obtain the information on the fate of the fishermen and the return of those survived, together with the boat, and remains of the dead if deaths

occurred.

On behalf of the grieved families of these hapless fishermen, we wish to express our deep appreciation, in advance, for the kind action you may take in this matter. We will be very happy to provide any further information on your request.

Sincerely yours,

Yong Woo Kim
President
ROKNRC

9. Second ROKNRC Telegram to ICRC

To: President Eric Martin
International Committee of the Red Cross

From: President Yong Woo Kim
The Republic of Korea National Red Cross

February 21, 1974

At 9:40 p.m., February 20, north Korean authorities had one of the fishermen of Suwon-ho No. 33, which had been abducted by north Korean gunboats on the high seas on February 15, read, via Radio Pyongyang, an alleged 'confession,' admitting that he had committed 'espionage activities.'

As we have already let it be known to your Committee, those fishermen taken to the north, together with their ship, are bona fide fishermen, who

have made their living on fishing.

Judging from the contents of the broadcast 'confession,' it is easily assumed that the north Korean authorities must have placed those fishermen under severe physical torment in order to force them to make the fabricated 'confession' that they had committed 'espionage activities,' although they had not.

I hold this atrocity by the north Korean authorities as a serious violation of the Geneva Convention and accuse it as a serious crime violating the spirit of humanitarianism and the principles of the Red Cross.

The situation is very serious, requiring an urgent attention. And I strongly plead with the ICRC, the guardian of the humanitarianism, to take whatever necessary measures to make the north Korean authorities immediately stop such an inhumane treatment of our fishermen being held there in the north.

I also ask you that your Committee advise the north Korean authorities to treat the fishermen on the basis of humanitarianism, inform us on the fate and conditions of the fishermen involved at an early date and to return them safely to their families at an early date.

Promising further details in a letter,

Part Three

Institutionalization of Peace in Korea

1. President Park Offers a Non-agression Accord

- | |
|---|
| <ol style="list-style-type: none">1) Denunciation of Use of Force against One Another2) Denunciation of Infringement on Internal Affairs of the Other Side3) Maintenance of the Force of the Armistice Agreement |
|---|

President Park Chung Hee of the Republic of Korea proposed, at his New Year press conference on January 18, 1974, that the north Korean authorities agree to conclude a Non-agression Agreement with the Republic of Korea.

“Success of our efforts to develop new south-north relations genuinely committed to the cause of achieving a peaceful unification of the divided country,” President Park declared, “hinges on whether or not we succeed in building the foundation for lasting and stable peace upon the Korean peninsula,” adding that conclusion of a Non-agression Agreement between the two sides of Korea was a necessity “as a foundation for a peaceful co-existence between the two sides for an interim period” before the unification of the country was finally achieved.

President Park further elaborated on his proposal of a South-North Non-agression Agreement as following:

“What I refer to in terms of a South-North Non-agression Agreement must have at least the following three component elements specified in the agreement.

“First, the two sides of Korea should make the pledge that they would not, under whatever circumstances, wage armed aggressions against one another.

“Second, the two sides of Korea should never, under whatever circum-

stances, infringe upon the internal affairs of the other side.

“Thirdly, the two sides of Korea should agree to cooperate to keep the existing Armistice Agreement remain in force, under whatever circumstances.

“Provided that the kind of Non-aggression Agreement is concluded between the two sides and observed faithfully by the two sides, I am firmly convinced that peace will be securely maintained upon the Korean peninsula, with wars prevented in advance. With this agreement concluded and observed between the two sides, I suggest that the two sides of Korea institutionalize a peaceful co-existence with one another as an interim measure before the eventual achievement of peaceful unification and, in the meantime, actively continue their dialogue, and implement exchanges and cooperation, in order to cement the foundation for unification. I would like to make it clear that my proposal of a South-North Non-aggression Agreement fully conforms with the spirit of the new Foreign Policy for Peace and Unification of my government that I had announced on June 23, 1973.”

President Park also commented, at the New Year press conference, on the north Korean proposal of the so-called ‘peace treaty’ between the two sides of Korea and termed it a ‘wolf in the guise of a sheep,’ which had the hidden scheme of using it as a tool to create a condition warranting an armed aggression against the Republic of Korea.

President Park viewed the north Korean proposal of a ‘peace treaty’ as a north Korean attempt to destroy the existing armistice structure in Korea, featuring, among others, withdrawal of the United Nations forces. “It is all too evident that the north Korean ‘peace treaty’ proposal is aimed at unilateral disarmament of the Republic of Korea, as part of the scheme to create a favorable condition for an armed aggression against the Republic of Korea as a means to achieve a Communist takeover of the southern half of Korea by force,” the President declared.

President Park wondered if the north Korean ‘peace treaty’ proposal was indeed meant for peace in genuine sense of the word. **“If north Korea**

genuinely wants peace,” the President said, “we may not necessarily have to conclude particularly a ‘peace treaty.’ ” “There will be solid peace,” the President added, “if only north Korea faithfully observe the existing Armistice Agreement.”

President Park cited cases of violation of numerous clauses of the Armistice Agreement, let alone cases of flagrant violation of agreements in the July 4 South-North Joint Communiqué, and cautioned the nation that north Korean Communists had historically abused the word ‘peace’ to “gain time” necessary to achieve their specific political ends and to “delude” the people who believe in the cause of peace in its genuine sense.

“There can be no solid peace with a sheet of paper in names like an ‘agreement’ or a ‘treaty,’ ” the President emphatically said, adding, “whether there will be solid peace or not hinges solely on whether the two sides concerned are in unison in the firm determination to keep peace, a firm determination to avoid armed hostilities against one another at all cost.” “If only north Korea faithfully honor the Armistice Agreement and abide by the spirit of the July 4 South-North Joint Communiqué now, we would certainly have a lasting and stable peace, without the fear of war, instituted upon our Korean peninsula,” President Park declared.

“We must take a hard look at the reality that, however earnestly we wish to have the unification achieved, it can never be achieved overnight,” concluded the President, and added, “I therefore, suggest that, until the day when the time is ripe and conditions are met for the unification, we would continue to co-exist peacefully with each other, vigorously continuing our South-North Dialogue and enforcing exchanges and cooperation as a means to broaden the road to a peaceful reunification of the country.”

2. Truth about North Korean Version of ‘Peace Treaty’

North Korea broke eight days of silence on January 26, 1974, to flatly turn down an offer of a South-North Non-aggression Agreement by Presi-

dent Park Chung Hee of the Republic of Korea on January 18.

By refusing to accept the offer of a non-aggression accord, north Korea let it be known to the world that north Korea was not interested in institutionalizing peace in Korea and that north Korea's so-called 'peace treaty' proposal was only a fiction.

In an editorial of the Rodong Shinmun, the organ of north Korea's all-powerful Workers' Party, north Korea rejected the offer of a non-aggression accord on the ground that "while talking of peace, it says nothing about termination of 'strong-arm occupation of south Korea by the forces of American imperialist aggressors.' "

"It is the 'American imperialists' who are responsible for the 'plot' to 'fabricate' two Koreas and for the 'obstruction' to unification through invitation of 'Japanese militarists' into south Korea and it also is the 'American imperialists' who are driving the 'south Korean puppets' onto the path of 'confrontation' and 'war' with us (north Korea) by providing them with weapons," north Korea vehemently argued in the editorial, adding, "we will continue to ask for withdrawal of the forces of 'American imperialist aggressors' from south Korea and conclusion of a south-north 'peace treaty.' "

Widely regarded as an official reaction of north Korean Communist leadership to the proposal of a South-North Non-aggression Agreement by President Park Chung Hee of the Republic of Korea, the Rodong Shinmun's editorial was itself a testimony of the fictitiousness of the north Korean version of 'peace' in Korea and north Korea's proposal of a so-called 'peace treaty.'

The editorial has made it shockingly clear that the north Korean version of 'peace' in Korea is a slogan designed solely to serve the cause of communization of the entire Korean peninsula and that the hidden purpose of north Korea proposing the so-called 'peace treaty' was to get the United Nations troops out of Korea and thus tear down the foundation of the precarious armistice structure that exists in Korea today.

It is noteworthy that the north Korean version of 'peace' in Korea and the north Korean idea of a 'peace treaty' are logically based on fantastic distortion of historical facts, describing the American troops, now stationed in Korea under the United Nations flag, as the major obstacle to institutionalization of peace in Korea and realization of unification of the country.

The Rodong Shinmun's editorial of January 26 made no bones to distort the situation grossly by quoting Kim Il Sung's remarks, saying, "the 'strong-arm occupation' of south Korea by 'American imperialists,' together with their 'aggressive policy,' is the true cause of all the misfortunes of our nation, the 'major obstacle' to unification and the 'ever-present factor' to make war possible."

Let us, then, review the historical facts as they stand:

- North Korean Communists forced the division of the Korean peninsula, back in 1945 following liberation of the country from Japanese rule, by refusing to honor the United Nations resolution calling for an all-Korea election under the United Nations supervision for creation of a unified, independent government of Korea. Moreover, north Korean Communists keep the shameful record of opposing an immediate independence of Korea, in support of a trusteeship as agreed upon at a meeting of foreign ministers of America, Britain and Russia in Moscow in 1945.
- North Korean Communists quickly moved to exploit the military vacuum, created in the Republic of Korea in 1949 in the aftermath of withdrawal of the American occupation army, by waging the unprovoked pre-dawn all-out military invasion of the Republic of Korea on June 25, 1950, driving the length and breadth of the Korean peninsula into a havoc of three years of manslaughter.
- North Korea obstructed a political settlement of the Korean question at the Geneva parley in 1954 by insisting upon unreasonable and impracticable demands.

—North Korea continued to increase, from early 1960s and thereafter, in particular, her military capability in overt violation of the Armistice Agreement and continued to heighten the tension upon the Korean peninsula by steadily increasing armed infiltrations into the Republic of Korea, including commando attacks.

(On February 9, 1974, the Ministry of Culture and Public Information of the Republic of Korea disclosed that north Korea now has an army of 2,670,000 men in total, including the regular army of 470,000 men, 50,000 guards, 1,450,000-men 'Red Labor and Farm Guards' and 700,00-men 'Red Youth Guards.' The Ministry also put the estimate on the north Korean armament at some 800 war planes, including 598 fighter-planes and bombers of up-to-date models, a naval fleet of some 320 vessels which include three submarines, 18 guided missile ships of KOMAR and OSA classes and some 60 gunboats, in addition to some 1,180 tanks, 200 armored vehicles, some 6,000 artillery pieces, some 50 SA-2 surface-to-air missile sites and 6 Samlet surface-to-ship missile sites.

According to experts on north Korean affairs, north Korea has imported a sizable number of MIG 19s and 21s, together with guided missile ships of KOMAR and OSA classes and a submarine, in the months after the announcement of the July 4 South-North Joint Communique.)

—There is no need to elaborate on the purpose of the United Nations forces being stationed in Korea today. The sole purpose of them being stationed in this part of the world under United Nations resolutions is to serve the cause of peace in Korea, functioning as an effective deterrence against war in an area where peace is constantly challenged by continued provocations by the north Korean Communist regime. It is an undeniable historical fact that the United Nations troops came to Korea in 1950 under United Nations Security Council resolutions to repel the north Korean aggressors who waged the unprovoked-illegal

war on the Republic of Korea in June 1950 and restore peace in this part of the world.

These are the hard historical facts which no one can refute.

It undoubtedly is a sheer nonsense to argue that the Republic of Korea as a sovereign independent state is under a 'strong-arm occupation' by 'American imperialists.' And a man of common sense cannot refrain from bursting into laughter to hear the north Korean Communists arguing that the 'Japanese militarists' are making a new 'landing' on the soil of Korea. The north Korean Communists have gone on further recently to describe Japanese 'tourists,' coming to Korea for the beautiful scenery here, as 'advance party' of the 'invading Japanese militarists.'

To hear the north Korean nonsenses is a bit like viewing caricatures. However, it certainly makes things serious because the north Korean version of 'peace' in Korea and the north Korean idea of a 'peace treaty' are based on these cartoonist nonsensés.

North Korea has been, and still is, making no bones to distort historical facts without the pangs of conscience and replace them with fabricated falsehood, trying all the way to justify her fictitious version of 'peace' in Korea and her deceptive proposal of a 'peace treaty' with the fabricated historical facts.

It was exactly because of this deceptive and double-crossed behavior of north Korea that President Park Chung Hee of the Republic of Korea termed the north Korean proposal of a 'peace treaty' a 'wolf in the guise of a sheep.'

It is a known fact that north Korea'presently is capable of producing a substantial amount of weapons in various kinds, as a result of her ruthless effort during the past years to expand her military industry at the expense of the daily necessities of her populace. And north Korea is a tightly closed society, where effective surveillance on such agreements as arms reductions is highly questionable.

The Republic of Korea, on the other hand, is a totally open society, with her armament relying heavily on imports from abroad, as a result of years of concentration on peace industry with the purpose of having a fast-growing economic development.

Considering these differences between the two sides, one can easily come to the conclusion that to have the two sides of Korea agree on arms reductions, without accumulation of sufficient trust in one another in advance, would naturally mean a unilateral disarmament by the Republic of Korea alone.

The deceptiveness of the north Korean proposal of a 'peace treaty' can be evidenced from still another aspect, from north Korea's vehement disapproval of a 'peaceful co-existence' between the two sides of Korea, as an interim measure before a foundation is securely laid for achievement of unification.

North Korea angrily turned down, in the Rodong Shinmun's editorial on January 26, the idea of a 'peaceful co-existence' between the two sides of Korea, by arguing that a 'peaceful co-existence' was a "concept which can be applied only to relations among 'different nation-states.'" "It can never be applied to the relations between the two sides of Korea," the editorial argued, "because the relations between the two sides of Korea are 'internal matters' of 'one nation' and 'one country.'"

It was indeed an important pronouncement of grave concern in that such an allegation of north Korea logically ruined the foundation of the north Korean proposal of a 'peace treaty' and, at the same time, denied the so-called 'south-north confederation' proposal advocated by Kim Il Sung of its logical validity.

If the relations between the two sides of Korea were indeed 'internal matters' of 'one nation' and 'one country' already like the north Koreans so noisily allege now, there would also be no question about the fact that, logically speaking, it would be absolutely impossible for the two sides of

Korea to 'conclude' a peace 'treaty,' because a 'treaty' necessarily involves more than two 'states,' more than two 'countries,' in other words, to do the concluding. It is, of course, a sheer nonsense if north Korea argue that the two sides of Korea could 'conclude' a peace 'treaty,' when the two sides of Korea were already 'one nation' and 'one country' according to the north Korean theory.

The north Korean denial of a 'peaceful co-existence' is tantamount, at the same time, to denial of the so-called 'south-north confederation' advocated by Kim Il Sung, the almighty master of the north Korean regime.

Kim Il Sung has thus far explained that his version of the 'south-north confederation' calls for "maintenance of the presently different political systems of south and north Korea as they are now for the time being and formation of a 'national committee,' to be organized with representatives of the 'governments' of south and north Korea."

The question now has to be asked to the north Koreans if there is any difference between the idea of a 'peaceful co-existence' and the idea of the so-called 'south-north confederation.' It is quite simple to find the fact that Kim Il Sung's 'south-north confederation' proposal itself is irrefutably based on the concept of a 'peaceful co-existence' between the two different political systems that exist in Korea today. There is, therefore, no denying of the fact that north Korean denial of the idea of a 'peaceful co-existence' between the two sides of Korea is naturally tantamount to north Korea's own denial of the so-called 'south-north confederation' itself.

The fictitiousness of the north Korean version of 'peace' in Korea and the so-called 'peace treaty' proposal thus comes, as have been examined so far in detail, from the dangerous allegation of north Korean Communists that the two sides of Korea are already 'one nation' and 'one country' and that the relations between the two sides of Korea are 'internal matters' of 'one nation' and 'one country. Such an allegation of north Korean Communists inevitably carries the danger of distorting the hard reality of Korea, now divided into two halves for over a quarter century with the legitimate

Government of the Republic of Korea in the south and the north Korean Communist regime in the north.

The danger that the north Korean allegation carries becomes appalling when we consider the probability that north Korea one day may wage a full-scale military operation against the Republic of Korea, trying to justify the unwarranted aggression as ‘internal matters’ of a country. Many people may now argue that such a probability is highly unlikely. But, we think it is worth a careful study in this light that the north Korean Communists recently have repeatedly turned down suggestions by the Republic of Korea against infringements upon the internal affairs of one side of Korea by the other, on the very ground that they have the ‘right’ to speak about the ‘internal matters of a nation.’

It has by now become all too clear that the north Korean proposal of a ‘peace treaty’ is nothing any more than a fiction of deceptive nature designed only to serve the unwholesome purpose of the north Korean Communists pursuing withdrawal of the United Nations troops stationed in Korea and the subsequent unilateral disarmament of the Republic of Korea as a means to achieve a Communist takeover of the southern half of the Korean peninsula by force. There is now no denying of the fact that the north Korean proposal of a ‘peace treaty’ has nothing to do with peace in Korea in the genuine sense of the word.

Published on February, 27, 1974

International Cultural Society of Korea

I.P.O. Box 4161

Seoul, Korea

No. 005
July, 1974

South-North Dialogue in Korea

—An Interim Review of the Dialogue—

International Cultural Society of Korea
Seoul, Korea

South-North Dialogue in Korea

— *South-North Coordinating Committee*—

— *South-North Red Cross Conference*—

To Readers:

Two years have now passed since the simultaneous announcement of the July 4 South-North Joint Communique by the two sides of Korea in 1972. However, the prospect remains as grim as ever for an early resumption of the two-lane South-North Dialogue, which was derailed by the north Korean side in August last year.

The United Nations, at its 28th General Assembly last year, gave its blessing to the patient effort of the Republic of Korea to have the suspended dialogue resumed at an early date, by urging the two sides of Korea to continue the dialogue. The International Committee of the Red Cross in Geneva, in the meantime, has recently volunteered to offer its good offices to see the humanitarian Red Cross talks back on the rails.

Nevertheless, the overall relations between the two sides of Korea these days look more and more like those of pre-Joint Communique days, as the north Korean side keeps on aggravating the general situation in Korea with increased military provocations, increased espionage infiltrations and pursuit of a communist revolution against the Republic of Korea.

The fifth issue of the "South-North Dialogue in Korea" offers to the readers an interim review of the dialogue with the purpose of serving the benefit of the readers who are interested in the developments in the relations between the two sides of Korea. The Editor looks forward to all kinds of comments from readers on the contents of this booklet. -Ed.

SOUTH-NORTH JOINT COMMUNIQUE

Recently there were talks held both in Pyongyang and Seoul to discuss problems of improving South-north relations and unifying the divided Fatherland.

Director Hu Rak Lee of the Central Intelligence Agency of Seoul visited Pyongyang from 2 to 5 May 1972 to hold talks with Director Young Joo Kim of the Organization and Guidance Department of Pyongyang. Second Vice Premier Sung Chul Park, acting on behalf of Director Young Joo Kim, also visited Seoul from 29 May to 1 June 1972 to hold further talks with Director Hu Rak Lee.

With the common desire to achieve peaceful unification of the Fatherland as early as possible, the two sides in these talks had frank and openhearted exchanges of views, and made great progress in promoting mutual understanding.

In the course of the talks, the two sides, in an effort to remove the misunderstandings and mistrust and mitigate increased tensions that have arisen between the South and the North as a result of long separation, and further to expedite unification of the Fatherland, have reached full agreement on the following points:

1. The two sides have agreed to the following principles for unification of the Fatherland:

First, unification shall be achieved through independent Korean efforts without being subject to external imposition or interference.

Second, unification shall be achieved through peaceful means, and not through the use of force against each other.

Third, as a homogeneous people, a great national unity shall first be sought, transcending differences in ideas, ideologies, and systems.

2. In order to ease tensions and foster an atmosphere of mutual trust between the South and the North, the two sides have agreed not to slander or defame each

other, not to undertake armed provocations whether on a large or small scale, and to take positive measures to prevent inadvertent military incidents.

3. The two sides, in order to restore severed national ties, promote mutual understanding and to expedite independent peaceful unification, have agreed to carry out various exchanges in many fields.

4. The two sides have agreed to cooperate positively with each other to seek early success of the South-North Red Cross talks, which are underway with the fervent expectations of the entire people.

5. The two sides, in order to prevent the outbreak of unexpected military incidents and to deal directly, promptly and accurately with problems arising between the South and the North, have agreed to install a direct telephone line between Seoul and Pyongyang.

6. The two sides, in order to implement the aforementioned agreed items, solve various problems existing between the South and the North, and to settle the unification problem on the basis of the agreed principles for unification of the Fatherland, have agreed to establish and operate a South-North Coordinating Committee co-chaired by Director Hu Rak Lee and Director Young Joo Kim.

7. The two sides, firmly convinced that the aforementioned agreed items correspond with the common aspirations of the entire people, who are anxious to see an early unification of the Fatherland, hereby solemnly pledge before the entire Korean people that they will faithfully carry out these agreed items.

July 4, 1972

**UPHOLDING THE DESIRES OF THEIR RESPECTIVE
SUPERIORS**

HU RAK LEE

YOUNG JOO KIM

**Agreed Minute
on
Formation and Operation
of
South-North Coordinating Committee**

Both parties agree on the formation and operation of the South-North Coordinating Committee as follows:

1. The South-North Coordinating Committee aims at the solution of the problem of *unifying the fatherland on the basis of such agreed principles for the unification of the fatherland as furtherance of the execution of agreed items in the South-North Joint Communique of July 4, 1972, developing of increasingly improved relations between the South and the North and joining efforts and working together in various fields.*
2. The functions of the South-North Coordinating Committee are as follows:
 - A. To consult about, and settle, the question of realizing an independent and peaceful unification of the country on the basis of the agreed principles for *the unification of the fatherland and to guarantee its implementation.*
 - B. To consult about, and settle, the question of effecting a wide range of political exchanges between political parties, social organizations and individuals in the South and the North and to guarantee its implementation.
 - C. To consult about, and settle, the questions of economic, cultural and social exchanges as well as of joining efforts and working together between the South and the North, and to guarantee their implementation.
 - D. To consult about, and settle, the questions of easing tensions, preventing military clashes and dissolving the state of military confrontation between the South and the North, and to guarantee their implementation.
 - E. To consult about, and settle, the question of taking joint steps in overseas activities between the South and the North, enhancing accordingly the

national prestige as a homogeneous nation, and to guarantee its implementation.

3. The South-North Coordinating Committee shall be organized as follows:

- A. The South-North Coordinating Committee shall be composed of one Co-chairman, one Vice Chairman, one Executive Member and two Members from each party. The number of the Committee Members may be increased as necessary. Director Hu Rak Lee of the Central Intelligence Agency and Director Young Joo Kim of the Organizational Guidance Department are hereby designated as the Co-chairmen. Vice Chairmen, Executive Members and Members shall be of ministerial or vice ministerial rank and shall be appointed respectively by the Co-chairmen through prior consultation.
- B. An Executive Council shall be created within the South-North Coordinating Committee.

The Executive Council shall consult about, and settle, when the authority is so delegated by the Co-chairmen of both parties, various problems that arise in the south-north relations while the South-North Coordinating Committee is in recess, and shall guarantee their implementation. The Executive Council shall be composed of the Executive Member and two Secretaries from each side.

- C. Political, Military, Foreign Affairs, Economic and Cultural Subcommittees shall be created within the South-North Coordinating Committee. Each subcommittee shall be created as the progress at the South-North Coordinating Committee warrants it. The functions and the formation of the subcommittees shall be regulated separately through mutual agreement.
 - C. The South-North Coordinating Committee shall have its Joint Secretariat at Panmunjom. Both parties shall respectively appoint Co-directors of the Joint Secretariat one from each party and shall staff necessary number of personnel to work under Co-directors.
4. The South-North Coordinating Committee shall operate as follows:
- A. The South-North Coordinating Committee shall make it a principle to hold

its meetings in Seoul and Pyongyang by turns, and may hold them at Panmunjom, if necessary.

- B. The South-North Coordinating Committee shall convene once every two to three months, and the Executive Council once every month. Extraordinary meetings can be held through mutual agreement.
 - C. The South-North Coordinating Committee meeting shall be held either in public or behind the closed door.
 - D. Necessary number of specialists and staffs of the Joint Secretariat shall be allowed, through mutual agreement, to attend the South-North Coordinating Committee and the Executive Council meetings.
 - E. A final agreement of the South-North Coordinating Committee shall take effect as soon as the Co-chairmen of both parties put their initials on the note of agreement and the agreed items shall be simultaneously announced through the Joint Secretariat upon mutual agreement.
 - F. Detailed operational procedures for the South-North Coordinating Committee shall be worked out separately.
5. This Agreed Minute shall be revised and supplemented through mutual agreement.
6. This Agreed Minute takes effect upon exchange of the texts with initials of both parties on them.

November 4, 1972

(Signed)

Director Hu Rak Lee
Co-chairman (Seoul side)

South-North Coordinating
Committee

(Signed)

Director Young Joo Kim
Co-chairman (Pyongyang
side)

South-North Coordinating
Committee

**SEVEN POINTS OF REPUBLIC OF KOREA'S FOREIGN
POLICY FOR PEACE AND UNIFICATION, PROCLAIMED
BY PRESIDENT PARK CHUNG HEE, JUNE 23, 1973**

1. The peaceful unification of the fatherland is the supreme task of the Korean people. We will continue to exert every effort to accomplish this task.
2. Peace must be maintained in the Korean peninsula by all means. The south and the north should neither interfere with each other's internal affairs nor commit aggression against each other.
3. We will continue to make efforts with sincerity and patience to secure concrete results from the South-North Dialogue based on the spirit of the South-North Joint Communique dated 4th July 1972.
4. We shall not oppose north Korea's participation with us in international organizations, if it is conducive to the easing of tension and the furtherance of international cooperation.
5. We shall not object to our admittance into the United Nations together with north Korea, if the majority of the member-states of the United Nations so wish, provided that it does not cause hindrance to our national unification. Even before our admittance into the United Nations as a member, we shall not be opposed to north Korea also being invited at the time of the U.N. General Assembly's deliberation of the "Korean question" in which the representative of the Republic of Korea is invited to participate.
6. The Republic of Korea will open its door to all the nations of the world on the basis of the principles of reciprocity and equality. At the same time, we urge those countries whose ideologies and social institutions are different from ours to open their doors likewise to us.
7. Peace and good-neighborliness are the firm basis of the foreign policy of the Republic of Korea. It is reaffirmed that we will continue to further strengthen the ties of friendship existing between our friendly nations and our country. (I wish to make it clear that matters concerning north Korea in the policies enumerated above are interim measures during the transition period pending the achievement of our national unification and that the taking of these measures does not signify our recognition of north Korea as a state.)

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Part One

Historical Background of the Dialogue

1. Division of the Korean Peninsula

At noon, August 15, 1945, the Second World War came to an end with the unconditional surrender of Japanese empire. With the fall of Japanese empire, there came the liberation of Korea from 36 years of Japanese occupation.

The liberation, however, foreshadowed yet another national tragedy for the 30 million Korean people, then rejoicing over the prospect of restoration of a unified, independent Korea. They soon knew that their “Land of Morning Calm” was going to be divided into two halves against their will. The 38th Parallel became the dividing line, and Korea was cut into two halves as the victorious American and Russian troops moved into the peninsula, the former into the south and the latter into the north, with the official purpose of “disarming” Japanese forces there.

There followed two rounds of negotiations between American and Russian military authorities, one in 1946 and the other in 1947, for agreement on termination of the state of division of the peninsula. However, the negotiations bore no fruit.

On November 14, 1947, the 2nd United Nations General Assembly adopted a resolution calling for an “all-Korea free election under United Nations observation” on May 10, 1948, for creation of a unified, independent Korea, and, at the same time, established the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea (UNTCOK), empowering it with the mission of observing the election. However, in January 1948, the UNTCOK was denied, by the Russian military commander in north Korea, of its entry into the northern half of the peninsula, and thus it was made impossible to hold the all-Korea election.

On February 26, 1948, the United Nations General Assembly’s Interim

Committee adopted a resolution authorizing the UNTCOK to go ahead with plans to observe elections “in as much of Korea as was accessible” to it—namely, south Korea.

A general election was duly held on May 10, 1945, in southern half of Korea below the 38th Parallel under United Nations observation, giving birth to the Constituent National Assembly of the Republic of Korea. The Republic of Korea Government was organized in accordance with pertinent provisions of the new constitution enacted by the Constituent Assembly, and the world saw the official declaration of independence of the Republic of Korea on August 15, 1948.

On September 9, 1948, the communist proteges of the Russian military authorities in north Korea announced the creation of the north Korean communist regime of their own, in the name of “democratic people’s republic of Korea,” in the northern half of Korea.

On December 12, 1948, however, the 3rd United Nations General Assembly confirmed the sole legitimacy of the Republic of Korea by adopting a resolution declaring the Republic of Korea Government as “a lawful government.... and the only such government in Korea.” The United Nations General Assembly in the same resolution also established the United Nations Commission on Korea (UNCOK), to replace the UNTCOK. The UNCOK was again refused of its entry into north Korea by the north Korean communist regime.

The Republic of Korea applied for United Nations membership on January 19, 1949. The north Korean regime followed the suit on February 10, the same year.

The United Nations Security Council voted on April 8, 1949, 9 to 2 to recommend the Republic of Korea’s admission, but Russia vetoed it. The Security Council at the same time voted down 2 to 8 north Korea’s

application for admission. Nevertheless, the Republic of Korea's qualification of membership was endorsed by the 4th United Nations General Assembly on December 22, 1949, in a resolution advising the Security Council to approve the Republic of Korea's admission into the world body.

2. Korean War—North Korea's All-out Aggression

In 1949, the American government withdrew all American forces from south Korea, leaving behind them a seriously unbalanced military disparity (footnote 1) between the two sides of Korea.

By 1949, the communist regime in north Korea came to have a formidable military strength, armed with fighter-planes, tanks and heavy artillery pieces, all provided by Russia, whereas the Republic of Korea had a nominal military strength, numerically outnumbered and poorly equipped with mostly outdated individual firearms.

The north Korean communist regime decided to capitalize on the military vacuum, which had developed in south Korea following the withdrawal of American troops, for fulfillment of its ambition of a communist unification through military means. On June 25, 1950, north Korea waged a full-scale pre-dawn Sunday morning surprise invasion of the Republic of Korea all along the 38th Parallel, touching off the tragic fratricidal manslaughter among the same Koreans that lasted for three years. Within three days of the outbreak of war, Seoul, the capital city of the Republic of Korea, fell before the onrushing communist invaders.

The United Nations, at its emergency Security Council meeting on June 27, 1950, branded north Korea an "aggressor," and asked all member nations to "furnish all assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack." Sixteen member nations responded to the call by dispatching military units to Korea and many other countries furnished their assistance in the form of relief and medical materials. On

July 7, the same year, the United Nations Security Council adopted a resolution creating the United Nations Command in Korea. The United Nations General Assembly, in the meantime, adopted a resolution on October 7, the same year, establishing the United Nations Commission for Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK).

During the winter of 1950, Red China entered the Korean War to save the north Korean army, which was then on the brink of total destruction in the face of an all-out counter-offensive of the United Nations forces. The United Nations General Assembly on March 18, 1951, branded Red China an “aggressor” too and demanded an immediate withdrawal of Red Chinese troops out of Korea.

The bloody Korean war came to a halt on July 27, 1953, with the signing of an armistice agreement between the United Nations Command on one side and the north Korean and Red Chinese armies on the other. Armed hostilities were now over and an unstable peace set in in their place in the name of armistice. Korea was to remain divided into two halves as ever. The 38th Parallel was now replaced by the 155 mile-long military demarkation line.

In April 1954, a 19-nation political conference convened in Geneva to seek political settlement of the Korean question. The Republic of Korea, together with 15 United Nations member nations who were Korean War allies, proposed that an independent and democratic unification of Korea be achieved through a “free all-Korea election under United Nations supervision,” with representations to be made “in direct proportion to the indigenous population in Korea.” The communist side rejected the proposal, however, and the Geneva conference broke down in June, the same year.

The damages done by the three-year Korean War were simply immeasurable. Aside from the astronomical damages in property, the war also cost millions of human lives. North Korea alone lost over half a million

soldiers in battlefields and Red China some nine hundred thousand. The total casualties of the United Nations troops, including the Republic of Korea army, were listed somewhere around one hundred and eighty thousand. Besides, the Republic of Korea alone suffered some nine hundred and ninety thousand civilians either dead or injured.

During the war, north Korea forcibly abducted to the north some 85 thousand civilians of the Republic of Korea, all leading personalities of various walks of life. On the other hand, some three million north Koreans are known to have left north Korea, leaving behind them their loving homes and families, to live in freedom in the Republic of Korea. The total north Korean populace at the time of the outbreak of the Korean War was estimated at some twelve million and the record showed that roughly a quarter of the north Korean populace at the time had left that part of Korea to live in the other side of the country.

The reckless military venture of north Korean communists has certainly made the tragic national division more acutely felt in the minds of all Korean people. The two sides of Korea had to become ever more estranged from one another due to the bitter animosities which had developed during the war.

3. Resurging Tension—Rising Armed Provocations

A relative calm prevailed in Korea during the remaining years of 1950s that followed the armistice of 1953. North Korea was busy with rehabilitation of war damages.

With the start of 1960s, however, tension began to resurge in Korea, as north Korean communists began employing a new kind of tactics in their pursuit of a communist unification of the country—pursuit of what they call a “south Korean revolution”—featuring, among others, steady increase in military provocations and espionage activities against the Republic of Korea.

Tension was found steadily on the rise year after year during the 1960s, as the communist regime in north Korea intensified its campaign to idolize the person of Kim Il Sung among the populace there. A systematic and exhaustive campaign was initiated in north Korea in early 1960s to idolize the person of Kim Il Sung as a means to satisfy the need to solidify the north Korean communist regime against prevailing economic odds. Achieving of a communist unification—a unification under the banner of “people’s democratic republic of Korea”—was introduced as the rationale of the idolization of Kim Il Sung, and a “south Korean revolution” was called for as a stepping-stone to an eventual communist unification. The north Korean version of a “south Korean revolution” in turn called for the so-called “people’s democratic revolution” in the Republic of Korea—overthrow of the constitutional order of the Republic of Korea by force through a popular uprising. In a report to the fifth Workers’ Party convention on November 2, 1970, north Korea’s then “premier” and demigod boss of the Workers’ Party declared that the chief objective of the “south Korean revolution” was eventually to “drive the American troops out of south Korea and to establish a ‘people’s democratic regime’ there after overthrow of the incumbent south Korean regime.”

With the north Korean communists’ campaign to idolize Kim Il Sung gaining growing intensity, north Korea’s subversive activities against the Republic of Korea grew intense, as part of the so-called “south Korean revolution” that they avowed to pursue, in various forms that included dispatches into south Korea armed guerrillas and espionages, agitation of political unrest in south Korea and stepped-up military harassments along the 155 mile-long military demarkation line cutting across the waistline of the peninsula.

Most of the armed guerrillas and espionages dispatched into south Korea by the north Korean communists were captured by the Republic of Korea security authorities, either dead or alive. But north Korean communists then opted to capitalize on the incidents involving the armed

guerrillas and espionages for domestic purposes, by telling the north Korean populace that those incidents were “all cases of popular uprisings by the people of south Korea.” North Korea used these incidents, with falsified explanations, to justify the rationale of the so-called “south Korean revolution,” and, in turn, the idolization of Kim Il Sung.

Tension in Korea at last reached its climax in 1968, when the north Korean communists became bold enough to attempt a commando attack on the Presidential Mansion of the Republic of Korea, the Blue House, in Seoul, some 40 miles from the military demarkation line. In the late evening of January 21, 1968, a 31-man specially trained north Korean commando unit was spotted within 200 meters of the Blue House, preparing a surprise attack on the life of President Park Chung Hee of the Republic of Korea. All of the north Korean armed agents, except one who surrendered, were killed in raging battles that ensued between the guerrillas and Republic of Korea police and army forces who were rushed to the scene.

The daring incident was followed in October, the same year, by the landing of 120 north Korean armed guerrillas in Ulchin and Samchok areas on the eastern coast of the Republic of Korea. The north Korean communist regime again told the north Korean populace that the attempted commando attack on the Blue House and the landing of 120 guerrillas on the eastern coast were all “brave armed uprisings by south Korean people themselves.”

Four years thereafter, in May 1972, north Korea’s Kim Il Sung, while meeting with Lee Hu Rak, then Director of the Republic of Korea Central Intelligence Agency visiting Pyongyang on a secret mission of exploring an avenue of political dialogue between the two sides of Korea under President Park Chung Hee’s instruction, volunteered to make issue of the two guerrilla incidents of 1968, and offered his “profound apology” for them, and for the attempted attack on the life of President Park, in particular.

Kim Il Sung flatly admitted that the armed guerrillas in the two cases had all been sent down into south Korea by north Korea—by the “ultra-leftist elements” within north Korea’s Workers’ Party—“without approval” of Kim Il Sung himself. “I would have been infuriated myself,” Kim said. “had there been a similar attempt made on my life,” and added, “after knowing the fact that the operations had been mounted by my side, I instantly fired then defense minister (Kim Chang-man), army chief of staff (Choi Kwang) and director of army reconnaissance (Kim Chung Tae) in a row.” “I am truly sorry to President Park about the incident,” Kim repeatedly made his apologetic remarks.

Such a frank and apologetic mood, however, did not last long. On March 6, 1974, the north Korean mission to the United Nations in New York released a press statement presenting the old-time argument that the attempted attack by the north Korean commando unit on the life of President Park Chung Hee on January 21, 1968 “was a heroic armed uprising by a band of patriotic south Korean people.”

“The year 1968 saw still more military provocations by the north Korean side. Within two days of the attempted commando attack on the Blue House in January, north Korea seized USS Pueblo on high seas off the eastern coast of north Korea, and it was followed by the downing of U.S. air force EC-121 in April. These military provocations by north Korea, all put together, gave rise to a serious tension in the Korean peninsula, critically endangering the precarious peace and security in this part of the world.

4. ROK Proposes Dialogue with North Korea

1960s was a decade in which the people of the Republic of Korea found new hope and vision for their future, as the Republic of Korea kept on scoring world’s record economic growth rates, year after year, with repeated successes in carrying out the first and the second five-year economic plans.

Maintenance of peace in the Korean peninsula, unquestionably, was the fundamental foundation of continued economic growth and prosperity that the Republic of Korea had just begun to enjoy. And the serious threat to peace in Korea posed by the intensified military provocations by north Korea in 1968 was, no doubt, a serious threat to the very foundation of continued economic growth and prosperity on the part of the Republic of Korea.

Somehow and somewhere, the Republic of Korea had to find some means to curb the situation—some effective means to preserve peace and security in this part of the world.

There, of course, is no denying of the fact that an eventual solution of the Korean question will come about when political reunification of Korea is at last achieved.

However, there also is no denying of the hard fact that, under the circumstances, political reunification of divided Korea is by no means an easy thing to achieve.

Division of Korea does not signify a mere partition of land. It signifies existence of two entirely different political systems in the two parts of divided Korea, free democracy in the Republic of Korea and communist proletarian dictatorship in north Korea. They respectively represent extremely antagonistic ideologies, with entirely different historical views and value systems. Even the life style is by far different from each other. Political reunification of divided Korea, therefore, could be made possible only when a choice between the two systems is made possible. Yet, it goes without saying that, under the circumstances, the choice between the two systems is an impossibility. The north Korean communists who have a population of 14 million Koreans under their control have no intention of dropping the wild idea of achieving a communist unification, whereas the 33 million Koreans living in the Republic of Korea would never accept a life in communist system.

Theoretically, there, of course, is an ideally democratic way to solve the problem—and that is to make the choice by abiding by the principle of majority rule. It was exactly in this respect that the Republic of Korea governments, in the past, traditionally endorsed the unification formula which called for a free all-Korea election under United Nations observation where representation would be in direct proportion to the indigenous population in Korea. However, this unification formula had to become ineffective because north Korean communists, who did not see their chance of winning in such an election, had persistently refused to accept it.

It was against this backdrop that the Republic of Korea, back in 1969–1970 period, seriously began searching for some second best means—some second best means which would first stabilize peace in Korea and create an atmosphere in which the two sides of Korea could develop a process of accommodations and assimilations between themselves. The Republic of Korea decided to initiate a dialogue with north Korean communists.

In his commemorative address marking the 25th anniversary of the country's liberation from Japanese rule on August 15, 1970, President Park Chung Hee of the Republic of Korea explicitly proposed some form of joint effort by the two sides of Korea to institutionalize peace in the Korean peninsula. President Park called for a “peaceful competition in good faith” between the two systems in Korea and suggested that he was going to initiate a dialogue with north Korea by declaring that he would take “drastic measures” to remove man-made barriers between the two sides of Korea, if north Korean communists “drop the scheme to communize the southern half of the country by force and stop military provocations.”

On August 12, 1971, the Republic of Korea National Red Cross proposed a humanitarian dialogue between the Red Cross societies of the two sides of Korea on ways to alleviate the suffering of the millions of Koreans who have their loving family members living in total separation in the other side of the divided country for more than a quarter century now.

In May 1972, President Park Chung Hee directed Lee Hu Rak, then Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, to go secretly to Pyongyang for talks with Kim Il Sung and other leading figures of the north Korean communist regime, including Kim Young Joo, younger brother of Kim Il Sung and director of the powerful organizational guidance department of north Korea's Workers' Party, Park Sung Chul, north Korea's then "second vice premier," and Kim Choong Rin, Workers' Party politburo member and secretary in charge of the so-called "south Korean revolution." Lee's mission was to explore the possibilities of a political dialogue between the two sides of Korea and his secret Pyongyang visit in May led to the announcement of the historic South-North Joint Communique on July 4, 1972.

Part Two

South-North Dialogue (An Interim Review)

1. A Resume of the Dialogue

The South-North Dialogue was formally initiated on September 20, 1971, with the opening of the preliminary talks of the South-North Red Cross Conference in Panmunjom. It was agreed that the tasks of the preliminary talks would be to decide on the agenda, the venues and the rules of the full-dress talks and to fix the date for the first full-dress talks.

The progress of the Panmunjom preliminary talks proved to be slow and tiresome, however. Time and again, the Republic of Korea National Red Cross (ROKNRC) delegates to the preliminary talks found themselves fighting stiffly against persistent efforts of the north Korean Red Cross (NKRC) delegates to complicate the humanitarian Red Cross talks with political arguments.

It took twenty-five rounds of plenary meetings and sixteen rounds of closed-door working-level meetings of the preliminary talks to bring the preliminary talks to a close after a full year. It was only after the announcement of the historic South-North Joint Communiqué on July 4, 1972, that the two sides could agree on a date for the first full-dress South-North Red Cross Conference meeting.

The two sides agreed to hold the full-dress Red Cross talks in Seoul and Pyongyang by turns and decided on a five-point agenda (footnote 2). They also decided to have the two sides represented at the full-dress talks by a 54-man delegation, respectively, to be composed of seven delegates, seven advisors, twenty attendants and twenty accompanying reporters. The size of the delegation was soon expanded to 59 men, due to an increase in the number of accompanying reporters by five. The first full-dress talks were at last held in Pyongyang for two days on August 30 and 31, 1972.

At the third full-dress talks held in Pyongyang in late October 1972,

the two sides began deliberating on Item 1 of the Agenda, “the question of tracing, and notifying thereof, the whereabouts and fate of the dispersed families and relatives” in the two parts of Korea. The question at issue was to work out arrangements for the kind of tracing services that the Agenda Item 1 called for—ascertainment and notification of whereabouts and fate—to be carried out.

The ROKNRC delegation proposed that the tracing services of the Agenda Item 1 be carried out through use of traditional international Red Cross methods—exchange of tracing cards (inquiries and replies) with the two Red Cross societies concerned functioning as legitimate intermediaries.

The NKRC delegation, however, came out with a surprise proposal (footnote 3), which called for, among others, what was called “creation of legal conditions and social environment” by the Republic of Korea government as a “prerequisite” for substantial debate on the Agenda Item 1. The NKRC proposal called for abolition of all “anti-communist” legislations, dissolution of all “anti-communist” organizations and a ban on all “anti-communist” movement by the Republic of Korea government.

The humanitarian Red Cross talks inevitably went into trouble as the north Korean side renewed its effort to bring politics into it. “Humanitarianism in Korea is a synonym of unification and, therefore, there are no humanitarian problems in Korea which can stand apart from the question of unification,” argued the north Korean side, demanding that the two sides discuss the question of unification, instead of the humanitarian problems concerning the fate of the dispersed families and relatives, at the Red Cross talks.

A total of seven rounds (three in Seoul and four in Pyongyang) of the full-dress Red Cross talks was held during a period August 1972-July 1973, with the last one held in Pyongyang in July 1973 (footnote 4). However, no progress could be made as the north Korean side refused to budge an inch from its original stand.

At the seventh full-dress talks in July 1973, the ROKNRC proposed, in an effort to break the deadlock, that the two sides agree to let a group each of those who have their ancestral graves in the other side of the country cross the military demarkation line during the Lunar August Full Moon (September 11) holidays of the year so that they could visit their ancestral graves and meet their separated families and relatives in their respective home towns. The NKRC turned it down too, on the ground that it was a “trivial matter.” In August 1973, the north Korean side unilaterally cut off the humanitarian Red Cross talks, together with the political South-North Coordinating Committee meetings.

The year 1972 saw, in the meantime, the announcement of the historic July 4 South-North Joint Communique, which provided for the inauguration of the South-North Coordinating Committee, giving it the mission of functioning as an arena of political dialogue between the two sides of Korea.

The South-North Joint Communique declared that the mission of the South-North Coordinating Committee would be to “remove the misunderstanding and mistrust between the two sides of Korea that have arisen as a result of long separation, to mitigate the increased tension and further to expedite unification of the fatherland.” In the Item 6 of the Communique, it was declared that the Committee would be inaugurated in order to “implement aforementioned agreed items (Items 1—5), solve various problems existing between the two sides of Korea and settle the unification problem on the basis of agreed principles for unification of the country.”

The official inauguration of the South-North Coordinating Committee on November 30, 1972, was preceded by adoption of the “Agreed Minute on Formation and Operation of the South-North Coordinating Committee” on November 4, the same year, at a meeting of Co-chairmen, Lee Hu Rak for Seoul side and Park Sung Chul for Pyongyang side, in Pyongyang. Park Sung Chul was acting on behalf of Kim Young Joo, Pyongyang side’s Co-chairman who was reported to have been hospitalized for illness at the time.

The Agreed Minute provided, in its Article 1, that the South-North Coordinating Committee would deal with the questions of 1) independent and peaceful unification of the country on the basis of agreed principles, 2) exchanges between political parties and social organization as well as individuals, 3) exchanges and cooperation in economic, cultural and social fields, 4) mitigation of tension and prevention of military accidents and 5) pursuit of joint steps in overseas activities. The Agreed Minute also provided that the Committee, to be composed of five members of ministerial and vice ministerial ranks from each side, would have, as its apparatuses, the Executive Council and the Joint Secretariat and would create five subcommittees, political, military, economic, cultural and diplomatic, within the framework of the Committee, when the Committee deemed it necessary. It was also agreed that the Committee would convene every two to three months in Seoul and Pyongyang by turns and the Executive Council every month in Panmunjom.

The South-North Coordinating Committee, thereafter, convened three times (two in Seoul and one in Pyongyang) (footnote 5) during a period November 1972–June 1973. There also were three rounds of Executive Council meetings in Panmunjom in March, April and May 1973.

The political dialogue at the Coordinating Committee, however, began to be stalemated with the start of the year 1973. North Korea began stalemating progress in the dialogue first by advancing impossible demands and then by trying to pervert the Committee itself.

The Republic of Korea proposed, at the second Coordinating Committee meeting in March 1973, that the Committee begin its work first in economic and socio-cultural fields, by creating economic and socio-cultural subcommittees prior to others and enforcing a wide range of exchanges and cooperation in those fields, as a means first to foster an atmosphere of trust and understanding between the two sides. (footnote 6)

North Koreans, however, came out with a sweeping proposal that

included insistence on settlement of military questions prior to other questions, overall and simultaneous creation of five subcommittees and convocation of a south-north “political conference” in order to “settle the unification question.” (footnote 7).

On August 28, 1973, Kim Young Joo, the Committee’s Co-chairman for Pyongyang side who had all along been absent from the Committee meetings under the excuse of illness, abruptly released a statement (footnote 8) announcing north Korea’s unilateral decision to suspend the Committee meetings. North Korea, at the same time, discontinued the humanitarian Red Cross talks too with no explanations at all.

On November 15, 1973, the Republic of Korea formally proposed to north Korea that the two sides resume the interrupted dialogue on both lanes immediately. North Korea half-heartedly responded, and, as a result, the two sides now began a two-lane contact in Panmunjom, one the Vice Chairmen’s meetings of the Coordinating Committee (footnote 9) and the other a “contact” between delegates of the two sides to the Red Cross talks (footnote 10).

The purpose of the two-lane Panmunjom contacts was to normalize the two avenues of the interrupted South-North Dialogue, the Coordinating Committee meetings and the full-dress Red Cross talks. However, little progress has been achieved so far in the Panmunjom contacts and it obviously is going to take some more time for the Panmunjom contacts to achieve anything close to full resumption of the dialogue.

At issue at the Vice Charimen’s meetings of the Coordinating Committee has been the question of reorganizing the Committee as a means to have the interrupted Committee meetings back into session. But discussions on the question has been getting nowhere as the north Korean side insist on a preposterously unrealistic reorganization formula (footnote 11).

Nominal progress has been made on the side of the Red Cross talks. The two sides had agreed to replace the “delegates’ contacts” with “working-level meetings” (footnote 12) and had the first “working-level meeting” held on July 10, 1974, in Panmunjom. But it seems a certain prospect that it will take a considerable length of more time before the Panmunjom “working-level meetings” wind up by reaching an agreement on resumption of the full-dress Red Cross talks.

Concerned over the continuing deadlock in the progress of the Red Cross endeavor in Korea, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) recently volunteered to offer its good offices to help the two Red Cross societies iron out their differences and get the humanitarian talks reopened at an early date. The ICRC invited, in letters sent to both the ROKNRC and the NKRC twice in April and June 1974, the chief delegates of the two sides, Lee Bum-suk of the ROKNRC and Kim Tae-hui of the NKRC, to visit Geneva for a tripartite meeting with ICRC officials sitting in as mediators. The ROKNRC whole-heartedly accepted the ICRC offer, but the NKRC, on the other hand, rejected it on the ground that the ICRC intervention was a “meddling by a third party” (NKRC central committee statement on June 26, 1974, monitored over Radio Pyongyang).

2. Deadlock and Its Cause

A. Conflict of Basic Positions

What is the genuine cause of the deadlock in the South-North Dialogue? In order to find a correct answer to this question, we must first closely examine the differences in the basic positions of the two sides at the dialogue—a close study of the objectives which the two sides of Korea respectively pursue to achieve through the dialogue.

The dialogue between the two sides of divided Korea is committed eventually to the cause of unification of the country, and it is emphatically declared so in the July 4 South-North Joint Communique. And, quite un-

derstandably, the basic positions of the two sides at the dialogue, respectively, are expressions of their respective unification policies. It is crystal clear that the Republic of Korea proposed the dialogue with north Korea with the hope that it would eventually prove to be instrumental in achieving the kind of reunification of the country that she pursued. It is likewise clear that north Korean communists accepted the Republic of Korea's offer in the belief that they would be able to capitalize on the dialogue in trying to achieve reunification of the country on their own terms. Differences in the basic positions of the two sides at the dialogue, therefore, had to arise basically from differences in the objectives of their respective unification policies.

North Korean communists had to stalemate, and later discontinue, the dialogue, primarily because they found, in the course of the dialogue, that progress of the dialogue did not conform with objectives of their unification policy, whereas the Republic of Korea found the two things, progress of the dialogue and objectives of her unification policy, in full conformity. It is, therefore, necessary, in order to grasp the genuine cause of the deadlock in the dialogue, to examine basic positions of the two sides at the dialogue in connection with their respective unification policies.

1) The Republic of Korea

Republic of Korea's objectives in the dialogue fully conform with objectives of her unification policy. Republic of Korea's unification policy calls for institutionalization of an interim process—process in which the two vastly different systems in the two sides of Korea could experiment accommodations and assimilations between themselves through implementation of a series of confidence-building measure—to precede eventual realization of peaceful unification, and the Republic of Korea sees the dialogue as an instrument to usher in that interim process in the thorny relations between the two sides of Korea.

It is beyond question that the primary task of an effort to achieve

reunification of divided Korea is to overcome the vast differences that have come to exist between the two systems in the two divided parts of Korea as a result of a generation of national division. It is the hard reality that the differences between the two sides of Korea in historical views, in value systems, in the way of thinking, in life-styles and in languages, let alone in ideologies, have become so vast that the two systems now look almost heterogeneous with one another.

During a span of a generation that followed division of the country, a high wall of mutual distrust has been erected between the two sides of Korea.

Ideological antagonism; appalling damages, both in human lives and property, caused by war waged by north Korea in early 1950s; north Korea's continued military provocations and subversive activities against the Republic of Korea after the armistice of 1953; differences between the open society of the Republic of Korea and the closed society of north Korea; and, important of all, north Korea's increasingly intensified campaign to sow in the minds of Koreans the feeling of enmity and hatred against the same Koreans, under the veil of "class antagonism," were the factors that, combined altogether, have torn the two sides of Korea wider and wider apart as time wore on.

Because of these realities, any major effort to promote accommodations between the two sides of Korea called for, as its initial step, restoration of mutual trust between them. Enforcement of a series of confidence-building measures, therefore, was badly asked for to spearhead the process of mutual accommodations.

The intensified north Korean guerrilla activities in 1968, in the meantime, raised the question of peace in Korea. It now became quite clear that, without peace institutionalized between the two sides first, it would be futile to expect the relations between the two sides improve, let alone enforcement of whatever confidence-building measures.

Institutionalization of peace in Korea thus became the primary objective that the Republic of Korea wanted to achieve through the dialogue with north Korean communists. The Republic of Korea believed that cultivation of the foundation of stable and lasting peace in Korea would be a cornerstone of the process of mutual accommodations and assimilations which would eventually lead to realization of a peaceful reunification of the country.

The objectives that the Republic of Korea wanted to achieve through the dialogue with north Korea were fourfold:

1. Prevention of recurrence of war—war of any kinds, including guerrillawar and brushfire war as well as full-scale war.

2. Stabilization of lasting peace in Korea—institutionalization of peaceful coexistence between the two different systems, as an interim measure pending unification of the country.

3. Implementation of exchanges and cooperation, on a gradually expanded scale, between the two systems in order to restore mutual trust and promote mutual accommodations and assimilations.

4. Full restoration of the sense of national identity and achievement of peaceful reunification with the rehabilitated national homogeneity as its foundation.

On June 23, 1973, President Park Chung Hee of the Republic of Korea declared that these four objectives were, in effect, the objectives of the new unification policy of the Republic of Korea, the Foreign Policy for Peace and Unification, which was proclaimed on the very date.

In the new Republic of Korea's unification policy, which is commonly called as June 23 Declaration, President Park emphatically declared that

realization of peaceful unification of the country was the “ultimate objective” of the Republic of Korea and assured that the Republic of Korea would “continue to exert unswerving effort” to achieve the ultimate objective. After reviewing progress in the South-North Dialogue and the international situation, however, President Park concluded that it would still take a considerable length of more time before unification was finally achieved, and urged north Korean communists to accept certain mutually acceptable interim measures, hoping that they would eventually lead to realization of unification itself. President Park called on the north Korean communists 1) to accept the principle of non-interference and non-aggression against one another in order to maintain peace in Korea and 2) to continue the South-North Dialogue based on the South-North Joint Communiqué in order to see some concrete results at an early date. The President also declared that the Republic of Korea would “not be opposed” to becoming a member of the United Nations and other international organizations together with north Korea, if north Korea wishes so.

In sum, the June 23 Declaration was an appeal by the Republic of Korea that north Korea accept, and the international community publicly endorse, the idea of having institutionalized peaceful coexistence in Korea for some time.

A bold reaffirmation of the new peace-oriented unification policy of the Republic of Korea came on January 18, 1974, when, at his New Year press conference, President Park proposed conclusion of a non-aggression agreement between the two sides of Korea.

President Park said at the press conference that the proposed south-north non-aggression agreement would call for pledges by the two sides 1) to denounce aggressions against one another, 2) to stop interfering in the internal affairs of one another and 3) to maintain the effect of the armistice agreement in force under whatever circumstances. “After concluding the non-aggression agreement,” the President added, “the two sides would move,

step by step, toward realization of genuinely peaceful unification by peacefully coexisting with one another, pending unification, and by vigorously continuing the dialogue and enforcing exchanges and cooperation, in the meantime.”

On June 23, 1974, on the occasion of the first anniversary of the June 23 Declaration, President Park issued a special statement, in which he called on the north Korean communists to “renounce immediately their policy of communizing the whole of Korea by force and violence” and, by returning to the spirit of July 4 Joint Communique, to “join us in efforts to normalize the South-North Red Cross Conference and the South-North Coordinating Committee and to realize exchanges and cooperation” between the two sides of Korea.

In the statement, the President strongly urged that the north Korean side “discontinue at once all its acts of interference in our internal affairs and all its hostile activities against the Republic of Korea, including military provocations, and respond without delay to our call for negotiations to conclude a non-aggression agreement” between the two sides of Korea.

The President also reiterated his hope that the Republic of Korea, with its 33 million population, “be admitted into the United Nations, so as to positively contribute to the maintenance and strengthening of international peace and to the promotion of international cooperation,” adding that the Republic of Korea “would not oppose north Korea, with its 14 million people, joining the United Nations, if it so desires.”

The President reaffirmed that the Republic of Korea “cannot afford interruption or delay in the efforts toward the easing of tension and the consolidation of peace on the Korean peninsula,” because of the belief that “these are the major prerequisites to peaceful unification of the country.”

Republic of Korea’s new unification policy was further elaborated on by Republic of Korea Minister of National Unification Board Kim Yong-

shik on July 5, 1974, in a speech at the opening session of an academic seminar in Seoul on "international situation surrounding Korean peninsula and relations between the two sides of Korea," sponsored by the Asiatic Research Center, the Korea University.

Reviewing recent relations between the two sides of Korea, Minister Kim observed that "in mutual relations between the two sides of Korea, particularly in diplomatic, defense and financial fields, we witness today fixation of two extremely heterogeneous systems, based on two antagonistic ideologies which would not mix with one another, and its spillover effects are felt even in educational and cultural fields, as are seen in the growing degrees of distinction between the two differentiated views on the national history itself, both in terms of concepts and the way of interpretations, the growing possibility of linguistic barriers between the two sides of Korea." "As a result," Minister Kim said, "the kind of unification that we are asked to pursue under the circumstances is a 'unification as process,' in which conditions for eventual unification are improved, day by day."

"Institutionalization of peace in this land is a vital factor for improvement of conditions for eventual unification," the Minister said, "and liquidation of Cold War logic in the relations between the two sides of Korea is primarily asked for in that respect," adding, "we should, therefore, refrain from becoming overly impatient about institutional solution of the unification question and, instead, should make every possible effort to restore a state in which the two sides of Korea could exchange people and goods and jointly develop the intrinsic national culture of Korea."

The Minister also asked north Korea to remove the major obstacle in the way of achieving peaceful unification of the country "by accepting Republic of Korea's proposal of a non-aggression agreement and by dropping the unrealistic unification policy of north Korea which calls for achievement of a communist revolution in the Republic of Korea as a precondition." "North Korea would also have to recognize the realities of the international

politics which see simultaneous admission of the two sides of Korea into the United Nations not necessarily as a legal ground for fixation of division of Korea, but as a means conducive to dissolution of the state of Cold War confrontation that still remain intact between the two sides of Korea,” Minister Kim concluded.

2) North Korea

North Korea, too, propagates its unification policy to be a “peaceful unification policy.” North Korean communists assert that, during the years that followed national division in 1945, they have presented what they call “peaceful unification formula” on “more than 300 occasions.”

But what is irrefutably clear in this connection is the fact that north Korean version of “peaceful unification” has been, and is, “peaceful unification” in names only. By “peaceful unification,” north Korean communists have never on a single occasion meant unification through genuinely peaceful means.

Without a single exception, north Korea’s so-called “peaceful unification formula” have always rested on fulfillment of a “precondition” in advance. The north Korean version of “precondition” has insistently called for achievement of what they call a “south Korean revolution.” North Korea officially explains that the so-called “south Korean revolution” demands “establishment of a communist (people’s democratic) regime in south Korea after overthrow of the legitimate constitutional order (and the government) of the Republic of Korea, through a violent revolution (at the manipulation of north Korean communists), preceded by expulsion of American forces in Korea.” The north Korean version of a “south Korean revolution,” in other words, calls for achievement of what they call a “people’s democratic revolution” in the Republic of Korea at the manipulation of north Korean communists themselves, meaning a communist takeover of the southern half of the peninsula.

To simplify the matter, north Korea's so-called "peaceful unification formula" mean that a "peaceful unification" of the country can be achieved only on condition that the Republic of Korea is "converted into a communist society in advance through a 'people's democratic revolution.' "

The fictitiousness of the north Korean version of "peaceful unification" has been irrefutably substantiated on a number of occasions in the past by none other than Kim Il Sung himself.

In an audit report delivered personally before the fifth convention of north Korea's Workers' Party on November 2, 1970, Kim Il Sung declared that the "precondition" of unification of the country was achievement of a "south Korean revolution," clarifying that the purpose of the "south Korean revolution" was "eventually to overthrow the present regime in south Korea and to establish a 'people's democratic regime' in its stead there." Kim Il Sung made it emphatically clear that the so-called "south Korean revolution" called for achievement of a "people's democratic revolution" in south Korea. North Korea's "Dictionary of Political Terminologies" defines that the so-called "people's democratic revolution" north Korea pursues against the Republic of Korea calls for "overthrow of the present regime in south Korea by force, through combined use of legal and illegal means, by a 'unified front' of all 'patriotic elements' (organized anti-government elements that north Korea presume to exist in the Republic of Korea) led by the 'Marxist-Leninist' party (communist party) and the 'working class' and establishment of a 'people's regime' there." The dictionary also says that, under the so-called 'people's regime,' south Korea will "undergo a process in the way of a 'socialist revolution,' in which all land and industry are nationalized and socialist economy, featuring state monopoly of all industries, is securely instituted to govern the economic life." In other words, the so-called "people's democratic revolution" in the Republic of Korea means a "communist revolution" there.

It is noteworthy that north Korea usually mention south Korea's "present

regime” as an object of “overthrow.” However, it is never a “government” of the Republic of Korea or any “specific government” that north Korea so avowedly pursue to “overthrow.” Instead, it is the constitutional order—the democratic institutions, in other words—in the Republic of Korea which is the object of “overthrow” by the north Korean communists. Kim Il Sung publicly admitted it himself when he asserted that, in order to have “peaceful unification” realized, “south Korea should first 1) nationalize all plants owned by capitalists and all business firms with foreign investment, 2) forfeit all privately owned farm lands and 3) sever her economic ties with America and Japan.” (Quotation from “study of the works of Kim Il Sung, Radio Pyongyang. April 17, 1974) In saying so, Kim clearly had in his mind total comunization of south Korea as a condition of achieving what the north Korean communists call “peaceful unification.”

The true nature of north Korea’s self-styled “peaceful unification policy” was further manifested in a policy thesis of north Korea, entitled **“On Mutual Relations between South Korean Revolution and Unification of Fatherland,”** broadcast in full over Radio Pyongyang on the very eve of announcement of the South-North Joint Communique on July 4, 1972.

The policy thesis also declared that unification of the country would be achieved **“only on condition that the ‘south Korean revolution’ is achieved in advance,”** adding that the “south Korean revolution” would be completed **“with the accomplishment of a ‘people’s democratic revolution’ in south Korea.”** It made no bones to assert that unification of the country **“should be achieved under the flag of the ‘people’s democratic republic of Korea.’ ”**

The thesis carried a still more horrifying passage which read: **“There are two ways, one peaceful and the other non-peaceful, of achieving unification. But there is solely violent means only to achieve the ‘south Korean revolution.’ ”**

The passage of the thesis at issue irrefutably carries this mesage: **If a**

“peaceful unification” were ever to be accomplished, it should be preceded by a “south Korean revolution,” communist takeover of the Republic of Korea, in other words. And the communist takeover of the Republic of Korea “should be achieved solely through violent means.” Unless the said communist takeover of south Korea by force is achieved in advance, there is no way of achieving the unification through “peaceful means.” The unification then should be achieved through “non-violent means,” through use of arms, in other words. The thesis, by so saying, made it amply clear that north Korea had never dropped the idea of resorting to arms as a means to achieve unification on their own terms.

The fact that north Korea has not given up the idea of resorting to arms as a means to achieve unification was again substantiated by Kim Il Sung’s own remarks. **“Our party (north Korea’s Workers’ Party) wants to have unification achieved through peaceful means,”** said Kim Il Sung, adding, **“however, if the enemy obstructs our ‘revolutionary movement (south Korean revolution)’ by arms, then we should, of course, unify our country through use of arms.”** (Quotation from “study of the works of Kim Il Sung,” Radio Pyongyang, April 18, 1974)

Because of such an extortionary and bellicose nature of the unification policy, north Korea has never considered “compromise” or “negotiation” with the Republic of Korea as a means to achieve unification. To north Korean communists, unification has always been regarded as an “object of revolution and struggle.” Unification to them was never a “negotiable” matter.

It was in line with this basic stand of north Korea that Kim Il Sung, in his speeches at welcome rallies in Pyongyang for Bulgarian government delegation on October 28, 1973, and for Algerian President Houari Boumediene on March 4, 1974, declared that **“unification of the country would come about only through struggle and there would be no compromise whatsoever with the ‘separatists’ of south Korea (alias Republic of Korea government).”**

Here, then, comes the crucial question. Why did then north Korea accept the South-North Dialogue proposed by the Republic of Korea back in 1971?

From a thoroughly done behavioral analysis of north Korea's policy, we obtain an answer to the question as follows.

North Korean communists at first accepted the dialogue because they thought, or hoped, that it would turn out to be instrumental in pursuing unification on their own terms; creation of a climate in the Republic of Korea favorable for accomplishment of the "south Korean revolution," as a step leading to a communist unification of the country, and/or removal of major obstacle in the way of achieving unification through use of arms.

North Korea hoped that the dialogue would prove to be instrumental in securing room for communist agents, working under instruction from north Korea, to operate legally, or half-legally at the worst, within the boundary of the Republic of Korea. It was clearly in line with this hope that north Korea insisted, at the humanitarian Red Cross talks, on agreement on what was called "creation of legal conditions and social environment in south Korea," calling for, among others, abolition of certain vital national security measures and renunciation of anti-communist policy by the Republic of Korea, prior to discussions on the substance of the agenda items proper.

