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회의 일정 CONFERENCE SCHEDULE

6. 14(목), June 14(Thursday)

10:00-12:00 a.m.


제 1 회의
Session I

2:00-4:00 p.m.

제 2 회의
Session II

4:30-6:30 p.m.

제 3 회의
Session III



6. 15(금), June 15(Friday)

09:30-12:00 a.m.

제 4 회의
Session IV

2:00-4:00 p.m.

제 5 회의
Session V

4:30-6:30 p.m.

제 6 회의
General Discussion

Handwritten notes in Korean, including the date "6.25" and several lines of illegible text.

제 1 회 의
SESSION I

한국전쟁의 기원
THE ORIGINS OF THE KOREAN WAR

THE SECOND INTERNATIONAL
CONFERENCE ON THE KOREAN WAR
JUNE 14~15, 1990
SEOUL, KOREA

**International Trends in Korean War Studies:
A Review of the Documentary Literature**

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for Social Affairs)

I. Introduction: An Overview

Causes Behind Accelerated Research Overseas in the 1970s

Research on the Korean War (June 25, 1950 July 27, 1953) increased significantly in the period after the 1970s and it is therefore important to begin with an examination of the factors behind the acceleration or expansion of Korean War studies since that time. Consistent with such an objective, the following reasons maybe cited for the expansion of Korean War studies. First, the emergence of detente--the reduction of tension--in the international scene in the early 1970s was manifested by two broad trends, a deemphasis on the Cold War and correspondingly, on ideology. Such an evolving international environment contributed towards a more objective undertaking of studies pertaining to the Korean War, a conflict which was a by-product of the Cold War. Put in another way, the ideological restrictions in assessing the Korean War were considerably relaxed.

Second, critical source materials relating to Korean War studies were either released or uncovered in the 1970s, particularly in the mid-1970s. More specifically, they can be broken down into four main areas: (1) a significant portion of the primary documents pertaining indirectly and directly to the Korean War can be found in the United States and these can be classified

further into three areas:

(a) Official documents of the United States government. A primary example of such a document is the Foreign Relations of the United States series published by the Department of State, a compilation of official papers dating back to the period concerned as well as other documents compiled by the United States Army.

(b) Official documents deposited in the Department of State as well as depositories of papers of key figures who played critical policy making roles during the Korean War such as the Harry S. Truman Presidential Library and the libraries of General Douglas MacArthur and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles.

(c) North Korean documents seized by the United States during the Korean War. Referred to often as "Captured North Korean Documents," these papers cover such areas as the background leading to, and the rationale behind, the formation of the North Korean government as well as insights into the North Korean leaderships' perceptions on South Korea and unification, and thus adds new light on the origins of the Korean War.¹⁾

These three types of documents remained classified as secret material until they were declassified after a period of 20 or 25 years. As a result, by the mid-1970s scholars could have access to these and other documents.

(2) Documents based in Great Britain were also released after the mid-1970s. Britain's rationale for participating in the Korean War was very different from that of the United States and these two countries differed widely on the question of continuing the war effort as well as the terms surrounding the armistice talks. These discrepancies are highlighted in the papers of the British Foreign Office.

(3) Soviet and Chinese documents. Although by and large they have not

been released as of yet, a small number have surfaced since the mid-1970s. In the case of the Soviet Union, such works as the The Liberation of Korea (in Russian) which was published in 1976 and The Relations Between the Soviet Union and the People's Korea (in Russian) which was released in 1981 both under the auspices of the Institute of Oriental Studies, the Academy of Sciences of the USSR can be cited as samples.²⁾ Although these two books do not deal directly with the Korean War, it enables one to indirectly analyze the conditions of the Korean War as based on the relationship between these two countries prior to the outbreak of hostilities.

In the case of China, the Bureau of Party History of the Central Committee School under the Chinese Communist Party published a chapter in the 1980 by Yao Xiu in Chinese entitled "The Correct Policy of Resisting the United States and Supporting Chosun [Korea]: In Commemoration of the 30th Departure Anniversary of the People's Volunteer Forces and Its Participation in the [Korean] War" in its journal Party History Research.³⁾ This paper includes a number of new documents relating to China's participation in the Korean War, and in addition Peng Dehuai who was the commander of the "People's Volunteer Force" during the Korean War published his memoirs entitled Peng De Huai's Recollections (in Chinese) by the People's Publishing Company in 1981.

(4) Documents released in South and North Korea after the mid-1970s. In the case of South Korea, all 11 volumes of the History of the Korean War prepared by the War History Compilation Committee were published in 1980 in Korean although except for Volume 1, 2, and 11, the remaining 8 volumes were published earlier in 1970. At the same time, the revised version of Volumes 1 and 8 were published in the 1970s. In addition, President Syngmann Rhee's wife Francesca published a memoir entitled The Korean War and

President Rhee (in Korean) which appeared as a series from June 24, 1983 until April 19, 1984 in the Jungang Daily, and Chung Il-Kwon subsequently published his own memoir (in Korean) as commander of the Third Army during the Korean War entitled Confidential Records of June 25: War and Armistice.⁴⁾

Conversely, no known official documents pertaining to this period have been released by North Korea. Nevertheless, the aforementioned "captured documents of North Korea" are critical in understanding North Korea's position.

Third, the Vietnam War not only resulted in a reassessment of the Vietnam War but also Asian nationalism as well as the United States' Asia policy. Reduced to its basics, such a reassessment alleges that in the aftermath of the Second World War, Asian nationalism was characterized by such forces as the perceived need to breakdown the existing order, the building of socialism and the call for revolutions and that the Vietnam War was based on a conflict--essentially civil in nature--between North Vietnam which exhibited such traits and South Vietnam which did not. Nevertheless, so goes this theory, the United States opted to intervene in this conflict in order to protect its "imperialistic" interests.

Such a reevaluation of the Vietnam War contributed towards the reassessment of the Korean War. For instance, it has been maintained that the United States intervened in the Korean War in order to protect its "imperialistic" interests in a "wrong war" despite the fact that the Korean conflict was a civil war between North and South Korea, the former which was imbued with the unique characteristics of Asian nationalism whereas the latter, was not. Both Selig Harrison and Calum MacDonald's works can be classified as being in this category. The recently aired six-hour documentary

on the Korean War produced by Thames Television in England entitled The Korean War also chastizes the United States' Asian policy.

Fourth, the growth and expansion of revisionism as based on the above-mentioned developments. Although experts are very well aware of the terms traditionalism versus revisionism, it is perhaps best to provide a brief explanation of these terms for the benefit of the general audience.

There are two broad schools in assessing the origins of the Cold War which began towards the end of World War II between the United States and the Soviet Union. One school of thought maintains that the Cold War expanded owing to the United States' "decisive reaction" against the Soviet Union's "expansionary and aggressive foreign policy." On the other hand, the revisionist school seeks to revise the tenets of the traditionalist school by maintaining that the primary responsibility for the Cold War rests with the United States' "imperialistic foreign policy." Furthermore, this school alleges that the Cold War expanded because the Soviet Union had no choice but to counterbalance the United States' attempts to maintain global "hegemony" given that its military and economic capability far surpassed that of the Soviet Union's.

In looking for causes in the outbreak of the Korean War, these two schools' point of contention are also clearly evident. The traditionalists maintain that the Korean War broke out owing to the Soviet Union's "aggressive and expansionist policy," whereas the revisionists assert that the origins can be traced to the United States' "imperialistic policy." Seen from this perspective, both South and North Korea can be seen as "secondary actors" (or "pawns") in the Korean War.

Revisionism in international politics can be traced back to Professor D.F. Fleming's The Origins of the Cold War which was published in 1961.⁶⁾ Thereafter, these two schools of thought partially revised their own logical

assumptions in an effort to sharpen their propositions and contributed towards a more precise understanding of the postwar Cold War era in addition to other postwar international political events. If an attempt is made to assess which school of thought gained increasing influence, it is the revisionist school given the increasing prominence of political-economy or Marxist-Leninist methods of inquiry. As mentioned above, the revisionist school was able to attain a leading position in explaining the origins of the Cold War in the postwar period owing to a careful reevaluation of its main weaknesses.

One of the main areas of inquiry in this process of the expansion and growth of revisionism was the Korean War and a large number of research findings relating to this conflict have appeared, particularly with a revisionist bent.

Fifth, the rise in "second generation Korean studies scholars" overseas, especially in the United States. In the case of the United States, "first generation Korean studies scholars" were mainly comprised by missionaries or their offsprings with a background in Korea, and officers of the U.S. armed forces in Korea together with embassy officials. Following on their footsteps a small group of American scholars began to appear in the academic community, particularly those who chose to receive doctorates in Korean studies and acquiring the ability to examine Korean documents during the process of their graduate education. In an effort to assess American foreign policy in a broader context, these scholars' attention turned naturally towards the Korean War in the process of examining Korean-American relations prior to and after the World War II period.

Professor Bruce Cumings' edited work, Child of Conflict: The Korean-American Relationship, 1943-1954 which was published in 1983 is a prime example of the trend in Korean War studies by the "second generation Korean

studies scholars." This particular book is a compilation of chapters by those who are heavily critical of the entire spectrum of Korean-American relations from the period of the division of the Korean peninsula through the signing of the armistice accord. Moreover, Cumings' 1981 book, The Origins of the Korean War is a primary example of a study produced by the "second generation Korean studies scholars" through a revisionist analysis.⁷⁾

Based on these cumulative developments Korean War studies picked up considerable momentum after the mid-1970s. Such a trend can be verified by the five to six doctoral dissertations which appear each year from American universities pertaining to the Korean War in addition to the five or six books on the Korean War which have appeared annually in Western Europe through distinguished publishing firms. Moreover, in April 1979 the annual conference of the American Asian Studies Association which was held in Los Angeles established a panel entitled "A Reevaluation of the Korean War," followed by the convening of a 1980 conference organized by Bruce Cumings at Washington University based on the theme "A Thirty-Year Anniversary Conference on the Outbreak of the Korean War," and a symposium sponsored by the British Association for Korean Studies in 1985 entitled "The Reevaluation of the Korean War."

Factors Behind Accelerated Research Within Korea After the 1970s

Although somewhat behind research trends abroad, academic interest within Korea relating to the Korean War escalated in the 1980s. A primary example of such a trend can be shown by the fact that in 1987 alone three conferences were held in Korea related to the Korean War.

First, the Korean War Studies Association held a symposium from June 15-16 based on the theme "A Reexamination of the Period of National

Disruption Prior to and After the Korean War." This was the first international symposium to be opened in Korea with the specific purpose of assessing the Korean War. A combined total of 13 papers by Korean and foreign contributors were presented at this conference.⁸⁾

Second, monthly seminars sponsored by the Association for Korean Diplomatic History. In an effort to study the Korean War from various perspectives, this association continues to hold monthly seminars with the presentation of at least two papers. All the paper presenters are Korean scholars and it is indicative of the steady gain which is being made in Korean War studies within Korea.

Third, the Council on U.S.-Korean Security Studies held an international conference on "Planning Oral Histories on the Korean War" on November 30. This conference had, as its main theme, recollections provided by Korean War veterans in an effort to further develop research models on the Korean War. Furthermore, the following three examples can be cited for an increase in Korean War studies in Korea.

First, the publication of the volume Documents Relating to the Korean War (in Korean) which was prepared by the Korean War Institute, founded in 1985. Comprising a total of 1,211 pages, this is the first volume to be published in Korea consisting of Korean War documents.

Second, the founding of the Association for Korean War Studies in 1987 (a more detailed description of this organization is provided for in a following section).

Third, the publication of an article (in Korean) in a journal published by the Center for International Affairs at Seoul National University entitled "A Reevaluation of the Korean War and a Critique of Studies on Communism."

Fourth, the publication of a special documentary volume on the Korean

War in the 1984 summer edition (volume 8, number 2) of the journal Korea & World Affairs.

Fifth, a steady translation of Korean War research findings from abroad. Such a recent trend is readily visible within the Korean academic community through the publication of translated volumes on the Korean War by revisionist scholars. It is also here that Cumings' work has had a major impact since it can be asserted with a fair amount of justification that his work is often quoted by virtually all Korean scholars concerned with the Korean War.

Given such developments, what are the major reasons relating to the increase in Korean War studies within Korea? Four basic factors can be said to have contributed to the acceleration of Korean War studies.

First, an overall increase in the understanding of Korean society as well as the contemporary history of Korea by the Korean academic community. Such interests have focused quite naturally on the Korean War given that this conflict was a major watershed in contemporary Korean history.

It is important to note here that the Korean War is viewed not just in terms of the three year duration of the conflict but as an integral part in the flow of modern and contemporary history. Although a more specific explanation on this trend is noted below, suffice it to say that scholars have focused their efforts increasingly on the Korean War since they believe that this war erupted as a consequence of contending forces in modern and contemporary Korean history and that as a result, modern and contemporary Korean history can be better understood on the basis of such inquiries on the Korean conflict.

Second, an increase in Korean unification studies. A strong emphasis is placed on the fact that unification studies should not be focused solely on prospects, but rather, from the standpoint of the history of nationalism since

it is only then possible to assess the basic roots of the Korean War. Such a strong academic emphasis on the issue of Korean unification naturally progressed to a evaluation of the Korean War.

Third, the rapid and extensive dissemination of research findings on political thought and other areas in the social sciences from abroad into Korea has influenced substantially the trend to assess very critically the entire spectrum of contemporary Korean history. At the same time, instead of the traditionalist school which viewed international politics through a rightist and anti-communist prism, the views propogated by the revisionist school with an emphasis on a political-economy perspective together with a Marxist- Leninist methodological approach gained increasing receptivity. (By "a Marxist- Leninist methodological approach" the author is not referring to a "Leftist-Radical methodological approach.") If the contemporary history of Korea is seen from this perspective, it is no wonder that the Korean War stands out as the primary area of inquiry or an effort to de-mystify the event.

Fourth, an increase in the number of experts who have received their doctoral degrees relating to the Korean War. A short listing of the more prominent scholars who wrote their dissertations on the Korean War and returned to Korea after the 1970s would include Kim Chul Baum (State University of New York, U.S.A.), Ra Jong Il (Cambridge University, England), Park Doo Bok (Cultural University, Taiwan), Suh Jae Man (National Ankara University, Turkey), Yang Dae Hyun (University of Munich, West Germany), and On Chang Il (Kansas University, U.S.A). Amongst the scholars who received their degrees within Korea, one could cite the work of Kim Chung Kon who received his degree by assessing the Korean War from the perspective of the combat strategy of the South Korean Workers' Party and the work of Lee Dae Keun who received his doctoral degree with

a dissertation on the analysis of the Korean War through an economic perspective.⁹⁾

As was noted above, studies on the Korean War have been accelerated both in and out of Korea and a number of prominent experts are engaged in this field. It is the author's primary objective in this article to investigate the perimeters of such studies through a central examination of the origins of the Korean War.

II: The Initial Traditionalist Explanation of the Origins of the Korean War: Its Content and Documentary Record

A large segment of the research findings relating to the Korean War are based on the origins of the Korean War. Specifically, a major portion of the researcher's interest rests on the question "who started the Korean War and why was such an action taken?" Such a question is asked so as not to merely define who the "perpetrator" was, rather, it is posed in order to accurately assess the nature of the Korean War through an investigation of its origins. It is from this perspective that an attempt will be made to analyze the central points surrounding the debate on the origins of the war through documentary analysis.

The Initial Interpretation: The Stalin Initiation Theory

When the Korean War broke out the perception in the West was predominated by the traditionalist view, and in particular, the United States chose to refer to the Korean War as "Stalin's war." The U.S. Department of State maintained that Stalin "caused the outbreak" of the Korean War through the following factors¹⁰⁾ and such an analysis was widely reported in the U.S. media which in turn helped to form a strong impression amongst the American public.

First, the pressure dispersion theory. In essence, this theory maintained that the Soviet Union opened the war in Korea in order to divert the increasing U.S. military pressure in the European front through the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Even Adam B. Ulam agrees with this theory of pressure dispersion even though he argues that it is incorrect to simplify the conceptualization of the Soviet Union's Asian policy as being subordinate to its European policy.¹¹⁾

Second, restraining the U.S.-Japanese alliance or Far Eastern strategy theory. This line of thought argues that the Soviet Union precipitated the outbreak of the Korean War in order to counter the United States' efforts to conclude a peace treaty with Japan excluding the Soviet Union. As is well known, the United States wanted to transform Japan into an "Asian Switzerland" during its occupation by dissolving Japan's military structure, heavy industries and conglomerates. Nevertheless, when the Chinese Communist Party seemed increasingly likely to attain victory by 1947 the United States became concerned with the need to counter the expansion of communist influence in Asia and thereby enacted a new policy to transform Japan into a powerful anti-communist base. As a result, there was a 180 degree turn in policy from the initial guidelines set during the occupation and it resulted in the formation of the Self Defense Forces together with a conscientious effort to promote the heavy industries. Moreover, right-wing politicians who were incarcerated as war criminals were released thereby permitting the revival of a conservative political body and a policy decision was made to strengthen Japan without the participation of the Soviet Union.

Stalin understood these developments to mean the potential creation of an anti-communist alliance much like NATO centered on a new Japan after the creation of a staunchly anti-communist Japan. Thereafter, with the arrival

of Mao Zedong in Moscow in February 1950 the Sino-Soviet alliance was formally concluded in order to counter "Japan and imperialist countries which may collude with Japan" compounded by the launching of a propaganda campaign alleging that the United States was in the process of absorbing Asian-Pacific countries into an "aggressive military bloc." At the same time, anti-American demonstrations by the Japanese Communist Party were intensified.

The main premiss of this theory lies with the assertion that it was at this time that Stalin calculated that the United States would not intervene in a war effort and that the Korean peninsula could be communized through a swift military victory. Furthermore, it is asserted that by such a turn of events communism could solidify its hold in Asia with the added bonus of reducing the United States' posture as well as disrupting Japan's pro-American posture concomitant with its military buildup. As an official who exercised a high degree of influence in formulating America's Japan policy at the time, George F. Kennan has noted that although the Japan factor cannot be cited as the most probable one behind the Soviet Union's decision to launch the Korean War, it would be most surprising to assert that the Japan factor was not of any consequence.¹²⁾

Third, exploitation of a weak-point theory. In other words, it is argued here that an "expansionist" Stalin was always ready to exploit weaknesses in order to expand the Soviet Union's sphere of influence and just such an opportunity arose with Secretary of State Dean Acheson's press conference of January 1950 (soon after the U.S. forces were withdrawn completely from Korea in the summer of 1949) stating that the United States would exclude South Korea from the United States' Far Eastern defense perimeter. Additionally, Stalin may have also perceived the May 1950 second National Assembly election in South Korea as a weakness given that the right-wing under

the leadership of Syngmann Rhee and Kim Seong Soo lost considerable ground. At the same time, since the United States "watched from the sidelines" after the Chinese Communist Party retained control over the mainland--resulting in the formation of the PRC on October 1, 1949--it could also be construed that the United States would not intervene in the event of a North Korean attack on the South. Therefore, the exploitation of a weak-point theory stressed the Soviet Union's misperception of the United States intention to intervene.¹³⁾

Fourth, the testing of American resolve or resistance capability theory. In essence, this theory stipulates that Stalin decided to launch the Korean War in order to observe the Western and the United States' reaction prior to realizing his "grand strategy of global communization."

In reality, this explanation was the most influential in President Truman's decision to intervene in the Korean War. As is noted in his memoirs, as soon as word of a North Korean attack reached the United States, Department of Defense officials cited such examples as Japan's Manchurian campaign of 1931, Japan's invasion of China in 1937, and the 1938-39 Nazi invasions in Central Europe. Therefore, such an argument seemed to suggest that Japan's or Nazi Germany's invasions would not have been expanded were it not for a stronger initial counteraction, and that much the same pattern could be discerned in the case of Korea whereby if the communist attack on the South was not swiftly addressed to, Stalin may well opt to launch invasions in other areas.

Fifth, demonstration of military power theory. Following on the heels of the communization of mainland China, America's prestige would fall even lower in the event of an easy communization of South Korea through an invasion from the North by such a demonstration of Soviet military might which would also serve to spur other communist movements in Asia.

Sixth, inducing a Sino-American conflict or attrition theory, or otherwise

referred to as the trap theory. This theory begins with the assertion that Stalin was apprehensive about the Chinese Communist Party given that the CCP succeeded in gaining control over the mainland mostly on its own without much assistance from the Soviet Union. It is argued further that Stalin calculated that in the instance that China chose to undertake an independent line, i.e., "a second Yugoslavia," it would hinder considerably Stalin's strategy of world-wide revolution.

Additionally, it is stipulated that Stalin chose to launch the Korean War in order to weaken both American and Chinese capabilities by prodding these two powers into a "deep abyss," particularly since signs were evident in early 1950 that the United States government was considering the recognition of China. By doing so, Stalin would also gain by isolating China which would be engaged in a direct conflict with the United States. Based on such preconceived steps, it is alleged that China fell into a trap set by Stalin since China was "pulled into" the Korean War which resulted not only in its denunciation by the U.N. forces as an "aggressor" but was also ostracized by the international community and confined by the American policy of containment.¹⁴⁾

New inferences were thus developed based on these six theories, and one can begin with Wilbur Chaffee's proposition. His point of departure commences with the formation of the People's Republic of China in October 1949 when Stalin articulated a need to realign the Soviet Union's Northeast Asian policy. Originally, Stalin felt a strong need to maintain considerable military influence in the Yellow Sea located between China and the Korean peninsula in order to protect Soviet interests in Northeast Asia and that he already had access

to Chinese ports in the Yellow Sea under a treaty concluded with Chiang Kai Shek's Nationalist government.

Nevertheless, during the January-February 1950 Mao-Stalin conference in Moscow Mao Zedong stated that China would no longer lease the Yellow Sea ports to the Soviet Union and Stalin fell into a dilemma. If he continued to insist on the need to retain the use of the Chinese ports it would become increasingly difficult to maintain the alliance with China, and could also lead to a Sino-Soviet impasse over the issue. Conversely, if the Yellow Sea ports were returned to China in order to preserve the close relationship with China a key Soviet mechanism for the security of Siberia would be lost.

Neither of these two options were palpable for the Soviet Union. As a result, was there another option which would enable the retention of both the security mechanism as well as the friendship with China? The answer to this question according to Chaffee was the communization of the Korean peninsula through a Korean War. Specifically, he asserts that Stalin calculated that after the communization of the Korean peninsula, a pro-Soviet government could be formed together with the retention of military bases in the peninsula, thereby enabling the Soviet Union to solve its policy dilemma.¹⁵⁾

These inferences cannot be verified on documentary evidence--even if there were such evidence it would be difficult to discover them--but are primarily based on an analysis of circumstantial evidence. Among the assumptions noted thus far, Western political scientists have for long been particularly fond of the so-called restraining the U.S.-Japan treaty theory together with the resistance capability testing theory.

The Stalin-Mao Conspiracy Theory

The views articulated by the traditionalists hold that Stalin took the

initiative as based on the inferences noted above but they also believe that Stalin "conspired" with Mao. Specifically, the traditionalists maintain that after the announcement by Andrei Zhdanov in the fall of 1947 the USSR openly called for a world communist revolution, the initiative for communist revolutionary strategy in Asia was transferred to China whose role was considered to be that of an "junior partner" to the Soviet Union. The traditionalists maintain that following on these developments China secretly concluded a military accord with North Korea and the coordination of military strategy for the successful implementation of the war effort following a Southern invasion under the supervision of the Soviet Union. This argument maintains that the Korean War was the first joint Sino-Soviet strategy to communize Asia. The opinion of scholars who share this view are noted below.

To begin with, A. Doak Barnett argues that following the formation of the PRC government Beijing became the regional center of Asian communism and that the Soviet Union agreed to transfer regional responsibility to China under the so-called "division of regions principle." He cites as evidence a speech made by Liu Xiaochi on November 16, 1949 during a regional meeting in Beijing of the Conference of Asian and Australian Trade Unions. What was the substance of Liu's speech?

In his capacity as conference chairman, he declared that "the path taken by the Chinese people...is the path that should be taken by the peoples of various colonial and semi-colonial countries in their fight for national independence and people's democracy." Moreover, Liu added that a national independence struggle was taking shape in East Asia including Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Japan and that with regard to the Korean peninsula, "the movement of the Korean people against Syngmann Rhee, puppet of American imperialism and for the establishment of a unified

Democratic People's Republic of Korea cannot be halted." Barnett stipulated that Liu's speech should be seen as the PRC's proclamation of its "new mission" of inspiring communist insurrection in many Asian countries and he defined the conference as a general communication line for Asian communist-revolutionary movements.¹⁶⁾

Harold Hinton also proposed a similar line of analysis. He emphasizes the participation of various representatives from East Asia including North Korea and concludes that "a coordination of the strategies among the major communist parties... of China, [North] Korea, and Vietnam" was begun and that the Korean War was the outcome of the resolution of this strategy.¹⁷⁾

On the other hand, Donald J. Dallin focuses his attention on the establishment of the "Liaison Bureau" on November 20 by the World Trade Federation. He compared this organization with the Far Eastern Cominform (International Communist Information Committee) which was comprised by Soviet, Chinese, Indian and Australian representatives who were under the directives issued by Solovyov, the Soviet representative and Dallin argues that this organization pursued the strategy concerning a Korean War.¹⁸⁾

In addition to these three scholars several others proposed variations of the theory of a joint Sino-Soviet strategy. Amongst the more representative are the works by Tan Tsou, Melvin Gurto, and Joseph Frankel.

In the context of the joint Sino-Soviet strategy, an interesting interpretation is offered by Marshall Schulman and Clement R. Attlee in that they emphasize the Chinese, as opposed to the Soviet role. Schulman suggests strongly that regardless of the question of Soviet aid, China was prepared to pursue the Korean War option as a means in extending communist revolution in Asia and that the Soviet Union also chose to pursue the Korean War option out of concern that China would assume an advantageous position vis-a-vis

North Korea. On the other hand, Attlee maintained that China's failure to gain admissions into the United Nations resulted in its decision to cultivate the North so that it could recover from its defeat by a victory in a Korean War. Furthermore, he maintained that if China was recognized by the United States and was admitted into the United Nations and that the Korean War would not have occurred.¹⁹⁾

Another example supporting the notion of a direct Chinese involvement in the planning of the Korean War can be found in the repatriation of Korean soldiers who were part of the Peoples' Liberation Army (PLA) into North Korea after the fall of 1949 by China and the fact that their repatriation gained increasing momentum beginning in the early part of 1950. There were Koreans who had entered the Chinese army after partaking in anti-Japanese movements in Manchuria and China or those who lived in northern China and Manchuria after the surrender of Japan. However, after the PLA successfully occupied Manchuria in the fall of 1948--it was also at this moment that a North Korean government was formed--China began to transfer the Korean soldiers into North Korea. Thereafter, with the fall of Nanjing in May 1949 following a successful river-crossing campaign across the Yangtze River approximately two divisions of Korean soldiers under the PLA's Fourth Field Army returned to North Korea and were regrouped into the Fifth and Sixth Divisions of the North Korean Peoples' Army (NKPA). More importantly, some 12,000 Korean soldiers returned to North Korea in April 1950 and formed the Seventh Division in the NKPA. As a result, over one-third of the NKPA's forces were comprised by soldiers who had direct combat experience under the PLA.

Amongst those scholars who argue that China was directly involved in the planning of the Korean War as based on the return of Korean soldiers to North Korea, they even maintain that the Korean soldiers who returned

to North Korea did so under a Chinese-North Korean agreement which was in turn initiated by the Soviet Union. For instance, Moon Hee Seok, a Korean military affairs specialist once noted that "upon the completion of the communization of China...the Republic of Korea was chosen as the next objective for a military invasion" and that in January 1949 at Harbin, an agreement was concluded calling for the repatriation of Korean soldiers to North Korea between China and North Korea under the initiative of the Soviet Union.²⁰⁾

Even the Kuomintang (Nationalist) government announced the existence of similar "agreements." As an example, on May 5, 1949 the KMT organ Central New Agency in Shanghai reported that "in March 17, 1949 the Chinese Communist Party concluded a mutual defense treaty with North Korea during Kim Il Sung's visit to the Soviet Union," and asserted that "the two sides pledged joint action in their joint war against the imperialist forces in case North Korea or Communist China is attacked by any imperialist power." The Central News Agency also noted the following points of the "Korea-China Mutual Defense Treaty" on May 5, 1949:

1. From July 1-August 31, 1949 the Chinese Communist Party agrees to deliver weapons and troops to North Korea from Manchuria.
2. North Korea will received the highest priority in the use of Japanese military supplies as well as Japanese technicians and workers in Manchuria.
3. North Korea and the Chinese Communist Party agree to engage in a barter trade dependent on each other's economic needs.²¹⁾

The Central News Agency continued to file reports on this subject. On October 16, 1949 it reported that "two secret agreements were already concluded between the Chinese Communist Party and the Soviet Union in Harbin and Moscow," and stipulated that according to the clause relating to

North Korea in these agreements, that China retained the right to establish air bases in North Korea together with the right to withdraw in wartime to the Soviet Union through North Korea whereas North Korea had the right to deploy troops in (Jilin) and (Andong) in Manchuria and a promise to receive these areas at an appropriate time.²²⁾

For those scholars who emphasize the Sino-Soviet conspiracy theory, the most important event is Mao Zedong's long-term stay in the Soviet Union from December 1949 until February 1950 and the outcome of the summit meeting with Stalin. In a press conference after his arrival in Moscow on December 16, 1949 Mao stated that during his meeting with Stalin issues such as the Sino-Soviet friendship treaty, Soviet assistance to China, Sino-Soviet trade in addition to "other problems" would be discussed.

Traditionalists maintain that amongst the "other problems" the planning for the Korean War would have received the highest priority. For instance, Dallin cites a report by a U.S. intelligence agency and states that "Beijing and Moscow agreed that North Korea should begin the war and they believed that North Korea would succeed without external military support. Only after the United States begins to win should China receive Soviet air support and military support." Dallin also stipulates that these agreements were reached during the Stalin-Mao summit. Both Richard Walker and Philip Mosley also hold similar views.²³⁾

Sino-Soviet "Conspiracy" and Support for North Korea

Traditionalists thus argued that North Korea's preparations for the war occurred under these "Sino-Soviet" conspiracies. Seen from this perspective some have also focused their attention on Kim Il Sung's March 1949 trip to Moscow and the resultant conclusion of the Soviet-North Korean economic

cooperation agreement. As is well known, during the conclusion of this agreement the Soviet media--for instance the March 23, 1949 edition of New Times (in English)--reported that from henceforth North Korea would receive Soviet assistance "in all areas." The phrase "in all areas" has been interpreted by the traditionalists in the West to also cover "military areas" and that the Soviet Union used such a general term so as to not take any direct responsibility for the soon-to-be launched Korean War.²⁴⁾

Beyond this highly opportune (?) source material the "testimony" of defectors from communist rule is much more specific, and amongst the most cited examples by the traditionalists are the following three cases.

First, the testimony of the Soviet Red Army's Kyril Kalinov who escaped to West Germany when he was transferred to East Germany after a tour of duty in North Korea. Second, the testimony of Yuri A. Rasvorvov who defected to the United States after having served at the Soviet Embassy in Japan. And third, the testimony of Paul Monat, the military attache at the Polish Embassy in Pyongyang, who defected to the West.

All three recalled that military assistance to North Korea was accelerated on the basis of a Sino-Soviet agreement which finalized plans for the Korean War. For instance, according to Kalinov's recollection the Soviet Union began the effort of modernizing North Korea's armed forces after dispatching a "Special Soviet Military Delegation" to Pyongyang following the withdrawal of Soviet occupation forces from North Korea in December 1949. This special delegation was comprised by such artillery specialists as Generals T. Shtykov and M. Katukov, and an intelligence specialist such as Admiral M.V. Zakharov, and they were entrusted with completing the modernization of the North Korean armed forces within 18 months, or until June 1950.²⁵⁾

If these sources are gathered together, from 1949 until June 1950 the

Soviet Union transferred 10 reconnaissance aircraft, 100 Yak fighters, 70 bombers, 100 T-34 tanks, and various other heavy artillery pieces to North Korea. Based on this assistance, North Korea was able to field a total of 135,000 ground forces by June 1950 and completed the deployment of its crack combat troops along the South-North border.²⁶⁾

South Korea's total troop strength at this time numbered only 65,000 with 4,000 maritime police, a 45,000 police force and with a very limited number of supplies. According to report prepared by the Korea Military Advisory Group which was issued by the U.S. Department of the Army in 1962, South Korea's troop strength immediately prior to the outbreak of the Korean War was the same level "as the U.S. army's in 1775," a comparison made with the level of the U.S. army one year prior to the eruption of the War of Independence in 1776. Such was the gross gap in the military balance between the two Koreas. It was owing to such circumstances that the then Minister of National Security (Ministry of Defense) Choi (Yong Kon) was able to declare on January 21, 1950 that "the Peoples' Armed Forces armed with such modern weapons as airplanes, tanks, and naval vessels is able to successfully undertake any combat responsibility and to engage in combat in order to crush the enemy of the unification of the Motherland and independence."

III: The Revisionist Interpretation: Its Contents and Documentary Record

The Interpretation from the Communist Bloc

The traditionalist analyses as noted thus far were immediately denounced by the communist world. North Korea insisted that the Korean War occurred owing to "a 'Northern invasion' by the U.S. imperialists and its fascist Rhee Synmann regime." According to North Korea's interpretation, the Korean

War's "main culprit" is the United States.²⁷⁾ If that is the case, why then did the United States "provocate" the Korean War? North Korea's explanation can be summarized as follows.

First, by destroying North Korea's peoples' democratic government, the United States attempted to utilize the entire Korean peninsula and Taiwan as a base to contain China.

Second, the United States wanted to save the Syngmann Rhee regime which was on the verge of collapse owing to a burgeoning peoples' revolution.

Third, the United States at that time possessed some 98 percent of all nuclear weapons world-wide and it wished to claim victory in a Korean War in order to prevent the Soviet Union from developing into a true nuclear power.

Fourth, the United States calculated that the West European imperialist powers would not be against its instigation of a war given that they were receiving benefits from the Marshall Plan.²⁸⁾

North Korea claims that in order to defeat the "Northern invasion" which erupted on the basis of the above mentioned factors, it carried out a "just war of national liberation." North Korea insisted from the onset on the "war of national liberation" theory and the Soviet Union and China together with other communist countries also supported the "war of national liberation." In addition, the primary responsibility for this "incendiary conflict" was placed on the shoulder of the United States.

Stone's The Hidden Story of the Korean War and its Impact

Questions or opposition to the traditionalist interpretation began to appear in the West and the first such work was the publication in 1952 during the Korean War of Isidore F. Stone's book, The Hidden Story of the Korean War.²⁹⁾ Although widely referred to as the work which suggested the "Northern

invasion" theory, this book does not categorically assert that the Korean War broke out as a result of a "Northern invasion," although it does highlight questions relating to the official interpretation of the U.S. government. Stone offers an alternative theory which suggests a "conspiracy" between a specific segment of the United States army (in particular, General MacArthur), South Korea's Syngmann Rhee, and Taiwan's Chiang Kai Shek. This is the reason why, according to Stone, that the Supreme Command Allied Powers under MacArthur was not surprised upon learning of the outbreak of the Korean War.

If that is the case, what is the basis for his inference? Stone's initial interpretation begins with the stipulation that Syngmann Rhee first suggested the "provocation" of the Korean War because his government was confronting a major domestic crisis. Moreover, Stone suggests that an attempt was made by MacArthur to overturn the Truman Administration's "Europe first" foreign policy orientation by emphasizing MacArthur's "Asia first" remark made as Supreme Commander Allied Powers and that he conspired with Syngmann Rhee and Chiang Kai Shek as well as the Department of State's advisor John Foster Dulles to ensure the intervention of the United States by "provoking" the outbreak of the Korean War.

Stone's work, however, is very lacking of source materials and is based primarily on newspaper reports and otherwise loose assertions. Nevertheless, his book had a significant impact on the growth and expansion of revisionism as it related to Korean War studies. For example, Fleming's argument on the origins of the Korean War which has already been cited is basically a refinement of Stone's analysis and the works of Gabriel and Joyce Kolko together with that of other revisionists which will be discussed in greater detail below were also influenced by Stone's work.

At the same time, Stone's book also influenced Japan's intellectuals who were already strongly prejudiced with a leftist perspective as well as the general public when it was translated in two volumes in 1952 by Uchiyama Satoshi and published by the Shin Hyo Publishing Company in Tokyo.³⁰⁾ Moreover, the publication of a book (in Japanese) entitled Japan's Dark Shadow, in particular, a chapter entitled "The Concocted Korean War" by a leading novelist of Japan, Matsumoto Kiyohari can be said to have been based on the rationale underlying Stone's work.

In addition, a foreigner journalist residing in Japan also suggested a "Northern invasion" theory. David W. Conde published in 1968 a volume entitled The History of the Korean War, 1950-1953 which was translated into Japanese by Mutsui Saburo and released by the Tai Hei Shupansa in Tokyo. Conde in fact rejected the legitimacy of the Republic of Korea and argued that North Korea was the bearer of a "legitimate national liberation power" and his work subsequently influenced the works of future revisionists.

The Rejection of the Chinese Conspiracy Theory

Both Stone's inference and the more updated version provided by Fleming remained into the late 1960s as an alternative explanation although the revisionist interpretation, while growing, had not yet surfaced as the mainstream view. As the circumstances began to change with the beginning of the 1970s, revisionist interpretations surrounding the origins of the Korean War began to be broadened and subsequently, the debate concerning the origins of the Korean War also became accelerated.

To this end, one could begin by citing Edward Friedman and Mark Selden's co-authored volume entitled America's Asia: Dissenting Essays in Asian-American Relations.³¹⁾ This book is the compilation of papers concerning

a revisionist overview of America's postwar Asia policy and also includes several chapters critical of the traditionalist interpretation of the origins of the the Korean War.

The most representative of such works is that of England's John Gittings.³²⁾ Gittings completely rejects the traditionalists' "Soviet conspiracy" theory and explains that Stalin was an accomplished and careful practitioner of diplomacy and that the Soviet Union under his rule carried out a risk-averse and defensive foreign policy. Further, Gittings asserts that compared to the United States, the Soviet Union's overall capability was much smaller and real industrialization was only begun in the 1930s. Additionally, Gittings argues that if one takes into consideration that the Soviet Union's capabilities were reduced further by the war with the highly industrialized Germany in the 1940s it is improbable to imagine just how the Soviet Union could have engaged in a risky war effort vis-a-vis the United States, a prevailing assertion shared by the revisionists in general.

Gittings also rejects the so-called Chinese conspiracy theory and the views articulated by Gittings, in addition to Friedman and Allen S. Whiting in the Friedman and Selden volume can be expressed as follows.

First, the relationship between China and North Korea prior to the outbreak of the Korean War were not so close to warrant a joint conspiracy. One such example which can be cited initially is the fact that although North Korea's first ambassador to China, Lee Joo Hyun arrived in Beijing in January 1950, China only sent a deputy ambassador and a first secretary to Pyongyang on July 10, two weeks after the outbreak of the war and only on August 6 did China name its first ambassador to North Korea. While such a fact does not necessarily mean an estrangement between Beijing and Pyongyang it is sufficient to explain that China did not attach much importance to the "Korean

issue."

Second, tensions surfaced between China and North Korea before the outbreak of the Korean War and the most representative example is the conflict which arose between the two sides concerning the status of the Supoong dam in the Amrok River.

Third, a reevaluation of the labor federation conference in Beijing and Liu Xiaochi's speech delivered at the conference. To begin with, the national representatives who participated in the labor federation conference were not in a high enough position to control revolutionary communist movements in Asia and it was only a technical meeting which enabled a combined discussion of each participating countries' labor problems. The standing committee of the conference was not sustained for long and was thereafter shortly disbanded.

Moreover, Liu Xiaochi's speech should not be construed as inciting communist revolutions in Asia, but rather in terms of an expression of the CCP's pride in the successful accomplishment of the Chinese revolution and the success also of the national liberation movements in China and Vietnam. In particular, it should be emphasized that prior to Liu Xiaochi's speech an "anti-imperialist armed struggle" movement was already in progress in several Asian countries and therefore incorrect to interpret his speech as a marching order for the countries of Asia including South Korea to begin an "anti-American armed struggle."

Fourth, there is no evidence that China directly stated or suggested its willingness to assist North Korea militarily or with other material support during the period prior to the outbreak of the Korean War. For instance, on the occasion of the presentation of credentials by North Korea's first ambassador to China, Lee Joo Hyun on January 28, 1950 Liu Xiaochi stated that "China expresses its endless sympathy to the Korean people in their heroic struggle

for national independence and unification," but a clear distinction must be maintained between psychological sympathy and military assistance. This point is more clearly evident in a subsequent June 1950 editorial by the Xinhua News Agency which proclaimed that "the Korean people must solve the problem of peace and unification in their country through their own efforts."

Fifth, the traditionalist argument generated by the "repatriation of Korean troops to North Korea" must be reinterpreted. For example, according to the analysis provided by Samuel B. Griffith, an American specialist on the Chinese armed forces, he asserts that the probability is very high that China returned the Korean troops to North Korea owing to China's domestic situation and that such a decision was not connected to any notions relating to a Korean conflict. He also states that China had already officially announced plans to reduce the size of its armed forces after the successful retention of control in the mainland. Following on such an analysis, Whiting has written that "Chinese Communist concern over military expenditures and preparations for a cutback in its own forces during 1950 made such a transfer expedient from Peking's point of view."³⁵)

Sixth, disputing the real existence of a "Sino-North Korean secret agreement" as stipulated by the traditionalists. Even with the example of the "Sino-North Korean mutual defense treaty" which was signed in February 1950, it is difficult to imagine that China would have entered into a secret agreement with North Korea to prepare for a Southern invasion before it received assurances on its own security from the Soviet Union.

It must be specifically emphasized here that the only source on the "Sino-North Korean agreement" was provided for by the KMT government's Central News Agency. This very point was cited by the U.S. embassy and its credibility was questioned in a report filed to its home office from Nanjing--the capital

of the Nationalist government. If that is the case, why did the Nationalist government publicize such a report? In the author's own assessment, in emphasizing the development of a military alliance in East Asia by the Soviet Union and China as well as North Korea with Soviet assistance, the Nationalist government may have opted to influence public opinion in the United States through a propaganda campaign which could then exert pressure on the U.S. government and the Congress to create a countervailing alliance between the United States and the Nationalist government as well with South Korea.³⁶⁾

Seventh, the Mao-Stalin summit must also be reassessed. Whiting has revealed that after an examination of the key issue of the extent to which this summit dealt with China's planning for the Korean War, much of the meeting was concerned with the Sino-Soviet treaty, Soviet military assistance to China, China's recognition of North Vietnam and other issues. This is not to say that Stalin would not have informed China of the plans pertaining to the Korean War since Whiting believes that Stalin imparted some information to Mao on preparations for the Korean War. For instance, he asserts that a Chinese field army based in southern China was transferred to Manchuria immediately prior to the outbreak of the Korean War together with the repatriation of Korean troops in China. Nevertheless, no direct nor official evidence has yet been found indicating that the issue of the Korean War was discussed or agreed to during this meeting.

At the same time, a report prepared by a North Korean delegation which visited Moscow on the occasion of Stalin's birthday while the summit meeting was in session only refers to the Soviet Union. For instance, in a report submitted to the Standing Committee of the Supreme People's Assembly by Kim Tu Bong the delegation leader and Chairman of the Standing Committee of the Supreme People's Assembly, it was only noted that "the Soviet peoples'

await the rapid unification of Korea and salutes our peoples' struggle for the unification and independence of Korea," without any reference to China.

Based on a comprehensive assessment, it can therefore be suggested that the prevailing assumption in the academic community lies in the assertion that while China knew of the preparations for the Korean War and hoped for a North Korean victory, it was not actively involved in the process of preparation for the Korean War. It is difficult to imagine China's involvement in the preparatory stages for the Korean War when it was confronting a number of problems arising just after a long-term struggle with the Nationalist government including such economic problems as the very large military expenditure burden, monetary expansion, and declining productivity in addition to the "liberation" of Tibet and Taiwan together with mopping-up operations involving remnants of the KMT and other insurgencies.

The Debate in the Early 1970s

At a minimum, the Chinese conspiracy theory lost its credibility owing to the pressure exerted by the revisionists and large segments of the Soviet initiation theory was also called into question. Nevertheless, the prevailing opinion that the Korean War was instigated by an invasion from the North held its ground and even the revisionist "bombardment" could not dislocate this basic position.

It was at this time during the early 1970s that a new effort was launched by the revisionists with the emergence of a new debate comprised largely by the following two aspects.

First, the debate which appeared in the China Quarterly journal. The point of departure can be traced back to the 52nd issue (October-December 1972) of the China Quarterly which published an article by Karunaker Gupta,

a professor at Calcutta University in India entitled "How did the Korean War Begin?"³⁷⁾ In this article, Gupta presented a theory purporting to an invasion of the North by South Korea, or at least, a provocation of a Southern invasion. He cites as evidence a newspaper article which included a remark supposedly made by Commander Baek In Hyup on the day of the outbreak of the Korean War to the effect that "we have received orders to push Northward and will soon occupy Haejoo." (This report concerning Baek's remark remains to this day as one of the major evidences cited by the revisionists who maintain the theory of a Northern invasion).

Nevertheless, it is difficult to assess Gupta's article as being of an in-depth scholarly work. In terms of source material, Gupta relies primarily on newspaper articles which appeared during the few days after the outbreak of the Korean War compiled when he was a graduate student at the London School of Economics and Politics and Kim Yong Koo sharply criticizes his article as being unworthy of serious consideration. As a result, in the 54th edition of the China Quarterly (April-June 1973) contending views were articulated by Robert Simons (Gelp University, Canada), Lee Chong Shik (Univeristy of Pennslyvania, U.S.A.), and W.E. Skillend (London University). These three scholars jointly rejected the Northern invasion theory³⁸⁾ and although Gupta responded to their criticisms, it was not persuasive.

Second, the debate which centered on the November 1973 edition of the American journal Pacific Historical Review. This debate began with a counterargument by William Stueck and a summary of the debate is provided for below.

To begin with, Joyce and Gabriel Kolko, two leading Marxist scholars from the University of Toronto and major figures amongst the revisionists published a land-mark work on U.S. foreign policy in 1972⁴⁰⁾ and they offered

two interpretations relating to the origins of the Korean War.

First, the Kolkos in effect rejected the Stalin initiation theory on the basis that it was very questionable whether the Soviet Union did indeed take the initiative pertaining to the Korean War. In fact, they stipulate that not only did Stalin not provoke the war, he did have any prior knowledge on the Korean War until the day the war broke out. Put in another way, they assert that the outbreak of the Korean War on June 25, 1950 was a "surprise" for the Soviet Union. They also claim as evidence the fact that the Soviet Union was not present during the United Nations Security Council meeting (because they had no foreknowledge on the outbreak of the Korean War) which was convened at the behest of the United States on June 25. As a result, it can be said that they in fact proposed a theory which suggested a Soviet Union which was "ignorant or surprised" at the outbreak of the Korean War.

Second, they claimed that the Korean War was initiated by the political ambitions of General MacArthur (the supreme commander of the allied powers in the Pacific) followed by a joint effort between MacArthur and Syngmann Rhee. According to the Kolkos, MacArthur wanted to become the "American de Gaulle" and that the war was the first step towards attaining that objective. They argue further that with the intervention of U.S. forces in the Korean War, the United States' "Europe first" policy would be shifted to one of an "Asia first" policy in addition to expanding the war effort to China so that the spreading tide of communism in Asia could be overturned in one grand sweep. Moreover, the Kolkos maintain that such a turn of events would enable MacArthur to become a "world hero" which would enable him to win the 1952 presidential election in the United States. At the same time, Syngmann Rhee could realize his dream of Northward unification by provoking a war and prolonging the intervention of the United States in addition to overcoming his

own political crisis.

According to the Kolkos, North Korea attacked the South because it was provoked by the South under the joint "conspiracy" effort by MacArthur and Rhee and further, that North Korea had no plans to occupy all of South Korea but only the vicinity of Seoul in order to surprise the Syngmann Rhee government to become more forthcoming to North Korea's demands in South-North negotiations. At this point, both MacArthur and Rhee calculated that North Korea fell into a "trap" set by them and by quickly calling for a wide-ranging retreat by the South Korean forces--as well as providing the impression that the South Korean government was on the verge of collapse--they were able to influence the decision of the United States to commit forces to the war effort. As for the United States government, it could readily realize its goal of expanding military expenditures without the disapproval of the Congress by a full-fledged intervention in the Korean War and therefore agreed to MacArthur's request for troops.

It is interesting to note that as a graduate student at Brown University William Stueck offered an alternative explanation to the assertions made by such leading scholars. As a result, in the above-mentioned journal Pacific History Review the Kolkos' offered their response to Stueck's initial criticism followed by Stueck's response to the Kolkos' response, which was again followed by the Kolkos' response which appeared in the same issue with Stueck's remarks.⁴¹⁾ This debate generated a lot of interest and although the Kolkos argument will be discussed in greater detail below, it is important to note at this stage that the Kolkos often used such terms as "perhaps" or "it is possible" throughout their presentation. In particular, it must be noted that they did not offer an analysis which was based on specific source materials and merely matched their methodology to fit their preconceived notion and

it is therefore not surprising that their logical framework was weak from the onset.⁴²⁾

IV: New Trends in the Revisionist Interpretation

As was noted above, although the revisionists contributed towards a more objective treatment of large segments of the traditionalists' assertions, their inferences pertaining to "the Northern invasion at the behest of the United States," or "the United States' provocation of a Northern invasion" resulted in a new round of criticism from the traditionalists. It was at this time that new interpretations were offered by the revisionists.

The Shifting of Attention to Domestic Factors

When seen from an overall perspective, both the revisionists and traditionalists sought to focus on external factors in evaluating the origins of the Korean War. Specifically, the traditionalists argued almost mechanically that the Korean War was instigated by the Soviet Union, as was the eruption of the international Cold War and conversely, the revisionists maintained that the international Cold War and the subsequent Korean War was instigated by the United States. As a result, both South and North Korea were viewed simply as "secondary or minor actors" in the Korean War.

Such attempts to view the outbreak of the Cold War or the Korean War as a byproduct of the U.S.-Soviet relationship were rapidly criticized. The main point of such a criticism was the fact that both the traditionalists and the revisionists failed to take into consideration the specific domestic situations in the regions affected by the U.S.-Soviet competition in their effort to focus almost exclusively on the U.S.-Soviet relationship. Such a critique was of primary importance owing to the new assertion that while the origins of the Cold War can be traced to the international level, the specific international circumstances of the individual countries concerned must also be examined.

For example, it would be virtually impossible to undertake an objective assessment of the CCP-KMT struggle, the Vietnam War or the Korean War by focusing solely on the global U.S.-Soviet competition without taking into serious consideration the internal dynamics of the concerned regions. Therefore, such an assertion to examine further the internal dynamics of the concerned regions in the effort to analyze the origins of the Cold War were directed strongly at the revisionists.

Correspondingly, a renewed effort was also emphasized in the attempt to explore the origins of the Korean War and resulted in a growing interest in assessing the domestic roots of the Cold War while taking into consideration the international basis of the Cold War as well. Nevertheless, such a trend already emerged in the 1960s by Korean studies scholars in Japan.⁴³⁾ They emphasized that a basic contributing factor to the Korean War could be traced to the rising tide of nationalism in the Korean peninsula strongly imbued with a unification impulse which gained increasing ground immediately following liberation. Specifically, for its part the South tried to absorb North Korea into its own system even through the use of force, and for its part, North Korea also tried to integrate the South into their own system again, even through the use of force and that such efforts by the South and the North eventually resulted in the eruption of the war. To summarize, it was maintained that the Korean War occurred on the basis of the clash between South Korea's emphasis on a "Northward unification" together with North Korea's claim of "the liberation of the South."

With respect to North Korea's so-called "liberation of the South" theory, Park Kap Dong, (with the pen name of Lim Young Soo in Japan) and a leading figure in the South Korean Workers' Party offered an explanation to the effect that one of the main causes of the Korean War was the power struggle between

Kim Il Sung and Pak Hun Yeong of the North Korean Workers' Party and the South Korean Workers' Party respectively over the key question of who would take the initiative on the "liberation of the South."⁴⁴)

According to Park Kap Dong, Park Hun Yeong remarked in 1950 that "the peaceful unification line must be adhered to continuously since in the next two to four years there is a chance that a bourgeois democratic government calling for the freedom of the press, publication and association will be formed in a peaceful and political struggle against the Syngmann Rhee regime." More specifically, Park Kap Dong maintains that Park Hun Yeong and the South Korean Workers' Party exclaimed that: (1) A Southern invasion instigated from the North would be considered to be an extreme left-wing adventure which could well impose the problem of an American involvement; (2) so long as the South Korean Workers' Party maintains its roots among the people, a "Northern invasion" from the South can be obstructed; and (3) peaceful unification must be achieved after a victory of the progressive forces in an election in the South.

In addition, and according to Park Kap Dong, Kim Il Sung began to plan for a unification by force along the following lines: (1) The positive support rendered to Kim Il Sung's Southern invasion scheme and the Soviet Union's massive military assistance by Soviet Ambassador Sthykov in Pyongyang; (2) the feasibility of a long-term buildup of military food supplies owing to successive bumper harvests; (3) foreknowledge on the internal situation in the South Korean army based on the defection of a large number of South Korean soldiers in May 1949; (4) the miscalculation that the United States had washed its hands from South Korea as based on the completed withdrawal of U.S. forces in 1949 and the January 1950 speech by Secretary of State Dean Acheson excluding South Korea from its defense perimeter in the Far East; and

(5) a very slim chance that a people's revolution would be instigated within South Korea given the actual dissolvment of the South Korean Workers' Party.

However, there is also a contending view which differs from Park Kap Dong's argument that as a matter of fact, Pak Hun Yeong expedited the outbreak of hostilities. Such an assertion was made by a researcher at the Institute for Neighboring Countries who published an article (in Japanese) in the monthly Freedom (May 1967) entitled "Factions in the North Korean Workers' Party." This paper asserted that "Pak Hun Yeong believed that the only way for the party members who were left in South Korea to be saved was through a war and in the instance that the whole of Korea could be unified, he would be able to receive much greater support than Kim Il Sung based on his own popularity among the people," and that this was why Park Hun Yeong asked Kim Il Sung to invade the South when he crossed over to North Korea. A similar claim was made by Cho Hun Joon, a Standing Member of the Central Committee of the Korean Communist Youth Alliance during the period of liberation in an article in Korean entitled "Pak Hun Yeong and I" and published in the journal North Korea (November 1973). In this article, Cho recalled that "as far as I know Pak Hun Yeong wanted to expedite an armed invasion of the South as much as Kim Il Sung and Pak Hun Yeong and other leaders of the South Korean Workers' Party incessantly called on Kim Il Sung to expedite the invasion plan conceived by the Kremlin."

According to the chairman of the board of the North Korea Institute, Kim Chang Soon, although Pak Hun Yeong did in fact stress the need for an armed struggle, he did so only on the condition that such a move had to be circumscribed so as not to give the United States' forces a reason to participate in the war.⁴⁵⁾ Kim Cheom Kon also maintains a similar position as he believes that Pak Hun Yeong only planned to occupy the Eungjin peninsula

close to Seoul in order to cause panic to the South Korean government and the South Korean public prior to entering into negotiations with the South.

Seen from an overall perspective, it is likely that whether it was an all-out or a limited conflict, Pak Hun Yeong and the South Korean Workers' Party faction strongly pursued the war option. Moreover, it is also likely that Kim Il Sung may have been influenced by such assertions alluding to the fact that "500,000" party members in the South remained underground and that once the war did break out they would "rise up and unite" in a struggle which would expedite the communization of South Korea. The already quoted paper from the Institute of Neighboring Countries also noted that "this was the major factor which caused the Kapsan faction to attack the South." During the trial of Pak Hun Yeong and officials of the South Korean Workers' Party in 1953, Kim Il Sung vehemently criticized through the prosecution's accusation that Pak Hun Yeong spread within the party "the 'false report' which supported the claim of "the 500,000 members of the South Korean Workers' Party who were ready to respond to a call" and in a subsequent speech to party cadres, Kim Il Sung expressed his contempt for Pak Hun Yeong and the South Korean Workers' Party faction for their "inability to soundly organize the South Korean people."

In the aftermath of assessing the positions of Kim Il Sung and Pak Hun Yeong, one must take into consideration whether the views articulated by Park Kap Dong, Kim Chang Soon and others can be construed to be revisionist views in that they asserted that Kim Il Sung and Pak Hun Yeong both supported the launching of the Korean War thereby focusing on domestic factors. The answer is quite simple: they are not since they fundamentally maintain that the Soviet Union was the planner of the Korean War.

The Debate Generated by Simmons' Book

A noted revisionist who emphasized the internal factors such as those mentioned above but who differs significantly from them is Robert Simmons who asserts that the Soviet Union was not involved.⁴⁶⁾ Simmons writes that in a speech to cadres of the South Korean Workers' Party by Pak Hun Yeong--who outpaced Kim Il Sung in his record as a communist and as a fighter for national liberation--he questioned whether "a leader like Kim Il Sung who only awaits a signal from Moscow that it is alright to invade the South be really considered to be a true fighter for national liberation" and insisted that one must be firmly committed to the "struggle for the liberation of South Korea" as he was, and that Kim Il Sung took the lead in calling for the overall invasion of the South in order to strengthen significantly his position as the "national liberator." Simmons further asserts that Kim Il Sung shortened by two months the launching of the Korean War, the original date of early August 1950 was already agreed to by the Soviet Union and China, in order to speed up the Southern invasion plans to out maneuver Pak Hun Yeong. Together with the emergence of the theory on the "ignorance or surprise" of the Soviet Union articulated by the Kolkos, to which Simmons also subscribes, he asserted that the Korean War was a civil conflict brought on by internal factors in the Korean peninsula. This is perhaps why Simmons used the term "The Korean Civil War" in the subtitle of his book.

Simmons' interpretation resulted in another set of debate. Koh Byung Chul wrote in a review of Simmons' book that more persuasive source materials had to be offered with respect to how the power struggle between Kim Il Sung and Pak Hun Yeong developed all the way to the outbreak of the Korean War.⁴⁷⁾

In particular, Stueck was highly wary of the assumption that the Soviet Union was either "ignorant" or "caught by surprise" following the eruption of the Korean War. He wrote that at the minimum the Soviet Union was not surprised at the outbreak of the Korean War and that unlike Simmons' view, the Soviet Union knew the date of the outbreak of the Korean War.⁴⁸⁾ In addition, Charles Bohlen, a distinguished American career diplomat who analyzed the Korean War during the period of that war in Washington, wrote in his memoirs that "the claim that the Korean War was not begun by the Soviet Union but was begun due to the North Koreans' independent action is childlike nonsense."⁴⁹⁾

It is important at this juncture to pierce more closely into the assumption that the Soviet Union was "ignorant" or "surprised" at the outbreak of the Korean War although with the caveat that the only primary source that is available is Krushchev's memoirs. As is well known, Krushchev emphasized that the Korean War was Kim Il Sung's, and not Stalin's idea. According to Krushchev, when Kim Il Sung visited Moscow in 1949 and explained plans for a Southern invasion in order to receive Stalin's support, Stalin replied to the effect that the Korean War must be carefully thought out and a thorough plan must be prepared and asked Kim Il Sung to return with a more specific plan. When Kim Il Sung presented a new plan firmly convinced of a "certain victory" together with the assurance that U.S. involvement could be avoided, Stalin gave his approval.⁵⁰⁾ Even the date of the Southern invasion was set, and that is why Krushchev noted in his memoirs that the time for the war "had arrived" and that Korean War therefore "was begun". As Stueck has noted, this particular phrase by Krushchev is completely contrary to the revisionists' assertion that the Soviet Union was surprised on June 25.

Even source materials in the United States are contrary to such similar

claims. According to a Central Intelligence Agency memorandum of June 19, 1950 entitled "The North Korean Government's Current Situation" which was declassified in 1974--a memorandum which can be seen as the joint view of the United States' intelligence community since the Departments of State, Army, Navy, Air Force noted in the endnote that they agreed with the conclusions of the memorandum--the Soviet Union's political, military, and economic control over North Korea immediately prior to the outbreak of the war was virtually total. Seen from this point of view, it is evident that the Soviet Union at a minimum knew full well of North Korea's Southern invasion plans.

As the theories purporting to the Soviet Union's "ignorance" or "surprise" came under increasing attack, the revisionists either remained silent or admitted that the Soviet Union had foreknowledge although they emphasized domestic factors within the Korean peninsula. Their frame of reference can be surmized as follows:⁵¹⁾

First, the assertion that military competition between South and North Korea resulted in the Korean War. Both the South and the North engaged in a serious military competition one year before the outbreak of the war and that even the United States government acknowledged that South Korea was increasing significantly its military buildup beginning in early 1950. Moreover, armed clashes during this period were manifold and even this development has been acknowledged by the United States government and the majority of these clashes were "instigated" by South Korea and that such an "instigation" escalated into the eruption of the Korean War.

Second, the assertion that Syngmañn Rhee's Northward unification provoked North Korea's vis-a-vis the South. As is well known, Syngmann Rhee on numerous occasions called for unification by force or a Northward unification and asked for U.S. military assistance to achieve this objective. On

this particular point, the English editor of the Leftist Review Jon Halliday offered a theory of a Northern invasion and argued that Syngmann Rhee nurtured the intervention of U.S. ground troops in order to destroy the North Korean regime.⁵²⁾

Third, the strengthening of the American military commitment to South Korea acted to "influence" North Korea. Both Kolko and Gupta maintain that North Korea undertook a "preventive measure" on June 25, 1950 based on a "passing military advantage" when it calculated that Syngmann Rhee was on the verge of implementing unification by force if the United States strengthened South Korea as based on the Department of State advisor John Foster Dulles' affirmation of the military commitment to Korea during a visit to Korea prior to the outbreak of the war.

As a result, how can one evaluate these assertions?

First, according to Choi Kwang Young who has meticulously examined the military competition between South and North Korea, "a competition did occur between South and North Korea on the number of troops and although from 1948 until 1949 South Korea initiated this competition, there was no competition between South and North Korea in terms of supplies or training and the North Korean army held an across-the-board advantage." As a result, if we are to differentiate between civilian organizations and combat forces on the basis of equipping oneself under arms, weapons, and training it is difficult to accept the notion that a South-North military competition was evident, and more so the notion that the South initiated that competition.

Second, on the point of Syngmann Rhee's Northern invasion scheme, it is true that he expressed the notion of a "Northward unification" but he only did so in order to emphasize the need for American military assistance since South Korea's military capability in comparison with that of North Korea's was

inferior, and as such, was merely a "policy of fabrication." He knew full well that the South Korean army was incapable of undertaking a Northern invasion by itself plus the fact that such a move would not be supported either by the United States or its allies. It has to be taken into consideration also that while advocating "unification by force" he also called for "peaceful unification."

Third, Dulles' speech during his visit to Korea. It is true that Dulles expressed a strengthened policy towards South Korea in an address to the South Korean National Assembly on June 19, 1950 when he remarked that "you do not stand alone. So long as you carry on your responsibility with value in the great cause of the freedom of man, you do not definitely stand alone." But in a meeting with President Rhee, Dulles emphasized that one did not need a formal treaty or alliance in the face of a common action against a common enemy. He noted further that the United States government did not believe that the Soviet Union would launch a war at that time but would control an indirect attack and that while the United States could not commit itself to the security of another country in the face of a third world war, it could give assistance in the case of an indirect invasion. As a result, it is difficult to interpret Dulles' remarks as evidence of the strengthening of the American government's military commitment to South Korea.

The Development of the "War of National Liberation" Theory

As such problems pertaining to the views of the revisionists were acknowledged, partial reassessments were made by the revisionists, particularly as it became crystal clear that the Korean War erupted owing to a Southern invasion by North Korea and there were those who accepted the fact that the Korean War was begun by North Korea's invasion of the South. Even Soviet scholars have used such neutral terms as "a military strategy began

in the Korean peninsula on June 25, 1950" and in his memoirs, the seasoned Chinese diplomat Wu Xioquan wrote that "the Korean War broke out only a few months after the formation of the new state."⁵³⁾

At the same time, the work of the Japanese scholar Shinao Seizaburo is often cited including the publication of his paper in Japanese entitled "The Korean War: An Epoch-Making Event in Modern History" in Sankei (August 1965) and the publication of his book (also in Japanese) entitled The Outbreak of the Korean War by the HuKumura Shuppansa in 1968. A noted Marxist scholar, he emphasized the mistakes evident in the works by Stone and Conde and rejected the notion of a "Northern invasion" by the United States and South Korea after a careful review of the documents in the Japanese Foreign Ministry, Truman's memoirs, MacArthur's memoirs, as well as other objective source material. Nevertheless, he categorized the Korean War as being fundamentally a "civil war."

Even Frank Baldwin who is close to the revisionist school rejects the "Northern invasion" theory. Upon the examination of Harold Noble's memoirs Embassy at War (who was the First Secretary at the American Embassy in Seoul during the Korean War), Baldwin maintained that it is difficult to accept the theory that South Korea prepared the "Northern invasion" or provoked a Southern invasion by North Korea as based on Noble's specific depiction of the atmosphere of chaos surrounding the South Korean government at the time of the invasion.⁵⁴⁾

As the theory of North Korea's invasion of the South increasingly became the majority view in the international academic community, the revisionists changed their focus of analysis. In particular, they began to argue that since the Korean War was fundamentally one of a "war of national liberation," it was pointless to debate who first started the war. The most representative of

scholars to hold such a view is Halliday. He argues that "it is difficult to reply to the question concerning why the Korean War broke out without a legitimate emphasis on the division of the Korean peninsula and its origin" and states that it was needless to ask who started the Korean War in examining the background of the Korean War. Halliday also adds that "the emphasis in the West on who is responsible for the Korean War or counterarguments from the socialist countries de-historifies the problem of the class struggle in Korea."⁵⁵⁾

Cumings' The Origins of the Korean War also follows on this general line of reasoning. He argues that in order to resolve the social and economic or class struggle contradictions which surmounted after the Yi Dynasty, a revolution bent on the destruction of the existing order was inevitable after liberation and that such forces did surface, only to be thwarted by the United States' imperialistic and status-quo policy and in the face of the strength of the conservatives and the anti-communists who were part of such a policy. Cumings argues that an explosion of the class struggle which erupted after liberation until the outbreak of the Korean War five years later was the cause of the civil war. From such a perspective, he traces the origins of the Korean War not from June 25, 1950 but from a period prior to the war, at a minimum the five-year period of modern Korean history following liberation. As a result, Cumings traces the origins of the Korean War to factors relating to the class struggle and the intermingling of opposing forces.

John Merrill's doctoral dissertation also stems from a similar trend.⁵⁶⁾ Merrill argues that the Cheju-do, Yeo-soo and other rebellions were inevitable explosions of the pent up frustrations of the "revolutionary forces" who remained suppressed and that North Korea, in an effort of showing its solidarity with such rebellions, became involved in a military struggle with the South

including border clashes which ultimately evolved into the Korean conflict in the form of a civil war.

Baldwin's opinion is also not dissimilar. He argues that "the Korean War is the final point of the struggle between the left and the right which began with the liberation of Korea in August 1945, or even as far back as the 1920s with the formation of the Korean Communist Party."⁵⁷⁾ Australia's Gavan McCormack also holds similar views and even criticizes the intervention of the United States and the United Nations in a "war of national liberation," or in other words, a civil war.⁵⁸⁾

The Development of the "International Civil War" Theory

It should be noted that through the new approach of the revisionists in their effort to focus on the origins of the Korean War in the Korean peninsula, a new dimension has been added to the study of the Korean War. But it is also true that a mistake was made in either ignoring or downsizing the international factors of the war in an effort to find the origins of the Korean War in Korea.

Seen from this point of view, it was a far-sighted view to characterize the Korean War as one of "an international civil war," a point made by the Japanese academic community. As already noted, Shinao Seizaburo stated as far back as 1965 that "the Korean War erupted as a civil war but evolved into an international war with the intervention of the United States," and Okonogi Masao has written that "in between the internationalization of domestic politics and the domesticization of international politics during the Korean War, a vicious cycle between international and domestic forces erupted in the Korean War," and stipulated that "the Korean War was a combined struggle based on a mixture of domestic and international factors."⁵⁹⁾ It is from such a perspective

that the Korean War is characterized as "an international civil war" by Nagai Yonosuke.

V: Conclusions

As can be seen by the various evidences and theories pertaining to the origins of the Korean War, both Korean and foreign scholars have embarked on new avenues of research relating to the Korean War. Although an abiding theme of this study has been focused on the debate (which is still on-going) between the traditionalist and revisionist schools as to the background relating to the Korean War in addition to the role of the United States, the Soviet Union and China (as well as the two Koreas) it is important to note that both perspectives have enabled scholars to broaden their inquiries on the Korean War.

Long considered to be a by-product of the Cold War, Korean War studies from the onset was influenced by the prevailing international political climate and it was only in the aftermath of the U.S.-Soviet detente of the early 1970s that a concerted effort was made by the academic community to more objectively assess the various international and domestic dimensions of the Korean War. While it would be inappropriate to categorically state which explanation or theory carries the most weight as based on research findings which have appeared thus far, suffice it to say that through the evolution in Korean War studies as noted in this article, some general observations can be made.

First, it can be stipulated with a high-degree of confidence that the Korean War broke out based firmly on a carefully prepared invasion of the South by North Korea. It is difficult to find evidence which backs up the proposition of the revisionists who maintain that the Korean War erupted owing to South

Korea's, or in a joint "conspiracy" with the United States, or for that matter on the basis of the United States' and South Korea's "provocation" of the war.

Second, it seems likely that North Korea's invasion of the South was pursued under the initiative of the North Korean leadership. To put it in another way, it seems unlikely that the Soviet Union initiated nor directed North Korea's invasion of the South. Even Krushchev's memoirs notes that Stalin accepted Kim Il Sung's plan under the condition that the United States would not be involved, and it appears that the Soviet Union provided military assistance to North Korea after that period. Taken together, James Matray's remark that "if North Korea did not plan for the unification of the Korean peninsula, there would have been no invasion of the South"⁶¹) and that of Barton Bernstein who stated that "as a civil conflict, the Korean War was initiated by North Korea which wanted to achieve its own objectives and was also agreed to by Stalin"⁶²) are deserving of greater scrutiny.

Third, during the preparations for the Korean War, China realistically did not have any role. In short, there is no evidence supporting the Chinese conspiracy theory.

Fourth, the international Cold War between the United States surrounding the Korean War helped to rigidify the internal cold war and from such a point of view, it can be cited as an important factor in the outbreak of the Korean War. The fact that the Korean War was not localized but shortly internationalized can be explained on the basis of the direct influence of the international Cold War.

Fifth, internal factors in the Korean peninsula also played a key role. The rising tide revolutionary forces intent in destroying the existent order and connected on the basis of an armed struggle and through the advocacy of

such objectives as "national liberation, rejection of foreign powers" under the banner of "war of national liberation" cannot be discounted, and from this perspective the Korean War at the same time retains characteristics of an international and a civil war.

Finally, it is hoped that through the results which have been produced thus far on the Korean War strenuous efforts will continue to be made on the Korean War which was a major watershed in contemporary Korean history. With the release of more source materials both within and outside South Korea concomitant with the general increase in Korean studies abroad, it is hoped that continuing research on the Korean War will result in a more conceptual and objective understanding of this conflict, particularly in the context of the approaching fortieth anniversary of the Korean War.

Endnotes

- 1) The substance and background on this document is explained in greater detail in the following article prepared by the author. See Hakjoo Kim, "North Korean Studies During the Formation and Initial Period of the Government (I): With an Emphasis on the Captured North Korean Documents by the U.S. Army," *The Journal of International Politics* (in Korean), 24:2 (1984), pp. 161-192.
- 2) These two books have been translated into Korean as follows. The first volume was translated by the Bureau of Research, National Unification Board entitled *The Liberation of Korea* (Seoul: National Unification Board, 1987) and the second volume was also translated by the same office, *The Soviet Union and its Relationship with North Korea* (Seoul: National Unification Board, 1987).
- 3) This article which appeared originally in Russian has been translated into Korean and published by the Sino-Soviet Studies, Hanyang University in its Journal *Sino-Soviet Affairs*, (Winter, 1984/5).
- 4) These documents are reviewed in greater detail in the author's following article. See Hakjoo Kim, "Domestic and International Documents on the Korean War, Part I" *Diplomacy* (in Korean) (Seoul: The Korean Council on Foreign Relations) vol.5 (March 1988), pp. 120-122.
- 5) Selig H. Harrison, *The Widening Gulf: Asian Nationalism and American Policy* (New York: The Free Press, 1978) and Calum McDonald, *Korea: The War Before Vietnam* (London: The Macmillan Co., 1986).
- 6) D.F. Fleming, *The Cold War and Its Origins, 1917-1960* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Co., 1961), vol. 1 and 2.
- 7) Bruce Cumings, (ed.), *Child of Conflict: The Korean-American Relationship, 1943-1954* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1983), and Bruce Cumings, *The Origins of the Korean War* (2 vols: Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981), vol. I *Liberation and the Emergence of Separate*

Regimes, 1945-1947.

- 8) The Association for Korean War Studies, ed., (in Korean) *A Reexamination of the Period of National Disruption Prior to and After the Korean War*, (Seoul: Bureau of Research, National Unification Board, 1987).
- 9) Kim Jeong Kon, unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, *A Study on the Communist Struggle in Korea, 1945-1950: With an Emphasis on Armed Struggle, Kyung Hee University, 1972, and Lee Dae Keun, The Korean War and the Accumulation of Capital in the 1950s: A General Overview of the Overcoming of the Criticism on "The Theory of Accumulation of Aid Dependence"* (Seoul National University, 1987) (Both dissertations are in Korean).
- 10) Fleming is the revisionist scholar who assessed the analysis provided by the Department of State and offers specific criticisms. See Fleming, *The Cold War*, op.cit., vol.2, p. 605.
- 11) Adam B. Ulam, *Expansion and Coexistence: The History of Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917-1967* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1968), p.514.
- 12) George F. Kennan, "Japanese Security and American Policy", *Foreign Affairs* (October 1964), p.15.
- 13) Raymond L. Garthoff, *Soviet Strategy in the Nuclear Age* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1965), p.72.
- 14) This theory is reviewed in detail by Edgar Snow, *The Other Side of the River: Red China Today* (New York: Random House, 1962), pp.654-655. For more information, see John Gunther, *The Riddle of MacArthur* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1951), p.172.
- 15) Wilbur Chaffee, "Two Hypotheses of Sino-Soviet Relations as Concerns the Instigation of the Korean War", *Journal of Korean Affairs*, 4:3-4 (October 1976-January 1977), pp.10-11.
- 16) A. Doak Barnett, *Communist China and Asia* (New York: Vintage Books, 1961), p.152.
- 17) Harold Hinton, *Communist China in World Politics* (Boston: Houghton & Mifflin Co., 1966), p.27.
- 18) Alexander Dallin, *Soviet Foreign Policy After Stalin* (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott, 1961), p.70.
- 19) Marshall Schulman, *Stalin's Foreign Policy Reappraised* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963), p.41, and Clement Attlee, "Britain and American Common Aims: Different Opinions,"

- Foreign Affairs*, 32:2 (January 1954), p.199.
- 20) Moon Hee Seok, "The North Korean Army Between The Soviet Union and China," in Kim (ed.), *The Future of China* (Seoul: Beob Moon Sa, 1967) (In Korean).
- 21) *The New York Times*, May 6, 1949.
- 22) Republic of China, Central News Agency, *China Handbook, 1950* (Taipei, 1950), pp.278-279.
- 23) cf. 18, p.87. Philip E. Mosley, *The Kremlin and World Politics* (New York: Vintage Books, 1960), p.325 and Richard Walker, *China Under Communism* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1955), p.271.
- 24) Max Beloff, *Soviet Policy in the Far East, 1944-1955* (London: Oxford University Press, 1953), pp.177-178.
- 25) Kyril Kalinov, "How the Russians Built the North Korean Army," *The Reporter* (September 26, 1950); Yuri Rastvorvov, "Red Frauds and Intrigues in the Far East," *Life* (December 1954); and Paul Monat, "Russians in Korea: The Hidden Bosses," *Life* (June 27, 1960). By utilizing these and other sources, Jin-Chull Soh who subscribes to the Sino-Soviet conspiracy theory has presented a cogent argument on how the Soviet Union supported North Korea militarily. See Jin-Chull Soh, "Some Causes of the Korean War of 1950: A Case Study of Soviet Foreign Policy in Korea(1945-1950) with an Emphasis on Sino-Soviet Collaboration," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Oklahoma, 1963, pp.196-197. Moreover, a synopsis is provided in Jin Chull Soh, "The Role of the Soviet Union in Preparation for the Korean War," *Journal of Korean Affairs*, 3:4 (January 1974), pp.3-14. At the same time, it has also been maintained by some revisionist scholars that a subsequent article written by Kalinov was in fact a doctored piece provided by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency.
- 26) This source material was also accepted by the U.S. Department of the Army, Sec Roy E. Appleman, *United States Army in the Korean War. South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu*, (Office of the Chief of Military History), (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1961), Chapter II.
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 - 29) I.F. Stone, *The Hidden History of the Korean War* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1952).
 - 30) An updated translation was made by Uchiyama Satoshi and published as a single volume by Aokishoten in 1966.
 - 31) Edward Friedman & Mark Selden (eds.), *America's Asia: Dissenting Essays on Asian-American Relations* (New York: Vintage Books, 1971).
 - 32) John Gittings, "The Great Asian Conspiracy," pp.108-132, in Friedman and Selden, *ibid.*
 - 33) Edward Friedman, "Problems in Dealing with an Irrational Power: America Declares War on China," p.218, in Friedman and Selden, *ibid.*
 - 34) Allen S. Whiting, *China Crosses the Yalu: The Decision to Enter the Korean War* (New York: Macmillan Co., 1960), p.44.
 - 35) *Ibid.*, and Samuel B. Griffith, *The Chinese People's Liberation Army* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967), p.347.
 - 36) This point is assessed in detail in the following work by the author. See Hakjoon Kim, *Sino-North Korean Relations, 1945-1984* (in Korean) (Seoul: The Korean Research Center, 1985), pp.47-50.
 - 37) Karunakar Gupta, "How Did the Korean War Begin?" *China Quarterly*, No.52 (October-December 1972), pp.699-716.
 - 38) "Commentaries" by Chong-sik Lee, W.E. Skillend and Robert Simmons, with a rejoinder by Gupta, *ibid.*, No.54 (April-June, 1973), pp.699-716.
 - 39) William Stueck, Jr., "Cold War Revisionism and the Origin of the Korean Conflict: The Kolko Thesis," *Pacific Historical Review*, 42 (November 1973), pp.537-560.
 - 40) Joyce and Gabriel Kolko, *The Limits of Power. The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1945-1954* (New York: Harper & Row, 1972), pp.585-587.

- 41) Joyce and Gabriel Kolko, "To Root Out Those Among Them," *Pacific Historical Review*, 42 (November 1973), pp.560-566.
- 42) This point has already been cited by Richard W. Leopold, "The Korean War: The Historian's Task," in Francis H. Heller (ed.), *The Korean War: A 25-Year Perspective* (Lawrence: Regents Press of Kansas, 1977), pp.209-224.
- 43) Minzoku Mondai Ken Kyu Kai, (ed.), *The History of the Korean War: A Reassessment of Modern History* (in Japanese) (Tokyo: Korea Hyoronsha, 1967).
- 44) Volume I, ibid and Park Kap Dong, *The Life and Times of Pak Hun Yeong and a Reevaluation of Modern History* (Seoul: People's Press, 1983).
- 45) *The Han Kook Ilbo*, June 25, 1962.
- 46) Robert Simmons, *The Strained Alliance: Peking, Pyongyang, Moscow and the Politics of the Korean Civil War* (New York: The Free Press, 1975).
- 47) B.C. Koh's review article, *The American Political Science Review*, 71:3 (September 1977), pp.1328-1330.
- 48) William Stueck, "The Soviet Union and the Origins of the Korean War," *World Politics*, 28:4 (July 1976), pp.622-635.
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- 50) *Khrushchev Remembers*, with an Introduction, Commentary and Notes by Edward Crankshaw, translated and edited by Strobe Talbott (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1970), pp.367-369.
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- 54) Frank Baldwin, "Editor's Introduction," in Frank Baldwin (ed.), *Embassy at War*, prepared by

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- 55) Cumings, *Child of Conflict*, op. cit., p.164.
 - 56) John Merrill, "Internal Warfare in Korea, 1948-1950: The Local Setting of the Korean War," unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, University of Delaware, 1982. This thesis is also introduced in *Child of Conflict*, pp. 133-162.
 - 57) Baldwin, op. cit., XVI.
 - 58) Gavan McCormack, *Cold War Hot War: An Australian Perspective on the Korean War* (Sydney: Hale & Iremonger, 1983).
 - 59) Okonogi Masao, "The Domestic Roots of the Korean War," in Yonosuke Nagai and Akira Iriye eds., *The Origins of the War in Asia* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977), p.300.
 - 60) Yonosuke Nagai, "The Korean War: An Interpretative Essay," *The Japanese Journal of American Studies*, No.1 (1981), p.169.
 - 61) James Matray, *The Reluctant Crusade: American Foreign Policy in Korea, 1941-1950* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1985), p.235.
 - 62) Barton J. Bernstein, "The Week We Went to War: American Intervention in the Korean Civil War," *Foreign Service Journal* (January 1977), p.9.

6. 25 연구의 國際的 동향

—6.25연구에 관한 文獻史적 考察—

金 學 俊 (大統領社會擔當補佐役)

I. 머리말: 문제의 배경

1970년대에 해외에서 연구가 활발해진 이유

1950년 6월 25일에 일어나 1953년 7월 27일에 정전된 한국전쟁에 대한 연구는 1970년대 이후 우선 국외에서 활발히 진행되어 왔다. 여기서 우선 논의되어야 할 대목은 1970년대 이후에 한국전쟁에 대한 연구가 활발해진 이유이다. 적어도 다음과 같은 몇 가지 이유를 지적할 수 있다.

첫째, 1970년대초 국제관계는 대탕트(긴장완화)를 지향하게 되어 脫냉전·脫이데올로기의 성향이 자리잡게 되었다. 이런 국제적 분위기는 냉전의 부산물이었던 한국전쟁에 대한 객관적 연구를 가능하게 하였다. 풀어 말하면 한국전쟁의 연구에 대한 이데올로기적 제약을 크게 완화시켰다.

둘째, 1970년대에 들어와, 특히 1970년대 중반 이후 한국전쟁의 연구에 필수적인 자료들이 공개되거나 발굴되었다.

(1) 한국전쟁의 연구에 직접적으로나 간접적으로 도움을 주는 1차 자료들의 상당히 많은 부분은 미국에 있다. 이 자료들을 크게 세 가지로 나눌 수 있다.

㉠ 미국 정부가 작성한 공식 자료이다. 그 대표적인 한 보기가 미국 국무성이 편집한 《미국의 대외관계(Foreign Relations of the United States)》에 공개되는 그 당시의 기밀문서들이고, 다른 한 보기가 주한미군의 정보 보고서들이다.

㉡ 한국전쟁 당시 미국의 정책 결정 과정에 직접적인 영향을 미친 트루먼(Harry S. Truman) 대통령의 기념도서관과 맥아더(Douglas MacArthur) 원수의 기념도서관 및 덜레스(John F. Dulles) 국무장관 문서보관실 등에 보관되어 있는 자료들이다.

㉔ 미군이 한국전쟁 기간에 노획한 북한측 문서들이다. 흔히 '노획된 북한 문서'라고 불리는 이 자료는 북한 정권의 성립 과정과 그 성격, 그리고 북한 정치지도자들의 南韓觀 및 統一觀을 잘 나타내고 있으며 따라서 한국전쟁의 본질에 새로운 조명을 준다.¹⁾

이 세 자료들은 기밀문서로 분류되어 있다가 20년 또는 25년이 지나면서 기밀문서 분류로부터 해제되었다. 그리하여 대체로 1970년대 중반이후 연구자들의 접근이 가능해졌다.

(2) 영국의 자료들 역시 1970년대 중반 이후 공개되었다. 한국전쟁에 입하는 영국의 입장은 미국의 입장과는 많은 대조를 보였다. 특히 전쟁의 계속 여부와 휴전의 문제를 둘러싸고 미국과 영국 사이에는 견해 차이가 잦았다. 이 측면을 영국 외무성 자료들이 상당히 자세히 보여 주었다.

(3) 소련과 중공의 자료들은 오늘날까지도 사실상 거의 공개되지 않고 있다. 그러나 역시 1970년대 중반 이후 조금씩 공개되고 있다. 소련의 경우, 소련과학아카데미 동양학연구소가 각각 1976년에 발생한 《조선의 해방》과 1981년에 발행한 《소련과 인민조선과의 관계, 1945-1980》를 지적할 수 있다.²⁾

이 두 책은 한국전쟁 그 자체에 관한 자료를 담고 있지는 않다. 그러나 한국전쟁이 일어나기 이전 시기의 두 나라 관계를 새롭게 분석할 수 있는 자료를 담고 있어서, 그것의 분석을 통해 비록 간접적으로나마 한국전쟁의 성격을 파악해 볼 수 있게 된다.

중공의 경우, 중국공산당 중앙당학교 산하 黨史研究室 소속의 연구원으로 추정되는 姚旭이 1980년 《黨史研究》에 「미국에 대항하고 조선을 지원한 현명한 정책: 중국인민지원이 출국하여 참전한 30주년을 기념하며」를 발표했다.³⁾ 이 논문은 중공의 한국전 참전에 관한 많은

새로운 자료들을 담고 있다. 이어 '중국인민지원군' 사령관이었던 彭德懷의 회고록 《彭德懷自述》이 1981년 人民出版社를 통해 출판되었다.

(4) 남한과 북한의 자료도 1970년대 중반 이후 적지 않게 나왔다. 우선 남한의 경우, 국방부 전사편찬위원회가 편집한 《한국전쟁사》 전11권이 1980년에 완간되었는데 그 가운데 제1권과 제2권 및 제11권을 제외한 나머지 여덟권이 1970년대에 나왔다. 제1권과 제2권의 개정판 역시 1970년대에 나왔다. 이어 한국전쟁 당시의 대한민국 대통령 부인 프란체스카 여사의 회고록 《6·25와 이승만 대통령》이 중앙일보에 1983년 6월24일부터 1984년 4월19일까지 연재되었고, 한국전쟁 당시 3군총사령관이었던 丁一權의 회고록 《6·25秘錄: 전쟁과 휴전》이 1986년 동아일보사에서 출간되었다.⁴⁾

북한의 자료로 북한 스스로가 이 시기에 공간한 것은 없는 듯하다. 그러나 앞서 지저한 '노획된 북한 문서'는 북한의 입장을 이해함에 있어서 필수적이다.

셋째, 베트남전쟁은 베트남전쟁 그 자체뿐만 아니라 아시아 민족주의와 미국의 아시아정책을 재평가하게 만들었다. 그 재평가의 내용을 단순화시켜 말한다면, 2차대전이 끝난 이후 아시아의 민족주의는 현상타파적이며 사회주의적이고 혁명주의적인 성격을 갖고 있었고 베트남 전쟁은 그러한 성격을 지닌 북베트남과 그러한 성격에 반대되는 남베트남 사이의 내전이었음에도 불구하고 미국이 자신의 '제국주의적' 이익을 지키고자 개입한 잘못을 저질렀다는 것이다.

베트남전쟁에 대한 이러한 재평가는 한국전쟁에 대한 재평가로 이어졌다. 한국전쟁 역시 아시아 민족주의 특성을 지닌 북한과 그 반대 물결

위에 선 남한 사이의 내전이였음에도 불구하고 미국이 자신의 '제국주의적' 이익을 지키고자 개입함으로써 '잘못된 전쟁'을 치렀다는 것이다. 해리슨(Selig Harrison)의 책이나 맥도날드(Calum McDonald)의 책이 그러한 계통에 속한다⁵⁾ 최근 영국의 타임즈 텔레비전社가 제작한 여섯 시간짜리 《한국전쟁(The Korean War)》도 대체로 미국의 아시아정책을 '고발'한다는 흐름 위에 있다.

넷째, 이와 관련하여 지적되어야 할 점은 수정주의(revisionism)심장과 확산이다. 전문가들은 이미 다 알고 있는 용어이지만 일반독자들을 위해 여기서 전통주의(traditionalism)와 수정주의에 대해 간단히 설명하기로 한다.

제2차 세계대전이 끝날 무렵부터 시작된 미국과 소련 사이의 냉전의 기원을 분석하는 입장에 두 갈래가 있다. 하나는 전통주의 학파로, 소련의 '공격주의적이고 팽창주의적인 대외정책'이 미국의 '단호한 반응'을 불러 일으켰고 여기서 냉전이 확대되었다고 설명한다. 다른 하나는 전통주의 학파의 분석을 수정한 수정주의 학파로, 그들은 냉전의 책임을 1차적으로 미국의 '제국주의적인 대외정책'에서 찾는다. 미국이 소련보다 월등히 높은 수준의 군사력과 경제력으로써 사실상 세계를 '지배'하려 함에 대해 소련이 불가피하게 강력히 반응함으로써 냉전이 확대되었다는 것이다.

한국전쟁의 기원을 찾음에 있어서도 이 두 학파의 기본적 시각은 그대로 투영되어 있다. 한국전쟁의 기원을 전통주의자들은 소련의 '공격주의적 팽창정책'에서 찾고 있고, 수정주의자들은 미국의 '제국주의적 정책'에서 찾는 것이다. 이러한 해석에서 남한이나 북한은 모두 한국전쟁의 '하수인'으로 여겨진다.

원래 국제정치학에 있어서 수정주의는 플레밍(D. F. Fleming)교수가 1961년에 출판한 《냉전과 그 기원들》에서 비롯되었다. 6) 그 뒤 두 학파는 서로 상대방의 논리를 부분적으로 수용하면서 자신의 입장을 보다 정밀화시켜 나갔으며, 이 과정을 통해 戰後의 冷戰史 또는 전후 국제 정치사의 여러 사건들에 대한 우리의 인식은 보다 더 정확해질 수 있게 되었다. 이 두 학파 가운데 점점 더 큰 영향력을 얻어간 쪽은, 굳이 대비한다면, 정치경제학적인 또는 마르크시스트적인 접근방법을 취한 수정주의 학파라고 하겠다. 수정주의 학파는, 앞에서 지적했듯이, 자신의 이론적 약점을 보완하면서 보다 정밀하게 가다듬으며 전후 냉전사의 설명에서 주류의 위치를 차지하게 되었다.

이러한 내용의 수정주의가 그 성장과 확산 과정에서 많이 다룬 소재들 가운데 하나가 바로 한국전쟁이었다. 따라서 한국전쟁에 관한 연구물, 특히 수정주의적 해석이 널리 보급되게 되었다.

다섯째, 해외 특히 미국에서의 '한국학 제2세대'의 성장이다. 미국의 경우 '한국학 제1세대'는 주로 한국에 온 미국인 선교사와 그 자녀, 주한 미군정청 및 대사관의 관리 등이었다. 이들에 이어, 대학원에서 한국을 전공해 박사학위를 받고 그 과정에서 한국어 독해능력을 확보해 한국어로 된 문헌을 다룰 수 있는 본격적인 한국전문가들이 비록 소수이나마 학계에 자리잡은 것이다. 이들은 미국의 대외정책을 분석하는 큰 테두리 안에서 제2차 세계대전의 종전을 전후한 시기로부터 한미관계를 다루는 가운데 자연스럽게 한국전쟁에 대해 깊은 관심을 쏟게 되었다.

커밍스(Bruce Cumings)교수가 편집해 1983년에 출판한 《갈동의 산물》은 이러한 '한국학 제2세대'의 한국전쟁觀을 잘 보여 준다. 한반도의 분단에서 한국휴전에 이르는 한반도의 解放前後史는 물론 한미관계 전반을 수정주의적이며 비판적인 안목에서 접근한 그들의 글 모음인 것이다.

그리고 어느 무엇보다 커밍스가 1981년에 출판한 《한국전쟁의 기원들》은 '한국학 제2세대'의 대표자격인 저자의 수정주의적 시각을 가장 잘 보여 주고 있다. 7)

이러한 이유들로부터 한국전쟁에 대한 연구는 1970년대 중반 이후 활발해졌다. 그 활기는 미국 대학의 경우 한국전쟁을 주제로 하는 박사 학위논문이 매년 5-6편 정도 나오고 있으며, 서구의 저명한 출판사들로부터 매년 역시 5-6권 이상의 단행본이 간행되고 있는 사실에서 확인된다. 한편 1979년 4월 미국 로스앤젤레스에서 열린 미국아시아학회 연례 총회는 '한국전쟁의 재평가'라는 본과를 마련했고, 1980년 6월에는 커밍스가 워싱턴대학교에서 '한국전쟁 발발 30주년 기념 학술대회'를 열었으며, 1985년 9월 영국의 한국연구회(British Association for Korean Studies)가 '한국전쟁의 재평가'라는 심포지움을 열었다.

1970년대 이후 국내에서 연구가 활발해진 이유

해외에서보다는 조금 늦었으나 국내에서도 1980년대에 들어와 한국전쟁에 대한 학문적 관심이 높아지고 있다. 그 단적인 보기를 우리는 1987년 한 해에 국내에서 있었던 한국전쟁에 관한 세 개의 학술대회를 지적할 수 있다.

첫째는 한국전쟁연구회가 6월15일부터 16일까지 개최했던 '한국전쟁前後 민족격동기의 재조명'이다. 한국전쟁이라는 단일 주제를 놓고 국내에서 열린 국제학술회로는 이것이 처음이었던 것 같다. 이 회의에서 국내외의 전문가들로부터 13편의 논문이 발표되었다. 8)

둘째는 한국정치외교사학회가 연중 내내 계속한 월례 학술발표회이다. 이 학회는 한국전쟁을 여러 각도에서 살피기 위해 매달 평균 2편의 논문 발표를 주선해 오고 있다. 발표자들은 모두 국내 학자이며, 이것은 한국전쟁 연구의 국내적 축적을 말해 주는 증거이기도 하다.

셋째는 韓美安保研究協議會가 11월30일 열었던 '한국전쟁사 口述계획' 국제학술회의이다. 한국전쟁 참여자들의 증언을 받아 한국전쟁을 재조명해 보자는 연구 계획을 발전시키기 위한 회의였다.

한국전쟁에 대한 학문적 관심이 국내에서도 높아졌다는 점은 다음과 같은 몇 가지 단편적 사실들에서도 나타난다.

첫째 1985년 한국전쟁연구소가 세워져 《한국전쟁(6.25) 관계자료 문헌집》을 발간했다는 사실이다. 1,211페이지에 이르는 이 문헌집은 한국전쟁 문헌집으로는 국내 최초의 것이다.

둘째 1987년 한국전쟁연구회가 창립되었다는 사실이다. 이 연구회에 대해서는 뒤에서 다시 설명하겠다.

셋째 서울대학교 국제문제연구소가 1984년 《논문집》에 '한국전쟁의 재조명과 공산권 연구의 비판'이라는 특집을 마련했다는 사실이다.

넷째 《Korea & World Affairs(계간지)》가 제8권 제2호(1984년 여름호)에 한국전쟁연구문헌 목록을 작성해 게재했다는 사실이다.

다섯째, 한국전쟁에 관한 해외의 연구물들이 신속하게 번역되고 있다는 사실이다. 특히 수정주의 학파의 저술들이 상당한 관심 속에 역간되고 있음은 한국의 학계가 최근에 지닌 경향마저 나타낸다. 그 가운데 커밍스의 저술들이 미친 영향은 참으로 크다. 국내의 정치학계에서 한국의 현대 정치사에 관심을 둔 학도들치고 그를 거론하지 않는 이는 사실상 거의 없다시피한 형편이다.

그러면 국내에서 최근에 이르러 한국전쟁에 대한 연구가 활발해진 까닭은 무엇일까? 대체로 다음과 같은 이유들을 지적할 수 있겠다.

첫째, 한국의 현대사와 한국 사회 전반에 대한 학문적 관심의 늘어남이다. 이러한 관심은 자연스럽게 한국 현대사의 가장 중요한 사건이었던 한국전쟁으로 모여지게 되었다.

여기서 중요하게 지적되어야 할 점은 한국전쟁을 단순히 3년 동안 일어났던 하나의 개별적 사건으로 파악하는 것이 아니라 한국 근·현대사의 연속선상에서 발생한 역사^적계속적 사건으로 파악한다는 점이다. 이 점에 대해서는 뒷 부분에서 다시 설명하겠거니와, 한국전쟁을 한국 근·현대사의 분석을 통해 한국 근·현대사의 전반적 성격을 이해할 수 있다고 믿기 때문에 한국전쟁의 연구에 더 많은 노력을 쏟는 것이다.

둘째, 한반도의 통일 문제에 대한 학문적 관심의 늘어남이다. 그런데 한반도의 통일문제를 단순한 통일방안적 차원에서가 아니라 민족사적 차원에서 접근할 때, 한국전쟁을 어떻게 이해하느냐는 그 출발점이 된다고 말할 수 있다. 풀어 말해, 한국전쟁의 기본 성격을 어떻게 이해하느냐에 따라 한반도의 통일 문제에 대한 깊은 학문적 관심은 한국전쟁에 대한 학문적 관심으로 이어지고 있다.

셋째, 해외의 사회과학 분야에서 이뤄진 학문적·사상적 연구 업적의 신속하고도 광범위한 도입은 한국의 현대사와 사회 전반을 비판적 안목에서 보려는 知的 분위기를 크게 자극하였다. 국제정치를 보는 시각에 있어서도 우익적이며 반공주의적인 전통주의 학파의 시각보다 정치경제학적 접근과 마르크시스트적 접근인 수정주의 학파의 시각에 상당히 근접하게 하였다. (여기서 '마르크시스트적 접근이' '좌경용공적 접근'이라는 뜻은 아니다.) 이러한 시각에 서서 한국의 현대사를 바라보게 될 때 제일 먼저 탐구의

대상으로, 또는 脫神話化 작업의 대상으로 등장하는 것은 역시 한국전쟁이 아닐 수 없다.

넷째, 한국전쟁을 주제로 국내외에서 박사학위를 받은 전문적 연구자들의 늘어남이다. 외국에서 한국전쟁을 주로 다룬 논문으로 1970년대 이후 박사학위를 받고 귀국한 학자로 金徹凡(미국 뉴욕주립대), 羅鍾一(영국 캠브리지대), 朴斗福(중국 문화대), 西在萬(터키 국립앙카라대), 梁大鉉(서독 뮌헨대), 溫暢一(미국 캔사스대) 교수가 대표적인 보기이다. 국내의 대표적인 보기로는 한국전쟁을 남로당의 투쟁 전략이라는 맥락에서 분석한 논문으로 박사학위를 받은 金點坤교수와 한국전쟁을 경제학자의 안목에서 접근한 논문으로 박사학위를 받은 李大根교수를 지적할 수 있다.

위에서 살폈듯이, 거듭 말하거니와 한국전쟁에 대한 국내외의 연구는 매우 활발하여 오늘날 우리는 참으로 많은 우수한 저술들을 접하고 있다. 필자의 이 글은 이러한 연구의 현황을 주로 한국전쟁의 기원에 관한 쟁점들을 중심으로 개괄하려는 데 1차적 목적이 있다.

II. 한국전쟁의 기원을 둘러싼 초기의 전통주의적 해석: 그 내용과 문헌

한국전쟁에 관한 연구물들 가운데 상당수는 한국전쟁의 기원을 다루고 있다. 즉 '누가 한국전쟁을 시작했으며 그는 왜 그렇게 했는가'의 물음에 대해 많은 연구자들이 관심을 쏟은 것이다. 이 물음은 단순히 '放火者'를 찾아 규탄하자는 데 뜻이 있지 않다. 한국전쟁의 기원을 정확히 밝힘으로써 한국전쟁의 성격을 제대로 파악하자는 데 참뜻이 있다. 이러한 맥락에서 한국전쟁의 기원에 관한 논쟁을 그 쟁점과 관련문헌을 중심으로 살피기로 한다.

최초의 해석: 스탈린 主導說

한국전쟁이 일어났을 당시 서방이 가졌던 인식은 전적으로 전통주의적인 것이었다. 이때 서방은, 특히 미국은 한국전쟁을 '스탈린(Josif Stalin)의 전쟁'으로 이해했다. 스탈린은 다음과 같은 동기에서 한국전쟁을 '도발'했을 것으로 국무성은 분석했고, 10) 이 분석이 신문에 보도되어 미국 국민들의 머리에 깊게 박히게 되었다.

첫째, 압력분산설이다. 북대서양조약기구(NATO)의 창설로 대표되는, 유럽에서 가중되는 미국의 군사적 압력을 극동으로 분산시키기 위해 한국전쟁을 도발했다는 주장이다. 소련의 對아시아정책을 對유럽정책의 종속물로 파악하는 것은 지나친 單純化라고 주장하는 울람(Adam B. Ulam)도 압력분산설에 대해서는 긍정적이다. 11)

둘째, 美·日조약건제설 또는 극동전략설이다. 미국이 소련을 배제시킨 채 일본과 단독적인 평화조약을 체결하려고 하자 이것을 견제하기 위해 소련이 한국전쟁을 일으켰다는 설명이다. 우리 모두 잘 알고 있듯이, 미국은 일본을 점령하면서 일본을 '아시아의 스위스'로 만들려고 결심하고 군대조직과 중공업 및 재벌을 해체해 나갔다. 그러나 1947년 중국 공산당이 대륙을 재패할 가능성이 커지자 미국은 아시아에서 팽창하는 공산주의 세력을 견제하기 위해 일본을 강력한 반공 군사기지로 발전시켜야 한다는 새로운 정책을 채택하게 되었다. 그리하여 일본에 대한 점령 초기의 정책으로부터 1백80도 전환하여 자위대를 창설하고 중공업을 육성해 나가는 한편 전범으로 수감중이던 우익 정치인들과 고위 관료들을 석방하여 보수정계를 부활시켰다. 이와 더불어 소련을 무시하고 對日 강화조약의 체결을 추진해 나갔다.

스탈린은 미국의 이러한 행동을 미국이 일본에 반공국가를 수립하고, 이 새 일본을 중심으로 북대서양동맹기구와 같은 아시아 반공동맹을 형성하려는 시도로 해석했다. 그리하여 1950년 2월 모스크바에서 중공의 毛澤東과 '일본 그리고 일본과 제휴할 제국주의 국가'에 대항하기 위한 中·蘇同盟을 체결하는 한편 미국이 아시아·태평양 국가들을 '침략적 군사 블록'으로 흡수시키고 있다는 선전 공세를 폈다. 이와 동시에 일본 공산당의 반미 시위도 격화되었다.

이러한 시점에서 스탈린은 미국이 참전할 것 같지 않으며 따라서 손쉬운 승리가 예상되는 한국전쟁을 통해 한반도 전체를 공산화하고 아시아 공산주의의 안전을 확보하여 일본에서의 미국의 지위를 약화시키는 한편 일본의 친미화와 군사화를 방지하려고 한국전을 도발했다는 주론이다. 이 당시 미국의 대일정책 결정에 많은 영향을 미친 케난(George Kennan)도 일본 문제가 소련의 한국전 도발의 유일한 원인이라고 할 수는 없으나 일본 문제가 아무런 영향을 미치지 않았다고 한다면 놀라운 일이라고 논평했다. 12)

셋째, 허점공격설이다. '팽창주의자'인 스탈린은 소련의 세력권을 확장하기 위해 언제나 허점을 노리고 있었는데, 미국이 1949년 여름 주한 미군을 완전히 철수시키고 1950년 1월 국무장관 애치슨(Dean Acheson)의 기자회견을 통해 남한을 미국의 극동방위선에서 제외시킨 데다가 1950년 5월 제2대 국회의원 총선거에서 이승만·김성수계의 우익 보수 세력이 패배하자 남한을 허점으로 판단했다는 것이다. 특히 1949년 10월 1일 중화 인민공화국의 수립에 나타났듯이, 중국공산당의 대륙 제패를 미국이 '방관'한 사실은 북한이 남침해도 미국이 개입하지 않을 것으로 예측하게 만들었다는 것이다. 이처럼 허점공격설은 미국의 개입 여부에 대한 소련의 계산 착오를 강조한다. 13)

넷째, 미국의 결의실험실 또는 저항력 실험실이다. 스탈린이 자신의 세계 적화대전략'을 실천하기에 앞서 미국과 서방의 반응을 살피기 위해 남침을 시도했다는 설명이다.

실제로 이 설명은 트루먼 대통령의 對韓 참전 결정에 가장 크게 작용했다. 그의 회고록이 말해 주듯이, 그와 국방성의 고관들은 북한의 남침 소식을 듣자마자 1931년의 만주에 대한 일본의 침략과 1937년의 중국에 대한 일본의 침략 및 1938년과 1939년의 中歐에 대한 나치독일의 침략을 연상했다. 그리하여 마치 일제나 나치의 침략이 처음부터 저지되지 않았기 때문에 확대되었듯이, 한국에서의 공산 침략이 저지되지 않는다면 스탈린의 침략이 다른 곳으로 확대된다고 판단했던 것이다.

다섯째 무력시위설이다. 중국대륙의 적화에 이어, 북한의 남침으로 손쉽게 남한의 적화에 성공함으로써 미국의 위신을 떨어뜨리고 소련의 무력을 과시함으로써 아시아의 다른 지역들의 공산 세력을 고무시키려고 했다는 것이다.

여섯째, 미·중공 대결유도설 또는 미·중공 자기소모 유도설이다. 합정설이라고 부르기도 한다. 이 說의 출발점은 중국공산당에 대해 스탈린이 불안감을 갖고 있었다는 분석이다. 소련의 지원을 크게 받음이 없이 사실상 독자적으로 대륙 제패를 이룩한 중국공산당에 대해 스탈린은 불안해 하고 있었다. 중공이 독자노선을 추구해 나가는 경우, 즉 '제2의 유고슬라비아'가 되는 경우, 소련의 세계 적화전략에는 많은 장애가 발생할 것으로 스탈린은 판단했다는 것이다. 그런데 미국 정부가 1950년 초 중공을 승인하려는 듯한 움직임을 보이자 스탈린은 미국과 중공을 직접적 대결 속에 묶어 놓아 중공을 고립시키고, 미국을 중국이라는 '깊은 늪'속에 빠뜨려 두 나라의 힘을 소모시키기 위해 한국전을 일으켰다는 것이다. 중공이 한국전에 '끌려 나왔고', 이것으로 말미암아 국제연합에서 '침략자'로

규정되었을 뿐만 아니라 오랫동안 국제사회에서 고립을 면하지 못했으며 특히 미국의 봉쇄정책에 묶였던 것이 바로 스탈린이 파놓은 함정에 중공이 빠진 결과라는 것이다. 14)

이 여섯 개의 추론에 이어 뒷날 새로운 추론이 제시되었다. 채피(Wibur Chaffee)교수의 추론이다. 그의 출발점은 1949년 10월 중화인민공화국의 수립이 스탈린에게 소련의 동아시아정책을 재정립시켜야 할 필요성을 제기시켰다는 데 있다. 원래, 스탈린은 동아시아에 있어서 소련의 안전을 지키기 위해서는 중국과 한반도 사이의 황해에 상당한 군사적 영향력을 행사할 수 있어야 한다고 판단하고 蔣介石의 국민당정부와의 조약을 통해 중국의 황해안 항구들을 자신의 기지로 확보하고 있었다.

그런데 1950년 1-2월 모스크바에서 열린 모택동과 스탈린의 회담에서 모택동은 황해안 항구들을 더 이상 소련에게 빌려 줄 수 없다고 주장했다. 여기서 스탈린은 고민에 빠졌다. 황해안 항구들을 계속 자신의 기지로 확보해야 하겠다고 고집하면 중공과의 동맹을 유지하기 어렵게 될 뿐 아니라 중·소 대립마저 각오해야 한다. 그렇다고 중공과의 우호 관계를 앞세워 황해안 항구들을 돌려 주면 시베리아의 안전을 위한 소련의 장치가 없어진다.

이 두 개의 길은 소련으로서는 취할 수 없다. 그러면 자신의 안전장치도 확보하고 중공과의 우호도 살리는 길은 무엇일까? 이 물음에 대한 해답이 한국전쟁을 통한 한반도의 공산화였다고 채피 교수는 추측한다. 한반도 전체를 적화시켜 친소정권을 세워 놓고 여기에 군사 기지를 확보하면 소련은 정책적 고민에서 빠져나올 수 있다고 스탈린은 계산했다는 것이다.

이상의 추론들이 명백하게 입증될 공식 문서가 있는 것은 아니며- 이러한 공식 문서가 있다고 해도 찾기 어려울 것이다- 어디까지나 정황증거들에 의한 분석이다. 이러한 가설들에 대해 서방 국제정치학계는 오랫동안 미·일 조약건제설과 저항력실험설에 호의적이다.

스탈린이 중공과도 음모했다는 주장

위에서 살펴본 추론 위에서 스탈린의 주도설을 펼친 전통주의자들은 스탈린이 중공과도 '음모' 했다고 주장했다. 풀어 말해, 전통주의자들은 1947년 가을 즈다노프(Andrei Zhdanov)의 선언을 계기로 세계 적화를 노골적으로 추구한 소련이 1949년 10월 중화인민공화국의 수립 이후에는 아시아 지역의 공산 혁명 전략의 주도권을 자신의 '보조역'인 중공에 위임했다고 주장한다. 이어 그들은 이에 따라 중공은 소련의 주도 아래 북한과 남침을 위한 일련의 군사협정을 밀약하고 한국전의 성공적 수행을 위한 전략을 조정했다고 주장한다. 이 주장은 따라서 한국전을 아시아 적화를 위한 중공과 소련 사이의 제1단계 공동 전략으로 본다. 다음에서 이러한 입장에 있는 학자들의 견해를 소개해 본다.

우선 바네트(A. Doak Barnett)교수는 중공 정부의 수립 이후 북경이 아시아 공산주의를 위한 지역적 센터가 되었으며 소련은 '지역적 본업의 원칙'에 따라 아시아 적화의 지역적 책임을 중공에게 위임했다고 주장하면서, 그 증거로 1949년 11월 16일 북경에서 열린 아시아태평양지역 세계노동연맹 대회에서의 劉少奇의 연설을 지적했다. 그러면 유소기 연설의 내용은 무엇인가?

그는 대회 의장의 자격으로 우선 "제국주의와 그 주구들을 패퇴시키고 중화인민공화국을 수립함에 있어서 중국 인민이 걸어 온 길은 많은 식민지와 반식민지 국가의 인민이 민족의 독립과 인민민주주의를 위한 그들의 투쟁에서 걸어야 할 길"이라고 선언했다. 그는 이어 베트남 버마 인도네시아 말레이시아 필리핀 일본을 포함한 동아시아에서 민족 해방운동이 고조되고 있다고 주장하면서 한반도에 관해서는 "美帝의 괴뢰 이승만을 반대하는, 그리고 통일된 조선민주주의인민공화국을 수립하려는 조선 인민의 투쟁은 정지될 수 없다"고 강조한 것이다

바네트는 '이 연설이 아시아에 있어서 공산 혁명을 고취하겠다는 중공의 새로운 임무 선언이며, 노동연맹대회는 아시아 공산혁명 운동의 전반적 연락망이었다'고 풀이했다. 16)

힌튼(Harold Hinton)교수도 비슷한 논리를 전개했다. 그는 북경대회에 북한을 포함한 동아시아의 각국 대표들이 참석했음에 유의하여, '동아시아의 공산혁명을 위한 중공과 북한 및 북베트남 등 주요 공산당들의 전략이 이 대회에서 조정되었다'고 추측하고, 한국전쟁을 이 전략의 조정에 따른 결과라고 보았다. 17)

달린(Alexander Dallin)교수는 노동연맹대회가 11월 28일 북경에 창설한 '상설연락국'에 주목했다. 그는 이 기구를 극동의 코민폼(Cominform:국제공산주의 정보국)에 비유하고, 소련 중공 인도 호주의 대표로 구성된 이 기구가 소련 대표 솔로비요프(Solovyov)의 '명령'에 좌우되었다고 주장하면서 이 기구가 한국전쟁의 전략을 추진해 나간 것으로 설명했다. 18)

이 세 학자 밖에도 많은 학자들이 소련과 중공의 공동전략설을 제시했다. 조우(Tang Tsou)교수와 겔토프(Melvin Gurtov)교수 및 프랑켈(Joseph Frankel)교수 등이 그 대표적인 보기이다.

이러한 공동전략설 가운데 한 가지 흥미 있는 것은 한국전쟁의 기원에 있어서 소련보다 중공의 역할을 강조한 술만(Marshall Schulman)교수와 애틀리(Clement R. Attlee)수상의 해석이다. 술만은 중공이 소련의 지원 여부에 관계 없이 아시아 공산혁명의 연장으로 한국전쟁을 추진할 자세를 보였다고 강조한 다음, 이렇게 되면 북한에 대한 지배적 위치를 중공이 차지할 것이라는 우려 때문에 소련이 한국전을 추진한 것으로 추측했다. 한편, 애틀리는 중공이 국제연합 가입에 실패함으로써 중공이 미국에 의해 승인되고 국제연합에 가입되었다더라면 한국전쟁은 일어나지 않았을 것이라고 주장했다. 19)

중공이 한국전쟁의 계획에 직접적으로 관여했다는 주장의 또 하나의 논거는 중공이 중공군에 편입되어 있던 조선인 병사들을 1948년 가을 이후 북한에 돌려보냈고 특히 1950년 초 이후 그들의 북한 귀환이 촉진된 사실이다. 원래 중공군에는 만주나 중국에서 항일운동을 전개하다가 입대했거나 또는 일제 항복 이후에 華北이나 만주에서 살다가 입대한 조선인들이 있었다. 그런데 중공군이 만주 전역을 점령하는 데 성공한 1948년 가을 —바로 이때 북한 정권이 수립됐다— 부터 중공은 그들을 북한으로 보내기 시작했다. 이어 중공군이 양자강 도하작전을 강행하여 남경에 입성한 1949년 5월 이후에는 중공군 제4야전군에 있던 약 2개 사단 병력의 조선인병사들이 북한으로 돌아가 북한 인민군 제5사단과 제6사단에 편입됐다. 특히 1950년 4월에는 약 1만 2천명의 조선인 병사들이 북한으로 돌아가 인민군 제7사단을 형성했다. 그리하여 한국전쟁이 일어나기 직전에는 실전 경력을 쌓은 중공군 출신이 북한군의 3할을 넘었다.

이 조선인 병사들의 북한 귀환을 증거삼아 중공이 한국전쟁의 계획에 직접적으로 관여했다고 주장하는 학자들 가운데에는 조선인 병사들의 북한 귀환이 소련의 주선 아래 체결된 중공과 북한 사이의 협정에 의한 것이라고 까지 보는 이도 있다. 예컨대, 한국의 군사전문가 고文熙爽교수는 소련이 '중국 공산화의 완결을 보고[...] 다음의 적화 목표로서 대한민국을 무력 침공케 하기 위해' 1949년 1월 하르빈에서 그들의 북한 귀환에 대한 북한과 중공의 회담을 주선하고 협정을 체결하게 했다고 주장했다. 20)

국민당 정부도 비슷한 내용의 '협정'들을 제시했다. 예컨대, 1949년 5월 5일 당시 상해에 있던 국민당 정부의 中央通信은 "중공은 1949년 3월 17일 김일성의 訪蘇중에 김일성과 상호방위조약을 체결했다"고 단정적으로 보도하고, "양자는 어떠한 제국주의 세력이든 어느 일방을 공격하는 경우 그 제국주의 세력에 대한 공동전쟁에 있어 공동행동을 취할 것"을 다짐했다고

주장했다. 중앙통신은 이어 1949년 5월 5일 '朝·中 상호방위조약'의
요지로 다음 사항들을 제시했다:

① 중공당은 1949년 7월 1일부터 8월 31일까지의 기간 중 만주로부터
무기와 병력을 북한에 제공한다.

② 북한은 만주에 있는 일본 기술자와 고용원 그리고 만주에 있는
일본군수품 사용에 관해 최우선권을 갖는다.

③ 북한과 중공당은 양쪽의 경제적 필요에 의해 물물교환을 한다.*21)

중앙통신의 이같은 보도는 여기서 그치지 않았다. 1949년 10월 16일
에는 '중공과 소련 사이에 하르빈과 모스크바에서 2개의 비밀협정이 이미
체결되었다'고 보도하면서, 이 가운데 북한에 관계된 조항을 보면 중공이
후퇴할 수 있는 권리를 갖는 한편, 북한은 만주의 吉林省과 安東省 일부에
군대를 주둔시킬 수 있으며 이 지역을 적절한 시기에 할양받는다고 되어
있다고 주장했다. 22)

중공과 소련의 공동음모설을 주장하는 학자들이 가장 중요하게 취급하는
대상은 1949년 12월부터 1950년 2월까지에 있었던 모택동의 長期訪蘇와
이에 따른 스탈린과의 정상회담이다. 1949년 12월 16일 모스크바에 도착한
모택동은 기자회견에서 스탈린과의 회담에서는 중·소 우호동맹조약과
소련의 중공 원조 및 중·소 무역협정 동등의 문제들과 '餘他 문제들'을
논의할 것이라고 밝혔다.

이 '여타 문제들' 가운데 한국전쟁계획안이 우선순위를 차지하고 있었을
것이라고 전통주의자들은 주장했다. 예컨대, 달린 교수는 미국 정보기관의
정보를 인용하여 '북경과 모스크바는 북한이 전쟁을 시작해야 한다는 데
동의했다. 그들은 북한이 외부의 군사적 지원없이 승리할 것이라고 믿었다.
미국이 승리하기 시작할 때에만 중공은 소련의 對空 엄호와 군사지원을

받아 참전한다'는 내용이 스탈린과 모택동의 회담에서 결정됐다고 주장했다. 워커(Richard Walker)교수와 모즐리(Philip Mosley)교수도 비슷한 견해를 제시했다. 23)

중·소 '음모'와 對북한 지원

전통주의자들은 이러한 중·소의 '음모' 아래 북한의 전쟁 준비가 이뤄졌다고 주장했다. 이러한 맥락에서 그들 가운데 어떤 이들은 1949년 3월 김일성이 모스크바를 방문해 체결한 朝·蘇 경제문화협력협정에 주목한다. 우리 모두가 잘 기억하고 있듯이, 이 협정이 체결됐을 때 소련의 관영 매체들은 —예컨대 3월 23일자 《뉴타임즈》지(영문)— 북한이 앞으로 '모든 면에서' 소련의 협조를 받을 것임을 다짐했다. 이 '모든 면에서'라는 구절을 놓고 서방의 전통주의자들 가운데는 그것이 '군사면'까지도 포함하며 다만 소련이 앞으로 있을 한국전쟁에 대한 직접적인 책임을 회피하기 위해 그러한 遁辭를 사용한 것으로 풀이하는 이들도 있었다. 24)

이 무척 우회적인 자료(?) 밖에 공산권으로부터의 망명자들의 '증언'은 훨씬 더 구체적이다. 그 가운데 전통주의자들에 의해 가장 널리 인용된 자료는 세 가지이다.

첫째가 북한에서 근무하다가 동독으로 전속되었을 때 서독으로 탈출한 소련군의 칼리노프(Kyril Kalinov)의 증언이다. 둘째가 駐日소련대사관 정보원으로 근무하다 미국으로 망명한 라스트보르포프(Yuri A. Rastvorvov)의 증언이다. 셋째가 평양주재 폴란드대사관 무관으로 있다가 서방으로 망명한 모나트(Paul Monat)의 증언이다.

이들은 모두 소련이 중공과의 협의를 통해 한국전쟁안을 확정지으면서 북한에 대한 군사 지원을 활성화시켰다고 회고했다. 예컨대, 칼리노프의 회고에 따르면, 소련은 1948년 12월 북한으로부터 자신의 점령군을 철수시킨 후인 1949년 1월 평양에 '소련특별군사사절단'을 파견하여 북한군의 현대화를 추진했다. 이 특별사절단은 슈티코프(T. Shtykov)장군과 카투코프(M. Katukov)장군 및 쿠바노프(Kubanov)장군 같은 포병전문가들과 자카로프(M. V. Zakharov)제독 같은 정보전문가로 구성되었으며, 1950년 6월까지, 즉 18개월 안에 북한군의 현대화를 완료하는 임무를 지니고 있었다.25)

역시 이들의 자료를 종합하면, 1949년부터 1950년 6월까지 소련이 북한에게 공급한 무기는 정찰기 10대, 야크전투기 100대, 폭격기 70대, T-34형 탱크 100대, 중포 상당수에 이르렀다. 이러한 지원을 받은 북한은 1950년 6월 현재 13만 5천명의 지상군을 확보했으며, 남한과의 접경지대에 대한 정예부대의 배치를 끝냈다.26)

이 때 남한의 병력은 정규군 6만 5천명, 해안경찰대 4천명, 경찰 4만 5천명이었고, 장비는 무척 불충분했다. 미 육군성이 1962년에 발간한 《駐韓美軍事顧問團》에 따르면, 한국전쟁이 일어나기 직전 남한의 병력은 '1775년의 미군 수준' 곧 미국 독립전쟁이 일어난 해인 1776년 1년 전의 미군 수준에 비유되었다. 그만큼 남북한의 병력 수준에는 큰 차이가 있었다. 이러한 상황이었기 때문에 당시 북한 민족보위상(국방상) 崔侻健은 1950년 1월 21일 "비행기와 탱크와 전함과 현대무기로 무장된 인민군은 어떤 전투임무도 효과적으로 완수할 수 있고, 조국의 통일과 독립된 적을 분쇄하기 위해 언제나 전투할 태세가 되어 있다"고 호언할 수 있었다.

Ⅲ. 수정주의적 해석의 대두: 그 내용과 문헌

공산권의 해석

위에서 살펴 본 전통주의적 해석에 대해 공산권은 즉각 반발했다. 북한은 한국전쟁이 '미제와 그 괴뢰 이승만 정권'의 '북침'에 의해 시작되었다고 주장했다. 북한의 공식 해석에 따르면, 한국전쟁의 '주범'은 미국이다.²⁷⁾ 그러면 미국은 왜 한국전쟁을 '도발'했는가? 북한의 설명은 대개 다음과 같이 요약될 수 있다.

첫째, 미국은 북한의 인민민주주의 정권을 파괴하여 한반도 전체와 대만을 중공 봉쇄의 기지로 삼고자 했다.

셋째, 당시 미국은 전 세계 핵무기의 98퍼센트를 차지하고 있었다. 미국은 소련이 진정한 핵무기 국가로 성장하기 전에 한국전쟁을 성공 시키고자 했다.

넷째, 당시 서유럽은 제국주의의 도구인 마샬플랜의 혜택을 받고 있는 형편이어서 미국의 전쟁 도발에 반발하지 못할 것으로 미국은 계산하고 있었다.²⁸⁾

이러한 계산 위에서 일으킨 '북침'을 '격퇴'하기 위해 북한은 '정의의 민족해방전쟁'을 수행하게 되었다고 스스로를 변호했다. 북한은 처음부터 '민족해방전쟁'론을 취한 것이다. 소련과 중공을 비롯한 공산국가들 역시 '민족해방전쟁'론을 취했으며, '방화'의 1차적 책임을 미국에 부과했다.

스톤의 《한국전쟁 秘史》와 그 영향

전통주의적 해석에 대한 반박 또는 의문의 제기는 서방에서도 나타났다. 그 최초의 책은 미국의 좌파 언론인 스톤(Isidore F. Stone)이 한국전쟁이

진행 중이던 1952년에 출판한 《한국전쟁 秘史》이다. 29) 흔히 이 책이 '북침'설을 전개한 것으로 말하고 있으나, 이 책은 한국전쟁이 '북침'에 의해 시작되었다고 단정하지는 않았다. 다만 미국 정부의 공식 해석에 대해 많은 의문점들을 제기했으며, 그 과정에서 한국전쟁이 미국 군부의 한 부분(특히 맥아더)과 남한의 이승만 및 대만의 장개석의 '공모'에 의해 발발했을 가능성이 있다는 가설을 제시했다. 그렇기 때문에, 한국전쟁이 일어났다는 소식에 맥아더사령부는 놀라지 않았다고 주장했다.

그러면 그의 추론의 근거는 무엇인가? 그는 우선 남한의 이승만 정부가 국내정치적으로 위기에 직면해 있었다고 분석하면서 국내적 위기의 해소를 위해 한국전쟁을 '도발'하고자 했다고 추측한다.

그는 이어 당시 태평양지역 연합군최고사령관 맥아더가 '아시아 우선주의'를 내세우고 잇었음에 유의하면서, 맥아더가 이승만과 장개석 및 국무성 고문 딜레스와 '공모'하여 한국전쟁을 '도발'해 미국을 군사적으로 개입시켜 '유럽 우선주의'를 추구하던 트루먼 행정부의 대외정책을 역전시키려고 했다고 추측한다.

스톤의 책은 신빙성 있는 자료의 제시가 미흡하여 대부분이 단편적인 신문보도와 추측에 바탕을 두고 있다. 그러나 이 책은 수정주의의 형성과 성장에 적지않은 영향을 주었다. 예컨대 앞에서 소개한 플레밍 교수의 한국전쟁의 기원에 관한 주장은 기본적으로 스톤의 명제를 조금 더 발전시킨 것이다. 그리고 우리가 곧 살필 콜코 내외(Gabriel and Joyce Kolko)를 비롯한 수정주의자들 역시 스톤의 책으로부터 영향받았다.

또 스톤의 책은 1952년 内山敏의 번역으로 동경의 新評論社를 통해 상·하 두 권으로 출간되어 좌익편향이 강한 일본의 지식인들은 물론이거니와 일반 독자들에게조차 많은 영향을 미쳤다. 30) 일본의 유명한 소설가 松本清張의

《日本の黒霧》 가운데 <謀略朝鮮戰爭>은 스톤의 논리에 바탕을 둔 것으로 볼 수 있다.

한편 일본의 한 외국인이 '북침' 설을 제시했다. 콘데(David W. Conde)라는 언론인이 쓴 원고를 陸井三郎이 監譯하고 동경의 太平出版社가 1968년에 출판한 《조선전쟁의 역사, 1950~1953》가 그것이다. 콘데는 대한민국의 정통성을 사실상 부인하고 북한을 '민족해방의 정통세력'으로 파악하는 입장에서 그러한 논리를 제시했다. 이 책은 미국의 수정주의자들에게 적지 않은 영향을 주었다.

중공 공모설은 부인되다

스톤의 추론, 그리고 그것을 보다 더 정밀화한 플레밍의 해석은 1960년대 후반까지만 해도 少數說에 머물러 있었다. 수정주의적 해석은 성장하고는 있었으나 주류의 위치를 확보하지는 못했던 것이다.

1970년대에 들어와 상황은 조금씩 달라져 한국전쟁의 기원을 둘러싼 수정주의적 해석은 보다 더 광범위하게 제시되었다. 이에 따라 한국전쟁의 기원을 둘러싼 논쟁도 활발해지게 되었다.

우선 지적할 수 있는 것은 프리드먼(Edward Friedman)과 셸든(Mark Selden)이 공편한 《미국의 아시아》이다. 31) 이 책은 2차대전이 끝난 이후의 미국의 아시아정책을 수정주의적 입장에서 비판한 논문들을 모은 것인데, 이 가운데 몇 편의 논문들은 한국전쟁의 기원에 관한 전통주의적 해석을 수정주의적 시각에서 비판하고 있다.

그 대표적 보기가 영국의 기팅스(John Gittings)이다. 32) 그는 우리가 앞에서 살핀 전통주의자들의 '소련 음모설'을 철저히 부인한다. 그는 우선 스탈린이 신중하며 사려 깊은 외교가였고 그가 통치한 소련의 외교는

모험을 회피하고 자제적이며 방어적인 것으로 설명한다. 소련의 국력은 미국의 국력에 비해 열등하다는, 그리고 1930년대에 와서는 나치 독일과 같은 강력한 공업국가와 싸우느라고 국력이 크게 줄어든 소련이 어떻게 세계 최대의 강대국인 미국을 상대로 모험주의적인 전쟁을 도발할 수 있었겠느냐는 수정주의자들의 일반적인 인식이 그에게도 깔려 있다.

그는 이어 중공의 공모설도 부인한다. 그의 주장, 그리고 같은 책에 같은 취지의 주장을 전개한 프리드만의 주장, 33) 및 화이팅(Allen S. Whiting)의 주장을 34) 종합하면 다음과 같다.

첫째, 한국전쟁 발발 이전 시기에 중공과 북한의 관계가 전쟁을 공모할 만큼 밀착되어 있지 않았다. 그 증거의 하나로 우선 지적할 수 있는 것은 북한의 초대 駐中大使 李周淵이 북경에 부임한 때가 1950년 1월이었음에 비해 중공은 한국전쟁이 일어나고도 2주가 지난 7월 10일에야 부대사와 1등참사관을 평양에 보냈고, 8월 6일에야 비로소 초대 평양대사를 임명했다는 점이다. 이러한 자체가 북경과 평양 사이의 소원을 말해 주는 것은 결코 아니지만 그것은 적어도 북경이 '조선문제'를 중요하게 보고 있지는 않았음을 시사해 주기에는 충분하다.

둘째, 한국전쟁이 일어나기 이전 시기에 중공과 북한 사이에 갈등의 측면이 노출되었다. 압록강 수풍 댐의 배전을 둘러싼 양자의 분규가 그 대표적 보기이다.

셋째, 북경에서의 노동연맹대회 그리고 이 대회에서의 유소기의 연설을 재평가한다. 우선 노동연맹 대회에 참석한 각국 대표들이 아시아의 공산혁명을 조정할 만큼 중요한 인물들도 아니었고 이 대회는 각국의 노동문제를 종합적으로 토론하는 실무적 집회였을 뿐이었다. 이 대회의 상설사무국도 오래 가지 못하고 곧 소멸되었다.

이러한 문제의 유소기 연설도 아시아의 공산 혁명을 고취시킨 것이라기 보다는 중공 혁명을 성취시킨 중국공산당의 자부심을 나타내고 중국과 베트남에 있어서 민족해방운동의 성공을 찬양하는 성격이 더 강하다. 무엇보다도 유소기의 연설에 앞서 이미 아시아 각국에서 '反帝 무장 투쟁'이 진행되었으며, 따라서 유소기의 연설이 남한을 포함한 아시아 각국에 있어서 '반제 무장투쟁'의 기폭제였다는 전통주의자들의 해석은 잘못된 것이다.

넷째, 한국전쟁이 일어나기 이전 시기에 중공이 북한에게 군사적 또는 물질적 지원을 하겠다는 의사를 직접적으로나 함축적으로 표시한 일이 없다. 예컨대, 1950년 1월 28일 초대 중공주재 북한대사 李周淵의 신임장 제정사에 대한 답사에서 유소기는 "중국 인민은 조국의 독립과 민주주의와 통일을 위한 조선 인민의 영웅적 투쟁에 끝없는 동정을 표시한다"고 말했는데, 정신적 동정과 군사적 지원은 구별되어야 하는 것이다. "조선인민은 그들 자신의 노력에 그들 자신의 나라에 있어서 평화와 통일의 문제를 해결해야 할 것이다"라는 1950년 6월 新華社通信의 논평은 바로 그 점을 더욱 분명하게 나타내고 있다.

다섯째, 전통주의자들이 논거로 제시한 '조선인 병사들의 북한 귀환'은 다르게 해석되어야 한다. 예컨대, 중공군을 깊이 연구한 미국의 군사 전문가 그리피스(Samuel B. Griffith)는 중공이 조선인 병사들을 북한에 귀환시킨 것은 한국전쟁을 의식해서라기보다 중공의 국내사정 때문이었을 가능성이 크다고 주장한다. 중공은 대륙 제패를 이미 완수했고 따라서 중공군을 감축해서 재편하겠다는 계획을 공식 발표했었음을 그는 지적하고 있다. 이러한 맥락에서 화이팅 교수는 "군사비에 대한 중공의 배려와 1950년도 중공군 감축안에 대한 준비가 그러한 귀환을 촉진시켰다고 해석할 수 있다"고 썼다. 35)

여섯째, 전통주의자들이 제시하는 일련의 '朝·中 비밀협정'의 실존 가능성을 의심스럽게 보았다. '朝·中 상호방위조약' 하나를 보기로 들어 보아도, 중공이 소련과 상호방위조약을 체결한 때가 1950년 2월인데, 그때에 앞서서, 즉 중공 스스로의 안전에 대한 소련의 보장을 받기에 앞서서 북한과 남침을 목적으로 하는 군사조약을 맺기 어려웠을 것이다.

여기서 반드시 지적되어야 할 점은 일련의 '朝·中협정'에 관한 報道源은 예외 없이 국민당정부의 중앙통신이었다는 사실이다. 이 당시 국민당 정부의 수도였던 남경에 주재한 미국 대사관이 본국 정부에 보낸 보고문도 그 점을 지적하면서 이미 그 신빙성을 의심했었다. 그러면 국민당정부는 동북아시아에서 소련과 중공 및 북한이 소련의 지원 아래 군사동맹을 발전시키고 있음을 강조함으로써 미국 여론으로 하여금 미국도 그것에 맞서 국민당정부 및 남한과의 동맹을 형성해야 한다는 압력을 미국 행정부와 의회에 가중시키도록 유도하기 위해 그와 같은 선전을 편 것이다. 36)

일곱째, 문제의 스탈린·모택동 회담은 다르게 해석되어야 한다. 이 회담을, 특히 중공이 한국전쟁 계획에 과연 얼마만큼 깊이 참여했는가의 문제에 초점을 면밀히 검토한 화이팅은 이 회담의 대부분이 중·소동맹 조약, 중공에 대한 소련의 군사원조, 중공의 북베트남 승인 등의 현안에 치중되었음을 밝혀냈다. 그렇다고 하여 스탈린이 모택동에게 한국전쟁 계획에 대해 알리기조차 하지 않았던 것은 아니다. 화이팅은 스탈린이 모택동에게 한국전쟁계획에 대해 어느 정도 정보를 주었을 것이라고 추측한다. 이에 따라 華南의 중공야전군을 한국전 직전에 만주로 이동 시켰고 중공군 안의 조선인 한국전쟁에 대해 토의하고 합의했다는 직접적 또는 공식적 증거는 아직 발견되지 않고 있다.

이 회담이 진행되고 있는 동안 스탈린의 생일을 축하하기 위해 모스크바를 방문한 북한 사절단의 귀국 보고도 소련에 대해서만 언급하고 있다. 예컨대, 사절단장인 북한 최고인민회의 상임위원회 의장金科奉은 최고인민회의 상임위원회에 대한 귀국보고서에서 "소련 인민들은 조선의 조속한 통일을 바라고 있고, 조선의 통일과 독립을 위해 싸우고 있는 우리 인민들을 격려하였다"고 말했을 뿐, 중공에 대해서는 아무 말도 하지 않았다.

종합하건대, 중공은 한국전쟁의 계획에 대해서는 알고 있었고 북한의 승리를 희망하고 있었으나 한국전쟁의 준비 과정에 적극적으로 개입하지 않았다는 것이 학계의 정설이라고 할 수 있다. 당시 중공은 국민당정부와의 오랜 기간의 투쟁에서 일어난 경제 문제, 즉 막대한 군비 부담과 통화팽창 및 생산력저하 때문에, 그리고 티베트와 대만의 '해방' 뿐만 아니라 국민당 및 비적 소탕전에 몰두해 있어서 한국전쟁의 준비 과정에 개입할 여력이 없었다. 중공은 특히 동북아시아에서의 어떠한 극적인 변화는 미국의 아시아 불개입정책의 변화를 가져올 염려가 있음을 깊이 깨닫고 있었던 만큼 한국전쟁에 대해 지극히 신중했을 것이다.

1970년대 초의 논쟁들

수정주의자들의 공세 앞에 적어도 중공의 공모설을 무너졌다. 소련 주도설의 꽤 많은 부분도 무너졌거나 의심의 영역으로 남게 되었다. 그러나 한국전쟁이 한반도 북쪽으로부터의 공격에 의해 시작되었다는 견해는 여전히 살아 남았다. 전통주의적 해석에 대한 수정주의적 폭격은 그 부분까지를 파괴하지는 못한 것이다.

이 무렵인 1970년대 초 수정주의자들의 폭격이 새롭게 시작되었고, 이에 따른 논쟁이 다시 불타 올랐다. 그 대표적인 보기로 우리는 다음의 두 가지 보기를 들 수 있다.

첫째, 영국의 《季刊中國》지에서의 논쟁이다. 이 논쟁의 발단은 《계간중국》지 제52권(1972년 10~12월)에 게재된 인도 칼카타대학 교수 굽타(Karunaker Gupta)의 논문 <한국전쟁은 어떻게 시작되었나?>로서, 37) 이 논문에서 그는 남한에 의한 북침설 또는 남침유도설을 전개한 것이다. 여기서 그는 한국전쟁이 일어난 그날 '우리는 북진하라는 명령을 받았고 곧 해주를 점령할 것이다'라는 취지로 白仁燁 부대장이 발언했다는 국내 신문의 기사를 증거로 제시한다(백인엽 발언의 기사는 오늘날까지도 북침설을 내세우는 수정주의자들의 논거들 가운데 하나가 되고 있다).

이 논문은 깊이 있는 학술적인 논문이라고 보기 어렵다. 자료에 있어서도 그가 런던 경제정치대학교에 유학할 때 수집했던 한국전쟁 발발 초기의 며칠 동안에 일어난 사건들에 관한 신문기사들에 근거하고 있어, 金容九교수는 이 논문을 '습작 같은 것'으로 평가한다. 그렇기 때문에 《계간중국》 제54권(1973년 4~6월)에 캐나다 겔프대학교의 시몬즈(Robert Simmons)교수, 미국 펜실베이니아대학교의 李庭植교수, 영국 런던대학교의 스킬랜드(W. E. Skillend)교수의 반론이 실리게 되었다. 이들은 모두 굽타의 논리를 반박하고 북침설을 부인했다. 38) 이들의 반론에 대해 굽타는 재반론을 폈으나 설득력은 거의 없었다.

둘째, 미국의 《태평양역사평론》지(1973년 11월)에서의 논쟁이다. 이 논쟁은 스투어크(William Stueck)의 반론으로 시작되었는데, 그 내용을 요약하면 다음과 같다.

캐나다 토론토대학교의 마르크시스트 역사학 교수로 수정주의학파의 거장인 콜코 내외(Joyce and Gabriel Kolko)는 1972년 미국 외교사에 관한 力著를 발간했다. 40) 여기서 한국전쟁의 기원과 관련하여 그들은 두 가지 분석을 제시했다.

첫째 한국전쟁의 개전에 관해 소련이 과연 이니셔티브를 취한 것인지 대단히 의심스럽다는 분석이다. 그들은 사실상 스탈린주도설을 전면 부인했다. 스탈린이 주도하기는 커녕 한국전쟁의 개전 날짜로 잘 알지 못한 것 같다고 주장했다. 바꿔 말해, 1950년 6월 25일 한국전쟁의 발발은 소련에게 '놀라움'이었다는 것이다. 소련은 개전 날짜를 모르고 있었기 때문에 문제의 국제연합 안정보장이사회가 미국의 요청으로 6월 25일 열렸을 때 불참했다고 그는 추측했다. 이로써 그들은 '소련 무지설' 또는 '소련 경악설'을 제시한 셈이다.

둘째 한국전쟁은 아마도 태평양지역 연합군최고사령관 맥아더 원수의 정치적 야심에서 구상되고 그리하여 아마도 맥아더와 이승만의 합작으로 도발된 것 같다고 주장했다. 콜코 내외에 따르면, 맥아더는 '미국의 드골(Charles de Gaulle)'이 되려는 야심을 갖고 있었으며 그 야심을 실현시킬 첫 발판을 한반도에서 찾았다. 바꿔 말해, 한반도에서 전쟁이 일어나면 그 기회에 미군을 개입시켜 미국의 '유럽 우선주의' 정책을 '아시아 우선주의' 정책으로 전환시키는 한편 중공으로까지 전쟁을 확대해 아시아에서 팽창하는 공산주의의 물결을 한꺼번에 역전시킴으로써 '세계적 영웅'이 되고 동시에 1952년 미국 대통령 선거에서 승리하려고 했다는 것이다. 한편 이승만은 전쟁을 유도해 우선 자신의 정치적 위기를 극복하고 미국의 개입을 장기화시켜 북진통일의 꿈을 달성하고자 했다는 것이다.

그리하여 두 사람의 '공모'에 따라 북한을 오관하게 하여 북한의 남침을 유도했는데, 콜코 내외에 따르면, 북한은 남한 전체를 점령할 계획은 없었고 그저 서울지역을 장악해 이승만정부를 놀라게 함으로써 북한이 요구하는 남북협상에 응하게 하려고 시도했다는 것이다. 여기서 맥아더와 이승만은 북한이 자신들의 '합정'에 빠진 것으로 판단하고, 남한군을 재빨리 멀리 후퇴시켜 미국 정부로 하여금 한국 정부가 붕괴될 것 같다는 위기감을 갖게 하고 그리하여 미군의 파병을 결정하게 만들었다는 것이다. 미국정부는 미국 정부대로 군비를 확장하려는 계획을, 의회의 반대없이 손쉽게 실현할 수 있는 길은 한국전의 전면 개입이라고 계산해 맥아더의 파병요구에 응했다는 것이다.

大家의 이러한 견해에 당시 브라운대학교 대학원생이던 스투어크가 반론을 제기한 것이다. 그리하고 同社에는 곧 스투어크의 반론에 대한 콜코 내외의 반론과 스투어크의 재반론, 그리고 콜코 내외의 재반론이 동시에 게재되어, 41) 이 논쟁의 핵심적인 부분들을 살필 것이거니와, 여기서 우선 지적해야 할 것은 콜코 내외의 주장에는 '아마도' '추측 하건대'와 같은 용어가 너무 자주 쓰이고 있다는 점이다. 즉 어떤 구체적인 자료를 제시하고 분석을 제시하는 것이 아니라, 자신이 이미 설정한 틀에 맞춰 나가는 방법을 썼던 것이며, 따라서 논리의 구성과 전개가 약할 수 밖에 없었다. 42)

IV. 수정주의 해석의 새 경향

앞에서 살폈듯이, 수정주의학파의 해석은 전통주의 학파의 해석 가운데 많은 부분을 바로잡는 데 이바지했으나 '미국에 의한 북침설' 또는 '미국의 북침유도설'은 오히려 전통주의자들의 공격의 대상이 되었다. 여기서 수정주의학파의 새로운 해석이 시도되었다.

국내적 요인으로의 관심 전환

마치고 보면, 한국전쟁의 기원을 다름에 있어서 전통주의자들이나 수정주의자들은 모두 한국전쟁의 기원을 한반도 밖에서 찾았다. 즉 전통주의자들은 마치 국제 냉전이 소련에 의해 시작되었듯이 한국전쟁 역시 소련에 의해 시작되었다고 기계적으로 해석했고, 수정주의자들은 마치 국제냉전이 미국에 의해 시작되었듯이 한국전쟁 역시 미국에 의해 시작되었다고 기계적으로 해석했으며, 그리하여 남한이나 북한은 모두 한국전쟁의 단순한 '하수인'으로만 파악한 것이다.

이처럼 어느 지역에 있어서의 냉전 또는 전쟁을 미·소관계의 산물로 파악하려는 태도는 곧 비판을 받게 되었다. 전통주의자나 수정주의자 모두 미·소관계에 집착한 나머지 미·소가 대결하고 있는 지역들의 개별적인 내부 사정을 주목하지 못했다는 비판이 바로 그것이다. 이러한 비판은 중요한 의미를 지니고 있었다. 냉전의 원인은 국제적인 차(차)원에서도 찾아져야 하지만 각국의 내부적인 차(차)원에서도 찾아져야 한다는 새로운 시각을 담고 있었던 것이다. 예컨대, 중공과 國府의 대결이나 베트남전쟁 또는 한국전쟁을 해당지역의 내부적 문제들을 고려하지 않고 미·소의 세계적

대결이라는 맥락에서만 분석한다면 그 진상에 도달할 수 없다는 것이다. 이처럼 냉전의 기원을 규명함에 있어서 해당 지역의 내부적 문제들을 중시해야 한다는 주장은 수정주의자들로부터 더욱 강력하게 제기되었다.

그러한 경향은 이미 1960년대에 일본의 한국인 학자들에 의해 나타났었다. 43) 그들은 해방 직후부터 한반도에 표면화되고 만연된 통일지향적 민족주의가 한국전쟁의 중요한 원천이었음을 강조했었던 것이다. 즉 남한은 남한대로 무력을 써서라도 북한을 자신의 체제 속에 편입시키려 노력했고, 북한은 북한대로 역시 무력을 써서라도 남한을 자신의 체제 속에 병합시키려 노력했었음을 상기시키면서, 남한과 북한의 그러한 노력이 결국 자신들 사이의 전쟁을 가져 왔음을 지적했던 것이다. 결국 남한의 '북진 통일'론과 북한의 '남조선해방'론이 충돌해 한국전쟁을 낳았다는 지적이다.

여기서 북한의 '남조선해방'론, 그리고 '남조선해방'의 주도권을 둘러싼 김일성과 朴憲永 곧 北勞黨 세력과 南勞黨 세력 사이의 투쟁이 마침내 한국전쟁을 가져온 하나의 중요한 원인이었다는 주장이 남로당 간부 출신인 朴甲東(일본에서의 필명은 林英樹)에 의해 제시되었다. 44)

박갑동에 따르면, 박헌영과 남로당은 1950년 현재의 시점에서 '금후 2년 내지 4년 안에 평화적·정치적 투쟁에 의해 이승만 정권 대신 언론과 출판과 결사의 자유를 주장하는 부르조아 민주주의 정부를 다시 수립할 가능성이 있으므로, 평화통일노선을 그대로 지켜야 한다'고 주장했다. 보다 구체적으로, 박헌영과 남로당은

- (1) 북으로부터의 남침은 극좌모험주의로서 미국의 간섭을 초래할 위험이 있으며,
- (2) 남로당이 인민 가운데 뿌리박고 있는 한, 남으로부터의 '북침'을 막을 수 있고,

(3) 남의 진보 세력이 총선거에서 승리하여 남북한의 평화통일을 이룩해야 한다고 역설했다는 것이다.

이에 비해, 다시 박갑동에 의하면, 김일성은 다음과 같은 여건에 고무되어 무력통일을 구상했다.

(1) 소련의 대륙모 무기 원조와 김일성의 전면 남침구상에 대한 평양 주재 소련대사 스티코프의 적극적 지지이다.

(2) 연이은 풍작에 따른 군량의 장기적 비축이 가능했던 점이다.

(3) 1949년 5월 집단적으로 월북한 남한군인들을 통해 남한군의 내부 사정을 파악했다고 과신한 점이다.

(4) 1949년 완료된 주한 미군의 철수, 그리고 남한을 미국의 극동 방위선에 포함시키지 않은 1950년 1월의 그 유명한 애치슨 미국무장관의 기자회견에 비추어 미국이 남한을 포기했다고 오관한 점이다.

(5) 남로당의 실질적 붕괴에 따라 남한 내부에서 인민혁명이 일어날 가능성이 거의 없어졌다고 판단한 점이다.

박갑동의 증언과는 달리, 박헌영이 오히려 한국전쟁의 개전을 서둘렀다고 보는 이들도 있었다. 일본의 隣接諸國研究所의 한 연구원이 써서 월간지 《自由》(1967년 5월)에 발표한 논문인 <북한 조선로동당의 파벌>도 비슷한 견해를 제시한다. 이 논문은 '박헌영은 그가 남조선에 남겨 놓은 당원들이 전쟁에 의해서만 구출될 수 있으며 만일 全朝鮮이 통일된다면 그가 인민 사이의 자신의 인기에 미루어 김일성보다 확실히 더 많은 지지를 얻을 수 있을 것이라고 생각했다'고 전제하고, 그렇기 때문에 박헌영은 북한에 들어온 뒤 김일성에게 남침할 것을 요구했다고 주장했다. 해방 당시 조선공산주의청년동맹의 중앙위원회 상임위원 겸 지방부장이었던

趙憲俊도 《北韓》(1973년 11월)에 발표한 <박헌영과 나>에서 '박헌영은 김일성 못지 않게 무력남침을 서둘렀다고 나는 알고 있다. 박헌영과 남로당 간당들은 크레몰린 계획인 무력남침을 김일성에게 부채질하고 서둘렀다'고 회고했다.

北韓研究所의 金昌順 이사장은 박헌영이 무력 노선을 주장한 것은 사실이지만 미군이 참전할 명분을 주지 않는 범위 안에서의 국지전을 제의했다고 주장했다. 45) 김점근 교수도 비슷한 견해로 박헌영이 서울에 가까운 웅진반도를 점령하여 남한정부와 국민을 당황시켜 놓고 대남 협상을 전개할 것을 주장했다고 본다.

전반적으로 볼 때, 박헌영과 그의 남로당계는 전면전이든 국지전이든 戰端을 열 것을 주장하고 이 노선을 강력히 추진했었던 것 같다. 특히 남한에 '50만명'의 남로당원들이 지하에 잠복하고 있다고 호언하고, 일단 전쟁이 시작되면 이들이 일제히 '호응봉기'하여 남한의 적화는 쉽게 이뤄질 것이라고 김일성을 자극한 것 같다. 앞에서 인용한 인접제국 연구소의 논문은 '이것이 갑산파가 남조선을 공격하기로 결정한 주요한 이유였다'고 썼다. 김일성도 뒷날 박헌영과 남로당 간부들을 숙청하는 재판(1953년)에서 검사의 기소장을 통해 박헌영이 '남조선 50만 남로당원의 호응봉기' 운운하는 '허위 보고'를 당내에 유포시켰다고 비난했으며, 당원에 대한 연설을 통해서도 한국전쟁 당시 '남조선 인민들을 잘 조직하지 못한' 박헌영과 그의 남로당계를 원망했다.

이상에서 우리는 김일성의 입장과 박헌영의 입장을 살폈거니와, 여기서 잠시 생각해 볼 점은 김일성과 박헌영이 한국전쟁의 개전을 옹호했다는 주장을 폈다 하여, 즉 한반도의 내부적 요소에 관해 주목했다고 하여, 그들(예컨대 박갑동과 김창순 등)을 수정주의자로 부를 수 있느냐이다.

대답은 간단하다. 그렇지 않다. 그들은 기본적으로 한국전쟁의 계획자는 소련이었다는 입장을 취하고 있는 것이다.

시몬즈의 저서가 일으킨 논쟁

한반도의 내부적 요소를 강조하면서도, 그들과는 대조적으로 소련의 불개입설을 주장한 새로운 수정주의자가 시몬즈 교수이다. 46) 그는 우선 공산주의자로서의 경력이나 민족해방을 위한 투쟁경력에 있어서 김일성을 훨씬 앞지르고 있는 박헌영이 조선로동당 간부들에게 '모스크바에서 남침해도 좋다는 신호만 오기를 기다리는 김일성과 같은 지도자가 정말 민족해방의 투쟁가이나'고 물으면서 자신처럼 '남조선해방 투쟁'에 적극적으로어야 한다고 주장하자, 김일성은 '민족해방자'로서의 자신의 像을 강력히 부각시키기 위해 전면 남침에 앞장서게 되었다고 추측한다. 이어 그는 김일성이 박헌영보다 서둘러 전면 남침을 추진하기 위해 소련 및 중공과도 양해된 남침 예정일인 1950년 8월 초순보다 거의 2개월이나 앞당겨 개전하여 소련과 중공을 모두 놀라게 하였다는 것이다. 풀코에 의해 제시되었던 '소련 무지설' 또는 '소련 경악설'이 다시 등장한 셈인데, 시몬즈는 이처럼 소련 불개입설을 제시하면서 한국전쟁이 한반도의 내부적 요소들에 의해 일어난 內戰임을 강조한다. 책의 부제에서 '코리아의 내전'이란 용어를 사용하는 까닭이 거기에 있다.

시몬즈의 해석은 또 한 차례의 논쟁을 불러 일으켰다. 高秉喆 교수는 시몬즈 저서에 대한 서평에서 김일성과 박헌영의 권력 투쟁이 어떻게 한국 전쟁으로까지 이어졌는가에 대해서는 보다 설득력 있는 증거의 제시가 요청된다고 주장했다. 47)

특히 '소련 무지설' 또는 '소련 경악설'에 대해 스투어크는 깊은 의문을 표시했다. 한국전쟁의 발발에 적어도 소련은 놀라지 않았으며 이것은 시몬즈 교수의 주장과는 달리 소련이 개전일을 알고 있었음을 말한다고 주장했다. 48) 미국의 저명한 직업외교관으로 한국전쟁 당시 워싱턴에서 한국전쟁을 분석했던 볼렌(Charles Bohlen)도 자신의 회고록에서 "한국전쟁이 소련에 의해 시작된 것이 아니라 북한인들의 독자적 행동에 의해 시작된 것이라는 주장은 어린아이 같은 넌센스이다"라고 단언한다. 49)

여기서 우리는 '소련 무지설' 또는 '소련 경악설'을 보다 더 자세히 검증해 볼 필요를 느낀다. 물론 1차 자료는 흐루시초프의 회고록 밖에 없는 형편임을 자인하고 말이다. 우리 모두가 잘 알고 있듯이, 흐루시초프는 한국전쟁이 스탈린의 구상이 아니라 김일성의 구상이었음을 강조했다. 흐루시초프에 따르면, 1949년 김일성은 모스크바로 와서 남침 계획을 설명하고 스탈린의 동의를 얻고자 했으나 스탈린은 "잘 생각해야 하고 신중한 계획을 세워야 하며 구체적인 계획을 갖고 다시 오라"고 대답했고, 이에 따라 김일성은 새 계획을 제시하면서 '절대적인 승리'를 확신시킬 뿐만 아니라 미국의 간섭도 회피될 수 있음을 강조하자 스탈린은 동의했다. 50) 남침의 날짜도 합의되었다. 그렇기 때문에 흐루시초프는 "지정된 시간이 왔으며 전쟁은 시작되었다"라고 썼던 것이다. 스투어크가 지적했듯이, 흐루시초프의 이 문구는 소련이 6월 25일에 놀랐다는 수정 주의자들의 주장에 정면 배치되는 것이다.

미국쪽 자료도 '소련 경악설'에 어긋난다. 1974년 말에 공개된 1950년 6월 19일자 미 중앙정보부의 각서인 '북한정권의 현세' —이 각서의 주를 보면 국무성 육군성 해군성 공군성의 정보기관들이 이 각서의 내용에 동의

했다. 따라서 이 각서는 미국 정보기관들의 일치된 견해로 볼 수 있다. —
에 따르면, 한국전쟁 도발 직전의 시점에서 북한에 대한 소련의 통제는
정치적·경제적·군사적 방면에서 거의 완벽했다. 이렇게 볼 때, 소련은
최소한 북한의 남침 계획을 대단히 정확하게 알고 있었음이 확실하다.

‘소련 무지설’ 또는 ‘소련 경악설’이 반박되면서, 수정주의자들은 그
문제에 대해서는 침묵하거나 소련 역시 알고 있었다는 입장을 취하는
반면에 한반도의 내적 요인들을 더욱더 강조하고 나왔다. 그들의 논리를
정리하면 다음과 같다. 51)

첫째, 남북한 사이의 군비 경쟁이 한국전쟁의 발발을 가져 왔다는 주장
이다. 한국전쟁이 일어나기까지 약 1년 동안 남북한 사이에 군비경쟁이
본격적으로 전개되었으며, 특히 1950년 초부터 남한이 군비를 상당한
수준으로 증강한 사실은 미국정부도 인정했다. 그뿐 아니라, 이 기간에
무력 충돌이 잦았다. 이 사실 역시 미국 정부에 의해 인정되고 있다.
이러한 무력 충돌의 상당한 부분이 남한에 의해 ‘도발’된 것이고, 이
‘도발’의 延長線上에서 한국전쟁이 일어났다는 것이다.

둘째, 이승만의 북진통일론이 북한의 對南 도발을 촉진시켰다는 주장이
다. 주지하는 바와 같이, 이승만은 여러 차례 무력통일 또는 북진통일을
부르짖었으며 이 목표의 달성을 위해 미국에 군사 원조를 공공연히 요청
했다. 이 점에 근거하여 《좌파평론》의 편집위원인 영국인 할러데이
(Jon Halliday)는 북침설을 내놓으면서 이승만이 미 지상군의 개입을
유도하여 북한 정권을 붕괴시키고자 했다고 주장한다. 52)

셋째, 남한에 대한 미국의 군사공약의 강화가 북한을 ‘자극’했다는
주장이다. 쿨코와 굽타는 당시 국무성 고문이던 딜레스가 한국전쟁의
발발을 앞두고 방한해 對韓 군사공약을 다짐한 사실을 상기시키면서,

이처럼 미국이 남한군을 강화시키면 이승만은 숙원인 무력통일을 추구할 것이라고 판단한 북한이 1950년 6월 25일 현재의 '순간적 군사력 우위'를 이용해 '예방 조치'를 취하게 되었다고 설명했다.

그러면 이들의 논리는 어떻게 평가될 수 있을까?

첫째, 남북한의 군비경쟁에 대해 면밀히 따진 崔光寧에 따르면, '병력수에 있어서는 남 북한 사이에 경쟁이 발생하였으며 1948년부터 1949년까지는 남한이 그 경쟁을 주도했으나 장비와 훈련 수준에 있어서는 남 북한이 경쟁 상태에 있지 않았고 북한군이 시종일관 우위를 확보했다.' 그러므로 여기서 우리가 평민집단과 전투병력과 구별을 무장한 장비와 무기 그리고 군사 훈련의 유무에서 찾는다고 할 때, 남북한 사이에 군비 경쟁이 계속되었고 그 군비 경쟁을 남한측이 촉발하고 주도했다는 주장은 받아들이기 어렵다.

둘째, 이승만은 북진통일론에 대해서이다. 이승만이 '북진통일'을 표방한 것은 사실이다. 그러나 그는 남한의 군사력이 북한의 군사력에 비해 열세이며 따라서 미국으로부터 군사 원조를 끌어내기 위한 '공갈정책'으로 북진을 강조했을 뿐이다. 그는 무엇보다 남한군이 북진을 미국을 비롯한 우방들이 지지하지 않음을 잘 알고 있었다. 그뿐 아니라 그가 '무력통일'론을 펴면서도 어떤 때는 '평화통일'론을 폄하했다는 사실이 상기되어야 할 것이다.

셋째, 딜레스의 방한 연설에 관해서이다. 딜레스가 1950년 6월 19일 남한 국회에서 '여러분은 홀로 있지 않다. 여러분들이 인간의 자유라는 위대한 실개 속에서 여러분의 역할을 가치있게 계속해서 수행하고 있는 한, 여러분들은 결코 혼자가 아니다'라고 선언하여 남한에 대해 상당히 강화된 정책을 공약했음은 사실이다. 그러나 그는 방한 중에 가진 이대통령과의 대답에서 공동의 적에 대한 공동의 행동에는 형식적인 조약이나 동맹이

반드시 필요한 것이 아니라고 강조했다. 그는 이어 미국 정부는 소련이
현 상황에서 전쟁을 감행하지는 않으며 간접 침략을 조장할 것이라고
전제하고, 미국이 제3차 세계대전에 대비하여 다른 나라의 안보를 공약할
수는 없으나 간접 침략에 대해서는 원조가 가능하다고 말했다. 따라서
덜레스의 발언이 미국 정부가 대한 군사 공약을 강화한 증거로 해석되기는
어렵다.

'민족해방전쟁' 논의 전개

이처럼 수정주의자들의 논리가 문제점들을 안고 있음이 차차 인정되고,
특히 북한에 의한 남침으로 한국전쟁이 일어났음이 명백해지면서 한국
전쟁에 대한 마르크시스트 또는 수정주의학파의 입장에도 부분적인 변화가
있어났다. 그들 가운데에서도 한국전쟁은 북한의 남침에 의해 시작되었음을
인정하는 학자들이 나타났다. 소련의 학자조차 "1950년 6월 25일 조선반도
에서 군사 작전이 발생했다"는 중립적인 표현을 썼으며, 중공의 노련한
외교관 伍修權도 그의 회고록에서 "1950년 6월, 新民國이 성립된 지 불과
몇 개월이 되지 않아 조선전쟁이 발발했다"는 중립적인 표현을 썼다. 53)

일본에서의 대표적인 보기로 흔히 名吉屋大學의 信夫清三郎 교수가
1965년 8월호 《세계》지에 발표한 논문 <현대사의 劃期^{의 事件}로서의 조선
전쟁>, 그리고 1966년 福村出版社를 통해 출판한 《조선전쟁의 발발》을
지적한다. 마르크시스트로 알려진 그는 일본 외무성의 자료와 트루먼
회고록 및 맥아더 회고록 등을 포함한 객관적인 자료들을 광범위하게

활용하면서 스톤의 저서와 콘데의 저서의 오류들을 지적하는 한편 남한과 미국에 의한 '북침'설을 부인함과 아울러 북한의 남침에 의해 한국전쟁이 시작됐음을 인정했다. 그러나 그는 한국전쟁이 기본적으로 '내전'이라고 규정했다.

수정주의학파에 가까운 볼드윈(Frank Baldwin)박사조차 '북침'설을 부인한다. 한국전쟁 당시 주한 미국대사관 1등서기관이었던 노블(Harold Noble)박사의 회고록인 《戰時의 대사관》 원고를 검토한 볼드윈은 한국전이 시작되었을 때 당황하고 혼란에 빠진 남한 정부의 동정을 자세하게 묘사한 노블의 그 당시의 기록에 비추어 남한이 '북침'을 준비했다거나 또한 북한의 남침을 고의적으로 유도했다는 주장은 받아들이기 어렵다고 쓰고 있다. 54)

이처럼 북한에 의한 남침설이 사실상 국제학계의 多數說로 받아들여지자 수정주의자들은 논점을 바꿨다. 즉 한국전쟁은 기본적으로 '민족해방전쟁'이므로 누가 먼저 전쟁을 시작했느냐를 따지는 것은 무의미하다는 것이다. 그 대표적 학자가 할러데이이다. 그는 '한반도의 분단과 그 기원에 관한 정당한 강조가 없이 왜 한국전쟁이 일어났는가라는 주요한 물음에 대답하기 어렵다'고 전제하고, 누가 한국전을 시작했느냐고 묻는 것은 한국전의 성격을 이해함에 있어서 의미가 없다고 주장한다. '누가 한국전쟁을 시작했는가에 관한 서방, 그리고 또 사회주의 국가들에서의 반복적인 강조는 코리아에 있어서의 계급 투쟁의 문제를 非歷史化한다'고 그는 덧붙였다. 55)

커밍스의 《한국전쟁의 기원들》은 바로 이 명제와 맥을 같이 한다. 조선왕조 이후 쌓여 온 사회·경제적 모순을 해소하기 위해, 또는 계급적 갈등을 해소하기 위해, 해방 직후 현상타파적 혁명이 필요했으며, 실제로

현상타파를 지향하는 세력이 대두했으나, 남한을 점령한 미국의 제국주의적·현상유지적 정책과 그리고 이 정책에 편승한 한반도 안의 보수·반동 세력의 힘 앞에 좌절되게 되었고, 그 과정에서의 계급 투쟁이 결국 해방으로부터 5년 뒤에 한국전쟁이라는 내전으로 폭발했다고 보는 것이다. 그런 뜻에서, 그는 한국전쟁의 기원들을 1950년 6월 25일의 시점에서가 아니라 그 이전의 시기, 아무리 적게 잡아도 해방 5년의 한국 현대사에서 찾았다. 결국 한국전쟁의 원인들을 한반도 안의 계급투쟁적 요인들과 세력들의 상호 관련 속에서 찾은 것이다.

메릴(John Merrill)의 박사학위논문 역시 기본 발상에 있어서 이러한 흐름 위에서 있다. 56) '혁명 세력'이 억압됨에 따라 그들은 제주도 반란이라든가 여순 반란과 같은 형태로 자신의 혁명적 열기를 폭발시키지 않을 수 없게 되었고 북한은 이것을 지지하는 입장에서 남북한의 군사 대결과 경계선 충돌이 유지된 상황속에 내전의 형태로 한국전쟁이 일어났다는 것이다.

블드윈의 견해도 기본적으로 같다. 그는 '1945년 8월 코리아의 해방과 더불어 시작된, 또는 1920년대로까지 거슬러 올라간다면 조선공산당의 형성과 더불어 시작된 좌익과 우익 사이의 기본적 투쟁이 정점에 도달한 것이 한국전쟁이다'라고 말한다. 57) 호주의 메코르맥(Gavan McCormack) 교수의 저서도 이러한 명제 위에서 있다. 그는 '민족 해방 전쟁' 곧 내전에 개입한 미국과 국제연합을 비판하기까지 한다. 58)

'국제적 내전' 논리의 전개

수정주의의 새로운 조류가 한국전쟁의 기원들을 한반도 안에서 찾는 노력을 집중함으로써 한국전쟁의 기원들을 한반도 안에서 찾는 데 부심한 나머지 국제적 요인들을 무시하거나 경시한 잘못을 저지른 것 역시 사실이다.

이러한 맥락에서, 일본의 학계가 이미 한국전쟁을 '국제적 내전(an international civil war)'으로 규정했었음은 타견이다. 앞에서 소개한 信夫清三郎 교수는 이미 1965년에 "조선전쟁은 내전으로 발발하였으나 미국의 군사 개입으로 국제 전쟁으로 발전했다"라는 명제를 제시했었고, 小此木政夫 교수는 "한국전쟁은 국내정치가 국제화하고 국제정치가 국내화 하는 가운데 국내적 힘과 국제적 힘 사이에 확대의 악순환이 벌어지면서 일어났다"고 말하면서 "한국전쟁은 국내적 요소들과 국제적 요소들이 서로 얽힌 복합적 투쟁이었다"고 정의했다. 59) 永井陽之助 교수는 그런 뜻에서 한국전쟁을 '국제적 내전'으로 명명한 것이다. 60)

V. 맺음말

이제 위에서의 논의들을 요약해 본다.

첫째, 한국전쟁은 분명히 북한의 잘 준비된 전면 남침에 의해 일어났다. 남한의, 또는 미국과 남한의 '공모'에 의해, 또는 미국과 남한의 '유도'에 의해, 한국전쟁이 일어났다는 수정주의자들의 주장은 그 근거를 찾기 어렵다.

둘째, 북한의 남침은 대체로 북한 지도층의 이니셔티브에 의해 취해진 것으로 보인다. 바꿔 말해, 소련이 북한의 남침을 교사했거나 주도했던 것 같지는 않다. 흐루시초프의 회고록대로, 김일성의 계획을 스탈린은 미군 불개입이라는 전제 아래 받아들였던 것 같으며, 그 이후 북한에 군사지원을 베푼 것 같다. 이렇게 볼 때, "만일 북한이 한반도의 통일을 추구하지 않았더라면 남침이 없었을 것"이라는 매트레이(James Matray) 교수의 단언, 61) 그리고 "내전으로서의 한국전은 북한 스스로의 목적을 위해 북한에 의해

주도되었고 스탈린에 의해 동의되었다'는 번슈틴(Barton Bernstein)교수의 결론은⁶²⁾ 오히려 만하다.

셋째, 한국전쟁의 준비 과정에서 중공은 사실상 거의 아무런 역할도 수행하지 않았다. 한 마디로, 중공 공모설은 근거 없다.

넷째, 한반도를 둘러싼 미국과 소련 사이의 국제냉전은 한반도 안의 국내 냉전을 굽히는 데 이바지했으며 그런 의미에서 한국전쟁의 기원들 가운데 주요한 요인으로 꼽을 수 있다. 한국전쟁이 국지화하지 않고 곧바로 국제화된 데는 국제냉전이라는 요인이 직접적으로 작용하고 있었기 때문이다.

다섯째, 한반도의 내적 요인들 역시 중요하게 작용했다. 현상타파적 혁명 세력의 열기가 무력을 사용해서라도 '외세배제, 민족해방'의 목표를 달성해야겠다는 '민족해방전쟁'의 논리로 연결된 측면은 결코 부인될 수 없으며, 이런 뜻에서 한국전쟁은 국제적 성격과 더불어 내전적 성격을 동시에 갖고 있는 것이다.

<註>

- 1) 이 문서의 성격과 그 내용에 대해서는 필자가 다음 논문에서 자세히 설명했다. <정권 형성기와 초창기의 북한 연구 I : 한국전쟁기에 미군이 노획한 북한 문서에 관한 소개를 중심으로>, 《국제정치논총》 제24집 제2호(1984), pp.161~192.
- 2) 이 두 권의 책은 다음과 같이 번역되어 있다. 첫번째 책이 국토통일원 조사연구실(번역), 《조선의 해방》(국토통일원, 1987), 두번째 책이 국토통일원 조사연구실(번역), 《소련과 북한과의 관계, 1945~1980》(국토통일원, 1987)이다.
- 3) 이 논문은 한양대학교 중소연구소 계간지 《中蘇研究》, 1984/85년 겨울호에 번역되어 있다.
- 4) 이러한 자료들에 대해서는 필자의 <한국전쟁에 대한 국내외의 문헌 I>, 《외교》(한국외교협회), 제5호(1988년 3월), pp.120~122에서 자세히 소개했다.
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THE SECOND INTERNATIONAL
CONFERENCE ON THE KOREAN WAR
JUNE 14~15, 1990
SEOUL, KOREA

**Civil War of a Sort:
The International Origins of the Korean Conflict**

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President Harry S. Truman never had any trouble explaining the origins of the Korean War. "Communism," he stated frankly in his memoirs, "was acting in Korea just as Hitler, Mussolini, and the Japanese had acted ten, fifteen, and twenty years earlier."¹⁾ As Ernest R. May has shown, it was the lessons of the 1930's that had created an axiom dominating Truman's thinking in reaction to the North Korean invasion of South Korea.²⁾ If the United States did nothing to prevent the Communists from conquering all of Korea, this only would encourage more acts of aggression. International developments before World War II proved that appeasement, far from halting an aggressor, merely guaranteed a future war under tougher circumstances. Truman's advisors almost universally shared his judgment that the conflict in Korea was the direct result of the global expansionist strategy that the Soviet Union had followed since 1945. Secretary of State Dean Acheson, for example, later claimed that Moscow's "dagger thrust pinned a warning notice on the wall which said: 'Give up or be conquered!'"³⁾ A lone dissenter at that time was Soviet expert George F. Kennan, who considered the Korean War "a civil conflict, not an international one; and the term 'aggression' in the usual international sense was . . . misplaced."⁴⁾

Forty years after the outbreak of the Korean War the main explanation of its origins has changed dramatically. An excellent illustration of this

1
Harry S. Truman, Memoirs, II: Years of Trial and Hope (Garden City: Doubleday, 1956), 333.

2
Ernest R. May, "The Nature of Foreign Policy: The Calculated Versus the Axiomatic," Daedalus, 91 (Fall 1962), 662-663.

3
Dean G. Acheson testimony, U.S. Congress, Senate, Joint Committee on Armed Services and Foreign Relations, Military Situation in the Far East, 81st Cong., 1st sess. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1951), 1715, 1936.

4
George F. Kennan, Memoirs, I: 1925-1950 (Boston: Little, Brown, 1967), 490.

analytical shift appears on the first page of Callum MacDonald's Korea: The War Before Vietnam. There, the author asserts that the North Korean "attack was the latest act in a civil war which had been taking shape since the liberation of Korea from Japan in 1945." Burton I. Kaufman, in his recent study entitled The Korean War: Challenges in Crisis, Credibility, and Command, labels the conflict "a true civil war." Even Peter Lowe, who strives in his The Origins of the Korean War to assess the conflict in light of international developments, concludes that by 1950, the "situation in the Korean peninsula was in essence one of civil war." Most recently, John Merrill has charged that previous explanations for the Korean War have ignored the "local setting". In his Korea: The Peninsular Origins of the War, he asserts that "the war can be usefully interpreted as a case of intervention in the ongoing civil strife in the South."⁵⁾

These works reflect an interpretational trend that began in 1981 with the publication of Bruce Cumings's influential book entitled The Origins of the Korean War. Relying upon meticulous and exhaustive research in both American and Korean sources, Cumings contends that "the origins of the Korean War must be sought primarily in the events of the period 1945 to 1950 and secondarily in forces descending upon Korea in the period of colonial rule that left their peculiar stamp on the interwar years" As elsewhere in Asia, revolutionary nationalism was the primary political force on the Korean peninsula even before the end of World War II. Those favoring radical change were the leaders of a movement dedicated to the

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Callum MacDonald, Korea: The War Before Vietnam (New York: The Free Press, 1986), 3; Burton I. Kaufman, The Korean War: Challenges in Crisis, Credibility, and Command (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1986), 32; Peter Lowe, The Origins of the Korean War (London: Longman, 1986), 68; John Merrill, Korea: The Peninsular Origins of the War (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1989), 21.

destruction of Japanese colonialism, as well as Korea's traditional system of political, social, and economic privilege. The United States, however, was determined to prevent a leftist victory in Korea because its "goal was American hegemony in the postwar world." For Cumings, Truman's decision in 1945 to occupy the southern half of the Korean peninsula constituted "an unprecedented act of ambition" and "the first postwar act of containment". U.S. occupation officials purposely followed a counterrevolutionary course, supporting the political aspirations of the conservatives and attempting "through unilateral actions to build a bulwark against communism."⁶ Had the U.S. not intervened in Korea's civil war, the popular preference for revolutionary political and economic change would have resulted in the establishment of a Communist government to rule a united Korea.

Few writers have embraced the Cumings interpretation in its entirety. Nevertheless, in response to The Origins of the Korean War, a consensus has emerged that the Korean War had domestic origins and was in essence a civil conflict. However, this interpretation, much like Truman's in June 1950, offers an oversimplified answer to a considerably more complex question. International factors play a far more significant role in explaining the outbreak of hostilities in Korea than recent scholars have been willing to admit. Perhaps more important, the domestic origins argument has tended assign blame for the Korean War almost exclusively to the United States. Yet the real villain in the last century of Korea's history was Japan. If Japan had not conquered Korea in 1905 and incorporated the peninsula into its colonial empire, there would have been no war in 1950. Japan's attack at Pearl Harbor in 1941 would have a significant indirect impact on Korea.

6

Bruce Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War: Liberation and the Establishment of Separate Regimes, 1945-1947 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981), xx, xxiv-xxv, 116, 130-131.

War with the U.S. meant that eventual Allied occupation of Korea in some form was inevitable. Postwar isolation from international affairs was not a realistic expectation for Korea because ending World War II would require either destroying Japanese forces on the peninsula or accepting their surrender. Ultimate responsibility for Soviet-American partition of Korea at the 38th parallel in 1945 and the resulting war five years later therefore rests with Imperial Japan.

Wartime negotiations among the Allies suggest that a Soviet-American dispute over Korea's postwar fate, in contrast to military occupation, was far from inevitable. In fact, as this paper will attempt to demonstrate, there were at least four occasions between July 1945 and April 1948 when Washington and Moscow might have taken steps that would have resulted in Korea's reunification. In each case, however, international factors would block the implementation of an agreement, as Korea became a captive of the Cold War. Neither the U.S. nor the Soviet Union would accept a solution aimed at ending the partition because this might allow its adversary to dominate a reunited Korea. "The ultimate result of a great power rivalry," as Callum MacDonald has observed, "was to institutionalise [sic] the civil war in two contending states, both committed to the cause of unification." Having created two Koreas, both the Americans and the Soviets then provided enough support for each side to threaten its rival. Korean leaders in the north and the south could develop plans for achieving reunification through a resort to force only because their patrons provided them with the means to wage war. Thus, it was international developments that created the

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In 1986, Bruce Cumings told me at a conference that after World War II, the Allies should have set up a protective shield around Korea so that its people could determine their own destiny without outside interference.

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MacDonald, Korea: The War Before Vietnam, 15.

circumstances making possible the outbreak of Korea's civil war.

Few average Americans, let alone any informed observers, would have predicted in 1942 that U.S. combat forces would be fighting in Korea less than a decade later. In fact, before the first year of U.S. participation in World War II was over, President Franklin D. Roosevelt had embraced a policy that sought to prevent a postwar conflict on the Korean peninsula. American officials were aware that Korea, as the strategic focal point of northeast Asia, had been the victim of great power rivalry throughout its history.⁹⁾ Its future after World War II therefore would depend on the ability of the Allies to cooperate in negotiating an agreement that would protect the interests of all nations directly involved in the area. Thus, the State Department developed plans for the creation of an international trusteeship for Korea that would remove this strategically located nation¹⁰⁾ as a potential source of tension and conflict in the postwar world.

Roosevelt's diplomatic advisors anticipated criticism especially from Korean exiles for not promising immediate independence and self-government after World War II, but a number of factors argued in favor of trusteeship. First, the vast majority of Koreans were poor and illiterate, politically inexperienced, and economically backward. After forty years of Japanese domination, only older citizens could even remember when the Korean people ruled themselves. Second, there were several Korean groups in exile in the United States, China, and the Soviet Union each claiming to be Korea's legitimate representatives. Given the totality of Japanese control over

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Gregory Henderson, Korea: The Politics of the Vortex (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968), 161; Glenn D. Paige, The Korean People's Democratic Republic (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1966), 18.

10

James I. Matray, The Reluctant Crusade: American Foreign Policy in Korea, 1941-1950 (Honolulu: The University of Hawaii Press, 1985), 8.

events on the peninsula, American officials doubted whether any of these contestants had strong organizational backing inside Korea. Finally, as Korea's closest neighbors along with Japan, China and the Soviet Union had interests in that nation's future development. Trusteeship would foster cooperation, rather than competition, in determining Korea's destiny. 11)

During World War II, the Roosevelt administration followed a dual course in pursuit of its objectives in Korea. First, the U.S. withheld recognition and material support from any of the rival Korean exile groups. At a press conference in March 1942, Undersecretary of State Sumner Welles explained that the U.S. policy of impartiality toward all "free movements" applied to Korea. Although Washington had "utmost sympathy" for the cause of Korean nationalism, the Korean case involved certain complex problems that required caution and delay. 12) Second, the administration sought the approval of Britain, China, and the Soviet Union for a postwar four-power trusteeship arrangement for Korea. Impartiality infuriated Korean exiles in the United States and China, but Allied agreement on trusteeship would have been impossible without it. State Department officials were certain that if the U.S. showed a preference for any particular group of Koreans, 13) the Soviet Union would follow suit. More alarming, Chinese Nationalist leader Chiang Kai-shek already was sponsoring those Korean exiles residing

11

William R. Langdon memorandum, February 20, 1942, Dept. of State Records, 895.01/79, National Archives [NA], Washington, D.C.; Arthur B. Emmons memorandum, August 14, 1952, *ibid.*, 895.01/156A; Harold B. Quarton memorandum, August 15, 1942, *ibid.*, 895.01/157.

12

Sumner Welles press conference comments, March 2, 1942, Foreign Relations of the United States [FRUS], 1942, I: General, the British Commonwealth, the Far East (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1960), 864; New York Times, March 3, 1942, p. 7

13

Cordell Hull to Franklin D. Roosevelt, April 29, 1942, FRUS, 1942, I, 873.

14)
in Chungking--the self-styled Korean Provisional Government. Trusteeship provided the best method for ensuring that the Korean people would choose who would lead them to independence after liberation from Japanese rule.

State Department officials began work on a specific plan for postwar international control over Korea during the autumn of 1942. A projected committee comprised of representatives from China, New Zealand, and the U.S. would develop a plan "to cooperate with the Korean people in setting up and establishing a national government of Korea and . . . to assist in forming a temporary trusteeship under which there would be given advice and technical assistance." There also would be measures for coordination with the Soviet

15)
Union. The Roosevelt administration could expect Chinese acceptance of this plan, although Chiang Kai-shek was known to prefer Allied recognition of the Korean exiles in China. Enlisting British support would not be so easy because Britain was more interested in answering the broader question of Allied policy in all colonial areas than in planning for Korea's future. Discussions in Washington early in 1943 with Foreign Minister Anthony Eden made it clear that the British thought "very little of a trusteeship and would rather have the full responsibility in the hands of one country." On March 27, Roosevelt told Eden that he favored postwar international control over Indochina and the Japanese-mandated islands. Furthermore, "Korea might be placed under an international trusteeship, with China, the United States and one or two other countries participating." Eden

14

Clarence Gauss to Hull, April 18, 1942, *ibid.*, 872-873; Gauss to Hull, December 19, 1942, *ibid.*, China (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1956), 748; Gauss to Hull, June 19, 1942, Dept. of State Records, 895.01/148, NA; Roy P. McNair, Jr. to War Department, December 11, 1942, *ibid.*, 895.01/228; McNair Report, January 12, 1943, *ibid.*, 895.01/216; Gauss to Hull, January 15, 1943, *ibid.*, 895.01/213.

15

Division of Far Eastern Affairs memorandum, October 10, 1942, Dept. of State Records, 895.00/840, NA.

raised no objections, conveying the impression of British support.

Undersecretary Welles briefed Chinese Ambassador T. V. Soong on the results of these Anglo-American negotiations that same month. Roosevelt and Eden, he explained, had agreed on a trusteeship for Korea, but the specific features of the plan would await consultations with the Soviet Union.¹⁷⁾ Confident of British and Chinese backing, the State Department finished a specific proposal with details about the machinery to implement, supervise, and finance a program under which Korea would "be temporarily administered . . ., anticipating independence probably with close economic ties to China."¹⁸⁾ There was some concern that the Soviet Union might not cooperate with a trusteeship scheme. Moscow maintained close ties with Korean guerrillas in Siberia, who would provide an excellent vehicle for exerting Russian influence in postwar Korea.¹⁹⁾ Without an agreement among the Allies that provided for a neutral Korea, a postwar Sino-Soviet contest for control over the peninsula was probable. Much to the relief of the Roosevelt administration, a meeting of the Allied foreign ministers in Moscow during October 1943 provided indirect evidence of the Soviet Union's willingness to endorse a Korean trusteeship. There, Foreign Minister V. M. Molotov responded favorably when the U.S. proposed widespread application

16

Harry Hopkins memorandum, March 22, 1943, and Hull memorandum, March 27, 1943, FRUS, 1943, III: The British Commonwealth, Eastern Europe, the Far East (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1963), 34-37; Cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, II (New York: Macmillan, 1948), 1235-1236, 1595-1596.

17

Welles memorandum, March 29, 1943, FRUS, 1943, China (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1957), 845-846.

18

Memorandum on International Trusteeship, April 15, 1943, FRUS, The Conferences at Washington and Quebec, 1943 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1970), 720-726.

19

Stanley Hornbeck Memorandum, August 19, 1943, reel 23, folder 159, box 51-52, Cordell Hull papers, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.

of the trusteeship principle to resolve the fate of dependent peoples.

One of Roosevelt's objectives when he traveled to the Cairo Conference in November 1943 was to remove any possibility for a future war in Korea. He hoped to obtain formal British and Chinese consent for an international trusteeship arrangement in postwar Korea that would guarantee the eventual achievement of independence and self-government. The president's efforts were rewarded, as Winston Churchill and Chiang Kai-shek joined Roosevelt in issuing the famous Cairo Declaration, which promised the liquidation of the Japanese Empire. With respect to Korea, this statement declared that the Allies, "mindful of the enslavement of the people of Korea, are determined that in due course Korea shall become free and independent." Roosevelt recognized that postwar peace and stability on the Korean peninsula would depend not only upon the support of Britain and China, but also the Soviet Union for joint action regarding Korea's reconstruction. Thus, he left Cairo for his meeting with Joseph Stalin at Teheran intent upon gaining the Russian leader's assent for a Korean trusteeship. On November 30, Stalin voiced approval for the Cairo Declaration. Roosevelt later avowed that the Soviet leader had agreed specifically that "the Koreans are not yet capable of exercising and maintaining independent government and that they should be placed under a 40 year tutelage."

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Hull, Memoirs, II, pp. 1304-1305; Conference Notes, October 29, 1943, FRUS, 1943, I, 666-667.

21

"Conference of President Roosevelt, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, and Prime Minister Churchill in North Africa," Department of State Bulletin, IX (December 4, 1943), 393; Roosevelt-Churchill meeting notes, November 24, 1943, British draft declaration, n.d., and American draft declaration, n.d., FRUS, The Conferences at Cairo and Teheran, 1943 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1961), 389, 400, 404.

22

Conference notes, November 30, 1943, and Pacific War Council notes, January 12, 1944, FRUS, Cairo and Teheran, 566, 869.

During the spring of 1944, the State Department's Postwar Programs Committee discussed and approved three papers outlining a concrete plan for the occupation and administration of postwar Korea. Securing formal Soviet consent for these plans assumed greater importance with each Allied military victory over the Axis that year. This was the case because U.S. military experts had convinced Roosevelt that Soviet participation in the Pacific war would make the defeat of Japan much easier, perhaps removing the need to invade the home islands.²³⁾ At first, Roosevelt's advisors feared that without prior territorial arrangements, such as a trusteeship for Korea, Soviet entry into the war against Japan might set the stage for a postwar Sino-Soviet conflict. But political factionalism and economic deterioration in China sharply altered the administration's expectations. If Chiang Kai-shek's regime lacked sufficient strength and viability to counter future Soviet expansionist ambitions in Asia, firm agreements were essential.²⁴⁾ Consequently, when Roosevelt left for his meeting at Yalta with Churchill and Stalin early in 1945, his main objective was to confirm plans for Soviet entry into the Pacific War, but he also sought an accord that would produce a strong China and an independent Korea.

In preparation for the Yalta Conference, State Department officials had drawn up specific plans for Korea that placed a high priority on joint Allied participation in the occupation and civil administration of the

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Department of State memorandum, March 29, 1944, FRUS, 1944, V: The Near East, South Asia, and Africa-The Far East (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1965), 1225-1242; Postwar Programs Committee minutes, 27th Meeting, May 3, 1944, Postwar Programs Committee Minutes, February 1-May 31, 1944, box 32, Edward R. Stettinius, Jr. papers, University of Virginia Library, Charlottesville, Virginia; William D. Leahy, I Was There (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1950), 250-259.

24

Policy Committee minutes, 47th meeting, May 19, 1944, Policy Committee Minutes, box 370, Stettinius papers; Edward R. Stettinius, Jr. to Joseph Grew, May 5, 1944, box 216, *ibid.*

peninsula. If the Allies expected to avoid prolonged occupation or any delay in granting independence, there should be a detailed agreement for the establishment of a four-power trusteeship.²⁵⁾ On February 8, Roosevelt raised the issue of Korea during discussions with Stalin at Yalta and proposed a three-power trusteeship, suggesting the exclusion of Britain. The president speculated that international control would last twenty to thirty years. Stalin responded that the shorter the duration the better, then arguing in favor of British participation. He also asked about the stationing of foreign troops on the peninsula; both men agreed that there should be no postwar military occupation of Korea.²⁶⁾ Roosevelt and Stalin therefore agreed to a four-power trusteeship for Korea in addition to the concessions the Soviet Union would receive in return for participation in the Pacific war. Given the events at Yalta, Roosevelt and his advisors had every reason to believe that China and eventually Korea would emerge as independent and sovereign nations after World War II.

Unfortunately, neither Roosevelt nor Stalin anticipated that the defeat of Japan would follow so quickly after Allied victory in Europe. As a result, the two leaders had not discussed trusteeship in detail at Yalta. They had decided instead that a five-member committee, composed of representatives from member nations on the proposed Security Council of the United Nations, would meet prior to the San Francisco Conference to discuss the terms of an international trusteeship system.²⁷⁾ As the Soviet

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Briefing Book paper, "Inter-Allied Consultation-Korea," n.d., FRUS, 1945, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1955), 358-361.

26

Charles E. Bohlen minutes, February 8, 1945, *ibid.*, 770.

27

Yalta communique, "Territorial Trusteeship," FRUS, 1945, The Conference of Berlin (Potsdam), Vol. II (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1960), 1568.

Union established political control over Eastern Europe following Yalta, some U.S. leaders became fearful that Stalin would pursue "sovietization" in Asia as well. Henry L. Stimson and James V. Forrestal, secretaries of war and navy respectively, in fact had serious doubts about Roosevelt's entire approach toward the reconstruction of colonial areas. Both men worried that the U.S. would surrender areas of strategic importance in the Pacific but other nations would not follow suit. During a cabinet meeting on March 9, 1945, Roosevelt dismissed these concerns and reaffirmed his support for a system of trustee nations that would derive authority from the proposed postwar international organization. That same month, the the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC) formulated a detailed program for the occupation and interim administration of Korea. By early April 1945, American plans for Korea's transition from liberation to trusteeship were virtually complete.

International developments would rob Korea of perhaps its best chance to prevent the three year war that would start in June 1950. After the Yalta Conference, Stalin's determination to establish hegemony in Eastern Europe had caused Roosevelt to question the Soviet leader's willingness to fulfill Allied agreements. This emerging Soviet-American dispute raised doubts about the wisdom of trusteeship for Korea. Nevertheless, when the president died on April 12, he still was optimistic about the chances for continued Soviet-American cooperation despite sharp differences over such

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Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, On Active Service in Peace and War (New York: Harper and Row, 1947), 556-557; Cabinet meeting minutes, March 9, 1945, and James V. Forrestal memorandum, March 30, 1945, in Walter Millis, ed., The Forrestal Diaries (New York: Viking Press, 1951), 33, 77-78.

29

SWNCC PAPERS 76, 77, 78, 99, 101, March 19, 1945, Joint Chiefs of Staff [JCS] Records, CCS 383.21 Korea (3-19-45), sec. I, Record Group [RG] 218, NA, Washington, D.C.

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issues as the fate of Poland. Once Harry Truman assumed the presidency, any foundation for postwar Soviet-American cooperation quickly disappeared. The new president, to a far greater degree than Roosevelt, was suspicious of Soviet intentions and expected Stalin's actions in Asia to parallel his expansionist policies in Eastern Europe. Less than one week after taking office, Truman reversed Roosevelt's position on the territorial trusteeship issue. The U.S. now would resist any detailed discussion of the machinery for an international trusteeship system at the San Francisco Conference.³¹⁾ Truman's decision reflected his intense fears of "sovietization" in Asia and signaled the beginning of a search for an alternative in Korea that would eliminate any opportunity for Soviet expansionism.

Korea's fate ultimately was tied to American military capabilities and Truman's strategy for defeating Japan. One month after Roosevelt's death, U.S. military advisors still believed that Soviet entry into the Pacific war was essential.³²⁾ This advice forced Truman reluctantly to revive plans for joint Allied control of Korea, since unilateral U.S. occupation of the peninsula seemed impossible. Thus, when the new president dispatched Harry Hopkins to Moscow in May 1945 for discussions with Stalin, one purpose was to reach a firm agreement on Korea. Hopkins received instructions from the State Department to obtain among other specific provisions Soviet approval

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John Lewis Gaddis, The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972), 172-173; Robert H. Ferrell, "Truman's Foreign Policy: A Traditional View," in Richard Kirkendall, ed., The Truman Era as a Research Field: A Reappraisal, 1972 (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1974), 26.

31

"International Trusteeship" memorandum, April 18, 1945, Memoranda for the President, box 735, Stettinius papers; Stettinius to Andrei Gromyko, June 23, 1945, FRUS, Berlin, II, 634.

32

Herbert Feis, The Atomic Bomb and the End of World War II (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), 7.

for a trusteeship which guaranteed equal representation in the Allied civil administration of postwar Korea. But at Moscow, Hopkins failed to discuss Korea's future in detail. He merely reminded Stalin that at Yalta, he and Roosevelt had agreed to a four-power trusteeship, but did not specify its duration. Hopkins then suggested that the period of international guidance might last as long as 25 years, but certainly a minimum of five years. Stalin avoided a discussion of specifics as well, but he restated his unqualified endorsement of a four-power trusteeship for Korea.³³⁾

Stalin's comments to Hopkins provided little evidence that the Soviet leader intended to undermine plans for a Korean trusteeship. In fact, he reaffirmed his support during consultations with T. V. Soong in July 1945 regarding the development of a postwar Sino-Soviet treaty ratifying the Yalta agreement on the Far East. After Stalin raised the issue of Korea, Molotov commented that the Korean trusteeship proposal was unusual and unprecedented, thus requiring a detailed understanding among the Allied nations most concerned about Korea's future.³⁴⁾ The Soviet Union almost certainly expected to finalize the specific terms of an arrangement at the Potsdam Conference later that month. The U.S. State Department shared this assumption, having formulated a policy position paper in anticipation of the upcoming meeting. Alarmingly, the report predicted that Moscow would "probably occupy all or part of Korea" and insist upon establishing a friendly government composed of exiles trained in the Soviet Union. Poor economic conditions in postwar Korea would encourage a favorable reception

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Joseph C. Grew to Forrestal, May 21, 1945, FRUS, 1945, VII: The Far East: China (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1969), 882-883; Memorandum of conversation, May 28, 1945, FRUS, Berlin, I, 47.

34

Averell Harriman to James F. Byrnes, July 3, 1945, FRUS, 1945, VII, 914; Harriman to Byrnes, July 9, 1945, FRUS, Berlin, I, 234.

of Communist ideology, increasing the likelihood of popular support for a Soviet-sponsored socialist regime.³⁵⁾

While Stalin had shown consistent support for a Korean trusteeship, Truman never had been enthusiastic about the plan. Finally, the president found an alternative. On the day of his arrival at Potsdam, he received news of the successful testing of the atomic bomb. Stimson recorded in his memoirs that at this point, Truman began "losing his interest" in Soviet entry into the Pacific war.³⁶⁾ Both Truman and newly appointed Secretary of State James F. Byrnes immediately concluded that employing the atomic bomb against Japan would end the war quickly, preempting a Soviet declaration of war. While the main reason for using the bomb was to save American lives, Truman and Byrnes surely must have perceived the indirect diplomatic and strategic benefits. If Japan surrendered prematurely, the U.S. could avoid the many anticipated complications entailed in Russian participation in the postwar reconstruction of Asia. It also would permit the U.S. to occupy Korea unilaterally and avoid the distasteful necessity for trusteeship.

Washington's Korea policy thus experienced a remarkable transformation during the Potsdam Conference. Ignoring planning papers, American military leaders agreed to nothing specific regarding the multinational occupation of Korea. Truman and his diplomatic advisors also discarded trusteeship in anticipation of a rapid end to the Pacific war that would forestall Soviet occupation. At the Council of Foreign Ministers meeting on July 23, Byrnes joined Eden in opposing detailed discussion of trusteeship. Molotov agreed to table his proposal, on the condition that the summary report at least

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State Department policy paper, June 22, 1945, FRUS, 1945, VI: The British Commonwealth, The Far East (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1969), 561-564.

36

Stimson and Bundy, On Active Service in Peace and War, p. 637.

note Moscow's raising of the issue. But when the Allies drafted the final protocol, both Byrnes and Eden opposed the inclusion of a general statement on trusteeship. And so, the conference report noted only that the Allies had examined the trusteeship issue but referred specifically to the Italian colonies alone.³⁷⁾ Despite Moscow's genuine desire to reach an accord at Potsdam, the conference produced no definite agreement on Korea. Perhaps the last chance to avert the Korean War had been lost.

William Stueck has argued that trusteeship did not offer a workable solution to the Korean problem, because neither the Allies nor the Korean exiles would cooperate in implementing the scheme.³⁸⁾ We shall never know for certain whether trusteeship was doomed to fail. It is clear, however, that Truman's decision to abandon trusteeship had unfortunate consequences; it led to Korea's partition and the establishment of two governments bent on forcible reunification of the peninsula. Two days after the first U.S. atomic attack on Japan, the Soviet Union entered the Pacific war and sent the Red Army into Korea. Only Soviet acceptance of Truman's eleventh hour proposal for Korea's division at the 38th parallel into zones of military occupation prevented Russian control over the entire country.³⁹⁾ But the U.S. refusal to finalize terms for a trusteeship meant that there were no guidelines for coordination in the postwar administration of Korea. Worse

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Council of Foreign Ministers meeting minutes, July 23 and August 1, 1945, Soviet draft proposal on trusteeship, n.d., State Department minutes, August 1, 1945, and Potsdam protocol, August 1, 1945, FRUS, Berlin, II, 282-283, 550-551, 593, 1493, 1594-1595.

38

William Stueck, "The United States and Korea," Reviews in American History, XIV, 3 (September 1986), 457-458. Bruce Cumings has offered an entirely different judgment. Trusteeship, he argues, was a "paternalistic, gradualist . . . idea that deemed no colonial people fit to run their own affairs without a period of tutelage." Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War, p. 106.

39

Matray, The Reluctant Crusade, pp. 43-47.

still, once the Soviet Union and the United States each occupied half of the peninsula, ending the artificial division would require a diplomatic agreement. With Soviet-American relations experiencing a steady and serious deterioration in Europe, it was clear that neither Stalin nor Truman would be in the mood to compromise.

American occupation forces arrived in southern Korea on September 8, 1945, nearly a month after Russian troops had entered the north. Within a month, the U.S. confronted agonizing problems in Korea. "Sovietization" north of the 38th parallel already seemed well under way, while there had been little success in the south in controlling anti-imperialist agitation and revolutionary nationalism.⁴⁰⁾ Within a few days after occupation began, the Truman administration realized that without a negotiated settlement, it faced a painful choice: either prolonged military occupation and permanent partition or withdrawal and Soviet domination of the entire peninsula. By mid-September, the SWNCC had revived the trusteeship formula and had begun work on a specific proposal.⁴¹⁾ Washington remained hopeful as well that Moscow would agree locally to coordination in the implementation of uniform occupation policies. But during early October, the War Department received word that the Soviet occupation commander still was spurning substantive negotiations. Faced with Moscow's intransigence, the Truman administration decided to approach the Soviet government with a proposal that ultimately would offer a second chance to avert the Korean War.⁴²⁾

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Matray, The Reluctant Crusade, 47-51.

41

War Department memoranda, September 18, 30, 1945, Dept. of the Army Records, OPD 014.1 TS, sec. V, RG 319, NA.

42

JCS 1483/12, October 3, 1945, JCS Records, CCAC 014 Korea, sec. II, RG 218, NA; Douglas MacArthur to JCS, October 11, 1945, FRUS, 1945, VI, 1071-1072; John R. Hodge to War, October 12, 1945, Dept. of the Army Records, OPD 336 Korea, sec. I, RG 319, NA.

By October 18, the State Department had finished its proposal and had obtained approval from the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). The plan provided that Washington would open negotiations with Moscow as soon as possible for coordination of occupation policy in Korea, removal of the 38th parallel partition, and establishment of an international trusteeship. In Moscow, Ambassador Averell Harriman received instructions on November 3 to approach the Soviets with a request to end the 38th parallel as "a closed barrier". The U.S. also desired adequate and regular delivery of coal and electric power to the south, uniform fiscal policies, coastwide shipping, orderly resettlement of displaced persons, and the resumption of interzonal trade and communications. Harriman was to ask the Soviet government to grant its occupation commander the power to negotiate locally for the realization of Korean independence.⁴³⁾ Harriman immediately complied with this directive, but there was no change in Soviet policy.

Truman now decided that the only alternative was to formally raise the issue of Korea at the next meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers scheduled for December 1945 in Moscow. During these negotiations, the U.S. would propose "establishing an international control of Korea for a period of five or more years in preparation for self-government" and recommend that "assent of China and the Soviet Republics should be obtained through diplomatic channels."⁴⁴⁾ As a prelude to the Moscow Conference, the State Department announced that the U.S. intended to approach the Soviet Union again in an effort to reestablish "communications, trade, and free passage

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SWNCC to Byrnes, October 22, 1945, SWNCC to JCS, October 24, 1945, and Byrnes to Harriman, November 3, 1945, FRUS, 1945, VI, 1093-1103, 1106-1109.

44

William D. Leahy diary entry, November 11, 1945, Diaries 1945, box 5, William D. Leahy papers, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.

of individuals" between northern and southern Korea. If Moscow approved, this would open the way to the reunification and independence of Korea. By late November, the SWNCC had formulated a detailed policy paper on Asia for the upcoming meeting. The U.S., the paper advised, should anticipate and accept the Russian desire for inordinate influence in Korea. Trusteeship offered the best method for lessening the likelihood of Soviet domination, reducing tensions in northeast Asia, and permitting American withdrawal. But if Stalin insisted upon exclusive control, the U.S. should terminate⁴⁵⁾ any further talks about trusteeship and grant Korean self-government.

Upon arrival at Moscow, Secretary of State Byrnes acted immediately to place the Korean matter on the agenda. The final American proposal called for a trusteeship but did not provide a detailed description of the plan. It focused instead on Harriman's recommendations of November and the vital necessity for local coordination to lift the barrier at the 38th parallel. There was a provision, however, for the possible extension of trusteeship⁴⁶⁾ to ten years. Byrnes requested approval for his proposal, arguing that the creation of a unified administration was the indispensable first step for Korean reunification, trusteeship, and eventual independence. Molotov countered that a general agreement on trusteeship was a prerequisite for any discussion of specific issues relating to Korea's reunification. He requested a copy of the American proposal and time to study its provisions. On December 20, Molotov accepted Byrnes's argument that local discussion of "urgent" questions was needed, but he wanted prior agreement on a long-term

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"United States Forces in Korea," Department of State Bulletin, XIII (November 18, 1945), 812-813; Memorandum for JCS, December 11, 1945, JCS Records, CCS 383.21 Korea (3-19-45), sec. III, RG 218.

46

Conference minutes, December 16, 1945, and U.S. proposal on Korea, December 17, 1945, FRUS, 1945, II: General: Political and Economic Matters (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967), 617-621, 641-643.

trusteeship plan as well. Therefore, he announced that he would distribute a counterproposal that evening. While expressing a desire for cooperation, an impatient Byrnes alleged that the U.S. plan corresponded to "what Stalin had in mind four months ago in Berlin."⁴⁷⁾

As promised, Molotov later circulated the Soviet proposal on Korea. It contained four specific provisions. First, the major powers would establish a "provisional, democratic Korean government" to undertake all necessary measures for the development of Korean industry, transportation, agriculture, and culture. Second, representatives from Soviet and U.S. occupation forces would form a "Joint Commission" to consult with local Korean parties and social organizations to formulate procedures for the creation of a provisional government. Third, the Soviet-American Joint Commission would "work out measures of help and assistance (trusteeship) in the political, economic, and social progress" of Korea toward democratic self-government and independence. It also would formulate a five-year trusteeship plan and submit it for approval to the four major powers. Finally, within two weeks, the Soviet and American occupation commanders would convene a "Joint Conference" to answer "urgent questions" and begin permanent coordination of administration.⁴⁸⁾

Byrnes approved Molotov's proposal after minor changes. Initially, both the Soviet Union and the U.S. judged the Moscow agreement on Korea as entirely satisfactory. Moscow still desired a united Korea and believed the Korean people favored adopting a socialist system. Yet it would not risk allowing the emergence of an anti-Soviet regime and therefore refused to end the partition of the peninsula before the successful implementation

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Conference minutes, December 20, 1945, *ibid.*, 697-698.

48

Soviet proposal on Korea, December 20, 1945, *ibid.*, 699-700.

of a specific plan for a provisional government and trusteeship. Byrnes wanted to find a solution to the impasse that would permit U.S. military withdrawal without denying to the Korean people the ability to exercise the right of national self-determination. He accepted the Soviet proposal because its implementation would achieve these goals. Truman's advisors certainly realized that the Moscow agreement would please few Koreans. But temporary outside control seemed the only way to secure Soviet cooperation for the attainment of reunification and eventual self-government.

As expected, news of the trusteeship plan sparked a storm of angry protests in the American zone that bordered on mass hysteria. Extremists held street demonstrations, closed stores and schools, and staged work stoppages. Rowdy youth groups roamed the streets of Seoul intimidating U.S. military government personnel and distributing leaflets and posters decrying trusteeship. By January 1946, conservative leaders had organized an "Anti-Trusteeship Committee" dedicated to blocking implementation of the Moscow agreement and restoring Korea's sovereignty at the earliest possible date.⁴⁹⁾ At first, the Communists and members of the extreme left joined all Koreans in denouncing trusteeship, but suddenly reversed themselves and became the most outspoken defenders of the Moscow agreement. During a demonstration on January 3, 1946, they hastily substituted the word "up" for "down" on their signs, which then read "Up with Trusteeship!" Soviet officials undoubtedly had a hand in ordering the switch, but the Communists could hardly have expected the U.S. to endorse their political aspirations if they had opposed trusteeship. More important, the extreme left showed

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Emmons to Byrnes, December 30, 1945, and Hodge to Douglas MacArthur, December 30, 1945, FRUS, 1945, VI, 1152-1154; H. Merrill Benninghoff to Byrnes, January 23, 1946, ibid., 1946, VIII: The Far East (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1971), 615-616; New York Times, January 14, 1946, p. 2.

remarkable realism in recognizing that fulfillment of the Moscow agreement
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offered new hope for reunification and independence.

Soviet-American negotiations at the local level to answer "urgent questions" represented an early test of whether the Moscow agreement would resolve the Korean predicament. On January 16, 1946, the Soviet delegation arrived in Seoul and met immediately with U.S. representatives to discuss ending the 38th parallel partition. After fifteen sessions, it was clear that the two delegations interpreted the Moscow agreement differently. The Russians favored coordination of policy and the exchange of goods alone; the Americans desired complete administrative and economic integration.
51)
Nevertheless, the final Soviet-American agreement on administrative and economic coordination constituted an encouraging sign. Rail, truck, and coastwide shipping trade between zones was resumed, as was nationwide mail service. In addition, the negotiators agreed to create a permanent liaison between commands and to begin coordination at checkpoints along the 38th parallel. While the Soviets approved the use of uniform radio frequencies, they refused to permit free distribution of newspapers in the north or to allow unified fiscal policies. The Russians flatly rejected joint control over transportation, electric power, and communications, arguing that a definitive arrangement would have to await the creation of a provisional
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government for all Korea.

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New York Times, December 28, 1945, p. 12; Hodge to War, December 31, 1945, Dept. of State Records, 740.00119 Control (Korea)/12-3045, NA.

51

New York Times, January 16, 1946, p. 2, and January 17, 1946, p. 17; Benninghoff to Byrnes, February 15, 1946, FRUS, 1946, VIII, 634-636.

52

Hodge to War, February 19, 1946, JCS Records, CCAC 014 Korea (8-24-45), sec. III, RG 218, NA; New York Times, February 7, 1946, p. 17, and February 8, 1946, p. 12; U.S. Department of State, The Record on Korean Unification, 1943-1960: Narrative Summary with Principal Documents, Far Eastern Series, no. 101 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office,

Obviously, Moscow had no intention of weakening its control in the north without assurances that there would be a friendly Korean government after reunification. But there now was reason for optimism about Korea's future. Soviet-American negotiations at the local level had experienced significant progress and the overall Moscow agreement provided a workable formula for ending the partition and eventually achieving an independent Korea. Lieutenant General John R. Hodge, the U.S. occupation commander in Korea, was not so sanguine. He warned Washington that it could expect a similar divergence of interpretation when negotiations began for the creation of a provisional government. As an essential precondition, Hodge believed that the U.S. should insist upon the immediate establishment of complete freedom of speech, press, and movement throughout Korea. The State Department at first hesitated, but then authorized Hodge to insist on the right of free expression in consultations at the Joint Commission. If Moscow spurned this proposal, Hodge would announce that the Soviet Union was barring free speech and elementary civil liberties. American leaders were confident that popular criticism of Moscow would then force Stalin to retreat and accept Washington's position.

Soviet and American representatives met in Seoul on March 20, 1946, for the start of the Joint Commission negotiations. Even before the hard bargaining began, both sides had drawn distinct lines of disagreement. In his opening statement, Colonel General Terenty F. Shtikov declared that the Soviet government was committed to the attainment in Korea of "a true democratic and independent country, friendly to the Soviet Union, so that

October 1960), 5-6.

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Hodge to War, January 22, 1946, JCS Records, CCS 383.21 Korea (3-19-45), sec. III, RG 218, NA.

54

JCS to MacArthur, February 28, 1946, FRUS, 1946, VIII, 644.

in the future it will not become a base for an attack on the Soviet Union." Therefore, the Korean provisional government had to reflect not only wide representation but also unqualified support for the terms of the Moscow agreement. In response, Hodge emphasized that the U.S. was determined to see that "a government that corresponds to the views of the majority is established." Only national self-determination, he argued, could produce "the political, economic, and social progress of the Korean people, the development of democratic self-government and the establishment of the national independence of Korea."⁵⁵⁾ If the Soviet and American delegates could have found a way to reconcile these divergent positions at the Joint Commission, there might have been no Korean War.

Shtikov, during the early sessions, resisted the American desire for nationwide consultations; he wanted discussion within each individual zone instead. Later, Shtikov favored consultation only with parties that backed the Moscow agreement. Nonetheless, the negotiators ultimately reached agreement on the first phase of action at the Joint Commission. This stage would include consultation with local parties, consideration of a political platform, recommendation of a charter, and a choice of personnel for the provisional government. The Joint Commission organized three subcommittees to formulate specific measures for attaining each objective.⁵⁶⁾ This spirit of cooperation abruptly disappeared when the negotiators attempted to agree on the Korean parties eligible for consultation. The Soviets were shocked when the U.S. delegation announced that there were 500 legitimate parties in southern Korea eligible for consultation compared to only forty in the

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Hodge to Byrnes, March 22, 1946, FRUS, 1946, VIII, 652-653.

56

John Z. Williams to John Carter Vincent, March 25, 1946, Dept. of State Records, 501.BB Korea/3-2546, NA; Williams to Hugh Borton, April 2, 1946, *ibid.*, 501.BB Korea/4-246; New York Times, March 31, 1946, p. 14.

north. When Shtikov objected to consulting groups hostile to trusteeship, American representative William R. Langdon retorted that Korean hostility to the Moscow agreement did not constitute an acceptable criterion for determining legitimacy. Byrnes instantly approved the U.S. delegation's decision to resist Moscow's attempt to exclude from consultation those parties belonging to the "Anti-Trusteeship Committee".⁵⁷⁾

Moscow's behavior at the Joint Commission was not surprising. The Soviet Union was exploiting the trusteeship issue as a device to prevent a sizable group of anti-Soviet Korean leaders from gaining access to postwar political power. Yet the U.S. was in the unenviable position of insisting upon consultation with those very individuals who sought to undermine the work of the Joint Commission. Fears of sovietization dictated the stand of the American delegation. The U.S. believed that the exclusion of the conservatives would ensure a Communist seizure of power.⁵⁸⁾ Surprisingly, the Soviet-American negotiators appeared to have broken the deadlock with the publication on April 18 of a joint communique. The commission agreed to consult all "democratic parties and social organizations which are truly democratic in their aims" and would sign a declaration pledging to uphold Soviet-American decisions on creation of a provisional government. More important, the communique included as well a provision requiring all the signators to accept the trusteeship section of the Moscow agreement.⁵⁹⁾

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Williams to Borton, April 2, 1946, Dept. of State Records, 501.BB Korea/4-246, NA; Byrnes to Langdon, April 5, 1946, FRUS, 1946, VIII, 657-658.

58

Byrnes to Langdon, April 16, 1946, FRUS, 1946, VIII, 660-661; Langdon to Byrnes, August 30, 1946, Dept. of State Records, 711.00/8-3046, NA.

59

"Communique Issued by U.S.-Soviet Joint Commission on April 18, 1946," Department of State Bulletin, XVI (January 27, 1947), 173.

American officials in Seoul were pleased with the compromise because it seemed to permit consultation with the extreme right. Their optimism was premature. When negotiations resumed, Shtikov advocated exclusion of many prominent conservative leaders because they were affiliated with no specific organized group. The U.S. delegation insisted upon consultation with "all schools of political thought irrespective of our estimate of their popular backing." The Soviet representative raised a more serious barrier when he argued logically that a mere signature on a pledge would provide no guarantee of support for the Moscow agreement. Shtikov stated frankly that he would not sanction consultation with those groups most critical of trusteeship. When the American delegation adamantly upheld the principle of absolute freedom of expression, negotiations reached an impasse.⁶⁰⁾ On May 7, Hodge informed Washington that he would propose an adjournment of the Joint Commission the following day sine die, claiming that the only way to achieve Korea's reunification was by "standing firm"⁶¹⁾ and "letting the Soviets make the next move."

For some observers at the time, adjournment of the Joint Commission on May 8 constituted the first step toward civil war. Indeed, during the spring of 1946, rumors about armed clashes at the 38th parallel increased, while scattered acts of violence were everyday occurrences in the American zone.⁶²⁾ Responsibility for the Joint Commission's failure and this missed

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Hodge to War, April 20, 1946, Dept. of the Army Records, P&O 091 Korea, sec. 1, cases 1-14, box 87, RG 319, NA; Langdon to Byrnes, April 14, 1946, and Acheson to Moscow, Nanking, and Paris embassies, April 25, 1946, FRUS, 1946, VIII, 660-661; New York Times, April 11, 1946, p. 13, April 23, 1946, p. 11, and April 27, 1946, p. 5.

61

Hodge to War, May 7, 1946, JCS Records, Leahy file, Korea 1946-1947, RG 218, NA; Hodge to War, May 9, 1946, FRUS, 1946, VIII, 665-667.

62

New York Times, April 11, 1946, p. 13, April 17, 1946, p. 24, April 26, 1946, p. 8, May 8, 1946, p. 10, and May 9, 1946, p. 15.

opportunity to avoid the Korean War rests primarily with the Soviet Union. Although there was legal and logical justification for Moscow's position, exclusion of the conservatives from consultation violated the principle of national self-determination. More important, the extreme left definitely would dominate the provisional government even with rightist participation. As Hodge admitted at the time, since "the southern political structure includes almost equally left . . . and moderate-rightists, we would either have to nominate an unrepresentative slate for the south or expect its being outnumbered by combined strength of North and South Moscow controlled groups."⁶³⁾ Because of Soviet inflexibility on the issue of consultations, the U.S. was able to escape this unpleasant predicament.

For a second time, events outside of Korea closed what had seemed to be a promising road leading toward reunification and independence. Early in 1946, Stalin delivered a speech announcing a renewal of the worldwide struggle between communism and capitalism. Shortly thereafter, Churchill, in his Iron Curtain speech, called for accepting this challenge. The Joint Commission failed because the Cold War in Europe now had eliminated any foundation for trust between Moscow and Washington. Soviet suspicion of American motives in Korea was deep and intense, especially after Byrnes, upon his return from the Moscow Conference, announced that a trusteeship for Korea might not be necessary.⁶⁴⁾ Far worse, Hodge was permitting Korean conservatives to oppose the Moscow agreement. Moscow charged that the U.S. was determined to install anti-Soviet leaders in the provisional government

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Hodge to War, April 20, 1946, Dept. of the Army Records, P&O 091 Korea, sec. I, cases 1-14, box 87, RG 319, NA.

64

James F. Byrnes, "Report by the Secretary of State on the Meeting of Foreign Ministers," Department of State Bulletin, XIII (December 30, 1945), 1035-1036; Memorandum of conversation, January 4, 1946, Dept. of State Records, 740.00119 Control (Korea)/1-446, NA.

at all costs in order to prevent democracy and subordinate Korea to American political and economic influence. Under no circumstances, one Soviet writer proclaimed, would the Soviet Union permit "imperialist forces" to use Korea⁶⁵⁾ "as a base and jumping-off place for a attack on our country." Moscow was confident that time was on its side. Eventually, political violence and economic deterioration in southern Korea would force American withdrawal, opening the way to Communist control over the entire peninsula.

American military leaders were more than willing to leave Korea and satisfy Moscow's expectations. However, Truman refused to abandon Korea because this would inflict serious damage on the international credibility and prestige of the United States. Washington therefore persuaded Moscow to resume deliberations at the Joint Commission in May 1947, but nothing had changed. Two months of negotiations failed to produce an answer to the deadlock on consultations.⁶⁶⁾ Already, the administration had embraced the containment policy to halt Soviet expansion in Europe. State Department officials now wanted to apply the same approach in Korea, but Congress was unwilling to finance a program of economic aid for a separate government south of the 38th parallel. As a result, Truman's diplomatic advisors had to develop another strategy for ending the Korean stalemate permanently. In July 1947, the State Department finished work on a draft proposal that ultimately would offer Korea a third opportunity to achieve reunification and independence. Although the plan outlined three different scenarios,⁶⁷⁾ each provided for referral of the Korean issue to the United Nations.

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New York Times, May 16, 1946, p. 15; Max Beloff, Soviet Foreign Policy in the Far East (New York: Oxford University Press, 1953), 163.

66

Matray, The Reluctant Crusade, pp. 89-120.

67

John M. Allison memorandum, July 29, 1947, and Ad-Hoc Committee to SWNCC, August 4, 1947, FRUS, 1947, VI: The Far East and Australasia

In August 1947, Washington submitted its proposal to Moscow. Since the Joint Commission was unable to implement the Moscow agreement, the U.S. recommended the convening of a four-power conference to discuss alternative measures for achieving Korea's reunification and independence. The Truman administration expected and received the Soviet rejection of its proposal early in September. Acting in accordance with the State Department's plan, Truman instructed Secretary of State George C. Marshall to address the U.N. General Assembly during its next session and place the Korean issue on its agenda.⁶⁸⁾ In his speech on September 17, Marshall professed that the main reason for the impasse over Korea was Moscow's adamant stand against the principle freedom of expression. Since Soviet-American negotiations had not led to the fulfillment of past agreements on Korea, Marshall asked for international action to remove this threat to world peace.⁶⁹⁾

On October 17, Warren R. Austin, the permanent U.S. representative at the U.N., presented the American resolution on Korea and urged swift international approval. Based on a State Department draft, it called for free elections under U.N. supervision no later than March 31, 1948. This legislature, reflecting the two-to-one population superiority of southern Korea, would formulate a constitution and appoint officials to serve in a provisional government. Perhaps most important, the resolution provided for creation of a "United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea" (UNTCOK)

(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing, 1974), 734-741.

68

Robert A. Lovett to Walter Bedell Smith, August 21, 1947, and V. M. Molotov to George C. Marshall, September 4, 1947, FRUS, 1947, VI, 771-776; "Letter from Acting Secretary of State to the Soviet Foreign Minister," Department of State Bulletin, XVII (September 7, 1947), 473-475; "Korean Question to Be Referred to General Assembly," Department of State Bulletin, XVII (September 28, 1947), 623-624.

69

George C. Marshall, "A Program for a More Effective United Nations," Department of State Bulletin, XVII (September 28, 1947), 619-620; New York Times, September 18, 1947, pp. 8, 24.

comprised of eleven nations to supervise the elections, foster freedom of choice, and report its findings to the General Assembly. A final provision called for Soviet-American withdrawal after the formation of a provisional government. Less than one week later, Moscow submitted a proposal to the U.N. calling for an immediate end to Soviet-American occupation of Korea so that the Korean people could achieve reunification and independence without outside interference.⁷⁰⁾ International action--or inaction--would determine once again whether there would be an alternative to war in Korea.

Moscow's proposal for joint military withdrawal helped to crystallize American contingency plans for the creation of a separate government south of the 38th parallel. Hodge was nervous about the consequences of imminent Soviet disengagement from the north. After Russian withdrawal, he feared that the northern puppet army might mount an invasion against the south. The administration was confident, however, that once U.N. representatives were present in Korea, the threat of armed invasion southward virtually would disappear.⁷¹⁾ In another cable, Hodge voiced doubts that the Soviet Union ever would cooperate with the U.N. or permit peaceful reunification. U.S. military withdrawal from Korea therefore would be disastrous unless the administration fulfilled certain conditions. For example, Washington, he advised, had to implement an U.S. supervised five-year rehabilitation program. Once southern Korea developed economic strength and political

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Warren R. Austin to Trygve Lie, October 17, 1947, and Austin to Marshall, October 29, 1947, FRUS, 1947, VI, 832-835, 849; Warren R. Austin, "The Problem of the Independence of Korea," Department of State Bulletin, XVII (October 26, 1947), 820-822; New York Times, October 18, 1947, p. 14.

71

T. N. Dupuy memorandum, October 15, 1947, Dept. of the Army Records, P&O 091 Korea, sec. III, cases 16-50, box 87, RG 319, NA; S. L. Scott memorandum, October 16, 1947, *ibid.*, P&O 091 Korea TS, sec. I, pt. I, box 20; William H. Draper to Hodge, October 26, 1947, *ibid.*, P&O 091 Korea, sec. II, pt. I, case 2 only, box 87.

stability, Hodge predicted that "national feeling among the north Koreans may be aroused and sufficient pressure brought to bear upon the Soviets to compel them to permit . . . amalgamation of the two areas." Hodge thought that if the U.S. temporarily tolerated Korea's partition and applied the containment strategy, the Soviet Union would retreat. ⁷²⁾ Moscow's refusal to cooperate with the U.N. forced the U.S. to adopt this approach, thereby creating two Koreans dedicated to each other's destruction.

Despite Moscow's opposition, the administration's policy at the U.N. experienced rapid progress. On November 4, the organization's political committee approved the American proposal on Korea, which now provided for Soviet-American withdrawal from the peninsula within ninety days after the creation of a provisional government. Some administration officials were troubled about appearing unduly hasty, but the Soviet withdrawal proposal gave the Washington no choice. Much to the satisfaction of Truman and his advisors, the General Assembly passed the American-sponsored resolution on November 14 by a wide margin. ⁷³⁾ American leaders were also happy with the composition of the UNCTOC. Of the nine members, Canada, Australia, China, France, El Salvador, and the Philippines all had close economic, political, and military ties to the U.S. Only Syria and India were likely to hamper the pursuit of American objectives, while the final member, the Ukraine, probably would decline to serve. Marshall was jubilant. He immediately instructed Hodge to prepare for elections and contact the UNCTOC upon its

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Hodge to JCS, November 21, 1947, Dept. of the Army Records, P&O 091 Korea TS, FW 38, RG 319, NA; R. F. Seedlock memorandum, November 28, 1947, *ibid.*, P&O 091 Korea TS. sec. I, case 1, box 20.

73

Austin to Marshall, November 14, 1947, FRUS, 1947, VI, 857-859; Seedlock memorandum, November 4, 1947, Dept. of the Army Records, P&O 091 Korea, sec. III, cases 16-50, box 87, RG 319, NA; New York Times, October 30, 1947, p. 24.

74)
arrival to establish the specific date for the balloting.

Many nations endorsed U.N. involvement in the Korean affair with great reluctance. After all, the Soviet Union already had announced its refusal to cooperate with efforts to implement the November 14 resolution. H. V. Evatt of Australia, for instance, insisted during discussions with American officials that Korea was a question for Soviet-American resolution or, as a last resort, a Japanese peace conference.⁷⁵⁾ Canada indicated that it would not send a representative to serve on the UNICOK but changed its mind after receiving Truman's personal plea for cooperation.⁷⁶⁾ Several members of the temporary commission shared these misgivings, but chose nevertheless to travel to Korea in January 1948 hoping to achieve Korean reunification and independence. Moscow's attitude was central to the prospects for the UNICOK's success. Many observers thought that the Soviets would not defy overwhelming pressure from the world community for international action. Any reason for optimism vanished, however, when the Ukraine announced it would not participate in the UNICOK's activities. At its first meeting, the temporary commission expressed regret over the Ukrainian decision, but quickly agreed to approach each occupation commander with a request for cooperation and the release of political prisoners.⁷⁷⁾

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New York Times, November 5, 1947, p. 26; Leon Gordenker, The United Nations and the Peaceful Reunification of Korea: The Politics of Field Operations, 1947-1950 (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1959), 31; Marshall to Joseph E. Jacobs, November 17, 1947, and Jacobs to Marshall, November 19, 1947, FRUS, 1947, VI, 860-862.