North Korea obviously hoped, at the same time, that the dialogue would serve the purpose of paving the way for use of arms as a means to achieve a communist takeover of the southern half of the peninsula, by creating a military disparity in Korea in disfavor of the Republic of Korea. The major obstacle in its way was the presence of the United Nations troops in the Republic of Korea. And it was thought to have been in line with this hope that north Korea insisted at the South-North Coordinating Committee meetings on a prior agreement on settlement of military questions.

featuring, among others, dismantling of the United Nations Command in Korea and withdrawal of American forces stationed in Korea under UN flag.

It did not take long, however, for north Korean communists to realize that the dialogue was not going to serve their purpose as they had hoped it would. By and by, north Korean communists began to reconsider the merits of the dialogue from their own standpoint. They arrived at an interim conclusion that the dialogue was beginning to play its intrinsic role of stabilizing peace in this part of the world, as the foundation of a process of mutual accommodations and assimilations between the two sides, instead of promoting the extortionary cause of north Korea which pursued imposition of the north Korean system, featuring communist social order and the fanatical personality cult of Kim Il Sung, on the Republic of Korea. North Korean communists began to be disillusioned about the merits of the dialogue. It all began to take shape around the end of 1972 and the beginning of 1973.

B. Recognition of Economic Gap

—Direct Motive of Suspension of the Dialogue

After several rounds of Seoul-Pyongyang exchanges—exchanges that entailed reciprocation of visits by participants of the meetings to the theretofore forbidden areas on the other side of the country—during the fall of 1972, the communist leadership in north Korea began to feel markedly uneasy about the progress of the dialogue.

For the first time in more than two decades after Korean War, the door was opened ajar between the two sides of Korea as a result of these exchanges. Each of the full-dress Red Cross talks meant a visit by 59 Koreans from one side of the country to the other side, and each Coordinating Committee meeting the same experience by 25 men.

These visitors, although limited in numbers, were allowed the exciting moments in which they could observe the life in the other side of the country with their own eyes and compare it with one in their own side of the country.

For those north Koreans who took part in these experiences, however, the experiences turned out to be despairing ones, as they found that, economically, in particular, there already was a wide gap between the two sides of Korea—decisively in favor of the Republic of Korea—with the sure prospect that the gap would be ever widened as time wore on.

With repeated successes in the first and the second five-year economic development plans in 1960s, followed by a successful launching of the third five-year plan in 1972, the Republic of Korea was having a booming economy with record growth rates that astonished the world. Life-style was already vastly modernized, with abundance of modern consumer goods of all sorts and rapidly growing per capita income, as the Republic of Korea continued to stretch herself to catch up with industrially advanced nations of the world.

Life in north Korea, on the contrary, as was seen in the eyes of those Koreans from south visiting north, looked remaining as dreary as ever. North Korea was suffering badly, among others, from failure to have its industry infused with advanced technological knowhows of modern world, due mainly to ideological rigidity of its excessively closed society and lack of adequate international economic cooperation. North Korea's industry, therefore, had to remain in relatively primitive shape, relying heavily on outdated technologies, featuring labor-intensive methods. North Korean industry, moreover, sacrificed production of daily necessities and consumer goods in effect, by placing its emphasis heavily on arms industries and heavy industries related with arms industries.

In spite of these realities, however, the north Korean populace, blind-

folded as they were in one of world's most closed societies, believed the fabricated story that they were living in a "happy land," which had "one of the most advanced social systems." **The fanatical personality cult of Kim Il Sung in north Korea rested on the dogma of an "absolute superiority" of north Korean economy over that of the Republic of Korea in the south.** The north Korean populace was constantly told, day in and day out, that the Republic of Korea was a "new colony of American imperialism and Japanese militarism governed by less than 500 landlords, comprador capitalists and reactionary bureaucrats" and, therefore, "absolute majority of the people are suffering from poverty, starvation and unemployment." (Quotation from a lecture, "Kim Il Sung correspondence course," Radio Pyongyang, December 1973).

The stark falsehood of such a fabricated myth of north Korea, however, was brought out into daylight as a result of reciprocation of visits between the two sides as soon as it began to take place in the fall of 1972.

While in north Korea, the visitors from the south were shocked to find that life was so much different up there in the north. Life in north Korea looked so dreary and monotonous. Diversification of life was non-existent there and fanatical regimentation reigned all over that part of the country. Immense transformation was observed in all the fields of life. The way of life, the way of thinking, value systems, historical views and language up there in north Korea had become so much different from traditionally Korean ones that the atmosphere prevailing there looked almost heterogeneous in the eyes of the visiting Koreans from the south. Values such as individuality and privacy had been completely obliterated to make way for a collectivized life, where one does not speak for oneself.

On the contrary, life in the Republic of Korea, as was seen in the eyes of the visiting north Koreans, was equally, or by far more, shocking to them. Signs of booming economic prosperity were seen in every nook and corner of life in the Republic of Korea. The economic achievements seen

in the eyes of the visiting north Koreans were so impressive that, at first, they simply refused to believe it. When they first saw the streams of flooding cars in Seoul, they thought the Republic of Korea was assembling all the cars she had across the country in order to impress them! Home-made goods, diversified in kinds and abundant in quantity, displayed in department stores in downtown Seoul dealt the severest shock to the north Koreans. They now came, painful as it was, to realize that there was a wide gap between the economies of the two sides, with the sure prospect that it would grow wider. North Korean economy, it was found, was lagging by far behind that of the Republic of Korea.

This outcome of the reciprocation of visits during the fall of 1972 (footnote 11) posed a serious threat to the security of the north Korean communist regime. For north Korean communists, the threat was too serious to think lightly of in that it bore on the very rationale of the personality cult of Kim Il Sung, ideological pillar of north Korea's communist totalitarianism. For north Korean communists, to lose confidence in the viability of the north Korean system in a peaceful competition with the Republic of Korea was one thing and collapse of the assumed belief in the "absolute superiority" of the north Korean system over that of the Republic of Korea, imposed upon the north Korean populace, was another.

It was a horrifying thing for the north Korean communist leadership even to imagine that what those north Koreans had found in the southern half of the country was disseminated among the populace of north Korea.

With the turn of the year from 1972 to 1973, north Korea began to take protective measures—protective measures that featured prevention of the dialogue from evolving into business stage, where there would be a greater degree of mutual contact and exposure between the two sides. Meetings on both levels of the dialogue became increasingly infrequent. Dialogue on both levels began to be deadlocked over north Korean proposals which were totally unrealistic and impracticable.

Furthermore, a new development took place in the relations between the two sides of Korea, eventually forcing the north Korean communists to consider discontinuation of the dialogue seriously.

On June 23, 1973, the Republic of Korea announced the Foreign Policy for Peace and Unification, calling for institutionalization of peace in Korea as the foundation of a new relationship between the two sides of Korea genuinely oriented toward a stable peace in this part of the world, and peaceful unification of the country in the long run. It forcefully called on the north Korean communist leadership to accept, and on the international community to endorse, establishment of a relationship of peaceful coexistence between the two sides of Korea, with both sides of Korea renouncing aggressions against one another and interference in the internal affairs of one another's, as an interim measure pending realization of unification.

North Korea, however, found the June 23 Declaration of the Republic of Korea unacceptable for two major reasons:

First, north Korean communists had an interpretation of their own that a peaceful coexistence with the Republic of Korea would eventually entail a peaceful competition between the two different systems in the two sides of Korea, in order to determine which of the two systems would better serve the good of the people of Korea. North Korean communists could not accept this because of their lack of confidence in the viability of their economy in a peaceful competition with that of the Republic of Korea. The question of viability of their economy directly bore on the question of survival of their communist system.

Secondly, north Korean communists could not accept a peaceful coexistence with the Republic of Korea because it called on them to renounce publicly their avowed policy of pursuing a "south Korean revolution," a policy pursuing achievement of a "people's democratic revolution" in the Republic of Korea

as a step before accomplishment of a communist unification in the long run. It was impossible for north Korea to accept, at least for the time being, because the personality cult of Kim Il Sung was heavily resting on the pursuit of the so-called "south Korean revolution" as its rationale.

Now, north Korea could neither accept the June 23 Declaration of the Republic of Korea nor allow it to be endorsed by the international community. To north Korean communists, simultaneous admission into the United Nations by the two sides of Korea meant approval of a peaceful coexistence between the two sides—approval of the June 23 Declaration, in other words—by the international community.

North Korea, therefore, decided to oppose to the June 23 Declaration violently. In order to wage the campaign against the June 23 Declaration effectively, north Korea felt it necessary to have the relations between the two sides of Korea deteriorated, calling for, at the same time, a sharp increase in the tension in this part of the world. The South-North Dialogue, north Korean communists concluded, had to be sacrificed, because its continuation would not logically go together with deterioration of relations between the two sides.

North Korea at last decided to call the dialogue off and announced it on August 28, 1973. Military provocations were resumed against the Republic of Korea (footnote 13). Infiltrations and infiltration attempts into the Republic of Korea by armed espionages from north Korea began to be reported on the sharp increase. Tension in Korea began rising to a new high.

3. Present State of the Dialogue

The general picture of overall situation in Korea today looks more like that of the days before the announcement of the South-North Joint Communique in 1972.

Relations between the two sides of Korea after discontinuation of the dialogue on both lanes last year are overclouded by a combination of maneuvers by north Korea, which are, all combined, clearly directed at reviving a higher degree of tension in Korea and at preventing peace in this troubled part of the world from being stabilized and institutionalized.

There is a two-lane contact currently underway between the two sides in Panmunjom. And the primary purpose of the ongoing Panmunjom contacts is to get the interrupted dialogue resumed on both lanes at an early date. But north Korea does not appear interested, at least for some time yet to come, in having the South-North Coordinating Committee and the South-North Red Cross Conference, the two lanes of the South-North Dialogue, normalized. The north Korean side appears more inclined to obstruct evolution of the present Panmunjom contacts into full resumption of the dialogue, by insisting on discussing totally unrealistic terms for reopening of the dialogue.

Recent north Korean behavior in dealing with the relations between the two sides of Korea can be accounted for as follows:

A. Intensification of Military Tension

North Korea's renewal of military harassment of the Republic of Korea began to unfold with the beginning of 1973 as north Korea began slowing the tempo of the dialogue.

It started in March, 1973, with reappearance of armed agents dispatched by north Korea on an offshore island of the Republic of Korea. In October the same year, north Korea created a military crisis along the extension of the truce line on the Yellow Sea off the west coast of the peninsula by claiming, for the first time in twenty years following the signing of armistice in 1953, the territorial rights over the waters surrounding five offshore islands there held by the Republic of Korea. North Korea tried to

establish its naval presence in the area and attempted to exercise the right to search civilian vessels of the Republic of Korea which were sailing between the islands and the southern half of the peninsula.

On February 15, 1974, north Korea committed the piracy of attacking, with gunships, two unarmed civilian fishing boats of the Republic of Korea while they were peacefully engaged in fishing on high seas some 30 miles from Baiknyong-do Island, the westernmost offshore island at the extension of the military demarkation line in the Yellow Sea. One of the two fishing boats was sunk on the spot as a result of direct hits from the north Korean gunships with thirteen fishermen aboard and the other was forcibly towed to north Korea together with fifteen fishermen aboard. North Korea fabricated a story of “espionage activities” by the two superannuated fishing boats and refused to return the fifteen fishermen who were taken alive by the north Korean gunships aboard the captured fishing boat, Suwonho No. 33. The International Committee of the Red Cross in Geneva offered to intervene in the case in order to make sure if the fishermen detained in north Korea were getting humanitarian treatment. But north Korea flatly turned it down.

The critical aspect of the new rise of tension in Korea has been emphasized by intensive augmentation of offensive military strength undertaken by north Korea during 1973–1974 period, featuring massive beefing-up of offensive weaponry, reinforcement of military strength along the Demilitarized Zone, improvement of deep-penetration capabilities of the north Korean army and increase of exercises in guerrilla warfare (footnote 13).

North Korea, moreover, is currently operating a high-power clandestine pirate radio station in Haeju, a town in the southwestern part of north Korea, under the ghost name of “voice of the revolutionary unification party,” whose broadcasts are entirely directed towards the Republic of Korea with constant agitations of violent popular uprising in the name of “people’s democratic revolution” there.

B. Efforts to Undermine the Basis of the Dialogue

The South-North Dialogue had produced two impressive agreements during the latter half of 1972—the South-North Joint Communiqué and the Agreed Minute on Formation and Operation of the South-North Coordinating Committee.

However, north Korea these days does not in effect, recognize these two agreements as valid.

The Agreed Minute on Formation and Operation of the South-North Coordinating Committee has the rules of the Committee all provided for in its six articles. Yet north Korea nowadays defies the existence of the Agreed Minute, in its entirety, by refusing to abide by the articles of the Agreed Minute. The north Korean statement of August 28, 1973, announcing the unilateral decision to call off the dialogue, was, in effect, denunciation of the Agreed Minute, in that it denied the South-North Coordinating Committee of the legitimate right to settle whatever problems that arise in the relations between the two sides of Korea within its framework.

The July 4 South-North Joint Communiqué has also fallen a prey to north Korea's systematic campaign to undermine the basic fabric of the heretofore South-North Dialogue. North Korea still does cite the Joint Communiqué, on convenient occasions, as a major achievement of the dialogue. However, it has already been quite a long while since north Korea ceased to cite Items 2-6 of the Joint Communiqué. North Korea, in effect, does not recognize their very existence any more. The only part of the Joint Communiqué north Korea still cites is the "three principles for unification," in north Korea's own version, of Item 1, and the citing is done solely for propaganda purposes.

C. Defiance at the UN Consensus Statement

The United Nations, in the Consensus Statement on the Korean

question adopted unanimously at the 28th General Assembly last year, **1) expressed satisfaction over the issuance of the South-North Joint Communique, 2) urged the two sides of Korea to “continue the dialogue and implement many-sided exchanges and cooperation” in order to expedite an independent and peaceful unification of the country on the basis of the principles of the Joint Communique and 3) decided to dissolve the UNCURK.**

It appears obvious that the United Nations Consensus Statement is definitely not to north Korea’s own liking.

As is the case with the South-North Joint Communique, north Korea does not honor the Consensus Statement in its entirety. At the 28th General Assembly last year, north Korea fought to the last moment against compromise adoption of the Consensus Statement. And after the 28th General Assembly was once over, north Korea has made it manifestly clear on numerous occasions that north Korea would honor the Consensus Statement only partially, and that on north Korea’s own terms.

Kim Il Sung himself has mentioned the United Nations Consensus Statement on a number of occasions, including the New Year statement on January 1, 1974, a welcome speech for visiting Algerian President Houari Boumediene on March 5, 1974, a press interview with a Yugoslavian press agency on March 13, 1974, and another with the Italian communist party organ on April 5, 1974. **However, without the exception of a single occasion, Kim Il Sung mentions 1) and 3) parts only, omitting, evidently deliberately, 2) part, which calls on the two sides of Korea to “continue the dialogue and implement many-sides exchanges and cooperation.”**

Such a behavior of north Korea is not only a defiance at the United Nations Consensus Statement, but also a manifestation of north Korea’s intention to keep the dialogue derailed as it is now.

4. United Nations and Korean Question

Judging from the north Korean attitude of recent months, it seems quite certain that north Korea is now hard at work campaigning to have the Korean question back on the agenda of the forthcoming 29th United Nations General Assembly. North Korea obviously wants the Korea debate at the General Assembly this fall, if it ever takes place, to focus on the question of the United Nations Command in Korea.

In the preceding pages of this booklet, we have made an intensive analysis of developments in the relations between the two sides of Korea in recent months, particularly those in the months following north Korea's unilateral announcement of discontinuation of the South-North Dialogue in August last year.

We have come to the tentative conclusion that the two-lane dialogue between the two sides of Korea has achieved little progress during the last two years that followed announcement of the South-North Joint Communiqué on July 4, 1972. We have come to know of the fact that the dialogue has been deadlocked primarily over conflict of basic positions of the two sides; the Republic of Korea trying to make the dialogue function as a major instrument to stabilize peace in Korea as the foundation of a process of mutual accommodation and assimilation between the two sides, with the hope that the process would eventually lead to realization of peaceful unification of the country, in the true sense of the word, and north Korea persistently attempting to utilize it as a tool to pursue what is called a **“south Korean revolution,”** achievement of a **“people’s democratic revolution”** in south Korea, in other words, which calls for **achievement of a violent class revolution in the Republic of Korea and overthrow of the legitimate government of the Republic of Korea by force.**

It is precisely against this backdrop that the Korea debate, if it ever

takes place, is going to take place at the 29th United Nations General Assembly this fall.

It is our hope, in this respect, that any new United Nations action, if it is found necessary at all, should be the one which would prove itself to be genuinely conducive to promotion of the cause of peace in this troubled part of the world, and not the one which would undermine the basis of the precarious peace that presently exists there.

It is beyond question that any new effort on reunification of Korea should be preceded by efforts to stabilize a lasting peace between the two sides of Korea. It is only a piece of propaganda claptrap if one talks of a “peaceful unification” on the one hand and, at the same time, renounce peace and endorse violence on the other.

In order to have a stabilized peace in Korea, it goes without saying that use of arms, in any forms, should be renounced by both sides of Korea, peaceful coexistence should be institutionalized between the two vastly different systems in Korea and a process of mutual accommodations and assimilations should follow between them. Continuation of the dialogue between the two sides of Korea is the very and sole way to make the process possible.

It is in these contexts that we hope the United Nations, if it ever handles the Korean question again at the forthcoming 29th General Assembly this fall, would strongly urge the two sides of Korea to resume the now interrupted dialogue at an early date and urge them to implement agreements of the South-North Joint Communique in good earnest.

There is one irony about the Korean question nowadays. The irony concerns the north Korean communists trying all out to fabricate a fake story which depicts the presence of the United Nations in Korea, in the form of the United Nations Command, as a “threat to peace” and a “source of war” in

Korea. North Korean communists go on further to give the United Nations troops stationed in Korea the label of “aggressors.”

It is, of course, undoubtedly a gross distortion of facts. The United Nations Command in Korea was installed back in 1950 to repel north Korea’s all-out aggression on the Republic of Korea. And, furthermore, the United Nations Command in Korea was a product of a United Nations Security Council resolution. The Command has continued to remain in Korea, after the conclusion of armistice in 1953, to function as an “effective deterrent” against possible recurrence of war in the peninsula and, thus, function as a “peace-keeping force” in Korea, pending replacement of the unstable peace under the armistice structure with a lasting and stable peace structure. The question of the United Nations Command in Korea, therefore, is directly related with peace in Korea. And, therefore, any attempt on re-examination of the United Nations Command in Korea can be justified only in so far as it is made as part of measures which would guarantee a more stable and lasting peace and security in this part of the world.

Simultaneous admission into the United Nations by the two sides of Korea could be a great step forward to eventual realization of peaceful unification of divided Korea, in that it would make it possible to have peaceful coexistence institutionalized between the two sides of Korea, as an interim measure, in which the two sides could develop a process of mutual accommodations and assimilations in peace without violence and use of arms.

North Korea today opposes to simultaneous admission into the United Nations by the two sides of Korea on the ground that it would establish the presence of “two Koreas” in the world body and would thus “perpetuate” division of the country. Based on this line of reasoning, north Korea even attempts to call Republic of Korea’s new Foreign Policy for Peace and Unification of June 23, 1973, a “separatist policy,” on the ground that it advocates simultaneous admission into the world body by the two sides of Korea.

However, we must take a hard look, in this connection, at the stark fact that north Korea's own acts have constantly belied its own words. During recent years, north Korea has been found hard at work campaigning to effect a dual representation of Korea in as many countries as was possible, mainly seeking establishment of diplomatic ties with countries with which the Republic of Korea already had diplomatic ties. Besides, during last two years, north Korea has been found concentrating its diplomatic efforts in effecting a dual representation of Korea in a number of international organizations, including specialized agencies of the United Nations itself. As a result, as many as 42 nations in the world now have dual diplomatic relations with both sides of Korea. And north Korea is now a member in such affiliated organizations of the United Nations as the World Health Organization, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development and the Universal Postal Union, and the Inter-Parliamentary Union, where Korea was formerly represented solely by the Republic of Korea.

Now, north Korea argues that dual representation of Korea in the United Nations alone is a taboo because, according to north Korea's official explanation, the United Nations is a "political body." "Because the United Nations is a 'political body,' " so argues north Korea, "simultaneous admission into it by the two sides of Korea would make the existence of 'two Koreas' a fait accompli, in political sense, and thus 'perpetuate' division of the country." And, at the same time, north Korea commits the irony of arguing that neither dual diplomatic relations with third nations by the two sides of Korea, nor dual representations in those United Nations affiliated organizations by the two sides of Korea bear the political meaning of recognizing existence of two different political entities in Korea.

It is not necessary to go any deeper into the matter to verify the nonsensical illogicality of the north Korean argument on the matter.

Footnotes

1. According to official records, a comparison between the military strengths of the two sides of Korea at the time of the outbreak of Korean War was as follows:

*Troops:

Republic of Korea:

Army: 8 divisions (22 regiments) with 67,416 men (94,974 men when including support and specialized units)

Navy: 7,715 men

Air Force: 1,897 men

Marines: 1,166 men

(Total: 105,752 men)

North Korea:

Army: 10 divisions (30 regiments) with 120,880 men (182,680 men when including special units)

Navy: 4,700 men

Air Force: 2,000 men

Marines: 9,000 men

(Total: 198,380 men)

*Equipments and Arms:

Republic of Korea: Mortars (960), Howitzers (91), Anti-tank Guns (140), Armored Cars (27), Airplanes (22), Naval Vessels (28)

North Korea: Mortars (1,727), Howitzers (552), Anti-aircraft Guns (36), Anti-tank Guns (550), Tanks (242), Armored Cars (54), Self-propelled Guns (176), Aircrafts (211), Naval Vessels (30)

2. The five-point agenda of the full-dress South-North Red Cross Conference are as follows:

- A. The question of tracing, and notifying thereof, the whereabouts and fate of the dispersed families and relatives in the South and the North.
 - B. The question of facilitating free visits and free meetings between the dispersed families and relatives in the South and the North.
 - C. The question of facilitating free correspondence between the dispersed families and relatives in the South and the North.
 - D. The question of facilitating reunion of dispersed families in the South and the North, according to their free will.
 - E. Other humanitarian problems to be solved.
3. The north Korean Red Cross proposal on Agenda Item 1 covers contents which are as follows:
- A. That the Republic of Korea abrogate the Anti-Communist Law and the National Security Law, disband anti-communist organizations and prohibit anti-communist movements.
 - B. That not only those who are in search of their separated families and relatives but also their helpers and others concerned be granted full diplomatic immunity (including freedom of speech, publication, assembly and passage as well as all necessary conveniences and inviolability of their person and personal belongings) while in the other side's area.
 - C. That the two sides exchange "Red Cross publicity personnel," by one each for the lowest administrative unit (Ri or Dong), with the purpose of conducting, with full diplomatic immunity while in the other side's area, "publicity activities to ease the suffering of the divided nation, remove misunderstandings and distrust, create mutual understanding and trust, and promote an atmosphere of national unity and concord between the two sides." in addition to investigation into the fate of the dispersed families and relatives.
 - D. That ascertainment of the whereabouts and fate of the dispersed families

and relatives be carried out directly among themselves without the help of the Red Cross societies.

4. There was a total of seven rounds of full-dress Red Cross talks held in the following order:

1st	Pyongyang	August 29-September 2, 1972
2nd	Seoul	September 12-16, 1972
3rd	Pyongyang	October 23-26, 1972
4th	Seoul	November 22-24, 1972
5th	Pyongyang	March 20-23, 1973
6th	Seoul	May 8-11, 1973
7th	Pyongyang	July 10-13, 1973

5. There was a total of eleven rounds of get-togethers on the side of the South-North Coordinating Committee:

*Secret visit to Pyongyang May 2-5, 1972, by Lee Hu Rak, then Director of the Republic of Korea Central Intelligence Agency, for meetings with Kim Il Sung and Kim Young Joo.

*Secret visit to Seoul May 29-June 1, 1972, by Park Sung Chul, north Korea's then 2nd vice premier, acting on behalf of Kim Young Joo.

*South-North Coordinating Committee Co-chairmen's Meetings:

1st	Panmunjom	October 12, 1972
2nd	Pyongyang	November 2-4, 1972
3rd	Seoul	November 30, 1972

*South-North Coordinating Committee Meetings:

1st	Seoul	November 30-December 2, 1972
2nd	Pyongyang	March 14-16, 1973
3rd	Seoul	June 12-14, 1973

*Executive Council Meetings:

1st	Panmunjom	March 10, 1973
2nd	Panmunjom	April 24, 1973
3rd	Panmunjom	May 23, 1973

6. The Republic of Korea proposed, at the second South-North Coordinating Committee meeting held on March 15 in Pyongyang, that the two sides of Korea

start with two subcommittees, the economic and the socio-cultural, of the South-North Coordinating Committee, prior to the other three, the political, the military and the diplomatic, and embark on exchanges and cooperation in the following fields:

*In economic field:

- Exchange of businessmen and goods,
- Exchange of scientific technologies,
- Joint development of natural resources,
- Exchange of trade fairs,
- Exchange of resident business firms;

*In socio-cultural fields:

- People-to-people exchanges and exchanges between social organizations,
- Exchanges in academic and cultural fields,
- Exchanges in film and theatrical arts,
- Joint researches in the archaeology and the national history,
- Joint research for preservation of common language,
- Exchange of resident correspondents,
- Communications exchanges, including mails, telephones and telegrams, and
- Exchanges in tourist fields.

7. At the 2nd South-North Coordinating Committee meeting, north Korea proposed three items for discussion which read as follows:

- A. That the two sides discuss, prior to other problems, the conclusion of a peace treaty, featuring a) a ban on arms race, b) withdrawal of all foreign troops, c) reduction of troops and d) a ban on arms imports.
- B. That the five subcommittees of the Coordinating Committee be created all at once.
- C. That a "south-north political conference of representatives of political parties and social organizations" be convoked to settle the question of unification.

*The three-point proposal of north Korea was an indication of changes in the attitude of north Korea on the dialogue in the direction of stalemating progress

of the dialogue. Each of the three items listed above had its own trap to make further progress in the dialogue impossible.

First, in Item 1, north Korea made it manifestly clear that without an agreement reached first on military questions embraced in the item on north Korea's own terms, there would be no discussions on other problems. North Korea's acting Co-chairman Park Sung Chul declared that there would be **"no progress in the dialogue, no improvement of south-north relations and no solution to problems whatsoever, unless the military questions are solved first."** North Korea's insistence upon a prior agreement on the military question, the most sensitive and delicate part of the Korean question, was a clear manifestation of the fact that north Korea by now did not want to let the dialogue make progress any further.

Secondly, north Korea, by insisting on creation of the five subcommittees all at once, obstructed the way for creation of the subcommittees according to priority.

Thirdly, Item 3 was a telltale evidence of the fact that north Korea had already lost interest in going ahead with the South-North Coordinating Committee any further. North Korea's insistence on convocation of the so-called "political conference," apart from the Coordinating Committee, to "settle" the unification question irrefutably ran counter to pertinent articles of both the July 4 South-North Joint Communique and the Agreed Minute on Formation and Operation of the South-North Coordinating Committee which had expressly authorized the Coordinating Committee to handle all problems arising in the relations between the two sides of Korea, including settlement of the unification question on top of the list.

The August 28 statement of north Korea last year, announcing north Korea's unilateral decision to cut off the dialogue in the name of Kim Young Joo, north Korea's Co-chairman of the Coordinating Committee, carried the meaning that north Korea wanted to keep the dialogue off the rails until north Korea changes its mind. By producing such impossible and extortionary demands as withdrawal of the Republic of Korea's new Foreign Policy for Peace and Unification of June 23, 1973, and discontinuation of punishment of communist agents operating within the Republic of Korea under instructions from north Korea, as

“preconditions” for resumption of the dialogue, the north Korean statement has effectively blocked all efforts to have the interrupted dialogue back on the rails.

9. The two sides have held a total of seven rounds of Vice-chairmen’s meetings of the South-North Coordinating Committee so far, in the following order:

1st	December 4, 1973
2nd	December 19, 1973
3rd	January 30, 1974
4th	February 27, 1974
5th	March 27, 1974
6th	April 24, 1974
7th	June 28, 1974
*8th	August 21, 1974 (scheduled)

10. There was a total of seven rounds of contacts in Panmunjom between a delegate each of the two sides to the full-dress Red Cross talks, in the following order:

1st	November 22, 1973
2nd	February 25, 1974
3rd	March 11, 1974
4th	April 3, 1974
5th	April 29, 1974
6th	May 22, 1974
7th	May 29, 1974 (the last of the series)

11. At the third Vice Chairmen’s meeting of the South-North Coordinating Committee on January 30, 1974, north Korea proposed that the Committee be expanded to embrace down from 350 up to 1,400 members from each side. North Korea proposed that the two sides be respectively represented at the Committee by more than five representatives from the constituted authorities, five to twenty representatives each from some sixty to seventy political parties and social organizations and individuals of various classes and strata. At the fourth Vice Chairmen’s meeting on February 27, north Korea withdrew the ridiculous Committee reorganization formula. However, north Korea substituted it with a suggestion that north Korea would accede to reopening of

the Coordinating Committee only on condition that the Republic of Korea accept the ambiguous idea of convoking a "south-north political conference" of "political parties, social organizations and individuals" in order to "settle" the unification question there.

12. At the seventh Panmunjom contact on May 29, 1974, the two Red Cross societies reached an agreement to terminate the delegates' contacts and replace it with "working-level" meetings, to be attended by the alternate chief delegate and two more delegates from each side. The agreement said the "working-level" meetings, to be held in Panmunjom, would conduct "preliminary discussions" on the agenda items of the full-dress talks and, at the same time, discuss the question of reopening the interrupted full-dress talks.

13. It was during the fall of 1972 that north Korean participants in the dialogue did most of their sightseeing and observations while they were in Seoul. North Korea remained positively for the dialogue, for whatever reasons, throughout the fall of 1972, and, during this particular period of time, the north Korean participants appeared to have the permission to take part in social activities, including luxuries of cocktail parties, luncheons and dinners at flush hotels, sightseeing tours in and around the town, shoppings at department stores, plant visits and so forth, organized for them while they were in Seoul. The kind of liberty the north Korean participants had enjoyed during the fall of 1972, however, seemed to have been revoked with the turn of the year into 1973. The north Koreans came to Seoul twice in 1973. But, on both occasions, the north Koreans obstinately insisted on staying in their hotel, with the exception of attendance at meetings, turning down all social functions suggested by the south Korean host. Yet, there was already a long list of places which were visited by the north Koreans during the fall of 1972 while they were in the Republic of Korea. A number of flush hotels in Seoul such as KAL, Walker Hill, Chosun, King Sejong, Tokyu and Tower hosted the north Korean guests with either luncheons or dinners. On one occasion in September 1972, the north Koreans found themselves mingling with hundreds of society figures of all walks of life in the Republic of Korea at a grand cocktail party at Kyunghoeroo, a place in Seoul of gala functions during old dynasty. Included in the tour course for the north Koreans were the mass communication center housing the Joong-ang Daily

News, one of major Seoul dailies, and the Tongyang Broadcasting Company, department stores such as Shinsegye and Cosmos, the old palaces of Changkyungwon and Secret Garden, all in Seoul, and the Sunkyung synthetic fibre-plant in Suwon. They were also driven on a part of the Seoul-Pusan Expressway on their way to Hyunchoongsa in Choongchung Namdo Province, where General Yi Sun Shin is enshrined. The north Korean side showed the south Korean participants in and around Pyongyang on a strictly reciprocal basis while they were in north Korea. The south Koreans visiting Pyongyang were shown to places like the "revolutionary museum" and "Mankyungdae," both ideological sanctuaries of north Korea, Taesungsan Zoo, the office building of the Rodong Shinmun, the organ of north Korea's Workers' Party, and a poultry yard (which north Korean called a "poultry plant") in the suburbs of Pyongyang. They were treated to dinners at hotels like Hotel Pyongyang and Hotel Botonggang and were allowed to do some shopping at the Taedonggang store which was open to foreigners only. They were also shown to Pyongyang Theater to watch what the north Koreans call "revolutionary opera," which, in effect, proved to be a piece devoted to fanatical idolization of the person of Kim Il Sung.

Following is the list of cases of military provocations by north Korea against the Republic of Korea after the announcement of the July 4 South-North Joint Communiqué:

- | | |
|----------------|--|
| March 4, 1973 | Three north Korean armed agents appear on an island off Cheju Island. |
| March 7, 1973 | North Korean soldiers open fire at three Republic of Korea soldiers patrolling in the southern sector of the DMZ in the central part of the truce line, killing one of them and injuring the others. |
| April 17, 1973 | Two north Korean armed agents get killed after crossing the MDL into the south Korean sector in the central part of the truce line. |
| May 5, 1973 | Two armed north Korean agents appear on an island off Cholla Namdo Province (one gets killed and the other flees). |
| December 1973 | North Korea suddenly claims the territorial rights over |

- the waters surrounding five offshore islands off the west coast and threatens Republic of Korea vessels sailing to and from the islands.
- February 15, 1974 North Korean gunships attack two Republic of Korea fishing boats on high seas some 30 miles off the west coast, sinking one on the spot and kidnapping the other.
- February 16, 1974 An unidentified number of north Korean agents appear on the east coast near Tongyung, Kyungsang Namdo Province.
- March 24, 1974 An unidentified number of north Korean agents appear on the east coast near Yungduk, Kyungsang Bukdo Province.
- May 20, 1974 Three north Korean armed agents appear on Chujá-do Island off Cheju Island (one gets killed and the other two flee).
- June 28, 1974 North Korean gunships attack and sink on the spot one Republic of Korea maritime police coast guard ship on high seas off the east coast.
- June 29, 1974 The Republic of Korea navy sinks a north Korean high-speed boat carrying north Korean armed agents in an exchange of fire off the port of Pusan.
15. In a press interview on June 25, 1974, Republic of Korea Minister of National Defense Suh Chong Chul gave the latest estimate on north Korea's military strength as follows:
- Army: 24 infantry divisions, 4 brigades and support units with a total of 480,000 men. 15,000 artillery pieces, including Frog surface-to-surface missiles. 1,100 tanks,
- Air Force: A total of 850 operational aircrafts, including MIG 21s and AN 2s. Conversion of formerly reserve airfields in areas close to the armistice line into operational fields.
- Navy: Some 400 naval crafts, which include 6 submarines and 18 guided-missile ships of OSA and KOMAR classes.
- Paramilitary: A total of 2.2 million paramilitary force, including 1,260,000-

Youth Guards.”

Minister Suh said in the interview that north Korean communists have massively augmented their military strength, particularly during 1973–1974 period, with newly imported naval vessels, which include submarines, submarine-chasers, torpedo boats and guided-missile ships, operational aircrafts, which include some 90 MIG 21/19s and 100 AN 2s, and some 70 amphibian river-crossing crafts. Minister Suh also revealed that north Korea has recently upgraded a number of infantry brigades to full divisions, activated a number of new light-infantry brigades, newly activated west sea naval command and deployed Frog 5 surface-to-surface missiles in an area immediately to the north of Panmunjom.

Published on July 25, 1974

The Public Relations Association of Korea

I. P. O. Box 4161

Seoul, Korea

No. 006
October, 1974

South-North Dialogue in Korea

International Cultural Society of Korea
Seoul, Korea

South-North Dialogue
in
Korea

*South-North Coordinating Committee
South-North Red Cross Conference*

To Readers:

On August 15, 1974, the nation commemorated its liberation from the Japanese rule 29 years ago. In a brutal renewal of terrorist attacks on the Republic of Korea, however, north Korean communists took the festive day an occasion for an attempt on the life of President Park Chung Hee of the Republic of Korea. The President, attacked while delivering a commemorative speech at an indoor ceremony in Seoul, survived the attempt, which was later found to have been engineered by the north Korean communists, but one of the four bullets fired by the assassin managed to hit the President's wife, the late Mme. Yook Young Soo, giving her a mortal wound.

The tragic incident was a vivid reminder of the recently resurging terrorist attacks, coupled with stepped-up military provocations, against the Republic of Korea by the north Korean communist regime, which, after unilaterally boycotting the two lanes of the South-North Dialogue in August 1973, had obstinately refused its full resumption.

Despite the tragic incident, however, the President completed his commemorative speech, which highlighted presentation of three basic principles for a genuinely peaceful unification of the country, calling for, among others, resumption and continuation of the now grounded dialogue between the two sides of Korea.

The sixth issue of the "South-North Dialogue in Korea" covers the August 15 assassination attempt and President Park's commemorative speech of the day, together with a review of progress at the two lanes of Panmunjom contacts between the two sides of Korea, one the South-North Coordinating Committee's Vice Chairmen's Meetings and the other the South-North Red Cross "Working-level" Meetings. The Editor will remain obliged for whatever comments from readers on the Contents of this booklet. —Ed.

SOUTH-NORTH JOINT COMMUNIQUE

Recently there were talks held both in Pyongyang and Seoul to discuss problems of improving South-north relations and unifying the divided Fatherland.

Director Hu Rak Lee of the Central Intelligence Agency of Seoul visited Pyongyang from 2 to 5 May 1972 to hold talks with Director Young Joo Kim of the Organization and Guidance Department of Pyongyang. Second Vice Premier Sung Chul Park, acting on behalf of Director Young Joo Kim, also visited Seoul from 29 May to 1 June 1972 to hold further talks with Director Hu Rak Lee.

With the common desire to achieve peaceful unification of the Fatherland as early as possible, the two sides in these talks had frank and openhearted exchanges of views, and made great progress in promoting mutual understanding.

In the course of the talks, the two sides, in an effort to remove the misunderstandings and mistrust and mitigate increased tensions that have arisen between the South and the North as a result of long separation, and further to expedite unification of the Fatherland, have reached full agreement on the following points:

1. The two sides have agreed to the following principles for unification of the Fatherland:

First, unification shall be achieved through independent Korean efforts without being subject to external imposition or interference.

Second, unification shall be achieved through peaceful means, and not through the use of force against each other.

Third, as a homogeneous people, a great national unity shall first be sought, transcending differences in ideas, ideologies, and systems.

2. In order to ease tensions and foster an atmosphere of mutual trust between the South and the North, the two sides have agreed not to slander or defame each

other, not to undertake armed provocations whether on a large or small scale, and to take positive measures to prevent inadvertent military incidents.

3. The two sides, in order to restore severed national ties, promote mutual understanding and to expedite independent peaceful unification, have agreed to carry out various exchanges in many fields.

4. The two sides have agreed to cooperate positively with each other to seek early success of the South-North Red Cross talks, which are underway with the fervent expectations of the entire people.

5. The two sides, in order to prevent the outbreak of unexpected military incidents and to deal directly, promptly and accurately with problems arising between the South and the North, have agreed to install a direct telephone line between Seoul and Pyongyang.

6. The two sides, in order to implement the aforementioned agreed items, solve various problems existing between the South and the North, and to settle the unification problem on the basis of the agreed principles for unification of the Fatherland, have agreed to establish and operate a South-North Coordinating Committee co-chaired by Director Hu Rak Lee and Director Young Joo Kim.

7. The two sides, firmly convinced that the aforementioned agreed items correspond with the common aspirations of the entire people, who are anxious to see an early unification of the Fatherland, hereby solemnly pledge before the entire Korean people that they will faithfully carry out these agreed items.

July 4, 1972

**UPHOLDING THE DESIRES OF THEIR RESPECTIVE
SUPERIORS**

HU RAK LEE

YOUNG JOO KIM

**Agreed Minute
on
Formation and Operation
of
South-North Coordinating Committee**

Both parties agree on the formation and operation of the South-North Coordinating Committee as follows:

1. The South-North Coordinating Committee aims at the solution of the problem of unifying the fatherland on the basis of such agreed principles for the unification of the fatherland as furtherance of the execution of agreed items in the *South-North Joint Communique of July 4, 1972, developing of increasingly improved relations between the South and the North and joining efforts and working together in various fields.*
2. The functions of the South-North Coordinating Committee are as follows:
 - A. To consult about, and settle, the question of realizing an independent and peaceful unification of the country on the basis of the agreed principles for the unification of the fatherland and to guarantee its implementation.
 - B. To consult about, and settle, the question of effecting a wide range of political exchanges between political parties, social organizations and individuals in the South and the North and to guarantee its implementation.
 - C. To consult about, and settle, the questions of economic, cultural and social exchanges as well as of joining efforts and working together between the South and the North, and to guarantee their implementation.
 - D. To consult about, and settle, the questions of easing tensions, preventing military clashes and dissolving the state of military confrontation between the South and the North, and to guarantee their implementation.
 - E. To consult about, and settle, the question of taking joint steps in overseas activities between the South and the North, enhancing accordingly the

national prestige as a homogeneous nation, and to guarantee its implementation.

3. The South-North Coordinating Committee shall be organized as follows:

- A. The South-North Coordinating Committee shall be composed of one Co-chairman, one Vice Chairman, one Executive Member and two Members from each party. The number of the Committee Members may be increased as necessary. Director Hu Rak Lee of the Central Intelligence Agency and Director Young Joo Kim of the Organizational Guidance Department are hereby designated as the Co-chairmen. Vice Chairmen, Executive Members and Members shall be of ministerial or vice ministerial rank and shall be appointed respectively by the Co-chairmen through prior consultation.
- B. An Executive Council shall be created within the South-North Coordinating Committee.

The Executive Council shall consult about, and settle, when the authority is so delegated by the Co-chairmen of both parties, various problems that arise in the south-north relations while the South-North Coordinating Committee is in recess, and shall guarantee their implementation. The Executive Council shall be composed of the Executive Member and two Secretaries from each side.

- C. Political, Military, Foreign Affairs, Economic and Cultural Subcommittees shall be created within the South-North Coordinating Committee. Each subcommittee shall be created as the progress at the South-North Coordinating Committee warrants it. The functions and the formation of the subcommittees shall be regulated separately through mutual agreement.
 - C. The South-North Coordinating Committee shall have its Joint Secretariat at Panmunjom. Both parties shall respectively appoint Co-directors of the Joint Secretariat one from each party and shall staff necessary number of personnel to work under Co-directors.
4. The South-North Coordinating Committee shall operate as follows:
- A. The South-North Coordinating Committee shall make it a principle to hold

its meetings in Seoul and Pyongyang by turns, and may hold them at Panmunjom, if necessary.

- B. The South-North Coordinating Committee shall convene once every two to three months, and the Executive Council once every month. Extraordinary meetings can be held through mutual agreement.
 - C. The South-North Coordinating Committee meeting shall be held either in public or behind the closed door.
 - D. Necessary number of specialists and staffs of the Joint Secretariat shall be allowed, through mutual agreement, to attend the South-North Coordinating Committee and the Executive Council meetings.
 - E. A final agreement of the South-North Coordinating Committee shall take effect as soon as the Co-chairmen of both parties put their initials on the note of agreement and the agreed items shall be simultaneously announced through the Joint Secretariat upon mutual agreement.
 - F. Detailed operational procedures for the South-North Coordinating Committee shall be worked out separately.
5. This Agreed Minute shall be revised and supplemented through mutual agreement.
6. This Agreed Minute takes effect upon exchange of the texts with initials of both parties on them.

November 4, 1972

(Signed)

Director Hu Rak Lee

Co-chairman (Seoul side)

**South-North Coordinating
Committee**

(Signed)

Director Young Joo Kim

**Co-chairman (Pyongyang
side)**

**South-North Coordinating
Committee**

**SEVEN POINTS OF REPUBLIC OF KOREA'S FOREIGN
POLICY FOR PEACE AND UNIFICATION, PROCLAIMED
BY PRESIDENT PARK CHUNG HEE, JUNE 23, 1973**

1. The peaceful unification of the fatherland is the supreme task of the Korean people. We will continue to exert every effort to accomplish this task.
2. Peace must be maintained in the Korean peninsula by all means. The south and the north should neither interfere with each other's internal affairs nor commit aggression against each other.
3. We will continue to make efforts with sincerity and patience to secure concrete results from the South-North Dialogue based on the spirit of the South-North Joint Communique dated 4th July 1972.
4. We shall not oppose north Korea's participation with us in international organizations, if it is conducive to the easing of tension and the furtherance of international cooperation.
5. We shall not object to our admittance into the United Nations together with north Korea, if the majority of the member-states of the United Nations so wish, provided that it does not cause hindrance to our national unification. Even before our admittance into the United Nations as a member, we shall not be opposed to north Korea also being invited at the time of the U.N. General Assembly's deliberation of the "Korean question" in which the representative of the Republic of Korea is invited to participate.
6. The Republic of Korea will open its door to all the nations of the world on the basis of the principles of reciprocity and equality. At the same time, we urge those countries whose ideologies and social institutions are different from ours to open their doors likewise to us.
7. Peace and good-neighborliness are the firm basis of the foreign policy of the Republic of Korea. It is reaffirmed that we will continue to further strengthen the ties of friendship existing between our friendly nations and our country. (I wish to make it clear that matters concerning north Korea in the policies enumerated above are interim measures during the transition period pending the achievement of our national unification and that the taking of these measures does not signify our recognition of north Korea as a state.)

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Part One

North Korea's Renewed Terrorism

**—Attempts on the Life of the
President of the Republic
of Korea—**

1. A Full Account of August 15 Incident

August 15, 1974, was a day on which Korea commemorated her liberation from the 36 years of Japanese rule 29 years ago. It was also a day on which the nation had seen the birth of the Republic of Korea 26 years ago, with the dream of a unified Korea remaining an unfulfilled task because of the refusal by the north Korean communists to accept an all-Korea free election under United Nations observations.

A commemorative ceremony was called to order at 10 a.m., in the plush National Theatre in Seoul. President Park Chung Hee of the Republic of Korea was present there, accompanied by his wife, Mme. Yook Young Soo, and other government leaders, to deliver a commemorative speech.

The President took the rostrum shortly after 10 a.m., and began his nationally televised and broadcast speech.

At 10:23, an unidentified young man sprang from a back-row seat and began dashing toward the stage, firing at the President standing behind the speaker's lectern with a revolver. The scene turned into a chaos. The gunman was seized and wrestled to the ground by security officers when he reached the front row immediately below the stage. It was a breath-taking drama that lasted 22 seconds.

All of the four bullets fired by the gunman at the President missed their target. The President survived the attempt on his own life. But one of the bullets managed to hit the President's wife, seated behind the President onstage, in her temple, giving her a mortal wound.

The President resumed his interrupted speech, calming down the

audience, when the shooting was over. But, he was soon to know that the abortive attempt on his life was costing him the life of his loving wife. The nationally adored First Lady was pronounced deceased at 7 p. m., that afternoon, after four hours of fruitless efforts by the surgeons of the Seoul National University Hospital to save her life.

The captured gunman carried with him a passport issued by the Japanese Foreign Ministry, with the bearer's name listed as Yukio Yoshii, a Japanese national. Affixed on the passport was the gunman's own photograph. It became apparent that the gunman was admitted into the National Theatre identifying himself as a Japanese.

However, as the prosecution authorities began interrogating the captured gunman in the afternoon of the day, a horrifying account of the incident began to unfold.

The identity of the gunman became established, to begin with. It was discovered that the gunman was not in fact a Japanese national. He was a nisei of a Korean family living in Japan, 23 by age, whose Korean name was Moon Se-kwang, alias Seiko Nanjo and a few others by Japanese name. Born in Osaka, Japan, he grew up there. He quit schooling while in the second year grade of a three-year Japanese high school in Osaka. He had since tried all kinds of sundry jobs to make his own living, which included a laborer, a cabaret boy, a metal grinder and a windowpane cleaner. He had never been to his motherland, the Republic of Korea, until he smuggled into Seoul aboard a Korean Air Line plane on August 6, 1974, carrying a forged passport under alias, with the mission of attempting the assassination of the President of his home country nine days later.

The prosecution authorities uncovered the fact that the gunman had the forged passport issued by the Japanese Foreign Ministry with the help of Yukio Yoshii, 24, and his wife, Mikiko Yoshii, 23, a Japanese leftist activist couple who maintained a special personal relationship with the

gunman.

The revolver which the gunman used in his assassination attempt turned out to be a Smith & Wesson .38, one of the two revolvers stolen in the early morning of July 18, 1974, from a Japanese police station in Osaka.

The gunman confessed to the prosecution authorities that the attempted assassination of the President of the Republic of Korea on August 15 was part of a north Korean scheme, prepared over a period of two years with the aim of “triggering” an internal political confusion in the Republic of Korea, hoping that it would eventually lead to a communist takeover of south Korea—achievement of a “south Korean revolution,” which stood for the so-called “people’s democratic revolution” in the Republic of Korea.

It was the “Chosoren,” an organization of pro-Pyongyang Korean residents living in Japan, which acted as the proxy of north Korea in the preparation and execution of the assassination plot. It was the “Chosoren” which had approached and recruited Moon Se-kwang, way back in September 1972, for the role of a gunman in the attempt on the life of the President of the Republic of Korea.

In November 1972, North Korea instructed Moon to occasion the assassination attempt on March 1, 1974, a Memorial Day of Korea commemorating a nation-wide independence movement back in 1919. Moon was ordered to attend the Memorial Ceremony to be held in Seoul on the day and to attack the President, when he appeared there, with a pistol. The “Chosoren” provided Moon with 500,000 Japanese Yen for acquisition of the pistol needed for the assassination attempt. Moon went to Hong Kong, accompanied by Mikiko Yoshii, the wife of Yukio Yoshii, to buy a pistol there.

Moon did not succeed in acquiring the needed weapon in Hong Kong and the projected March 1, 1974, assassination attempt was duly called off.

On May 4, 1974, Moon was taken aboard the “Mankyungbong-ho,” a north Korean cargo-passenger ship then anchoring at the Osaka pier, where he met a man from north Korea who gave him August 15 as the date for his second try. “This order has come down all the way up from Comrade Kim Il Sung,” Moon later quoted the man from north Korea as having said, “and, therefore, we want you to carry out this order at the cost of your own life.”

Moon was placed under the personal care of Kim Ho-ryong, head of the “political department” of the Ikuno-nishi, Osaka, chapter of the “Chosoren.” Working under Kim’s instructions, Moon sneaked into an Osaka police station during the early morning of July 18 and stole two pistols from there. The “Chosoren” also made the name of Yukio Yoshii, one of its Japanese proteges, available to Moon for use in having the forged Japanese passport issued to him in that name. Yukio Yoshii was later turned out to be a member of the so-called “society for the study of Kim Il Sung’s thoughts,” a clandestine organization of pro-Pyongyang leftist Japanese, organized and financed by the “Chosoren.”

On August 6, Moon set his feet on the soil of his motherland for the first time in his life, under the guise of a Japanese. And, nine days thereafter, Moon was found charging toward the stage of the National Theatre in Seoul, firing a Smith & Wesson .38 at the President and the First Lady of the Republic of Korea onstage.

2. Resurging Terrorism—Assassination Attempts

Ever since the national liberation of 1945 and the subsequent territorial division of the country into two halves, north Korean communists

have pursued only one kind of unification— a communist unification of the country preceded by a communist takeover of the southern half of the peninsula.

North Korean communists always had two means in store to achieve the communist takeover of south Korea as a prerequisite for the communist unification of the country; one conquest of the Republic of Korea through military means and the other achievement of what they call a “people’s democratic revolution” in south Korea which calls for an overthrow of the existing political order of the Republic of Korea by force and establishment of a communist regime in that part of Korea.

In 1950, north Korea started the fratricidal Korean War with the hope of conquering south Korea by military means. North Korea’s military venture, however, wound up as a total failure in the face of the massive intervention by the United Nations forces.

Even after the 1953 armistice, north Korean communists did not abandon the idea of achieving a communist unification by military means.

Under what they call “four basic military lines,” north Korean communists have continuously strengthened, in flagrant violation of the armistice agreement, the north Korean army and kept the precarious peace in the Korean peninsula constantly endangered with ever increasing military provocations on land, sea and in the air, against the Republic of Korea.

From somewhere in 1960s, north Korean communists developed a temptation to try a Vietnam-type warfare in Korea— a backyard guerrilla warfare in the hinterland of the Republic of Korea. In an apparent effort to create bases of guerrilla operations, north Korean communists tried, on a number of occasions in late 1960s, to land specially trained commandos on the eastern coast of the Republic of Korea neighboring to the mountainous areas. One typical example was the case of 120 north Korean

commandos who, in October 1968, landed, in four separate groups, on the eastern coast and tried to penetrate into the mountainous areas, only to be crushed by the Republic of Korea's joint army-police punitive force.

North Korean communists, moreover, created a special army unit, the special 8th army corps, exclusively for operations within the Republic of Korea that feature deep-penetration attacks and guerrilla warfare. It became known later that the 31 north Korean commandos who attempted a raid on the Blue House, the Presidential Mansion of the Republic of Korea in Seoul, on January 21, 1968, were all men of the 124 unit of the north Korean army, a subordinate unit of the 8th special army corps.

North Korean communists, at the same time, have constantly worked to disturb peace and stability, and, instead, create social unrest and political crisis in the Republic of Korea, through underground subversive operations, as part of a scheme to touch off a violent popular uprising in south Korea as a means to overthrow the government of the Republic of Korea by force.

As part of this scheme, north Korea has, in the past years, restlessly repeated harassing the Republic of Korea with all kinds of terrorist provocations, featuring, among others, destruction of public facilities, murder of innocent civilians and attempts on the lives of the government leaders by armed espionages and commandos smuggled into south Korea from the north.

Almost without exception, north Korea has concentrated its assassination attempts on the life of the President of the Republic of Korea. The August 15 attempt on the life of President Park Chung Hee was preceded by a total of seven such attempts by north Korea during 1965-1971 period:

-On July 3, 1965, north Korea sent down into south Korea three north

Korean army captains, Noh Sung Jip, Ri Jae Hoon and Woo Myung Hoon, all highly trained terrorists belonging to the special reconnaissance bureau, an outfit exclusively in charge of deep-penetration military operations against the Republic of Korea, of north Korea's defense ministry, with the mission of attacking President Park's limousine with anti-tank and anti-personnel grenades. Reaching the northern outskirts of Seoul after successfully crossing the military demarkation line, the three assassins ran into a police cordon on a counter-espionage duty in the area and were exposed to a danger of having their bodies frisked. The three north Koreans opened fire at the police and, in a raging exchange of fire that ensued, Noh Sung Jip was captured alive, while the two others fled back to north Korea. North Korea, in April 1967, elevated Ri Jae Hyung to the rank of full colonel and appointed him the commander of the newly activated 124 unit, with Woo Myung Hoon, then promoted to the rank of lieutenant colonel, named as his deputy. Some seven months thereafter, men of the 124 unit attempted a daring raid on the Blue House in Seoul.

-On March 10, 1967, north Korea sent down into south Korea an armed espionage, Kang Il Soo by name, with the mission of "sneaking into the Blue House and attack President Park with grenades and firearms." Kang surrendered to the police authorities, however, after arriving safely in Seoul.

-On January 21, 1968, a platoon-size heavily armed north Korean commandos, all men of the 124 unit, the 8th special army corps, of the north Korean army managed, in one of the most daring attempts, to arrive in Seoul, disguised in the Republic of Korea army uniforms, and found themselves only a few hundred yards short of the Main Gate of the Blue House, before they were spotted by police patrol. Army and police reinforcements were rushed to the scene and, in hours of raging battle, all of the north Korean commandos, except one survivor, were killed.

-On May 15, 1970, the Republic of Korea security authorities arrested a north Korean armed espionage, Kim Byung Sup by name, who had smuggled into south Korea with the mission of "buying over" a Republic of

Korea air force pilot to “make a bombing raid” on the Blue House and the American Embassy in Seoul.

-On June 22, 1970, three north Korean spies tried to place a bomb at the gate of the Republic of Korea's National Cemetery in Seoul in an attempt to explode it by remote control when the President and other government leaders visit the cemetery three days later on June 25, the day of the outbreak of the Korean War, to pay homage to the Korean War deads buried there. The bomb went off while being placed, apparently because of poor handling, however, killing one of the three north Korean spies, Park Eun Sup by name, on the spot. The two others fled the scene.

-On November 14, 1970, the Republic of Korea security authorities arrested a north Korean spy, Chung Shi Il by name, who had smuggled into south Korea, via Japan, with the mission of “buying over” either a Republic of Korea air force pilot for a “bombing raid” on the Blue House or a “Blue House cook” to poison the President.

-On July 29, 1971, north Korea sent down into south Korea an armed spy, Chung Chung Hwa by name, with the mission of attacking the President, while the President attends public functions or is out on a golf course.

As the two sides of Korea began a dialogue between themselves in the fall of 1971, the terrorist attacks on the Republic of Korea by the north Korean communists showed a momentary decline. And, furthermore, the South-North Joint Communiqué of July 4, 1972, emphatically stated that the two sides had agreed to refrain from both military and terrorist provocations against one another.

Unfortunately, however, it did not take long for the north Korean communists to reconsider their pledge to renounce terrorism and military harassment against the other side of the dialogue.

Within months after the announcement of the South-North Joint Communique, north Korean communists were seen busy again sending down armed espionages into south Korea and creating increased tension along the Demilitarized Zone with stepped-up military provocations. North Korean communists, at the same time, began openly agitating what they called a "south Korean revolution" via the so-called "voice of the unification and revolution party," a ghost radio station which north Korea operates from Haeju, a town in the southwestern tip of north Korea, whose broadcast is exclusively directed at the Republic of Korea.

To many Koreans in the Republic of Korea, it was startling to hear Moon Se-kwang, the captured gunman in the August 15 assassination attempt, testify that the August 15 incident had begun to be prepared way back in September 1972, only two months from the announcement of the historic July 4 South-North Joint Communique. It was a telling testimony that, dialogue or no dialogue, north Korean communists have always remained faithful to their old militant and terrorist line of seeking a communist takeover of south Korea as the "sole means" to achieve a communist unification of the country.

*Reference

Seoul Demands Pyongyang's Apology; Terms North
Korean Terrorism Source of National Tragedy

*[Following is a full translated text of a speech by Seoul side's
Vice Chairman Chang Key Young at the 8th SNCC Vice Chairmen's
Meet on September 21, 1974, criticizing north Korea's repeated
terrorism against the Republic of Korea. -Ed.]*

Vice Chairmen Yu Jang-shik!

We sit here today face to face to hold the eighth Vice Chairmen's Meeting of the South-North Coordinating Committee.

But it is difficult for me to describe in words my unpleasant feelings. Only five weeks ago, we experienced a crucial incident which compelled us to question what can really be the fundamental meaning of the dialogue which we have pursued with you north Korean Communists during the past three years. The grief, the indignation and the shock of that day fill the hearts of myself and all other people even at this moment.

The primary objective of our initiation of a dialogue with you Communists of the north Korean area, and of our endeavors for continuation of the dialogue with patience and sincerity, despite many complications, was to expel war and violence from the territory of our fatherland. If we really want to pursue peaceful unification of the divided fatherland, prior creation of durable peace is indispensable. To bring about lasting peace, it is important, above all, to eliminate the seeds of war and violence from this land. It was for the establishment of just such peaceful south-north relations that we urged you over and again to abandon violent revolutionary goals against the south, called the "south Korean revolution"

We realize too well the true nature of you north Korean Communists.

We know that you north Korean Communists are terrorists who do not hesitate to adopt any available means in order to accomplish objectives strictly on the basis of the creed of violence that "ideology justifies all conduct." Looking back, you north Korean Communists who, by adopting violence as your supreme action platform, have forcibly occupied the northern zone with violence and strength, and have been seeking achievement of unification under communism by violence only, are the culprits who have smeared our national history page by page with blood, provoking the gory fratricidal tragedy of the Korean War and wielding violence for the past 29 years without any pause.

No lasting peace can ever be brought about in the midst of reckless pursuit of violence, and it would be a mere wild fancy to discuss peaceful unification in an atmosphere where no lasting peace has been established. This is why we have repeatedly asked your side to give up violence and arms as a prime prerequisite to genuine peaceful unification.

However, on last August 15, an auspicious day marking the anniversary of the nation's liberation from colonial rule by the Japanese imperialists, the evil hand of violence of you north Korean Communists committed an atrocity, to the infuriation of all the peoples of the world, of attacking the President who is the leader of the state and the nation, and his wife at a place none other than the site of that very Liberation Day ceremony, mortally wounding the First Lady.

Such a crucial incident, a deplorable event which so outrages us, which we guarded against and warned against, having finally occurred, can you imagine what my feelings can really be?

Our national sentiments still remain enraged. In these sentiments there can be no distinction of sex, age, occupation and status. What our people are demanding now is only one action. That is to drag before the judgement of the nation and history those who conceived, conspired and

directed the horrible crime, and punish them in the name of the nation and history, thereby uprooting Red violence from this land and eliminating the seeds of any further national tragedy. The enraged national sentiments which demand stern punishment of that Red violence which has gone so far as to commit the hideous crime of attempting to assassinate the President would not tolerate the fact itself that I sit here facing you at a time when no adequate measures of punishment have been taken.

Who can be the ones who conceived, conspired and directed a plot to assassinate the leader of the state and the nation?

The hatchet man who was arrested at the scene of the crime has testified that the man who gave the orders behind the incident was the highest authority of the north Korean Communist authorities.

The middleman who conveyed the order to the assassin aboard the "Mankyongbong-ho" anchored in Osaka harbor on the night of May 4 this year, told the assassin that "since the planned assassination of the President is a revolutionary task directed by Kim Il Sung himself, you must succeed in the task with confidence at the risk of your own life." Mun Se-kwang, who was employed as the hatchet man for the incident, remembered and described accurately in detail how he boarded the "Mankyongbong-ho" anchored in Osaka harbor on the night of May 4, and how he received the assassination order in the dining hall of the "Mankyongbong-ho." The culprit remembers correctly the structure and circumstance of the dining hall of the ship, as well as the appearance of the man who gave him the order there. Besides, he recounts accurately the conversation he had with the man.

Judging from the statement of the culprit and the results of the investigation of the incident so far, it is known expressly that the crime was conspired, organized and executed over as long as two years or more under a careful plan mapped out by north Korean authorities.

The Communist authorities of north Korea set out to prepare the crime early in September 1972, only two months after the issuance of the South-North Joint Communiqué of July 4, 1972, selecting Mun Se-kwang as the hatchet man through the organization of Chosoren in Japan and giving him training. Looking back, on July 3, one day before the issuance of the South-North Joint Communiqué, the north Korean Communist authorities declared in a policy commentary titled "Concerning Correlation between South Korean Revolution and Unification of the Fatherland" that "prerequisite to unification of the fatherland is accomplishment of a revolution in south Korea," adding "there can be no peaceful means in the implementation of a revolution in south Korea; the only means existing are a violent ones."

This was telling proof which made explicit the duplicity of you north Korean Communists, intent on pursuing a path for unification under communism by violence, regardless of the principle of peaceful unification embodied in the South-North Joint Communiqué made public the following day. True enough, in just less than two months after the issuance of the South-North Joint Communiqué, the north Korean Communist authorities began to sharpen the edge of the sword for horrible violence, a plan to assassinate the head of state of the other side of the dialogue.

Through training over a period of as long as two years since then, you Communists turned the culprit Mun Se-kwang into a vicious killer who blindly believes in Red terrorism without any tint of national conscience or love toward the fatherland and the people.

You Communists provided the culprit with all funds required for purchase of a car for use in preparation of the crime, for the trip to Hong Kong to obtain a weapon to be used in the crime, for the disguised hospitalization for intensive ideological training and preparation, and for the unlawful entry into the Republic of Korea for the purpose of execution of the crime.

You Communists have worked out a wicked international conspiracy in which you enabled assassin Mun Se-kwang to steal a weapon from the Japanese police, and to obtain a passport in the name of a Japanese national for use in the crime in devious attempt to estrange the national sentiments of the Republic of Korea and Japan, as well as to destroy the neighborly relations between the two countries.

By directing the so-called Chosoren—an organization which you created in the land of Japan for the sole purpose of splitting the Korean residents in Japan and forcing even our compatriots abroad to undergo the bitter pains of national division—to conspire the horrible crime of assassinating the head of state, you Communists have once again exposed before the whole world the true colors of Chosoren, which is an anti-nation, criminal organization.

According to culprit Mun Se-kwang's statement, Chosoren chieftain Han Dock-su handed the assassin New Year's cards and various gifts in the New Year season of 1973 and 1974, instigating him to the crime.

As was made evident in the foregoing it has been clearly proved before the whole world that the trigger for the tragic shot that sounded at the site of the ceremony marking the 29th anniversary of National Liberation in Seoul last August 15 was pulled by none other than you north Korean Communists, who have become blind with greed for achieving unification under communism by violence only.

You north Korean Communists who dared to commit such an atrocity did not content yourselves with the execution of the crime itself. When our side proposed temporary postponement of the Vice Chairmen's Meeting in order to have time together with all the people stricken with grief over the tragic event, to pray for the repose of the late woman who met a tragic death, you agreed to it. In the meantime, however, you have mobilized all your propaganda machinery to make unfounded sland-

ers and defamation that we were trying to suspend the dialogue.

When we informed your side last September 4 that we were sending a telephone message by the direct south-north telephone line concerning the proposal of a new date for the meeting your side avoided the receipt of it on purpose and played a mean trick by issuing a statement of accusation in the name of yourself, Vice Chairman Yu, asserting that our side “does not propose a date of the next meeting” or “tries to break off the dialogue.” Nevertheless, when we proposed that the meeting be held on September 11, you counterproposed that it be held ten days later, enabling the meeting to take place only today. In addition, your side has insisted that the recent incident was a product of our side’s fabrication, despite the immovable truth about the incident. You have committed a dual and triple crime by mobilizing Chosoren, the wire puller behind the incident, into obstructing the on-the-scene investigation in Japan, the place where the crime was prepared, in fear of exposure of the background of the incident before the world.

The criminality of you north Korean Communists who conspired and executed the attempted assassination of the President on August 15 is extremely grave. We cannot tolerate such grave criminal conduct by your side, nor can we forgive it.

The path of terrorism of you north Korean Communists, whose inhumane cruelty was once again exposed before the whole world through the recent incident, should be sternly judged, condemned, punished and liquidated once and for all. For this purpose, those who ordered and planned the crime and those who trained the assassin and who provided funds should be solemnly indicted before the nation and history, and the judgement of justice should be meted out to them for the crime they committed. Only by so doing can we expel for good the Red violence, a source of all national tragedies, and embark on a new march forward in pursuit of genuine peaceful unification of the fatherland.

Accordingly, I would like to demand resolutely here today that before it is too late, your side plead guilty before the fifty million compatriots and seek the nation's judgement for the grave crime your side committed. I firmly demand that the highest authority of your system apologize formally before us and the fifty million compatriots for the serious crime, and punish in the name of the nation those responsible persons involved in the planning, conspiracy, direction, funding, and training of the recent incident. Shamelessly, you insist now that you had nothing to do with the incident.

Culprit Mun Se-kwang was born in Japan and had come to entertain the idea of Red violence in the course of growing up in Japan. Once mature, he was recruited as a hatchet man by a violent criminal organization called Chosoren. He had never set foot on the land of his native country until he entered the country unlawfully for the purpose of carrying out the crime. Nonetheless, your side claims that the incident was "an event that occurred within" our side itself "without any outside instigation or direction." Your side then tried to pick a quarrel by insisting that our side groundlessly blames your side for the incident.