75

Gordenker, The United Nations and the Peaceful Reunification of Korea, p. 21; Memorandum of conversation, October 28, 1947, FRUS, 1947, VI, 552-553.

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Matray, The Reluctant Crusade, pp. 137-139.

77

Gordenker, The United Nations and the Peaceful Reunification of Korea, pp. 50-52; New York Times, January 10, 1948, p. 14, January 13, 1948, p. 2, January 14, 1948, p. 10, and January 18, 1948, IV, p. 10.

Hodge quickly pledged full support for conducting free and unfettered elections in the U.S. zone. To no one's surprise, the Soviet occupation commander ignored the temporary commission's communication. United Nations Secretary General Trygve Lie then approached the Soviet delegation directly with a plea for cooperation. In reply, Andrei Gromyko reminded Lie that Moscow already had indicated its "negative attitude" toward the UNICOK's activities. Austin now pressed Lie to declare his advocacy of supervised elections in southern Korea alone. Moscow's refusal to cooperate in the implementation of the November 14 resolution would lead to the creation of two Koreas and the outbreak of a war for reunification. For a second time, the Soviet Union had blocked a promising avenue leading toward a peaceful resolution of the Korean dispute. Had Moscow agreed to allow nationwide elections, it undoubtedly could have forced the U.S. to accept concessions regarding the elections that would increase the probability of an outcome favoring Soviet interests. Most Koreans were likely to vote for moderate and leftist candidates in any event. As the applications for consultation at the Joint Commission in the summer of 1947 had revealed, conservative parties were in a minority in the south. With the Communists enjoying widespread popularity in the north, there was little chance that free elections would produce an anti-Soviet government for all Korea.

By the fall of 1947, however, there was scant hope that Stalin would cooperate with the U.N.'s efforts to achieve Korea's reunification. A large majority of member nations in the international organization were aligned closely with the United States, making it impossible for Moscow to

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Jacobs to Marshall, January 24, 1948, FRUS, 1948, VI: The Far East and Australasia (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1974), 1085-1086; New York Times, January 24, 1948, p. 14.

79

Jacobs to Marshall, June 26, 1947, and Hodge to Marshall, June 26,

believe that the U.N. would be fair and impartial. Korea also was the victim of a recent escalation in the intensity of the Soviet-American rivalry. The Truman administration's proposal of the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan had placed the Soviet Union on the defensive. Now, Washington seemed to be forcing the issue with respect to Korea as well. Cold War tensions apparently blinded Moscow to the risks involved in a decision to defy the U.N. If the UNICOM chose to supervise elections in southern Korea alone, this would result in the emergence of a separate government hostile to the Soviet Union, an outcome Moscow consistently had sought to prevent. The conservatives in fact had acted swiftly to exploit Moscow's uncooperative stand, publicly demanding separate elections and the creation of a security force in southern Korea prior to American military withdrawal. American leaders had tried since 1945 to prevent a rightist political triumph but now assigned greater importance to establishing a bulwark preventing Communist control over the entire peninsula.

Some Korean leaders saw that if elections occurred only in southern Korea, this would transform the 38th parallel into a permanent boundary line dividing two countries. For example, Kim Kyu-sik, whose aspirations for political authority had briefly received American support during 1946, believed that supervised elections in the American zone alone would be a disaster. On the eve of the arrival of the UNICOM in Korea, the moderate politician had formed a "National Independence Federation" to build support for convening a "North-South Conference" to remove the partition of Korea. Only the Koreans themselves, Kim insisted, could end partisan strife and achieve the political unity necessary for peaceful reunification. He

1947, FRUS, 1947, VI, 679-680.

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New York Times, January 28, 1948, p. 2; Jacobs to Marshall, January 30, 1948, FRUS, 1948, VI, 1088-1089.

predicted that the arrival of the temporary commission would not bring reunification but would instead guarantee Korea's permanent division.⁸¹⁾ Significantly, Kim managed to enlist the backing of Kim Ku, a staunch conservative and wartime president of the Korean Provisional Government. Other political leaders joined the two Kims in advocating a "North-South Conference", while organizing opposition to anything less than nationwide elections.⁸²⁾ Although the chances for success were slim, there now was a fourth and final opportunity to avoid the Korean War.

Kim Kyu-sik's campaign against separate elections in southern Korea scored an early success during consultations with the UNTCOK. Members of the temporary commission were quite impressed with the strength of his arguments. Kim advised, for example, that if the UNTCOK desired truly free and democratic elections, "it will take considerable time to make necessary preparations." Should Moscow bar entry to the northern zone, the moderate leader strongly urged the UNTCOK to refer the entire matter back to the U.N. Interim Committee for reconsideration. Several of the temporary commission's members were receptive to Kim's viewpoint. Thus, a number of the UNTCOK delegates favored a delay until the U.N. commission could confer with the Interim Committee.⁸³⁾ Rising violence and disruption in the American zone contributed to this hesitancy. In January 1948, the extreme left organized a "General Strike Committee" to instigate work stoppages and acts of sabotage throughout southern Korea. Within four months, political unrest produced almost three hundred deaths and more

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Langdon to Marshall, December 30, 1947, Dept. of State Records, 895.01/12-3047, NA.

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Jacobs to Marshall, February 10, 1948, FRUS, 1948, VI, 1101-1103.

83

Jacobs to Marshall, January 29, 1948, and February 2, 1948, *ibid.*, 1087-1091.

84)
than ten thousand imprisonments. Some members of the UNTCOK concluded that these conditions made it impossible to conduct genuinely free and democratic elections south of the 38th parallel.

For American occupation officials, the UNTCOK's refusal to promptly authorize elections in southern Korea was thoroughly unacceptable. The temporary commission, they believed, had to accept the fact that the elections would be imperfect and would exclude the northern Koreans. If the UNTCOK fully endorsed the American policy of attempting to create a separate government as quickly as possible, such dissidents as Kim Kyu-sik and Kim Ku would bow to the inevitable and advocate separate elections as well.

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Hodge and his political advisor Joseph E. Jacobs both agreed that referral of the Korean issue back to the U.N. would be calamitous. They appealed to Washington to persuade the Interim Committee not to delay the elections any longer. Hodge also informed the administration of his need for more troops to maintain law and order. Unable to supply additional forces, Washington approved General Douglas MacArthur's suggestion to authorize an expansion of the Korean constabulary army to 50,000. 86)
The Soviets already had begun to build a powerful military force in the north and now the U.S. opted to follow a similar course in the south. Without this external military support, there would have been no Korean War.

American actions in southern Korea had a decisive impact on Soviet policy in the north. U.S. liaison officers in Pyongyang reported that the northern Koreans were on the verge of promulgating a new constitution for

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New York Times, February 8, 1948, p. 1, and February 11, 1948, p. 10.

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Jacobs to Marshall, February 8, 1948, FRUS, 1948, VI, 1095-1097.

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Jacobs to Marshall, February 10, 1948, *ibid.*, 1099-1101; Jacobs to Marshall, February 9, 1948, Dept. of State Records, 895.01/2-949, NA; White House meeting, February 18, 1948, in Millis, The Forrestal Diaries, p. 375.

a separate government of their own. On February 16, 1948, the People's Committee proclaimed its intention to form a government representing all Korea within the next few months. In subsequent statements, the northern Koreans condemned the UNTCOK as a tool of the U.S. and called upon all southern Koreans to resist the creation of a separate government.⁸⁷⁾ These events in the north reinforced the reticence of the UNTCOK. Key temporary commission members were certain that separate elections would harden the division of Korea and open the way to a bloody civil war. On February 6, the UNTCOK voted to refer the Korean matter to the U.N. Interim Committee for reconsideration in view of the Soviet Union's uncooperative attitude. In its report, the temporary commission recommended that the U.N. approve the election of consultants alone to assist in determining Korea's destiny. The Indian delegate, K. P. S. Menon, thus traveled to New York carrying a report that contained few specific recommendations from the UNTCOK on how to resolve the Korean predicament.⁸⁸⁾

World leaders had not failed to notice the marked increase in violence and disruption in southern Korea. In the interests of peace and stability, the Interim Committee thus decided to consider the UNTCOK report earlier than it originally had intended. Members of the Interim Committee surely were aware that sponsoring separate elections would solidify the partition of Korea. Withdrawal and inaction, on the other hand, would open the way to Communist control throughout the peninsula.⁸⁹⁾ It soon became clear

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Jacobs to Marshall, January 31, 1948, and February 24, 1948, FRUS, 1948, VI, 1088-1089, 1129-1131; New York Times, February 14, 1948, p. 10; Time, February 23, 1948, p. 34; David Dallin, Soviet Russia and the Far East (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1949), p. 310.

88

Jacobs to Marshall, February 5, 6, 13, 1948, FRUS, 1948, VI, 1093-1095, 1109.

89

New York Times, February 8, 1948, IV, p. 10, February 10, 1948,

that there was widespread resistance in the U.N. to supervising elections in southern Korea alone. But Washington now was determined to prevent any further delays. Marshall instructed Austin to acquiesce only in a brief adjournment for the examination of the UNICOK's report. During subsequent deliberations, the American delegation was to insist upon fulfillment of the November 14 resolution in those areas open to observation. When Menon presented the UNICOK report, American delegate Philip C. Jessup urged the Interim Committee to authorize elections for a separate government in southern Korea. Menon's response was noncommittal, although he did state that Korea would be ready for independence only following reunification. The Interim Committee now declared a ten-day recess to consider both the UNICOK report and Jessup's proposal.⁹⁰⁾

While the Interim Committee studied Menon's recommendations, the administration inaugurated a high-powered campaign to mobilize support for the American position. In cables to Britain and India, Marshall emphasized that the Koreans would not accept mere consultation with the U.N. because the vast majority of the populace favored quick elections and immediate independence. Marshall's tactic worked. On February 23, London informed Washington that it would accept Jessup's proposal, disavowing any desire to hinder the accomplishment of American objectives. India concurred as well, in large part because the U.S. promised that elections would produce a government for all Korea and not just the south. Once a legislature had emerged representing two-thirds of the Korean population, Marshall thought that the Soviet Union would have no choice but to recognize its legitimacy. Thus, the U.S. managed to convince two of the most influential members of

p. 17, and February 13, 1948, p. 20.

⁹⁰ Gordonker, The United Nations and the Peaceful Reunification of Korea, p. 70; Marshall to Langdon, February 20, 1948, FRUS, 1948, VI, 1124.

the Interim Committee that separate elections would promote, rather than prevent, the implementation of the November 14 resolution on Korea.⁹¹⁾

On February 24, Jessup formally recommended that the UNICOK observe elections for representatives to a national assembly in those areas of Korea accessible to the temporary commission. He confidently predicted that this measure would bring democracy to the majority of the populace and open the way to Soviet-American military withdrawal. Two days later, the Interim Committee approved Jessup's proposal without amendment.

Significantly, two nations with representatives serving on the UNICOK, Canada and Australia, voted against the resolution, while eleven others abstained.⁹²⁾ Jessup's presentation greatly impressed advocates of the American proposal, but Washington's diplomatic maneuvers and the recent Communist coup in Czechoslovakia were the key factors producing the administration's triumph.⁹³⁾

Upon receiving the Interim Committee's new instructions, the UNICOK convened and scheduled elections for May 9, 1948, despite the absence of Canadian delegate George Patterson. Upon his return from Japan, Canada's representative protested that the Interim Committee had only "recommended" that the temporary commission observe the balloting. His main concern was that Korean moderates and leftists would boycott the elections and thereby guarantee a sweeping victory for the anti-Soviet extreme right. When his colleagues refused to issue a clarification of the decision, Patterson

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Marshall to London, February 21, 1948, London to Marshall, February 23, 1948, Marshall to New Delhi, February 24, 1948, and New Delhi to Marshall, February 26, 1948, FRUS, 1948, VI, 1124-1125, 1127-1128.

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Austin to Marshall, February 24, 1948, *ibid.*, 1128-1129; New York Times, March 27, 1948, p. 1.

93

Gordenker, The United Nations and the Peaceful Reunification of Korea, pp. 71-75; New York Times, February 27, 1948, p. 20.

walked out in a huff.

Menon immediately relented and agreed to reconsider the whole matter. When the UNTCOK reconvened on March 12, the Australian delegate suggested that the temporary commission revoke its original decision in view of the probability of an electoral boycott. Instead, the UNTCOK should sponsor the national "North-South Conference" that Kim Kyu-sik had proposed to arrange nationwide elections under international supervision. He spoke vehemently against any action that would reinforce Korea's partition at the 38th parallel. The French delegate disagreed, perhaps with an eye toward ensuring U.S. support for France's policy in Indochina. He urged instead the rapid implementation of the initial decision to supervise separate elections. Syria's representative then offered a compromise: The temporary commission would observe elections in southern Korea alone on May 9, 1948, but only if an atmosphere conducive to freedom of choice existed. In a crucial vote, the UNTCOK approved the Syrian compromise, although Canada and Australia dissented. Thus, the temporary commission discarded the objective of reunification before or through a nationwide election.⁹⁵ This decision meant that American occupation officials and rightist politicians in southern Korea would be able to ignore moderate and leftist demands for participation in the "North-South Conference".

Nevertheless, the two Kims refused to accept the inevitability of separate elections. They gained renewed optimism in late March when the northern Democratic Coalition Front formally proposed a "North-South

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Langdon to Marshall, February 20, 1948, and March 10, 11, 1948, FRUS, 1948, VI, 1121-1122, 1146-1149; New York Times, March 3, 1948, March 9, 1948, p. 12, and March 10, 1948, p. 5.

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Langdon to Marshall, March 12, 1948, FRUS, 1948, VI, 1150-1155; Gordenker, The United Nations and the Peaceful Reunification of Korea, pp. 83-85; New York Times, March 13, 1948, p. 8.

Conference" to organize nationwide elections and secure withdrawal of all foreign troops. This conference would convene in Pyongyang on April 14, and the northerners invited a group of thirteen southern Korean leaders to attend, including Kim Kyu-sik and Kim Ku. Both the Canadian and Australian representatives on the UNTCOK encouraged the two Kims to attend the meeting and even pledged to postpone separate elections in the event of success. Kim Kyu-sik therefore responded favorably to the northern overture, asking Hodge to provide credentials and transportation. Not surprisingly, the U.S. occupation commander refused either to help or to hinder southern Koreans choosing to participate in the "North-South Conference".⁹⁶⁾

Prior to his departure, Kim Kyu-sik requested that the northern Koreans accept certain conditions, including pledges that the conference would not advocate a dictatorship, nationalization of all industries, foreign military bases, or less than free elections. When the northern Koreans consented, the two Kims traveled to Pyongyang, arriving in the northern capital on April 21.⁹⁷⁾ After a week of discussions, however, it was clear that the conference was indeed a sham. The constitution and governmental structure it outlined paralleled closely the Soviet system. In addition, the delegates issued a proclamation placing entire blame for the partition at the 38th parallel on the U.S. and calling upon all true Korean nationalists to demand the immediate withdrawal of American troops and the UNTCOK. Although Kim Kyu-sik was disappointed with the results, he returned to Seoul with a promise from northern leader Kim Il-sung that his

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Jacobs to Marshall, March 29, 1948, and April 5, 1948, FRUS, 1948, VI, 1162-1163, 1169-117; New York Times, March 27, 1948, p. 1; Time, April 5, 1948, p. 29.

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Jacobs to Marshall, April 30, 1948, FRUS, 1948, VI, 1180; New York Times, April 21, 1948, p. 14, and April 22, 1948, p. 2.

government would support truly free elections and accept the outcome. In the end, the two Kims decided not to participate openly in the upcoming elections in the south.⁹⁸⁾

Washington now became virtually obsessed with preventing any further delays. When several religious groups requested a one-day postponement, for example, the U.S. refused. Ultimately, the administration grudgingly relented because a solar eclipse was expected on May 9 and Koreans would construe this as a bad omen.⁹⁹⁾ By this time, Washington had decided that a conservative dominated government in southern Korea would serve American interests. Therefore, U.S. occupation officials permitted the right to inaugurate a campaign of intimidation and violence against moderate and leftist politicians. When the southern Korean people cast votes on May 10, the elections produced the resounding victory for the extreme conservatives that everyone expected.¹⁰⁰⁾ Worse still, a large number of the victorious candidates, including Syngman Rhee, had been outspoken critics of the Soviet Union since 1945. Just prior to the election, these politicians had been vocal in campaign denunciations of Moscow for obstructionism and domination of the north.¹⁰¹⁾ As a result, there was no question that the new South Korean government would be decidedly anti-Soviet.

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Jacobs to Marshall, April 30, 1948, and May 3, 1948, FRUS, 1948, VI, 1184-1186, 1188-1191; New York Times, May 1, 1948, p. 1, and May 6, 1948, p. 15; Gordonker, The United Nations and the Peaceful Reunification of Korea, p. 311; Merrill, Korea, 70-77.

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Langdon to Marshall, March 9, 1948, Dept. of State Records, 895.00/3-948, NA; Marshall to Langdon, March 11, 1948, *ibid.*, 895.00/3-1148; Jacobs to Marshall, March 24, 1948, *ibid.*, 501BB Korea/3-2448; Jacobs to Marshall, April 4, 1948, *ibid.*, 895.00/4-448; New York Times, April 4, 1948, p. 11.

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Matray, The Reluctant Crusade, pp. 147-149.

101

New York Times, May 29, 1948, p. 4; Jacobs to Marshall, May 19, 1948, FRUS, 1948, VI, 1201-1202.

On May 31, 1948, the new legislative assembly formally convened in its opening session. Six weeks later, it promulgated a constitution and then elected Rhee as the nation's first president. On August 15, American military government officially ended with the formal establishment of the Republic of Korea (ROK). Although the ROK claimed to represent all Korea, the U.N. extended qualified recognition as the only legitimate government on the peninsula.¹⁰²⁾ The Truman administration had accomplished its goal of creating a separate government in southern Korea, but in doing so was responsible for shattering the last hope for averting the Korean War. Had the U.S. not badgered the Interim Committee and the UNTCOK into sanctioning separate elections, the U.N. might have assumed primary responsibility for arranging a "North-South Conference" held in Seoul rather than Pyongyang. Popular pressure on both sides of the 38th parallel for national elections then might have persuaded the Soviets to permit northern participation. If not, at least Moscow would have been unable to assign blame to the U.S. and the U.N. for permanently dividing Korea through separate elections.

Meanwhile, political developments in the north were moving along the same path as those in the south. On July 10, Kim Il-sung announced that work on a constitution was near completion. This document provided for a national government with its capital at Seoul. He explained that there would be nationwide elections the following month, while displaying a new national flag sporting a hammer and sickle. On August 25, the People's Committee sponsored elections throughout Korea for delegates to a "Supreme Korean People's Assembly". During the first week in September, this body met in Pyongyang and promulgated the constitution. The legislature also elected a "Supreme People's Council" and chose Kim Tu-bong as chairman.

102

Matray, The Reluctant Crusade, pp. 156-165.

Kim Tu-bong then selected Kim Il-sung as premier and called upon him to form a cabinet, thereby providing the ruling authority for the "Democratic People's Republic of Korea" (DPRK). This new government announced that it represented the entire nation and would send delegates to the U.N. (103)

Thus, Korea had two governments by the end of 1948 and each one was dedicated to achieving reunification of the peninsula regardless of cost. From this point forward, the outbreak of a civil war was only a matter of time. Nevertheless, international developments would continue to have a significant impact on Korean affairs. Perhaps most important was the Truman administration's application of the containment strategy in Korea in an effort to destabilize the Communist regime in the north. It is conceivable that the DPRK decided to invade South Korea because it feared that a U.S. policy of rollback eventually would succeed. First, elections in South Korea during May 1950 had resulted in the defeat of politicians most closely linked to Rhee, suggesting progress toward the realization of a viable, if not democratic, political system. Second, economic conditions in South Korea recently had manifested a marked improvement, while the Rhee government had implemented strong measures to resolve its serious financial problems. Finally, the U.S. had decided to increase military assistance to the ROK. While the DPRK's leaders now had greater reason to fear invasion from the south, they also saw containment as a domestic political threat. North Korea had to destroy its rival or risk an internal rebellion aimed at ending Communist rule and achieving amalgamation with the south.

103

Jacobs to Marshall, July 11, 1948, FRUS, 1948, VI, 1238-1239; New York Times, July 12, 1948, p. 10, September 1, 1948, p. 7, September 11, 1948, p. 4; Department of State, Korea 1945 to 1948: A Report on Political Developments and Economic Resources with Selected Documents, Far Eastern Series #28 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, October 1948), 21; Jungwon A. Kim, Divided Korea: The Politics of Development, 1945-1972 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975), 107-108, 166-168.

It now has been four decades since North Korea launched its invasion of South Korea. The Korean conflict unquestionably had important domestic origins, but it was not a classic civil war. Nations experience internal warfare when their political or military leaders see force as the only way to resolve fundamental disagreements over the establishment of political, economic, and social goals. These circumstances, for example, explain the outbreak of the American Civil War. In Korea, this also may have been true of the internal situation in June 1950, but conditions necessary for civil war evidently did not exist in the immediate aftermath of Japan's surrender in World War II. Most writers agree that in August 1945, the Korean people overwhelmingly supported the indigenous Korean People's Republic because it advocated a radical reform program and relied for legitimacy on a network of local people's committees. But Japan's conquest of Korea in 1905 meant that the Korean people would not be able to determine their own destiny. Leaders in Washington and Moscow, rather than in Seoul and Pyongyang, would make the key decisions transforming Korea's future from political unity and revolutionary change to partition and a bloody war for reunification. From 1945 to 1948, there were a number of opportunities to break this sequence of events, but the Cold War struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union always eliminated the alternatives. The Korean conflict may have had domestic origins, but it was a civil war of a very peculiar sort.

第2次 韓國戰爭 國際學術會議
1990. 6. 14 ~ 6. 15, 서울

I-2

一種의 內戰：韓國戰爭의 國際的 起源

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I

해리 트루만 美國 大統領은 韓國戰爭의 起源을 쉽게 설명하고 있다. 그는 回顧錄에서 솔직하게 “히틀러, 뭇솔리니, 그리고 日本 사람들이 10년전, 15년전 그리고 20년 전에 행동했던 것처럼 共產主義가 韓國에서 활동하고 있었다”¹⁾라고 썼다. 어니스트 메이가 밝힌 것 처럼 그것은 北韓의 南侵에 대응하는 1930년대 트루만의 사고를 지배하고 있던 원리를 창조한 教訓이었다.²⁾ 만약 美國이 韓國을 共產主義者들의 정복으로부터 막아주지 않는다면, 또다른 侵略을 고무할 것이다. 世界 第2次 大戰 前에 있었던 國際情勢의 결과는 侵略者를 억제하지 않는 화해는 단지 더 어려운 상황에서 未來戰을 보장할 뿐이라는 것을 증명해 주었다. 트루만의 參謀들은 韓國戰爭이 蘇聯이 1945년 이래로 추구해 왔던 世界膨脹戰略의 직접적인 결과로 거의 모두 判斷하고 있었다. 예를 들어 美 國務長官 딘 애치슨은 나중에 蘇聯이 ‘降伏하라 그렇지 않으면 공격당할 것이다’라는 警告文이 적혀진 短劍을 던진 것이라고 말했다.³⁾ 그당시 유일하게 의견을 달리한 사람은 蘇聯問題 專門家인 조오지 케난으로 그는 韓國戰爭을 內亂으로 간주하고 國際戰爭으로 보지 않았으며 보통 國際的 의미에 있어서 ‘侵略’이라는 단어는 잘못 쓰여졌다고 했다.⁴⁾

韓國戰爭이 발발한지 40년이 지난 오늘날 그 起源에 대한 主要 解明은 극적으로 변화하여 왔다. 이러한 분석적 변화를 잘 설명한 것이 켈럼 맥도날드가 쓴 「韓國：越南 以前の 戰爭」의 첫페이지에 등장한다. 거기서 著者が 주장하기를 1945년 日帝治下로부터 해방된 이후로 실현되고 있는 內亂의 가장 최근 행위가 北韓의 攻擊이었다고 한다. 버튼 카우프만은 韓國戰爭이라는 제목을 가진 그의 최근 研究論文(“韓國戰爭：危機, 信賴, 그리고 命令의 挑戰”)에서 그 戰爭을 “진정한 內亂”이라고

규정하고 있다. 그 戰爭을 國際情勢의 관점에서 평가하려고 노력하는 피터 로우에의 著書 “韓國戰爭의 起源”에서조차도 1950년까지 “韓半島의 상황은 참으로 內亂이 일어날만한 상황이었다”라고 결론짓고 있다. 가장 최근에 존 메릴이 논박하기를 韓國戰爭에 관한 예전의 설명은 “地域的 背景”을 무시한 것이라고 했다. 그의 저서 「韓半島：戰爭의 起源」이라는 책에서 “그 戰爭이 南韓에서 진행되고 있던 국민들의 투쟁에 끼어든 사례로 유용하게 해석되어질 수 있다”라고 했다.⁵⁾

이러한 책들이 어떤 해석적 경향을 반영하여 주고 있는데 그것은 1981년 「韓國戰爭의 起源」이라는 제목의 부르스 커밍스의 영향력있는 책의 발행과 함께 시작되었다. 매우 조심스럽게 그리고 全力을 다해 모은 美國과 韓國의 資料의 도움으로 커밍스가 주장하기를 “韓國戰爭의 起源은 첫째로 1945년부터 1950년까지 발생했던 사건들에서 찾아져야 하며 둘째로는 그 시기에 이상한 자국을 남긴 植民統治 期間에 韓國으로 보내진 兵力에서 찾아져야 만 한다.” 아시아의 다른 지역에서 처럼 世界 第2次 大戰이 끝나기도 전에 革命的 民族主義는 韓半島의 제1의 정치세력이었다. 과격한 변화를 선호하는 운동 지도자들은 韓國의 전통적인 政治·社會·經濟的 體制 뿐만 아니라 日本의 植民主義를 파괴하기 위하여 노력했다. 그러나 美國의 목표는 戰後世界에서 주도권을 잡는 것이었으므로 韓國에서의 左派의 승리를 막으려고 했다. 커밍스에 있어서 韓半島의 南쪽 전반을 차지하려는 決定(1945년)은 “전례없는 야심적인 행위”이며 “牽制는 전후 처음의 행위”였다. 美 占領軍 관리들은 보수파들의 政治的 열망을 지지하고 “만장일치의 행동을 통하여 共產主義에 대항하는 칠벽요새”를 지을 것을 시도하면서 일부러 反革命 과정을 따라갔다.⁶⁾ 만약 美國이 韓國戰爭에 참여하지 않았다면 民衆들이 革命的으로 政治와 경제가 변화하는 것을 선호했기 때문에 共產主義 정

부가 통일된 韓國을 통치하는 결과가 되었을 것이다.

커밍스의 해석을 전부 받아들이는 학자는 거의 없다. 그럼에도 불구하고 韓國戰爭의 起源에 대한 반응으로 여론은 그 戰爭이 韓國 內部에 기원을 가지고 있으며 사실상 內亂으로 나타났다. 그러나 이 해석은 1950년 6월 트루만 大統領의 해석과 마찬가지로 대단히 복잡한 질문에 대하여 지나치게 간단한 해답을 제시하고 있다. 韓國에서 발생한 적개심의 발발을 설명하는데 있어서 국제적 요소는 최근 學者들이 인정하려고 하는 것보다 훨씬 더 중요한 역할을 한다. 아마도 더 중요한 것은, 國內에 그 기원을 두고 있다는 論爭은 韓國戰爭이 거의 전적으로 美國에 책임이 있다는 非難을 일으켰다. 그러나 韓國 歷史에서 지난 세기의 진짜 악당은 日本이었다. 만약 日本이 1905년에 韓國을 정복해서 韓半島를 植民地國으로 合併하지 않았더라면 1950년에 아무런 戰爭도 없었을 것이다. 1941년 日本의 진주만 侵攻은 韓國에 중대한 간접적 충격을 주었을 것이다. 美國과 戰爭을 한다는 것은 어떠한 형태에 있어서든 韓國을 공동 占有하는 것이 불가피하다는 것을 의미했다. 世界 第2次 大戰이 終熄되면 韓半島에서 日本군을 격파하거나 日本군의 항복을 받을 수 있기 때문에 戰後에 韓國이 國際적으로 고립된다는 것은⁷⁾ 현실적으로 맞는 예상이 아니었다. 그래서 1945년 38도선에서 蘇聯과 美國이 韓國을 분할점령하고 그 결과 5년후에 戰爭이 일어나게 된 궁극적인 責任은 日本에 있다.

II

韓國의 戰後 운명에 관한 蘇聯과 美國의 論議에 있어서 聯合國間의 戰時 協商은 軍事占領과는 대조적으로 전혀 불가피한 것은 아니었다.

사실상 이 論文이 立證하듯이, 1945년 7월과 1948년 4월 사이에 韓國의 統一을 성사시킬 수 있도록 와싱턴과 모스크바가 조치를 취할 수 있었던 경우가 최소한 4번은 있었다. 그러나 그때마다 韓國이 冷戰의 捕虜가 된 것처럼, 國際的 要所들이 協約의 시행을 가로막곤 하였다. 美國과 蘇聯 兩國의 어느 쪽도 分斷을 終熄시키는데 그 目的을 둔 해결책을 받아들여려 하지 않았다. 왜냐하면 그렇게할 경우 상대국이 統一된 韓國을 統治하도록 허용할 수 있기 때문이었다. 켈럼 맥도날드가 관찰한 것처럼 “強大國 間의 경쟁에 대한 궁극적인 결과는 統一이라는 대의명분에 公約을 結 두 國家 사이에서 內亂을 제도화한 것이었다.”⁸⁾ 2개의 韓國이 생기고 나서 美國과 蘇聯은 서로의 競爭國을 威脅하기 위하여 충분한 지원을 공급해 주었다. 美蘇 兩國이 戰爭을 일으킬 수 있는 手段을 제공해 주었기 때문에 南北韓 지도자들은 武力에 호소함으로써 統一을 달성할 수 있는 계획을 進行시킬 수 있었다. 따라서 韓國戰爭의 발발을 가능하게 만든 환경은 바로 國際情勢였던 것이다.

정통한 소식통은 차치하고라도 10년내인 1942년에 美軍이 韓國에서 싸우고 있을거라고 예견한 美國人은 거의 없었다. 사실상, 世界 第2次 大戰에 美國이 參戰한지 1년이 되기 전에 프랭클린 루우스벨트 大統領은 韓半島에서 戰後 충돌을 방지하는 政策을 고수하였다. 韓國이 東北아시아의 戰略 中心点이므로 前 歷史에 걸쳐서 強大國 競爭의 희생물이 되어왔다는 것을 美國 官吏들은 알고 있었다.⁹⁾ 그러므로 그 지역과 직접 연관된 모든 國家의 利益을 보호하여 줄 協約을 協商하는데 協力하는 聯合國의 능력에 世界 第2次 大戰後의 미래가 놓여 있었다. 美 國務省은 國際的 信託統治를 만들어낼 계획을 세웠는데 그것은 戰後 世界에서 韓國이 놓여 있는 잠재적 긴장과 충돌의 위험을 제거하기 위한 것이었다.¹⁰⁾

루우스벨트의 外交參謀들은 批判을 받을 것을 예상했는데 특히 海外亡命中인 韓國人들이 즉각적인 독립과 자치를 世界 第2次 大戰後에 약속하지 않았던 점에 非難을 하리라고 예상했지만 많은 요인들이 信託에 유리하게끔 움직였다. 첫째로, 대다수의 韓國人들이 가난하고 文盲人이며 政治的 經驗이 없고 經濟的으로 落後되어 있었다. 日本의 40년 동안의 지배가 끝난 후에 오로지 年老한 韓國人들 만이 韓國이 自治國이라는 것을 기억할 뿐이었다. 둘째로, 여러 개의 韓國團體들이 美國, 中國, 그리고 蘇聯에 亡命中에 있었는데 그들 각각이 韓國의 합법적인 대표라고 주장하였다. 韓半島에 관하여 日本이 가지고 있던 통치권 전체를 이양했을 경우 위의 경쟁자들 중에서 어느 단체가 韓國內에서 강한 조직적 後援을 얻을 것인가에 대하여 美國 官吏들은 의심하였다. 마지막으로, 日本과 마찬가지로 韓國의 가장 근접한 이웃 國家인 中國과 蘇聯이 韓國의 미래발전에 관심을 가지고 있었다. 韓國의 운명을 결정하는데 있어서 信託은 競爭보다는 協力을 조장했을 것이다.¹¹⁾

世界 第2次 大戰 동안에 루우스벨트 行政府는 韓國에서 美國의 目的을 추구하기 위하여 二元的 過程을 따랐다. 첫째로, 美國은 경쟁상태에 있는 韓國의 亡命團體에 대한 인정과 物資支援을 보류하였다. 1942년 3월 한 記者會見에서 國務省 次官인 썸너 웰리스가 설명하기를 “自由運動”에 대하여 美國 政策의 公平성은 韓國에 적용될 것이라고 말했다. 비록 華盛頓에서는 韓國의 民族主義라는 대의명분에 대하여 “극도의 동정”을 하고는 있었지만, 韓國의 경우는 조심성과 지체됨을 요구하는 어떤 복잡한 문제와 連累되어 있었다.¹²⁾ 둘째로, 美 行政府는 韓國에서의 信託을 결말짓기 위해서 戰後 4大強國 즉 英國, 中國, 그리고 蘇聯의 承認을 받으려고 하였다. 그러한 불공평이 美國과 中國에 있는 韓國의 亡命同胞들을 분노하게 만들었지만, 그 불공평함이 없었더라면 信託에

관한 聯合國의 협약은 불가능하였을 것이다. 만약 美國이 어떤 특정한 韓國團體에 선호성을 보인다면 蘇聯이 전례를 따를 것이라고 美國務省 官吏들은 확신하였다.¹³⁾ 더 놀라운 것은 中國의 民族主義 指導者인 장 개석이 이미 重慶에 있는 자치적 韓國 臨時政府의 亡命 韓國同胞들을 후원해 주고 있었다는 것이다.¹⁴⁾ 信託은 日帝로부터 해방된 후에 韓國人들을 이끌어 갈 지도자들을 선출하기 위한 최선의 방법을 제공하였다.

國務省 관리들은 1942년 가을에 韓國의 戰後 國際統治에 관한 구체적인 작업을 시작했다. 中國, 뉴우질랜드, 그리고 美國의 대표들로 구성된 특별위원회는 “韓國政府를 건설하는데 있어서 韓國人들과 협력하고…… 助言과 技術的인 援助를 해줄 臨時信託을 형성하는데 도움을 주기 위한” 계획을 개발하려 하였다. 蘇聯과 조정을 하기 위한 대책들도 있었을 것이다.¹⁵⁾ 비록 장 개석은 中國에 있는 亡命 韓國同胞들을 聯合國이 인정하여 주기를 원한다는 것이 알려졌지만 루우스벨트 行政府는 中國이 이 계획을 받아들일 것이라고 예상하였다. 英國은 韓國의 미래를 계획하는 것보다 전체 植民地에서의 聯合國 政策이라는 더 광범위한 질문에 대답하는 데 더 관심이 있었기 때문에 英國이 支援을 하는 것은 그리 쉽지 않았을 것이다. 1943년 와싱턴에서 外務部 長官 앤쏘니 이던(Anthony Eden)과의 討論에서 “英國사람들은 信託을 경시하고 차라리 한 나라에 대해 전적인 책임을 떠맡으려 한다”는 것이 분명해 졌다. 3월 27일 루우스벨트는 外務部 長官에게 자신은 인도지나와 日本이 統治했던 섬들에 대한 戰後 國際的 統制를 더 선호한다고 말하였다. 게다가 “韓國은 中國과 美國 그리고 한 두 나라가 더 참여하는 國際的 信託下에 놓여질 수도 있었다.” 이던 外務長官은 英國의 支援에 대한 인상을 披瀝하면서 아무런 반대도 제기하지 않았던 것이다.¹⁶⁾

웰리스 國務省 次官은 같은 달에 英·美協商의 결과에 대하여 中國大使 티 브이 송(T.V. Soong)에게 브리핑을 하였다. 루우스벨트와 이던은 韓國의 信託統治에 同意했지만 그 계획의 구체적인 사항들은 蘇聯과의 討議를 기다려야 했다. 英國과 中國의 後援을 확신한 美 國務省은 中國과의 밀접한 經濟紐帶에 힘입어 韓國이 獨立할 것을 예상하고, 實施·監督 그리고 韓國이 임시적으로 통제받을 프로그램의 財政支援을 하기 위한 기구의 구체적인 제의를 마무리지었다.¹⁸⁾ 蘇聯이 그 信託計劃에 협조하지 않을지도 모른다는 염려가 있었다. 모스크바는 시베리아에 있는 韓國 게릴라들과 밀접한 紐帶를 유지했으며 그 게릴라들은 戰後 韓國에 蘇聯의 影響力을 행사하는데 훌륭한 手段을 제공했을 것이다.¹⁹⁾ 韓國이 中立이 되도록 하는 聯合國 사이에서의 協約은 없었기 때문에 韓半島 統治를 위한 戰後 中國과 蘇聯의 경쟁은 있을 법한 것이었다. 루우스벨트 行政府에게 다행히도 1943년 10월 모스크바에서 열렸던 聯合國 外務長官 會議가 蘇聯이 韓國의 信託을 認准할 용의가 있다는 간접적인 증거를 제공하였다. 거기서 外務長官 브이. 엠. 몰로토프는 美國이 韓國人들의 운명을 해결하는 信託原則을 폭넓게 적용시키겠다는 말에 우호적으로 응답하였다.²⁰⁾

루우스벨트 大統領이 카이로 회담에 참석하러 갔을 때 그 목적중의 하나가 韓國에서 미래에 생길지 모르는 戰爭의 가능성을 제거하는 것이었다. 그는 戰後 韓國에서의 國際信託協定을 英國과 中國이 同意하여 궁극적으로 韓國이 獨立과 自治政府를 이루기를 희망했다. 日本帝國을 清算하는 것을 약속하는 그 유명한 카이로 宣言에 윈스턴·처칠과 장 개석이 합류함으로써 루우스벨트 大統領의 노력은 보상받았다. 韓國에 있어서 이 성명서는 “韓國人들을 노예화시키는데 급급했던 聯合國들이 얼마있지 않아 韓國을 자유스러운 獨立國이 되도록 한다는 것을 선언하였

다.”²¹⁾ 韓半島에서의 戰後 平和와 安定은 英國과 中國의 지원에만 달려 있는 것이 아니라 韓國의 再建에 관한 聯合行動에 蘇聯이 참여하느냐 않느냐도 중요하다고 루우스벨트는 인정했다. 그리하여 韓國信託에 대한 蘇聯 지도자의 同意를 얻을 의도를 가지고 루우스벨트는 테헤란에 있는 조셉 스탈린을 만나기 위해 카이로로 떠났다. 11월 30일 스탈린은 카이로 宣言을 認准한다는 것을 발표하였다. 루우스벨트가 나중에 솔직히 인정하기를 “韓國人들은 아직 自治政府를 행사하거나 유지할 능력이 없기 때문에 40년 동안 감독을 받아야 한다”라고 구체적으로 同意했다고 한다.²²⁾

1944년 봄에 國務省의 戰後計劃委員會는 戰後 韓國의 政令과 行政에 관한 구체적인 계획을 略述하는 3가지 서류를 토의하고 승인하였다. 이 계획들에 대한 蘇聯의 공식동의를 확보하는 것은 그 해에 聯合國 軍隊가 日本·獨一·이탈리아의 3個國 주축을 이룬 것보다 더 큰 중요성을 띠었다. 蘇聯이 太平洋 戰爭에 참전하게 되면 아마도 日本 本土를 침입할 필요가 없어지므로 日本의 패배를 더욱 용이하게 만들 것이라고 軍事 專門家들이 루우스벨트를 확신시킨 것이 그 경우였다.²³⁾ 처음에 韓國信託처럼 領土調整을 먼저 하지 않으면 日本에 대항하는 蘇聯의 參戰이 戰後 中國·蘇聯 紛爭을 위한 장을 마련해 줄지도 모른다고 루우스벨트의 參謀들은 두려워 하였다. 그러나 中國에서의 政治的 黨派主義와 경제의 악화는 美 行政府의 豫상을 현저하게 변화시켰다. 만약 장개석 정권이 아시아에서의 蘇聯의 膨脹主義的 野心을 막아낼 충분한 힘과 경쟁력이 부족했다면 확실한 협약은 필요 불가결한 것이었을 것이다.²⁴⁾ 그 결과, 1945년에 루우스벨트가 처칠 그리고 스탈린과 함께 會談을 하기 위해 알타로 떠날때 그의 주요 목표는 蘇聯이 太平洋 戰爭에 參戰하는 계획을 확고히 하는 것이었다. 그러나 中國이 강해지고 韓國이

독립되는 國際協定 또한 얻어내려 했다.

알타 會談을 준비하는 중에, 國務省 官吏들은 韓國에 대한 구체적인 계획들을 작성했는데 그 계획에는 공동으로 聯合國의 占領과 韓半島의 민정에 우선권이 부여되어 있었다. 만약 聯合國들이 연장된 占領을 회피하거나 獨立의 허용이 지체될 것이 예상될 때에는 4強大國의 信託成立에 관한 자세한 協約이 있어야 했다.²⁵⁾ 2월 8일에 루우스벨트는 알타에서의 會談中에 韓國의 문제를 제기하고 英國을 제외한 3強大國의 信託을 제의했다. 루우스벨트는 國際統治가 20년에서 30년 정도까지 지속될 것이라고 생각하였다. 스탈린은 統治期間이 더 짧을수록 더 좋고 응답하며 英國이 참가할 것을 종용하였다. 그는 또한 韓半島에 外國軍隊를 주둔시키는 것에 관하여 질문했다. 그러나 두 사람 모두 韓國에 戰後 占領軍이 있어서는 안 된다는 점에 동의했다.²⁶⁾ 그래서 루우스벨트와 스탈린은 蘇聯이 太平洋 戰爭에 參戰하는 보답으로 蘇聯에게 줄 이권뿐만 아니라 韓國에 대한 4強大國의 信託을 동의했다. 알타에서 있었던 일을 볼 때, 루우스벨트와 그의 參謀들은 中國과 韓國이 결국에 가서는 世界 第2次 大戰後에 獨立主權國이 될 것이라는 믿을만한 충분한 이유를 가지고 있었다.

불행히도 聯合國이 유럽에서 승리를 거둔 후 日本의 敗亡이 그렇게 빨리 올 줄은 루우스벨트도 스탈린도 예상치 않았다. 그 결과 그 두 指導者는 알타 會談에서 그 信託을 자세하게 논의하지 않았다. 그 대신에 유엔의 安全保障理事會議 회원국가의 대표들로 구성된 5명의 委員會가 國際信託 제도에 관하여 토론하기 위해 샌프란시스코 회담 이전에 만날것을 결정했다.²⁷⁾ 알타 會談이 있는 後 蘇聯이 東歐유럽의 정치 통제권을 장악하자 몇몇의 美國 지도자들은 아시아에서도 스탈린이 “蘇聯化”를 추구할 것에 대하여 두려워 하였다. 戰爭省 長官인 헨리·스팀

슨과 海軍省 長官인 제임스·포레스탈은 사실상 植民地 再建에 대한 루우스벨트의 접근방식에 크게 의심하였다. 두 사람 모두 美國이 太平洋의 중요 戰略地域을 넘겨주려고 하나 다른 나라들은 美國의 前例를 따르지 않을 것을 걱정하였다. 1945년 3월 9일 國務會議에서는 이러한 걱정들을 버리고 戰後 國際機構로부터 권한을 받아낼 彼信託國家體制의 지지를 재확인하였다.²⁸⁾ 같은 달에 國家·戰爭·海軍 委員會(SWNCC)는 韓國의 占領과 행정업무를 하기 위한 자세한 프로그램을 작성했다.²⁹⁾ 1945년 4월 초까지 韓國을 解放으로부터 信託에 이르게 하는 美國의 移讓計劃은 실제적으로 완료되었다.

國際的 興件이 1950년 6월에 발생할 3년간의 戰爭을 방지할 수 있는 가장 좋은 기회를 韓國으로부터 빼앗아 갔다. 알타 會談 以後에 東部 유럽에서 주도권을 차지하려는 스탈린의 결심이 루우스벨트로 하여금 蘇聯의 指導者가 聯合國 協約을 준수할 의사가 있는지에 관하여 의심하도록 하였다. 부상하고 있는 蘇聯과 美國의 摩擦은 韓國 信託의 분별력에 대한 의심을 일으켰다. 그럼에도 불구하고, 4월 12일에 루우스벨트가 죽었을 때 그는 아직도 폴란드의 運命과 같은 이슈에 관한 蘇聯과의 현격한 견해차이에도 불구하고 蘇聯과 美國의 협력이 계속될 것이라는 낙관론에 차 있었다.³⁰⁾ 해리 트루만이 大統領職을 맡게 되자 蘇聯과 美國의 戰後 協力の 기반은 금방 사라졌다. 새 大統領은 루우스벨트보다 훨씬 더 蘇聯의 의도를 의심하였으며 스탈린의 東歐 유럽에서의 膨脹主義 政策이 아시아에서도 취해질 것이라고 예상했다. 취임한지 일주일도 채 되지 전에도 트루만은 領土信託 問題에 관한 루우스벨트의 立場을 역전시켰다. 美國은 지금 샌프란시스코 會談에서 토론되어 졌던 國際信託制度의 기구에 대한 細部事項을 토론하기를 거부했던 것이다.³¹⁾ 트루만의 결정은 아시아에서 “蘇聯化”의 강렬한 두려움을 반영했고, 蘇

聯의 膨脹主義의 기회를 제거할 수 있는 代案策을 韓國에서 찾겠다고 시사하였다.

궁극적으로 韓國의 운명은 美國의 軍事能力과 日本을 패배시키기 위한 트루만의 戰略에 매여 있었다. 루우스벨트가 죽은 지 한달 후에, 美國의 軍參謀들은 蘇聯의 太平洋 戰爭에의 參戰이 필수적이라고 아직도 믿고 있었다.³²⁾ 일방적인 美國의 韓半島 占領이 불가능하게 보였기 때문에 이 助言은 트루만으로 하여금 어쩔수 없이 韓國의 聯合國 合同統治計劃을 부활시켜야만 하였다. 그리하여, 1945년 5월에 새 大統領이 스탈린과의 會談을 하기 위하여 해리 홉킨스를 모스크바로 특파시켰을 때, 한가지 목적은 韓國에 대한 확실한 協약에 도달하는 것이었다. 구체적인 다른 조항 가운데에서도 戰後 韓國에서 聯合國이 民政을 하는 데 있어 동등한 권리행사를 보장하는 信託에 蘇聯의 승인을 받아내기 위하여 홉킨스는 國務省으로부터 지시를 받았다. 그러나 모스크바에서 홉킨스는 韓國의 未來에 관하여 자세하게 토론하지 못했다. 홉킨스는 단지 스탈린과 루우스벨트가 4強大國의 信託에 동의한 것을 상기시킬 뿐이었고 信託의 期間에 대해서는 구체화시키지 않았다. 그때 홉킨스는 國際的 指導期間이 25년 정도 지속될 것이지만, 확실히 최소한 5년은 지속될 것이라고 암시했다. 물론 스탈린은 구체적인 사실을 토론하는 것을 피하였지만 韓國의 4強大國 信託에 대한 그의 부적당한 認准을 다시 밝혔다.³³⁾

스탈린이 홉킨스에게 한 말에는 蘇聯의 指導者가 韓國의 信託計劃을 전복시키려는 의도에 대한 증거를 거의 찾을 수 없었다. 사실상 스탈린은 1945년 7월에 티 브이 승과의 會談中에서 그가 한 極東地域의 協約을 비준하는 戰後 中蘇條約의 進전에 관한 그의 지지를 재확인하였다. 스탈린은 韓國의 문제를 제기한 후에, 몰로토프가 논평하기를

韓國의 信託提議案은 드분 일이며 前例가 없기 때문에 韓國의 미래에 가장 지대한 관심을 가지고 있는 聯合國들 사이에 깊은 이해가 요구된다고 말하였다.³⁴⁾ 그 달 말경에 蘇聯은 포츠담 會談에서 있었던 협정의 구체적인 기간을 마무리지을 것을 거의 확실하게 예상하였다. 美國務省은 이 과정에 동의하고 앞으로의 會談을 기대하는 美國政策의 立場을 밝히는 보고서를 작성하였다. 놀랍게도, 그 보고서에서는 蘇聯이 “아마도 韓國의 전 지역이나 일부지역을 占領”하고 蘇聯에서 훈련을 받은 韓國의 亡命同胞들로 구성된 親蘇政府를 세울 것을 주장할 것이라고 예견하였다. 戰後 韓國의 가난한 경제상황이 共產主義 理念을 유리하게 받아들이도록 고무시킬 것이며, 蘇聯이 후원하는 社會主義 政權을 대중들은 점점 더 지지하게 될 것이다.³⁵⁾

스탈린은 韓國의 信託에 관하여 일관된 지지를 표시하는 반면에, 트루만은 그 계획에 관하여 결코 열광적이지 않았다. 드디어 트루만은 代案을 발견하였다. 그가 포츠담에 도착한 날에 原子爆彈 實驗이 성공했다는 소식을 접했던 것이다. 스티븐슨은 그의 回顧錄에서 트루만은 蘇聯의 太平洋 戰爭의 參戰에 “흥미를 잃기”시작했다 라고 기록하였다. 트루만과 새로 임명된 國務長官 제임스 번즈 두 사람 다 原子爆彈을 사용하면 소련이 선전포고를 하기 전에 日本과의 戰爭을 끝낼 수 있을 것이라고 결론을 내렸다. 原子爆彈을 사용하는 주요 이유는 美國人들의 생명을 구하기 위한 것이었지만 트루만과 번즈는 간접적·외교적 그리고 戰略的인 이익을 분명히 認知했음에 틀림없었다. 만약 日本이 빨리 항복했다라면 蘇聯이 아시아의 戰後 再建에 참여함으로써 발생하는 복잡하게 예상되는 많은 문제들을 피할 수 있었다. 그것은 또한 美國이 일방적으로 韓國을 점령할 것을 허락해 주며 하기 싫은 信託의 필요성을 피할 수 있게 해 주었다.

그리하여 포츠담 會談 동안에 와싱턴의 韓國政策은 놀라운 변화를 불러 일으켰다. 美國의 軍部 지도자들은 계획서를 무시하고 韓國의 다국적 占領에 관한 구체적인 사항에 관해서는 전혀 동의하지 않기로 하였다. 트루만과 그의 外交參謀들은 太平洋 戰爭을 빨리 終熄시키고 蘇聯의 占領을 제압하기 위하여 信託을 포기하였다. 7월 23일 外務長官 會議에서 信託의 구체적인 토의에 반대하는 이던과 번즈는 뜻을 같이 하였다. 몰로토프는 요약 보고서에서 최소한 蘇聯이 그 문제를 제기했다는 것을 남긴다는 조건하에 그는 자신의 제안을 회의 테이블에 내놓았다. 그러나 聯合國들이 최종 의정서를 기안했을 때 번즈와 이던 두 사람은 信託에 관한 조항을 삽입하는 것을 반대하였다. 그리고 그 회의 보고서에는 聯合國들이 信託問題를 검토하였지만 구체적으로 논의한 것은 이탈리아 植民地 뿐이었다고 쓰여 있었다.³⁷⁾ 포츠담 會談에서 協定에 도달하려는 蘇聯의 간절한 욕망에도 불구하고 그 會談은 韓國에 대한 확실한 협약을 낳지 못하였다. 아마도 韓國戰爭을 피할 수 있는 마지막 기회가 유실되어진 것이다.

윌리엄 스투얼이 주장하기를 聯合國도 韓國의 亡命同胞들도 그 계획을 시행하는 데 협력하지 않으려 했기 때문에 信託이 韓國問題에 대한 실천에 옮길 수 있는 해결책을 제시하지는 못한다고 했다.³⁸⁾ 信託이 실패할 운명이었는지 아닌지는 결코 확실하게 알 수 없다. 하지만 信託을 포기하는 트루만의 결정은 불행한 결과를 초래하였다는 것은 확실하다. 그것은 韓國의 分斷을 가져왔고 강압적인 韓半島의 統一 때문에 2개의 政府가 수립되어졌다. 美國이 日本에 核攻撃을 한 이틀 후에, 蘇聯은 太平洋 戰爭에 참전했고 韓國으로 赤軍(the Red Army)을 보냈다. 마지막 순간에 38도선을 경계로 軍事占領 地域을 兩分하자는 트루만의 제의를 蘇聯이 받아들인 것이 韓國 全域에 蘇聯의 통치를 막아

주었다.³⁹⁾ 그러나 信託의 기간을 마무리 지을 것을 美國이 거절한 것은 戰後 韓國의 行政調整에 대한 지침이 전혀 없었다는 것을 의미하였다. 더욱 더 나쁜 것은 일단 蘇聯과 美國이 韓半島의 半을 占領하자 형식적인 分斷을 終熄시키기 위해서는 外交協約을 필요로 하였다. 유럽에서 美蘇關係가 점점 심각해지고 있던 터라 스탈린이나 트루만이 협상을 할 분위기가 아니었다는 것은 분명했다.

美國의 占領軍은 蘇聯軍이 北韓에 진입한지 거의 한달후인 1945년 9월 8일에 南韓에 도착했다. 한 달안에 美國은 韓國에서 괴로운 문제에 직면하게 되었다. 38도선 以北의 “蘇聯化”는 이미 많은 부분이 진행중인 것처럼 보였고 南韓에서는 反帝國主義 煽動과 革命的 民族主義를 통제하는 데 있어서 거의 성공하지 못하였다.⁴⁰⁾ 占領이 시작된 며칠만에 트루만 行政府는 협상을 하여 해결하지 않고는 고통스러운 선택을 맞아야 한다는 것을 깨달았다. 軍事占領을 연장해서 영원한 分斷을 가져오든지 아니면 철수해서 蘇聯이 韓半島 全域을 지배하게 하는 것이었다. 9월 중순까지는 國家·戰爭·海軍 委員會가 信託問題를 다시 들고 나왔으며 구체적인 제안에 착수하기 시작하였다.⁴¹⁾ 와싱턴은 蘇聯이 단일 占領政策을 지역적으로 실시하는 데 협력해 줄 것이라는 희망을 갖고 있었다. 그러나 10월초에 戰爭省은 蘇聯의 占領軍 司令官이 아직도 협상을 거부하고 있다는 말을 접수하였다. 모스크바의 非妥協에 직면한 트루만 行政府는 韓國戰爭을 궁극적으로 막을 수 있는 두번째 기회를 제시하는 제의를 가지고 蘇聯政府에 접근하기로 결정했다.⁴²⁾

10월 18일까지 國務省은 그 제의를 마무리지었고 合同參謀本部長의 승인을 받아냈다. 그 계획은 와싱턴이 韓國의 占領政策의 調整, 38도선 分斷의 撤回, 그리고 國際的 信託의 設립을 위해 가능한 한 속히 협상을 개시하겠다는 내용이었다. 모스크바에서는 아베렐 헤리만 대사가

11월 3일에 38도선을 “막힌 障壁”으로서 종결 짓도록 蘇聯에게 요구하라는 지시를 받았다. 美國은 또한 石炭과 電力이 南韓으로 적절하게 정기적으로 공급되기를 바랐고 일관된 회계정책, 해안 전역에서의 선적, 올바른 인사 재배치, 그리고 지역간 교역과 통신을 열망하였다. 해리만은 蘇聯政府에게 韓國獨立의 실현을 위하여 지역적으로 협상할 수 있는 權限을 占領軍 司令官에게 수여할 것을 요청해야 했다.⁴³⁾ 해리만은 즉시 이 지령에 따랐으나 蘇聯의 政策에는 아무런 변화도 없었다.

1945년 12월 모스크바에서 열릴 예정인 外務長官 會議에서 韓國問題를 정식으로 제기하는 것이 유일한 대안이라고 트루만은 결정했다. 협상중에 美國은 “韓國에 自治政府를 설립하기 위하여 5년 혹은 그 이상의 기간동안 韓國의 信託統治를 시행”하고 “中國과 蘇聯 共和國의 동역가 外交채널을 통하여 획득”될 것을 권고하였다.⁴⁴⁾ 모스크바 회담에 대한 전주곡으로서 美 國務省은 美國이 “通信, 交易, 南北韓의 自由往來”를 제기하고자 다시 蘇聯에게 접근할 의사가 있다는 것을 발표하였다. 만약 모스크바가 승인했다면 이것이 韓國의 統一과 獨立의 길을 열었을 것이다. 11월 후반에 國家·戰爭·海軍 委員會는 앞으로 있을 회담을 위한 자세한 정책보고서를 작성하였다. 그 보고서가 助言하기를 蘇聯이 韓國에서 과도한 영향력을 행사하고 싶어 한다는 것을 美國은 예상하고 받아들여야 한다고 했다. 信託은 蘇聯의 支配 가능성을 줄이며, 東北 아시아에서의 긴장을 완화시키며, 美軍撤收를 허용하는 최고의 방법을 제시하였다. 그러나 만약 스탈린이 독점통치를 주장했다면 美國은 더 이상 信託에 관한 회담을 끝내고 韓國의 自治政府를 인정하는 것을 종식했을 것이다.⁴⁵⁾

國務長官 번즈는 모스크바에 도착하자마자 韓國問題를 討議懸案에 올렸다. 美國의 최종 제의는 信託을 요구하였지만 그 계획의 자세한 묘사

는 하지 않았다. 그 대신에 美國의 최종 제의는 해리만의 11월 권고와 38도선 障壁을 철회하기 위한 지역적 조정의 중요한 필요성에 초점을 맞추었다. 그러나 信託期間을 10년으로 延長시키는 것을 가능케 하는 하나의 조항이 있었다.⁴⁶⁾ 번즈는 統一된 行政府를 만드는 것이 韓國의 統一, 信託, 그리고 나아가서는 獨立을 위해 없어서는 안될 첫번째 조치라고 주장하면서 자신의 제의를 승인해 줄 것을 요청하였다. 信託에 대한 一般協約은 韓國의 統一에 관련된 구체적인 문제를 토의하기 위한 전제조건이라고 몰로토프는 반박하였다. 그는 美國提議의 사본과 그 조항을 연구할 시간을 요청했다. 12월 20일 몰로토프는 “긴급한” 문제를 지역적으로 토론하는 것이 필요하다고 주장하는 번즈의 의견을 받아들였지만, 그는 또한 장기적인 信託計劃에 우선적인 협약을 하기를 원했다. 그리하여, 그는 반대 제의를 하겠다고 그날 저녁에 발표했다. 성급한 번즈는 협조하겠다고 하는 한편 美國의 계획이 “스탈린이 4개월 전에 베를린에서 생각하고 있던 것”과 일치한다고 주장하였다.⁴⁷⁾

약속한대로 몰로토프는 나중에 韓國에 대한 蘇聯의 提議를 널리 퍼뜨렸다. 그 제의에는 4개의 구체적인 조항이 있었다. 첫째로, 韓國의 産業, 交通, 農業 그리고 文化開發에 필요한 모든 대책을 떠맡기 위해서 強大國들은 韓國에 “임시 民主政府”를 세운다. 둘째로, 蘇聯과 美國의 占領軍 代表들이 “共同 委員會”를 조직하여 臨時政府創設을 위한 절차를 만들기 위해 韓國의 政黨과 사회기구들과 상의한다. 셋째로, 韓國이 民主的 自治政府와 獨立을 지향한 政治的, 經濟的, 社會的으로 발전하는데 있어서 美蘇共同委員會는 도움과 지원(信託)을 해줄 수 있는 대책을 입안한다. 美蘇共同委員會는 또한 5개년 信託計劃을 수립하여 4強大國의 승인을 받기 위해 제출한다. 마지막으로, 2주일 이내에 蘇聯과 美國의 占領軍 司令官들은 “긴급한 문제”에 대응하는 “共同會議”를 개최하여 항

구적 행정조정을 시작한다.⁴⁸⁾

번즈는 몇 개의 작은 수정을 거친 후에 몰로토프의 제의를 승인했다. 처음에는 蘇聯과 美國 兩國이 韓國에 대한 모스크바 協約이 아주 만족스러운 것으로 평가했다. 모스크바는 여전히 통일된 韓國을 열망했고 韓國사람들이 社會主義 體制를 채택하기를 원한다고 믿었다. 그러나 모스크바는 反蘇聯 政權의 등장을 허락하는 모험을 하지 않으려 했기 때문에 臨時政府와 信託을 위한 구체적인 계획을 성공적으로 시행하기 전에 韓半島의 分斷을 終熄시키기를 거부하였다. 韓國人들에게 民族自決의 권리를 행사할 수 있는 능력을 부인하지 않고 美軍을 철수시킬 수 있는 해결책을 번즈는 발견하고 싶어 하였다. 그는 蘇聯의 제의를 받아들였는데 그 提議의 실행이 이 목적들을 이룰 수 있기 때문이었다. 모스크바 協約을 韓國人들은 거의 반가워하지 않을 것이라는 것을 트루만의 參謀들은 분명히 깨달았다. 그러나 臨時信託統治만이 統一과 結局에 가서는 自治政府를 획득하기 위하여 蘇聯의 협력을 얻어내는 유일한 방법으로 보였다.

예상했던 대로, 信託計劃의 소식은 미군지역에서 분노를 야기시켰고 시위의 暴風을 일으켰다. 極端主義者들은 가두 데모를 했으며 가게와 學校는 門을 닫았으며 操業中斷을 단행했다. 난폭한 青年團體들은 美軍事政府要員을 위협하고 信託을 비난하는 전단과 포스터를 배포하며 거리를 돌아다녔다. 1946년 1월에 보수파 지도자들은 모스크바 協約의 시행을 막고 가능한 빠른 시일내에 韓國의 주권을 回復하기 위하여 “反信託委員會”를 조직하였다.⁴⁹⁾ 처음에는 共產主義者들과 極左派分子들은 信託을 비난하는 모든 韓國人들과 합류했으나, 갑자기 태도를 전환하여 모스크바 協約을 노골적으로 지지하였다. 1946년 1월 3일 데모중에 그들의 플래카드에 “反對”라는 단어 대신에 “贊成”이라는 단어로 서둘러 대체했다. 그래서

“信託贊成”이라고 읽혀지게 되었다. 의심할 여지도 없이 蘇聯官吏들이 바꾸도록 명령했음에 틀림없지만 共產主義者들은 그들이 信託을 반대했다면 美國이 그들의 정치적 열망을 인준해 줄 것이라고는 거의 예상하지 못했다. 더 중요한 것은 極左派分子들이 統一과 獨立의 새로운 희망을 모스크바 協約의 실시가 제시해 준다는 것을 인식하는 데 있어서 놀랄 만한 현실성을 보여주었다는 것이다.⁵⁰⁾

地域次元에서의 蘇聯-美國 協商이 “긴급한 문제들”을 답하는데 있어서 모스크바 協約이 韓國의 곤경을 해결할 수 있는지 없는지를 일찍 테스트하는 시금석이 되었다. 1946년 1월 16일 蘇聯의 派遣團이 서울에 도착하여 38도선 分斷을 終熄시키기 위해 美國의 代表들과 즉시 접견했다. 15차례의 회의가 있는 후에 두 派遣團이 모스크바 協約을 다르게 해석하고 있다는 것이 분명하여졌다. 蘇聯人들은 정책조정과 상품교환만을 원했지만 美國人들은 완전한 행정 및 경제 통합을 갈망하였다.⁵¹⁾ 그럼에도 불구하고 행정 및 경제조정에 관한 최종 美蘇協約은 고무적인 표시를 나타내었다. 전국에 걸친 우편업무 뿐만 아니라 鐵道, 트럭, 海岸 全域에 걸친 船積, 交易이 지역간에 재개되었다. 거기다가 협상자들은 司舍部間 상설 연락망을 만들것과 38도선을 따라 설치되어 있는 檢問所에서 협조할 것을 동의하였다. 蘇聯은 동일한 라디오 주파수의 사용을 허용하는 반면에 北韓에서 신문의 자유 보급이나 통일된 회계정책을 허가할 것을 거부하였다. 최종적인 협정은 韓國의 臨時政府가 생길 때까지 기다려야 한다고 주장하면서 蘇聯人들은 交通, 電力, 그리고 通信에 대한 共同統制를 딱 잘라 거절했다.⁵²⁾

분명히 統一이 된 후에 親蘇的 韓國政府가 생긴다는 보장이 없이는 北韓에서 통제권을 약화시킬 의도가 전혀 없었던 것이다. 그러나 韓國의 미래가 낙관적이라는 것에 대한 이유가 있었다. 지역적 차원에서의

美蘇協商은 중요한 진전이 있었으며 전체적인 모스크바 協約은 分斷을 終熄시키고 궁극적으로 韓國의 獨立을 가져올 수 있는 실천가능한 방식을 제공하였다. 駐韓 占領軍 司令官인 존 하지 中將은 그렇게 낙관적이지 않았다. 그가 와싱턴에 경고하기를 臨時政府 창설을 위해 협상이 시작되었을 때 유사한 해석의 차이를 예상할 수 있었다고 말했다. 중요한 전제조건으로 하지 중장은 美國이 韓國 전역에 언론, 출판, 이주의 완전한 자유를 즉시 허용해야 한다고 믿었다.⁵³⁾ 國務省이 처음에는 주저했으나 권한을 위임받은 하지 중장이 共同 委員會에서 자유표현의 권리를 주장하기 시작하였다. 만약 모스크바가 이 제의를 받아들이지 않았다면 蘇聯이 언론의 자유와 시민의 자유를 금지하고 있다고 하지 중장이 발표했을 것이다. 모스크바에 대한 비판이 대중화되면 그것이 스탈린으로 하여금 철수하게 만들고 와싱턴의 입장을 받아들여야 할 것이라고 美國의 指導者들은 확신하고 있었다.⁵⁴⁾

蘇聯과 美國의 代表들은 共同委員會의 協商을 시작하기 위하여 1946년 3월 20일 서울에서 만났다. 힘든 協商이 시작되기도 전에, 兩側은 분명히 의견이 다르다는 것을 나타내 주었다. 테린티 쉬티코프 장군은 그의 개회사에서 “미래에 韓國이 蘇聯의 공격용 기지가 되지 않도록 親蘇 民主獨立 國家”를 韓國에 만들 것을 蘇聯政府가 천명한 바 있음을 확인하였다. 그리하여 韓國의 臨時政府는 폭넓은 대표자들을 반영할 뿐만 아니라 모스크바 협약에 따르면 부적격한 지원을 반영해야만 하였다. 그에 대한 응답으로 하지는 “대다수의 의견에 부합하는 政府가 세워지는 것”을 美國이 확인하고야 말겠다는 결심을 강조하였다. 그가 논박하기를 民族自決만이 韓國人들의 “政治·經濟·社會的인 發展, 民主的 自治政府의 發展, 그리고 韓國의 獨立”을 이룩할 수 있다고 말했다.⁵⁵⁾ 만약 蘇聯과 美國의 派遣團이 共同委員會에서 상이한 입장을 화해시킬

수 있는 방법을 발견할 수 있었다면 韓國戰爭은 없었을 지도 모른다.

會議初盤에 쉬티코프는 전국적인 회의를 하자는 美國의 열망을 거부했다. 그는 대신에 각각 한 지역에서 토론하기를 원했던 것이다. 나중에 쉬티코프는 모스크바 協約을 지지하는 政黨들만 함께 상의를 하고 싶어했다. 그럼에도 불구하고 共同委員會의 첫번째 행동국면에 대한 협약에 궁극적으로 도달하였다. 이 단계는 地域政黨들과의 協議, 政治綱領의 考慮, 憲章의 推薦, 그리고 臨時政府 要員의 선택을 포함하였다. 共同委員會는 각기 목표를 달성하기 위한 구체적인 대책을 세우기 위해 3개의 小委員會를 조직하였다.⁵⁶⁾ 이러한 협조정신은 협상자들이 韓國政黨의 협상자격에 동의하려 했을 때 순식간에 사라져 버렸다. 北韓에는 협상자격이 있는 政黨이 40개 밖에 없는데 비하여 南韓에는 5백개의 合法政黨이 있다고 美國의 派遣團이 발표했을 때 蘇聯人들은 충격을 받았던 것이다. 쉬티코프가 信託에 적대적인 단체들과는 상의하는 것을 반대하자 美國 代表인 윌리엄 랭던은 모스크바 協約에 敵對的이라는 것이 합법성을 결정짓는 받아들일 만한 기준이 될 수는 없다고 반박했다. “反信託委員會”에 소속된 政黨들과의 상의를 제외시키려는 모스크바의 시도에 저항하는 美國의 派遣團의 결정을 번즈는 즉시 承認하였다.⁵⁷⁾

IV

共同委員會에서의 모스크바의 行動은 놀라운 것이 아니었다. 蘇聯은 상당히 큰 집단인 反蘇 韓國指導者들이 戰後 政治勢力이 되지 못하게 하기 위한 手段으로 신탁문제를 이용하고 있었다. 그러나 美國은 共同委員會의 作業을 해치려고 하는 바로 그 사람들과 협의할 것을 주장하

는 따분한 立場에 놓여 있었다. 蘇聯化라는 공포가 美國 派遣團의 位置를 支配하였다. 보수주의자들을 제외시키는 것은 공산주의자들의 執權을 확실히 한다고 미국은 믿었다.⁵⁸⁾ 놀랍게도 4월18일 공동 코뮤니케의 發表로 蘇聯과 美國의 協商者들이 그 膠着狀態를 깬 것처럼 보였다. 그 委員會는 “目的에 있어서 진실로 민주적인 정당들과 사회조직들이 상의하는 것을 同意하였고 臨時政府를 樹立하려는 蘇聯과 美國의 決定을 支持할 것을 誓約하는 宣言文에 署名을 하였다. 더욱 중요한 것은 그 코뮤니케에는 모스크바 協約에 있는 신탁부분을 서명자들 모두가 受諾할 것을 요구하는 조항도 포함되어 있었던 것이다.⁵⁹⁾

서울에 있던 미국 관리들은 그 타협에 만족하였는데 그것이 極右派들과의 상의를 허락하는 것처럼 보였기 때문이다. 그들의 낙관적인 생각은 時期尙早였다. 協商이 재개되었을 때 쉬티코프는 많은 수의 저명한 보수주의적 지도자들이 特定한 組織團體와 아무 연관이 없다고 하여 그들을 제외할 것을 주장하였다. 미국의 파견단은 “우리가 평가하는 그들의 민중 지지도와는 상관없이 모든 정파”들과의 상의를 주장하였다. 蘇聯代表는 誓約書에 서명하는 것만으로는 모스크바 協約의 支援을 保障할 수 없다고 論理的으로 反駁하면서 더욱 곤란한 난관을 조성시켰다. 쉬티코프는 신탁에 대해 가장 批判的인 단체들과의 상의는 인가하지 않겠다고 솔직히 진술하였다. 미국 파견단이 표현의 절대 자유의 원칙을 강력하게 支持하였을 때 協商은 膠着狀態에 逢着하였다.⁶⁰⁾ 5월7일 하지는 와싱턴에 報告하기를 그 다음날 共同委員會의 休會를 제의하고 한국의 統一을 達成하는 유일한 방법은 “강경한 자세”를 가지고 “소련인들이 다음 동작을 하게 하는 것”이라는 主張을 本國에 타전하였다.⁶¹⁾

몇몇의 그 당시 관찰자들에게는 그 共同委員會의 休會(5월 8일)가 韓國戰爭으로 향하는 첫 스텝이 된것으로 비추어졌다. 정말로 1946년 봄

에 38도선에서의 무장충돌에 관한 소문은 늘어만 갔고, 美軍地域에서 散發的인 暴力行爲는 일상적인 일이 되어 버렸다.⁶²⁾ 共同委員會의 실패와 韓國戰爭을 피할 수 있는 이 기회를 놓친 것에 대한 책임은 일차적으로 소련에 있다. 비록 모스크바의 입장에 대한 법적인 그리고 논리적인 정당화가 있긴 하였지만, 보수주의자들을 協商對象에서 제외시킨 것은 民族自決의 原則을 위반한 것이었다. 더욱 중요한 것은 우익이 참가하더라도 극좌파가 분명히 임시정부를 지배했다는 것이다. 그 당시 하지가 인정했던 것처럼 “남한의 정치구조는 거의 동등한 좌파... 그리고 온건우익을 포함하기 때문에, 우리는 南韓을 위해서 非代表 공천 후보자 명부를 지명하든지 그렇지 않으면 남북한에 있는 모스크바가 통제하는 단체들의 연합된 힘에 의해 압도당하는 것을 예상해야 할 것이었다.”⁶³⁾ 協商問題에 대한 蘇聯의 경직성 때문에 美國은 이 유쾌하지 않은 곤경으로부터 빠져나올 수 있었다.

두번째로, 한국 밖에서의 사건들이 統一과 獨立으로 향하는 유망한 길처럼 보였던 것을 막아버렸다. 1946년 초반에 스탈린은 共產主義者와 資本主義의 全世界的인 鬭爭을 다시 새롭게 하는 연설을 하였다. 그 후 얼마있지 않아 처어칠은 그의 철의 장막이라는 연설에서 이 도전을 받아 들일 것을 촉구하였다. 유럽에서의 냉전이 모스크바와 워싱턴 간의 신뢰의 기초를 제거했기 때문에 共同委員會는 실패로 끝났다. 韓國에서 美國의 動機에 대한 蘇聯의 의심은 깊고 강한 것이었는데 번즈가 모스크바 회담 후 본국에 돌아가서 한국 신탁이 필요없을지도 모른다고 발표한 후에 소련의 의심은 더욱 심하여졌다.⁶⁴⁾ 훨씬 더 나쁜 것은 하지가 한국의 보수주의자들이 모스크바 협약을 반대하는 것을 허용하고 있었다는 것이다. 미국이 어떠한 비용이 들더라도 臨時政府에 反蘇 指導者를 배치하려고 하는 것은 民主主義를 막고 韓國을 美國의 政

治·經濟的 영향 아래 隸屬시키기 위한 것이었다고 모스크바는 비판하였다. 한 蘇聯作家가 주장하기를 어떠한 狀況이라 할 지라도 소련은 “제국주의 군대”가 한국을 “소련을 공격하기 위한 기지 및 도약대”로 사용하는 것을 허용하지 않을 것이라고 했다.⁶⁵⁾ 모스크바는 시간이 자기들에게 유리하다고 확신하였다. 결국에 가서는 남한의 政治暴力과 經濟惡化가 美軍撤收를 강요하게 되었고 韓半島 全體에 共產主義 統制로의 길을 열어주게 되었다.

美國의 軍部 指導者들은 기꺼이 韓國을 떠나서 모스크바의 기대를 만족시켜 주려고 하였다. 그러나 이것이 美國의 國際的 信賴도와 명성에 심각한 피해를 입힐 수 있기 때문에 트루만은 한국을 포기하기를 거부하였다. 그리하여 와싱턴은 모스크바에 1947년 5월 共同委員會에서 討議를 再開하자고 說得하였지만, 아무것도 변하지 않았다. 두 달 동안 協商을 하였지만 대화의 膠着狀態에 대한 回答을 구할 수 없었다.⁶⁶⁾ 이미 美 行政府는 유럽에서 蘇聯의 팽창을 막는 牽制政策을 固守하고 있었던 것이다. 國務省 官吏들은 한국에서도 같은 접근방식을 적용하고 싶어 하였지만 美 議會는 38도선 남쪽의 분리된 정부를 위한 經濟援助 프로그램에 財政支援을 해주려고 하지 않았다. 그 결과, 트루만의 외교 참모들은 한국의 교착상태를 영구히 終熄시키기 위한 다른 전략을 開發해야만 했다. 1947년 7월 美 國務省은 韓國에게 統一과 獨立을 제시하여 줄 3번째 기회의 原案作成을 마무리 지었다. 비록 그 계획은 3개의 각기 다른 시나리오의 개요를 밝혀 놓은 것이지만 각 시나리오는 유엔이 韓國問題를 참고하도록 하였다.⁶⁷⁾

1947년 8월 와싱턴은 그 提議를 모스크바에 提出하였다. 共同委員會가 모스크바 協約을 施行할 수 없었기 때문에, 美國은 韓國의 統一과 獨立을 達成하는 次善의 對策을 討論하기 위하여 4強大國의 會談을 열것

을 권고했다. 트루만 行政府는 예상했던 대로 9월 초순에 蘇聯의 拒否를 받았다. 國務省의 계획에 따라 행동하던 트루만은 國務省 長官인 조지 마아살에게 다음 會期の 유엔 總會에서 韓國問題를 討議懸案에 상정하라고 지시하였다.⁶⁸⁾ 9월 17일 그의 연설에서 마아살은 한국의 難局 狀況에 대한 주요 원인이 소련이 표현의 자유의 원칙을 너무 강하게 막기 때문이라고 밝혔다. 美蘇協商이 韓國에 대한 過去の 協約을 遵守하지 못하였기 때문에, 마아살은 世界平和에 대한 이 위협을 제거하기 위해 國際的 行動을 취할 것을 促求하였다.⁶⁹⁾

10월17일 유엔의 常任 美國代表인 워렌 오스틴은 韓國에 대한 美國의 解決策을 提示하였고 신속한 國際的 承認을 요구하였다. 國務省의 原案에 基礎하여 3월 31일 이전까지 유엔의 감독하에 자유선거를 실시할 것을 촉구하였다. 남한이 2대 1로 인구가 많은 상태에서 이 立法은 憲法을 制定하고 臨時政府에서 일할 官吏들을 지명할 수 있게 하였다. 아마도 가장 중요한 것은 그 解決策이 “유엔 臨時韓國委員會”를 만들어서 11개국이 그 選舉를 監督하고 選擇의 自由를 支援하며 調查結果를 總會에 보고하도록 하는 것이었다. 마지막 조항에서는 臨時政府가 形成된 이후에 美國과 蘇聯이 撤收할 것을 促求하였다. 일주일도 채 되지 전에 蘇聯은 韓國이 외부의 간섭없이 統一과 獨立을 達成할 수 있도록 美國과 蘇聯의 점령을 즉시 끝내는 것을 촉구하는 提議를 유엔에 제출하였다.⁷⁰⁾ 國際的 行動을 취하느냐 않느냐는 것이 다시 한번 韓國 戰爭을 피할 수 있느냐 없느냐를 결정하였다.

모스크바가 제의한 군대의 공동철수는 미국이 38도선 남쪽에 분리된 政府를 세우고자 했던 美國의 우발 計劃을 明瞭하게 만들었다. 하지만 蘇聯이 北韓으로부터 갑자기 손을 떼는 것에 대하여 긴장하고 있었다. 蘇聯人들이 撤收하고 난 후에 북한의 괴뢰군대가 南韓을 침입할지도 모

른다고 하지는 두려워 하였다. 그러나 유엔 대표들이 韓國에 있는 한 무장 남침의 위협은 사실상 사라질 것이라고 美 行政府는 確信하였다.⁷¹⁾ 다른 海外電報를 통해 하지는 蘇聯이 유엔과 協力할 것인지 혹은 平和的 統一을 허용할 것인지에 의심스럽다는 의견을 표명하였다. 그러므로 美 行政府가 어떤 條件들을 보장하지 않는 한, 美軍이 韓國으로부터 撤收하는 것은 悲劇的이 될 것이다. 예를 들어 하지가 조인한 대로 와싱턴은 美國이 監督하는 5個年 재건 프로그램을 실시해야만 했다. 하지가 예언하기를 일단 남한이 經濟力과 政治的 安定을 발전시킨다면 “북한 사람들 사이에 民族 感情이 發生하여 蘇聯人들에게 두 地域의 結合을 허용하도록 充分한 압력을 넣을 것”이라고 하였다. 만약 美國이 臨時的으로 韓國의 분할을 용인하고 抑制戰略을 適用시킨다면, 蘇聯은 退却할 것이라고 하지는 생각했다.⁷²⁾ 모스크바가 유엔과의 協調를 거부했기 때문에 美國은 이 접근방식을 채택할 수 밖에 없었고 그리하여 2개의 韓國은 서로를 파괴하기에 專念하게 되었다.

모스크바의 反對에도 불구하고, 유엔에서 美 行政府의 政策은 급속한 진전을 보였다. 11월 4일 그 조직의 政治委員會는 韓國에 대한 美國의 提議를 承認하였는데, 그 提議란 臨時政府가 樹立된 후 90일 이내에 蘇聯과 美國이 韓半島로부터 撤收하는 것이었다. 몇몇 行政府 官吏들은 너무 성급하게 보이는 것같아 걱정을 하였지만 蘇聯의 撤收提議는 와싱턴에게 아무런 選擇의 여지도 주지 않았다. 트루만과 그의 참모들이 아주 만족스럽게도, 11월 14일 總會에서 美國이 後援하는 解決策이 큰 표 차이로 通過되었다.⁷³⁾ 美國의 指導者들은 또한 유엔 臨時韓國委員會의 構成에도 흡족해 하였다. 9개의 회원국 가운데 캐나다, 호주, 중국, 불란서, 엘살바도르, 그리고 필리핀 등 모두는 美國과 긴밀한 經濟的, 政治的, 軍事的 紐帶를 맺고 있었다. 시리아와 인도만이 美國의 目標追

求를 방해할 것 같았고 마지막 회원국인 우크라이나는 아마도 協力を 拒否할 것 같았다. 마아살은 기쁨에 넘쳐 있었다. 그는 즉시 하지에게 選舉準備를 하도록 지시하고 유엔 臨時韓國委員會가 투표일을 具體적으로 정하기 위해 韓國에 도착하는 대로 連絡을 취할 것을 지시하였다.⁷⁴⁾

많은 국가들은 마지못해 유엔이 韓國問題에 介入하는 것을 認准하였다. 결국, 蘇聯은 11월 14일의 決議案 실시 노력에 협조하지 않을 것을 이미 發表하였다. 예를 들어 호주의 H.V. Evatt은 미국 관리들과 토의하는 중에 韓國은 美蘇 決議案의 問題가 되거나 혹은 마지막 手段으로 日本의 平和會談의 問題라고 主張하였다.⁷⁵⁾ 加나다는 유엔 臨時韓國委員會에 代表를 보내지 않겠다고 밝혔으나 나중에 트루만의 直接的인 協調呼訴를 받고 마음을 바꾸었다.⁷⁶⁾ 臨時委員會의 몇몇 會員國들은 이러한 불안감을 갖고 있었지만 그럼에도 불구하고 1948년 1월 韓國의 統一과 獨立이 達成되기를 희망하면서 韓國에 오기를 決定하였다. 모스크바의 테도는 유엔 臨時韓國委員會의 장래에 集中되어 있었다. 많은 관찰자들은 國際的 行動을 위해 全世界가 누르는 압도적인 힘에 蘇聯이 도전하지 않을 것이라고 생각하였다. 그러나 우크라이나가 유엔 臨時韓國委員會에 參加하지 않겠다고 發表했을 때 낙관론은 사라지고 말았다. 첫 모임에서 臨時委員會는 우크라이나의 결정에 유감을 표시했으나 제빨리 각 점령군 사령관에게 協力과 政治犯의 석방을 요구하는 문제에 대해 동의하였다.

하지는 제빨리 南韓에서 자유롭고 拘束을 받지 않는 選舉를 위해 最大한 支援을 하겠다고 誓約하였다. 예측했던 대로 蘇聯의 占領軍 司令官은 臨時委員會의 討議內容을 無視하였다. 유엔 사무총장 트리그브 라이는 協調를 요청하기 위해 蘇聯派遣團에 直接 接近하였다. 그에 대한 대답으로 안드레이 그로미코가 라이에게 모스크바는 이미 유엔 臨時韓國

委員會의 行動에 대하여 “부정적인 태도”를 보였다고 상기시켜 주었다. 오스틴은 南韓만이라도 감독하에 선거하는 것을 支持하는 것을 라이에게 宣言하라는 壓力을 주었다. 11월 14일 決議案의 實行에 蘇聯이 協力을 拒否한 것이 2개의 韓國을 남겨 하고, 統一을 위한 戰爭을 발발하게 하였다. 두번째로 蘇聯은 韓國紛爭의 평화로운 解決策으로 이끄는 有望한 길을 封鎖해 버린 것이다. 만약 모스크바가 全國的인 選舉를 許容하는 것을 同意하였다면 틀림없이 蘇聯의 利益을 選好하는 結果의 確率을 높혔을 선거에 관하여 美國이 양보하게 되어졌을 것이다. 대부분의 韓國人들은 어떤 경우에서나 온건 좌파 候補에게 투표했을 것이다. 1947년의 여름에 있었던 共同委員會의 討議에서 드러난 것 처럼 보수정당들이 南韓에서는 소수에 불과하였다. 北韓에서 共產主義者들이 폭넓은 인기를 누리고 있었으므로 자유선거가 한국 전역에서 反蘇政府를 만들어 낼 확률은 거의 없었다.⁷⁹⁾

그러나 1947년 가을 스탈린이 韓國의 統一을 이루려는 유엔의 노력에 協調할 것이라는 가냘픈 希望이 있었다. 國際機構에서 대다수의 會員國들은 美國과 가깝게 연결되었기 때문에 유엔이 公平하고 치우치지 않을 것이라고 蘇聯이 믿는 것은 거의 불가능하였다. 韓國은 또한 현대사에서 증폭되는 美蘇競爭의 희생물이었다. 트루만 行政府가 트루만 주의와 마아살플랜을 제의한 것이 蘇聯을 수세의 입장에 서게 만들었다. 와싱턴은 韓國에게도 그 문제를 강요하고 있는 것처럼 보였다. 冷戰에 대한 緊張感은 분명히 모스크바를 눈멀게하여 유엔에 도전하는 결정에 關聯된 위험을 못 보게 하였다. 만약 유엔 臨時韓國委員會가 南韓에서만 選舉監督의 決定을 내렸더라면 이것은 蘇聯에 敵對的인 分離 政府의 登場을 招來하였을 것이며 그것은 모스크바가 줄곧 막으려고 했던 결과이다. 사실상, 보수주의자들은 分離 選舉와 美軍이 撤收하기 전에 安全保

障軍의 創設을 공공연하게 요구하면서 모스크바의 非協調的인 姿勢를 이
용하기 위하여 신속한 行動을 취하였다.⁸⁰⁾ 美國의 指導者들은 1945년
이후로 계속 보수세력의 政治掌握을 막으려고 노력해 왔으나, 韓半島
全域에 共產主義者들의 支配를 차단시키고자 하는데 더 큰 重要性을 할
당하였다.

만약 남한에서만 선거를 한다면 38도선이 두 나라를 분할하는 영원
한 境界선으로 변할 것이라고 몇몇 韓國의 指導者들은 생각하였다. 예
를 들어 1946년 自身の 政治的 권위가 美國의 支持를 받은 김규식도
美國 地域에서만 監督下에 選舉를 하게 되면 큰 불행이 될 것이라고
믿었다. 유엔 臨時韓國委員會가 韓國에 도착하기 전날 밤에 온건파 政
治家들이 韓國分斷을 除去하기 위한 “南北會談”을 열기 위한 支援을 받
기 위하여 “民族獨立協會”를 構成했다. 김규식이 主張하기를 韓國人들만
이 스스로 黨派鬭爭을 끝낼 수 있고 平和統一을 위해 필요한 政治的
團結을 이룰 수 있다고 하였다. 그가 예언하기를 臨時 委員會의 도착
이 統一을 가져다 주지 않고 대신에 韓國의 永久 分斷을 초래할 것이
라고 말했다.⁸¹⁾ 중요하게도, 김규식은 믿을만한 보수주의자이며 전쟁 당
시 韓國臨時政府의 大統領이었던 金九의 지지를 가까스로 얻어낼 수
있었다. 다른 政治 指導者들은 全國的 選舉가 아닌 것에는 무엇이든
反對하면서 “南北會談”을 옹호하는 兩 金氏와 合流하였다.⁸²⁾ 비록 成功
의 可能性은 稀薄했지만, 韓國戰爭을 피할 수 있는 4번째이자 마지막
기회가 있었던 것이다.

南韓에서의 단독 선거를 반대하는 김규식의 캠페인은 유엔 臨時韓國委
員會와의 會談 동안에 빠른 成功을 거두었다. 臨時委員會의 會員國들은
자기 主張의 힘에 매우 강한 인상을 받았다. 예를들어 김규식이 조언
하기를 만약 유엔 臨時韓國委員會가 진정으로 自由民主的 選舉를 원한다

면, “필요한 준비를 하는데 상당한 시간이 걸릴 것이다”라고 말했다. 만약 모스크바가 북쪽 지역의 입국을 막는다면, 온건과 指導者가 強力하게 유엔 臨時韓國委員會가 모든 問題를 유엔 臨時 委員會(Interim Committee)에서 재고하도록 촉구하였을 것이다. 臨時委員會의 몇몇 會員들은 김규식의 見解를 받아 들었다. 그리하여 많은 數의 유엔 臨時韓國委員會의 派遣團은 유엔 委員會가 臨時委員會와 토의할 때 까지 延期할 것을 원하였다.⁸³⁾ 미국 지역에서 발생한 暴力과 混亂은 더욱 이 문제를 지연시켰다. 1948년 1월 極左派들은 남한 전역에서 조업 중단과 태업 행위를 조장하기 위하여 “총 파업위원회”를 조직하였다. 4개월 이내에 정치불안이 거의 3백명의 죽음과 1만명 이상의 투옥을 가져왔다. 유엔 臨時韓國委員會의 몇몇 회원들은 이러한 조건들이 38도선 이남에서 진정으로 자유민주 선거를 수행하는 것을 불가능하게 만들었다고 결론지었다.

美國 占領軍 관리들에게 있어서 유엔 臨時韓國委員會가 南韓에서의 選舉를 신속하게 承認하지 않은 것은 결코 수용할 수 없는 것이었다. 그들이 믿는 바로는 臨時委員會가 選舉가 不完全해지고 北韓住民들을 제외시킬 것이라는 事實을 받아 들여야만 했다. 만약 유엔 臨時韓國委員會가 分離된 政府를 세우려는 美國의 政策을 가능한 한 빨리 認准하였다면, 김규식과 金九 같은 이견자들이 不可避性에 屈服하고 分離 選舉도 옹호했을 것이다.⁸⁵⁾ 하지와 그의 政治 參謀인 요셉 자콥은 韓國 問題를 다시 유엔에 가져 가는 것은 재난을 부를 것이라는 데 두 사람 모두 同意하였다. 그들은 워싱턴이 臨時委員會를 說得하여 選舉를 더 이상 지체하지 말 것을 요청하였다. 하지는 또한 法과 秩序를 維持하기 위하여 더 많은 軍隊가 필요하다고 美 行政府에 通報하였다. 兵力을 追加로 供給할 수 없었기 때문에, 워싱턴은 韓國의 警備軍의

수를 5만명으로 擴張承認을 해야 한다는 더글라스 맥아더 장군의 提案을 받아 들였다.⁸⁶⁾ 蘇聯은 이미 北韓에 막강한 軍事力을 增強하기 시작하였고 그제서야 美國은 비슷한 과정을 따르기로 선택했다. 이러한 外部의 軍事支援이 없었더라면, 韓國戰爭은 생겨나지 않았을 것이다.

南韓에서의 美國의 行動은 北韓에서 蘇聯의 政策에 決定的인 影響을 주었다. 平壤에 있던 美國의 連絡將校들은 북한 사람들이 스스로 분리 정부를 위한 새 憲法을 制定하려는 순간에 있다고 보고하였다. 1948년 2월 16일 人民委員會는 몇 개월 내로 남북한을 대표하는 政府를 樹立할 意思를 宣稱하였다. 잇따른 성명서에서 북한사람들은 유엔 臨時韓國委員會를 美國의 도구라고 비난했으며 남한 사람들에게 단독 정부의 수립을 거부할 것을 촉구하였다.⁸⁷⁾ 북한에서의 이러한 사건들이 유엔 臨時韓國委員會를 더욱 침묵하도록 하였다. 주요 臨時委員會의 會員國들은 단독 選舉가 韓國의 分斷을 굳게하여 流血 內亂의 길을 열어 줄 것이라는 것을 확신하였다. 2월 6일 유엔 臨時韓國委員會는 蘇聯의 非協調的 態度를 보다 못해 유엔 臨時委員會에 韓國 問題를 넘길 것을 투표에 부쳤다. 그 報告書에서 臨時委員會는 韓國의 運命을 決定짓는데 도움이 될 고문단 선거만이라도 유엔이 承認해 줄 것을 勸告하였다. 인도 파견대표인 K.P.S. Menon은 韓國의 難局을 解決하는 方法에 대한 유엔 臨時韓國委員會의 몇몇 具體的인 勸告事項이 담겨 있는 報告書를 가지고 뉴욕으로 갔다.⁸⁸⁾

世界의 指導者들은 南韓에서 暴力과 混亂이 加重되고 있음을 알아차렸다. 그리하여 平和와 安定을 위하여 臨時委員會는 원래 의도보다 더 일찍 유엔 臨時韓國委員會의 報告書를 檢討하기로 決定하였다. 臨時委員會의 會員國들은 단독 選舉를 後援하는 것이 韓國의 分斷을 굳게 할 것이라는 것을 확실히 알고 있었다. 한편 위축되고 방관적인 분위기는

韓半島 全域에 共產主義 支配의 길을 열어 주었다.⁸⁹⁾ 南韓에서만 선거를 감독하는 것에 대하여 유엔내에도 반대의사가 널리 퍼져 있다는 것이 곧 분명하여 졌다. 그러나 와싱턴은 이제 더 이상 지체되는 것을 막기로 결심했다. 마아살은 오스틴에게 유엔 臨時韓國委員會의 報告書를 검토하기 위해 잠깐 동안만 휴회할 것을 지시하였다. 계속 연이은 회의 중에 美國의 派遣團은 11월 14일 決議案을 관철 가능한 지역에서는 실시할 것을 주장하였다. 메논이 유엔 臨時韓國委員會의 報告書를 설명했을 때 美國의 派遣團 필립 제섭은 臨時委員會가 南韓에서 단독 政府의 設立을 위한 선거를 承認할 것을 촉구하였다. 비록 메논은 韓國이 統一만 되면 獨立할 준비가 되어 있을 것이라고 말하였지만 그의 대답이 公約은 아니었다. 臨時委員會는 유엔 臨時 韓國 委員會의 報告書와 제섭의 제의를 고려하기 위하여 10일간의 휴회를 宣言하였다.⁹⁰⁾

臨時委員會가 메논의 권고를 연구하는 동안, 美 行政府는 美國의 立場을 支持하는 強力한 캠페인을 전개시켰다. 영국과 인도로 보내는 電文에서 마아살은 대다수의 民衆들이 選舉를 빨리 치루고 獨立을 즉시하기를 원하기 때문에 韓國人들은 더 이상 유엔과 討議하지 않을 것이라고 強調하였다. 마아살의 戰術은 的中하였다. 2월 23일 런던은 美國의 目標達成을 방해하지 않고 제섭의 제의를 수용하겠다고 와싱턴에 통보 하였다. 인도도 역시 같이 동의하였는데 그 이유는 미국의 남한만이 아니라 남북한 전체를 위한 선거를 하겠다고 약속했기 때문이었다. 일단 立法府가 한국 인구의 3분의 2를 대표하면서 등장하자 마아살은 소련이 그것의 合法性을 인정하는 수 밖에 없을 것이라고 생각하였다. 그리하여 단독 선거가 한국에 대한 11월 14일 결의안의 실행을 막기보다는 촉진시킬 것이라는 것을 임시위원회의 가장 영향력 있는 두 회원국에 게 미국은 가까스로 확신시킬 수 있었다.⁹¹⁾

2월 24일 제섭은 臨時委員會가 出入할 수 있는 地域에서 國會議員을 뽑기 위한 選舉를 유엔 臨時韓國委員會가 지켜 볼 것을 정식으로 권고했다. 그는 이 方案이 대다수의 民衆에게 民主主義를 안겨 주며 美國과 蘇聯의 軍隊가 撤收하는 길을 열어 줄 것이라고 確信에 찬 提議를 하였다. 이들 후에, 臨時委員會는 아무것도 개정함이 없이 제섭의 提議를 承認하였다. 重要한 것은 유엔 臨時韓國委員會의 두 代表國家인 캐나다와 호주가 그 決議案에 반대 투표를 하였고 나머지 11개국은 棄權을 했다는 것이다.⁹²⁾ 제섭의 說明은 美國의 提議를 支持하는 사람들에게 큰 영향을 주었지만, 와싱턴의 外交策略과 체코슬로바키아에서 최근 있었던 共產主義 쿠데타가 美 行政府의 勝利를 낳는데 주요한 원인이 되었다.⁹³⁾

臨時委員會의 새 지시를 받자마자, 캐나다 派遣團인 조지 페터슨의 불참에도 불구하고 유엔 臨時韓國委員會는 1948년 5월 9일로 선거일자를 정했다. 조지 페터슨이 日本으로부터 돌아오자마자 캐나다 代表는 臨時委員會는 그 投票過程을 觀察하는 것을 “권고”만 했을 뿐이라고 反撥하였다. 그의 主要 關心事는 韓國의 온건파와 좌익들이 그 선거를 보이콧해서 反蘇 極右翼이 壓勝을 거두는 것을 保障하는 것이었다. 그러나 그의 동료들이 그 결정을 밝힐 것을 거부하자 페터슨은 발끈하여 나가 버리고 말았다.

메논은 즉시 마음이 약해져서 모든 問題를 再考할 것을 同意하였다. 유엔 臨時韓國委員會가 3월 12일 재개되었을 때 호주 派遣團들은 臨時委員會가 선거를 보이콧할 가능성에 비추어 볼 때 원래의 決定을 무효로 할 것을 提案했다. 그 대신 國際的인 監督下에서 김규식이 提議한 韓國 全地域의 選舉를 위한 “南北韓 會談”을 유엔 臨時韓國委員會가 後援해야 한다고 提案했다. 그는 38도선에서 韓國의 高착을 強化 할

수 있는 行動이라면 무엇이든지 열렬하게 反對하였다. 불란서는 인도지에서 美國이 불란서의 政策을 支援하는 것을 보장받으려는 것 때문에 아마도 불란서 派遣團은 同意하지 않은 것 같다. 그는 대신에 단독 選舉를 監督하자는 처음 決定을 신속하게 실시할 것을 促求하였다. 시리아 代表는 그 때 타협할 것을 제시하였다. 분위기가 선택의 자유를 돕는 것이라면 그때에 한하여 1948년 5월 9일 남한에서만이라도 임시 위원회가 선거를 지켜 본다는 것이었다. 결정적인 투표에서 유엔 임시 한국위원회는 시리아의 妥協을 承認하였지만 캐나다와 호주는 의견을 달리 하였다. 그리하여, 임시위원회는 남북한 선거 이전에 혹은 그 선거를 통하여 統一의 目標을 포기하였다.⁹⁵⁾ 이 결정은 남한에 있는 미국 점령군 관리들과 우익 정치가들이 “남북한 회담”에의 참가를 요구하는 온건 좌파들의 요구를 무시할 수 있다는 것을 의미했다.

그럼에도 불구하고, 兩 金氏는 분리 선거의 불가피성을 받아 들이기를 거절하였다. 그들은 北韓의 民主聯合戰線이 南北韓의 選舉를 치르고 모든 外國軍隊의 撤收를 확고히 하기 위한 “南北韓 會談”을 公式적으로 提議 했을 때인 3월 後半에 새로운 낙관론을 가질 수 있었다. 이 會談은 4월 14일에 平壤에서 開催되었고 북한사람들이 김규식과 金 九를 포함한 13명의 南韓 指導者들을 招請하였다. 유엔 臨時韓國委員會의 캐나다와 호주 대표들은 兩 金氏가 그 會議에 참석하기를 권했고 成功的인 경우라면 단독 選舉를 延期시킬 수도 있다는 誓約을 하였다. 그리하면 김규식은 北側의 提議에 肯定的으로 反應하며 하자에게 신임장과 교통편을 제공해달라고 부탁하였다. 놀랍게도 미 점령군 사령관은 “남북한 회담”에 참가하고자 하는 한국인들을 돕거나 막기를 거절하지 않았다.⁹⁶⁾

김규식은 출발에 앞서 本 會談이 獨裁와 産業의 國有化, 外國 軍事

基地 혹은 자유롭지 못한 선거를 옹호하지 않을 것이라는 誓約을 포함한 몇몇 조건들을 北韓이 받아들일 것을 요청하였다. 北韓이 동의하자 兩 金氏는 4월 21일 북한의 수도인 평양에 도착하였다.⁹⁷⁾ 그러나 1주일 간의 토론을 한 이후에 同 會談이 정말로 詐欺였다는 것이 분명해졌다. 同 會談는 憲法과 政府 構造가 蘇聯의 制度와 거의 흡사하다는 것을 보여주었다. 거기다가 파견단은 38도선 分斷에 대해 美國을 全的으로 비난하고 진실한 한국사람들은 모두 미군과 유엔 臨時韓國委員會를 즉시 撤收 시킬 것을 요구하는 성명서를 발표하였다. 김 규식은 비록 그 결과에 실망하였지만 金日成 政權이 自由選舉를 진정으로 支持하고 그 결과를 받아 들이겠다는 約束을 받고 서울로 돌아왔다. 결국에 가서 兩 金氏는 남한에서 있을 선거에 公開的으로 참가하지 않기로 결정하였다.⁹⁸⁾

와싱턴은 이제 더 이상 지체되는 것을 막는데 정말로 머리가 복잡해졌다. 예를 들어, 몇몇 종교단체들이 하루 연기할 것을 요청했을 때 미국은 거절하였다. 결국에 가서는 美 行政府는 마지못해 누그러 졌다. 왜냐하면 5월 9일이 日蝕 예정일이었고 한국인들은 이것을 나쁜 징조라고 여기기 때문이었다.⁹⁹⁾ 이때 쯤에 와싱턴은 남한에서 保守主義 政府가 들어 서는 것이 美國의 利益이 될 것이라고 決定하였다. 그리하여 美國 占領軍 官吏들은 온건 좌파 정치인들에 대한 선거 캠페인을 허용하였으나 그들은 위협과 폭력적 선동을 시작했다. 5월 10일 남한 사람들이 투표를 하였을 때 모든 사람이 예상했던 대로 극단적 보수주의자들이 떠들썩한 가운데 그 선거에서 승리를 거두었다. 더 나쁜 것은 李承晩을 포함한 많은 수의 당선자들이 1945년 이래로 노골적인 反蘇人士였다는 것이다. 선거가 있기 전에 이 政治家들은 蘇聯의 간섭과 북한을 지배하려는 것에 대하여 소련을 비난하는 캠페인에 참가하고 있었

다.¹⁰¹⁾ 그 결과 새 남한 정부가 단호하게 反蘇傾向이 있다는 것은 의심할 여지가 없었다.

1948년 5월 31일 새 立法府가 會議를 正式으로 시작한지 6주 후에 憲法을 公布했고 이승만을 初代 大統領으로 選出하였다. 8월 15일 美軍事 政府는 大韓民國이 公式 수립이 됨과 동시에 公式的으로 막을 내렸다. 大韓民國은 南北韓을 代表한다고 주장하였지만 유엔은 大韓民國을 韓半島의 유일한 合法 政府로 承認하였다.¹⁰²⁾ 트루만 行政府는 南韓에서 단독 政府를 수립하는 目標를 達成하였지만 그렇게 하는 과정에서 韓國 戰爭을 피할 수 있는 마지막 希望을 산산히 부순 責任이 있다고 하겠다. 만약 美國이 臨時委員會와 유엔 臨時韓國委員會가 단독 選舉를 승인하는 것을 막지 않았더라면 “남북한 회담”을 평양이 아니라 서울에서 열려는 것에 대한 일차적인 책임을 졌을 것이다. 38도선 양쪽에서 남북한 선거를 하자고 국민들이 압력을 가하였더라면 소련이 북한의 참가를 허락하였을 지도 모른다. 그렇지 않더라도 최소한 모스크바가 단독 선거때문에 생긴 영구적인 한국의 분단에 대하여 미국과 유엔을 비난할 수는 없었을 것이다.

한편 북한의 정치 사정도 남한과 같은 길을 따라 움직이고 있었다. 7월 10일 憲法의 制定作業이 거의 완료되었다고 金日成은 發表하였다. 이 문서에는 민족을 대표하는 政府의 수도가 서울에 있다고 쓰여 있었다. 金日成은 망치와 낫이 그려져 있는 새 국기를 전시하면서 다음 달에 全國的인 選舉가 있을 것이라고 설명하였다. 8월 25일 人民委員會는 “最高人民會議”의 代表들을 뽑기 위한 全國에 걸친 選舉를 後援하였다. 9월 첫째 주에 이 團體는 平壤에서 會同하여 憲法을 公布하였다. 그 立法府는 또한 “最高人民委員會”를 選出하여 그 議長으로 金日成을 推戴하였다. 김두봉은 그때 김일성을 首領으로 뽑았고 내각을 樹立하여

“朝鮮民主主義人民共和國”의 支配權限을 金日成이 가지도록 보장하였다.

그리하여, 韓國은 1948년 말경에 2개의 政府를 갖게 되었고 각기 서로 희생에 관계없이 韓半島에 統一을 이루기 위하여 몰두하였다. 이 時點 以後로부터 內亂의 발발은 시간문제였다. 그럼에도 불구하고 國際狀況은 韓國問題에 끊임없이 중대한 영향을 입혔다. 아마도 가장 중요한 것은 트루만 行政府가 北韓에 있는 共產主義 政權을 불안에 빠뜨리려는 노력의 일환으로 封鎖戰略을 사용했던 것이다. 北韓은 美國의 적극적 대항 정책이 결국에 가서는 성공할 이라는 것을 두려워 하였기 때문에 南韓을 침입하겠다는 결정을 내린 것은 납득할 만한 일이었다. 첫째로, 1950년 5월에 있었던 南韓에서의 선거가 이승만과 밀접한 관계가 있는 政治人들의 敗北를 낳았고 그리하여 民主的이지는 않더라도 자립할 수 있는 정치제도의 실현방향으로 진전하고 있다는 것을 의미하였다. 둘째로, 이승만 政府가 심각한 財政問題를 해결하기 위하여 강력한 대책을 실행한 結果, 南韓의 經濟狀況은 근래 놀라운 향상을 기록하였다. 마지막으로, 美國은 南韓에 軍事支援을 늘리기로 결정했다. 北韓의 지도자들은 封鎖政策을 國內政治의 위협으로 간주 하였기 때문에 南韓으로부터의 침입을 두려워할 더 큰 이유를 갖게 되었다. 北韓은 경쟁자를 제거하든지 아니면 共產主義 統治를 終熄시키고 南韓과 합병하기 위한 內部叛亂의 모험을 해야만 했다.

V

이제 北韓이 南韓을 침입한지 40년이 흘렀다. 말할 것도 없이 韓國戰爭은 중요한 國內 起源을 가지고 있었지만 그것이 전통적인 內亂은 아니었다. 政治 혹은 軍部 指導者들이 政治的, 經濟的, 社會的인 目標를

수립하는 데서 발생하는 기본적인 의견 차이를 해결하는 유일한 방법이 힘이라고 생각할때 内部 戰爭을 겪게 된다. 예를 들어, 이런 분위기는 美國의 南北戰爭의 발발을 설명해 주고 있다. 韓國에서 1950년 6월에 이것이 또한 内部 상황에 해당되었을 수도 있지만, 世界 第2次 大戰 중에 日本이 降伏한 직후에 內亂에 필요한 조건들은 분명히 존재하지 않았다. 1945년 8월 韓國사람들은 土着的 人民共和國을 압도적으로 지지하였는데 그 이유는 그 人民共和國이 革新的인 改革 프로그램을 제시하였고 地域人民委員會의 네트워크의 合法性에 의지하였기 때문이라는 점에 대부분의 著者들은 意見을 같이 한다. 그러나 1905년 日本의 韓國侵略은 韓國 사람들이 자신의 운명을 스스로 결정할 수 없었다는 것을 의미하였다. 韓國의 미래를 政治統合과 개혁적인 변화로부터 統一을 위한 分斷과 流血戰으로 바꾸어 놓은 중요한 결정을 한 사람들은 서울과 平壤에 있는 指導者들이라기 보다는 와싱턴과 모스크바에 있는 指導者들이었다. 1945년부터 1948년까지 이러한 사건의 진전을 꺾 수 있는 기회는 많이 있었지만, 美國과 蘇聯間의 冷戰的 葛藤이 항상 그 代案들을 제거하였다. 아마도 韓國戰爭의 要因이 國內에 起源을 가지고 있었다면, 그것은 一種의 매우 特異한 종류의 內戰이었다.

〈註〉

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THE SECOND INTERNATIONAL
CONFERENCE ON THE KOREAN WAR
JUNE 14~15, 1990
SEOUL, KOREA

The Origins of the Korean War: Unanswered Questions

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By any reasonable standard of evidence, the question of who started the Korean War has long been resolved. I.F. Stone and the revisionist authors who followed him may once have been justified in poking holes in official US and ROK accounts, but this has become an increasingly sterile exercise. In the spirit of glasnost, even Soviet historians are hinting, ever more broadly, that Pyongyang struck first (and saying they plan to revisit the war on this, its 40th anniversary).

A problem common to many accounts of the war is their focus on the motives of statesmen and political leaders at the expense of looking at the complexities of the situations they face. Even with a documentary record, "real motives" are often obscure and difficult to establish--and in the absence of such records (especially on the communist side), imputing hidden motives is bound to be an exercise in futility. As a research strategy, it is better to sidestep or "black box" the question of motive until the logic of the situation can be fully explored. Looked at in this way, North Korean policy before the war--far from being crazy or irrational--was closely keyed to the changing situation on the peninsula and, at least by Pyongyang's own yardstick, quite rational.

The war's international context has been exhaustively--if still not satisfactorily--analyzed, but scant attention has been paid to its regional and peninsular aspects. Over 100,000 persons were killed before June 1950 in an insurgency in the South and clashes along the 38th parallel. The way in which Stalin's

policies in Manchuria and US moves to establish a base structure in Japan played into the North Korean attack also need to be explored. It is these aspects of the war, to paraphrase I.F. Stone, that are truly its hidden history.

There are several questions about the war that need to be answered.

--How was the outbreak of the war related to the southern guerrilla struggle?

The failure of the southern guerrilla movement over the winter of 1949-1950 meant that to unify the country, on its own terms, the North had to resort to conventional military force. Most of the early guerrilla struggles were local outbursts, begun by lower level communist leaders in South Korea. The incidents were not part of a centrally coordinated strategy; they often threatened to upset Pyongyang's plans. The Cheju-do uprising in April 1948 nearly derailed an effort to form a united front with southern leaders opposed to Rhee, and the rebellion of a ROK constabulary regiment at Yosu in October caught the North by surprise.

The DPRK's shift to support of an armed struggle in the South did not come until the spring of 1949, when the formation of the Democratic Front for the Unification of the Fatherland (DFUF) signalled the start of an all-out guerrilla offensive. Large, well-equipped guerrilla bands, trained at a camp near the North Korean capital, infiltrated into the South to establish bases in the rugged mountains along the the ROK's east coast. Pyongyang

said that the goal of the guerrillas was to smash the Rhee government and hold elections to unify the country by autumn. There was an all-out push--both on the military and propaganda fronts--in September, but the strategy of moving to large-scale mobile warfare and mounting attacks on towns failed. After the offensive collapsed, the southern guerrilla movement was thoroughly reorganized--with the apparent goal of bringing it under the direct control of Kim Il Sung.

Turning its attention to the guerrilla threat, the ROK began a major counterinsurgency campaign in early September. The government mobilized several task forces, relocated the nearby rural population, and after cordoning off the main guerrilla base areas, swept through them one by one. The government constantly rotated in fresh troops to maintain pressure on the guerrillas and run them to ground. The communist party structure in the South also began to crumble under successive waves of arrests; the engine of the party's demise was an organization of ex-communists the police ran as a massive informant network. During the winter of 1949-50, the government succeeded in breaking the back of the southern guerrillas.