Besides, your side uttered a shameless lie without any sense of remorse when you asserted that "communism has no linkage to political terror" and "revolution cannot be exported, nor can it be imported."

There is nothing new or surprising in such shameless allegations and lies of you north Korean Communists. For you have staged violent provocations against us in the past without any interruption, and then feigned ignorance with lies. Cases of violent provocation are so many that they are innumerable.

For the sake of historical records, however, I would like to make it clear here that assassins ordered to the south by you north Korean Communists have made attempts on the life of our President on at least eight

occasions, including the recent assassination attempt, since 1965.

On July 3, 1965 your side infiltrated to the south a three-man armed espionage team led by north Korean Army Captain Noh Sung-jip with the mission of assassinating President Park Chung Hee by blowing up the President's sedan with anti-tank and infantry grenades.

On March 10, 1967, your side infiltrated an armed agent named Kang Il-su with the order to assassinate President Park with a pistol or hand grenade after sneaking into Chong Wa Dae, the Presidential mansion

On January 21, 1968, your side infiltrated 31 armed guerrillas of the north Korean army 124 unit close to the Presidential mansion with the mission of blowing up the Presidential mansion and assassinating the President and other government leaders. We still remember the shocking remarks by one of the guerrillas that "we have come on orders to crush Chong Wa Dae and get rid of President Park."

On May 15, 1970, your side infiltrated agent Kim Byong-sop with the mission of "winning over an Air Force pilot" and "having him bomb Chong Wa Dae."

On June 22, 1970, armed agents you sent to the south unsuccessfully attempted to plant explosives at the entrance of National Cemetery for the purpose of assassinating President Park and other government leaders. The attempt failed because the explosive went off accidentally during the work of installation.

On November 14, 1970, our investigation authorities arrested agent Chung Shi-il who, on orders from your side, was seeking an opportunity to "buy over an Air Force pilot to bomb Chong Wa Dae, or buy over a Chong Wa Dae cook and have him poison the President."

On July 29, 1971, your side infiltrated to the south Chung Chong-

hak, an armed agent belonging to the liaison department of the north Korean Workers' Party, with the mission of assassinating President Park at a golf course or at the Seoul Stadium or sites of ceremonies.

Finally on last August 15, your side had Mun Se-kwang commit the atrocity of shooting at President and his wife at the site of a ceremony for the National Liberation anniversary.

Of course, whenever announcements of these incidents were made, our side denied your involvement and insisted that they were events that occurred within our side, as in the case of a thief crying "thief." Your violent atrocities against us reached a peak when 31 armed guerrillas attempted to raid Chong Wa Dae on January 21, 1968, and when 120 armed guerrillas landed on the East Coast in October of the same year.

At the time of the incidents, the north Korean Communist authorities argued and propagandized that both incidents were alleged "armed uprisings by patriotic people" that arose within our side.

Four years later, on May 3, 1972, however, the highest responsible man of your side frankly conceded in a meeting with former Co-Chairman Lee Hu-rak in Pyongyang that the two guerrilla incidents of 1968 were perpetrated by the north Korean authorities. The highest responsible man said at that time that the two incidents "were committed by leftist radical elements without my knowledge," making an apology by saying "I am very sorry for the sake of President Park." He added that those responsible for the incidents were relieved of their posts.

Nevertheless, on March 6 this year, your side's mission to the United Nations in a statement argued that the attempted raid on Chong Wa Dae on January 21, 1968 was "an armed uprising by a group of patriotic armed people of south Korea," denying even what was conceded by the highest responsible man of your side himself.

This is not all. The north Korean Communists who shamelessly quibbled that “revolution cannot be exported or imported” have the record of attempting to export violent revolution to various countries such as Mexico, Sri Lanka and Chile, and of being expelled from those countries because of such an attempt.

It is a well known fact around the world that your side has continuously threatened world peace by calling in and training terrorists from everywhere in the world for murder, destruction and sabotage before sending them back.

The fact that the north Korean Communist system is notorious worldwide for being a den for terrorists can be substantiated expressly by the fact that the radicals of the so-called Red Army Faction who hijacked a passenger plane in Japan chose the north Korean area as their destination, and are still protected there; that those who hijacked a ship in Singapore insisted on being sent to the north Korean area; and that thugs of various countries of the world have undergone terrorist and guerrilla training in the north Korean area.

What can all these facts really mean? In a single word, they point to the naked true colors of the north Korean Communists, who are nothing more than terrorists who live by violence and who die by violence.

Despite the records of these experiences and acts, you insist without grounds that you have nothing to do with violence or terror, or that we were trying to shift blame on your side. By so doing, your side itself eloquently testifies how despicable are the terrorists of north Korea.

You north Korean Communists who, having thrown away national conscience, were rendered mere slaves of violence, disguise violence as peace, and organize and rule the people by deceit and cheating, are busy trying to shun responsibility by dirty and shameless means and tricks, in

fear of exposure of your ugly nature, full of disguise, deceit and deception, without any sense of remorse after committing the atrocity of attempting to assassinate the President with the bloody hand of your violence.

But I would like to make clear today our firm determination that such unforgivable acts of terrorism by you north Korean Communists cannot be left unchecked and tolerated any further.

We have arrived at the conviction that any further tolerance of this practice of violence would only result in the tolerance pains of the people stemming from national division to become ever more aggravated of the prospects for genuine peaceful unification to become ever darker of the ardent hope of the people for promotion of freedom and maximization of prosperity in peace to become shattered and of world peace on the Korean peninsula to become ever more imperiled.

We who have experienced the assassination attempt of August 15, which was another event that aroused resentment in the mind of the people, have decided resolutely to see to it that such a tragic event would not recur again. For this reason, I solemnly warn you in the name of our people and government that we shall carefully watch what attitude your side takes toward the recent incident, and that your side should entirely shoulder responsibility for all events that may arise in the relations between the south and north depending on the nature of your attitude.

Vice Chairman Yu Jang-shik!

In the above, I conveyed to your side clearly and fully our extraordinary decision and determination in connection with the assassination attempt of August 15. What we demand of your side is clear. It is, basically, that you abandon violence and accept peace. For this, we demand that your side stop its tricks intended despicably to shun responsibility any further, frankly concede and apologize for the crime of attempting to

assassinate the President, and take steps to shoulder proper responsibility for the incident.

We demand at the same time that your side renounce formally and practically the so-called policy of "revolution in south Korea," the goal to achieve unification under communism strictly by violence. And we demand that your side accept our peaceful unification formula calling for bringing about durable peace on the Korean peninsula first, and promotion of genuine peaceful unification based on an established lasting peace.

President Park Chung Hee, who narrowly escaped the Red terrorist's bullet and witnessed another bullet take the life of this beloved wife while delivering a congratulatory message at a ceremony for the 29th anniversary of the National Liberation on August 15, reiterated again at home and abroad a three-point basic principle for peaceful unification of the divided fatherland in the congratulatory message which he resumed delivering immediately after the dreadful tragedy at the very site of the crime.

The three-point principle was; first, to bring about durable peace on the Korean peninsula by concluding a south-north non-aggression agreement; second, to restore mutual trust by means of sincere continuation of the south-north dialogue and multi-faceted exchanges and cooperation by opening the door of the south and north to each other; and third, to achieve unification by conducting free general elections in the south and north in proportion to indigenous population under fair election management and supervision, on the basis of a restored mutual trust.

The dauntless attitude of President Park, who declared this three-point principle for peaceful unification at the site of the very crime that forced a tremendous sacrifice upon him and his family and caused heart-breaking sorrow and indignation to all the people, caused us to realize once again his lofty mission as the leader of the state and nation who thinks light of any individual sacrifice and suffering for the sake of

peace and unification of the fatherland, and struck us with awe and reverence. It is for this reason that we again ask your side to reject violence and accept peace, if only to make all the more precious the noble blood shed by the First Lady who met a tragic death, and to respect rightfully the lofty mission of President Park, who expressed dauntlessly his unchanging belief in peaceful unification amidst such a horrible tragedy.

Mr. Yu!

I now demand your reply to our demand which I have conveyed to you today in respect of the view of our people and government.

In view of the critical developments of the south-north relations we are facing now, I sincerely hope that you will not respond to the above mentioned issues rashly, offhandedly, or immediately.

I demand that you give me responsible answers of your authorities after you have conferred with Pyongyang authorities fully on the contents of my remarks made here today.

Part Two

**Address by Pres. Park Chung Hee
on the Occasion of
29th Anniversary of National Liberation**

ROK Presents Three Principles for Peaceful Unification

- 1) Peace should be firmly established in the Korean peninsula. For this purpose, a mutual non-aggression agreement should be concluded between the south and the north.**
- 2) The south and the north should open their doors to each other and mutual trust should be restored between them. For this purpose, they should pursue rapid progress of the South-North Dialogue with sincerity, and many-sided exchanges and cooperation should take place between them.**
- 3) Based on the above foundations, free general elections should be held throughout Korea under fair election management supervision, and in direct proportion to the indigenous population, thereby achieving the unification of the country.**

(Following is the full translated text of the commemorative speech by President Park Chung Hee of the Republic of Korea at a Memorial Ceremony in Seoul on August 15, 1974, marking the 29th anniversary of the nation's liberation from the Japanese rule. —Ed.)

Dear compatriots in the south and north:

Today we observe the 29th anniversary of National Liberation with deep emotions and high hopes. I would like to congratulate our fifty million fellow countrymen in the south and north on this meaningful occasion.

It is a day for rejoicing over regained life of the people we had forfeited under foreign domination. Furthermore, it should be time to renew our determination to carry through the grand task of nation-building and unification of the divided land.

Our national liberation embodies new historical landmark in the

restoration of national identity and the building of a modern state.

Herein lies the genuine significance and value of the national liberation, and for this reason we emphasize the importance of peaceful unification of the fatherland.

It is really saddening to see that up now, nearly one generation after 1945, the liberation has yet to be fully realized amidst the tragedy of division and under the dark clouds of continuing tensions.

Therefore, we all must observe this day not as a merely ceremonial event, but as a time of dedication when we resolve to sublimate our rejoicing over liberation into jubilation over unification, and when we pledge to open a new chapter in the history of national renaissance.

Fellow citizens!

Looking back upon our history, we have not been entirely without opportunities of achieving national unification during the post-liberation years.

If the north Korean Communists had been in accord with our aspirations for national unification, and had come out in opposition to the trusteeship proposed at the Moscow Conference of Three Powers in December 1945, we would have laid the groundwork for unification at that time.

Unfortunately, however, the north Korean Communists made an aboutface overnight and supported the anti-national trusteeship proposal, sowing the seeds of national division in this land.

Later, in November 1947, the United Nations General Assembly, in response to our rejection of trusteeship, proposed all-Korea elections under U.N. supervision and dispatched a temporary commission to oversee the

proposed elections.

Again, the north Korean Communists rejected the proposal, and by so doing they ruined the first chance of having a unified government through general elections.

Moreover, they denied the U.N. Temporary Commission on Korea access to north Korea, and began to exercise dictatorial rule over the north Koreans, activating the so-called People's Army.

In May 1948, north Korea suspended the supply of electricity to south Korea, and cut off the southward flow of the Yesong River in June of the same year. In this way, they did not hesitate to perpetrate treacherous attempts to further national division.

Under these circumstances we had no alternative but, in conformity with the aspiration of the people, to establish the Republic of Korea government on August 15, 1948 as a result of free general elections held under the supervision of the United Nations.

And in December of the same year, the United Nations recognized our government as the only lawful government in Korea.

Less than two years thereafter, however, the north Korean Communists villainously unleashed an unwarranted armed invasion of the south with a view to communizing the entire Korean peninsula as they originally schemed,

This was the Korean War of 1950.

Due to their atrocious treachery, the sacrifice of the precious lives of our compatriots was enormous, and nearly the entire land was reduced to ashes.

This armed invasion by the north Korean Communists was denounced by world opinion, and the United Nations branded the invaders “aggressors.” At that time, we repelled the Communist aggressors in firm solidarity, with the spirit of saving the nation from Communist takeover. A number of peace-loving countries did not spare full-fledged cooperation in these struggles.

The north Korean Communists once again trampled an opportunity for national unification by rejecting the formula for peaceful unification through democratic procedures which we proposed at the Geneva Political Conference held in 1954 after the signing of the armistice.

In addition, the Communists, adhering to their schemes for communization of the south, pushed through the so-called “Four Major Military Paths” to build up their military strength, while committing innumerable acts of armed provocation against us.

As a result, tensions were mounting and even the danger of the recurrence of war hovered over the Korean peninsula.

If such tensions and provocations are allowed to intensify further, it would certainly bring a most critical moment to the entire nation, both south and north.

Notwithstanding, we must persevere in our solemn determination to inherit, evolve and glorify, rather than to disrupt, the 5,000 year-long unbroken historical continuity of the nation by preventing the recurrence of war and by easing tensions in this land, even in the midst of such a crisis.

In the conviction that the first step toward the accomplishment of this mission lies in dialogue and exchanges between the south and north, I announced on Liberation Day in 1970 the August 15 Declaration calling upon north Korea to abandon its policy of seeking unification under

communism by force, and to exert peaceful efforts for development and prosperity.

The following year, we proposed Red Cross talks, and in 1972 we took the initiative in issuing the South-North Joint Communique in conformity with popular wishes.

Thus the door of dialogue was opened for the first time between the south and north, which had been in a state of isolation for over a quarter century.

In the course of the south-north dialogue we have been sincerely exerting all possible endeavors, maintaining the realistic stand that mutual distrust should be remedied and the barrier between the south and north removed gradually by settling easy soluble issues first.

Notwithstanding, the north Korean Communists, who have been obstructing chances for national unification from the time of the nation's liberation, have been simply repeating unreasonable demands that would only endanger our national security, hampering the progress of the negotiations and finally stalemating the south-north dialogue.

At this point, I proclaimed on June 23 last year the Special Foreign Policy Statement for Peace and Unification with a view to bringing about lasting peace, prerequisite to peaceful unification, as well as creating a practical situation for that unification.

In contrast to our incessant efforts for peace, the north Korean Communists suspended the south-north dialogue unilaterally and stepped up unfounded slander and defamation against us.

They have perpetrated intensified military provocation, both in the seas around five of our islands in the West Sea, and along the truce line.

In the midst of such a crisis and resultant mounting tensions, I proposed to north Korea the conclusion of a mutual non-aggression agreement between the south and north early this year, in an effort to forestall the recurrence of war by whatever means.

From the time of the nation's liberation on August 15, 1945 to date, we have consistently made sincere, consistent and multi-faceted endeavors for the achievement of peaceful unification, which is the urgent aspiration of the people and also the supreme challenge facing the nation.

However, the north Korean Communists, who have grown jealous of our national development, have turned their backs even on our non-aggression agreement proposal. On the other hand, they keep perpetrating inhuman and unlawful atrocities, such as the sinking of one of our fishing boats and hijacking of another on the western high seas in February, and the sinking of a police patrol boat on the eastern high seas during June.

Although they utter words about peaceful unification and unity of the people, in reality they are simply seeking to continue national division and repeat the armed invasion of the south.

Nevertheless, our Republic of Korea has been able to pursue efforts for peace despite persistent aggressive provocations of north Korea owing to the fact that we have ensured firm national solidarity, in the face of their threats, and have maintained a sustained high economic growth at a pace unmatched elsewhere in the world through hard work, while resolutely fighting north Korean provocations.

The face of our land and the spiritual attitude of our people are being renovated in a new and hopeful way through the New Community Movement. Our reputation as an exporting country is now spreading over the Five Oceans, and the great strides made by heavy and chemical industry demonstrate the industrial prowess and potential of this country to the

world.

We are accelerating economic development while coping wisely with the present worldwide economic slowdown caused by the petroleum crisis and scarcity of resources. And we have broadened the base for public welfare and amenities, as exemplified by the construction of Seoul subway which goes into operation today.

Our national strength forms the very driving force that forestalls the recurrence of war and maintains lasting peace in this land, creating a practical base for peaceful unification.

My compatriots!

The essence of history is creativity, and the essence of a nation as the prime mover of history dwells in vitality. History develops by means of creativity, and a nation moves ahead on vitality.

I am fully convinced, as you my fellow country men must be, that peaceful unification, which is the supreme aspiration of our people, will be realized as a natural consequence of the history of a nation with unbounded creativity.

And I am positive beyond any doubt that the brilliant restoration and prosperity of our nation will be achieved without fail through the efforts of our people armed with unlimited vitality.

This is why I take this significant occasion today to emphasize once again that unification should be achieved through peaceful means under any circumstance. At the same time, I would like to make clear the basic principles for peaceful unification which we have been pursuing so faithfully.

The following are the basic principles upheld by our side for the peaceful unification of the fatherland :

First, peace should be firmly established on the Korean peninsula. For this purpose a mutual non-aggression agreement should be concluded between south and north.

Second, the south and north should open their doors to each others and mutual trust should be restored between them. For this purpose they should pursue rapid progress of the south-north dialogue with sincerity, and many-sided exchanges and cooperation should take place between them.

Third, based on the above foundations, free general elections should be held throughout Korea under fair election management and supervision, and in direct proportion to the indigenous population, thereby achieving the unification of the country.

It is my conviction that these principles for our peaceful unification represents the most realistic and practical step toward unification of the divided fatherland, not by arms but by peaceful means under the prevailing international situation.

It is for this reason that we have firmly adhered to and will pursue persistently the basic policy of "Unification Preceded by Peace," which calls for bringing about durable peace first and then achieving unification based thereupon.

I strongly exhort the north Korean Communists to return to national conscience as soon as possible, and to make sincere efforts for normalization of the south-north dialogue and establishment of peace for a better future of the fatherland and the people, in line with the spirit of the South-North Joint Communiqué of July 4, 1972 and the Special Foreign Policy

Statement for Peace and Unification on June 23, 1973.

If the north Korean Communists persist in their opposition to our 1973 Special Foreign Policy Statement and to our proposal for a non-aggression agreement, I would be obliged to point out that their opposition reveals before the world that the unification they advocate is not peaceful unification but unification by arms.

For there can be no peaceful unification where there is no durable peace.

And I would also like to urge our friends to be particularly careful about their relations with north Korea and act on the basis of equity, lest they should shake the equilibrium of power on the Korean peninsula.

I am confident that in this way our allies can support our June 23, 1973 Special Foreign Policy Statement for Peace and Unification and contribute to peace on the Korean peninsula and Northeast Asia.

Dear fellow countrymen!

A nation is everlasting. The life of an everlasting nation grows and develops through the state only. The supreme goal of our Republic of Korea, which is responsible for continually nurturing the life of our people, is none other than national unification and national renaissance.

This is why I emphasize that we all should become idealists committed to the revival of the nation in order to fulfill the highest goal of this stage of our continuing national history.

The idealists for national renaissance I just referred to can by no means be those preoccupied by illusions, but those who know how to face up to a given situation and harness positive factors inherent therein as motive

power for evolving the nation's future history.

And they should be those who are firm in the belief that the basis for both national renaissance and unification lies in peace, and the driving force for maintenance of that peace rests with national strength.

They should, therefore, be those who work hard and contribute to enhancing the national strength, remaining dedicated to the lofty ideal of national renaissance.

In this respect, the idealists of national renaissance should be, in a sense, solid realists.

I would like to emphasize that we all should become solid realists, working for the buildup of national strength, as well as idealists serving national renaissance.

All our politicians and social leaders in particular should face the stark reality of the divided fatherland and lead the van for elimination of all waste and inefficiency, aware of the fact that the consolidation of national strength is the shortest path to the achievement of national unification and renaissance.

All businessmen and workers should contribute to the public interest through industries, as well as the strengthening of national power, equipped with a sense of mission that they are the vanguards of economic growth.

And all intellectuals should do their share in national development from a much more creative and cooperative standpoint, taking the lead in refining public morals and enhancing sound national traits, thus fostering an independent and positive outlook on national history.

When each and every citizen does his best in his respective social role

in the execution of the Revitalizing Reforms program, our ideal of national renaissance is certain to materialize and bear tangible fruit.

Fellow countrymen!

Let us unite and channel the stirring sensations and zeal we felt 29 years ago today into the accomplishment of the Revitalizing Reforms program and continue the great national march forward in full vigor.

Let us thereby greet proudly the day of a genuine national liberation, that is, the day of national unification when the joy of liberation will culminate in rejoicing over unification.

Part Three

8th SNCC Vice Chairmen's Meeting

Seoul Demands Immediate Normalization of Talks; Proposes Debate on Mutual Non-aggression Accord

Seoul side's Vice Chairman Chang Key Young of the South-North Coordinating Committee (SNCC) proposed, at the eighth SNCC Vice Chairmen's Meeting on September 21, 1974, that the two sides of Korea immediately resume the SNCC meetings, which had remained interrupted for 13 months already.

Speaking at the SNCC Vice Chairmen's Meeting which was held in Panmunjom for the first time after the abortive attempt on the life of the President of the Republic of Korea in Seoul by a communist terrorist on August 15, the Seoul side's Vice Chairman suggested that the two sides of Korea start concrete debates on the question of concluding a non-aggression agreement between the two sides at the SNCC meetings as soon as they were resumed.

Vice Chairman Chang told his north Korean counterpart, Yu Jang Shik, at the Panmunjom meeting that the failure of the SNCC to have its function, disrupted unilaterally by the north Korean side back in August the previous year, normalized was entirely due to north Korea's obstinate refusal to honor standing agreements between the two sides on the formation and operation of the SNCC.

The Vice Chairman stressed the urgent need to ameliorate the recently aggravating relations between the two sides of Korea and demanded that north Korea 1) immediately agree to have the function of the SNCC brought back to normalcy, 2) immediately accept the Republic of Korea's new Foreign Policy for Peace and Unification and the proposal of a mutual non-aggression agreement between the two sides and 3) immediately drop the policy of pursuing export of a communist revolution down into the south in the name of the so-called "south Korean revolution."

Vice Chairman Chang reminded his north Korean counterpart of the fact that 1) the July 4 South-North Joint Communique had empowered the SNCC with the authority to handle all the problems, including the question of unification, that arise in the relations between the two sides of Korea, 2) the present SNCC had been created through mutual consultation, and mutual approval of the Committee members of the other side, in advance, in accordance with the relevant articles of the Agreed Minute on Formation and Operation of the SNCC, 3) the Agreed Minute provided that the SNCC meetings would be held once every two to three months in Seoul and Pyongyang, by turns, and 4) that it was so provided that the Agreed Minute could be either revised or supplemented only through mutual agreement between the two sides.

The Pyongyang side was again reluctant at the eighth Vice Chairmen's Meeting to discuss the question of reopening of the SNCC meetings. The Pyongyang side, instead, renewed its attacks on the internal affairs of the Republic of Korea, finding fault with her anti-communist policy and new Foreign Policy for Peace and Unification. The Pyongyang side went on further to argue that the Republic of Korea was "preparing a war" against north Korea.

In the face of the Pyongyang side's renewed defamatory harangues, Seoul side's Vice Chairman Chang made issue of the system of north Korea, for the first time in the entire process of the SNCC Vice Chairmen's meetings, to severely scold the waywardness of his north Korean counterpart obstructing progress in the dialogue with irrelevant arguments about the internal affairs of the other side. The Seoul side's Vice Chairman demanded that the north Korean communists "return to the purity of national conscience" and take measures to "liberalize, democratize and open" the society of north Korea," so as to have the interrupted South-North Dialogue resumed and have steps taken toward achievement of a genuinely peaceful unification of the country.

* Reference

“Liberalization & Democratization of North Korea
A Prerequisite for Genuine Peaceful Unification.”

*(Following is a full translated text of a speech by Vice Chairman
Chang Key Young at the 8th SNCC Vice Chairmen's Meeting on
September 21, 1974, answering renewed attacks on the internal affairs
of the Republic of Korea by his north Korean counterpart. -Ed.)*

Vice Chairman Yu!

You are repeating again unfounded slander and defamation against us, which you have reiterated over and over again more than a hundred times in the past, like a malfunctioning gramophone. And you are blocking resumption of the dialogue with me by raising issues that obviously go beyond the boundaries of the duty of the Vice Chairmen's Meeting.

I am obliged to arrive at the conclusion that we can no longer tolerate this insincere attitude and posture of your side. Therefore, though reluctantly, I would like to disclose my views on the issues your side has raised for a few minutes.

In order to improve and settle our abnormal south-north relations, put an end to the unnatural state of division, and achieve national unification, first of all, we must face the south-north relations squarely as they stand. Any discussion that is not based on reality, that is removed from the actual situation, is mere empty dogmatism or irresponsible propaganda and agitation. Therefore, our endeavors to settle the south-north relations should start with an accurate grasp of the reality.

The prime problem that has arisen in the situation facing our divided fatherland derives from the fact that although the Republic of Korea government was established in the territory of our fatherland after the national liberation of 1945 under just, democratic and constitutiona

national decision-making procedures based upon the orthodoxy of the national tradition handed down from our forefathers, another political entity was formed in an area north of the 38th Parallel in an unlawful and extortionary way that can never be justified on any historical, legal and moral grounds, on the basis of an alien ideology that has nothing to do with the national tradition handed down from our forefathers.

The Communists who forcibly occupied the northern area have further deepened the state of territorial and national division by provoking the Korean War of 1950. One of the problems our fatherland is confronted with as a result of the prolongation of the state of division is the phenomenon of heterogeneity that has developed and deepened between the homogeneous people of the south and north as time passed by. The Communists of the northern area have forced upon the people in the area a dictatorial Communist system based on the so-called materialistic view of class history, an alien ideology that rejects all the long history and tradition of the nation.

The things you Communists have accomplished thus far in the northern area were to estrange and split compatriots with the same blood, and make them antagonistic against each other by inventing a so-called "class consciousness" which did not exist in our traditional society, to reduce the entire population into labor slaves in a Nazi-style totalitarian way of thinking that calls for "all for the sake of one, and one for the sake of all," and to liquidate and exterminate the nation's indigenous tradition, values, way of thinking, living patterns and virtuous customs, branding these as "counter-revolutionary" or "reactionary."

Before our eyes unfolds a disgusting situation in which the younger generation growing up in the northern area today knows and learns as national history fictitious invented facts that have no linkage to the conduct of our forefathers because of the arbitrary deviation, distortion and fabrication of the national history. The effect of such a national

extermination policy undertaken under the Communist dictatorial system of the northern area by the minority alien force of the Communists has spread to all fields today such as politics, economy, society, culture and language.

The so-called "class" in our country you mention is nothing more than a mere fiction invented with the impure objective of achieving unification under communism by violence, persecuting and oppressing those brethren who do not want to accept communism within the nation and alienating and splitting the people into two hostile forces, thereby instigating a fratricidal tragedy.

The Communist system which your side has planted in the northern area is a mere satellite system of outside aggressive forces, which was created in the area of north Korea by hatchet man of the international Communist movement that has emerged in the 20th Century as a new international expansionistic aggressive force. This is why you north Korean Communists have eradicated the entire national indigenous tradition and values, and concentrated all your energies upon serving strictly for the so-called proletariat internationalism.

According to the 1970 edition of the "Dictionary of Political Terminology" published by the "Academy of Social Science" of your side, it describes nationalism as "a bourgeois thought advocating ruling class and exploitation by bourgeoisie within one's own nation." And by insisting and Communists, therefore, should fight against nationalism, your side has proved the anti-nationalism of the north Korean Communist system itself.

Your side, which is employing a violent dictatorial system full of deceit and falsehoods now attempts shamelessly to pick quarrels with us over "freedom" or "democracy," refusing to carry on the dialogue on such excuses.

I want to ask you, what on earth are the things that you call “freedom” and “democracy”? How do you dare to dispute our “freedom” and our “democracy” as in the case of a thief crying “thief?” Have you ever granted “freedom” and “democracy” to the people of your area?

Is there any freedom of thought in the area of your side? Is there any freedom of publication? Is there freedom of speech? Is there freedom of the press? Is there freedom of assembly? Is there freedom of organization?

Let us discuss freedom of thought. Is there any freedom to think in the area of your side except Communist thoughts, even that north Korea version of Communist thought, Kim Il-sungism, so-called?

According to the “Dictionary of Political Terminology,” the so-called “Ideological revolution” is described in your area as “a demand essential to the construction of socialism and communism.” Then, what is “ideological revolution”? “Ideological revolution” is described as designed to “uproot the time-worn feudal bourgeoisie or petit bourgeoisie thought remaining among workers, to fend off strictly the poisonous element of bourgeoisie thought encroaching from the outside, and to arm all workers with the thought of communism.” Moreover, the April issue of *Keunroja*, said to be the politico-ideological organ of the north Korean Workers’ Party, gave an extremist description that “all party members and people unite firmly around the parent head, and entertain the firm belief that one would face none else but glory on the path to push through the teachings of the head.” Can you still insist you have freedom of thought, and have the nerve to discuss freedom of thought?

The thought allowed, not allowed but enforced, in the area of your side is the so-called “thought of Kim Il-sungism” and none else. All other thoughts become targets of merciless liquidation and extermination.

Let us also discuss freedom of organization, which is one of the major

pillars of democracy. Do the people residing in the area of your side have really the freedom to form organizations as they wish in a self-ruling and voluntary way? The “Dictionary of Political Terminology” of your side describes so-called “social organizations” in your side’s area: “Social organizations are establishments of which the basic duty is, as contour organizations of the Workers’ Party, to arm the entire workers with the revolutionary thought of Kim Il-sung under the guidance of the party, establishing a unitary thought system of the Workers’ Party and protecting Kim Il-sung with their lives.” In other words, the so-called “social organizations” of your side are mere puppets of the so-called Workers’ Party, whose own independence or self-rule is granted under no circumstances. Can you still argue that your side has freedom of organization? Besides, is there any freedom of faith in your side? Is there freedom of movement or travel? Is there freedom of choice of occupation? Is there freedom of hobby or recreation? Is there freedom of any kind, on your side?

Let us discuss freedom of faith. Ridiculously, your side dares to insist that there is freedom of faith in the area of your side. Your side has gone so far as to agitate the Christians and Buddhist followers of the Republic of Korea for violent revolution, using the titles of Christian and Buddhist organizations which do not exist at all. What can be the reality, then?

According to the “Dictionary of Political Terminology” of your side, “Christianity, as a spiritual weapon of the exploiting class intended to exterminate the liberation struggles of the exploited working masses, as well as to perpetuate its exploitive system, has become a means of justifying the exploitation, persecution, aggression and war of the imperialists, and also a guide on the road of colonial plundering, and in our country, Christianity serves positively by defending the policy of colonial subjugation by the American imperialists, spreading the religious illusion and humiliating slavery among the working masses, as well as infusing the thought of anti-communism into their minds.” Christianity, therefore,

becomes one of the major targets of the so-called “ideological revolution.”

According to the same dictionary, your side describes Buddhism as, “as an ideological ruling tool of the feudal ruling class, having paralyzed the people’s senses of class and struggle dealing a profound blow to the development of culture and science,” adding that “Buddhism has already disappeared in the north Korean area, whereas it still remains in south Korea, playing a considerable part in paralyzing the revolutionary sense of the people.” While categorizing religion as the target of liquidation and persecution in such a way, your side still dares to pick a quarrel on the issue of freedom of religion. The same applies to other freedoms.

The system of your side is a blackened, closed society without any freedom, unseen elsewhere in the world. Moreover, the system of your side is a so-called proletariat Communist dictatorial system recognized by yourself and others alike. Your system being a unitarian system of the so-called Workers’ Party, the party reigns over all other public authorities.

All political views of your side are decided by the Workers’ Party only. People are never granted any opportunity to participate in political decisionmaking. They are simply demanded mechanically to follow what the Workers’ Party decides and orders. In fact, decisions of the party itself are a mere fiction.

The system of your side, an obsolete Stalinist personality cult system which no longer exists elsewhere in the world, is an individual dictatorial system which rules the people with the words of Kim Il Sung. The personality cult system which is being consolidated today in the northern area day by day poses a problem even for the Communists of north Korea if they have some historical knowledge to reflect whether there is any difference between the personality cult of north Korea and the absolute monarchy of Louis XIV who argued “I am the state.” Can you still dare to discuss democracy and attempt to pick quarrels with us on the issue of democracy? Moreover,

you have onesidedly demanded that we renounce our anti-Communist policies and retract the Special Foreign Policy Statement for Peace and Unification of June 23, 1973, while attempting to mislead world opinion with disguised proposals, like wolves with the masks of sheep, for a so-called "grand national conference" or "conference for political negotiations." On these issues, too, I would like to take this occasion to disclose our viewpoint clearly.

First, we cannot tolerate communism in our country, at least at the moment. We do not intend to dispute other countries' adoption of communism. In our country, however, we shall adhere to anti-Communist policies in the days ahead also.

In the foregoing, giving some examples, I accused the poisonous effect of the alien ideology called communism on our nation, as well as the treacherous fictitiousness of the Communist dictatorial system that holds the north Korean area in forced occupation. I have already explained fully the reason why we cannot tolerate communism in our country.

At the same time, I feel compelled to point out expressly that our anti-Communist policies are a product of our self-defense measures to cope with your side's incessant provocations against our national security and peace of the Korean peninsula. Therefore, it is your side, instead of ourselves, which has the key to the lifting of our anti-Communist policies.

As long as your side continues acts such as military provocations and attempts to abet violent revolution in the south against our national security and peace of the Korean peninsula, not abandoning impure schemes for achieving unification under communism by violence and strength of arms, our anti-Communist policies will be maintained tightly, and will be further strengthened.

Only when your side gives up the attempt to achieve unification under communism by violence and arms, which your side has so obstinately been

pursuing in the sugarcoated name of a so-called “revolution in south Korea,” agrees to bring about durable peace on the Korean peninsula, and allows freedom of thought other than communism in the area of north Korea, giving rise to a change that makes it possible for people to choose of their own free will the type of ideology for a unified country, can we reconsider our anti-Communist policies.

Your side’s demand for withdrawal of the Special Foreign Policy Statement for Peace and Unification of June 23, 1973, itself serves as telling proof that substantiates the fact that your side has no interest in peaceful unification of the divided fatherland and, first of all, opposes establishment of lasting peace in the area of our fatherland.

The special foreign policy statement is by no means a “separatism” policy, as your side argues so dogmatically. In a genuine sense, it constitutes the most realistic and rational means of expediting peaceful unification of the divided fatherland. This embodies our lofty philosophy for unification. Can any person accept the nonsensical allegation that unification can be realized at this time of aggravating antagonism, hatred and distrust between the south and north without prior alleviation and liquidation of such abnormal relations?

The objective of the special foreign policy of June 23, 1973 is to systematize the relations of peaceful coexistence first between the south and north, based on the principle of mutual non-aggression and non-intervention for the alleviation and liquidation of such abnormal relations in a peaceful way and independent endeavors, as a course unavoidable for making peaceful unification possible between the south and north. And in such relations of peaceful coexistence, can the south and north continue their dialogue, making steady efforts in pursuit of peaceful unification.

We well know the reasons why your side is opposed to the Special Foreign Policy Statement for Peace and Unification of June 23, 1973. One

of the reasons is that your side realizes the fact that in a peaceful competition that will be inevitably waged between the two systems in south-north relations of peaceful coexistence, the Communist system of the north has no chance at all to win over the democratic system of the south. Another reason is an internal situation which does not warrant abandonment of the path for unification under communism, a backbone policy of the extremist personality cult system of your system.

In consequence, such an attitude of your side is tantamount to rejecting peace and unification. If your side does not give up this attitude but adheres to it continuously, your side will receive before long the stern judgement of history as “national schismatics” who block peace and unification.

Your side has been clamorously trumpeting that if the south and north join the United Nations separately as we proposed in the special foreign policy statement, it will split the nation permanently. The truth is contrary, however. The proposed individual entry of the south and north rationalizes the peaceful coexistence of the south and north as a temporary measure pending realization of national unification.

Your allegation that dual representation at the United Nations would inevitably lead to perpetuation of the national split and to fixation of the idea of “two Koreas” is entirely fictitious, nonsensical, and arbitrarily illogical. This can be fully proved by the cases of Tanzania, Malaysia, the United Arab Republic, as well as by the case of Soviet Russia, the Ukraine and Byelorussia. No clause of the United Nations Charter contains any provision that outlaws voluntary consolidation of the rights of representation between or among U.N. member countries. In other words, the right to representation at the United Nations has nothing directly to do with any consolidation or division of that right. Even after we joined the United Nations separately, we could continue dialogue for unification without restriction. In fact, entry into the United Nations

would rather spur exchanges and cooperation between the south and north.

Our situation, which urgently requires correction, is that our 50 million Korean people, ranking 13th in terms of population size in the world, has been unable to have a voice at the world organization called the United Nations due to the unrealistic stand of your side, and this unreasonable situation continues to date.

If your side, which has a population of 14 million, opposes entry into the United Nations on account of your stubbornness, we do not intend to dispute it. However, no one can argue about the right to admission of the Republic of Korea, with 35 million population, into the United Nations as a member of the world community.

Individual entry into the United Nations of south and north Korea on a temporary transitional basis will rectify the unrealistic situation in which the fair right to a voice of the Korean people is blocked because our 50 million Korean people remain outside the United Nations, and will help bring about durable peace on the Korean peninsula. In addition, genuine peaceful unification will be expedited by continuation of the dialogue between the south and north.

I feel obliged to point up the deception and fictitiousness of your side, in view of the fact that it was none other but north Korea which, contrary to your words, openly seeks "two Koreas" by actions lately taken on the world diplomatic stage.

Your side has recently joined some specialized agencies of the United Nations, such as the World Health Organization (WHO), the U.N. Conference on Trade and Development and the Universal Postal Union which the Republic of Korea has already joined, thereby implanting in these organizations the presence of "two Koreas." Your nonsensical assertion that "these organizations are different from the United Nations

because they are non-political agencies” is a poor and cowardly excuse which would only serve as a laughing stock. Moreover, your side has diplomatically approached those countries which already have diplomatic relations with us on the peculiar theory of “equidistance diplomacy,” and as a result planted the presence of “two Koreas” in 43 countries of the World. If you insist this is not the promotion of a policy of “two Koreas,” it will only make person with sensible minds laugh.

We conclude firmly that the so-called “grand national conference” or “conference for political negotiations” for which your side has been propagandizing carries no value at all for consideration at the moment.

As long as both sides have the organization of the South-North Coordinating Committee, any endeavor at this time to scheme anything other than to make the Coordinating Committee function properly cannot help but be regarded as an attempt to disrupt the existing channel of dialogue, and thereby to undermine efforts for unification. Besides, the idea of the so-called “grand national conference” itself is nonsense; hidden behind such a proposition is an unforgivable, impure destructive scheme.

The proposal of the “grand national conference” is a disguised overture with an impure scheme hidden in it to deny dialogue between responsible authorities of both sides, reject the constitutional order of the other side of the dialogue, and use it as a means of promoting violent revolution against the other’s system, instead of a peaceful approach toward settlement of unification issues. This is why we say that such a double-faced proposal cannot become a subject of serious consideration.

Vice Chairman Yu!

In the above, I have fully proved that your Communist system of the north Korean area is a self-styled system full of deception and falsity. I also gave clear evidence that the things you are engaged in tend to obstruct

peaceful unification of the divided fatherland, and destroy and destroy and exterminate systematically the orthodoxy of the nation with a long history and tradition.

In view of the terrible phenomenon of heterogeneity that has been deepening in the north Korean area during the past quarter century, we cannot help but reaffirm once again that in order to achieve genuinely independent and peaceful unification, the most urgent thing is that a substantial change first take place, in the direction of restoring genuine national homogeneity in the north Korean society.

Therefore, I demand that your side return to the standpoint of pure national conscience and take steps for the democratization, liberalization and opening of the north Korean society, thereby laying groundwork for genuine peaceful unification.

I also demand that before it is too late, your side renounce its hitherto peace-rejecting, dialogue-rejecting and unification-rejecting violent path, and agree to bring about a stabilized peace structure on the Korean peninsula as a basic prerequisite to peaceful unification of the divided fatherland.

Part Four

SNRCC Working-level Meetings

ROKNRC Proposes Dates for 8th Full-dress Meets; NKRC Rejects “Old Parents First” Proposal

The Republic of Korea National Red Cross (ROKNRC) and the north Korean Red Cross society (NKRC) began holding a series of “working-level” meetings, starting with the first one held on July 10, 1974, at Panmunjom, substituting the obscure “delegate’s contact” which had lasted for seven rounds. A total of four rounds of the “working-level” meetings have been held so far, respectively on July 10, July 24, August 28 and September 25.

Attended by the Alternate Chief Delegate and two other Delegates from each side, it had been so agreed that the “working-level” meetings would tackle the question of having the already long-overdue 8th full-dress talks in Seoul of the South-North Red Cross Conference and, at the same time, “conduct preliminary debates on the items of the agenda of the full-dress talks.”

At the first “working-level” meeting held on July 10, the ROKNRC side proposed that 1) the 8th full-dress talks be held on August 30, 1974, in Seoul and that 2) the two sides immediately begin implementing services for “aged parents living separated in the two divided parts of Korea,” a pilot programme of the tracing services embraced in the Item One of the five-point agenda, “the question of tracing, and notifying thereof, the whereabouts and fate of the dispersed families and relatives in the south and the north.”

The ROKNRC suggested that the tracing services for the “aged parents” would include “ascertainment and notification of their fate and whereabouts, meetings at Panmunjom and mutual visits between them.”

The NKRC stubbornly rejected the ROKNRC suggestion to hold the 8th full-dress talks on August 30 in Seoul and asserted that the full-dress talks would be resumed only if the Republic of Korea :

- Repeal all anti-communist legislations, including the National Security Law and the Anti-communist Law;*
- Disband all anti-communist organizations and authorities;*
- Ban all anti-communist activities; and*
- Guarantee the freedom of press, publication, assembly and travel, in addition to the inviolability of the person and belongings, to the "participants" in the tracing services as well as their "helpers" and "those who are concerned," while they were within the Republic of Korea.*

The NKRC also turned down the ROKNRC offer of spearheading the tracing services envisaged in the Item One of the five-point agenda with the tracing services for the "aged parents," terming it an "unreasonable suggestions ignoring the substance of the matter."

The NKRC, at the same time, made issue of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) letters of March 13 and April 26, 1974, expressing the ICRC's concern over the prolonged stalemate in the South-North Red Cross Conference and proposing a meeting between the Chief Delegates of both sides in Geneva, Switzerland, with the ICRC sitting in as an arbitrator, and accused the ROKNRC of "begging for improper intervention by a 'foreign force.'"

At the fourth "working-level" meeting on September 25, the ROKNRC strongly urged the NKRC to reconsider the latter's obstinate opposition to an early resumption of the humanitarian Red Cross talks and proposed November 6, 1974, as the date for the 8th full-dress talks. However, the NKRC again turned down the ROKNRC proposal with a counterproposal that the two sides hold the fifth "working-level" meeting on November 26.

Published on October 15, 1974

International Cultural Society of Korea

I.P.O. Box 4161

Seoul, Korea

No. 007
December, 1974

South-North Dialogue in Korea

International Cultural Society of Korea
Seoul, Korea

South-North Dialogue in Korea

- South-North Coordinating Committee
- South-North Red Cross Conference



Inside of Underground DMZ Tunnel under
Construction by North Korea

To Readers:

The Year 1974 is now at dusk with the South-North Dialogue, announced discontinued unilaterally by north Korea in August the previous year, remaining yet to be resumed. Looking back, north Korea not only have persistently refused to have the interrupted dialogue brought back to resumption throughout the year, but also committed the barbarity of making an attempt on the life of the President of the Republic of Korea on the Liberation Day of August 15 and, furthermore, made no bones about its surreptitious preparation for a major surprise military operation against the Republic of Korea by constructing a number of underground tunnels (photo on the opposite page) which cut across the four kilometer-wide Demilitarized Zone from north to south.

The Republic of Korea, was heartened, however, by the United Nations move, at its 29th General Assembly, defeating the pro-Pyongyang draft resolution calling for an unconditional dissolution of the United Nations Command, without a proper successor arrangement, and, instead, adopting a resolution urging continuation of the South-North Dialogue and continued United Nations commitment to peace and security in Korea.

The 7th Issue of the "South-North Dialogue in Korea" covers facts about the north Korean-made underground tunnels in the DMZ, north Korea's successful attempt to abort the 9th SNCC Vice Chairmen's Meeting of December 4, developments in the SNRCC working-level meetings and a chronological review of the two-lane dialogue between the two sides of Korea in 1974. The Editor looks forward to comments on the contents of the booklet from readers.

SOUTH-NORTH JOINT COMMUNIQUE

Recently there were talks held both in Pyongyang and Seoul to discuss problems of improving South-north relations and unifying the divided Fatherland.

Director Hu Rak Lee of the Central Intelligence Agency of Seoul visited Pyongyang from 2 to 5 May 1972 to hold talks with Director Young Joo Kim of the Organization and Guidance Department of Pyongyang. Second Vice Premier Sung Chul Park, acting on behalf of Director Young Joo Kim, also visited Seoul from 29 May to 1 June 1972 to hold further talks with Director Hu Rak Lee.

With the common desire to achieve peaceful unification of the Fatherland as early as possible, the two sides in these talks had frank and openhearted exchanges of views, and made great progress in promoting mutual understanding.

In the course of the talks, the two sides, in an effort to remove the misunderstandings and mistrust and mitigate increased tensions that have arisen between the South and the North as a result of long separation, and further to expedite unification of the Fatherland, have reached full agreement on the following points:

1. The two sides have agreed to the following principles for unification of the Fatherland:

First, unification shall be achieved through independent Korean efforts without being subject to external imposition or interference.

Second, unification shall be achieved through peaceful means, and not through the use of force against each other.

Third, as a homogeneous people, a great national unity shall first be sought, transcending differences in ideas, ideologies, and systems.

2. In order to ease tensions and foster an atmosphere of mutual trust between the South and the North, the two sides have agreed not to slander or defame each

other, not to undertake armed provocations whether on a large or small scale, and to take positive measures to prevent inadvertent military incidents.

3. The two sides, in order to restore severed national ties, promote mutual understanding and to expedite independent peaceful unification, have agreed to carry out various exchanges in many fields.

4. The two sides have agreed to cooperate positively with each other to seek early success of the South-North Red Cross talks, which are underway with the fervent expectations of the entire people.

5. The two sides, in order to prevent the outbreak of unexpected military incidents and to deal directly, promptly and accurately with problems arising between the South and the North, have agreed to install a direct telephone line between Seoul and Pyongyang.

6. The two sides, in order to implement the aforementioned agreed items, solve various problems existing between the South and the North, and to settle the unification problem on the basis of the agreed principles for unification of the Fatherland, have agreed to establish and operate a South-North Coordinating Committee co-chaired by Director Hu Rak Lee and Director Young Joo Kim.

7. The two sides, firmly convinced that the aforementioned agreed items correspond with the common aspirations of the entire people, who are anxious to see an early unification of the Fatherland, hereby solemnly pledge before the entire Korean people that they will faithfully carry out these agreed items.

July 4, 1972

**UPHOLDING THE DESIRES OF THEIR RESPECTIVE
SUPERIORS**

HU RAK LEE

YOUNG JOO KIM

**Agreed Minute
on
Formation and Operation
of
South-North Coordinating Committee**

Both parties agree on the formation and operation of the South-North Coordinating Committee as follows:

1. The South-North Coordinating Committee aims at the solution of the problem of unifying the fatherland on the basis of such agreed principles for the unification of the fatherland as furtherance of the execution of agreed items in the South-North Joint Communique of July 4, 1972, developing of increasingly improved relations between the South and the North and joining efforts and working together in various fields.
2. The functions of the South-North Coordinating Committee are as follows:
 - A. To consult about, and settle, the question of realizing an independent and peaceful unification of the country on the basis of the agreed principles for the unification of the fatherland and to guarantee its implementation.
 - B. To consult about, and settle, the question of effecting a wide range of political exchanges between political parties, social organizations and individuals in the South and the North and to guarantee its implementation.
 - C. To consult about, and settle, the questions of economic, cultural and social exchanges as well as of joining efforts and working together between the South and the North, and to guarantee their implementation.
 - D. To consult about, and settle, the questions of easing tensions, preventing military clashes and dissolving the state of military confrontation between the South and the North, and to guarantee their implementation.
 - E. To consult about, and settle, the question of taking joint steps in overseas activities between the South and the North, enhancing accordingly the

national prestige as a homogeneous nation, and to guarantee its implementation.

3. The South-North Coordinating Committee shall be organized as follows:

- A. The South-North Coordinating Committee shall be composed of one Co-chairman, one Vice Chairman, one Executive Member and two Members from each party. The number of the Committee Members may be increased as necessary. Director Hu Rak Lee of the Central Intelligence Agency and Director Young Joo Kim of the Organizational Guidance Department are hereby designated as the Co-chairmen. Vice Chairmen, Executive Members and Members shall be of ministerial or vice ministerial rank and shall be appointed respectively by the Co-chairmen through prior consultation.
- B. An Executive Council shall be created within the South-North Coordinating Committee.

The Executive Council shall consult about, and settle, when the authority is so delegated by the Co-chairmen of both parties, various problems that arise in the south-north relations while the South-North Coordinating Committee is in recess, and shall guarantee their implementation. The Executive Council shall be composed of the Executive Member and two Secretaries from each side.

- C. Political, Military, Foreign Affairs, Economic and Cultural Subcommittees shall be created within the South-North Coordinating Committee. Each subcommittee shall be created as the progress at the South-North Coordinating Committee warrants it. The functions and the formation of the subcommittees shall be regulated separately through mutual agreement.
- C. The South-North Coordinating Committee shall have its Joint Secretariat at Panmunjom. Both parties shall respectively appoint Co-directors of the Joint Secretariat one from each party and shall staff necessary number of personnel to work under Co-directors.

4. The South-North Coordinating Committee shall operate as follows:

- A. The South-North Coordinating Committee shall make it a principle to hold

its meetings in Seoul and Pyongyang by turns, and may hold them at Panmunjom, if necessary.

- B. The South-North Coordinating Committee shall convene once every two to three months, and the Executive Council once every month. Extraordinary meetings can be held through mutual agreement.
 - C. The South-North Coordinating Committee meeting shall be held either in public or behind the closed door.
 - D. Necessary number of specialists and staffs of the Joint Secretariat shall be allowed, through mutual agreement, to attend the South-North Coordinating Committee and the Executive Council meetings.
 - E. A final agreement of the South-North Coordinating Committee shall take effect as soon as the Co-chairmen of both parties put their initials on the note of agreement and the agreed items shall be simultaneously announced through the Joint Secretariat upon mutual agreement.
 - F. Detailed operational procedures for the South-North Coordinating Committee shall be worked out separately.
5. This Agreed Minute shall be revised and supplemented through mutual agreement.
6. This Agreed Minute takes effect upon exchange of the texts with initials of both parties on them.

November 4, 1972

(Signed)

Director Hu Rak Lee

Co-chairman (Seoul side)

**South-North Coordinating
Committee**

(Signed)

Director Young Joo Kim

**Co-chairman (Pyongyang
side)**

**South-North Coordinating
Committee**

**SEVEN POINTS OF REPUBLIC OF KOREA'S FOREIGN
POLICY FOR PEACE AND UNIFICATION, PROCLAIMED
BY PRESIDENT PARK CHUNG HEE, JUNE 23, 1973**

1. The peaceful unification of the fatherland is the supreme task of the Korean people. We will continue to exert every effort to accomplish this task.
2. Peace must be maintained in the Korean peninsula by all means. The south and the north should neither interfere with each other's internal affairs nor commit aggression against each other.
3. We will continue to make efforts with sincerity and patience to secure concrete results from the South-North Dialogue based on the spirit of the South-North Joint Communique dated 4th July 1972.
4. We shall not oppose north Korea's participation with us in international organizations, if it is conducive to the easing of tension and the furtherance of international cooperation.
5. We shall not object to our admittance into the United Nations together with north Korea, if the majority of the member-states of the United Nations so wish, provided that it does not cause hindrance to our national unification. Even before our admittance into the United Nations as a member, we shall not be opposed to north Korea also being invited at the time of the U.N. General Assembly's deliberation of the "Korean question" in which the representative of the Republic of Korea is invited to participate.
6. The Republic of Korea will open its door to all the nations of the world on the basis of the principles of reciprocity and equality. At the same time, we urge those countries whose ideologies and social institutions are different from ours to open their doors likewise to us.
7. Peace and good-neighborliness are the firm basis of the foreign policy of the Republic of Korea. It is reaffirmed that we will continue to further strengthen the ties of friendship existing between our friendly nations and our country. (I wish to make it clear that matters concerning north Korea in the policies enumerated above are interim measures during the transition period pending the achievement of our national unification and that the taking of these measures does not signify our recognition of north Korea as a state.)

**THREE BASIC PRINCIPLES FOR PEACEFUL REUNIFICATION
PRONOUNCED BY PRESIDENT PARK CHUNG HEE IN HIS
COMMEMORATIVE SPEECH ON THE LIBERATION DAY OF
AUGUST 15, 1974**

First, peace should be firmly established on the Korean peninsula. For this purpose, a mutual non-aggression agreement should be concluded between south and north.

Second, the south and north should open their doors to each other and mutual trust should be restored between them. For this purpose, they should pursue rapid progress of the South-North Dialogue with sincerity and many-sided exchanges and cooperation should take place between them.

Thirdly, based on the above foundations, free general elections should be held throughout Korea under fair election management and supervision, in direct proportion to the indigenous population, thereby achieving the unification of the country.

TEXT OF THE 29TH UNGA RESOLUTION ON KOREA

The General Assembly, desiring that progress be made towards the attainment of the goal of peaceful reunification of Korea on the basis of the freely expressed will of the Korean people, recalling its satisfaction with the issuance of the Joint Communiqué at Seoul and Pyongyang on July 4, 1972, and the declared intention of both the south and the north of Korea to continue the dialogue between them, aware, however, that tension in Korea has not been totally eliminated and that the Armistice Agreement of July 27, 1953, remains indispensable to the maintenance of peace and security in the area, recognizing that, in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations regarding the maintenance of international peace and security, the United Nations has a continuing responsibility to ensure the attainment of this goal on the Korean peninsula.

1. Reaffirms the wishes of its members, as expressed in the consensus statement adopted by the General Assembly on November 28, 1973, and urges both the south and the north of Korea to continue their dialogue to expedite the peaceful reunification of Korea.

2. Expresses the hope that the Security Council, bearing in mind the need to ensure continued adherence to the Armistice Agreement and the full maintenance of peace and security in the area, will in due course give consideration, in consultation with the parties directly concerned, to those aspects of the Korean question which fall within its responsibilities, including the dissolution of the United Nations Command in conjunction with appropriate arrangements to maintain the Armistice Agreement which is calculated to preserve peace and security in the Korean peninsula, pending negotiations and conciliation between the two Korean governments leading to a lasting peace between them.

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Part One

Why Underground Tunnels?

1. North Korea Digs Tunnels in DMZ

A. UNC Discovers Underground DMZ Tunnels

At 11 p.m., November 15, 1974, Col. Woodside, spokesman of the United Nations Command (UNC) in Korea, called an extraordinary late evening press conference and made the following statement.

1) At about 7:35 a.m. today, a nine-man DMZ civil police squad made up of Republic of Korea soldiers was making a routine patrol in the southern sector of DMZ. A member noticed steam rising from apparent air holes in the ground.

2) The squad dug away the earth and uncovered a tunnel about 18 inches below the surface. They continued to expose the tunnel until, at 8:05 a.m., some three hundred rounds of automatic weaponsfire were received from the north side of the Military Demarcation Line. The firing continued for about three minutes.

3) The UNC squad took appropriate defensive measures to insure their safety and no casualties were sustained.

4) The patrol remained in the area and, at nightfall, was continuing to probe the tunnel. Members of the UNC component of the Military Armistice Commission were dispatched to the area and confirmed the presence of the tunnel. The portion of the tunnel initially discovered is about 1,000 meters inside the southern portion of the DMZ in the West Central sector. The tunnel runs in a northwest to southeast direction for in as yet undetermined distance both ways from the portion uncovered.

5) The UNC investigation has established that the tunnel is about three feet

wide, four feet high, reinforced with prefabricated concrete slabs, and is equipped with electric lines for lighting. The lines and lights are 220 volts, 60 watts.

6) A narrow gauge railway and carts for removing dirt were found inside the tunnel. The tunnel also has bypasses and a roundhouse for turning of the carts. There are also discovered rice bowls, some explosives including north Korean claymore mines and north Korean watches. The appearance of the food in the bowls and the dirt in the carts indicates that recent construction has been underway.

7) As provided by the Armistice Agreement, the UNC will also ask for an investigation of the north Korean violations of the Armistice Agreement, evidenced in the discovery of the underground tunnels, by the Joint Observer Team.

Branding the illegal construction of the approach tunnel by north Korea inside the southern sector of the DMZ and the firing by the north Korean army at the UNC civil police squad at the site of the discovery of the tunnel “serious violations of the Armistice Agreement by north Korea,” Col. Woodside announced that the United Nations Command was going to formally raise them in the Military Armistice Commission (MAC).

B. More Facts about Underground DMZ Tunnels

A thorough investigation of the underground tunnel was instantly begun, following its initial discovery on November 15, by the UNC side of the Joint Observer Team, revealing many more facts about the tunnel.

The incomplete underground tunnel had its southern end reaching a point in the southern sector of the Demilitarized Zone 1.2 kilometers from the Military Demarcation Line, leaving only 800 meters yet to be dug to cover the entire width of the southern sector of DMZ. By Armistice Agree-

ment of 1953, the two belligerent parties of the Korean War, the UNC on the one side and the north Korean and the Red Chinese armies on the other, created a 155 mile-long and four kilometer-wide Demilitarized Zone, whose southern half fell under UNC jurisdiction and northern half became placed under north Korean jurisdiction.

The underground tunnel discovered was found located some 8 kilometers northeast of Korangpo, Kyunggi-do Province (map on the back of this page).


The tunnel not only had gauge rails and rail carts, but also had, at regular intervals, roundhouses to turn the carts. The wall and ceiling of the tunnel was reinforced by prefabricated concrete slabs and the tunnel had elaborately made water sewage systems. In all, it was quite obvious that the tunnel was definitely for permanent and military use.

Included among articles which came into the UNC acquisition in the course of the investigation were some six boxes of Russian-made dynamites, a quantity of north Korean-made claymore mines, watches, compasses, water canteens, rice bowls, telephone sets and lines, levers, field spades, hoes and cigarettes, all of north Korea's making.

Judging from its scale, the tunnel was found capable of pumping a regiment strength of fully armed and equipped infantrymen, all by surprise, out into the open behind the southern limit of DMZ every hour. Besides, with the use of the railway system found in the tunnel, it was found that the tunnel could easily be used as a passageway for heavy artillery pieces in quantities.

C. Purpose of Tunnel Construction—Overt Preparation for Surprise War

On November 16, National Defense Minister Shu Chong Chul of the



Republic of Korea said in a press conference that the defense ministry had irrefutable evidences indicating that there actually were not only one underground tunnel, the one that had been uncovered the previous day, but also some more under construction by north Korea in DMZ. The defense minister assured a full exposure of the other tunnels shortly.

Why, then, is north Korea surreptitiously digging these underground tunnels within the Demilitarized Zone?

The news of the discovery of the tunnel itself was shocking to most Koreans as well as many foreigners who had their interests in the maintenance of peace and security in this part of the world. But, the presence of the tunnels, that link both ends of the four kilometer-wide buffer zone underground, naturally mean more to worry about, considering the hardened state of military confrontation between the two sides of Korea lately.

It was doubtless clear that the north Korean communists had not constructed the underground tunnels for anything close to peaceful purpose. Nor were the tunnels defensive military installations. The presence of the underground tunnels under construction there in DMZ itself was a telling proof of the fact that, in spite of all their propaganda overtures of 'peace,' north Korean communists had, in fact, been hard at work surreptitiously preparing for a major surprise armed invasion, the like of the Korean War of 1950–1953, of the Republic of Korea.

On November 20, Republic of Korea National Assembly met in an emergency plenary session and unanimously adopted a resolution and a message to the United Nations on the construction of the underground tunnels in DMZ by north Korea:

- Branding it as an “actual armed aggression against the south, surpassing a mere violation of the Armistice Agreement,”
- Condemning it as a “direct challenge to the ardent aspiration of the

entire Korean people for a peaceful unification as well as an outright infringement on the agreement of July 4 South-North Joint Communiqué,” and

—Regarding it as a “grave threat to the cause of international peace, especially to the maintenance of peace as well as to a world trend directed towards easing of tensions in this area.”

Specialists in north Korean affairs were tempted to link the construction of the underground tunnels in DMZ by north Korea with recent developments in north Korea, which include 1) advancing operational air and naval bases further south toward the truce line, 2) a sharp increase in the firepower deployed along the truce line and 3) amassing of operational equipments and materiel in places close from the truce line.

Defense Minister Suh, on the other hand, had the view that north Korea’s purpose of digging the underground DMZ tunnels was apparently to “wage a massive surprise attack on the frontline fortifications of the Republic of Korea by surreptitiously sending the north Korean army, through the tunnels, by hundreds or thousands at a time.”

In the meantime, Lt. Gen. Lee Byung Hyung, head of the defense ministry’s counter-espionage outfit, supported the defense minister’s view, in his report at the plenary session of the Republic of Korea National Assembly on November 20, and said that, by digging the underground DMZ tunnels, the north Korean communists might have had two specific uses, among others, in their mind; to use it as a pipeline to supply arms to communist insurgents that north Korea desperately wants to have planted within the Republic of Korea for underground guerrilla activities and to wage an all-out surprise invasion of the Republic of Korea when the north Korean communists feel that it is a time for such a military risk.

2. North Korea Refuses Joint Probe of Tunnels

On November 16, the day after the discovery of the underground tunnel in the southern sector of DMZ near Korangpo, the UNC asked an emergency meeting of the Military Armistice Commission on November 19 and proposed that the UNC and the north Korean army respectively send, on November 17, a Joint DMZ Observer Team each to the site of the discovery of the tunnel in order to conduct a joint on-the-spot investigation of the tunnel, both inside and out.

On November 17, however, north Korea flatly rejected the UNC offer of a joint on-the-spot investigation. Answering the UNC offer over Radio Pyongyang, north Korea alleged that it “had nothing to do with the DMZ tunnel” and, instead, charged that the UNC was “fabricating a political scheme” against north Korea over the DMZ tunnel.

Due to north Korea’s refusal, the UNC had to conduct further investigation of the tunnel alone.

At 1:20 p.m., November 20, an explosion rocked the tunnel complex, killing one Republic of Korea marine officer and one U.S. navy officer, and injuring one Republic of Korea soldier and five American men, as the officers and men of the UNC Joint Observer Team were carefully searching their way northward in the tunnel. It was found that the north Korean communists placed claymore mines and other explosives all along the inside of the tunnel complex, in a desperate attempt to prevent the UNC Joint Observer Team from going over to the northern sector of DMZ where the tunnel had originally started.

The Military Armistice Commission meeting, asked by the UNC to take place on November 19, in the meantime, could come into session on

November 26, as the north Korean side kept on playing a delaying game.

At the 356th Military Armistice Commission meeting, Rear Admiral Henry Morgan, U.S. navy, UNC chief delegate to the MAC meeting, irrefutably established the fact that the underground DMZ tunnel discovered on November 15 was of north Korea's making, by showing a variety of evidences acquired as a result of the on-the-spot investigation and, stressing that the UNC knew of the existence of some more similar underground DMZ tunnels under construction by north Korea, demanded that north Korea "instantly destroy and remove" all of them.

❖ References:

Statement by ROK Government Spokesman (Minister of Culture & Public Information) on November 16, 1974

1. The Republic of Korea Government deems it a matter of grave concern that communist north Korea undertook secret construction of underground tunnels in the Demilitarized Zone and strongly demand that north Korea immediately stop such a flagrant act of aggression.

2. It is obvious that the purpose of the underground DMZ tunnels under construction by north Korea is to infiltrate armed espionages massively into the south and, at the same time, to wage a full-scale armed surprise invasion of the Republic of Korea, when north Korea thinks the situation in the Republic of Korea warrants such an armed aggression. The presence of the underground DMZ tunnels under construction by north Korea also attests to the fact that, while loudly talking about peace, north Korea, in fact, is fanatically engrossed in plotting an overthrow, by force, of the Republic of Korea Government, without giving up her basic policy seeking a communist takeover of the entire peninsula through use of arms.

3. Such an act of aggression by north Korea is not only a blatant and grave violation of the Armistice Agreement, but also an act to nullify the July 4 South-North Joint Communique in which both parties pledged to refrain from military provocations against one another and to take positive measures to prevent inadvertent military accidents. The Republic of Korea Government, therefore, asks that north Korea immediately stop such aggressive military provocations and accept the south-north non-aggression agreement which the Republic of Korea proposes as a means to solidify peace in the Korean peninsula.

ROK National Assembly Resolution Adopted on November 20, 1974

1. The National Assembly, deeming it a matter of grave concern that, in spite of our sincere and patient efforts to solidify peace in the Korean peninsula, communist north Korea, capitalizing on the world trend oriented toward easing of tension, has increasingly intensified provocations of various kinds against us, as a means to fulfil its avowed desire of achieving a communist unification of the country, expresses a firm determination that we should marshal all our resources, through achievement of national concord and unity, to be fully prepared for whatever provocations and aggressions by communist north Korea.

2. The National Assembly urges that the Government, taking note of the fact that, after unilaterally suspending the South-North Dialogue on August 28, 1973, communist north Korea, while stepping up its deceptive peace offensive externally, has intensified provocations of all kinds against us all along, immediately and effectively work out measures to cope with, and punish, whatever armed provocations and/or indirect aggressions against us by communist north Korea.

3. The National Assembly, at the same time, urges that communist north Korea give up the fanciful dream of a communist unification and the scheme to provoke a war, immediately remove the illegal presence of troops and military installations within DMZ, including the newly discovered underground DMZ tunnels, in its entirety, and accept, by returning to the spirit of the Armistice Agreement and the July 4 South-North Joint Communique, the south-north non-aggression agreement proposed by the Republic of Korea in order to ensure a peaceful unification of the country.

Message to the United Nations from ROK National Assembly

The Republic of Korea National Assembly,

Taking very grave note of the fact that the north Korean communists

constructed an underground tunnel which cuts across from the north to the direction of south, extending over one kilometer southward from the Military Demarcation Line in the Demilitarized Zone, as has been announced by the Ministry of National Defense of the Republic of Korea and the United Nations Command (UNC) in Korea on November 15, 1974;

Viewing with serious concern the fact that the north Korean communists even built the said underground tunnel after repeating armistice violations following their refusal of an UNC offer, made at the 317th plenary meeting of the Military Armistice Commission on June 12, 1971, in which it was proposed that the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) be used for peaceful purposes and that all illegally fortified positions and military installations as well as unlawfully introduced military personnel and weapons be removed from DMZ,

1. Brands the north Korean act as an actual armed aggression against the south, surpassing a simple violation of the Armistice Agreement;

2. Condemns the north Korean act as a direct challenge to the ardent aspiration of the entire Korean people for a peaceful unification as well as an outright infringement on the agreement of July 4 Joint Communiqué for a dialogue between the South and the North;

3. Regards the act as a grave threat to the cause of international peace, especially to the maintenance of peace as well as to a world trend directed towards easing tensions in this area;

4. Requests that the United Nations, taking note of the serious situation wrought on the Korean peninsula by north Korea's armed provocations and acts of aggression, work out a strong punitive measure against such barbarous act and to take effective steps to prevent recurrence of such situation; and

5. Affirms that the Republic of Korea will continue its efforts to reduce tensions and to promote peace on the Korean peninsula with patience and sincerity despite the north Korean acts of provocation and aggression.