The North tried, but failed, to revive the insurgency by infiltrating large, well-equipped guerrilla units into the South. The exfiltration of the remnants of the east coast guerrillas in the spring of 1950 was a sign of the collapse of the insurgency. The North dispatched a large guerrilla force to cover their retreat, but most of this relief force was killed in a month of bitter fighting. In a signal that the DPRK was distancing itself from the failed insurgency, Radio Pyongyang stopped referring to

the southern guerrillas as "partisans in the Kim Il Sung tradition." Its reports on their activities became much more sketchy, and it began airing misinformation--reporting nonexistent clashes and broadcasting biographic sketches of long-dead guerrilla leaders as if they were still active.

North Korean hopes of achieving unification by forging a united front with opponents of Rhee, by infiltrating the ROK security forces, and by supporting the southern guerrillas had been successively dashed. The only instrument Pyongyang had left to unify the country on its own terms was its armed forces--which far outclassed those of the South in training, equipment, and morale. The North was too realistic to expect a widespread popular uprising in the South, although this may well have been the picture it wished to convey to the Soviets in lobbying for their support.

--How were the border clashes that flared up along the 38th parallel tied to the outbreak of the war?

The war was connected to the border clashes but obviously qualitatively different. The South initiated the initial clashes and usually got the better of it in engagements with the North's border guards, but later--as significant quantities of Soviet military equipment began to arrive and Pyongyang committed its army to the fighting--the tide changed. The North mounted a concerted media campaign against South Korean "border provocations" and administered a series of stern object lessons to ROK forces along the parallel. The cumulative effect of the border clashes may have been to fix in the minds of the North

Korean leadership the image of a long-term threat from the South. Rhee clearly wanted to march North, and would have done so if he saw a chance to do so successfully. This view of Rhee's intentions was shared by the US Embassy and Korean Military Advisory Group, which kept his forces on a short leash.

The border clashes have been virtually ignored in most accounts. Clearly more than just sabre-rattling was involved. Many clashes were quite large, with attacks by regimental or larger units supported by artillery. The North Korean regime was able to play on the clashes to mobilize support and raise funds from the public to purchase Soviet weapons. Opposing forces often penetrated several miles into the other's territory. The North's attacks were designed to underscore political points and dislodge South Korean forces from salients they occupied on the northern side of the parallel. In one offensive, the North could have taken the entire Ongjin peninsula--but stopped short.

An Australian journalist who covered the war from the communist side, Wilfred Burchett, viewed the border clashes as serious enough to raise the question of when the war actually began. The war, he claimed, was not a transition from peace to war, but from a small war to a big one. According to Burchett, there was "a kind of war" along the parallel from the autumn of 1949.

According to my own still incomplete investigation, the war started in fact in August-September 1949 and not in June 1950. Repeated attacks were made along key sectors of the parallel throughout the summer of 1949, by Rhee's forces, aimed at securing jumping off positions for a full-scale invasion of the North. What happened later was that the North Koreans simply decided that things had gone far enough and that the next assault by Rhee's forces would be repulsed; that--having

exhausted all possibilities of peaceful unification--those forces would be chased back and the South liberated.

The amazing thing about this statement is that it was published by Pyongyang. Although I do not agree with Burchett completely, he is right in saying the border clashes lent a certain preemptive quality to the North Korean attack--and bolstered Kim's effort to obtain Stalin's go-ahead.

The border clashes have to be viewed along a time line. Many of the initial ones were started by the South as part of a campaign to keep the North off balance and to demonstrate the need for US military aid after the last American combat troops withdrew in the spring of 1949. The clashes began with a "general consolidation of the parallel" by ROK forces as discussions opened with the US over troop withdrawal. Serious engagements followed at Ongjin, Kaesong, and Chunchon (where the commanders of two ROK battalions defected to the North in early May). Along with the border clashes, Rhee organized big "Give us arms!" demonstrations in Seoul, started a lobbying effort in Washington, and threw his support behind a proposal for a Pacific Pact.

The North got the worse of it in the early skirmishes. One reason for this was that--like most communist countries--it garrisoned its border with lightly armed security forces, while holding its regular army in reserve. The head of the US Military Advisory Group, General Roberts, described the border clashes as follows:

Each was in our opinion brought on by the presence of a small South Korean salient north of the parallel. Each was characterized by the CO's screaming "invasion, reinforce, ammo!" ... The South Koreans wish to invade the North. We tell

them that if such occurs, all advisers will pull out and the ECA spigot will be turned off. In case they'd lost the Ongjin peninsula, they felt they'd have to invade to Chorwon about twenty miles in, in order to save face...Most incidents on the parallel are due to needling by opposing local forces. Both North and South are at fault. No attacks by the North have ever been in serious proportions.

It was not until mid-summer 1949 that Pyongyang committed its regular army to the fray. The North was enraged by Rhee's vows to March North and by repeated ROK border incursions. The most provocative of these attacks may have been a ROK naval raid against Pyongyang's assembled West Coast fleet shortly before Liberation Day festivities in August. The small South Korean flotilla sank four and captured one North Korean vessel, which Seoul later used for target practice off Inchon during a highly publicized visit by Rhee.

Pyongyang responded to the incidents by launching a campaign against the repeated ROK "invasions" of its territory. As the campaign unfolded over the next few weeks, the North staged a show trial for captured ROK guerrillas, put on an impressive display of its newly acquired Soviet military hardware in a huge Liberation Day parade, and mounted offensives to dislodge southern forces from positions north of the parallel. The campaign took a new turn when Kim Il Sung called for mobilizing the whole society to support defense and set up an organization to raise money from the public to purchase arms. The campaign ended in mid-October with Foreign Minister Pak Hon Yong sending a copy of a report detailing the ROK's border violations to the UN, along with a warning that if the international body continued to ignore the DPRK and interfere on the peninsula, the Korean people would have to rely on their own means to unify the country.

Except for a brief flareup on Ongjin, the border remained relatively quiet after this until the outbreak of the war. South Korean commanders no longer started battles they could not win. In the end, Rhee's "policy of bluff" proved tragically self-defeating. It wasted scarce resources and squandered American goodwill; it made it hard to distinguish whether the North Korean buildup was for offensive or defensive purposes; and it kept Rhee's government from focusing on its own economic and political problems.

--What was the DPRK's relationship to the Soviet Union? Could it have started the war on its own?

Kim Il Sung may have sold Stalin a bill of goods on the war. Soviet control mechanisms in those years were too strong for the North to have begun the war on its own, but this does not mean that Kim Il Sung was just a creature of the Soviets.

In fact, there is good reason to believe that Kim lobbied Stalin for a year before he got the go-ahead to invade. Kim apparently first brought up the question of an attack when he visited Moscow in March 1949, before the border clashes had begun in earnest. Khrushchev says that Kim argued that an invasion would be a walkover, since revolutionary fervor in the South was so great that it would explode with only a bayonet prod across the parallel. (To underscore the point, shortly thereafter the North began dispatching armed guerrilla units into the South.) Stalin supposedly avoided giving Kim a direct answer, but told him to get back to him after developing a more concrete plan.

Stalin apparently balked at giving Kim the green light to attack, but he did agree to supply some \$40 million in arms (enough to equip six infantry divisions, three mechanized units, and an airforce of 150 planes.) The Soviets may have assumed that the US would proceed with a planned aid package for South Korea. As it happened, however, the Truman Administration decided it could not go before Congress with aid programs for Korea and for Greece and Turkey; a Korean aid bill was not passed for another year. It was this delay that created a temporary military imbalance on the peninsula. Soviet arms deliveries were limited at first, not greatly exceeding the standard issue for the East European satellites, and the buildup of the North Korean forces was at least partially offset by the continuing presence of a small number of US combat troops in the South for half a year after the last Soviet forces had withdrawn.

The insurgency in the South and the border clashes along the 38th parallel probably aided Kim in making the case for an invasion to Stalin. The Soviets were notoriously concerned about buffer states and the security of their borders. Nowhere else did they have a satellite with such unsettled borders.

Kim Il Sung may have exaggerated the revolutionary ferment in the South in order to obtain Stalin's approval for an attack. The leader of the southern faction, Pak Hon Yong, was purged after the war ostensibly for having submitted false reports that greatly exaggerated the revolutionary potential of the south. But Kim Il Sung was as responsible for these "false reports" as anyone in the North Korean leadership, and may have been trying to lay the blame for his own sins on Park after the failure of the attack. The

reason the North launched large-scale guerrilla offensives in June and September of 1949 may have been to convince the Soviets that, just as in China, the southern insurgency had moved beyond guerrilla warfare to large-scale operations by regular forces, the final phase in a classic guerrilla insurgency. Radio Pyongyang's exaggerated reports on the activities of the guerrillas early in 1950 may also have been intended primarily for Moscow's benefit.

--What role did factionalism play in the origins of the war?

Factionalism within the North Korean leadership was no more than a minor factor in the origins of the war. It set a floor on discussions of policy towards the South. No one could afford to appear to be soft on Rhee. At the most factionalism may have biased North Korean policy in favor of a more active policy towards Seoul. Nevertheless, none of the factions had positions that were set in stone and none were inextricably committed to war with the South. Like North Korean policy as a whole, factional positions changed over time in response to the changing situation.

If North Korea was a puppet, then the strings of control were snarled. In addition to Kim's ex-guerrilla faction and a few hundred "Soviet-Koreans", there were also influential pro-Chinese, South Korean, and domestic North Korean factions. At the time, Kim Il Sung was more first-among-equals than the unchallenged leader he later became, but even then he was calling most the shots on policy towards the South. Kim--who had considerable experience in such matters stemming from his background as an anti-Japanese guerrilla leader--appears to have taken a more direct hand in running the southern insurgency after a sweeping

reorganization of guerrilla operations following the collapse of the September 1949 offensive. Kim's rival, Pak Hon Yong, was in charge of the early guerrilla efforts, and the collapse of those efforts worked to Kim's advantage.

Some South Korean authors claim that the North supported only those guerrillas it had dispatched and not local, independently formed guerrilla groups. Likewise, the September 1949 guerrilla offensive is seen as a deliberate ploy by Pyongyang--meaning Kim Il Sung--to undercut the influence of the southern faction within the DPRK leadership. The North Koreans are said to have stood by while the South Korean guerrillas expended their strength in a hopeless struggle.

This period remains one of the most puzzling--and troubling---for a historian. We do not know whether the North gave the guerrilla insurgency its best shot, supporting the September offensive with several big infiltrations, only to come up short; or whether the offensive was designed to draw South Korean forces away from the parallel; or whether Kim was trying to convince Stalin of the feasibility of an invasion; or whether, having had his request to invade turned down by Stalin, Kim Il Sung decided to act with resources at his disposal--as presumably the guerrillas were. We also do not know how the guerrilla offensive fit in with the North's campaign against the South's border "provocations," which was the focal point of Pyongyang's propaganda effort at the time.

There is no evidence to support Robert Simmons' view that the North "jumped the gun" on an invasion scheduled for later in

the year because of factional struggles within its leadership. The two North Korean unification proposals on the eve of the war were not, as he suggests, competing initiatives by the Pak Hon Yong and Kim Il Sung factions. Rather, as Harold Noble has noted, they were part of a "superb razzle dazzle series of deceptions" that succeeded in distracting the South from the final preparations for the attack. Pak had a lot to gain from southern "liberation"--linking up again with his base of support in the South. But so did Kim Il Sung, who, after all, was the commander of the North Korean military.

Far more important in the origins of the war than factionalism was Korean nationalism. Strong nationalist sentiment pervaded the political atmosphere in post-liberation Korea. Its pull was strong enough, for example, even to draw many conservative southern politicians to a unification conference in Pyongyang in the spring of 1948. All political groups saw unification as paramount goal that brooked no delay.

--How did China figure in the planning of the North Korean attack? Did Stalin use the war to try to force a recalcitrant Mao back into line?

It is unclear how directly the Chinese were involved in the North Korean attack, though they must have known of it in advance. The only publicly available source is Khrushchev's memoirs, in which he says that Mao approved the invasion plans. The published memoirs, however, are not the same as the transcript of what Khrushchev actually said. The transcript is much more tentative--suggesting only that, in responding to a question from

Stalin, Mao approved "the essence" behind such an action.

When the war broke out, Mao's regime was preoccupied with its own problems of consolidating power and rebuilding a shattered society. The Chinese do not appear to have played a direct role in planning the North Korean attack. Beginning in late 1949, after their victory in their civil war, however, the Chinese repatriated tens of thousands (several divisions) of seasoned Korean veterans who had seen action with Mao's forces in China. Through a liaison office established by the Manchurian people's authorities in Pyongyang a few years earlier they also had a sizable diplomatic presence in the North. They would have had to be blind not to notice the Soviet weaponry pouring across Manchuria into the DPRK.

Stalin's most immediate problem on the eve of the war was how to tame Mao. The two had long had a troubled relationship. Time and again, Stalin's insistence on guiding the Chinese revolution from afar had resulted in disaster. Spurning Stalin's advice in favor of a rural-based strategy, Mao had fought his way to power after more than a decade of dogged resistance to Japan and civil war. Moscow continued to recognize Chiang Kai Shek's government--and wring concessions from it--until the very end. With Mao's victory, Stalin had to completely rethink his "weak China" policy.

Manchuria was a sore point in Sino-Soviet relations. Moscow had long coveted Manchuria, and Stalin sought to establish a paramount position of influence there through Kao Kang, a vice-chairman of the Chinese Communist Party and head of the semi-autonomous northeastern people's regional government.

Pursuing what amounted to an independent foreign policy, Kao had visited Moscow in June 1949--a few months after Kim Il Sung--to sign a package of trade and economic cooperation agreements that gave Stalin a sphere of influence in Manchuria.

Mao apparently complained about Soviet penetration of Manchuria in his talks with Stalin early 1950, recalling later that it was only by sheer persistence that he was able "to take the meat (Manchuria) out of the tiger's mouth." Kao seems to have been taken down a peg or two after the signing in February of a treaty of friendship and alliance between the two countries, but bounced back after the outbreak of the war. Kao was said to have "facilitated" the dispatch of the Chinese People's Volunteers and set about organizing Manchuria as a logistical base for the war effort. The PRC's intervention is usually interpreted as a move to preserve a buffer to protect Manchuria, but Mineo Nakajima speculates that Mao may intervened to deny the Soviets a pretext to reoccupy the province to "protect" it from MacArthur's advance.

In any case, Kao was purged immediately after the war in what Mao later termed a "political earthquake registering eight on the ten-point Richter scale." (It was in investigating this episode that Deng Xiaoping first made his mark.) The principal charge against Kao was that he had tried to make Manchuria into an "independent kingdom." Kao's purge coincided with those of other pro-Soviet figures in China and North Korea.

There is some reason to believe, then, that Stalin may have been playing a deeper game than he has been given credit for in Korea. The transcript of Khrushchev's tapes suggests that

Stalin hoped for some response by Washington to the attack. Apart from getting the US bogged down in Korea, the only conceivable reason for his wanting American intervention would have been to create hostility between Washington and Beijing so that Mao would have no choice but to continue to "lean to one side."

--How did the Soviets and the North Koreans assess US policy on the eve of the war?

Despite the popular notion that Secretary of State Dean Acheson's National Press Club excluding Korea from the US defense perimeter in East Asia gave the go-ahead for the North Korean attack, the flow of American power back into the region on the eve of the war was far more important to Pyongyang and Moscow. Acheson's speech was a much more nuanced statement than is usually recognized. It acknowledged the importance of Asian nationalism, warned of a Soviet attempt to pry loose Manchuria from China, and, stressed--accurately, as it turned out--that the US would defend Korea under the collective security arrangements of the United Nations. By early 1950, Washington was moving towards a separate Japanese peace treaty and had begun to establish permanent military bases in Japan. The Truman Administration had recovered its equilibrium after what Walter LaFeber has called the "twin shocks" of 1949--the fall of China and the Soviet's test of their first atomic bomb.

Stalin certainly knew that the US was planning to open talks, without Russian participation, on a peace treaty with Japan. The coordinated propaganda campaign against the revival of Japanese militarism that Moscow, Beijing, and Pyongyang launched

in the spring of 1950 was obviously not pointed at Japan but through Japan to the US.

Washington's moves apparently played into an ongoing debate within the Soviet leadership. The two sides were represented by Malenkov--an advocate of "peaceful competition" with the West--who believed that the USSR no longer had to worry about capitalist encirclement and could concentrate on economic construction, and Suslov--an old-line Stalinist--who warned that the creation of NATO and US work on the hydrogen bomb meant that the West was trying to tip the scales in its favor and roll back communism, in Eastern Europe, the PRC, and North Korea. Stalin finally came down on Suslov's side just before the war--in, of all things, an arcane journal article on linguistic change. Moscow saw Washington as readying a counteroffensive to roll back communism, not as in disorganized retreat.

In the end, however, it was the North Korean invasion that helped make Suslov's nightmares a reality. NSC-68 (a blueprint for mobilizing American resources for containment) had been drawn up but was still on Truman's desk when the North Koreans attacked. The invasion seemed to bear out the document's most dire predictions and spurred Washington into action.

--Did Rhee provoke the war to to escape insurmountable internal difficulties?

A canon of revisionist interpretations is that Rhee was on the ropes in the spring of 1950 and that he either let the war happen, provoked it by staging a border incident, or ordered a

headlong retreat to force the US to become involved in the war. Although I would not necessarily put any of this past Rhee--or, for that matter, General Douglas MacArthur--there is little evidence to back up these theories, and much that argues against them.

It is almost impossible that the war began with an incident staged by the ROK along the parallel. An invasion of the scale that the DPRK launched required extensive preparations, and, if Burchett is correct, the North had already made up its mind to go to war. All it needed was Stalin's go-ahead. Pyongyang had never allowed itself to be drawn by Rhee's needling before, so why should it have done so in June 1950?

Rather than being on the verge of collapse, the Rhee government had begun to consolidate its position by the spring of 1950. The economy was looking up, the southern guerrillas had been smashed, and tensions in US-ROK relations had been, at least temporarily, papered over. True, Rhee had suffered an electoral setback, but--as the purge of progressive assemblymen the previous year on trumped-up charges showed--the aging South Korean leader had far from exhausted the coercive resources he could use to bring the new assembly to heel. There is no reason to think that he had to resort to war as his only way out, or--for that matter--that he was so confident of US support that he felt Washington would pull his chestnuts from the fire.

Some historians point the finger of blame at the US rather than Rhee for having sprung a trap on North Korea. Rhee was certainly capable of such a maneuver, but it is doubtful American

policymakers were. As it happens, surprise attacks nearly always give rise to this sort of historical debate. Abraham Ben Zvi notes that the arguments fall into two categories. The more conspiratorial view emphasizes the "coherence, clarity, and consistency" of the "victim's" foreign policy. It insists that top policymakers are never really surprised but failed to sound warning in order to deliberately entice an attack. The other approach takes the cognitive route, emphasizing missed signals, inattentiveness, and perceptual barriers to warnings. True, US intervention in Korea was a sharp reversal of previous policy, but such reversals are common in crises, when time is short, there is a high perception of threat, and decisions are bucked up to top leaders, who are not bound by precedent. The US was much more directly engaged in Korea than it had been in China. And even without a formal security commitment, US decisionmakers felt they had to respond to an attack that put American credibility at risk.

--"Was it an invasion or a war of national liberation?"

Some broader questions about the war's meaning and significance also remain. There are any number of ways to frame them, but perhaps the title--not mine--of a Korean translation of my dissertation is best: "Was it an invasion or a war of national liberation?"

The North Koreans can never (as long as Kim Il Sung is alive) openly admit that they started the war. To do so would undercut the regime's heroic self-image--that it prevailed against the strongest power in the world--and open Pyongyang up to the charge of having unleashed a war that cost as many as a million

and a half Korean lives. For the next few years, we can probably look forward to Pyongyang's annual celebration of the Month of Anti-US Struggle.

The North Koreans' recourse to legalisms about who struck first, however, suggests that they feel some guilt over having begun the war. They do not make their own case with much conviction. Pyongyang has never published a detailed account of the first hours of the war, nor has it been willing to engage in scholarly discussions on the war. Even in the DPRK's published war histories, a critical reader can discern oblique admissions that the North struck first. No one wants to humiliate Pyongyang or point the finger of blame at it for events 40 years ago, but the North Koreans should unencumber themselves of this historical baggage--especially if they want to build trust with South Korea and move towards the shared goal of unification. (As we have seen, the South has some baggage of its own.)

The answer to the question that began this section--whether the war was an "invasion" or a "war of national liberation"--is simply that it was both. The North Koreans refer to it as the "Fatherland Liberation War." While there was a boundary that was forcibly crossed, it would have been hard to find any Korean in 1950 who recognized the division of the country as legitimate, much less accepted it as permanent. Given the means and opportunity, Syngman Rhee would have gone North, just as Kim came South--but he would not have blushed about admitting it.

Finally, there is the question of whether the Korean War was international or civil in character. And here the answer is

also both. The balance changed over time. The initial division of Korea--as well as its liberation from Japan--was due to the US and USSR. Superpower disengagement and the subsequent creation of rival Korean regimes strengthened the civil aspect of the struggle between the Korean left and right. Later, as the Soviets now delicately put it, the war was "internationalized" by US and, later, Chinese interventions (Soviet intervention too was, we have recently been told, only narrowly averted.) Today, with the end of the Cold War, the civil character of the competition between the two Koreas is again assuming more importance.

第2次 韓國戰爭 國際學術會議

1990. 6. 14 ~ 6. 15, 서울

I-3

韓國戰爭의 起源 : 對答없는 質問

존 메릴(美 國務省)

目 次

- I. 戰爭의 勃發과 南韓의 戒嚴亂鬪은 어떤 關係가 있는가? 4
- II. 38度線上에서 일어났던 國境衝突은 戰爭勃發과 어떤 聯關이 있는가? 6
- III. 朝鮮人民共和國의 蘇聯에 대한 關係는 어떠한 것이었는가? 그 關係가 戰爭을 일으킬 수 있었는가? 10
- IV. 戰爭의 起源에서 黨派主義는 어떠한 役割을 했는가? 12
- V. 中國은 北韓의 攻擊計劃에 어떠한 役割을 했는가? 스탈린은 완고한 모택동을 戰線으로 몰려고 戰爭을 利用했는가? · 14
- VI. 蘇聯과 北韓은 戰爭 直前に 美國의 政策을 어떻게 評價했는가? · 16
- VII. 李承晩은 처리할 수 없는 國內問題를 回避하기 위해서 戰爭을 挑發했는가? 17
- VIII. 韓國戰爭은 侵略인가, 아니면 民族解放戰爭인가? 19

韓國戰爭을 누가 일으켰는가 하는 문제는 어떤 합리적인 證據에 의해서건 이미 오래 전에 解明되었다. I.F. 스톤과 그를 따르는 修正論者들은 美國과 韓國의 公式的인 說明에 구멍이 나게 했다는 점에서 한때 正當化되기도 했으나, 이제는 점점 무용한 理論이 돼가고 있다. 심지어 蘇聯 史學者들조차도 ‘글라스노스트’의 분위기 속에서 平壤이 먼저 戰爭을 일으켰다는 사실을 더욱 폭넓게 暗示하고 있다(그리고 이들은 韓國戰 勃發 40周年을 맞이하여 이 문제를 재고하겠다고 밝히고 있다).

戰爭에 관한 많은 설명에 공통된 문제는 그들이 직면한 복잡한 상황에 주목하는 것을 소홀히 한 채, 政治家와 政治 指導者들의 動機들에 焦點을 맞춘다는 점이다. 심지어 公式文書에서조차 ‘現實的인 動機’가 곧잘 소홀시되고 확정짓기 어렵게 서술돼 있다—그리고 그러한 기록들(특히 共產 側에 관한)이 부재한 가운데 감춰진 動機를 전하는 것은 부질없는 시도이다. 研究 戰略으로서 상황의 論理가 충분히 구명될 때까지는 動機의 問題는 비껴가거나 ‘未題’로 남겨두는 편이 낫다. 이렇게 보면, 戰爭 以前의 北韓의 政策은—광기가 어렸거나 非理性的인 것이 결코 아니고—韓半島의 狀況을 변화시키려는 면밀한 시도였으며, 최소한 平壤의 基準으로 볼때 지극히 합리적인 것이었다.

戰爭의 國際的인 맥락은 충분히—아직까지 완전하지는 않다 하더라도—분석됐으나, 戰爭이 지역적으로 또는 韓半島에서 가졌던 측면들에는 거의 주의를 기울이지 않았다. 1950년 6월 이전에 10만명 이상의 사람들이 南韓에서 暴動이나 38度線上에서의 충돌로 사망했다. 스탈린의 滿洲 政策이나 日本에 根據를 마련하려는 美國의 움직임이 北韓의 攻擊에 미친 방식들도 또한 구명될 필요가 있다. I.F. 스톤의 見解를 바꿔 말하자면, 戰爭의 이러한 측면들이 韓國戰의 감춰진 歷史의 實體이다.

戰爭에 관해 答辯돼야 할 필요가 있는 몇 가지 문제들이 있다.

1. 戰爭의 勃發과 南韓의 게릴라鬪爭은 어떤 關係가 있는가?

1949년~50년 겨울의 南韓 게릴라 運動의 失敗는 北韓의 用語를 빌자면 祖國을 統一하기 위해서는 傳統的인 軍事力에 依存하는 수 밖에 없다는 것을 의미했다. 대부분의 初期 게릴라 紛爭은 地方的인 차원의 폭동이었고 南韓의 共產主義 指導者들에 의해 낮은 수준에서 시작됐다. 그러한 紛爭들은 중앙에서 통제되는 戰略의 일부분이 아니었으며 곧잘 平壤의 計劃을 뒤집을 정도로 위험스럽기까지 했다. 1948년 4월의 濟州道 暴動은 李承晩에 反對하는 南韓 指導者들의 統一戰線을 樹立하려는 노력을 빗나가게 했으며, 또한 10월에 麗水에서 있었던 南韓 軍警의 叛亂은 北韓을 경악케 했다. 北韓은 祖國統一 民主戰線(DFUF)이 게릴라 總攻勢를 시작했던 1949년 봄까지는 南韓에서의 武力鬪爭 支援으로 旋回하지 않았다. 잘 무장된 대규모 兵力이 北韓의 首都 近郊 部隊에서 訓練을 받고 韓國의 동해안을 따라 분포된 험산에서 근거지를 마련하기 위해 南韓으로 侵透됐다. 平壤이 表明한 바로는 게릴라전의 目標은 李承晩 정부를 타도하고 가을에 조국을 통일하기 위한 총선을 실시한다는 것이었다. 9월에 軍事 및 신진 兩面의 總攻勢가 있었으나, 大規模 戰으로 옮겨가고 都市에 대한 攻擊을 敢行한다는 戰略은 失敗했다. 攻擊이 붕괴된 뒤, 南韓의 게릴라운동은 金日成의 직접적인 統制 下에 든다는 分명한 目標을 갖고 완전히 재조직 되었다.

韓國은 게릴라의 威脅에 주의를 돌리면서 9월 초, 大規模 反暴動 캠페인을 시작했다. 政府는 몇몇 部隊를 機動하여 인접 농촌 주민을 소개하고, 주요 게릴라 기지 지역을 차단한 후 하나 하나 차례로 쓸어버렸다. 政府는 게릴라에 대한 압력을 지속시키기 위하여 계속 새로운 兵力으로 交替하여 게릴라를 지치게 했다. 南韓의 共產黨 構造는 연이

은 체포로 분쇄되기 시작했는데, 이를 繼承한 黨의 中心部는 경찰이 대규모 밀고 정보망으로 활용하는 非共產主義 組織이나 다름 없었다. 1949~50년 겨울 동안에 政府는 南韓 게릴라를 괴멸시키는 데 성공했다.

北韓은 잘 무장된 대규모 部隊를 南韓에 侵透시킴으로써 暴動을 되살리려고 노력했으나 실패했다. 東部海岸의 殘餘 게릴라들이 1950년 봄에 퇴각한 것은 폭동의 붕괴를 상징했다. 北韓은 그들의 後退를 掩護해줄 大規模 게릴라를 급파했으나, 이 增員軍들은 대부분 일개월 간에 걸친 치열한 戰鬥에서 섬멸되었다. 北韓이 敗北한 暴動에서 발을 뺀다는 징후로서 平壤방송은 南韓의 게릴라를 “金日成 將軍의 傳統을 따른 빨치산”이라고 언급하는 것을 중단했다. 그들의 활동에 관한 平壤방송의 보도는 점점 더 개괄적으로 돼 갔으며, 그릇된 정보를 방송하기 시작했다. - 즉 있지도 않은 전투를 보도하고 오래 전에 죽은 게릴라 指導者들의 삶을 마치 그들이 여전히 살아 있는 것처럼 방송했던 것이다.

李承晩에 대한 反對者들과 統一戰線을 결성하고 韓國防衛軍에 侵透하며, 南韓의 게릴라를 支援함으로써 統一을 달성하려했던 北韓의 希望은 잇달아 꺾이고 말았다. 平壤이 자신들의 의도대로 祖國의 統一을 達成하기 위하여 남은 유일한 수단은 자신들의 군대였다. - 그들은 訓練, 裝備, 士氣面에서 南韓의 軍隊를 훨씬 능가했다. 南韓에서의 大衆蜂起는 北韓이 蘇聯의 支援을 구하는 데 있어 蘇聯에게 강조하고 싶은 훌륭한 구상이기는 했겠지만, 北韓은 그것에 기대할 만큼 비현실적이지는 않았다.

II. 38度線上에서 일어났던 國境衝突은 戰爭 勃發과 어떤 聯關이 있는가?

韓國戰爭은 國境衝突과 聯關이 있기는 하지만 분명히 質的으로 다른 것이었다. 南韓은 총돌을 조장했고 北韓의 國境防衛軍과 交戰하여 通常勝利했지만, 뒤에는—蘇聯의 상당량의 軍事裝備가 도착하기 시작하고 平壤이 戰鬥에 그것을 투입하면서부터—상황이 反轉했다. 北韓은 南韓의 ‘국경 도발’ 행위에 대한 계획적인 선전 캠페인을 벌이는 동시에 國境線의 韓國軍에 대한 단호한 응징의 교훈을 보여주었다. 國境衝突의 結果들이 蓄積됨에 따라 北韓의 指導者들에게 南韓으로부터의 장기적인 위협의 인상을 심어다 주었다. 李承晩은 분명히 北韓으로의 進軍을 원했으며, 또한 그렇게 하여 성공할 수 있는 기회만 있었다면 그렇게 했을 것이다. 李承晩이 가졌던 생각은 美國大使와 軍隊를 短期的으로 묶어두고 있었던 韓國軍 顧問團도 마찬가지로 공유하고 있었다.

國境衝突은 대부분의 설명에서 사실상 무시되고 있었다. 분명히 武力의 과시 이상의 행동이 개재됐다. 많은 총돌들이 砲兵의 支援을 받는 연대급 또는 그 이상의 部隊의 攻擊을 포함하는 大規模의 것이었다. 北韓의 體制는 그러한 衝突에 支援을 할 수 있었고 人民大衆들로부터 武器를 구입하기 위한 모금을 할 수 있었다. 兩側 軍隊가 상대방의 영토 수 마일 내까지 침투하는 경우가 자주 있었다. 北韓의 攻擊은 정치적인 거점에 집중됐으며 南韓의 軍隊를 38度線 以北地域에서 南韓軍이 占領하고 있던 突出地点에서 남한군을 격퇴했다. 어떤 攻勢期에는 北韓은 웅진반도 전체를 장악할 수 있었으나, 곧 중단했다.

共產側에서 戰爭에 從軍했던 오스트리아의 저널리스트인 밀프레드 버체트(Wilfred Burchett)는 國境衝突을 언제 戰爭이 실제로 시작됐는가 하

는 문제를 충분히 제기할 만큼 심각한 것으로 보았다. 그가 주장하기로는, 韓國戰은 平和에서 戰爭으로 옮겨간 것이 아니라 小規模戰에서 大規模戰으로 이행한 것이다. 베헤트의 말에 따르면 1949년 가을 西部 38度線을 따라 ‘一種의 戰爭’이 있었다.

“아직까지 불완전한 본인의 연구에 따르면, 戰爭은 사실상 1949년 8~9월에 시작된 것이지 1950년 6월에 개시된 것은 아니었다. 1949년 여름 내내, 北韓에 대한 전면적인 진입을 시작할 수 있는 거점의 확보를 목표로 한 李承晩의 軍隊에 의한 攻擊이 38度線의 主要 地點을 따라 거듭됐다. 이 후에 北韓사람들은 상황이 이제 李承晩의 軍隊에 의한 奇襲이 있으면 철저히 맞서야 할 정도로 충분히 발전했다고 판단했다.

平和적인 統一의 모든 가능성이 사라진 바에야 그 軍隊를 擊退해서 南韓을 해방해야 한다고 판단했던 것이다.”

이러한 기술에서 놀라운 점은 이것이 平壤側에 의해 출판됐다는 것이다. 筆者가 베헤트의 견해에 완전히 동의하는 것은 아니지만, 國境衝突이 北韓의 攻擊에 어떤 선제적인 성격을 부여했고 또한 스탈린의 적극성을 얻어내기 위한 金의 노력을 뒷받침했다고 말한 점에서는 그가 옳다고 본다.

國境衝突은 시간대를 두고 살펴보아야 한다. 초기의 많은 衝突은 北韓의 均衡을 깨고 1949년 봄 美國의 마지막 戰鬥部隊가 철수한 후 美國의 軍事援助를 받을 필요를 입증하기 위한 캠페인의 일환으로 南韓에 의해 촉발됐다. ‘38度線의 전반적인 교착화’와 함께 軍隊撤收에 관한 美國과의 논의가 시작되면서 韓國軍이 충돌을 시작했다. 襄津, 開城, 春川

(이곳에서 韓國軍의 내대장 2명이 5월초 월북했다)에서 심각한 교전이 잇따랐다. 李承晩은 國境衝突에 편승하여 ‘우리에게 부기를 달라’는 시위를 서울에서 조직하고 워싱턴에서 로비활동을 시작했으며, 太平洋 條約案을 지지했다.

北韓은 초기의 소규모 접전에서 패했다. 그 이유는—대부분의 共產國家들과 마찬가지로—北韓은 國境線에 輕武裝된 防衛軍을 주둔시키고, 정규군은 예비로 보유하고 있었기 때문이다. 美國의 軍事顧問團 대표인 로버트 장군은 國境衝突을 다음과 같이 기술했다.

”우리의 의견으로는 38度線 以北의 南韓의 小規模 突出陣地가 등장하면서 충돌이 일어났다고 본다. 각 전투에는 ‘前進이다 增兵해 달라, 軍需品을 달라!’는 部隊長들의 아우성으로 가득찼다… 南韓사람들은 北韓에 侵入하기를 원했다. 우리는 그들에게 만약 그러한 사태가 발생하면, 모든 顧問團이 철수할 것이고 經濟協力委員會(ECA)의 援助도 중단될 것이라고 이야기했다. 그들은 甕津半島에서의 敗北와 같은 경우에는, 그들의 체면을 유지하기 위해서는 鐵原까지 20마일 가량 침입해야 한다고 생각했다… 38도선에서 일어났던 대부분의 사태들은 그 지역의 雙方 軍들이 서로를 자극한 데서 비롯된 것이다. 南北 兩側에 모두 잘못이 있다. 北韓에 의한 攻擊이 심각한 비중을 차지한 적은 한 번도 없다.”

1949년 한여름까지 平壤은 그 正規軍을 戰線에 내보내지 않았다. 북한측은 李承晩의 北으로 進擊한다는 豪言과 韓國軍의 거듭된 侵透로 격앙됐던 것이다. 그러한 공격들 중에 가장 도발적이었던 것은 韓國海軍이 8월의 解放紀念行事 직전에 平壤에 집결한 西海岸 艦隊를 급습한

경우였을 것이다. 南韓의 소함대가 4척을 격침시키고 北韓의 전함 1척을 나포했는데, 서울은 이것을 대대적으로 선전하는 가운데 李承晩이 參觀한 仁川에서의 訓練을 목표물로 사용했다.

平壤은 그러한 일련의 사태들에 대해서 自身の 領土에 대한 韓國의 거듭된 ‘侵略’에 대항하는 캠페인을 벌임으로써 반응을 보였다. 그 캠페인은 그 후 수 주간에 걸쳐 전개됐는데 北韓은 체포한 韓國軍 將校들에 대한 공개재판을 거행하고, 解放紀念日 大行進에 새로·입수한 蘇聯製 장비를 인상적으로 과시했으며, 南韓軍을 38度線 以北의 거점으로부터 몰아내기 위한 공세를 취했다. 이 캠페인은 金日成이 祖國 防衛를 支援하기 위해서 全社會를 동원할 것을 호소하고 武器 구입을 위한 大衆募金運動을 고취하기 위한 조직에 착수하면서부터 새로운 전환점에 들어섰다. 이 캠페인은 10월 중순 外相 박헌영이 韓國의 38度線 도발행위를 상세하게 기술한 보고서를 UN에 제출하면서 끝났는데, 그에 따르면 만약 국제기구가 계속 朝鮮人民共和國를 인정하지 않고 韓半島에 개입할 경우, 韓國 人民은 祖國을 統一하기 위해 자신들의 고유한 수단으로 의지할 수 밖에 없다고 경고하고 있다.

웅진에서의 短期間의 치열한 접전을 제외하고는, 38도선은 韓國戰의 勃發時까지는 이 이후로 비교적 소강상태를 유지했다. 南韓의 司令官들은 그들이 이길 수 없는 戰鬪는 더 이상 벌이지 않았다. 결국, 李承晩의 ‘虛勢 政策’은 비극적으로 자괴했다는 것을 입증했다. 그것은 빈약한 자원을 낭비했고 美國의 善意를 흐뜨러뜨렸다. 그리고 그것은 北韓의 體制가 防禦的인 目的을 가졌는가 아니면 攻擊的인 目的을 가졌는가를 구분하기 어렵게 했으며, 또한 그로 인해 李承晩 政府는 자체의 經濟·政治的 問題들에 집중하는 것을 방해받았다.

Ⅲ. 朝鮮人民共和國의 蘇聯에 대한 關係는 어떠한 것이었는가? 그 關係가 戰爭을 일으킬 수 있었는가?

金日成은 戰爭의 問題에 關係 스탈린을 기만했을런지 모른다. 이 시기의 蘇聯의 統制 메카니즘은 아주 강력했기 때문에 北韓의 獨自力으로 戰爭을 일으킬 수는 없었다. 그러나 이것이 金日成이 단지 蘇聯의 허수아비에 지나지 않는다는 것을 의미하지는 않는다.

실제로, 金이 그가 侵略戰爭을 추진하기 일년전에 스탈린에게 로비를 밧었다고 하는 것을 믿을 만한 상당한 이유가 있다. 金은 國境衝突이 본격적으로 시작되기 전인 1949년 3월에 모스크바를 방문했을 때, 분명히 攻擊에 關係를 처음으로 제기했다. 후르시초프가 말한 바로는, 南韓의 革命的인 情熱이 엄청나서 38선에 총검을 쏘서대기만 해도 그것이 폭발할 것이기 때문에 南侵은 쉽게 勝利를 거둘 수 있다고 주장했다고 한다(이 점을 강조하기 위해 모스크바 방문 직후에 北韓은 南韓에 개털라부대를 급파했다) 스탈린은 金에게 직접적인 答辯을 回避한 듯 하나, 그에게 좀 더 구체적인 계획으로 발전하면 그를 지원하겠다고 이야기 했다.

스탈린은 金에게 攻擊에 대한 靑信號를 보내는 것은 분명히 주지했으나, 4천만 달러 상당의 부기를 공급하는 데 동의한 것은 틀림없다(6개의 보병사단, 3개의 기계화부대, 150대의 전투기가 무장할 수 있는 충분한 량) 蘇聯은 美國이 南韓에 대한 援助를 계획대로 진행하리라고 상정했다. 그렇지만, 트루만 行政府는 議會에서 韓國, 그리스, 터키에 대한 援助 프로그램이 동의를 얻기 전에는 원조를 실행할 수 없었는데, 韓國에 대한 援助는 다음 해까지 통과되지 않았다. 이렇게 원조가 지연됨으로 인해서 韓半島에는 일시적인 軍事的 불균형 상태가 만들어졌

다. 蘇聯의 武器 引導는 처음에는 동유럽의 위성국가들에 대한 기준량을 초과하지 않는 범위로 제한됐고, 北韓軍의 增強은 最後의 蘇聯軍 撤收 後의 반년동안 南韓에서 小數의 美軍 戰鬥部隊가 계속 등장함에 따라 최소한 부분적으로 보충됐다.

南韓에서의 暴動과 38度線의 國境衝突은 어쩌면 金으로 하여금 스탈린에게 남침에 관한 주장을 하는 데 도움을 주었을 런지 모른다. 주지하다시피 蘇聯은 緩衝國家와 그들의 국경의 안전에 상당히 신경을 쓰고 있었다. 그 어느 위성국가도 그 정도로 불안정한 국경을 가지고 있지 않았다.

金日成은 攻擊에 대한 스탈린의 승인을 얻어내려고 南韓에서의 革命的 政變을 과장했었을 것이다. 남로당 지도자인 박헌영은 전쟁 후에 南韓의 革命的인 潛在力을 지나치게 과장한 그릇된 보고서를 제출했다는 명시적인 이유로 숙청됐다. 그러나 金日成은 이러한 '잘못된 報告'에 대해서는 北韓의 어느 지도자 못지 않게 책임이 있으며, 攻擊이 失敗한 後에 朴에 대해서 자신이 저지른 과오에 대해서 자책하려고 노력했던 것처럼 보인다. 北韓이 1949년 6월과 9월에 大規模 계릴라 攻勢를 敢行했던 이유는 中國과 마찬가지로 南韓의 暴動은 계릴라전의 양상을 넘어서 정규군에 의한 大規模 作戰, 곧 고전적인 계릴라 폭동의 최후 국면으로 이행해갔다는 것을 설득하기 위해서였다. 1950년 초에 나타났던 계릴라 활동에 관한 平壤방송의 誇張된 報道도 우선적으로 蘇聯의 토의를 얻어보고자 하는 의도에서 이루어졌을 것이다.

IV. 戰爭의 起源에서 黨派主義는 어떠한 役割을 했는가?

北韓의 指導者 內의 黨派主義는 戰爭의 起源에 관한 小要因에 不過하다. 그것은 對南政策에 관한 論議의 章을 마련했다. 어느 누구도 李承晚에 대해서 유연하게 보일 수 없었다. 大部分 黨派主義는 北韓의 政策을 서울에 대하여 좀 더 積極的인 政策으로 偏向되게 했다. 北韓의 政策 一般이 그러하듯이, 黨派的 立場도 狀況이 變化함에 따라서 時間이 經過하면서 變化했다.

만약 北韓이 꼭두각시였다면, 統制의 끈은 흐트러졌을 것이다. 金의 韓일유격대와 및 수백명의 '蘇聯派 韓人' 以外에도, 중국과, 남로당과, 그리고 北韓 國內派 등도 影響力을 갖고 있었다. 그 당시 金日成은 훗날의 것처럼 도전받지 않는 指導者였다기 보다는 비슷한 사람들 중에서 좀 나은 정도였지만, 그 때에도 그는 對南政策을 大部分 主管했다. 金은—그러한 問題들에 관해서는 抗日遊擊隊 指導者로서의 背景에서 비롯된 상당한 經驗을 갖고 있었다—1949년 9월 공세의 실패에 이은 게릴라작전의 재조직이 전멸한 뒤 남한의 북동에 대한 보다 直接的인 指揮權을 행사했던 것으로 보인다. 金의 경쟁자인 박헌영은 초기의 게릴라작전의 책임을 졌으며, 그러한 작전의 실패는 김에게는 유리하게 작용했다.

南韓의 一部 著者들은 北韓이 侵透시킨 게릴라만을 支援했지 自立的으로 形成된 지방 게릴라들은 支援하지 않았다고 主張한다. 마찬가지로 1949년 9월 공세는 朝鮮人民共和國 指導部 內에서 남로당과의 影響력을 쥐으려는 평양측—김일성을 의미한다—의 必死的인 策略으로 파악된다. 북한사람들은 남한의 게릴라들이 질망적인 투쟁에 힘을 쏟을 때 옆에서 방관하고 있었다는 것이다.

이 時期는 歷史家에게는 가장 당혹스럽고 곤란한 시기들 중의 하나이다. 우리는 다음과 같은 것을 정확하게 알지 못한다. 북한이 9월 공세에 몇 차례의 大規模 侵透를 支援하면서 개털라폭동에 최대한의 노력을 기울였는가? 아니면 그 공세는 南韓軍을 38도선에서 유인해내기 위해 計劃된 것인가? 또는 金이 스탈린에게 南侵이 成功可能하다는 것을 說得하려고 노력했었는가? 아니면 김일성은 그의 南侵要求가 스탈린에 의해서 거부된 뒤, 개털라전에서 그러했던 것처럼 그가 기동할 수 있는 병력을 갖고 행동하기로 결정했는가? 우리는 또한 그 當時의 平壤側의 宣傳의 焦點이었던 南韓의 國境線에서의 '挑發行爲'에 對抗하기 위한 캠페인에 개털라 공세가 얼마만큼 부합하는 것이었는가를 정확히 알지 못한다.

북한의 指導部 內部的 黨派鬭爭 때문에 北韓이 일년 후에 계획된 남침을 앞서서 감행했다는 로버트 사이먼의 견해를 입증할 만한 자료는 없다. 그가 제시하는 것처럼, 戰爭 直前の 두 개의 統一案은 박헌영과 김일성이 서로 경쟁하는 主導權 다툼의 결과로서 나온 것은 아니다. 오히려 헤롤드 노블이 지적했듯이, 그 案들은 攻擊의 最終的인 準備에 대한 南韓의 關心을 돌려놓는 데 成功했던 '훌륭한 攪亂策'의 一環이었다.朴은 그의 지지기반과 다시 연결된다는 점에서 남한의 '解放'으로 상당한 利益을 얻을 것이다. 하지만 이것은 북한군 統帥權者인 金日成에 대해서도 마찬가지로 結果的으로 적용되는 것이다.

戰爭의 起源에 있어서 黨派主義 보다도 훨씬 더 중요한 것은 韓國의 民族主義였다. 강한 民族主義的 霧圍氣가 解放 後의 政治的 風土를 支配했다. 그 흡인력은 예컨대 南韓의 많은 保守的인 政治人들 조차도 1948년 평양에서 열린 統一會談에 參席케 할 정도로 強力했다. 모든 政治集團은 統一을 잠시도 지체해서는 안 될 지상목표로 보았다.

V. 中國은 北韓의 攻擊 計劃에 어떠한 役割을 했는가? 스탈린은 완고한 모택동을 戰線으로 몰려고 戰爭을 利用했는가?

北韓의 攻擊에 中國이 얼마만큼 直接的으로 介入했는가 하는 것은, 물론 그들은 事前에 알았겠지만, 우리로서는 분명치 않다. 公開發적으로 입수할 수 있는 유일한 資料는 후르시초프의 回顧錄인데, 거기서 그는 毛가 南侵計劃을 承認했다고 말한다. 그렇지만 出版된 回顧錄은 후르시초프가 實際로 말한 사본과는 같지 않다. 사본은 훨씬 유보적이다—거기서 알 수 있는 것은 스탈린의 질문에 대하여 毛가 그러한 행동 이면의 ‘본질’을 인정했다는 사실 뿐이다.

戰爭이 勃發했을 때, 毛의 體制는 權力을 공고히 하고 分碎된 社會를 再建하는 自體的인 問題에 專念하고 있었다. 中國人은 北韓이 攻擊計劃을 세우는 데 直接的인 役割을 하지 않은 것으로 보인다. 그런데 中國의 內戰에서 그들이 勝利한 뒤인 1949년 말부터 시작하여 中國은 中國軍에서 활약했던 수 만명의(수 개 사단) 노련한 한국인 兵隊들을 본국으로 보냈다. 평양의 民主人民共和國에 設置된 連絡事務所를 통해 그들은 이미 수년 전에 상당 규모의 外交要員을 北韓에 派遣한 바 있다. 그들은 만주를 통해 朝鮮人民共和國에 大量 供給되는 武器를 窺본 試해야만 했다.

戰爭 直前に 스탈린의 當面 問題는 어떻게 毛를 길들이냐는 것이었다. 兩者의 關係는 오래 전부터 삐걱거렸다. 中國革命을 指導하겠다는 스탈린의 主張은 민병이 無爲로 끝나고 말았다. 毛는 農村에 根據한 戰略을 選好하여 스탈린의 助言을 無視하면서 십년 이상 日本과 內戰에 대한 緊要한 저항을 통해 權力을 爭取했다. 모스크바는 마지막 순간까지 장개석 정부를 계속 인정했다—물론 그로부터 양보를 얻어내기는

했지만, 毛의 승리와 함께 스탈린은 그의 '약한 중국' 정책을 완전히 재고해야만 했다.

만주는 中-蘇 關係에서 感情이 응어리진 지점이다. 모스크바는 오래 전서부터 만주를 탐냈었고 스탈린은 中國共產黨의 副議長이고 反自立的인 동북부 人民 地域政府의 代表였던 카오 강을 통해서 強力한 影響力을 행사하고자 했다. 카오는 自立的인 外交政策을 追求하면서 1949년 6월 -金日成이 訪問한 후 수 개월 후-에 모스크바를 방문하여 交易協定과 經濟協力條約에 署名했는데, 이것으로 스탈린은 만주에서 影響力을 行事할 수 있는 領域을 獲得했다.

毛는 1950년 초, 스탈린과의 회담에서 만주에 대한 소련의 개입에 대해 노골적인 불평을 했는데, 뒤에 그는 그것이 그가 '호랑이의 입에서 고기(만주)를 빼내올' 수 있다는 순전한 억지에서 한 이야기라고 회상한다. 카오는 2월에 兩國間의 友好와 同盟協定에 조인한 후 상당히 풀이 죽은 듯 했으나, 戰爭이 勃發한 후 되살아났다. 카오는 中國人民 義勇軍의 派遣을 '促進'하고 만주를 兵站基地로 組織하는 일에 着手할 것을 要求받았다. 中共의 介入은 滿洲를 保護하기 위한 緩衝地帶를 保存하기 위한 試圖로 解釋되는 境遇가 흔히 있지만, 미네오 나카지마는 毛가 소련이 맥아더의 進擊으로부터 滿洲를 '保護'한다는 구실로 그 곳을 再占領하는 것을 막기 위해 介入했다고 생각한다.

어쨌든, 카오는 戰爭 直後에 毛의 表現을 빌자면 리히터 지진계의 진도 8에 해당하는 政治的 地震과도 같이 숙청됐다.(등소평이 처음으로 각광을 받은 것도 이 문제를 다루면서부터였다.) 카오에게 適用된 主要 죄목은 그가 만주 '獨立 王國'으로 만들고자 했다는 점이다. 카오의 숙청은 中國과 北韓內의 蘇聯派 人物들이 당한 숙청과 일치한다.

스탈린이 韓國에 대해서 생각했던 것보다 훨씬 깊숙히 介入했다고 믿

을만한 몇 가지 理由가 있다. 후르시초프의 테이프 사본은 스탈린이 공격에 대한 워싱턴의 반응을 기대했다는 事實을 밝힌다. 美國을 韓國에서 進退兩難에 빠지게 하려는 것과는 별도로 스탈린이 美國의 介入을 바랬다고 생각해 볼 수 있는 唯一한 理由는 워싱턴과 北京 사이에 敵對感을 造成해서 毛가 계속 ‘한 쪽에 기대’는 것 외에는 다른 選擇權을 가지지 못하게 하려는 것이었다.

VI. 蘇聯과 北韓은 戰爭 直前に 美國의 政策을 어떻게 評價했는가?

韓國을 동북아시아의 美國 防衛線으로부터 除外한다는 國務長官 딘 에치슨의 내셔널 프레스 클럽 演說이 北韓의 攻擊을 誘發했다는 一般의인 見解에도 불구하고, 戰爭 前に 美國軍이 이 地域에 流入되는 것이 平壤과 모스크바에게는 훨씬 重要했다. 에치슨의 演說은 通常의으로 認識되는 것 보다도 훨씬 여러가지 意味를 含蓄한 微妙한 發言이었다. 그 演說은 아시아의 民族主義의 重要性을 認定하고 滿洲를 中國으로부터 떼어놓으려는 蘇聯의 기도에 대해서 경고하는 한편, 뒤에 分명한 事實로 들어났지만 韓國을 UN의 集團防衛 體制로 지키겠다는 點을 強調했다. 1950년 초에 美國은 日本과의 單獨 平和協定을 推進하고 있었고 日本에 永久 軍事基地를 세우기 시작했다. 트루만 行政府는 월터 래피버가 1949년의 2大 衝擊이라고 불렀던 中國의 共產化와 蘇聯의 제1차 원폭실험 이후에 勢力 均衡을 回復했다.

스탈린은 美國이 蘇聯이 參加하지 않은 가운데 日本과의 平和協定을 締結할 計劃을 가지고 있다는 것을 확실히 알았다. 1950년 봄에 모스크바, 北京, 平壤이 日本 軍國主義의 復活에 反對하는 聯合 宣傳캠페인을 벌인 것은 분명히 日本을 향한 것이 아니라, 日本을 통해 美國을

노리는 것이었다.

워싱턴의 動靜은 蘇聯 指導者와의 對話 進行에 分明히 一定한 役割을 했다. 말렌코프-西歐와의 ‘平和적인 競爭’의 擁護者-는 蘇聯이 더 이상 資本主義의 包圍에 대해서 걱정할 필요가 없으며 經濟建設에 集中할 수 있다고 믿었던 反面에, 수슬로프-완고한 스탈린주의자-는 NATO의 創立과 美國의 수소폭탄 실험은 西歐가 狀況을 자신들에게 有利하게 뒤바꾸고 共產主義를 後退시키려고 試圖하는 것을 意味한다고 警告했다. 이는 蘇聯의 두 가지 立場을 代辯하는 것이었다. 스탈린은 戰爭 直前に 秘密 新聞에서 言語上의 變化를 보이는 가운데 最終적으로 수슬로프의 立場을 취했다. 모스크바는 워싱턴을 비조직적인 退却을 하는 것이 아니라 共產主義를 後退시키기 위한 역공세를 準備한다고 보았다.

그렇지만 결국, 수슬로프의 惡夢을 現實로 實現시키는 데 일조한 것은 北韓의 南侵이었다. NSC-80 (共產主義 牽制를 위한 美國의 資源動員 計劃)은 이미 採擇됐으나 北韓의 攻擊이 시작됐을 때 트루만의 책상에서 계속 보류되고 있었다. 南侵은 그 文書의 緊急한 豫想을 實證했으며 워싱턴은 그것을 行動으로 옮겼다.

Ⅶ. 李承晩은 처리할 수 없는 國內問題를 回避하기 위해서 戰爭을 挑發했는가?

修正論者들의 解釋으로는 이승만이 1950년 봄에 궁지에 몰려있었고, 그 때문에 그는 38度線의 事件이 발단이 되어 일어난 戰爭을 계속 進行시키든지 아니면 거꾸로 後퇴해서 美國이 戰爭에 介入하게 만들어야 했다고 본다. 물론 筆者는 이 중에 어떤 것도 반드시 이승만-또는 이 문제에 관한 한, 맥아더-의 탓이라고 돌리지는 않겠지만, 어쨌든

이러한 理論을 뒷받침해 줄 證據는 거의 없는 反面에 反駁할 수 있는 資料는 상당히 많다.

韓國戰이 38度線上에서 韓國이 일으킨 事件으로 시작될 수 있다는 것은 거의 不可能하다. 朝鮮人民共和國이 敢行한 侵略의 規模는 相當한 準備를 必要로 하는 것이었으며, 또한 마체트가 옳다면 北韓은 이미 戰爭을 하기로 作定하고 있었다. 北韓이 必要한 것은 스탈린의 決斷뿐이었다. 平壤은 이승만이 전처럼 계속 自身을 집적거리게 놓아 둘 수는 없었다. 그런데 왜 그것이 1950년 6월에 일어났는가?

이승만 政府는 崩壞危險에 처해 있었다기 보다는 오히려 1950년 봄에 自身の 立場을 強化하기 始作했다. 經濟는 活性化되고 있었고 南韓의 개발자들은 토벌됐고, 또한 韓美關係의 緊張은 최소한 一時的으로나마 小康狀態에 있었다. 이승만이 選舉의 敗北로 어려움을 겪은 것은 사실이지만, 49년에 進步的 國會議員을 난조된 죄목으로 축출한 것에서 볼 수 있듯이— 이 노련한 南韓의 指導者는 새로운 國會를 자신의 뜻에 따르게 하기 위하여 強制的인 手段을 無窮無盡하게 使用할 수 있었다. 依存할 수 밖에 없었다거나, 또는 그 問題에 관해서 워싱턴이 危險을 무릅쓰고 自身을 구해 줄 정도로 美國의 支援을 確信했다고 생각할 아무런 根據가 없다.

몇몇 歷史家는 이승만 보다는 美國이 北韓에 함정을 놓았다고 비난한다. 이승만은 분명히 그러한 奇襲作戰을 敢行할 수 있으나, 美國의 政策立案者들이 그렇게 했으리라고 믿기는 어렵다. 항상 그러하듯이, 奇襲攻擊은 거의 大部分 이런 類의 歷史家의 論爭을 불러일으킨다. 아브라함 벤즈비는 그 論爭을 두 개의 범주로 나눈다. 보다 음모적인 見解는 對外政策의 ‘희생양’의 ‘정함성, 명료성, 일관성’을 상조한다. 이 견해는 最高政策立案者들이 결코 공세에 대해 놀라지 않았으며 오히려 攻

擊을 어떻게 해서든 誘引하기 위해 適切한 警告를 하지 않았다고 主張한다. 다른 接近法은 認知的인 경로를 택하면서, 잘못된 신호, 부주의, 경고에 대한 知覺的인 障礙를 強調한다. 물론 韓國에 대한 美國의 介入은 以前의 政策이 완전히 反轉된 것이긴 하지만, 時間이 短期的이고 威脅에 대한 認識이 高揚되고, 決定이 先例에 구애받지 않는 最高指導者에게까지 緊急하게 傳達되는 危機時에는 그러한 反轉은 흔히 있는 일이다. 美國은 中國에 介入했던 것 보다 더 直接的으로 韓國에 參戰했다. 그리고 美國의 意思決定者들은 形式的인 防衛公約이 없이도 美國의 信賴性을 威脅하는 攻擊에 대해서 對應해야 한다고 생각했다.

VIII. 韓國戰爭은 侵略인가, 아니면 民族解放戰爭인가?

戰爭의 意味와 意義라는 폭넓은 問題는 계속 남는다. 그 問題를 규정짓는 무수한 方法이 있겠으나, 本人의 論文의 韓國語 翻譯版 제목은 -내가 붙인 것은 아니지만- 適切하다고 생각한다. 그 제목이 바로 '韓國戰은 侵略인가 아니면 民族解放戰爭인가?'이다.

北韓은 (金日成이 살아 있는 한) 결코 그들이 戰爭을 시작했다고 公開적으로 認定할 수 없다. 그렇게 하는 것은 그 體制의 英雄的인 自畫像-世界에서 가장 強力한 힘을 갖고 持續해 온-을 훼손하고 平壤으로 하여금 백오십만의 韓國人의 목숨을 앗아간 戰爭을 일으켰다는 죄를 자인케 하는 것이기 때문이다. 앞으로 수 년 동안 우리는 아마도 反美鬪爭月의 平壤의 慶祝行事를 계속 지켜보게 될 것이다.

그렇지만, 누가 戰爭을 먼저 일으켰는가에 관하여 북한사람들이 形式主義에 依存한다는 것은 그들이 戰爭을 始作했다는 것에 대해서 어느 정도 죄책감을 느낀다는 것을 意味한다. 그들은 自身の 立場을 아주

自信있게 辯護하지 않는다. 平壤은 戰爭의 초기 몇시간에 관한 상세한 說明을 결코 出版物을 통해서 밝히지 않고 있으며, 戰爭에 관한 學術 討議에 參加하려고 하지도 않는다. 朝鮮人民共和國에서 發刊한 戰爭史에서 批判적인 讀者라면 北韓이 먼저 戰爭을 일으켰다는 것을 認定하는 모호한 표현을 발견할 수 있을 것이다. 아무도 平壤을 格下하거나 40년 전의 그 事件들에 대해서 그들을 非難하고 싶어하지 않는다. 그러나 북한사람들은 이러한 歷史적인 집에 입게여서는 안된다. 특히 그들이 南韓과의 信賴를 構築하고 統一이라는 共同目標을 公有하려면 이것은 더욱 必要하다 (우리가 볼 수 있듯이, 南韓은 나름대로의 집을 지고 있다).

이 집에서 시작한 問題-韓國戰은 '侵略'인가, 아니면 '民族解放戰爭'인가-에 대한 답은 두 가지 다 해당된다고 간단하게 말할 수 있다. 북한사람들은 그것을 '朝鮮解放戰爭'이라고 부른다. 強制的으로 가로놓여진 境界線이 있는 동안, 1950년에 國土의 分斷을 正當하다고 생각하는 사람은 거의 발견하기 어려웠을 것이며 그것을 永久的이라고 받아들이는 사람도 드물었을 것이다. 手段과 기회가 주어졌더라면, 이승만은 金이 南으로 왔던 것처럼 北進했을 것이다-그러나 그는 그런 일을 저지름으로써 얼굴을 붉히려 하지 않았다.

마지막으로, 韓國戰爭이 國際戰인가 아니면 內戰인가 하는 問題가 있다. 그리고 여기에서도 답은 兩者가 모두 해당된다는 것이다. 韓國의 分斷은 -日本으로부터의 解放과 마찬가지로- 美國과 蘇聯에서 비롯된 것이다. 超強大國의 불간섭과 그에 따른 韓國에서의 競爭的인 兩體制의 創出은 韓國의 좌익과 우익간의 鬭爭의 國內的인 側面을 強化했다. 이제 蘇聯이 미묘하게 표명하고 있듯이, 그것은 그 이후 美國과 또 그 뒤의 中國의 介入(現在 우리가 조심스럽게 표명되고 있는 것을 듣고

있듯이 蘇聯의 介入도 있었다)에 따라 '國際化'됐다. 오늘날은 冷戰의 終熄과 함께 두 개의 韓國 사이의 競爭이 갖는 國內的 性格이 다시 重要性을 더하고 있다.

제 2 회 의
SESSION II

한국전쟁에 있어서의 소련과 동구
**THE SOVIET UNION AND EASTERN
EUROPE IN THE KOREAN WAR**

THE SECOND INTERNATIONAL
CONFERENCE ON THE KOREAN WAR
JUNE 14~15, 1990
SEOUL, KOREA

The Soviet Union and the Origins of the Korean War

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An American author entitles his recent book on the Korean conflict The Forgotten War.¹⁾ Although publication in the last five years of nine major historical works on Korea belies that label, there can be no doubt that the later conflict in Vietnam has had far greater appeal to writers and a general reading audience alike.²⁾ Americans apparently prefer to study wars with conclusive--even if traumatic--outcomes. Yet it was Korea not Vietnam that brought the Soviet Union and the United States to the brink of direct military confrontation; that militarized the Cold War, producing a permanent US presence in Europe and ensuring a rearmed and divided Germany; that exacerbated harsh economic policies in eastern Europe, thus engendering serious tensions within the Soviet satellites; that probably saved Tito's Yugoslavia from invasion by its Communist brethren to the north and east; and, finally, that signalled the rise of a strong, united, and self-confident China willing, in time, to challenge Soviet preeminence over international Communism. Indeed, Korea deserves a place equal if not superior to Vietnam in the international history of the post-World War II era.

Aside from the generally recognized fact that North Korea invaded South Korea during the wee hours of June 25, 1950, much regarding the origins and course of the Korean conflict remains shrouded in mystery, or at least uncertainty. Although huge bodies of archival material are now open in the West, including official materials from North Korea captured in Pyongyang during the fall of 1950, little beyond published primary sources such as newspapers, magazines, journals, and memoirs are available from the Soviet Union

and China. In the latter case, some material did filter out prior to the crackdown at Tianamen Square a year ago, but even here the question of the origins of the Korean War remains so sensitive in relations between Moscow, Beijing, and Pyongyang that the breakthrough was less than momentous.³⁾ In interpreting Soviet and Chinese policies, Western historians continue to find themselves drawing extensively upon contemporary reports from within their own governments, which, in addition to being based on limited information, cannot help but be colored by the extreme tensions of their time.⁴⁾ While scholars still argue over many aspects of US policy, they at least do so on the basis of a wealth of high quality documentation. Thus readers of this paper, not to mention its author, can hardly remain unaware of the limitations inherent in analyzing the Soviet side. Hopefully, the broad and often speculative interpretation offered below will at minimum set the stage for an exploratory exchange.

In all likelihood, the Korean War began as a result of a coordinated effort by the North Koreans, the Soviets, and the Chinese, with the first being the prime initiator and the last two being both cheerleaders and crucial suppliers of materiel, advisers, and troops. A variety of circumstances and evidence suggest that it would have been impossible--not to mention imprudent--for the North Koreans to launch a massive, well-coordinated attack across the 38th parallel without Soviet foreknowledge and approval. Although greater uncertainty remains regarding the Chinese role, the alliance relationship between Moscow and Peking plus the latter's provision

of tens of thousands of experienced soldiers from its own recent civil war suggests China's collusion as well.⁵⁾

Yet even if we accept this basic scenario as a given, the question remains, why did the Soviet Union, at a time of great tension in superpower relations and of its own great vulnerability given the superior US atomic capability and mobilization potential, choose to promote the North Korean venture? The Kim II-sung regime in Pyongyang undoubtedly viewed its options essentially in local terms, with its overriding objective being unification of the peninsula under its control; but the Soviet Union was a global, or at least a Eurasian, power with its primary foreign interests facing westward. Its interests had been seriously compromised over the previous three years as a result of the belligerent nature of its foreign policy. By the fall of 1949, it seems that the implementation of the Marshall Plan, the creation of NATO and an indigenous West German government, and the passage by the US Congress of an arms aid bill for western Europe should have told the Kremlin that the appropriate course was to lie low, to avoid any action that would further provoke a concerted effort by America and its allies.

Before addressing the substance of this question, a word is essential about the context of decision-making in the Soviet Union in 1950. There is every reason to believe that Joseph Stalin held the final power of decision, both on foreign and domestic matters. Despite the reality of his authority, Stalin remained a highly suspicious man, ever wary of the designs of those around him. The purge of Communist party leaders in Leningrad and Moscow during 1949

and 1950 and his frequent juggling of high level personnel over the last years of his rule suggests the old despot's never-ending quest for security within his own house. To him, maintaining his position at the top of the Soviet hierarchy was not simply the way to maximize his personal power; it was his only method of sustaining life itself. In general, then, it is safe to say that Stalin made foreign policy choices with a keen sense of how they would influence his own position at home.⁶⁾

Whatever the range of his authority and depth of his insecurity--perhaps in part because of them--Stalin permitted a good deal of public debate on foreign policy. During 1949 and early 1950, two identifiable factions existed in the Soviet press, one which used Pravda as its primary mouthpiece and included such officials as Vyacheslav Molotov and Mikhail Suslov, the other which used Izvestia as its main outlet and drew support from Georgii Malenkov and Lavrentii Beria. The first or "militant" faction argued that the capitalist states were inherently hostile toward the Soviet camp and unreliable in carrying out agreements, but that opposition to US policies was on the rise among the peoples and governments of western Europe and that the United States itself suffered from an increasingly debilitating economic crisis. If the Soviet Union continued its pressure on the West, the United States soon would become disillusioned with its efforts abroad and retreat to the Western Hemisphere. The second or "moderate" group, on the other hand, downplayed the contradictions within and between the Western powers as well as the economic problems of the United States. The moderates emphasized American progress in western

Europe and the economic advantages accrued from US economic exploitation of the area. Since Soviet pressure had actually strengthened the Western alliance, a reduction of international tension was necessary. In a word, conciliatory moves by the Soviet Union would make America's task more difficult in maintaining and consolidating the alliance.⁷⁾

According to the leading analyst of Soviet factionalism during the period, a compromise of sorts occurred in December 1949, with the militants accepting the line of peaceful coexistence over an extended period while the moderates conceded the need for continued vigilance at home regarding economic development and military spending. During the first six months of 1950, there was a notable decline--though not a disappearance--of factionalism in the Soviet press. In this view, Stalin had concluded for the moment that a "more accomodating policy" was appropriate in Western Europe "to secure that flank so that the Soviet government could devote additional attention to the more promising situation in the Far East."⁸⁾ This did not mean serious negotiations with the West on Germany or Austria, a letup of political pressure on Tito, or a reduction of propaganda attacks on Western government.⁹⁾ Yet it did involve at least a postponement of any plans to invade Yugoslavia and greater concentration on the peace movement in propaganda directed toward western Europe.

But why devote more attention to the Far East? Why not adopt a broad policy of accomodation as the moderates appear to have wanted? Stalin probably viewed the matter from the standpoint of fulfilling three broad objectives: first, to maintain his own hold on power at

home; second, to reinforce his influence over Communist governments on the Soviet periphery; and, third, to distract American attention and resources from the more important European theater. In the first case, we already have seen Stalin's concern manifested in the internal purges commencing in 1949. The maintenance of a high level of international tension through a forward policy in Asia further could discourage any straying from his leadership at home. The same could be said for eastern Europe, where purges began in the fall and continued for the remainder of Stalin's reign. According to one estimate, about one of every four members of the Communist parties in the satellites suffered expulsion.¹⁰⁾ Official harassment of British and American diplomats in those countries provides additional evidence of both Stalin's fears and of his determination to seal off eastern Europe from the outside world.¹¹⁾ In the third case, deeper US embroilment in the Asian morass would stretch out American resources, perhaps facilitating the economic collapse that the militants anticipated and paving the way for a satellite and/or Soviet move against Yugoslavia.¹²⁾ At the same time, American action in Asia would further solidify China's dependence on the Soviet Union.

What specific actions in Asia did Stalin have in mind? Obviously, the North Korean attack was one move, but it is likely that it was neither the first nor the last one planned. By June 1950, four actions had been taken by Communist parties or governments in Asia that may have been conceived by Stalin as the beginning stages of a broad offensive. In mid-January, the Soviets walked out of the UN Security Council, allegedly in protest of its

failure to seat Communist China but quite possibly to freeze the Mao regime out of the international organization and as a first step toward complete withdrawal from it in favor of establishing a new, Communist-dominated body.¹³⁾ At the end of the month, the Soviet Union and China recognized the Ho Chi Minh government in Vietnam. Two weeks later, the Communist giants signed a treaty of friendship and alliance. Then, in the spring, Japan's Communist party, under pressure from Moscow, departed sharply from its previously "lovable" approach to a more aggressively militant line.¹⁴⁾ Finally, after the Korean venture was well underway, Ho Chi Minh's forces launched a major offensive in Vietnam.

Of all these moves, North Korea's attack was clearly the most risky. American signals on Korea had been ambiguous. During 1949, the United States withdrew its last occupation troops from the peninsula and it responded coolly to overtures by the Philippines, Nationalist China, and South Korea regarding a "Pacific Pact" along the lines of NATO. In an important address on January 12, 1950, Secretary of State Dean Acheson omitted South Korea from the American defense perimeter in the Pacific. Yet he did suggest that, if attacked, the ROK could expect help from the United Nations.¹⁵⁾ On several previous occasions, American leaders had publicly labelled Korea a testing ground in Asia between Communism and democracy, and in June 1949 Truman compared economic assistance to the ROK with that to western Europe, which was about to receive a military commitment from the United States.¹⁶⁾

Yet rhetoric was cheap, military involvement was not. The broad pattern of US policy in Asia had been to studiously avoid the

kind of commitment of resources and prestige made in Europe. Between 1947 and 1949, the Truman administration had refused to take direct action in China to prevent a Communist victory in the civil war. Now, at the beginning of 1950, it resisted strong domestic pressure to make a concerted effort to save even the island of Taiwan from the Communist onslaught.

Furthermore, recent American attempts to construct a united front in East Asia had failed. The United States had urged Great Britain, its closest ally, and India, the largest non-Communist state in Asia, to at least delay recognition of the People's Republic of China.¹⁷⁾ By mid-January 1950, however, both those countries, plus ten others outside the Soviet camp, had recognized the new regime. On Korea, the United States had received support for its policy in the UN General Assembly, but that support was more impressive in breadth than enthusiasm. The Syngman Rhee regime did little to endear itself to UN representatives in the UN Temporary Commission on Korea or its successor, the UN Commission on Korea, established at the end of 1948. Indeed, the South Korean government often irritated members of those bodies from India, Australia, Canada, France, and Syria by discouraging their efforts to enhance representative political institutions in the South and to establish contact with North Korean officials. In any event, the lowly rank in their home countries of UNCOK members and their frequent absence from the peninsula suggested a less than exalted place for Korea in the foreign policies of even those nations willing to participate in UN activities there.¹⁸⁾ Even in the United States, the Truman administration had difficulty maintaining support for aid to Korea.

In mid-January 1950, the House of Representatives actually defeated an economic assistance bill for the ROK. Understandably, then, Stalin concluded that, in a pinch, there would be little support for collective intervention to save South Korea.

Stalin and Kim Il-sung probably had discussed a North Korean attack on South Korea as early as March 1949, when the latter visited Moscow. With the last American troops about to leave the peninsula, the Soviet leader may have encouraged Kim to make plans for such a move, but, although he signed an arms assistance agreement with his North Korean counterpart, he avoided the conclusion of a mutual security pact. Whether or not Kim himself returned to the Soviet capital at a later date to get final approval for the attack and to coordinate efforts remains uncertain.¹⁹⁾

In all likelihood, plans for a conventional move across the 38th parallel remained contingent upon a variety of factors, including evolving conditions in South Korea, where Communist-backed guerrilla action stood some chance of overthrowing the Rhee regime from within, and broader developments in the international arena. Stalin may have given a tentative green light for the attack sometime during the first six weeks of 1950, when Mao Tse-tung, Ho Chi Minh, and a North Korean delegation all visited Moscow, but these surely stood subject to revision in the face of events either in Korea or elsewhere.²⁰⁾

According to Khrushchev's memoirs, Stalin had reservations about the venture, fearing that the Americans might "jump in."²¹⁾ Khrushchev's memory, of course, has proven faulty on numerous occasions, yet in this case it fits with the image of Stalin as an

essentially cautious actor in the foreign policy sphere, especially when it came to direct military action. Still, if he feared the presence of American soldiers on the peninsula, he may have viewed a variety of other US responses as desirable, such as a military commitment to defend Taiwan, stepped-up aid to the beleaguered anti-Communist forces in Indochina and the Philippines, and even a bolstered presence in Japan, which might be countered by a newly militant Communist party there as well as through the psychological impact of the fall of nearby Korea. What he most certainly did not want was an expanded US effort in Europe, a response he probably thought unlikely because of his estimate of American economic capacities and political strength. Even so, he was willing to accept certain risks due to his belief in US unpreparedness for war with the Soviet Union--militarily, politically, and economically--and to his pursuit of certain goals at home and on his eastern and western borders.²²⁾

As June approached, events confirmed Stalin's tentative decision. Guerrillas in South Korea failed in their winter offensives, thus eliminating any prospect for an early collapse from within of the ROK.²³⁾ Yet the Rhee regime continued to rest on extremely shaky foundations in its relationship to both the indigenous population and its foreign sponsor, the United States. Acheson threatened openly to withdraw American aid unless it held spring elections as scheduled and acted to curb runaway inflation. Early in May, Tom Connally, the Democratic chairman of the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee, stated publicly that South Korea probably would be overrun by the Communists "whether we want it to

or not." In response to this declaration, Acheson refused to commit the United States to the use of force to prevent such an occurrence.²⁴⁾ During his visit to Moscow late in the month, UN Secretary-General Trygve Lie failed even to raise the Korean issue with Stalin.²⁵⁾ On May 30, in elections for the National Assembly of the ROK, opponents of President Rhee scored major gains, thus reinforcing the apparent belief in Moscow that when North Korean forces moved across the 38th parallel they would receive widespread indigenous support.²⁶⁾ Washington's concern about Asia was on the upswing, but the attention centered on Southeast Asia, particularly Indochina and the Philippines, and Japan. This trend was not on a sufficient scale, however, to shift attention away from Europe, where spring NATO meetings held an ominous ring. What better method to draw America's efforts away from the decisive theater of the Cold War and to further dampen anti-Communist morale in western Europe than a quick, successful, proxy venture in Korea?

Stalin got more than he had bargained for. The North Korean attack came at a time of increasing alarm in Washington over recent international developments. The Soviet explosion of an atomic device in August 1949 ended the American monopoly over the most potent weapon in human history. The Communists' expulsion of the Nationalists from mainland China later in the year plus the conclusion of the Sino-Soviet treaty of alliance early the next year caused further upset. Soon American intelligence reported the stationing of Soviet jets in China and the concentration of Chinese forces in provinces along the border of Indochina.²⁷⁾ Communist

rebels of Chinese descent stepped-up pressure on the British in Malaya as did the Huks against a corrupt and inept pro-American regime in the Philippines.²⁸⁾ The Communist threat appeared no less compelling in Burma and Thailand.²⁹⁾ Pressures mounted within the Truman administration to prevent the Communist conquest of Taiwan, to grant the French material support in Indochina-- which in fact did commence in May--and to bolster military aid to the Philippines and even South Korea.³⁰⁾

The lengthy top secret document NSC-68 provided the theoretical foundation for America's application of containment to Asia. Although the paper reaffirmed the Europe-first strategy, it characterized the Cold War as an ideological struggle of global proportions. The Soviet Union, its authors asserted, "is animated by a new fanatic faith, antithetical to our own, and seeks to impose its absolute authority over the rest of the world.... In the context of the present polarization of power a defeat of free institutions anywhere is a defeat everywhere." However innovative American foreign policy may have been since 1947, the ongoing Communist advance, militarily and politically, now dictated a far greater marshalling of US resources than in the past. With Soviet resources "mobilized close to the maximum possible extent," the United States could not permit a continuation of the huge gap between its potential and its actual capabilities. Closing this gap was essential not only to defend America's immediate boundaries, but to maintain the determination of "our allies or potential allies" to resist "Soviet intimidation" and reject neutrality.³¹⁾

Domestic political constraints combined with President Harry S. Truman's fiscal conservatism to prevent an immediate increase in American defense spending, but the outbreak of war in Korea provided the spark necessary to implement NSC-68. Not only did the United States intervene in Korea, it also stepped-up aid to anti-Communist forces in Indochina and to the beleaguered government of Elpidio Quirino in the Philippines and announced that it would defend Taiwan from Communist attack. Such moves made prospects for Sino-American rapprochement more remote than ever, which surely delighted Stalin. The Korean War, however, provided an impetus as well for the consolidation and expansion of NATO, for a further movement of Yugoslavia toward the West, for a sustained American military presence in Japan, and, initially at least, for a rejuvenation of spirit in the United Nations, all of which certainly worried Moscow.

Yet these developments also provided a context within which Stalin could maintain his iron rule at home and continue to tighten his grip on eastern Europe. Although from time to time he did show interest in ending the conflict in Korea, it was not until after his death that concessions were made on a sufficient scale to achieve an armistice. In this context, Stalin's last testament, published in October 1952 only six months before his death, bears quotation. Entitled Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR, that document revealed the dictator's ongoing concern about internal pressures. Directly confronting those "comrades" who argued that wars between capitalist countries "have ceased to be inevitable," he declared that such "imperialist countries" as Great Britain and France could not "endlessly tolerate the present situation. . .in which American

capital is seizing raw materials and markets in the British and French colonies and thereby plotting disaster for the high profits of the British and French capitalists." Nor could "the major vanquished countries, Germany (Western) and Japan," continue "languishing in misery under the jackboot of American imperialism." These smaller capitalist nations eventually would challenge US domination "and force their way to independent development."³²⁾ Thus Stalin clearly cast his lot with the militants of 1949, even after the Korean War had sparked a major buildup in the West. That he choose this path derived, in part, from the continuing strains apparent in the Western camp and the capacity of Marxist-Leninism to elevate those strains to the forefront of international relations even in the midst of substantial evidence of Western cohesion resulting from a perceived threat of Soviet aggression. Yet the choice also revealed a continuing preoccupation with his own position at home and on his immediate borders. The Korean War, therefore, in both its origins and its course, require a careful analysis not only of local conditions and international context but of the deeper needs of the aging master of the Kremlin.

NOTES

¹Clay Blair, The Forgotten War: America in Korea 1950-1953, New York: Times Books, 1987.

²In addition to Blair's volume, see Burton I. Kaufman, The Korean War Challenges in Crisis, Credibility, and Command, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1986; Callum A. MacDonald, Korea The War Before Vietnam, New York: Free Press, 1986; Max Hastings, The Korean War, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987; Rosemary Foot, The Wrong War: American Policy and the Dimensions of the Korean Conflict, Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1985 and her forthcoming book by the same press on the armistice negotiations; John Merrill, Korea The Peninsular Origins of the War, Newark, Delaware: University of Delaware Press, 1989; Mark A. Ryan, Chinese Attitudes toward Nuclear Weapons: China and the United States during the Korean War, Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1989; and the second volume of Bruce Cumings' The Origins of the Korean War forthcoming with Princeton University Press.

³Much of the material I have received on the Chinese side over the last two years has been passed on verbally by Chinese scholars or in papers circulated privately with the stipulation that materials therein are not for attribution.

⁴See, for example, the endnotes in William Taubman, Stalin's American Policy: From Entente to Detente to Cold War, New York: W.W. Norton, 1982.

⁵The troops provided by the Chinese were Korean nationals who had fought in Communist armies in the Chinese civil war. For discussions of the evidence, see William Stueck, "The Soviet Union and the Origins of the Korean War," World Politics, 28 (July 1976): 622-35, and John Merrill's review of Khrushchev's memoirs in Journal of Korean Studies, 3 (1981): 181-91, and his analysis in his Korea, pp. 22-29. Merrill points out the differences between the published version and the transcripts of Khrushchev's actual statements, which are stored at Columbia University. The transcripts, more than the published account, emphasize Khrushchev's fragile memory, especially on the Chinese role, but they do not call into question the fundamental point that the Soviets approved and participated in the planning of the North Korean venture. For a challenge to Merrill's translation of the Russian-language transcript, see Bernd Bonwetsch and Peter M. Kuhfus, "Die Soviet Union, China Und Ver Koreakreig," pp. 34-35.

The best-executed presentation arguing that China did not have knowledge of North Korean intentions is Mineo Nakajima, "The Sino-Soviet Confrontation: Its Roots in the International Background of the Korean War," Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, 1 (January 1979): 35-39. Nakajima bases his hypothesis on several interrelated arguments: first, that the Sino-Soviet talks in Moscow from December 1949 to February 1950 were filled with acrimony and, therefore, were unlikely to have included issues beyond those of

direct relations between the two countries; second, that the new Mao regime on the mainland had many reasons for not wanting any disruption on its borders at the time and, indeed, was acting on the eve of the Korean war as if it did not anticipate any such disruptions; third, that the return of Korean soldiers who had fought in Communist armies during the Chinese civil war was simply a natural process once that war was over; and fourth, that the delayed Chinese response to the outbreak of war in Korea suggests surprise in Peking. My response, in brief, is as follows: the first point overestimates the friction between Moscow and Peking and underestimates Peking's hostility toward and fear of Washington. The second point ignores the probability that, to a degree, Mao was trying to prove his mettle to Stalin and that he did not anticipate the American response to the North Korean attack. It also ignores China's provocative action in Indochina of support for Ho Chi Minh during the early months of 1950. The third point is certainly no more plausible than the one that Korean troops were returned to the peninsula rather quickly because the PRC was cooperating with the Soviets and the DPRK in preparing for the move in June 1950. The fourth point may be countered with the argument that the Chinese, despite their involvement in the planning of the attack, did not want to associate themselves too directly with it.

⁶On the purges of 1949 and 1950, see Werner G. Hahn, Postwar Soviet Politics: The Fall of Zhdanov and the Defeat of Moderation, Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1982, 122-29, 136-49, and Adam B. Ulam, Stalin The Man and His Era, New York: Viking Press, 1973, 705-14. In characterizing Stalin's inner thoughts during his final declining years, Ulam identifies "two conflicting emotions:" first was "a genuine weariness and a desire to lay down his awesome duties before he would be 'found out' to be incapable of discharging them;" second was the realization "that a man in his position cannot really retire, that one cannot be a part-time despot" (ibid., 725). For firsthand accounts of Stalin's suspicions of those around him during his last years, see Svetlana Alliluyeva, Twenty Letters to a Friend, translated by Priscilla Johnson MacMillan, New York: Harper and Row, 1967, 196-200, and Nikita Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers, Boston: Little, Brown, 1970, 246, 275, 279. As Taubman has pointed out (Stalin's American Policy, 197), "seeing enemies all around him was nothing new for Stalin." For secondary accounts that emphasize domestic pressures in the formulation of Soviet foreign policy, see William O. McCagg, Stalin Embattled, Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1978, chapter 14, and Gavriel D. Ra'anan, International Policy Formation in the USSR: Factional 'Debates' During the Zhdanovschina, Hamden, Ct.: Archon Books, 1983.

⁷This account of factionalism is based on Ronald L. Letteney, "Foreign Policy Factionalism under Stalin, 1949-1950," Ph.D. diss., Johns Hopkins University, 1971. I wish to thank Jack Snyder of Columbia University for pointing out this work to me. I agree with Snyder's assessment of it: "While some of Letteney's reconstructions involve speculative interpretations of Aesopian communication in the Soviet press, there are enough smoking guns in

his mass of evidence that I find the whole story quite credible" (Snyder, "Russia's Nuclear Window of Vulnerability, 1948-1955: Soviet Perceptions and Debates," paper delivered at conference at the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, Cambridge, Mass., May 6-7, 1988). In interpreting the domestic bases of Stalin's foreign policy, I have also drawn on Snyder's "The Gorbachov Revolution: A Waning of Soviet Expansionism?" International Security, 12 (Winter 1988): 94-105. On Stalin's personality in his last years, Ulam's Stalin, chapters 13 and 14, was useful.

⁸Letteney, "Foreign Policy Factionalism," p. 217.

⁹See, for example, "Monthly Review of Soviet Tactics, January 1950," 6 February 1950, FO 371/868731, Public Records Office, Kew, England (henceforth referred to as PRO).

¹⁰Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, The Soviet Bloc: Unity and Conflict, revised and enlarged edition, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971, pp. 91-97.

¹¹On the harassment of diplomats, see Sir David Kelly (British ambassador to the Soviet Union), "Soviet Union: Quarterly Report, January-March 1950," 30 May 1950, FO 371/87609, PRO. For evidence that Stalin had some reason for fearing British and American activities in eastern Europe, see John Joseph Yurechko, "From Containment to Counter Offensive: Soviet Vulnerabilities and American Policy Planning, 1946-1953," Ph.D. diss., University of California, Berkeley, 1980, pp. 67-93.

¹²On Soviet preparations for an attack on Yugoslavia, see Bela Kiraly, "The Aborted Soviet Military Plans Against Tito's Yugoslavia," in At the Brink of War and Peace: The Tito-Stalin Split in a Historic Perspective (Wayne S. Vucinich, ed.), New York: Brooklyn College Press, 1982, pp. 273-88.

¹³Letteney, "Foreign Policy Factionalism," pp. 221n, 260-62. Numerous Western analysts have argued that the Soviet walkout of the Security Council was really an effort to keep Communist China from taking its place in the United Nations. The hypothesis is argued most vigorously in Robert R. Simmons, The Strained Alliance: Peking, P'yongyang, Moscow and the Politics of the Korean Civil War, New York: Free Press, 1975.

¹⁴Rodger Swearingen and Paul Langer, Red Flag in Japan: International Communism in Action 1919-1951, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1952, chapters 18-20.

¹⁵On the Pacific Pact, see Milton Walter Meyer, A Diplomatic History of the Philippine Republic, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1965, chapter 7, and David Mabon, "The Idea of a Pacific Pact," paper delivered at the annual meeting of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations, Stanford University, June 1984; also boxes 1.3 and 1.4, Carlos Romulo Papers, University of the Philippines Library, Quezon City, Metro Manila, The Philippines,

and box entitled "Department of Foreign Affairs: Specific Subjects," Elpidio Quirino Papers, Ayala Museum and Library, Makati, Metro Manila, The Philippines. For Acheson's speech of January 12, 1950, see Department of State Bulletin, 22 (January 23, 1950): 116.

¹⁶Department of State Bulletin, 20 (June 19, 1949): 783.

¹⁷Edwin W. Martin, Divided Counsel: The Anglo-American Response to Communist Victory in China, Lexington, Ky.: University of Kentucky Press, 1986, chapters 15, 17, 20.

¹⁸See Leon Gordenker, The United Nations and the Peaceful Unification of Korea: The Politics of Field Operations, 1947-1950, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1959, and Shiv Dayal, India's Role in the Korean Question, Delhi: S. Chand, 1959, 64-71; also the numerous reports of the principal secretaries of UNCOK to the secretary-general in DAG-1/2.1.2-2-6, United Nations Archives, New York, N.Y.

¹⁹See Merrill's review of Khrushchev's memoirs cited in note #4 above.

²⁰On North Korean visits to Moscow in early 1950, see Jin Chull Soh, "Some Causes of the Korean War of 1950: A Case Study of Soviet Foreign Policy in Korea (1945-1950), with emphasis on Sino-Soviet Collaboration," Ph.D. diss., University of Oklahoma, 1963, 124n64. For evidence of Ho's presence in Moscow in early 1950, see Wu Xiuquan, Eight Years in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (January 1950-October 1958)--Memoirs of a Diplomat, Beijing: New World Press, 1985, p. 23.

²¹See Merrill review cited in note #5 above.

²²On US military strength in early 1950, see Marc Trachtenberg, "A 'Wasting Asset' American Strategy and the Shifting Nuclear Balance, 1949-1954," International Security (Winter 1988/1989): 5-48. It is likely, given Soviet espionage activities in the United States and Great Britain, that Stalin knew a good deal about US capabilities.

²³See Merrill, Korea, chapter 6, and "Internal Warfare in Korea, 1948-1950: The Local Setting of the Korean War," in Child of Conflict: The Korean-American Relationship, 1943-1953 (edited by Bruce Cumings), Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1983, 153-57.

²⁴US Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, vol. 7, Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1976, 64-67. Henceforth, volumes in this series will be referred to as FRUS.

²⁵ UNCOK requested Lie to raise the matter, but the secretary-general declined. See A.B. Jamieson (acting chairman, UNCOK) to Lie, April 28, 1950, DAB 1/2.1.2-4, UN Archives, and Lie to Jamieson, June 19, 1950, DAG 1/2.1.2-4, UN Archives. Lie's explanation, in retrospect fraught with irony, was that "I concentrated attention on a number of more acute problems and above all on the most immediate problem now facing the United Nations, that of the continued participation by the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe in the work of the various organs of the United Nations.... The question of Korea was not mentioned ... and I felt that it would not be appropriate, in the context of these conversations, to give undue emphasis to this problem."

²⁶ For a dispassionate analysis of the election, see Bertil A. Renborg (principal secretary, UNCOK), to Lie, June 15, 1950, *ibid.* In the aftermath of the election, North Korea launched a propaganda campaign for peaceful unification, which climaxed on June 19 with the proposal that the ROK and the DPRK (Democratic People's Republic of Korea) merge their legislative bodies as a means of ending the political division of the country. UNCOK explored the North Korean move, but without an encouraging result. In view of later events, the campaign appears to have represented an effort to exacerbate divisions within the South, especially between President Rhee and the National Assembly, to enhance prospects for the coming invasion. For documentation on the matter, see Renborg to Lie, June 16, 1950, *ibid.*; Australian Mission to the United Nations to the Department of External Affairs, July 4, 1950, and A.B. Jamieson (Australian delegate to UNCOK) to A.S. Watt (secretary, Department of External Affairs), June 12, 1950, A1838/T184, 3123/4/5, Australian Archives (Mitchell Branch), ACT, Australia.

²⁷ FRUS, 1950, 6: 335; US Far East Command, Intelligence Summary, May 6, 1950, Record Group 260, Washington National Records Center, Suitland, Md.; US Central Intelligence Agency, "Reports of Current Soviet Military Activity in China," April 21, 1950, Box 255, President's Secretary's Files, Harry S. Truman Papers, Truman Library, Independence, Mo.

²⁸ On the Malayan revolt, see Anthony Short, The Communist Insurrection in Malaya 1948-1950, London: Frederick Muller, 1975, chapter 8; on conditions in the Philippines, see Benedict J. Kerksvliet, The Huk Rebellion: A Study of Peasant Revolt in the Philippines, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977, chapter 6, and Robert Aura Smith, Philippine Freedom 1946-1958, New York: Columbia University Press, 1958, chapters 6 and 7.

²⁹ See FRUS, 1950, 6: 29.

³⁰William Whitney Stueck, Jr., The Road to Confrontation: American Policy toward China and Korea, 1947-1950, Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 1981, 146-152, 165-70; for a broad survey of the evolution of US policy toward Southeast Asia, see Gary R. Hess, The United States' Emergence as a Southeast Asian Power, 1940-1950, New York: Columbia University Press, 1987, chapter 11.

³¹FRUS, 1950, 1: 235-92; John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, New York: Oxford University Press, 1982, chapters 3-5.

³²J. Stalin, Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR, Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1952, pp. 37-39.

第2次 韓國戰爭 國際學術會議
1990. 6. 14 ~ 6. 15, 서울

II-2

蘇聯과 韓國戰爭의 起源

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I

한 美國作家는 韓國戰爭을 다룬 그의 최근 著書에 「잊혀진 戰爭¹⁾ (The Forgotten War)」이라는 제목을 붙였다. 지난 5年間の 韓國을 다룬 9가지 主要 歷史研究의 出版이 그러한 呼稱이 잘못임을 나타낸다 할지라도, 이후의 베트남戰爭이 作家들과 一般讀者들 모두에게 훨씬 더 어필했다는 것은 의심할 바가 아니다.²⁾ 美國人들은 분명 어떤 확실한 結末-상처가 될지라도-이 있는 戰爭을 研究할 것을 선호한다. 그러나 蘇聯과 美國을 직접적인 군사적 對決의 위기로 이끌었던 것은 베트남이 아닌 바로 韓國이었다. 유럽에 永久的인 美國의 존재를 생성하고, 再武裝되고 분단된 獨逸을 지키려는 冷戰的 軍國主義를 고취했다. 東部유럽의 가혹한 經濟政策을 惡化시킴으로써 蘇聯의 衛星國들 內部에 심각한 긴장상태를 초래하게 했다. 티토의 유고슬라비아를 그 동일 共產國의 北東쪽으로서의 侵略으로부터 필시 구해냈다. 그리고 마지막으로 國際共產主義에서의 蘇聯의 탁월함에 때를 맞춰 기꺼이 도전하는 강하고 結束된 자신만만한 中國의 상승을 알려주었다. 참으로 韓國은 2次大戰以後 國際史에서 베트남보다 우위가 아니라면 同等한 위치를 차지함이 마땅하다.

II

北韓이 1950年 6月 25日 새벽에 南韓을 侵攻했다는 일반적으로 인정된 사실을 제외하고는, 韓國戰爭의 起源과 過程에 관한 많은 부분이 신비에 싸여진 채 적어도 不確實한 상태로 남아있다. 1950年 가을에 平壤에서 노획한 北韓의 公式資料를 포함해서 엄청난 分量의 기록물이 지금 西方에서 開放되었다고 할지라도, 新聞·雜誌·저널·傳記등 出版되

는 기초적인 資料外에는 거의 蘇聯과 中國으로부터 入手되는 것이 없다. 後者의 경우에 어떤 資料는 1년전 天安門(Tianamen) 廣場에서의 강경조처에 앞서서 정보가 새어나왔다. 그러나 여기서조차 韓國戰爭의 起源에 관한 의문은 모스크바, 北京, 平壤 間의 관계에 있어서 매우 민감하게 남아서 軍事上의 作戰은 그렇게 중요하지 않았다.³⁾ 蘇聯과 中國의 정책을 解析하는 데 있어서 西方의 역사가들은 그들 자신이 自國政府로부터 당시의 리포트상에서 광범위하게 結論을 끌어냄을 계속하였고, 이들 政府는 제한된 情報에 根據를 두고 있었기 때문에 中·蘇의 정책을 해석함에 있어서 그들 시대의 극도의 緊張狀態를 떨 수 밖에 없었다.⁴⁾ 學者들이 美國政策의 여러 양상에 대해 論爭하는 동안 그들은 적어도 높은 水準의 풍부한 參考文獻에 基礎하여 논쟁을 하였다. 따라서 作家는 물론이거니와 이 論文의 독자들은 蘇聯側을 分析함에 있어서 본래부터 存在하는 限界를 거의 인식하지 않을 수 없었다. 바라긴대, 아래에 제안된 폭넓고 때론 公論的인 解明이 최소한 探究的 交流를 위한 발판을 마련할 것으로 보인다.

아마 韓國戰爭은, 그 첫번째 “주모자”인 北韓과 주요 軍需物資 제공과 軍事顧問團과 兵力의 결정적 供給者였던 蘇聯, 그리고 中國의 종합된 노력의 結果로써 시작되었다고 본다. 다양한 상황들과 證據가 시사하건대, 北韓이 蘇聯의 事前 認識과 승인없이 38도 境界線을 넘어서 대규모의 조직적인 攻撃을 감행했다는 것은 신중하지 못함은 물론이거니와 불가능한 일이있을 것이다. 中國의 役割에 대해선 더욱 不確實하다 할지라도 모스크바와 북경 사이의 同盟關係 그리고 북경에 발생하였던 內亂덕분에 熟鍊된 수많은 實戰兵士들이 中國의 介入을 또한 암시하고 있다.⁵⁾

그러나 우리가 이런 기본적인 시나리오를 진제로 받아들인다 해도,

왜 蘇聯이 이 시기에 北韓冒險을 추진할 것을 선택했는지에 대한 疑問이 남는다. 당시 蘇聯은 超強大國 사이의 팽팽한 緊張狀態와 우수한 美國의 原子能力과 기동력의 潛在力으로 인하여 극도의 脆弱性의 시기에 놓여 있었다. 平壤의 金日成 政權은 의심할 여지없이 우선적인 관심사는 자기의 支配下에 韓半島 統一이었고, 統一을 본질적으로 내부분제로 보았다. 그러나 蘇聯은 全世界的인 아니 적어도 유라시아의 즉, 對外的 관심이 西方으로 쏠려있는 힘(Power)으로 보았다. 그러한 관심은 對外政策의 好戰性의 결과로서 3년 이상이나 심각하게 折衝되었다. 1949년 가을까지 마샬플랜(Marshall Plan)의 이행, 나토(NATO)와 독자적 西獨政府의 出帆, 그리고 西部유럽을 위한 美國議會의 軍事援助案 可決등이 크렘린(kremlin)에 다음과 같이 전했을 것으로 보인다. 즉 적합한 方法이란 意見を 표명하지 않는 것이며 美國과 그 同盟國들의 일치단결을 더욱 유발시키는 조치를 피하는 것이라는 점이다.

이 質問의 실체를 表明하기 전에, 먼저 1950年 蘇聯에서 의사결정을 짓기까지의 경위에 대해 言及하는 것이 필요하다. 조셉·스탈린이 모든 對内外事 문제에 最終 決定權을 지녔다는 사실을 믿는다는 충분한 이유가 있다. 그의 權威의 실재에도 불구하고, 스탈린은 그의 주위의 사람들의 陰謀에 결코 방심치 않았던 매우 疑心많은 사람이었다. 1949년과 50年中에 레닌그라드 및 모스크바에서의 共產黨 指導者 肅清, 그리고 그의 지난 統治期間에 고위급 관리의 빈번한 造作任命등이 오랜 專制君主의 결코 끝나지 않는 自國內에서의 安定追求를 시사한다. 그에게 있어 蘇聯 階級制의 最高位置를 확보한다는 것은 단순히 그의 개인적 權力을 확대하기 위한 方法이 아니었다. 그것은 그의 생명자체를 유지하는 단 한가지 方法이었다. 일반적으로 스탈린은 對外政策의 선택시, 그것들이 어떻게 自國에서의 그의 위치에 영향을 미칠것인가에 대한 예리

한 판단에 의해 결정했다고 말하는 것이 안전하다 하겠다.⁶⁾

그의 權限範圍와 不安 程度가 얼마였던간에, 어쩌면 부분적으로 그것들 때문에 스탈린은 對外政策에 대한 많은 公開 演說會를 허락했다. 1949年과 50年初 동안에 두 구별된 黨派가 蘇聯 言論에 보도되었다. 하나는 그 기본적 대변자로 「프라우나」紙를 이용했고, 몰로토프(Vyacheslav Molotov)와 수슬로브(Mikhail Suslov) 같은 公務員이 포함됐다. 또 하나는 그 주요 출구로서 「이즈베스차」紙를 사용하여 말렌코브(Georgii Malenkov)와 베리아(Lavrentii Beria)로부터 지원을 받는다. 첫번째 “軍國主義的” 派閥은 다음과 같이 論爭했다. 즉 資本主義國들은 蘇聯陳營에 대해 본래부터 敵意를 가지고 있으며 合意事項을 실행하는 데 믿을만하지 못하다. 그러나 美國政策에 대한 그런 반대는 西部유럽의 民衆과 政府들 사이에서 浮刻되었고, 美國自身은 점점 쇠약해지는 經濟危機로부터 고통받는다고 논쟁하였다. 만약 蘇聯이 西部에 압력을 계속 가했다면, 美國은 곧 해외의 노력에 환멸을 느껴 西半球로 退却했을 것이다. 반대로, 두번째 “穩健”그룹은 美國의 經濟問題는 물론 西方 強大國들 사이 및 內部에 있는 모순을 중요시하지 않았다. 穩健派들은 西部 유럽에서의 美國의 발전과 그 지역에 美國의 經濟開發로 인한 經濟的 잇점등을 강조하였다. 蘇聯의 壓力이 실제 西方同盟關係를 튼튼하게 했으므로 國際的 緊張狀態가 완화될 필요가 있었다. 한마디로 蘇聯의 妥協的 움직임은 美國의 同盟關係를 유지하고 강화하려는 과업을 더욱 어렵게 만들었을지도 모른다.⁷⁾

그 기간동안에 蘇聯 派閥主義에 대한 주요 分析者들에 의하면, 穩健派들이 經濟發展과 軍의 消費에 관해 自國에서의 계속적 經濟의 필요성을 인정하는 동안, 軍國主義者들은 연장된 기간의 平和的 共存體制를 받아들이는 등, 여러 종류의 妥協案이 1949年 12월에 발생하였다. 1950

年 上半期동안에는 蘇聯의 言論에 주목할 만한 派閥主義의 退步가, 물론 없어진 것은 아니지만, 있었다. 이러한 觀點에서 스탈린은 잠시 “그러한 측면을 지키기 위한 보다 好意的인 政策”이 西部유럽에 적합하고, “蘇聯政府는 極東地域에서의 보다 유망한 지위로 추가적인 주의력을 돌릴 수 있을 것이다”⁸⁾라고 결론을 내렸다. 이것은 獨逸 또는 오스트리아에 대한 西方과의 진지한 협상이나 티토에의 政治的 壓力의 中止, 또는 西方政府를 겨냥한 선전에 의한 비방의 감소를 뜻하지는 않았다.⁹⁾ 그러나 이것은 최소한 유고슬라비아를 攻擊하기 위한 전면계획의 연기, 그리고 西部유럽을 향한 선전에 나타난 좀더 강한 平和的 움직임에 대한 노력과 관련되었다.

그렇지만 왜 極東地方에 더 많은 주의력을 쏟는가? 왜 穩健派들이 원했던 것으로 보이는 광범위한 和解政策을 채택하지 않았는가? 스탈린은 아마도 이 문제를 다음 세가지 주요 목표를 충족하기 위한 입장에서 보았다. 먼저 蘇聯에서 자신의 政權掌握을 유지하는 것, 두번째로 蘇聯 주위에 있는 共產圈 政府들에 대한 그의 영향을 강화하는 것, 그리고 세번째로 美國의 주의력과 보다 중요한 유럽 지역으로부터의 방침을 흐뜨리는 것이었다. 첫번째 경우에, 우리는 이미 1949년에 시작된 國內의 肅清에서 명백히 드러난 그의 염려를 보았다. 아시아에서의 진보적 政策을 통한 팽팽한 國際的 긴장상태의 유지는 自國에서의 그의 지도로부터 벗어나는 일이 더욱 없도록 억제할 수 있었다. 가을에 肅清作業이 시작되어 스탈린의 남은 統治期間 동안 계속되었던 東部 유럽 역시 마찬가지였다. 어떤 평가에 의하면, 衛星國들에서 共產黨員 4名中 약 1名은 추방으로 고통을 받았다고 한다.¹⁰⁾ 이러한 國家에 派遣된 英國과 美國의 外交官들의 직무상 문제점이 스탈린의 두려움과 東部 유럽을 외부세계와 차단하려는 그의 결정에 대해 추가적인 증거를 제시해

준다.¹¹⁾ 세번째의 경우에, 아시아 문제에 美國의 더 깊은 휘말림은 아마 軍國主義者들이 바라는 경제적 朋壤을 촉진하고 衛星國과 또는 유고슬라비아에 대한 蘇聯의 움직임에 돕는 쪽으로 美國의 방침을 왜곡하게 될 것이다.¹²⁾ 동시에 아시아에서의 美國의 조처는 中國의 蘇聯에 대한 의존을 더욱 굳게 할 것이다.

스탈린은 아시아에서 어떤 특별한 행동을 생각하였는가? 당연히 北韓의 攻擊은 한 方案이었으나, 그것은 첫번째도 마지막으로 계획된 것도 아니었다. 1950年 6月까지 아시아에서는 共產黨 혹은 共產政府에 의해 4가지 조처가 마련되었다. 이것들은 광범위한 侵攻의 시작단계로써 스탈린에 의해 구상되었다. 1月 중순에 蘇聯은 유엔 安全保障理事會를 나가 버렸다. 전하는 바에 의하면, 이것은 中國共產黨을 입회시키고 될 수 있는 한 마오(Mao)정권을 國際機構밖으로 몰아내려던 의도의 失敗에 抗議하여 새로운 共產國家 主導型 機構의 設立을 위해 유엔으로부터 완전히 脫退하려는 첫번째 段階로써 행해졌다.¹³⁾ 1月 末에 蘇聯과 中國은 베트남의 호치민 政府를 인정하였다. 2주 뒤에 共產大國들은 修交와 同盟關係의 조약에 서명하였다. 그리고 나서 봄에, 모스크바의 壓力을 받는 日本의 共產黨은 이전의 “사랑스런” 접근에서 좀더 호전적인 軍國主義的 노선으로 단호하게 전환했다.¹⁴⁾ 마지막으로 韓國冒險이 잘 이행된 후에, 호치민의 軍隊는 베트남에서 大侵攻을 감행했다.

이러한 모든 조처들 중, 北韓의 攻擊은 확실히 가장 위험한 것이었다. 韓國에 대한 美國의 신호는 불투명해졌다. 1949年 동안 美國은 韓半島의 마지막 駐屯兵力을 철수했으며, 나토(NATO)방침에 따른 太平洋條約에 관한 필리핀, 臺灣, 그리고 南韓의 건의에 대해 차갑게 대응했다. 美 國務長官 Dean Acheson은 1950年 1月 12日 그의 중요한 연설에서 美國의 太平洋 方位體制에서 南韓을 제외시켰다. 그러나 그는

분명히 시사하기를 만약 공격을 받는다면 南韓은 유엔으로부터 援助를 기대할 수 있다고 했다.¹⁵⁾ 몇몇 이전의 경우에도 美國의 指導者들은 공공연하게 韓國을 共產主義와 民主主義 間의 아시아 試驗地域이라고 칭했다. 그리고 1949年 6월에 Truman은 韓國에 대한 經濟援助와 美國으로부터 곧 軍事支援 公약을 받을 西部 유럽과 비교하였다.¹⁶⁾

그러나 翁變술은 값이 싸지만 軍事的 介入은 그렇지 않았다. 아시아에서 美國政策의 주요한 패턴은 유럽에서의 그 같은 種類의 방침의 實行과 名聲을 신중하게 피하는 것이었다. 1947년과 49년 사이에 Truman 行政府는 中國 內亂에서 共產黨이 승리하는 것을 막기 위해 직접적인 措處를 취하는 것을 拒否했다. 1950년 초반에 行政府는 타이완섬조차도 共產黨의 습격으로부터 구하기 위해 일치단결된 國內外 壓力에 강력히 저항했다.

더구나, 동아시아에 聯合된 戰線을 세우려는 美國의 試圖는 실패하였다. 美國은 가장 가까운 同盟國인 英國과 아시아에서 가장 큰 非 共產國인 인도에게 中國을 인정하는 것을 적어도 연기할 것을 강력히 권고하였다.¹⁷⁾ 그러나 1950년 1월 중순까지 그 두 나라와 蘇聯陳營 밖의 다른 10개국이 새 정권을 인정하였다. 유엔총회에서 미국은 한국에 대한 정책에선 지지를 받았다. 그러나 그 지지는 열광적이기 보다는 폭넓음에서 더 인상적이었다. 이승만 政權은 유엔 한국 임시위원회 대표들이나 그 후임자로 1948년말 설치된 유엔 한국 임시 위원단에게 信任을 받기 위한 특별한 노력을 기울이지 않았다. 사실상 인도, 濠洲, 캐나다, 프랑스, 시리아의 委員들이 南韓에 代議 政治制度를 고취하고 北韓 官僚들과의 實務的 接觸을 確立하려는 노력을, 南韓政府는 때때로 실망시키면서, 그들을 성나게 했다. 여하튼 간에 유엔 한국 임시 위원단 회원들의 自國에서의 낮은 지위와 그들의 韓半島로부터의 빈번한 不

在가 그곳에서 유엔활동에 기꺼이 참가하려는 나라들의 對外政策에서까지 韓國이 尊貴하지 못한 위치에 있음을 시사했다.¹⁸⁾ 미국내에서 조차 Truman 行政府는 韓國援助를 위한 支持를 확보하는 것이 어려워졌다. 1950년 1월 중순 美下院에서 실제로 韓國에 대한 經濟援助案이 거부되었다. 그때에 스탈린은 위급한 고비에 당면하면 南韓을 구하려는 집단적 개입에 대한 지지가 거의 없을 것이라고 結論을 내렸다.

스탈린과 金日成은 아마도 金日成이 모스크바를 방문했던 1949년 3월 쯤에 南韓에 대한 北韓의 攻擊을 論議했을 것이다. 마지막 남아있던 美軍이 韓半島를 곧 떠나려고 했으므로 蘇聯의 指導者는 金日成으로 하여금 그런 움직임에 대한 計劃을 세우도록 격려했을 것이다. 그러나 그는 北韓側 指導者와 軍事援助 合意案에 書名을 했지만, 相互 安全條約의 締結은 피했다. 김일성 자신이 이후에 공격에 대한 最終承認을 얻고 協力을 調整하기 위해 소련의 수도로 다시 돌아갔는지 아닌지는 불확실하다.