Part Two

Postponement of SNCC Vice Chairmen's Meet

1. Pyongyang Proposes Yet Another Postponement

The ninth Vice Chairmen's Meeting of the South-North Coordinating Committee (SNCC) was scheduled to take place at Panmunkak in the Pyongyang side's sector in Panmunjom on December 4, 1974.

The two sides of the SNCC had originally agreed at the eighth SNCC Vice Chairmen's Meeting held on September 21 at Freedom House in the Seoul side's sector in Panmunjom that they would hold the ninth Vice Chairmen's Meeting on November 15. On November 12, however, Pyongyang side transmitted a telephone message, via the Seoul-Pyongyang hotline, asking that the meeting be postponed to December 4. Pyongyang side gave no explanation as to why it wanted the meeting put off. It only attributed it to some unexplained "reasons" of its own.

With the deferred date for the ninth Vice Chairmen's Meeting of December 4 only a few days away, Pyongyang side asked a meeting between the spokesmen of the two sides to be held at Panmunkak on November 30.

The meeting between the two spokesmen was held as was asked and there, Pyongyang side again proposed a postponement of the Vice Chairmen's Meeting, now an indefinite one. Again, there was no explanations as to why the postponement was asked for. Pyongyang side merely suggested that the date for the ninth Vice Chairmen's Meeting be decided through a further consultation between the two spokesmen.

2. Seoul Demands Meeting As Scheduled

Seoul side opposed to the Pyongyang side's proposal of yet another postponement of the ninth SNCC Vice Chairmen's Meeting. Seoul side

could find no reason to justify the repeated postponement of the meeting.

The SNCC Vice Chairmen's Meeting was originally started in December 1973, with the single purpose of working on procedural matters to have the South-North Coordinating Committee meeting, announced discontinued unilaterally by Pyongyang side on August 28, 1973, brought back into session. There have been a total of eight rounds of Vice Chairmen's Meetings thus far, this year without bringing the two sides to agreement on the question at issue, resumption of the SNCC meetings.

The failure of the SNCC to operate and function normally was solely due to Pyongyang side's refusal to honor relevant articles of agreement spelled out in the July 4 South-North Joint Communique and the Agreed Minute on the Formation and Operation of the South-North Coordinating Committee of November 4, 1972. These two documents irrevocably gave the SNCC the authority to tackle all the problems that arise in the relations between the two sides of Korea, including the question of unification.

Pyongyang side, however, completely ignored all these agreements spelled out in these two documents and insisted that it would agree to have the SNCC meetings brought back into session only if Seoul side accepts a string of preconditions which were totally unilateral and unacceptable by the other side of the dialogue.

To begin with, Pyongyang side insisted that the Republic of Korea withdraw her Foreign Policy for Peace and Unification proclaimed on June 23, 1973. Pyongyang side also insisted that the Republic of Korea take legal and administrative measures to illegalize opposition to communism in any form. And, furthermore, Pyongyang side asked that, in effect, the South-North Coordinating Committee be substituted by an obscure "south-north political conference," or "grand national congress" by different calling.

At the eighth SNCC Vice Chairmen's Meeting on September 21, Seoul

side called for an immediate and unconditional normalization of the interrupted function of the SNCC and convocation of the already long-overdue fourth SNCC plenary meeting in Pyongyang, and demanded that Pyongyang side make its reply, yes or no, at the forthcoming ninth Vice Chairmen's Meeting.

The Pyongyang side's reply, however, came on November 30 in the form of a proposition of yet another postponement, an indefinite one, of the ninth SNCC Vice Chairmen's Meeting of December 4. It was noteworthy that the Pyongyang side's offer of postponement came in the wake of the discovery of an underground DMZ tunnel under construction by north Korea, one of the most blatant and flagrant violations of the Armistice Agreement since the agreement had gone into effect in 1953.

Seoul side could not accept the Pyongyang side's offer of postponement. Seoul side's SNCC Vice Chairman Chang Key Young sent a telephone message to his Pyongyang side's counterpart Ryu Jang Shik on December 2, which read as follows:

"I have received a report that, at a meeting between the spokesmen of the two sides held on November 30 in Panmunjom at your side's request, your side proposed a postponement of the ninth SNCC Vice Chairmen's Meeting, which we had agreed to hold on December 4.

Before expressing my view on the question at issue, postponement of the ninth Vice Chairmen's Meeting proposed by your side, I feel urged to remind you of the fact that the date for the ninth Vice Chairmen's Meeting has already been deferred to December 4, also at your side's request, from November 15, the date on which we had originally agreed to have the meeting held.

Considering recent developments in the relations between our two sides and the public opinion, both domestic and international, calling for an early normalization of the operation of the SNCC, I am now compelled to

make it known to you that I consider the postponement, and that an indefinite one, of the ninth Vice Chairmen's Meeting, now proposed anew by your side without acceptable explanations, an improper suggestion.

I, therefore, feel entitled to expect that the ninth Vice Chairmen's Meeting will be held on December 4, as has been scheduled, and that our discussions on the question of normalization of the function of the SNCC will be continued there at the meeting."

Pyongyang side, in a reply on the same day to the above telephone message from Seoul side, however, came out with a suggestion of yet another meeting between the spokesmen of the two sides to be held in Panmunjom at 4 p.m., December 3.

Now, the Pyongyang side's intention was quite obvious. By proposing a meeting between the spokesmen on the question of whether or not to put off the ninth Vice Chairmen's Meeting to be held on the eve of the scheduled date for the meeting, Pyongyang side was obviously trying to keep the question as a pending one until the very date of the scheduled meeting, and thus abort the meeting itself, if Seoul side refuse to accept the postponement offer to the last moment.

Vice Chairmen Chang instantly sent his second telephone message to his Pyongyang side's counterpart, which read as follows:

"Commenting, in my telephone message to you today, on your side's proposition of yet another postponement of the ninth Vice Chairmen's Meeting, I have made my position on the question very clear that the ninth Vice Chairmen's Meeting would have to be held on December 4, as has been agreed to between our two sides.

I, therefore, believe that there is absolutely no need for further working-level contacts on the question of the date for the ninth Vice Chairmen's Meeting. If there are problems which one of our two sides would like to raise for discussion between us, I would suggest that they be raised at the Vice Chairmen's Meeting on December 4."

3. 9th Vice Chairmen's Meet Put Off to Jan. 8

In the morning of December 3, Pyongyang side's Vice Chairman Ryu Jang Shik sent another telephone message to Seoul side's Vice Chairman Chang Key Young, making a new proposal that 1) the ninth Vice Chairmen's Meeting be put off to January 8, 1975, and 2) a meeting between the spokesmen be held in Panmunjom on December 4, instead of the projected Vice Chairmen's Meeting.

It became all too clear that Pyongyang side was desperate to abort the ninth Vice Chairmen's Meeting of December 4. It now seemed certain that, in case Seoul side refuse to accept the Pyongyang side's offer of a postponement to the last moment, Pyongyang side was going to abort the meeting of December 4, by simply not appearing there.

Why, then, was Pyongyang side so desperate to have the Vice Chairmen's Meeting of December 4 aborted? The answer was now quite obvious too.

Pyongyang side was obviously in a flurry over the discovery by the United Nations Command in Korea on November 15 of an underground tunnel within the southern sector of the Demilitarized Zone under construction by north Korea. Pyongyang side was evidently in panic because the presence of the secret underground DMZ tunnel under construction by north Korea was became known at a time when the Korean debate at the political committee of the 29th United Nations General Assembly was at its crucial stage. Pyongyang side was worried that, if the underground tunnel was taken up for debate at the ninth SNCC Vice Chairmen's Meeting of December 4, the result of the debate would undoubtedly create a situation decisively harmful to the position of north Korea and its supporter, in the United Nations, with a confrontation of vote on the Korean question expected to take place any moment now.

After a meticulous examination of the situation, Seoul side came to the conclusion that there was no alternative but to accept the Pyongyang side's renewed offer of postponement of the ninth Vice Chairmen's Meeting.

In the afternoon of December 3, Seoul side's Vice Chairman Chang Key Young sent his third telephone message to his Pyongyang side's counterpart Ryu Jang Shik, which read as follows:

"I have already stated, in my earlier telephone messages to you, that, when we recall the fact that the ninth SNCC Vice Chairmen's Meeting has already been put off, at your side's request, from November 15 to December 4, consider the fact we now have a number of problems that have arisen in the relations between our two sides awaiting our urgent attention and take note of the fact that the public opinion, both domestic and international, now calls for an early normalization of our South-North Dialogue, there absolutely is no valid reason which justifies yet another postponement of the ninth SNCC Vice Chairmen's Meeting, that your side now asks without proper explanations.

However, it now seems unavoidable that the ninth SNCC Vice Chairmen's Meeting will be put off again, for, while refusing to faithfully honor the agreed date, your side, without explaining why, insist that the meeting be put off again.

I must express my profound regret over the fact that, due to your side's obstinate insistence, we have now become unable to hold the ninth Vice Chairmen's Meeting on the agreed date and, instead, are compelled to have it put off to next year.

Nevertheless, I would like to make use of this opportunity to reaffirm my fervent desire to see an early normalization of the function of the SNCC and, in that spirit, let it be known to you that I accept the proposal of your side's that the ninth Vice Chairmen's Meeting be held on January 8, 1975, instead of December 4, 1974.

As to your side's proposal that the spokesmen of the two sides meet in Panmunjom on December 4 for what you call "working-level discussions," may I remind you of the fact that we already have the Executive Council, an apparatus of the SNCC, officially inaugurated in February 1973 in accordance with the Article 3 (B) of the Agreed Minute on Formation and Operation of the South-North Coordinating Committee, precisely for such purposes?

Therefore, I now propose that, instead of having the said informal contacts between the spokesmen held as you propose, we call an Executive Council meeting into session on December 18 at the "Freedom House" on our side of Panmunjom for "working-level" discussions on matters that your side apparently intends to raise."

**Statement by Spokesman (Seoul Side)
On Postponement of the Ninth Meet.**

“Let Us Jointly Investigate the Tunnel”

(“While our side was hard at work clearing a road of peace under the sun, Pyongyang side went down underground digging a cave for invasion.”)

1. The ninth SNCC Vice Chairmen's Meeting, originally scheduled to take place at 10 a.m. this morning at Panmunkak, Panmunjom, has, at last, been made impossible to be held as was scheduled. Beginning on November 30, Pyongyang side began insisting on yet another postponement of the ninth Vice Chairmen's Meeting of December 4, making it practically clear that it would not hesitate to abort the meeting, by simply not appearing there, if Seoul side refuse to accept the postponement offer. After studying the situation closely, Seoul side reached the conclusion that it had no other alternative but to accept the renewed postponement offer of Pyongyang side.

In the last of a series of telephone messages that Pyongyang side sent us on December 3, Pyongyang side suggested that 1) the ninth Vice Chairmen's Meeting be postponed to January 8, 1975, and 2) a meeting between the spokesmen of the two sides be held on December 4 in Panmunjom. To this suggestion, our side let it be known to Pyongyang side, in a telephone message, that we are accepting the Pyongyang side's offer of putting off the ninth Vice Chairmen's Meeting to January 8, 1975, and that we are proposing a meeting of the SNCC Executive Council, a steering body of the SNCC officially inaugurated in February 1973 in accordance with Article 3 (B) of the Agreed Minute on Formation and Operation of the SNCC, to be held on December 18, instead of having the informal contact between the spokesmen on December 4.

In agreeing to the postponement of the ninth Vice Chairmen's Meeting, however, we must express our profound regret over the arbitrary attitude of Pyongyang side forcing, time and again, postponements of the agreed meetings without understandable reasons, by simply insisting on them. We also warn against any further recurrence of these practices by Pyongyang side.

2. It is not at all difficult for us to understand, although unexplained, the reason why Pyongyang side was so desperate to have the ninth Vice Chairmen's Meeting of December 4 put off again.

Pyongyang side now obviously is in a flurry over the recent discovery by the United Nations Command in Korea of an underground tunnel under construction in the southern sector of the Demilitarized Zone by north Korea, whose presence there is a telltale proof of the fact that north Korea, despite all its deceptive peace propaganda, has been surreptitiously preparing for a major surprise invasion of the Republic of Korea. Particularly now at a time when the Korean debate at the 29th United Nations General Assembly is in its crucial stage, it seems quite obvious that Pyongyang side is seriously worried over the prospect that, when the ninth SNCC Vice Chairmen's Meeting is held on December 4, as has been scheduled, and the presence of the underground DMZ tunnel secretly under construction by north Korea is discussed there, the result of the discussion would no doubt seriously impair the north Korean position on the Korean question at the United Nations.

3. Considering recent turn of events in the South-North Dialogue and the relations between the two sides of Korea in general, we feel it now perhaps is a moment for us to make a reflection on the basic positions of the two sides of Korea on the South-North Dialogue.

We of Seoul side initiated, back in 1971, and have tried our hardest to push ahead with, the South-North Dialogue with a clear-cut purpose and vision.

We have committed ourselves to the task of bringing about an institu-

tionalized peace in Korea, a peaceful coexistence between the two sides of Korea based on the principles of non-aggression and non-interference, as a primary and indispensable step before achieving the long-sought unification of the country in a genuinely peaceful way.

We have dedicated ourselves to the task of vigorously continuing our dialogue, within the framework of the peaceful coexistence, opening a way for exchanges and cooperation, on a gradually expanded scale, between the two sides of Korea, as a means to facilitate mutual exposure between the two societies, leading to restoration of mutual trust and a shared sense of national identity.

We were firmly convinced that it was the only and best practical means to work for a genuinely peaceful and independent reunification of the divided country.

Communist north Korea, on the other hand, has been found hard at work, all along, trying to utilize the dialogue for the sole purpose of making it an instrument for achievement of the so-called "south Korean revolution," a communist takeover of the Republic of Korea by force.

Throughout the entire progress of the dialogue, our north Korean counterparts were seen trying solely to make use of the dialogue as a means to weaken our anti-communist policies, shake the foundation of our national security and to create social unrest among the people of the Republic of Korea through agitation and propaganda.

It was when the north Korean communists at last realized that they were not going to achieve the unwholesome purposes by keeping on with the dialogue that, on August 28, 1973, they announced their unilateral decision to boycott any further dialogue.

Communist north Korea, in the meantime, did not, for a single moment,

give up the wild idea of seeking a communist takeover of the southern half of the peninsula by arms. On the one hand, the north Korean communists boasted that they had already completed their war preparations through accomplishment of what they called the "Four Basic Military Lines." And, on the other hand, they have been secretly at work on the construction of the underground passages that cut across the breadth of the four kilometer-wide Demilitarized Zone from north to south, with the obvious purpose of using them in the event of a large-scale surprise attack on the Republic of Korea across the DMZ.

While our side was hard at work clearing a road of peace and unification linking the two sides of Korea under the bright sun, the north Korean communists are now found to have gone underground digging the tunnels, with the indisputable purpose of using them for repetition of the pre-dawn Sunday morning surprise invasion of the Republic of Korea on June, 25, 1950.

4. We of Seoul side believe that it is now time for the north Korean communists to reconsider and rectify their insincere and double-dealing attitude, which has been evidenced throughout the past progress of the dialogue.

We now demand that the north Korean communists immediately stop trying to use the dialogue as a means to pursue a violent communist revolution in the Republic of Korea and, instead, promptly accede to our effort to faithfully continue the dialogue, institutionalize a stable peace in the peninsula and steadily improve the relations between the two sides of Korea, leading, ultimately, to a genuinely peaceful and independent reunification of the divided country.

5. Lastly, we are asking a special attention of our north Korean counterparts to the grave meaning of the presence of the recently discovered underground DMZ tunnels under construction by north Korea, particularly in the sense that it poses a direct threat to the maintenance of the precarious peace in the peninsula, and formally suggest that the two sides at the South-North Coordinating Committee immediately form a joint fact-finding team to undertake a joint on-the-spot investigation of the tunnels and assure their complete destruction and removal.

Part Three

SNRCC Working-level Meetings

6th Working-level Meet:

ROKNRC Proposes Panmunjom Meetings on New Year Day Between Old Parents & Kins

The Red Cross societies of the two sides of Korea had two, the fifth and the sixth, working-level meetings held in Panmunjom on November 5 and November 29, 1973, respectively.

The ROKNRC delegates attending the working-level meetings, while calling for an early convocation of the long-overdue eighth full-dress meeting of the South-North Red Cross Conference (SNRCC) in Seoul, suggested that the two Red Cross societies enforce a pilot program of facilitating meetings on the New Year Day of 1975 at Panmunjom between aged parents of over 60 by age and their families and relatives living separated in the other side of the divided country.

At the sixth working-level meeting on November 29, the Republic of Korea National Red Cross (ROKNRC) delegates presented to the north Korean Red Cross (NKRC) delegates a program covering detailed working procedures for tracing services for aged parents of over 60 by age to be undertaken, as a pilot project, prior to those for other separated families and relatives in general. In this program, the ROKNRC suggested that the two sides 1) immediately embark on services to ascertain the fate and whereabouts of the aged parents of over 60 by age, through exchanges of tracing cards, 2) facilitate meetings between those aged parents, whose fate and whereabouts are ascertained, and their families and relatives living in the other side of the country in Panmunjom on the New Year Day of 1975, 3) facilitate mutual visits, according to their wishes, between the aged parents and their families and relatives in the other side of the country and, finally, 4) facilitate exchange of correspondence between them.

In order to carry out these pilot tracing services, the ROKNRC suggested that the two sides 1) inaugurate a “Panmunjom Joint Project Office,” 2) set up in Panmunjom meeting places for those aging parents and their families and relatives and activate a “South-North Panmunjom Post Exchange” in order to handle the exchange of correspondence between them.

The NKRC delegates, however, rejected the new ROKNRC proposal, by describing it as an “attempt to create confusion and obstacles in the humanitarian efforts at the South-North Red Cross Conference.” The NKRC side asserted that the “Old Parents First” proposal of the ROKNRC side “had nothing to do with the substance of the Red, Cross talks,” and went on further to allege that, by making such a proposal, the ROKNRC was “deliberately trying to delay solution to pending problems.”

The two sides at the Red Cross working-level meeting agreed, at the sixth meeting, to have their seventh meeting held on January 24, 1975.

Verbatim Text of Speech by Dr. Kim Yeon-choo, ROKNRC Alternate Chief Delegate, at the 6th SNRCC Working-level Meet:

Today, we open the sixth working-level meeting.

This working-level meeting, needless to say, has the important mission to normalize the Red Cross Conference at an early date by quickly resuming the suspended full-dress meetings between the south and north Korea Red Cross societies, and at the same time by expediting the discussion of the agenda items at the full-dress meeting.

To fulfill such a mission imposed upon the working-level meeting, the Republic of Korea National Red Cross delegation has been exerting all endeavors with utmost sincerity ever since the first working-level meeting.

As you may remember, the Republic of Korea National Red Cross delegation formally proposed at the first working-level meeting held last July 10 that the eighth full-dress meeting be held in Seoul on August 30, 1974, for early resumption of the suspended full-dress meetings. As for the question of the agenda items at the full-dress meeting, our delegation proposed that as a demonstration program for the settlement of Agenda Item No. 1. "The Issue of Finding Out and Informing the Whereabouts and Fate of the Families and Relatives Dispersed in the South and North," a project be launched to "search for and inform the whereabouts and fate of aged parents," a class of the people the settlement of whose problems is more exigent than that of any other persons among the 10 million separated family members.

At the fourth working-level meeting held last September 25, the Republic of Korea National Red Cross delegation again proposed that the eighth full-dress meeting be held in Seoul on November 6, 1974, urging a sincere response from your side. And at the fifth working-level meeting, our delegation proposed materialization of reunions with aged parents in the New Year season of 1975 at Panmunjom.

Despite these incessant endeavors of the Republic of Korea National Red Cross delegation, none of the tasks with which the working-level meeting has been

charged has ever been settled, and the dialogue remains stalemated as before.

We have spent the four-month period from the time of the first working-level meeting to date fruitlessly. The year of 1974 is drawing to a close already.

It is really heart-rending to see that the lofty humanitarian program designed to search for the 10 million separated family members, and alleviate the pains those who have been living dispersed in the south and north for nearly 30 years against their will due to the artificial territorial division, has struck such a bottleneck and is making little progress today.

This stalemate is tantamount to betraying the humanitarian spirit of the Red Cross, as well as the brotherly love of compatriots, and also going against the spirit of the South-North Joint Communiqué spelling out the principles for national unification and solidarity.

I now believe that excuses, no matter what they may be, can no longer warrant further delay in normalizing the conference, nor can we put off the program to search for the 10 million dispersed family members any further.

In this context, I would like, in the first place, to clarify once again the basic attitude and stand which the Republic of Korea National Red Cross delegation has maintained, from the time the conference was suspended in July last year to date, towards the issue of resuming the full-dress meetings. I also want to ask your side to show sincerity toward normalization of the conference.

As your side well knows, also, both the south and north Korean Red Cross societies agreed at the third preliminary meeting held on October 6, 1971 to "hold full-dress meetings in Seoul and Pyongyang by turns."

According to the agreement, the eighth full-dress meeting is naturally supposed to take place in Seoul, inasmuch as the seventh full-dress meeting was held in Pyongyang.

Besides, the chief delegates of both sides agreed at the seventh full-dress meeting held in Pyongyang in July last year to hold the eighth full-dress meeting in Seoul. Timing of the eighth meeting was to be determined through direct telephone or other contacts between the liaison officers posted at Panmunjom.

In view of such an agreement, the only thing remaining to be settled in the question of resuming the full-dress meetings is to determine the time of the meetings through consultations.

In order to respect and faithfully to implement such an agreement reached between the two sides, the Republic of Korea National Red Cross delegation proposed a time for the next full-dress meeting on four occasions since the suspension of the conference, suggesting formally that the eighth full-dress meeting be held in Seoul.

Your side, however, has turned down all proposals for the next full-dress meeting suggested by the Republic of Korea National Red Cross delegation, refusing to meet in Seoul, in defiance of the agreement.

Moreover, your side, while violating express provisions of the agreement itself, has been attempting to shift the responsibility for delay in the meetings to our side, as in the case of a thief crying "thief." Your side also did not hesitate to make utterances interfering in and slanderous or defamatory to the internal affairs of the other side of the conference, on the excuse of so-called "prerequisites."

Such an approach may be plausible if your side were determined not to normalize the conference or not to agree to early holding of the eighth full-dress meeting.

If your side were interested in normalization of the conference at an early date, as well as in prompt holding of the eighth full-dress meeting, your side cannot reject resumption of the full-dress meetings in overt violation of the agreement, nor can your side indulge in acts aggravating the conference atmosphere by interfering in and slandering or defaming the internal affairs of the other side of the conference.

There exists "the other side" in any conference. At meetings, therefore, each side ought to respect the other side and, at the same time, should abide by agreements.

The conference can be normalized only when both sides respect and implement what was solemnly agreed upon. On the contrary, a conference is bound to head for breakoff when agreements are scrapped unilaterally and promises are breached.

Today, therefore, I want to ask your side whether or not it is willing to normalize and resume the full-dress meetings before the end of 1974 at the latest. I demand that your side give a definite answer to this question. If your side is really willing to resume the full-dress meeting, your side should agree right away to the early holding of the eighth full-dress meeting, due to be held in Seoul in accordance with the agreement.

At the previous fifth working-level meeting, I suggested that "this time your side should propose the earliest possible time, at your side's convenience, for the eighth full-dress meeting to take place in Seoul, since the Republic of Korea National Red Cross delegation has made proposals for the time of the meeting on several occasions already." I urge your side to cooperate in the efforts to normalize the conference by respecting and carrying out agreed items, expecting that your side will endeavor to meet the aspirations of the 10 million separated family members and the 50 million compatriots who wish to see the settlement of the working-level meetings at an early date.

Next, I would like to discuss the stand of the Republic of Korea National Red Cross delegation toward the issue of the agenda items for the full-dress meeting.

As your side well knows, the issue of full-dress meeting agenda items concerns settlement of the items set as the topics for the full-dress meetings, namely, "searching for and informing of the whereabouts and fate of the families and relatives dispersed in the south and north," "realization of their free meetings and mutual visits" and "exchange of letters between them." This is an agreement and also an obligation which this working-level meeting must fulfill.

In accordance with the agreement, the Republic of Korea National Red Cross delegation has proposed, as a means of settling Agenda Item No. 1, that a program be launched on a demonstration basis for "searching for and informing of the whereabouts and fate of aged parents," a category of the people the settlement of whose problems is more urgent than that of any other persons among the families and relatives dispersed in the south and north.

The Republic of Korea National Red Cross delegation's proposal for "a program for searching for and informing of the whereabouts and fate of aged parents," a project which would make easier the treatment of Agenda Item

Number 1 of the full-dress meeting, namely, “issue of searching for and informing of the whereabouts and fate of the families and relatives dispersed in the south and north,” and also a demonstration project based on the theory of settling exigent problems first, is a realistic and reasonable proposal which ought to be taken up at this working-level meeting in accordance with the agreement.

Nonetheless, your side has described this justifiable proposal of the Republic of Korea National Red Cross delegation as “an unreasonable issue that has nothing to do with Agenda Item Number 1 of the full-dress meeting, and that runs counter to the agreement.” Your side has gone so far as to argue that “the proposal is political propaganda designed to obstruct the discussion of humanitarian issues, to slander the other side of the conference, and to distort public opinion at home and abroad.”

Delegates of the north Korean Red Cross!

How can the proposal by the Republic of Korea National Red Cross for settlement on a demonstration basis of the issue of “searching for and informing of the whereabouts and fate of aged parents” be an unreasonable question that has nothing to do with Agenda Item Number 1, or violation of the agreement?

On what conceivable grounds can your side claim that this proposal of the Republic of Korea National Red Cross delegation to find a clue to the settlement of the issue of the 10 million dispersed family members, as well as a breakthrough for the normalization of the conference by settling the issue of aged parents on a demonstration basis, under the present circumstances in which the South-North Red Cross Conference has been deadlocked for as long as one and a half years from July last year to date due to your side’s refusal to resume the meeting, is “political propaganda aimed at obstructing discussion of humanitarian issues, slandering the other side and distorting public opinion at home and abroad?”

The proposal by the Republic of Korea National Red Cross delegation for implementation of “a program for searching for and informing of the whereabouts and fate of aged parents” on a demonstration basis is designed to normalize discussion of the agenda item instead of creating confusion in its debate, and to accelerate settlement of humanitarian issues instead of obstructing it.

I well remember, and remind you of, the fact that your side on numerous occasions made emphatic utterances symphasizing with and appealing to those anxious children longing to hear from their aged parents at an early date.

Nevertheless, your side does not agree to the concrete proposal by the Republic of Korea National Red Cross delegation for early settlement of the issue of aged parents.

This represents the consistently insincere attitude of your side at the conference, whose acts belie words and whose arguments contradict.

I cannot help but emphasize once again how reasonable, realistic and justifiable, in view of the humanitarian spirit of the Red Cross, is the suggestion of the Republic of Korea National Red Cross delegation for early settlement of the aged parents' issue. I also feel obliged to call upon your side to show sincerity toward substantial settlement at an early date of the "issue of the families and relatives dispersed in the south and north," as agreed upon between the two sides.

In this context, I am going to set forth today more conclusive measures for settlement of the issue of aged parents. I expect that your side will make a sincere study of and response to this proposal by the Republic of Korea National Red Cross delegation.

**Proposal by the Republic of Korea National Red
Cross Delegation for Settlement of
the Issue of Aged Parents**

First, both sides, the south and north Korean Red Cross societies, shall implement preferentially a program for "searching for and informing of the whereabouts and fate of aged parents" as a pilot project for the settlement of Agenda Item No. 1 of the full-dress meeting, that is, "the question of searching for and informing of the whereabouts and fate of the families and relatives dispersed in the south and north."

Second, "aged parents" shall be those persons, male and female, who are 60 years old or above, living separated from their children or relatives in the south and north.

Third, "search and informing" shall be made on the method of exchanging "letters of request for search for missing persons" which the Republic of Korea National Red Cross delegation laid down at the third full-dress meeting held on October 24, 1972.

Fourth, parallel with the implementation of the program of "searching for and informing of the whereabouts and fate of aged parents," reunions, visits and exchange of letters between the persons involved (aged parents and their children and relatives) shall be carried out by the following methods according to their request.

(1) Reunion

Both sides, the south and north Korean Red Cross societies, shall make arrangements for those aged parents and their children and relatives whose whereabouts and fate were confirmed to meet freely at Panmunjom at their request.

For this purpose, both the south and north Korean Red Cross societies shall establish a "reunion house" at Panmunjom and provide all conveniences necessary for reunion.

(2) Visits

Both sides, the south and north Korean Red Cross societies, shall make arrangements for those aged parents and their children and relatives whose whereabouts and fate were confirmed to visit freely the area of the other side at their request.

The periods for such visits shall, in principle, be 15 days before and after the New Year and Chusok holidays. However, other visits shall also be allowed depending on personal reasons of the persons involved. The south and north Korean Red Cross societies shall provide all conveniences necessary for such visits.

(3) Exchange of Letters

Both sides, the south and north Korean Red Cross societies, shall make arrangements so as to enable aged parents and their children and relatives to exchange letters, for which a "south-north exchange center for postal matter" shall be established and operated at Panmunjom.

Fifth, the south and north Korean Red Cross societies shall establish at an early date the proposed “Panmunjom joint project office,” as agreed upon at the fourth full-dress meeting, in which the “reunion house” and “postal matter exchange center” mentioned above shall be established and operated.

The above proposal of the Republic of Korea National Red Cross delegation is not only in conformity with the agreed items set for discussion at the working-level meeting, but also a realistic and reasonable suggestion expediting the settlement of Agenda Item No.1 of the full-dress meeting.

I believe that in view of the spirit of the South-North Joint Communiqué, the humanitarian spirit of the Red Cross, and universal brotherly love, there is no reason why your side cannot accept the implementation of the “program for aged parents.” I expect your side’s sincere study of and response to the above proposals of the Republic of Korea National Red Cross delegation.

Part Four

Dialogue 1974 in Review

A Chronological Review

Jan. 18 President Park Chung Hee of the Republic of Korea proposes, in his New Year press conference, a **“south-north non-aggression agreement,”** featuring three component principles; **1) non-aggression, 2) non-interference and 3) maintenance of the Armistice Agreement in force.**

Jan. 26 In an editorial on the “Rodong Shinmun,” north Korea rejects President Park’s offer of a “non-aggression agreement.”

Jan. 30 3rd SNCC Vice Chairmen’s Meeting (Panmunkak)

On SNCC reorganization:

Seoul side proposes an increase in the number of Committee members from one side from five to ten, comprising representatives of political parties and social organizations in addition to the authorities.

Pyongyang side makes a fancy proposal that the SNCC be transformed into an obscure mass rally-type body, by organizing it with five, or more, representatives of the authorities, five to twenty representatives each from some sixty to seventy political parties and social organizations, plus undetermined number of representatives of various classes and strata of people, from each side respectively.

Feb. 15 North Korean gunships open fire at two Republic of Korea fishing boats on high seas some 30 miles off the west coast south of the extension of the Military Demarcation Line, sinking one of them and kidnapping the other.

Feb. 25 2nd SNRCC delegates’ contact (Panmunjom)

ROKNRC delegate asks that 1) NKRC assure humanitarian treatment of the fishermen kidnapped to north in the Feb. 15 incident and 2) agree to have the 8th full-dress SNRCC meeting in Seoul Apr. 9–10, 1974.

NKRC delegate turns a deaf ear to the ROKNRC suggestions.

Feb. 27 4th SNCC Vice Chairmen's Meeting (Freedom House)

On Feb. 15 incident:

Seoul side asks that *Pyongyang side*:

- 1) apologize for the incident,**
- 2) return the kidnapped fishing boat and fishermen aboard
as well as the remains of the dead fishermen,**
- 3) punish those north Koreans responsible for the incident,**
- 4) compensate for the fishermen drowned dead and damages
in property and**
- 5) guarantee against recurrence of the incident.**

Pyongyang side argues that the two fishing boats involved in the Feb. 15 incident were "spyships."

On SNCC reorganization:

Pyongyang side withdraws the facy proposal of the earlier 3rd Vice Chairmen's Meeting and, instead, says that it would agree to normalize the function of the SNCC, without reorganization, if *Seoul side* agree to hold a "south-north political conference" in parallel with the SNCC.

Mar. 11 3rd SNRCC delegates' contact (Panmunjom)

NKRC rejects the ROKNRC suggestion that the 8th full-dress SNRCC talks be held Apr. 9–10, 1974, and, instead, proposes that the two sides hold "Panmunjom preliminary meetings," with each side represented there by the alternate chief delegate, "for preliminary discussions on agenda items of the full-dress talks."

Mar. 17 5th SNCC Vice Chairmen's Meeting (Panmunkak)

Fruitless debates on Feb. 15 incident and SNCC reorganization.

- Apr. 3 4th SNRCC delegates' contact (Panmunjom)
- ROKNRC* proposes that **1) ROKNRC, NKRC and International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) form a tripartite fact-finding team for investigation of the conditions of the fishermen detained in north Korea and 2) the two sides hold "temporary Panmunjom meetings of the full-dress talks,"** with each side represented by the chief delegate, instead of the "preliminary meeting" proposed by NKRC.
- NKRC* instantly rejects *ROKNRC* proposals.
- Apr. 24 6th SNCC Vice Chairmen's Meeting (Freedom House)
- Fruitless debates on Feb. 15 incident and SNCC reorganization.
- Apr. 29 5th SNRCC delegates' contact (Panmunjom)
- ROKNRC* asks *NKRC* to offer the latter's good offices for exchange of mails between the Republic of Korea fishermen detained in north Korea and their families. However, *NKRC* turns a deaf ear to the *ROKNRC* request.
- May 22 6th SNRCC delegates' contact (Panmunjom)
- The two sides agree to hold SNRCC "working-level meetings" in Panmunjom, each side represented by the alternate chief delegate, for discussions on 1) agenda items of the full-dress talks on a preliminary basis and 2) the question of holding the 8th full-dress SNRCC talks.
- May 29 7th SNRCC delegates' contact (Panmunjom)
- The two sides agree to have the first "working-level" meeting held on July 10, 1974, in the conference room of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC) in Panmunjom, and to have their respective sides represented at the meeting by a three-man delegation each, headed by the alternate chief delegate.

June 28

7th SNCC Vice Chairmen's Meeting (Panmunkak)

Seoul side lodges a strong protest with the authorities of Pyongyang side over the sinking of a Republic of Korea maritime police patrol boat on high seas off the east coast by north Korean gunships.

Pyongyang side asserts that the sinking of the Republic of Korea police patrol boat was "exercise of the right of self-defense."

July 10

1st SNRCC working-level meeting

ROKNRC proposes that 1) the 8th full-dress SNRCC talks be held on August 30, 1974, in Seoul and 2) the two sides undertake, as a pilot project, tracing services for aged parents, prior to sweeping implementation of tracing services for separated families and relatives in general.

NKRC rejects the *ROKNRC* proposals.

July 24

2nd SNRCC working-level meeting

NKRC proposes that the two sides adopt a "joint statement" asking the Republic of Korea Government to 1) repeal the Anti-Communist Law and the National Security Law, 2) disband all anti-communist organizations and anti-communist authorities, 3) legalize opposition to communism and 4) allow participation by political parties and social organizations in the implementation of the tracing services currently at issue at the SNRCC.

Aug. 15

A gunman, identified as a Korean born and raised in Japan, opens fire, with a revolver, at President Park Chung Hee, while delivering a commemorative speech marking the 29th anniversary of the nation's liberation at an indoor ceremony in Seoul, taking the life of the wife of the President, the late Mme. Yook Young Soo. The gunman, Moon Se Kwang by name, is found to have made the attempt on the life of the President under instruction from communist north Korea, which was passed to him through Chosoren, a pro-Pyongyang organization of Korean residents living in Japan.

In his commemorative speech, President Park declares **three basic principles for peaceful unification of the country; 1) concluding of a "non-aggression agreement" between the two sides of Korea, 2) continuation of the South-North Dialogue and implementation of exchanges and cooperation between the two sides of Korea and 3) holding of a free all-Korea election, under fair election management and supervision, with a representation in direct proportion to the indigenous populace in the two sides of Korea, for achievement of the unification.**

Aug. 28 3rd SNRCC working-level meeting

ROKNRC raises the attempted assassination of the President of the Republic of Korea by communist north Korea of August 15 and demand that north Korea 1) punish those responsible for the murder attempt of August 15, 2) give up the policy blindly pursuing a violent class revolution in the Republic of Korea and 3) show sincerity to have the humanitarian talks of SNRCC normalized at an early date.

Sept. 21 8th SNCC Vice Chairmen's Meeting (Freedom House)

On August 15 incident

Seoul side demands that north Korea:

- 1. Apologize for the incident and punish those north Koreans responsible for the incident.**
- 2. Formally denounce the avowed policy seeking what is called "south Korean revolution."**
- 3. Immediately accept the three basic principles for peaceful unification declared by President Park Chung Hee of the Republic of Korea in his August 15 speech.**

On normalization of SNCC function:

Seoul side asks that Pyongyang side:

1. **Immediately agree to terminate the Vice Chairmen's Meeting and resume normal operation of the SNCC.**
2. **Accept the Republic of Korea proposal of a "south-north non-aggression agreement, as well as the Foreign Policy for Peace and Unification of June 23, 1973, and agree to start discussions on the question of concluding the "non-aggression agreement" at the SNCC meetings, as soon as the SNCC has its function normalized.**
3. **Stop seeking a communist takeover of the southern half of the country by force.**

Pyongyang side refuses to discuss the August 15 incident on the ground that it had "nothing to do" with the incident. On normalization of the SNCC function, *Pyongyang side* demands, as preconditions, that *Seoul side*:

1. **Withdraw the June 23 Foreign Policy for Peace and Unification.**
2. **Sever Republic of Korea's traditional ties with America and Japan.**
3. **Prohibit all forms of opposition to communism.**
4. **Agree to hold what is called a "south-north political conference" in parallel with the SNCC.**

Sept. 25 4th SNRCC working-level meeting

ROKNRC urges *NKRC* to accept the *ROKNRC* offer of "Aged Parents First" program. *NKRC* again refuses the *ROKNRC* offer.

Nov. 5 5th SNRCC working-level meeting

Nov. 15 UNC announces discovery of an underground tunnel in the southern sector of DMZ under construction by north Korea.

Nov. 29 6th SNRCC working-level meeting

ROKNRC presents a detailed program for implementation of the

“Aged Parents First” project.

Nov. 30 Meeting between SNCC spokesmen of the two sides in Panmunjom
Pyongyang side proposes postponement of the 9th SNCC Vice Chairmen’s Meeting of December 4.

Dec. 3 *Seoul side* accepts *Pyongyang side*’s proposal to put off the 9th SNCC Vice Chairmen’s Meeting to January 8, 1975, and proposes a meeting of SNCC Executive Council on December 18, 1974.

Dec. 14 Meeting between SNCC spokesmen in Panmunjom
Pyongyang side demands reorganization of SNCC Executive Council, as a precondition for holding an Executive Council meeting.

Published on December 24, 1974

The Public Relations Association of Korea

I. P. O. Box 4161

Seoul, Korea

No. 008
March, 1975

South-North Dialogue in Korea

International Cultural Society of Korea
Seoul, Korea

South-North Dialogue in Korea

- South-North Coordinating Committee
- South-North Red Cross Conference

To Readers:

The year 1975 sees the division of Korea becoming exactly 30 years old. Earlier in 1971, the two sides of divided Korea began, at the initiative of the Republic of Korea, a two-lane dialogue with the eventual aim of bringing to an end the tragic division of the country. The two-lane South-North Dialogue in Korea was suspended in August 1973, however, when north Korea abruptly announced its decision to walk out of the dialogue. The two-lane dialogue, thereafter, had to be survived by two-lane Panmunjom contacts, the South-North Coordinating Committee Vice Chairmen's Meetings and the South-North Red Cross Conference Working-level Meetings.

We find the two-lane Panmunjom contacts still going on in 1975. But we see little prospect that the two-lane South-North Dialogue will be brought back to full resumption anytime soon. North Korea is found still in no mood to accede to the repeated Republic of Korea offer to have the two-lane dialogue fully normalized at an early date. We see, instead, a new swelling in the tension in the relations between the two sides of divided Korea recently, as a result of increasingly expanded and intensified provocative activities by north Korea against the Republic of Korea. The 8th Issue of the "South-North Dialogue in Korea" covers a review of progress in the two-lane Panmunjom contacts as well as cases of north Korean provocations against the Republic of Korea in recent months.

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Part One

SNCC Vice Chairmen's Meets

Pyongyang Reshuffles Its Vice Chairman

The dawn of 1975 for the South-North Coordinating Committee (SNCC) came with north Korea renewing its effort to further degrade, or interrupt, the already nominal dialogue at the Committee, survived for over a year and half now by the Vice Chairmen's meetings in Panmunjom.

Earlier in December the preceding year, north Korea had attempted, although in vain, to interrupt the Vice Chairmen's meetings by proposing that the Vice Chairmen's Panmunjom meetings be replaced by 'working-level' meetings between the spokesmen of the two sides, to be held also in Panmunjom.

The Republic of Korea, turning down the north Korean proposal, counterproposed that the two sides, while continuing the Vice Chairmen's meetings, rather normalize the operation of the SNCC Executive Council, the steering body of the SNCC boycotted by north Korea earlier in 1973 together with the SNCC plenary meetings, than have the informal contacts between the spokesmen.

The Republic of Korea counterproposal was aimed at normalizing the operation of the SNCC, although partially. It had run into a stiff refusal by north Korea, as north Korea was apparently not yet in the mood to accept any idea of having the dialogue brought back to resumption. North Korea withdrew its suggestion to have the Vice Chairmen's meetings replaced by the 'working-level' meetings and, at the same time, rejected the Republic of Korea counterproposal that the operation of the SNCC Executive Council be normalized.

With the dawn of 1975, however, north Korea now moved unilaterally to 'degrade' the level of the political inter-Korean dialogue at the SNCC. On January 6, 1975, only two days before the date of the 9th SNCC Vice Chairmen's meeting, north Korea cabled, via the Seoul-Pyongyang direct telephone line, to Seoul a telephone message, in the name of Pyongyang

side's Co-chairman Kim Young Joo, unilaterally notifying the Seoul side that the Pyongyang side had removed Ryu Jang Shik as its SNCC Vice Chairman and had named Cho Myung Il as his successor.

It seemed obvious that the unilateral move of north Korea had a number of unexplained calculations of its own.

In the first place, it was a calculated move to 'degrade' the level of the Vice Chairmen's meetings, in contravention of pertinent provisions in the Agreed Minute on Formation and Operation of the South-North Coordinating Committee.

In Item 3-A, the Agreed Minute provided that the "Vice Chairmen," the "Executive Members" and the "Committee Members" of the SNCC would have to be those of either "ministerial" or "vice ministerial" ranks.

In accordance with this provision, Seoul side's Vice Chairman Chang Key Young was appointed in his capacity as "former deputy prime minister" of the Republic of Korea. Pyongyang side's Vice Chairman Ryu Jang Shik was introduced as "deputy director of the organizational guidance department and director of the department of external affairs" of north Korea's Workers' Party, equalling a ministerial rank in north Korea.

In the telephone message of January 6, 1975, notifying his appointment as new Pyongyang side's SNCC Vice Chairman, Cho Myung Il was introduced by north Korea as "councilor" of the "central people's committee" and, at the same time, "deputy chairman" of the "committee for peaceful unification of fatherland."

However, one could easily find that these titles were, in fact, all fakes. Cho was already a known figure to the Republic of Korea, as the third ranking member of the north Korean Red Cross (NKRC) delegation to the Panmunjom preliminary talks of the South-North Red Cross Conference (SNRCC) (September 1971—August 1972) and again the third ranking member, and concurrently spokesman, of the NKRC delegation of the full-dress SNRCC meetings (August 1972—January 1975). He was also one of

the NKRC delegates to the Panmunjom Red Cross working-level meetings that began to be held in July 1974, up to the moment when he was named to succeed Ryu Jang Shik as new Pyongyang side's SNCC Vice Chairman. His career was introduced as covering various Red Cross positions, and none else, such as heads of the "culture and propaganda section" and the "publication and press section" of the NKRC and "councilor," "standing member" and "secretary general" of the NKRC central committee.

In the second place, it was obviously a calculated move to lure the Republic of Korea's veto of Cho's appointment as new Pyongyang side's SNCC Vice Chairman, and indefinite interruption of the Vice Chairmen's meetings.

The Agreed Minute on Formation and Operation of the SNCC, in its Item 3-A, provided for "prior consultations" between the two sides on any reshuffle of the SNCC members. In effecting the reshuffle of its SNCC Vice Chairman, however, north Korea chose to skip, apparently deliberately, the "prior consultation" with Seoul side, and took the form of simply notifying its unilateral decision to make the change. With the projected date for the 9th SNCC Vice Chairmen's meetings only two days away, it was all too evident that any objection by the Republic of Korea to north Korea's reshuffle of its SNCC Vice Chairman would result in yet another postponement of the 9th Vice Chairmen's meeting, and possibly indefinite interruption of the Vice Chairmen's meetings. The Republic of Korea decided to accept, although with regret, north Korea's unilateral decision to reshuffle its SNCC Vice Chairman and let it be known to the north Koreans in a telephone message on January 7, 1975.

Seoul Censures North Korean Provocations; Hopes for Early Normalization of SNCC

[In 1975, the two sides of Korea have so far had two rounds of SNCC Vice Chairmen's meetings in Panmunjom, the ninth on January 8 and the tenth on March 14. At these meetings, Seoul side repeatedly urged that the two sides agree on a date for the already long-overdue fourth plenary meeting of the SNCC, bringing the inter-Korean political dialogue at the SNCC back to full resumption. Pyongyang side, however, remained intransigently opposed to have the operation of the SNCC normalized, insisting that Seoul side, instead, agree to hold the so-called "south-north political conference." Seoul side, at these meetings, made a presentation of cases of recently intensified military and other provocations by north Korea against the Republic of Korea and appealed to north Korea to put an end to the acts of aggression against the Republic of Korea being perpetrated in the name of its support of the so-called "south Korean revolution." The following is a translated version of a verbatim text of remarks by Seoul side's Vice Chairman Chang Key Young at the tenth SNCC Vice Chairmen's meeting on March 14.]

-Ed.

During the months since the turn of the new year, we have been observing a sharp increase in the number of undesirable incidents, taking place one after another, in the relations between our two sides. Frankly speaking, I have the feeling that these unhappy developments portend further aggravation of our inter-Korean relations.

Record shows that, during the last one and a half years following the interruption of our dialogue at the full-dress South-North Coordinating Committee meetings in August 1973, I have been constantly pressing the point that our two sides normalize the operation of the Coordinating Committee at the soonest possible moment. I have done so for obvious reasons.

I have done so in the belief that, were we truly committed to the cause of achieving peaceful unification of our divided country, we would have to start with a steady improvement of our mutual relations. Our two sides have already agreed to do so and made the agreement known to the world by announcing the South-North Joint Communiqué on July 4, 1972. And, it was precisely in that spirit that we have started the South-North Red Cross Conference and inaugurated our South-North Coordinating Committee back in 1972.

It is quite natural, therefore, that, were we to pursue a steady improvement of our mutual relations and thereby move on toward peaceful unification of our country, we would have to have a normal operation of our South-North Coordinating Committee faithfully in accordance with the purpose and rules that the two sides of us have agreed on.

Nevertheless, your side not only had the normal operation of the South-North Coordinating Committee interrupted unilaterally back in August 1973, but also have remained obstinately opposed to our repeated suggestions that we normalize the operation of the Committee.

Your side, on the other hand, has since taken to efforts to have all the agreements reached earlier between our two sides practically invalidated, by resuming, in a growing intensity, various kinds of provocations against us, in flagrant violation of standing agreements between us prohibiting such belligerent acts.

The renewed bellicosity in your attitude toward us has naturally been a matter of grave concern for us, in that it could lead our inter-Korean relations back to the time when our two-lane inter-Korean dialogue was yet to start. This grave concern of mine directs me to make a review of recent incidents that have taken place in our mutual relations on a case-by-case basis.

Construction of Underground DMZ Tunnels

In November last year, to begin with, we uncovered one of the underground ap-

proach tunnels under construction by your side within the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). At the time of discovery, the underground DMZ tunnel was found to have dug its way some 1.2 kilometers down to south from the Military Demarcation Line, leaving only 800 meters to reach the southern boundary of the four-kilometer-wide DMZ. In view of the size and interior lay-out, we had to come to the conclusion that the purpose of the construction of those underground DMZ tunnels was clearly to use them as massive transit passageways for troops and arms for undetected infiltration into areas south of the southern boundary of the DMZ. The presence of those underground DMZ tunnels under construction by your side was an irrefutable evidence that your side was actually engaged in clandestine preparation of a major full-scale surprise armed attack upon us as you had done in the early Sunday morning of June 25, 1950.

Subsequent developments have more than substantiated such an apprehension of ours. Upon discovery of the tunnel, we demanded that your side immediately destroy and dismantle the underground DMZ tunnels at issue. Your side ignored our demand. And, instead, your side has continued digging the tunnels at issue, with even greater zeal. We have come to know that your side has been hastening the construction of the tunnels with the aim of completing their construction by October 10 this year, the 30th anniversary of the founding of your “Workers’ Party.”

Let me now make one thing very clear, Vice Chairman Cho. The Republic of Korea now possesses sufficient advanced civil engineering technologies which will definitely not let your side complete the clandestine construction of those tunnels as you wish. Believe me, we have by now located all of these tunnels that your side is digging inside the DMZ. And let me tell you that, if there is anything that your side wants to achieve by digging those underground tunnels, it will not be very long before your side will wake up from the daydream.

The underground DMZ tunnels under construction by your side have been made a laughing stock in the world these days. I have a report saying that, at the United Nations General Assembly last year, a delegate of the United Kingdom drew a roar of laughter from the hall when he quipped; “I have been told that north Korea is now digging underground tunnels in the DMZ in Korea. How about the representatives of south and north Korea meeting inside the tunnel to talk in amity?” I know that delegates from your side were also present there and they must have felt ashamed to be made a mockery of in such a manner by a foreign representative.

I once again demand that your side immediately stop digging the underground DMZ tunnels at issue, destroy them and dismantle those parts which have already been constructed. To offer you a piece of advice, you must wake up to the fact that, had your side ever considered converting the enormous quantity of materiel and manpower squandered for construction of the tunnels at issue for use for other peaceful purposes, you would have certainly succeeded in improving the daily economic lives of the hard-pressed brethren of ours in north Korea.

Aside from construction of the underground DMZ tunnels, there also is a long list of undesirable provocations of various kinds by your side against us, which have taken place during the months since the turn of the new year.

Unilateral Resumption of DMZ Loudspeaker Broadcast

On January 23, your side unilaterally reopened loudspeaker broadcasts against us along the 155-mile truce line, in violation of agreement reached at the second SNCC Co-chairmen's meeting on November 4, 1972. After protests from our side, your side silenced the loudspeakers two days thereafter.

There also has been a sharp increase in the volume of leaflets being flown into our area from your side. Until recently, your side used toy balloons to have the propaganda leaflets flown into our area. But, during the last several months, we have collected a good many aerostats obviously used by your side to have the leaflets flown into our area in greater volumes.

For a long time now, your side has operated privately established radio and television stations in your side's area for broadcasts aimed at sabotaging our national security. Now, with the turn of the new year, your side has gone on further to jam our side's radio and television programs, using those unlawfully established radio and television stations in your side's area.

On February 15, an armed north Korean spy ship was sunk by our navy in the waters off the east coast way down south from our Northern Limit Line. And it was followed by yet another incident on February 26 in the waters off the west coast south of the Northern Limit Line, in which one of a group of your side's armed vessels sank after colliding with our side's navy patrol boat, while attempting to sail away ignoring a challenge by the patrol boat. Upon outbreak of the incident, your side rushed to the scene of the incident warplanes and gunships and

created a vulnerable state of military confrontation in the area.

Provocation of Illicit War of Electric Waves

Among these incidents, let me first take up the case of the unlawful radio and television activities by your side.

It is a common knowledge that electric waves are among the leading means of communications in the civilized world of ours today. The electric waves travel in the air, where there is no national boundary. And, therefore, maintenance of order in the traffic of the electric waves in the air is nowadays a matter of international concern. And it is precisely in that respect that we now have an international organization, by the name of the International Tele-communications Unions, which has all world countries as its members, to see that maintenance of order in the traffic of the electric waves is assured as governed by the Charter of the Union.

The Charter of the Union asks all the radio and television stations in operation in the world to register with the International Frequency Registration Board, an apparatus of the ITU, and have their frequency bands and electric outputs authorized by the IFRB. The Charter prohibits use of frequency bands which may cause harmful interference with other radio and television stations in operation in a specific area and, at the same time, restricts electric outputs so that they will not exceed the optimum requirement to cover authorized area.

The Republic of Korea is now the sole ITU member from the Korean peninsula. In the case of the Korean peninsula, therefore, the radio and television stations of the Republic of Korea are the only stations lawfully authorized, by the Charter of the Union, to be in operation in the peninsula.

It is a fact, nevertheless, that, in that part of Korea held by your side, there have actually been radio and television stations of yours in operation ever after the national liberation in 1945. And it also is a fact that, when we pass judgment strictly based on pertinent articles of the Charter of the Union, those radio and television stations in operation in your side of Korea are actually illegally operated private stations and their broadcasts, accordingly, no more than pirate broadcasts.

But I do not intend to press upon the point at this moment.

The matter of grave concern for me at the moment is the fact that, far from

being contented with the operation of such illegal radio and television stations in your side of Korea, your side has been found eager to provoke an unwarrantably immoral war of electric waves against us. In flagrant violation of all pertinent articles of the Charter of the Union, your side has been observed using those radio and television stations in operation in your side's area as a major instrument of your propaganda campaign to sabotage our national security and agitate the kind of communist revolution that your side avowedly pursue to achieve in our side of Korea. Now, with the turn of the new year, you have gone on even further to start jamming radio and television programs of our side, making illicit use of the stations in operation in your side of Korea.

Already for a long time now, to begin with, your side has intentionally taken to harmful interference with our radio broadcasts, by arbitrarily using frequency bands immediately adjacent to the frequency bands lawfully authorized for radio stations in operation in the Republic of Korea. There is no question about the fact that such an activity is an act irrefutably prohibited under Article 35 of the Charter of the Union.

The IFRB has thus far authorized radio stations in the Republic of Korea outputs of 500 kilowatts, or less, considering the optimum requirement in the area. Accordingly, the electric outputs of radio stations in the Republic of Korea are all less than 500 kilowatts.

Nevertheless, we have irrefutable evidence that, in the case of the Radio Joong-ang, your side has amplified the electric output to a staggering 1,500 kilowatts. This, too, is an illegal act violating the spirit of the Charter of the Union.

In the meantime, your side has set up a clandestine radio station in Haeju in your side of Korea, under the name of the "voice of unification and revolutionary party," feigning as an underground radio station broadcast from within the Republic of Korea, putting on the air programs solely devoted to agitation of a communist revolution in the Republic of Korea. The all too illegal radio broadcast strikes me as an apparition of the "Tokyo Rose" of Imperial Japan and the "Die Nazi Lorelei" of Nazi Germany, both clandestine psy-war radio broadcasts during the Second World War famed for their notoriety. I warn you to wake up to the fact that the so-called "voice of unification and revolutionary party" is an illicit and immoral radio operation which can neither be justified by any international law, nor by the conscience and the good sense of mankind.

It is a known fact that your side has the telecasts in your side's area televised by the OIRT method, the East European method, in other words, whose transmitting and receiving system is different from that of the U.S. method now in use in the Republic of Korea. You cannot view our television programs with the television sets supplied in your side's area because of the difference in the television system.

Nevertheless, your side installed a television station in Kaesung in your side's area, using the U.S. television system, and began televising programs in April 1971 over our Channel 13. As I have told you just now, you cannot view these television programs with the television sets that you have up there in your side of Korea, because of the difference in the television system. Now then, for whom are these television programs televised? Obviously, they are for viewers in our side of Korea and definitely not those in your side's area. What for? I need your answer.

Not only that. With the turn of the new year, your side has begun, making an illicit use of the television station in Kaesung, jamming our Korean Broadcasting System television programs televised over Channel 9. You have since continued this outrageous television jamming up to this very moment on a day-to-day basis. This television jamming, again, is an illicit act prohibited under Article 35 of the Charter of the Union.

As I said earlier, I can never be too emphatic to stress the prime importance of the electric waves in the flow of ideas nowadays. And, in that respect, you must know that you are playing with fire by provoking such an illicit and unwarrantably immoral war of electric waves between our two sides.

There have actually been discussions, on a number of occasions at our past meetings, on the control of hostile radio broadcasts against one another between our two sides. And, on one occasion at the second SNCC Co-chairmen's meeting in Pyongyang in November 1972, we did have arrived at an agreement to have all hostile radio broadcasts against one another suspended. Your side has never remained bound by the agreement, however. And, to make the matter worse, your side has always kept on alleging that your side had no part in the illicit radio and television activities against us, which I have illustrated in detail in the above.

Joint Probe into Unlawful Radio & TV Activities

In this era of advanced scientific technologies, however, I don't think such a blatant lie can go unchallenged for a long time. And I formally propose here today that the two sides of us set up a fact-finding team, composed of technicians of the two sides and chaired by an ITU representative, in order to take a hard look into the unlawful radio and television activities as I have illustrated above and to take measures to restore order in the traffic of electric waves in the Korean peninsula. In the meantime, I strongly urge that your side realize the graveness of the situation and take whatever measures necessary to correct the situation, irrespective of the investigation that I have just now proposed.


I also demand, in the same context, that your side immediately stop having propaganda leaflets flown into our side's area.

Let me now move on to the naval incidents that have taken place between our two sides recently.

Your side now insist that the armed spy ship sunk on February 15 in the waters off the east coast south of our Northern Limit Line was a "patrol boat" of your side "set adrift" at the time of the incident "off Wonsan," a naval port in your side of Korea on the east coast.

The actual scene of the incident, nevertheless, was way down south from the water off Wonsan and well within the waters of the Republic of Korea south of our Northern Limit Line.

The spy ship at issue was first spotted by our patrol boats in the waters off Chuhjin well south of the Northern Limit Line, crusing straight south at a speed of 13 knots an hour. The ship was found equip-




ped with radar and two high-speed engines and armed with two heavy-machine guns on the deck. Although you now claim that the ship at issue was having difficulties due to bad weather at the time of the incident, we were, in fact, having a fine weather, with a clear sky and visibility of more than ten miles, at the time of the incident in the area where the incident took place. There was definitely no sign of the ship at issue developing any engine trouble at the time of the incident. And, naturally, no sign that the ship was "set adrift."

On spotting the ship at issue, our patrol boats began to give chase to her, calling a halt for identification and inspection, a lawful exercise of internationally established maritime practice.

Allegation of A "Ship Adrift" Is A Sheer Lie

The distance between the ship at issue and our patrol boats narrowed to less than 200 yards when the naval chase of about an hour brought the ships to the waters off Kojin. Defying the call for a halt from our patrol boats, however, the ship at issue abruptly opened machine gun fire at our patrol boats and, turning its bow back to north, began sailing northward at a speed of 22 knots an hour. Our patrol boats in chase had to exercise the right of self-defense and it was after another hour of naval chase that the ship at issue was finally sunk still south of the Northern Limit Line. And, still, you assert that this ship was a ship which was "set



adrift!" Such an allegation is a sheer lie. The ship at issue proved herself, by her own conduct, to be a spy ship which attempted to infiltrate into our waters apparently to carry out unexplained missions given by your authorities.

At approximately 5:30 p.m., February 26, on another occasion, our navy vessels on patrol in the waters 23 miles southwest from paiknyong-do and 23 miles west from Taechong-do sighted a flotilla of unidentified vessels and called the vessels a halt for identification. These unidentified vessels, however, refused to obey the order and attempted to escape the scene without answering. In the flurry that ensued, one of the vessels rammed into one of our patrol boats and sank on the spot. These vessels at issue, all armed with machine guns, were by now identified as vessels belonging to your side. These vessels, rushing to the spot where one of them had gone down into the water, prevented our patrol boats from going to the rescue of the crew of the sunken vessel.

The scene of the incident was south of our Northern Limit Line and east of the Peace Line, where our navy vessels normally conduct patrol duties for protection of our fishing boats in the area. Therefore, we must take it for granted that, if the vessels at issue really were fishing boats of your side, as your side alleges, then they ought to have complied with the call for a halt from our patrol boats. And you must also explain, at the same time, why those vessels were all armed. I would like to tell you that, had those vessels complied with the call for a halt, and proved themselves as fishing boats, then the untoward incident of the day would certainly have been avoided and the sunken ship itself would have gone back to the fishing area of your side safely to be engaged in fishing there.

Immediately in the wake of the February 26 incident, your side rushed to the scene of the incident warplanes and gunships and created a dangerous state of military confrontation in the area. The vulnerable state of military confrontation in the area persisted until the next day. And, in the meantime, your warplanes violated our territorial air over Paiknyung-do on eleven occasions.

These recent developments in the relations between the two sides of us undoubtedly pose a direct and overt threat to peace and security in Korea. I think I have good reasons to believe that the sharp increase in the provocative activities by your side against us has very much to do with your apparent desire to lead our inter-Korean relations into a gravely dangerous situation.

It was out of that concern of mine that, over the past months, I have, time and again, taken to our Seoul-Pyongyang direct telephone line to warn you of the grave consequences that might result from those reckless provocations by your side against us and to call for your side's reflection and restraint.

I would like to make use of this occasion today to call on you once again that your side come back to reason and immediately stop acts comparable to playing with fire.

The most serious problem of ours at this moment lies in the fact that, because of the expanded and intensified provocations of various kinds by your side against us, our inter-Korean relations have become unprecedentedly aggravated, with a new rise in the tension between our two sides.

Under these circumstances, I think I must remind you of the fact that, back in 1972, we announced the historic South-North Joint Communiqué and inaugurated our South-North Coordinating Committee primarily in order to prevent undesirable provocations against one another and to seek a steady improvement of our mutual relations, as a fundamental step toward a genuinely peaceful unification of our fatherland. And, to put it otherwise, it is because of the failure of our Coordinating Committee to carry out its given duties that we now see aggravation of our mutual relations, with untoward incidents taking place one after another. Therefore, I think I have the obligation to renew my call that, without any further delay, we get down to our important business and have our Coordinating Committee brought back to normal operation at the earliest possible moment.

Let Us Agree on A Date for Fourth SNCC Meet

I, therefore, propose that, at this meeting today, we bring to an end our debate on the question of normalizing the operation of the Coordinating Committee and agree on a date for the already long-overdue fourth plenary meeting of the Committee.

As has been pointed out repeatedly in the past, I do not think there is any problem for us to solve before we see the operation of our Coordinating Committee normalized. You may still want reorganization of our Coordinating Committee, as a precondition for normalization of the Committee's operation. In that case, you can have an expanded and reorganized Coordinating Committee by

accepting the reasonable suggestion of ours on the question.

In terms of principles, however, I think I must make it clear that you are not entitled to argue that reorganization of the Committee is a "precondition" for normalization of its operation. The irrefutable principle in this matter is that we ought to have the operation of the Committee normalized first and have whatever problems raised at the Committee meetings for debates and settlement there.

What are the genuine causes of the present deadlock in our dialogue? I know, for myself, the answer to this question. To be frank, the present deadlock in our dialogue has resulted from your side's obstinate pursuit of a communist revolution in the Republic of Korea, the so-called "south Korean revolution," in other words, as a step before achieving a communist unification of the country, or else, the lingering attachment for a communist takeover of the southern half of the peninsula through use of arms. And I know that your side's unification formula, featuring either use of arms or the so-called "south Korean revolution" is responsible for the provocations of various kinds by your side against us which have been on the sharp increase recently.

But you must wake up to the fact, the sooner the better, that such a dream of yours is a dream which will never be realized. May I assure you that such a fancy dream of yours will never bring to you a communist unification? Your attachment to such a fancy dream would only result in further aggravation of our inter-Korean relations and, because of the heavy burden required to be shouldered by the brethren of ours in your side of Korea for the pursuit of the counter-productive policy goal, would certainly make the life in your side of Korea increasingly unbearable one.

I have already stated, over and again, that, for our part, we are committed to the cause of having peace institutionalized in Korea first before moving on to the task of achieving a genuinely peaceful unification. We know that it requires a great deal of patience and sincerity. But I think I must also let it be known to you that our patience and our restraint have their own limits, too.

I have so far made a review of developments in the relations between our two sides and made my views on these developments known to you. I have done so out of my deep concern over the future of our mutual relations. I now look forward to you, Vice Chairman Cho, to open your heart and be constructive enough to con-

sider my presentation affirmatively.

Before concluding my statement, may I invite your attention to the fact that, at our last meeting on January 8, you did not give your reply to my suggestion that the two sides of us agree on exchange of mails between our two sides. I will be most happy to hear from you an affirmative reply at this meeting here today on the matter. Thank you.

Late News:

**2nd DMZ Cave Uncovered 50 ms Underground;
“There Are More Being Built,” Defectors Say;
ROK Warns against N. Korean War Preparations**

The United Nations Command (UNC) in Korea announced on March 19 that a second underground tunnel under construction by north Korea has been discovered in the UNC sector of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), some 13 kilometers northeast of Chorwon, Kangwon-do Province, in the central sector of the 155-mile truce line.

Col. William W. Woodside, UNC spokesman, said that, as a result of precision drilling operation, the new underground DMZ tunnel, found in a granite stratum some 50 meters below the surface of the earth, was determined to have a width of two meters and a height of two meters.

Col. Woodside disclosed that the precision drilling operation had been underway for some time, because, “based on information gained from various sources,” there were “suspicions that north Korea has constructed a number of tunnels south of the Military Demarcation Line (MDL) in the DMZ, in violation of the Armistice Agreement. “In order to enable full investigation and neutralization of the illegal construction of the underground DMZ tunnels,” Col. Woodside said, “the Commander-in-Chief, UNC, has authorized intercept-tunnel excavations entirely within the southern half of the DMZ under UNC control.”



The underground DMZ tunnel built by north Korea, cutting across the four-kilometer-wide width of the DMZ from north to south under the ground, was first discovered on November 15 last year by a platoon of UNC civil police at a spot some 1.2 kilometers south of MDL, about 47 kilometers southwest of the site of the new discovery announced on March 19.

At the 361st plenary meeting of the Military Armistice Commission (MAC) held on March 20 in Panmunjom, the UNC lodged a strong protest with north Korea over the illegal construction of the underground DMZ tunnels, charging north Korea with violation of the Armistice Agreement. Maj. Gen. Henry Morgan, chief UNC delegate, MAC, proposed, at the MAC meeting, that the UNC and north Korean army conduct a joint on-the-spot investigation on the site of the discovery of the new tunnel.

It has been reported, in the meantime, that there are now more than a dozen underground DMZ tunnels under construction by north Korea, inside the southern half of the DMZ under UNC control, yet to be pinpointed, in addition to the two already discovered. On January 30 this year, U.S. Army Lt. Gen. James Hollingsworth, Commander, I Corps (ROK/US) Group, said, in a press interview, that he had "indications that there are 13 more underground DMZ tunnels," in addition to the one discovered earlier on November 15 last year and added, "we are now working on an intensive investigation to find the precise locations of two of them."

Meanwhile, two recent north Korean defectors, one a cadre of the north Korean Workers' Party, belonging to the liaison office No. 53 in Kaesung of the section 7 of the party's liaison department, with a personal experience of physically taking part in the excavation of one of the tunnels, and the other a second lieutenant of the north Korean army as commanding officer, 2nd platoon, 3rd company, 1st battalion, 30th regiment, 12th north Korean army division, appeared on March 21 before press in Seoul to disclose that the excavation of the underground DMZ tunnels by north Korea "had begun in September 1971 under instruction from Kim Il Sung, president of north Korea, himself."

The two north Korean defectors, Kim Boo-sung, 35, and Yoo Tae-yun, 29, by name, revealed, in the press interview, that all the north Korean army corps deployed in the frontline area along the 155-mile truce line are now assigned with the task of constructing a certain specified number of the underground DMZ tunnels each, with October 10 this year, the 30th



Layout Plan of 3rd DMZ Tunnel 4Kms SW of PanMunJom

⊗ OBS : NB (Northern Boundary), SB (Southern Boundary), DMZ (Demilitarized Zone), MDL (Military Demarcation Line), BWF (Barbed Wire Fence), EL & Ts (Electric Locomotive and Trolleys)

anniversary of the founding of the north Korean Workers' Party, as the target date for completion of the construction.

Maj. Gen. Henry Morgan, chief UNC delegate, MAC, also declared, at the 361st MAC plenary meeting March 20, that the UNC had the knowledge of "construction of a third underground DMZ tunnel now underway on a spot some four kilometers southwest of Panmunjom," and demanded that north Korea immediately stop the illegal construction.

The two north Korean defectors said that the underground DMZ tunnels now under construction under the joint charge of north Korea's Workers' Party and defense ministry were designed to be used 1) as a route for an undetected massive pumping of regular north Korean army out into the area south of the southern boundary of the DMZ in the event of north Korea's all-out military attack on the Republic of Korea, 2) as a route for infiltration of elements of north Korea's 8th special army corps, an outfit of specially trained commandos, down into the Republic of Korea in the event of a "decisive" political confusion in south Korea which north Korea has been avowedly pursuing to stir through indirect means and, lastly, 3) as a route for supply of material as well as personnel support for underground communist elements that north Korea feverishly seeks to have planted in south Korea.

According to estimates, based on the findings by UNC engineers who managed to enter it through an intercept-tunnel on March 24, the second underground tunnel found in the DMZ north of Chorwon has been determined to have the capacity, judging from its size with a height of two meters and width of two meters, of pumping some 24,000 fully-armed foot-soldiers in an hour out into the area south of the southern boundary of the DMZ. It can also be used for jeeps and field artillery pieces. Each of these underground DMZ tunnels was known to have been designed to have five outlets some 500 meters south of the southern boundary of the DMZ, scattered over an area, to be kept in concealment normally for use on a chosen occasion. Informed sources made it known that the third under-

ground DMZ tunnel found to be under construction by north Korea on a spot southwest of Panmunjom had a scale 1.6 meters wide and 1.8 meters in the interior height.

The Republic of Korea government could not have been more shocked to be confronted with the discovery after discovery of the underground DMZ tunnels under construction by north Korea. Government Spokesman, Minister of Culture and Public Information Lee Won Kyung charged north Korea, in a statement on March 20, with “covert preparation of war behind the make-believe offer of peace,” and demanded that north Korea “immediately dismantle all those illegally constructed underground DMZ tunnels.”

Defense Minister Suh Chong Chul, on the other hand, expressed his grave concern over the fact that north Korea attaches special significance to the current year, chanting “unification of fatherland by the 30th anniversary of the national liberation and the founding of the Workers’ Party and the 25th anniversary of the outbreak of the “south Korean liberation war,”” alias the Korean War of 1950-1953, all of which fall in the current year. Minister Suh warned that the portentous significance of the underground DMZ tunnels under construction by north Korea all along the truce line “will have to be measured in connection with the avowed strategy of north Korea, featuring a blitzkrieg attack on us in case of war,” and called on the nation for tighten vigilance against whatever provocations by north Korea.

“No Peaceful Unification without Peace First”; Seoul Rebutts N. Korean Meddling in Home Affairs

[At the ninth and the tenth SNCC Vice Chairmen’s meetings, Pyongyang side spent the bulk of time criticizing internal affairs of the Republic of Korea, arguing that the principle of “non-interference” could not be applied to the inter-Korean relations, “because the people on both sides of Korea belong to the same ‘nation.’” Under the cover of that arbitrary logic, Pyongyang side demanded, as preconditions for resumption of the two-lane inter-Korean dialogue, that the Republic of Korea withdraw the Foreign Policy for Peace and Unification of June 23, 1973, and renounce her anti-communist policies. Seoul side’s Vice Chairman Chang Key Young made the following remarks at the tenth Vice Chairmen’s meeting on March 14 to rebut north Korea’s repeated interference in the internal affairs of the Republic of Korea.] -Ed.

Time and again, I have been stressing that our main concern is the question of normalizing the operation of our Coordinating Committee. But, I cannot help having the impression that the case is entirely different with your side. Today, I again find you spending the bulk of your time in accusing us over purely internal affairs of ours.

Such an attitude of yours undoubtedly is a factor that impedes our dialogue, aggravates our mutual relations and obstructs our efforts toward peaceful unification. And, precisely in that respect, I formally asked your predecessor, at our eighth Vice Chairmen’s meeting on September 21 last year, that your side discard such a dangerously aggressive attitude and be more sincere with our dialogue.

Sitting here today, however, I find myself sadly disheartened listening to you repeating all those unwarranted accusations against our purely internal affairs.

At this point, I feel myself urged to make it clear that we are not disposed to tolerate such an unwarrantable infringement by your side on our internal affairs any further. And I am now going to take my own time briefly to point out the impropriety of such an attitude of yours.

You say that it does not constitute a violation of the principle of non-interference for you to meddle in our own internal affairs. You argue that you have the right to interfere with our internal affairs because, you say, "the people of both the south and the north constitute one single nation."

To begin with, however, such an argument of yours is only a sophistry and an utter nonsense, and I now intend to go briefly over the matter.

In the first place, it is a foregone conclusion that, were we to tackle our inter-Korean problems correctly, we must first accept the realities as realities, no matter what the realities are. We must accept the realities as the realities objectively and historically stand, without distortion and fabrication. Only by doing so, can we have a clear perception of the root cause of our problems and find a solution to the problems.

The tragedy of Korea has its roots in the fact that, whether we like it or not, Korea remains divided into two parts for three decades now. Had we of the two divided parts of Korea ever achieved a political unity in the meantime, there would have been no necessity for us to be tied up in this difficult and tiresome business which we call the South-North Dialogue in Korea.

In retrospect, the tragedy of Korea began to unfold earlier in 1945 when, following the national liberation from the Japanese occupation, a group of communists, Korean by blood but alien by upbringing, moved into that part of Korea north of the 38th Parallel, at the heels of foreign occupation force, in the guise of self-styled "patriotic independence fighters." These inbound communists, operating under the aegis of foreign occupation force, sooner or later became the masters of north Korea, forcing territorial partition of Korea, when, in 1948, they created a regime of their own in north Korea, rejecting an all-Korea general election under the United Nations observation for creation of a unified Korean

government. As a result, although we now have the Republic of Korea as the only lawful and legitimate government in the Korean peninsula, we also have a separate political entity controlling the northern half of the peninsula, mastered by you the north Korean communists. It is precisely in order to put an end to the painful territorial division of the country and find a way to reunite the two divided parts of Korea into one single nationhood, through peaceful means, based on the principle of national self-determination and according to democratic procedures, that we are now exerting our maximum efforts to lead this dialogue to success, in spite of all difficulties.

Now, let me come back to your argument that you have the right to criticize our internal affairs “because the people of our two sides of Korea constitute the same ‘nation.’”

Different Interpretation for The Same Word

Both sides of us use the same word, the “nation.” But I must first point out the hard fact that the two sides of us have entirely different interpretations for the word, the “nation.”

We of the Republic of Korea perceive the “nation” in terms of a consanguineous body. For us, the “nation” signifies a historical *gemeinschaft*, cherishing traditional values, handed down from generation to generation, both ideologically and culturally, while sharing the common blood-ties.

On the other hand, we are well aware of the fact that, for you north Korean communists, believing in the materialistic view of history, the “nation” is a concept which in itself is inadmissible ideologically. You do not regard the “nation” as a historical community based on the common blood-ties. And, instead, you regard the “nation” simply as a social phenomenon that uniquely exists in a bourgeois society, a stage of historical development by the materialistic interpretation of history, destined to disappear with the dissolution of the bourgeois society. It is precisely in that context that your “Dictionary of Political Terminologies” brands the “nationalism” as a “bourgeois thought” and declares that it is the mission of the communists “to fight against the nationalism.” In other words, the “nation” is a concept ideologically harmful for your effort to achieve a communist society and, thus, is a value that you are committed to its eventual extermination. It is quite natural, therefore, that you

north Korean communists deny the blood ties as the fundamental fabric of a human society and set aside your own parents to adulate a man idolized for political purpose with the calling as your “beloved father.”

In spite of all these realities, you continue to meddle in our own internal affairs and, what is more, refuse to give up the wild idea of a communist takeover of the Republic of Korea through use of arms, under the cover of the fanciful “nation” theory.

It is nothing any more than a piece of fraud and deception, suiting you the north Korean communists who are believers in the theory that the ends justify the means. We see yet another piece of fraud and deception in your attempt to agitate the religious people in our society in the name of fake religious organizations in your society, when all the religions, including Christianity and Buddhism, have now long been “exterminated.”

We, of course, strongly denounce such a mean demeanor of yours. And we are saddened by the fact that, due to such a mean demeanor of yours, our mutual relations are increasingly growing worse and the prospect of unification becomes remoter and remoter.

Vice Chairman Cho,

Were we to discuss our mutual relations purely from the standpoint of the “nation,” I must say that I have a lot more things to say myself.

Let me first take a hard look at the root cause of our national division and of the current deadlock in our effort toward peaceful unification of the divided country.

It is beyond question that the root cause lies in the fact that the north Korean communists, after seizing power in that part of Korea under the aegis of the foreign occupation force, have mercilessly opted to exterminate all the national traditions and history, values and heritages that existed in north Korea.

Extermination of National History & Heritage

We know very well how in north Korea the nation’s history has been rewritten over and again, distorting, falsifying and fabricating all the historical facts in order

to satisfy the needs of your authorities in Pyongyang. We know how the so-called “juche-ism” and “yuil-ism” as well as “Kim Il Sung-ism” were first invented and how they have been adapted for use to meet the political needs up there in north Korea. And we also know all about the falsehoods, fictions, distortions and fabrications put on display in the so-called “Revolutionary Memorial Museum” in Pyongyang. With your consent, I am willing to make an on-the-spot inspection of the articles displayed in the museum and show you, one by one, what kind of fakes all those articles are. You have perpetrated the unforgivable national crime of totally rewriting the nation’s history, in order to canonize a man and his family, to a degree unsurpassed by any ruler in the history of mankind.

We know very well about the brutal techniques of terror, suppression and extermination that you north Korean communists have employed, and are still employing, in north Korea to establish the fanatical personality cult of Kim Il Sung, an *iron-fisted one-man dictatorship which has no parallel in the annals of history.*

Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, the Nobel prize winning novelist recently expelled from Soviet Russia, shocked the conscience of mankind by describing, in detail, the brutal acts of suppression perpetrated in Soviet Russia during the days under Stalin’s rule, in his famous work, the “Gulag Archipelago.” But, in north Korea during the last three decades, you the north Korean communists have wielded techniques of suppression by far more merciless than those described by Solzhenitsyn in the “Gulag Archipelago,” in order to suppress our brethren there and train them into loyal slaves of the one-man dictatorship there. The heart-breaking labor camps at Aoji are still in operation in your side of Korea and, to make the long story short, north Korea, in its entirety, is a north Korean version of the “Gulag Archipelago.”

You may have thought that you could keep the outside world unaware of the atrocities and cruelties committed in north Korea, simply by sealing up your society and by turning it into a north Korean version of the “Animal Farm.” But, by sealing up your society, you have merely succeeded in blinding and deafening our brethren in north Korea, who had already been deprived of the freedom even to think about their misfortunes and suffering. The news of the human suffering taking place up there in north Korea have never failed to find their way out to reach us in this outside world.

The tragic Korean War of 1950 provided many of us Koreans of the Republic

of Korea with an experience of life ruled by you the north Korean communists and most of them still retain a vivid memory of the experience. And, moreover, we now have within the Republic of Korea millions of north Koreans living in freedom, after fleeing from that part of Korea ruled by you the north Korean communists during the Korean War. May I add that these millions of north Korean refugees are living witnesses of the kind of suppressive rule that exist in north Korea? Over and again in the past, I have made it emphatically clear that the thirty-five million Koreans now living in the Republic of Korea are united in their opposition to communism and, believe me, their opposition to communism has sprung up from their own experience. They have become anti-communist by virtue of none other than you the north Korean communists yourselves.

You are not satisfied merely by rewriting our national history, We know that you have gone on further to rewrite the history of the communist party in north Korea, the Workers' Party, from time to time in order to meet the needs of the present. We know how the collection of the works of Kim Il Sung has been rewritten, grossly modifying their contents, whenever a new edition was published. We also know why you have completely done away with the book three of the second edition of the collection of the works of Kim Il Sung.

What are the realities of north Korea now after three decades of such a gross distortion of the national history and extermination of the national heritages?

At the moment, we are facing the hard realities that, in north Korea, there is no national history. As a result, the common national homogeneity between the two Korean societies in Korea has totally been carried away. The heterogeneity that has thus been created between the two Korean societies in Korea is the main reason why we have so many difficulties and obstacles lying ahead in our road to unification of our divided fatherland.

Under the circumstances, when and if someone asks us what we believe the fundamental condition is, were we to achieve unification of the country based on the legitimacy of the national history, in its true sense of the word, we have a simple ready answer. We would answer that the north Korean communists would have to make their exits from north Korea and the communist regime now in north Korea would have to be dissolved. We know too well that, unless these conditions are met, it would be utterly impossible for the fifteen million brethren of

ours now living in north Korea to regain their place among the ranks of Koreans as a “nation,” in terms of a consanguineous and historical gemeinschaft which we call a “nation.” Were we to tackle the question of unification strictly from the standpoint of the “nation,” we are entitled and, at the same time, obliged to make these demands.

Nevertheless, we now find ourselves conditioned by objective realities.

Renunciation of Use of Arms Is A Lesson of History

It is now all too clear that there is no possibility that communism will find its own exit from north Korea. And it is also clear that your side has no intention to tackle the question of unification from the standpoint of the “nation,” in its genuine sense of the word.

Were we to pursue to effect such a change in the behavior of your side, then we would naturally have limited option. We would then have to resort to force—use of arms, in other words.

However, here me, Vice Chairman Cho, use of arms, as a means to solve our national problems, is one thing which we resolutely and irrevocably renounce. We do so because, although unification of our fatherland is undoubtedly our national goal, we know that use of arms, as a means to achieve it, would promise more pain and suffering for the Koreans in both sides of Korea. This, as a matter of fact, is a lesson taught by none other than you the north Korean communists when you started the Korean War of 1950–1953, which left our Korean peninsula virtually in ruin, almost in its entirety, an unforgettable memory for generations yet to come.

We, therefore, have arrived at a conclusion that any earnest effort of ours for a genuinely peaceful unification of our country should start with institutionalization of peace in Korea, taming the heretofore hostile relations between the two sides of us into an institutionalized peaceful coexistence for some time, pending solution to the unification question.

Restoration of Homogeneity Is A Key to Unity

We would first have to have the danger of a recurrence of fratricidal war between

us eliminated. We would also have to have a foundation of mutual trust laid in our mutual relations, broadening its scope on a gradually expended scale. We would, then, have to accept the realities as they objectively stand and refrain from interfering, for the sake of our commitment to the cause of promoting peace, in the established political, economic, social and cultural order of the other side. We would, instead, have to concentrate our efforts on finding areas of agreement mutually acceptable and broaden the scope of areas of agreement as we continue to implement agreements reached between our two sides. We must, then, move on to the task of recovering the common denominator, between our two sides, as a homogeneous national community, as a must step leading to a genuinely peaceful unification of the country.

I must now remind you, Vice Chairman Cho, of the fact that your side too has already acceded to the kind of approach to unification that I have just elaborated above. The historic South-North Joint Communique of July 4, 1972, is itself a crystalization of agreement reached between us on the above-stated approach to unification. And, it was precisely based on that concept that we started our two-lane inter-Korean dialogue, the humanitarian South-North Red Cross Conference and the political South-North Coordinating Committee.

We find your side recently frantically engaged in the treacherous act of perpetrating a gross distortion and falsification of the contents of the historic South-North Joint Communique of July 4, 1972, making unwarrantable propaganda attacks on us on alleged charges of violations of the Joint Communique. The contents of the Joint Communique itself irrefutably testify the fact that such a behavior of your side is itself an unpardonable betrayal and deception. And, in case you do not agree with me on this point, may I suggest that we bring to our next meeting the Executive Members of our Coordinating Committee, Mr. Chung Hong Jin of our side and Mr. Kim Duk Hyun of your side, who had taken part in the original drafting of the Joint Communique, for item-by-item interpretation of the contents of the Joint Communique? I assure you that that would be the best way to determine which of the two sides of us is telling the truth on the matter now at issue.

You also argue that the new Foreign Policy of the Republic of Korea for Peace and Unification declared on June 23, 1973, by President Park Chung Hee was a "splittist" policy, aimed at "perpetuating" the national division.

However, you must know that your argument does not make sense at all, in that the new Foreign Policy of the Republic of Korea for Peace and Unification is indeed a policy committed to the cause of achieving a genuinely peaceful unification of our divided country, faithfully reflecting the basic spirit of the South-North Joint Communiqué.

Whenever I listen to you denouncing our new foreign policy for peace and unification so maliciously, I cannot help having the doubt being formulated within my mind as to whether you have had chance to read through President Park's statement of June 23, 1973, announcing the new foreign policy of ours. I now propose, if I may, that we make a study, sentence by sentence, of President Park's foreign policy statement of June 23, 1973, here at our meeting, so that we can determine whether the new Republic of Korea foreign policy is a policy committed to the cause of achieving a peaceful unification, as we explain it to be, or merely a piece of "separatist" policy, as your side claims it to be.

Judging from recent developments in our inter-Korean relations and also from remarks of your side at our Vice Chairmen's meetings, it seems all too evident that your side is more interested either in overt preparation for yet another fratricidal war against us or in covert agitation of the so-called "south Korean revolution," under the cover of the so-called "nation" theory, than in continuation of our dialogue and observance of agreements that have been arrived at between our two sides.

Fascism Is A Label for Pyongyang Regime

To make the long story short, it sounds simply preposterous to hear you argue about "democracy," "civil rights" and the likes, which are all attributes of a democratic society and values that do not simply exist in a communist totalitarian society like that of yours in north Korea. And we cannot but become dumbfounded to hear you dare call the democratic society of the Republic of Korea a "fascist" society. I wonder if your side ever has the qualifications to make arguments about those values. Let me make a brief observation on the kind of society that you have up there in north Korea.

You now have, up there in north Korea, a communist proletarian dictatorship uniquely of your own making, featuring a life-long dictatorship of a specific

person, idolized as a demi-god for a personality cult which has no parallel in the history of mankind for its fanaticism, and subjugation of the entire populace there into “unconditional and absolute submission” to the “teachings” of that specific person. A north Korean version of a “neo-fascist” dictatorship, so to speak.

The democracy of yours, that you say you do have up there in north Korea, is a democracy that boasts 100% of eligible voters turning up at the polls and 100% of ballots cast turning out to be in support of the single candidate appointed by the communist party. Your north Korean “democracy” is a democracy without freedom of thoughts, freedom of religion, freedom of choice of residence, freedom of travel, freedom of press, freedom of publication, freedom of assembly, freedom of association, freedom of occupation and freedom of learning. And the self-styled “democracy” of yours does not even recognize the freedom of entertainment and amusement.

And, yet, you try to find fault with the democracy of our society and, what is more, does not hesitate to outrage us by pertly calling our democratic government in the Republic of Korea a “fascist” government!

Let me now ask you one question. Do you north Korean communists really understand what “fascism” is? The internationally established Webster’s Dictionary has this definition for the word, “fascism.” According to the dictionary, “fascism” is “a system of government characterized by rigid one-party dictatorship, forcible suppression of the opposition, the retention of private ownership of the means of production under centralized governmental control, beliegent nationalism and racism, glorification of war, etc (first instituted in Italy in 1922).” Now, would you think that this definition applies to us? Or else, would you think that it applies to your society in north Korea? Talk to yourself, and, I am sure, you will find the answer for yourself.

Do you, by any chance, have what we call “civil rights” in your society in north Korea? It is a known fact that in your north Korean communist society the people are asked, by the party, to submit not only their “rights,” but also their very lives, “unconditionally” to the party and their “beloved leader.” Naturally, it is undoubtedly clear that you don’t have any such things as “individual civil rights” in your side of Korea. And, notwithstanding, you continue to indulge yourselves with alleged charges of curtailment of “civil rights” in the Republic of Korea.

Inter-Korean Relations Is A Reciprocal Business

Time and again, I have stated earlier that such an aggressive attitude of yours, intent on interference in internal affairs of ours, is seriously counterproductive for our dialogue, for peace in Korea and for our efforts toward peaceful unification of the divided country. I now ask you the north Korean communists once again to keep your dirty hands off our internal affairs and to mind your own house. You must come back to your senses before too late and return to the basic spirit of the South-North Joint Communique.

Don't you ever forget the fact that our inter-Korean relations are a reciprocal business.

If your side takes a hard look at the realities of our country and becomes sensible enough to respond to our efforts toward a genuinely peaceful unification of our country, we would then be ready to assure you that we would not mind your business in your side of Korea, in consideration of the greater cause of peace, prosperity and future of our nation. We would do so in the belief that, under the circumstances, what we badly need is an institutionalized peace in Korea, pending a final solution to our unification question.

It has now been made very clear that the choice is there for your side to make. It is a plain fact that our peace-oriented policies and efforts toward peaceful unification need your consent, and approval. It takes two to negotiate. I advise you, Vice Chairman Cho, that your side will give a thorough consideration to the suggestions that I have made here today. Thank you.

Part Two

SNRCC Working-level Meets

Prolonged Stalemate A likely Prospect ROKNRC Offers Swap of Pictures of Aged Parents

The two Red Cross societies of Korea held, during the early months of 1975, a total of three rounds of working-level meetings of the South-North Red Cross Conference (SNRCC), on January 24, February 28 and March 26, respectively, all in Panmunjom.

No progress was reported, however, from these Panmunjom meetings, as the two sides remained bogged down over the question of reopening the full-dress SNRCC meeting. While calling for early normalization of the humanitarian dialogue at the SNRCC meetings, the Republic of Korea National Red Cross (ROKNRC) repeatedly urged at these recent meetings that the two sides immediately begin working on a program, which, as a pilot project, would confine, for the moment, the scope of the tracing services to aged parents of over 60 years by age. At the eighth working-level meeting on February 28, the ROKNRC proposed that the two Red Cross societies spearhead the tracing services for the aged parents with exchange of photographs between the aged parents and their separated families and relatives in the other side of Korea.

Throughout these three rounds of working-level meetings, the north Korean Red Cross (NKRC) did not give any sign of backing away from its obstinate opposition to an early normalization of the full-dress SNRCC meetings. And there is the indication that the current stalemate in the Panmunjom Red Cross working-level meetings will be prolonged for a good length of time.

Dr. Kim Yeon Choo, alternate chief ROKNRC delegate to the SNRCC heading the ROKNRC delegation to the Panmunjom working-level meetings, charged that the NKRC's persistent refusal to come to Seoul to attend the already long-overdue eighth full-dress SNRCC meeting was "totally unjustifiable by any reasons," and appealed, over and again, that the

NKRC accede to the ROKNRC offer of an early normalization of the humanitarian dialogue at the Red Cross talks. The NKRC, however, remained intransigent on its earlier demand that, as preconditions for resumption of the full-dress Red Cross talks, the Republic of Korea government renounce the new Foreign Policy for Peace and Unification of June 23, 1973, and abolish all anti-communist laws and policies.

The ROKNRC continued to press its earlier suggestion that, as a pilot project, the two sides take up the cases of aged parents, over 60 by age, for settlement prior to an overall agreement on implementation of projects envisioned in the five-point agenda of the full-dress Red Cross talks. The ROKNRC suggestion called for a bilateral agreement between the two Red Cross societies of Korea to facilitate ascertainment, and notification, of the fate and whereabouts of the aged parents sought after by their separated family members and relatives, and, in addition, to facilitate meetings, visits and exchange of mails between those aged parents and their separated family members.

The NKRC remained intransigently negative to the ROKNRC suggestion either. The NKRC argued that there was no point of taking up the cases of the old parents "because they are only trivial matters." The NKRC admitted that its sole concern at the moment was the "political and social climate" in the Republic of Korea, in other words, the Republic of Korea's anti-communist policies.

Part Three

Pres. Park's New Year Press Meet

President Urges Early Normalization of Talks; Asks N. Korea to Abandon Revolutionary Aims

[The following is a translated version of unexpurgated excerpts of remarks by President Park Chung Hee of the Republic of Korea on the state of the inter-Korean dialogue between the two sides of divided Korea at his New Year Press Conference on January 14, 1975]-Ed.

Question: In disregard of our efforts to carry on the south-north dialogue, the north Korean Communists are intensifying their maneuvers to communize the Republic of Korea, as exemplified by their assassination attempt on the President and the digging of an underground tunnel in the DMZ.

Would you tell us how you will go about conducting the south-north dialogue under such circumstances?

President: As I told you earlier, we have to admit frankly that the south-north dialogue is not going well. Candidly speaking, no progress has been made.

Recently, the Communist side has taken steps obviously intended to lower the status of the South-North Coordinating Committee. Why has the dialogue not gone smoothly?

In Korea, we have a proverb: "The priest is interested not so much in prayer as in the offerings." I think the south-north dialogue has not progressed well because the other side has had some ulterior motives of their own in undertaking the dialogue.

The purposes for which we and the Communists are coming to the conference table for dialogue are poles apart. We are seeking ways to reduce tension between the south and north, thus assuring peace and preventing war in Korea. Peaceful unification is a question that could be tackled after that on a gradual basis through exchanges and cooperation between south and north.

We have embarked on a sincere dialogue as a first step toward relaxation of tensions and establishment of peace. But the Communists are abusing this dialogue

for purposes of political propaganda. They are intent upon fomenting instability and confusion in our society. By disturbing, distracting, or weakening the anti-Communist system in the Republic of Korea by any means, they are seeking to take advantage of weaknesses that may arise within ourselves to attain unification of the country under Communist terms through the use of force. This ulterior motive on their part stands in the way of the south-north talks.

What did the northern side come up with as soon as the July 4 Joint Communiqué was declared in 1972 and the dialogue got under way?

All our countrymen in both the south and the north without reservation welcomed the announcement of the July 4 communiqué. Some optimistic people went so far as to imagine unification was close at hand. Other less impatient people also thought that, even if unification would not come forthwith, both sides would no longer fight or criticize each other as had been the case before, but would start exchanges step by step, including that of mail and visitors, and things would soften up considerably.

Immediately upon the start of the talks, the north Korean Communists demanded repeal of our Anti-Communist Law; they also called for abolition of the National Security Law and the release of anti-state offenders now imprisoned in south Korea. These anti-state prisoners were those who had committed criminal espionage, those who had collaborated with spies, and those who initiated underground movements under the direction of the Communist Party.

They call these criminals patriots—democratic patriots. They demand the pullout of American forces from Korea; they contend that the U.S. troops must be withdrawn because the presence of American forces is the major impediment to south-north dialogue, and to unification.

When we made the June 23 declaration, they demanded the renunciation of the declaration on the grounds that it would perpetuate the division of the Korean peninsula. To borrow their terminology, the declaration is tantamount to an advocacy of division of the country, and withdrawal of the declaration would be prerequisite to continuation of the south-north dialogue.

More recently, the Communists came up with a number of other absurd overtures, such as the demand that a grand south-north national congress should be convened, and a federation be formed, or that south and north should

join the United Nations as a single entity, in the name of the federation of Koryo, instead of separate admission to the U.N.

I myself wish that these things could happen. But everybody, even a child, knows that these are impossible things at this stage. They propose impracticable things and require us to accept them.

If we say we cannot accept them, the north Koreans try to place the blame for suspension of the south-north dialogue upon south Korea. They try desperately to make it appear that the dialogue cannot proceed because of our refusal to accept their "rational" proposals.

We have guessed that much, because what they wanted from the beginning was to derive maximum propaganda mileage from the dialogue.

While conducting the dialogue, they perpetrate all kinds of reckless provocations, including the sinking of our fishing and patrol boats, the assassination attempt of last August 15, and the digging of infiltration tunnels under the DMZ.

These are among the things they have been doing ever since the south-north dialogue began. Let me cite the case of the August 15 assassination attempt. It was revealed by the report on the investigation of the assassin, Mun Sekwang, that the August 15 assassination plot had been plotted and planned since the first directive for the assassination was issued in September 1972.

The assassination order was given in the same year when the joint communique was announced, namely 1972. From this single instance, we know that they started the whole scheme even before the ink was dry with which the joint communique had been signed.

As for the underground tunnel dug within the DMZ, it is the agreed opinion of experts that digging such a tunnel must have taken at least one or one and a half years.

This shows that they began to build the underground passageway immediately following the announcement of the July 4 Joint Communique. The tunnel is not an isolated one. We are looking for more such tunnels, of which public announcement will be made shortly, I believe.

What attracts our special attention is the fact that they intended to complete the underground tunnel construction by October this year.

The coming October is a highly festive occasion for them, what with the 30th anniversary of the inauguration of their regime and the birth of their Workers' (Communist) Party. From this it becomes clear why they timed the completion of the tunnel construction for October, and what sort of scheme they had in mind.

During the recent 29th U.N. General Assembly session a British delegate made an interesting statement. He said he was very disappointed at the stalemate in the south-north dialogue. "But having heard that north Korea is digging an underground tunnel inside the DMZ toward the south, I felt that delegates from the south and the north could join in a dialogue in an amicable atmosphere inside the tunnel," he said. This joke touched off a resounding wave of laughter in the U.N. chamber.

Such being the basic thinking of the north Korean Communists about the south-north dialogue, and such being their attitude toward its implementation, there is little to be expected of the south-north dialogue.

However, we are determined to normalize the south-north dialogue by all means, not to disrupt it. In order to avoid further fratricidal bloodshed, and not to repeat such a tragic event as the Korean War, maximum efforts must be made to continue and normalize the dialogue.

No one is in a position to predict whether unification can be achieved within this generation. Even if unification is not achieved in our time, we will have to prevent war among our fellow countrymen—this is the historic mission and responsibility entrusted to us.

Then what is the most urgent task for us at this juncture? It is the establishment of peace; our task is to reduce tension and firmly establish peace.

Peaceful unification will have to be preceded by the firm establishment of peace. Establishment of peace is an absolute prerequisite to our quest for peaceful unification.

Without firmly established peace, there will be no peaceful unification. Unless one victorious side imposes unification upon the other through war, and as long as we persevere in pursuing unification through peaceful means without resorting to war, the first step must be to establish peace.

Then, what is the most practical way of assuring peace? You can find it in a series of policies for peace which our government has proposed thus far. They constitute the most reasonable and realistic way.

Therefore, north Korea ought to accept them openmindedly. Our peace policies have been enunciated repeatedly through the June 23, 1973 declaration of foreign policy for peaceful unification, the proposal for a south-north non-aggression agreement, and the three fundamental policies for peaceful unification I announced last August 15.

I would like to ask what other practicable way of establishing peace in Korea is open to us at this stage?

We are convinced that these represent the most rational, logical and realistic approach, as I said before; and that the entire world community, excluding the Communist bloc, firmly supports our approach.

Even the Communists in north Korea are aware that this is the most rational and realistic way.

The reason why they cannot accept our proposals, I think, is that they are still obsessed with the illusion and fantasy that they can achieve unification of the country by force of arms.

Unless and until the extremists, ultra-radicals, leftist adventurists and jingoists within the north Korean Communist group renounce such an illusion and fantasy completely, they will not accept our overtures. They cannot accept them, even knowing that they are reasonable. Then, how can we make them accept our overtures? There is only one way.

It is necessary for us to build up and strengthen our national power, I believe, so that they will recognize their inability to overthrow the Republic of Korea by force of arms or violence, and thus give up the illusion.

If we reach a point where our national power is overwhelmingly superior to theirs, they must renounce the illusion and fantasy, turning away from the course of violent revolution. After that, I believe they would approach the dialogue with greater sincerity.

As you know, Communists the world over have a common strategy regarding violent revolutions.

Whenever they think we are weak, they will swoop down upon us, using arms and violence; but when they think we are strong, they turn to negotiations and bargaining. This is their strategy, common to all Communists in the world. Thus with the Chinese Communists also.

While the Chinese Communists still had inadequate strength, they pretended to seek a compromise under the guise of a so-called Nationalist-Communist Collaboration, but as soon as they came to have greater power and confidence, they lost no time in confronting the Nationalist forces.

It is likewise the case with the Communists in Vietnam, where a fresh wave of combat is rising again. The north Korean Communists are the same. What made the Communists propose an armistice in 1953? They came up with the proposal once they judged that the United Nations forces were too formidable, and they could not resist the U.N. forces with their own strength.

If they had thought at that time that our side was weak, and they could prevail over us with what strength they had, they would never have proposed an armistice; even if our side had proposed one, they would never have listened.

It is often pointed out that the relations between East and West Germany are different from our case. But I think these relations are not much different as far as principle goes.

Why does East Germany not challenge West Germany militarily? It is because West Germany is far stronger than East Germany, and East Germany has judged they could not overwhelm West Germany by force. For this reason, East Germany agreed to a compromise with West Germany, and the two are now enjoying peaceful coexistence following joint entry into the United Nations.

Suppose West Germany was weaker than East Germany in all respects. Would East Germany not have followed the suit of the north Korean Communists or the Vietnamese Communists, simply because the East German Communists were so gentle and conscientious?

As I see it, they agreed to a compromise because West Germany was far stronger in relative national strength. The same will be true with the north Korean Communists, I think.

If we are strong, they will offer to negotiate. If we seem weak, they will always challenge us with force. The basic objectives of the 1972 October Yushin Reforms—achieving national consensus, total defense and accelerated buildup of national power—were all motivated by such considerations.

It is my firm belief that the Yushin system provides the only way through which we can fulfill this crucial national task. There are some people who say that the Yushin system must be abolished to attain national consensus and to prevent aggression from north Korea, but this is simply nonsense.

Question: As you have just mentioned, north Korea refused our proposal for a south-north non-aggression agreement, while demanding the dissolution of the United Nations Command in Korea. Would you please give us the government's policy about this?

President: Right on this spot one year ago, I proposed a non-aggression agreement with north Korea in my New Year press conference. In making this proposal, I said that if north Korea really wanted peace, it should accept the proposal. But north Korea has repeatedly refused it.

Before I made this proposal, I had been well aware of the fact that north Korea had made a proposal for a south-north peace agreement and used it for political propaganda. We were opposed to this proposal of north Korea because we knew that what they meant by a peace agreement was peace in name only—a deceitful scheme camouflaged in the name of peace, an agreement not for peace but for war and aggression.

Now, let us recall what they stipulated in this camouflaged peace proposal. First, they demanded the withdrawal of all foreign troops, U.S. troops and U.N. troops from south Korea. Second, they called for mutual reduction of forces on the grounds that because both south and north Korea have too many troops there are frequent military clashes between the two sides. They even proposed that south and north Korea reduce their respective forces to less than the 100,000-man level and that the armistice agreement of the Korean War be scrapped. Of course, we rejected this.

On the other hand, we said in our non-aggression agreement proposal that both south and north Korea should make a joint pledge before the whole world that

they would not use force in any manner against each other or interfere in internal affairs of the other side, as you all well know. What we meant in this proposal was that although we abhor the Communists we would not slander them, nor would we interfere affairs. And we demanded in exchange that they also refrain from slandering us or interfering in our internal affairs, even though they dislike our democracy and capitalism. We also said that the truce agreement must be kept intact. These are the points we envisioned under the proposed non-aggression agreement.

But north Korea rejected the proposal. Why? Their reason is self-evident. As I mentioned earlier, insofar as the north Korean Communists stick to their desire and illusion for unifying the country under Communist rule by use of force, they cannot and will not accept our proposal for a south-north non-aggression agreement.

In order to translate this desire and illusion into reality they must continue armed provocations against us, infiltration of agents into our society, and dispatch of terrorist groups to our country. They must send espionage agents to the south to organize underground cells of the Communist Party and expand its networks so as to create confusion in our society. But if they concluded a non-aggression agreement with us, they could not play such Communist games in south Korea. This is why they rejected the non-aggression agreement proposal.

The north Korean Communists stubbornly demand withdrawal of U.N. troops from south Korea. They put this demand to the 28th U.N. General Assembly session and again to the 29th U.N. General Assembly session last year. It may be more correct to say that it is the north Korean Communists themselves who are responsible for U.N. troops being in Korea than to say that we south Koreans caused them to come to Korea.

It was toward the end of 1949, just a few months before the outbreak of the the Korean War, when all U.S. troops in south Korea were pulled out, leaving only a small contingent behind. On the morning of June 25 of the following year, north Korea launched an all-out attack on south Korea along the 38th parallel. Accordingly, U.N. troops came to Korea to check the advance of north Korean troops and help south Korea defend herself from the invasion. The continued presence of U.N. troops in south Korea testifies to the danger in this country of a renewed invasion from north Korea.

To repeat, U.S. troops and U.N. troops still remain in south Korea because the military power of north Korea poses a grave threat to the Republic of Korea.

Of course everybody, including myself, realizes that the U.N. Command will not remain in Korea indefinitely

But should the U.N. General Assembly or the U.N. Security Council resolve to dissolve the U.N. Command in Korea at this point of the time, such a resolution must not include the termination of the armistice agreement. In other words, the dissolution of the U.N. Command must not come about together with repeal of the truce agreement of the Korean War at this juncture. This is my government's stand and the view of friendly nations.

We have already made this stand clear, that if there is some effective alternative to the armistice agreement guaranteeing effective maintenance, operation and observance of the cease-fire terms as agreed upon under the truce pact, we dare not oppose the dissolution of the U.N. Command here in Korea.

This is why we positively supported the resolution on the Korean question submitted by the Western nations to the 29th U.N. General Assembly session last year. But the point I must make clear to you all here is that the dissolution of the U.N. Command is one thing and the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Korea is another thing. It is under the Korea-U.S. mutual defense treaty that U.S. troops are here in Korea.

However, the north Korean Communists aim at the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Korea in their demand for dissolution of the U.N. Command. They are concerned not about the U.N. Command itself but about U.S. troops under the U.N. flag in Korea. They argue that when the U.N. Command is dissolved, all U.S. troops now under the U.N. flag must also leave Korea. The intention of the north Korean Communists behind their demand for the dissolution of the U.N. Command is withdrawal of U.S. troops from south Korea.

Judging from all this tirade of the north Korean Communists, we can see what they inflexibly aim at in their political and diplomatic offensives directed against us. In fact, what they intend in their peace treaty proposal is the eventual withdrawal of U.S. troops from Korea. Because they want the withdrawal of foreign troops before anything else, they cannot but reject our proposal for a non-aggres-

sion agreement. They consider that if they accept the non-aggression agreement proposal, U.S. troops will not pull out of south Korea. Because our proposal calls for non-interference in internal affairs of the other side, and continued validity of the armistice agreement; and because they desire withdrawal of U.S. troops from south Korea, they cannot accept the proposal.

Recently, the north Korean Communists have proposed an all-Korea grand national congress, and I have deeply considered in many ways what it would be like, only to reach the conclusion that this also is designed to send home U.S. troops in Korea. By an all-Korea grand national congress, they mean a meeting of representatives from all political parties and social organizations in south and north Korea. I presume this would be a meeting of 500 to 1,000 persons, and I wonder what such a large assembly of people could discuss to reach what conclusion about peaceful unification of the country.

What do they seek to gain from such a meeting? South and north Korea would be equally represented at the meeting. If the meeting consists of 500 people, both sides can send 250 representatives each, and if it is of 1,000 people, they will be represented by 500 each. Consider what the north Korean delegation would want to discuss first. Needless to say, it will come up with the demand for withdrawal of all foreign troops from south Korea.

And what do the north Korean Communists expect from such a meeting? Of course, the north Korean delegates to the meeting will unite to a man, echoing what their chief delegate will say. But among the delegates from south Korea will be some people who are critical of the south Korean government, and fully aware of this, the north Korean delegation will certainly try to win over such dissident delegates from Seoul, maneuvering to buy votes in their favor. Suppose they cut down our votes in such a maneuver in a meeting held on the basis of equal representation, then they could pass their demand for withdrawal of foreign troops from south Korea.

I am not sure whether such would be a consequence of their grand national congress, but I am sure that they proposed the conference expecting such a result. Once they get such a result, they will make use of it for political purposes, claiming that although all Koreans demand withdrawal of foreign troops from Korea, they still remain in south Korea. I presume they proposed an all-Korea grand national Congress with such an aim in mind.

They have also proposed a south-north confederation system in the same context and with the same objective. We have no reason for accepting such a proposal, and I know that they know this. Should we accept it and suggest a south-north meeting to discuss it, they would come with the demand for withdrawal of foreign troops from south Korea, among other things.

In this proposal for a confederation government, the north Korean Communists said that insofar as there are U.S. troops on Korean soil it would be impossible to hold a dialogue to discuss a confederation system, but that there must be a united confederation government for all Korea. In other words, they consider the U.S. troops in south Korea as an obstacle to the establishment of a confederation system uniting the country, and strenuously demand the pullout of these troops from south Korea. As mentioned earlier, their demand for the dissolution of the U.N. Command is fundamentally motivated by their plot to send home the U.S. troops under the U.N. flag in south Korea. All this leads us to the conclusion that the supreme and pressing goal of the north Korean Communists in their political, diplomatic and propaganda offensives against us is the withdrawal of U.S. troops from south Korea. This we can infer from their tirades.

You know very well what they will drive at after the withdrawal of U.S. troops from south Korea. Because both the Korean and U.S. governments are well aware of such schemes and intentions of the north Korean Communists, they are in complete agreement that the U.S. troops in south Korea must not be withdrawn at this point in time.

Availing myself of this occasion, I would like to reiterate a few propositions to the north Korean Communists.

First, I sincerely want them to accept our proposal for a south-north non-aggression agreement if they really want peace on the Korean peninsula, instead of wasting time by sticking to their useless and visionary dream. This may seem a mere repetition of what I said last year to them, but I can only repeat it this year for the sake of peace on the Korean peninsula.

Second, I once again call on them to respond affirmatively to my foreign policy statement on peace and unification issued on June 23, 1973, and to enter the United Nations simultaneously with south Korea and remain there as separate members of the world body until unification.

Third, if they agree to the need for continued validity of the armistice agreement and its effective operation, I clearly say that the south Korean government will not be opposed to the dissolution of the U.N. Command in Korea.

Fourth, I ask them to be really sincere in normalizing the south-north dialogue as soon as possible.

Finally, I would like to say to them that should they be opposed to entering the United Nations simultaneously with us under any and all circumstances, we will unilaterally seek U.N. membership. I believe that the Republic of Korea is fully eligible for such membership. So I ask north Korea not to oppose or impede our effort to seek U.N. membership simply because it does not care to seek its own membership.

Part Four

References

SOUTH-NORTH JOINT COMMUNIQUE

Recently there were talks held both in Pyongyang and Seoul to discuss problems of improving South-north relations and unifying the divided Fatherland.

Director Hu Rak Lee of the Central Intelligence Agency of Seoul visited Pyongyang from 2 to 5 May 1972 to hold talks with Director Young Joo Kim of the Organization and Guidance Department of Pyongyang. Second Vice Premier Sung Chul Park, acting on behalf of Director Young Joo Kim, also visited Seoul from 29 May to 1 June 1972 to hold further talks with Director Hu Rak Lee.

With the common desire to achieve peaceful unification of the Fatherland as early as possible, the two sides in these talks had frank and openhearted exchanges of views, and made great progress in promoting mutual understanding.

In the course of the talks, the two sides, in an effort to remove the misunderstandings and mistrust and mitigate increased tensions that have arisen between the South and the North as a result of long separation, and further to expedite unification of the Fatherland, have reached full agreement on the following points:

1. The two sides have agreed to the following principles for unification of the Fatherland:

First, unification shall be achieved through independent Korean efforts without being subject to external imposition or interference.

Second, unification shall be achieved through peaceful means, and not through the use of force against each other.

Third, as a homogeneous people, a great national unity shall first be sought, transcending differences in ideas, ideologies, and systems.

2. In order to ease tensions and foster an atmosphere of mutual trust between the South and the North, the two sides have agreed not to slander or defame each

other, not to undertake armed provocations whether on a large or small scale, and to take positive measures to prevent inadvertent military incidents.

3. The two sides, in order to restore severed national ties, promote mutual understanding and to expedite independent peaceful unification, have agreed to carry out various exchanges in many fields.

4. The two sides have agreed to cooperate positively with each other to seek early success of the South-North Red Cross talks, which are underway with the fervent expectations of the entire people.

5. The two sides, in order to prevent the outbreak of unexpected military incidents and to deal directly, promptly and accurately with problems arising between the South and the North, have agreed to install a direct telephone line between Seoul and Pyongyang.

6. The two sides, in order to implement the aforementioned agreed items, solve various problems existing between the South and the North, and to settle the unification problem on the basis of the agreed principles for unification of the Fatherland, have agreed to establish and operate a South-North Coordinating Committee co-chaired by Director Hu Rak Lee and Director Young Joo Kim.

7. The two sides, firmly convinced that the aforementioned agreed items correspond with the common aspirations of the entire people, who are anxious to see an early unification of the Fatherland, hereby solemnly pledge before the entire Korean people that they will faithfully carry out these agreed items.

July 4, 1972

**UPHOLDING THE DESIRES OF THEIR RESPECTIVE
SUPERIORS**

HU RAK LEE

YOUNG JOO KIM

Agreed Minute
on
Formation and Operation
of
South-North Coordinating Committee

Both parties agree on the formation and operation of the South-North Coordinating Committee as follows:

1. The South-North Coordinating Committee aims at the solution of the problem of unifying the fatherland on the basis of such agreed principles for the unification of the fatherland as furtherance of the execution of agreed items in the South-North Joint Communique of July 4, 1972, developing of increasingly improved relations between the South and the North and joining efforts and working together in various fields.
2. The functions of the South-North Coordinating Committee are as follows:
 - A. To consult about, and settle, the question of realizing an independent and peaceful unification of the country on the basis of the agreed principles for the unification of the fatherland and to guarantee its implementation.
 - B. To consult about, and settle, the question of effecting a wide range of political exchanges between political parties, social organizations and individuals in the South and the North and to guarantee its implementation.
 - C. To consult about, and settle, the questions of economic, cultural and social exchanges as well as of joining efforts and working together between the South and the North, and to guarantee their implementation.
 - D. To consult about, and settle, the questions of easing tensions, preventing military clashes and dissolving the state of military confrontation between the South and the North, and to guarantee their implementation.
 - E. To consult about, and settle, the question of taking joint steps in overseas activities between the South and the North, enhancing accordingly the

national prestige as a homogeneous nation, and to guarantee its implementation.

3. The South-North Coordinating Committee shall be organized as follows:

- A. The South-North Coordinating Committee shall be composed of one Co-chairman, one Vice Chairman, one Executive Member and two Members from each party. The number of the Committee Members may be increased as necessary. Director Hu Rak Lee of the Central Intelligence Agency and Director Young Joo Kim of the Organizational Guidance Department are hereby designated as the Co-chairmen. Vice Chairmen, Executive Members and Members shall be of ministerial or vice ministerial rank and shall be appointed respectively by the Co-chairmen through prior consultation.
- B. An Executive Council shall be created within the South-North Coordinating Committee.

The Executive Council shall consult about, and settle, when the authority is so delegated by the Co-chairmen of both parties, various problems that arise in the south-north relations while the South-North Coordinating Committee is in recess, and shall guarantee their implementation. The Executive Council shall be composed of the Executive Member and two Secretaries from each side.

- C. Political, Military, Foreign Affairs, Economic and Cultural Subcommittees shall be created within the South-North Coordinating Committee. Each subcommittee shall be created as the progress at the South-North Coordinating Committee warrants it. The functions and the formation of the subcommittees shall be regulated separately through mutual agreement.
 - C. The South-North Coordinating Committee shall have its Joint Secretariat at Panmunjom. Both parties shall respectively appoint Co-directors of the Joint Secretariat one from each party and shall staff necessary number of personnel to work under Co-directors.
4. The South-North Coordinating Committee shall operate as follows:
- A. The South-North Coordinating Committee shall make it a principle to hold

its meetings in Seoul and Pyongyang by turns, and may hold them at Panmunjom, if necessary.

- B. The South-North Coordinating Committee shall convene once every two to three months, and the Executive Council once every month. Extraordinary meetings can be held through mutual agreement.
 - C. The South-North Coordinating Committee meeting shall be held either in public or behind the closed door.
 - D. Necessary number of specialists and staffs of the Joint Secretariat shall be allowed, through mutual agreement, to attend the South-North Coordinating Committee and the Executive Council meetings.
 - E. A final agreement of the South-North Coordinating Committee shall take effect as soon as the Co-chairmen of both parties put their initials on the note of agreement and the agreed items shall be simultaneously announced through the Joint Secretariat upon mutual agreement.
 - F. Detailed operational procedures for the South-North Coordinating Committee shall be worked out separately.
5. This Agreed Minute shall be revised and supplemented through mutual agreement.
6. This Agreed Minute takes effect upon exchange of the texts with initials of both parties on them.

November 4, 1972

(Signed)

Director Hu Rak Lee
Co-chairman (Seoul side)
South-North Coordinating
Committee

(Signed)

Director Young Joo Kim
Co-chairman (Pyongyang
side)
South-North Coordinating
Committee

**SEVEN POINTS OF REPUBLIC OF KOREA'S FOREIGN
POLICY FOR PEACE AND UNIFICATION, PROCLAIMED
BY PRESIDENT PARK CHUNG HEE, JUNE 23, 1973**

1. The peaceful unification of the fatherland is the supreme task of the Korean people. We will continue to exert every effort to accomplish this task.
2. Peace must be maintained in the Korean peninsula by all means. The south and the north should neither interfere with each other's internal affairs nor commit aggression against each other.
3. We will continue to make efforts with sincerity and patience to secure concrete results from the South-North Dialogue based on the spirit of the South-North Joint Communiqué dated 4th July 1972.
4. We shall not oppose north Korea's participation with us in international organizations, if it is conducive to the easing of tension and the furtherance of international cooperation.
5. We shall not object to our admittance into the United Nations together with north Korea, if the majority of the member-states of the United Nations so wish, provided that it does not cause hindrance to our national unification. Even before our admittance into the United Nations as a member, we shall not be opposed to north Korea also being invited at the time of the U.N. General Assembly's deliberation of the "Korean question" in which the representative of the Republic of Korea is invited to participate.
6. The Republic of Korea will open its door to all the nations of the world on the basis of the principles of reciprocity and equality. At the same time, we urge those countries whose ideologies and social institutions are different from ours to open their doors likewise to us.
7. Peace and good-neighborliness are the firm basis of the foreign policy of the Republic of Korea. It is reaffirmed that we will continue to further strengthen the ties of friendship existing between our friendly nations and our country. (I wish to make it clear that matters concerning north Korea in the policies enumerated above are interim measures during the transition period pending the achievement of our national unification and that the taking of these measures does not signify our recognition of north Korea as a state.)

**THREE BASIC PRINCIPLES FOR PEACEFUL REUNIFICATION
PRONOUNCED BY PRESIDENT PARK CHUNG HEE IN HIS
COMMEMORATIVE SPEECH ON THE LIBERATION DAY OF
AUGUST 15, 1974**

First, peace should be firmly established on the Korean peninsula. For this purpose, a mutual non-aggression agreement should be concluded between south and north.

Second, the south and north should open their doors to each other and mutual trust should be restored between them. For this purpose, they should pursue rapid progress of the South-North Dialogue with sincerity and many-sided exchanges and cooperation should take place between them.

Thirdly, based on the above foundations, free general elections should be held throughout Korea under fair election management and supervision, in direct proportion to the indigenous population, thereby achieving the unification of the country.

TEXT OF THE 29TH UNGA RESOLUTION ON KOREA

The General Assembly, desiring that progress be made towards the attainment of the goal of peaceful reunification of Korea on the basis of the freely expressed will of the Korean people, recalling its satisfaction with the issuance of the Joint Communiqué at Seoul and Pyongyang on July 4, 1972, and the declared intention of both the south and the north of Korea to continue the dialogue between them, aware, however, that tension in Korea has not been totally eliminated and that the Armistice Agreement of July 27, 1953, remains indispensable to the maintenance of peace and security in the area, recognizing that, in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations regarding the maintenance of international peace and security, the United Nations has a continuing responsibility to ensure the attainment of this goal on the Korean peninsula.

1. Reaffirms the wishes of its members, as expressed in the consensus statement adopted by the General Assembly on November 28, 1973, and urges both the south and the north of Korea to continue their dialogue to expedite the peaceful reunification of Korea.

2. Expresses the hope that the Security Council, bearing in mind the need to ensure continued adherence to the Armistice Agreement and the full maintenance of peace and security in the area, will in due course give consideration, in consultation with the parties directly concerned, to those aspects of the Korean question which fall within its responsibilities, including the dissolution of the United Nations Command in conjunction with appropriate arrangements to maintain the Armistice Agreement which is calculated to preserve peace and security in the Korean peninsula, pending negotiations and conciliation between the two Korean governments leading to a lasting peace between them.

Published on March 28, 1975

The Public Relations Association of Korea

I. P. O. Box 4161

Seoul, Korea

No. 009
December, 1975

South-North Dialogue in Korea

International Cultural Society of Korea
Seoul, Korea

South-North Dialogue in Korea

— *South-North Coordinating Committee*—

— *South-North Red Cross Conference*—

To Readers:

For the inter-Korean relations, the year 1975 was yet another year of setbacks full of new trials and challenges, accompanied by a sharp increase in the tension between the two sides of Korea. Earlier in the spring, the year saw a traumatic finale of the Indochinese war, obviously making communist north Korea seriously tempted to try an Indochinese version of communist takeover in the Korean peninsula, too. For months now the probability of north Korea considering a military solution to the problems of divided Korea, taking advantage of the weakness of the U.S. security commitments to her allies thought to have been exemplified in the case of the Indochinese debacle has remained a subject of raging debates among concerned Korea watchers. The year also saw discontinuation of the Vice Chairmen's Meeting of the South-North Coordinating Committee in the immediate wake of the fall of Indochina.

The 9th issue of the "South-North Dialogue in Korea" intends to make a review of developments in the relations between the two sides of Korea during 1975, as it concerns the two-way inter-Korean dialogue, together with an account of progresses made in the faltering dialogue on both lanes, the South-North Coordinating Committee and the South-North Red Cross Conference. The editor would also like to let it be known to readers that this booklet is being presented with its contents edited, as have been the cases with the earlier issues, Nos. 1-8, in full cooperation and consultation with both the South-North Coordinating Committee (Seoul side) and the Republic of Korea National Red Cross. Therefore, the editor has this message to readers that, when they quote and/or reproduce, either in full or in part, the contents of this booklet, they may attribute their source either to the South-North Coordinating Committee (Seoul side) or the Republic of Korea National Red Cross, as the quotations and/or reproductions relate to either of them. The editor will appreciate comments and advises from readers.

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Part One

President Urges Dialogue to Resume

3rd Anniversary of SNJC:

President Assails NK War Preparations; Asks Early Resumption of Dialogue

[In a special statement on July 4, 1975, marking the third anniversary of the historic announcement of the South-North Joint Communique in 1972, President Park Chung Hee of the Republic of Korea called the Joint Communique a crystallization of the persistent efforts of the people and the government of the Republic of Korea to institutionalize a durable peace on the Korean peninsula and to achieve a peaceful unification of the divided country. The President urged in the special statement that, by returning to the basic spirit of the South-North Joint Communique, communist north Korea respond to the repeated calls of the Republic of Korea to have the inter-Korean dialogue resumed at an early date on both lanes. The full English text of the President's special statement is as follows. -Ed.]

My fellow countrymen at home and abroad!

We observe today the third anniversary of the historic announcement of the South-North Joint Communique of July 4, 1972, which was made amidst acclamations from our fifty million countrymen aspiring for peaceful unification of their fatherland and the people around the world dedicated to the cause of peace.

As is well-known, **the basic spirit of the South-North Joint Communique is to work for restoration of trust and expansion of exchanges between the two sides of Korea through dialogue between themselves, and based on achievements thereby, to pursue institutionalization of a durable peace**

on this land and accomplishment of an independent unification.

Unfortunately, however, three years thereafter today, we find the dialogue between the south and north deadlocked, with the tension on the Korean peninsula at an all-time high.

I would like to make use of this occasion, therefore, to reiterate our steadfast dedication to the cause of a peaceful unification, recalling the policies of ours heretofore solidly committed to the task of bringing about relaxation of tensions and institutionalization of peace.

Looking in retrospect, we have a vivid memory of the Korean War of 1950–1953, provoked by the north Korean communists who launched a fullscale unprovoked invasion of the Republic of Korea on June 25, 1950, and the armed provocations of various kinds that have continued to be perpetrated against us by the north Korean communists in the years that followed the armistice of 1953.

In 1968, in particular, there was even an attempted commando raid on Chong Wa Dae, the Presidential Residence in Seoul, in January, followed by the landings on Uljin and Samchok areas on the east coast by groups of north Korean armed agents trained for guerrilla operations in November and the kidnapping of a Korean Air Lines passenger plane in December of the following year. The 1970s in Korea dawned amidst heightening tensions, not without the mounting danger of yet another war to break out.

These were the circumstances which prompted me, back on August 15, 1970, to issue a declaration, now called the August 15 Declaration, as a means to prevent this land from being plagued by yet another havoc of war and, instead, keep the peace maintained intact.

I suggested, in the declaration, that, provided the north Korean communists accept the authority and competence of the United Nations, we would not be opposed to allowing them to take part, along with us, in the

discussions on the Korean question in the United Nations. I also proposed that they would agree to enter into a competition of good faith with us of development, constructiveness and creativity.

Then, in August of the following year, 1971, we proposed the South-North Red Cross Conference—a manifestation of our brotherly love toward those fellow countrymen of ours having their loving family members living in total separation as a result of the Korean War provoked by the north Korean communists, seeking amelioration of their sufferings and their reunions at an early date.

In a move to bring about a turning point in our strenuous efforts to accomplish peaceful unification through a dialogue directly between the two sides of Korea, I also had a personal emissary of mine sent over to Pyongyang, despite many difficulties, and, as a result, gave birth to the South-North Joint Communiqué announced on July 4, 1972.

Before long, however, the south-north dialogue was found stalemated due to the lack of cooperation from the north side.

On June 23, 1973, in yet another move to stimulate progress in the dialogue and to adjust our policies to the prevailing international trends generally headed toward promotion of the cause of peace, I enunciated the new Foreign Policy for Peace and Unification—a seven-point policy for peaceful unification of the country in which, among others, we rededicated ourselves to the cause of having the south-north dialogue pushed ahead patiently and with sincerity, withdrew our opposition to having north Korea represented, together with us, in international organizations, including the United Nations, and declared an open-door to all those nations with ideologies and systems different from those of ours, based on the principle of reciprocity and equality.

Rather than responding affirmatively to the all too reasonable and realistic policy proposals of ours, however, the north Korean communists have countered them with unfounded accusations and attacks on us, dangling lip services of the unrealistic clichés about the so-called “federated”

Korea and the “grand national congress.”

Moreover, on August 28, 1973, the north Korean communists unilaterally cut off the south-north dialogue, trying to excuse themselves with such demands totally unacceptable to us as we abrogate the Anti-Communist Law and the National Security Law.

We have remained undaunted in spite of the lawlessness of the north Korean communists. We have been patient enough to continue to placate them, dedicated as we were to the cause of working toward a peaceful unification of our fatherland at all cost, into accepting resumption of the dialogue both in the South-North Coordinating Committee and the South-North Red Cross Conference.

Not only has the north Korean communist regime remained obstinately opposed to normalization of the dialogue, however, they have continued to intensify their aggressive military campaigns against us, posing military threats on those islands of ours off the west coast and having their military installations of all kinds increasingly strengthened all along the Demilitarized Zone.

Under these circumstances, I was as determined as ever to make sure that there would not be yet another outbreak of war in the Korean peninsula.

On January 18, 1974, I proposed a south-north mutual non-aggression agreement. And on August 15, 1974, I laid down the most realistic and pragmatic principles for a peaceful unification in three points, calling for the concluding of a south-north mutual non-aggression agreement, the mutual opening of their respective societies and achievement of unification through a freely-held general election based on mutual trust restored between the two sides of Korea.

It was a dramatic demonstration of our firm national will that we should, under any circumstances, renounce use of arms as a means by which to achieve unification and that unification should be achieved solely by peaceful means, whatever the circumstances.

Notwithstanding the peace proposals of sincerity and persuasions of ours, however, the north Korean communists have intransigently refused to normalize the dialogue. They, instead, have begun sabotaging even the working-level contacts lately, while being found frantically engaged in schemes to have their daydreams of having the country unified either through overthrow of the Republic of Korea by force or through use of arms realized.

My fellow countrymen both in the south and the north!

All the way down from the very day of the national liberation in 1945, the north Korean aggressors have remained persistently loyal to their master strategy seeking an “armed revolution in south Korea,” without a moment of distraction.

It was at the very moment when we were in session with them in the South-North Red Cross Conference and when we were having the South-North Joint Communiqué announced that the north Korean communists were deep under the surface of the earth in the Demilitarized Zone digging the underground tunnels unmistakably designed for use in the event of their renewed attack on us.

It was at the very moment when we were together sitting across the table that the north Korean communists were found continuously engaged in the treacherous and barbarous acts of provocation, infiltrating armed agents and snipers into the south, with the telltale aim of seeking subversion of the Republic of Korea.

These, among others, were the hard evidences that the north Korean communists have never a time departed from their blind pursuit of an armed revolution in south Korea.

There is no denying, therefore, that the “peace” spoken of by the north Korean communists has never meant the true peace desired by us. It is only a piece of flagrant fraud designed as a cover to conceal their pursuit of yet another aggressive war against us and a violent revolution in south Korea.

And, despite all those lip services about the so-called “self-reliance,” the north Korean communists obstinately refuse to normalize the south-north dialogue, which is irrefutably the first major step toward relaxation of tension in the Korean peninsula and, ultimately, peaceful unification.

While refusing to sit together with the countrymen of their own across the table for serious talks on the future of the nation, they are now found roaming about around the world, frantically trying to defame and libel the Republic of Korea with fraudulent propaganda allegations.

Considering these realities, there is no question about the fact that the “peace” and the “self-reliance” spoken of by them are anything but flagrant frauds.

And, it is crystal-clear that the north Korean communists should be entirely responsible for the deadlock in the south-north dialogue.

And, it is precisely on that account that the north Korean communists, remaining obstinate in keeping their backs turned on the national efforts toward restoration of trust between the south and north, while frantically engaged in their scheme of seeking unification through use of both arms and violence, have no qualifications whatsoever to speak of “nation,” “peace” or “peaceful unification of the fatherland” sort of things.

I, therefore, would like to make use of this occasion today strongly to ask the north Korean communists:

—Immediately to terminate all their preparations of aggressive war, all their acts of indirect aggression and those overseas activities of theirs aimed at disgracing none other than the countrymen of their own, should they have affection for their own fellow countrymen and were they committed to the cause of peaceful unification, in their true sense of the words.

—To agree to bring the south-north dialogue back to full resumption by having the plenary meetings of the South-North Coordinating

Committee and the full-dress meetings of the South-North Red Cross Conference reopened at the earliest possible date.

My dear fellow countrymen!

It now is the most urgent task of ours being shouldered by our contemporary generation to make sure that we have yet another armed aggression against us by the north Korean aggressors securely forestalled and, thus, to have a durable peace solidly institutionalized on this land.

And, were we to have a durable peace solidly institutionalized on the Korean peninsula, let me be very emphatic to state that it is imperative that we maximize our total national strength. It is my firm belief that the maximized total national strength of ours will, in turn, be a vital factor indispensable to lead the south-north dialogue to success. Let us now rededicate ourselves, therefore, to the cause of maximization of our total national strength, solidly based on national concord and unity, in order to provide a momentum for the south-north dialogue and, ultimately, peaceful unification.

30th National Liberation Day:

President Sees Peaceful Unification A Must for Full National Liberation

[On August 15, 1975, the Republic commemorated the 30th anniversary of her national liberation, as the nation entered into the 30th year of its tragic territorial division. In a commemorative speech delivered on the day at an indoor rally in Seoul, President Park Chung Hee of the Republic of Korea asked the nation to pledge anew its undaunted commitment to the cause of achieving a peaceful unification of the country in order to make the national liberation a complete one. The full English text of the President's commemorative speech is as follows. —Ed.]

My fifty million compatriots of the South and North!

We commemorate today our Nation's thirtieth anniversary of liberation from the yoke of Japanese imperialism and of the Restoration of our sovereign rights.

The real significance of this event of thirty years ago lies in the fact that we, as a nation, have seized upon an opportunity of historic moment to build in this land an independent, united, and prosperous state which inherits legitimacy in the unfolding history of our Nation, thereby making positive contributions toward peace of the world and progress of mankind.

This is the reason why we have continued to this day our unceasing efforts to attain the revival of our national glory. We have consecrated our

joyful emotions and excitements of thirty years ago for the aim of nation-building today. The hopes we had embraced at that moment have been elevated to our new devotion today.

The blood and sweat we poured into this immensely worthwhile task have crystallized into tangible results. And so, in spite of the harsh and regrettable reality of the division of our Fatherland, we can indeed celebrate this national day, with our eyes fixed upon the bright and better future for our nation.

It is with these thoughts that I want to reflect with you now upon the path we together have walked through in these decades of the past. I wish this moment of reflection to be elevated to an occasion to rededicate ourselves to the goals of prosperity and peaceful reunification of our Fatherland.