아마도 38도 경계선에 대한 協定進行 計劃은 共產主義 後援을 받은 게릴라 행위가 내부로부터 이승만 政權을 타도할 可能性이 있었던 南韓에서의 狀況展開와 國際情勢에서의 보다 폭넓은 進展등을 포함한 다양한 要因에 달려 있었다. 스탈린은, 마오쩌둥, 호치민 그리고 北韓側 代表團이 모스크바를 방문했던 1950년 첫 6주 중에, 그 침공계획에 대해서 시험적으로 허가하였을 것이다. 그러나 이러한 사실은 확실히 韓國에서나 다른곳에서의 事件들에 직면하여 修正을 條件으로 하고 나왔을 것이다.²⁰⁾

호루시초프의 回顧錄에 따르면, 스탈린은 미국이 “뛰어들”것을 두려워하여 그 모험을 유보했다.²¹⁾ 호루시초프의 記憶力은 물론 많은 경우에 있어 잘못된 것으로 판명됐지만, 이 경우에 外交政策 領域, 특히 直接

的 軍事행위에 있어서는 본래 조심스러운 行爲者로서 스탈린의 모습과 일치한다. 그러나 만일 그가 한반도에 美國 軍人들의 출현을 두려워했다면 그는 다른 다양한 美國의 대응책들, 예를 들면, 타이완을 방어하기 위한 軍의 투입이라든지, 인도차이나와 필리핀에서 위협받는 반공 단체들을 위한 원조의 확대라든지, 그리고 심지어 한국 가까이에에서의 崩壞라는 心理的 衝擊은 물론 새로운 호전적 共產黨으로부터 역습받을 지도 모르는 日本에서의 강화된 存在狀況 등을 그가 바라는대로 판단했을 것이다. 그가 확실히 가장 원하지 않았던 것은 유럽에서의 팽창된 美國의 노력이었고, 이것은 아마 그가 미국의 經濟能力과 政治的 힘에 대한 나름대로의 평가를 내린 뒤 좋지않다고 생각했던 것이었다. 심지어 그는 美國이 蘇聯과의 戰爭에 대해 미비하다는 것을 軍事的·政治的·經濟的으로 확신하였고, 自國內에서 그리고 동부 및 서부의 국경선상에서의 그의 어떤 目標의 追求에 기인된 사고의 위험을 기꺼이 받아들일 수 있었다.²²⁾

6월이 다가옴에 따라 사건들은 스탈린의 시험적인 결정을 확실히 했다. 남한에서 게릴라들은 그들의 겨울공격에 실패했고, 한국의 내부로부터 오는 早期 崩壞에 대한 期待는 좌절되었다.²³⁾ 그러나 李承晚 政權은 國民과 그 對外的 後援者인 美國과의 關係에서 극도로 不安定한 기반에 계속 머물렀다. Acheson은 公開的으로 한국이 계획대로 봄선거를 하지 않고 폭등하는 物價上昇을 調節하는 措處를 취하지 않는다면, 미국의 援助를 撤回하겠다고 위협했다. 5월초 美上院 對外關係委員會 民主黨 所屬 議長인 Tom Connally는 公開的으로 南韓은 아마 “우리가 원하던 그렇지 않든간에” 공산주의자들에 의해 침략당할 것이라고 陳述했다. 이 발표에 대한 대담으로, Acheson은 미국이 그러한 사건을 예방하기 위해 병력을 사용하는 것을 거부했다.²⁴⁾ 그 달 말에 그의 모스크바 訪

問期間 동안, 유엔사무총장 Trygve Lie는 스탈린과 한국문제를 거론하는
 짓조차 실패하고 말았다.²⁵⁾ 5월 30일 한국의 국회 총선거에서,李大統領
 領의 相對者들이 主要한 득표를 얻게되자 모스크바에서는 北韓의 軍隊가
 38선을 넘어 쳐들어 올경우 그들은 韓國內의 광범한 支持를 받을 것이
 라는 明白한 믿음을 강화했다.²⁶⁾ 워싱턴의 아시아에 대한 염려는 현저
 히 더해졌으나, 그 관심은 동남아시아 특히 인도차이나와 필리핀 그리
 고 日本에 集中되었다. 그렇지만 이러한 추세는 봄의 나토(NATO)회의
 가 불길한 同盟을 유지했던 유럽으로부터 관심을 돌릴만큼 충분한 規模
 의 것은 아니었다. 韓國에서의 신속하고 성공적인 대리 모험보다, 美國
 의 노력을 冷戰의 決定的 現場으로부터 떼어놓고 서부유럽에서 反共主義
 者의 士氣를 좀더 격어 놓는 더좋은 방법이 무엇이겠는가?

III

스탈린은 그가 흥정했던 것보다 더 많은 것을 얻었다. 北韓의 攻擊
 은 워싱턴에서 국제관계 발전과정에서 경악이 더해가던 시기에 일어났
 다. 1949年 8月 蘇聯의 原子力 研究에 대한 급격한 증가는 人類歷史上
 가장 유력한 武器에 대한 美國의 독점을 終熄시켰다. 그해 나중에 있
 었던 共產黨의 中國 本土로부터의 國民黨 逐出과 이듬해 初中·蘇 同
 盟條約의 締結은 더 큰 衝擊을 불러일으켰다. 곧 美國의 情報部는 中
 國駐屯의 蘇聯 제트기와 인도차이나 國境線 附近의 中國의 兵力增強에
 대해 보고했다.²⁷⁾ 共產黨은, Huks가 필리핀의 부패되고 부조리한 親美
 政權에 대항했던 것처럼, 말라야에 있는 英國人에게 中國의 直接的 壓
 力을 강화하는 것에 대해 반항했다.²⁸⁾ 共產黨의 威脅은 버마와 타이
 란드에서도 강력한 듯 했다. 긴장감은 共產黨의 타이완 정복을 방지하

고 인도차이나에 프랑스의 軍品支援을-사실상 5월에 시작했던-해주고, 필리핀과 심지어 南韓에게까지 軍事援助를 강화하려던 Truman 行政府 내에서 맴돌았다.³⁰⁾

長文의 1級 秘密文書 NSC-68은 美國의 아시아에 대한 봉쇄정책 적용의 이론적 바탕을 제공했다. 그 文書가 비록 유럽 우선적 作戰을 재차 斷言했다 할지라도 그것은 冷戰을 全世界 지역의 이데올로기적 몸부림으로써 파악했다. 그 문서의 作成者가 주장하기를, 蘇聯은 “우리와 대조적으로 어떤 새로운 광적 믿음에 의해 활기를 얻고 있으며, 기타 세계위에 그 절대적인 權威를 유지하려 한다. 현재의 權力의 兩極化 現狀에 관련하여 어디에서든지 자유제도의 패배는 모든 곳에서의 패배와 마찬가지로.” 그러나 美國 外交政策이 1947年 이래 아무리 革新的이었다 해도, 軍事的으로 政治的으로 진행된 共產主義의 심화는 이제 과거 어느 때보다도 훨씬 더 집결된 美國의 자원을 요했다. “기동가능한 최대의 범위에 근접하게 정비된” 蘇聯의 지원을 보며, 美國은 더 이상 가능성과 실제 능력간의 커다란 격차를 허락할 수 없었다. 이 격차의 해소는 美國의 引接 國境線을 방어하기 위해서뿐 아니라, “우리의 同盟國과 미래의 同盟國”들로 하여금 親蘇化에 저항하고 中立化를 거부하는 결단의 확보를 위해서 필수불가결했다.³¹⁾

國內外 政治的 압박들은 美國의 防衛費의 급속한 증가를 방지하려는 Harry S. Truman 大統領의 財政的 保守主義와 합세했다. 그러나 韓國 戰爭의 돌발은 NSC-68을 이행하기 위한 필요한 계기가 되었다. 美國은 단지 韓國에만 개입했던 것이 아니라, 인도차이나에 있는 反共勢力과 그리고 필리핀의 포위된 Elpidio Quirino 政府에게도 援助를 증강했으며, 臺灣을 共產黨의 攻擊으로부터 방어할 것임을 선언했다. 이러한 움직임들은 美國과 中國의 親善關係를 어느 때보다도 더 멀어지게 만들

이서 확실히 스탈린을 기쁘게 했다. 그러나 韓國戰爭은 나토(NATO)의 강화와 확장은 물론 유고슬라비아의 西部를 향한 기동력 강화와 在日 美駐屯軍의 지속, 그리고 적어도 유엔정신의 회복을 위한 원동력을 제공하였다. 이 모든 것들은 확실히 모스크바를 걱정하게 만들었다.

하지만, 이런 진전상황들은 스탈린이 蘇聯에서 그의 철칙을 유지하고 東部유럽의 지배를 계속 강화할 수 있는 배경을 마련해 주었다. 비록 그가 때때로 韓國戰爭의 終熄에 관심을 보였다고 해도, 그것은 그의 죽음이후에 休戰을 얻기 위한 충분한 규모의 양보가 있기까지는 이루어지지 않았다. 스탈린이 죽기 6個月 前인 1952年 10월에 出版된 그의 마지막 유서는 이것에 관련하여 인용되어진다. 「蘇聯 社會主義의 經濟的 問題」라고 제목이 붙여진 그 文書는 독재자의 內部壓力에 대한 끊임없는 염려를 드러냈다. 資本主義 國家들사이의 戰爭이 “더이상 필연적이지 않다”라고 논쟁했던 그 “친구들”을 직접 대면하면서, 그는 선언하기를 英國과 프랑스같은 “帝國主義 國家들”은 “현 상황을 끝없이 묵인할 수는 없다…… 美國의 資本이 英國과 프랑스 식민지에서 원자재와 시장을 움켜쥐고 있으므로 그로인해 英國과 프랑스 자본가들은 高利潤을 위해서 당연히 음모를 꾸밀 것이다.” “西獨과 日本 등 주요 정복된 국가들”도 역시 “美 帝國主義의 軍火발 아래에서 고통받으며 계속해서 衰弱할” 수는 없을 것이다. 이런 보다 작은 資本主義 國家들은 점차적으로 美國의 통치에 도전하고 그들의 길을 자체적 발전으로 향하도록 힘쓸 것이다.³²⁾ 이처럼 韓國戰爭이 西部에서 증강의 주요 계기가 된 후에도 스탈린은 분명히 1949年の 軍國主義者들과 그의 운명을 같이했다. 그는 부분적으로 西部陳營에서 분명히 계속된 긴장과 이러한 긴장들을 國際關係의 최전선으로 상승시키려는 마르크스·레닌주의의 능력에 기인했던 그러한 길을 선택했다. 이것은 蘇聯의 侵略威脅을 인식한 결과로 초래된

西部團結의 본질적 확증속에 이루어졌다. 그러나 그 선택은 또한 自國에서 그리고 引接國境에서의 그의 長期執權의 陰謀를 드러냈다. 따라서 韓國戰爭은 그 起源과 過程에 있어서 國內外 狀況이나 國際的 背景뿐만이 아니라 크렘린의 늪어가는 征服者의 더깊은 욕구에 대해서도 세심한 分析이 필요하다 하겠다.

〈註〉

- 1) Clay Blair, *The Forgotten War: America in Korea 1950-1953*, New York: Times Books, 1987.
- 2) In addition to Blair's volume, see Burton I. Kaufman, *The Korean War Challenges in Crisis, Credibility, and Command*, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1986; Callum A. MacDonald, *Korea The War Before Vietnam*, New York: Free Press, 1986; Max Hastings, *The Korean War*, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987; Rosemary Foot, *The Wrong War: American Policy and the Dimensions of the Korean Conflict*, Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1985 and her forthcoming book by the same press on the armistice negotiations; John Merrill, *Korea the Peninsular Origins of the War*, Newark, Delaware: University of Delaware Press, 1989; Mark A. Ryan, *Chinese Attitudes toward Nuclear Weapons: China and the United States during the Korean War*, Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1989; and the second volume of Bruce Cumings *The Origins of the Korean War* forthcoming with Princeton University Press.
- 3) 지난 2년간 내가 받았던 中國側에 대한 資料의 많은 부분이, 中國의 學者들로부터 口頭로 전해지거나, 혹은 所有될 수 없다는 條件下에서 非公開의으로 流布된 文書속에서 얻어졌다.
- 4) See, for example, the endnotes in William Taubman, *Stalin's American Policy: From Entente to Detente to Cold War*, New York: W.W. Norton, 1982.
- 5) 中國인들이 援助한 兵力은 中國內亂에서 共產軍으로 싸웠었던 한국동포들이었다. 證據檢討를 위해, William stueck의 "The Soviet Union and the Origins of the Korean War", *World Politics*, 28 (July 1976), pp. 622-35와, John merrill의 흐루시초프의 回顧錄에 대한 評論, *Journal of Korean Studies*, 3 (1981), pp. 181-91, 그리고 그의 저서 *Korea*에서 그의 분석(pp.22-29)를 보시오. merrill은 콜롬비아 대학에 소장된 흐르시초프 원문 사본과 출판번역서 사이에 다른 점을 지적하고 있다. 사본은 출판된 내용에서보다 흐루시초프의 빈약한 기억력, 특히

중국의 역할에 대한 것 등에 더 많이 역점을 두고 있으나, 蘇聯이 北韓 南侵計劃을 承認하고 함께 가담했다는 기본적인 관점을 문제삼지 않고 있다. merrill의 노어원문 해석에 대한 비판으로는 Bernd Bonwetsch와 Peter M. Kuhfus의 “Die Soviet Union, China Und Ver Koreakreig” pp. 34-35를 보시오.

중국이 북한의 남침의사에 대한 지식이 없었다는 주장은 Mineo Nakajima의 “The Sino-Soviet Confrontation: Its Roots in the International Background of the Korean War”, *Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs*, 1 (Jan. 1979), 35-39에서 가장 잘 완성되어 나타났다. Nakajima는 相互密接한 關係가 있는 논거들을 바탕으로 그의 가정을 뒷받침했다. 먼저, 1949년 12월부터 1950년 2월까지 모스크바에서 있었던 中·蘇 對話는 매우 신랄해서 두 國家間에 直接關係된 것의 이슈들은 포함하지 않았었을 것이다. 둘째로, 中國本土의 새로운 Mao 정권은 그 당시 國境地域에서 어떤 混亂이 發生하는 것을 원하지 않았고, 실제로 韓國戰爭前夜에는 마치 그런 분열을 예기치 못한 듯이 움직이고 있었다. 세째로, 中國內亂 중에 共產軍으로 싸웠었던 韓國軍들의 歸還은 단순히 戰爭이 끝난뒤에 進行되었던 자연스러운 처리였다. 네째로, 韓國戰爭突發에 대한 中國의 지연된 반응은 Peking에서 그만큼 놀라워 했음을 시사한다. 나의 응답은 간단하게 다음과 같다. 첫번째 관점은 모스크바와 베이징 사이의 마찰을 과대평가하고 워싱턴을 향한 敵對感과 두려움을 과소평가하고 있다. 두번째 관점은, Mao가 점차적으로 그의 열의를 스탈린에게 입증하려고 시도했고, 그가 북한의 南侵攻擊에 대한 美國의 反應을 예기치 못했을 것이라는 可能性을 排除하고 있다. 그것은 또한 1950년 초기에 인도차이나의 호치민을 지지하는 중국의 煽動的 措處를 無視하고 있다. 세번째 관점은 중국이 소련 그리고 1950년 6월에 침공계획중인 북한과 합세했기 때문에, 한국군대가 한반도로 빨리 돌아갔다는 주장보다도 확실히 더 논리적이지 못하다. 네번째 관점은 中國이 侵攻計劃에 關聯했음에도 불구하고, 거기에 直接的으로 關係하기를 꺼려했다는 主張과 一致하지 못한다.

- 6) 1949년과 50년의 숙청에 대해서는 Werner G. Hahn의 *Postwar Soviet Politics: The Fall of Zhdanov and the Defeat of Moderation*, Ithaca, N.Y. : 코넬 대학 출판사, 1982, pp. 122-29, 136-49, 그리고 Adam B. Ulam의 *Stalin the Man and His Era*, New York : Viking 출판사,

1973, pp. 705-14를 보시오. 스탈린의 정권말기시 그가 마음속에 품은 생각을 기술하는 데 있어, Ulam은 두 모순되는 감정을 파악했다. 첫 번째는 “진짜로 피곤에 지쳐서 그가 부능력함이 알려지기 전에 그의 엄청난 義務를 빚어머리고 싶은 욕구”이고, 두 번째는 “사람은 자신의 위치에서 정말로 불러낼 수 없다”는 논리, 즉 “한번 전제군주는 영원한 전제군주이다.”라는 자각이었다. 스탈린 정권말기시 그가 주위사람들에게 품은 의심에 대한 자세한 설명을 위해선, Svetlana Alliluyeva의 작품을 Johnson MacMillan이 번역한 *Twenty Letters to a Friend*, New York : Harper and Row, 1968, pp. 196-200 과 Nikita Khrushchev의 *Khrushchev Remembers*, Boston : Little, Brown, 1970, p. 246, 275, 279를 보시오. Taubman이 지적했던 대로, “스탈린은 항상 그의 주위에서 죄를 찾아볼 수 있었다.” 蘇聯外交政策의 形成에 가해진 國內壓力을 重點的으로 說明한 부차적 자료로는 William O. McCagg의 *Stalin Embattled*, Detroit : Wayne State Univ 출판사, 1978, ch.14와, Gavriel D. Ra'anani의 *International Policy Formation in the USSR : Factional 'Debates' During the Zhdanovschina*, Hamden, Ct. : Archon Books, 1983을 보시오.

- 7) 이 파벌주의 보고서는 Ronald L. Letteney의 “Foreign Policy Factionalism under Stalin, 1949-1950,” Ph.D. diss., Johns Hopkins 대학, 1971년도판에 기초한 것이다. 이 작품을 나에게 소개해준 콜롬비아 대학의 Jack Snyder에게 감사하고 싶다. 나는 이 작품의 전 이야기가 꽤 믿음직하다는 Snyder의 평가에 동의한다. 스탈린의 외교정책의 국내 기반을 해석하는데, 나는 또한 Snyder의 “The Gorbachov Revolution : A Waning of Soviet Expansionism?” *International Security*, 12 (Winter 1988), pp. 94-105를 참조했다. 스탈린의 말기, 그의 성격에 대해선 Ulam의 *Stalin*, Ch. 13과 14가 유용한 자료였다.
- 8) Letteney, “Foreign Policy Factionalism,” p.217
- 9) See, for example, “Monthly Review of Soviet Tactics, January 1950,” 6 February 1950, FO 371/868731, Public Records Office, Kew, England (henceforth referred to as PRO).
- 10) Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, *The Soviet Bloc : Unity and Conflict*, revised and enlarged edition, Cambridge, Mass. : Harvard University Press, 1971, pp. 91-97.

- 11) 외교관들의 애로사항에 대해선 Sir David Kelly(소련주재 영국대사)의 "Soviet Union : Quartely Report, Jan. - Mar. 1950." 1950년 5월 30일, FO 371/87609, PRO를 보시오. 스탈린이 유럽에서의 英國과 美國의 活動을 두려워 한 데에는 이유가 있었다. 그 사실의 증거로, John Joseph Yurechko의 "From Containment to Counter Offensive : Soviet Vulverabilities and American Policy Planning, 1946-1953," Ph.D.Diss., U.C. 버클리, 1980, pp. 67-93을 보시오.
- 12) 유고슬라비아 침공을 위한 소련의 준비에 대해서는, Bela Kiraly의 "The Aborted Soviet Military Plans Against Tito's Yugoslavia", *At the Brink of War and Peace: The Tito-Stalin Split in a Historic Perspective* (Wayne S. Vucinich, ed.), New York : Brooklyn College Press, 1982, pp. 273-88를 보시오.
- 13) Letteney, "Foreign Policy Factionalism", pp.221n, 260-62. 다수의 서양 분석가들은 소련의 유엔 안전보장이사회 탈퇴가 사실은 중국의 유엔입회를 막기위한 노력이었다고 주장해왔다. 이러한 가정은, Robert R. Smmons의 *The Strained Alliance: Peking, P'yongyang, Moscow and the Politics of the Korean civil War*, New York : Free Press, 1975에서 가장 신랄하게 비판되었다.
- 14) Rodger Swearingen and Paul Langer, *Red Flag in Japan : International Communism in Action 1919-1951*, Cambridge, Mass. : Harvard University Press, 1952, chapters 18-20.
- 15) 평화조약에 대해서는, Milton Walter Meyer의 *A Diplomatic History of the Philippine Republic*, Honolulu : 하와이 대학 출판사, 1965, Ch.7와 David Mabon, "The Idea of a Pacific Pact," Stanford 대학, June 1984를 보시오. 후자는 미 외교관계에 대한 역사가들 모임의 매년 정기회의에서 전달된 논문이었다. 이밖의 기타자료로는 boxes 1.3과 1.4, Carlos Romulo Papers, Univ. of the Philippines Library, Quezon City, Metro Manila, The Philippines와 box "Department of Foreign Affairs : Specific Subjects," Elpidio Quirino Papers, Ayala Museum and Library, Makati, Metro Manila, The Philippines를 보시오. 1950년 1월 12일의 Acheson 연설을 위해선 *Department of State Bulletin*, 22 (1950년 1월 23일), p. 116을 보시오.

- 16) *Department of State Bulletin*, 20 (June 19, 1949), p. 783.
- 17) Edwin W. Martin, *Divided Counsel: The Anglo-American Response to Communist Victory in China*, Lexington, Ky.: University of Kentucky Press, 1986, chapters 15, 17, 20.
- 18) See Leon Gordenker, *The United Nations and the Peaceful Unification of Korea: The Politics of Field Operations, 1947-1950*, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1959, and Shiv Dayal, *India's Role in the Korean Question*, Delhi: S. Chand, 1959, pp. 64-71; also the numerous reports of the principal secretaries of UNCOK to the secretary-general in DAG-1/2.1.2-2-6, United Nations Archives, New York, N.Y.
- 19) See Merrill's review of Khrushchev's memoirs cited in note #4 above.
- 20) 1950년초에 북한인의 모스크바 방문에 대해서는 "some causes of the Korean War of 1950: A Case Study of Soviet Foreign Policy in Korea (1945-1950), with emphasis on Sino-Soviet Collaboration," Ph.D. diss., University of Oklahoma, 1963, 124n64 소진철(Jin Chull Soh) 著書를 보시오. 1950년도 초에 모스크바에서의 Ho의 존재 증거에 대해서는 Wu Xiuguan, *Eight years in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (January 1950-October 1958)-Memoirs of a Diplomat*, Beijing: New World Press, 1985, p.23을 보시오.
- 21) See Merrill review cited in note #5 above.
- 22) 1950년도 초의 美軍事力에 대해서는 Marc Trachtenberg, "A 'Wasting Asset' American Strategy and the Shifting Nuclear Balance, 1949-1954," *International Security* (Winter 1988/1989), pp. 5-48을 보시오. 미국, 영국에서의 소련 스파이 활동을 보진데, 스탈린은 미국 능력에 대해서 많이 알았던 것 같다.
- 23) See Merrill, *Korea*, chapter 6, and "Internal Warfare in Korea, 1948-1950: The Local Setting of the Korean War," in *Child of Conflict: The Korean-American Relationship, 1943-1953* (edited by Bruce Cumings), Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1983, pp. 153-57.

- 24) US Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1950, vol. 7, Washington, DC : US Government Printing Office, 1976, pp. 64-67. Henceforth, volumes in this series will be referred to as *FRUS*.
- 25) UNCOK는 Lie에게 문제를 제기하라고 요청했으나 사무총장은 이를 거절했다. A.B. Jamieson(UNCOK의 대리 의장) to Lie, April 28, 1950, DAB 1/2.1.2-4, UN Archives, and Lie to Jamieson, June 19, 1950, DAG 1/2. 1. 2-4, UN Archives. 矛盾과 關聯된 것으로 가득 찬 Lie의 설명은 다음과 같다. “나는 조그마한 問題들에 신경을 썼으며, 당장 부딪치는 문제들에 최우선을 두었다. 이 문제는 바로 소련과 동유럽 국가가 UN의 여러 단체 활동에 계속적 참여인 것이었다. 한국에 대한 문제는 제시되지 않았으며 나 자신은 이 대화의 내용에 요구되지 않는 강조는 불필요 하다고 느꼈다.
- 26) 선거의 냉정한 분석에 대해서는 Bertil A. Renborg(UNCOK 최고 총장) to Lie, June 15, 1950, *ibid.*를 보시오. 選舉 後에 北韓은 平和 統一에 대해 선전 캠페인을 벌였으며 이것은 6월19일 南韓과 北韓이 國家 分斷을 종식시키기 위해 立法府를 합치자는 提議를 했을 때 극치를 이루었다. UNCOK는 北韓 行動을 조사하였으나 좋은 結果를 얻지 못하였다. 후에 사건들을 보았을 때 북한의 선전은 남한내의 분리, 특히 李 大統領과 國會사이를 악화시키기를 원했던 것 같으며 후의 攻擊 可能性을 增進시키기 위하였던 것 같다. 이 문제에 대한 서류는, Renborg to Lie, June 16, 1950, *ibid.* : Australian Mission to the United Nations to the Department of External Affairs, July 4, 1950, and A.B. Jamieson (Australian delegate to UNCOK) to S. Watt(Secretary, Department of External Affairs), June 12, 1950, A1838/T184, 3123/4/5, Australian Archives(Mitchelle Branch), ACT, Australia. 이다.
- 27) *FRUS*, 1950, 6 : 335 : US Far East Command, *Intelligence Summary*, May 6, 1950, Record Group 260, Washington National Records Center, Suitland, Md. ; US Central Intelligence Agency, “Reports of Current Soviet Military Activity in China,” April 21, 1950, Box 255, President’s Secretary’s Files, Harry S. Truman Papers, Truman Library, Independence, Mo.

- 28) Malayan 혁명에 관해서는, Anthony Short, 'The Communist Insurrection in Malaya 1948-1950, London : Frederick Muller, 1975, 8장을 보시오. 필리핀 상태에 대해서는 Benedict J. Kerksvlict, *The Huk Rebellion : A study of Peasant Rebolt in the Philippines*, Berkeley : University of California Press, 1977, 6장, and Robert Aura Smith, *Philippine Freedom 1946-1958*, New York : Columbia University Press, 1958, 6장 7장을 보시오.
- 29) See *FRUS*, 1950, 6, p. 29.
- 30) William Whitney Stueck, Jr., *The Road to Confrontation : American Policy toward China and Korea, 1947-1950*, Chapel Hill, N.C. : Univ. of North Carolina 출판사, 1981, pp. 146-152, 165-70 ; 동남아시아에 대한 미국정책 발전의 광범위한 조사를 위해서는, Gary R. Hess의 *The United States' Emergence as a Southeast Asian Power, 1940-1950*, N.Y. : 콜롬비아 대학 출판사, 1987, Ch.11을 보시오.
- 31) *FRUS*, 1950, 1, pp. 235-92 ; John Lewis Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment*, New York : Oxford University Press, 1982, chapters 3-5.
- 32) J. Stalin, *Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR*, Moscow : Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1952, pp. 37-39.

THE SECOND INTERNATIONAL
CONFERENCE ON THE KOREAN WAR
JUNE 14~15, 1990
SEOUL, KOREA

**The Role of the Korean War (1950-1953)
in the Internal and Foreign Affairs of
East-European Countries with Particular
Regard to Hungary: Forms of Hungarian Assistance**

Károly Fendler (Hungary)

The global international situation and the countries directly or indirectly concerned have undergone changes over the past four decades that enable us now to study the Korean war from aspects which were impossible to explore during and after the war. Such aspects, for example, include the role of the Korean war in the internal and foreign affairs of East-European countries and the assistance those countries provided to the People's Democratic Republic of Korea during and after the war. These are the points I wish to review below in relation to Hungary.

In the aftermath of World War II, the Soviet Union became a leading and predominant power in the East-European region, its positions being supported by its military presence apart from the agreements with the Allies. All this substantially influenced and determined the direction and features of the otherwise justified and inevitable social and political transformation in East-European countries, including their foreign policy alignment. In addition, this process was only intensified by the break-up of the antifascist

coalition, the hostility among the victorious powers and the evolving cold war. In this context I wish to point out two facts. First, after the events in 1948-1949, Stalin forced the Soviet political and economic model on the East-European countries, including Hungary, which formulated increasingly similar positions on all key issues and several details of internal policy. Secondly, the Soviet Union and the East-European countries became unified and their political, economic, cultural, etc cooperation was developed (eg. bilateral agreements were signed by the end of the 1940s). It was indicated by the basic principle adopted at the first meeting of the ~~Information~~ Bureau in September 1947 whereby "in the performance of the major tasks of the post-war period the Soviet Union and its foreign policy will play the leading role".¹⁾ All this increasingly thwarted any attempt to give room for national specificities and subordinated all national interests to the then ~~great~~ power interests and efforts of the Soviet Union.

As a consequence of internal and regional developments and the impact of the cold war, the traditional ties of Hungary and most East-European countries with Western Europe were at an ebb and even intergovernmental relations were frozen at the end of the 1940s. The situation was only exacerbated by the Yugoslav issue. As

regards the Far East, the media and the public followed first of all the Chinese events and the formation of the People's Republic of China with keen interest. The latter event was interpreted as the expansion and victory of socialism in the official ideology and propaganda. The relations between Eastern Europe and North Korea, which were marginal in those days, were also determined by the same line of Soviet-type social and political development. This similarity and "affinity" motivated East-European countries to recognize the People's Democratic Republic of Korea without delay.

In the light of the foregoing, the recognition of the People's Democratic Republic of Korea by Hungary may seem a routine political act which may not have had any real "diplomatic background" beyond the apparent fact. Or perhaps there was still something to it? Extant diplomatic documents suggest some "higher political" implications.

At this point I wish to note that there were no special relations between Hungary and Korea because of the Japanese annexation before 1945. Although the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy signed a Treaty on Friendship, Commerce and Navigation with Korea in 1892, before World War I, it was merely symbolic and had no practical significance.²⁾ Our image about Korea was not augmented even after 1945 and we can hardly find news items about

Korea in the contemporary Hungarian press. Even "Szabad Nép" (Free People), the official party organ reported on the meeting of the North-Korean National Assembly held in September 1948 with almost a two-week delay and rather imprecisely wrote about the formation of the People's Democratic Republic of Korea.³⁾ The paper published a review of the most important events of the year, "1948: The year of victories" on 25 December in which the item "New people's democracy being born in North Korea" is dated 4 May (!).

In an article "Hungary recognizes the independent People's Democratic Republic of Korea", "Szabad Nép" reported on the exchange of telegrams between the foreign ministers Pak Hon-Yong and László Rajk, the decision of the Hungarian Government to recognize the PDRK and the Korean initiatives to establish diplomatic and economic relations not earlier than 12 November 1948.⁴⁾ It seems, however, that nothing happened in response to the latter initiatives for almost a year. The Hungarian Embassy in Moscow first reported on 29 August 1949 that upon a central instruction the ambassador/counsellor had visited the ambassador of the PDRK to communicate the Hungarian Government's intention to send an ~~ambas-~~ **envoy** or chargé d'affaires to the PDRK. The ambassador said, "the Korean government intends to establish diplomatic relations with all people's democracies soon

after the unification" (author's italics), ie. he gave an elusive reply to the Hungarian initiative. As the Hungarian diplomat reported, the ambassador's words "implied a firm belief that the unification is only a short while away" and "what he said can also be understood that before the unification it is not likely that Korea and Hungary will send diplomatic missions". As an official at the Hungarian Foreign Ministry noted in the file, "it is not so much to mean de facto unification as it is to suggest that the North-Korean government considers itself to be the only legitimate government of the entire Korea, irrespective of the puppet government recognized by the US." Finally, the issue is concluded by a note with reference to foreign secretary of state, Berei on 29 September, saying "the (Korean) ambassador in Moscow said that his government would appreciate the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries. The only condition is that it should be done at the ambassadorial level."⁵⁾

What was the background of those controversial statements of the Korean ambassador in Moscow? Was it the lack of experience or an premature manifestation of the propagandistic position of Pyongyang on the issue of unification? It cannot be precluded in the case of the first reply, however it is contradicted by a statement a month later in which the ambassador greeted the

Hungarian initiative on behalf of his government. It is unlikely that the Hungarian diplomat's visit was unexpected for the ambassador. So his first response ("soon after the unification") could only have reflected an official position on such a major principal/political issue as "the relations with all people's democracies". If it is the case, why did the position in Pyongyang change?

We can most probably find the reasons in the global international situation and the radical changes that occurred in the related Soviet foreign policy in summer/early autumn 1949. Briefly, foreign policy in the US and in the West in general came to a new phase with the establishment of the NATO on 4 April 1949. At the Paris conference of the Council of Foreign Ministers of the four great powers (23 May-20 June 1949), the Soviet proposal for the restoration of political, economic and administrative unity in Germany and the preparations of the peace treaties was rejected. In fact, general elections were held in the Western zones, "Trizonia" in Germany as early as August 1949 and the Federal Republic of Germany was formed on 20 September the same year. In response, the German Democratic Republic was formed on 7 October 1949. These events marked the definite split of Germany. As a consequence, the efforts to strengthen armed forces and strategic secu-

city ultimately became the focal point of the Soviet foreign policy concept and practice. On 25 September, it was announced that the first atomic bomb had been exploded by the Soviet Union as a test.⁶⁾

To sum it up, we cannot preclude that prior to the Hungarian initiative there could have been certain ideas about restoring Korea's unity in Pyongyang (and perhaps in Moscow?) - on the basis of some agreement of the great powers (although the Joint Soviet-US Committee interrupted its activities in Korea as early as autumn 1947 and the Korean issue was put on the agenda of the UN General Assembly in 1948). As the two German states had been formed and the international scene became bipolarized, Korea's unification also became unrealistic.

In any case, Hungarian-Korean diplomatic relations were established relatively fast but only at the level of envoys. The first Hungarian envoy presented his credentials in Pyongyang on 20 April 1950 and his Korean counterpart did so in Budapest on 22 June the same year.⁷⁾

Diplomatic relations were ~~set up~~ ^{setup} at the ambassadorial level - at Korea's request - only as of 1 February 1954.

At the outbreak of the Korean war on ²³15 June 1950, which came rather unexpected to the public, Hungary was in a

peculiar situation. After the "year of change" in 1948, the political thinking and practice of the leadership of the ruling Hungarian Workers' Party was characterized by increasing distortions, unjustified administrative measures and the "sharpening of the class struggle". The forceful transformation of the social and political structure, conceived political trials, forged "spy cases", "sabotage actions", "denunciations" and the evacuation of "class aliens" created mounting tension in the country - in the face of undoubted achievements. All walks of social life were permeated by general distrust and a "search for the enemy". In the international atmosphere of the cold war, the Hungarian political leadership blamed all this on the imperialistic powers and their "Hungarian agents". The country's isolation from the rest of the world and media manipulations made it difficult for the public to have realistic orientation (for example, relations with Western subjects or listening to Western radio programs had administrative consequences).

In this situation, the political leadership and the representatives of the official ideology and propaganda hastened to capitalize even on such a distant event as the Korean war to promote their internal policy concept and daily agitprop activities. They saw it as a proof for their policy based on a mounting threat of war and a

confirmation for the "image of the imperialistic enemy" and the "need to denounce imperialism" in mass propaganda ("they launch attacks through spies and saboteurs in our country and with arms in Korea"). The leadership tried to use the Korean war as a pretext for armament and preparations for war in order to mitigate the tension in production and consumption due to the forced pace of economic plans and escalating military expenditure (about 20% of the national income in 1950). Having endorsed the Soviet position on the immediate possibility of a world war (see, for example, the resolution of the ~~Information~~ Bureau in November 1949), they further cut consumption and increased investments in heavy industries for strengthening defence.⁸⁾ The outbreak of the Korean war provided a reason for overt actions as of the autumn 1950 to prepare the population morally and politically for a threatening war and to mobilize them (the Western and Southern borders of the country were practically considered "front lines"; they were closed zones where technical barriers were set up and movements were restricted, etc). The society became increasingly "homogenized" and the political structure of the one-party state was heavily centralized. In November 1950, Mátyás Rákosi, Ernő Gerő and Mihály Farkas formed the Defence Committee without the knowledge or approval of the legitimate state and party agencies. "In the subsequent two years all decisions

were made by the Committee, acting in full power and without any control, on all political, economic, military and other issues affecting the country's future."⁹⁾ In February 1951, the party conference decided to raise plan estimates substantially, for heavy industry investments in particular. Wide-ranging performance competitions were organized to boost workers' productivity in order to implement the overambitious plans. From summer 1950, such competitions featured what was called "a week for Korea", "brigades for Korea" or "ten-day shifts for Korea" organized in factories.¹⁰⁾

In summary we can conclude that the Korean war and its interpretation not only became integrally "embedded" in the arguments formulated by the one-party state in a very short time but it was also a major factor in the decisions on internal, economic, military and foreign policy issues. Similarly to the establishment of the NATO and the FRG, the leadership used the Korean events as a proof for war threat. An extensive solidarity movement evolving as early as the second day of the war was also intended to mobilize the public and the society at large. Although it was initiated, organized and controlled by the political leadership in pursuit of their own targets, similar "parallel" initiatives by the public can also be noted, showing different features however.

Public opinion was also influenced by the early military involvement of several states in the Korean war. It threatened with the escalation of the war, which broke out in the direct border regions of the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China, leading to armed conflicts between the NATO and the Soviet Union and its allies.¹¹⁾ (Although the Warsaw Pact was signed only in 1955, the East-European countries except Albania had earlier entered into bilateral agreements for mutual assistance with the Soviet Union, with the most recent such agreement with China signed in February 1950.) For this reason, there were views that saw the Korean war as a prelude to a third world war, and the Hungarian press also voiced the same fear. In addition, the public response in Hungary was most certainly influenced by the still vivid memories of World War II which had only ended five years before and in which about 8-10% of the country's population had been killed.¹²⁾ ~~Add in the World~~ War II, Hungary continued to be a front and a scene of direct military activities for about 7-8 months, much longer than Western Europe. Such fresh memories also motivated fear and readiness to give humanitarian help among the Hungarian public which ultimately coincided with the position and efforts of political leadership described earlier.

I do not consider it my duty to analyze the different

reasons leading to the outbreak of the Korean war or the military and political developments that provided the background. All this is well-known from the literature just as the fact the East-European countries were united in endorsing and following the version and the position created in Pyongyang, Moscow and Peking. Thus, the official Hungarian position was also determined by the internal and external factors I outlined earlier. It was the case even though no government or foreign ministry statement or similar official document that we know of was released after the outbreak of the Korean war.¹³⁾ At the same time, press editorials and commentaries expounded the Hungarian position.¹⁴⁾

It was not before Tuesday, 27 June 1950 that the Hungarian papers reported on the outbreak of the Korean war (the papers did not appear on Monday). On the first two pages, "Szabad Nép" extensively wrote about the "ambush" against the PDRK and even published a detailed review of Korea and the Korean issue with maps. From then on, the paper invariably discussed the situation on the front on the basis of North-Korean war bulletins and extensively described the international reaction to the conflict on the first two pages for about two months.

Korean solidarity movements started in Hungary in early July ("Hands off from Korea!") and a rally was held in Budapest on 15 July. "Szabad Nép" devoted the first two

pages to the event with a headline "the people in Budapest gathered at a mass peace rally to protest against the violent attack by the US imperialists against Korea". Leading cultural and church personalities and the representatives of the public addressed the rally. A resolution was adopted that "on behalf of the Hungarian workers, we are offering to send a military hospital with doctors and nurses, medical instruments and medicines to the Korean People's Republic (sic) as a symbol of our solidarity and to help the Korean people in their fight for freedom".¹⁵⁾ The National Council of the movement "We will defend peace!" made an appeal to the Hungarian people that everybody should contribute to the costs of the hospital according to one's means.¹⁶⁾ The paper continuously reported on improvised political/solidarity meetings organized in support of the campaign throughout the country and specifically mentioned the donations made by the workers' collectives of some large factories, leading artists, scientists and intellectuals.¹⁷⁾

Donations all over the country soon exceeded 12.8 million forints which was a considerable amount in those days.¹⁸⁾

On 18 July, the papers already published interviews with doctors and nurses about to leave for Korea and reported on the farewell ceremony and the departure of the train

taking the Hungarian hospital staff and equipment on 26 July. The first group of Hungarian doctors arrived in Korea and started to work on 27 July 1950.

The "production movement" in support of solidarity with Korea began in Hungary in late July. Contemporary press releases give a very good picture of that movement.

Let me quote a few examples: "Korea's example inspires heroic acts on the production front"; "At their conference, Stachanovites of the steel industry decided to overshoot the new norms"; "Forward for the victory of the Week for Korea"; "Outstanding production figures on the first day of the Week for Korea"; "Experience of the agitprop work in the Week for Korea"; "How the experience of the Week for Korea is used in practice at a foundry".¹⁹⁾ Even István Csók, painter and a renowned personality of Hungarian fine arts and culture published an article under the title "The Week for Korea is a cause shared by all of us" in "Szabad Nép" on 10 August.

Later on, the Hungarian press always devoted predominant coverage to the events of the three-year war and the armistice talks on which "Szabad Nép's" special correspondent in Korea gave regular reports from 12 August 1951.²⁰⁾

Offerings to organize performance competitions and

solidarity donations continued all through the war. For example, at the end of August 1950, peace commissions organized a purchase campaign with coupons in denominations of 5, 7.5 and 10 forints representing "gift parcels for Korea". About one million gift parcels were bought this way and were sent to Korea in a special train.²¹⁾ It is understandable that those actions still had a political touch to them. In response to an appeal made by the Presidium of the National Peace Council in June 1952 (24 June, Szabad Nép), the 2nd Department of the General Staff of the Hungarian People's Army sent out an internal circular to all political officers, describing the guidelines and political objectives of collecting donations. It was emphasized in the circular that (a) donations cannot be made compulsory and (b) salaried staff (ie. professionals) should donate 3% of their monthly salaries while conscripts should buy stamps of 2, 5, 10, 20 or 50 forints. "I assign the political officers with the responsibility for carrying out the collection successfully", reads the concluding sentence of the circular signed by the Deputy Head of the Political Department.²²⁾

In response to the aforesaid appeal of the Peace Council, a monthly solidarity campaign is organized for Korea under the banner "to commemorate the 2nd anniversary of aggression in Korea" between 1 July and 1 August 1952. The mass rally in Budapest is followed

by thousands of improvised meetings in factories and offices all around the country which were attended by the Hungarian doctors who had worked in Korea. Another donation campaign resulted in almost 37 million forints collected.²³⁾

On the whole it can be said that during the three years of the Korean war, the activities of the Hungarian hospital and medical staff as well as the various aid supplies (medicines, prime necessities, food) were in the focus of interest of the political leadership, propaganda and social solidarity.

The Hungarian hospital (under the name 'Mátyás Rákosi' in the beginning) and the medical groups worked in Korea for seven years from end July 1950 to June 1957. During that period, altogether 162 Hungarian doctors, nurses and other medical staff worked there.²⁴⁾ Between 1950 and 1953 it operated as a military hospital and its activities up to the armistice are summarized in a report prepared by the minister of health for the Hungarian government.²⁵⁾

On 10 August, Foreign Minister Nam Ir - on behalf of Kim Ir-Sung - requested the Soviet, Rumanian, Hungarian, Czechoslovak and Polish governments through their diplomatic missions in Pyongyang to continue operating their hospitals and delegating their doctors in Korea

as long as possible for the period of reconstruction.²⁶⁾ Hungary along with those countries accepted the request and financed the operation and maintenance of the hospital (with an annual 6.5 million forints from the state budget) for an additional four years.²⁷⁾ The operation of the hospital was changed. It was relocated to Sarivon where it functioned as a hospital for the province. Internists, phthisiotherapists, obstetricians and pediatricians also joined the team of Hungarian surgeons. Hospital care was complemented with wide-ranging out-patient care.

In addition to medical care, the Hungarian doctors organized annual scientific conferences with their Korean colleagues for large groups of specialists (for example in the subject of the experience in the fight against tuberculosis in 1956).²⁸⁾ The papers of the conference were published in the Korean language for use in the local medical training.²⁹⁾

The political leadership and health authorities in Korea thought highly of the performance of the Hungarian hospital and doctors and their expertise. It was emphasized by Kim Ir-Sung and Foreign Minister Pok Hon-Yong and Health Minister, Li Byong-Nam on several occasions. On one occasion the Health Minister said "our hospital keeps receiving letters from the wounded who had been treated here, calling our attention to the work and achievements of Hungarian doctors".³⁰⁾

Our doctors received several similar letters from their Korean patients even after they returned to Hungary. The Archives of Military History even keeps among such letters a poem written by Yang Bok-Yun, who was also wounded, in Hungarian and Korean, "Tender hands - to a Hungarian doctor".³¹⁾ The government of the PDRK awarded high decorations to several Hungarian doctors and nurses in recognition of their efforts. A memorial column in the courtyard of the Sarivon hospital commemorates their devoted work.

The ceremonial performance in honour of the last group of Hungarian doctors and medical staff was also attended by Kim Du-Bong, then head of state, and more than 1500 people waved farewell to the group at the railway station.³²⁾

The operation of the Hungarian hospital and doctors during seven years was financed from donations organized by the National Peace Council and later from the state budget as I already noted. So the total expenditure amounted to 67.5 million forints in the period of 1950-1957.³³⁾ Although the hospital was destroyed in autumn 1950 and was bombed several times later on, there were no Hungarian victims.³⁴⁾

Hungarian doctors, especially surgeons analyzed their experience in Korea after they returned to Hungary. For example, the monthly periodical, "Katonarvosi Szemle" (Bulletin of Military Physicians) published a series of articles, "Military plastic surgery" in 1953-54. In the introduction the authors noted, "...In Korea, forty percent of all operations are related to plastic surgery. This series of articles is intended to communicate the related experience for use by military surgeons."³⁵⁾

I have not found any medical report or study on the use of bacteriologic weapons which was mainly the topic of press articles and the correspondent of "Szabad Nép" in Korea. However, two notes were prepared at the Scientific Research Institute of the Hungarian People's Army on 2 June 1952. In the first note, the author (a medical captain who had never been to Korea) summarized the forms, cases and experience of the use of bacteriologic weapons in Korea while the second made a proposal for a special institute to be set up and specialists to be trained for a possible bacteriologic war.³⁶⁾ (There is no evidence for any response to the proposal.)

In addition to medical assistance, another significant form of Hungary's support to Korea was the reception of students and war orphans during and after the war, their number reached about one thousand according to less than complete statistics. Students studied at the university o

medical sciences and at various technical faculties (architecture, electricity, chemistry, agriculture) just as at the faculty of liberal arts. Two special schools and a college were opened with Hungarian and Korean teachers for war orphans in primary and secondary education. (The schools were named after Kim Ir-Sung and Pak ~~Jon-Ŭe.~~) The Korean youth were popular among the Hungarian population, in fact several Hungarian families wished to adopt Korean children but it was not possible. Unfortunately, the foreign studies and stay of Korean students were strongly influenced by the given political stance of the Pyongyang leadership. So after the Hungarian events in autumn 1956, all students were ordered back to the PDRK and only a few graduates were allowed to complete their studies in 1958-1959.³⁷⁾ Although the increasingly different internal situation in Hungary and Korea later on did not make it possible for Korean students who had studied in Hungary to contribute more actively to the cooperation between the two countries, they had a positive role, for example in culture. With their help, several Korean classics were published in Hungarian and a Hungarian-Korean dictionary was also compiled by the end of the 1950s. (See Attachment 5).

According to the statistics of the Hungarian Ministry of Education, Hungary received a total of 601 Korean

students on fellowship grants, representing a total of 37.8 million forints in expenditure in the period 1951-1955. During the same period, the establishment and maintenance of the two schools and the college already mentioned cost 18.6 million forints.³⁸⁾

As regards economic aid, the Hungarian government extended a trade credit equivalent to 15 million old roubles to the PDRK on 5 July 1952, and cancelled the debt in June 1959. Participating in the postwar reconstruction of Korea with other East-European countries, the Hungarian government passed a resolution on "the friendly assistance to be granted to the Korean people" on 5 August 1953. On that basis the two governments signed an agreement on economic and technical assistance on 7 September. Under the agreement, Hungary delivered various machinery and equipment (rail engines, mining equipment, machine tools, etc) and medicine in aid in a value of 15 million old roubles in 1954 and sent investment goods in a value of 10 million old roubles in 1955-56.³⁹⁾

In addition, Hungary undertook to construct and install three factories free of charge under the same agreement signed on 7 September 1953. We commissioned the scale manufacturing factory in Pyongyang in January 1959, an engineering factory in Kusun and a paint factory in Pongun in 1960. The total cost estimate of those facto-

ries were about 70-85 million old roubles back in 1953.⁴⁰⁾
As part of technical assistance, 32 Hungarian architects and technicians were involved in the design work of the housing estate in Pyongyang and other four specialists worked in the mining equipment factory in Nagon in 1954-1955.

Finally, under an intergovernmental agreement signed on 20 June 1956, Hungary made a long-term loan of 7.5 million old roubles and a non-repayable aid of 7.5 million old roubles for the purchase of basic necessities to Korea.⁴¹⁾ At the same time the two countries began to trade on the basis of annual trade and payment protocols in a relatively insignificant volume from that year.

In conclusion, it is difficult now to tell exactly the value and size of assistance given by Hungary (and the other East-European countries, the Soviet Union and China) to North-Korea during the war and in the post-war reconstruction. Such an analysis or estimate is made even more difficult by the absence of precise statistics or contradicting figures, the complete lack of publications in some countries concerned, the problems of conversion and settlements as regards the various national currencies, etc. There are even differences between Korean figures and those of other countries. Considering all this, the value of Hungarian assistance

and aid programs, including cancelled debts, to the PDRK is estimated to have exceeded 180 million old roubles (about 40 million new roubles).⁴²⁾ It is also hard to come up with a precise estimate because in line with the political spirit and practice of those days several institutions, social and mass organizations and local communities sent various aid supplies in addition to the aforesaid forms of assistance (eg. school supplies by the Ministry of Education, jeeps by the Foreign Ministry, etc.)⁴³⁾ and those aid supplies were not included in the central assistance funds.

Without going into details, the author estimates the value of assistance, free loans, cancelled debts and other direct and indirect grants made by the Soviet Union, China and the East-European countries to the PDRK to be over 4.5-5.0 billion new roubles most certainly, excluding military supplies (in which Hungary was not involved). For comparison, the same figure was estimated at 500 million roubles in Pyongyang.⁴⁴⁾

x x x

As I already noted, the Hungarian political leadership treated the issue of the Korean war as an internal policy issue and used it as an internal policy instrument all through the period in question. Accordingly, the press and media gave outstanding coverage to the mili-

tary events and international implications of the war during the three-year period. At the same time, the international solidarity movement related to the Korean war also widened the elbowroom for Hungary, including several outstanding intellectuals.

The armistice agreement was greeted by the Hungarian press and public as "the great victory of the policy of peace". In an editorial with the same title, Szabad Nép pointed out, "The Korean war was a matter not only for Korea but the most burning issue of international politics as a whole. Consequently, the Korean armistice agreement is not confined only to Korea."⁴⁵⁾ Imre Nagy, then Prime Minister, greeted Kim Ir-Sung and Mao Tse-tung in a telegram on the occasion of the armistice agreement.⁴⁶⁾

Beyond the national tragedy, the Korean^{War} was also a symbol of confrontation and the hottest conflict of the cold war. Today, looking back after forty years, it can offer several historical lessons for the new generations. And just as the international situation prior to the Korean war and especially the developments of the German issue undeniably had an impact on the Korean situation then, we can ask ourselves a question by the same token: what could be the impact of the present German situation and the German reunification on the Korean situation and could it lead to eliminating the

split - over and above the internal development in Korea. Will, or could, the East-European countries including Hungary that was the first to reflect the new international realities in its foreign policy and to resume diplomatic relations with the Republic of Korea, have some role in promoting Korea's unity? I believe that the 1990s will soon answer both questions.

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NOTES

- 1) In: "A magyar népi demokrácia története 1944-1962" (History of the Hungarian people's democracy 1944-1962), Budapest, 1978, p.387
István Kende: "Forró béke - hideg háború" (Hot peace - cold war), Budapest, 1970, p. 102
Sándor Balogh: "Magyarország külpolitikája 1945-1950" (Hungary's foreign policy), Budapest, 1988, p. 269
- 2) Károly Fendler: One Hundred Years of Hungarian-Korean Relations, Korea Journal, Vol.30, No.3, March 1990
- 3) Szabad Nép (Free People), 21,22 September 1948
- 4) ibid.

- 5) New Hungarian Central Archives (NHCA), Korea
XIX-J-1-j, Box 3, File 4/h, 580/49 (Moscow 27/sz.b.),
717/49 (Moscow 31/sz.b.)
- 6) "A magyar népi demokrácia története 1944-1962", p.145,
István Kende: quoted , pp. 178-179
- 7) So far, the conditions and experience of other East-European countries such as Czechoslovakia and Poland as regards establishing relations with the PDRK are unknown.
- 8) "A magyar népi demokrácia története 1944-1962", p.176
- 9) ibid, p. 169
- 10) ibid, p. 177
- 11) Sándor Balogh: "Magyarország külpolitikája 1945-1950",
Budapest, 1988, p. 339
- 12) Mihály Korom: "A magyar népi demokrácia első évei 1944-1948" (First years of the Hungarian people's democracy), Valóság, No.3, 1984, pp.3-4 and Tamás Stark: "Magyarország II. világháborús embervesztése" (Hungary's death toll in World War II), Budapest, 1989, p. 80
- 13) Later, on 15 July 1950, the US Embassy in Budapest sent a note informing the Hungarian Foreign Ministry that with reference to the UN Security Council's re-

solution the President of the United States ordered a blockade along the Korean coastline. In a note sent in reply, the Foreign Ministry stated that the Hungarian People's Republic regarded the Security Council's resolution as illegitimate and pointed out that the overt armed attack by the US meant an aggressive intervention in the internal affairs of the Korean people.

- 14) For example: "Imperialist provocation in Korea" (Szabad Nép, 30 June 1950); "We support the Korean people in their fight for freedom" (ibid, 18 July); "Spirited sympathy with Korea (ibid, 28 JULY), etc.

The official position, communication and propaganda were also supported by some Soviet publications in the series "International issues" of the Party's Publisher "Szikra": "Korea" (No.11), "The Soviet Union and the Korean issue" (No.30), "The Soviet Union and the US intervention in Korea" Documents (No.41).

- 15) Szabad Nép, 16 July 1950

- 16) ibid., 18 July

- 17) ibid., 21 July. For example: "The mission of the State Security Authority ceremoniously handed over the donations running to 454.604 forints so far ... The head of the mission said ... in addition to financial

support, they would reply to the imperialist provocation in Korea by continuing the fight against all enemies of the country, against the imperialist agents with all their might." This news item seems to reflect truly the prevailing political climate and the internal policy efforts of the leadership in those days.

- 18) *ibid.*, 28 July
- 19) *ibid.*, 28 July, 8, 16 and 18 August, etc
- 20) Tibor Méray's activities were positively valued by the respective Korean leaders: "...Both the Foreign Minister and the deputy minister of culture and propaganda think that "Comrade Méray holds a firm line and performs his work as a good communist"", NHCA, XIXJ-1-j Korea, Box 7, 00858/1952
- 21) Szabad Nép, 24 August, 14 and 16 September 1950
- 22) Military History Archives (MHA), Dept. 2 of the General Staff of the Hungarian People's Army, V. 1952/T. 111/1., foil 112, 04922/Pol.Fcsf./1952
- 23) NHCA, XIX-J-1-j Korea, Box 8, File 11/f, 001132/1952
- 24) MHA, VII.205.Pgy.Ko.1-11, 32. File K/1, containing a full list of names.

- 25) NHCA, XIX-J-1-j Korea, Box 9, File 13/g 00292/2/1954
- 26) ibid., 001637/1953
- 27) ibid., 0091/3/1954
- 28) NHCA, XIX-J-1-j, Korea, Box 3, File 4/bc, 004431/1/
1957
- 29) MHA, VII.205. Pgy Ko.1-11, 32 K/7, see Attachment 3
- 30) NHCA, XIX-J-1-j, Korea, Box 7, File 5/h, 001970/1951
- 31) MHA, ibid., K/10, see Attachment 4
- 32) NHCA, XIX-J-1-j, Korea Box 9, File 13/g, 001362/4/
1957
- 33) ibid., 00292/2/1954 and 001362/3/1957, see Attachments
1 and 2
- 34) In his telegram addressed to the UN General Secretary and the Chairman of the Security Council, Foreign Minister Pok Hon-Yong protested against the bombing of the hospital in Chunhva village where there were also Hungarian doctors working. Ibid., Box 8, File 11/f, 001516/1950
- 35) Katonaorvosi Szemle, Vols V-VI, 1953, 1954, Dr János Zoltán - Dr József Galambos, June 1953, p.540 and Dr György János: Adalékok a lőtt sérülékes eredetű idült csontvelőgyulladások kezeléséhez" (Addi-

- tions to the treatment of chronic osteomyelitis resulting from shot wounds), *ibid.*, Vol. VI, September 1954, pp. 892-908
- 36) MHA, Military Supply Service of the HPA, Dept. of Health, 1952/T, 229/4, Foil 54
- 37) According to some unconfirmed information, some Korean students helped the Hungarian youth in the uprising with their "military experience". See: Péter Gosztonyi: "Feltámadott a tenger ... 1956. A magyar október története" (And the sea rose ... 1956. History of the Hungarian October), Budapest, 1989, p. 172
- 38) NHCA, XIX-J-1-j, Korea, Box 10, File 17/d, 003607/2/1955 and O.M. 8462-B.8/1955
- 39) *ibid.*, Box 3, File 4/ba, 008011/1955
- 40) *ibid.*, Box 12, File 25/j, 001776/1953
- 41) *ibid.*, Box 11, File 25/c, 00369/1959
- 42) Following the Soviet currency reform in 1960, a rate of 4.4 to 1 is used to convert the rouble in international settlements.
- 43) *ibid.*, Box 10, File 25/c, 001858/1952
- 44) Nodong Sinmun, 23 April 1963

45) Szabad Nép, 28 July 1953

46) ibid., 29 July and 1 August

Attachment 1

Report to the Hungarian Government on
the medical assistance given to the Korean government

(Excerpt)

"The first group of medical doctors and staff left for Korea on 20 July 1950. At the same time we sent the full equipment necessary for a 400-bed hospital in two airplanes and 6 railway waggons. Our hospital was named after Mátyás Rákosi. The first consignment was complemented with monthly consignments in 1950. In an attack by the US forces our first hospital was completely destroyed so we sent another consignment with the full equipment of another 400-bed hospital at the end of 1950. At the beginning and summer of 1951 we developed a 1000-bed hospital ... which we continued operating until the end of the war. The original equipment was supplemented in 1951, 1952 and 1953. In spring 1952 we sent a disinfecting station, laboratory equipment, DDT and a large consignment of human and animal vaccines and plant protection chemicals.

In addition to the hospital equipment, we sent 2 jeeps, a GAZ automobile, 4 trucks, 10 bicycles and motorcycles to be used by the hospital.

Before the armistice we spent a budget of approx. 23 million forints (= 8 million roubles) on the operation of the hospital "Mátyás Rákosi"...

... Since the armistice, 4 consignments have been sent

in altogether 15 waggons to Korea. Those consignments will ensure the full equipment, instrumentation and medicine supply of the regional hospital for several months.

Budapest, 27 September 1954

New Hungarian Central Archives, XIX-J-1-j, Korea,
Box 9, File 13/g, 00292/2/1954

Attachment 2

(Summary report of the Health Ministry)

(Excerpt)

"Between July 1950 and December 1953, hospital equipment was sent in a value of 23 million forints. ... In addition, the cost of transportation and personnel was 15 million 800 thousand forints plus the contribution to the construction of the hospitals in Sarivon and Songrim of 648 thousand forints, altogether totalling 41 million 448 thousand forints."...

" Between January 1954 and June 1957 when it was opened, 26 million forints were spent on the hospital."

"Hence, from June 1950 the total expenditure amounted to 67 and a half million forints of which materials and equipment accounted for 38 million 620 thousand forints, transportation and personnel costs were 28 million 180 thousand and construction costs reached 648 thousand."...

New Hungarian Central Archives, XIX-J-1-j, Korea,
Box 9, File 13/g, 001362/3/1957

Attachment 3.

황해북도 인민위원회 보건부

제2차 의학회

문헌집

황해북도 제 2 차 의학회

준비 위원회

1956.10

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조선애착은 폐결핵을 다루는 방법과 그의 중요성은 앞으로 모르고 보게될것입니다.

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중히 봐야하며 이사업의 성공을 위하여 노력합니다.

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것입니다.

오늘 우리는 중부위과 부문에서 또 역시 위으로 선봉적 사업을 진행하고 있습니다.

우리가 알고 있는데에 의하면 현재 조선의사들 중에서 처음으로 우리 병원에서 의사 이직석동
주가 핵심적임을 증명하였다고 봅니다.

우리는 벌써 2년전부터 결핵전문 의사 양성사업과 기술전수사업을 광범하게 진행하고 있습니다.
뿐만아니라 우리 도중앙병원에 많은 결핵병원들과 로양소들을 기술적으로 방조하고 있습니다.
년된 외과 식감을 비롯하여 최철의 인민군 로양소 등에서는 많은 성과를 거두었습니다.

우리 년별 영애전상부 방면에서는 그간 하건의 사망자도 비교적 낮고 수많은 영애들을 성공적
제거의 사실을 증명하였습니다.

이러한 많은 성과를운데가 영고리아 중부위과가 조선에서 벌써 많은 확고적 양성을 하였다는데
있습니다. 즉 이리하여 성과들은 의사들만이 증명할것이아니라 영고리아 중부 위과공업에서
제1인인 스트레 로양소, 이소너피드, 레바미나우, 리오미제로 중부 위과공공과 더불어 제작된 재료
성리들은 우리 의사들에게 방조하여 주고 있습니다.

그러나 이 모든 성과물 달성할수있었던것은 조선민주주의 인민공화국 보건일꾼들이 막대한 방조와 호상 육친적 전선을 도모하며 호상 경험을 교환하며 사업하였으며 이거대한 방조가 주되는 요소로 된다는것을 우리는 잊지않을것입니다. 헝그리아 보건일꾼들이 우리들의 사업을 그 무엇이 난관을 극복하면서 성과를거두었음 그무하여주었것참니까 이 질문에대한 답변은 간단합니다

이는 조선인민에대한 형제적인 동경으로써 존경과 사랑을 가지고 있기때문입니다. 이는 영웅적 조선인민의 임무에게 다시금 가혹한 제공학대전을 도발하려는 적들의 기도를 분쇄하고 자기조국을 영웅적으로 수호하였을뿐만아니라 세계평화를 공고화하는 투쟁에 크게 기여하신기때문입니다. 이렇으로써 헝그리아 인민은 전쟁의 발발처우 영웅적 조선인민을 원조하기위하여 제일먼저 의모단을 보여주었습니다. 헝그리아 병원은 전쟁기간을 전후하여 6차례 걸쳐 새로운 계방으로 이동하면서 헝그리아까지 전개되고 있습니다. 전쟁기간에 병원은 수차 순찰되었으며 4차례 건물들과 설비물을 복구하였습니다.

그동안 1000명 또는 2000명의 참다운 기전 병원도 새로 설치하게되었는바 이는 조선인민들의 많은 방조로써 이루어졌습니다. 영웅적 조선인민들은 적들을 물리치고 역사적인 승리를 쟁취하였습니다. 우리는 전쟁이 끝난후에도 역시 조국의 천우들을 떠나지않고 죽임하게 파괴된 국가의 복구건설사업에 참가하게 되었습니다.

우리나라와 정부는 우수한 의료일꾼들을 계속 보내주고있으며 그들을 사업을 통하여 전쟁으로 죽임하게 파괴된 상처를 회복함에 계속 방조하고 있습니다.

진저 우리병원은 6년간 조선에서 사업하고 있습니다. 훌륭한 자업을했다고 인정되며 특히 견책분야에서 활동했다고 감상된다. 이는 여러번 우리 병원에서 처음으로 승부외과 의사들을 양성하였기때문입니다.

만일 우리가 귀국하게되면 우리를 파견해준 우리나라 인민들에게 이들을 구체적으로 전할것입니다.

끝으로 큰쾌변적야 조직사업에 우선 막대한 방조를주신 블라토 까로이 대사동지. 당회북도 중앙병원 원장 의사 한동승 의사 파카카쉬 라요쉬 동지들과 상의를 준비해주신 여러동지들과 이불번역해주신 원일 동지와 의사 와이타 비직 의사 보르쉬 임페 의사 헐미쉬 라요쉬 및 까로샤 이 라요쉬 동지들과 사리원 광국일보 출판사 책임주길 한동승동지와 문선석지에서 모든 곤난을 극복하면서 이사업을 방조해주신 전체 출판 일꾼들에게 중심으로부터의 감사할 드립니다.

1956년 10월

헝그리아 병원

원장 공준 이사 세비로게너 야보쉬

ELOSZO

A koreai magyar körök az 1956. évben a tartományi orvosi konferencia feladatát a tuberkulózist választotta. A konferenciára való készületes közben tanulmányoztuk a gondolatunk, hogy a konferencia jegyzőkönyvi anyagát nyomtatásban kiadjuk. Reméljük, hogy sok tanulsággal szolgál azoknak a koreai orvosoknak, akik a tuberkulózis problémáival behatóbban foglalkoznak,

akik hazájuknak ezt az igen elterjedt népbetegséget felszámolni törekednek. Ez a nyomtatott kiadvány nem tart arra igényt, hogy a phthisiologia tankönyvvel szolgáljon, előrebecsüljük, hogy egy jó tankönyv tanulmányozását távolról sem teszi feleslegessé. A kiadvány főleg diagnosztikai és therapiás kérdéseket tárgyal, fontos elvi kérdéseket foglal össze a phthisiologia jelen állásának megfelelően, melyekkel a tudorvos szinte naponta találkozik. Reméljük, hogy könyvünk igen sok tekintetben nagy hasznára lesz a koreai szakorvosoknak, könyvünkben, miként a konferencián is, tag helyett adjuk az extrapulmonalis tuberkulózis problémájának, ugyanis a tuberkulózis extrapulmonalis formáinak is igen nagy jelentősége van.

A mi korházunk koreai és magyar orvosai Koreában a tuberkulózis elleni küzdelem terep utolsó munkáit végezték és máris sok sikerre tekintethetnek vissza. Az egész koreai munkánk igen lenyeges részét fordítottuk éppen a tuberkulózis elleni küzdelemre. Ebben a tekintetben ki kell emelnünk dr. Boszormenyi Miklós kollektív munkáját, akinek kezlemező terekenysége nélkül nehéz lett volna jelen munkánkat a mostani mértékig kiszélesíteni.

A mi munkánk nyomán van Koreában meghonosodóban a mellkasi sebészet, a mi korházunkban vezető általunk képzett koreai orvos (Ho Hí Szok dr.) az első tudorsectiót. A tudororvosok képzése és továbbképzése terep ereket a széleskörű munkát végzők számos tudororvosintézetet patronálunk tartományunk területén kívül is, így a Njong-Pion-i, Vekki-i, Szoktam-i és a Hicson-i tudororvosintézeteket, melyeknek munkájukat sikerült jelentős mértékben megjavítani. Ezenkívül a koreai tudororvosok általános mellkasi sebészet iskolája számos kiadványt készített Korea reudallézésére.

Erdményeink ismertetésekor nem hallgathatjuk el azt a tényt, hogy sikerünket részben a magyar gyógyszeripar kituno keszitmenyeinek (Streptomycin, Isoniazid, Telaminal, Tiomicid) koszonhetjuk. Munkaunkban segitettek az orvosi muszerek, a Rontgen-keszulekek, amelyeket a magyar gyarak gyartottak.

Nem feledkezunk meg arról a segitsegről sem, amelyet a Koreában dolgozó magyar barati nepok korhazainak egészségügyi dolgozói nyújtottak nekünk.

Munka közben sok tekintetben egymás tapasztalataira támaszkodtunk és időnként anyagi segitseget is kaptunk.

Ha feltesszük a kérdést, hogy mi lelkesítette a magyar egészségügyi dolgozókat nehéz munkájukban, a felelet egyszerű: a koreai nép iránti testvéri együttérzés, a szeretet és nem utolsó sorban a hala. Mert ez a nép helytállásával, a saját földjén vívott hősi harcával megakadályozta a harmadik világháború kitörését. Ezáltal az emberiségnek a világbékeért vívott nagy, közös harcában elvitatlan érdemeket szerzett. Ezt érezte meg a magyar nép, midőn régen a háború kezdetén egy orvoscsoporthoz a kiküldésével elsőként sietett a hős koreai nép segítségére. A háború kezdete óta korházunk már hatodik helyen folytatja működését. Negyszer kellett a korházat újjáépíteni és újból felszerelni, mert a háború folyamán többször tonkrement. Korházunk volt minden 1000, sőt 2000 ágyas is, és mindig újra kellett kezdenünk. Mindez fáradhatatlan buzgalommal történt, mert láttuk a koreai nép szívós kitartását, mely végre is az igazság győzelméhez vezetett.

Igaz látványunkat a háború végeztével sem hagytuk cserben, részt kívántunk venni tonkrement országuk újjáépítésében. Kormányunk és partunk a legjobb orvosokat és egészségügyi dolgozókat küldte nekünk, hogy a háború utólagos sebeit minél hamarabb gyógyítsuk.

Itt a háború után munkánkra visszapillantva, úgy érzem, jó munkát végeztünk, különösen a tuberkulózis elleni küzdelem terén, mint említettük, a mi korházunknak köszönhetően, ki Koreai első mellkasi sebészeti igazgatójunktól utána

Joleso erzesssel mondhatjuk el, hogy kuldetesunkben helyt alltunk. Vesul koszonetemet fejezem ki mindenkinek, aki a konferencianak es a most utlara locsatott konyvunk létrehozasanban resztvett. Elsosorban koszonjuk Prath Karoly elvtarsnak, a magyar Nepkoztarsasag penlani rendkivuli es meghatalmazott nasykovetenek ertekes tamozatasat. Koszonetunket fejezzuk ki kedves baratunknak Han Dong Szung dr-nak, korhazunk koreai igazgato-foorvosanak. Koszonetet mondunk dr Fazekas Lajos foorvosnak a konferencia megrendezese korul szerzett erdemciert. Koszonetetunket fejezzuk ki Von Ir, Toth Laszlo dr, Boros Imre dr, Karsai Lajos elvtarsaknak, akik e kiadvany szerzoi, szerkesztoi es forditoi munkalaban a legnagyobb usybuzaosagot tanusitottak, tovalba meskoszonjuk a szarivoni nyomda dolgozoinak lelkes es gondos munkajat.

Korea, Szarivon, 1956. evi oktober ho. 11-e n.

dr Szederkenyi Janos

"erdemes orvos".

• koreai magyar korhaz

igazgato foorvosa

따뜻한 손길

평화공리야 이토란을 위하여.

수심 수벽 만리 이국에서
 산맥이 바아건너 뻗쳐온 손길
 이른 정명 피르며 사위이진 영웅조년
 화자 어머니의 따뜻한 손길

모습과 마음 다르다만
 찬꽃으로 흐르노 심령이며
 고대들의 손이 피쳐는 화자마다
 웃음의 찬박꽃 피어나

과대들의 온광은
 꽃은 산보마 같은 바아보마모
 무는 맹시 하노니
 고대들의 따뜻한 손길로
 전강해리 품으로
 때려의 강호위에 새긴살칼이
 심비 뼈버로 더 싸우리라

안무시
 평화공리야에서 반주자나 있다면
 상손을 돌고 말려 가리라

1954. 8. 26.

조선 사회권 이전 양복문

Sgyed her

- A way of existence -

Solaker li tsivolbol
 Hegeren, hegeretben atnyed. saceto' kradet
 olgar pi, leint omgane heae
 Es apogin a karane nepet
 My serubal vedde dris harigint.

X
 Ha was is a meho is a mubnoko urvoko
 Epy' insonol vhu kelve mivink -
 S' uiter a baleyok latjoks or vhrusokhat
 Brucutee masov kolto'nik
 Holajink mitg'ed a kengeriel a wengvial a
 hepp'ed

X
 Most, long eyes'egere uak nima'keit
 - Uoy'p'og'it'at' p'oy'ed' karabala -
 Es'ich'au, long or ya'ep'it'is'ek
 Minoleu v'ronumel hest'venc'ok
 S' la' hau Maggarainay venat' deu leme' epy'ax
 Dr'innimel mol'umel nepit'og'je'ra

1954 Aug. 26.

Harold Satoru

Young Oak Kim
 Bang
 (Satoru's translation)

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+ /Faludi Péter is my pen-name/

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+ + +

東歐諸國, 특히 헝가리의 國內外
問題에 있어 韓國戰 (1950~1953)의
役割 : 헝가리의 支援 形態

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I

세계의 國際的인 狀況과 직접·간접적으로 關聯된 國家들은 지난 40년 동안 큰 變化를 겪어 왔고 그 結果 우리는 戰爭 중이나 직후에는 생각해 볼 수 없는 側面에서 韓國戰爭을 研究할 수 있게 됐다. 예를 들어 그러한 측면들은 韓國戰이 東歐國家들의 國內外 問題에 대한 韓國戰의 役割과 戰爭 중이나 후에 이 國家들이 北韓에 준 援助에 관한 問題도 包含된다. 이러한 점들이 필자가 헝가리와 관련하여 살펴보고자 하는 부분이다.

第2次 世界大戰 이후 蘇聯은 東歐地域에서 指導的이고 支配的인 勢力이 되는데, 蘇聯의 地位는 同盟들의 同意와는 상관 없이 그 軍事力으로 지탱됐다. 이러한 모든 것들이, 그렇지 않았으면, 東歐에서의 정당하고 불가피했을 對外政策을 포함한 社會·政治的인 變革의 方向과 性格을 規定했다. 더구나 이러한 과정은 反파시스트 연합의 결렬, 戰勝國들 간의 대립 그리고 冷戰의 심화에 의해서만 강화될 수 있을 뿐이었다. 필자는 이러한 맥락에서 두 가지 사실을 지적하고자 한다. 첫째, 1948-49년 사이의 일련의 事件들을 경과한 후에 스탈린은 蘇聯의 政治·經濟的인 모델을 헝가리를 포함한 東歐諸國들에게 강요했고, 그 결과 이 국가들은 모든 핵심적인 事案과 세부적인 國內정책에서 점점 비슷한 입장을 취하게 된다. 둘째, 蘇聯과 東歐國家들은 統合되고 그들의 政治·經濟·文化 등의 相互協力이 發展했다(예, 1940년대 말에 調印된 雙務協定). 그것은 1947년 9월에 제1차 情報局會議에서 채택된 기본 원칙들에서 나타나는데, 거기서는 ‘戰後의 主要 課業들을 實現하는 데 있어 蘇聯과 그 對外 政策이 指導的인 役割을 할 것’¹⁾이라고 밝혔다. 이러한 모든 것은 民族的 特殊性에 여지를 주고자 하는 모든 努力들을 점점 위협했

고 모든 民族的 利益을 蘇聯의 利益과 노력들에 從屬시키게 된다.

國內와 地域的인 發展의 結果와 冷戰의 여파로서 헝가리와 대부분의 東歐 國家들이 西歐와 가졌던 傳統的인 紐帶는 退潮하고 1940年代 末에 政府 相互間의 關係도 冷却됐다. 그러한 狀況은 오직 유고슬라비아 문제로 인해서만 악화됐을 뿐이다. 극동에 관해서는 매체와 大衆들은 中國의 사태들과 中華人民共和國의 樹立을 예의 주시했다. 後者의 事件은 公式的인 이데올로기와 선전에서는 社會主義의 확장과 승리로 解釋되었다. 東歐와 그 당시에는 周邊的인 位置에 있었던 北韓의 關係들도 또한 蘇聯式의 社會·政治的인 發展과 同一한 선상에서 결정됐다. 유사성과 ‘친숙함’으로 인해 東歐國家들로 하여금 朝鮮民主主義人民共和國을 지체없이 인정하게 된다.

이렇게 볼 때, 朝鮮民主主義人民共和國에 대한 헝가리의 인정은 명백한 사실을 넘어서 어떠한 실재적인 ‘外交的 背景’도 갖지 않은 의례적인 政治行爲로 보일 것이다. 아니면, 거기에는 여전히 다른 어떤 것이 있는가? 현존하는 外交文書들은 거기에 어떤 ‘高度의 政治的인’ 함축이 있다는 것을 보여 준다.

이 점에 관해서 筆者는 1945年 以前에는 日本의 傘邦에 따라 헝가리와 北韓 사이에는 별다른 관계가 없었다는 것을 지적하고자 한다. 물론 제1차 세계대전 이전에 오스트리아-헝가리 王朝가 朝鮮과 헝가리 兩國 사이의 友好·通商·航海條約을 맺기는 했지만, 그것은 단지 象徵的인 것이었을 뿐 아무런 實際的인 意味를 지니지 않았다.²⁾ 韓國에 대한 우리의 이미지는 1945년 이후에조차도 確立되지 않았고 당시의 헝가리의 언론에서 韓國에 관한 보도는 거의 찾아볼 수 없었다. 黨 公式機關紙인 『자유 인민(Szabad Nép)』은 1948년 9월에 개최된 北韓의 最高人民會議를 거의 2주 후에 보도했고 더구나 조선민주주의인민공화국

의 구성에 관해서는 상당히 부정확하게 썼다.³⁾ 이 신문은 12월 25일자에 승리의 해인 1948년의 주요사건의 하나로써 5월 4일 북한에서 새로운 人民民主主義가 탄생한 것을 들고 있다(!).

『자유인민』지는 ‘헝가리는 독립된 朝鮮民主主義人民共和國을 승인한다’라는 기사에서 북한의 外相인 박헌영과 라즐로 라야크(Laszlo Rajk)간의 전보 교환, 헝가리 政府가 朝鮮民主主義人民共和國과 外交 및 經濟關係 樹立에 있어서의 共和國의 主權을 承認하기로 決定했다는 사실을 1948년 11월 12일에서야 보도했다.⁴⁾ 그렇지만, 後者의 主權에 대응한 조치들은 거의 일년 동안 취하지 않았던 것 같다. 모스크바 주재 헝가리 대사는 1949년 8월 29일, 中央政府의 指示에 따라 대사와 고문이 대리대사를 파견하겠다는 헝가리의 의사를 협의하기 위해서 북한대사를 처음으로 방문했다고 보고했다. 대사는 ‘北韓政府는 統一이 된 후에 모든 인민민주주의 국가와 外交關係를 樹立하려고 하고 있다’라고 말했다. 즉 그는 헝가리의 제안에 대한 排除的인 應答을 한 것이다. 헝가리 외교관이 보고했듯이, 대사의 발언은 ‘통일이 머지 않을 것이라는 확고한 信念을 담고 있으며’, 또한 ‘그가 말한 것은 統一 前까지는 北韓과 헝가리 사이에 外交關係가 없을 것이라는 말로 이해될 수 있다.’ 헝가리 外務省의 한 관리가 外交 화일에 기록했듯이, ‘그것은 北韓政府가 사실상의 政府라는 것을 意味하는 것이라기 보다는 미국이 인정한 한국 정부에 상관 없이 북한정부가 자신을 한반도에서 유일한 合法政府라고 자임하는 것이다.’ 결국, 그 문제는 9월 23일 外務省의 각서를 통해 결말을 보았는데, 거기에는 모스크바 駐在 (北韓)大使는 그의 政府가 兩國間의 外交關係의 樹立을 受諾하겠다고 發表했다. 그것의 唯一한 條件은 ‘外交關係가 大使 차원에서 이뤄져야 한다는 것이다’ 라는 내용이 기록돼 있다.⁵⁾

모스크바의 北韓大使가 이렇게 論亂의 여지가 있는 성명을 發表한 背景은 무엇이었는가? 그것은 統一에 關한 平壤의 宣傳的 立場에 있어 아직 經驗이 不足하거나 未熟한 狀態에 있었다는 것을 나타내는가? 일단 그것을 배제할 수는 없으나, 이는 北韓 대사가 일개월 후에 그의 政府를 代表해서 헝가리 政府의 提議에 감사한다는 성명을 발표한 것과 모순된다. 헝가리 外交官의 訪問을 대사가 예상 못했던 것은 아닌 듯하다. 따라서 그의 첫번째 應答(‘統一이 된 직후에’)은 ‘모든 人民民主主義國家와의 關係’라는 主要하고도 政治的인 事案에 關한 公式的인 立場을 반영할 수 있었을 뿐이다. 그렇다면, 平壤은 왜 그 立場을 바꿨을까?

우리는 그 理由를 어찌면 당시의 國際的인 狀況과 1949년 여름과 초가을 사이에 蘇聯의 關聯 對外政策에서 일어난 급격한 變化에서 찾을 수 있을런지 모른다. 간단히 말해서 美國과 西歐一般의 對外政策은 1949년 4월 4일의 NATO創立과 함께 새로운 局面에 들어섰다. 파리에 서 열린 4大強大國의 外相會談(1949년 5월 23일-6월 20일까지)에서 獨逸의 政治·經濟·行政上의 統一의 回復과 平和協定에 關한 蘇聯의 提案이 거부됐다. 실제로 西歐地域에서는 1949년 8월 초에 總選이 이루어졌으며 같은 해 9월 20일에는 獨逸聯邦共和國이 수립됐다. 그 結果 무력과 전략적인 安全을 強化하려는 노력들은 소련의 對外政策 概念과 實際의 齟齬가 됐다. 9월 25일에 소련에서 최초의 원자폭탄 폭발실험이 있었다고 발표됐다.

요컨대, 우리는 헝가리의 제의에 앞서서 평양에서는(또한 모스크바에서는?) 韓國의 統一에 關한 一定한 見解-強大國의 모종의 동의를 기초로 한(美蘇共同委員會가 1947년 초 한국에서 활동을 중단하고 韓國問題는 1948년 UN총회의 안건으로 상정됐지만)-가 成立될 수 있었다는 事實

을 排除할 수 없다. 두 개의 獨逸 政府가 樹立되고 國際的인 環境이 양극화 돼 감에 따라, 韓國의 統一도 實現 不可能한 것이 됐다.

어쨌든 헝가리와 북한의 外交關係는 相對的으로 일찍 樹立됐으나 公使次元에서만 이루어졌다. 초대 헝가리 公使는 1950년 4월 20일 평양에 자신의 신임장을 제출했고, 북한의 公使는 같은 해 6월 22일 부다페스트에 자신의 신임장을 제출했다.⁷⁾ 北韓이 要求한 大使次元의 外交關係는 1954년 2월 1일에 가서나 이루어진다.

II

1950년 6월 25일 예기치 못한 韓國戰이 발발했을 때, 헝가리는 미묘한 狀況에 처해 있었다. 1948년의 ‘變革의 해’ 이후에, 헝가리 勞動黨 指導部의 政治的 思考와 실치는 점차 왜곡돼 갔고 不當한 行政的인 措置들을 내림으로써 ‘계급투쟁을 침체화’하고 있었다. 社會·政治構造의 強力한 變革은 의심할 바 없는 여러 성과에도 불구하고 날조된 ‘스파이 혐의’, ‘사보타지’, ‘고발’, 國內의 긴장의 고조에 따른 ‘계급동맹’의 후퇴로 나타났다. 社會生活의 모든 과정에 전반적인 균열과 ‘적을 찾는 태도’가 파고들었다. 헝가리의 정치 지도자는 冷戰이라는 國際的인 분위기 속에서 이러한 모든 것을 제국주의 세력과 헝가리의 ‘제국주의 세력의 대리자들’의 탓으로 비난했다. 헝가리의 세계로부터의 孤立과 言論操作은 大衆이 現實的인 方向을 잡을 수 없게 만들었다(예를 들어, 이러한 정부정책의 결과 서구의 자료들을 구독하고 서구의 방송프로그램을 들으려는 경향이 나타났다).

이러한 狀況에서 政治指導者와 공식 이데올로기 및 宣傳의 擔當者들은 韓國戰爭과 같이 먼 地域에서 일어나는 사건들조차 그들의 國內 政治

와 일상적인 선전 선동 활동을 촉진시키는 기회로 삼는 데 급급했다. 그들은 한국전쟁을 고조되는 전쟁위협 의 증거로 보았고 대중선전에서 ‘帝國主義 敵의 모습’과 ‘제국주의를 격하시킬 필요’를 확증시켜주는 증거로 보았다(‘그들은 우리나라에서는 간첩과 사보타지를 통해서 그리고 한국에서는 군대를 통해 공격을 개시했다’). 指導部는 強制的인 經濟計劃과 軍事費의 增大(1950년 國家豫算의 20% 정도)에 기인한 生産과 消費의 긴장을 완화하기 위해서 한국전을 군비와 戰爭準備를 위한 본보기로 이용하려고 했다. 그들은 世界大戰의 當面한 可能性에 關한 蘇聯의 立場을 지지하면서(예컨대, 1949년 11월의 情報局의 결의를 보라), 소비를 더욱 축소하고 防衛力을 強化하기 위한 重工業에 대한 투자를 增大시켰다.⁸⁾ 韓國戰爭의 발발로 인해 大衆들은 戰爭의 威脅으로부터 道德·政治的으로 준비케 하고 그들을 동원하기 위한 1950년 가을의 公開的인 行爲에 名分이 設了(西部와 南部 國境은 실제로 ‘戰線’으로 간주됐는데, 그 곳은 障壁이 設置됐고 이동이 제한된 폐쇄 地域이었다). 사회는 점차 ‘균질화 됐고’, 일당국가의 정치적 구조는 과도하게 중앙집중화 됐다. 1950년 11월, 마타스 라코시(Matyas Rakosi), 에르노 게로(Erno Gero), 미할리 파르카스(Mihaly Farkas)는 적법한 국가나 당 기관의 인지 또는 承認 없이 國防委員會를 구성했다. ‘앞으로 2년 내에 모든 決定들은 委員會를 통해서 이루어지며, 委員會는 國家의 장래에 影響을 줄 정치, 경제, 군사, 그리고 다른 모든 문제들에 대해 아무런 制限 없이 全權을 행사한다.’⁹⁾ 1951년 2월, 당회의는 특히 重工業에 대한 投資를 중시하는 計劃案을 제기하기로 결정했다. 광범한 成果競爭體制가 지나치게 야심적인 計劃을 遂行하기 위해서 勞動者의 生産性을 獨려하려고 조직됐다. 1950년 여름부터 그러한 경쟁은 이른 바 ‘조선 週間’, ‘조선組’, ‘조선을 위한 10일 근무’ 등의 형태로 공장에서 조직되게 된

다.¹⁰⁾

요컨대 우리는 韓國戰爭과 그 解釋은 극히 단기간 내에 一黨 국가가 내세운 논의들로 완전히 '귀착'됐을 뿐만 아니라, 그것은 또한 국내적·경제적·군사적 對外 政策의 問題들에 관한 決定에 있어 주요한 요인이 되기도 했다는 結論을 내릴 수 있다. NATO와 FRG에 대해서 그러했던 것처럼 지도부는 조선의 사건들을 전쟁 위협의 증거로 이용했다. 전쟁 개시 후 2일 만에 시작된 연대운동도 대중과 社會全體를 動員하기 위해 의도된 것이었다. 물론 그것은 당 지도부들이 자신의 目的을 追求하기 위해서 시작되고, 조직되고, 통제됐지만, 이와 '대응하는' 대중의 행동들도 찾아볼 수 있는데, 그것은 다른 모습을 보였다.

輿論은 韓國戰에 몇 개 國家가 初期에 軍事的으로 介入한 것에 의해서도 影響을 받았다. 蘇聯과 中共의 直接的인 境界線에서 일어난 戰爭이 치열해지면서, NATO와 蘇聯 및 同盟國들 사이의 軍事的인 衝突 危險이 증대됐다.¹¹⁾ (물론 바르샤바조약은 1955년에서야 체결되긴 했지만, 알바니아를 제외한 東歐國家들은 蘇聯과의 相互 支援에 관한 쌍무 협정을 그 보다 앞서 맺었고, 韓國戰 직전인 1950년 2월에 중국과의 협정도 조인됐다.)

이 때문에, 韓國戰爭을 3次大戰의 序曲으로 파악하는 見解가 있었던 것이고, 헝가리 言論도 같은 우려를 표명했다. 더구나, 헝가리 대중의 반응은 불과 5년 전에 끝났고 인구의 8-10%가 사망한 第2次 世界大戰의 생생한 기억들에 의해 가장 커다란 影響을 받았다.¹²⁾ 第2次 世界大戰 以後에도 헝가리는 계속해서 서구 유럽보다 훨씬 오랜 기간인 7-8개월 동안 계속 전쟁 상태에 있었고 直接的인 軍事活動의 장이 됐다. 그러한 생생한 記憶들은 헝가리 대중들 사이에 공포를 불러일으켰고 人道主義的 援助에 나서게 했는데, 이것이 結果的으로 앞에서 이야

기한 政治指導者들의 立場 및 노력과 一致하게 됐던 것이다.

筆者는 韓國戰爭을 일어나게 하거나 그 背景이 된 軍事·政治的인 發展들에 관한 다른 理由들을 分析하는 것은 筆者의 義務가 아니라고 생각한다. 이러한 것들은 東歐國家들이 평양, 모스크바, 북경이 내세운 전쟁에 대한 解釋과 立場을 지지하고 쫓는 데 一致했다는 사실처럼 여러 문헌들을 통해 잘 알려진 사실이다. 따라서 헝가리의 公式的인 立場도 筆者가 앞서 이야기한 内外적 要因들에 의해 결정됐다. 이것은 우리가 알고 있는 外務省의 문서나 유사한 公式資料들이 韓國戰爭 발발 후에 공개된 것이 없다 해도 마찬가지이다.¹³⁾ 동시에 신문의 사실이나 논평이 헝가리의 입장을 설명했다.¹⁴⁾

1950년 6월 27일(화요일)에 가서야 헝가리의 신문들은 한국전의 발발을 보도했다(신문은 월요일에는 발행되지 않았다). 『자유인민』지는 제1, 2면에 걸쳐서 조선민주주의인민공화국의 軍에 대항하는 ‘메북’에 관해서 폭넓게 썼으며, 심지어 조선과 조선問題에 관한 상세한 解説을 지도를 곁들여 설명하기까지 했다. 그 때부터 신문들은 한결같이 北韓의 戰爭 報道를 基礎로 戰況을 論했고 두 달 동안 1, 2면에 걸쳐서 戰爭에 대한 國際的인 反應을 폭넓게 다뤘다.

III

헝가리에서의 北韓과의 연대운동은 7월 초에 시작됐으며(‘북한에 대한 간섭을 중단하라!’), 7월 15일에는 부다페스트에서 집회가 치루어지기도 했다. 『자유인민』지는 ‘부다페스트 市民들은 북한에 대한 美帝國主義者들의 폭력적인 攻撃에 抵抗하기 위해 대중 평화시위 행하다’라는 머릿기사를 쓰면서 그 사건에 대하여 1, 2면을 할애했다. 指導的인 文化 및

宗教人士, 그리고 대중들의 代表들이 集會에 參席했다. ‘헝가리의 노동자를 대표해서 우리는 우리의 연대의 상징으로서 그리고 自由를 위해 싸우는 朝鮮人民을 支援하기 위해서 朝鮮민주주의인민공화국에 의사와 간호원이 딸린 군사병원과, 의료기구, 의약품들을 보낼 것이다’라는 결의문을 採擇했다.¹⁵⁾ ‘우리는 평화를 수호한다’운동의 國民協會는 헝가리 人民에게 모두가 각자의 형편에 따라 病院設立基金에 성금할 것을 호소했다.¹⁶⁾ 신문들은 이 캠페인을 지원하기 위해 全國에서 열리는 임시 정치적·연대적 회의에 관해서 연일 보고하고 대규모 공장의 노동단체, 指導的 예술가·과학자·知識人들의 기부금에 관해서 특별히 言及했다.¹⁷⁾

전국에서 모금된 성금은 곧 1,280만 포린트를 넘어섰는데, 이것은 당시에는 상당한 액수였다.¹⁸⁾

7월 18일, 신문들은 北韓으로 떠날 예정인 의사와 간호원들과의 인터뷰 기사를 실었고 7월 26일에 거행된 환송식과 헝가리 의료진 및 장비를 적재하고 떠나는 열차를 보도했다. 헝가리 의사 제1진은 1950년 7월27일에 北韓에 도착해서 診療를 시작했다.

北韓과의 연대를 支援하기 위한 ‘생산운동’이 7월 하순에 헝가리에서 시작된다. 당시의 언론은 이 운동의 좋은 측면을 부각시켰다. 몇가지 예를 이용해보면, ‘북한의 사례는 생산전선에서 영웅적인 행동은 고무시킨다’, ‘철강산업의 스타하노프주의자들을 그들의 會議에서 새로운 規範을 실시키로 결정했다.’ ‘조선週間の 승리를 위하여’, ‘조선週間の 첫날에 生産의 超過達成이 이루어졌다’, ‘조선週間에 선전선동 작업의 경험’, ‘조선週間の 경험이 주물공장에서는 어떻게 활용되고 있는가’¹⁹⁾ 등이다. 화가이자 헝가리의 저명한 예술 및 文化人인 이반 초크(Istvan Csok)조차도 ‘조선週間이 우리모두가 공유해야 할 운동이다’라는 제목의 글을 8월 10일자 『자유인민』지에 발표했다.

그 뒤에도 헝가리 言論은 3年間의 戰爭의 事件들과 8월12일부터 『자유인민』지의 특파원이 定期的으로 보도해 온 停戰會談에 關係 상세하게 보도했다.²⁰⁾

戰爭 遂行을 위한 誠金과 의연품 등이 전쟁 내내 持續的으로 제공된다. 예를 들면 1950년 8월말에 ‘북한을 위한 위문품’이라고 쓰여진 5, 7.5, 10포린트 단위의 쿠폰 구매 캠페인을 준비했다. 약 100만개의 위문품이 이런 방식으로 팔려 특별일차편으로 북한에 보내졌다.²¹⁾ 그러한 행위가 그들에게는 여전히 政治的인 意味를 가졌다는 것은 이해할 만하다. 1952년 6월 (『자유인민』 6월 24일), 國家平和委員會의 호소에 반응하여 헝가리 인민군 제2 참모국은 모든 정치장교들에게 회람을 돌려 의연품 모집의 목적과 지침을 설명했다. 회람에서 강조된 내용을 보면, (1) 의연품은 強制的으로 募集할 수 없으며, (2) 금료를 받는 군인(직업군인)은 봉급의 3%를 공제하고, 사병이 2, 5, 10, 20 또는 50 포린트의 우표를 사야 했다. 政治局 副議長이 署名한 회람의 결론을 보면, ‘나는 정치장교들에게 모금을 成功的으로 遂行하라는 義務를 부과했다.’²²⁾고 밝혔다.

앞서 말한 平和委員會의 호소에 따라 월간 친선 캠페인이 1952년 7월 1일과 8월 1일 사이에 ‘조선전쟁 2주기를 기념하기 위해’란 기치아래 치루어졌다. 전국의 공장과 관공서에서 韓國戰에서 일한 적이 있는 의사들이 참가한 가운데 임시집회가 열렸다. 또 다른 의연품 모집 캠페인의 결과 3천 7백만 포린트가 모금됐다.²³⁾

전체적으로 言及할 수 있는 것은 3年間의 韓國戰爭 동안 헝가리 病院과 醫療陣의 활동 그리고 다양한 援助物資(醫藥品, 生必品, 食糧)들은 政治 指導部의 利益과 宣傳, 그리고 사회적 연대에 主眼點을 두고 있었다는 점이다.

헝가리 病院과 醫療陣은 1950年 7月末부터 1957年 6月까지 약 7年間 北韓에서 활동했다. 그 기간 동안 총 162名의 醫師, 看護員, 그리고 여타 醫療陣들이 그 곳에서 활동했다.²⁴⁾ 이 病院은 1950年과 1953年 사이에는 軍事病院으로 운영됐으며 停戰時까지의 활동은 헝가리 政府 보 건상이 提出한 보고서에 요약돼 있다.²⁵⁾

8월 10일, 남일 外相은 金日成을 대신하여 平壤의 외교망을 통하여 蘇聯, 루마니아, 헝가리, 체코슬로바키아, 폴란드 政府에 가능한 한 北韓 재건 기간 동안 醫師를 파견하고 病院을 계속 운영해 줄 것을 요청했다.²⁶⁾ 헝가리는 다른 나라와 마찬가지로 北韓의 要請을 받아들여 향후 4年 동안 病院의 운영과 유지를 위해 財政上(매년 國家豫算 중 6百萬 4千 포린트)의 지원을 했다.²⁶⁾ 病院運營 방식은 변화했다. 醫療陣은 地域病院으로 운영될 사리원으로 再配置됐다. 內科, 産婦人科, 肺結核科, 小兒科 醫師들도 또한 헝가리 外科 醫師팀과 결합했다. 病院의 診療는 많은 外來 患者의 治療를 통해서 이루어졌다.

헝가리 醫師들은 診療 외에도, 北韓의 同僚들과 함께 각 전문 분야 별로 醫學분야 年例會議를 개최했다(예컨대 1956年度の 주제는 結核鬪病 경험을 주제로 했다).²⁸⁾ 協會의 논문은 지역 醫療教育에 사용될 목적으로 朝鮮語로 출판됐다.²⁹⁾

北韓의 政治指導者들과 保健 當局은 헝가리 病院과 醫師, 그리고 그들의 專門 기술진들이 수행한 업적들을 높이 평가했다. 金日成, 外相 박헌영, 保健相 이병남은 몇 가지 事例를 강조했다. 一例로 保健相은 ‘이 病院에서 治療받은 患者들의 感謝便紙를 받은 우리 病院 측은 헝가리 醫師들의 任務遂行과 業績에 깊은 관심을 보낸다.’³⁰⁾라고 말한 바 있다. 헝가리 醫師들은 歸國한 뒤에도 北韓의 患者들로부터 이와 비슷한 여러 통의 便紙를 받았다. 軍事文書 보관소는 그 같은 便紙들 중

에서 부상당한 바 있던 양복윤이란 시인이 朝鮮語와 헝가리語로 쓴 ‘다정한 손길—어느 헝가리 醫師에게’³¹⁾라는 詩를 보관하고 있다. 朝鮮民主主義人民共和國 政府는 헝가리 醫師와 看護員 일부에게 그들의 노고에 대한 보답으로 最高勳章을 수여하기도 했다. 사리원 病院의 안뜰에는 기념비를 세워 그들의 헌신적인 業績을 기리고 있다.

마지막 헝가리 醫療陣에 대한 환송식에는 당시 수상인 김두봉이 參席했으며, 1500名 이상의 사람들이 역에서 헝가리 醫療陣을 환송했다.³²⁾

7年間 헝가리 病院과 醫療陣들을 운영하는 經費는 앞에서 言及한 國家 平和委員會가 募金한 義捐金과 國家豫算으로 充當됐다. 여기에 소요된 總經費는 1950年—1957年 사이에 6,750万 포린트에 달했다. 1950년 가을에 病院이 파괴되고 여러 차례 폭격을 받았음에도 불구하고, 헝가리人 犧牲者는 하나도 없었다.³⁴⁾ 헝가리 醫師, 특히 外科 醫師들은 歸國한 이후에 北韓에서의 경험을 분석했다. 예를 들어 월간지인 『軍醫月報』에는 1953—54年 사이에 “軍事 成形手術”이라는 일련의 논문이 발표됐다. 저자들은 序文에서 ‘...北韓에서는 모든 診療의 40%는 成形手術과 관련돼 있다. 일련의 논문들을 통해서 軍醫가 행한 경험들을 전달하고자 한다.’고 밝히고 있다.³⁵⁾

筆者는 당시 北韓의 기사나 『자유 인민』의 特派員의 주요 관심사였던 細菌武器의 사용에 관한 어떠한 醫學的 研究報告도 발견한 적이 없다. 그런데 2건의 보고서가 1952년 6월 2일 헝가리 人民軍 科學研究所에 제출됐다. 첫번째 보고서에서 著者(韓國戰爭에 전혀 참여한 적이 없는 軍醫 課長)는 北韓에서의 細菌武器使用의 經驗, 事例, 形態들을 요약하고 있으며, 두번째 보고서에서는 특수연구소를 설립하여 專門家들이 가능한 細菌戰에 대비케 할 것을 제안하고 있다 (제안에 대한 어떤 반응의 증거는 없다.)

IV

醫療上의 援助 외에 北韓에 대한 또 다른 지원 형태는 戰爭 과정 또는 前後에 발생한 孤兒들과 學生들을 받아들이는 것이었는데, 그 수가 정확한 통계는 아니지만 천여명에 이른다고 한다. 學生들은 醫科大學, 工大(建築, 電氣, 化學, 農業), 그리고 人文大에서 공부했다. 헝가리와 北韓人 教師들로 구성된 특수학교 2個校와, 專門大學 1個校가 戰爭 孤兒들에 대한 初等教育和 中等教育을 위해 문을 열었다(이 두 學校의 校名은 金日成과 박정애의 이름을 땄다). 北韓의 젊은이들은 헝가리인들 사이에 人氣가 있었으며, 실제로 여러 헝가리 가족들은 北韓의 孤兒들을 扶養하기를 원했지만 허용되지 않았다. 불행하게도 外國에서의 연구 활동과 北韓學生들의 滯留는 평양정권의 정치적 태도에 크게 좌우됐다. 1956년 헝가리 사태 이후에 모든 학생들은 朝鮮民主主義人民共和國으로 소환됐으며, 단지 몇명의 졸업생만이 1958-59년 사이에 그들의 연구를 마치도록 허락받았을 뿐이다.³⁷⁾ 비록 날로 달라지는 헝가리와 北韓의 도덕적 상황이 헝가리에서 연구하고 있던 北韓學生들에게 兩國 사이의 協力에 보다 더 能動的으로 공헌할 수 없게 만들었지만 그들은 文化 분야 등에서 적극적인 역할을 했다. 그들의 도움으로 여러 편의 조선 古典들이 헝가리에서 出版됐고, 헝가리-朝鮮語 辭典 또한 1950년대 말에 出刊됐다.

헝가리 文教省의 자료에 따르면, 헝가리는 1951-55년 사이에 총 지출 3천 7백 8십만 포린트에 상당하는 研究獎學金을 지급하여 總 601名の 北韓 學生들을 받아들였다. 같은 기간에 2개의 특수학교와 專門大學의 건설과 維持費로 1천 8백 6십만 포린트가 소요됐다.³⁸⁾

經濟援助로서 헝가리 政府는 1952年 7月 5日 北韓에 1천 5백만 舊

루블에 상당하는 借款을 대여했으며, 1959年 6월에 債務를 淸소했다. 東유럽 국가들과 함께 北韓의 戰後復舊作業에 참여하면서 헝가리 政府는 1952年 8月 5일에 ‘朝鮮 人民에게 보답하는 友好 援助’라는 결의안을 통과시켰다. 그에 기초하여 두 나라 政府는 9月 7日 經濟와 技術協調에 관한 협정에 署名했다. 이 협정에서 헝가리는 1954年 1천 5백만 舊 루블 상당액의 다양한 기술과 설비(기차엔진, 광업설비, 기계도구 등) 및 의약품을 원조형태로 전달했고, 1955~56년 사이에 1천만 舊루블 상당의 투자상품을 보냈다.³⁹⁾

이에 더하여 헝가리는 1953년 9월 7일에 조인된 同協定에 따라 무상으로 3개의 工場建設에 着手했다. 우리는 1959년 평양에 대규모 製造工場을, 그리고 1960년 구성에 기계공장과 봉은에 페인트 공장을 각각 建立했다. 이 공장들의 총 建立費用은 1953년 환산으로 약 7천만-8천 5백만 舊 루블이었다.⁴⁰⁾ 技術協調 分野로서는 32명의 헝가리 建築家와 技術者들이 平壤의 建築設計 作業에 參與했고, 다른 4명의 專門家들은 1954-55년에 낙원에 있는 광산설비공장에서 일했다.

마지막으로, 1956년 6월 20일에 두 정부 사이에 체결된 協定에 따라 헝가리는 北韓에 基本的인 生必需品의 구입을 위해 長期 貸與金으로 7백 5십만 舊 루블과 무상원조금으로 7백 5십만 舊 루블을 제공했다.⁴¹⁾ 동시에 두 나라는 그 해부터 비교적 소량이지만 매년 무역과 지출 의정서에 기초하여 교역하기 시작했다.

V

結論적으로 헝가리(그리고 다른 동구국가들, 소련과 중국)에 의해 戰爭中과 戰後 복구작업 기간 동안에 북한에 제공된 원조액의 規模가 일

마인지를 正確하게 말한다는 것은 어렵다. 그 같은 分析과 評價는 精確한 統計資料의 미비, 또는 상호 모순되는 지표들, 關聯國의 公式資料의 결여 때문에 점점 어렵게 됐다. 심지어는 북한의 指標들과 다른 나라의 指標 사이의 편차가 발견되기도 한다. 이 같은 모든 점들을 고려해볼 때, 債務의 淸소를 포함한 북한에 대한 헝가리의 원조액은 1억 8천만 舊 루블(新 루블로는 약 4천만)로 추산된다.⁴²⁾ 이것 또한 精確하게 산정하기 어렵다. 왜냐하면, 당시의 다양한 기구들, 사회 및 大衆 組織들과 地域 共同體들은 政治思想과 實踐에 따라 多樣한 援助 供給과 앞서 말한 원조 형태들(예를 들면, 文教省의 學校設立, 外務省의 자동차 제공 등)을 提供했는데,⁴³⁾ 이같은 援助供給은 中央援助基金에 포함돼 있지 않기 때문이다. 상론할 필요 없이 필자는 북한에 대한 蘇聯, 中國과 東歐國家들의 원조, 무상융자, 채무 淸소, 그리고 다른 직접·간접의 보조액은 軍事的인 것(여기에 헝가리는 포함되지 않았다)을 포함하여 45억에서 50억 新 루블이라고 추정한다. 평양의 자료는 5억 루블로 평가하고 있다.

이미 言及했듯이 헝가리의 政治指導者들은 韓國戰의 問題를 國內 政治 問題로 取扱하여 그것을 國內의 政治的 方便으로 이용했다. 신문과 방송은 3년 동안 전쟁의 國際的 影響과 軍事的 事件들로 가득 찼다. 동시에 韓國戰과 관련된 국제연대운동 또한 몇몇의 걸출한 지식인들을 포함하여 헝가리에 활동영역을 넓혀 주었다.

休戰協定은 ‘平和政策의 거대한 勝利’로 헝가리 言論과 국민들에게 환영받았다. 『자유 인민』지는 社說에서 ‘한국전은 단지 한국만의 문제가 아니라 국제정치적의 초미의 문제였다. 결국 한국의 휴전협정은 한국에게만 국한되는 것은 아니었다.’⁴⁵⁾라고 지적했다. 수상 나기(Imre Nagy)도 휴전협정에 관한 電文에서 김일성과 모택동을 치하했다.

民族的 悲劇을 넘어 韓國戰爭은 冷戰의 가장 치열한 葛藤과 敵對의 象徴이었다. 오늘날 40年前을 되돌아 볼 때, 그것은 새로운 세대에게 많은 歷史的 教訓을 줄 수 있다. 그리고 韓國戰爭에 앞선 國際的 狀況과 특히 獨逸 問題의 進行이 분명히 그 이후의 韓國상황에 영향을 주었듯이, 우리는 같은 근거로서 自問해 볼 수 있다. 現在의 獨逸의 狀況과 韓國의 狀況에 있어 獨逸 再統合의 影響은 무엇이며, 그리고 그것이 分斷을 해소할 수 있는가? 헝가리를 포함한 동구 국가들이 南韓을 외교적으로 새로운 國際的 實體로서 인정하고 外交關係를 회복하는 것이 韓國 統一을 촉진하는 데 어떠한 역할을 할 수 있을 것인가? 필자는 1990년대가 이 두 問題에 대해 答을 줄 수 있을 것이라고 믿는다.

〈註〉

- 1) In, "A magyar népi demokrácia története 1944-1962"(헝가리 인민민주주의 史 1944-1962), Budapest, 1978, p.387.
Istvan Kende : "Forr ó béke-hideg háboru"(뜨거운 평화-냉전), Budapest, 1970, p.102.
Sándor Balogh : "Magyarország külpolitikája 1945-1950"(헝가리의 대외정책), Budapest, 1988, p.269.
- 2) Károly Fendler, "One Hundred Years of Hungarian-Korean Relations", *Korea Journal*, Vol. 30, No.3, March, 1990.
- 3) *Szabad Nép*(자유 인민), 21, 22, September 1948.
- 4) *ibid.*
- 5) *New Hungarian Central Archives* (NHCA), Korea XIX-J-1-j, Box 3, File 4/h, 580/49 (Moscow 27/sz.b.), 717/49 (Moscow 31/sz. b.)
- 6) "A magyar népi demokrácia története 1944-1962", p.145, István Kende : quoted, pp.178-179.
- 7) 그 때까지는 朝鮮民主主義人民共和國과 關係를 確立하는 問題에 관한 체코슬로바키아나 폴란드와 같은 다른 東歐國家들의 條件과 經驗들은 아직 알려지지 않았다.
- 8) "A magyar népi demokrácia története 1944-1962", p.176.
- 9) *ibid.*, p.169.
- 10) *ibid.*, p.177.
- 11) Sándor Balogh : "Magyarország külpolitikája 1945-1950", Budapest, 1988, p.339.
- 12) Mihály Korom : "A magyar népi demokrácia első évei 1944-1948" (헝가리 인민 외교의 초기 역사), *Valóság*, No.3, 1984, pp.3-4 and Tamás Stark : "Magyarország II. világháborús embervesztése" (제2차 세계대전 중의 헝가리의 사망자), Budapest, 1989, p.80.
- 13) 1950년 7월 15일, 부다페스트 駐在 美國大使는 헝가리 외상에게 UN 안전保障會議의 決議와 關聯하여 미 대통령은 한국 해안의 봉쇄를 명했다는 정보를 통지했다. 헝가리 외상은 답신에서 헝가리 人民共和國은 안전保障會議의 決議는 不當한 것으로 간주하며 미국에 의한 공공연한 무

- 력 공격은 한국인민의 내부 문제에 침략적인 간섭을 의미한다는 것을 지적했다.
- 14) 예: "Imperialist provocation in Korea" (Szabad Nép, 30 June 1950)
; "We support the Korean people in their fight for freedom" (*ibid.*, 18 July); "Spirited sympathy with Korea(*ibid.*, 28 July), 등. 공식적인立場과言論 및宣傳은 다음과 같은 일련의 소련 간행물을 통해서도 지지를 받았다. "International Issues" of the Party's Publisher "Szikra": "Korea"(No.11), "The Soviet Union and the Korean Issue"(No. 30), "The Soviet Union and the US intervention in Korea" Documents(No.41).
- 15) *Szabad Nép*, 16 July 1950.
- 16) *ibid.*, 18 July.
- 17) *ibid.*, 21 July. 예: "國家安全當局의 임무는 지금까지 454,604포인트에 달하는 기부금을 전달했다...使節團의 代表는...財政的인 支援 외에도 그들은 조선에서의 帝國主義의 도발에 대한 對應으로서 全力을 나하여 國家의 모든 적들에 대한, 帝國主義의 代行者들에 대한 鬭爭을 계속할 것이라고 밝혔다." 이러한 뉴스 기사들은 당시의 지배적인 정치 분위기와 내부의 국내 정치적인 노력들을 상당히 진실하게 반영한 것으로 보인다.
- 18) *ibid.*, 28 July.
- 19) *ibid.*, 28 July, 8, 16 and 18 August, etc.
- 20) 티버 메레이(Tibor Méray)의 활동들은 한국의 지도자들에게 긍정적으로 평가받았다. : "...의상...그리고 분화 및 선전장관은 메레이 동지가 훌륭한 공산주의자로서 확고한 노선과 그의 업무를 수행하고 있다고 생각했다." NHCA, XIXJ-1-j Korea, Box 7, 00858/1952.
- 21) *Szabad Nép*, 24 August, 14 and 16 September 1950.
- 22) *Military History Archives* (MHA), Dept. 2 of the General Staff of the Hungarian People's Army, V. 1952/T. 111/1., foil 112, 04922/pol.Fcsf./1952.
- 23) NCHA, XIX-J-1-j Korea, Box 8, File 11/f, 001132/1952.
- 24) MHA, VII.205. Pgy. Ko.1-11, 32.File k/1, 총 명단 수록.
- 25) NHCA, XIX-J-1-j Korea, Box 9, File 13/g 00292/2/1954.
- 26) *ibid.*, 001637/1953.