My beloved compatriots!

Our country, the Republic of Korea, has surmounted many challenges and obstacles of the past three decades, and have continued advance toward prosperity and the ultimate goal of peaceful unification of our nation.

The state of our economy at the time of our national liberation was at a very low ebb. Furthermore, what we had then was totally destroyed in the war triggered by the north Korean surprise invasion of the South. Our country lay in smoldering ruin.

But we were blessed with the tenacity of courage and determination to build again. We successfully implemented the three Five-Year Economic Development Plans; and, in the process, we have turned our ruins of yesterday into what we all can see today—a strong base on which to build national prosperity.

The *Saemaul* (New Village) Movement, propelled by our evergrowing spirit of diligence, self-help, and cooperation, have revolutionized the esprit of our Nation and transformed our national geography. Fertile soil was reclaimed where once was sea, and in the expanding industrial centers

are mushrooming factories of international standard in terms of their scale and sizes.

Our express-ways, lengthening each year, have linked all communities in our land and brought them together in distances that are spanned in a day. Improved flow of goods and services helped better the lives of our people, gradually eliminating the gap between urban and rural communities, and building solid foundations which assure success of our struggles against poverty.

We can now begin to aspire to the levels of welfare achieved by the advanced countries. Korea today has become in fact an object of world attention. The groundwork has been laid for peaceful unification of our Fatherland and the eventual revival of our national glory.

Now, we cannot, even for a moment, falter in these precious and creative endeavors. We must always devote our best efforts so that these precious fruits of our hard labor will never be lost again due to another destructive war.

It was to prevent the recurrence of war in Korea that we had urged the north Korean Communists to abandon the thought of southward invasion and to join the South in bona fide competition of development, construction and creativity. Thus we had taken the initiative in producing the South-North Joint Communiqué of July 4, 1972, and the subsequent dialogue between the South and the North of Korea.

And, to place these new and encouraging developments on a firmer footing, there was proclaimed on June 23, 1973, my Special Statement of Foreign Policy for Peace and Unification. I also proposed that a mutual agreement of non-aggression be concluded between the South and the North.

When, through these means, peace takes root in Korea, and the South and the North restore mutual trust through dialogue and other interchanges, then a ground will have been secured on which free and general elections can be held throughout Korea under fair election man-

agement and supervision and in direct proportion to the indigenous population, so as to establish the government of a united Korea. As I have made clear, these are the gist of the three basic principles for peaceful unification of Korea.

As mentioned above, we have made during the past three decades unceasing efforts aimed at peaceful unification of our Fatherland. This policy will be pursued in the future as in the past, and in the end, we shall achieve the very goal to which our efforts are dedicated today.

Unfortunately, the north Korean Communists, however, have chosen a path diametrically opposed to what we have been pursuing.

They plotted aggression and destruction of peace in Korea. They betrayed the national interest, fanatically espoused ideologies alien to our people and have done everything to communize the whole of Korea and to break up the continuity of our national history.

Earlier, they had not only agitated in favor of trusteeship of Korea, but also rejected the general elections of the South and the North as recommended by the United Nations in 1947. In this manner, they had sown the seed of partition of our country and the division of our Nation.

But that was not all. They started the Korean War by invading the South. They mercilessly massacred the people of their own race by the hundreds of thousands. Thus, they betrayed the national aspiration for peaceful unification of the Fatherland, thereby committing grave crimes against our Nation.

This group of the same war criminals persistently continued to be captives of their own aggressive ambitions even after the armistice.

By cruelly exploiting the masses in north Korea, they pursued the so-called "Four Military Policy Lines," and completed all preparations for another invasion of the South. By so doing, they have transformed the entire land of north Korea into a vast garrison area.

In this process, they enslaved our north Korean brethren under an

unprecedented personality cult vicious to a degree unparalleled in history.

In this manner, our nation's cultural heritage was emaciated there, with the good traditions, morals and our national identity which we have inherited from our forefathers being destroyed beyond their recognition in north Korea.

While this has been going on, they are continuing armed provocations and simultaneously increasing their false peace propaganda barrages to camouflage their aggressive designs. Violent provocations coupled with propaganda are the same double-edged tactics which they tried on the eve of the outbreak of the Korean War.

Incidents of their armed provocations in late 1960's are still vivid in our memory today. We remember, for example, the attempted assault on the Chong Wa Dae (the Presidential Residence), the armed guerrilla infiltrations in the Uljin-Samchok area, and the hijacking of the Korean Airlines passenger aircraft to north Korea.

More recently, they invaded our waters surrounding our five islands in the West Sea. Last year today, at the celebration of the National Liberation Day, attempt was made on the life of the President. And more than ten tunnels have been constructed for the obvious purpose of invasion of the South. Thus acts of armed aggression continue unabated.

It is a matter of particular concern that the aggressive-minded adventurists in north Korea had constructed the offensive tunnels precisely at the time when they had accepted our proposal to initiate the peaceful dialogues between the South and the North.

And, in less than a year after the dialogue had begun, they suspended it unilaterally after various implausible excuses were uttered by them and unacceptable conditions were attached by them.

It is an undeniable fact that they were never really interested in restoring mutual trust or in promoting mutual exchanges. It cannot but be concluded that, all along, they had intended to use the dialogue as a cover for their aggressive and offensive manoeuvres.

Emboldened by the recent situation in Indochina, they plotted “the second Korean War,” but when they confronted the ever-strong and total national security posture here in the South, as well as the growing concern and criticism in the forums of international opinion, they started once more to cover up, until more favorable moment would arrive for them, their aggressive designs with deceptive propaganda campaign.

The tunnels, in particular, remain the strikingly visible evidence which reveals the treachery and the deception of which their propaganda is made.

It is not by chance that, without giving any justifiable reasons, they refused to accept our proposal to conduct a joint fact-finding investigation into these tunnels dug under the armistice line. Such is the proof of their duplicity and deceit.

My fellow countrymen!

These are the circumstances under which we commemorate the thirtieth anniversary of our National Liberation. These are the harsh and stark realities in the Korean peninsula.

But, however harsh the challenge may be, neither have we abandoned, nor shall we abandon in the future, any of our efforts for the peaceful reunification of our Fatherland. The reason for this is that the peaceful unification of our Fatherland is the ultimate wish cherished deep in the hearts of all the Korean people.

To the fulfillment of this national aspiration, we must devote our best efforts. And that is the historic mission entrusted to all of us.

But, however pressing and urgent the national unification may be, the goal must never be pursued by means of violence or military force.

It is my firm conviction that unification of our Fatherland must be achieved only through peaceful means. This forms the very basis of the unification policy adopted by the Republic of Korea.

We do not conceive of national unification in terms of exacting the

bloodshed of our People, or destroying the foundations of our Nation's progress. We do not think of unification merely as an elimination of armistice line of demarcation. We desire only such unification that the entire Korean people may enjoy peace and prosperity not only for this generation, but also for the generations to follow.

Therefore, I take this opportunity to make it clear once again to the north Korean side that violence or military force will never be employed by us in the pursuit of the goal of unification. That has been, and will continue to be, our fundamental position.

But, on the other hand, if the north Korean Communists should misread our peaceful efforts and intentions or miscalculate the situation to such an extent as to stage another invasion, then I warn them that aggressors will be surely and decisively destroyed.

My fellow countrymen!

Nothing is more important and urgent to us now than to establish peace firmly on the Korean Peninsula.

Efforts to strengthen the fabrics of peace serve the very cause of our Nation's progress and prosperity and the eventual unification of the fatherland by peaceful means. For, there can be no peaceful unification where there is no durable peace.

But peace cannot be built with slogans or unilaterally expressed hopes only.

Peace requires the cultivation of national strength which, in turn, demands precious sacrifice and effort.

A sacrifice made for our country's strength is a sacrifice made for our Nation's prosperity and the peaceful unification of our Fatherland.

And so, as we commemorate this significant anniversary of National Liberation, we should rededicate our hopes and our joy of thirty years ago to our united devotion of this day forward. Each of us must do his best in fulfilling his responsibility so as to accelerate the growth of our

national strength for peaceful unification and the revival of our national glory.

To the north Korean side, I emphasize again that the South-North Dialogue, which it had unilaterally suspended, must be resumed unconditionally. In particular, pressing humanitarian problems of mutual visits and eventual reunion of the separated families must be resolved without any further delay.

And I strongly urge them, furthermore, to open up their totally dark and closed society in north Korea and to liberate the north Korean people from enslavement in a system of totalitarian dictatorship, which has turned one particular individual into an anachronistic object of personality cult. Let them remember that our north Korean brethren, too, deserve the minimum freedom and basic human rights to live as human beings.

I have stated on numerous occasions, and I do so again. In order to reduce the tension in the Korean peninsula, and to contribute to greater international cooperation, my Government takes the position that as an interim measure until the peaceful unification of the country it is desirable for the South and the North of Korea to enter the United Nations and other international organizations as members.

We know from the history of the United Nations that the entry into this world body as member has, in itself, no direct bearing upon any subsequent union or division of state. We know of actual historical precedents in which two members, having joined the United Nations separately, have later united themselves into one member.

Therefore, accession of the South and the North of Korea to memberships in the United Nations, as an interim step taken prior to peaceful reunification, does not constitute any perpetuation of the national division of Korea. On the contrary, such a step will help restore mutual trust between the South and the North, stabilize and strengthen peace in the Korean peninsula, and make it possible for the Nation to find the momen-

tum of moving toward peaceful reunification.

I must warn the north Korean side to terminate forthwith their anti-national actions that continue to deprive our Nation of its national interest in being represented in the international community, particularly the legitimate right to its voices to be duly expressed in the world body.

I am confident that our efforts for peace and unification will continue to receive the support of our friends abroad. We shall do our best on our part so that the relationships of amity and cooperation that already exist between the Republic of Korea and her friendly countries will continue to grow.

And I also expect that we and those countries that differ with us on ideologies and systems can open doors to each other on the basis of equality and reciprocity to normalize relations with them eventually. Thus, we hope to cooperate with them to reduce tension and maintain peace in the Korean peninsula.

My dear fellow Koreans of the South and North!

Our Fatherland is one. Our Nation is one perpetual living body that is indivisible permanently.

By all means, let us experience anew the emotions of joy of this Day, thirty years ago. And then let us, in the South, rededicate our efforts to foster our national strength to reinforce the legitimacy of the Republic of Korea in the history of the Nation. As for our compatriots in the North let them courageously free themselves of anachronistic personality cult and alien thoughts and keep their national identity, and let us work together for the peaceful reunification of our Fatherland.

With our own strength, let us restore our united Fatherland to our People. Let us create new and shining pages of the revival of our national glory in our Nation's history.

Part Two

State of Dialogue

Inter-Korean Relations 1975 in Review

For the treacherous inter-Korean relations, the year 1975 was yet another year of continuing uncertainty and setbacks, It was earlier in August 1973 when the South-North Coordinating Committee (SNCC) became practically moribund as communist north Korea unilaterally began boycotting its plenary meetings held in Seoul and Pyongyang, by turns, leaving the inter-Korean political dialogue in the Committee to sustain some sort of a vegetarian life in the form of the SNCC Vice Chairmen's Meetings in Panmunjom. The year 1975, however, saw discontinuation of the SNCC Vice Chairmen's Meetings, too.

It was in late 1974, with the first discovery on November 15 of the underground tunnels deep under the surface of the earth in the southern United Nations Command (UNC) sector of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) under construction by north Korea, that north Korea openly began maneuvering to have even the vegetarian life of the SNCC in the form of its Vice Chairmen's Meetings stifled. The 9th SNCC Vice Chairmen's Meeting, slated for December 4, was only 19 days away when the first discovery by a UNC/DMZ civil police patrol of the underground DMZ tunnels under construction by north Korea was made. Using the Seoul-Pyongyang hot telephone line and the contacts between the SNCC spokesmen of both sides in Panmunjom, the north Korean side immediately began asking that the Republic of Korea accept an "indefinite" postponement of the planned 9th SNCC Vice Chairmen's Meeting, substituting it, in the meantime, with the all too obscure "working-level" contacts at the level of spokesmen of the two sides.

The Republic of Korea was least in the mood to approve the north Korean scheme to have the SNCC Vice Chairmen's Meetings indefinitely interrupted. However, she has no alternative but to accept it when, confronted by the stiff opposition by the Republic of Korea to an indefinite postponement, north Korea insisted that the planned 9th Vice Chairmen's Meeting be put off to January 8, 1975.

On January 6, 1975, only two days before the planned 9th SNCC Vice Chairmen's Meeting, Pyongyang now notified Seoul, again in a unilateral action, that it now had its new SNCC Vice Chairman, Cho Myung Il, replacing Yu Jang Shik.

Until the day of notification of his appointment as Yu's replacement, Cho had been known as one of the junior staffs of the north Korean Red Cross (NKRC) society, holding various posts there including head publicity man, head publications man, councilor, standing committee member and secretary-general. Cho had been a third ranking member of the five-man NKRC delegation to the Panmunjom preliminary talk of the South-North Red Cross Conference (SNRCC) and a third ranking member of the seven-man NKRC delegation to the SNRCC full-dress talk. Cho was a second ranking member of the three-man NKRC delegation to the SNRCC "working-level" meetings held in Panmunjom when he was announced replacing his predecessor, Yu Jang Shik, as the second man in charge in the north Korean delegation to the political SNCC—undoubtedly a surreptitious north Korean move aimed at downgrading the political dialogue in the SNCC, considering the fact that Cho's predecessor, Yu, had been made SNCC Vice Chairman for Pyongyang side earlier in 1972 in his capacity as deputy director of the powerful nucleus of north Korea's "Workers' Party," its department of organization and guidance.

There were two rounds of SNCC Vice Chairmen's Meetings held in 1975, the 9th on January 8 and the 10th on March 14. At the 10th Vice Chairmen's Meeting, the two sides agreed to have the 11th Vice Chairmen's Meeting slated for May 30. On May 29, only a day before the agreed date of the meeting, however, north Korea notified the Republic of Korea, unilaterally again, that the 11th Vice Chairmen's Meeting was "indefinitely postponed." The SNCC was now thrown into total inactivity, making the Seoul-Pyongyang hot telephone line the only apparatus of the inter-Korean body to continue to function, although inefficiently, with the two sides intermittently using it for "one-way" transmissions of "telephone messages" to each other.

The SNRCC “working-level” meetings, on the other hand, have continued to be held in 1975 without interruption, although without any substantive progress. During the year, a total of eight rounds of SNRCC “working-level” meetings were held in the conference room of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC) in Panmunjom, with the latest one, the 14th in the series, on November 28, charged with the mission of “solving the question of resuming the interrupted SNRCC full-dress meetings” and of “making preliminary debates on the items of the five-point agenda of the full-dress meetings.” But, it was no exception that the supposedly humanitarian dialogue in the SNRCC “working-level” meetings, too, has continued to remain more or less moribund, as the NKRC, defying the repeated appeals by the Republic of Korea National Red Cross (ROKNRC) for early resumption of the full-dress meetings, obstinately kept on making issue of domestic as well as foreign policies of the Republic of Korea at each of the meetings, alleging that those policies of the Republic of Korea were the “obstacles” to resumption of the full-dress meetings.

End of Indochina War & New Threat to Peace in Korea

It was with the traumatic finale of the decades-old Indochinese affair in the spring, highlighted by the falls of P’nom Penh on April 17 and Saigon on April 30, that communist north Korea suddenly began demonstrating a hardened posture on the already sagging inter-Korean dialogue and the inter-Korean relations in general.

April 15 in north Korea is normally the biggest “national holiday” of the year, with frenzied “celebrations” dragging on at least a month thereafter across the land, being the “birthday” of the self-made “demigod” of communist north Korea, “beloved leader and father” Kim Il Sung. It has been customary throughout past years that Kim Il Sung stays home during the month of “celebrations,” appearing here and there in the countryside to acknowledge the “cheering” crowds.

Not so this year, however. On April 17, only two days after the “birth-

day” and the very day of the fall of P’nom Penh into the hands of Khmer Rouge, Kim Il Sung was on his way on an unannounced visit to Peking, making his China tour public only the following day, as his train was pulling into the railway station of Peking. Speaking at a banquet given by the State Council of Red China in the evening of April 18, his first day in Peking, Kim Il Sung was unprecedentedly hawkish in stating his ambition to achieve a communist unification of Korea through use of the force of arms.

“As we see the total collapse of the ‘imperialist colonialism’ around the world today,” Kim Il Sung bellowed, “neither will the ‘colonial rule’ by ‘American imperialists’ in south Korea be left alone to remain in safety.” “Should a ‘revolution’ arise in south Korea today,” Kim went on to declare, “we will not be sitting by idle. We will positively support them (‘south Korean revolutionaries’), instead, for we are all same Koreans.” If there is yet another war to break out in Korea, Kim asserted, “it will be the military demarcation line that we are going to lose, while gaining, in return, unification of the fatherland.”

It was all too evident that the end of the Indochinese affair had led the north Korean communist theoreticians to be deluded into believing that the time was about ripe for a renewed Korean war of Indochinese version—the so-called “people’s liberation war”—in order to achieve a communist unification by having a fratricidal war fought within the Republic of Korea. On yet another occasion on July 17, 1975, Kim Il Sung was reportedly quoted as having said in a talk with Tokuma Utsunomya, the notorious pro-Pyongyang Liberal Democratic member of the Lower House of the Japanese Diet, in Pyongyang, “now that we have the Indochinese problems about solved, it is our turn now to have our own country unified.” Quite obviously, it was not a coincidence that north Korea chose the immediate aftermath of the Indochinese debacle to force the SNCC Vice Chairmen’s Meetings into discontinuation.

For a time at least, there appeared to be one major resultant side effect, among others, of the traumatic final stage of the Incochinese affair that concerned the north Korean communist theoreticians most—a sharp

decline in the credibility of the American security commitments abroad. And, if only it was true that the U.S. security commitments abroad, and the one to the Republic of Korea, in particular, had become ineffective as a result of the Indochinese nightmare, there was no question that it was a most welcome development for communist north Korea, ever intent on grabbing the most opportune moment to try a military solution to the problems of divided Korea—a military takeover of the Republic of Korea as a leading step toward achievement of the avowed goal of a communist unification of the entire peninsula.

Throughout the last twenty or so years since the Armistice Agreement of 1953, the north Korean communist theoreticians have theoretically regarded the presence of American troops stationed in the Republic of Korea under the ROK-U.S. mutual defense treaty, together with the United Nations flag flown by the UNC/Korea as a symbol of a commitment by the world body to the cause of preservation of peace in this part of the world, in addition to the repeated security commitments to the Republic of Korea by successive U.S. governments, as the “main and only obstacles” to a communist unification achieved through use of the force of arms. For they have become helpless captives of their own psychopathic dogma that the Republic of Korea was unable to stand alone on her own feet, “unless aided by American ‘imperialist’ and Japanese ‘militarist’ ‘masters,’ ” the north Korean communist theoreticians have traditionally developed an all too dangerous tendency of belittling, and underestimating, the formidable self-reliant defense capability of the Republic of Korea, lamenting, as a result, that use of the force of arms against the Republic of Korea was being blocked only because of the American military presence.

For them, therefore, withdrawal of U.S. troops stationed in the Republic of Korea as an effective deterrence against any possible recurrence of war in Korea, together with dissolution of the UNC/Korea as a symbolic guardian of peace in this troubled corner of the world, was always the “priority No. 1” item in their arsenal of “preconditions” for any meaningful movement toward unification of the country.

It was in this context that the decline in the credibility of the American security commitments abroad in the wake of the fall of Indochina bore a grave significance, as it concerned the situation in the Korean peninsula. The U.S., as a military power, was now hopefully cast in the eyes of the north Korean communist theoreticians as a “paper tiger,” tempting them to be misled to take advantage of the traumatic aftermath of the Indochinese affair. There had already been cases in the past, like the incidents of USS Pueblo and EC-121, not to speak of the more catastrophic Korean War, in which the north Koreans have amply demonstrated their weakness in resisting such a temptation. As if to reaffirm such a crucial weakness, Kim Il Sung was now in Peking doing the sabre-rattling.

Things, however, have not evolved the way the north Korean communist theoreticians obviously hoped they would.

The north Korean communist theoreticians, to start with, were again making mistakes in passing judgments on the developments both within and without the Korean peninsula.

It was a fatal mistake, in the first place, that the north Korean communist theoreticians had themselves convinced that the self-ordained goal of achieving a communist unification was possible at all. Worse still, in order to make the impossible goal look, at least, like a possible one, they have made the more grave mistake of refusing to recognize the hard realities of the divided peninsula objectively as they stood, leaving the course of their policy decisions always guided by totally subjective assessment of the prevailing situation. As a result, the self-reliant defense capability of the Republic of Korea was constantly intentionally belittled. The north Korean communist theoreticians were constantly infatuated with the wild thought that there was the likelihood of a massive violent popular revolt in the Republic of Korea (a ‘south Korean revolution’), instigated and agitated by north Korea, only if there was no American military presence, allowing north Korea to use it as an excuse to justify a full-scale military intervention by north Korea for a communist seizure of the southern half of the peninsula.

Traumatic as the aftermath of the Indochinese debacle was, on the other hand, nor was communist north Korea left all by itself to relish the wild hope of capitalizing on it.

The badly-shaken U.S., on her own part, used the Mayaguez incident in the immediate wake of the fall of Indochina as a lesson to tell the world that she was rather a “wounded tiger” than a “paper tiger.” President Ford, Secretary of State Kissinger and Secretary of Defense Schlesinger, all in moves to prevent the trigger-happy communist north Korea from harboring any dangerous temptation, made use of one occasion after another to drive the warnings home that the U.S. was as determined as ever to honor her security commitments to the Republic of Korea. The mood in the U.S. Congress, too, was found unprecedentedly in support of the call to have the U.S. security commitments to the Republic of Korea unmistakably reaffirmed.

For the Republic of Korea, in the meantime, the fall of Indochina was an event that prompted her to expedite her already ongoing program of modernizing her armed forces, drastically improving the degree of self-reliance in her national defense capability and preparedness. Thanks to the hasty sabre-rattlings by anxious Kim Il Sung, the nation was now suddenly found feeling an upsurge of the solid sense of unity among the people, politically and socially, making the nation’s security posture able to enjoy the maximum degree of fitness.

In an exclusive interview with the New York Times Tokyo bureau chief Richard Halloran ran by August 21, 1975, issue of the paper, President Park Chung Hee said that, “in five years from now,” the Republic of Korea “will no longer need American ground, air or naval forces or even logistic support to help defend itself if north Korea attacks without Communist Chinese or Soviet aid,” adding, “if the north Korean communists launch an attack against us even now without any external help, then we would be able to repel it successfully if proper air and naval support is given by the United States with appropriate logistic support,” in the absence of help by American ground forces.

“We know very well that we cannot depend on the United States for the upgrading of our military capabilities indefinitely,” the President said, “and it is our wish to possess the capability to defend ourselves with our own means,” and added, “in my view, that will take about five years.”

Repeated Calls for Resumption of Dialogue

Earlier on July 4, 1975, President Park Chung Hee made use of the third anniversary of the historic announcement of the South-North Joint Communiqué jointly by the two sides of Korea as an occasion to renew his call that communist north Korea, acknowledging the need to lessen the tension and solidify the peace in the Korean peninsula, respond to the repeated request by the Republic of Korea to have the two-lane inter-Korean dialogue, the political SNCC and the humanitarian SNRCC, brought back to full resumption.

In a special statement, the President told the nation, and the north Korean communists, too, that the “basic spirit” of the South-North Joint Communiqué was to have the two sides of Korea jointly committed to the cause of “working for restoration of trust and expansion of exchanges between the two sides of Korea through dialogue between themselves and, based on achievements thereby, to pursue institutionalization of a durable peace on this land and accomplishment of an independent unification.”

Three years now after the announcement of the Joint Communiqué, however, “we find the dialogue between the south and north deadlocked, with the tension on the Korean peninsula at an all-time high,” deplored the President, charging that the north Korean communists not only have “intransigently refused to normalize the dialogue,” but also have begun “sabotaging even the working-level contacts lately, frantically engaged in schemes to have their daydreams of having the country unified either through overthrow of the Republic of Korea by force or through use of arms realized.”

“Should they have affection for their own fellow countrymen and were they committed to the cause of peaceful unification in their true senses of the

words,” the President emphatically asked the north Korean communists to “immediately terminate all their preparations of aggressive war, all their acts of indirect aggression and those overseas activities aimed at disgracing none other than the countrymen of their own,” and, at the same time, to “bring the south-north dialogue back to full resumption by having the SNCC plenary meetings and the SNRCC full-dress meetings reopened at the earliest possible date.”

The repeated calls by the Republic of Korea for an early resumption of the interrupted dialogue, however, continued to fall on the deaf ears of communist north Korea. In his talk with Tokuma Utsunomya, the pro-Pyongyang Liberal Democratic Japanese Diet member, in Pyongyang on July 17, Kim Il Sung was reportedly at his best again back with the all too familiar lip services of rhetorics about his own version of a “peaceful unification” and his self-ordained mission of achieving it. **While claiming an alleged commitment to the cause of a “peaceful unification,” however, Kim Il Sung was openly belying his own self by refusing to accept the government of the Republic of Korea as “counterpart in a dialogue.” President Park Chung Hee was “just not the person to talk with,” argued Kim Il Sung, adding, “we will talk with south Korea on peaceful achievement of unification anytime when south Korea has a ‘new person,’ whom we find we can talk with, instituted in power.”** Kim was never willing, he made it indisputably clear, to consider an improved relationship between the two sides of divided Korea as long as south Korea does not meet the north Korean demand that the present government of the Republic of Korea be overthrown, to be replaced by either a communist or, at least, a pro-Pyongyang regime.

There was yet another Japanese parliamentary group to visit Pyongyang during the summer of 1975, a group of 13 Liberal Democratic Japanese Diet members, whose itinerary while in Pyongyang included a call on Kim Il Sung on July 27. **Hajime Tamura, a Lower House member, was leader of the group and, making a full disclosure of the conversations between the visiting Japanese parliamentarians and Kim Il Sung in an article appearing in the August 22 issue of the Asahi Journal, a Tokyo weekly, Tamura**

was extremely mystified by the two-facedness of Kim Il Sung's remarks. "I had to find myself more or less confused," Tamura recalled in his article, "to hear Kim Il Sung saying that he was willing to talk with all political parties in the Republic of Korea, even including the ruling Democratic Republican Party, on peaceful unification, while refusing to accept President Park Chung Hee, head of state of the other side of Korea, as counterpart in a dialogue."

Kim Il Sung was back to his lip services of rhetorics about his kind of peaceful unification on October 9, while speaking before a Pyongyang gathering celebrating the 30th anniversary of the founding of the Workers' Party of north Korea, dangling his patented "willingness" to "talk with the people as well as all political parties, social organizations and individuals of south Korea, including the Democratic Republican Party, on peaceful unification anytime." There were "preconditions" again, however, so went Kim Il Sung, that the Republic of Korea should "cease to remain as an anti-communist state," "abrogating" all her anti-communist legislations, leaving communist underground agents planted in south Korea by north Korea to go "unpunished" and "accepting 'alliance' with communists" in the formation of the government. There was no doubt that these extortionary demands of north Korea were tantamount to asking the Republic of Korea to renounce her free democratic, pluralistic political institutions, opting, of her own volition, to turn practically into a communist state. It was self-evident that the abundant lip services by Kim Il Sung of rhetorics about the so-called "peaceful unification" in his version, featuring such unlikely ideas as a 'grand national congress' and a 'federated' Korea, were all meant to confuse both the totally blinded people of north Korea and the outside world. In his speech on October 9, Kim Il Sung did again speak for a "federation" of the two 'governments' in Korea as a "reasonable arrangement" for "peaceful and independent unification." But it was not without the accompaniment of the contradictory exhortation that the "people of the northern half of the 'republic'" and the "'people of various classes and strata' of south Korea, including laborers,

farmers, youthful students, journalists, religious people and politicians” form a “national united front” in order to carry on a ‘fight’ for a “peaceful and independent unification,” thus calling, in effect, for an overthrow of the government of the Republic of Korea.

30th UN General Assembly And Debates on Korea

The 30th United Nations General Assembly of this year was a major battleground between the two sides of Korea in a bitterly fought confrontation of vote, as the member nations of the world body grouped into two camps over two rival draft resolutions on Korea.

The debate on Korea at the United Nations General Assembly gathered heat this year, too, as communist north Korea, through a maniacal globe-trotting campaign, managed to prevail upon dozens of member nations, an assortment of communist, non-aligned and third world nations, to cosponsor a draft resolution on Korea (A/C I/L 709), demanding “dissolution of the UNC,” together with “withdrawal of all the foreign troops stationed in south Korea under the UN flag,” without a successor arrangement necessarily worked out in advance to keep the 1953 armistice in force, and a “peace agreement” to be concluded among the “real parties” to the Armistice Agreement to have the agreement replaced.

Undoubtedly, the pro-Pyongyang draft resolution seriously lacked in utility, with many loopholes, whether intentionally or inadvertently, particularly in the vital sense that, by providing against a successor arrangement to keep the 1953 Armistice Agreement in force in the event of dissolution of the UNC, it was meant to bring about a total collapse of the present armistice structure in Korea, the only institutional apparatus keeping the fragile truce arrangements under surveillance. Not only that. The draft resolution was, in part, openly encroaching on the sovereignty of both the Republic of Korea and the United States.

It was all too logical a consequence that dissolution of the UNC without a successor arrangement worked out in advance would automatically mean the death of the 1953 Armistice Agreement. **The Korean Armistice**

Agreement was signed jointly by Gen. Mark Clark, Commander-in-Chief of the UNC, on one side, and Kim Il Sung, in his capacity as supreme commander of north Korean army, and P'aing Tao Hoe, as commander of the 'people's volunteers' of Red China, on the other. It, therefore, was out of question that disappearance of one of the two parties signatory to the agreement, without a successor, or an interim, arrangement to take care of the aftermath of the disappearance, would have to mean disappearance of the agreement itself.

It was based on this self-evident logic of the case that, preceding the submission by pro-Pyongyang group of nations of their own draft resolution, the Republic of Korea, in consultation with nations supporting her cause, had a draft resolution on Korea of her own (A/C I/L 708/Rev. 1) tabled, calling on the two sides of divided Korea to continue the dialogue between themselves, asking "all the parties directly concerned" to "enter into negotiations on new arrangements designed to replace the Armistice Agreement, reduce tensions and ensure lasting peace in the Korean peninsula" and, "bearing in mind the need to ensure continued observation of the Armistice Agreement and the full maintenance of peace and security in the region," urging, as a first step, "all the parties directly concerned" to "embark on talks as soon as possible so that the UNC may be dissolved concurrently with arrangements for maintaining the Armistice Agreement."

In an address before the UN General Assembly on September 22, U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger said that the Republic of Korea and the U.S., "looking forward to the time when a lasting solution of the Korean problem can be achieved," were proposing to the "parties of the armistice," meaning the Republic of Korea, the U.S., north Korea and mainland China, the "convening of a conference to discuss ways to preserve the armistice agreement." "At such a meeting," Secretary Kissinger went on to say, "we should also be prepared to explore other measures to reduce tension on the Korean peninsula, including the possibility of a larger conference to negotiate a more fundamental arrangement." "It goes without saying," the Secretary emphatically told the world body, however, "that no proposal for security

arrangements on the Korean peninsula which attempts to exclude the Republic of Korea from the discussions can be accepted by the United States.”

North Korea, in the meantime, made the preposterous statement, in a ‘foreign ministry memorandum’ to the United Nations General Assembly dated August 17, that the U.S. forces deployed in the Republic of Korea under the ROK-U.S. mutual defense treaty should be withdrawn from there with the dissolution of the UNC, claiming that they were a “component part” of the UNC, and that the proposed “peace agreement” to replace the Armistice Agreement should be a bilateral one between the U.S. and north Korea, alleging that the U.S. and north Korea were the two only “real parties” to the Armistice Agreement.

There is no denying of the fact that the U.S. troops deployed in the Republic of Korea are stationed there under the ROK-U.S. mutual defense treaty concluded, and ratified, by the Republic of Korea and the U.S. in accordance with their respective constitutional processes. The two countries also have a status-of-forces agreement, concluded and ratified again according to their respective constitutional processes, to control the status of the U.S. troops stationed in Korea. These are the arrangements that make the stationing of the U.S. troops in the Republic of Korea a matter of sovereignty of both the Republic of Korea and the U.S., separating the American military presence from the UNC.

The north Korean argument that the U.S. and north Korea are the two only “real parties” of the armistice agreement is a sheer nonsense, too, in all respects, legally, logically and as a matter of fact.

The north Korean argument is based on the logic that the Republic of Korea does not have the qualification as a “real party” of the Armistice Agreement, “because she was not a party signatory at the time when the agreement was concluded,” while mainland China is deprived of the qualification, though it was a party signatory to the agreement, “because there are now no Chinese army left in north Korea.”

It is not difficult to learn the fact that the logics the north Koreans are using to disqualify the Republic of Korea and mainland China are

openly self-contradictory, posing a showcase example of the north Korean version of lawlessness, echoing the argument, “mine is mine and yours is mine, too.”

It should be noted in this connection that, in putting up the argument, north Korea intentionally attempts to ignore one vital fact—the fact that the 1953 Korean Armistice Agreement was not an agreement concluded among “governments” of the countries concerned. Instead, it was an agreement concluded between “field commanders” of the two opposite sides at war at the time when it was negotiated and concluded. It was not the “commanding general of the U.S. troops” but the “Commander-in-Chief of the UNC” how put his signature on the agreement for the UNC troops. The Republic of Korea, at the time, was having her armed forces integrated within the unified command of the UNC for operational purposes and, therefore, it was quite understandable that the Republic of Korea armed forces were represented by the “Commander-in-Chief of the UNC,” like the rest of the troops of the 16 Korean War allies, when the armistice was signed. There is just no denying of the hard fact that, regardless of whether the Republic of Korea army was a party signatory, along with the UNC, to the armistice agreement or not, the Republic of Korea remains a “real” party of the armistice arrangement, legally, logically and as a matter of fact.

As has been examined in the above, the pro-Pyongyang draft resolution on Korea was indisputably the one lacking sufficient lawfulness to acquire binding force even if it was passed by the world body. As was rightly pointed out by Republic of Korea Ambassador to the United Nations Park Tong Jin, for the UN General Assembly to pass the pro-Pyongyang draft resolution was tantamount to “giving recognition to the regime of Kim Il Sung as the lawful government of the whole of Korea, preventing the United Nations from possible intervention in case of a new crisis” in the Korean peninsula. “It is the covert scheme of north Korea,” the Republic of Korea envoy to the world organization said, “to lay the diplomatic ground to make it possible for north Korea to have any future aggression by north Korea against the south presented as an internal affair of ‘Korea,’ making it impos-

sible for the UN to intervene.” At the same time, there was no question about the certainty that the passage of the pro-Pyongyang draft resolution by the United Nations General Assembly would be quickly taken up by the north Korean communists as a ground to justify their all-out campaign to remove the American troops stationed in the Republic of Korea, the “only obstacle” in the north Korean eyes blocking their use of the force of arms against the south.

Despite the all too obvious crucial lack in utility in the pro-Pyongyang draft resolution, the 30th United Nations General Assembly, however, was securely in the hands of the numerical majority of the communist, non-aligned and third world “alliance,” barring a reasonable outcome of the hard-fought debate on the Korean question. In an unprecedented move in the history of the United Nations, the 30th General Assembly ruled, in a confrontation of vote on November 19, to pass both the pro-Seoul and pro-Pyongyang draft resolutions on Korea; the pro-Republic of Korea resolution by 59 for, 51 against with 29 abstentions and the pro-Pyongyang one by 54 for, 51 against with 42 abstentions. Earlier on October 30, the First (Political) Committee of the 30th General Assembly had foreshadowed the General Assembly outcome by adopting both draft resolutions; the pro-Republic of Korea one by 59 for, 51 against with 29 abstentions and the pro-north Korean one by 51 for, 38 against with 50 abstentions.

“It seems to us,” Ambassador Park Tong Jin had commented, after the First Committee votings, “that the United Nations is getting impotent on the Korean question and is now giving the signal knowingly or unknowingly that the United Nations is no longer the right forum to discuss the Korean question seriously. The indecisive attitude of the (First) Committee as manifested in the adoption of the two opposing resolutions forcefully endorses our own sentiment that from now on Korean problems should be settled by negotiations and cooperations among parties directly concerned.”

A feverish and, to put it more properly, a maniacal north Korean vote-getting campaign was reported as having been conducted, in the mean-

time, across the world. The Venezuelan newspaper, El Universal, reportedly carried, in its October 24 issue, an article exposing that north Korean ambassador to Argentine Chung Kwang Soon had been caught trying to offer 1,000 U.S. dollars to the wife of the chief of the international organization bureau of the Argentine Foreign Ministry as a "bribe," only to be rejected and "strictly warned." The November 1 issue of the Joong Ang Ilbo, a leading Seoul daily, also reported an incident in which a north Korean envoy to an African nation "bought" at 500 U.S. dollars the "acting foreign affairs minister" of the country, forcing him to send a false instruction, in the name of the President of the country, to the country's mission to the United Nations, ordering it to vote for the pro-Pyongyang draft resolution and against the pro-Republic of Korea one, in a departure from the standing policy of the country vice versa. The President of the country gained knowledge of the incident, at the inquiry by the country's mission to the United Nations, and quickly corrected the messy affair by issuing a new instruction to the mission to stick to the original policy of the country voting for the pro-Republic of Korea resolution and against the pro-Pyongyang one.

It looks certain that the United Nations action this year adopting the two rival draft resolutions will encourage communist north Korea to continue to remain negative to resumption of the inter-Korean dialogue now in interruption. Moreover, it should also be suspected that, by passing the pro-Pyongyang draft resolution, along with the pro-Republic of Korea one, the United Nations may, in effect, have licensed communist north Korea to try yet another attempt at a military solution to the Korean problem at a moment when it thinks the time is ripe. As if to endorse such worries, communist north Korea now totally ignores the fact that the pro-Republic of Korea resolution was also passed by the UN General Assembly this year together with the pro-Pyongyang one, receiving more votes in support than the latter one and, instead, is found beginning to make use of the pro-Pyongyang resolution as a ground of increasingly harsher propaganda offensive for early withdrawal of the U.S. troops stationed in Korea.

South-North Coordinating Committee:

Pyongyang Discontinues Vice Chairmen's Meets

In a telephone message on May 29, 1975, north Korea "notified" Seoul that the 11th SNCC Vice Chairmen's Meeting, slated for the following day, May 30, was "indefinitely postponed," alleging that the postponement was made necessary by the "anti-communist fuss" in the Republic of Korea which had "heightened the tension and the war atmosphere" in the relations between the two sides of divided Korea.

It was needless to say, when pictured against the backdrop of developments in the Korean peninsula in the wake of the end of the Indochina affair, that the north Korean allegation was totally to the contrary. On May 30, after seeing the projected 11th SNCC Vice Chairmen's Meeting aborted due to the north Korean boycott, Lee Dong-bok, SNCC spokesman for Seoul side, issued a statement repudiating the north Korean allegation, reading, in part, as follows:

"The north Korean allegation is gross distortion of facts. As is widely accepted by the world community, it is an indisputably substantiated fact that, as the Indochina affair drew to a close, communist north Korea has been found busy at work, both overtly and covertly, recklessly preparing for yet another war in Korea in pursuit of an Indochinese version of military takeover of south Korea for unification under communism, amassing troops and firepower along the DMZ, advancing the air and naval deployment down southward and digging underground approach tunnels deep down under the surface of the earth in the DMZ on more than a dozen spots. At the same time, the top man in power in north Korea has been reported to be making, while touring Peking, Bucharest and Algiers, among others, lately, such unprecedentedly trigger-happy statements as; "should a war break out anew in Korea, it will be the military demarcation line that we are going to lose, while gaining, in return, unification of the fatherland"; "should a revolution arise in south Korea today, we will not be sitting by idle. Instead, we will positively support them ('south Korean revolutionaries'), for we are all same Koreans"; "after Indochina,

it is now the turn of south Korea to fall”; and “we will drive the American ‘imperialists’ out of Korea and unify the country, at all cost.” We know, and the world knows, into what temptations the north Korean communists presently find themselves being deluded and on what schemes they are now found at work.

Alerted by the all too evident reckless schemes of the north Korean communists, the Republic of Korea, in recent months, has been taking measures, strengthening her self-reliant national defense capabilities based on a maximized degree of national unity, designed primarily to forestall any possible miscalculations on the part of the north Korean communists to justify yet another fratricidal war in Korea. At the same time, the Republic of Korea has been asking the north Korean communists in recent SNCC Vice Chairmen’s Meetings to have all the underground DMZ tunnels under construction by north Korea immediately dismantled and to have the political dialogue in the SNCC resumed unconditionally at an early date in order to make it possible for the two sides of divided Korea to join their efforts for institutionalization of a durable peace between them and a genuinely peaceful unification to be worked out in the long run.

All in all, we cannot but conclude that, by enforcing an indefinite postponement of the 11th SNCC Vice Chairmen’s Meeting, the north Korean communists are hoping to avert the risk of having all the evidences of their reckless war preparations unearthed at those meetings....”

On July 3, 1975, the eve of the third anniversary of the announcement of the South-North Joint Communique, north Korea put on the air a tatement in the name of Kim Young Joo, its SNCC Co-chairman, filled with liches attacking the Republic of Korea for her domestic as well as foreign olicies. The north Korean statement demanded that the Republic of Korea “reshape her basic national policy,” were she to see the interrupted dialogue resumed. In order to have the dialogue brought back to resumption, the statement argued, the Republic of Korea should 1) force the U.S. troops stationed in Korea out of the country, 2) renounce her Foreign Policy for Peace and Unification of June 23, 1973, favoring the idea of having both sides of Korea admitted into the United Nations, as an interim measure pending unification, 3) drop her anti-communism and 4) cancel

her national defense measures being tightened in the wake of the end of the Indochina war. In case these demands were not accepted by the Republic of Korea, the north Korean statement went on further to ask, “the present government of south Korea should have to be removed to be replaced by another one headed by a patriotic, democratic person genuinely dedicated to the cause of unification of the fatherland.”

On July 5, Seoul side’s Acting SNCC Co-chairman Chang Key Young filed a telephone message to his counterpart in Pyongyang, Kim Young Joo, proposing that the delayed 11th SNCC Vice Chairmen’s Meeting be held on July 15. Expressing his grave concern over the recently deteriorating relations between the two sides of Korea in a statement issued on July 9, the Seoul side’s Acting SNCC Co-chairman also hoped that the two sides of Korea could arrive at an agreement at the proposed 11th SNCC Vice Chairmen’s Meeting to have the already long-overdue fourth SNCC plenary meeting held in Pyongyang before August 15, the day that marked the 30th anniversary of the nation’s liberation from the Japanese colonial rule, so that they could take up the overall inter-Korean relations for discussion and thereby normalize the political dialogue in the SNCC. The statement by the Seoul side’s Acting SNCC Co-chairman, in part:

“In my opinion, the date for the fourth SNCC plenary meeting is the only procedural matter before us to decide upon to have the proposed meeting held. We already have the agreement telling us that it is now the turn of Pyongyang to host the SNCC plenary meeting. I want to let it be known to the north Korean side that I and the other SNCC members of my side are all prepared to go to Pyongyang and attend an SNCC meeting there on whatever date that we decide upon through mutual agreement.

I have a report, in the meantime, that Kim Young Joo, my north Korean counterpart, had a statement issued in his name on last July 3, in which he was found reportedly trying to hold our side responsible for the stalemate and the interruption of our dialogue and, without even a single word on the outstanding question of normalizing the operation of the SNCC, repeatedly brought up the moot idea of having what he sumptuously called a ‘grand national congress,’ or a ‘north-south political conference,’ by different calling, convoked.

It makes me feel obliged to remind him of the fact that we already have the SNCC an inter-Korean body that the two sides of us have jointly had inaugurated, through mutual agreement, precisely with the purpose of using it as a forum of our dialogue. It doesn't simply make sense to us that my north Korean counterpart, himself one of the architects of the SNCC, now comes out with the all too ambiguous idea of convoking the so-called 'grand national congress,' or a 'north-south political conference,' which seems to me to indicate a hodgepodge 'mass rally'-type assembly, to be attended by hundreds at the least and thousands at the most, at the expense of the forum of dialogue which we already have between the two sides of us.

We all know the fact that the north Korean communists already have gained the infamous record of trying to politically abuse even the SNRCC meetings, an internationally recognized Red Cross humanitarian endeavor charged with the mission of working on ways to ease the heartbreaking sufferings of the millions of none other than Koreans themselves who have their loving family members living three full decades in total separation across the DMZ.

Judging from these north Korean behaviors, we cannot but frankly suspect the true intent of theirs. These probably are the telling indications that the north Korean communists are never truly committed to the real cause of the dialogue and, instead, are solely bent on capitalizing on the dialogue as a means by which to have their unquenchable desire for a communist takeover of the southern half of the country fulfilled, even at the cost of prolonged suffering of their fellow countrymen.

To repeat it once again, it is a known fact that the SNCC is an inter-Korean body, whose missions, duties and responsibilities are to tackle the entire spectrum of inter-Korean problems, no doubt including the ultimate national task of unifying the country through peaceful means and independent efforts, based on the express provisions of the South-North Joint Communiqué and the Agreed Minute on Formation and Operation of the SNCC, the two historic documents to which the two sides of Korea are jointly parties signatory. It, therefore, is our basic position that the two sides of us in the dialogue are duly obliged, under the two historic documents, to have whatever issues that arise in the relations between the two sides brought up, discussed and settled within the framework of this inter-Korean body that we already have. It is in this

respect that I repeat my call that our north Korean counterparts immediately come back to the forum of dialogue and meet us at the table....”

The north Korean reaction, however, was as negative as ever. In a telephone message filed back to Seoul on July 14, north Korea flatly rejected the Republic of Korea proposal that the 11th SNCC Vice Chairmen’s Meeting be held on July 15, reiterating the demand that the Republic of Korea 1) renounce her Foreign Policy for Peace and Unification of June 23, 1973, 2) drop her anti-communism and 3) cancel the national defense measures being tightened, should there be a resumption of the dialogue at all. There was yet another telephone message filed to Pyongyang by Seoul side’s Acting SNCC Co-chairman Chang Key Young on August 8, suggesting that the 11th Vice Chairmen’s Meeting convene on August 25. This time, it was not even replied by north Korea.

On October 13, for the third time in a row, Seoul side’s Acting SNCC Co-chairman Chang Key Young sent a telephone message to his counterpart in Pyongyang, Kim Young Joo, repeating his call that the political dialogue in the SNCC be resumed at the earliest possible date. Noting that the SNCC had long been forced into interruption as north Korea, for some “untold reasons” of its own, had obstinately refused to play host to the fourth SNCC plenary meeting in Pyongyang, the Seoul side’s Acting Co-chairman this time made the conciliatory offer that the fourth SNCC plenary meeting be held unconditionally at an early date “in Panmunjom,” the neutral zone within the DMZ, instead of Pyongyang, “if it suits the convenience of the north Korean side better,” asking that the 11th SNCC Vice Chairmen’s Meeting be held on October 20, “in order to have procedural matters discussed for the proposed fourth SNCC plenary meeting.” Acting Co-chairman Chang’s October 13 telephone message, in part:

“When seen against the backdrop of the seriousness of the developments in recent months in the relations between the two sides of us, I cannot but feel it about time for me to express deep concern at the attitude of your side on our dialogue.

It was earlier on August 28, 1973, that your side unilaterally had the normal operation of the SNCC suspended. Your side, thereafter, has been found solely bent on measures designed to exacerbate the tension between the two sides of us, while obstinately refusing to have the SNCC operation normalized, unreservedly violating all the existing agreements so laboriously worked out between our two sides. There was a steady increase in the terrorist and military provocations perpetrated against us by your side. With the termination of the Indochinese hostilities in the last spring, your side began dangling the dangerous idea of considering use of arms for a communist unification of the country. In an obvious attempt to secure an excuse to justify yet another fratricidal war in our country, your side began intensifying the flagrant campaign of instigating and agitating outbreak of violence in the Republic of Korea. And, worse still, your side is now seen even trying to discontinue the Vice Chairmen's Meetings, the only inter-Korean contact that until recently has remained active within the framework of the SNCC since the suspension of normal SNCC operation by your side earlier in 1973.

I have been told, in the meantime, that your side now talks about so-called "preconditions" for resumption of the dialogue in the SNCC, making issue of domestic as well as foreign policies of the Republic of Korea—an unwarrantable act of interference in the internal affairs of the Republic of Korea as well as a flagrant violation of the spirit of the South-North Joint Communique. On other occasions, your side is reportedly being quoted as saying that your side would never talk with our side as long as the present Republic of Korea government remains power.

Needless to say, allegations of yours as such, more often than not, not only contradict among themselves but also lack coherence. They are simply tantamount to an outright denial of the two historic inter-Korean documents—the South-North Joint Communique and the Agreed Minute on Formation and Operation of the SNCC—to which we find our two sides jointly parties signatory.

I must remind you, in this regard, that we have had our inter-Korean dialogue started because we found the two sides of us in agreement that we had so many problems to settle between our two sides and that these were the problems that could be settled only through dialogue, negotiation and mutual agreement directly between the two sides of Korea, the two parties most directly concerned. It was precisely on the basis of this perception shared by our two sides that, back on July 4, 1972, we agreed on, signed and jointly announced the South-North Joint Communiqué, inaugurating the SNCC, a joint inter-Korean body charged with the mission of tackling the entire spectrum of problems arising in the relations between the two sides of Korea. It should also be noted that the inter-Korean agreement as such was further bolstered by a later agreement, on November 4, 1972, adopting the Agreed Minute on Formation and Operation of the SNCC, specifying the missions of the supposedly all-embracing inter-Korean body as 1) achieving of an independent and peaceful unification, 2) promotion of political exchanges, 3) implementation of exchanges in economic, cultural and social fields, 4) relaxation of the military tensions and, finally 5) working for joint step in overseas activities.

These are the two historic documents to which the two sides of us have solemnly pledged our adherence. We are jointly bound by the duty to observe the stipulations of the two documents faithfully. And, in order to observe the documents faithfully, we are asked to have the SNCC normally operated, in strict adherence to pertinent provisions in the documents, having whatever problems arising in the relations between our two sides raised, discussed and negotiated within the SNCC for settlement through mutual agreement.....”

North Korea was still negative. In a telephone message transmitted to Seoul on October 17, north Korea again rejected Acting Co-chairman Chang's conciliatory offer. North Korea was now demanding that the Republic of Korea admit that the heightened tension on the Korean peninsula in the wake of the fall of Indochina was a “fabrication” by her

as a means to “satisfy the internal political needs” of the Republic. What was more, north Korea now openly demanded that the Republic of Korea accept “alliance” with communists, should she want to see the dialogue resumed.

On October 20, Lee Dong-bok, Seoul side’s SNCC spokesman, commented on the latest north Korean telephone message in a statement which read, in part, as follows:

“In a telephone message of Friday (October 17), the Pyongyang side again refused not only to have the SNCC brought back to normal operation but also to have the 11th SNCC Vice Chairman’s Meeting held, repeating earlier allegations that domestic as well as foreign policies of the Republic of Korea were obstacles to have the dialogue in the SNCC resumed. Not only did the Pyongyang side, in the telephone message, hang onto the old clichés about our national defense measures, our free democratic institutions and our Foreign Policy for Peace and Unification, demanding their “abolitions” and “withdrawals” as “preconditions” for resumption of the dialogue, but it also went on further to assert that there would be no resumption of the dialogue, unless the Republic of Korea “renounce” here anti-communist policies and “accept” communists as a partner in “alliance,” in an open violation of the South-North Joint Communique providing against interference in the internal affairs of the other side—its thoughts, ideologies and systems.

It goes without saying that the national defense measures being tightened by the Republic of Korea are primarily designed to provide the means to preserve peace on the Korean peninsula by restraining the north Korean communists, ever intent on grabbing an opportunity to rely on the use of the force of arms for fulfillment of the avowed goal of achieving unification under communism, from being tempted to go to arms and, thus, prevent the 50 million Koreans on both sides of Korea from being embroiled in yet another tragic fratricidal bloodletting. Our anti-communist measures are vitally needed national security measures of the

Republic of Korea designed to provide the means to protect her free democratic institutions against the communist north Korean scheme constantly seeking an overthrow of the legitimate government of the Republic of Korea, as a leading step toward an eventual unification under communism, through various forms of subversive activities. Our Foreign Policy for Peace and Unification enunciated on June 23, 1975, by His Excellency President Park Chung Hee is a set of conceivably the most practical, reasonable and forward-looking policies designed, based on the hard realities of the prevailing inter-Korean relations, to provide for a process indispensable for working toward a genuinely peaceful unification of the country. Needless to say, these are the policies of the Republic of Korea that she regards as vital cornerstones for her security as well as preservation of peace on the Korean peninsula, while working toward a major inter-Korean accommodation for settlement of the problems of the divided country.

It is imperative that we denounce the Pyongyang side making issue of these policies of the Republic of Korea as an unforgivable encroachment on the sovereignty of the Republic of Korea and, at the same time, an inadmissible interference in her internal affairs. And, furthermore, we must also point out that it is simply incompatible with both the South-North Joint Communiqué and the Agreed Minute on Formation and Operation of the SNCC, the two documents that the two sides of Korea had earlier in 1972 had themselves pledged to have them faithfully observed, that the Pyongyang side, while having the dialogue unilaterally suspended and while obstinately refusing to have it resumed, insist that alterations in the basic national policies of the other side of the dialogue is a “precondition” for resumption of the dialogue.

The Pyongyang side’s preposterous demand that the Republic of Korea “renounce” her anti-communism and “accept” an “alliance” with communists, again as a “precondition” for resumption of the dialogue, is a telltale proof that the Pyongyang side is interested neither in the cause of peace on the Korean peninsula, nor in the improvement of the inter-

Korea relations, nor in a genuinely peaceful unification of the country. It is another piece of self-admission that, for the Pyongyang side, the dialogue between the two sides of Korea is more a tool by which to pursue a communist seizure of the southern half of the peninsula than a means by which to work toward settlement of the problems that exist in the relations between them through mutual agreement, no doubt an attitude tantamount to an open denial of agreements spelled out in the South-North Joint Communiqué and the Agreed Minute on Formation and Operation of the SNCC. Judging from these wayward practices of the Pyongyang side, it should also be noted that the much professed propaganda blares by the Pyongyang side about its self-styled devotion to the cause of a “peaceful unification” is nothing any more than a piece of propaganda fraud, acting a wolf in the guise of a sheep, with the sole aim of confusing the world public opinion.....”

South-North Red Cross Conference:

Working-level Meets Continue to Be Held

[In contrast to the SNCC Vice Chairmen's Meeting that has run into interruption, the SNRCC Working-level Meetings have continued to be held in Panmunjom intermittently throughout 1975, although without any substantial progress at all. A total of 8 rounds of the SNRCC Working-level Meeting was held during 1975; the 7th on January 24, the 8th on February 28, the 9th on March 26, the 10th on May 8, the 11th on July 21, the 12th on August 22, the 13th on October 23 and, finally, the 14th on November 28. At each of these working-level meetings, the Republic of Korea National Red Cross (ROKNRC) delegates continued to press for early convening of the long-overdue 8th full-dress meeting and, thereby, normalization of the humanitarian dialogue in the Red Cross talk. On the contrary, the north Korean Red Cross (NKRC) delegates continued to spend most of their time making issue of the internal affairs of the Republic of Korea, refusing to have the interrupted full-dress meetings resumed. At the 13th working-level meeting, Dr. Kim Yeon Joo, ROKNRC's alternate chief delegate to the SNRCC heading the ROKNRC delegation to the working-level meeting, made an overall review of the inter-Korean Red Cross talk to urge early normalization of the humanitarian dialogue there. The following is a full translated text of Dr. Kim's statement at the 13th working-level meeting. -Ed.]

The position of our side, the ROKNRC delegation, on the issues before the two sides of us in this Red Cross talk is quite clear. It has been stated over and again in the past that we want to have the disrupted SNRCC full-dress meeting resumed at an early date and to make substantive progress in our "preliminary" debate on the items of the agenda of the full-dress meeting.

To our regret, however, it is already a long period of time that your side has

persistently obstructed normalization of our humanitarian dialogue, and substantive discussions on our agenda items, constantly holding fast to the so-called “preconditions,” using such absurd expressions as “creation” of “social atmosphere” and “legal conditions” in the Republic of Korea, thereby endlessly delaying the long-awaited realization of our humanitarian projects—the dream of the millions of our fellow countrymen living in separation from their loving family members.

I want to make use of this occasion today to renew my oft-repeated call that your side show sincerity for an early normalization of our Red Cross talk and realization of the dream of the millions of our fellow countrymen longing to be reunited with their separated family members.

Let us first discuss the question of having our full-dress meeting resumed. The full-dress meeting has remained interrupted ever since the last seventh full-dress meeting held in Pyongyang in July 1973, as your side has obstinately refused to come to Seoul and attend the eighth full-dress meeting due to be held there. Over the last two years, the ROKNRC has urged, time and again, that the eighth full-dress meeting be held in Seoul unconditionally at an early date, while making suggestions of the date for the meeting no less than five times. Your side, however, has continued to turn down the suggestions, one after another, alleging that your side would not come to Seoul “because of the bad atmosphere” there.

It goes without saying that the allegations of your side as such openly betray the truth of the case and, at the same time, lack coherence. And I feel it necessary for me to make an examination of your side’s allegations in some length.

It must be pointed out, to begin with, that your side is making allegations as such clearly in an attempt to create the false impression that the ROKNRC is to blame for the lack of progress in our Red Cross talk, while making your side free to keep the humanitarian dialogue in our talk continue to be stalemated, openly violating all existing agreements between our two sides.

To recall some historical facts, I must first emphasize that we should not deny the fact that the two sides of us agreed at the third preliminary meeting of our talk way back in June 1971 to have the full-dress SNRCC meetings held in Seoul and Pyongyang, by turns. On yet another occasion, at our latest, the seventh, full-dress meeting held in Pyongyang in July 1973, the two sides of us confirmed

is valid the agreement to have the next, the eighth, full-dress meeting held in Seoul, only leaving the date for the meeting to be decided through later consultation. Nevertheless, your side has continued to oppose the convening of the meeting in Seoul, in spite of the agreements, making use of the allegations about the so-called “atmosphere” in Seoul. I cannot help feeling myself obliged to remind your side of the all too self-evident logic that, should your side want to have agreements revised for whatever reasons at all, your side will first have to have the meeting called into session and prevail upon the other side of the dialogue to have the agreements revised through mutual agreement, rather than plotting to cook up such unseemly allegations as “atmosphere” sort of things to stalemate the dialogue and create the false impression that the other side was to blame.

To speak about the alleged “atmosphere” in Seoul, in the second place, I want to remind your side of the fact that we have already in the past had our respective delegations visiting each other side’s area, with total safety assured them. The record shows that your side’s delegation was in Seoul three times, returning back north totally unharmed, while our side’s delegation was in Pyongyang four times.

The reciprocation of visits that has taken place so far is itself a telltale evidence that it is a sheer nonsense for your side to make issue of the alleged “bad atmosphere” in Seoul, using it as an excuse to justify your side’s refusal to have the full-dress meetings continue to be held normally.

In the third place, I think I must say that Seoul has a “by far better atmosphere,” when compared with Pyongyang, for our Red Cross meeting to take place.

Just as your side has had first-hand on-the-spot looks in the past, Seoul, as the capital city of the Republic of Korea, is today one of the most reputed metropolises of the world, renowned for its “good atmosphere” and facilities, together with the freedom of movement, openness and beauty, offering itself, more frequently than not, as an ideal place of international events of all kinds.

It was in May this year that we had an international seminar of junior Red Cross leaders from Asian and Pacific region held in Seoul, with participants coming from 15 nations in the area.

There have also been international conferences and events held in Seoul, in which even citizens of Soviet Russia, mainland China and other East European nations came to take part as freely as they pleased.

It was your side of Korea alone that has obstinately refused to come to Seoul. The NKRC was cordially invited to attend the junior Red Cross leaders' seminar held in May in Seoul. But your side declined the invitation and, thereby, drastically reduced the compatibility of your side's argument that the "bad atmosphere" in Seoul was a factor that made your side unable to come.

I think it is now about time for me to speak up that the falsehoods so flagrantly fabricated by your side can deceive, or make a fool of, neither our fellow countrymen in both sides of Korea nor the world any longer.

It is based on these examinations that I today urge that your side immediately stop playing with those falsehoods and evasions and agree to have a date fixed for the eighth SNRCC full-dress meeting. It has already been stated, many times in the past, that the ROKNRC delegation is always ready to go to Pyongyang to attend the ninth full-dress meeting there, due to follow the eighth one to be held in Seoul. I call on the NKRC once again that it instantly agree to have the eighth full-dress meeting of our Red Cross talk held in Seoul at the earliest possible date without any preconditions.

Let us now discuss the question of having the humanitarian projects envisioned in the five-point agenda of the SNRCC implemented.

There is no denying that it always has been the basic position of the ROKNRC, all the way down from the very start of the preliminary meetings in Panmunjom of our Red Cross talk in September 1971, that the two sides of us take a step-by-step approach, beginning with problems of urgency in nature and programs of practicability, in order to be efficient and speedy in having the humanitarian tasks commissioned to us carried out, bringing up concrete proposals to that effect.

It is a known fact that, at the third full-dress meeting in October 1972, our side brought up a proposal that, as a means to have the "ascertainment and notification" of the fate and whereabouts of the separated family members and relatives, a project called for by Item 1 of the five-point agenda, effectively undertaken, the two sides ask the two Red Cross societies in Korea to function as

legitimate intermediaries to supervise exchange of tracing letters between those persons involved in the tracing activities, using mutually accepted identical forms of inquiry and reply forms to guarantee a maximum degree of vitally needed political neutrality, in conformance with the commonly used International Red Cross practices in the field of tracing services.

Your side, however, has blocked the way for a substantive progress on the matter at issue by cooking up the unfounded and unwarrantable allegations about “legal conditions” and “social atmosphere” in our side of Korea. I should say, as I have stated it many times in the past, that there is no question about the fact that the kind of behavior of your side as such is clearly tantamount to an attempt to enforce a political entanglement of our humanitarian endeavor, a practice clearly inhibited, under Red Cross principles, in the international Red Cross movement, obviously with the aim of capitalizing on our SNRCC solely as a means to serve the political purpose of communist north Korea seeking a communist takeover of the Republic of Korea.

It was due to the improper attitude of your side as such that the humanitarian dialogue in our Red Cross talk has become stalemated.

The persisting stalemate in our Red Cross talk prompted our side to explore rooms for possible compromise to help the humanitarian dialogue break out of the deadlock. At the seventh full-dress meeting in July 1973, our side made the compromise offer that, as a pilot project, the two sides agree to have a mutually agreed number, each, of separated family members, and relatives, allowed to make a tour to the other side of Korea, respectively, around the Lunar August Full Moon Holiday (September 11 by solar calendar in 1973) so that they could visit their ancestral graves in their home towns and pay homage to their ancestors buried there. It goes without saying that, had your side been genuinely interested in the humanitarian need to look after those fellow countrymen of ours so desperately longing to be given an opportunity in their lifetime to be back with their ancestors lying in state in their graves, your side would certainly have, without hesitation, accepted our side’s offer. However your side rejected the offer outright, asserting that the offer dealt only with “matters of trivial nature.”

Our side was undaunted, however, in our search for a way out of the deadlock. We could not possibly betray the fervent aspirations of the millions of our fellow countrymen eagerly looking toward the day when a good news is delivered

to them from the humanitarian dialogue in our Red Cross talk.

After due consideration of your side's position opposing full implementation of projects envisioned by the five-point agenda, our side brought up yet another compromise proposal, at the first SNRCC working-level meeting held in Panmunjom on July 10, 1974, that the two sides of us first take up the problems of "aged parents," over 60 by age, facilitating operation of a "meeting place" in Panmunjom, exchange of mails and/or exchange of recently taken photographs, at the least, considering the fact that they had a limited, diminishing number of days yet to live. Again, however, the proposal was turned down by your side, being termed again as dealing with "matters of trivial nature" only.

Now, due to the persistently negative attitude of your side as has been examined in the above, we have not seen a single humanitarian project called for by the five-point agenda of our Red Cross talk undertaken yet. We have continued to repeat our meetings, but they have remained void of any substantive progress.

May I ask you, delegates from the NKRC, to pause a moment now and come back to enough sense to read the true minds not only of the millions of our fellow countrymen who have separated family members and the fifty million Koreans in both sides of Korea, but also of all the peace-loving people around the world?

It certainly is not the wishes of these people that the humanitarian dialogue in our Red Cross talk remain endlessly bogged down over such political demands of your side as are implied by the allegations about the so-called "legal conditions" and "social atmosphere" in our side of Korea, being abused to serve the political purpose of north Korea seeking to have it used as a means to achieve a communist takeover of the Republic of Korea.

It, instead, is the wishes of these people that the humanitarian dialogue make a substantive progress as soon as possible and, thus, have the various humanitarian projects called for by the five-point agenda implemented, contributing, in effect, to the cause of relaxation of tension and institutionalization of a durable peace in the Korean peninsula.

It is a foregone conclusion that the proposed humanitarian projects, designed to help ease the dire sufferings of the separated families, and relatives, purely from a

humanitarian standpoint, transcend the bounds of laws, politics and ideologies. And, therefore, no one is entitled to abuse them politically or to oppose them for political reasons. It was based on these considerations that the ROKNRC, back in 1971, proposed to the Red Cross society of your side a Red Cross talk for fulfillment of the lofty humanitarian objectives.

I would like to repeat my earlier statement, in this respect, that our side does not, and refuse to, regard the differences between our respective political institutions and social systems necessarily as an “obstacle” to a solution to the problems of the separated families. Instead, it is the desire of our side that, by having the proposed humanitarian projects undertaken, one after another, in a reasonable manner, we would be able to contribute significantly to relaxation of the tensions, removal of the mutual distrust and achievement of a peaceful unification of the country in the long run.

I would also like to call your side’s attention, in this same respect, to the impressive program of ours inviting those fellow Koreans living in Japan affiliated with the pro-Pyongyang organization of Korean residents there, the “Chosoren,” over to the Republic of Korea so that they can visit their home towns, meeting their home folks, including their family members and relatives living separated ever since their departure from their home towns years ago, and paying their homage to their ancestral graves. The Lunar August Full Moon of this year, falling on September 20 by solar calendar, was an occasion of a tearful, emotional homecoming for hundreds of these Koreans living in Japan, who had thus far obstinately refused to acknowledge their unseverable ties to the Republic of Korea at the malicious instigation of your side. Hundreds of them, in spite of their past background acting against the interests of the Republic of Korea under instructions from the pro-Pyongyang “Chosoren” where they belong by affiliation, already have successfully completed their home visits, returning back to Japan with total safety, after weeks in the Republic of Korea, moving about on the soil of their motherland as freely as they pleased and reinstating their blood-ties with their long-forgotten kinsfolk. They have also been assured that they can freely come back to their motherland any time as they please and freely return to their homes in Japan after freely spending their time in the Republic of Korea. And, may I add that there are now more Koreans in Japan of the “Chosoren” affiliation, in an increasingly greater number, in line filing their way into the Republic of Korea?

It certainly was an experience for these homecoming Koreans that matched the jubilation over the nation's liberation three full decades ago. It was a grandiose crystalization of the strenuous efforts of the Republic of Korea aimed at easing the sufferings of the millions of Koreans living separated from their loving family members, realizing the family reunions first among those Koreans living in Japan.

The case of these homecomings by the Koreans in Japan of the "Chosoren" affiliation was, in its own right, an irrefutable evidence that there were, in fact, none of the alleged "legal conditions" and "social atmosphere" in the Republic of Korea that posed an obstacle to a solution to the humanitarian problems of the Korean families separated among themselves, negating the preposterous allegations of your side that there can be "no implementation" of the proposed humanitarian projects at issue in our Red Cross talk, "as long as the 'legal conditions' and 'social atmosphere' in south Korea remain unchanged."

Next, let me briefly discuss the incident of "Shosei Maru," the Japanese fishing vessel which was reportedly attacked and kidnapped by your side's gunboats on last September 2 somewhere on the Yellow Sea.

I do not intend to discuss the incident in full. Nor do I intend to make an argument as to who was wrong and who was to blame as it relates to the incident. I only intend to make issue of some of the attitude shown by your side while dealing with the incident, as our side watched it closely with respect to similar incidents that had taken place earlier between our two sides.

In the first place, reports had it that your side publicly announced after the incident that your side had "fired" at the Japanese fishing vessel for your side had "mistaken" it for "one of south Korea's."

I must tell you that this indeed was a horrendous statement. It seems to us that, judging from what was so cold-bloodedly spoken in the statement, it is the policy of your side to fire indiscriminately on any ship, as long as she is "one of south Korea's," regardless of whether she is a fishing vessel or a ship in distress. If such a reasoning of mine does reflect the thinking of your side, then I think I ought to ask seriously if that is your side's version of "humanitarianism" and "love of compatriots." I simply cannot help being aghast at the brutality and inhumanity of your side so callously expressed in the statement.

In the second place, I must also discuss the repatriation of the Japanese fishing vessel, "Shosei Maru," and the Japanese fishermen aboard, as it relates to the case of "Suwon No. 33," the fishing boat of our side kidnapped by your side, together with her crew and the crew of another fishing boat, "Suwon No. 32," which was sunk on the spot by your side's gun-fire, on February 15, 1974, on high seas off west coast.

Many times in the past, our side has continued to press for early repatriation of the boat and the crew, through the good offices of the NKRC, or, if not, such humanitarian measures as meetings between the crew and their family members and exchange of mails between them.

Your side however has never responded to the humanitarian request of ours, keeping those innocent fishermen in custody for more than a year and a half now fabricating the unseemly story of "espionage activities" by the fishermen. On the other hand, however, your side is now seen repatriating the Japanese fishing boat complete with the crew aboard, not without some apologetic statements, within days of the kidnapping, even paying compensations for the two fishermen killed in the incident. Let me then ask your side a question, or two, if I may. Does the kind of behavior of your side distinguishing between the two incidents so much alike in their nature but different only because of the countries involved, the way your side did, do conform with the alleged "devotion" of your side to the "love of compatriots?" Or, is it not a case in which your side so obsequiously demonstrated your side's own version of "flunkeyism?"

There are still more, let me tell you, that should be discussed in this regard in due course.

We have the case of two civilian passenger planes abducted to your side of Korea in the past yet to be solved. Your side not only has not returned to our side the planes, but also has continued to detain some of the passengers and the crew. There also are now some 30 fishing vessels of our side along with some 400 fishermen aboard abducted in the past to that part of Korea held by your side remaining yet to be released and returned back to their loving family members left behind in the Republic of Korea thirsting, in vain, for some informations about their safety. Time and again in the past, we have asked that these innocent people be repatriated back to their homes, or, if not, some essential informations

about their safety be supplied to their families back home. Your side, however, has never responded favorably to these humanitarian requests.

I want to make use of this occasion to renew my appeal that the two sides of us in this Red Cross talk wake up to the hard realities of our divided country and, before it becomes late, make a move to solve all these humanitarian problems, committing ourselves anew to the foregone truth that neither different political beliefs nor different political systems can, and should be allowed, to tear the integral body of Korean people apart.

At this moment of the time, I must reiterate the basic position of our side that there should be no further stalemate in our Red Cross talk. There should be no more frustrations on the part of the millions of Koreans having their family members separated as well as the fifty million countrymen of ours in both sides of the divided country.

Fully in conformance with the basic position of our side stated as such, I now move to bring up a few suggestions for your prompt attention:

First, I ask that, as a means to ease the tension between our two sides and promote an atmosphere of mutual trust, your side provide us with essential information about the safety of the people of our side currently unlawfully detained in your side of Korea and return them back to their families as soon as possible.

Secondly, I propose that, in a move to normalize the humanitarian dialogue in our Red Cross talk, your side agree to have the long-overdue eighth SNRCC full-dress meeting held in Seoul, honoring our earlier agreements to that effect, at an early date, to be followed by the ninth full-dress meeting in Pyongyang shortly thereafter.

Thirdly, I propose that the two sides of us immediately enter into substantive discussions, without preconditions, on concrete ways to have the projects proposed in the five-point agenda undertaken, starting with the "ascertainment, and notification thereof," of the fate and whereabouts of the separated family members, and relatives, as provided by Item 1 of the agenda. I must remind your side in this regard that the humanitarian dialogue in our Red Cross talk was interrupted while Item 1 of the agenda was still under discussion at the full-dress meetings and that our side had a proposal put forth at the third full-dress meeting in October 1972 on ways to implement Item 1 of the agenda, calling for the use of the widely practiced international

Red Cross methods that featured exchange of identical forms of tracing cards (inquiry forms and reply forms) with the two Red Cross societies concerned functioning as legitimate intermediaries.

If, however, your side is not prepared yet to enter into a full discussion on Item 1 of the agenda and/or if your side is not inclined to consider the proposal of our side already before our full-dress meeting, I would then propose that the two sides of us take up the following projects to be undertaken as pilot projects, considering the urgency in their nature. They are:

1) That the two Red Cross societies in Korea use their good offices to let a group each of a mutually agreed number of people who have their ancestral graves in the other side of the country allowed, on an exchange basis, to cross the DMZ for trips to their ancestral graves on such national holidays as “Chusok,” the Lunar August Full Moon, and the New Year Day. The ROKNRC proposes that arrangements be worked out for the first such reciprocation of visits between the two sides of the divided country by the “tomb-worshippers” to take place on the New Year Day of 1976.

2) That the two Red Cross societies in Korea immediately take up the case of the “aged parents,” over 60 by age, preceding general implementation of the projects provided by the five-point agenda, to have their present living conditions ascertained first and, then, to have “meeting places” jointly operated in Panmunjom to facilitate “meetings” between the “aged parents” and their separated junior family members

The recent successes in the case of the home visits by the Koreans in Japan of the “Chosoren” affiliation convince the ROKNRC that there will be no difficulties in having the above-stated humanitarian projects successfully undertaken between our two sides. And, therefore, I think I have sufficient reasons to believe that your side will respond affirmatively to the proposals I have made here today. Thank you for your attentive listening.

Part Three

ROK Position on UN Debate on Korea

UNGA 1st Committee on Korea:

**“Peace without Unification Is Incomplete, But
Unification without Peace National Calamity”**

[On October 21, 1975, Foreign Minister Kim Dong-Jo of the Republic of Korea took the floor of the First (Political) Committee of the 30th United Nations General Assembly to let the official views of the Republic of Korea on the Korean question heard by the Committee on the first day of the Committee’s deliberations on the question. Commenting on the two rival draft resolutions on Korea before the Committee, sponsored by the pro-Seoul and pro-Pyongyang groups of nations, respectively—their conflicting contents and motivations—the Republic of Korea Foreign Minister, in the speech, strongly argued a case for the draft resolution sponsored by nations in favor of the genuinely peace-oriented cause of the Republic of Korea. The full text of Minister Kim’s speech before the First Committee is as follows. —Ed.]

Mr. Chairman and Distinguished Delegates of the First Committee,

I wish to express my appreciation to this Committee for inviting a representative of the Republic of Korea to take part in these deliberations, I also wish to express my appreciation to the distinguished statesmen of many peace-loving nations, who have expressed their understanding and support for the Government and people of my country during the general debate. We shall always be grateful to them for the good will they have shown us on this occasion. At the same time, I must emphatically reject the slanderous and insulting remarks made during the debate by a few speakers, who allowed themselves to depart from the spirit of

reason and fairness befitting this great Organization.

Last year, after the deliberations of this Committee, the General Assembly overwhelmingly adopted Resolution 3333, which urged continuation of the dialogue between the Republic of Korea and the North Korean authorities to expediate the peaceful unification of our country, and which also expressed the hope that the United Nations Command might be dissolved without prejudice to continued adherence to the Armistice Agreement. I wish to inform the Committee that, pursuant to this resolution, my Government has spared no effort to revive the South-North dialogue, and to prepare the necessary arrangements that would make possible the dissolution of the United Nations Command.

On June 27 of this year, I proposed a conference of the parties directly concerned with the maintenance of the armistice in Korea, so as to consider the whole subject calmly and in good reason. Repeatedly during the year, my Government has called for unconditional resumption of the South-North dialogue.

In this connection, you may recall that President Park also issued, on June 23, 1973, a statement announcing "New Foreign Policy for Peace and Peaceful Unification," putting forth a set of measures intended to reduce tensions and to facilitate unification by peaceful means. In January 1974, he further proposed the conclusion of a solemn non-aggression agreement between the South and the North of Korea.

I regret to report that these constructive initiatives have been to no avail.

They have kindled not the slightest positive response from the other side. On the contrary, we have been subjected during the past year to unparalleled abuse and provocation by the northern authorities. Confrontation and high tension continue to overshadow the peninsula, and the threat of another war hangs heavily upon us. There is still no peace in Korea.

Mr. Chairman and Distinguished Delegates.

More than a quarter of a century has passed since North Korean forces launched their unprovoked aggression against the Republic of Korea in June 1950, a criminal assault that brought untold death and destruction to my country. Since then, and despite the ever-present danger of renewed aggression from the North, the Government and people of the Republic of Korea have striven with

single-minded purpose to heal the wounds of war—to restore our devastated country, and to create a strong and rapidly growing economy with which to sustain and improve the material livelihood of our people.

We have come a long way. In the economic field alone, we have achieved an average annual growth rate of 10.3 percent in gross national product over the past decade, and 44.7 percent in exports.

We look forward to reaching the stage of self-sustaining growth and achievements by any standard of measure, and my countrymen are justifiably proud of them. At the same time, we are well aware that the progress we have made in the political, economic and cultural fields can be wiped out by another aggression from the North and the resulting calamity of war. We must keep a constant and watchful eye on developments everywhere in the world, and especially in East Asia. We have learned the lesson that eternal vigilance is the price of peace and independence.

For the Korean people, unification remains a paramount national aspiration of the Korean people. Their long and proud history, their cultural unity and ethnic homogeneity, bespeak a single national destiny. The people of Korea, both South and North, look to the day when their homeland shall be united again. It is also no accident that they have come to cherish peace as their highest and most urgent national imperative. They have suffered too much from war. We do know that another war would not only destroy all that we have achieved over the past two decades, but also cause untold sufferings and sacrifice in human lives. For this reason above all, while unification remains our highest national goal, peace has become our most urgent national imperative.

For the Korean people, peace without unification is incomplete. But unification without peace would entail national calamity. Our greatest national purpose, therefore, is peace with unification—that is, unification achieved by peaceful means. The Government and people of the Republic of Korea are irrevocably and forever committed to peace and the peaceful pursuit of unification.

Let us now examine the policy of North Korea regarding unification, and the means that they are prepared to employ in order to achieve that goal. The whole world remembers what their policy was, and what means they used, in 1950—naked, unprovoked military aggression against the South. We trust that the world

also remembers the outcome: the heroic successful struggle waged by the entire people of the Republic of Korea against the northern invaders. From this experience, the North Korean regime must surely realize that the people of the South will never submit to its domination. Nevertheless, North Korea persists in pursuing unification by means of force. Just as we in the South are committed to peace, so the regime in the North is committed to violence. In their blind appetite for conquest, they apparently do not see—or simply do not care about—the fatal dangers posed to the whole Korean nation by their policy of aggression. Herein lies the fundamental cause of continued tensions on the Korean peninsula.

Last year, I reported to this Committee on the discovery of an underground tunnel constructed southward across the Demilitarized Zone by North Korea. At that time, the North Korean representative told you that this was, and I quote, “a rigged-up case,” designed “only to kick up a frenzied racket” against his regime. Since then, we have made other discoveries, and according to our intelligence sources, there are now, beneath the Demilitarized Zone, more than a dozen similar tunnels, the construction of which was still in progress at the very time North Korea agreed to issue with us the July 4 South-North Joint Communiqué of 1972. I regret to report, moreover, that North Korea has flatly rejected our repeated requests for a joint investigation of these tunnels, which constitute a most serious violation of the Armistice Agreement. These tunnels are clearly for military purposes. I wish to extend an invitation to all of the Distinguished Delegates gathered here, to visit my country and see these tunnels for yourselves. You would then be in a position to judge whether they have been built for any purposes other than military—to facilitate a southward invasion. These tunnels provide the most compelling recent evidence of North Korean intentions. They are the latest—but not, I fear, the last—in an infamous record of deliberate armistice violations by the North, which includes the illegal fortification of the Demilitarized Zone, the infiltration of innumerable bands of armed guerrillas into the South, whose mission has been death and wanton destruction and an attempted attack on the life of our President.

Moreover, North Korea has been concentrating all its energies and resources on building up a military machine of unprecedented proportions, whose only purpose can be to attack the South. The northern regime has been spending more than 14 percent of its GNP annually for military purposes, while the Republic of

Korea, which continues to place the highest priority on economic development and improving the conditions of life for our people, spends just over 4 percent of the GNP for defense. Kim Il-sung's thorough-going totalitarian regime has turned the North into an armed camp, which, in its degree of regimentation and obsession with war preparations, is unparalleled in all the long history of my country.

As the saying goes, actions speak louder than words. No amount of peace propaganda from North Korea can change the facts I have reported to you. The confrontation on the Korean peninsula is not a confrontation between two aggressive states. It is a confrontation between a peaceful state, the Republic of Korea, and a regime in the North bent upon aggression and war.

Since the beginning of 1975, the men who lead that regime have become even bolder and more belligerent. Not only do they refuse to talk with us. They have also begun to threaten my country openly. While on a foreign visit last April, Kim Il-sung, the head of the North Korean regime, boasted publicly, "In this war, we will only lose the Military Demarcation Line and gain the country's reunification." Surely this is the utterance of a man, intoxicated by his own personality cult, a man intent on war and violence. Is it any wonder that tensions on the Korean peninsula have increased once more, the dark clouds of war hover over us?

Mr. Chairman and Distinguished Delegates,

It is in these circumstances that we must now face the questions of reviving the South-North dialogue, preserving the Armistice Agreement, and providing for a more lasting arrangement for peace and security on the Korean peninsula.

The North Korean position on all three issues is regrettably negative. To be sure, the northern authorities clamor loudly for "peace" and "peaceful unification." Since their policy is based on violence, at a time when peace has become a universal necessity, they must inevitably indulge in hypocrisy, deceit, and distortion. Indeed, it has become second nature to them. But it is not difficult, after all, to expose their real intentions hidden behind the mask of "peace." They claim that they are for national self-determination. But they refuse to carry on the South-North dialogue, which is the only practical avenue for the peaceful exercise of self-determination. Indeed, they fail even to mention the dialogue in the opera-

tive paragraph of their draft resolution. They call for the immediate and unconditional dissolution of the United Nations Command, even if this would entail—as they insist that it would—the termination of the Armistice Agreement and thus the breakdown of the whole Armistice system. They say that they will negotiate an alternative arrangement with the United States—but not with the Republic of Korea. They persist in their refusal to work out arrangements that would permit the dissolution of the United Nations Command without prejudice to the continued validity of the Armistice Agreement.

In short, their overall position is tantamount to a call for the renewal of war on the Korean peninsula, as a precondition to negotiating peace. But we must never resort to war in order to achieve peace. They allege, in their memorandum of August 17, 1975, that North Korea and the United States are the only “real” parties to the Armistice Agreement. Hence, they insist that they cannot negotiate with the Republic of Korea on arrangement for preserving the Armistice Agreement, let alone on other, more long-term arrangements. What could be more absurd than this? How is it possible for North Korea, which claims to stand for national self-determination, to allege that the Armistice Agreement—and, indeed, the whole question of peace on the Korean peninsula—are matters between North Korea and the United States only? It simply makes no sense to talk about arrangements for peace on the peninsula that do not involve the Republic of Korea, which includes more than two thirds of the whole Korean population. It is obvious to anyone, and requires no further explanation, that the Republic of Korea is an indispensable party to the Armistice, and an essential partner to the maintenance of peace on the peninsula. To allege otherwise is an insult to the intelligence of the Distinguished Delegates present here, and reveals the true dimensions of North Korea’s callous contempt for peace. North Korea maintains that it is prepared to discuss “practical measures” to remove the military confrontation between the South and the North through bilateral negotiations. If they really mean this, then they should agree immediately to resume the South-North dialogue. It is sheer hypocrisy to talk about negotiating all the “practical measures” enumerated in their draft resolution, and still refuse to reopen the only available avenue for direct negotiations between the two sides.

From beginning to end, their position is interwoven with such self-contradictions, with palpable insincerity and deceit. Indeed, their draft resolution—if

adopted—could well lead to the breakdown of the Armistice and to the resumption of war in Korea. To the northern regime, “unification” is not the voluntary process of joining two freely concurring entities through peaceful means. For them, “unification” is the forceful absorption of one side by the other—through aggression.

North Korea also calls for the withdrawal of foreign troops from the Republic of Korea. To begin with, such a demand constitutes an unwarranted interference in the exercise of the inherent sovereign right of the Republic of Korea, and thereby violates one of the most sacred principles of the United Nations Charter. We reject such interference out of hand. The North Korean argument is that, since all foreign troops have been withdrawn from the North, foreign troops in the South should also be withdrawn. This kind of specious logic will deceive no one familiar with the military and geopolitical realities of the Korean peninsula. They know full well that they do not need to have foreign troops actually stationed on their territory, since they can count on foreign troops encamped just across their northern border, if needed.

It is worth recalling that in 1950, it took more than two months for the United Nations to render effective assistance to the Republic of Korea. But it took less than a week for foreign troops to intervene massively on North Korea’s behalf. Once before, soon after the establishment of the Government of the Republic of Korea, our National Assembly adopted a resolution calling for the withdrawal of U.S. troops from the South. In full compliance with that resolution all American troops had left the Republic of Korea by the end of 1949. What happened thereafter is history—tragic, senseless, brutal history. Six months later, North Korea launched a massive military invasion of the South, and thereby touched off the bitter, three-year Korean war. This act of naked and unprovoked aggression, a resort to the use of force that mocked the spirit of the United Nations, spurred this organization to action, in order to meet what was, in fact, a fundamental challenge to its very existence. Men of reason and good will, men of honest purpose, rallied to repel the aggression, and resulting collective security action on the Korean peninsula wrote an honorable chapter in the history of the United Nations.

Today, we devoutly hope that the United Nations does not need to learn the same lesson twice. It has been wisely said that “those who cannot remember the

past are condemned to repeat it.”

Let me remind the world of the well-known fact that North Korea has military alliances with both of the big neighboring powers lying just across its northern border. These facts, when coupled with the belligerent posture and aggressive policies of the North Korean regime, compels my Government to take measures necessary to ensure a military balance between the South and North.

I wish to declare clearly and unmistakably in this hall that the Republic of Korea will continue to exercise its inherent sovereign right to provide for its own security, so long as we remain under serious military threat from the North. This is the indisputable right of every sovereign state, and derives directly from the state's sacred duty to defend its people. In keeping with the letter and spirit of the United Nations Charter, the Government and people of the Republic of Korea resolutely reject any foreign interference with their exercise of this sovereign right. And to the North, let me say this. Let there be no miscalculations. Do not misjudge our dedication to peace as a sign of weakness. The Government and people of the Republic of Korea are united and supremely confident. We shall defend our country against any aggression.

Mr. Chairman and Distinguished Delegates,

In his National Day speech on August 15 of this year, President Park Chung Hee stated:

“Violence or military force will never be employed by us in the pursuit of the goal of unification. That has been, and will continue to be our fundamental position. Nothing is more important and urgent to us than to establish peace firmly on the Korean peninsula. Our effort to consolidate peace serve the very cause of unification of the fatherland by peaceful means. For there can be no peaceful unification where there is no durable peace.” In this spirit, my Government wishes to propose the following as the most reasonable and realistic steps to consolidate peace and foster conditions favourable to peaceful unification.

First, let us maintain the present Armistice Agreement. The Armistice system is the foundation of peace in Korea. Our first and most immediate task is to preserve this hard-won, precarious, but precious arrangement.

Second, my Government will agree to dissolution of the United Nations Command and to the withdrawal of the U.N. forces under it, Provided that the

validity of the present Armistice Agreement is not affected thereby. To this purpose, let us hold discussions among the parties directly concerned with the maintenance of the Armistice Agreement. As I stated on June 27 of this year, we are prepared to meet with the other parties at any time, and at any place. It is our sincere hope that agreement can be reached on this point before the end of the year, so that the dissolution of the United Nations Command and the withdrawal of the U.N. forces can be completed by January 1, 1976.

Third, my Government is prepared to consider other measures, including negotiations on the more fundamental arrangement designed to replace the Armistice Agreement, reduce tensions between South and North, and ensure lasting peace and security on the Korean peninsula. As in the past, when we took the initiative in opening the South-North dialogue, the Republic of Korea will make every effort to bring about improvement of relations between South and North. I sincerely hope that the North Korean side will seriously consider and accept these constructive calls for negotiations.

Finally, let us immediately resume the South-North dialogue, which is the only practical path to the relaxation of tensions and to ultimate reconciliation. Without such dialogue, all North Korean talk of national self-determination, and of independent solutions to our national problems, is sheer hypocrisy. Only through dialogue can the wounds of war and forced division be healed. Only through dialogue can the South and North move away from the wilderness of hostility and confrontation and enter the hopeful ground of reconciliation. The deliberations of the South-North Coordinating Committee, which was originally established by the South-North Joint Communique of July 4, 1972, were unilaterally and indefinitely suspended by North Korea in August 1973. A week ago, on October 13, 1975, the acting Co-Chairman of the Committee for the Republic of Korea sent still another message to his counterpart in the North, urging the early resumption of the work of the Coordinating Committee. Against our earnest hope, we were deeply disappointed, when, on October 17, North Korea once again rejected this latest call of our side for an early resumption of the dialogue. I see little possibility of any solution to any of the problems that divide the South and North so long as the dialogue remains suspended.

Let the whole world know that my Government attaches no preconditions to its resumption. No excuse can possibly justify the rejection of this proposal by

the northern authorities.

Mr. Chairman and Distinguished Delegates,

Such is the position of my Government. It is a position founded on the aspirations of the entire Korean people, whose most ardent hope is for the reunification of their homeland, and whose paramount imperative is peace. We also believe that this national position is in complete accord with the aspirations of all mankind for peace and for national self-determination.

The Government of the Republic of Korea is convinced that the draft resolution contained in document A/C.I/L.708/Rev.1, co-sponsored by friendly countries and tabled before you, fully reflects this legitimate position of the Korean people. We therefore urge your full and overwhelming approval of this draft resolution. At the same time, we are also convinced that the draft resolution tabled by the other side would, if adopted, lead to the destruction of the present Armistice system in Korea, and dangerously increase the probability of war. In no way would it create "favorable conditions for peaceful reunification of Korea." Indeed, its effect would be the very opposite. Adoption of this resolution could only encourage the intransigence and aggressive posture of the North Korean regime, and thus contribute to the prolongation of our tragic national division. I sincerely hope that the members of the United Nations, in their collective wisdom, will see through the sham and pretense of this resolution, and reject it decisively.

Before closing, I should like to address myself directly to the North Korean regime. I would remind them again that the only alternatives to dialogue are war and national tragedy. You must not permit these horrors to occur, for history—and all mankind—will judge you harshly. Let us, therefore, return—together—to the national forum of peaceful dialogue. Let us follow—together—the path of national reconciliation and the peaceful unification of our fatherland.

Thank you.

Published on December 1, 1975

The Public Relations Association of Korea

I. P. O. Box 4161

Seoul, Korea

No. 010
March, 1976

South-North Dialogue in Korea

International Cultural Society of Korea
Seoul, Korea

South-North Dialogue in Korea

- South-North Coordinating Committee
- South-North Red Cross Conference

Foreword

It is now still another new year -1976. The past year -1975- was a year of stalemate, and further setback, as it concerned the situations in Korea, what with the United Nations adopting, at its 30th General Assembly, both of the two rival draft resolutions on Korea, a telltale message that a solution, if any, to the Korean problems will by all means have to be worked out between the two parties most directly concerned—the two sides of divided Korea, to start with, and what with the inter-Korean dialogue between them on two lanes—the political South-North Coordinating Committee (SNCC) and the humanitarian South-North Red Cross Conference (SNRCC)—obstinately remaining disrupted, being boycotted by north Korea. As it concerns the inter-Korean dialogue, there is no indication that the turn of the new year will promise any substantial headway, at least for the time being. North Korea remains as opposed as ever to resumption of the political dialogue in the SNCC and is no less reluctant to replace the current Panmunjom contacts in the SNRCC working-level meetings back with the full-dress meetings held alternately in Seoul and Pyongyang.

The 10th issue of the "South-North Dialogue in Korea" covers recent statements by President Park Chung Hee of the Republic of Korea on peace, security and unification of Korea, together with an account of recent developments in the two-lane inter-Korean dialogue and in the relations between the two sides of divided Korea. The editor will appreciate comments and advices from readers -Ed.

[We have the pleasure of announcing that, as from March 10, The Public Relations Association of Korea has been renamed as The International Cultural Society of Korea," with Hong Sung Chul, former Minister of Home Affairs, elected as its new President at a general meeting for 1976 held on that day. Former President Sohn Won Il was elected as an Adviser for ICSK at the meeting.]



Tearful Reunion after Decades of Separation

There were so many touching scenes of reunion at Kimpo International Airport, as hundreds after hundreds of Koreans in Japan of 'Chosoren' affiliation filed their way into the Republic of Korea, with each of them letting loose a heart-breaking moment of excitement and deep emotion. The expression in the face of a Kim Ban Yoon, 68, setting his feet on the soil of his homeland for the first time in fifty long years, is that of an ecstatic agony, as he is being greeted by his elder sister of 78 by age.

—The Korea Herald photo



It is the natural instinct of every Korean at the dying moment to see a vision of the sunny side of a hill in his native village, yearning to rest in peace buried nearby the graves of generations of his forefathers there. A Cho Che Soo, a Hyogo-ken resident and himself 76 by age, one of thousands of Koreans of 'Chosoren' affiliation on a home-going tour, deplanes at Kimpo International Airport carrying a box containing the remains of his mother, who died in Japan 18 years ago wishing to be buried on a hillside in her native village in Korea.

—The Hankook Ilbo photo



Why was this moment of reunion so late in coming? Having parted while still in childhood, the many wrinkles in the faces of this pair, a brother and a sister, testify to the long years of separation. Greeting his sister of 'Chosoren' affiliation coming in from Japan on a visit at the airport, the brother turns his face up into the sky, apparently trying to keep tears from bursting out.

—*The Seoul Shinmoon photo*




Expressions of the jubilation over the sensational home-coming varied, depending on the individual persons. Some wept. But, some others danced, as they found themselves standing on the soil of their homeland. For this elderly lady, returning home from forty years of a life in Japan, the day of her arrival in Korea was a day of feast, a day of many gaieties, naturally not without some dancing.

—The Shin-A Ilbo photo



A group of Koreans in Japan of pro-Pyongyang 'Chosoren' affiliation touring the automobile assembly line of the Ki-A industrial Co. on the outskirts of Seoul.

—The Korea Herald photo



Home-coming Koreans in Japan of 'Chosoren' affiliation grouped in front of the huge 260,000 ton tanker in her final stage of construction at the shipyard of the Hyundai Shipbuilding and Heavy Industry Co. in Ulsan.

—The Korea Herald photo



Due to the scare scenario given by 'Chosoren' cadres, they were "not without the apprehension of possible 'arrests' on arrival at Kimpo airport" when they boarded the Korean Air Lines planes bound for the Republic of Korea. As they deplaned at Kimpo airport, however, their 'apprehensions' were suddenly gone, with their faces emanating expressions of sheer joy and expectation.

—The Hankook Ilbo photo



It is a piece of good morals and manners for most Koreans, handed down from generation to generation, to visit, on national holidays of the year, the graves of their ancestors to enjoy a spiritual reunion with those resting in peace there. Returning to their native hometowns after decades of a life in a foreign country, most of those Koreans in Japan of 'Chohoren' affiliation on a visit to Korea, made it directly to their ancestral graves to make a tearful report on their homecoming trip.

—The Korea Herald photo

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Part One

**Peace, Security & Unification
of Korea**

President's New Year Press Interview:

**“Chances for ‘South Korean Revolution’ Are Over;
Discard Daydreams And Come Back to The Table**

[In his New Year Message to the Nation on January 1, 1976, President Park Chung Hee of the Republic of Korea rededicated himself to the cause of the South-North Dialogue in Korea, calling it the “only short-cut” to “prevention of recurrence of war, building-up of mutual trust and acceleration of peaceful unification of the fatherland,” and assured the nation that his government would “continue to do its best in the new year to persuade the north Korean side for an early resumption of the dialogue which is still in interruption.” When asked by a reporter to speak on the issue at his New Year Press Conference on January 15, 1976, the President repeated his earlier statement that the Republic of Korea would continue to press communist Korea for continuation of the dialogue “with patience and sincerity.” The following are the excerpts of the President's remarks on the inter-Korean dialogue at his New Year Press Conference.]
-Ed.

Question: It is already a long time since the South-North Dialogue has been interrupted, suspended unilaterally by north Korea. Would you tell us, Mr. President, if you have any plan for a breakthrough in the dialogue out of current impasse?

Answer: I must say that I don't frankly have any fancy idea at the moment as to how we can bring the South-North Dialogue back to resumption.

I think all of you remember that I have been repeatedly saying to this date that we need some amount of patience and sincerity, should we expect some achievement in the dialogue. I think I must again repeat the statement today. We would rather have to continue to be patient and sincere pressing the north Korean communists for their return back to the table and, at the same time, we would have to be patient waiting for them to do so. I don't think there is any other way and I am confident that we are that much patient.

The key to the problem, however, appears to me to be whether they (north Korean communists) are really interested in seeking a peaceful solution to the problems between the two sides of Korea.

I may think that there is little reason for us to feel upset much by the current stalemate and interruption in the dialogue, if only we are assured that they, too, are genuinely interested in the cause of seeking a peaceful solution to our problems. In that case, there will be no problem at all for us to wait for some time, with patience.

However, it will certainly be a totally different story, if that is not the case. I don't think there is much sense in waiting endlessly if, in spite of all their lip services of rhetorics about "peace," they continue to commit themselves to the cause of arms and violence. If and when such is the case, I would rather say that it will be a waste of time trying to keep up the dialogue.

We know that they claim a monopoly of "peace." But, at the same time, we also know that their deeds do not match their words.

It was in the immediate wake of the announcement of the South-North Joint Communique of July 4, 1972, that they began digging the infamous underground tunnels down south across the Demilitarized Zone.

To be true to their own nature, they refuse to admit that the construction of the underground DMZ tunnels was their own work. And,

what is more, they unashamedly make the false allegation that we, and not they, dug those tunnels in the DMZ, in an attempt, so they allege, to hold the north Koreans responsible for them.

In 1974, they instructed a Moon Se Kwang to come over to Seoul from Japan to carry out the terrorist mission of assassinating me. And the subsequent investigations have revealed the fact that it was again in the wake of the announcement of the South-North Joint Communiqué, in the fall of 1972, that Moon was first given the instruction to prepare for the terrorist mission. Here again, they deny their complicity in the terrorist plot, alleging that the entire assassination plot was a fabrication faked by us.

It is a common knowledge that for the north Korean communists the habit of lying has become their second nature. And, therefore, we have the feeling that we need not care much whatever they say. One should note, in this regard, the fact that they are still telling their own people as well as the world that the Korean War of 1950–1953 was started by us and not by them. Judging from these practices of their own, there ought to be little sense in making issue of their habit of lying.

It also was while we were having the South-North Dialogue still under way that they continued to dispatch armed agents down south, trying to plant underground organizational networks on the campuses as well as in other fields of life here, with the unmistakable aim of subverting our society. Out on the world stage, they were seen roaming about around the globe intensifying their filthy campaign of muckraking none other than the same Koreans in the south. Is it not quite natural, then, that we feel compelled to question the sincerity of all their lip services of rhetorics about “peace?”

Viewed from my vantage point, I must say that the north Korean communists are totally wrong about everything now. They appear to be helpless captives of some kind of daydreams. They appear to be unable to extricate themselves from the daydreams. And, I frankly feel myself

inclined to offer them a piece of advice of mine that the kind of daydreams they have been nurturing in their minds, whatever they may be, are simply totally impossible ones. They ought to realize that, before it is already too late.

I am strongly advising them to do away with their daydreams about the so-called "south Korean revolution" and "unification under communism." I can tell them for sure that the chances are already over for them to think of a success in such a reckless adventure. The time is already over.

The only remaining road before us, let me tell them in bold characters, is for the two sides of us to talk directly between us, organizing a joint effort to settle what problems there are, on a step-by-step basis, thus consolidating the fabrics of peace on this land. Only by so doing, can we organize a process of cooperation necessary to create conditions conducive to eventual achievement of unification. I am firmly convinced that this is the proper approach to expedite achievement of the long-sought unification.

The above-stated position of ours is the one that fully conforms with the three basic principles for peaceful unification which we have set forth before the world. Provided that there should be yet another war to break out on this peninsula under the circumstances, I don't think it will be a question of who wins and who loses. Should there be such an undesirable event, I think I would rather say that achievement of unification of our divided land will be delayed by another 50 years or so, at least. It precisely is the reason why we are so firmly committed to the cause of preventing such an outbreak of yet another war here in Korea.

Like I have repeatedly stated already in the past, our paramount concern today, therefore, is rather peace than an outright unification. More precisely, an institutionalized peace. I am convinced that peace securely institutionalized on this land will, without fail, prove to be the key to an earlier achievement of unification.

An argument on unification that disfavors the concept of "peace first" will have to be interpreted as refusing to rule out the use of arms

as a means to achieve unification. And we cannot buy such an argument.

At the same time, I must also point out the fact that, so long as the problems that exist in the relations between the south and the north are concerned, there is none of them that we can settle at all, unless the two sides of Korea arrive at an agreement on it through a dialogue directly between them.

Within the United Nations, we have undergone numerous confrontations of vote in past years. On none of these numerous occasions, the result of the United Nations deliberations on the Korean question has proved to be effective, because the two parties directly concerned, the two sides of Korea, continued to remain in disagreement on them. Year after year, the United Nations continued to adopt a draft resolution sponsored by nations friendly to us by an absolute majority. None of these resolutions proved to be effective, however, as the communist bloc nations continued to flatly ignore them, one after another.

At the moment, the north Korean communists appear to be rejoicing over the fact that a draft resolution in their favor had barely managed to be adopted, along with a rival one sponsored by nations friendly to us, by the 30th United Nations General Assembly last year. They may do so, as they please. Yet they will also have to wake up to the fact that, so long as we do not approve of it, it will prove to be ineffective just as well.

In the past years, we have steadfastly continued to press the north Koreans for an early resumption of the dialogue. But, every time we asked them to come back to the table, we have been continuously rebuffed by them, as they have persistently kept on producing so-called "preconditions" – "preconditions" which are so irrational and unreasonable that we could hardly consider accepting them. The all-too evident implications appear to be that they don't simply like to talk with us.

Let us take the case of the South-North Red Cross Conference. By an earlier agreement, it now has been the turn of Seoul to host its eighth

full-dress meeting. But, the north Koreans reportedly refuse to abide by the agreement, alleging that they could not come down to Seoul “because of the bad atmosphere” in Seoul. As we all know, we may have a state of atmospheric pollution here in Seoul somewhat more serious than in Pyongyang, for we have by far more automobiles driven in Seoul when compared with Pyongyang. But, I don’t frankly accept the argument that the alleged “bad atmosphere” in Seoul could justify their refusal to come to Seoul.

Beginning around ‘Chusok’ (Korean version of the Thanksgiving Day by lunar calendar) of last year, we have recently been having thousands of Korean residents in Japan, belonging to the pro-Pyongyang “Chosoren” by affiliation, coming over to the Republic of Korea, after decades of self-imposed separation from their homeland owing to their choice of political allegiance, to visit their hometowns for reunion with their family members there and to pay their homage to their ancestral graves. They have been seen enjoying total safety and complete freedom of movement during their stay here, returning back to Japan in total safety upon completion of their planned tour to their homeland.

Besides, take the case of the tens of thousands of foreign tourists flocking into our country in these recent years, plus the countless number of foreign visitors. Again, they enjoy total safety and complete freedom of movement while they are in our country. What a nonsense it is for the north Koreans to blame the so-called “bad atmosphere” in Seoul for their refusal to come to Seoul.

The north Korean version of “preconditions” include demands that, for example, we create such and such “legal conditions and social environment” and that we release what they sumptuously call “democratic and patriotic elements” in prison. In a word, their demands amount to a suggestion that, of our own volition, we choose to put an end to our anti-communist policies. To illustrate, they are demanding that we abrogate our Anti-Communist Law and National Security Law, giving legal or quasi-legal ground for north Korean agents to operate freely in our

country.

If the north Koreans were ever sanctioned to stick to such unilateral demands, I may say that we are also entitled to do likewise ourselves.

They demand that we release from prisons what they call “democratic and patriotic elements.” I don’t frankly know what the so-called “democratic and patriotic elements” in the north Korean vocabulary precisely amount to. And, they may perhaps feel free to use whatever terms, as they please. It seems very clear to me, however, that, by the term “democratic and patriotic elements,” they unmistakably indicate those who are currently serving prison terms for their state crimes—such as agents sent down south by north Korea and communist collaborators. How dare can they ask us to “release” these state criminals?

Burrowing the extortionary logic of theirs, are we not entitled, then, to demand that the north Korean communists release the countless number of people in north Korea presently believed to be either in prisons or in detention camps for their opposition to communism and, at the same time, reinstate those others who have already been purged, for we deem them as truly democratic and patriotic figures? I wonder if the north Korean communists are ready and willing to discuss these demands when, and if, we put them before them.

After putting before us totally unacceptable demands as these, the north Korean communists are hollering at us, and out into the world, that, because we refused to accept them, we are responsible for the interruption of the dialogue. We don’t think we can tolerate such a totally misleading accusation. We would rather advise them once more that they reflect on their own misdemeanor and unconditionally come back to the forum of dialogue, discarding their ill-fated daydreams and ungrounded demands.

I want to repeat, in conclusion, that this is the only way before us to express our love for our own people, our care for the good of the nation and to expedite achievement of a peaceful unification. And it,

undoubtedly, conforms with the fervent aspiration of our fifty million Koreans in both sides of the divided land.

President's Written Interview with THE YOMIURI:

**“Dialogue The Only Key to Solution of Problems;
'A Third Party Initiative' Is A Dangerous Idea”**

[Answering in written reply to a questionnaire submitted by The Yomiuri Shimbun, a leading Japanese daily, on January 26, 1976, President Park Chung Hee of the Republic of Korea declared that the dialogue between the two sides of Korea was the “only key to a peaceful settlement of the Korean problems.” The full text of the questions and answers, covering the full spectrum of the outstanding problems of Korea, its peace, security and unification, was run by the Japanese newspaper in its January 26, 1976, issue. “The President looked unprecedentedly self-confident,” commented The Yomiuri in a commentary that accompanied the full text of the written interview, “rather than presenting a crisis picture,” adding, “we cannot but conclude that, when viewed against the counterproductive international climate in which north Korea refuses to talk, demanding a direct contact with the United States, and the United Nations adopts two rival draft resolutions on Korea, at a time, the President’s firm advocacy of the dialogue, as the only best means to organize a joint inter-Korean effort for settlement of the Korean problems on a step-by-step basis and for institutionalization of peace in Korea, had all its practical points.” The full text of the written interview is as follows.] -Ed

O: What kind of an approach do you think the Republic of Korea will have to take during the latter half of the 1970s in order to secure peace and security in the Far East, and particularly in Korea, amid the

changing Asian situations? Would you think that there is any need to consider some changes in the basic policies of the Republic of Korea?

A: Historically, it can be said that the Korean peninsula occupies an area that is most sensitive and vital for peace and security in Northeast Asia as well as the world. In this context, maintenance of peace and security in the Korean peninsula has always been closely related with those of Northeast Asia and the world as well.

And, when we pursue peace, it is my conviction that there can be no other means but to talk. I know of no past precedents in which peace was attained without a dialogue to that end.

It was on that account that, back in early 1970s, I decided to try a dialogue with Pyongyang, with the purpose of institutionalizing a lasting peace on the Korean peninsula.

To be frank, it was by no means an easy decision to open up a dialogue with the north Korean communists, having lived in total separation for over a quarter century, particularly with a vivid memory of the tragic experiences of 1950s caused by the surprise invasion by north Korea.

In the latter half of 1960, moreover, we had to witness the ever-heightening of tensions on the Korean peninsula, with the north Korean communists ever intensifying armed provocations of various types against us. Therefore, it really was a hard decision to open up a dialogue with them under the then prevailing circumstances.

I made the decision to talk with them, nevertheless. I did so as I came to the conclusion that the rise in tensions was, in its own right, prompting us to seek some kind of solution as soon as possible. In addition, I came to be convinced that any solution to the Korean problems, whatever it might be, would have to prove to be ineffective, unless it was worked out between the two parties directly concerned, through a dialogue and mutual agreement.

As a result, we saw the start of the South-North Red Cross Conference and, subsequently, following the announcement of the South-North Joint Communique on July 4, 1972, the start of the political dialogue in the South-North Coordinating Committee.

On June 23, 1973, I went one step further to proclaim, based on the spirit of the South-North Joint Communique, our seven-point new Foreign Policy for Peace and Unification of Korea.

The new set of our foreign policy had items as follows:

First, a peaceful unification of our fatherland remains as the supreme goal of our nation. We shall continue to exert our maximum efforts to attain the goal.

Second, peace on the Korean peninsula must be maintained at all cost. To this end, the south and the north of Korea must not interfere in each other's internal affairs and must not invade each other.

Third, we pledge to continue our efforts, with sincerity and patience, to lead the South-North Dialogue to fruition, based on the spirit of the South-North Joint Communique.

Fourth, we will not oppose north Korea participating, with us, in international organizations, should it prove to be conducive to relaxation of tensions and promotion of international cooperation.

Fifth, if it is so desired by the majority of the member-nations of the United Nations, we will not oppose having the Republic of Korea admitted into the United Nations together with north Korea, on condition that it will not cause hindrance to our national unification. Even before we are admitted into the United Nations, we will not oppose north Korea being invited, along with us, to take part in the deliberations on the Korean question at the United Nations General Assembly.

Sixth, the Republic of Korea will open her door to all nations, based on the principles of reciprocity and equality. We, at the same time, urge those nations with ideologies and social systems different from those of ours

to open their doors to us likewise.

Seventh, the foreign policy of the Republic of Korea makes it fundamental to promote the cause of peace. It should also be reaffirmed that we will continue to consolidate our existing ties with friendly nations.

In effect, I made it emphatically clarified that, in order to solidify peace on the Korean peninsula, we were ready, and willing, to adhere to the principles of reciprocity and equality in the conduct of our foreign policy, in spite of differences in ideologies and social systems. There is no change in such a position of ours as yet.

As is widely known, however, north Korea is categorically opposed to the approach of ours and has unilaterally suspended the South-North Dialogue. And, notwithstanding, they are acting a thief crying thief by alleging that the Republic of Korea is responsible for the stalemate in the dialogue.

They allege that, should we see some progress in the dialogue, the Republic of Korea should create such and such "legal conditions and social environment." To be specific, they demand that we abrogate the Anti-Communist Law and put an end to our anti-communist policies.

Let us, then, borrow the fantastic logic of theirs. Then, I think we are likewise entitled to ask them that, as a precondition for the dialogue, they do away with communism and accept free democracy and capitalist economy, instead.

We are too well aware that a demand such as the north Koreans' not only lacks in utility, but, on the contrary, would only contribute to further heightening of tension. It, therefore, is the basic position of ours that the given realities should be the starting point of the South-North Dialogue.

For reasons given above, it seems imperative to me that, in order to solidify peace on the Korean peninsula, we will first have to prevail upon the north Korean communists to discard their illusory revolutionary

dreams seeking a break-down of the status quo by force and, instead, take a reasonable stand of recognizing the realities as they are.

In spite of our persistent efforts throughout the first half of 1970s so firmly committed to the cause of continuation of the dialogue, however, the north Korean communists have continued to turn a deaf ear to the repeated suggestions of ours calling for continuation of the dialogue and serious negotiations on the outstanding issues.

Under the circumstances, therefore, I think that we will continue to press the north Koreans for an early normalization of the dialogue during the latter half of 1970s, with an adequate amount of emphasis given to maintenance of the military balance of power in the Korean peninsula as well as in Northeast Asia to build up a pressure on the north Korean communists to depart from their illusory revolutionary dreams.

It is essential, in this respect, that the Republic of Korea attain a high degree of self-reliance in her defense posture so as to prevent the north Korean communists from harbouring temptations to go to arms. No less essential is the cooperation and support from Free World allies to the effect that a stable balance of power is securely maintained throughout Northeast Asia, which is pivotal for balance of strength in the Korean peninsula.

I will rather advise the north Korean communists to discard the day-dreams about the so-called "south Korean revolution" and "unification under communism" sort of things and wake up to the fact that, were we to settle the problems of Korea peacefully, there is no other means but for the two sides of Korea to organize their joint effort through a dialogue between them, tackling outstanding problems on a step-by-step basis and, thus, solidifying peace on the peninsula.

The time is already well over for them to think of anything close to a success in yet another try of theirs at their reckless adventure. They must realize that it has become already too late.

Q: Would you say that the overall situations in Korea are oriented

toward further aggravation of tension and possibly yet another war? How would you comment on the north Korean allegation that they have no “intention” of invading the south?

A: Like I said above, we ceaselessly tried our hardest throughout the first half of 1970s to solidify peace. To our regret, however, we cannot say as yet that tension in Korea has been eased somewhat, as we launch into the-latter half of 1970s.

The reason why is very simple.

It goes without saying that, were we to have tension eased in the Korean peninsula, it should be accepted as a matter of principle that neither of the two sides attempt to break the status quo either by force or by revolutionary means. The problem lies in the fact that the north Korean communists as yet obstinately refuse to accept it as a matter of principle.

We cannot rule out the possibility that tension in the Korean peninsula will become further aggravated, not without the danger of yet another war to break out, as long as the north Korean communists refuse to accept the principle of peace and continue to harbour the day-dreams about unification under communism through use of force, like they have done in the past and do now.

It is a matter of sheer rhetorics that they allege that they have no “intention” of invading us. If they really do not have the “intention” to invade us, why, then, are they not disposed of accepting our offer that the two sides of Korea conclude a mutual non-aggression agreement?

They are now seen dangling the unseemly idea of having a “peace treaty” concluded with the United States, which is a total nonsense to me. If they really do not consider starting a war against the Republic of Korea, then why are they so reluctant to make a public pledge with us as the same Koreans that they will never again wage a war against the Republic of Korea and honor peace, instead?

It was against us, the Republic of Korea, that they waged the fratricidal war back in 1950 through a surreptitious surprise attack and it was again against us, the Republic of Korea, that they continued to perpetrate countless number of instances of provocations in the years that followed the Armistice Agreement of 1953. And, what a nonsense it is for them to say that they will conclude what they call a “peace treaty,” aimed at putting an end to the state of war and hostilities in Korea, with the United States!

In a word, I must say that it is yet another piece of self-admission by the north Korean communists of the typical deceptiveness of their self-styled peace overtures.

I will now go into some more details.

In the years that followed the Armistice Agreement of 1953, a surprising total of more than twenty thousand truce violations have been reported along the Demilitarized Zone.

In addition, there have been a countless number of subversive activities taking place in the Republic of Korea by elements sent down south by north Korea, which included cases of commando attacks, military provocations on seas surrounding the five offshore islands in the Yellow Sea and terrorist activities like the attempted demolition of the Main Gate of the National Cemetery in Seoul by explosives, to name one among others. In August 1974, they went on further to make an attempt on my life, the President of the Republic of Korea, indisputably demonstrating the terrorist attribute of the north Korean regime.

The deceptiveness of the self-styled “peace” overtures of north Korea was further demonstrated with the revelation that the north Korean communists began digging the infamous underground DMZ tunnels all along the truce line roughly about the time when the two sides of Korea put their signatures on the South-North Joint Communique in July 1972.

We have sufficient reason to believe that there are at least 10, or more, underground DMZ tunnels under construction by north Korea,

forcing us to maintain a high degree of alert.

We have managed to discover two of those tunnels so far. And, it is my understanding that there already has been an intensive press coverage of them, by means of on-the-spot inspections, by major news media of our friendly nations as well as nations of neutrality across the world on newspapers, over the air and via the television screens.

Notwithstanding, the north Korean communists have not only rejected our offer of a joint investigation of the tunnels at issue, but also gone out of the way to allege that the story about the underground DMZ tunnels was a “fabrication” faked by us, while they had nothing to do with them.

Then, are the north Korean communists implying that all those major news media across the world were reporting falsehoods about those underground DMZ tunnels?

From the very outset of the New Year, we find the north Korean communists obviously being deluded into believing that the overall world situations are in favor of the so-called “revolution” and “world revolution” of their kind and, as a result, they are now talking loudly about the solidifying of the so-called “revolutionary forces” and “improvement of mobilization posture of the ‘people’s army’ ” of north Korea.

However, we are confident that we are prepared to meet all kinds of eventualities. We are now fully prepared to repel any aggression and insure our own national security. If only they are wise enough to take a hard look at the realities, I do not think they will dare to consider repeating the foolishness of starting a war again.

I deplore, however, the fact that, up there in the northern half of our divided land, we have those Koreans reckless to the extent that they consider bloodlettings by their fellow Koreans a price worth paying in order to serve the purpose of an imported alien ideology called communism. It is an abominable anachronism that they have made such a fanatical warlikeness their second nature.

As we have launched into yet another new year, I truly hope that they, too, will come back to our national conscience as soon as possible. I truly hope that they will soon come back to our forum of dialogue unconditionally and openheartedly and, thus, immediately start working on measures to ease tensions and solidify peace in the Korean peninsula. It is my firm conviction that it is imperative for them to do so, were we to bring about peaceful coexistence between the two sides of Korea and work toward a peaceful unification on that basis.

Q: It seems to be our understanding that one of the keys to peace and security in Korea has very much to do with changes in the international situations. How would you evaluate, in that context, the United Nations action last year adopting two rival draft resolutions on Korea? And would you comment on your future course of action as it relates to the United Nations deliberations on the Korean question from now on?

A: At its 30th General Assembly last year, the United Nations, as we all know, adopted two rival draft resolutions on Korea altogether, although they contradicted against one another.

It was extremely regrettable that the United Nations did what it did last year on the Korean question. It was crystal clear that the self-contradictory decision of the United Nations was of little, if any, help to settlement of the Korean problems. To the contrary, we have found every possibility that it would lead to further intensification of unnecessary and counterproductive competition and confrontation on the issue.

We have sufficiently made it known to the world that, for our own part, we are taking a very flexible posture in the United Nations, welcoming negotiations and consultations on the question at issue.

Fundamentally, we have let it be known that we did not think it possible to effect relaxation of tensions in the Korean peninsula, unless the two sides of Korea talk directly between themselves on the crucial issue. And, understandably, the United Nations for some time has con-

tinued to make it its stand to encourage the South-North Dialogue ever since it was started in 1971.

For two years, 1971 and 1972, the United Nations wisely shelved deliberations on the Korean question. The United Nations in 1973 adopted a consensus statement without vote and in 1974 passed a draft resolution urging the two sides of Korea to continue the dialogue.

In 1975, however, the United Nations succumbed to pressures from nations supporting the north Korean cause, adopting, along with the draft resolution tabled by our allies, another one submitted by those nations friendly to north Korea.

The draft resolution reflecting the north Korean position demanded unconditional dissolution of the United Nations Command in Korea and withdrawal of the American troops stationed in Korea outright, while that of our side called for negotiations to work out new arrangements to replace the UNC.

The communist cause was all too evident. It was clear from the very outset that, if the UNC was dissolved without a successor arrangement worked out in advance, it would certainly raise a serious question of legal as well as administrative domains as to how to preserve the truce in the Korean peninsula. By ruling out the necessity to have a responsible successor arrangement worked out in advance, the communist camp was clearly trying to invalidate the existing Armistice Agreement and, as a consequence, destroy the existing military balance of power in Korea unilaterally.

It was beyond question, in particular, that the demand by the communist camp for pullout of the American troops currently deployed in Korea under the bilateral Republic of Korea-United States mutual defense treaty was clearly a violation of the sovereign rights of the Republic of Korea and the United States, running, at the same time, counter to the positions currently being advocated by the bulk of member-nations of the United Nations.

In terms of their legal status, there is a clear distinction between the United Nations Command and the American forces stationed in Korea. The

American forces are currently being deployed in Korea under the ROK-U.S. mutual defense treaty, and upon our own request, and, therefore, constitutes a question of bilateral relations between the two countries concerned.

It is the explicit desire of us that there will soon be a conference of parties to the Armistice Agreement to cope with the question of dissolving the UNC and an expanded (international) conference of parties concerned to work out new arrangements to replace the existing Armistice Agreement, as is called for by the resolution of our side which was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly last year.

It should be stressed here, in that context, that we have continued to be cooperative with the United Nations, up to this very moment, where it concerns the United Nations decisions on Korea, ever since the Korean question began to be brought up before the world body in 1947. The Republic of Korea was founded through a national election held in 1948 under the United Nations supervision, upon recommendation by the world body. During 1950-1953, the Republic of Korea relied on the United Nations' collective security action to repel the north Korean aggression against her. And, in recent years, the Republic of Korea has been faithfully compliant with the repeated calls by the world body that we keep at our dialogue with the north Korean communists.

By contrast, however, I must point out the hard fact that, never a time throughout the past three decades, were the north Korean communists found cooperative with the United Nations.

So far, they have roundly ignored all the United Nations resolutions on Korea. They have constantly tried to convert the United Nations General Assembly to a stage for their irresponsible and unilateral propaganda activities.

It, therefore, is our fervent wish that the United Nations will avoid to offer it as a stage for unnecessary confrontations and counterproductive competitions between the two sides of Korea and, instead, offer it as a forum for dialogue and reconciliation for the cause of a substantial

resolution of the Korean question.

I hope that the United Nations will soon return to its own spirits of the time of its inception and function as a responsible world body overseeing the international peace. And, I hope that the United Nations will be guided by those spirits to the effect that either it will allow both of the two sides of Korea to become its members, separately, or at least allow the Republic of Korea, representing the two-thirds of the total population of Korea as a whole, with the pride in her legitimacy as the mainstream of the life of Korea as a nation-state, to become its member nation.

I must emphasize that it is one choice for the United Nations to make in order to solidify peace in the Korean peninsula and expedite national unification of Korea.

Q: Around the end of last year, you executed a reshuffle of your cabinet, making former foreign minister Choi Kyu Ha your new Prime Minister. Can you please outline the policy objectives of the new cabinet under the new Prime Minister, in some detail?

A: I think the new cabinet under Prime Minister Choi Kyu Ha has, by and large, three major policy objectives, which, in fact, are by no means new ones. To illustrate them:

First, the new cabinet is being committed to the task of building a total security posture of our country.

It is imperative for us that, unless the unprecedentedly aggressive north Korean communists drop the idea of achieving unification under communism by force, we accelerate the growth of our national strength and the building of our total security posture, through achievement of national consensus and unity, for our own survival's sake.

Protection of our national survival and promotion of the cause of democracy in Korea are just the two opposite sides of a coin. Either of the two cannot stand all by itself at the expense of the other.

And the new cabinet is charged with the mission of keeping at the house-cleaning campaign currently under way since last year, as part of our effort to consolidate a total security posture.

We are not cracking down on irregularities and corruptions among government officials only. We intend to crack down hard on all the social vices and decays with as much intensity. It is my firm conviction that the success in our house-cleaning campaign is no less important than winning in a war with outside enemies, for those social ills are literally enemies within.

Secondly, the new cabinet is charged with the mission of continuing to pursue a steady economic growth of our country, as has been the case of recent years.

It was one of the worst recessions that hit the world last year. But our economy recorded a growth of 7.4 % during that year. Export during that period was expanded by 15 %, when compared with that of the previous year, thanks to the hard-working people of ours who spared no blood and sweats to improve their economic lot.

This year, we are bound to wind up our third five-year economic development plan and we ought to make preparations for the fourth five-year plan which will be launched next year. We are now determined to make our country one of the advanced industrial nations, as a nation featuring heavy chemical industry, with the completion of the projected fourth five-year plan. And, therefore, it is going to be one of the most critical stages in the economic development of our country, with the new cabinet under Prime Minister Choi being asked to be the helmsmen. I am going to expect all of the members of the new cabinet to do their own parts in assuring a steady economic development of our country.

Lastly, the new cabinet is charged with the mission of continuing to carry on the Sae Mawul (New Village) Movement.

It was in the early years of 1970s that the impact of the New Village Movement began to be felt in every nook and corner across the country.

And, as we move into the latter half of 1970s, we are now finding the New Village Movement rapidly beginning to assume the role of a spiritual enlightenment movement of the entire people, as it expands its domain of influence to urban areas, transcending the scope of a campaign whose aim was to increase the gains of farmers while in its embryonic stage.

I expect the new cabinet to mobilize the maximum possible efforts to make the spirits of the New Village Movement — spirits of diligence, self-help and cooperation — a matter of every-day life of the people across the nation. I am convinced that the spirits of the New Village Movement are securely founded on our nationalistic ethos, making the impact of our proud spiritual heritage of the past fully felt in the momentum to build a modern industrial society, committed to the cause of peace and prosperity.

Q: We understand that there are talks about “cross recognitions” as a means to make peace and security in the Korean peninsula guaranteed internationally by nations with stakes in Korea. Would you say that that would be some idea?

A: I have stated earlier on June 23, 1973, that the Republic of Korea would open her door to all nations, based on the principles of reciprocity and equality. I also appealed to those nations with ideologies and social systems different from those of ours to open their door to us likewise. And, at the same time, I have made it clear that the Republic of Korea would not oppose to north Korea being admitted into the United Nations together with her.

With our basic policy lines as they are, I don't think, in principle, we have any objection to the idea of “cross recognitions” itself. Instead, I deplore that the idea of “cross recognitions” does not materialize because of the negative attitude of north Korea.

Nevertheless, I am ill-prepared to accept the theory that the proposed

“cross recognitions” would automatically “make peace and security in the Korean peninsula internationally guaranteed by nations with stakes in Korea.” To the contrary, I will rather like to term such a theory a gravely dangerous idea, based on thoroughly unrealistic over-expectations.

It is simply a matter of common sense that never was there an instance in the history of mankind where the so-called “international guarantee” had really worked under circumstances similar to those we have here in the Korean peninsula, where one of the two sides, that is, communist north Korea, is found ever intent on grabbing at a chance to use force to destroy the status quo.

And, it will make a totally different story if free world nations become overly enthusiastic unilaterally about the idea of “cross recognitions,” while the communist side continues to turn a deaf ear to the idea. It will only result in the catastrophic consequence of ruining the precarious balance of power in the Korean peninsula and Northeast Asia as a whole as well, running counter to the cause of promoting peace in the region.

It is precisely in this context that we propose an international conference of parties concerned to be held as soon as possible. We believe that an international conference of the sort will prove to be effective in seeking a solution to the Korean problems, which will consolidate peace without prejudicing the existing balance of power in the area.

I must repeat that communist north Korea is solely responsible for making it unable for either of the two suggestions, “cross recognitions” and an international conference of parties concerned, to get off the ground. It must be stressed that, by rejecting all forms of negotiations and dialogue, the north Korean communists are telling the world, in bold characters, that they can never care less the cause of peace in the Korean peninsula.

I would like to make it an occasion today to ask once again that the north Korean communists do give up their daydreams about unifica-

tion of the country under communism by force and, instead, affirmatively consider constructive suggestions of ours for relaxation of tensions.

Q: We can fully understand that there ought to be a dialogue between the two parties directly concerned for a solution of any kind to the Korean question. Yet, would you not think it necessary to consider some new initiatives to remove the mutual distrust, which is believed to be debarring the South-North Dialogue from being resumed? May we say that we are being reminded of a newspaper report in the fall last year, in which you were quoted as having expressed the willingness to consider a meeting with Kim Il Sung in person.....?

A: I cannot approve of the logical structure of your question, to start with. I think it should be the other way around. I don't think the course of the logic should be that we ought to remove our mutual distrust in order to resume the South-North Dialogue. On the contrary, I think we should say that we are in need of the South-North Dialogue in order to remove the mutual distrust.

It is because we are being guided by the all too obvious logic of the matter that we, on our part, do not have any "preconditions" for resumption of the South-North Dialogue. We are demanding that the South-North Dialogue be resumed unconditionally.

And, it was for that reason that I said, when asked by a reporter last year, that, should it prove to be necessary and conducive to the cause of peace in the Korean peninsula, I was willing even to consider meeting with Kim Il Sung personally.

I think, however, it is about time for us to take a hard look at the truth of the matter. In the first place, we need to determine, for sure, why, in the world, the north Korean communists have decided to cut off the dialogue unilaterally.

As is known already, they have thus far continued to fail to match their own words with their own deeds: They began constructing the

underground DMZ tunnels roughly about the time when we had the South-North Joint Communiqué announced. Even while the South-North Dialogue was still in progress, they have spared no efforts to muckrake us in the international theater and to instigate internal disorder within the Republic of Korea, obviously for the purpose of exploiting it as an occasion to ignite a “communist revolution,” at best, and an “anti-government uprising,” at the least.

It has become more and more obvious with the passage of time that they accepted our offer of a dialogue never in good faith, but only as part of their master strategy seeking to utilize it as a means to accomplish their avowed goal of a communist takeover of the Republic of Korea.

After a few rounds of reciprocation of visits that took some north Koreans, although relatively limited in number, down into the Republic of Korea with credentials as participants in the two-lane inter-Korean conferences which commuted between Seoul and Pyongyang for their full-dress meetings, however, they came to realize that there was little, if any, room in the Republic of Korea for the kind of a “communist revolution” that they wanted to stage there. Instead, they instantly woke up to the fact that the Republic of Korea was by far more developed in every aspects of life when compared with north Korea. They became scared that continued reciprocation of such visits would certainly backfire to their disadvantage, eroding the basic fabric of the tightly closed society of north Korea.

The north Korean communists became particularly frightened when the Republic of Korea proposed that the two Korean societies take measures to open their respective societies to one another. Obviously panic-stricken, they decided to disrupt the South-North Dialogue unilaterally.

Now, let us examine if there is any alternative choice for us to make to prevail upon the north Korean communists to consent to resumption of the dialogue.

I have stated it over and again that we do not have any “precondi-

tions” of our own for resumption of the dialogue and, therefore, we are frankly not obliged to consider paying any “price” to have the dialogue resumed. In other words, I am naturally convinced that there is absolutely no need for us to consider any “new initiative” with respect to the dialogue.

Having said so, there may still be one thing for us to do. We may perhaps find ourselves obliged to take measures to help the north Korean communists realize the fact that their dreams about a unification under communism achieved through use of force are now but an ill-timed illusion and, thus, help them decide to abandon the illusory daydream, of their own volition.

Were we to achieve that end, it seems to me that there is no other means for us but to maintain our strength strong enough to discourage the north Korean communists from considering the use of arms for a communist takeover of our side of Korea.

It seems to me that it will be only after they come to recognize the formidable strength of ours when they will finally recognize the need to have peace firmly institutionalized in the Korean peninsula and, consequently, recover enough sense to come back to the table.

Therefore, I think I can rightly say that the painstaking efforts of ours dedicated to the cause of strengthening our national strength can rightly be described as a bona fide effort to insure peace and security and relax tensions in the Korean peninsula.

It is my firm belief that, under the circumstances, our primary concern should rather be peace than unification. Institutionalization of peace in the peninsula should by all means come first and foremost. Only then can we find some clues to solution to the question of unifying the country at an early date. And, it is likewise my firm belief that maintenance of our national strength at a necessary scale and continuation of the dialogue are the two vital ingredients that would make it possible for us to have peace securely institutionalized in the Korean peninsula.

In this connection, I feel myself obliged to restate the three basic principles for peaceful unification of our country which I set forth in my commemorative speech on the occasion of the anniversary of the national liberation on August 15, 1974. They are:

First, we must above all make peace firmly take root in the Korean peninsula. In order to meet that end, we must have a mutual non-aggression agreement concluded between the south and the north of Korea.

Secondly, the south and the north of Korea should then respectively open their doors to one another and take measures to restore their mutual trust. In order to meet that end, they should faithfully continue the dialogue and thereby effect multifarious exchanges and cooperations between them.

Thirdly, with the objectives listed above achieved in due course, the two sides should call a free general election to be held across the entire expanse of Korea under fair election management and supervision, with representatives to be elected in direct proportion to the indigenous population of the two sides of Korea, in order to achieve the political integration.

I am firmly convinced that these basic principles of ours for peaceful unification of the country genuinely provide the most realistic and pragmatic approach toward unification of divided Korea through peaceful means, at the expense of use of force, amid the prevailing international environment that surrounds us.

Q: Could you please comment for us on the relations between Soviet Russia and Red China? Would you say that these Sino-Russian relations will affect resumption of the South-North Dialogue?

A: It has been widely known that north Korea has thus far fully capitalized on the worsening relations between Soviet Russia and Red China, cleverly managing to make the two rival communist superpowers competitors in rushing their economic and military aids into north Korea.

Without aids coming from the two communist superpowers, north Korea would not have been able to acquire the massive buildup of arms

that it has now.

I know that there are now speculations that both Soviet Russia and Red China are presently in agreement in wishing that there would not be yet another outbreak of war in the Korean peninsula, being tacitly contented with maintenance of the status quo.

I frankly wonder if they really are. But, aside from that, the question at issue in my view at the moment seems to be that, concerned as they are over the growing rift in their own relations, both Moscow and Peking appear to be caring more for their respective bilateral ties with Pyongyang, rather on competitive terms, opting, as a consequence, to restrain themselves from acting against the interests of Pyongyang.