- 27) *ibid.*, 0091/3/1954.
- 28) NHCA, XIX-J-1-j, Korea, Box 3, File 4/bc, 004431/1/1/1957.
- 29) MHA, VII.205, Pgy Ko.1-11, 32 k/7, see Attachment 3.
- 30) NHCA, XIX-J-1-j, Korea Box 7, File 5/h, 001970/1951.
- 31) MHA, *ibid.*, K/10, see Attachment 4.
- 32) NHCA, XIX-J-1-j, Korea Box 9, File 13/g, 001362/4/1957.
- 33) *ibid.*, 00292/2/1954 and 001362/3/1957, see Attachments 1 and 2.
- 34) 박현영은 UN사무총장과 안전보장회의 의장에게 보내는 電文에서 헝가리의 의사들도 진료하고 있는 천화 마을의 병원에 대한 폭격에 대해서 항의했다. *Ibid.*, Box 8, File 11/f, 00156/1950.
- 35) Katonaorvosi Szemle, Vols V-VI, 1953, 1954, Dr János Zoltán-Dr Jozsef Galambos, June 1953, p.540 and Dr György János: "Adalékok a lőtt sérüléssel eredetű idült csontvelőgyulladások kezeléséhez" (Additions to the treatment of chronic osteomyelitis resulting from shot wounds), *ibid.*, Vol. VI, September 1954, pp.892-908.
- 36) MHA, Military Supply Services of the HPA, Dept. of Health, 1952/T, 229/4, File 54.
- 37) 미확인된 정보에 따르면, 몇몇 북한의 학생들이 그들의 '군사적인 경험'을 갖고 봉기에서 헝가리의 청년들을 도왔다고 한다. See: Peter Gosztonyi: "Feltámadott a tenger...1956. A magyar október története"(그리고 노도가 일어났다...1956년. 헝가리의 10월의 역사), Budapest, 1989, p.172.
- 38) NHCA, XIX-J-1-j, Korea, Box 10, File 17/d, 003607/2/1955 and O.M. 8462-B. 8/1955.
- 39) *ibid.*, Box 3, File 4.1ba, 008011/1955.
- 40) *ibid.*, Box 12, File 25/j, 001776/1953.
- 41) *ibid.*, Box 11, File 25/c, 00369/1959.
- 42) 1960년 소련의 화폐개혁에 따라, 국제거래에 있어 루블의 교환은 4.4대 1로 이루어졌다.
- 43) *ibid.*, Box 10, File 25/c, 001858/1952.
- 44) 로동신문, 1963년 4월 23일.
- 45) *Szabad Nép*, 28 July 1953.
- 46) *ibid.*, 29 July and 1 August.

제 3 회 의
SESSION III

한국전쟁에 있어서의 미국의 정책결정
U.S. DECISION-MAKING IN THE KOREAN WAR

THE SECOND INTERNATIONAL
CONFERENCE ON THE KOREAN WAR
JUNE 14~15, 1990
SEOUL, KOREA

**General of the Army Douglas MacArthur :
The China Issue, Policy Conflict, and the Korean War**

Michael Schaller (University of Arizona)

Now it is not good for the Christian's health to hustle the Aryan brown, for the Christian riles, and the Aryan smiles and he weareth the Christian down; And the end of the fight is a tombstone white with the name of the late deceased, And the epitaph drear: "A Fool lies here who tried to hustle the East" (Rudyard Kipling, "Chapter Headings: The Naulakha")

Two weeks after the Korean War began, Time magazine lamented the "dizzily swift descent from the triumph of V-J Day to the desperation" experienced by American units in the face of the North Korean assault. While "ruthless Communist tyrants" had enslaved millions of people, "lazy minded" diplomats had provided a "false sense of security" by suggesting that "Asian Communists were not really Communists."

Only General Douglas MacArthur, "whose job it was to police the boundaries of chaos in Asia, was not fooled." He had "never for one minute" believed the "U.S. secure in the face of the Red Advance." He had tried to alert his countrymen to the impending disaster but was "largely ignored" as "too political." Having turned its back on its most qualified expert, Time's staff concluded, America had squandered victory in the Pacific.¹⁾

On July 31, 1950, MacArthur, by now U.S. and United Nations theater commander, flew to Taiwan to confer with Generalissimo Chiang Jieshi, still a pariah to the Truman administration. At the time, public controversy swirled over whether MacArthur had received permission or exceeded his authority by visiting the

island. The American military attache in Taipei, Col. David Barrett, found this dispute unremarkable compared to the scene he observed upon MacArthur's arrival. The general strode toward the greeting party, embraced his assumed host and, in a loud voice declared: "My dear Generalissimo, I have waited so long to meet you." An awkward silence followed as Vice-President Ch'en Ch'eng eased away the American's grasp.²⁾

Had MacArthur not spent a lifetime going to extraordinary lengths to publicize himself as America's greatest expert on Asia, and were he not among Chiang's most vocal advocates, one might dismiss this as a mere faux pas. But his confusion revealed much about his isolation from the realities of contemporary Asia.

Born into an army family and shaped by the values of that institution, Douglas MacArthur searched his entire life for the personal and professional recognition that the military never seemed able to provide. He yearned for the power to shape, not merely implement, national policy. The higher he rose in rank, the more frustrated he became with the constraints imposed by the traditions of civilian supremacy and the complexities of war and diplomacy. Each promotion left him under the control of some higher military or civil authority whom he resented and against whom he felt compelled to rebel. Even as army chief of staff, the Depression and FDR's New Deal mocked the Republican orthodoxy and military tradition he championed.

Although he never said so, MacArthur found only two effective outlets for his repressed ambitions. Service abroad,

especially in Asia, provided release from the constraints and supervision of stateside posts. Also, by the 1930s, he dreamed of a political career leading to the White House. As president, he would control the levers of power that had impeded the fortunes of his father and himself. In 1944 and, especially, in 1948, the general sought the Republican presidential nomination. By 1950 he nursed political grievances more than serious ambitions. Still, he was determined never again to allow his own interests or command to be subordinated to national strategy as during the Pacific War and later period of the Japanese Occupation.

Since his first important commands in the Philippines during the 1920s, he discovered that service in Asia provided exceptional freedom to prove his abilities. MacArthur utilized his successive commands in the Philippines, Southwest Pacific, Japan and Korea as part of his struggle to achieve political power in the United States.

In Asia, few other great American generals shared the limelight, allies were too weak to complicate planning, and Washington provided relatively little direct oversight. He thrived in an environment where few policymakers felt the confidence to second guess his actions.

A ceaseless promoter of the idea that he possessed a unique knowledge of "oriental psychology," the general functioned as a sort of American proconsul for sixteen years. To much of the public, he personified the American experience in midcentury Asia. As an early biography observed, "he was an American prophet

honored at home largely because of the lavish ways in which he was honored abroad."

The drama and nostalgia still evoked by MacArthur's name obscure many ironies of his life. Six months before the Pearl Harbor attack, he lived as a frustrated expatriate in Manila. Following his December 1937 retirement from the U.S. Army, his defense program for the Philippines had withered to the point where he became the butt of cruel jokes by both American and Philippine leaders. Only Japan's southward thrust, and Washington's need to throw something into the breach, revived his moribund career.

Recalled to active duty in July 1941, MacArthur lived in a fantasy world, woefully misjudging Japanese strength and intentions. As late as December 1941 he insisted the Japanese would not attack before mid-1942 and that he could defeat the enemy "with one hand tied behind his back." Admiral Thomas Hart, Asiatic Fleet Commander in Manila, concluded that MacArthur was "was no longer altogether sane" and "may not have been so for a long time."³⁾

MacArthur's defense plans for the Philippines proved worthless. He infuriated President Roosevelt and the War Department leadership through his hysterical demands for aid impossible to deliver, his alternating predictions of victory and defeat, his backing of a plan for a separate peace with Japan and, finally, his acceptance of a \$500,000 private, illegal payment by Philippine President Manuel Quezon.⁴⁾

Nevertheless, early in 1942, a "MacArthur craze" swept the U.S. This reflected the drama of the siege, MacArthur's dramatic press releases, and the fact that his troops maintained, if only briefly, the one point of resistance early in 1942 against the Japanese advance. The anti-New Deal press, led by William Randolph Heart, Roy Howard, Colonel Robert McCormick and Henry Luce, considered MacArthur an ideal weapon to use against Roosevelt's "Europe First" strategy as well as his domestic reform program. As cities and towns renamed bridges, parks and roads in honor of the general, Republican members of Congress demanded that FDR appoint MacArthur commander of the Pacific War, if not all U.S. forces.

Roosevelt relented by ordering MacArthur to Australia and appointed him to lead the Southwest Pacific Theater, envisioned as a minor complement to the larger Naval effort in the Central Pacific. Against the advice of most of the War Department, Roosevelt and General George C. Marshall awarded MacArthur a Congressional Medal of Honor. Privately, they justified the award as having "morale value" to the public and useful in heading off the Republican stampede to give MacArthur more resources. As FDR put it, giving MacArthur a medal rather than court martialing him for his "criminal" failures in the Philippines was an act of expedience and "pure yielding to Congressional pressure and public opinion." Nevertheless, by 1942 many Americans had come to believe in the heroic "MacArthur legend" which limited the freedom of action of both FDR and Harry Truman. As one war

correspondent observed, it hardly mattered what happened on the real battlefield, since "MacArthur talked the greatest war ever fought."⁵⁾

In an "off the record" session with journalists in November 1944, during the battle to retake the Philippines, MacArthur railed that wartime aid to China was "absolutely useless." He even questioned the importance of defeating Hitler. Instead, all effort should be devoted to his Southwest Pacific Theater. He complained of "treason and sabotage" by FDR and the Joint Chiefs. No American leader beside himself understood that:

the history of the world will be written in the Pacific for the next ten thousand years...we made the same old mistake of intervening in European quarrels we can't hope to solve cause they are insoluble...Europe is a dying system. It is worn out and run down, and will become an economic industrial hegemony of Soviet Russia...The lands touching the Pacific with their billions of inhabitants will determine the course of history...for the next ten thousand years.

Journalists loved this kind of rhetoric and conceded to MacArthur the role of sage and Asia expert.⁶⁾

The public mythology surrounding MacArthur remained a powerful force in the aftermath of Japan's defeat. In August 1945, as Harry Truman weighed whether to appoint MacArthur Occupation commander in Japan, a move demanded by the Republican press and bloc in Congress, the new president lamented his

options. He told Harold Ickes it was not fair to "blame on him the appointment of MacArthur as the chief commander in the Far Eastern Area." The Interior Secretary admitted that, politically, the president "couldn't do anything else." The blame was "due to Roosevelt" who made a terrible "mistake in taking MacArthur away from the Philippines." He should have left the general "to clean up his own mess and taken Wainwright out," allowing the Japanese to solve the MacArthur problem. The two men complained that while most Americans considered MacArthur a "hero" and sage of the Orient, he was a military fraud. Yet, Ickes admitted, denying MacArthur command in Tokyo would only "make a martyr out of him and a candidate for president." Truman disputed only one point: "MacArthur would probably be a candidate anyway."⁷⁾

In spite of his fame, by most measures, MacArthur failed in each of his successive Asian/Pacific commands - the Philippines, Southwest Pacific Theater, Occupied Japan, and Korea. In each, critical lapses in his military skill, political judgement and knowledge of Asia proved disastrous. Through all of these events, despite boasts of his expertise, Asia served mainly as a platform for a relentless effort to impress Americans with his capacity to lead the United States. As MacArthur admitted to an aide in 1948 who urged him to return to America to campaign for the Republican nomination: As long as I remain "out here...I have a certain mysticism." As soon as I return home, I become just another "political target."⁸⁾

MacArthur's emergence as a "cold warrior" in Asia, especially his antipathy towards China and support for Taiwan, as well as his concern with Korea, largely followed his loss of influence in Tokyo following the 1948 U.S. presidential election.

Yet, for all MacArthur's rhetoric about the "great events of the next ten thousand years" transpiring in Asia, he seldom commented on Asian events outside areas under his direct control, or those areas he hoped to control.

MacArthur blamed most problems of postwar Asia on the Truman administration's alleged coddling of Chinese Communism. He emerged as the most persistent advocate of military action against the People's Republic of China. As with most issues, MacArthur personalized complicated policy questions. For example, he attributed the Communists' postwar success in China to the appointment of George C. Marshall, an old rival, as mediator in the civil war. In July 1946, MacArthur told Navy Secretary James Forrestal that while Chiang Kai-shek and his government "might not be the best in the world," they "were on our side and should be supported." He accused State Department China specialists of "disloyalty" for exposing Kuomintang corruption. A few months later, MacArthur charged that Marshall sought a temporary truce in China only to win a place on the ticket "with Truman in the next [presidential] campaign."⁹⁾

During his pursuit of the presidential nomination in 1947-48, MacArthur pandered to Congressional Republicans who demanded aid for China as their price for supporting the Marshall Plan. In

March 1948, at a crucial juncture in debate on the Marshall Plan, and on the eve of the critical Wisconsin primary, the Occupation Commander sent a statement to Congressman Charles Eaton, of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, endorsing military aid to China. He described Nationalist China as the "fundamental keystone to the Pacific Arch." The Truman administration ignored the "global picture" and thought only about Western Europe. MacArthur proposed an "integrated solution" to the cold war, starting with the suppression of Chinese Communism.¹⁰⁾

On the eve of the 1948 presidential election, when it appeared Truman would lose, several Republican politicians approached MacArthur about his becoming a special "military adviser to Chiang Kai-shek." He "would not be averse to adding this responsibility to his present one in Japan," MacArthur responded. He spoke of a plan to drive the Chinese Communists from Manchuria which he "could accomplish ... in six months by air action with a force of 1000 suitable aircraft." He also suggested he should occupy and administer Northeast China as a "trustee" for the Nationalists and, thereby, safeguard all Asia from communism. Truman's victory precluded these possibilities.¹¹⁾

When the Nationalist regime fled China during 1949, MacArthur conceived of Taiwan as a critical outpost from which to halt and then roll back Communist forces on the Asian mainland. MacArthur's commitment to the defense of Taiwan and the rollback of Chinese Communism stemmed from several sources, including his belief that the Soviets had targeted Asia for their main

offensive against the West. Equally important, the general's policy and pronouncements made him the hero of the so-called China Bloc in Congress, a diffuse group of (mainly) Republican legislators whom he saw as key political supporters.

Also, by 1949-50, MacArthur's service as Occupation commander in Tokyo had reached the point of diminishing returns. Seemingly endless squabbles between the State and Defense Departments (over rearmament and post-occupation bases) had blocked a peace settlement with Japan. If, by some miracle, the two agencies did agree on treaty terms, MacArthur dreaded the possibility of the Occupation ending without his first securing a new high profile assignment in Asia. He believed that a confrontation with China, or a commitment to Taiwan, would submerge State and Defense department objections to a Japan treaty while assuring a major new command for himself.

During 1949, President Truman, the State Department, Joint Chiefs and MacArthur all debated whether to extend U.S. protection to Taiwan. While all agreed that Communist control of the island would give China and the Soviet Union greater control of the sea lanes between Japan and Southeast Asia, neither civilian policymakers nor the Joint Chiefs of Staff favored a U.S. defense commitment to the Nationalist-held island. MacArthur, in contrast, insisted that "if Formosa went to the Chinese Communists our whole defensive position in the Far East was definitely lost." Eventually, it would push "our defensive line back to the West Coast of the continental United States."

Informing the Joint Chiefs that "By hook or by crook, we must keep Taiwan out of Communist hands," during 1949 MacArthur proposed several schemes to protect the island. These included putting Taiwan island under American "trusteeship," under the control of some other "safe nation," or even returning it to the Japanese - which, for the moment at least, meant himself.¹²⁾

MacArthur also endorsed a proposal made by Claire Chennault, the WWII flying ace, military adviser to Chiang and co-owner of Civil Air Transport, that Washington create a five-hundred plane air force piloted by American volunteers, and a small navy, to protect Taiwan and "blockade and destroy China's coastal cities." Late in 1949 the Central Intelligence Agency discovered that MacArthur permitted some Japanese aviators to travel to Taiwan to assist the KMT air force. Rumors circulated in Taiwan that MacArthur had a secret plan to "thwart a communist takeover" of the island. MacArthur and his top staff fed these rumors by meeting frequently with such American "entrepreneurs" and soldiers of fortune as Claire Chennault, former OSS head William Donovan, Preston Goodfellow and William Pawley who sold arms to the Nationalists and served as an informal link between Taiwan and Pentagon officials.¹³⁾

In December 1949, MacArthur told Army Undersecretary Tracy Voorhees, then visiting Tokyo, that a communist takeover of Taiwan would prove a "fatal" blow to American security in the Pacific. Even "Japan in enemy hands" would not be so dangerous. MacArthur recommended that Truman declare the island "neutral"

territory, forbidding attacks upon it by the Communists or from it by the Nationalists. This would secure the area without actually committing American forces. Later, the United States could sponsor an "independent" Chinese regime on Formosa.¹⁴⁾

Fortunately for MacArthur, the rapid deterioration of relations with China early in 1950 created a new opportunity for his program. In January, the Communists seized American consular property in Peking, provoking a withdrawal of all American diplomats. In February, Senator Joe McCarthy launched a spectacular verbal barrage against alleged Communist influence in the State Department. That month the signing of a Sino-Soviet Friendship Treaty undermined predictions of an early split. These developments eroded the influence of "moderates" within the State Department and helped carry the day for MacArthur and other "hardliners."

During the spring of 1950, Truman authorized resumption of small scale arms sales to Taiwan while a shadowy network of "private" activists, including Claire Chennault, Preston Goodfellow and William Donovan funneled additional American weapons to the Nationalists. Donovan coordinated an effort to gain possession of a fleet of Chinese government aircraft in Hong Kong which the Nationalists claimed to have sold to Chennault but which Beijing insisted remained Chinese government property.

Donovan conferred in Tokyo with MacArthur and SCAP intelligence chief, General Charles Willoughby, regarding his plans to establish spy networks in China and assist anti-

communist guerrillas on the mainland. Both men encouraged the idea and promised unspecified support.¹⁵⁾

Preston Goodfellow, an American close to Syngman Rhee as well as to MacArthur, shuttled between Seoul, Tokyo and Taipei during early 1950. He spoke of organizing a "foreign legion" of Chinese Nationalist and Korean troops to undertake operations against north Korea and China. In January and again in March, Goodfellow informed Taiwan's ambassador in Washington, Wellington Koo, of MacArthur's "sympathetic ...reaction to carrying out an underground activities program on the mainland." Willoughby and others on the SCAP staff proposed channeling funds for these activities through Tokyo to circumvent the administration's "deep rooted objection" to providing direct assistance to a Taiwan still controlled by Jiang.¹⁶⁾

MacArthur's efforts were abetted by a change in administration policies. As diplomats Dean Rusk and John Foster Dulles to played a more active role in setting China and Japan policy, the State Department took a more sympathetic line toward Taiwan and a tougher attitude toward Beijing. Rusk and Dulles advocated "covert action in support of resistance on Formosa" and moves to "draw the line in Asia" by defending Taiwan, increasing aid to Southeast Asia and Korea and pushing through a Japanese settlement. The State Department proposed to Truman the possibility of arranging Jiang's "retirement," protecting Taiwan through dispatch of the Seventh Fleet, and increasing military assistance to the Philippines, Indochina and Korea.¹⁷⁾

Evidence suggests that in May 1950 MacArthur, retired Admiral Charles Cooke (then an adviser to Jiang) and Nationalist General Ho Shi-chi (a member of the Allied Council for Japan in Tokyo) discussed a military pact linking Taiwan and South Korea. Ho later told Wellington Koo that MacArthur wanted Chiang to deploy several thousand Nationalist soldiers in South Korea to deter or beat back an anticipated northern invasion. However, Chiang's exorbitant demands for payment delayed a decision and "discussions were still going on when the war in Korea actually broke out."¹⁸⁾

Koo discussed with Defense Department officials and Dulles a plan for MacArthur to send weapons, planes and pilots from Japan to Taiwan "without necessarily obtaining the formal approval of Washington." The ambassador revealed that some aid had already come through this "back channel" and that MacArthur and Willoughby were working with Cooke, Chennault, Goodfellow and Donovan to set up an intelligence net in China and supply weapons to Taiwan and anti-communist guerrillas on the mainland. The outbreak of fighting in Korea elevated MacArthur's influence - and opportunity for conflict with the administration - to new heights.¹⁹⁾

THE IMPACT OF THE KOREAN WAR

Historians assessing MacArthur's role in the Korean War have, I would argue, missed a critical aspect of his behavior.

Much attention has been spent weighing the pros and cons of his battlefield strategy, contrasting it to the "limited war" favored by the Truman administration, and examining the mounting confrontation between the general and president which led, in April 1951, to MacArthur's recall. While these and other questions deserve careful scrutiny, scholars have tended to overlook or misconstrue his not so secret agenda to fight China.

Nearly as soon as fighting in Korea erupted, MacArthur alluded to his desire to widen the conflict into a crusade against China and communism. A strategy of carrying the war into China underlay his determination to liberate North Korea. It's origins long antedated the devastating Chinese intervention of November 1950, and its implications went far beyond the geographical and political concept of limited war.

In July 1950, before U.N. forces had taken the initiative in Korea, Generals J. Lawton Collins and Hoyt Vandenberg conferred with MacArthur in Tokyo. Collins recalled that MacArthur's plea for reinforcements "gave me the impression of addressing not just his immediate listeners, but a larger, audience, unseen." He told Generals Collins and Vandenberg that a victory in Korea would "check Communist expansion everywhere and thus obviate the necessity of our being fully prepared to meet aggression elsewhere," especially in Europe. He wanted to "grab every ship in the Pacific and pour the support into the Far East." "Delays or half-way measures" would prove "disastrous."²⁰⁾

After destroying communist troops on both sides of the 38th parallel, MacArthur explained, he would "compose and unite" Korea - even though he had no authority yet to do so. Vandenberg worried this might provoke Chinese intervention and require "an advance into Manchuria." MacArthur doubted it. But since Manchurian and Siberian links with Korea depended on tunnels and bridges, "he saw a unique opportunity for the use of the atomic bomb to deal a crippling blow to these supply routes."

MacArthur told General Collins that he intended to visit Taiwan. Despite his public interest in Jiang's offer to send Nationalist troops to Korea, MacArthur admitted privately that he opposed this since the poorly trained and equipped forces would "be an albatross around our necks for months." Instead, he wanted more American troops and an opportunity brandish Taiwan as a threat against the Chinese mainland. MacArthur concluded his meeting with the visiting Army Chief with an inspirational declaration. "We win here or we lose everything; if we win here, we improve the chances of winning everywhere."²¹⁾

In addition to advocating pressure on China, MacArthur rejected the distinction, made frequently by President Truman and Dean Acheson, between shielding Taiwan from a communist takeover and supporting Jiang domination of the island or reconquest of the mainland. Even "if he [Chiang] has horns and a tail," MacArthur told William Sebald, so long as the Generalissimo was "anti-communist we should help him." The State Department should "forget its vendetta...and assist him."²²⁾

Following MacArthur's July 31 visit to Taiwan, the general's incessant calls to assist the Nationalists led Truman and the Joint Chiefs to send presidential adviser Averell Harriman and General Matthew Ridgway on a mission to Tokyo. Harriman pressed the UN Commander to stop contradicting administration policy. Although MacArthur pledged his loyalty, "for reasons which are rather difficult to explain," Harriman wrote, they failed to come "to a full agreement on the way he believed things should be handled on Formosa and with the Generalissimo."

MacArthur praised Truman's action toward Korea but ridiculed the administration's China policy. The President and Secretary of State should, instead, defer to him, the greatest American expert on "Oriental Psychology." Westerners, he explained, "hate to die." With "Orientals, life begins with death. They die quietly, folding their arms as a dove" and with that "MacArthur folded his arms and sighed."

The General promised he would "obey any orders he received from the President" and would not permit Chiang to drag the United States into a war with China. But, Harriman reported, MacArthur made the promise "without full conviction" and even suggested "it might be a good idea" to settle the China question by permitting Chiang to attack the mainland. He would win or you could "get rid of him that way."

MacArthur claimed that building up Taiwan's power would destabilize the Chinese leadership, delay UN seating of Beijing and, possibly, fracture Mao's support which would "encourage a

split with the Soviets." Instead of "kicking Jiang around," Washington should take advantage of the "great potentialities" for covert operations in China. Although he did not reveal it, MacArthur had probably begun assisting KMT guerrilla operations against the mainland.²³⁾

General Ridgway also found MacArthur obsessed by China and Taiwan. In the midst of their consultations on the proposed Inchon landing, Ridgway recalled, the UN commander kept changing the subject. Although MacArthur no longer thought the Communists would invade Taiwan, he told Ridgway that he got "down on my knees" and "prayed nightly that they will." He would then go to the front and "deliver such a crushing defeat it would be one of the decisive battles of the world - a disaster so great it would rock Asia and perhaps turn back communism."²⁴⁾

In a 1986 interview, Paul Nitze, former head of Policy Planning in the State Department, emphasized that throughout the Korean War MacArthur cared less about Korean unification than the "restoration of Jiang to the mainland." MacArthur knew that Jiang could never make it back on his own. The U.S. would have to "defeat the Red Chinese armies, and that could be done only with nuclear weapons."²⁵⁾

The Taiwan issue exploded again in mid-August when the Veterans of Foreign Wars asked the General to send a message to the group's Chicago convention, scheduled for the end of the month. On August 20, he responded with a bitter critique of administration policy designed to dispel "misconceptions

currently being voiced concerning the relationship of Formosa to our strategic potential in the Pacific." He described Taiwan as an "unsinkable aircraft carrier and submarine tender" (terms suggesting much more than the official policy of merely shielding the island) commanded by a courageous ally, Jiang Jieshi.

He again asserted that his intimate knowledge of "Oriental psychology" proved that Asians "respect and follow aggressive, resolute and dynamic leadership." Implicitly, he contrasted his own record to the alleged timidity of the president.²⁶⁾

Truman, Acheson and Harriman interpreted the VFW message as a ploy to force the administration into making an "unlimited commitment" to Jiang. Moscow and Beijing, Acheson feared, would use it to rally Asian nationalism against the U.S. America's friends would conclude that both military and foreign policy were under the control of an "uncontrollable military commander." Jiang would be impelled to carry out some "provocation" against the PRC while the Chinese Communists might make a preventive strike against Taiwan convinced that the island was a "springboard" for an American attack against them.²⁷⁾

When an outraged Truman compelled MacArthur to "withdraw" his already publicized VFW message, the general, in conversation with an aide "burst into a long tirade about a State Department clique attempting to undermine his position." He "pilloried the State Department and said that one of these days he intended to blast them wide open."²⁸⁾

Following the Inchon landing and the rout of the North Korean army in late-September, the United States raised the stakes of war. The administration spurned peace feelers from several sources and resolved to unify, by force, all Korea. Early in October, under the fig leaf of a new United Nations resolution, American troops crossed the 38th parallel and began their ill fated advance to the Yalu River.

Most officials Washington agreed with MacArthur that, in spite of several warnings, China was unlikely to enter the war to defend North Korea. Apparently, little serious thought was given to the possibility that Peking might consider its own security and credibility at stake once American forces crossed the 38th parallel. Evidence from Chinese sources suggests that they feared American occupation of North Korea would, at best, make Manchuria a hostage. At worst, MacArthur would use his victory to bully Washington into supporting a more hostile policy towards China.²⁹⁾

What strategists in Peking perceived more clearly than those in Washington was that MacArthur may not only not have cared about the dangers of Chinese intervention but actually coveted an opportunity to engage the PRC. While the General never admitted this in so many words, his provocations and actions are difficult to explain in any other way.

When Indian ambassador K.M. Panikkar passed on Zhou Enlai's October 3 threat that if American troops crossed the 38th parallel, they would "encounter Chinese resistance," the General disparaged it as "pure bluff." He told British diplomat Sir

Alvary Gascoigne that if Peking really wanted to deter America, it would not have used the left-leaning Panikkar as a channel.

Gascoigne reported that:

In any case MacArthur claimed he had plenty of troops [to deal] adequately with the Chinese and even with the Russians if they should prove so foolish as to enter the arena at this stage. The Chinese, he said, had neither troops nor equipment nor air power to take him on - if the Chinese had come in three weeks ago it might have been another matter...

If the Chinese came in, MacArthur would immediately unleash his air force against towns in Manchuria and North China, including Peking - he knew Chou must know that, and must realize his (MacArthur's) vastly greater potential in the air, on the ground and on the sea. Chou's statement to Panikkar was just blackmail.³⁰⁾

Buoyed by MacArthur's optimism and afraid of the political backlash should they "leash" a winning general, the Joint Chiefs, Defense Secretary George C. Marshall, Dean Acheson and President Truman agreed that the UN commander should drive toward the Yalu even if limited Chinese forces intervened. They left most of the details to MacArthur's "judgment." About the only limit on his authority was an instruction to "obtain authorization from Washington prior to taking any military action against objectives in Chinese territory."

Given MacArthur's ability to intimidate his nominal superiors, the Chinese leadership was probably correct in its surmise that the risk of not intervening in Korea far outweighed the costs. The responsibility had fallen upon Beijing to bring U.S. policymakers to their senses. As one Chinese official later put it, Mao Zedong bet that a blow from China would help the moderates in Washington suppress extremists like MacArthur.

Chinese strategists had hoped to form a resistance line somewhere in the middle of North Korea. But MacArthur's rush toward the Yalu meant an engagement much closer to China. When Chinese troops launched a brief but fierce assault south of the Yalu early in November, MacArthur dismissed it as a bluff and bullied the Joint Chiefs and Truman into permitting him to bomb the sensitive Yalu bridges as a prelude to an "end the war offensive." In mid-November he told William Sebald that when Chinese and north Korean troops were pushed across the Yalu, the "Korean campaign would be at an end." Although he expected to respect the border, "should the planned operation fail and Communist forces continue to stream into North Korea from Manchuria," he saw "no alternative from a military point of view to bombing key points in Manchuria." Then the "fat would be in the fire" because it would "probably bring about a countermove by Soviet Russia."³¹⁾

Reflecting on MacArthur's motives at the end of November, Matthew Ridgway thought the General envisioned himself as the "swordsmen who would slay the communist dragon" and save Asia.

strategy which included utilization of Chinese Nationalist forces to fight both in Korea and the Chinese mainland.

President Truman, Secretaries Acheson and Marshall and the Joint Chiefs, in contrast, feared getting "sewed up" in the "wrong war" against the "second team." As soon as the dimension of China's intervention became apparent, they sought primarily to preserve American troops, arrange an armistice, avoid a wider war with China and the Soviet Union and speed the build up of NATO. Committing additional men, weapons and prestige to Korea undermined these priorities. Civilian and military planners contemplated operations against China primarily as a last resort to cover an evacuation or retaliate if the Communist powers launched air attacks against South Korea, Japan and, possibly, Taiwan. They toyed with but, ultimately, scrapped the idea of air and naval strikes against China. For tactical, strategic and political reasons, the administration rejected use of atomic weapons. While the administration collaborated with Taiwan in small scale guerrilla operations, it strongly opposed using Nationalist troops in Korea or in major operations against China.

What officials in Washington had difficulty understanding was the degree to which MacArthur both personalized the Korean War and considered it a political springboard. In his mind only one critical position existed in this or any war: the one where he exercised command. As during the Pacific War, he complained that his domestic enemies preferred to see "MacArthur lose a battle rather than to see America win a war."

In his formal reports to the JCS, and in numerous press interviews, MacArthur insisted the United States could threaten or even attack China with impunity. Instead of settling for a restoration of the 38th parallel, he demanded pursuit of Korean unification. He labeled as "appeasement" all talk of a "limited war" and feared that a military stalemate which left Korea divided would prove politically useless, or worse, to him.

On the other hand, a victory in North Korea and a roll back of communist power in part of China would transform the cold war and put MacArthur in a tremendously powerful political position. Within a few days of the Chinese intervention, the General proposed he be sent to "negotiate directly" with Jiang on how to utilize Nationalist troops.³³⁾

Then, as afterwards, MacArthur hesitated to define the "victory" he sought. His successor, Matthew Ridgway, surmised that he did not mean merely the destruction of enemy forces in the field and unification of Korea under a democratic government. Rather, "what he envisaged was no less than the global defeat of Communism, dealing Communism a blow from which it would never recover and which would mark the historical turning back of the Red Tide." Thus, he wanted to destroy the "air bases and industrial complex in Manchuria" as well as the remainder of China's "industrial centers." He wanted to equip and carry Chiang's troops to the mainland to "break the Communist hold." He believed the "Chinese masses were ready to welcome Chiang back." Although MacArthur doubted the Soviets would enter this

"preventive war on Red China," if they did, Ridgway guessed, the General would probably have "urged the further step of an attack upon the USSR."³⁴⁾

Fearful that a wider war with China would endanger both Japan and Western Europe, nearly all Truman's advisers rejected MacArthur's strategy. They felt the United States would be lucky to get an armistice which restored the 38th parallel. Attacks upon China would be considered only to cover an evacuation from Korea or to retaliate should the Chinese drive American forces out of the South or threaten Japan.

MacArthur demanded escalation, not negotiations with Beijing. In late-December he raised the possibility of using atomic bombs against "critical concentrations of enemy power in Manchuria." He proposed to "blockade the coast of China, destroy through naval gun fire and air bombardment China's industrial capacity to wage war," secure Chinese Nationalist troops to fight in Korea and "release existing restrictions upon the Formosan garrison ... possibly leading to counter invasion against vulnerable areas of the Chinese Mainland." Besides halting the current offensive, MacArthur argued, these measures would "neutralize" China's warmaking ability "and thus save Asia from the engulfment otherwise facing it." Failure to act, the General predicted, would result in the loss of Southeast Asia and Japan and would "insure later defeat in Europe itself."³⁵⁾

Dean Rusk, assistant secretary of state and Acheson's closest adviser on Asian policy, felt that MacArthur strongly

desired an "all out war against China." Since everyone realized that Chinese troops would overwhelm American ground forces, MacArthur's strategy implicitly required the "mass destruction of Chinese cities" with atomic weapons. Truman, Rusk asserted, "never spent an instant even thinking about it" since the U.S. "would have worn the mark of Cain for generations to come."³⁶⁾

Privately, JCS Chairman Omar Bradley concluded MacArthur "was monumentally stupid, had gone mad, or had rejected JCS and administration policy to keep the war localized. Instead, he risked an all out war with China, regardless of the consequences." The Chiefs wrung their hands in dismay. General Hoyt Vandenberg lamented the uselessness of sending MacArthur direct orders since "he wouldn't obey them anyway." Truman complained privately that "MacArthur as usual has been shooting off his mouth," and once more considered relieving him.³⁷⁾

Despite MacArthur's effort to stampede the Truman administration into a war with China, the actual battlefield situation in Korea began to stabilize in January. General Matthew Ridgway, new commander of the Eighth Army, rallied his troops and brought tremendous pressure to bear on the badly overextended and inadequately supplied Chinese People's Volunteers. Ignoring mounting evidence that US/UN forces could hold the bulk of South Korea without any substantial reinforcements, MacArthur continued to issue warnings that his command faced "complete destruction" unless he were allowed to attack China.³⁸⁾

By now Bradley and the Joint Chiefs concluded that MacArthur's demands had less to do with the real battlefield situation than with his desire to avenge the "Red Chinese generals who had made a fool out of him" and of his "infallible 'military genius'." The Joint Chiefs decided that Ridgway obviously deserved the credit for turning the tide of battle and demonstrating that the Chinese could be stopped in Korea with limited, conventional means. As General Bradley later wrote, even though the Joint Chiefs continued to address messages to MacArthur, they no longer considered him the decisive factor in Korea. In their minds, at least, he was "kicked up stairs to chairman of the board and was, insofar as military operations were concerned, mainly a prima donna figurehead who had to be tolerated."³⁹⁾

As General Ridgway stabilized the fighting front during the first months of 1951, MacArthur grew furious at the diminishing role he had been confined to. By March, Truman's advisers guessed the Chinese might be willing to begin armistice talks aimed at restoring the prewar Korean boundaries. The prospect of Washington negotiating a compromise terrified MacArthur, who feared being blamed for the failure to achieve victory. After the JCS rebuffed his demand to bomb additional targets along North Korea's border with China and the Soviet Union, diplomat William Sebald found MacArthur "tired and depressed." He complained about the "lack of instructions regarding his mission in Korea" and that he "no longer knows what he is supposed to do.

In mid-February MacArthur told Sebald that he had conceived of a new "concept to bring China to her feet by" means of a naval blockade and air power. The task would take less than a year, although he "was not clear about whether the Soviets would come in or not."⁴⁰⁾

In his memoir and in several posthumously released interviews, MacArthur claimed that in February 1951 he conceived a plan to win the war "in a maximum of ten days." The general asserted that he recommended "massive air attacks" against north Korea coupled with a move to "sever Korea from Manchuria by laying a field of radioactive waste...across the lines of enemy supply."¹⁾

Whatever else he had in mind, it is certain that during the spring MacArthur sought authority to use atomic weapons. On March 10 he requested that the Joint Chiefs make available to him on an "on call basis" atomic bombs for use on "D-Day" should the Soviets invade Japan. It was "vital," to react immediately to a Russian attack, he reported, without taking the time to refer the question to Washington. Although the Chiefs shared MacArthur's anxiety about Soviet threats to Japan, they were nearly as

¹ Late in 1952, MacArthur urged President-elect Dwight Eisenhower to spread a "belt of radioactive cobalt" along the Sino-Korean border and then invade North Korea with Chinese Nationalist troops and American marines. In 1954 MacArthur told journalists (who kept the story secret for a decade) that he wanted to drop as many as fifty atomic bombs on Manchuria before laying a barrier of radioactive wastes and invading North Korea. It is uncertain that he actually proposed this in 1951.

fearful of the general's judgment as of the Russians or Chinese. The JCS stalled, agreeing only to "consider" his request.⁴¹⁾

MacArthur spoke publicly with increasing bitterness about his disagreements with the Truman administration. He complained to journalists about Washington's responsibility for the "savage slaughter" in Korea and denounced plans to resurrect the 38th parallel. Despite his complaints, the administration resolved to make a peace overture to Peking, an offer which implied a willingness to discuss regional disputes (Taiwan, Indochina, a Japanese treaty, etc.) following a Korean armistice.

The prospect of any negotiations with China enraged MacArthur. He denounced the peace initiative as an unwarranted "military restriction" on his command. Instead of talking to China, the general recommended sending the 7th fleet closer to the China coast "to make a show of force." As with his request for atomic bombs, the Joint Chiefs stalled.⁴²⁾

On March 24, MacArthur decided to make a "show of force" by preempting the administration's peace proposal. In a Tokyo press release he condemned the pretensions of "Red China" to great power status and declared it inadequate to the "challenge of modern war." Even under the "inhibitions which restrict[ed]" his actions, China could not achieve its goals in Korea. Unless the "enemy" commander met him on the battlefield to sue for peace, he threatened to take the war to the "coastal and interior bases" of "Red China." Peace would come with no change in Taiwan's status, no UN seat for China and no "sacrifice" of any part of Korea.

MacArthur and his closest associate in Tokyo, Gen. Courtney Whitney, described this bombshell as a desperate move to stop "one of the most disgraceful plots in U.S. history." MacArthur told William Sebald that Truman and his advisers had "plotted" to "hand over...Formosa to Red China." MacArthur hoped to antagonize China, scuttle the administration's peace feeler and increase public pressure for a showdown with Beijing.⁴³⁾

MacArthur's "latest bomb," as one Pentagon official called it, left "the [Washington] boys hanging on the ropes." Truman's advisers considered it a bald attempt to seize control of the nation's foreign policy and shuddered at the general's public assertion that he could, if he wished, carry the war deep inside China. Officials admitted that "it would be perfectly obvious if it were anybody else who had made the statement which MacArthur made... he would be relieved of his command at once." However, many shared the concern of Undersecretary of Defense Robert Lovett that MacArthur's talk of humiliating China as a means of ending an unpopular war had broad public support. If the president fired the general, the Republicans would accuse him of "being on the side of sin." Truman merely sent MacArthur a reprimand about making unauthorized policy statements and awaited the next crisis. A Washington Post cartoonist parodied the act by depicting Truman waving the message under MacArthur's nose and declaiming "Honest, no fooling this time!" Disdainfully, the general directed an aide to "file this one with the others."⁴⁴⁾

As if on cue, MacArthur soon provoked a new crisis. On April 5, House Minority Leader Joseph W. Martin (R-Mass.) released a telegram from the general responding to the Congressman's demand that Truman "open a second front in Asia" by helping Chinese Nationalist troops invade the mainland. "Without a single GI being forced to place foot on the soil of the Chinese mainland," Martin had declared, this strategy would punish the aggressor, relieve pressure on Korea and save American lives. Unless Truman planned to win the war, he should be charged with the "murder" of thousands of GIs.

MacArthur's reply of March 20 (actually composed before the peace initiative flap but released later) applauded Martin's statement. In Asia, MacArthur declared, the "Communist conspirators ... elected to make their play for global conquest." Defeat in Asia would doom the free world. "We must win, MacArthur wrote, for "there is no substitute for victory." The general followed the letter with interviews stressing a similar theme.⁴⁵⁾

For Truman, this "rank insubordination," proved "the last straw." The President wrote on his desk calendar that the "situation with regard to the Far Eastern General has become a political one." Although he wanted his inner circle to endorse independently his conclusion, he had decided that the "Big General in the Far East must be recalled."⁴⁶⁾

MacArthur's threats and tantrums seemed particularly worrisome because it coincided with a real military crisis in Northeast Asia. In early April, intelligence sources revealed a

huge build up of Chinese troops and aircraft in Manchuria, coordinated with a concentration of Soviet submarines northeast of Japan. The Joint Chiefs feared these forces might be employed in a new offensive to drive the UN command out of Korea or even to attack Japan. (The build up was probably designed to deter or respond to MacArthur's threatened American escalation.)

To counter this possible threat, the Joint Chiefs and the President wanted to transfer atomic weapons from control of the civilian Atomic Energy Commission to the Air Force. This idea worried AEC chairman, Gordon Dean, who feared that Truman and the Joint Chiefs might use atomic bombs in inconclusive tactical warfare which would diminish their value as a psychological deterrent. Dean especially opposed giving MacArthur, "who had little knowledge concerning effects," access to nuclear weapons.

On April 6, Truman conferred with Dean regarding the build up in Manchuria and the massing of Soviet submarines at Vladivostok and Sakhalin. He feared a new Chinese offensive in Korea coordinated with a Soviet attempt to "take the Japanese islands and with the submarines cut our supply lines to Japan and Korea." Truman ordered Dean to transfer to the Air Force nine atomic bombs destined for Guam and Okinawa.⁴⁷⁾

Despite this decision, neither Truman nor the Joint Chiefs any longer trusted MacArthur in a position where he might create an incident and then demand atomic or conventional attacks upon Chinese or Soviet targets. Gen. Omar Bradley admitted he "was now so wary of MacArthur" that he "deliberately withheld the message

[regarding the transfer of the bombs and authority to attack China] and all knowledge of its existence from him, fearing that he might make a premature decision in carrying it out."⁴⁸⁾

This dilemma increased the determination of Truman and his advisers to remove the Korean commander. By replacing MacArthur with a reliable officer, the President could: 1) rid himself of a ruthless critic in league with the Republicans; 2) cover his domestic flanks; 3) assure the support of the Joint Chiefs in his decision by giving the new commander the authority denied MacArthur and, 4) hopefully, deter Sino-Soviet escalation by leaking word of the atomic bomb transfers.

On April 8 the Joint Chiefs and Truman's leading civilian advisers recommended MacArthur's relief. The president announced his concurrence the next day, telling members of his staff he "was sure MacArthur wanted to be fired." Arrangements were made to appoint Ridgway to fill MacArthur's several posts. Truman signed the necessary orders on April 10, as the shipment of atomic weapons to the Pacific began. The president never publicly linked the two elements of his decision.⁴⁹⁾

Several days before Truman recalled him, MacArthur told his closest aides he would be fired. He "intimated that his removal was [part of] a plot in Washington" to "hand over" Formosa to "Red China." The Philippines would fall next, followed by Japan. Then "our whole position in the Far East would crumble."⁵⁰⁾

Few of MacArthur's predictions came to pass. Despite his hopes, following an inconclusive Congressional investigation and

the opening of armistice talks with China, the public and the Republican Party lost interest in his strategy and presidential candidacy. Despite this, MacArthur probably took solace in having helped poison the well of Sino-American relations for a generation. America's "greatest expert on Oriental psychology," it is safe to say, knew little about Asian realities and not much more about American politics. He played the role of spoiler, not builder. American policy in Asia finally achieved a peaceful balance by coming to terms with the Chinese regime he hoped to destroy.

ENDNOTES

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4. Papers of Henry L. Stimson, Yale University, see entries for Jan. 2, 8, 13, 17, Feb. 9, 23, 1942; Robert Ferrell, ed., The Eisenhower Diaries (New York, 1981), 43-49; Executive Order # 1, Jan. 3, 1942, box 4 (57) and Cash Receipts of Feb. 19 and 25, 1942, *ibid*, Richard J. Sutherland Papers, Modern Military Records Branch, National Archives; Carol Petillo, "Douglas MacArthur and Manuel Quezon: A Note on an Imperial Bond," Pacific Historical Review 48 (Feb. 1979), 107-17; Communications between MacArthur and Quezon and Roosevelt during the siege are located in PSF Safe # 7, Franklin D. Roosevelt Papers, Roosevelt Library.
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9. Diary entry of July 10, 1945, Forrestal Papers; memorandum by E.A. Bayne of conversation with MacArthur, Dec. 21, 1946, fold 7, box 1, W. Walton Butterworth Papers, Marshall Library; diary entry of March 22, 1948, Eichelberger Papers.
10. MacArthur statement to Eaton Committee, March 3, 1948, CCS 383.21, Japan (3-13-45), sec. 20, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, RG 218, National Archives.
11. Sir Alvary Gascoigne to Prime Minister Clement Attlee, Dec. 26, 1947, FO 371/63830, Public Record Office, London; Gascoigne to M.E. Denning, Feb. 28, 1948, FO 371/69818, *ibid*.
12. Transcript of a meeting with Col. Babcock, Nov. 10, 1949, JSSC 388.1, Japan, sec. 1 (9-1-47), JCS Records, RG 218; Report by the JSSC to the JCSS on "Impact of an Early Peace Treaty with Japan on U.S. Strategic Requirements," Nov. 30, 1949, JCS 1380/75, *ibid*; notes on a memorandum of conversation with Goldthwaite Dorr by John Howard, Dec. 8, 1949, FRUS 1949, 6: 1128; notes by Under Secretary of the Army Tracy Voorhees of MacArthur's opinions on a Japanese peace treaty, Dec. 14, 1949, CJCS 092.2, Japanese Peace Treaty 1950, JCS Records, RG 218.
13. Report of a meeting between MacArthur and Chennault, Nov. 21, 1949, NLT-12, CIA, FOIA; memorandum of conversation: MacArthur briefing to Huber Sub-committee, Sept. 5, 1949, CCS 452, China (4-3-43), sec. 7, pt. 5, JCS Records, RG 218.
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15. William M. Leary, Perilous Missions: Civil Air Transport and CIA Covert Operations in Asia (University of Alabama Press, 1984); Slessor to P. Reilly, Dec. 30, 1949 FO 371/83012, PRO; Fergusson to Gascoigne, Feb. 11, 1950, FO 371/83013, *ibid*; Michael Schaller, The American Occupation of Japan: The Origins of the Cold War in Asia (N.Y., 1985), 251.
16. Oral History, vol. 6, pts. A and J, Wellington Koo Papers, Columbia University.
17. Memorandum by Gen. Burns to Rusk, May 29, 1950, FRUS, 6: 346-47; memoranda by Fisher Howe to W. Park Armstrong, May 31, 1950, *ibid.*, 347-49; Rusk's report of May 31, 1950, box 18, Chinese Affairs Lot File, Department of State Records, National

Archives; For a fuller discussion, see, Schaller, The American Occupation of Japan, 260-71.

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第2次 韓國戰爭 國際學術會議
1990. 6. 14 ~ 6. 15, 서울

Ⅲ-2

맥아더 將軍 :

中國問題, 政策葛藤, 韓國戰爭

마이클 살라(美아리조나 大)

I

韓國戰爭이 勃發한 지 2주일 후, 잡지 「타임」(Time)은 北韓의 攻擊에 직면하여 “전승기념일(V-J Day)의 승리감으로부터 절망감으로 현기증 날 정도로 急降下”하는 美軍이 당하고 있는 現實에 대해 言及했다. “거칠기 짝이 없는 共產主義者 폭군들”이 수백만의 人民들을 사로잡는 동안, “나태한” 外交官들은 “아시아 共產主義者들은 진짜 共產主義者가 아니다”라고 호언장담함으로써 “잘못된 安保意識”을 流布하고 있었다.

“당시 아시아 紛爭地域을 擔當하고 있던 맥아더 원수만이 바보가 아니었다.” 그는 “빨갱이들의 전진에 직면하여 美國의 安保는 단 일분도 保障할 수 없다”고 判斷하고 있었던 것이다. 맥아더는 國民들에게 이 절박한 危機感을 認識시키고자 노력했지만, “너무나 政治的이었던” 만큼 “그의 노력은 대체로 무시당했다.” 이렇듯 가장 뛰어난 專門家에게 등을 돌리면서, 「타임」지의 스탭은 이렇게 結論을 내렸다. “美國은 태평양에서의 승리에 지나친 낭비를 했다.”¹⁾

1950년 7월 31일, 당시 美軍 및 유엔군 地域司令官 맥아더는 트루만 政府로부터 여전히 부랑아 취급을 당하는 장개석 總統과 商議하기 위해 타이완으로 갔다. 당시 공식 관측통들은 맥아더의 타이완 방문이 越權行爲인지 아니면 承認을 받은 것인지, 도저히 가늠하지 못했다. 타이페이에 주둔하고 있던 美 육군무관 데이비드 바레트(David Barrett) 대령이 맥아더 도착시에 목격한 장면에 비하면, 이런 논쟁은 대단치 않은 것임을 알았다. 사령관은 환영파티장에 들어와서, 그의 거만한 호스트와 포옹을 하면서 큰 소리로 외쳤다. “親愛하는 總統閣下, 저는 오래 전부터 閣下를 뵈고 싶었습니다.” 그리고 제2인자인 첸 쉹(Ch'en Ch'eng)이 미국인과의 악수를 마치자, 어색한 침묵이 흘렀다.²⁾

백아더가 스스로를 美國에서 가장 위대한 아시아 專門家로 宣傳하는데 특별히 긴 시간을 할애하지 않았을 뿐만 아니라, 그가 말뿐인 장개석 옹호자들 가운데 한 사람이 아니었음에도 불구하고 사람들은 파티장에서의 그의 단순한 실수 때문에 이 점을 잊어버렸을지도 모른다. 그러나 백아더의 이같은 혼란은 그가 당시의 아시아 현실에 관해 너무나 무지하다는 사실을 폭로한 것만은 틀림없다.

군인집안에서 태어나 軍人 教育機關의 價値觀에 따라 定型化된 더글라스 맥아더는 一生동안 軍隊가 결코 提供할 수 없는 個人的이고도 專門的인 能力을 認定받기를 추구했다. 그는 國家政策을 단순히 遂行하는 權力이 아니라, 그것을 具體化하고 實現하는 權力을 갈망했다. 맥아더는 階級이 올라가면 갈수록, 市民權利意識의 傳統이라든가 戰爭과 外交의 複雜多樣性이 賦課하는 압박감으로 인해 좌절감은 점점 더 깊어만 갔다. 한 계급씩 승진할 때마다, 그는 軍隊 및 文官의 權威에 의해 더욱 高度의 統制를 받아야 했다. 그리고 權威에 대한 맥아더의 반발심은 불쾌한 감정을 넘어 그것을 뒤집어 엎어버리고 싶은 衝動까지 불러일으키는 정도였다. 더구나 참모장 시절에, 공황과 루즈벨트의 뉴딜 정책은 그가 옹호해 마지 않던 공화당의 정통파적 관행과 군부의 전통을 물거품으로 만들었다.

백아더 스스로는 한번도 그렇게 말한 적이 없었지만, 자신의 억제된 야망을 표출할 수 있는 단 두 가지의 效果的인 出口을 마침내 發見했다. 海外勤務, 특히 아시아에서의 勤務였다. 이것은 國內勤務地에서 가해지는 압박감과 감시로부터 解放될 수 있는 方便이었다. 한편 1930년대 맥아더는 백악관으로 들어가는 정치적 경력에 관한 꿈을 꾸었다. 大統領이 되면 그는 자기 아버지와 自身の 野望을 가로막은 權力의 지렛대를 자유자재로 구사할 수 있게 될 것이라는 것이다. 1944년과 특히

1948년에 맥아더 원수는 공화당의 大統領 指名權을 따내려고 했다. 1950년까지 그는 집요한 야망보다 더 심각한 정치적 불만을 달렸다. 역시 그는 太平洋 戰爭以後 日本占領 時期 동안 나타났던 現象, 즉 國家戰略에 자신의 관심이나 支配權이 從屬되는 것을 다시는 허용치 않을 결심이었다.

1920년대 필리핀에서 처음으로 막대한 權力을 행사하면서 맥아더는 아시아 근무는 그에게 자신의 능력을 입증할 예기치 않은 기회를 제공한다는 것을 깨달았다. 그리하여 그는 필리핀, 서남태평양, 일본, 한국 등지에서 계속되는 支配權을 美國에서의 政治權力을 獲得하는 鬭爭의 一環으로 活用했다.

아시아에 주둔해 있던 다른 美軍將星들은 거의 脚光을 받지 못했고 事態에 耳目을 集中시키기에는 그 關心도가 너무 약했으며, 워싱턴 역시 相對적으로 直接的인 監督이 소홀했다. 맥아더는 대부분의 정치입안자들이 지원할 확신을 가지지 못하는 地域에서 自身の 行動을 試驗하는데 成功했다.

‘東洋 心理學’에 관해 독특한 知識을 가지고 있다는 事實을 끊임없이 流布함으로써, 맥아더 원수는 16年 동안 일종의 미국의 식민지 總督과 같은 役割을 했다. 그는 아시아에서 大多數의 大衆을 對象으로 美國人의 經驗을 具體化시켜 나갔다. 어떤 傳記作家의 말을 빌면 “맥아더는 外國에서 너무나도 후하게 尊敬을 받았기 때문에, 당연한 귀결로 국내에서도 광범위하게 존경받는 美國인 선각자가 되었다.

II

맥아더라는 이름이 상기시켜 주는 드라마나 鄉愁는 그의 生涯에서 보여줬던 갖가지 아이러니를 유아무야로 만들었다. 眞珠灣 攻擊이 있기 6개월 전, 맥아더는 좌절감에 사로잡힌 一種의 追放者로서 마닐라에 살고 있었다. 1937년 12월 美 陸軍에서 隱退한 데 이어, 그가 美國과 필리핀 指導者들의 잔인한 웃음거리 對象이 된 바로 그 시점에서 그의 필리핀 防禦計劃은 시들해졌다. 오직 日本의 南進野慾과 이에 대한 워싱턴의 封鎖 必要性만이 빛을 잃어가는 맥아더의 경력을 되살려주었다.

1941년 7월 任務遂行차 다시 부름을 받았을 때, 맥아더는 한마디로 환상세계에 살고 있었다. 日本의 軍事力과 執念을 지독하게도 오판하고 있었던 것이다. 1941년 12월도 다 갈 무렵, 맥아더는 日本이 1942년 中半期 前에는 絶對 攻擊을 하지 않을 것이므로 “背後에서 발목을 잡아서” 敵을 防禦할 수 있다고 장담했다. 마닐라에 있는 아시아 艦隊 司令官 토마스 하트(Thomas Hart)提督은 다음과 같은 結論을 내렸다. “오래 전부터 그랬던 것은 아닐지 모르지만, 지금의 맥아더는 온전한 精神을 가졌다고 볼 수 없다.”³⁾

맥아더의 필리핀 防禦計劃은 고려할 가치도 없는 것임이 立證되었다. 당연히 맥아더의 이런 愚昧한 判斷은 루즈벨트 大統領을 노발대발케 했다. 나아가 受容하기 不可能한 支援을 要請한 그의 히스테리성 要求들, 예를 들어 勝利와 敗北를 뒤바꾼 예언이라든가, 日本과의 單獨強化 計劃에 대한 그의 後退, 심지어 마누엘 케손 필리핀 大統領으로부터 不法的으로 받은 50만 달러를 個人的으로 着服한 行爲들 때문에 戰爭局 首腦部도 격노했다.⁴⁾

그럼에도 불구하고 1942년초, ‘맥아더 광기’는 전 美國을 휩쓸었다.

이 현상은 포위공격 드라마, 즉 맥아더에 대한 드라마틱한 언론지원사격과 짧은 기간이었지만 1942년 초 日本軍隊의 進擊을 封鎖할 수 있는 地點에 그의 軍隊가 駐屯하고 있었다는 事實을 반영하고 있었다. 윌리엄 랜돌프 하트(William Randolph Heart)라든가 로이 하워드(Roy Howard), 로버트 맥코믹(Robert McCormick)제독, 헨리 루스(Henry Ruce) 등에 의해 주도되던 反 뉴딜 언론은 맥아더를 루즈벨트의 國內 改革 政策 뿐만 아니라, 그의 ‘유럽 최우선’戰略에 對抗하는 데 사용할 理想的인 武器로 간주하고 있었다. 맥아더 원수의 名譽를 記念하여 도시나 마을의 다리라든지 공원 거리들의 이름을 고치는 한편, 공화당 의원들은 프랭클린 루즈벨트에게 맥아더를 太平洋戰爭 總責任者로 任命하도록 壓力을 가했다.

루즈벨트는 맥아더를 오스트레일리아로 쫓아보내, 서남 太平洋 駐屯軍 司令官으로 任命함으로써 마음이 어느 정도 풀렸다. 당시 西南 太平洋 駐屯軍은 중앙 태평양에 주력하는 大規模 海軍力을 補助하는 補充部隊였던 것이다. 한편 戰爭局의 대부분의 官僚들이 助言했음에도 불구하고, 그 意見을 묵살하고 루즈벨트와 조지 C. 마셜 원수는 맥아더에게 명예 하원의원 勳장을 수여했다. 個人的으로 그들은 이 수여가 맥아더에게 엄청난 資産을 부여하고자 하는 공화당원들의 要求에 쫓겨 박는 데 더욱 가치있고 필요한 조치라고 판단했다. 그 結果, 프랭클린 루즈벨트가 맥아더에게 필리핀에서의 ‘犯罪的’ 過誤에 관해 軍事的 責任을 묻는 대신에 명예勳장을 수여한 것은 一種의 臨機應變的 措處였고, “순전히 의회의 壓力과 輿論에 대한 屈服”이었다. 그럼에도 불구하고 1942년에 들어서서, 많은 美國人들은 프랭클린 D.루즈벨트와 해리 트루만(Harry Truman)의 독주를 차단한 英雄的인 “맥아더 전설”에 대해 믿기 시작했다. 한 從軍記者의 말을 빌리면, “맥아더가 과거에 치렀던 가장 위대한

전투에 관해 이야기했기”때문에 실제 戰場에서 무슨 일이 일어났는지는 하등 중요하지 않았다.⁵⁾

1944년 11월 기자들과 가진 非公開會見에서 맥아더는 中國을 겨냥한 전쟁무드는 “絶對적으로 不必要한” 行爲라고 조롱했다. 그는 히틀러를 무너뜨리는 것이 과연 중요한 일인가라고 疑問을 提起하기조차 했다. 그대신 그가 駐屯한 西南太平洋 地域에 전력을 기울여야 한다고 主張했다. 뿐만 아니라 그는 프랭클린 D.루즈벨트와 聯合軍 首腦部들이 저지르는 “反逆罪와 사보타지”에 대해 불평했다. 다음과 같은 認識을 가진 사람은 美國 指導者들 가운데 오직 맥아더뿐이었다.

“世界 歷史는 向後 1만년 동안 太平洋에서 記述될 것이다 ... 도저히 解決이 不可能하기 때문에 解決될 希望조차 가질 수 없는 유럽 戰爭들에 介入하는 해묵은 실수를 또 저질렀다... 유럽은 이미 죽어가는 體制이다. 그곳은 낡고 정지된 체제일 뿐 아니라, 經濟的 해게모니는 앞으로 소비에트 러시아로 넘어갈 것이다... 수십억의 인구를 가진 太平洋 周邊 國家들은... 向後 1萬 年 동안 歷史의 흐름을 決定하게 될 것이다.”

저널리스트들은 이런 類의 미사여구를 選好했으며, 맥아더에게 아시아 專門家이면서 賢人이라는 名譽를 부여했다.⁶⁾

맥아더를 둘러싼 공공연한 神話는 日本에 대한 敗北의 後遺症에 強力한 호소력을 주었다. 1945년 8월 해리 트루만은 공화당 언론들이나 議會內 共和黨 블럭이 요구하는 대로, 맥아더를 日本 占領軍 司令官으로 任命할 것인가를 놓고 고심하게 되었다. 결국 신임 대통령은 자신의 선택을 한탄했

다. 맥아더를 극동아시아 總司令官으로 任命한 責任을 나에게 돌리는 것은 不當하다고 트루만은 해롤드 아이크스(Harold Icks)에게 말했다. 內務長官 역시 大統領은 政治적으로 다른 決定을 할 수 없었다는 것을 認定했다. 正작 責任은 “맥아더를 필리핀에서 벗어나게 했던 重大한 실수를 저지른 루즈벨트에게”있었다. 루즈벨트는 日本人들에게 맥아더 問題를 解決하게 함으로써 將軍이 자기 칼을 갖도록 했다는 것이다. 大部分의 美國인들이 맥아더를 “영웅” 또는 東洋의 哲人으로 여기는 데 반해, 두 사람은 그를 軍事上的 사기꾼이라고 혹평했다. 하지만 아이크스는 토오쿄에 있는 맥아더 司令官이 “神話적인 存在로 되었을 뿐 아니라, 大統領 候補로까지 浮上”했음을 否定하지는 않았다. 이에 반해 트루만은 단 한 가지 점에 관해서는 異見을 表明했다. “맥아더는 어떤 식으로든 大統領 候補가 되었을 것”이라는 점에 관해서였다.⁷⁾

거의 모든 면에서 맥아더는 名聲을 날렸음에도 불구하고, 그는 필리핀, 서남태평양 駐屯軍, 占領地 日本, 韓國 등 잇달은 아시아 태평양 지역 사령관직에서 모두 실패했다. 軍事的 能力이나 政治的 判斷, 아시아에 대한 지식 면에서 저지른 맥아더의 重大한 과오는 엄청난 災殃을 가져왔다. 그 스스로는 아시아 專門家로 자처하고 있었지만, 이 모든 事件을 통하여 아시아는 단순히 美國人들에게 美合衆國을 이끌어 나갈 그의 能力을 각인시켜 주기 위해 잔인한 댓가를 치르는 플랫폼으로 作用했을 뿐이다. 1948년 맥아더가 공화당의 대통령후보 지명선거전을 치르기 위해 美國으로 가도록 권하는 어느 側近에게 認定했듯이, 그가 “이곳 國外에 있는 한, 맥아더는 신비로운 人物로 남아 있을 것”이다. 하지만 故國으로 돌아가는 그 순간, 그는 또 하나의 “政治的 과녁”이 되었을 것이다.⁸⁾

맥아더가 아시아에서 “빛나가는 老兵”으로 특히 中國에 대한 적개심이

나 韓國에 대한 關心과 더불어 臺灣에 대한 支持를 노골적으로 나타냄에 따라, 1948년 美合衆國 大統領 選舉에 이어 토오쿄에서의 그의 影響力은 重大한 打擊을 입었다.

한편 아시아에서 일어날 “향후 1만년 동안의 중대한 사건들”에 대한 맥아더의 신화에도 불구하고, 그는 자기가 직접 관장하거나 그렇게 하기를 바라는 地域들을 벗어난 곳에서 일어나는 아시아 事件들에 관해서는 거의 無知했다.

맥아더는 트루만 行政府가 中國 共產黨을 터무니없이 애지중지하고 있다는 등 전후 아시아 問題들을 처리하는 방식에 맹비난을 퍼부었다. 그는 中華人民共和國에 對抗하여 軍事的인 行動을 敢行할 것을 가장 열렬히 부르짖는 사람으로 떠올랐다. 맥아더는 대부분의 爭點들을 그렇게 처리해 나가듯이, 복잡한 政策問題들을 個別化 시켰다. 예를 들어 그는 戰後 中國에서 일어난 共產黨의 成功을 內戰의 仲裁者이자 오랜 競爭者인 조지 C. 마샬의 탓으로 돌렸다. 1946년 7월 맥아더는 해군 제독 제임스 포레스탈(James Forrestal)에게 이렇게 말했다. 장개석과 그의 政府가 “세계에서 最高가 아님에는 틀림없지만,” 그들은 “우리 편이므로 우리의 支援을 받아야 한다.” 그리고 맥아더는 國民黨의 부패를 폭로한 國務省의 中國擔當官들의 “不誠實”을 비난했다. 그로부터 몇 달 후 맥아더는 마샬이 “차기 (大統領) 選舉에서 트루만과 함께” 티켓을 따기 위해서, 오직 그 이유 때문에 中國과 臨時 休戰協定을 摸索하고 있다고 非難했다.⁹⁾

1947-48년의 大統領 指名權을 얻으려고 東奔西走하는 동안, 맥아더는 마샬 플랜을 支持하는 댓가로 中國 支援을 要求하는 議會內 共和黨 議員들을 증제했다. 마샬 플랜에 대한 論爭의 決定的인 重大局面이자, 중요한 위스콘신 大統領候補 豫選大會 前날인 1948년 3월에 占領軍 司令

官은 찰스 이튼(Charles Eaton) 議員 앞으로 聲明書를 보냈다. 내용은 外國問題 委員會에서 中國에 대한 軍事的 支援을 적극 支持하라는 것이 었다. 맥아더는 中國 國民黨을 “환 태평양 지역에서 가장 기초가 되는 “머릿돌”로 묘사했다. 반면 트루만 行政府는 “全 世界的인 그림”에는 無知했으며, 오직 서유럽만 생각하고 있었다. 맥아더는 中國 共產黨에 대한 鎮壓作戰을 시작함으로써, 冷戰을 集約적으로 解決할 것을 提案했다.¹⁰⁾

1948년 大統領 選舉 前날, 그때까지만 해도 트루만이 落選할 것 같은 분위기가 짙었지만, 몇몇 共和黨 政治家들은 맥아더가 장개석의 특별 ‘군사고문’이 되는 問題를 가지고 그를 揶揄하기 시작했다. 그는 “日本에서의 現在 職位에 이 責任이 追加되는 것을 꺼려하지는 않았다.” 맥아더는 肯定的인 反應을 보였던 것이다. 그는 中國共產黨을 만주에서 쫓아내는 計劃에 대해 言及했다. 그는 “1천 내의 戰鬥兵力을 갖춘 空中作戰으로 6개월내에 이 계획을 완수하겠다”고 장담했다. 나아가 맥아더는 中國 東北部를 占領하여 國民黨의 “信託統治地域”으로 다스림으로써, 全 아시아를 共產主義로부터 보호해야 한다고 提案했다. 물론 이 可能性들은 트루만의 勝利를 전혀 고려하지 않은 상태에서 提示된 것이었다.¹¹⁾

1949년 國民黨 政權이 中國에서 달아났을 때, 맥아더는 타이완을 아시아 대륙에 있는 共產主義 勢力의 擴張을 正지시키고 나아가 격퇴시킬 前초지로 간주했다. 타이완 방어와 中國 共產主義 擊退에 관한 맥아더의 公約은, 소비에트가 西方에 對抗한 主要 攻擊地로서 아시아를 겨냥하고 있다는 믿음을 포함한 몇몇 정보들을 바탕으로 하여 나온 것이었다. 마찬가지로 이같은 政策과 意見表明으로 맥아더는 이른바 議會內 中國 블럭의 영웅이 되었을 뿐 아니라, 그 스스로 重要한 政治的 後援者로 간주하는 (주요) 공화당 입안자들로 구성된 말많은 그룹들의 영

용으로 부상했다.

역시 1949-50년이 되면서, 토오쿄의 占領軍 司令官으로서의 맥아더의 任務는 축소되는 回歸點에 이르게 되었다. 表面上으로는 國防省과 國務省의 (日本 재무장과 접령 후 기반에 관한) 그칠 새 없는 言爭 結果, 日本과의 平和協定이 封鎖되어 버렸다. 행여 奇蹟이 일어나 國防省과 國務省이 모두 條約에 同意한다면, 맥아더에게 새로운 그리고 더 높은 아시아에서의 地位를 보증할 可能性도 없이, 日本 占領이 끝나버릴 수도 있으므로 맥아더로서는 이 점이 심히 염려되는 바였다. 中國과의 對決과 타이완 支援은 자기가 주요한 새 자리를 확보하는 데 필요한 期間 동안의 日本駐屯에 異意를 提起하는 國防省과 國務省의 反撥을 가라앉힐 것이라고 判斷했다.

1949년 내내 트루만 大統領과 國務省, 合同參謀長 會議, 그리고 맥아더는 한결같이 美合衆國의 보호를 타이완까지 확대할 것인가의 여부를 놓고 의견이 분분했다. 共產主義者들이 섬을 統制하게 되면 日本과 동남아시아 사이의 海路에 대한 中國과 蘇聯의 統制權은 커지게 마련이라는 점에는 모두 同意했지만, 政策立案者들 뿐 아니라 합동참모회의의 閣僚들도 국민당이 장악한 섬에까지 美軍兵力이 介入하는 것은 꺼려했다. 이에 반해 맥아더는 “臺灣이 中國 共產主義者들의 손에 넘어간다면, 극동아시아에서의 우리의 防禦地域들을 決定的으로 잃어버릴 것”이라고 斷言했다. 마침내 “우리의 防禦線은 美國의 獨立戰爭 당시의 美合衆國의 서해안까지 밀려날 것”이라고 主張했다.

“무슨 수를 쓰든 우리는 共產主義者들이 타이완을 掌握하는 것을 막아야 한다”고 合同參謀會議에서 밝히면서, 1949년 맥아더는 섬을 보호할 몇 가지 方案을 提示했다. 이 方案에는 타이완 섬을 美國의 “신탁통치” 또는 다른 “安全國家들”의 統制下에 두는 內容과 심지어는 맥아더

의 말에 의하면, 적어도 당분간만이라도 이 섬을 日本에 돌려주는 內容 등이 包含되어 있었다.¹²⁾

한편 맥아더는 WWⅡ기 용사이자 장개석 군사고문이면서 민간항공수송기 공동소유자인 클레어 체놀트(Claire Chennault)가 提案한 事項에 대해 支持를 보냈다. 그의 提案 內容은 위싱턴이 타이완을 보호하고 “中國의 海岸都市들을 封鎖·破壞할” 美國인 支援兵들이 탄 전투기 5백대와 소규모 海軍部隊를 創設한다는 것이었다. 1949년 말경에 中央情報局은 맥아더가 日本人 조종사들에게 中國 國民黨의 空軍을 支援하기 위해 타이완으로 가는 것을 許容한 事實을 포착했다. 맥아더는 “共產主義者들이 섬을 장악하는 것을 뒤엎을” 비밀계획을 가지고 있다는 소문이 타이완에 떠돌았던 것이다. 맥아더와 그의 수석 참모들은 몇몇 美國人 “기업가들”이나 클레어 체놀트, 전임 OSS 우두머리 윌리엄 도노반, 프레스톤 굿펠로우 같은 모험군인들, 그리고 국민당에 무기를 팔고 타이완과 펜타곤 관리들 사이의 非公式 通路役割을 하는 윌리엄 파울레이(William Pawley)와 함께 자주 모이는 자리에서 이 소문들을 흘렸다.¹³⁾

1949년 11월 맥아더는 당시 토오쿄를 訪問중이던 육군차관 트레시 보어히스(Tracy Voorhees)에게 共產主義者들이 타이완을 장악하면 태평양에 있어서의 美國의 安保는 “치명적인” 타격을 받는다고 말했다. “日本이 敵의 손에 넘어가는 일”조차 그다지 위태로운 것이 아니라고 단언했던 것이다. 그리고 그는 共產主義者들이 섬을 攻擊하지 못하도록 트루만은 타이완을 “中立”地域으로 宣布해야 한다고 主張했다. 이렇게 되면 美軍兵力이 實際적으로 介入하지 않아도 이 地域을 保護할 수 있다는 것이다. 나중에 美合衆國은 대만에 대한 “독립적인” 中國政權을 보증해 주었다.¹⁴⁾

맥아더에게는 너무나도 다행스럽게 1950년 초에 中國과의 關係가 급속

도로 악화되면서, 그의 프로그램에 새로운 계기를 부여했다. 1월에 中國 共產黨은 모든 美國 外交官들의 追放을 煽動하면서, 北京에 있는 美國 領事館의 財産을 沒收했다. 2월에 上院議員 조 맥카시는 國務省內 共產主義者의 影響을 받았다고 지목되는 사람들을 향해, 분자 그대로 극적인 일제사격을 가하기 시작했다. 바로 그 달, 中蘇 友好條約이 맺어지면서 초기의 분열이 예견되었던 것이다. 중소 우호가 깊어지면서 그 결과, 國務省內에 있는 “온건파”들의 影響力은 衰退하고 맥아더와 다른 “강경파들”의 날이 도래하는 데, 中蘇關係는 一翼을 擔當하게 되었다.

1950년 봄 클레이 체놀트와 프레스턴 굿펠로우, 윌리엄 도노반 등을 포함한 “사적인” 행동대원들의 검은 네트워크 中國 國民黨의 軍隊에게 美國武器를 追加로 넘기는 동안, 트루만은 타이완에 小規模 武器販賣를 再開할 것을 許諾했다. 國民黨은 체놀트에게 팔았다고 主張했으나, 北京에서는 中國政府의 所有로 남아 있어야 한다고 主張했던 홍콩에 있는 中國政府의 航空編隊의 所有權을 獲得하기 위해 도노반은 全力을 기울였다.

도노반은 中國에 스파이망을 構築하고 본토에 반공 게릴라를 支援하는 計劃에 관해 맥아더나 SCAP 情報部長인 찰스 윌러우비(C. Willoughby)와 함께 토오쿄에서 會談을 가졌다. 參席한 사람들은 모두 도노반의 計劃에 고무되었으며, 非正規的 支援을 하겠다고 約束했다.¹⁵⁾

맥아더는 물론이려니와 이 승만의 美國인 친구이기도 한 프레스턴 굿펠로우는 1950년초 한동안 서울과 토오쿄, 그리고 타이페이 사이를 분주하게 오갔다. 그는 北韓과 中國에 對抗하는 作戰을 遂行할 韓國軍隊와 中國 國民黨의 “外人部隊”를 創設할 것에 대해 言及했다. 1월 그리고 다시 3월에 굿펠로우는 워싱턴에 있는 타이완 대사, 웰링톤 구

(Wellington Koo)에게 맥아더의 “共感할 수 있으며… 本土에서 秘密行動計劃을 遂行할 정도의 保守的 傾向”에 대한 情報을 주었다. 그리고 윌러바이와 SCAP의 다른 간부들은 여전히 장개석 통치하에 있는 타이완에 직접적인 지원을 하는 데 대해 “뿌리 깊은 반대”를 하는 行政府를 속이기 위해, 이런 일련의 作戰들을 遂行하는 데 要求되는 財源을 토오쿄에 集中시킬 것을 提案했다.¹⁶⁾

行政府 政策의 變化는 맥아더의 計劃을 부추기는 結果를 낳았다. 對中國과 日本 政策을 樹立하는 데 重要的 役割을 擔當하는 外交官, 딘 러스크와 존 포스터 덜레스(J.F. Dulles)의 비중이 점점 커짐에 따라, 國務省은 北京에 대해서는 불쾌한 태도를 표명하는 반면, 타이완에 대해서는 동정적인 경향으로 점점 더 기울어졌던 것이다. 딘 러스크와 덜레스는 “대만을 은밀하게 지원하는 행동”을 추진하여 타이완을 방어하고 동남아시아와 한국에 지원을 보장하는 한편, 日本과의 화해를 밀고 나감으로써 “아시아 방어선을 구축”해야 한다고 주장했다. 한편 國務省은 트루만에게 타이완에 제7함대를 급파하여 보호하고 필리핀과 인도지나, 韓國에 軍事援助를 增強하는 同時에 장개석의 “은퇴”를 준비할 可能性에 대해 提案했다.¹⁷⁾

證言에 의하면, 1950년 5월 맥아더는 퇴역 제독 찰스 쿠크(Charles Cooke ; 그는 당시 장개석 고문이었다)와 國民黨員 호시치(Ho Shi-chi) 장군(토오쿄에 있는 聯合軍 日本委員會 委員)과 함께 타이완과 南韓을 連結하는 軍事條約에 관해 意見을 나누었다. 그후 호시치는 윌링톤 구(Koo)에게 이렇게 말했다. 즉 맥아더는 예상되는 北韓의 侵攻을 沮止·擊退시키기 위해, 장개석이 南韓에 수천 명의 國民黨 軍人들을 配置하기를 바란다는 것이었다. 그러나 장개석은 그 댓가로 엄청난 요구를 해냈기 때문에 決定은 遲延되었으며 그 構想에 관한 “討論은 韓國에서

實際로 戰爭이 勃發할 때까지 계속되었다.”¹⁸⁾

구(Koo)는 國防省 官吏들과 덜레스와 함께, 맥아더가 “워싱턴의 公式承認을 얻지 않고” 日本에서 타이완으로 무기와 비행기, 파일럿 등을 팔고 있는 것에 관해 의논했다. 그 자리에서 대사는 몇몇 지원은 이미 “검은 채널”을 통해 이루어지고 있으며, 맥아더와 월러우비는 中國에 첩보망을 구축하여 타이완과 본토의 반공 게릴라들에게 武器를 供給하고 있는 쿠크, 체놀트, 굿펠로우와 함께 일하고 있다고 폭로했다. 한편 韓國에서 戰爭이 發發하면서 새로운 도약에 대한 맥아더의 영향력—그리고 행정부와 싸울 기회—은 고조되었다.¹⁹⁾

II

우선 筆者는 韓國戰爭에서의 맥아더의 役割을 歷史家들이 評價하는 데 있어서, 그의 行動에 대한 批判적인 觀點을 놓쳐 왔다는 점을 입증하고자 한다. 歷史家들은 주로 맥아더의 戰略과 戰術에 관해 贊反으로 나뉘어 저울질하는 데 關心을 기울여 왔다. 즉, 트루만 行政府가 選好하고 있던 “制限戰”과 맥아더의 戰略을 대비하거나 1951년 3월에 있었던 맥아더 召還으로 야기된 大統領과 將軍 사이의 고조된 對決樣相을 分析하는 데 集中해 있었던 것이다. 물론 이런저런 問題들을 주의깊게 分析할 가치는 있겠지만, 學者들은 對中國 戰爭에 관한 그의 비망록을 간과하거나 오해하는 경향을 보여왔다.

韓國에서 戰爭이 일어나자마자, 맥아더는 中國과 共產主義를 撲滅하는 方向으로 戰爭을 擴大시키려는 그의 意圖를 던지시 披瀝했다. 물론 中國에 대한 戰爭으로까지 擴大시키려는 맥아더의 戰略은 北韓을 解放시킨다는 그의 決心을 前提로 하고 있었다. 이러한 발상은 1950년 11월에

中國軍이 韓國戰爭에 介入한 時期보다 훨씬 전에 이루어졌고, 制限戰에 대한 지정학적·정치적 概念과도 거리가 먼 것이었다.

유엔군이 韓國에서 戰爭의 主導權을 掌握하기 이전인 1950년 7월에, 로튼 콜린즈(J. Lawton Collins) 장군과 호이트 반덴버그(Hoyt Vandenberg)는 토오쿄에서 戰爭에 관해 맥아더와 협의했다. 이 자리에서 軍備 增強을 披瀝하는 맥아더의 호소는 바로 앞에 있는 청중들에게 하는 것이 아니라, 더 많은 보이지 않는 청중들에게 연설하는 듯한 인상을 받았다고 콜린즈는 회상했다. 그리고 그는 콜린즈 장군과 반덴버그에게 韓國에서의 승리는 “共產主義 膨脹을 곳곳에서 沮止할 수 있을 뿐 아니라 그 밖의 모든 곳, 특히 유럽에서 共產主義의 侵略에 대해 對備할 必要性을 미연에 방지해 준다”고 장담했다. 맥아더는 “太平洋에 있는 全 艦隊를 掌握하여, 極東地域의 支援을 위해 集中시키기”를 원했다. “이런 決定이 遲延되거나 어정쩡한 조치”가 취해진다면, “큰 재난”을 부르게 될 것이라고 단언했다.²⁰⁾

38도선 양쪽에 있는 共產主義 軍隊를 擊退시킨 후, 맥아더는 다음과 같이 主張했다. 즉, 아직 그렇게 할 權限도 가지고 있지 못하면서도 그는 韓國을 “調整하고 統一시키게 될 것”이라고 하였다. 이에 대해 반덴버그는 맥아더의 이같은 作戰은 中國의 介入을 야기시킬 것이며, 급기야는 “만주로 진격”해야 한다고 주장하게 될 것이라고 우려했다. 맥아더 역시 이 점을 의식했다. 하지만 韓國과 滿洲나 시베리아와의 연결루트는 전적으로 터널과 교량에 의존했기 때문에, “맥아더는 이들 공급루트를 차단하는 데 원자폭탄을 사용할 특별한 기회가 주어질 것으로 보았다.”

맥아더는 타이완을 訪問할 計劃이라고 콜린즈 장군에게 말했다. 韓國에 國民黨의 軍隊를 派遣한다는 장개석의 提案에 대한 자신의 公開의인

關心에도 불구하고, 맥아더는 私적으로는 이것을 反對하고 있음을 認定했다. 그 理由는 貧弱한 裝備에다 訓練조차 제대로 되지 않은 장개석 軍隊는 “수개월 동안 우리 목에 걸려 있는 가시 같은 존재가 될 것”이 틀림없었기 때문이다. 그 대신 맥아더는 美國 軍隊의 充員을 要求하는 한편, 中國 本土를 威脅하는 存在로써 타이완을 樞두를 기회를 원했다. 맥아더는 자신을 방문한 합참의장을 만난 자리에서 고무적인 선언을 했다. “우리는 여기서 이기거나 그렇지 않으면, 모든 것을 잃어버릴 것이다. 여기서 우리가 승리한다면, 우리에게는 그외의 모든 곳에서 승리할 기회가 많아질 것이다.”²¹⁾

中國에 대한 壓力을 강력히 主張하는 데서 한발 더 나아가, 맥아더는 트루만 大統領과 딘 애치슨이 자주 提起하는 이른바 共產主義者의 掌握으로부터 타이완을 保護하는 問題와 장개석 政權의 타이완 支配나 本土 奪還問題를 區別하는 發言을 단호히 拒否했다. 맥아더가 윌리엄 세발드(William Sebald)에게 말한바, “아무리 그(장개석)가 빨과 꼬리가 달린 괴물이라 하더라도” 總統이 “反共主義者인 한 우리는 그를 도와야 한다”는 것이었다. 國務省은 장개석에게 “복수할 생각일랑 잊어버리고... 그를 지원”해야 한다는 것이었다.²²⁾

맥아더가 7월 31일 타이완을 訪問한 데 이어, 國民黨의 政府를 支援해야 한다고 끊임없이 主張하자, 트루만과 參議長은 大統領 보좌관 에이브러햄 해리만(Averell Harriman)과 매튜 리지웨이(Matthew Ridgway) 將軍을 日本特使로 派遣했다. 해리만은 유엔사령관에게 行政府 政策에 異意를 提起하는 일을 삼가하라고 壓力을 가했다. 맥아더는 그의 忠誠을 맹세했지만, “다소 설명하기 어려운 몇 가지 이유 때문에” 그들은 “대만과 장충통을 다루는 方案에 대해 披瀝하는 맥아더의 意見에 완전한 意見一致”를 보는 데 실패했다고 해리만은 쓰고 있다.

맥아더는 트루만의 對韓國 措置에 대한 찬사를 보내면서도 行政府의 中國政策을 조롱했다. 그 결과, 大統領과 國務長官은 “東洋 心理學”에 가장 정통한 미국인 專門家인 맥아더에게 양보를 하지 않으면 안되었다. 서양인들은 “죽음을 두려워한다”고 그는 불평했다. “동양인들에게 삶은 죽음과 함께 시작하는 것이다. 그들은 마치 비둘기처럼 팔짱을 끼고 조용하게 죽어간다”라고 하면서, 맥아더는 팔짱을 끼고 탄식했다.

타이완에 세력을 구축함으로써 中國의 指導力을 위태롭게 할 뿐 아니라 北京의 UN加入을 遲延시킬 것이며, 나아가 “소비에트와 分擔할 可能性이 있는” 마오의 支援을 분쇄할 수도 있다고 맥아더는 斷言했다. “장개석을 흡사시키는”대신에 워싱턴은 中國에서의 은밀한 공작을 위하여 “거대한 잠재력”을 이용해야만 했던 것이다. 물론 맥아더 스스로 그렇게 밝히지는 않았지만, 그는 이미 본토에 對抗할 國民黨의 게릴라 活動을 支援하기 시작했다.²³⁾

리지웨이 장군 역시 맥아더가 완전히 中國과 타이완에 사로잡혀 있다고 判斷했다. 仁川 上陸作戰에 관한 審議會가 한창 進行중인 도중에, 유엔군 司令官은 主題를 계속 탄 데로 돌렸다고 將軍은 回想했다. 맥아더 자신은 共產主義者들이 타이완을 侵攻하리라는 생각을 斷念했음에도 불구하고, 그는 리지웨이에게 “매일밤 무릎을 꿇고 그들이 그렇게 하도록 기도한다”고 말했다. 그렇게 되면 그는 戰線에 나서서 “세계에서 가장 決定的인 戰鬥의 하나가 될 것이 틀림없는 처절한 敗北와 엄청난 災殃을 가져옴으로써 아시아를 뒤흔들어놓고 共產主義者를 擊退시켰을 것”이다.²⁴⁾

전임 國防省 政策計劃 總責任者였던 폴 니츠(Paul Nitze)는 1986년 한 인터뷰에서 맥아더는 韓國戰爭 동안 장개석의 本土 奪還만큼 韓國統一에 關係 關心을 기울이지 않았다고 強調했다. 맥아더는 장개석이 자

기 힘만으로는 本土를 되찾을 수 없음을 알고 있었다. 美合衆國은 “中國의 붉은 軍隊를 擊退해야만 하는데, 그것은 오직 핵무기로서만 可能했다.”²⁵⁾

外國戰爭의 베테랑들의 모임(Veterans of Foreign Wars)이 將軍에게 8월말에 예정된 시카고 大會에 메시지를 보내달라고 요청한 8월 중순경, 타이완 문제는 다시 舉論되었다. 8월 20일, 맥아더는 “臺灣과 太平洋에서의 우리의 戰略과 潛在力과의 關係에 관하여 널리 알려져 있는 오해를 불식시키고자 하는 의도에서 세워진 行政府 政策에 대해 신랄한 批判을 가하는 것으로 對應했다. 그는 타이완을 용기있는 맹우, 장개석(Jiang Jie shi)이 이끄는 “침몰하지 않는 항공모함과 잠수함”(단순히 섬을 보호하는 公式的인 政策 以上の 것을 要求하는 意味에서)이라고 묘사했다.

맥아더는 자신의 “東洋 心理學”에 대한 해박한 지식에 의하면, “아시아인들은 積極的이고 絶對的이며 ダイナミック한 指導力을 尊敬하며 추종한다”고 단언했다. 확실히 그는 自身の 發言을 大統領의 소심한 態度에 대비시켰던 것이다.²⁶⁾

트루만, 애치슨, 헤리만은 맥아더의 베테랑들의 모임(VFW)의 메시지를 行政府로 하여금 장개석에게 “無制限的인 支援”을 하도록 壓力을 가하기 위한 計劃된 發言으로 解釋했다. 모스크바와 北京이 이것을 계기로 美合衆國에 對抗하여 아시아 民族主義를 勾합해 나가게 되지 않을까 하고 애치슨은 우려했다. 그리고 美國의 友邦들은 軍事 및 外交政策이 “統制 不可能한 軍部指揮官”의 指揮 하에 놓여 있다고 結論을 내릴지도 모른다고 생각했다. 美國이 中國의 共產主義者들을 攻撃하는 데 “도약판”으로 작용한다고 확신하고 있던 타이완에 대해 中國의 共產主義者들이 예비공격을 하는 동안, 장개석은 中華人民共和國에 대해 일련의

“도발행위”를 敢行해야 한다는 압박을 받았음에 틀림없다.²⁷⁾

모욕을 당한 트루만이 맥아더에게 이미 공개된 VFW 메시지를 “撤回”하라고 強要하자, 어떤 自身の 支持者와 이야기하는 자리에서 將軍은 “自己의 地位에 威脅을 加하고 있는 國務省의 과벌에 대해 長時間에 걸친 彈劾演說을 토해 냈다.” 그는 “國務省을 웃음거리로 만들었을 뿐만 아니라, 어느 날은 公開的으로 그들을 批判해 나갈 생각이라고 말했다.”²⁸⁾

9월말 仁川上陸 作戰이 敢行되고 北韓軍이 敗走하면서, 美國은 戰爭에 보다 큰 期待를 걸었다. 行政府는 여러 部處에서 提起되고 있던 終戰과 平和 霧圍氣를 일소하는 한편, 무력에 의해서라도 韓半島 全體를 統一시킬 決心을 굳혀 갔다. 10월초 보잘 것 없는 새로운 UN의 결의 아래, 美國 軍隊는 38線을 넘어 압록강을 향해 실패로 운명지워진 進軍을 시작했다.

大部分의 워싱턴 官吏들은 韓國戰爭에 대한 中國의 態度에 관해 맥아더와 意見을 같이하고 있었다. 즉, 이들은 中國이 여러 차례에 걸쳐 경고를 하기는 했지만, 北韓을 防衛하는 戰爭에 介入하는 것은 원치 않을 것이라고 判斷했던 것이다. 일단 美國軍隊가 38線을 넘으면, 北京은 自身の 安保와 危機에 직면한 信賴性에 대해 심각하게 고려할 可能性이 있다는 데에 대한 진지한 검토는 거의 이루어지지 않고 있었다. 중국 소식통들에 의거해 판단해 보건대, 美國이 北韓을 占領하면 기껏해야 만주가 불모가 될 소지가 있다는 점에 대해 中國은 憂慮하고 있을 뿐이라는 것이었다. 설상가상으로 맥아더는 自身の 勝利를 워싱턴으로 하여금 中國에 대한 더욱 敵對的인 政策을 취하도록 부추기는 데 이용했다.²⁹⁾

北京의 戰略家들이 워싱턴의 戰略家들보다 훨씬 分明하게 認識하고 있

있던 것은, 맥아더는 中國이 介入할 危險性에 대해 전혀 고려하고 있지 않을 뿐 아니라 中華人民共和國를 侵攻할 機會를 現實적으로 渴望하고 있다는 점이었다. 물론 將軍은 그 어떤 연설에서도 이 점을 인정하지 않고 있었지만, 확실히 그의 선동발언이나 行爲는 다른 식으로 說明하기는 어려웠다.

인도 대사 K.M. 파니카(Panikkar)가 10월 3일 美軍이 38선을 넘어온다면, 그들은 “中國人の 抵抗을 피할 수 없을 것”이라는 주은래의 威脅을 傳達했을 때, 將軍은 그것을 “단순한 허세”에 불과하다고 일축했다. 그리고 그는 영국 대사 알버리 가스코인(Alvary Gascoigne)에게 北京이 實際로 美國을 沮止할 생각이 있었다면, 그 意思傳達의 채널로 좌경화되어 있는 파니카를 사용하지는 않았을 것이라고 斷言했다. 가스코인은 다음과 같이 보고했다.

“그 어떤 경우에도 맥아더는 만약 中國과 蘇聯이 이 段階에서 競爭者에 參與할 만큼 어리석다면, 中國뿐 아니라 러시아인들까지 適切하게 다룰 수 있는 軍隊는 充分하다고 壯談했다. 中國人들은 그를 잡을 軍隊도 裝備도 空軍力도 없다고 그는 말했다. 물론 맥아더의 이같은 發言도 中國人들이 3주일 전에만 參與했다라면 다른 문제가 되었겠지만 . . .

中國이 介入하면, 맥아더는 즉각적으로 만주와 北京을 包含한 中國北部에 있는 都市들을 겨냥하여 그의 空軍을 풀 것이다. 맥아더는 주은래가 틀림없이 陸海空軍에 保有하고 있는 그의(맥아더의) 방대한 潛在力을 알 뿐 아니라 實感하고 있다고 보았다. 따라서 파니카에게 한 주은래의 發言은 單純한 恐嚇에 불과했다.”³⁰⁾

맥아더의 낙관론과 政治的 逆戰에 대한 두려움에 자극을 받아 그들은 勝戰將軍과 合參議長, 國防將官 조지 마샬, 딘 애치슨 그리고 트루만 大統領으로 하여금 限定된 中國兵力이 介入한다 할지라도 UN 司令官이 압록강으로 進擊하는 데 同意하도록 “壓力”을 가했다. 그리고 그들은 大部分의 細部事項을 맥아더의 “判斷”에 맡겼다. 다만 그의 權限에 制限을 가한 것은 中國領土內 目標物에 대해 軍事的 行動을 敢行하기에 앞서 워싱턴의 承認을 받아야 한다는 단서였다.

아무리 맥아더에게 그의 名目上의 上官을 威脅하는 能力이 있다 하더라도, 中國 指導部는 韓國戰爭에 介入하지 않음으로써 야기되는 危險性이 치러야 할 댓가보다 낫다는 맥아더의 억측을 꿰뚫고 있었다. 北京은 美國의 政策立案者들의 잘못을 깨우쳐 주는 責任까지 맡았다. 훗날 어느 中國 官吏가 밝히고 있듯이, 모택동은 美國의 中國攻擊은 워싱턴에 있는 온건파들이 맥아더 같은 강경파를 억누르는 데 一翼을 擔當할 것이라고 判斷했다.

中國의 戰略家들은 北韓의 中間 地域 부근에 저지선을 구축할 계획이었다. 하지만 압록강으로 막무가내 돌진하는 맥아더의 作戰은 中國 侵略이 점점 더 가까워졌다는 것을 意味했다. 中國軍隊가 11월초에 압록강 남쪽에 짧지만 날카로운 攻擊을 시작하자, 맥아더는 이 攻擊을 단순한 허세로 치부하면서 한술 더 떠 이것을 合參議長과 트루만으로 하여금 자기에게 “攻擊的인 戰爭을 終熄”시키는 前奏曲으로, 민감한 압록강 다리에 폭탄을 투하할 權限을 주도록 壓力을 가하는 미끼로 사용했다. 11월 중순에 맥아더는 윌리엄 세발드에게 中國과 北韓 軍隊가 압록강을 넘어 進擊해 올 때, “韓國戰爭은 끝난다”고 壯談했다. 맥아더가 國境線을 고려했다고 判斷되지만, 아뭏든 計劃된 作戰이 失敗하고 共產黨 勢力이 계속 滿洲에서 北韓으로 流入되자, “軍事的 觀點에서 보건

대, 만주의 主要 地點에 폭탄을 투하하는 것 외에 달리 대안이 없다”고 백아더는 생각했다. 그러면 비록 소비에트 러시아의 역습이 예상되기는 하지만, “노른자위는 불바다가 될 것이 틀림없었다.”³¹⁾

IV

11월말, 백아더의 目的을 면밀히 檢討한 매튜 리지웨이는 백아더가 자신을 “공산주의 용(dragon)을 죽이고 아시아를 구출하는 군인”으로 상상하고 있다고 판단했다.

반면, 트루만 대통령과 에치슨 장관, 마셜 장관, 그리고 합동참모장회의는 “두번째 팀”과 “잘못된 전쟁”을 치르면서 전력을 완전히 소모하게 될 것을 우려했다. 한편 中國攻擊의 規模가 分明해지자, 그들은 주로 美國軍隊를 保護하는 데 關心을 기울이면서 中國과 蘇聯과의 더 擴大된 戰爭을 피하면서 休戰協定을 맺으려고 시도하는 한편, 나토 강화에 박차를 가했다. 韓國에 軍人과 武器를 追加로 投入하는 行爲는 이러한 急先務를 당연히 위태롭게 했다. 文官 및 軍事 企劃家들은 만약 共產主義 勢力이 南韓과 日本, 가능하다면 타이완에 空中攻擊을 敢行할 경우를 대비하여 주로 撤收하거나 應戰하는 데 요구되는 마지막 手段으로서 中國攻擊을 計劃하였다. 戰術的으로는 물론이려니와 戰略的·政治的 理由 때문에 行政府는 원자폭탄의 사용을 거부했다. 行政府는 타이완과 소규모 게릴라 作戰을 遂行하는 데 協力을 하는 反面에, 韓國 또는 주로 對中國作戰에 國民黨의 軍隊를 사용하는 데 대해 강력히 반대했다.

워싱턴 관리들이 이해하기 어려웠던 점은 백아더가 어느 정도로 韓國 戰爭을 個人化시키고 政治的 발판으로 이용하려는가 하는 것이었다. 항

상 그의 마음 속에서는 이 戰爭 아니면 또 다른 戰爭에 매우 重要的 比重을 두고 있었다. 戰爭은 바로 맥아더의 統率力을 訓練하는 場이었던 것이다. 太平洋 戰爭 내내, 맥아더는 國內의 敵들이 “맥아더는 美國이 戰爭에서 勝利하기보다 지기를 원한다”고 말하는 것에 대해 不評을 했다.³²⁾

合參會議에 보낸 그의 儀禮的인 報告書와 수많은 언론 인터뷰에서 맥아더는, 美國은 끊임없이 中國을 威脅하고 攻擊하기까지 해야 한다고 主張했다. 38線을 復舊시킬 것이 아니라, 韓國의 統一을 追求해야 한다고 그는 要求했다. 그는 “制限戰”에 대한 發言을 “유화정책”이라고 일컫는 한편, 韓國이 分斷되는 軍事的 막다른 골목에 이르게 되면, 이것은 그에게 政治的으로 아무런 쓸모가 없을 뿐 아니라 惡影響을 미칠 것이 틀림없다고 判斷했다.

反對로 北韓에서 勝利하고 中國에 들어가 共產黨의 勢力을 沮止시킨다면 冷戰事態로 突入할 것이며, 이러한 狀況은 맥아더에게 엄청나게 強力한 政治的 地位를 부여하게 될 것이었다. 中國이 介入한 지 며칠 후, 將軍은 國民黨의 軍隊를 活用하는 方案에 관해 장개석과 “直接交涉”을 하러 臺灣으로 가게 해 줄 것을 提案했다.³³⁾

하지만, 그 후 맥아더는 自身이 壯談한 “勝利”를 분명히 하는 데 주저했다. 그의 後任者 매튜 리지웨이는 맥아더는 단순히 戰鬥에서 敵軍을 打破하고 民主主義 政權下에 韓國을 統一시키는 것만을 構想한 것은 아니었던 것 같다고 推測했다. 오히려 “그가 마음 속에 그리고 있었던 것은 共產主義에게 다시는 回復할 수 없을 뿐 아니라, 붉은 물결의 歷史的 後退를 가져올 수 있는 大打擊을 줌으로써 世界的으로 共產主義를 敗北시키는 것이었다.” 따라서 맥아더는 “만주에 있는 空軍基盤과 産業體” 그리고 그 밖의 中國의 “産業中心地들”을 破壞시키기를

원했다. 그리고 그는 “共產黨 執權을 粉碎하기” 위해 장개석 軍隊를 무장시켜 本土에 投入시키기를 원했다. “中國 國民들은 장개석이 돌아오면 歡迎할 準備를 갖추고 있다”고 맥아더는 믿고 있었다. 물론 맥아더는 “붉은 中國에 대한 이 예방전쟁”에 소비에트가 참여할지에 대해서는 확신이 서지 않았지만, 소비에트가 참여를 한다면 장군은 “소련에 대한 공격까지 감행하자”고 主張했을 것이라고 리지웨이는 推測했다.³⁴⁾

中國과의 戰爭擴大는 日本과 서유럽을 危險에 빠뜨릴 可能性이 있다고 判斷한 大部分의 트루만 參謀들은 맥아더 戰略에 反對했다. 그들은 美國이 38線을 復舊시키는 休戰協定만 맺으면 다행이라고 判斷했다. 中國에 대한 攻撃은 韓國에서의 撤收를 擔保로 하고, 그리고 中國이 美軍을 南韓에서 쫓아내고 日本을 威脅하는 데 대한 報復을 敢行하는 것을 擔保로 하여야 고려될 수 있는 성질의 것이었다.

맥아더는 北京과의 協商이 아니라 擴戰을 요구했다. 12월 하순, 그는 “만주에 敵軍兵力이 심상치 않게 集中”되고 있다고 밝히면서, 원자폭탄을 사용할 可能性에 대해 提起했다. 그는 “中國 海岸을 封鎖하고 艦砲射擊과 空軍 爆擊으로 中國의 軍需産業能力을 破壞할 것”을 提案했다. 그리고 中國 國民黨의 軍隊를 韓國戰爭에 參戰시키고 “臺灣 駐屯軍에 現存하는 制限을 緩和하고…可能하다면 中國 本土의 脆弱地區에 逆襲을 敢行할 것”을 提案했다. 이런 일련의 措置들은 中國의 戰爭遂行 能力을 “무산시킬” 뿐 아니라, “그 결과 아시아를 이 소용돌이에서 구출할 수 있다”고 맥아더는 보았다. 이 작전에 실패하면, “동남아시아와 일본을 잃는 결과를 낳을 것이며” 나아가 “유럽 자체에서도 패배가 확실시될 것”이라고 그는 예견했다.³⁵⁾

국무성 차관보이자 애치슨의 가장 가까운 아시아 정책의 자문역이기도 한 딘 러스크는 맥아더가 “중국에 대한 전면전”을 강력하게 희망한다고

판단했다. 누구나 中國軍隊가 美 地上軍을 꺾을 것이라고 判斷하고 있었기에, 맥아더의 戰略은 명백히 원자폭탄으로 “中國都市들을 대량 破壞”하기를 要求했다. 트루만과 러스크는 “이 戰略은 일고의 가치가 없다”고 단언했다. 만약 맥아더의 주장대로 한다면, 미국은 “후세에 카인의 낙인이 찍히는 것을 면치 못할 것”이기 때문이었다.³⁶⁾

합參議長 오머 브래들리(Omar Bradley)는 個人的으로 맥아더는 “터무니없이 어리석을 뿐 아니라 완전히 미쳤다. 戰爭을 계속 일으킬 酌定으로 行政府와 JCS 政策을 反對했다. 그는 結果를 전혀 고려치 않고 中國과의 全面戰을 敢行하려 한다”고 結論을 내렸다. 합參會議 사람들은 당황하여 손을 내저을 뿐이었다. 그러나 호이트 반덴버그 장군은 “맥아더는 전혀 그들에게 복종할 리 없기” 때문에 그에게 직접적인 명령을 내리는 것은 아무 소용이 없다고 한탄했다. 그리고 트루만은 私席에서 “평소에 맥아더는 모든 것을 입으로 解決해 왔다”고 불평하면서, 또 다시 그의 파면에 관해 고려하기 시작했다.³⁷⁾

트루만 行政府에 中國과의 戰爭에 突入하도록 壓力을 넣는 맥아더의 努力에도 불구하고 韓國의 實際 戰鬥狀況은 1월에 들어서 膠着狀態에 빠졌다. 제8군 新任 司令官 매튜 리지웨이 將軍은 軍隊를 再集結시켜 무시무시한 勢力으로 엄청나고도 부적절하게 투입되는 中華人民共和國의 義勇軍들을 牽制해 나가기 시작했다. 미군과 유엔군이 아무런 實質的인 보강없이 南韓의 大部分을 掌握했다는 엄연한 事實에 무지했던 맥아더는 中國의 攻擊 權限을 자신에게 부여하지 않는다면, 자기 사단은 “완전한 파괴”에 직면하게 될 것이라는 경고성 발표를 줄기차게 해 나갔다.³⁸⁾

마침내 브래들리와 合同參謀本部는 맥아더의 要求는 實際 戰鬥狀況과 關係가 있는 것이 아니라, “그 自身과 疑心の 여지가 없는 自身の 軍事的 資質을 바보로 만든 붉은 中國의 장군들”에게 복수하고자 하는

그의 熱望과 關聯이 있다는 結論을 내렸다. 그리고 合同參謀 本部는 戰爭 狀況은 變化되고 있을 뿐 아니라, 中國은 北韓에 限定的인 在來式武器를 配置하는 데 그칠 것이라는 리지웨이의 브리핑을 더 신뢰할 만하다고 판단했다. 후에 브래들리(Bradley)장군이 쓰고 있듯이 합동참모 본부는 계속 맥아더에게 메시지를 보내기는 했으나, 그를 더 이상 韓國에서의 決定的인 要素로 간주하지는 않았다. 적어도 그들은 마음 속으로 맥아더는 “합참의장 위에 앉아 있는 사람이었으며, 軍事上의 作戰에 관한 한 명목상의 변덕장이 프리마 돈나임을 목인할 수 밖에 없다”고 판단했다.³⁹⁾

리지웨이 將軍이 1951년초 몇 달 동안 戰線을 固着化시키자, 맥아더는 自身の 役割이 縮小되어 나가는 데 대해 분노를 금치 못했다. 3월에 들어서, 트루만의 보좌관들은 中國이 戰前의 韓國 國境線을 回復하는 것을 겨냥하여 休戰會談을 開始할 意思가 있음을 간파했다. 妥協案으로 協商을 試圖하려는 워싱턴의 움직임은 맥아더를 놀라게 했다. 그로서는 勝利를 獲得하는 데 실패한 非難을 면치 못할 것이기 때문이었다. JCS가 北韓의 中國과 蘇聯의 國境地帶에 있는 追加的 目標에 爆撃을 加하자면 맥아더의 요청을 거부한 후, 윌리엄 세발드는 “피로에 지치고 풀이 죽은” 맥아더를 보았다. 그는 “韓國에서의 그의 任務에 관한 指命이 없는 데” 대해 불평을 늘어 놓으면서, “자기가 무엇을 해야 할지 더 이상 모르겠다”고 투덜댔다.

2월 중순, 맥아더는 海軍封鎖와 空軍力으로 “中國을 일어나게 할 새로운 作戰”을 着眼했다고 세발드에게 밝혔다. 비록 “소비에트가 介入할지 여부에 대해서는 明確한 判斷이 서지 않지만” 이 任務을 遂行하는 데는 1년도 안 걸린다고 장담했다.⁴⁰⁾

맥아더의 回顧錄과 死後에 公開된 몇몇 인터뷰에서, 그는 1951년 2월

에 “최대한 길게 잡아도 10일 이내”에 戰爭을 勝利로 이끌 計劃을 세웠노라고 主張했다. 그리고 將軍은 “방사선으로 황폐화시켜... 敵의 供給路를 遮斷하여 韓國과 滿洲를 分離”시키는 作戰과 並行하여 北韓에 “大量의 空中爆擊”을 敢行할 것을 권했다고 強調했다.

그의 本心은 어떠했든, 봄에 맥아더는 원자폭탄을 使用할 權限을 委任받으려고 애썼던 것만은 事實이다. 3월10일, 그는 合同參謀 本部가 그에게 소비에트가 日本을 攻撃할 것이 틀림없는 “D-Day”에 원자폭탄을 즉각적으로 사용할 수 있는 “權限”을 줄 것을 요청했다. 워싱턴에 문의할 時間的 여유도 없이 러시아의 攻撃에 즉각적으로 반격하는 것은 “필수적”이라고 그는 보고했다. 합참본부는 소비에트가 日本을 威脅할 것이라는 맥아더의 우려에 대해서는 공감했지만, 그들은 러시아인이나 中國人들을 두려워 한 만큼 將軍의 判斷에 우려를 금치 못했다. JCS는 맥아더의 요청을 “고려”해 보겠다는 선에서 교묘하게 빠져 나갔다.⁴¹⁾

맥아더는 공공연하게 트루만 行政府와의 불협화음을 드러내면서 行政府를 신랄하게 批判해 나갔다. 기자들을 앞에 놓고 그는 韓國에서 恣行된 “野蠻的인 殺戮”에 대해 워싱턴은 責任을 져야 한다고 불만을 늘어놓는가 하면, 38선을 부활하려는 計劃에 대해 공공연히 비난했다. 이러한 맥아더의 불평에도 아랑곳없이 行政府는 北京에 韓半島에서의 休戰協定에 이어, 地域紛爭(타이완, 인도지나, 일본 주둔 등)에 관해 協商할 用意이 있다는 意味를 함축한 제안, 즉 平和交渉을 하는 것으로 解決을 보려고 했다.

中國과의 協商을 試圖할 것이라는 展望은 맥아더를 격노케 했다. 平和協商 提案은 자기 管轄地域에 대한 도저히 認定할 수 없는 “軍事的 制限”이라며, 그는 公開的인 非難을 불사했다. 將軍은 中國과의 協商 대신에, 제7함대를 中國 海岸으로 派遣하여 “武力示威를 敢行할”것을 提

案했다. 合參本部는 원자폭탄에 관한 그의 提案 때처럼 교묘히 발뺌을 했다.⁴²⁾

3월 24일, 맥아더는 行政府의 平和提案을 先取함으로써 “힘의 시위를 감행하기”로 결정했다. 토오쿄 言論과의 公開的인 인터뷰에서 맥아더는 權力을 擴大시킬 目的으로 提案한 “붉은 中國”의 要求를 非難하면서 이것은 “현대전에 대한 도전”으로서 不當하기 그지없다고 斷言했다. 맥아더는 行동을 “제한한 제반 금지조치” 아래에서조차 中國은 韓國에서 自身の 目的을 達成할 수 없었다. “적군”사령관이 전장에서 그를 만나 平和를 愛護하지 않는다면, 그는 “붉은 중국”의 “海岸과 國內 施設基盤”을 燻擊하는 戰爭도 불사할 것이라고 위협했다. 하지만, 平和는 타이완 狀況에 아무런 變化를 주지 않을 뿐더러, 中國에게 유엔 의석을 주지도 않으며, 韓國에 어떠한 “犧牲”도 招來하지 않을 것임에 틀림없었다.

맥아더와 토오쿄에 있는 그의 절친한 친구 커트니 위트니(Courtney Whitney)장군이 이 폭탄을 “美國 歷史上 가장 불명예스러운 음모의 하나”를 沮止하기 위한 必死的인 行動이라고 표현했다. 맥아더는 윌리엄 세발드에게 이렇게 말했다. “트루만과 그의 側近들은 臺灣을 붉은 中國에 넘겨줄 음모를 꾸미고 있다.” 맥아더는 中國에 對抗하여 일어나기를 간절히 希望했다. 그리고 北京과의 決戰을 要求하는 大衆의 壓力이 加重되어, 行政府의 平和愛好家들이 허겁지겁 도망치기를 바랐다.⁴³⁾

팬타곤 관리가 그렇게 표현했듯이, 맥아더의 “최후의 폭탄”은 “(위싱턴)아이들을 난처하게” 만들었다. 트루만 측근들은 이것을 國家의 對外政策을 掌握하기 위한 노골적인 시도로 간주하였으며, 마음만 먹으면 중국 내부 깊숙이 들어가서 戰爭을 치를 수도 있다는 그의 공공연한 주장에 몹서리를 쳤다. “맥아더가 한 發言을 다른 사람이 했었다더라면...