Under the circumstances, therefore, I am highly doubtful if either of the two, Soviet Russia and Red China, is ever interested in using one's influence to persuade north Korea to accept resumption of the dialogue. Instead, we have the indications that they are rather found in agreement, caught as they are in a competition of the sort, encouraging north Korea to keep at its perilous revolutionary drive. To me, it seems more realistic to expect both Soviet Russia and Red China to provide north Korea with aids, like it or not, in case north Korea starts a war with us, although it will undoubtedly be unwise of them to do so, for their own interests.

Q: By and large, we think we can say that we have somehow managed to overcome problems of various kinds that have kept on straining the relations between the Republic of Korea and Japan. But, we must also frankly say that there are still rooms for future misunderstandings, and frictions. And, it is our understanding that the Republic of Korea has its own dissatisfaction over the ways economic cooperations, the basic ingredient in the existing ties between the two countries, have been being organized between the Republic of Korea and Japan in past years. Could we ask you to comment on this issue as well?

A: It is true that we indeed had some misgivings in the past as it relates to our mutual relations between the Republic of Korea and Japan

It is my feeling, however, that, ever since we had our diplomatic relations normalized in 1965 for the cause of peace and security in Northeast Asia, we have more or less managed to continue to develop a fairly friendly relationship, based on the principles of reciprocity and equality, as close allies.

During the last decade, the two countries have witnessed an increasingly greater amount of economic cooperations and trade. And, we ought not deny the fact that the rapid economic growth of ours during the past years owes a lot to Japan's capital investments in Korea as well as supply of loans.

It is also true that, during the past years, the relations between the two countries have sometimes had some rough-goings, strained by a number of undesirable incidents. However, I think I can say that the state of the relations between our two countries at the moment is generally good.

One of the problems that we now have in our relations with Japan has something to do with our trade deficit of over a billion dollars a year, and I think we have sound enough reasons to expect that the Japanese government, in conjunction with its business sector, take some drastic measures soon to correct it, just for the common good of the two countries.

Fundamentally, the relationship between the Republic of Korea and Japan is not a one-way street. It must be a mutual relationship, instead, that adheres to the principle of reciprocity. I should say that the two countries, as close neighbours, are partners in the new international order, commonly committed to the cause of peaceful coexistence and inter-dependence. And, besides, as is shared by many Japanese intellectuals as well as their leaders, security of Korea is essential to that of Japan.

These are some of the reasons why we think Japan should make it a matter of principle to be forward-looking and reciprocity-minded in

coping with economic cooperations between the two countries. Japan should also bear in mind that future development of the ties of friendship and cooperation between the two countries will prove to be a key to peace and security in the entire Northeast Asian region.

Q: To be a little bit more frank, there are some Japanese who hold what they believe to be restraints on freedom of the press in Korea to criticize the government responsible for the lack of mutual trust between the peoples of the two countries. Can we have some comments of yours on such an allegation?

A: I do not quite agree with them. I do not agree because, basically, we do not have the kind of restraints in Korea as they allege on freedom of the press to criticize the government.

I am quite certain that those who have ever had a chance either to read our newspapers, listen to our radio broadcasts, or to observe our National Assembly in session doing all the debates and interpellations of government officials, will quickly agree that there indeed are plenty of freedom of the press in Korea to criticize the government on its policies and measures. I do not deny that we do have some restraints laid on such activities as aimed at subverting our legitimate government or endangering our public safety and order. The restraints, however, are all being implemented strictly in accordance with the law.

It is a common sense knowledge that every world nations have some restraints of kinds, in varying degrees, as they are deemed necessary, without respect to their respective social systems.

Ours is a country, to be particular, that faces the north Korean communists, ever intent on grabbing an opportunity to deprive us of our very survival by force, along the DMZ, which is, when closest, only 25 miles away from Seoul, our capital city. Under these prevailing circumstances, I am being compelled to think that it must be taken for granted the we take certain appropriate measures necessary to insure our

own survival as a nation and our national security.

You say there are some Japanese who would distort the fact to paint a picture of Korea totally without freedom of the press to criticize the government and, based on the wholly distorted portrayal of Korea of their own painting, attempt to hold the alleged "non-existence" of freedom of the press responsible for the lack of mutual trust between the peoples of the two countries. To make the long story short, their allegation is a sheer nonsense. And, if there really are those Japanese of such a thinking, then I think I should say that they are either those already of a pro-Pyongyang leaning or those who have unfounded prejudices against us.

I would rather expect that, sooner or later, these Japanese, if they really are there, will correct their misunderstandings and prejudices in due course of time. I would only like to ask them that they take a hard look at the real situations in Korea all over again, as objectively as they can. I want them to make an objective comparison between the two Korean societies in Korea and then determine which of the two societies is truly committed to the cause of free democracy and which of the two is truly an ally of Japan.

And, they should also realize that, before long, they will see, with their own eyes, which of the two qualifies itself as a society genuinely dedicated to the cause of peace and prosperity. I ask them to note the fact that there already is an ever-widening gap between the two Korean societies in Korea in economic and sociological as well as other aspects of life. As a matter of fact, it has already been a long time since we have begun outpacing north Korea in all aspects of life that include productions, economic development and social welfare. I think, as more Japanese people come to formulate a correct perception of the Republic of Korea making a big stride ahead in terms of her national strength, as a society truly committed to the cause of peace and prosperity, outpacing north Korea, there will naturally be an increased amount of incentives

for the peoples of the two countries to understand and trust each other.

Q: Lastly, what kind of a role do you expect Japan can play in the days ahead with respect to settlement of the Korean question?

A: I have emphasized in the above that the Korean question will primarily have to be settled by Koreans themselves. Therefore, the South-North Dialogue naturally is the sole means to have a solution to the question worked out. And, that makes it clear that no nations in the world, no doubt including Japan, can find us Koreans any solution.

I feel myself compelled, in that context, to describe it as purely impractical and even dangerous if there are some people who believe that there can be some sort of a third party initiative for settlement of the Korean question. It is impractical and dangerous in the sense that any rash move by a third party risking a tilt in the sensitive balance of power that exists in Korea will automatically lead to a very serious consequence, crippling the precarious fabric of peace and security in this region.

In that sense, we expect Japan to continue to contribute to peace and prosperity in the Republic of Korea and, in turn, to peace and security of Northeast Asia as a whole, by further developing the existing ties of cooperation with the Republic of Korea. We are determined, on our own part, to continue to mobilize our maximum efforts to further promote our bilateral ties of cooperation, expanding the scope of economic cooperations and cultural exchanges, among others, expecting that Japan, on its own part, will do likewise.

Part Two

News from The South-North Dialogue

South-North Coordinating Committee:

Seoul Demands Immediate, Unconditional Reopening of SNCC in Its First Cable to Pyongyang of The Year

On January 26, 1976, Acting Co-chairman Chang Key Young of the South-North Coordinating Committee (SNCC), Seoul side, filed, over the Seoul-Pyongyang direct telephone line, his first telephone message of the year to his counterpart in Pyongyang, Kim Young Joo, asking that the Pyongyang side immediately accept the Seoul side's offer that the SNCC operation be normalized unconditionally. The full text of Acting Co-chairman Chang's telephone message:

"As we launch into yet another new year, I feel myself obliged to express a grave concern over the fact that the normal operation of our Committee remains disrupted for too long a period of time against the fervent wishes of the fifty million Koreans on both sides of Korea and to restate my wish that your side become sincere enough to consider normalizing the Committee's operation at an early date.

As is widely known already, even the Vice Chairmen's Meetings of the SNCC have been forced to be suspended since last year, as your side unilaterally postponed the 11th SNCC Vice Chairmen's Meeting, originally slated to take place on May 30, 1975, and has since obstinately continued to turn down repeated proposals of ours on the date for the 11th Vice Chairmen's Meeting, one after another. Considering the seriousness of developments that have unfolded on the Korean peninsula over the past months while your side has obstinately remained opposed to having the dialogue resumed, I cannot help feeling obliged to make issue of the attitude of your side so manifestly negative to the cause of peace and ask your side to make some self-reflections of its own to make good the original objectives of our dialogue.

There indeed is a number of questions before us waiting to be resol-

ved: On top of them all, we have mounting tensions between our two sides waiting to be eased and a precarious peace on the peninsula waiting to be firmly institutionalized. We are also asked, as we succeed in making peace firmly take root on the peninsula, to make concrete moves to remove misunderstandings and mistrust, broadening, instead, the basis of understanding and trust, between our two sides and to open the road toward a peaceful and independent unification, in turn.

Undoubtedly, these are the joint tasks of us. We can never accomplish these tasks as long as either of the two sides resorts to political propaganda and agitations or tries to impose its unilateral demands and conditions on the other. Relaxation of tensions and promotion of mutual understandings can be a matter of possibility only when the two sides of us succeed in exploring the common grounds from which they can work out specific agreements and have them implemented, on a gradually expanded scale, beginning, in the first place, in areas where they find it possible to work out the agreements despite their enormous differences. It was precisely for that reason that we have inaugurated our inter-Korean body, the SNCC, back in 1972.

Facing, as I do, the prevailing circumstances of Korea, I am firmly convinced that I should stress the dire need to have the SNCC operation normalized at the earliest possible moment, because I can make a long list of jobs of urgency for us to do: First and foremost, to cite a few of them, we must take measures to put an end again to the activities, both at home and abroad, unashamedly trying to muckrake the other side of the dialogue. We must, secondly, take measures to prevent armed provocations of various types, which have recently become not infrequent to happen. Thirdly, we must see to it that the humanitarian endeavor in the South-North Red Cross Conference be whipped to move faster toward some concrete achievements. And, to cap them all, we must open the way for inter-Korean exchanges and cooperations between our two societies, in good faith, thereby contributing to the common good of all of us Koreans in both sides of the divided land and to the mutual exposure of our respec-

ctive societies to one another.

Needless to say, these are all problems that can never be resolved unless the two sides of Korea, as parties directly concerned, manage to arrive at agreements on specific ways to solve them. It goes without saying that the two sides of Korea are the parties most directly concerned to whatever problems that arise in the inter-Korean relations. And, it, therefore, is imperative that we normalize the SNCC operation before anything else, were we truly committed to the cause of solving the problems of Korea peacefully and independently.

Based on this self-evident course of logic, I am going to make use of this occasion today to renew my oft-repeated appeals that the two sides of us instantly and unconditionally normalize the SNCC operation. It is my firm belief that, if your side comes back to enough sense to consent to this repeated proposal of mine, it will undoubtedly be acclaimed by the entire nation as a precious gift of yours to us Koreans as a whole, enabling us to redeem our national pride and regain the hope for the future of our fatherland. If, however, your side further continues to refuse to accept it as a matter of principle that, as parties most directly concerned, the two sides of Korea are jointly responsible for resolution of the Korean problems, in whatever way they may choose between themselves, and continues to remain opposed to normalization of the South-North Dialogue, I must solemnly warn your side that future historians will surely record, in the chapters of our national history that they will write in their own time, your side as the traitor who has wilfully obstructed a genuinely peaceful and independent unification of the country.

In conclusion, therefore, I expect that your side will affirmatively respond to my call for an early resumption of our dialogue."

[Pyongyang, however, keeps silence as yet to Acting Co-chairman Chang's telephone message of January 26 that called for instant and unconditional reopening of the SNCC.

On February 6, north Korea, instead, put on the air via Radio Pyon-

gyang a lengthy reproduction of an article allegedly run by a north Korean newspaper, the "Tongil Shinbo (Unification Daily)" by name, apparently as an indirect response to the telephone message of January 26, making the unseemly assertion that the Republic of Korea was "responsible" for the interruption of the dialogue. The Radio broadcast gave out the old cliches of north Korea again that the north Korean communists would not come back to the table, unless the Republic of Korea cease to be an anti-communist state by accepting the north Korean demands that the Republic of Korea 1) put an end to her anti-communist policies, 2) withdraw her new Foreign Policy for Peace and Unification of June 23, 1973, 3) stop cracking down on the communist agents operating under instructions from north Korea and 4) give up her efforts to build up a self-reliant military capability.]

Seoul Names Lee Yong Hee Its New SNCC Member; His Predecessor Becomes Acting Prime Minister

Lee Dong-bok, SNCC spokesman, Seoul side, announced on February 10, 1976, that Lee Yong Hee, Special Assistant to President Park Chung Hee, was newly named as one of five SNCC members from Seoul side as of the day. The new SNCC member replaced his predecessor, Choi Kyu Ha, who had resigned last year-end as a member of the inter-Korean body upon his appointment by the President as the Republic of Korea's Acting Prime Minister. The announcement by the SNCC spokesman for Seoul side said that Pyongyang side of the SNCC was immediately advised, over the Seoul-Pyongyang direct telephone line, of the latest shifting in the line-up of SNCC members for Seoul side.

[The new SNCC member for Seoul side, Lee Yong Hee, is one of the most reputed and respected scholars in Korea on international politics and relations, serving, ever since 1950, as a senior professor at the College of Liberal Arts and Science (now the College of Social Science), Seoul National University, until he was appointed as one of the President's Special Assistants last year. He was born in 1917 as a son of Lee Kap Sung, the only living survivor among the 33 signers of the Declaration of Independence of March 1, 1919, which touched off a nationwide popular movement demanding an outright independence of Korea from the colonial rule imposed by the then Imperial Japan.

After graduating from the Chosun Christian College (now the Yonsei University), Lee won his degree of Doctor of Law in 1963 from the College of Law, SNU. He served twice as President of the Korean Association of International Politics and once as Dean of the Graduate School of Public Administration, SNU. He is the author of a number of books, which include "General Theory of International Politics," "The Principles of International Politics" and "Studies in Politics and Political Thoughts."]

South-North Red Cross Conference:

“Let Us Reopen Road between Seoul & Pyongyang” ROKNRC Calls for Substantial Progress in Talks

[The 15th Working-level Meeting of the South-North Red Cross Conference, the first such meeting between the two sides of Korea in the new year, was held on schedule on February 12, 1976, in the conference room of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission in Panmunjom. The humanitarian meeting, however, adjourned without any substantial headway made at all, as the Republic of Korea National Red Cross (ROKNRC) delegates failed to evoke favorable response from their north Korean Red Cross (NKRC) counterparts to their call for an early convocation of the already long-overdue 8th full-dress meeting of the inter-Korean Red Cross talk. The ROKNRC delegates urged at the Panmunjom meeting that, among others, the two sides in the Red Cross talk immediately and unconditionally reopen the full-dress meetings, disrupted unilaterally by the NKRC since the summer of 1973, and instantly begin substantial debates on the items of the agenda of the humanitarian talk. The NKRC delegates, on the other hand, obstinately refused to comply with the ROKNRC call, allegedly making issue of what they called the “legal conditions and social environment” in the Republic of Korea all over again. The recent home-visits by thousands of Korean residents in Japan of the pro-Pyongyang Chosoren affiliation provoked a fiery exchange of charges and countercharges at the meeting as the ROKNRC delegates accused the north Korean authorities of trying all out to discourage those pro-Pyongyang Koreans in Japan applying for home-visits from actually making their trips to the Republic of Korea. The NKRC delegates, however, came out with the unseemly accusation that the Republic of Korea’s prom-

otion of home-visits by those pro-Pyongyang Koreans in Japan was a "traitorous plot aimed at prolongation of the national division," going out of their own way to allege that there was "not a single Chosoren member" among the thousands of Koreans in Japan who had already completed their home-visits identifying themselves as belonging to the Chosoren by affiliation. Following is a verbatim text of a statement made at the meeting by Dr. Kim Yeon Choo, Alternate Chief Delegate of the ROKNRC to the inter-Korean Red Cross talk.] —Ed.

Today we are holding a working-level meeting of the South-North Red Cross Conference for the first time in the new year of 1976. The Republic of Korea National Red Cross delegation has come to this Fifteenth Working-Level Meeting today with the earnest hope that the Red Cross talks will reap successful results this year, an achievement for which the 10 million dispersed family members and 50 million brethren in the south and north have been longing so eagerly.

Looking back, it is already the sixth year since we initiated the South-North Red Cross Conference, with a view to achieving the national aspiration of providing a stepping-stone for peaceful unification of the fatherland by granting to separated families in the south and north the joy of reunion.

During this period, our Republic of Korea National Red Cross delegation has devoted its efforts with zeal and sincerity to the task of substantially alleviating the sufferings of those dispersed families and relatives in the south and north, based on the humanitarian spirit of the Red Cross and brotherly love transcending the differing systems and ideologies of the south and north.

Despite such untiring efforts by our side and the ardent aspirations of our 50 million compatriots, the full-dress South-North Red Cross

Conference, once held in Seoul and Pyongyang by turn, has yet to resume to date, two and a half years after it was suspended. Moreover, these working-level meetings designed to normalize the stalemated talks have been going on without any success so far. It is really heartbreaking to see that our humanitarian talks drag on this way.

Our South-North Red Cross Conference is aimed at the humanitarian goal of easing the sufferings of families and relatives dispersed in the south and north. Besides our humanitarian program should be implemented in a way that can best contribute to consolidating peace in this land and accelerating independent peaceful unification of the fatherland by eliminating the chronic misunderstanding and distrust, as well as the tensions, existing between south and north.

How, then, can our Red Cross representatives of the south and north settle the question of 10 million dispersed family members satisfactorily, and contribute substantially to independent peaceful unification of the fatherland at this time, when tensions are building up and mutual distrust is deepening between the south and north day by day? It will not be a difficult thing, if only there is the will.

First, our Red Cross representatives of the south and north should solidly consolidate the basis of mutual trust by faithfully respecting the mutually-agreed items first in the course of dialogue. To accumulate mutual understanding and trust between the two sides, beginning with the dialogue, constitutes a shortcut, and a basic task, for dismantling the barrier of mistrust between south and north. Mutual understanding and trust can be achieved through faithful respect of mutually agreed matters.

If either side discards solemn agreements made with express provisions like one throws away worn-out shoes, and refuses to honor in the evening what was agreed on in the morning, putting forth unreasonable preconditions, how can we remove distrust and restore mutual trust to accelerate national unity?

Aware of the important historical significance the South-North Red

Cross Conference, the south and north Red Cross societies agreed in the course of preliminary meetings during 1971 and 1972 to hold the full-dress meetings in Seoul and Pyongyang alternately, with a view to settling the issue of 10 million dispersed family members in the south and north more effectively. It was upon this agreed principle that the delegates of the two Red Cross societies held their full-dress meetings, traveling to Seoul or Pyongyang no fewer than seven times.

When travel to Seoul or Pyongyang began by the south and north Korean Red Cross delegations, our nation broke a quarter century barrier of separation. The path, though narrow, has given us the confidence that it may be developed into a national “bridge of trust” through which the 10 million dispersed families in the south and north would enjoy reunion, and all of the 50 million brethren might travel back and forth in the future.

It really was a victory of humanitarianism scored across the barrier of separation.

If we maintain and pave this path by respecting the mutually agreed principles, the path will not only facilitate reunion between dispersed families and relatives in the south and north, but will lead to consolidation of peace and national unification in our country.

It is for this reason that the “path between Seoul and Pyongyang” along which we have traveled is a roadway carrying important significance as a means for accelerating national reconciliation in a broader dimension, instead of a simple road intended for the South-North Red Cross Conference only.

Regretfully, however, our south and north Korean Red Cross have failed for a long time to travel along the path which we ourselves paved, due to the failure to carry out solemn agreements and promises. As even the working-level meetings taking place here at Panmunjom fail to register any successful results, it is quite difficult to predict when the path will reopen.

Such stalemate of the talks stands against the objective which we sought at the beginning, nor is it in accord with the principles upon which both sides have agreed.

Faithfully carrying out the matters agreed on between the two sides, we must hold the eighth full-dress meeting in Seoul at an early date. And by resuming our travels to Seoul and Pyongyang, we should normalize the suspended south-north dialogue unconditionally at an early date, hardening and widening the path of mutual trust.

Second, we must bear in mind the objective, mission and responsibility of the South-North Red Cross Conference. Needless to say, the Conference is fundamentally intended to search for the 10 million family members dispersed in the south and north. We must fulfill the responsibility entrusted to us in order to accomplish this lofty objective, as expressly set forth in the agenda topics of the full-dress meeting agreed upon between the two sides.

Therefore, we must participate in the South-North Red Cross Conference with the original Red Cross posture, following the rightful path of humanitarianism. We should engage in substantial debate of the issue of dispersed families unconditionally at an early date, rather than shunning the solution of the issue on the excuse of some political or social preconditions.

The South-North Red Cross Conference is not a meeting designed to handle political, social or military problems arising from the different systems and ideologies of the south and north. For the political, social and military issues existing between the south and north, a separate conference body has been established between the south and north to deal with such questions. The South-North Red Cross Conference ought to exert all endeavors to alleviate the sufferings of the dispersed families in the south and north, transcending political, social and military conditions.

If the dialogue between south and north Korean Red Cross representatives were carried out smoothly, based on the humanitarian spirit of

the Red Cross and brotherly love, then the barrier of separation caused by the difference in systems and ideologies could be overcome easily. In fact, humanitarian dialogue would substantially remove such barriers one by one.

Therefore, the way of settling the issue of dispersed families urgently and in a humanitarian manner under the circumstances is to withdraw political and social prerequisites, and show good faith in the discussion of the agreed topics at an early date.

In the settlement of separated families, we consider it reasonable and effective to lay the basis for experience and trust, and then to expand our programs gradually by settling issues one by one, beginning with those most practically urgent and easy ones.

Our side has endeavored to solve all questions in a realistic and reasonable manner, based on this original Red Cross posture as well as the humanitarian spirit.

The proposals by the Republic of Korea National Red Cross delegation, such as "method of inquiry into missing persons," "prior settlement of the issue of aged parents," "mutual exchange of groups of visitors to ancestral tombs" and "exchange of pictures of separated families," are humanitarian programs which can be implemented at any place and any time, regardless of the different systems and political conditions of the south and north. They are all exigent programs which the dispersed families in the south and north themselves invariably support.

If these humanitarian programs which our side has proposed would actually be implemented, it could lead to expanding personnel and material exchanges between the south and north, as well as free trips to the south or north by the 10 million separated family members, contributing greatly to removing misunderstanding and distrust and restoring mutual understanding and trust.

Today the general trend of the world community is that all coun-

tries pursue open-door and mutual cooperation policies, transcending ideologies and systems. Such changes and developments point to the fact that all countries reject reckless violence and ideological confrontation in favor of development and peace.

Our country, responding positively to such objective reality of international society from early days, has introduced an open-door policy toward all those world nations with different ideologies and systems, promoting exchanges and cooperation with them, beginning in the sectors of economy and culture in particular.

As a result, our country has come to maintain postal and communications networks with all world countries already, exchanging news and information mutually. In this way, citizens of the Republic of Korea have been enabled to exchange news and information at any time with their families or relatives scattered around the world, with the sole exception of those in the north Korean zone.

Especially, in a program for visits to the homeland by Korean residents in Japan affiliated with Chosoren, the pro-Pyongyang Korean residents' group in Japan, which was initiated on the occasion of the Chusok holiday last year, as many as 3,000 Chosoren-affiliated Koreans visited their motherland on the Lunar New Year holiday this year alone. Emotional scenes of such persons visiting their native places and reuniting with their families or relatives for the first time in many decades take place every day, even nowadays.

These persons, most of whom had to live away from their fatherland and families against their will for more than 30 years, were our patriots who could not visit their motherland even a single time in the past due to political harassment and deceptive propaganda, although they had longed for homeland visits in their minds.

As they could no longer control their longing toward their fatherland and families and relatives, they returned to the fatherland, shaking off the yoke of deception and intimidation, with the determination that

“even if it means death, I will die in my homeland.”

The bosom of their fatherland, the Republic of Korea, was warm and proud as it greeted them. The reunions between the beloved families and relatives were literally a succession of emotions and rejoicings.

They are no longer exiles from home, nor are they separated families any more. Those Korean residents in Japan affiliated with Chosoren are our compatriots who now acknowledge their proud fatherland and home towns. They have now become members of a single family without any restriction.

The number of our Korean residents in Japan visiting the homeland has been on steady increase despite acts of organized harassment by some extremist elements of Chosoren, such as inhumane intimidation, persuasion, kidnapping and retaliation. The Chosoren-affiliated Korean residents who have been to the homeland have totaled about 5,000 already.

This proves that more precious than system and ideology is one's affection toward his blood relatives, showing that humanitarianism stands above politics. Now no person can stand in the way of our residents in Japan visiting their fatherland and blood relatives. To block their visits to the motherland is an inhumane act of blocking one's affection toward his blood relatives. Such an anti-national and nation-splitting act should be done away with promptly. The free visits to the motherland by Chosoren-affiliated Korean residents in Japan have clearly proved how justifiable and reasonable was the urging by the Republic of Korean National Red Cross delegation in the past for humanitarian settlement of the issue of separated families.

The visits have also substantiated with concrete facts the unreasonableness and absurdity of the contention that humanitarian programs cannot be carried out due to political and social conditions and surroundings. It was also exposed that such contentions were simply a poor excuse for delaying the talks.

Presently, many foreign newspapers and broadcast reports describe the visits to the motherland by our residents in Japan as “a victory of humanitarianism beyond politics.” They comment that the campaign for searching out dispersed families in the south and north promoted by the Republic of Korea National Red Cross has found a way of implementation in the Korean residents’ community in Japan first.

As your side well knows, East and West Germany, the territory of which remains divided like our country, settled the issue of reunion between separated families long ago in a humanitarian manner beyond politics. Besides, increased personnel exchange has been promised between the Western world and Communist countries in the wake of the so-called “Helsinki Declaration.”

Anywhere around the world where there is humanitarianism or affection toward one’s blood relatives, national boundaries have come to open and political and ideological barriers crumble. In a strict sense, such alone is the place where man can live.

Nevertheless, extremely high tension has been created today in relations of the south and north, contrary to the currents of the outside world. The reality is that the artificial barrier which cuts off one’s affection toward his blood relatives has thickened, showing no signs of early removal.

The South-North Coordinating Committee born of the spirit of the South-North Joint Communique of 1972 has been unilaterally suspended by your side, while the South-North Red Cross Conference, designed to ease the sufferings of the 10 million separated family members in a humanitarian manner, fails to register any progress due to the so-called “political and social preconditions” set forth by your side.

Moreover, the state of military tension has been building up further between the south and north because of the reckless policy for violence, such as “liberation of south Korea” and “revolution in south Korea” and the “four major military paths” which your side’s authorities have

continuously been pursuing even after the south-north dialogue.

The time has passed when violence or war could be rationalized with such anachronistic logic as so-called “liberation” or “revolution,” which your side talks about. The Republic of Korea now maintains a strong national defense capability and solid national solidarity capable of repelling any challenge. The path to our nation’s coexistence and prosperity in the days ahead is for the south and north to restore mutual trust through mutual dialogue, transcending differences in systems and ideologies and consolidating peace in this land, as well as realizing independent and peaceful unification of the fatherland.

The way for our south and north Korean Red Cross to contribute substantially to such consolidation of peace and unification is to reopen the “Seoul-Pyongyang path,” which we have already paved, by holding the eighth full-dress meeting in Seoul at an early date, and also to alleviate by humanitarian means the sufferings of the dispersed families and relatives in the south and north at an early date by listening to the ardent wishes of our 50 million compatriots.

Hoping that this year will become a historic era in which the joy of reunion can be accorded to the 10 million separated family members by all means, the Republic of Korea National Red Cross delegation would like to urge your side’s favorable response to issues such as the following for the normalization of the South-North Red Cross Conference:

First, as part of the efforts for easing tensions and restoring national trust between the south and north, your side should do away with all acts of obstruction as well as slander and defamation with regard to the program for visits to the motherland by our compatriots in Japan affiliated with Chosoren.

Second, your side should reopen the closed “Seoul-Pyongyang path” by holding the eighth full-dress meeting in Seoul at an early date, as agreed on between the two sides.

Third, for discussion of the agenda topics of the full-dress meeting,

your side should agree at an early date without any preconditions to the settlement of more urgent and easy humanitarian issues, such as “program for aged parents” and “exchange of visitors to ancestral tombs.”

I hope that these justifiable propositions of our side will be discussed seriously at this working-level meeting. I look forward to your side's affirmative response.

Part Three

Other Developments in Korea

Home-visits by Pro-Pyongyang Koreans in Japan:

Thousands File Their Way into Their Homeland; Festive Days Mark Triumph of Humanitarianism

『It was 'Chusok' (Thanks-giving Day in Korean version) in Korea on September 20 this year. It was the day on which the gentle-hearted descendents would flock to the tombs of their ever-revered ancestors, up on the hillsides and down in the cemetery-turned-parks in the vicinity of towns, for their annual spiritual reunion with their ancestors lying in state there. A good many number of Korean residents living in Japan was again seen this year making their annual trip back to their homeland for the tomb-visits on the 'Chusok' day. This year, however, it was worth noting that, unlike preceding years, there were new faces among the home-going Koreans – some 800 Koreans officially registered as "Koreans of north Korean nationality."』

The total number of Korean residents living in Japan is said to be estimated at some 640,000 strong. Reflecting the division of their home country, they are divided into two groups – Koreans of the "Republic of Korea nationality" and those other Koreans of "north Korean nationality." The former is a group supporting the cause of the Republic of Korea and the latter the cause of north Korea. More often than not in the past, these two groups of Koreans have acted as if they were eternally at odds with each other. Under these circumstances, the Republic of Korea this year decided to open her door even to those Koreans of "north Korean nationality." The promise by the Republic of Korea government that there would be "no preconditions whatsoever" for those Koreans to do the home-visits appear to have more than paid off. Some 300 Koreans of "north Korean nationality" were already in the Republic of Korea even before the 'Chusok' day.

There were many uncanny and unseemly rumors in the air prior to their departure from Japan. Having been exposed to rumors of 'all kinds, like the one that, "once you are within south Korea, there will never be your returning back to Japan," there reportedly were some Koreans who went aboard the airplanes bound for the the Kimpo International Airport in Seoul with the determination of jumping off a speeding train.

After a short while, they found themselves walking into a milling crowd at the Kimpo Terminal, each of them loudly calling the names of a relative or two among the incoming Koreans from Japan. One of these incoming Koreans, a lady of 59 by age, was greeted at the airport by her own mother of 79 by age and was suddenly gripped by an outburst of tears when her mother still recognized her face after 34 long years of separation, so reported a Korean daily, while the mother kept on exclaiming, "I am not dreaming, am I?"

Once back in their home country, the visiting Korean residents in Japan began to take a hard look at the life in Korea with their own eyes. It was a world entirely different from what they had been told while in Japan. It was definitely not a "heaven" yet, just as neither of Japan, the United States, Soviet Russia and China was as yet. Yet, it was definitely not a "hell," either. Like in other countries, there were plants being built, farming villages with electricity being installed. In short, it was a society in which everybody was at his hardest trying to live a life of abundance.

These, of course, are simple facts. Yet, it is ridiculous that Japan, as a society, has so far provided those Korean residents living in Japan with a social environment that has necessitated them to make some "determination" of the sort to wake up to those "simple facts." It is a common knowledge that even those Koreans in Soviet Russia of "Russian nationality" are now aware of the fact that the Republic of Korea has subway systems of her own being operated in Seoul. Living in Japan, it seems quite

natural to expect them to have more accurate picture of Korea. Unfortunately, however, that does not appear to be the case.

The case is more or less not different with the Japanese people, either. It is presently a fashion of the day for some Japanese to "discuss" the Korean question, based on "ready-made" ideas and clad in "ready-made" informations. To tell the truth, it is now only some 30 years since the days when we, the Japanese people, were dangerously exposed to the perverted ways of thinking and acting, that had resulted from our failure to formulate in our minds an objective perception of the hard realities of the day as they were.....』〈Verbatim translation of "Yoroku," an anonymous editorial column on the front page of *The Mainichi Shimbun* of Japan, that appeared on the newspaper's September 24, 1975, issue.〉 -Ed.

It may be said that there may perhaps have been no better account of facts as they relate to the long queue of thousands of Korean residents living in Japan, with their hitherto allegiance committed to the cause of communist north Korea as members of the pro-Pyongyang 'Chosoren' by affiliation, currently filing their way into the Republic of Korea for an emotion-filled home-coming after decades of separation of their own choosing, than what was said in the "Yoroku" column which the prestigious Japanese daily, *The Mainichi*, put into print on its September 24, 1975, issue.

Estimates say that there are presently some 600,000, or more, Koreans managing their living in Japan. The bulk of these Korean residents in Japan is part of millions of those Koreans who were forcibly requisitioned from their homes by the then Imperial Japan, to be put into hard labor in arms industries of various sorts in Japan. Some returned back to Korea following Japan's surrender in 1945. But, others chose to remain in Japan, mostly because they lost the nerve to try a stabilized living

in Korea with the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950.

The tragic division of Korea in 1945 did not leave the Korean residents in Japan all by themselves. They were accordingly divided into two mutually hostile groups, those belonging to the pro-Seoul 'Mindan' and those others belonging to the pro-Pyongyang 'Chosoren,' respectively by affiliation. For most of these Korean residents in Japan, it was a life stricken by many woes in the beginning; what with racial discriminations by the Japanese, uncertainty of their legal status and economic hardships, and what with the crucial lack of attentions paid by the governments of the Republic of Korea during those years when the diplomatic relations between the Republic of Korea and Japan were yet to be normalized and when the Republic of Korea was primarily occupied with problems at home. These were all factors that gave room for the pro-Pyongyang 'Chosoren' to take root among the Korean residents in Japan, with communist north Korea's proud skills in propaganda, agitation and organization set into full play with the overt aid from some leftist Japanese elements. By and by, the 'Chosoren' organization has grown up to be a mountain out of a molehill, hostile not only to the Republic of Korea but also to the present Japanese establishment. For communist north Korea, in particular, the 'Chosoren' organization in Japan has become a strategically located relay as well as regrouping base for its operation of infiltrating espionages, terrorists and underground agents into the Republic of Korea as part of its strategy to stage a violent popular uprising there for an overthrow of the government of the Republic of Korea by force. The abortive attempt on the life of President Park Chung Hee of the Republic of Korea on August 15, 1974, in Seoul by a Moon Se Kwang, a Korean resident born and reared in Japan, was one telling example of such north Korean operations.

Although the Korean residents in Japan are mostly those with their home-towns in the southern half of the peninsula, it has become unavoidable for those who chose to associate with the 'Chosoren,' knowingly or unknowingly, to sever their ties with the part of Korea to which their

home-towns belonged, the Republic of Korea, and, naturally, with their home-folks, too. Through 'Chosoren,' communist north Korea has thoroughly indoctrinated these Koreans in Japan into believing that Kim Il Sung of present-day north Korea was indeed the legendary hero by the same name of guerrilla fights against Japanese troops in the Manchurian forests riding a 'white horse,' in spite of the hard fact that Kim Il Sung of present-day north Korea was only in his early thirties with Kim Sung Joo as his original name in 1945, when he came back to Korea from Siberia clad in a Russian army uniform, while the name of the legendary Kim Il Sung had been known to most Koreans as early as late 1910s, and that, while north Korea was a 'paradise,' with its 'advanced social systems' envied even by 'other socialist countries,' south Korea was a "dark society, filled with ever-and omni-present starvations, poverty, unemployment and exploitation, in the total absence of freedom." It was against this unbelievable backdrop that the "Yoroku" column of the September 24, 1975, issue of *The Mainichi* had to deplore that those home-coming Korean residents in Japan of 'Chosoren' affiliation had to make "some determination of the sort" to make up their minds to face the "facts of life" in the Republic of Korea.

Beginning in late 1950s, some 100,000, or so, of these Korean residents in Japan of 'Chosoren' affiliation have literally been deported to north Korea, under the good name of 'free choice of residence,' to be dumped into the notoriously infamous hard labor camps in north Korea, making up for north Korea's chronic labor shortage. Their fate thereafter has never been known since to the outside world. They have simply disappeared into oblivion after going the one-way track. Among them were thousands of Japanese wives of the Koreans deported to north Korea together with their husbands. And we now find the woes of the families of these Japanese wives thirsting for some bits of news from north Korea about their safety have, by and large, become one of the most heart-breaking humanitarian problems of our time.

Launching into the 30th year of the territorial division in 1975, the

Republic of Korea Government, at long last, decided to take some drastic measures to help these Koreans in Japan regain their life as ordinary common-sense people. The Republic of Korea Government chose 'Chusok' of the year, falling on September 20 by solar calendar, as an occasion to give a 'go' signal for a campaign allowing these Koreans of 'Chosoren' affiliation come back to the Republic of Korea for a visit to their home-towns, and their ancestral graves there as well, as they please, unconditionally regardless of whether they choose to shift their affiliations or not.

Communist north Korea instantly mounted a heated campaign to block the humanitarian measure decided upon by the Republic of Korea. Tens of 'political commissars' were shipped to Japan aboard "Mankyungbong-ho," the north Korean ship on an irregular freight service between Japan and north Korea, to supervise the obstruction campaign on the spot. The entire 'Chosoren' organizational network, up from the central down to the local levels, were being alerted and the hundreds of Korean schools of all levels across Japan run by the 'Chosoren' were being given unscheduled vacations in order to let teachers as well as students take part in the campaign. There were home-calls, road-blockades, temporary kidnappings and others in order to keep those Koreans of 'Chosoren' affiliation applying for the trip to the Republic of Korea from actually making their way to the airplanes that would take them to their long-forgotten home-towns.

The typical communist propaganda was again seen in full swing. At the beginning, those Koreans of 'Chosoren' affiliation applying for the trip were told that *they would be "summarily arrested by the Republic of Korea Central Intelligence Agency on arrival at the Kimpo International Airport and subsequently made unable to make it back to Japan."* When group after group of the home-visitors began returning to Japan in total safety, communist north Korea instantly rewrote their scare scenario to say that *they were allowed to go back to Japan safely because they were in "groups."* *"It will make a totally different story if you go alone,"*

argued the north Korean propaganda. On other occasions, communist north Korea brought up the unseemly argument that *the personal safety of the home-visitors would be assured "only until the second time" of their visit. "When you go there for the third time,"* the north Koreans asserted, *"that will be the end of it."* There were still others who were told to "postpone" their planned home-visit, *"because in another year you will see unification of the country."*

With all these feverish obstruction campaigns, however, communist north Korea could not succeed in quenching the fire once kindled in the hearts of the home-going Koreans. A total of 2,000 of those Koreans in Janpan of 'Chosoren' affiliation made their home-coming tours around 'Chusok' of last year. Around the Lunar New Year Day of January 31, 1976, some 3,000 of them followed suit, with an increasingly larger number of them currently reported to be forming a long queue of waiting lists.

A nationwide fund-raising campaign has been initiated in the Republic of Korea with the purpose of raising money to cover the travel expenses of the poor and needy of those Koreans in Japan of 'Chosoren' affiliation. Within months, the total of donations amounted to 1 billion Korean wons (some 5 million dollars-worth) and was delivered to President Park Chung Hee on January 21, 1976, who instantly turned it over to government authorities concerned.

Staying in the Republic of Korea for two weeks, the home-visitors from Japan were taken, in groups, on an extensive tour of the country, urban as well as rural areas, with places such as General Yi Sun Shin Memorial in Asan, Ki-A automobile assembly line in Anyang, historical relics in and around Kyungju, the assorted steel mill in Pohang and the Hyundai shipyard and the Hankook oil refinery in Ulsan, in addition to the metropolitan cities of Seoul and Pusan, included in their itinerary for the first half of their trip. During the second half of the trip, they were all broken down into individuals so that they could individually go to their home-towns, meeting home-folks and visiting ancestral graves.

As was pointed out in the "Yoroku" column of *The Mainichi*, for most of these Koreans from Japan, it was a country totally different from what they had been indoctrinated into believing while in Jnpan. Many of them simply kept on weeping, as they realized that they had so long been "deceived." For most of them, their home-tours were literally tantamount to crossing an invisible 38th Parallel in Japan which, over the past years, had drawn a line of no crossing between the two hostile Korean societies in Japan and, therefore, a moment of de facto unification of a sort for them.

To quote some of them for their feelings about their home-visits:



A Ro Kil Boo, a leading 'Chosoren'-affiliated businessman of Kyoto, Japan, had to make the trip to the Republic of Korea all by himself, cancelling his original plan to make it as one of a group, because 'Chosoren' cadres had threatened to snatch him away from the group at Osaka airport.
The Chosun Ilbo photo

Ro Kil Boo (Male; 38; vice chairman of Kyoto chapter of 'Chosoren' chamber of commerce and industry; top man in Kyoto branch of 'Chosoren's' Japan-wide banking system; owner of two 'Kim Il Sung medals,' three 'Chosoren' citations; resident of Kyoto; home-town in Kimhae-gun, Kyungsang Namdo): "I feel myself like dreaming to find the Republic of Korea so much unlike what I have so far been told to be. I have put in a couple of overseas telephone calls to my mother and wife in Japan to tell them what 'Chsoren' people have told us of the Republic of Korea were all lies. I now have the strong feeling that this is my homeland where I think I should have my remains buried....."

〈*The Hankook Ilbo* and *The Chosun Ilbo*, Jaunary 31, 1976〉

Kwon Choong Suk (Male; 56; former teacher of 'Chosoren' schools of various levels in Japan; owner of a 'national flag medal' of north Korea; resident of Metropolitan Tokyo; home-town in Cholla Pukto): "Although they verbally profess 'democratic and national educations,' 'Chosoren' schools in Japan, as a matter of fact, feature indoctrination courses on the so-called 'Kim Il Sung-ism' and north Korea's unification policy, which is committed to the cause of unification under communism achieved through a 'south Korean revolution.' Before leaving Japan, we were told by 'Chosoren' people that we would be arrested on arrival at Kimpo

airport and, therefore, we were very much apprehensive when we boarded the Korean Air Lines plane at Haneda airport....."

〈*The Chosun Ilbo*, January 31, 1976.〉



'Medals' and 'honors' (of north Korea) could not hold a Lee Hyung Shik, an influential 'Chosoren'-affiliated businessman in Shiga-ken, Japan, from going his own "human way," which took him back to his mother (on his left) and wife (on his right) after three decades of separation. *The Seoul Shinmoon* photo

Lee Hyung Shik (Male; 59; vice chairman of Shiga-ken branch of 'Chosoren' Japan-wide banking system; vice chairman of the Aoki Trust Company; owner of a total of 14 north Korean medals that include 'Kim Il Sung medals,' 'national flag medals' and other 'citations'; resident of Shiga-ken; home-town in Yongil-gun, Kyung-sang Pukto): "I have made up my mind to make this trip guided by the natural instinct as a human being longing to be reunited with my own family members. 'Chosoren' people in Japan tried their hardest to keep

me from coming. But, I told them that it was my human decision and there was no room for politics to meddle in. However, it is my understanding that a good many Koreans in Japan of my kind have been persuaded to give up their planned trip to the Republic of Korea this time. Yet, I have come to believe that communist north Korea is now fighting for the lost cause.” <*The Korea Herald* and *The Seoul Shinmoon*, January 28, 1976.> “From now on, I am a proud citizen of the Republic of Korea. It is my plan that, when I go back to Japan from this trip, I will go to as many Korean residents in Japan of ‘Chosoren’ affiliation as I can to tell them that the Republic of Korea is very much unlike what ‘Chosoren’ people used to believe it was.....” <*The Seoul Shinmoon*, January 30, 1976.>

Kwon Hong (Male; 20; a sophomore at the Tojisha University in Kyoto): “Having attended Japanese primary, middle and high schools, I have had little, if any, knowledge of our own national history, not to speak of tales about our ancestors. My tour of the home country this time helped me open my eyes and ears to see the brilliant historical remains of our past and to hear the proud sagas of our great forefathers. I hope that the home government would, in the days ahead, see to it that Koreans in Japan of younger generations are invited to their homeland to share the great experiences such as mine this time.” <*The Shin-A Ilbo*, January 30, 1976.>

Koh Pyung Hoon (Male; 73; resident of Osaka): “This is my first time ever to be in Seoul. It was a hard decision to me to actually board the airplane, because for days, I was under strong pressures from ‘Chosoren’ friends to change my mind. But, I now feel so great being back in my home country and, naturally, I know I have made up my mind well.” <*The Hankook Ilbo*, January 25, 1976.>

Kang Neung Soo (Male; 60; resident of Osaka; home-town in Cheju Island): “For a very long time, the Republic Korea was a forbidden land for a ‘Chosoren’ hard-liner like me. Now that I am here back in my home country, I am trying to make the best and the most of my trip, as

I feel obliged to tell my children in Japan that we do have a fatherland of our own which we can feel very proud of.” <*The Seoul Shinmoon*, January 26, 1976.>

Pyun Ryong Duk (Male; 62; resident of Kida-kyushu; home-town in Chongdo-gun, Kyungsang Pukto): “It became crystal clear on arrival at Kimpo airport that we had so long been totally deceived and misled. We never knew that our home country has achieved such an impressive progress as we see now. I feel I cannot tell Japan from the Republic of Korea.” <*The Seoul Shinmoon*, January 27, 1976.>

Shim Jae Don (Male; 55; a restaurant owner; former head of a local ‘Chosoren’ chapter; resident of Kawasaki; home-town in Jinyang-gun, Kyungsang Namdo): “It is already a couple of months since my last trip to the Republic of Korea which took me there for the first time in 30 years. But, night after night, I continue to wake up in the middle of the night, because of the visions of the home-town revisited, half dream and half real. Pictures I took while I was in Korea are good reminders of those emotion-filled days there. And the records I brought home from Korea provide me with added funs these days. I feel tears rolling down my cheeks whenever I listen to these records played. I sit at the desk and write a letter or two to those relatives and friends of mine whom I have regained during the home-going trip. Not infrequently, I invite some neighbors of mine here in Japan of ‘Chosoren’ affiliation, who have not yet made up their minds to make the trip, over to my house and repeatedly make an account of my last trip to the home country, feeling the wall crumbling down in my mind.” <*The Joong-Ang Ilbo*, December 4, 1975.>

Koh Chang Hun (Male; 33; resident of Tokyo; home-town in Cheju Island): “I was surprised to find electric lights in rural villages. I saw everybody wearing shoes. On top of that, there were so many tall buildings, complete with highways. Ocean-going ships of breath-taking sizes were being built and there were so many automobiles being assembled.

Alas, I have spent so many years believing in those 'Chosoren' lies."
<*The Chosun Ilbo*, December 4, 1975,>

These are only a few examples of observations made by those Korean residents in Japan of 'Chosoren' affiliation, as they wound up the tear-filled emotional journey to their homeland. Yet, they are convincing enough to speak out the significance of their home-coming trip.

In the beginning, the Republic of Korea National Red Cross (RO-KNRC) originally had the plan to bring up the case of Korean residents in Japan, as a whole, at the South-North Red Cross Conference to find ways to settle their humanitarian problems along with the case of millions of Koreans who have their family members living separated in the two sides of Korea. However, the inter-Korean Red Cross talk has run into virtual interruption since the summer of 1973, as the north Korean Red Cross (NKRC) refused to hold the projected 8th full-dress meeting due to be held in Seoul, making the unseemly allegation that the "legal conditions and social environment" in the Republic of Korea was making it unsafe for them to come to Seoul. However, the home-coming tours by those Koreans in Japan of 'Chosoren' affiliation dealt a stunning blow to such unseemly allegations of communist north Korea as to their validity as well as utility.

Communist north Korea became increasingly unhappy, as they saw more and more Koreans in Japan of 'Chosoren' affiliation filing their way into the Republic of Korea for the home-visits. According to *The Doang-A Ilbo* and *The Kyulghyang Shinmoon* reports on January 29, 1976, communist north Korea accused the Republic of Korea, over Radio Pyongyang on January 26, of "perpetrating an act of treachery by coercing the Korean residents in Japan to make the trip to south Korea under the good name of humanitarianism" and frantically called on the 'Chosoren' rank and file to protect the 'Chosoren' organization from falling apart with their "own lives," allegedly "as did 'Madame Kim Chung Sook' 30 years ago to protect the life of the 'leader.'" (Kim Chung Sook

was a former wife of Kim Il Sung and mother to Kim Chung Il, reportedly the heir apparent to his demi-god father as top man in north Korea, who died in Pyongyang on September 22, 1949, while laboring to give birth to the third child between her and Kim Il Sung.)

The home-visits by the Korean residents in Japan of 'Chosoren' affiliation was made an issue of raging debates at the 15th Working-level Meeting of the South-North Red Cross Conference in Panmunjom on February 12, 1976, when the ROKNRC delegates asked that north Korea stop its frenzied campaign harassing those Koreans in Japan of 'Chosoren' affiliation applying for the home-visits. *"Your side asserts that there were some Korean residents in Japan of 'Chosoren' affiliation who had actually made their trip to south Korea,"* fumed the NKRC delegates at the meeting, *"but the allegations as such by your side are an utter fabrication because there was not a 'single' Korean belonging to the 'Chosoren' by affiliation among those who had actually gone to south Korea."* *"They were all either those belonging to the 'Mindan' by affiliation or those uncommitted to either of the two organizations,"* the KNRC delegates went on to allege, preposterously calling the decision by the Republic of Korea to allow the Korean residents of pro-Pyongyang leaning to come to the southern half of the peninsula as they please a *"filthy trick of a hoodlum reputed as a plotter and man-hunter."*

It was obvious, however, that the north Korean communists were spitting in their own faces. On its December 4, 1975, issue, *The Chosun Ilbo* ran an episode about a youngish Korean resident in Japan of 'Chosoren' affiliation and his elderly first cousin holding a high position in the pro-Pyongyang organization. Upon knowing of the younger one's application for his trip to the Republic of Korea, the elder one went to the younger to dissuade him from actually making the trip, telling him the scare scenario, "if you go, you will be summarily arrested on arrival at Kimpo airport and last seen by me." When the elder one found the younger still undaunted, he then revised the scenario, now warning a calamity on their family life, saying, "if you still make the trip, it will

be I who will have been finished.” Nevertheless, the younger one, *Lim Yong Taik* (Male; 27; a restaurant owner in Kawasaki; home-town in Namhae-gun, Kyungsang Namdo) by name, stuck to his original plan of the projected home-going tour and boarded a Korean Air Lines plane at Haneda, “not without the apprehension of possible arrest in south Korea.” Lim completed his tour and subsequently returned to his home in Kawasaki in total safety, reported *The Joong-Ang Ilbo* on December 4, 1975. The newspaper quoted Lim as saying on his return to Japan, “I have come to be convinced that, even if I move back to my homeland now, I will be able to manage a comfortable living there, if only I continue to work as hard and diligently as I have done here in Japan.” Lim then persuaded *Chung Kyng Il*, a son to his elder sister of his age, to make the trip to the Republic of Korea and made him an ally of his within his family supporting his cause.

The home-visits by those Koreans in Japan of ‘Chosoren’ affiliation have been picked up by many, if not most, major news media of the world and, thus, have become a news of global interest, signifying a major triumph of humanitarianism. Ironical as it might have been, however, one of the most persuasive summings-up of the meaning of the Republic of Korea campaign inviting these Koreans in Japan of formerly unfriendly political leaning came from *Tsukemaru Iida* (68), who, as chairman of Ganakawa-ken chapters of both the Japan-north Korea friendship committee and the Japan-north Korea parliamentarians’ union, had assumed a leading role in laying down the bridge of no return for the tens of thousands of Koreans in Japan who had been deported to north Korea under the excuse of “free choice of residence.” Iida was quoted by *The Kyunghyang Shinmoon* on December 3, 1975, as having said: “I have been to north Korea four times during the past 15 years since those Koreans began to be deported to north Korea. On none of these four occasions could I see, while in north Korea, a single Korean who had gone to north Korea from Japan. I had the feeling that it had very much to do with the possibility that they (deported Koreans) were having a miserable

life there in north Korea, and I always have felt sorry about that. I now believe that, in the true sense of the words, the current Republic of Korea campaign inviting these Koreans in Japan over to their homeland for a visit truly conforms with the lofty spirit of humanitarianism.”

Controlled Press Calls Kim The 'Sun of Mankind' 'Kim Il Sung-ism' "Increases Catch of The Fish"

[It is already a known fact that the personality cult of Kim Il Sung in north Korea today by far outclasses other forms of personal adulation that have ever existed in the annals of mankind in terms of its fanaticism and ferocity. To many, if not most, north Korea watchers today, the maniacal drive in north Korea to idolize a specific person appears to be claiming a place among the various forms of Shamanist practices of the world that have, more often than not, afflicted the world of reason of mankind. Recent reports even had it that, during early months of 1975, communist north Korea had the huge bronze statue of Kim Il Sung, standing 20 meters tall in front of the "revolutionary memorial museum" in Pyongyang, plated entirely in gold. In an article, entitled, "the immense glory and happiness of a people led by the great leader," run in the April, 1974, issue of "Keunloja (Workers)," the official organ of north Korea's Workers' Party, the north Korean communist party leadership called it an "immense glory, paramount happiness and holy duty" for the people of north Korea to "sacrifice themselves to be loyal, to the very last moment, to the 'great leader' of theirs." In the article, the north Korean leadership asked the north Korean populace to keep their 'great leader' "rest in peace," "by carrying out the instructions of the 'great leader' unconditionally to the last moment," while "accepting the authority of the 'leader' as absolute and guarding and protecting the 'leader' with their own lives, politically and ideologically." The article also told the north Korean populace to be "united in the conviction" that "glory is theirs whether they are alive or dead," so long as they loyally continue

to be dedicated to the task of "carrying out the instructions of the 'great leader.'" Recently, Peter Hazelhurst, Tokyo bureau chief of the London-based The Times, worked on a story on facts about the ferocious personality cult in north Korea. The full text of Peter Hazelhurst's article on north Korea run by The Times in its February 4, 1976, issue is as follows.]-Ed.

From Peter Hazelhurst, Tokyo, Feb. 3 — In terms of building up a personality cult, the somewhat immodest president Kim Il Sung, of north Korea, is attempting to outdo Stalin, Chairman Mao or even Lenin and Marx.

Throwing caution to the wind, comrade Kim has, in the words of official party organs, set himself up as the greatest revolutionary thinker of all time "without precedent in the East or West, in all ages, the sun of mankind."

The word communism has been eliminated in official jargon in Pyongyang and replaced by a new officially entitled doctrine — "Kim Il Sung-ism." The state-controlled press declares that hundreds of millions of people have been liberated throughout the world by "Kim Il Sung-ism" and the doctrine has provided north Korea with the most advanced educational system in the world.

In an attempt to deify the dictatorial leader, the latest edition of The People's Korea goes on to assert: "The people of the world have extended eternal thanks to the great leader, comrade Kim Il Sung, reverently looking up to the sun of mankind, to the great leader who has led hundreds of millions of once oppressed and maltreated people on the globe to take their place in the arena of history.....Thanks to the great leader, comrade Kim Il Sung, the genius of revolution, the outstanding thinker and theoretician and peerless legendary hero....."

Almost every sentence among the hundreds of thousands of words of turgid ideological literature emanating from north Korea is now punctuated with grandiose descriptions of comrade Kim — “great and respected leader, tender-hearted father of the nation, beloved leader and revolutionary genius.”

The People’s Korea states that the last year fish catch increased under the guidance of his “inspiring thoughts,” cement production exceeded the set target and industrial production rose by 18 per cent.

In a typical example of jargon used to glorify president Kim, the central committee of north Korea’s communist party commented: “In the northern half of Korea today, the unbreakable political and ideological unity and cohesion of the whole party and whole society with the great leader as the only centre has been achieved under the banner of ‘Kim Il Sung-ism.’

“The whole party, the whole country and entire people are firmly united like a monolithic organism breathing, thinking and acting only in accordance with the revolutionary idea of the great leader.

“This is a human historic example of ideological unity at a high level which is without precedent in any other society in the East or West in all ages and which can only be realized in the land of ‘Kim Il Sung-ism.’ ”

Unlike other communist powers, north Korea has spent huge sums of its precious foreign exchange reserves in recent years to advertise Kim Il Sung’s ‘thoughts’ in Latin American and West European newspapers such as the Daily Express, The Times and The New York Times, considered hostile to the communist world.

Close observers of north Korea believe that the motive behind this move was not designed to convert the West to Kim Il Sung-ism but to reproduce the advertisements in north Korea, where the average person might believe that the Western press was giving editorial prominence to the thoughts of Kim Il Sung.

North Korea Uninterested in Ease of Tension Rude Manners Disturb Many Foreign Countries

[The beginning of the South-North Dialogue in 1971 obviously opened the way for the north Korean communists to act a wolf in sheep's clothing in the international theater, launching a frantic globe-trotting diplomatic offensive pursuing a confrontation of vote in the United Nations with the Republic of Korea over the status of the United Nations Command in Korea and, hopefully, the American troops stationed in the Republic of Korea, under the cover of self-assumed "peace proposals." For a time, they appeared blessed with tith trends of international developments, feauring the triumphant entry of mainland China into the United Nations in 1971 and the rapidly growing aggregate voice of the Third World and Non-aligned nations within the United Nations. It was definitely not the ordinary diplomatic objectives of a nation that communist north Korea pursued to achieve through its recent diplomatic drive. The first and foremost objective of north Korea was to secure the basis of a wider international support for the north Korean cause of achieving a 'south Korean revolution,' a synonym of a communist takeover of the Republic of Korea by force — one of the three elements of north Korea's master strategy to attain the avowed goal of unification under communism, together with "consolidation of north Korea as a base from which to launch a revolution in south Korea" and "building up of a mainstay revolutionary force in south Korea." For the ideologically dogmatic north Korean communists, diplomacy, like war, was solely supposed to function as yet another means by which to pursue their revolutionary political ends, rather than a means by which to promote the cause of peace and international cooperation. As north Korea rapidly expanded its scope of diplomatic activities across the world in the past few years, its rigidly goal-oriented posture has not infrequently become a source of embarrassment for many, if not most, nations desiring to enter into relations, in one way or

another, with north Korea for its rude, unruly and provocative manners. The Hong Kong-based monthly "Asian Analysis," published and distributed by the United Kingdom Regional Information office in Hong Kong, recently made an extensive behavioral survey on north Korea's diplomatic conducts across the world in recent years and had a four-page article run in its December, 1975, issue on the subject. The full text of the article is as follows.]-Ed.

<Although seeking wider diplomatic recognition and attempting to establish President Kim Il-sung as a world statesman, North Korea still shows no sign of a desire to reduce tensions with the South.>

During 1975 North Korea achieved some success in gaining diplomatic recognition and support in the United Nations, but her methods of conducting foreign relations evoked criticism. In particular the North Koreans' evident belief that countries which recognised Pyongyang must follow its line towards South Korea was deplored by Senator Willesee, then the Australian Foreign Minister, in the Senate on November 11, 1975. Referring to the withdrawal of the North Korean Embassy and the expulsion of the Australian in North Korea, he said that his government had made it clear when opening relations in 1974 that it was not committed to changing its policies or reducing its ties with South Korea. The North Korean Government had accepted this in 1974, he said, but "for reasons best known to itself it was unable to accept it in 1975". The North Koreans' action had not been conducive to the development of the spirit of conciliation or to making progress towards a peaceful and lasting settlement in Korea.

The North Korean Foreign Ministry had given the Australian Chargé d'Affaires on November 6 a note accusing the Australian Embassy of systematic "subversive activities" and incessantly "slandering and defaming our Socialist system and confusing our social order".

Senator Willesee commented that all this was said to have been undertaken by a three-man mission over seven months in a highly-controlled society. The North Korean Government's charges were so transparently false as to raise serious questions about its willingness or capacity to act in the normally accepted way. Australia also rejected allegations that the North Korean Embassy in Canberra had been threatened and blackmailed.

North Korea's action is thought to have been taken in anticipation of an unfavourable Australian vote on the Korean question in the United Nations. The Australian Ambassador to the UN had indicated in the General Assembly on October 22 that Australia would be voting for a resolution put forward by South Korea's allies and against one from a group sympathetic to North Korea. In the Political Committee a week later, however, Australia abstained on the second resolution. By this time, as the *Canberra Times* pointed out on November 13, the North Korean Embassy had already made arrangements to leave Australia.

In the UN General Assembly on November 18 the pro-South Korean resolution calling for the dissolution of the UN Command set up after the North Korean invasion in 1950, together with arrangements to preserve the 1953 Armistice Agreement, was adopted by 59 votes to 51, with 29 abstentions. But the Assembly also endorsed (by 54 votes to 43—including Australia—with 42 abstentions) a resolution which required all foreign troops to be withdrawn from South Korea and called on the "real parties" to the 1953 Armistice agreement (meaning North Korea and the United States and excluding South Korea) to replace it with a peace treaty. According to the London *Sunday Times* of December 14, North Korean lobbying had been so crude that the permanent representative of one Asian country had complained to the Chinese—as a result of which the North Koreans had apologised.

The departure of US forces serving under the UN flag in South Korea has long been sought by North Korea and her friends, who must

be aware that in the event of a new conflict North Korea could be reinforced much more easily by her allies than could South Korea. Moreover, as the US representative pointed out in the General Assembly, the vast majority of the 40,000 US troops in South Korea are there not as UN forces but in accordance with the 1954 bilateral defense treaty. They are therefore not a matter for the UN.

Two Koreas

For the past two years North Korea has also favoured direct talks with the US, thus attempting to cut out South Korea and reduce her international standing. In the same way the North Koreans, while themselves joining UN agencies, have opposed the suggestion by President Park Chung Hee in June, 1973, that both Koreas might be admitted to the UN. President Kim Il-sung of North Korea told the managing editor of the Japanese *Kyodo* news agency on August 31, 1975, that there was a difference between cooperating for the sake of "anti-imperialism" by taking part in UN specialised bodies and other international organisations, and having "two Koreas" in the UN.

Dr. Kissinger, the US Secretary of State, said in the UN General Assembly on September 22, 1975, that the US and South Korea proposed a conference, with the participation of the US, China and both Koreas, to discuss ways of preserving the Armistice Agreement and other measures to reduce tension. He thought that the two Korean governments should be admitted to the UN. The Security council, however, refused to consider South Korea's application, though her Foreign Minister pointed out in a letter on September 21 that she had diplomatic relations with over 90 UN members. The conference idea was dismissed in a later speech by the Chinese Foreign Minister, Chiao Kuan-hua, Peking's view being that the Korean question should be solved by the Korean people themselves without foreign interference.

Hopes for progress through existing channels, however, have not so

far been realised. Full meetings of the North-South Co-ordinating Committee set up in 1972 have been suspended since late 1973. The South Koreans proposed in July, 1975, that the Vice-Co-chairmen should meet to discuss a resumption, but the North Koreans replied (according to the South Korean *Haptong* news agency on July 14) that further contacts were unnecessary until the South accepted their demand for an end to its antiCommunist policy. The Red Cross talks, begun in 1971 as the result of an initiative by President Park to discuss reuniting divided families, have similarly made little headway. Closer contacts have already brought problems—about 680 members of the pro-Pyongyang Korean Residents' Federation in Japan (Chosoren) who visited South Korea in September under the auspices of the pro-Seoul organisation, Mindan, declared that they had changed their allegiance, *Haptong* reported on September 24.

Prospects for a negotiated solution to Korea's problems were further threatened by signs of a warlike attitude in Pyongyang. In November, 1974, and March, 1975, tunnels built by the North Koreans were found under the demilitarised zone between North and South. According to a North Korean defector, they were part of a network under construction capable of taking vehicles and artillery for a future surprise attack on the South. The unexpected visit to Peking by Kim Il-sung in April, just before the fall of Saigon, was seen as evidence that, following the Communist successes in Indochina, the North Koreans were seeking support for a military venture of their own. If a revolution occurred in South Korea, Kim Il-sung said in Peking on April 18, "we as one and the same nation will not just look at it with folded arms but will strongly support the South Korea people." (Although North Korea has been expecting such an upheaval for many years, the Southern "Revolutionary Party for Reunification," which owes allegiance to Kim Il-sung, seems to have made hardly any impact).

The North Korean visitors received little encouragement from the Chinese, who made it clear in a joint communique that, while backing Kim Il-sung's policy towards the South in general terms, they favoured

“peaceful reunification”. similar stand has been taken by the Soviet Union, though Moscow was omitted from the North Korean President’s subsequent travels. This apparent abandonment of a carefully-maintained neutrality between Moscow and Peking may reflect North Korean dislike of Soviet *détente* policies. The Chinese have accused the Soviet Union (in a *New China News Agency* report of October 24) of failing to endorse North Korea’s slogan of “*independent* and peaceful reunification” and encouraging the continued existence of two Koreas by developing contacts with Seoul.

Kim Il-sung’s foreign tour in May and June which took him to Romania, Algeria, Mauritania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, besides being part of a longer-term campaign to consolidate support in the United Nations, was probably undertaken with the Non-Aligned Foreign Ministers’ meeting in mind. The conference, held in Lima in August, admitted North Korea while rejecting South Korea. Pyongyang’s drive to gain international support has resulted in diplomatic relations, or agreements to establish them, with more than 80 countries, though this is still fewer than South Korea has.

Reluctant Hosts

While North Korea had made considerable progress in Latin America, the newspaper *La Estrella de Panama* commented on September 21, several governments which had agreed to establish relations were reluctant to accept permanent missions, probably because of Pyongyang’s record of promoting revolution and subversion. The newspaper said that between 1966 and 1970 North Korea, in collaboration with Cuba, had trained at least 1,000 Latin American youths in guerrilla warfare. Costa Rica, which agreed to establish diplomatic links in February, 1974, resisted North Korean pressures to open an embassy there and in August asked a visiting North Korean mission to leave because its members had “participated in certain acts contrary to national sovereignty”.

Another aspect of North Korea’s drive to spread her influence abr-

oad has been the the placing of large advertisements in foreign newspapers, extolling Kim Il-sung and the Communist regime's achievements. This campaign began in 1969, though there was a lull in 1972 coinciding with moves towards détente with South Korea. The North Korean material has frequently been presented in such a way as to be superficially indistinguishable from editorial matter and has even been quoted as such by the *Pyongyang Times*. The Indian Parliament was told that the North Koreans had spent some 100,000 pounds on advertising in India during early 1970. Between January and July, 1975, the North Korean mission in Pakistan was estimated to have paid out 550,000 rupees (nearly 28,000 pounds) for the same purpose, according to the weekly *Istiqlal* in September. One reason for North Korea's breach with Australia was reported to have been a ban by the Canberra government on the placing of political advertisements and the circulation of a propaganda booklet regarded as offensive to South Korea.

Australia, like Japan and a number of West European countries, has also suffered as a result of North Korea's inability to pay for her imports. In an effort to reduce her dependence on the major Communist powers, North Korea began to develop trade with the non-Communist developed countries in the 1960s, relying increasingly upon them for machinery and technology with the launching of the new Six-Year Plan in 1971. Over the past year or so, however, North Korea has run into payments difficulties for a variety of reasons, thought to include inexperience, over-ordering as a result of mismanagement, transport problems and the fall in prices for her non-ferrous metal exports. Much of these and of the country's iron ore have in any case had to be diverted to the Soviet Union and China to meet the cost of imported oil, the Russians (though not the Chinese) having apparently raised their prices to world levels. Yet North Korea is still estimated to owe the Soviet Union, China and East Europe over US \$700 million, while a group of non-Communist creditors meeting in October, 1975, are reported to have put her debt to them at \$430 million.

Published on March 20, 1976

The Public Relations Association of Korea

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