그 사람이 당장 해고되는 것은 너무나도 분명한 사실이었을 것이다”라고 政府官吏들은 이를 시인했다. 그러나 많은 사람들은 국방차관 로버트 로베트(R.Lovett)의 의견에 공감했다. 로베트는 인기 없는 전쟁을 끝내는 手段으로서 中國을 모욕한 맥아더의 발언은 대중들 사이에서 광범한 지지를 얻었다고 보았던 것이다. 만약 大統領이 將軍을 파면한다면, 共和黨 議員들은 “속죄양의 편을 들어” 大統領에게 非難을 퍼부을 것이 명약관화했다. 트루만은 맥아더에게 政策을 發表하는 越權行爲에 대한 譴責을 가하는 것으로 그치고, 다음 중대국면을 기다렸다. 「워싱턴 포스트」지 만화가는 트루만이 맥아더 코 앞에 바짝 메시지를 대고 흔들면서 “정직하게 이제 바보짓은 그만 두게!”하고 소리치는데, 장군은 거만하게 자기 지지자들에게 “이것도 다른 서류들과 함께 보관해 뒤”라고 명령하는 만화를 그려서, 당시 상황을 풍자적으로 묘사했다.⁴⁴⁾

V

마치 신호인양 맥아더는 곧 바로 새로운 위기를 야기시켰다. 4월 5일, 야당 원내 총무 조셉 W. 마틴(Martin)은 議會의 質疑에 應答하는 將軍의 電報를 공개했다. 전보내용은 트루만은 中國 國民黨의 軍隊가 本土를 侵攻하는 데 支援함으로써, “아시아에서 제 2 전선”을 열어야 한다는 것이었다. “단 한명의 美軍도 中國本土의 흙을 밟지 않고” 이 戰略은 侵略者를 處斷할 것이며, 韓半島에 대한 壓力을 緩和시키고 미 국민들의 생명을 구할 수 있을 것이라고 마틴은 일찌기 표명한 적이 있었다. 트루만이 戰爭을 勝利로 이끌 計劃을 가지고 있지 않다면, 그는 수천에 달하는 미군 병사들의 “살인자”라는 탄핵을 받아 마땅하다는

것이였다.

3월 20일자 맥아더의 답신(실제로는 平和協商 분위기가 고조되기 전에 작성되었으나, 그 후에 공개되었다)은 마틴의 견해에 박수갈채를 보내고 있었다. 아시아에서 “共產主義 음모자들은… 全 世界를 共產化하려고 갖은 手段을 다 動員하고 있다”라고 맥아더는 主張했다. 따라서 아시아에서의 패배는 자유세계에 最後의 審判을 내리게 될 것이라고 단언했다. 그리고 그는 이렇게 쓰고 있다. “우리는 반드시 이겨야 한다. 왜냐하면 승리를 대치할 것이 아무것도 없기 때문이다.” 장군은 이 답신에 이은 여러 인터뷰에서도 이와 비슷한 논조를 강력하게 주장했다.⁴⁵⁾

이 “어처구니 없는 반항”은 트루만에게 “마지막으로 가중된 짐”이라는 것이 입증되었다. 大統領은 執務室 책상에 있는 캘린더에다 다음과 같이 썼다. “극동에서 일어난 狀況은 將軍을 政治的 存在로 부상시켰다.” 트루만은 자신의 내부회의에서 자기가 내린 결론에 대해 별도로 지지를 표명하기를 바라기는 했지만, 이미 “극동에 있는 大將軍을 파면할 수밖에 없다”는 결론을 내리고 있었다.⁴⁶⁾

맥아더의 위협과 울화통은 동북아시아에서 일어나고 있는 실제적인 군사위기와 일치했기 때문에 특히 더 염려가 되었다. 4월초에 정보원들은 일본 동북부에 소련 잠수함들이 집결하는 것과 때를 같이하여 中國군대가 대규모적으로 증강되고 있다는 정보를 흘렸다. 합참본부는 이 군사력이 유엔 사령부를 한국에서 쫓아내는 것 뿐 아니라, 일본까지 침입하는 새로운 공격을 시도하는 것이 아닌가 우려했다(실제로 군사력 증강은 미국인을 부추기는 맥아더의 위협에 대한 대응이자, 이를 저지시키기 위한 의도를 담고 있었던 듯하다).

이 가능성 있는 위협에 대항하기 위해, 합참본부와 대통령은 민간 원자력 에너지위원회(AEC)의 통제하에 있는 원자폭탄을 공군으로 옮겨

놓기를 원했다. 이에 대해 AEC의장, 고든 딘(Gordon Dean)은 우려를 표명했다. 그는 트루만과 합참본부가 심리적인 군사적 보복력으로 그 가치를 축소시키고 있는 非결정적 전술전에 원자폭탄을 사용할 가능성이 있음을 우려하는 사람이었다. 딘은 “원자폭탄의 효과에 대해 거의 무지에 가까운” 맥아더에게 원자폭탄에 접근하는 것을 허용하는 데 대해 특히 반대했다.

4월 6일, 트루만은 만주에서 일어나고 있는 군사력 증강과 블라디보스톡이나 사할린에 소비에트 함대가 증강·배치되고 있는 사태에 관해 딘과 협의했다. 트루만은 소비에트가 “일본 열도에 진공하여 잠수함으로 우리 일본과 한국 사이의 공급루트를 차단하려는” 시도와 때를 같이하여 한국에서 中國의 새로운 공격이 감행될지 모른다고 우려했다. 그리고 그는 딘에게 원자폭탄 9개를 괄과 오키나와에 예정되어 있는 공군 기지로 옮겨 놓도록 명령했다.⁴⁷⁾

비록 이런 결정을 내리긴 했지만, 트루만은 물론 합참본부도 中國이나 소비에트의 목표물에 원자폭탄 공격이나 의례적인 공격을 할 것을 요구하면서 또 사건을 일으킬 가능성이 있는 자리에 더 이상 맥아더를 앉혀 놓을 의사는 전혀 없었다. 트루만이 “맥아더를 너무 의식한 나머지 (폭탄 수송과 中國공격 권한에 관한) 메시지를 숙고에 숙고를 거듭한 끝에 보류했음”을 오머 브래들리 장군은 시인했다.⁴⁸⁾

이 딜렘마는 트루만과 그의 측근들로 하여금 駐韓 사령관을 제거하는 결단을 내리도록 강요했다. 맥아더 자리에 믿을 만한 관리를 임명함으로써, 대통령은 다음과 같은 이점을 얻게 되었다.

1) 트루만은 공화당과 연합한 무자비한 흑평가로부터 벗어날 수 있었다. 2) 국내 사안들에 힘을 기울일 수 있게 되었다. 3) 신임 사령관에게 맥아더에게는 부여하지 않았던 권한을 줌으로써 자신의 결정에 대

한 합참본부의 지지를 확인할 수 있었다. 그리고 4) 원자폭탄의 이동을 의도적으로 누설함으로써 중·소의 군사력 증강을 저지할 수 있었다.

4월 8일, 합참본부와 트루만의 유력한 민간인 고문들은 맥아더의 파면을 제기했다. 다음날 대통령은 그의 스탭진들에게 “확실히 맥아더가 파면되기를 원한다”고 밝힘으로써 자신의 동의를 알렸다. 협의결과, 맥아더가 집적하고 있는 몇몇 자리에 리지웨이를 임명하기로 결정했다. 태평양으로 보낼 원자무기의 선적이 시작된 4월 10일, 트루만은 필요한 명령서에 사인을 했다. 대통령은 그의 결정의 두 가지 요소를 결코 공개적으로 연결시키지는 않았다.⁴⁹⁾

트루만이 맥아더를 소환하기 며칠 전에, 맥아더는 그의 측근들에게 자신은 분명히 파면당할 것이라고 말했다. 맥아더는 “그의 파면이 대만을 붉은 中國에 넘기려는 워싱턴의 각본의 일부라고 암시”했다. 다음으로 필리핀이 넘어갈 것이고 그 다음은 일본이 넘어갈 것이며, 마침내 “극동지역에서의 미국의 지위는 모두 산산조각이 날 것”이라고 단언했다.⁵⁰⁾

맥아더의 예언은 전혀 적중되지 않았다. 그의 희망에도 불구하고, 보류상태에 있던 의회조사와 中國과의 휴전회담이 시작되면서 대중들과 공화당은 맥아더의 전략과 대통령 입후보에 흥미를 잃었다. 이런 일련의 사태에도 아랑곳없이 맥아더는 자신은 한 세대 동안 中國과 미국 사이에 가로놓여 있는 장벽을 허무는 데 일익을 담당했다고 자위했다. 감히 이렇게 말해도 무방하다면, “가장 위대한 동양 심리학의 미국인 권위자”는 아시아 현실에 대해 거의 무지했을 뿐 아니라, 미국 정치에 대해서는 더더욱 그러했다. 맥아더는 건설자 역할을 한 것이 아니라 방해자 역할을 했던 것이다. 맥아더가 파괴하기를 갈망했던 中國의 정

권과 우호적인 관계를 맺게됨으로써, 마침내 아시아에 있어서의 미국의 정책은 평화적인 균형을 유지하게 되었다.

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THE SECOND INTERNATIONAL
CONFERENCE ON THE KOREAN WAR
JUNE 14~15, 1990
SEOUL, KOREA

**Negotiating with Friends-Negotiating
With Enemies: The Politics of Peacemaking
at the Korean Armistice Talks**

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The Korean armistice negotiations - lasting some two years and requiring 575 meetings to effect a settlement - represented one of the most difficult bargaining processes of the cold war period. With the improvement in US/UN battlefield fortunes following on from the defeats in the winter of 1950/51, and the failure of the Chinese-North Korean offensives in April/May 1951, the time had seemed ripe in mid-1951 for settling the conflict. The Truman administration's desire to maintain unity among its Western allies, coupled with the realisation that any significant push into North Korean territory would encounter stiffer enemy resistance, encouraged a tempering of American objectives. The Chinese inability to overcome the problem of their over-extended supply lines, and a suspicion that the outcome of their most recent offensives owed something to America's successful adaptation of one of their own strategies - that of "luring the enemy deep" into hostile territory - also convinced the PRC and North Korean leaderships of the need to contract their goals. An armistice therefore seemed mutually advisable and desirable.

Why then did this conflict prove so difficult to resolve? Until comparatively recently and with the publication of the works of, most notably, Barton Bernstein, Burton Kaufman and Callum MacDonald, (1) the dominant explanation for the long drawn out nature of the

talks derived from the conclusions of those who had been closely involved with the negotiations on the U.S. side. Charles Turner Joy, William H. Vatcher, Matthew B. Ridgway, Mark Clark (2) (among others) all provided graphic accounts of what for them had been a gruelling experience. Their accounts also influenced those interested in the more theoretical questions surrounding bargaining and strategy; for example, Fred Iklé in How Nations Negotiate (1964) referred frequently to the Korean experience in his influential work, as did Bernard Brodie in War and Politics, (1973). These various authors have argued that the UN Command (UNC) had proved to be a weak negotiator and had made concession after concession to the patient and intransigent Chinese, whose own negotiating demands grew ever larger. More particularly, they have argued that US administrations were unwilling to use the military force that was necessary to convince the Communists to concede; rather, they allowed their enemies to engage them in a war of attrition, in which the Communists were willing to expend the lives of their soldiers, while Americans became ever more eager to end the fighting.

This portrayal of US flexibility in contrast to Communist intransigence has never been, of course, an adequate explanation for the lengthy nature of these negotiations. It neglects detailed consideration of the difficulties of successfully applying coercive diplomacy. It ignores the impact that the use of military personnel had on discussions that were highly political in nature.

Such a depiction of a U.S. willingness to compromise also neglects the presence of domestic political critics in America who were only too ready to equate compromise with that negative term "appeasement." This portrayal also does not take into account the complicated decision-making structure present during the Korean negotiations. As head of the UN Command, the United States did play the dominant role in the talks but was still constrained, not only by Western allies whose preferences were for flexibility, but also by Asian allies, notably the Republic of Korea (ROK), who encouraged intransigence. Neither does this depiction of the U.S. role in the discussions consider the delay that policy divisions within the administration caused, divisions between those officials out in Korea and those in Washington, in addition to those among officials from different executive departments in the nation's capital. These opposing positions were frequently to be forged into a policy consensus during the course of the negotiations rather than prior to the talks.

Though each of these features warrants further discussion, this paper will focus only on these latter elements in the armistice negotiations - inter-allied bargaining and inter-departmental discussion. It will concentrate on the U.S. role in the process and predominantly on the first nine months of the armistice discussions, since it was during this period when most progress was made and when agreement came tantalizingly close.

U.S. ATTITUDES TOWARDS NEGOTIATION

If we examine more closely the Americans who were involved in these armistice talks, we encounter many who had long been known to feel uneasy with the notion of compromise and lengthy negotiation. President Truman once complained that 17 days was too long to negotiate the great issues at Potsdam ("why in 17 days you can decide anything", he said (3)). Acheson's dislike of negotiating with adversaries except from a position of strength has often been noted. The joint State-Defense Department study, NSC 68, described by one of Acheson's biographers as a "thoroughly Achesonian exposition," eschewed diplomacy as a means of dealing with Moscow, seeing such action as a distraction from "building positions of strength around the Soviet periphery." (4) Acheson's Republican successor, John Foster Dulles, has also been described as reluctant to enter into negotiations, believing that when an opponent sought to negotiate, this was "a sign of weakness and/or failure." (5) In these circumstances, Dulles believed it best to drive home the advantage.

The civilian dislike of negotiation was even more pronounced (not surprisingly) in the military branch of government. Yet it was precisely these officials who were chosen to search for a settlement of the Korean conflict. Though it was politically useful for the United States to be able to claim it was confining the armistice discussions to military matters between field commanders - as Acheson said, it avoided the issue of US

non-recognition of the PRC and DPRK, and prevented such questions as the status of Taiwan and Chinese membership of the United Nations being raised (6) - it also meant that those directly engaged in the talks had little experience of and no stomach for the task. As the RAND specialist assigned to the negotiating team suggested, what the military negotiators would have preferred was final positions that they could stick to rigidly in order "to avoid the difficulties of negotiating." 7 The UNC team's distaste for the bargaining process was also reflected in the virulently hostile and racist terms in which they described the opposing negotiating team: "treacherous savages" in the UN Commander's view, "common criminals" in the chief UN negotiator's opinion. (8)

There was little inherent in military training, with its emphasis on action and concrete achievement, that was appropriate to such a passive process. U. Alexis Johnson, Deputy Asst. Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs during the Korean conflict, subsequently claimed that for these kinds of reasons he had been against the military being used in the truce negotiations: "They were not practiced in foiling propaganda ploys or keeping cool during deliberately offensive harangues about themselves and their country." Furthermore, he regretted their lack of negotiating experience and the need for their instructions to come through "military channels as orders which tended to produce a certain rigidity in how they were implemented." (9) However, the State Department should bear primary responsibility for contributing to

that outcome since it refused Ridgway's request that his delegation be provided with political advisers. The Chinese were not to make a similar mistake. Chiao Kuan-hua, who headed a department at the Foreign Ministry, was in the background at Panmunjom throughout and was joined by a Vice Foreign Minister and, for a time, by the Director of the American and Oceanian Department in the ministry. (10)

The Decision-Making Structure - interallied relations

The negative attitude towards the negotiations undoubtedly slowed their progress. However, other factors served to complicate the search for an agreement, notably the complex decision-making structure that existed for each protagonist.

It should be noted, for example, that the Communist negotiating team was made up of two military commands. Though it is difficult to establish the relationship between these two, indications are that the Chinese (whose troops controlled 3/4 of the front line) dominated the formulation of policy objectives but were not entirely unresponsive - at least in the first year of the talks - to North Korean preferences. The Soviet role also merits consideration since it was clear that Moscow, as head of the socialist camp and as the sole supplier of North Korean and Chinese military equipment, did intervene at significant moments in the negotiating process. Malik's broadcast in June 1951 and Moscow's role in November 1952 during the UN General Assembly debate on

the armistice negotiations are but two examples of how the USSR could intervene to shape developments.

However, to concentrate on the American side of this decision-making structure: while, as head of the UN Command, the US government played the dominant role in the talks, formulating and transmitting policy positions through national rather than through UN channels, nevertheless, those nations contributing to the war effort on the UN side did have some influence over US policy choices. The necessity for maintaining this allied coalition thus often required negotiations, too, though of a rather different kind from those taking place at Panmunjom.

Britain, Canada, France, Australia, among other Western allies, all hoped for a relatively speedy end to the Korean conflict and often attempted to persuade Washington to be more flexible in the truce negotiations. Though these allies were constrained in their criticism of US policy - especially by the argument that failure to support Washington's objectives could result in Congressional retribution in the form of the renewed appeal of unilateralism and reduced financial assistance - having chosen the UN route, US administrations had to remain at least outwardly responsive to other nations' initiatives. Furthermore, should Washington become too dismissive, it risked the possibility that attempts would be made to take negotiations out of its hands and to place them into those of the UN Security Council or General Assembly. Allied support for certain US policy

positions had therefore to be gained and while these same Western allies could help prevent the UNC team from issuing ultimatums and breaking off talks, they could also serve to delay the presentation of UNC negotiating positions while their agreement was sought. The formulation of the "greater sanction" policy was a particular example of this type of complication.

In mid to late November 1951, a State-Defense department consensus was being forged on the type of inspection thought necessary to prevent the future violation of the armistice agreement. However, Defense would only agree to moderate its position on inspection inside the demilitarized zone (DMZ) and at key points outside of it, provided the State Department could get allied and particularly British agreement to a statement (to be known as the "greater sanction") making it plain that if the Communists violated the armistice, then retaliatory action - bombing of northern China and blockading the China coast - would be forthcoming. (11) The question was thus raised with the British ambassador in Washington on November 21, but the first substantive discussion of the proposal with the British foreign minister did not take place until November 28 when Western allies had gathered in Rome for a NATO meeting.

The major inducements offered Anthony Eden to gain his agreement to the greater sanction statement was the prospect of an armistice sooner rather than later and a willingness on Acheson's part to allow Eden to remain uncommitted to specific courses of action against China.

Nevertheless, the British foreign secretary was still lukewarm about the proposal, especially about the notion of a blockade against the PRC. (12) Consultations with Cabinet colleagues on the matter were essential, Eden argued, and not until December 3 was he able to provide their view which stipulated that the United States should continue the search for an acceptable inspection system and only in the event that the UNC team failed to achieve this, would the greater sanction policy come into operation.

The Truman administration would not accept these qualifications, however, believing that, regardless of the extent of inspection achieved, a statement carrying the threat of retaliation would be necessary to deter the Communists from a renewal of hostilities at some future date. Thus, further discussion with the UK government ensued. (13) Though committed in principle, London worked to soften the terminology that the U.S. administration initially wished to see used to describe the greater sanction. Whereas the first American draft of the greater sanction statement implied that in the event of renewed aggression the countries responsible would receive full retribution without geographical limitation, the British wished to propose a weaker formula that read: "in the event of a renewal of aggression, it might not be possible to confine hostilities to Korea." A compromise was necessary and found when the Truman administration countered with: "the consequences of such a breach of the armistice would be

so grave that, in all probability, it would not be possible to confine hostilities within the frontiers of Korea."¹⁴ Other governments, such as the Canadian, Australian and South African, followed the British lead in recommending textual changes and eventually, like Britain, gave their assent to the modified wording. However, the position for the UNC negotiators in Korea was that well over a month had passed since this agenda item had been introduced into the discussions at Panmunjom, a month during which the delegation had more or less marked time.

If Western allies could then prove to be a mixed blessing where forward movement in the talks was concerned, the South Korean government unequivocally was to prove a detriment to progress. South Korea was in many respects a dependent state but its President, Syngman Rhee, could demonstrate the "power of the weak" by the extreme and unexpected nature of his actions and, more tangibly, by threatening to withdraw ROK forces from the UN Command, troops that held 2/3rds of the line. There were limits as to how far Rhee would be allowed to go - as the development of contingency plans in Washington to remove him demonstrated - (15) but, still, he could block the path to agreement in myriad ways. For example, not only were ROK army units responsible for causing a number of incidents within the neutralized area surrounding the conference site (16) which increased the level of animosity between the two delegations and interrupted the talks, but Seoul was also responsible for

stiffening the UNC's position on the rejection of the 38th parallel as the ceasefire line. Administration officials believed that any attempt to agree a settlement on that line "would have incalculably explosive results in the ROK" (17); and should there have been any doubt in the administration's understanding of that, Rhee threatened to withdraw his cooperation with the armistice efforts. Rhee's tactics represent only part of the explanation of why the UNC would not agree to a ceasefire based on the status quo ante - the administration advanced strong military and psychological arguments to support an improved geographical position - but the South Korean President's adamant stand, backed by allies in Congress only too ready to label agreement at that line an "appeasement peace", made its mark on the Truman administration and contributed to its inflexibility on this agenda item.

In other ways, too, Rhee could force his preferred position on UNC negotiators. On September 20, 1951, for example, the same day that Beijing and Pyongyang had suggested the resumption of negotiations (in recess since August 23) Rhee maintained publicly that despite an imminent move towards an agreed ceasefire at the line of contact between opposing forces, the city of Kaesong should come into UNC hands. Admiral Joy, chief UNC negotiator at that point, recorded in his diary that the reason the delegation had put forward the proposal for the retention of Kaesong was as a "sop to the ROK government." (18) Its effect was to hold up agreement on

the demarcation line, which had otherwise been resolved in principle, for over two weeks.

More dramatic still was the ROK leader's decision right at the close of negotiations to release those North Korean prisoners in UN custody who had recorded that they did not wish to be repatriated, rather than letting them be handed over to the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission (NNRC) as had been agreed. While the US administration struggled to curtail Rhee from initiating further unwelcome moves of this kind, the UNC team in Korea sought to assure the Communists that any armistice agreement would be honoured by the South Koreans. As with the earlier position concerning Kaesong, Rhee's actions on this occasion served to delay the signature of the armistice agreement by a further month. Moreover, in Robert D. Murphy's view, Rhee bore the responsibility for thousands of extra casualties, for without South Korea's action, Murphy believed that an armistice would have been signed in time to avoid them. 17

Earlier, in May 1953, Western allied and South Korean positions were to be sharply pitted against each other. In the final stages of the discussion of the prisoner of war policy, the Eisenhower administration agreed with the UN Commander's suggestion that the Korean prisoners who did not wish to be repatriated to the North should not be handed over to the repatriation commission, but should be released in the south of the country as soon as the armistice agreement had been initialled. The US also argued that the Neutral Nations Repatriation

Commission should operate on the basis of unanimity in its voting. Both of these policy positions had been put forward in order to placate Rhee (and some of his supporters in the US Congress) and to win his acceptance for the armistice agreement. However, these positions were to prove unacceptable to the Western allies. Only with "great difficulty", for example, was the Canadian foreign minister restrained from publicly denouncing the latest UNC stand on the POW policy. In Parliament, Winston Churchill berated the U.S. truce negotiators for dragging their feet. As Ward P. Allen on the European Desk in the State Department put it, anxiety and concern were being expressed in the Netherlands, Britain, Canada, Australia, Belgium, New Zealand and Italy, as well as in neutral nations. Walter Bedell Smith warned that the position with the allies was deteriorating daily while Rhee continued to foment "public opposition to any armistice along present lines." In this instance, Smith recommended that the administration establish a compromise with its Western allies, offering Rhee "the bait of a security guarantee" to get him to support the newly amended U.S. negotiating position. ²⁰ Meanwhile, further animosity was created between the negotiating teams at Panmunjom, and further delays were introduced into the talks after the period when the major concession over the POW issue had been made.

The Decision-Making Structure - bureaucratic debates

Allies from East and West served to complicate the negotiating process for the United States, but so too did

members of the Truman and Eisenhower administrations, notably those directly engaged with the talks in Korea. On occasion, it was less a question of transmitting policy positions from Washington and having them introduced into the cease-fire proceedings, and more a matter of negotiating between the executive branch and the UN Commander in the field. It was as if there was a double set of negotiations in progress at times - between Washington and Tokyo as well as between the UNC and the Communist commanders. (21)

On nearly every point at issue in the first nine months of the negotiations, General Ridgway (UN Commander) showed considerable reluctance to modify UNC negotiating positions, even when his team in Korea had opened the bid well above the minimum requirements. As early as July 15, for example, the UN Commander informed Washington that he would be willing to recess the conference over the Communist agenda item concerning foreign troop withdrawal. On July 20, he went further and requested complete support for his decision to interrupt the talks unless the Communists accepted the four agenda items already agreed upon. Moreover, he wanted to issue this ultimatum publicly, a course which Washington did not approve. In the administration's view, it would raise the prestige factor to such a degree for the Communists as to make it more difficult for them to concede the point. In addition "world opinion". Ridgway was told, would not support breaking off the talks over this particular issue. (22)

These requests, made right at the start of the negotiations, indicated the mood in which Ridgway approached these discussions. He was also capable of tying the Truman administration to positions it did not feel strongly about. During the recess in the talks between late August and October 1951, over the alleged violation of the conference site's neutrality, Ridgway refused to reopen discussions at the original conference location of Kaesong and pressed to renew the meetings at Panmunjom. When on September 20, the Communists had proposed resuming at Kaesong, Ridgway's intended reply was so angry in tone that an immediate redrafting exercise began in Washington. The UN Commander was subsequently instructed to delete the "purple adjectives" which gave his message "a necessarily truculent tone", though the substance of his response remained unchanged. (23) It survived, therefore, as a tough message (if a little more courteously phrased) but still unbending on the point of Kaesong, a matter that Washington did not feel strongly about. As Charles Bohlen (State Department Counsellor) acknowledged on September 26, the administration had got itself tied up quite unnecessarily over the location question, but now that the issue had been raised publicly, it was difficult for the UN Command to back down. (24)

Further disagreement between Tokyo and Washington occurred in late September 1951. When it seemed probable that the talks would shortly resume, Ridgway announced that the UNC negotiating team would be proposing a DMZ of

some 20 kilometres north of the battle line and that only if Beijing and Pyongyang dropped their insistence on the 38th parallel as the ceasefire line, would he allow the delegation to offer concessions. To do otherwise, he warned, would be taken as a weakening of America's position.

As with the General's earlier suggestions, this proposal initiated more discussions in Washington, the dominant view being that Ridgway's proposed course of action took no account of the Communist concessions that were in the making on August 23, that the southern boundary he was proposing took in some territory beyond his present positions, and that he was not even suggesting the line of contact as the southern boundary of the DMZ. General Bradley, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, concluded from this that the UN Commander had "decided not to follow our views." (25)

These tensions over the approach to the negotiations occasioned a trip to Korea later that month by Bohlen and Bradley. However, the visit accomplished less than it might have done because Ridgway's thinking seemed to have a greater impact on these two officials than did Washington's on the UN Commander and his negotiating team. As Admiral Joy recorded in his diary (a report that was subsequently confirmed by Bohlen's account of the meeting) the Commanders in Korea had convinced Bradley and Bohlen of the UNC's favourable military position and in consequence it had been agreed with the two officials that "we would not be in a hurry to meet

with Commies or present our new UNC proposed zone...Time and the approach of winter is working to our advantage. Therefore, it is better from our stand point not to hurry a meeting of the delegations." (26)

Those directly concerned with the negotiations out in Korea continued, then, to adopt approaches that were harsher than those thought necessary in Washington, but perhaps because of the Defense department's respect for the tradition of allowing the Commander in the field as full a latitude as possible they proved reluctant to educate him fully about thinking in Washington and in allied capitals. The result was that already complex negotiations met with additional, probably avoidable, obstacles. Political direction of the conduct of the negotiations should have been much greater. Ridgway should have had a number of high-ranking foreign service personnel directly attached to the negotiating team, providing it with advice and reminding it of some of the broader points at issue. (27) Instead, a great deal of responsibility remained in the hands of military men, unfamiliar with the idea of bargaining, and whose troops were still fighting the forces of those with whom they were conducting the discussions.

There seems little doubt, however, that the UNC negotiators' task was made that much tougher still as a result of policy positions remaining fluid in Washington, even as discussions were well-advanced on particular points. Though it was essential for the administration to remain responsive to Communist negotiating

initiatives, Washington nevertheless sometimes seemed uncertain about the objectives it sought.

The inspection questions and POW policy, for example, (agenda items 3 and 4) were both debated simultaneously in Washington and at the conference site. On the eve of the negotiations, the US position on item 3 had been to seek to organize a ceasefire commission with supervisory powers and powers of inspection entailing free and unlimited access to the whole of Korea in order to ensure that there was no reinforcement of men or materiel or preparations for the renewal of hostilities. In early October, Ridgway suggested that the UNC did not need unlimited inspection since this would not ensure security but would only "multiply serious causes for friction..with no comparable gain." Joint inspection at ground, sea, and air ports of entry, plus joint observation of the DMZ would be sufficient, he argued.

(28) A State official, in response to this proposal went even further and recommended, simply, joint inspection of the DMZ, on the grounds that even if there were a build-up of troops or supplies, the UNC would be unlikely to take any action unless such increases were accompanied by an overt act of aggression. (29)

This suggestion in turn initiated an intense debate between State and Defense with the latter trying to support Ridgway's proposal whilst the former department began discussion with UN allies on the greater sanction statement. Such activity also instigated a consideration of related issues concerning the relative

merits and demerits of allowing the rehabilitation of facilities in Korea, with the eventual decision that repairs would be permissible with the exception (at that stage) of airfields. (30) Meanwhile, discussions at Panmunjon on item 3 had finished their second week.

Similar fluidity characterised the administration's POW policy. Briefly, the initial position was to press for an exchange of POWs on a one for one basis until all UNC prisoners were released, and then the remaining Communist prisoners would be returned. On July 5, however, the army's chief of psychological warfare first raised the issue of whether all POWs in UNC camps should be repatriated, given that in his view many would likely be "severely punished, sentenced to slave labor, or executed," an outcome that would have a detrimental impact on future US psychological warfare operations. The Joint Chiefs' and Secretary of Defense's early interest in the political benefits of such a policy was quashed, however, when Acheson pointed out that the "overriding consideration should be the prompt return of all UN and ROK POWs." (31)

However, in late October, the President raised doubts about the morality of sending back those prisoners who had "cooperated" with the UNC administration in the camps, (32) a remark that initiated and shaped a new phase of the policy debate. By December 7 Ridgway was being instructed to introduce the notion of non-forcible repatriation for POWs at the talks, though he was told

that it was not necessarily the administration's last word on the topic.

Positions were crystallizing, however, and when Acheson reversed himself and began fully to support giving prisoners a choice concerning their destination on release, the argument was as good as over, especially since the few with doubts were insecure about advancing a position that contradicted presidential predilections. (Domestic developments further confirmed the wisdom of Acheson's and Truman's position as some 60 Senators made moves to table a resolution calling on the administration to be unflinching in its support for non-forcible repatriation). At the end of the February, therefore, the policy consensus was finally reached, the decision being that force would not be used to return prisoners; (33) but it was some two and a half months since discussion had begun on this agenda item.

CONCLUSION

These features associated with the Korean armistice negotiations illustrate some - although by no means all - of the reasons why the talks proved to be such a lengthy process. They demonstrate, much as Snyder and Diesing have argued, ³⁴ that a considerable part of bargaining activity will be directed towards gaining the support and commitment of one's own allies. They also show the utility of being sensitive to intra-governmental bargaining models, while taking account of a background of shared images and shared values. In focussing on the "negotiations with friends" and not just on the

"negotiations with adversaries", bargaining takes on a more multi-layered complexion. In the Korean case, attention to inter-allied and inter-departmental negotiations also shows that there was a kind of negotiating continuum in place: between the two extremes of flexibility and inflexibility in policy positions, with coalitions forming at or near one or other of these polar opposites. Though the composition of these groupings did vary over time, and leaving aside (as has been the case throughout this paper) domestic political factors, we can see arrayed towards the inflexible end of the continuum the military commanders in Korea, certain members of the Pentagon in Washington and the South Korean government. Conversely, towards the flexible end, there were the Western allies, and certain members of the State Department. Where the Presidents and their Secretaries of State chose to settle along this line was vital to the success or failure of one coalition's policies and to the perception of the best means of achieving certain objectives at the talks. Negotiating with friends might not have been as difficult as negotiating with the enemy but the energies that had to be devoted to that activity, especially in the circumstances of the Korean conflict, were clearly considerable.

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April 1990

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敵과의 協商과 友邦과의 協商：
休戰會談에서의 和解政治

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目 次

I. 協商에 대한 美國의 態度	6
II. 意思決定構造－同盟相互間の 關係	8
III. 意思決定構造－官僚들의 論議	14
IV. 結論	19

協定の 調印을 위해 2년여의 期間을 끌고 575차례의 會議을 필요로 했던 韓國의 休戰協商은 冷戰時代의 가장 어려웠던 흥정 과정의 하나였다. 1950~51년 冬季 作戰의 敗北와 1951년 4~5월에 걸친 中國과 北韓軍의 攻擊 失敗의 結果, 國際聯合과 美國의 전황이 개선됨에 따라서 1951년 중반에는 戰爭을 종결시키기 위한 시기가 成熟한 것으로 인식됐다. 西歐의 盟邦들과의 團結을 유지하고자 했던 特루만 行政府의 희망하며 北韓의 領土로 어떤 형태로든 진격을 할 경우 敵의 완강한 抵抗에 직면하게 될 것이라는 認識과 結合하여 美國의 목표물들을 緩和할 것을 권장했다. 지나치게 擴大된 補給線의 문제를 해결할 수 없었던 中國의 立場과, 최근의 대부분의 공세의 전과는 美國이 敵을 상대방의 領土로 깊숙히 誘引한다는 그들의 戰略들 중의 하나를 성공적으로 適用한 덕분에 획득한 것이 아닌가 하는 會議로 말미암아 中國人民共和國과 北韓의 指導者들은 그들의 목표를 縮小할 필요를 실감하게 됐다. 따라서 休戰은 서로에게 권장할 만하고 바람직한 것으로 보여졌다.

그렇다면 이 戰爭은 왜 그토록 和解하기 어려웠을까? 비교적 최근까지 바튼 번스타인(Barton Bernstein), 버튼 코프만(Burton Kaufman) 그리고 칼럼 맥도날드(Callum Macdonald)와 같은 사람들의 著作들에서는¹⁾ 會談이 오래 끌었던 것은 美國 측에서 協商과 밀접하게 연결됐던 사람들이 내린 結論 때문이었다라는 설명이 支配的이었다. 찰스 터너 조이(Charles Turner Joy), 윌리엄 배처(William H. Vatcher), 매쓰유 리지웨이(Matthew B. Ridgway), 마크 클라크(Mark Clark)는²⁾ 모두 그들에게 혹독한 經驗이었던 것에 관한 생생한 說明을 하고 있다. 그들의 說明은 또한 흥정과 전략을 둘러싼 理論的인 문제들에 관심을 가진 사람들에게 영향을 끼쳤다. 예를 들어 프레드 이클(Fred Ikle)은 「國家들은 어떻게 協商하는가」(1964)에서 버나드 브로디(Bernard Brodie)가

그의 「戰爭과 政治」(1973)에서 그러했던 것처럼 韓國의 經驗을 자주 언급했다. 이러한 여러 저자들은 UN軍이 나약한 協商者라는 것을 立證했으며 協商의 필요성이 점점 증대돼가는 끈질기고 非妥協적인 中國에게 양보를 거듭했다고 주장했다. 보다 구체적으로 그들은 美行政部가 共產主義者들이 敗北를 是認하게 하는 데 필요한 軍事力을 사용하는 데 주저했다고 주장한다. 오히려 美 行政府는 그들의 敵이 자신들을 소모전에 끌어들이는 것을 허용했으며, 그 가운데서 共產主義者들은 그들의 兵士들의 생명을 연장한 반면에 美國은 戰鬥을 終熄시키는 데 더 열심이었다는 것이다.

이렇게 美國의 유연성을 共產主義者들의 非妥協性에 대비하여 묘사하는 것은 물론 이 協商이 장기적인데 적절한 說明이 결코 되지 못한다. 그것은 成功的으로 적용된 強制外交의 難點들에 관한 면밀한 고려를 외면한다. 그것은 그 성격상 고도로 政治的인 論議에 軍事要員을 사용하는 것이 주었던 충격을 무시한다. 美國이 기꺼이 妥協하고자 했다는 그러한 설명은 妥協을 '유화'라는 부정적인 用語와 동일시하는 데만 몰두했던 美國內의 政治的인 批判의 대두를 무시한다. 이러한 묘사는 또한 韓國戰의 協商過程 중에 나타난 복잡한 의사결정 구조를 고려하지 않는다. UN軍의 주축으로서 美國은 會談에서 支配的인 役割을 하기는 했으나, 美國은 유연성을 選好하는 西歐의 同盟國들에 의해서 뿐만 아니라 아시아 同盟國들에 의해서, 특히 非妥協을 고수하는 大韓民國에 의해서도 여전히 制約을 받았다. 뿐만 아니라 會議에서의 美國의 役割에 대한 이러한 묘사는 行政府內에서의 政治적 異見들, 곧 韓國의 官僚들과 워싱턴의 官僚들 사이의 異見, 아울러 美國 資本의 서로 다른 執行部處들 사이의 異見들이 야기한 會談의 지체를 무시한다. 이러한 對立되는 立場들은 會談 前이 아니라 會談 過程 중에 政治적 합의로

곧잘 僞造되곤 했다.

이러한 특징들은 각각 더욱 論議해야 하겠지만, 이 論文은 休戰協商에서의 이러한 後者의 요소들, 다시 말해서 同盟國들 사이의 행정과 部處들 사이의 논의에 관해서만 초점을 맞추겠다. 이 논문은 그 과정에서 美國의 役割, 그것도 주로 休戰論議의 최초의 9개월간의 기간에 집중되겠는데, 그것은 이 시기에 대부분의 진전이 이루어지고 協定이 감질나게 끝나기 때문이다.

I. 協商에 대한 美國의 態度

이 休戰會談에 關여한 美國人을 면밀하게 살펴보면, 우리는 妥協과 오랜 協商이란 概念에 대하여 불편하게 느꼈다고 오래 동안 알려졌던 많은 人들을 集한다. 트루만 大統領은 포츠담에서 주요 問題들을 論議하는데 걸린 17일은 너무 길다고 불평한 적이 있다(“당신들은 왜 17일이 걸려서야 무언가를 決定할 수 있단 말인가”라고 그는 말했다³⁾). 애치슨이 힘의 立場에 서서 하는 것을 제외하고는 敵과의 協商을 싫어했다는 것이 자주 指摘됐다. 애치슨의 전기 작가가 ‘철저하게 애치슨의 說明方式을’ 따른 研究라고 평가한 바 있는 NSC68이라는 國防省의 共同研究는 外交를 모스크바와 去來하는 手段이라고 꺼려하고 있는데, 그러한 行위는 ‘소비에트의 變방에 힘의 거점들을 건설하는’ 방침을 混亂시키는 것으로 보고 있다.⁴⁾ 공화당의 애치슨 後任者인 존 포스터 덜레스(John Foster Dulles)도 또한 그가 상대방이 協商을 추구할 때는 이것은 ‘脆弱性 그리고, 또는 失敗의 徵表’라고 믿었기 때문에 協商에 참여하는 것을 꺼리는 人으로 여겨졌다.⁵⁾ 덜레스는 이러한 狀況에서는 자신의 利益을 견지하는 것이 最善이라고 믿었다.

協商에 대한 民間의 힘오는 政府의 軍事部署에서도(놀랄 일은 아니지만) 더욱 빈번하게 表現됐다. 그런데 바로 이러한 官吏들이 韓國戰의 終熄을 위한 摸索을 하는 자리에 選拔됐던 것이다. 애치슨이 말했듯이 美國으로서 休戰論議를 野戰司令官들 사이의 군사적인 問題에 국한시키고 있다고 주장할 수 있는 것이 政治的으로는 유용하겠지만, 그것은 中華人民共和國와 北朝鮮人民共和國에 대한 美國의 不認定이라는 問題를 회피했고 그러한 問題들이 UN에서의 臺灣과 中國의 地位와 같은 問題들로 제기되는 것을 가로막았다.⁶⁾ — 그것은 또한 會談에 직접 參與한

사람들이 그러한 課題에 관한 經驗이나 그를 해결할 의향이 거의 없었다는 것을 의미했다. 랜드(RAND)의 專門家들이 제안된 協商팀에 배치되자, 軍事協商家들이 선택하려고 했던 것은 그들이 ‘協商의 難點들을 回避하기’ 위해서 완고하게 고수할 수 있었던 최종적인 立場 뿐이었다. 7) 흥정 과정에 대한 UN軍팀의 기피는 그들이 相對協商팀을 이야기할 때 사용했던 극도로 敵對적이고 人種적인 用語들 가운데서도 반영된다. 곧 UN司令官의 견해로는 相對協商팀은 ‘신뢰할 수 없는 야만인’이었고 UN協商代表의 의견으로는 ‘共犯들’이었던 것이다.⁸⁾

軍事訓練이 행동과 구체적인 전과를 강조할 때에는 거기에는 본질적이란 것은 거의 없으며, 그것은 그러한 受動的인 과정에 적합한 것이었다. 韓國戰爭中에 國務省의 極東問題 次官補였던 알렉시스 존슨(U. Alexis Johnson)은 그 뒤에 이러한 이유 때문에 그가 停戰協商에 기용됐던 軍部に 반대했다고 주장하면서 다음과 같이 말했다. “그들은 그들 자신과 그들의 祖國에 관한 필사적으로 공격적인 장광설이 계속될 동안 선전행위를 좌절시키거나 가라앉히는 데 능숙하지 못했다.” 나아가서 그는 그들이 協商의 經驗이 없고 ‘그들의 任務遂行에서 엄격성을 낮게 하는 명령과 같은 軍事的인 채널’을 통해서 도달되는 지시가 缺乏됐다는 것을 유감으로 생각했다.⁹⁾ 그렇지만 國務省은 그러한 결과를 낳은 데 대한 일차적인 책임을 져야 하는데, 그것은 국무성이 리지웨이(Ridgway)가 그의 대표단에 政治顧問을 派遣해달라는 요구를 거절했기 때문이다. 中國人들은 비슷한 실수를 저지르지 않았다. 外務省의 한 部 署의 代表였던 차오 관화는 板門店에서 시종일관 배석했으며 여기에 外務次官이 가담했고 때로는 外務省의 美國 및 大洋局의 長이 參席하기도 했다.¹⁰⁾

II. 意思決定構造－同盟 相互間の 關係

革命에 대한 否定的인 태도는 無의식적으로 協商過程을 늦췄다. 그렇지만 다른 要因들이 調印의 추구를 복잡하게 만드는 役割을 했는데, 그 중에서도 각 지도자들을 위해 존재했던 복잡한 意思決定 構造가 주요한 要因이었다.

예컨대 공산진영의 協商팀은 두 나라의 軍隊로 구성됐다. 兩者의 關係를 확립하는 것은 어렵지만, 中國(그들의 軍隊가 전선의 4분의 3을 統制했다.) 이 政策目標 樹立에 영향력을 행사하였으나 北韓의 선택에 대해 -최소한 회담 첫해에는- 전적으로 반응을 보이지 않을 수는 없었다. 사회주의진영의 지도자로서 그리고 北韓과 中國의 軍事裝備의 유일한 공급자로서 모스크바가 協商過程에서 중요한 순간들에 介入했다는 것이 분명한 이상, 蘇聯의 役割도 또한 고려할 만한 것이다. 1951년 6월의 말리크의 방송이나 1952년 11월에 UN總會의 休戰協商 중에 담당했던 蘇聯의 役割은 蘇聯이 발전적인 結果들을 형성하는 데 어떻게 介入할 수 있었는가를 보여주는 두 가지 사례에 지나지 않는다.

그렇지만 이러한 意思決定 構造에서 美國의 立場에 주목해 보자. 美國政府는 UN軍의 首腦로서 會談에서 UN의 채널 보다는 國家的 채널을 통해서 政治的 立場을 정하고 전달함으로써 지배적인 役割을 했으나, UN側에 서서 戰爭에 參戰했던 國家들도 美國의 政策의 선택에 얼마간 영향을 끼쳤다. 이러한 同盟的인 提携關係를 유지할 필요성 때문에 板門店에서 열리는 協商과는 상당히 다른 부류의 것이긴 하지만, 역시 일종의 協商들이 자주 요구됐던 것이다.

英國, 캐나다, 프랑스, 濠洲 등의 西歐 同盟國들은 모두 韓國戰이 비교적 빨리 끝나기를 원했으며 停戰協商에서 좀 더 融通性을 발휘하라는

설득을 워싱턴에 대해서 여러 차례 시도했다. 물론 이들 同盟이 UN을 선택한 美國의 정책을 批判할 때 조심스러워 하기는 했다(특히 워싱턴의 목표들에 대한 지원의 失敗는 財政援助의 일방적인 減縮이라는 議會의 보복을 초래할 수도 있다는 주장과 같은 경우에). 美行政府는 최소한 표면적으로는 다른 國家의 이니셔티브에 대해서 반응을 보여야 했다. 더구나 워싱턴이 너무 오만해졌다 하더라도, 즉각 協商을 벌이고 그것을 UN安全保障會議 또는 總會에 상정하는 시도를 하는 冒險을 할 가능성은 있었다. 따라서 美國의 政策的 立場에 대한 同盟國들의 지지를 얻어야만 했고 반면에 이 西歐의 同盟國들은 UN軍 協商팀이 最後通牒을 하거나 會談을 결렬시키는 것을 저지해야만 했었지만, 다른 한편으로는 그들은 協定の 締結을 시도하는 동안에 UN軍이 協商立場을 표명하는 것을 연기시키는 役割을 할 수 있었다. ‘더 큰 制裁’ 정책의 정식화는 이러한 강제 유형의 특별한 일례였다.

1951년 11월 중순부터 하순까지 國防省은 예상되는 休戰協定 違反을 방지하는 데 필요한 감시안을 立案하는 형태로 意見의 一致를 보고 있었다. 그렇지만, 國防省은 만약 共產主義者들이 休戰을 위반할 경우, 報復行動-中國北部地域에 대한 폭격과 中國海岸 封鎖-을 감행한다는 규정(‘더 큰 制裁’라고 알려진)에 同盟國, 특히 英國의 同意를 얻을 수 있다는 假定 下에, 休戰線 안과 休戰線 밖의 주요 거점에서의 監視에 관한 立場을 완화하는 데만 同意하려고 했다.¹¹⁾ 11월 21일, 워싱턴의 英國大使가 문제를 제기했으나, 그 提案에 관한 英國 外務長官과의 실제적인 첫 討議는 西歐 同盟國들이 NATO會議를 위해 로마에 모일 때까지는 이루어지지 않았다.

‘더 큰 制裁’ 규정에 관한 안토니 에덴(Anthony Eden)의 同意를 얻기 위해 그에게 권유한 것은 조만간 休戰會談에 참관하고 애치슨 측

에서 에덴이 中國에 대한 특별한 制裁를 취하지 않는 것을 허용하겠다는 정도였다. 그럼에도 불구하고 英國의 外務部長官은 그 提案에 대해서, 특히 中共에 대한 封鎖概念에 대해서 여전히 微溫的이었다.¹²⁾ 그 문제에 관하여 同僚 內閣과 반드시 상의해야 한다고 에덴이 주장했고, 12월 31일이 돼서야 그는 美國이 수용가능한 監視體制를 계속 모색해야 하고 UN軍 協商팀이 이에 실패할 경우에만 더 큰 制裁 政策을 실행해야 한다는 그들의 見解를 제시할 수 있었다.

트루만 行政府는 이 修正案을 받아들여려고 하지 않았으나, 어느 정도의 감시 水準을 確保하는가의 여부에 상관없이 報復 威脅을 담은 文書가 共產主義者들로 하여금 미래의 어느 시점에서든 다시 敵對行爲를 하지 못하도록 저지하는데 필요하다고 믿었다. 따라서 英國政府와 이 문제는 더 논의하게 된다.¹³⁾ 런던은 원칙적으로 인정하기는 했지만, 美國行政府가 더 큰 制裁를 명문화하는 데 사용하기를 원했던 용어들을 순화시키는 작업을 했다. 더 큰 制裁의 규정에 관한 美國의 초안은 再侵略의 경우에 그 국가들의 地理的 境界에 상관 없이 전면적인 보복이라는 責任追窮을 당할 것이라는 내용을 담고 있었던 데 반하여, 英國은 ‘再侵略의 경우에, 敵對行爲를 韓國에 국한하지 않을 가능성이 있다’라는 보다 약한 형식의 表現을 원했다. 트루만 行政府가 ‘休戰의 그와 같은 결렬이 초래할 結果는 너무 중대한 것이어서 戰鬥은 아마도 韓國 戰線에만 국한할 수 없을 것이다’라는 식으로 반발하자, 協商의 필요성이 提起됐고 실제로 이루어졌다.¹⁴⁾ 캐나다, 濠洲, 남아프리카와 같은 政府들은 文脈上의 변화를 권유한다는 점에서는 英國과 立場을 같이 했고 결국 英國과 함께 修正된 표현에 동의를 했다. 그렇지만 韓國의 UN軍 協商關係者들은 이 案件을 板門店의 論議에 제기한 후 한달을 그냥 보냈으며, 이 한달동안 대표들은 어느 정도 시간을 벌 수 있었다.

만약 西歐의 同盟들이 그 당시 會談에서의 전향적인 움직임을 염려하는 복잡한 助言을 했음이 證明되었다고 한다면, 南韓政府는 그 과정에 손상을 입었다는 것이 분명하게 입증됐다. 南韓은 여러 側面에서 從屬的인 國家였지만, 大統領인 이승만은 그의 行動의 극단적이고 豫想을 넘어서는 性格을 통하여, 보다 구체적으로는 戰線의 3분의 2를 장악하고 있었던 大韓民國의 軍隊를 UN軍으로부터 빼내겠다고 威脅함으로써 ‘약자의 힘’을 과시했다. 이승만이 어디까지 가도록 내버려두는가 하는 데는 限界가 있었지만—워싱턴에서 그를 제거하려는 緊急計劃이 진전됐다는 것이 예증하듯이¹⁵⁾, 그러나 그는 무수한 方法으로 協定으로 가는 길을 가로막을 수 있었다. 예를 들어 大韓民國의 軍部隊는 會談場 주변의 中立地域에서 수많은 사건들을 일으킴으로써¹⁶⁾ 兩側代表들 사이의 敵對感을 고양시키고 會談을 중단시킨 장본인이었을 뿐 아니라, 서울은 또한 38도선을 休戰線으로 삼는 것을 거부하여 UN軍의 立場을 경직되게 한 데도 책임이 있다. 行政府 官吏들은 그 선에서 停戰에 동의하려는 어떠한 시도도 ‘大韓民國에서 폭발적인 사태를 낳을 것’이라고 믿었다.¹⁷⁾ 그리고 이승만이 休戰協定에 대한 그의 協力을 撤回할 것이라는 威脅을 行政府 官吏들은 믿어 의심치 않았다. 이승만의 戰術은 UN軍이 왜 이전 상태로의 현상유지에 기초한 休戰에 동의하지 않으려고 했는가에 관한 부분적인 說明 밖에 안된다(行政府는 地理的으로 유리한 지점을 확보하기 위하여 강력한 軍事的이고 心理的인 설득을 했다). 그러나 南韓의 大統領의 완고한 立場은 그 선에서의 協定을 ‘유화적인 平和’라고 규정한 同盟者들의 후원을 받으면서 트루먼 行政府에 대해서 성과를 올렸으며 이 안전에 관해서 行政府가 유연성을 발휘하지 못하게 하는 데 기여했다.

이승만은 다른 방법으로도 UN軍 協商者들에 대해서 그가 선택한 立

場을 강요할 수 있었다. 예를 들어, 北京과 平壤이 協商의 再開(8월 23일의 休會 以後)를 제안했던 날과 같은 날인 9월 20일에, 이승만은 피아간에 接戰하는 戰線에서 休戰을 하고자 하는 절박한 움직임이 있었음에도 불구하고 UN軍이 開城을 점령해야 한다고 公開적으로 주장했다. 그 시기의 協商代表였던 조이 海軍大將은 그의 日記에 대표단이 開城을 장악해야 한다는 제안을 한 까닭은 ‘大韓民國政府에 대하여 환심’을 사고자 했기 때문이라고 썼다.¹⁸⁾ 그 결과 協定은 그선에서 담보상태에 머물렀는데, 그렇지 않았으면 원칙적으로 협정은 2주안에 終結됐을 것이다.

더욱 극적인 事態는 協商의 終結과 때맞추어 UN의 보호하에 있는 北韓軍 捕虜 중에서 송환되기를 원하지 않고 中立國送還委員會(NNRC)로 넘겨지기를 희망했던 捕虜들을 大韓民國의 지도자가 釋放하기로 결정한 사건이었다. 美行政府가 이런 類의 환영받지 못할 行動을 더 이상 벌이는 것을 막으려고 필사적으로 노력했던 반면에, 韓國의 UN軍팀은 共產主義者들에게 南韓사람들은 어떤 休戰協定에 대해서도 경의를 표할 것이라고 설득하고자 했다. 開城에 관한 앞의 입장에서처럼 이러한 경우의 이승만의 행동은 休戰協定の 調印을 수개월 延長시키는 役割을 했다. 더구나 로버트 머피(Robert D. Murphy)의 見解로는 이승만이 그 밖에도 수천명의 死傷者를 낸 데 책임이 있으며, 南韓의 그러한 행동이 없었으면 그와 같은 死傷者를 내지 않고 제때에 協定이 조인됐을 것이라고 머피는 확신했다.¹⁹⁾

일찌기 1953년 5월에 西歐 同盟國들과 南韓의 立場들은 서로 尖銳하게 대립했다. 戰爭捕虜 논의의 최종단계에서 아이젠하워 行政府는 北韓으로 送還되기를 원하지 않는 北側의 捕虜들은 送還委員會에 넘겨져서는 안되며 休戰協定이 效力을 발휘하는 즉시 南韓으로 釋放되게 해야 한다는 UN軍司令官의 제안에 동의했다. 美國은 또한 中立國送還委員會는 그

票決에 있어 만장일치 방식을 채택해야 한다고 주장했다. 이 두가지 政策的 立場은 모두 이승만(그리고 이승만에 대한 美議會의 몇몇 지지자들)을 회유하고 休戰協定에 대한 그의 承認을 받아내기 위하여 제시된 것이다. 그렇지만 이런 立場들은 西歐 同盟國들에게는 수용될 수 없다는 것이 입증된다. 예를 들어 ‘우여곡절을 겪은 끝에’ 캐나다의 外務長官 만이 戰爭捕虜政策에 관한 UN軍의 최근의 立場에 대한 공개적인 비난을 삼갔다. 윈스턴 처칠은 議會에서 美國의 停戰協商 擔當者들이 시간을 질질 끌고 있다고 격렬하게 비난했다. 國務省 유럽국의 워드 알렌(Ward P. Allen)이 표현했듯이, 中立國에서 뿐만 아니라 네덜란드, 英國, 캐나다, 濠洲, 벨기에, 뉴질랜드, 이태리에서 우려와 關心을 표명했다. 월터 베델 스미스(Walter Bedell Smith)는 이승만은 ‘현재의 戰線에서의 어떠한 休戰에도 공개적으로 반대한다’고 계속 선동하고 있었던 반면에 西歐 同盟國들의 立場은 날로 攪亂되고 있다고 경고했다. 이 경우에 스미스는 行政府가 西歐 同盟國들과 협의하여 이승만에게 새롭게 수정된 美國의 協商立場을 지지하도록 ‘安全保障이라는 미끼’를 던질 것을 권장했다.²⁰⁾ 그러는 동안에 板門店에서는 協商팀들 사이의 적개심이 더욱 증대했으며, 戰爭捕虜에 관한 주요문제에 관한 합의가 이루어진 후에도 會談이 繼續 지체하게 됐다.

Ⅲ. 意思決定構造－官僚들의 論議

아시아와 서구의 東盟國들이 美國의 협상과정은 複雜하게 하기는 했지만, 이것은 트루만과 아이젠하워 行政府 멤버들, 특히 韓國에서의 會談에 直接 參與했던 사람들도 마찬가지였다. 종종 워싱턴의 政策的 立場을 傳達하고 그것을 休戰節次에 導入하는 것은 問題가 될 되고 執行部 署와 野戰司令官 사이의 協商이 더 問題가 됐다. 그것은 때때로 마치 進行중인 協商에 워싱턴과 도쿄 사이 그리고 UN司令部와 共產黨 사이에 두가지 種類의 協商이 있었던 것처럼 보이게 한다.²¹⁾

協商的 첫9개월 동안에는 현안의 거의 모든 事項에서 리지웨이 장군 (UN사령관)은 韓國에 있는 그의 협상팀이 최소한의 要求條件을 확보하고 흥정을 시작했을 때에도 UN군의 協商立場을 變更하는 데 상당히 주저했다. 예를 들어 6월 15일에 이 UN군사령관은 일찌감치 워싱턴에 외국군의 철수에 관해 共產주의자들이 案件을 提議할 경우 休회하겠다고 通告했다. 6월 20일에는 그는 여기서 한 걸음 더 나아가서 共產主義者들이 이미 合意했던 4가지 사안을 受容하지 않는다면 會談을 中斷하겠다는 그의 決定을 전폭적으로 지지할 것을 요청했다. 더구나 그는 이러한 최후통첩을 公式的으로 提起할 것을 바랬는데, 그러한 과정은 워싱턴이 承認할 수 없는 것이었다. 行政府의 見解로는 그것은 워신의 분제를 제기해서 共產主義者들이 그러한 짐을 양보하는 것을 더욱 어렵게 만들 뿐이었다. 더구나 ‘世界輿論’은 이러한 個別的인 主題들로 인해서 會談이 결렬되는 것을 支持하지 않을 것이라는 짐을 리지웨이에게 주지시켰다.²²⁾

協商이 시작하자 마자 제기된 이러한 要請들은 리지웨이가 이 論議들에 접근했던 마음가짐을 보여준다. 그는 또한 트루만 行政府를 그들이

절실하게 느끼지 못했던 立場과 連結시킬 수 있었다. 1951年 8月末과 10月 사이의 會談의 休會 期間 중에 회담장의 中立性이 지켜지지 않았다고 主張하며 원래의 會談開催地인 개성에서는 論議를 재개할 수 없으며 板門店에서 會談을 새롭게 시작하라는 壓力을 넣었다. 9월 20일 共產主義者들이 개성에서의 會議의 재개를 提案했을 때, 즉각 草案을 고쳐쓰는 作業이 워싱턴에서 시작됐다는 리지웨이가 의도했던 應答은 그러나 그 톤에 있어서는 상당히 격앙됐다. UN사령관은 이어서 그의 메시지에 ‘필연적으로 거친 분위기’를 갖게 하는 ‘화려한 수식어’를 비록 그의 應答의 內容을 바꾸지 않는다 하더라도 削除하라는 지시를 받았다.²³⁾ 그렇게 해서 그것은 (좀 더 공손하게 씌여지기만 하면서) 開城에 관한 問題에 관해서는 굽히지 않는 완강한 메시지로 존속했으며, 워싱턴은 그 問題를 심각하게 느끼지 않았다. 찰스 볼렌 (Charles Bohlen(國務省 顧問))이 9月 26일에 認定했듯이, 行政府는 아주 不必要하게 場所問題에 스스로를 束縛했으나, 하지만 그 主題가 이제 公開的으로 提起된 이상 UN군이 물러서기는 어려웠다.²⁴⁾

도쿄와 워싱턴 사이의 또 다른 불일치는 1951년 9월말에 나타난다. 會談이 빠른 시일내에 제기돼야 한다는 것이 說得力이 있었을 시점에서, 리지웨이는 UN군 協商팀은 戰線에서 北으로 약 20km까지의 지역에 非武裝地帶를 설치할 것을 提案하고 北京과 平壤이 38도선을 休戰線으로 정하자는 그들의 주장을 撤回해야만 그는 代表團이 양보를 하는 것을 허용하겠다는 發表를 했다. 다른 行動을 취하는 것은 美國의 立場을 弱화시킬 것이라고 그는 警告했다.

將軍의 이 보다 앞선 提案이 그러했듯이 이 提案도 워싱턴에서 더 많은 논란을 불러일으켰는데, 支配的인 見解는 리지웨이가 제안한 행동 방침은 8월 23일에 共產主義者들이 행한 양보를 고려하지 않고 있으며,

그가 提案하고 있는 남쪽 境界는 現在의 그의 진지를 넘어선 領土를 포함하고 있다는 것과, 또한 그가 現在의 전투의 접촉선을 非武裝地帶의 남쪽 境界로 提案하고 있는 것조차도 아니라는 것이었다. 舍參議長이었던 브래들리 장군은 이로부터 UN군사령관이 ‘우리의 見解를 따르지 않는 決定을 내렸다’는 結論을 내렸다.²⁵⁾

協商에 대한 접근에 있어서의 이러한 긴장들로 인하여 그 달 하순에 볼렌과 브래들리가 韓國에 다녀가게 됐다. 그렇지만 그 訪問은 예상했던 것 보다 못한 成果를 거두었는데, 그것은 워싱턴이 UN군사령관과 그의 협상팀에게 주는 것 보다 더 큰 影響을 리지웨이의 사고가 이 두 관리에게 미쳤기 때문인 것 같다. 조이 해군 대장이 그의 일지(그 직후에 會談에 대한 볼렌의 評價에 의해 확증된 報告書)에서 기록했듯이, 韓國의 사령관은 브래들리와 볼렌에게 UN군에게 바람직한 軍事的인 立場을 納得시켰고 그 결과 그 2인의 관리들과 ‘우리는 서둘러 共產主義者들과 만나거나 UN군의 새로운 非武裝案을 내놓지 않을 것이다.. 時間이 흐르고 겨울이 다가온다는 것이 우리에게 有利하게 作用하고 있다. 따라서, 우리의 立場으로서는 代表團의 會議를 서두르지 않는 것이 낫다’라는 점에 意見一致를 보았다.²⁴⁾

그렇게 되자 協商에 直接的으로 參與했던 사람들은 워싱턴에서 생각한 것보다 더 엄격한 접근을 계속했으나, 아마도 가능한 한 최대한으로 야전 사령관의 제량을 허용하는 國防省의 傳統을 준수했기 때문에 그들은 워싱턴과 동맹자본들의 생각을 그에게 충분히 주지시키는 데 주저했다는 것을 보여주었다. 그 결과 애초에 複雜했던 協商에 어쩌면 피할 수도 있었던 추가적인 장애물을 덧붙였다. 협상행위의 정치적 성격이 더욱 커졌다. 리지웨이는 협상팀에 많은 고급 해외요원을 붙여줘야 했으며, 그들은 협상팀에 대한 조언을 하고 그 문제를 보다 넓은 시각에서 고

려하게 했다.²⁷⁾ 대신에 책임의 상당부분이 타협이라는 개념에 익숙치 않은 군사요원들에게 부과됐으며, 그들의 군대들은 그들이 협상을 벌이고 있는 상대세력들과 계속 전투를 벌여야 했다.

그렇지만 UN군 협상담당자들의 과제는 워싱턴에서 유동적인 상태에 있었던 政治的 立場의 結果, 論議들이 具體的인 事項에서 잘 진행되고 있었을 때에도 더욱 강경해졌다는 것은 의심할 여지가 거의 없다. 물론 행정부가 공산주의의 협상 주도자들에 반응을 보이는 것은 필요하겠지만, 그럼에도 불구하고 워싱턴은 때때로 그것이 추구해야 할 목표들에 관하여 불확실했던 것처럼 보였다.

예를 들어 監視問題와 戰爭捕虜政策(협의항목 제3항과 제4항)은 모두 워싱턴과 會議場에서 同時에 論議됐다. 協商 전에 제3항에 대한 美國의 立場에서 人員이나 物資의 補強 또는 戰爭의 재개를 위한 準備가 이루어지지 않고 있다는 것을 確認하기 위하여 韓國全域에 자유롭게 아무런 制限 없이 出入할 수 있는 權限을 包含한 監督權과 監視權을 갖는 休戰委員會를 構成하려고 했다. 10月 초, 리지웨이는 UN군은 무제한적인 監視權을 必要로 하지 않는데, 그 理由는 이것이 安全을 保障하는 것이 아니라 단지 ‘摩擦의 重大한 要因들만을 增大시킬 ... 그에 相應하는 所得이 없기’ 때문이라는 意見을 提示했다. 陸海空의 通路 共同 監視에 非武裝地帶의 共同 觀察이면 充分하다고 그는 主張했다.²⁸⁾ 이러한 提案에 대하여 國務省의 官吏는 더 나아가서 非武裝地帶에서 軍隊의 駐屯이나 보급품의 供給이 있다고 하더라도 그러한 增大가 明白한 侵略行爲를 隨伴하지 않는 한 UN군의 軍事行動을 취할 可能性은 稀薄하다는 理由에서, 非武裝地帶의 共同監視를 提案했다.²⁹⁾

이러한 提案은 國務省과 國防省 사이의 치열한 論爭을 불러일으켰는데 國防省은 리지웨이의 提案을 支持하려고 애쓴 반면에 國務省은 더 큰

제제조항에 관하여 UN同盟國들과 討論을 시작했다. 그러한 활동은 韓國에서의 시설복구의 相對的인 長點과 短點들에 관하여 關聯問題들의 고려도 촉진시켰는데, (그 당시에는) 空軍을 除外한 수리시설은 허용한다는 最終的인 結論을 내리게 된다.³⁰⁾ 그러는 가운데 제3항에 관한 板門店에서의 論議는 그 달 둘째주에 終結됐다.

비슷한 유동성은 行政府의 戰爭捕虜政策에서도 나타났다. 간단하게 말해서 最初의 立場은 모든 UN군 포로가 석방될 때까지 1대1 捕虜交換을 要求하고, 차후에 나머지 共產捕虜들을 送還한다는 것이었다. 그렇지만 6월 5일, 육군의 心理戰 指揮官이 UN군의 모든 戰爭捕虜가 送還되어야 한다는 問題를 처음으로 제기하는데, 그의 見解로는 많은 포로들이 ‘가혹한 처벌을 받고 강제노동에 처해지거나 처형당할’ 可能性이 높는데 그 結果는 美國의 心理戰 遂行에 致命的인 影響을 끼치리라는 것이다. 하지만 ‘UN군과 한국군의 모든 포로들의 신속한 귀환을 우선적으로 고려해야 한다’라고 애치슨이 지적하면서, 앞의 포로정책의 政治的 利益에 관한 合參議長과 國防長官의 초기의 關心은 木살된다.³¹⁾

그렇지만 10월 末, 大統領은 수용소에서 UN군 당국에 ‘협조했던’ 포로들을 송환시키는 것의 도덕성에 관해서 의문을 제기했는데,³²⁾ 이러한 언급으로 인하여 그 政策의 論議는 새로운 局面에 들어서기 시작했다. 리지웨이는 12월 7일에 회담 중에 전쟁포로의 非強制的인 送還이라는 概念을 導入하라는 지시를 받았다. 물론 그것이 반드시 그 주제에 관한 行政府의 最終的인 立場은 아니라는 점도 그에게 傳達되기는 했다.

하지만, 이에 관한 立場들이 구체화되고 있었고, 애치슨이 자신의 立場을 번복하여 포로들에게 석방시에 자신들의 운명을 선택할 수 있도록 하자라는 것을 전적으로 지지하기 시작했을 때에는 그 논의는 사실상 終結됐고, 특히 大統領이 선호하는 것과 모순된 立場을 내세움으로써 몇

몇 사람들이 政治적으로 不安定하게 된 이후로는 더욱 그렇게 된다 (國內의 政治的 發展은 60여명의 上院議員이 非強制的 送還에 대한 支援을 撤回하지 말 것을 促求하는 決議案을 내면서 애치슨과 트루만의 立場의 현명했음을 더욱 確證해주었다). 이렇게 해서 2月末에 最終적으로 政策的 合意에 도달했고, 포로를 송환하는 데 력을 사용하지 않을 것을 결정했다³³⁾ 그러나 이 항목에 관한 논의가 시작된 이후로 2개월 반이라는 기간을 소비하게 된다.

IV. 結 論

韓國의 休戰協商과 關聯된 이러한 特徵들은 그 會談이 왜 그토록 오랜 過程을 必要로 했는가에 관한 몇가지-물론 모든 것은 결코 아니지만-理由들을 설명해준다. 그것들은 스나이더(Snyder)와 디징(Dising)이 主張했던 것처럼³⁴⁾, 타협활동의 상당 部分이 각 同盟國들의 支援과 認定을 얻는 方向으로 이루어진다는 것을 例證해준다. 그것들은 또한 政府間의 타협모델에 주의를 기울이는 한편, 共有한 目的이나 價値들의 裏面에 대한 고려도 해야 한다는 것을 보여준다. 단순히 ‘敵과의 協商’이 아니라 ‘友邦과의 協商’에 焦點을 맞출 경우에는 妥協은 中층적인 複合성을 띤다. 韓國과 같은 사례에서는 同盟國 相互間 그리고 部署 相互間의 協商에 대한 고려는 각 立場에 따라 일종의 協商連續體가 존재했다는 것을 보여준다. 다시 말해서 유연과 경직이라는 대립되는 政治적 立場 사이에서 이런 양극을 중심으로 또는 그 주변에서 제휴를 하는 가운데 그러한 협상이 잇달아 이루어지는 것이다. 이와 같이 분류하는 것은 시간이 감에 따라 달라지고, 國內의 政治적 요인들을 고

려하지 않은 것이긴 하지만 (이 논문 전체에서 그런 입장을 취했다), 우리는 경직된 목적을 지향하는 한국에 있었던 군사령관, 워싱턴의 펜타곤의 특정 인물들 그리고 남한 정부라는 연속체를 정리해볼 수 있다. 반대로 서구동맹국들, 그리고 國務省의 特定 人物들은 유연성의 目標을 指向했다. 大統領과 國務長官들이 이러한 路線을 따라 問題를 처리하는 方案을 選擇했던 것은 어떤 提携政策들의 成功 또는 失敗에, 그리고 會談에서의 일정한 目標들을 達成하기 위한 最善의 方案의 選擇에 必須的이었다. 友邦과의 協商은 敵과의 協商만큼 어렵지 않겠지만, 그러한 활동에 쏟아야 할 정력은 특히 韓國戰의 狀況 속에서는 분명히 상당한 것이었다.

〈註〉

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특히 p.85를 볼 것. 그렇지만 이것은 美國과의 協商이란 概念을 中國이 싫어하지 않았다고 主張하는 것은 아니다. 中國은 古代文明에 대한 自負心, 1946년의 人民共和國 樹立 후의 승리감과 團結意識으로 말미암아 그 지도자들은 目的과 決議에 찼다. 그러한 속성들은 歷史가 그들 편에 있으며 資本主義에 대한 共產主義者들의 戰爭은 不義에 對抗하는 정의의 전쟁이라는 信念을 강화했다. 美國이 '民主主義를 위한 十字軍戰爭'이라는 意識을 가지고 戰爭을 수행했듯이, 共產主義者에 妥協을 위한 戰爭이라는 概念이 끼어들 여지는 역시 없었다. 더구나, 中國語에서는 妥協을 위한 戰爭이라는 단어는 부정적인 의미를 가지고 있었다-그러므로 이것은 상호이익이라는 사고를 택하는 데서도 마찬가지였다.

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제 4 회 의
SESSION IV

중국과 한국전쟁
CHINA AND THE KOREAN WAR

THE SECOND INTERNATIONAL
CONFERENCE ON THE KOREAN WAR
JUNE 14~15, 1990
SEOUL, KOREA

China, the Sino-Soviet Alliance, and the Korean War

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Forty years after the onset of the Korean war, the fuller story of the conflict is slowly beginning to emerge. The history of most wars is replete with mythology and demonology, but perhaps especially one that ended where it began, with neither side experiencing unambiguous victory or defeat. Though an absolute rendering of "truth" always eludes the historian, the problems in interpreting the Korean conflict are especially acute. Until fairly recently, the flow of information and documentation was largely one way. Archival materials, diplomatic accounts, military histories, and interview data derived almost exclusively from the United States, its Western allies, and to a lesser extent the Republic of Korea. Beyond presentational history and Party propaganda, none of the Communist powers saw fit to furnish even a semi-serious rendering of their participation in these events.

Although the flow of information from the Communist coalition remains uneven, it has increased measurably in recent years. The preponderance of this material has emanated from China, as the resuscitation of historical studies in the People's Republic enabled preparation of serious research. The publication of memoirs of leading Chinese generals, the compilation of official Chinese diplomatic and military histories, and reminiscences of various eyewitnesses or

participants in wartime decisionmaking have greatly enriched our understanding of the war, particularly in terms of Chinese military operations and strategy.

However, much less remains known at a political level. Most of the key participants in wartime decisionmaking (with the exception of Kim Il Sung) are long since deceased, though some of the eyewitnesses to history (for example, translators and secretaries) are still living. But political sensitivities remain the principal inhibition against full disclosure. A conspiracy of silence among officials in Pyongyang, Beijing, and Moscow has proven remarkably durable for the past four decades. Thus, a comprehensive rendering of the war's major decisions and deliberations is impossible without a far more forthcoming attitude on the part of North Korea and its wartime allies. All have much to hide: Pyongyang (in the person of Kim Il Sung), its incontestable responsibility for initiation of the conflict; Moscow (in the person ^{of} ~~of~~ Josef Stalin), its uncharacteristic acquiescence to Kim's entreaties that provided North Korea the wherewithal to launch the war; and Beijing (in the person of Mao Zedong), its foreknowledge of Kim's plans and its reluctant compliance with decisions imposed upon China by its comrades-in-arms. As a result, there is prodigious record of mendacity and obscurity about the role of all three states prior to and during the conflict.

Though this conspiracy of silence has proven extraordinarily durable, it has started to unravel. Given the secretiveness inherent in these decisions (especially considering the historical context in which they were made), few either know the entire story or have access to the

requisite documentation that would allow a full description of events. Though the renewed chill in Chinese intellectual circles seems likely to again curtail the flow of documentation from the PRC, the portents on the Soviet side are more encouraging, and could well yield major new insights into the history of the war. (To my knowledge, this has yet to occur; assuming a degree of longevity to *glasnost*, it seems virtually inevitable.) Scholars must therefore persist in somewhat painstaking detective work, "triangulating" the evidence that can be acquired from all three states.

In this essay, I will attempt to summarize my current understanding of how Chinese became involved in the Korean War. It is based on interviews with Chinese scholars and retired officials conducted between 1986 and 1989, including some with archival access, or some ability to interview those with more detailed firsthand knowledge of Chinese wartime strategy. In addition, I have drawn on a variety of Chinese publications, some of them designated *nei-bu* (for internal circulation only), though this designation has not prevented extremely valuable material from circulating outside China. I concede that my understanding is only partial and is still evolving; I make no claim to a definitive rendering of events. My focus will be on developments leading up to Chinese participation in the conflict, beginning with the *denouement* of the Chinese civil war, the establishment of the People's Republic in October 1949, and the signing of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance in February 1950.

LIBERATION AND ITS AFTERMATH

The unexpectedly abrupt collapse of Kuomintang armies in 1948 accelerated the Chinese Communist Party's timetable for assuming power. Mao had not anticipated the sudden string of military successes in the three major campaigns under way at the time, but (rejecting Stalin's advice) he saw every reason to press the CCP's advantage. The imminence of full military victory underscored the need to plan for the post-liberation period. Though hopes persisted in some circles that the United States might embrace the new government (thereby precluding a much closer Sino-Soviet alignment), it is doubtful that Mao entertained too many illusions. Even though Mao (unlike Stalin) judged the risks of a "last gasp" American intervention relatively low, the near-term outlook for tolerable relations with the United States was not encouraging.

Thus, Mao saw an imperative need to mend fences with Stalin, or at least to see if accommodation were possible. Stalin's dispatch of Anastas Mikoyan to China in January 1949 marked the onset of this phase, but the extended secret visit of Liu Shaoqi to Moscow in the summer of 1949 was much more important. It was then that Stalin purportedly apologized to Liu for his bad advice and inaccurate understanding of the Chinese revolution. By his action, Stalin had acknowledged the inevitability of the CCP triumph, and for the first time conceded the CCP's legitimacy in Soviet eyes. Chinese calculations were complicated. The Chinese were intent on staking a claim to autonomy if not outright independence in the international communist movement. On the other hand, the Chinese Communists desperately needed help to rebuild their

war ravaged economy and security guarantees in the face of potential American threats. Liu's extended stay (including five meetings with Stalin) helped pave the way for Mao's December 1949 visit to Moscow, the first time he had traveled beyond the borders of China.

But planning for security did not rest exclusively on expectations of Soviet political or military guarantees. Even as the Chinese Communists cleared out the remaining pockets of Kuomintang resistance and (in the aftermath of Chiang Kai-shek's flight to Taiwan) began to plan for an amphibious assault across the Taiwan Strait, Mao initiated post-liberation contingency planning. As early as June 1949, Mao saw three potential fronts where the United States might foment tensions, including the possible initiation of military actions. The three fronts were linked to the three major Communist revolutionary movements in East Asia: along China's southeastern coast, where Chiang's forces continued to launch disruptive actions; along China's border with Vietnam, where the United States was abetting French efforts to displace the Vietminh and reestablish French predominance over the Indochina peninsula; and in the northeast, where the United States sought to buttress a fledgling but very weak Republic of Korea.

It is difficult to ascertain whether Mao took the threat of war seriously, where he thought it most likely to occur, and on what scale. But preparations had to be made. In May 1950, Mao established a strategic reserve force in Henan Province in central China, consisting of units from the 38th, 39th, 40th, and 42nd Armies. They were specifically intended to deal with contingencies involving Taiwan, Vietnam, or Korea. These forces could be "swung" to any of the three

potential theaters, thus avoiding a situation where Mao had to rapidly draw down forces from other fronts, thereby exposing China to potential danger. However, Mao appeared to concede that U.S. military actions could also occur in response to actions initiated by Communist forces, to which China might then be compelled to respond. Exactly such an outcome came to pass in Korea.

It is frequently forgotten that the fate of the Korean and Vietnamese communist movements was unextricably intertwined with their relations with the CCP. Mao had given sanctuary and support to both Kim Il Sung and Ho Chi Minh. Ethnic Korean units had fought with Chinese revolutionary forces; Kim spoke fluent Chinese, and had even been a member of the Chinese Communist Party. But Kim's circumstances were rendered more complex by his links to the Soviet Union, which had installed him in power north of the 38th Parallel. It was a measure of Kim Il Sung's extraordinary deftness that he very early learned to parlay his separate relations with the Chinese and Soviets to political advantage. It is an enduring mystery as to why Beijing and Moscow were prepared to allow their larger geopolitical interests to be held hostage to Kim's political designs.

When Mao embarked on his trip to Moscow, he did not know what kind of reception awaited him. Soviet diplomatic personnel in China had spent substantial time in the fall mending fences, but they did not speak for Stalin. Mao had several major goals in mind. Any prospect for tolerable relations with the United States had dwindled rapidly, with Mao opting to "lean to one side." Thus, there was an urgent need for a Soviet security guarantee. As Mao told Stalin on their first

meeting on December 16, the Chinese hoped for an outcome that was "both beautiful and tasty." Mao resented the terms of the Sino-Soviet treaty of 1945 that Stalin had negotiated with the Kuomintang, insisting they were inappropriate for relations between ruling communist parties. However, the "comradeliness" of these relations remained to be seen. As Mao revealed privately many years later, Stalin viewed the Chinese (and perhaps Mao in particular) very warily, fearing a Titoist problem on an incalculably larger scale. Thus, Mao was both needy *and* mistrusted, which did not augur well for his first meeting with the Soviet leader.

As Stalin contemplated the global scene in late 1949, the CCP victory seemed a mixed blessing. His disdain for the Chinese Communists (he dismissed them derisively as "margerine communists") quite possibly extended to all Asians. A close relationship with the Chinese, while giving the socialist camp predominance over most of the Eurasian land mass, potentially entailed major obligations to Beijing that Moscow could ill afford. It is little wonder that the economic terms offered by the Soviets seemed both grudging and withholding. Stalin did not want a highly encumbering relationship with China, even as he desired a relatively compliant partner in Asia that would accommodate to Soviet needs and goals. But the spawning of a major socialist ally in China created longer-term uncertainties for Soviet strategic interests, and it is doubtful that Stalin believed that China would remain comfortable indefinitely in a subordinate relationship.

Both the Soviets and the Chinese have recently published revealing assessments of the Mao-Stalin talks, and they vividly impart the difficulties of these negotiations. Though these accounts do not agree

in all aspects, they suggest that Mao had more than met his match. In Chinese renderings, the relationship between Mao and Stalin was awkward and somewhat strained; in Soviet versions, Mao seemed awed and even intimidated by the Soviet leader. After prolonged negotiations in which neither Mao nor Stalin participated extensively (negotiations were left to their subordinates), the treaty of alliance was signed on February 14, 1950, nearly two months after Mao had arrived in Moscow. Indeed, as Zhou Enlai acknowledged to a ranking Chinese diplomat in the mid-1950s, Mao "refused to leave Moscow until the treaty was signed."

THE ROAD TO WAR

To what extent was Korea a topic for discussion during the Sino-Soviet negotiations? The only published source on this question remains Khrushchev's memoirs, and he asserts that Stalin raised the relevant possibilities with Mao. In Khrushchev's account, Kim Il Sung first proposed military action on a visit to Moscow in late 1949 (i.e., while Mao was also in the Soviet capital). After returning to Pyongyang at Stalin's urging to draw up more detailed war plans, Kim again visited Moscow. It was during this second visit that Stalin supposedly queried Mao on his views, and Khrushchev claims that Mao endorsed Kim's proposed course of action.

Two Chinese interviewees have independently provided a different though not necessarily contradictory version of events prior to the onset of war in June. According to these sources, Kim first broached the subject of an attack across the 38th Parallel not with Stalin, but with Mao. (The date of these alleged exchanges is not wholly clear, but they most likely occurred in the fall of 1949.) On the face of it, this

possibility is not implausible. Kim, installed in power by the Red Army, hoped to secure alternative sources of political and military support. He had a more natural affinity for the Chinese, who had themselves just realized victory. Kim may well have argued to Mao that a victory over the South on the heels of the CCP triumph would remove the last vestige of American military power from Northeast Asia, and free both states from potential Soviet domination.

Mao was allegedly far less sanguine than Kim. The North Korean leader was arguing for a *blitzkrieg* style attack, since he believed that a massive show of force would be followed quickly by a collapse of governmental authority in Seoul and a spontaneous surge of revolutionary activity in the South. Mao was a much more prudent military strategist. As reflected in his military writings, he believed there was a time and place for the "strategic offensive," but that this phase of revolutionary warfare had to be preceded by carefully calibrated, well prepared guerrilla actions. There was an impulsive streak in Kim's military style: he believed that bold actions could by themselves reshape the political-military landscape, leading to rapid victory when circumstances did not appear inherently propitious.

Mao is also alleged to have posed a question to Kim: what if his plan did not work as anticipated? What course of action would then be available? Mao's presumed fear was that a major push by North Korean forces across the 38th Parallel would lead to precisely the outcome that Mao feared most: a "reintervention" by American military forces on the Asian mainland, proximate to one of the three strategic "soft spots" that he had identified in June 1949. With American military power

reengaged in Northeast Asia, Chinese security interests would become inextricably intertwined with those of Korea. Moreover, Mao probably feared that hostilities in Korea could place Chinese plans to assault Taiwan on indefinite hold. For a combination of all the above reasons, Mao demurred from supporting Kim's plans, and instead urged the North Korean leader to discuss his proposed strategy with the Soviets.

Rebuffed by the Chinese, Kim launched a late 1940s version of "shuttle diplomacy" by presenting his case to Stalin. According to Khrushchev, Stalin also feared the possibility of an American intervention, but Kim exuded full confidence in his plans. As Khrushchev observed, "Kim was the initiator [but] Stalin ... didn't try to dissuade him." But Stalin also allegedly sought Mao's advice. As depicted by Khrushchev, Mao endorsed Kim's idea, stating that so long as the struggle appeared to be entirely an internal affair of the Korean people, the United States was very unlikely to intervene. Khrushchev offers no hint that Mao dissented from Kim's course of action. In the face of Stalin's awesome presence--all the more so as Stalin extolled Mao's sagacity as an Asian military strategist--Mao may well have been unable to challenge Kim's proposal, or at least did not challenge it vigorously.

Thus, the timing of Secretary of State Acheson's January 1950 speech to the National Press Club (as well as comparable remarks by General MacArthur in Tokyo a few days earlier) could not have been worse. By specifically excluding the Korean peninsula from the sphere of American defense responsibilities, Acheson unknowingly buttressed Kim Il Sung's brief to Mao and to Stalin. By opting for an island defense strategy, the United States appeared to wash its hands of future political or security commitments on the mainland of Asia.

At this point, the trail of evidence on Chinese awareness of Kim Il Sung's impending plans grows cold. In his memoirs, Marshal Nie Rongzhen (then the PLA Acting Chief of Staff) acknowledges that a North Korean emissary (General Kim Kwang Hyung) visited Beijing in January, requesting that Korean units numbering 14,000 men that had fought with the Fourth Field Army be returned to North Korean control. In the context of Kim's lobbying for Chinese and Soviet support, Nie could not have been oblivious to the military value of these forces, and the purposes for which they were intended. Indeed, according to Nie Rongzhen, General Kim explicitly sought to play off the Chinese against the Soviets, asserting that if Beijing failed to transfer the troop units and provide needed equipment, North Korea would have no option but to ask for additional Soviet support. With the consent of the Party center, Nie acceded to Pyongyang's request.

Numerous interviewees nevertheless insist that the outbreak of the war in late June was a surprise to the Chinese, with Beijing not apprised of Pyongyang's war plans. This assertion seems only half true. Stalin's readiness to accede to Kim's requests, though never adequately explained, made it impossible for the Chinese to overtly oppose North Korean actions. In assessing Stalin's willingness to embark on what seemed uncharacteristic risktaking, scholars frequently forget that Kim came very close to achieving his goals in the summer of 1950. Kim's estimate nearly proved correct. If Pyongyang's armies had prevailed at Pusan and placed the entirety of the peninsula under their control, Stalin's gamble would have paid off handsomely, and few would have asked why the Soviet leader acquiesced to Kim's strategy. It was only the

failure of North Korean war aims that impels us to examine Stalin's motivations and calculations.

But there is no evidence of *direct* Chinese involvement in Kim's planning for the invasion of the South. As Allen Whiting has noted, the Chinese did not even have an accredited ambassador in Pyongyang on June 25. Mao may have sought to distance himself as much as possible from Kim's plans, hoping to impart a fully indigenous character to the Korean conflict. A lower Chinese profile also entailed fewer risks. The Chinese in any case could not have assisted North Korea on any appreciable scale without seriously degrading China's own military capabilities, especially in the areas where Kim most needed help (e.g., tanks and artillery pieces). The PLA's hands were still full seeking to complete military operations on the mainland and preparing for the impending assault on Taiwan. Mao may also have calculated that a "hands off" attitude toward Korea would allay U.S. worst case fears of a coordinated communist offensive in East Asia.

But Mao's hopes came to naught. The consummation of the Sino-Soviet treaty (including provisions for the Soviets retaining control of major naval facilities in Northeast China); resumed Vietminh offensives against the French; and North Korea's attack across the 38th Parallel all seemed pieces of a larger puzzle. As U.S. forces were interposed in the Taiwan Strait and American reinforcements landed in Korea to assist beleaguered South Korean forces, China was drawn ineluctably into a maelstrom of conflict in Northeast Asia, leading in late October to the direct involvement of Chinese units in Korean combat.

THE ROAD TO THE CHINESE INTERVENTION

The story of China's decision to cross the Yalu is a fascinating one, but a good deal more complicated than many have long assumed. To most scholars, the Chinese intervention appeared a relatively straightforward decision that reflected the risks posed to Chinese security by the rapid advance of American armies toward the Yalu. General MacArthur's bold landing at Inchon in mid-September had abruptly turned the tables in the war. Ignoring repeated Chinese warnings and emboldened by the abrupt collapse of North Korea's armies, U.S. forces advanced northward, meeting little or no resistance. But the American crossing of the 38th Parallel in early October and the prospect of a hostile U.S. military presence at China's borders entailed unacceptable risks to Chinese security. This was especially true given General MacArthur's unremitting hostility toward China and his explicit desire (constrained only by President Truman's orders) to undermine Communist rule on the mainland by all available means. Under such circumstances, and regardless of the risks of a major conflict with the United States, the Chinese felt compelled to intervene.

There is substantial credence for this interpretation, most fully and capably presented by Allen Whiting in *China Crosses the Yalu*. In light of newly available evidence, however, the Chinese decision appears considerably more complex and protracted than long supposed. Within weeks of the North Korean attack in June, Mao and his senior generals had begun to plan seriously for the possibility that Chinese forces would be needed. But there was nothing predetermined about the final outcome. Even as the dangers to Chinese security interests mounted in

the last two weeks of September and the first two weeks of October, there was evidence of division, uncertainty, and outright dissent at the highest levels of the Chinese leadership. Chinese decisionmaking in 1950 followed the patterns of the revolutionary war years, and was fairly freewheeling and collegial. Mao was unquestionably the person to whom others deferred (especially on military matters), but he was still nearly a decade away from exhibiting Stalin-like paranoia toward his long-time comrades-in-arms. Thus, debate entailed very different implications in the earliest years of the People's Republic; all leaders (including Mao) were feeling their way.

Although numerous Chinese accounts portray Mao as moving decisively in the face of major risks to Chinese security, other evidence presents a more mixed picture. Mao was evidently torn by the implications of a large-scale intervention. Regardless of Kim Il Sung's culpability for landing China in such an acute predicament, the dangers to Beijing's political and security interests dictated a search for solutions, not for scapegoats. A substantial commitment of Chinese forces very likely made armed conflict with the United States only a matter of time. It would transform Sino-American antagonisms from tensions and uncertainty into outright hostility and prolonged confrontation. Thus, China's intervention solidified Beijing's estrangement from the West for a full two decades, and immeasurably heightened China's dependence on the Soviet Union. Equally vexing, Taiwan has remained outside the CCP's grasp ever since.

In an immediate sense, however, the implications for the Sino-Soviet alliance were uppermost in Mao's mind. As noted previously, Mao's visit to Moscow had hardly been an unalloyed success. Stalin was a very tough negotiator, and even following Mao's return to China, senior Chinese officials remained to hammer out the terms of economic, technological, and military support. Banquet toasts aside, Mao was not wholly confident of his ties with the Soviets.

Mao may have ^{been} awed by Stalin and was intent on proving his loyalty and trustworthiness, but it is doubtful that his earnestness or interest was reciprocated by the Soviet leader. Yet how could the Chinese deploy forces beyond the PRC's borders against the world's most advanced military power, without unambiguous assurances from Moscow that the USSR fully supported their cause? Might not Stalin see value in China remaining mired in a prolonged, inconclusive war with the Americans that posed no direct threat to Soviet security, with enough support from Moscow to stave off North Korea's defeat but not enough to secure China's political or military objectives? We do not know if Mao voiced these concerns openly to his colleagues, but it is difficult to believe that they were absent from his calculations.

However, such concerns were probably not paramount in Mao's thinking until the waning days of the summer of 1950, when a Chinese intervention had become much more likely. In July and August, Mao sought to prepare both mentally and militarily for the *possibility* that Chinese forces would need to intervene, but China's entry into the war was still not inevitable. The Chinese could not anticipate fully North Korean battlefield prospects; they also had to wait and see the extent

and effectiveness of the American intervention. The Chinese recognized that American opinion was deeply divided about the wisdom of deploying forces in Korea. America's post-war demobilization was nearly complete, and the challenge of Soviet power to American interests in Western Europe was incalculably greater. Thus, Mao may have believed that the U.S. would only seek to restore the *status quo*, which the Chinese (at least in a 1950 context) would have deemed a tolerable outcome.

In the uncertain atmosphere of the early summer, the Chinese sought to assess their options. Early North Korean successes pointed to the prospect of quick victory, but other outcomes were also possible. According to Marshal Nie Rongzhen, shortly after the North Korean invasion, some "comrades in the Northeast" (presumably, Gao Gang and his lieutenants) asked Beijing's permission to deploy anti-aircraft units south of the Yalu River in order to defend various bridges from potential air attack. Following approval by North Korea, these highly secretive deployments were undertaken. On July 7 and 10, Zhou Enlai (at Mao's behest) chaired meetings of the Party Military Commission, at which time it was decided to organize the Northeast Frontier Force, drawn predominantly from the 13th Army Group of the 4th Field Army. These units and their commanding officers (including Generals Deng Hua and Xie Fang) were ultimately among the Chinese People's Volunteers (CPVs).

The tone of Chinese editorials and radio broadcasts also grew much more ominous, as Beijing no longer deemed it useful to maintain detachment from the mounting difficulties along its northeastern borders. General MacArthur's highly provocative statements on a visit

to Taiwan in late July lent further weight to Chinese concerns: security in East Asia seemed increasingly less divisible. According to Nie Rongzhen, on August 5 the Military Commission decided to implement contingency plans that if necessary would permit Chinese forces to enter combat within one month. Two weeks later, however, Nie acknowledged the over ambitiousness of Chinese plans, with final preparations now scheduled for completion by September 30.

As the tide of battle turned increasingly against North Korean forces, Mao warned privately that the United States might enlarge the scope of its involvement. In a speech to the Central People's Government Council on September 5, Mao cautioned against the risks of hasty involvement, while also counseling increased preparedness for war, regardless of China's seeming weakness. But the decisive change occurred following the Inchon landing on September 15. According to a leading Chinese military historian, the abrupt deterioration in Pyongyang's fortunes panicked Stalin, who told the Chinese leadership that it might need to assist Kim Il Sung by establishing a government-in-exile in China. A more pressing consideration was the circumstances under which the Chinese might feel compelled to intervene. In a September 21 meeting with Indian ambassador K. M. Pannikar, Zhou Enlai intimated that Beijing's forces would enter the war if American forces crossed the 38th Parallel; the warnings were reiterated more directly in subsequent meetings between Ambassador Pannikar and Nie Rongzhen (on September 25) and Zhou Enlai (on October 2). PRC warnings were also reinforced by Zhou's major public speech on September 30 highlighting the dangers of war. With U.S. forces crossing into North Korea in strength on October 7, Chinese entry into the war seemed imminent.

But the trail of evidence on Chinese decisionmaking during the first two weeks of October is highly contradictory. Rather than a single, unambiguous decision committing China to combat, the Chinese appear to have opted for intervention on *three* separate occasions (October 2, 7, and 13), reversing themselves or pausing twice before finally crossing the Yalu late on the night of October 18. Interestingly, several Chinese publications attribute the ultimate decision not to PRC actions, but to Beijing's response to a formal request from North Korea for military assistance. According to one Chinese account, Kim's request came in the aftermath of U.S. forces crossing the 38th Parallel. Another dates the request following the Truman-MacArthur October 15 meeting on Wake Island (i.e., after China's "final" decision of October 13). One interviewee suggests a much earlier date--immediately after the Inchon landing. According to this source, Kim went to Moscow to plead his case to Stalin, but the Soviet leader (ever wary of the dangers of a direct Soviet-American clash) urged Kim to turn to the Chinese, since "they knew more about Asia." One way or another, Kim made an urgent trip to Beijing (most likely, in mid to late September) to plead for help under increasingly desperate circumstances.

Regardless of Kim's pleas or Stalin's entreaties to Beijing (about which we can only surmise), the decision on whether to intervene ultimately had to be ^emade ^{by} the Chinese themselves. But three factors appear to have contributed to China's hesitancy and equivocation, as embodied by Mao Zedong: (1) Mao's own unease and anxiety; (2) divisions within the top Chinese leadership; and (3) Mao's insistence on binding

guarantees of Soviet military support before Chinese entry into the war. Each merits consideration.

Evidence of the first intervention decision dates from October 2. A *nei-bu* version of Mao's *Selected Military Works* includes a lengthy extract of a cable from this date issued by Mao in the name of the Military Commission, though it does not identify to whom the cable was sent. (For reasons to be explored further below, I believe this document was sent to Stalin.) The language of the cable is quite unequivocal: "We have decided to dispatch some of our armed forces as Chinese volunteers to Korea to assist our Korean comrades . . . We consider this as necessary . . . if the United States occupies the entire Korean peninsula and the Korean revolutionary forces suffered fundamental defeat . . . such a development will be most unfavorable to the entire situation in the Far East."

Despite the seemingly unequivocal quality of this declaration, innumerable Chinese sources document a prolonged Politburo debate over possible intervention, beginning on October 4 and ending on October 7, followed on the 8th by Mao's formal order establishing the Chinese People's Volunteers, with Peng Dehuai serving concurrently as Commander and Political Commissar. (One source also suggests that "some generals" attended the Politburo sessions as nonvoting members.) On the 4th, Peng had been hurriedly called back to Beijing from Xian, where he was overseeing developments in the Northwest. Although Peng was a Politburo member, his recall to Beijing was not to ratify a *pro forma* decision made by Mao, but to determine (in the event of a Chinese intervention) whether Peng was willing and fit to serve as commander of Chinese forces.

Mao had been compelled to turn to Peng following Lin Biao's rejection of an earlier invitation from Mao to lead Chinese forces. Lin's refusal to serve followed from his open skepticism about the wisdom of the Chinese intervention. One interviewee asserted that the full text of Mao's October 2 order explicitly names Lin Biao as commander of Chinese forces in Korea. Mao's relationship with Lin was extremely close. Lin had served under Mao as early as the 1920s, and Lin enjoyed a reputation as a brilliant military strategist. However, as described by one interviewee, Lin was a deeply insecure man, prone to periodic bouts of pessimism that then required Mao to boost his spirits by flattery and cajolery. Peng, on the other hand, was a pure peasant general--direct, unquestioningly loyal, and utterly fearless. Mao knew the sort of man to whom he was turning in a crisis, and Peng did not disappoint him.

But this still begs the question: Why did Lin oppose the intervention and how strongly was his opposition voiced? Various Chinese sources allude to two main lines of opinion in the Politburo. The doubters expressed great caution: "We still weren't steady on our feet and weren't prepared at all. If we sent troops without careful consideration, it could put the newly created New China in great danger." The advocates saw no alternative but to intervene, fearing the consequences of letting U.S. advances go unchecked. Although the advocates conceded that "we weren't fully prepared," they countered that "neither was the United States. They did not have sufficient troop strength and their supply lines were overextended. They had many weaknesses and it would be difficult for them to sustain the war."

Moreover, "the Chinese revolution has changed the balance of power in the world . . . If we only look after the welfare of our nation and see a friend in danger and do not save him, looking on with folded arms . . . this will be hard to remedy."

Although Chinese documentation hints that both schools of thought were amply represented in these Politburo deliberations, only two leading political figures (Gao Gang and Lin Biao) have been named as directly opposing the Chinese intervention. It would be difficult to imagine two more strategically positioned opponents. Gao wore three hats, serving simultaneously as party, government, and military overseer for the Northeast military-administrative region. These powers made him directly responsible for all activities related to the shipment of war materiel, the billeting and transfer of Chinese troop units, and the resupply of Chinese forces during the conflict. (Indeed, despite his evident opposition to involvement in Korea, Gao was subsequently placed in charge of logistics work in China for the war.) Lin Biao's role was equally critical. His crack 4th Field Army units constituted the backbone forces that had been redeployed to the Northeast during July and August, and would prove instrumental in China's earliest military successes. But a demonstrable reluctance on Lin's part potentially created major uncertainties about the military role of units presumably loyal to him.

Though there may have been an underlying political design to Gao and Lin's opposition, it may also have reflected their honest assessment of the military risks involved. Lin is alleged to have traveled to Korea on an inspection visit; similarly, "long before the CPVs went

abroad, Commander Peng had already personally visited the Korean battle front to receive instructions from Comrade Kim Il Sung on the combat role of the CPVs. He traveled deep into the front line to learn about the enemy's situation, to survey the geographical conditions, to investigate and study the strong points of both our enemy and ourselves." According to an account published by Generals Han Xianchu and Xie Fang, Lin and Gao's unease was rooted in total U.S. control of the air and its huge advantage in firepower. They feared China's humiliation, including attacks on China itself, with the Northeast being the obvious and immediate target of attack. According to Han and Xie, Lin and Gao believed that "fighting a war with the United States at that time was a 'risk' and would 'draw fire on oneself' and 'court disaster.'"

It is easy to see how these arguments could have resonated within Party circles. Not only were China's own needs extremely pressing; Kim's desperate plight reflected adventurism entirely of his own making, for which China was not responsible. We can only surmise the degree to which debate polarized the Politburo. The prolonged nature of the discussions suggests that others stood with Gao and Lin, or at least expressed sympathy for their position. As Zhou Enlai is said to have remarked to Mao on October 5, "we cannot wind up this meeting today. I think it would be appropriate to extend it for a day or two. We had better let everyone fully present their views on a matter this important. This way the common understanding that is reached will be a firm one."

Some sources allege that Mao had also found it very difficult to reach a conclusive judgment. According to a speech delivered by Hu Yaobang in mid-1986, "when [Mao] was thinking about the question of whether we should dispatch troops to Korea or not, he remained silent and did not shave for a whole week. Chairman Mao did not shave off his beard until he straightened out his thinking, held a meeting, and reached a common understanding." Early anxieties aside, by the time of the early October Politburo meetings Mao was squarely on the side of those advocating intervention. Following a fulsome speech on the 6th by Peng Dehuai supporting Mao's position, a decision favoring intervention was made on the 7th of October. In Mao's official order of October 8, he commanded the CPVs to "march speedily to the Korean border and join the Korean comrades in fighting the aggressors and winning a glorious victory." Peng proceeded immediately to Shenyang to be briefed by North Korean officials on the battlefield situation. At the same time, Peng conveyed a Central Committee decision setting a time limit of ten days for Chinese forces to be readied for intervention. We do not know whether or how the critics of intervention had been mollified, but a conclusive decision appeared to have been reached.

Yet anomalies continued to persist, suggesting that the October 8 directive was neither final nor decisive. According to Nie Rongzhen, even as U.S. forces pushed closer to the Sino-Korean border, Mao asked Nie to urge General Deng Hua "to slow down a bit" to give Mao some additional time to ponder the decision. Mao ordered Peng's return to Beijing on the 11th to report on the rapidly deteriorating situation of North Korean forces. The Politburo met in emergency session during the

early morning of October 13, declaring that troops should be sent to Korea "immediately." The decision reaffirming the absolute necessity of the intervention--described in one document as a "unanimous decision"--indirectly conveys continued debate and uncertainty in high Party circles.

Returning to the Northeast on the same day, Peng met with regional leaders, and then spoke to senior CPV commanders on the 14th. In his speech to the officers, Peng is said to have "emphasized and clarified the main significance of resisting U.S. aggression and aiding Korea, and critiqued the difficulties that were stressed and *the thinking of those for not sending troops or temporarily not sending troops*" (my emphasis). Thus, it appeared that others were uncomfortable with the Politburo decision, and either did not want Chinese forces committed to combat, or wanted to delay the decision further. In Peng's estimation, however, there was no time to waste: with each passing day, the DPRK drew closer to outright extinction.

Something was still amiss in Chinese decisionmaking. Nowhere was this more vividly conveyed in the peculiar October odyssey of Zhou Enlai to the Soviet Union. (There are some sketchier reports of consultations between Stalin and Chinese officials after Inchon, but conclusive evidence is not available.) Other than a brief discussion in *Khrushchev Remembers*, Zhou's trip to Moscow has not been extensively discussed. My information derives from a single interview, and therefore needs to be viewed with a measure of caution. (Though comparable to Khrushchev's account, this recapitulation conflicts with the Soviet leader's memoirs on several factual points.) Sometime in October (most likely following

the Politburo session between the 4th and the 7th), Mao sent Zhou to Moscow to consult with Stalin over future strategy toward Korea. Stalin had allegedly been impressed with Zhou during the negotiations over the Sino-Soviet treaty, so he seemed the logical choice for such an extremely sensitive mission. According to an article prepared by several of Zhou's long-time staff assistants, Zhou had "valiantly accepted the formidable task of helping Chairman Mao organize and direct the war." Thus, Zhou was fully apprised of China's potential materiel and military requirements.

But Zhou's initial message to Stalin was highly cautionary. Following his arrival in Moscow, Zhou had supposedly received word from Mao via cable that the Politburo had decided *not* to intervene. Upon informing Stalin, the Soviet leader became angry. Following a short talk, Stalin ordered V. M. Molotov to accompany Zhou to the Crimean peninsula for a brief rest. Zhou purportedly remained there for a full two weeks, during which time he was in regular contact with Mao. Zhou then supposedly received a surprise cable from Mao: The decision had been reversed, and China would now intervene on behalf of North Korea. Zhou immediately telephoned Stalin, who sent his personal aircraft to bring Zhou back to the Kremlin for renewed negotiations.

Negotiations between Zhou and Stalin allegedly continued for another week. There was really only one issue--the form, extent, and terms of Soviet military assistance to China. It seems very likely that this factor had been decisive in Chinese deliberations from the outset. In early October, Mao had already drawn a link between Soviet aid and China's ability to achieve its military objectives. In an available

fragment of a cable sent to Stalin on October 2 (quite possibly part of Mao's initial declaration of an intention to intervene), Mao cautioned the Soviet leader that the Chinese army "is not yet sure that it can eliminate one American division at once." As observed in the official Chinese military history of the war, "even before our army entered the war, [the CCP Central Committee and Chairman Mao] had pointed out: We are inferior compared to the enemy in technology and equipment If we want to eliminate American troops in large quantities, we have to wait until our army is equipped."

The Soviets, and the Soviets alone, could meet these needs. Mao knew that such assistance would take time in arriving, and he sought to calibrate Chinese military operations and strategy accordingly. In the CPV's initial battle plans, Chinese forces totaling twelve divisions were to restrict themselves to defensive operations against American and South Korean forces that had crossed the 38th Parallel. Attention would focus especially on ROK forces, since they were far weaker. As observed in one military publication, a Chinese "counter-offensive should be launched only after the forces are reequipped with Soviet weapons and equipment, the arrival of which was yet pending."

In Mao's estimation, there were two principal considerations in the Chinese intervention. Mao's ^{optimal} hope ^{was} that China would have the wherewithal to defeat (or at least rebuff) American forces in operations restricted to Korean territory. Under such circumstances, any conflict between U.S. and Chinese forces would be "quite limited in scale and time." The ^{designation} denigration of Chinese units as "volunteers" was specifically intended to reinforce this possibility: Mao did not want

to provide the United States additional political ammunition that regular PLA units were pushing aggressively beyond China's borders. A worst case scenario was stalemate or defeat on the battlefield, leading to open clashes with the United States that could extend to Chinese territory. (This was the concern that greatly exercised Lin Biao and Gao Gang.) Mao discussed these relevant possibilities in an extended conversation with Peng Dehuai on October 5. According to Mao, "we will prepare to annihilate and destroy [enemy forces] within the borders of Korea [but] since we will be fighting, we must be prepared for the United States to declare war on us. We also must be prepared for them to at least bomb our major cities and industrial bases, their using the navy to attack our coastal cities, and even bombing everywhere, carpet-bombing, and, always in the end, dropping atomic bombs."

It is impossible to determine how Mao estimated the likelihood of a worst case scenario. But there was no disputing the inhibiting effects of Chinese armament and equipment shortages on CPV operations. The story of Chinese military strategy during the conflict is a long and fascinating one, and I will not undertake to summarize it in this essay. My concern is instead to discern the nature of Sino-Soviet understandings reached during Zhou's negotiations with Stalin, and how this may have contributed to Chinese political and military calculations at the time of the intervention. At one level, there appears to have been a relatively clear understanding ^{of} a division of labor: China would send troops to Korea, but the USSR would send equipment and weapons. It is less clear whether the two sides reached full agreement on the terms of payment (i.e., credits vs. grants), and no understanding

was ratified in a written document. This issue was revisited some years later, with Khrushchev supposedly seizing upon ambiguities to insist upon repayment. As the Chinese were to note during the Sino-Soviet polemics, all weaponry supplied to Chinese forces during the war were furnished on a credit basis, with the PRC ultimately repaying Moscow for all its assistance.

But there is no question that Stalin promised timely, substantial aid. Direct evidence exists in cables exchanged between Mao and Peng during the early campaigns of the war. In response to an October 22 cable from Peng requesting approval for pursuing certain military objectives, Mao reminded Peng and Gao Gang the next day that artillery and air support for Chinese forces might not be available for another six months to a year. On November 8, Peng almost plaintively queried the Military Commission on the anticipated arrival date of "the vehicles purchased from the Soviet Union." Though Mao's return cable of the 9th promised that they would be arriving "soon," this may have been more hope than expectation. On December 4, Peng again noted the tremendous disparities between the Chinese and American armies, reminding Mao that without air support the CPVs could operate only at night.

The issue of Soviet assistance persisted throughout the active phases of the conflict, inhibiting Chinese operations and allowing the U.S. to inflict devastating losses on Chinese forces. In his memoirs, Marshal Xu Xiangqian describes a June-October 1951 secret military mission to Moscow that was intended to reequip Chinese forces. In preparatory meetings in May, Mao instructed Xu to purchase weapons and equipment, but then to press the Soviets for technological assistance in

creation of an indigenous ordnance industry. The Chinese evidently hoped that weapons and equipment sufficient to outfit 60 divisions could be secured. Following prolonged negotiations, the Soviet side agreed to outfit 16 divisions (later reduced to 10), but remained extremely withholding throughout the war years on direct provision of technology. In Xu's estimation, Stalin remained worried that excessive military assistance might still provoke a war with the United States; more tellingly, Xu asserted that Stalin still feared that "China might become a second Yugoslavia."

Thus, the relationship with the Soviet Union was uncertain and distrustful from the start. Still, as the Chinese observed in the 1963 polemics, "we ourselves preferred to shoulder the heavy sacrifices necessary [in Korea] and stood in the first line of defense of the socialist camp so that the Soviet Union might stay in the second line." But these sacrifices were unquestionably premised on explicit assurances of Soviet backing. Irrespective of Mao's understandable concerns about Chinese security, he was not prepared to put China's future at risk in the absence of unambiguous indications from Stalin about timely provision of needed support. It was China that bore the burdens, took the grievous losses, and accepted the risks of major armed conflict with the United States, and at all levels this ultimately won Stalin's grudging admiration. Since the Chinese assumed these multiple responsibilities, it assured them a decisive say in the conduct and overall strategy for the war, though they paid a huge price in the process.

SOME CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

However, the initial events spurring the Korean conflict were long since lost in the larger context of Sino-Soviet-American relations and the spreading in hot form of the Cold war to Asia. The Chinese now regularly describe Korea as a "civil war" (*nei-zhan*) that "broke out" (*bao-fa*) in June 1950. Politically sophisticated Chinese privately acknowledge this formulation as the operative code words for describing North Korea's attack across the 38th Parallel. But subsequent events reduced Pyongyang to a subsidiary role in the conflict as a whole. Thus, Beijing's mid-October intervention irrevocably altered the stakes for all sides in the war, with the consequences still felt four decades later.

As we mark the Korea war's fortieth anniversary, scholars are slowly beginning to understand the larger dimensions and implications of the conflict for the participating communist states. It can only be hoped that Pyongyang, Moscow, and Beijing ultimately deem it in their interest to allow preparation of a truly comprehensive history of the war. The official sanction given by the Chinese to detailed research represents a promising beginning. Slowly but ineluctably, the larger story has begun to take shape, permitting the deeper understanding that these crucial events deserve.

第2次 韓國戰爭 國際學術會議
1990. 6. 14 ~ 6. 15, 서울

IV-1

中國，中·蘇同盟，韓國戰爭

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目 次

I. 序論	3
II. 解放과 그 波長	5
III. 戰爭으로 가는 길	10
IV. 中國의 介入 過程	15
V. 몇가지의 結論的 考察	32

I. 序 論

韓國戰爭이 발생한 시기로부터 40년이 지난 지금에 와서야 그 당시에 일어났던 갈등에 대한 전모가 서서히 드러나기 시작하고 있다. 대부분의 戰爭의 경우에 그 歷史는 神話로 歪曲되기 쉽지만 특히 출발점으로 환원하여 종결되고 만 戰爭, 즉 어느 일방도 명백한 勝利 또는 敗北를 경험하지 못한 戰爭의 경우에는 더욱 神話에 의하여 歷史가 歪曲되는 경우가 많다. 歷史家가 언제나 절대적인 진리를 규명할 수는 없지만, 韓國戰爭의 경우에는 해석상의 문제들이 너무도 어렵게 되었다. 가령 최근까지만 하더라도 情報와 文書들은 一方에서만 흘러나오고 있었다. 公式外交文書와 軍史 그리고 인터뷰 자료 등은 거의 모두 美國과 西方側 同盟들에서 나왔으며 韓國으로부터 약간 구할 수 있을 뿐이었다. 共產國家들 중에서는 共產黨의 宣傳文 또는 공식 입장의 설명 이외에는 그 당시의 사건들에 대한 보다 상세한 자료를 하나도 제공하지 않았었다.

그러나 최근에는 비록 충분하지는 않지만 共產國家들로부터도 좀 더 많은 자료가 나오기 시작했다. 그 가운데 대부분의 자료는 진지한 歷史 研究가 부활되면서부터 中國에서 나오고 있다. 즉 韓國戰爭 당시 중요한 역할을 했던 中國軍 將星들의 回顧錄과 公式外交 및 軍事文書 그리고 당시 中國의 중요한 정책결정 과정에 참여했거나 목격했던 사람들의 回顧錄 등이 출판되고 있으며, 이러한 자료들은 韓國戰爭 특히 中國의 軍事戰略과 作戰에 대한 이해를 돕는 데 큰 보탬이 되고 있다.

그러나 政治的 次元에서는 아직도 우리가 알 수 있는 것이 크게 제한되어 있다. 우선 金日成을 제외하고는 戰爭의 중요한 정책결정 과정

에 참여했던 인물들이 거의 다 死亡하고 말았다. 다만 그 때 通譯 및 秘書로 활동했던 사람들이 아직까지 일부 생존해 있을 뿐이다. 그러나 그 때의 상황에 대해서 보다 충분하게 모든 것을 밝히지 않는 이유는 그것이 政治的으로 민감한 문제이기 때문이다. 사실 지난 40년 동안 平壤과 北京 그리고 모스크바는 약속이라도 한 듯이 일관되게 침묵을 지켜왔다. 따라서 北韓과 北韓의 戰時 友邦들이 보다 개방적인 태도를 취하지 않는 한 韓國戰爭의 주요 결정들과 사건들에 대한 총체적인 설명은 불가능한 것이다. 그런데 문제는 이들이 제각기 간직하고 있는 秘密들이 그들로서는 좀처럼 밝히고 싶지 않은 것들이라는 점이다. 北韓의 경우에는 戰爭의 시발에 대한 책임이 분명히 金日成에게 있다는 사실을, 蘇聯의 경우에는 스탈린(Joseph V. Stalin)이 金日成의 南侵提議를 동의해 주었다는 사실을, 그리고 中國은 毛澤東이 金日成의 계획을 事前에 認知하고 있었으며 자기의 同盟國들의 결정에 억지로 따를 수밖에 없었다는 사실을 결코 밝히고 싶지 않은 것이다. 결과적으로 韓國戰爭 以前 時期와 戰爭期間中에 이들 세 나라가 어떤 역할을 했는지에 대해서는 놀라운 정도의 허위와 날조된 기록이 있을 수밖에 없는 것이다.

그러나 최근 마침내 그와 같은 침묵의 陰謀가 무너지기 시작했다. 戰爭과 관련된 결정들은 성격상 필연적으로 秘密스러운 것이기 때문에 그 누구도 戰爭의 전모를 낱낱이 알 수가 없으며 그 당시의 사건들을 모두 설명해 줄 수 있는 자료들이 빠짐 없이 가지고 있을 수도 없다. 결국 필요한 자료들은 부분적으로 蓄積되어 나갈 수밖에 없는데, 그나마 최근 中國에서는 다시금 지성활동에 대한 제약이 강화되면서 자료의 공급이 줄어들고 있는 경향이다. 반면에 蘇聯쪽은 과거보다 더욱 고무적으로 변해가고 있으며, 韓國戰爭史에 중요한 새로운 解析의 可能

性도 주고 있다.(글라스노스트가 지속될 수 있다면 이것은 거의 불가피해질 것이다). 이상과 같은 상황 때문에 學者들은 결국 北韓, 中國, 蘇聯에서 나오는 短片的인 증거들을 기초로 꾸준한 탐구작업을 계속하는 길밖에 없다.

이 論文에서 筆者는 韓國戰爭에 中國이 어떻게 가담하게 되었는가 하는 문제에 대하여 現在의 時點에서 筆者가 理解하고 있는 바를 要約하고자 한다. 이것은 1986년부터 1989년 사이에 본인이 中國의 學者 및 前職 官吏들과 가졌던 인터뷰, 제한된 文書調查, 그리고 中國의 전략에 대하여 직접 알 수 있는 입장에 있었던 中國人들과의 인터뷰 등에 기초하고 있다. 또한 中國에서 출판된 자료들도 참조했는데, 그 중에는 “內部”라고 분류되어 中國 內의 제한된 인사들에게만 배포되는 자료들도 있었다. 물론 그렇게 분류된 자료라 하더라도 筆者가 접근할 수 있는 길은 있었다. 하여튼 본인의 理解는 아직 부분적일 뿐만 아니라 충분히 가변적인 것이므로 어떤 최종적인 解析을 갖고 있다고 주장하지는 않겠다. 한편 이 글은 中國의 內亂 終結過程에서 출발하여 1949년 10월 “中華人民共和國”의 樹立, 1950년 2월 “中·蘇 友好同盟 및 相互援助條約”의 調印 과정을 거쳐 中國이 韓國戰爭에 참전하기까지의 時期와 過程에 초점을 두고자 한다.

II. 解放과 그 波長

1948년 中國 國民黨이 예상보다 갑작스럽게 무너지게 됨에 따라 中國 共產黨은 그들의 權力掌握 時期를 앞당기게 되었다. 사실 毛澤東은 그 당시에 진행중이던 3대 主要 戰鬪에서 그렇게 빨리 승리를 거둘 수 있으리라고는 예상하지 않았지만, 攻擊을 遲延시키는 것이 좋겠다는 스

탈린의 충고도 받아들이지 않았다. 최종적인 軍事的 勝利가 다가옴에 따라 오히려 解放 以後의 상황에 대비하는 計劃樹立이 더욱 절실했다.

이러한 상황 하에서 中國 共產黨 내에서는 일단 새 政府가 들어서게 되면 蘇聯과의 밀착을 방지하기 위해서도 美國이 새 政府를 환영해 줄 것이라고 기대하는 사람도 있었다. 하지만 毛澤東은 그런 幻想을 갖지 않았던 것으로 보인다. 물론 스탈린과는 달리 毛澤東은 美國이 국민당을 구제하기 위해 최후의 개입을 감행할 확률이 높다고는 생각하지 않았지만 머지 않아 美國과의 관계가 개선될 전망이 있다고 생각하지도 않았다.

따라서 毛澤東은 스탈린과 和解를 하든지 아니면 적어도 和解가 가능한지 알아 볼 필요가 있다고 생각했다. 마침 스탈린이 1949년 1월에 아나스타스 미코얀(Anastas Mikoyan)을 中國에 派遣함으로써 中·蘇 接近은 시작되었는데, 1949년 여름에 劉少奇가 비밀리에 모스크바를 장기간 訪問함으로써 兩國 關係에 중요한 진전이 이루어지게 되었다. 바로 그 때에 스탈린은 劉少奇에게 과거 中國革命을 잘못 이해하고 그릇된 충고를 한 데 대하여 사과했다고 한다. 그렇게 함으로써 스탈린은 中國 共產黨의 승리가 불가피함을 인정했으며 처음으로 蘇聯이 中國 共產黨의 正統性을 인정함을 시인하였다. 그런데 中國側의 계산은 복잡한 것이었다. 中國 指導者들은 國際 共產主義 運動에 있어서 中國의 완전한 獨立 또는 최소한 자주성을 주장할 계획이었다. 그러나 다른 한편으로 그들은 廢墟에 놓여 있는 中國의 경제를 재건하고 잠재적인 美國의 위협앞에 中國의 안전을 보장하기 위해서는 밖으로부터의 도움이 절실히 필요했던 것이다. 결국 劉少奇는 모스크바에 장기간 滯留하면서 스탈린을 다섯 번이나 만나 1949년 12월 毛澤東의 모스크바 訪問을 준비했던 것이다. 물론 이것은 毛澤東이 처음으로 中國 國境을 넘는 여

행이었다.

그러나 中國은 安保를 위하여 蘇聯의 政治·軍事的 保障에만 의존할 생각은 없었다. 바로 中國 共產主義者들이 국민당의 殘存 勢力을 소탕하고 蔣介石이 臺灣으로 도주함에 따라 대만에 대한 상륙작전을 계획하기 시작했을 때 毛澤東은 解放 以後의 여러 가지 상황에 대비한 계획을 구상하고 있었다. 이미 1949년 6월부터 毛澤東은 앞으로 美國이 軍事行動을 포함하여 여러 가지 방법으로 긴장을 고조시킬지도 모르는 잠재적 戰線으로 세 개의 지역이 가능하다고 생각했다. 이들 3개 戰線은 東 아시아에서의 3大 共產革命運動과 연결되어 있었는데, 첫째는 蔣介石의 軍隊가 방해공작을 계속하고 있는 中國의 東南 海岸地域이고, 둘째는 베트남(Viet Mihn, 越南獨立同盟)을 逐出하고 인도지나반도에 대한 中·越 國境地帶였으며, 마지막으로 세번째 지역은 새로 태어나 취약한 大韓民國을 美國이 支援해 주고 있는 東北亞地域이라고 생각했던 것이다.

실제로 毛澤東 자신이 戰爭의 위협이 어느 정도 심각하다고 생각했는지, 심각하다면 어디서 발생할 것으로 예상했으며 그 규모는 어느 정도 될 것으로 내다 보았는지는 確言하기 어렵다. 그러나 전쟁에 대비를 하고 있었던 것만은 틀림없다. 1950년 5월에 毛澤東은 제38, 39, 40 및 42軍에 속하는 兵力 일부를 재편성하여 中國의 河南 지역에 戰略 豫備部隊를 창설했다. 이 戰略 豫備部隊의 임무는 대만, 베트남 또는 韓國에서 사태가 발생하는 데 대비하는 것이었는데, 이 세 지역 어느 곳에도 긴급 이동할 수 있게 편성함으로써 유사시에 中國의 다른 전방에 배치되어 있는 兵力을 이동하지 않고도 上述한 지역에서의 상황에 대처할 수 있게끔 하는 데 그 목적이 있었다. 그러니까 中國 자체의 방위를 약화시키지 않으면서 외부의 局地戰에도 대응할 수 있도록

사전 조치한 것이다. 그러나 毛澤東은 內心으로 美國이 軍事的 攻撃을 감행해 오기보다는 오히려 共產勢力들 중에서 먼저 어떤 行動을 취한 데 대한 대응으로 美國이 軍事的 行動을 취하게 될 가능성이 더 많으며 그런 경우 中國은 대응하지 않을 수 없을 것이라고 믿었던 것 같다. 그런데 이런 상황이 실제로 韓半島에서 전개되었다.

우리는 韓國과 베트남에서의 共產主義 運動이 그 운명에 있어서 中國 共產黨과 떼어 놓을 수 없는 관계를 갖고 있었다는 사실을 종종 망각하는 수가 있다. 실제로 毛澤東은 金日成과 胡志明을 지원하고 피난처를 제공했었다. 朝鮮族들은 中國의 革命勢力과 어깨를 나란히 하여 싸웠으며 金日成은 中國語를 유창하게 할 뿐만 아니라 한 때 中國 共產黨의 정식 당원까지 된 일이 있다. 그러나 金日成의 상황은 그를 38도선 以北 지역의 권좌에 앉혀 준 蘇聯과의 관계 때문에 매우 복잡하였다. 이러한 복잡한 상황 하에서 일찍부터 金日成은 蘇聯 및 中國과의 별도의 관계를 자신의 政治的 利益 도모에 활용하였는데 이것은 그가 政治적으로 얼마나 영리했는가를 보여준다. 오히려 불가사의한 일인데 北京과 모스크바가 그들의 광범위한 地政學的 利益을 金日成의 政治的 戰略에 담보되도록 허용했는지 하는 점이다.

毛澤東은 모스크바로 출발하면서 蘇聯으로부터 어떤 迎接을 기대해야 할 지 알 수가 없었다. 駐中 蘇聯 外交官들은 그 해 가을에 兩國의 和解를 위해 많은 시간을 보냈지만, 그들이 스탈린을 직접 대변하는 것은 아니었다. 毛澤東은 몇 가지 뚜렷한 목적을 갖고 있었다. 그는 美國과의 관계가 다소라도 개선될 전망이 거의 없어졌기 때문에 對蘇一邊倒 政策으로 기울게 되었으며, 무엇보다도 그는 蘇聯의 安保公約을 절실히 필요로 하고 있었던 것이다. 毛澤東은 12월 16일 스탈린과의 첫 만남에서 中國 사람들은 “아름답고 맛있는” 결과를 기대한다고 말

했다. 毛澤東은 스탈린이 中國 國民黨과 締結한 1945년의 中·蘇 友好 同盟條約의 내용이 이제는 집권하는 위치에 놓인 中國 共產黨과의 관계에는 적절하지 못하다고 주장했다. 그러나 共產黨 間의 관계가 얼마나 同志的 關係로 될 것인가 하는 것은 앞으로 더 두고 보아야 할 일이었다. 몇 년 후에 毛澤東이 私席에서 밝힌 것처럼 당시 스탈린은 中國사람(특히 毛澤東)을 제2의 티토 같은 존재가 될 것으로 두려워하면서 의심에 찬 눈초리로 보고 있었다. 따라서 毛澤東은 스탈린의 도움을 필요로 하고 있었으나 오히려 스탈린에게 의심받는 처지에 있었던 것이다. 그런 상황 아래서 이 두 사람의 만남이 순조로울 수는 없었다.

스탈린이 바라본 1949년 後半의 世界情勢 속에서 中國 共產黨의 勝利가 완전한 축복만은 아니었다. 그는 中國 共產主義者들을 “마가린 共產主義者”라고 조롱한 일이 있는데, 그는 中國 共產主義者들뿐만 아니라 모든 아시아인들을 경멸했던 것 같다. 中國과의 밀접한 관계는 유라시아 대륙에서 社會主義 캠프를 우세하게 만드는 利點이 있지만, 또 다른 한편으로는 北京에 대한 모스크바의 의무도 무거워지는 것을 의미하며 모스크바는 그럴 만한 여유가 없었다. 따라서 蘇聯이 中國에게 제의한 經濟援助가 극히 미미하고 인색해 보인 것은 놀라운 일이 아니다. 스탈린은 아시아지역에서 蘇聯의 요구와 目標에 잘 순응하는 말 잘 듣는 파트너를 원했지만 지나치게 행동에 制約을 줄 수 있는 關係成立은 원하지 않았다. 또한 中國땅에 커다란 社會主義 同盟을 키운다는 것은 蘇聯의 長期的 戰略의 利益 側面에서 보아 불확실성이 높은 것이었다. 다시 말해 스탈린은 中國이 언제까지나 蘇聯과의 下位的 關係에 만족하리라고는 믿지 않았던 것이다.

최근에 蘇聯과 中國은 당시의 毛-스탈린 會談에 대한 흥미있는 평가

들을 각각 발표하였는데, 이 資料들은 毛-스탈린間의 協商이 얼마나 어려웠는가를 생생하게 보여주고 있다. 兩側의 평가는 모든 점에서 일치하지는 않지만 毛澤東과 스탈린이 모두 제각기 대단한 협상 상대였음을 알 수 있게 한다. 中國側 자료에 의하면 毛澤東과 스탈린의 관계는 부자연스럽고 긴장이 깔려 있었던 것으로 되어 있고, 蘇聯側 자료에 의하면 毛澤東이 蘇聯 지도자로부터 깊은 인상을 받고 다소 겁에 질린 것 같았다고 기술하고 있다. 실제로 자세한 協商은 毛와 스탈린의 참여가 없는 보좌관들 사이에서 장시간 이뤄졌으며, 同盟條約은 毛澤東이 모스크바에 도착한 지 거의 2개월이나 지난 1950년 2월 14일에 조인되었다. 후일 1950년대 중반에 周恩來가 어느 中國 外交官에게 말한 바 있듯이, 당시에 毛澤東은 “條約이 체결되기 전에는 모스크바를 떠나지 않겠다”고 결심하고 있었던 것 같다.

Ⅲ. 戰爭으로 가는 길

그렇다면 中·蘇 協商에서 韓半島 問題는 어느 정도까지 거론되었을까? 이 문제에 관해 발표된 자료로는 흐루시초프(N.S.K.hrushchev)의 回顧錄이 있을 뿐이다. 그에 의하면, 스탈린이 먼저 毛澤東에게 韓半島에서 가능한 상황에 대해 물었다고 한다. 또한 흐루시초프의 설명에 의하여 金日成이 1949년 말 모스크바를 방문하여 처음으로 軍事行動을 제의했을 당시 스탈린은 일단 金日成에게 보다 상세한 계획을 세워보라고 제시하였으며, 이에 따라 金日成은 平壤으로 돌아와 보다 철저한 준비를 한 후 또 다시 모스크바를 방문했다. 바로 金日成의 두번째 訪問時期에 스탈린이 金日成의 提案에 대한 毛澤東의 意見을 물었으며, 毛澤東은 金日成의 提案을 지지했다고 흐루시초프는 밝히고 있다.

그런데 筆者가 인터뷰한 中國인 두 사람은 韓國戰爭의 背景에 대해서 흐루시초프의 설명과 정면으로 모순되지는 않지만 다른 내용의 설명을 제공하였다. 즉 金日成이 38선 以南에 대한 공격 계획을 스탈린이 아니라 毛澤東과 먼저 協議했다는 것이다(그러한 協議가 어느 날에 있었는지는 분명치 않지만 아마 1949년 가을이었던 것만은 분명하다). 이것은 충분히 사실일 수 있다. 蘇聯 붉은 軍隊의 덕분으로 권좌에 앉게 된 金日成은 蘇聯 以外の 다른 세력으로부터 政治·軍事的 도움을 받기를 희망했다. 더욱이 金日成은 최근에 승리를 쟁취한 中國人에게 더욱 친근감을 느끼고 있었다. 金日成은 中國 共產黨의 승리에 이어 南朝鮮에 대해서도 共產黨이 승리를 거둔다면 東北亞로부터 美國의 마지막 남은 軍事力을 모두 축출해 버릴 수 있을 뿐만 아니라 中國과 朝鮮은 蘇聯이 잠재적 위협으로부터도 벗어날 수 있을 것이라고 毛澤東에게 말했다. 가능성이 높다.

毛澤東은 金日成보다 훨씬 더 낙관적이었던 것으로 알려져 있다. 金日成은 대규모의 軍事力을 투입하면 서울에 있는 政府의 權威가 순간적으로 붕괴되고 南韓 内部에 革命活動이 자동적으로 일어날 것으로 믿었기 때문에 電擊戰(Blitzkrieg)을 주장했다. 毛澤東은 金日成과는 대조적으로 훨씬 더 신중한 전략가였다. 그의 軍事問題에 대한 著述에서 볼 수 있듯이 毛澤東은 “戰略的 攻擊”에는 적절한 시기와 장소가 있다고 믿었으며 그러한 攻擊을 위한 단계까지는 치밀하게 계획되고 조정된 게릴라활동을 통하여 攻擊을 위한 상황을 조성하는 것이 필요하다고 생각했다. 반대로 金日成의 軍事問題에 대한 사고방식은 충동적인 면이 있었는데, 그는 대담한 행동을 취함으로써 政治·軍事的 狀況 自體를 변경시키고 반드시 유리하지 않더라도 速戰速決에 의한 勝利를 爭取할 수 있다고 믿었다.

毛澤東은 金日成에게 만일 그의 계획대로 상황이 展開되지 않는다면 어떻게 대처할 것인가 하는 문제를 提起했다. 毛澤東은 걱정했던 北朝鮮 軍隊가 38선을 넘는 경우 그가 1949년 6월부터 想定하여 온 戰略的 “脆弱地域” 세 곳 가운데 한 지역에 近接한 아시아 대륙에서 美國이 軍事的으로 “再介入”하는 것이었다. 만일 美軍이 東北亞에 다시 介入하게 된다면 中國의 安保利益은 北韓의 安保利益과 不可分の 關係에 말려들게 된다. 또한 毛澤東은 韓半島에서 戰爭이 발생하는 경우 臺灣에 대한 中國의 攻擊計劃이 무기한 연기될 수 밖에 없을 것으로 걱정했다. 이상과 같은 여러 가지 고려 끝에 毛澤東은 金日成의 計劃을 지지하기를 주저하면서 金에게 그의 계획을 협의할 것을 권유했다.

中國으로부터 거절당한 金日成은 스탈린에게 호소하기 위해 일종의 “셔틀외교”를 전개했다. 흐루시초프에 의하면 스탈린도 美國의 介入 가능성을 걱정했지만, 金日成은 자신의 계획에 대해 자신만만하게 보였다고 한다. 흐루시초프는 “金이 提案者였는데 스탈린은 그를 말리려 하지 않았다”고 기억하고 있다. 그러나 스탈린은 毛澤東의 意見を 물었다고 한다. 이에 대해 毛澤東은 韓半島에서의 鬭爭이 전적으로 朝鮮 人民의 國內 問題로 보이는 한 美國이 개입할 가능성은 적다고 하면서 金日成의 계획을 지지했다는 것이다. 흐루시초프에 따르면 毛澤東은 金의 생각에 반대한다는 기색을 전혀 보이지 않았다고 한다. 아마도 스탈린의 위엄 때문에—특히 스탈린이 毛澤東을 아시아의 뛰어난 전략가라고 치켜세웠기 때문에—毛澤東은 金의 提案을 정면으로 반대할 수 없었는지는 모르겠으나, 하여튼 강하게 반대하지는 않은 것만은 확실하다.

따라서 1950년 1월 美國의 애치슨(Dean G. Acheson)國務長官의 “내셔널 프레스 클럽” 演說은(며칠 후 東京에서 있었던 맥아더 將軍의 발언도 마찬가지로) 그 타이밍이 더 이상 나쁠 수가 없었다. 애치슨은

韓半島를 美國의 安保責任 領域에서 분명히 제외시킴으로써 毛澤東과 스탈린에게 제의한 金日成의 계획을 자신도 모르게 뒷받침해 주는 결과를 초래했다. 美國은 “島嶼防禦 戰略”을 채택함으로써 아시아 大陸에 대한 어떤 政治的 또는 安保的 負擔도 갖지 않겠다는 인상을 주었던 것이다.

그런데 이 時點 以後로 中國이 金日成의 실제 공격계획을 어느 정도 알고 있었는지는 그것을 확인할 수 있는 증거를 거의 찾아보기 어렵다. 그 당시 中國 人民解放軍 總參謀長의 代理였던 聶榮榛의 回顧錄을 보면 北韓의 特使(金光俠將軍)가 1950년 1월중에 北京을 방문하고 中國의 제4군과 함께 싸워 온 14,000명의 朝鮮人 部隊를 北韓의 統制 밑에 귀속시켜 줄 것을 요청했다고 한다. 金日成이 中國 및 蘇聯의 支援을 요청한 상황 하에서 섭영진은 北韓이 요청한 朝鮮人 部隊의 軍事的 價値와 그 활용 목적에 대해서 모르고 있었을 리가 없다. 실제로 섭영진에 의하면 北韓 特使 金將軍은 만일 中國이 朝鮮人 部隊와 北韓이 요청한 軍事裝備들을 제공하지 않는다면 北韓은 蘇聯側에 추가 지원을 요청할 수밖에 없다고 지적함으로써 中國과 蘇聯의 관계를 이용하려고 했다. 聶將軍은 결국 黨의 同意를 얻어 平壤의 요구를 들어 주었다.

이상과 같은 자료에도 불구하고 필자가 인터뷰할 수 있었던 많은 中國人들은 6월말 실제로 戰爭이 발발했을 때 中國은 平壤의 戰爭計劃을 통보받지 못한 상태였으므로 놀랄 수밖에 없었다고 주장하였다. 이러한 주장은 半 정도 진리인 것 같다. 스탈린은 金의 계획에 어떤 이유에서건 同意할 용의가 있었으므로 사실 中國이 北韓의 행동을 정면으로 반대한다는 것은 불가능했던 것이다. 많은 學者들은 원래 신중한 스탈린이 왜 그런 모험을 했을까 하는 문제를 제기해 왔다. 그러나 1950

년 여름 金日成이 실제로 그의 목적을 거의 달성할 뻔 했다는 사실을 망각하고 있는 경우가 많다. 사실 金의 豫測은 거의 정확했던 것으로 사실상 증명되었다. 만일 北韓 軍隊가 釜山까지 占領함으로써 韓半島全體가 北韓 統治下에 들어 갔다면 스탈린의 도박은 큰 수확을 거둘 수 있었을 것이며 오늘날 왜 스탈린이 金日成의 戰略에 말려들었는지 묻는 사람은 없을 것이다. 우리들은 北韓의 戰爭目的이 달성되지 못했기 때문에 스탈린의 동기와 계산에 대해 의문을 던지게 되는 것이다.

그러나 中國에 관한 한 中國이 金日成의 南侵計劃에 직접 관련되어 있다는 증거는 없다. 政治學者 앨런 화이트(Allen Whiting)이 지적한 바 대로 中國은 6.25당시에 平壤駐在 大使도 없었다. 毛澤東은 韓國戰爭이 전적으로 民族內部的 문제라는 인상을 뒷받침하기 위해서 金의 計劃에 대하여 될수록 거리를 두려고 했던 것 같다. 中國은 깊이 관여하지 않으므로써 위험 부담도 줄일 수 있었다. 그리고 실제로 中國은 金日成이 가장 필요로 하는 分野(예 ; 탱크와 포)에서 中國 스스로의 軍事力을 약화시키지 않고는 北韓을 실질적으로 도와줄 수 없는 입장이었다. 中國 人民解放軍은 아직도 本土의 軍事作戰을 완전히 종결짓지 못한 채 대만공격도 준비해야 하는 상황이었다. 毛澤東은 또한 北韓에 개입하지 않음으로써, 아시아에서 共產勢力이 상호 조정된 계획 하에 공세를 취할지도 모른다고 우려하고 있는 美國을 안심시킬 수 있다고 판단했던 것 같다.

그러나 그것은 毛澤東의 희망대로 되지는 않았다. 中·蘇 條約의 調印(中國 東北地域의 주요 海軍 施設에 대한 蘇聯의 利用權限을 보장하는 조항을 포함한 條約), 프랑스에 대한 Vietminh의 攻勢 再開, 38선에서의 北韓 攻擊, 바로 이러한 사건들은 서로 어떤 연관성이 있는 것처럼 보였다. 이러한 情勢下에 美軍이 臺灣海峽에 나타나게 되고 쫓

기는 韓國軍을 돕기 위해 美軍이 추가로 韓半島에 투입되면서 中國은 하는 수 없이 東北亞에서의 葛藤의 소용돌이 속으로 말려들게 되었으며, 결국 10월 하순에 中國의 兵力이 韓國戰爭에 직접 참가하게 되었던 것이다.

IV. 中國의 介入 過程

中國이 鴨綠江을 건너기로 한 결정에 대한 이야기는 매우 흥미진진한 것이지만 실제로는 많은 사람들이 생각하는 이상으로 복잡한 것이었다. 대부분의 學者들은 美軍이 대동강을 향하여 빠른 속도로 進軍해 오며 따라 中國이 안전에 대한 위협의식을 갖게 되었고 결국 參戰을 결정했다고 믿는다. 물론 9월 중순 맥아더(Douglas MacArthur)將軍의 대담한 仁川上陸으로 戰爭狀況이 순식간에 역전된 것은 사실이다. 그리고 美軍은 北韓軍이 예상 외로 쉽게 붕괴되는 데 고무되어 여러 번 되풀이된 中國의 경고를 무시하고 계속 북진하고 있었다. 그러나 10월 초에 美軍이 38선을 넘게 되면서 中國 國境 가까이 敵對的인 美軍이 자리잡게 될 것이라는 전망은 中國으로서는 받아들일 수 없는 安保上的 위협을 뜻하는 것이었다. 더욱이 맥아더 將軍의 中國에 대한 끊임없는 敵對感과, 트루먼 大統領의 명령으로 겨우 견제되고 있기는 했지만 中國 本土에서 共產 統治를 어떻게든 무너뜨려야 하겠다는 맥아더의 욕심 때문에 中國으로서는 國境에 접근해 오는 美軍을 위협으로 간주하지 않을 수 없었던 것이다. 따라서 美國과의 갈등에 말려들지도 모른다는 위협성에도 불구하고 당시의 狀況 下에서 中國은 介入이 불가피하다고 느꼈던 것이다.

이상과 같은 解析은 상당한 신빙성이 있다고 할 수 있는데, 앨런

화이팅의 著書, 「中國, 鴨綠江을 건너다」에 가장 잘 제시되어 있다. 그러나 최근에 나타난 증거에 의하면 中國의 개입 결정은 오랫동안 많은 學者들이 생각했던 것보다 훨씬 더 복잡하고, 中國이 최종 결심을 하기까지는 많은 시간이 걸렸던 것 같다. 北韓의 攻擊이 개시된 이후 몇 주일이 지나면서 毛澤東과 일부 주요 將軍들은 中國軍의 도움이 필요하게 될 가능성에 대해 심각하게 계획을 세우기 시작했다. 그러나 아직 최종 결과에 대해서는 정해진 것이 아무 것도 없었다. 9월 후반부터 10월 전반 기간에 中國의 안보위협이 증가하고 있을 때에도 中國의 최고 지도층에서는 아직도 意圖이 통일되지 못하고 더구나 자신감도 없는 상태에서 개입에 대해 정면으로 반대하는 목소리까지 있었다는 증거가 있다. 1950년만 해도 中國의 정책결정 과정은 革命戰爭 時期의 패턴을 그대로 유지하고 있었으며 상당히 자유스럽고 동료적 성격을 갖고 있었다. 물론 毛澤東에 대한(특히 軍事問題에 대해서는) 존경은 틀림없었지만, 毛澤東이 스탈린식으로 동료들에 대하여 피해망상증을 나타내기 시작한 것은 이보다 10년 후의 일이다. 따라서 中華人民共和國 초창기의 토론은 현재와는 매우 다른 뜻이 있었으며 모든 지도자들(毛澤東을 포함한)이 아직은 서로 탐색하는 단계에 있었다고 할 수 있다.

많은 中國사람들은 毛澤東이 中國의 안전에 대한 위협에 직면했을 때 결단력 있게 대처해 나갔다고 말하고 있지만, 다른 증거들을 고려해 보면 실재는 훨씬 더 복잡했던 것 같다. 毛澤東은 中國이 대규모로 개입하는 경우의 결과에 대해서 고민했던 것이 틀림없다. 물론 中國을 근경에 몰아 넣은 책임은 金日成에게 있었지만, 中國의 政治的·安保의 威脅에 직면하여 필요한 것은 責任追窮이 아니라 당장의 해결책을 찾아내는 일이었다. 中國이 대규모 軍隊를 투입할 경우 美國과 軍事的 衝突을 한다는 것은 뻔한 일이었다. 그럴 경우 美·中 關係는 긴장과

불확실성의 관계로부터 직접적인 대결과 적대관계로 변할 것이다. 실제로 中國은 개입을 단행함으로써 향후 20년 동안이나 西方側으로부터 따돌림을 당하고 蘇聯에 대한 의존도를 크게 제고해야만 하는 결과를 가져왔다. 中國으로서 더욱 문제가 되는 것은 韓國戰 介入으로 말미암아 臺灣을 中國의 支配下에 넣을 수 없게 되어 버렸다는 점이다.

毛澤東의 우선적인 관심사는 개입으로 인해 對蘇 同盟關係에 어떤 영향을 낳을 것인가 하는 문제였다. 앞서도 지적했지만 毛澤東의 訪蘇는 결코 성공적인 것만은 아니었다. 스탈린은 참으로 대단한 협상자였으며 毛澤東이 中國으로 돌아간 뒤에도 中國의 高位 官吏들은 계속 蘇聯에 滯留하면서 經濟, 技術 및 軍事支援의 구체적 조건에 대한 협상을 계속할 수밖에 없었다. 毛澤東은 크레믈린의 만찬장에서 축배를 들면서 했던 긍정적인 발언과는 달리 실제로는 蘇聯과의 관계에 대하여 마음을 놓지 못하고 있었다.

毛澤東은 스탈린에게 겁에 질려 그에 대한 충성을 확신시키고자 했는지 모르지만 스탈린은 毛澤東에 대하여 성실하기는 커녕 그다지 큰 관심도 보이지 않았다. 그렇다면 이처럼 蘇聯으로부터의 완전한 지지 약속도 받지 않은 상태에서 中國이 어떻게 감히 世界 最強大國의 軍隊, 그것도 中國의 國境 밖에 있는 兵力에 대항하여 자신의 軍事力을 전개할 수 있었을까? 혹시 스탈린이 北韓의 패배를 방지하는 동시에 中國의 軍事的·政治的 目標達成을 못하게 하는 선에서 지원을 해 줌으로써, 결과적으로 中國으로 하여금 蘇聯의 안전에는 직접적인 위협이 안 되는 美國과 戰爭을 치르게 하고 그 戰爭이 별다른 결론도 없이 계속된다면 그것은 蘇聯에게 유리한 것이라고 판단했던 것은 아닐까? 우리는 毛澤東이 그의 동료들에게 이와 같은 염려를 공개적으로 표현했는지는 알 수 없으나, 그의 心中에 이러한 계산들이 없었다고 보기는 힘

들다.

그러나 1950년 여름이 지나 中國의 개입이 점점 확실해질 무렵까지는 그와 같은 염려가 毛澤東의 마음 속에서 제일 큰 비중을 차지한 것은 아니었다. 7월과 8월 중에 毛澤東은 中國軍이 개입해야 될지도 모른다는 可能性에 대해서 軍事的으로 뿐만 아니라 정신적으로도 대비하고자 노력했다. 그러나 아직까지는 개입이 불가피한 것은 아니었다. 이 때까지만 해도 中國은 北韓이 전투에서 어떻게 될지 예상할 수 없었으며, 또 美國의 개입 규모가 어느 정도이고 얼마나 효과적인지 기다려 보는 수밖에 없었다. 中國은 美國의 개입에 대한 美國 內의 여론이 크게 분열되어 있음을 알고 있었다. 전후 美國은 軍事力을 거의 해체한 상태였으며, 서유럽에서의 美國의 이익에 대한 蘇聯 軍事力의 도전이 韓國戰爭과는 비교할 수 없을 만큼 더 큰 것이었다. 따라서 毛澤東은 美國의 목적이 戰爭 以前의 현상유지(staus quo)를 회복하는 데 있다고 믿었을 가능성이 있으며, 그런 경우(특히 적어도 1950년대의 상황에서는) 中國도 이를 받아들일 수 있다고 생각했을 것이다.

시기적으로 모든 것이 아직 불확실한 情勢 속에서 中國의 指導者들은 그들이 선택할 수 있는 범위가 어느 정도인지 평가해 보려고 했다. 北韓이 戰爭 初期에 성공적으로 싸운다면 곧 승리를 내다 볼 수 있겠지만 다른 結果들도 가능했다. 십영진에 의하면 北韓의 攻擊 直後 “東北地區의 동지들”(高崗과 그의 부하들을 지칭하는 듯함)이 鴨綠江의 다리들을 空中爆擊으로부터 보호하기 위해 中國軍의 防空砲 部隊를 鴨綠江以南으로 배치할 수 있도록 北京이 허락해 줄 것을 요청했다고 한다. 실제로 中國의 防空砲 部隊는 北韓의 同意 하에 극비리에 北韓 領土에 배치되었다. 7월 7일과 10일 周恩來는 毛澤東의 指示에 따라 黨 軍事委員會를 개최하여 동북지역 戰線軍을 조직하기로 결의하고 제4 야전군

제13 군단에서 兵力을 충원하기로 하였다. 바로 이 部隊들과 그 指揮官들(鄧華 및 解方 將軍 포함)이 후에 韓國戰爭에 투입된 兵力의 골격을 이루었으며 “中國人民支援軍”으로 불리게 되었다.

北京當局은 동북 국경지역에서 일어나고 있는 상황이 점차 악화됨에 따라 더 이상 이 문제에 대하여 초연한 자세를 취해서는 안되겠다고 간주하게 되었으며 中國 言論의 報道나 社說들도 점차 불길한 어조를 띠기 시작했다. 특히 7월 말경 맥아더 將軍의 臺灣 訪問中에 발표한 극히 자극적인 성명들은 동아시아의 안전이 國家別로 분리될 수 없는 것인지도 모른다는 中國側의 우려를 보강해 주었다. 섭영진에 의하면, 8월 5일 軍事委員會는 필요한 경우에 中國軍이 그 달 안으로 개입할 수 있도록 하는 非常計劃을 집행하기로 결정했다고 한다. 그러나 2주 후에 섭영진은 그 계획이 지나치게 조급하다고 판단하여 9월 30일까지는 일체의 준비를 완료하도록 조정했다고 한다.

韓半島의 戰況이 점점 北韓側에 불리하게 진행되는 것을 보고 毛澤東은 美國이 개입의 폭을 확대할 것 같다고 개인적으로 경고했다. 9월 5일 中央 人民政府委員會에서 행한 演說을 통해 毛澤東은 성급한 개입에 뒤따를 危險性에 관해 주의를 환기시키면서 中國이 비록 취약해 보일지 모른다 해도 戰爭에 대한 준비를 강화해야 할 것이라고 주장했다. 그러나 9월 15일 仁川 上陸作戰이 단행됨으로써 결정적인 변화가 일어났다. 한 권위있는 中國 軍事學者에 의하면 毛澤東은 平壤이 갑작스럽게 쓰러지는 데 대해 당황해 했으며 中國 지도층에게 中國 내에 北韓 亡命政府를 수립함으로써 金日成을 도와 주어야 할 것 같다고 말했다고 한다. 더욱 시급한 문제는 어떠한 상황 하에서 中國에 개입해야 하는가 하는 문제였다. 9월 21일 周恩來는 駐中 인도大使 파니카르(K.M. Pannikar)와 만남 자리에서 만일 美軍이 38선을 넘으면 中國이

軍事的으로 개입할 것이라고 암시하였다. 그 후 9월 25일 인도大使와 섭영진의 만남과 10월 2일 美軍이 北韓地域으로 들어가는 순간 中國의 戰爭介入은 더욱 임박해졌다고 볼 수 있다. 그러나 10월 첫 2주 동안에 中國의 정책결정 과정에 대한 증거를 추적해 보면 相互 矛盾되는 측면이 많이 나타난다.

中國 指導層은 韓國戰爭에 개입하기로 단번에 분명한 결단을 내린 것이 아니라 세 차례에 걸쳐(10월 2일, 7일, 13일) 개입하는 방향으로 결정했던 것으로 보이며, 특히 10월 18일 실제로 中國軍이 鴨綠江을 넘기 전까지는 그들의 입장을 번복하기도 하고 두 차례나 결정을 미루는 과정을 거친 것으로 보인다. 한 가지 흥미로운 사실은 中國 文獻들이 中國의 介入決定을 자체적인 결정으로 보지 않고 北韓의 공식적인 軍事支援 要請에 대한 北京의 대응 결과로 묘사하고 있다는 점이다. 中國側의 한 설명에 의하면 金日成은 美軍이 38선을 넘은 직후에 中國의 지원을 정식으로 요청했다고 한다. 또 다른 中國側 설명에 따르면 金日成은 10월 15일 웨이크 섬에서 있었던 트루먼·백아더 會談(즉 10월 13일 中國의 “最終” 決定 이후에) 후에 正式으로 지원요청을 했다고 되어 있다. 筆者가 인터뷰한 또 다른 中國人은 이보다 훨씬 일찍, 그러니까 仁川上陸 직후에 金의 要請이 있었다고 한다. 이 사람에 의하면 金日成은 먼저 스탈린에게 도움을 請하기 위해 모스크바로 갔으며, (美國과의 직접적이 衝突을 두려워하고 있던) 스탈린은 “아시아에 대해서는 中國사람들이 더 잘 알고 있으니까” 中國과 협의해 달라고 충고했다고 한다. 어쨌든 金日成은 악화 일로에 있는 情勢에 직면해(9월 하순경으로 추측되는데) 급히 北京을 방문하고 中國側의 支援을 호소했던 것이 사실이다.

결국 金日成의 호소나 스탈린의 제의(이 문제에 대해서는 추측 이상

의 자료는 없음)에도 불구하고 中國이 介入할 것인가 하지 않을 것인가 하는 결정은 中國人들 스스로 내릴 수밖에 없는 것이었다. 그러나 毛澤東의 思考에서 볼 수 있듯이 中國이 그렇게 주저하고 애매한 태도를 취했던 배경에는 세 가지 요소가 작용했다고 볼 수 있다. 즉, (1) 毛澤東 자신의 불안감과 우려, (2) 中國 지도층 내부의 의견분열, (3) 中國의 戰爭介入 以前에 蘇聯의 軍事的 支援에 대해 효력 있는 보장이 필요하다는 毛澤東의 主張, 以上 세가지 요인 때문에 中國의 결정이 단순한 것일 수는 없는 것이었던 바, 이 세 요인은 모두 개별적으로 좀 더 자세히 검토해 볼 필요가 있다.

첫번째 개입 결정의 증거는 10월 2일부터 시작된다. 毛澤東의 軍事論文 選集 중에서 “內部”로 분류된 편을 보면 바로 10월 2일 軍事委員會의 이름으로 毛澤東이 발송한 全文의 내용이 일부 포함되어 있다(이 全文의 수신인은 밝혀지지 않고 있으나 筆者는 스탈린이 수신인이었다고 믿고 있으며 그 이유는 뒤에 밝히겠다). 이 全文에 나타난 표현을 보면 毛澤東의 의사를 분명하게 알 수 있다. 즉 “우리는 朝鮮 同志들을 돕기 위하여 우리 軍隊의 일부를 中國人民支援軍의 자격으로 韓半島에 파견하기로 결정했습니다…… 우리는 이러한 조치가 필요하다고 생각합니다…… 만일 美國이 全 韓半島를 占領하게 되고 朝鮮의 革命勢力이 근본적으로 패배를 당하게 되면…… 그러한 情勢는 極東 地域의 전체 상황에 불리할 것입이다.”

이 선언만 보면 그 내용은 분명하게 보이지만, 많은 中國 資料들을 검토해 보면 10월 4일부터 10월 7일 사이에 中國 共產黨 政治局에서 개입문제에 대해 상당히 긴 討論이 있었던 것이 분명하다. 그리고 10월 8일에야 드디어 中國人民支援軍을 조직하고 彭德懷를 그 指揮官 및 政治委員로 임명한다는 毛澤東의 公式 命令이 내려졌던 것을 알 수

있다(또 한 소식통에 의하면 몇몇 장성들이 投票權 없이 政治局 회의에 참석했다고 한다). 10월 4일 西安에서 서북지방을 감독하고 있던 彭德懷는 급히 北京으로 돌아왔다. 彭德懷는 政治局 멤버였으나 그가 北京에 돌아오게 된 것은 毛澤東의 형식상의 결정을 認准하기 위해서가 아니라(中國이 介入하는 경우) 그가 中國軍의 總責任者로 출동할 용의가 있는지, 또 그렇게 할 자격을 갖추고 있는지 확인하기 위해서였다.

毛澤東은 먼저 林彪에게 中國이 개입하는 경우 指揮를 맡아 달라고 했으나 林彪가 이를 거절하자 彭德懷에게 같은 요청을 하게 된 것이다. 林彪는 中國의 韓國戰 介入이 현명하지 않다고 생각했으므로 毛澤東의 요청을 거절했었다. 筆者가 인터뷰한 中國人 한 사람은 10월 2일 자로 된 毛澤東의 指示文에는 林彪의 이름이 韓半島에 派遣되는 中國軍의 總責任者로 분명히 적혀 있었다고 한다. 毛澤東과 林彪와의 관계는 매우 밀접했다. 이미 1920년대부터 林彪는 毛澤東 밑에서 싸웠으며 林彪는 매우 유능한 軍事 戰略家로서도 명성이 높았다. 그러나 한 증인에 의하면 林彪는 매우 불안한 성격의 소유자로서 거의 주기적으로 깊은 厭世主義에 빠지곤 했는데, 그럴 때마다 毛澤東은 찬사와 감언으로 林의 용기를 북돋아 주었다고 한다. 이와 대조적으로 彭德懷는 순수한 농부형의 將軍으로서 직선적이고 때묻지 않고 忠誠하며 전혀 공포를 모르는 軍人이었다. 毛澤東은 어려운 위기에 직면하여 어떤 型의 인간이 필요한지 알고 있었으며 彭은 毛澤東을 실망시키지 않았다.

그러나 문제는 남아 있다. 왜 林彪는 개입을 반대했으며 과연 그의 반대의 목소리는 얼마나 크게 울렸는가? 여러 中國側 資料와 情報를 종합해 보면 政治局 內에 주로 두 갈래의 주장이 있었던 것 같다. 慎重論者들은 “우리는 아직 기반이 확고하지 못하며 軍備도 不足하다. 만일 우리가 신중한 고려 없이 軍隊를 투입하고 보면 새로 세워진 新

中國 자체가 크게 위태롭게 될 수 있다”고 주장했다. 반면에 개입론자들은 美國이 아무런 제약 없이 계속 전진하는 경우에 예상할 수 있는 결과에 대해서 우려하면서 개입 이외에 다른 代案이 없다고 강조했다. 개입론자들은 물론 “우리는 충분히 준비되어 있지 않다”는 데는 同意하면서 동시에 “美國도 충분히 준비되어 있지 않다”고 지적하였다. 말하자면 “美國도 兵力 水準이 불충분하고 공급선이 복잡해 취약점이 많고 따라서 戰爭을 오래 지속하기가 힘들 것”이라는 것이 적극론자들의 판단이었다. 뿐만 아니라 이들은 “中國革命은 세계의 세력 균형에 변화를 가져왔다.…… 만일 우리들이 우리나라의 이익만 생각하고 위협에 처한 친구를 수수방관하면서 도와 주지 않는다면…… 그것은 돌이키기 어려운 일이 될 것이다”라고 믿었다.

中國의 文書들은 政治局의 토론과정에서 신중론자와 개입론자들이 각자의 생각을 충분히 주장한 것으로 밝히고 있지만 개입을 반대한 사람으로는 두 사람(高崗과 林彪)의 이름만이 밝혀져 있다. 그런데 이 두 사람 사이만큼 전략적으로 서로 적대적인 위치에 놓여 있는 경우는 찾기 힘들 것이다. 高崗은 당시에 동북지역(만주지역)에서 黨, 政, 軍을 두루 책임지는 실력자로 君臨하고 있었다. 이러한 위치 때문에 그는 韓國戰爭 중에 中國軍의 再供給, 部隊의 移動과 宿泊, 戰爭物資의 運送 등에 관련된 모든 활동에 대한 직접적인 책임을 지고 있었다(실제로 高崗은 韓國戰爭에 개입하는 것을 반대했음에도 불구하고 戰爭 동안 中國 내의 모든 兵站業務를 담당했다). 林彪의 역할도 마찬가지로 중요한 것이었다. 그의 指揮下에 있는 제4 야전군은 7월과 8월 사이에 동북지구에 재배치된 兵力의 中樞를 형성하고 있었으며, 이후 韓國戰 개입 초기의 성공에 결정적인 역할을 하였다. 그러나 처음에는 林彪의 공개적인 개입 반대로 인하여, 그에게 충성한 것으로 알려진 부대들이

韓國戰爭에서 어느 정도 역할을 다할 것인가 하는 데에 대한 의문이 제기되기도 했다.

高崗과 林彪가 戰爭介入을 반대하고 나선 데에는 모종의 政治的 底意가 있을 수도 있으나, 軍事的 위협에 대한 이들의 진지한 평가와 판단을 반영한 것으로도 볼 수 있다. 林彪는 現場調査를 위해 직접 韓半島를 다녀갔다는 이야기도 있다. 또한 “中國支援軍이 中國을 출발하기 훨씬 전에 彭德懷 將軍이 支援軍의 전투 역할에 대해서 金日成 동지로부터 설명을 듣기 위해 직접 朝鮮의 戰線을 방문했다. 그는 敵의 狀況을 알아 보고 지리적 조건을 조사하며 我軍과 敵軍의 강점에 대해 조사·연구하기 위해 최전방 깊숙히 들어갔다.” 韓先楚 將軍과 解方 將軍의 출판물에 의하면, 林彪와 高崗이 불안하게 생각했던 점은 美國의 制空權과 뛰어난 火力에 대해서였다. 그들은 美國이 동북지역으로부터 시작하여 中國本土를 직접 공격함으로써 中國이 굴욕적으로 패전하는 것을 우려했다. 韓과 解의 설명에 의하면, 林彪와 高崗은 “그 시점에서 美國과 戰爭을 한다는 것은 冒險이며 불을 안으로 끌어들이고 재난을 자초한다”고 믿었다는 것이다.

이상과 같은 主張들이 中國 共產黨 內部에서 상당한 反應을 불러 일으켰을 것은 充分히 想像할 수 있다. 中國 自身の 立場이 아직도 매우 어려웠을 뿐만 아니라 金日成이 切迫한 狀況에 놓이게 된 것도 事實上 그의 모험주의적 行動의 結果이며 이에 대하여 中國은 아무런 責任이 없었다. 어쨌든 이러한 討論이 政治局 內의 意見을 어느 정도까지 갈라 놓았었는가 하는 問題에 대하여 우리는 단지 추측만 할 뿐이다. 討論이 상당히 오래 계속된 것을 보면 고강과 임포 이외에도 介入을 反對하거나 그러한 意見에 同調하는 사람들이 더 있었다고 볼 수 있다. 이것은 10월 5일 주은래가 모택동에게 한 말에서도 찾아볼 수

있다. “오늘 會議에서 結論을 낼 수는 없습니다. 하루나 이틀 회의를 延長하는 것이 적절한 줄로 압니다. 이와 같은 중요한 문제에 대해서는 모든 사람들이 意見을 充分히 發表할 수 있도록 하는 것이 좋겠습니다. 그렇게 해야만 共同의 理解에 도달했을 때 그것이 堅實한 것이 될 것입니다.”

中國의 一部 소식통들은 모택동 자신도 最終的인 判斷을 하는 것을 매우 어렵게 느꼈다고 한다. 1986년 중반에 胡耀邦이 한 연설에 의하면, “毛澤東은 우리가 韓半島에 軍隊를 派遣해야 하는가 하는 問題에 대해서 생각할 때에는 계속 침묵을 지키고 일 주일 동안 수염도 깎지 않았다. 毛 의장은 그의 생각을 정리하고 회의를 소집하여 共同의 이해에 도달한 후에야 수염을 깎았다”고 한다. 그러나 10월 초 政治局 會議가 열릴 때에는 모택동은 당초에 갖고 있었던 모든 懷疑를 버리고 介入을 主張하는 편에 서 있었다. 10월 6일 政治局 會議에서 팽덕회가 모택동의 立場을 역겨울 정도로 열렬히 지지하는 演說을 한 다음날(즉, 10월 7일) 드디어 戰爭에 介入하기로 하는 決定이 採擇되었다. 10월 8일자 모택동의 公式 訓令은 中國 人民支援軍들에게 “신속히 韓國 國境으로 달려가 朝鮮의 同志들과 함께 침략자들과 싸워 영광스러운 勝利를 쟁취하라”고 指示하고 있다. 팽덕회는 즉시 瀋陽으로 가서 北韓側으로부터 戰鬥狀況에 대해서 브리핑을 받았다. 同時에 그는 中國軍이 10일 以內에 介入 準備를 완료한다는 中央委員會의 決定도 通報해 주었다. 그동안 介入을 反對해 온 신중론자들이 모두 說得되었는지는 알 수 없지만 이미 最終的인 決定에 도달했다는 점은 분명하다.

그럼에도 불구하고 10월 8일의 訓令이 완전히 最終的인 것이 되지 못했는지 모른다는 可能性을 제시하는 이상한 징후들이 있다. 가령 섭영진 장군에 의하면, 美軍이 이미 中國 國境線에 가까이 接近해 오고

있었을 때에도 모택동은 섭장군에게 最終 決定을 내리기 전에 좀 더 생각할 수 있는 시간이 필요하므로 鄧華 장군에게 “약간 속도를 늦출 것”을 권고해 달라고 요청했다. 모택동은 급속도로 악화되어 가고 있는 北韓軍의 狀況에 대한 報告를 듣기 위하여 10월 11일에 팡덕회를 北京에 오도록 지시했다. 그리고 13일에 政治局은 非常會議를 소집하고 韓半島에 즉각 軍隊를 派遣하도록 決定했다. 그런데 介入의 絶對的 必要性을 재확인하고 있는 이 決定-한 中國 文書에는 만장일치로 採擇되었다고 기록되어 있음-은 따지고 보면 黨 고위층에 討議와 意見 對立이 계속 있었음을 間接的으로 시사하고 있다. 같은 날인 10월 13일 東北 地域에 돌아온 팡덕회는 그 지역의 指導者들과 만났으며, 14일에는 支援軍의 간부들을 모아 놓고 교시하였다. 특히 그는 “美國의 침략을 물리치고 조선을 도와주는 것(抗米援朝)이 얼마나 중요한가를 강조하고, 軍隊를 파견하지 않거나 당분간이라도 그것을 留保하자고 하는 思考方式 및 그 주장자들의 이른바 困難性이라는 구실을 비판했다”(필자의 강조점). 이렇게 보면 中國軍이 戰鬥에 가담하는 決定을 지연시키고자 하는 勢力이 있었던 것으로 추측된다. 그러나 팡덕회의 계산으로는 더 오래 시간을 낭비할 수가 없었다. 왜냐하면 하루 하루 朝鮮民主主義人民共和國의 崩壞가 다가오고 있었기 때문이다.

그런데 아직도 中國의 決定이 絶對로 最終的인 것이라고 간주하기 어려운 側面이 남아 있었다. 이것은 특히 10월중 주은래가 蘇聯을 訪問한데서 나타난다(인천상륙 직후 스탈린과 중국 관리들 사이에 협의가 있었다는 부분적인 정보는 있으나 뚜렷한 結論을 내리기에는 부족하다.) 주은래의 訪蘇에 관해서는 흐루시초프의 회고록에 간략하게 언급되어 있을 뿐 다른 어디에서도 깊이 있게 다룬 것은 없다. 필자가 갖고 있는 情報도 단 한 차례의 인터뷰에 基礎하고 있기 때문에 매우 조심스

럽게 취급해야 한다(이 정보의 내용은 흐루시초프의 회고록에 나오는 내용과 유사한 점도 있지만 몇 가지의 사실 문제에 대해 그것과 다르다). 10월 어느 날 (政治局會議 직후인 4일과 7일 사이가 될 가능성이 큼) 모택동은 韓半島에 대한 앞으로의 전략에 대하여 스탈린과 協議하기 위해서 주은래를 모스크바에 보냈다. 이미 중·소 협상때부터 스탈린이 주은래를 높이 評價했다고 하는 이야기도 있었기 때문에 극히 민감한 案件에 대해서는 주은래가 가장 적격자로 보였던 것이다. 주은래 밑에서 오랫동안 일했던 한 보좌관이 쓴 글에 보면, 주은래는 그 당시 “모택동 議長이 戰爭을 準備하고 遂行하는 일을 도와드리는 어려운 責任을 용감하게 받아 들였다”고 한다. 그러므로 주은래는 中國이 앞으로 어떤 物資와 裝備들을 必要로 할 것인가 하는 問題도 잘 알고 있었다.

그러나 주은래가 스탈린에 전한 메시지는 매우 신중한 것이었다. 모스크바에 도착한 후에 주은래는 모택동이 보낸 전문을 통하여 政治局이 不介入을 決定했다는 通報를 받았다고 한다. 이 소식을 들은 스탈린은 크게 분노하였으며, 주은래와의 짧은 면담을 끝낸 뒤 몰로토프에게 주은래가 休息을 취할 수 있도록 크리미아 반도로 안내하라고 지시했다. 주은래는 결국 그 곳에서 2주일이나 체류하게 되었는데, 모택동과는 定期的으로 연락을 취하고 있었다. 그러던 어느날 모택동으로부터 놀라운 소식을 담은 전문을 받았다고 한다. 즉 中國이 원래의 決定을 뒤집어 였고 北韓을 돕기 위해 戰爭에 介入할 計劃이라는 內容이었다. 주은래는 즉각 스탈린에게 電話를 걸어 이 소식을 전했으며 스탈린은 그의 전용 비행기를 보내 주은래를 모스크바로 데려와 협상을 재개했다.

주은래와 스탈린 사이의 協商은 1주일 동안 계속되었다고 한다. 실제로 協商 議題는 하나였는데, 中國에 대한 蘇聯의 원조 형태와 규모

그리고 條件에 관한 것이었다. 事實은 바로 이 問題가 처음부터 中國 側의 고려에서 가장 決定的인 要素였을 可能性이 높다. 10월 초에 이미 모택동은 中國이 軍事的 目的을 達成할 수 있는 能力과 蘇聯의 援助 사이에 直接的인 關聯이 있음을 分明히 했다. 모택동이 10월 2일 스탈린에게 보낸 전문 가운데 筆者가 入手할 수 있었던 부분을 보면 (그 全文은 아마 모택동이 介入意思가 있음을 알리는 첫 언질일 可能性이 높다), 그는 스탈린에게 中國軍隊가 “아직도 美軍 1개 사단을 한꺼번에 제거할 수 있을지 자신할 수 없다”고 指摘하고 있다. 韓國戰爭과 關聯한 中國側 公式 記錄의 表現을 빌린다면, “中國軍이 戰爭에 介入하기 전부터 中國 共產黨 中央委員會와 毛 주석은 우리가 적군에 비하여 技術과 裝備面에서 뒤떨어져 있음을 指摘하였다. …만일 大規模의 美軍을 한꺼번에 除去하려면 우리 軍이 裝備를 갖추는 때까지 기다려야 한다”는 것이었다.

그런데 이러한 要求를 充足시켜줄 수 있는 나라는 蘇聯밖에 없었다. 그리고 모택동은 蘇聯의 援助가 도착하기까지는 시간이 걸린다는 事實을 잘 알고 있었기 때문에, 中國의 軍事作戰과 戰略을 適切히 調整하려고 努力하였다. 支援軍의 당초 戰鬥計劃에 따르면, 12개 사단으로 구성된 中國軍의 任務는 38선 이북에 있는 美軍과 南韓 軍隊에 對應하는 防禦作戰에 국한된 것이었다. 특히 比較的 劣勢에 있는 南韓 軍隊에 關心을 集中하도록 計劃되었다. 한 軍事 專門誌에 指摘되어 있듯이, 中國軍의 “역공적은 소련제 무기와 장비로 무장한 후에 開始되어야 하는데 아직 蘇聯 武器와 裝備가 도착하지 않았다.”

모택동은 中國의 介入問題와 關聯하여 크게 두 가지를 고려하고 있었다. 모택동은 中國이 朝鮮 領土에 국한된 作戰을 통해 美國을 패배시킬 수 있기를(아니면 적어도 저지할 수 있기를) 원하고 있었다. 그렇

계만 된다면 美軍과 中國軍 간의 갈등을 “그 規模와 時間에 있어서 상당히 제한”시킬 수가 있는 것이다. 中國軍 部隊를 支援軍이라고 지칭한 것도 바로 이러한 可能性을 強調하기 위해서였다. 다시 말해 모택동은 中國 正規軍이 國境을 넘어 공세를 취하고 있다는 식의 새로운 政治的 구실을 美國側에 提供하고 싶지 않았던 것이다. 그가 걱정하는 최악의 시나리오는 韓半島 內에서의 戰鬪에서 敗北하거나 또는 대치상태로 남아 窮極的으로 美國과의 公開的인 衝突을 조장하여 전쟁이 中國의 領土에까지 확대되는 것이었다(이것이 바로 임표와 고강이 크게 우려하던 점이었다). 10월 5일 모택동은 바로 그러한 可能性에 관해 팽덕회와 의논하였다. 이 자리에서 모택동은 다음과 같이 말했다. “우리는 韓半島 內에서 적군을 파멸시킬 준비를 할 것이지만, 실제로 우리가 직접 戰鬪에 임하게 될 것이나만큼 美國이 바로 우리(중국)에게 戰爭을 宣布할 각오를 해야 한다. 또한 그들이 우리의 主要 都市와 産業施設들을 爆擊하고 그들의 海軍이 우리의 海岸 都市들을 攻撃하며 그뿐만 아니라 도처에서 兪단폭격을 해오고 중국에는 원자폭탄도 터뜨릴 수 있다는 것을 각오하지 않을 수 없다”

실제로 모택동이 이러한 最惡의 시나리오에 대해 얼마만큼 확률이 있다고 判斷했는지 확실히 알 수는 없다. 그러나 武器와 裝備의 부족 때문에 中國支援軍의 作戰이 상당히 制約을 받았다는 점은 의심할 여지가 없다. 韓國戰爭 동안 中國이 세웠던 軍事戰略에 관한 이야기는 매우 흥미로운 것이지만 여기서는 하지 않겠다. 이 글에서 筆者가 가지고 있는 가장 큰 관심은 주은래와 스탈린의 協商을 통해 도달한 中·蘇間 合意事項의 性格을 糾明하는 것이며, 그러한 合意가 韓國戰爭 介入 당시 中國의 政治·經濟的 計算에 어떻게 영향을 미쳤는가 하는 점이다. 일단 中·蘇 間에는 比較的 分명한 役割分擔이 있었던 것 같다.

즉 中國은 韓國戰爭에 兵力을 提供하고 蘇聯은 武器와 裝備를 提供한다는 것이다. 그러나 兩側 사이에 支拂條件(즉 借款인가 無償援助인가 하는 問題)에 관한 充分한 合意가 있었는지는 분명치 않다. 한 가지 확실한 사실은 문서에 의한 合議는 없었다는 점이다. 바로 이와 같은 모호성을 이용하여 몇 년 후에 흐루시초프는 中國側에 대한 蘇聯援助의 代價를 支拂할 것을 要求했다고 한다. 中·蘇 분규가 악화되었을 때 中國側이 指摘했듯이, 韓國戰爭 期間中에 蘇聯이 中國軍에게 提供한 모든 武器는 借款으로 처리되었으며 결국 中國은 그에 해당하는 모든 액수를 返濟하고 말았다.

그러나 스탈린이 알맞은 시점에서 적절한 援助를 약속해 주었다는 점에 대해서만은 의심의 여지가 없다. 이는 戰爭 初期의 電文들 속에서 그 증거가 보인다. 예를 들면 모택동은 10월 22일 팽덕회로부터 作戰計劃에 대한 承認을 要請하는 電文을 받고, 그 다음날 팽덕회와 고강에게 中國軍을 위한 포병 및 空軍 支援은 앞으로 6개월 내지 1년 정도 더 기다려야 할 것 같다고 통고했다. 11월 8일 팽덕회는 軍事委員會에 대하여 “蘇聯으로부터 구입한 장비들”이 과연 언제쯤 도착할 예정이냐고 거의 짜증내듯 물었다. 이튿날인 11월 9일자 모택동의 회신은 곧 도착한다는 것이었다. 그러나 그것은 모택동으로서도 그렇게 되기를 希望하는 것이었지 꼭 그렇다는 확신을 가지고 대답한 것은 아니었다. 12월 4일 팽덕회는 中國軍과 美軍과의 엄청난 수준차이를 指摘하면서 空軍의 支援이 없는 한 夜間에만 作戰할 수밖에 없다고 모택동에게 다시 한번 상기시켰다.

戰鬪가 가장 熾烈했던 時期에도 蘇聯側의 援助 問題는 미해결 상태였으며, 이로 인해 中國軍의 作戰은 많은 制限을 받았고 그만큼 美國은 中國軍에게 막대한 피해를 입힐 수 있었다. 徐向前 장군은 자신의 회

顧錄에서 당시 그가 中國軍에게 필요한 裝備를 調達하기 위해 1951년 6월부터 10월 사이 비밀리에 모스크바를 찾아간 사실을 밝히고 있다. 5월경 그가 모스크바 출장을 준비하는 동안, 모택동은 그에게 武器와 裝備는 購入하되 中國이 武器産業을 시작할 수 있도록 技術援助도 받을 수 있게끔 압력을 넣을 것을 지시했다고 한다. 中國側에서는 적어도 60개 사단을 무장시킬 정도의 武器와 裝備는 확보할 수 있을 것으로 期待했던 것 같다. 그런데 蘇聯側은 긴 協商 끝에 결국 16개 사단만을 武裝시켜 주겠다고 약속하였고(나중에는 10개 사단으로 축소됨), 그나마 戰時中の 技術移轉에 대해서는 매우 소극적이었다. 서향전의 판단으로는, 스탈린은 蘇聯이 과도한 軍事援助를 提供하는 경우 蘇聯이 美國과의 戰爭을 誘發할 수 있다는 우려를 하고 있었다는 것이다. 특히 스탈린은 “中國이 제2의 유고슬라비아가 될지 모른다”는 두려움을 여전히 가지고 있었다고 한다.

이처럼 蘇聯과의 關係는 처음부터 不確實하고 不信에 가득 찬 것이었다. 더구나 1963년의 中·蘇 紛爭에서 中國側이 指摘했듯이, “우리는(중국은) 朝鮮에서 필요로 했던 커다란 희생을 직접 감수하였으며, 사회주의 진영의 방어를 위한 제1선에 나섬으로써 소련은 제2선에 남아 있을 수 있었다.” 물론 이러한 희생은 蘇聯으로부터의 分명한 支援 약속을 전제로 한 것이었다. 中國의 安全에 대한 모택동 自身の 염려는 차지 하고라도 그는 스탈린의 分명한 支援 約束이 없는 한 결코 中國의 將來를 놓고 모험할 사람이 아니었다. 어쨌든 戰爭의 負擔을 직접 안은 채 엄청난 犧牲을 치러가면서 美國과의 大規模 戰爭危險까지 무릅쓴 나라는 中國이었다. 그 후 스탈린은 中國에 대하여 내키지는 않지만 일종의 존경심을 갖게 되었다. 이처럼 中國은 여러 가지 責任을 어깨에 짊어짐으로써 비록 많은 대가를 지불하기는 했지만, 戰爭의 進行과 全

般的인 戰略에 있어서 重要한 權利를 確保할 수 있었다.

V. 몇 가지의 結論的 考察

韓國戰爭을 뜨겁게 달아 오르도록 만들었던 戰爭 初期 段階의 事件들은 그 후에 냉전이 아시아 地域으로 확대되면서 美·中 關係라는 보다 큰 틀 속에 일찌감치 파묻혀 버리고 말았다. 오늘날 中國은 韓國戰爭을 1950년 6월에 爆發한 하나의 內戰이라고 부르고 있다. 政治的으로 세련된 中國人들은 위의 표현이 북한의 38선 이남에 대한 南侵을 뜻하는 일종의 공식기호 같은 것이라고 私的으로 설명해 준다. 그러나 어쨌든 韓國戰爭의 全體的 觀點에서 보았을 때 北韓의 南侵에 따른 그 이후의 事態展開는 結局 北韓의 役割을 보조적인 것으로 전락시키고 말았다. 특히 10월에 있었던 中國의 介入은 戰爭에 參與하고 있는 모든 勢力들의 利害 關係에 돌이킬 수 없는 影響을 미쳤으며, 그 結果는 40년이 지난 오늘에도 느낄 수 있다.

韓國戰爭 발발 40주년을 맞이하면서 마침내 學者들은 그 戰爭이 거기에 參與했던 共產國家들에게 과연 어떤 意味를 지닌 것이었으며, 어떤 結果를 招來했는가 하는 全般的인 問題들에 관해 이해하기 始作하고 있다. 이제 우리가 希望하는 바는 앞으로 平壤과 모스크바와 北京이 진정으로 綜合的인 韓國戰爭史를 작성하는 것이 그들의 利益과도 一致한다고 스스로 깨닫게 되는 것이다. 그런 意味에서 中國 當局이 韓國戰爭에 대한 상세한 研究를 許諾하기로 한 것은 고무적인 일이다. 결국 천천히 그리고 불가피하게 韓國戰爭에 대한 보다 精確한 윤곽이 드러나기 시작하고 있으며, 그 당시의 決定的인 事件들에 대한 보다 深層的인 理解도 可能해지고 있는 것이다.

제 5 회 의
SESSION V

한반도에서의 군비통제
ARMS CONTROL IN THE KOREAN PENINSULA

THE SECOND INTERNATIONAL
CONFERENCE ON THE KOREAN WAR
JUNE 14~15, 1990
SEOUL, KOREA

**Arms Control Prospects for Northeast Asia:
What Lessons From Recent Developments Elsewhere?**

Kevin Lewis (RAND Corporation)

INTRODUCTION

With so many favorable political developments under way around the world, and with much recent progress in several arms control issues having been achieved in several different negotiations, to urge caution in the possible expansion of diplomatic agendas--including, in this case, any ambitious schemes for arms control in Northeast Asia, may seem overly prudent. Certainly, recent developments in Europe have demonstrated how abruptly some differences may be reconciled using the same negotiating forum that achieved only limited results with the tentative efforts of the past decade and a half. These recent developments seem to have invalidated the pessimistic views held by many that meaningful results were unlikely to emerge with such force from a background of complex, frustrating, and turbulent negotiations. And if such progress--not only in conventional forces in Europe (CFE) reductions, but also in START and other forums (chemical weapons, INF, etc.)--has been realized, then why not hope for similar payoffs in all other negotiating arenas?

It is my contention in this paper, however, that recent progress in European, strategic nuclear, and other arms reductions talks is the result of very specific combination of developments that is not likely to be replicated in many other regions--barring certain unpredictable and highly significant developments. Moreover, the context in which arms control proceedings in Northeast Asia should be viewed cannot be divorced from the overall strategic environment which, again, is quite different from those that characterize certain other military balances. In other words, unless we are to adopt as an objective "arms control for its own sake," we need to move ahead cautiously, mindful of the total strategic environment. Further, despite progress to date in various negotiated interactions, it is not now absolutely certain that all the promising outcomes of START, CFE, and other talks will indeed be realized.

It is my view that it would be unwise to attempt any simplistic extrapolation from the recent history of arms limitation in other

This Draft paper has been prepared for *The International Conference on the Korean War*, to be held in Seoul 14-16 June 1990. The views and conclusions of this paper are the author's, and do not necessarily reflect those of The RAND Corporation or any of its sponsors. The present draft paper should not be quoted or further distributed.

regions and under other circumstances to the unique and demanding security problems of Northeast Asia. No doubt there will be some who will choose to believe that such extrapolation is possible. Among that group there will be some who may attempt to exploit the hopes raised in Europe and elsewhere as vehicles for pursuing certain other strategic objectives of their own. However, none of these cautions should be taken as an argument against striving to develop a more specific basis for possible future progress in mutual and verifiable arms limitations in Northeast Asia.

As we have recently seen in Europe, years of difficult and slow progress yielded little in the way of fruitful force reductions.¹ But it can be argued that this undistinguished record did help the Western Powers to begin to exploit the dramatic developments that have swept across Eastern Europe and the USSR in the past many months. Although earlier negotiations may not have produced much of contemporary importance, they did provide a foundation for institutions, frameworks, and rationales, that have now been put to work speedily and to good effect. In essence, previous arms limitation efforts did not produce useful results, but they have made relatively more likely the successful pursuit of meaningful negotiated outcomes *once other developments unlocked the potential for major arms control progress.*

This is, perhaps, the key point that I will stress in this paper. The French biologist Louis Pasteur is reported to have said: "Chance favors the prepared mind."² In other words, while the potential for truly meaningful arms control in the case of Korea and Northeast Asia may not be--for the moment at least--very promising, it is nonetheless possible that future developments (most notably, some kind of reconfiguration of the DPRK government after Kim Il Sung departs the scene) may make possible a greater degree of progress. To the extent that we can lay the groundwork for the institutions, policies, and other options that may become more important at some point in the future, increased efforts in this direction may be justified. As in the case of Europe, and in the U.S./Soviet strategic arms control regime, it may be possible to prepare the terrain, as it were, for any significant movement in force limitations or tension reductions that might be possible by developments not typically thought of as being on "the arms control agenda." On the other hand, a number of pitfalls might follow from proceeding too quickly, such as creating an adverse environment for ROK-U.S. relations or stimulating overly optimistic expectations in domestic audiences on both sides of the Pacific.

In this paper, I will review such matters from several perspectives. First, I will recall the traditional objectives and means

¹See U. Nerlich and J.A. Thomson, eds., *Conventional Arms Control and the Security of Europe*, Westview Press, Boulder Colorado, 1988.

²Or, as the former manager of the Brooklyn Dodgers, Branch Rickey, put it: "Luck is the residue of design."

of arms control with special attention paid to the requirements of the Korean case. Second, I will review selected propositions that have strongly governed the pursuit of arms control in both strategic forums, and in Europe (and elsewhere). Third, I will see what lessons for Korea might be drawn from recent European experience. In other words, I will examine similarities and differences between Northeast Asia and Europe when it comes to the arms control setting, and discuss briefly their pertinence to our present options. Fourth, I review a few prerequisites to successful arms control, and cite some implications for Northeast Asia of experience elsewhere. Fifth, I will expand on some of these lessons in discussing certain special problems of Northeast Asian arms control. I will conclude by citing a few potential policy issues for the future that should be borne in mind as we contemplate our options today. Throughout this paper, I will discuss in passing various ancillary questions. In particular, what developments might lead to a much-changed strategic situation in which major arms limitation arrangements become both possible and desirable? What are possible risks and dangers associated with the materialization of these new conditions? How can we best assure that we will remain as prepared as possible to make either slow or dramatic progress without taking unacceptable security or political risks?

THE AIMS AND MEANS OF ARMS CONTROL

It may be helpful to begin with a short review of the objectives of arms control. Next we briefly consider a set of conventions and traditions that have grown up about how to practice these principles. Although Northeast Asia presents some circumstances very different from those that have marked the European or strategic negotiating milieu over the years, the basic principles of arms control given here seem to be fairly universal, and for this reason it is worthwhile to briefly survey a few key points. Selected comments pertinent to the Northeast Asian case are provided throughout.

Over time, both theoretical and official observers of the arms control scene have identified certain fundamental objectives of arms control. Depending on the parties involved and the issues at stake, the relative importance of the different goals can be greater or less. Although considerable overlap exists among these categories, and pursuit of the various principles can sometimes lead to important contradictions, a list of selected arms control objectives is presented here with the entries given as equal, complementary, and discrete objectives.

Traditional Arms Control Objectives

1. **Further Goodwill and Enhance Political Contacts.** An active arms control process facilitates, and sometimes guarantees, more congenial relations between the parties involved. Such negotiations can become "centerpieces" of the positive interactions among rival states (the case in most U.S.-Soviet bilateral discussions). Whether or not arms control

actually achieves a tangible warming of relations depends on a host of complex variables, including the sincerity with which the parties approach the talks, the willingness of all concerned to achieve mutually beneficial reductions, and so on. Historically, of course, we find numerous examples of arms control talks that either coincided with frosty interactions or, worse, were cynical cloaks for less positive agendas.³⁾ Considering recent Korean history, it would seem that even small gestures in the direction of proscribing military capabilities and behaviors would seem advantageous. Such discussions become more meaningful if they lead to a situation in which others with regional interests (notably the USSR) become involved and to play a more influential role *vis-a-vis* the DPRK. (On the other hand, as we will see below, this participation may involve complications in itself, and must be carefully monitored.)

2. Further a Mutually Beneficial Improved Understanding of the Local Military and Strategic Context. Talks on military means and intentions can enhance mutual understanding of the security situations of both sides. Such discussions obviously promote the first objective, above, but they have other advantages. The important fact to recall is that the perceptions of both sides may not coincide with certain realities. Care must be taken because of the possibilities for disingenuous communication and various disconnections between words and actions--between stated intentions and actual capabilities, in other words) particularly in a situation such as that faced by the two Koreas, where mutual suspicion about ultimate strategic intentions has fueled the continuation of great efforts in defense preparations.

Creating a climate for improved communications about perceived threats, objectives, and fears, is particularly useful when it promotes enhanced dialogue among military planners who, though they serve their political leaderships faithfully, are probably more aware of the strategic implications of the other sides' practical preparations and capabilities. For instance, the military might of the DPRK seems unambiguously offensive (replete as it has been with armored, special forces, and other offensively configured posture components). But in an open, nondefensive atmosphere, perhaps DPRK military officials would be willing to shed some light on the determinants of their planning process which--if there are other than aggressive ones--might facilitate a more warm climate. Similarly, as implacable as Pyongyang's political leadership may be in its perception of the U.N. forces to the South, perhaps North Korean military leadership can be sensitized to the anxieties produced by their own military steps.

³⁾Even under such circumstances, however, arms control as window dressing can create popular expectations at home and overseas that can take on a life all their own. A classic example in this regard involves the very subtle crafting by NATO of its "Two-Track" INF deployment scheme (in light of a correctly anticipated popular reaction in some quarters, particularly in Europe). See Kevin N. Lewis, "Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces," *Scientific American*, December 1980.

In Europe, various techniques for improving such mutual understanding includes posting of observers to exercises, various opportunities for liaison, consultative enterprises, to name a few. The origin of many of these channels of communication resides in the peculiar nature of the post-World War II European situation, in which former allies (subsequently adversaries) had at least a few aligned aims, initially including the suppression of any possible adverse remilitarization of a vanquished Germany. Such a commonality of interests and backgrounds, of course, has not characterized the Korean situation.

3. Reduce the Costs and Pace of Arms Competitions. Arms control holds out at least the potential for reducing the costs to both sides of participating in an ongoing competition. This may happen in several ways. Force levels could be lowered, certain costly exploratory development efforts could be forbidden, and the costs of maintaining adequate readiness may be diminished. Regrettably, it should be noted that to date the record regarding this payoff of arms control is quite mixed. In a number of U.S./Soviet forums, the demonstrable savings produced by treaties have been modest, whereas the "costs" of successful arms control--in terms of bargaining chips, verification, and payoffs required to produce domestic support--have often been non-trivial. Yet conventional arms control may bring the opportunity to break from this experience, given the high costs of these forces (relative to, say, strategic forces), the national economic circumstances of those involved--more salient than ever now, given the immediate savings that can be produced when forward deployments and routine readiness levels are reduced. Indeed, a large part of Mr. Gorbachev's interest in European conventional force reductions is said to involve the diminution of the USSR's military burden, which has been large enough to compromise prospects for the Soviet Union's domestic economy.

In the case of the DPRK, the situation is even more striking, given that estimates of that nation's defense burden run to 10-17% of GNP, depending on definitions and assumptions. In relative terms, the South is less burdened, of course, but any savings--not only in budgetary terms, but with respect to labor, R&D diversion, etc.--would be desirable. Table 1 shows the present relative burden of participation in the Korean standoff across national economies, and compares these statistics with certain other cases. By way of background, recall that the U.S. figure has been declining in real terms (in budget authority) since FY85 (a development not related to arms control progress to any major degree). The Japanese figure is typically cited by many, at least in the United States, as "inadequate," particularly given the great size of the Japanese economy (and, not incidentally, the trade imbalance between the United States and Japan). The West German data are about average for most of NATO in terms of defense in relation to GNP, and toward the higher end of the spectrum as far as population burdens are concerned (given West Germany's major ground forces contribution to NATO). Thus, both Koreas fall into the high end of the relative defense burden range worldwide, with North Korea at the very top of the list.

Certainly the burden of defense on the South is not manifestly intolerable, particularly when compared with the costs of any breakdown in deterrence. Indeed, given the present state of the Korean economy, current levels of defense outlays can probably be maintained without forfeiting prospects for long-term growth. But should prudent and tangible force reductions permit any decrease in defense burdens, they would of course be most welcome.

The objective of simply reducing the costs of a military competition should be reviewed in the context of a nation's or coalition's total strategic plan. Given the manifestly superior economic health of the Pacific region's democratic economies (not to mention certain other advantages, such as access to high technology and the benefits bestowed by voluntary defense coalitions), those nations can obviously tolerate even significantly higher levels of defense spending without risking much economic damage. To compete with its southern neighbor, Pyongyang must endure great sacrifices. In at least one sense, however, these sacrifices may not be without merit from a long-term perspective. To the extent that their enormous diversion of wealth and population to defense concerns deprives the DPRK's citizens of comforts enjoyed in capitalist societies, the imposition of a huge defense burden on the North may ultimately contribute to political and economic reform (if at a non-trivial cost to everyone of increased risk of conflict. The North can maintain this sacrifice only so long as it can promote the proper siege mentality among its citizens. So far it has done so successfully, but as recent events in the USSR, Eastern Europe, Nicaragua, and elsewhere indicate, this is not necessarily a permanent mentality. For this reason, the risks and indirect benefits of what some call a "cost-imposing" strategy need to be carefully blended with the other bases for arms control policy.

4. Alleviate Sources of Instability and Enhance the Predictability of an Ongoing Military Competition. A major objective of arms control (including measures such as Confidence Building Measures--CBM, nautical "rules of engagement," etc.) is the reduction of possible sources of tension, instability, and uncertainty that might lead to heightened competitive pressures in peacetime and various adverse developments in crisis and wartime. The former types of measures include two general considerations. First are measures intended to prevent day-to-day frictions and events from evolving into larger crises. A significant example of these, from the roster of U.S./Soviet interactions, are various consultative and communications means such as the "Hot Line". A second general class of routine provisions involve the suppression of both the costs and long-term sources of instability involved in military competitions (that is, the mitigation of so-called "arms race instability"). The aim here is to suppress possible long-range movement, perhaps by means of a series of "action/reaction" steps, into undesirable or costly areas of military competition. Historically we have seen such logic behind U.S./Soviet restrictions on strategic anti-missile defenses. More recent cases include possible restrictions on certain classes of offensive weapons, including mobile MIRVed ICBMs and sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs).

Table 1

COMPARISON OF DEFENSE BURDENS: SOME SELECTED CASES (1987)

	ROK	DPRK	U.S.	Japan	FRG
Defense Spending (\$Billions)	5.7	4.2	288.4	25.4	34.5
Defense as a Share of GNP/GDP (%)	4.7	>10	6.1	1.0	3.1
Defense Spending per Capita (\$1000s)	135	195	1170	205	560
Active Armed Forces (1000s)	629	842	2163	245	489
Active Military Personnel per Population (%)	1.5	3.9	0.9	0.2	0.8

Source: IISS, *Military Balance 1989*.

Of course, prudent military planners need to think about such measures in terms of the reliability, as well as desirability, of the constraints intended. Consequently, the verification, definitional, and institutional checks intended to enforce such terms--not to mention the maintenance of an adequate roster of "sanctions" to be invoked should an adversary defect from such a regime--are vital objectives.

5. Codify Mutually Held Views About Strategic and Military Requirements and Means. This is a special case of various points already raised that seems abstract at first, but which can have major consequences. The most notable example historically has involved the general movement toward convergence in the nuclear strategies and operational assumptions of the United States and Soviet Union. Some have criticized this type of initiative, arguing that any American attempt to "sell" the Soviets the so-called "Mutual Assured Destruction" concept was at odds with fundamentally different Russian views on the nature of warfare in the modern age. Such assertions aside, there has been some noticeable convergence in strategic fundamentals on both sides: the matter of "educating one's adversary" about the nature of such things as stability, appropriate force levels, and so on is a most difficult one, but should not be ignored as we prepare possible arms reduction options.

6. **Mitigate the Consequences of Adverse Developments.** A very important aim of arms control is to reduce the probability of misunderstandings, accidents, or miscalculations leading to genuine crises; if a crisis does develop, to limit pressures on escalation; and if war comes, to reduce its destructiveness and achieve the earliest possible cessation of fighting on favorable terms. Arms limitations and other constraints on behavior are, of course, no guarantee that accidents, miscalculation, or deliberate malfeasance will not occur. By allowing for the possibility of both unpredictable and deliberate events, though (providing that sanctions for cheating or breakout from Treaty provisions exist), arms control can create an environment in which inhibiting the evolution of a crisis is more easily accomplished. Given the need to back up good intentions with real sanctions and options, various propositions--for example, "No First Nuclear Use" pledges--are not very helpful, except at a diplomatic or public relations level. On the other hand, by encouraging convergence in capabilities and concepts (e.g., by devising strategic arms control terms in a way that encourages both sides to maintain survivable reserve forces, and by trying to limit certain destabilizing weapons), we may accomplish a great deal.

7. **Reduce the Spill-Over Potential of Arms Competitions.** If an arms competition exists and seems likely to continue, it may be highly desirable to restrict its ability to adversely influence developments outside of the area of competition being considered. This would involve constricting the competition to prevent acquisition of new means of warfare (as with the Non-Proliferation Treaty), or to prevent a local arms race from influencing in undesirable ways the strategic situation in a larger regional context.

8. **Achieve Various National and Coalition Aims Unilaterally, and Hedge against National and Coalitional Disadvantages vis-a-vis an Adversary's Capabilities.** Finally, arms control does not exist in a void, nor is arms control a matter of strictly military or strategic concern. To varying degrees, the existence of an arms control process can have important unilateral consequences for domestic political outcomes to which governments must be sensitive; and for participating governments' interactions with allies, friends, and others. For the domestic political ramifications of arms control processes, it is certainly the case that democratically constituted governments will face a more delicate balancing act than would authoritarian regimes.

Such, then, are some of the general aims of arms control. All of them are relevant, in varying degree and with special circumstances, to the military balance on the Korean peninsula. In concluding this section, the following possible objectives and issues are likely to be particularly salient in the near-term:

1. **Cost reduction/cost imposing issues.** There is no point in simply disarming for its own sake, inasmuch as the costs of any preparedness are trivial when compared with the costs that

would be borne should war occur. There are, of course, limits to what the citizenry will bear in terms of defense preparations, especially in a democratic, free-market oriented society. On the proposition that the ROK cannot and would not choose the kind of full-mobilization burdens which the North elects to bear, any doubts about the robustness of the local conventional military balance between the two Koreas must be resolved in a combination of three ways: (1) reliance on the deterrent potential of American conventional and nuclear security commitment; (2) pursuit of arms limitation; (3) acceptance of risks (whether on the proposition that the DPRK does not want to attack or something else does not really matter). Wisely, prudent leaders and citizens in the South eschew the third option. Presently, the DPRK would have Seoul rely exclusively on the second possibility, but only providing that it is willing to forego the direct deterrent presence of American forces. Clearly, a balancing between the first and second approaches seems the best course until a fully implemented, verified, and sanctioned arms reduction program can be put into place. This is a demanding task, and one that will take years to bring about--contrary to the demands emanating from the North and the overly optimistic expectations of an increasingly vocal segment in the South.

2. **Arms control and related steps** (such as CBM and the like) to mitigate tensions generally, and to reduce the chances that tensions could lead to war. Regardless of how much progress can be made in bringing about meaningful arms reduction, enhanced communications, more diplomatic contacts, and the closer integration of the North into a collective diplomatic process are all very desirable goals in their own right. But policymakers must be careful to avoid the injection of hidden agendas from a variety of sources into such a process.
3. **Propaganda and "Public Relations" Matters.** The North has made a variety of proposals over the past couple of decades that have been configured with both domestic and international propaganda goals in mind. How to keep discussions at a mature, productive levels without descending into a histrionic arms reduction process should be among the most important issues we must confront. In the case of Korean arms reduction, this will be all the more important given the lack of precedents with which, say, European domestic audiences have been familiar for years.

SELECTED PROPOSITIONS GOVERNING THE PURSUIT OF ARMS CONTROL

Given these objectives, it is now useful to turn to a brief discussion of a few generic points involving implementation of any particular arms control regime, again, with an aim of drawing parallels and identifying dissimilarities between previous experience in other forums, and the situation in Korea.

Verifiability. Over the years, verifiability has emerged as a crucial issue shaping both the domestic and international prospects for success of major arms control agreements.⁴⁾ Verification can be of several types: standoff vs. invasive, routine vs. challenge, and so on. Verification technologies will vary depending on the parties to the agreement--for instance, the superpowers have the so-called "national technical means" required to monitor certain adversary behaviors; these means not always available to local powers. Given the historical record, it is likely that meaningful verification of arms limitation schemes would become a stumbling block in any Korean negotiations. The secrecy characterizing Northern political and military behavior has been one major stimulus to an atmosphere of suspicion and "worst casing" over the years. In short, working out a viable verification regime will require a commitment to arms control that would be unprecedented in Northeast Asia over the last four decades.

Mutuality/Parity/Parallelism. This is a rather broad and vague set of issues which are difficult to summarize easily. Basically, there is a proposition that arms limitations, restrictions on conduct, and so on, should apply to the parties in a generally equal fashion, or should produce a state of equality if it does not exist in advance of negotiations. Depending on how one defines and measures the military balance in question, from a military planner's perspective, this can lead to not very useful results⁵⁾. Nonetheless, from a political and diplomatic perspective, the appearance of parity or symmetry in cuts or in results is frequently an overriding priority. Hence the essence of the DPRK position on equal, post-cut force levels on the order of 100,000--a consideration that overlooks the widely varying military objectives and situations of the two sides.

Whether or not this proposition of arms control makes much military or strategic sense, it is usually mandated by the political desiderata

⁴⁾Regarding START, President Reagan once noted: "Trust, but verify." In U.S.-Soviet strategic arms negotiations, a number of noteworthy verification issues have emerged over the years including such arcane technical points as missile test data encryption, monitoring of missile reloads, the functions of particular military systems (e.g., the Krasnoyarsk radar), etc.

⁵⁾For one case-in-point, one need only compare the role of tactical aviation in the military arsenals of the U.S. (and NATO) and the Soviet Union. The Atlantic Alliance has historically relied extensively on tactical air power to offset numerically (and often qualitatively) superior Warsaw Pact ground forces. Thus, a perfectly symmetric reduction in air power to certain levels would, were a variety of considerations not taken into account, disproportionately undermine NATO's deterrent prospects unless such reductions were to coincide with countervailing disproportionate reductions in Warsaw Pact ground force capabilities. Indeed, "tacair" has become a sticking point of sorts in ongoing CFE negotiations for a variety of reasons related to this point.

of a given situation. It is of course essential to think through the meaning of parity, balance, and more so, deterrence, before launching into discussions. In U.S./Soviet dealings in the early days of the strategic arms control process, a number of informal communications of perceptions and views on such issues as the meaning of the balance, techniques for its measurement, the relationship of balance to deterrence, and so on, were undertaken through informal channels, speeches and declarations, and publication of influential articles. Perhaps a series of informal exchanges can help facilitate progress of an ultimately more serious type.

Explicitness and Formalism in Negotiations. To be useful, arms control must not be casual: the rules, conditions, means for monitoring compliance, etc. must be spelled out in great detail. Loopholes, possible unforeseen future developments (e.g., in technological areas), and other such uncertainties need to be anticipated. Rules and an organizational infrastructure for the management of a treaty must be spelled out and accepted fully by all parties. As negotiators looking at even fairly narrow problems (e.g., the U.S./Soviet strategic nuclear balance) have discovered, this is often not easily accomplished. This holds out certain problems in the case of Given the historical suspicion and distrust characterizing relations in this region, and the tortuous nature of routine North-South interactions, it would take considerable dedication on both sides to

Any agreement to work seriously and practically toward some kind of negotiating framework in itself might considerably improve North/South dialogue. Many rules of conduct would have to be observed during the course of any such developmental talks. As befits any negotiatory process, both sides would have to observe considerable discipline in confining interactions to proper forums. Going outside of formal negotiating channels (e.g., to propagandize one's rival's domestic populace) would undermine any serious discussions. Such discipline would require a considerable modification in DPRK behavior, which could be the South's benefit: failure of the North to display proper sobriety and commitment would reveal their lack of true commitment to the tension-reduction mission.

Even assuming a reasonable degree of mature comportment, it is wise to begin to think through the many technical obstacles likely to await serious conventional force reduction initiatives intended for Northeast Asia. A variety of legal, military, and technical considerations would have to be folded into--which would in turn, condition--the political agenda. I will return to these momentarily. As we have learned in other contexts, when it comes to real treaties, "the Devil is in the details."⁶ Perhaps I err in applying the same standards of verification,

⁶For a short review of some of these troublesome details as they have applied to U.S.-Soviet strategic arms negotiations, see Kevin N. Lewis, "Negotiating a Nuclear Freeze?", *Strategic Review*, Winter 1984.

cooperation, and compliance which many in the U.S., USSR, and Europe think essential to the Korean context, but in all likelihood, the same rigorous criteria would have to be observed.

The Cumulative Concept of Arms Control. A major discovery concerning the prospects of arms control is that the best path to truly meaningful long-term progress is a gradual and cumulative one. Naturally, there is a tendency in some quarters to aspire to dramatic progress, usually in short order. However, even in cases where there exists a significant foundation upon which to build, such an expectation is likely to lead to disappointment. It makes more sense to accomplish what is possible, deferring longer-term and more complex choices to subsequent rounds of negotiation. This proposition, of course, has been well recognized by the government in Seoul. But the North has tended, with varying degrees of specificity, to endorse rather radical initiatives (notably, those involving reductions on both sides to 100,000 troops or less, along with the immediate withdrawal of U.S. forces and nuclear weapons).

The advantage of the incrementalist approach is that it is undeniably the best way to achieve practical objectives: should some unforeseen bit of serendipity come our way, moreover, we would have in place the diplomatic, analytic, and other systems and frameworks needed to exploit whatever developments arise. The disadvantage of adhering to this incremental approach, of course, is that it renders one vulnerable to political and propagandistic "grand-standing." By declining to rush into ill-conceived and reckless reductions, the risk exists that various domestic factions might perceive a sensible government as obstinate and disinterested in making a real commitment to arms control. In my view, this is yet another argument to be made in favor of widespread education of domestic audiences on the nature, aims, and methods of arms control.

LESSONS FROM EUROPE, 1989-90: HOW APPLICABLE TO NORTHEAST ASIA?

The current prospects for breathtaking progress in force limitation and operational restriction protocols, unilateral developments, the shifting political environment, and other developments have changed the entire European security environment almost overnight. Such events hold out great hope for possible areas of tension elsewhere in the world. Thus, talks on enhancing European security by means of force reductions and operational constraints have proceeded desultorily for decades. The predecessor to the current CFE process--the MBFR (Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions)--began in the 1970s, as did the CSCE (which may ultimately become a central component in a future universal collective security system in Europe). However, for a number of reasons--not the least of which involved the relative unwillingness of either Alliance in Europe to entertain any real change in the political predicates of the strategic balance--such talks produced little in the way of meaningful outcomes.

Events of the last year or so have eclipsed in their import those of the entire preceding epoch of European-oriented arms control. Observing a long-standing stalemate being broken up so rapidly in Europe raises a number of questions. Could the same kind of dramatic breakthroughs be hoped for in Northeast Asia? If so, how might progress in arms and tension reduction be facilitated? If not, what are the special circumstances of Korean rivalry that need special accommodation in possible arms limitation initiatives among the Koreans? What other unique issues and circumstances need to be taken into account in planning and policy for military reductions on the Korean peninsula? Finally, regardless of the answer to these points, what can we say in general about the nature of "dramatic" developments in arms control (their causes, and the factors contributing to their ultimate successful implementation, ratification, and integration with other security and diplomatic requirements)?

As suggested above, although the Northeast Asian negotiating environment has many unique features, basic principles of arms control seem widely applicable. Looking beyond such principles, what specific issues might we want to consider as we entertain the prospects for possible practical initiatives?

In my view, the factors that have led to the apparent millennial developments in Europe are highly unique, special, and the result of a very complex combination of fortuitous events. This represents an irony of sorts, of course. One could argue that the key developments which have unfolded in Europe were inevitable (that is, the Soviet economy was bound to eventually slide into oblivion, Germany was bound to be reunified, etc.). What is bizarre about recent developments of course is that they have happened all at once and in short order. Even so, there was no *deus ex machina* here. In light of the dazzling nature of developments there, it is easy to forget that many key trends--Western European economic and political integration, increasing economic interdependence, relaxation of military tensions--have been unfolding for years.

How the Arms Control Situation in Asia Differs From That of Europe

Given the allegations by some that arms control techniques and objectives might be transplanted more or less in kind from the European theater into Northeast Asia, it is worthwhile recalling certain major differences that effectively prohibit such a scheme.⁷

⁷It is also worth recalling that the initial promise of CFE and other talks has faded considerably in recent weeks and months. The Soviets, greatly concerned with the ultimate politico-military status of Germany have adopted a much more reluctant stance lately, and it is possible that much of the promise of ongoing negotiations could wither should a stalemate over the German question and Gorbachev's growing domestic problems continue. In other words, the euphoria over what is "possible" in arms control should be taken with a grain of salt pending the successful resolution and implementation of such treaties.

reduction relatively less "critical" to some of the parties involved at varying times, and should complicate negotiations.

The Role of the Status Quo. The political agenda in Northeast Asia differs significantly from that in Europe in that the latter has been generally devoted to the concept of assuring the continuation of a *status quo*, whereas the latter seeks ultimately fundamental shifts in the strategic context--notably unification. This invites a number of complications into the picture. Blending arms reductions with unification (and a major shift in the strategic situation in Northeast Asia) requires all concerned to address two major issues at the same time: the arms reduction part of the equation in its own right, and the dynamic political agenda (notably reunification of the Koreans). This must be counted as yet another complicating factor. Since a major reduction in military capability on both sides in the Korean peninsula would more or less imply a fundamental change in the relationship between the two, any major progress in this direction would raise new and complex questions (for instance, new Japanese and Chinese security requirements given such a shift, and so on).

Strategic Geographical Aspects of the Northeast Asian Region.

Another major set of differences pertinent to the prospects for arms control in Northeast Asia follow from the strategic geography of the Korean defense problem. To be sure, there are some major similarities between, say, the defense of ROK and the defense of the FRG. Geography prohibits the trading of "space for time": a steadfast defense must be conducted as far forward as possible. This has led to stationing of large force complements as far forward as possible, and has conditioned the escalation strategy of both sides. But many dissimilarities can be cited in the cases of Western Europe and Northeast Asia. One of these comes from the defense strategy adopted by the Allied forces in the South, which follows the lines of a classic barrier defense.⁸⁾ The relatively small forward U.S. conventional forces presence raises additional strategic questions.

Most important of all, perhaps, is the much more central role played by Northeast Asian region by maritime power. Central Europe is predominantly a continental theater (although maritime power would play a key role, the main emphasis has been on large opposed ground and tactical air formations). In Northeast Asia, the peninsular aspect of the region, the involvement of offshore forces and allies, the capabilities of the increasingly capable Soviet fleet, and certain command arrangements all add a difficult new wrinkle to the problem of

⁸⁾Over the years, proposals to fortify the inter-German border to the same degree have met with profound resistance, not because the idea was not militarily sensible or because its costs were prohibitive, but because in West German eyes, this would serve to codify the division of the two Germanies. The same logic has not been at work in Korea.

arms limitation. This issue is so important, I will return to it specifically in a moment.

Historical Experience. To be sure, there have been enormous tensions from time to time in Europe, and until recently the Warsaw Pact has maintained an offensively oriented military posture. However, in spite of the meanderings of the military balance, the effects of developments outside of the metropolitan Europe area (Suez, Vietnam, Cuba), the periodically bellicose nature of Soviet policy, periodic crises (Berlin, various Soviet invasions of its allies) and so forth, the fact remains that no war has actually begun in Europe. This result no doubt follows from many things, including the theater military balance, the very close linkage of European theater defense with the U.S. strategic posture, the existence of other nuclear players (UK and France), and so on. But it may also follow from the fact that, their longer term aspirations aside, the Soviets have apparently never viewed the military option as a sufficiently attractive one to justify the potential gains of aggression. The same has been manifestly untrue in the case of Korea. We are about to observe the 40th anniversary of the outbreak of the Korean War, a climactic event that continues to this day to add various unique characteristics to planning for both deterrence in the presence, and for the possible transition to a more peaceful future. The issues involved are far beyond the scope of this brief assessment, but suffice it to say that they represent a great dissimilarity among the two major land theaters in which Communist and Free World forces have been opposed continuously throughout the Cold War.

PREREQUISITES TO SUCCESSFUL ARMS CONTROL: IMPLICATIONS FOR NORTHEAST ASIA

What makes conventional arms control succeed? Heretical as it may seem, we do not really know, largely because we have not yet witnessed a completed "success." In the near future, we may indeed witness the signing of a treaty in Europe, followed by its speedy and permanent implementation, but this is not now a foregone conclusion.⁹ If that does happen, we would probably be justified in attributing the success of this process to several things.

1. **Unilateral Economic and Domestic Political Self-Interest.** The steadily worsening social, political, economic, and other problems which the Soviets and their Eastern European have faced over time require no elaboration here. Suffice it to say that, their societies teetering on the brink of collapse, reform for the sake of national survival--and not for the sake of improved external relationships--has become essential.

⁹Indeed, as noted *supra*, the Soviets have recently threatened to block further progress in CFE if the question of a unified Germany's military status (e.g., its exclusive membership in NATO, the configuration of its armed forces, etc.) is not resolved to the Kremlin's liking.

military conciliation and tension reduction may release pent-up opposition to anything resembling a prudent (or even apparently *status quo*) approach.

As we shall see shortly, moving from principles and good intentions to a secure and successful arms limitation arrangement is more difficult than it may seem to those unfamiliar with the issues. Even tentative arms control steps might also fuel existing concerns with the nature of the U.S./ROK security relationship, and about Korea's strategic role in Northeast Asia generally. The more variables that are introduced into the equation early on, and the greater the politicization of arms control, the more expectations may tend to outstrip what is realistically possible. For this reason, management of domestic and coalitional reactions in even a preliminary arms control effort should be a central consideration in the design of such policy. Democratic governments are obviously more susceptible to such effects than totalitarian ones.

4. Existence of Adequate "Fallback" Positions For Both Sides. No sane party to an arms control process puts himself in the position of having to rely ultimately on trust or good will as the final assurance of their security situation. In the case of developments in Europe since 1989, all of the concerned parties have been able (though with many dislocations and uncertainties) to rely on certain unilateral security arrangements. For instance, the party facing the most dramatic shift in its security situation in the short run--the USSR--will, regardless of the resolution of CFE or the German reunification process, remain the most formidable military power in Europe (and a nuclear superpower as well). Although the Kremlin may be most displeased with the way certain events are unfolding, they will by no means be caught in anything resembling a militarily vulnerable position.

5. Compatibility With Other Political Realities. This of course represents a different sort of enlightened self-interest, particularly on the part of the Soviet Union. As the Soviet presence in Eastern Europe was increasingly cast into jeopardy, pressures on the USSR to withdraw its forces were quite literally inevitable. In conjunction with the larger elements of *perestroika*, the USSR found itself more limited in terms of its options than had been the case, say, in Poland in 1981 or in Czechoslovakia in 1968. Given the intensifying pressures on the USSR to go home, it only stands to reason that the USSR should try to put the best possible spin on this development, casting what might otherwise have been a set of painful, unilateral arms reductions in the context of a progressive, voluntary arms reduction scheme.

How do these particular circumstances square with the contemporary case of the Koreans? A short survey reveals some areas of coincidence, but also some of significant divergence. Obviously, it would be in the interests of all involved in the Northeast Asian balance today to reduce their economic and social burdens of defense in the region. It is also in everyone's interest to do anything possible to reduce the probability

of a catastrophic and costly conflict. Also, although there are many approaches that might be followed in pursuit of these goals, presumably everyone is pretty much in agreement on the advantages of the ultimate reunification of the Koreas and the removal of the need for external security guarantees. At this point, however, similarity to the recent European context ends.

Although all governments are interested in maintaining sufficient popular support for their defense efforts, the DPRK government has a particularly vested interest in maintaining in the minds of its population the image of a bellicose U.S.-inspired and supported threat. This distracting image seems the best means for thwarting any serious aspirations at a more sound economy or movement toward political reform. This could all change abruptly in the future, but for the time being, much evolution in this situation seems unlikely at the present.

There is very little in the way of an existing framework of previous serious negotiation on which to build, moreover. If we trace back the origins of today's CFE process back to the 1970s (or to even antecedents), then one might come to the conclusion. It has taken an enormous amount of painstaking effort (with few commensurate payoffs) to, in effect, create the favorable circumstances within which recent progress has become possible. This is not evidence, in my view, of any central intransigence, reluctance, or other structural impediments to progress, but rather an almost natural consequence of the enormous difficulties that have attended the establishment of a sound negotiating forum involving many nations each with different concerns. Given the circumstances already described that apply to the unique Asian situation--a multipolar constellation of interests, an atmosphere of suspicion, the heavy political loading of the North-South dialogue, and so forth--one might reasonably suspect that many preliminaries would have to be undertaken prior to the attainment of any realistic chances for progress in any Korean arms limitation forum.

Also worth noting is the fact that the future for consolidating the gains begun in Europe may not be as bright as some now imagine it to be. As noted above, the Soviets have recently begun to balk at continued arms control progress over the question of Germany's ultimate membership status within the NATO system, and possibly also on account of problems Mr. Gorbachev may be facing with some of his conservative constituencies (such as the military) back home. In other words, there is liable to emerge a growing gap between apparent accomplishments in Europe and actual results. We would therefore be wise to inspect closely the proposals of those who believe that "dramatic progress of the European sort" can be attained in Northeast Asia. There is a chance, perhaps a small one, that the ultimate results of CFE, at least in the near term, will not live up to the expectations held by many.

intention of actually bringing about reductions of any side. The North's simple strategy is to prevent the furtherance of any reasonable progress while at the same time putting the Allies to the South on the political defensive.

Recent indications suggest that the North has become rather more subtle in its agenda. Perhaps in order to capitalize on the hopes of those everywhere in the region that such progress as has been seen in Europe might be replicated in this region, and possibly also to respond to Seoul's conciliatory "Northern Policy," Pyongyang will continue to be more subtle, measured, and apparently reasonable in its initiatives. However, the ultimate aim in the short run must be not the rendering of the old propaganda battle in a more subtle light, but rather the continuing pursuit of a range of diplomatic, economic, and military policies with the aim of making untenable anything but a sincere commitment to realistic talks. A major dimension of Seoul's strategy in this respect has become the expansion of diplomatic contacts with others in the region who can be expected to behave in more moderate and productive ways: as I am writing this, for instance, it has been announced that Roh Tae Woo will meet with Soviet President Gorbachev in San Francisco following the current superpower summit. Such prospects must stimulate enormous anxiety in predictable circles, inasmuch as the possible ultimate isolation of North Korea must be seen as a key factor in undermining Pyongyang's ability to follow an obstinate course.

This of course further raises hopes about the ultimate prospects for tension reduction measures. But continuing caution must be exercised. To avoid a damaging and fruitless propaganda war, it is imperative that any ROK or UN proposals for arms reductions have certain characteristics. These include:

- Clarification of ultimate objectives (to avoid allegations of foot-dragging, or slavish devotion to the *status quo*)
- Coherence in light of the larger Northeast Asian security situation
- Involvement of all concerned parties so as to avoid unilateralist and radical flavor of the DPRK agenda (that might be cast to appeal to audiences in the South by promising immediate reductions, say, in defense burdens and more autonomy and "freedom" from United States influence)

Such objectives, taking place as they would in an atmosphere of changing domestic expectations, might be said to raise some political risks, because they essentially put in conflict two essential elements of the larger security problem. In particular, given the feverish preparations by the North all these years, and the state of the military balance in the Koreas which is well known to all at this conference, the role of the U.S. as a deterrent force is obviously central to continuing stability in the region. Thus, to satisfy domestic calls for reduced

burden would presumably involve the maintenance of an absolutely undiluted US commitment and presence in the South.

On the other hand, given the traditional presence of U.S. forces (including nuclear forces) in ROK, and the nature of the command arrangements and divisions of labor in South Korea's defense concept, the goal of maintaining at least the present level of U.S. involvement would seem to conflict with several things including: the historically adamant position of DPRK for immediate U.S. withdrawal and denuclearization of the Korean region; domestic concerns in South Korea about the future nature of the U.S.-ROK military relationship; calls by many across the Pacific to bring home U.S. forces for budgetary and political reasons; and anxieties that would emerge not only in Korea but throughout the Asia-Pacific area were the U.S. either to signal a reduced military interest in the region, a reduced interest in military means in general, and/or a reduced set of capabilities (and here developments in Korea should not be separated from other possible developments that might take place throughout the Asia/Pacific region, such as possible removal of U.S. bases from the Philippines.

Obviously, one cannot have it both ways. Thus, we need weigh the relative advantages of these two alternatives to arms limitation in Korea: that is, the radical and gradual approaches. The gradualist, or incrementalist approach, has numerous advantages. As noted elsewhere, this approach is most likely to yield meaningful long-term progress that can be justified, verified, and that ensures maintenance of an adequate set of deterrence conditions throughout its evolution. It also presents the most favorable conditions for keeping open important options, a particularly important consideration given the uncertain political climate that may arise after the passing of the present Pyongyang leadership. The disadvantages of this approach generally are political, or more properly, propagandistic in character. A perception by some parts of the domestic South Korean audience that adequate progress was not being made (or even pursued) could inflame anxieties, opposition, and doubts about Seoul's real intentions--particularly given what would inevitably be a strong propaganda program from Pyongyang and evidence from Europe and elsewhere that dramatic progress in conventional arms reductions was indeed possible.

But I have already discussed some of the disadvantages of this approach, particularly given the many complexities of the Korean strategic situation, and the relative lack of precursor experience. If something resembling the DPRK's radical approach to arms control were to be adopted, its success would depend on a number of factors that so far have not been adequately addressed, and in some cases not even been considered at all. We can infer from the European experience that truly meaningful conventional arms control reductions "live or die on the details." It is one thing, in other words, to espouse various long-term objectives (a lasting peace, or at least reductions in tensions, budget alleviation, progress to larger political goals, etc.). It is another to bring any arms control scheme--especially a multifaceted,

multiparty, major reductions-oriented one--to fruition in terms likely to be acceptable to both sides.

To reiterate, we need only revisit European experience. Until recently, the proceedings have not yielded a great deal, and even in the past few months there have been not only political problems, but also a staggering array of bewildering definitional problems, technical questions, coordination issues (among and between sides), etc. It is true that dramatic recent developments in Germany, Eastern Europe, and the Soviet Union have seemed to unjam the glacial and often frustrating course of this process, opening up some avenues to real and positive movement. But putting aside for a moment the question of ultimately bringing these things about by a negotiated scheme (about which more in a moment), many technical and logistical problems remain. To give just a sampler of these, they include:

- Definitional problems and counting rules (e.g., with combat aircraft)
- Logistical problems involved in removing and redeploying forces. Even if the Soviets were to order full and unqualified demobilization of its forward posture in Eastern Europe, it could take literally years to move these forces home, dismantle bases, etc.¹⁰⁾
- Verification, consultative, and other protocols (these tend to be far more straightforward in the strategic case where we have great experience and where issues are conceptually much simpler, but even so there are problems)
- Genuine difficulties and disagreements in handling key parts of the negotiating agenda (again, as with tactical air forces or prepositioned stocks in Europe; in Northeast Asia, the nature of U.S. reinforcement capabilities, a continued relationship between U.S. and Korean command entities, and forces offshore--afloat or, say, in Okinawa, would no doubt have to be addressed)

And this is just a short resume of the most immediate, "local" issues. Factoring in other topics--such as U.S. maritime capabilities, Japanese forces, PRC forces, etc.--would only compound these matters. What this suggests to me is that a primary goal before the government in Seoul *should be the education of its domestic populace in the whys and wherefores of arms control, both in general terms, and as far as unique Northeast Asian circumstances are concerned.* In Europe and in the United

¹⁰⁾And still other problems remain. For instance, the Soviet housing shortage is acute as its transportation deficiencies. There is literally no place for these units to go, either in the civilian or military infrastructure in the USSR.

States, the public has, over time, become relatively well informed about what some have called the "theology" of arms control. If one thinks about it, to take one example, the basis of the "Two-Track" INF deployment and negotiation system rested in some fairly complex strategic principles. While the general public no doubt remained unaware of the full magnitude of the issues, the strategic arguments put forward at the time of the Two-Track strategy were sufficient to allay the anxieties of key parts of the Western European electorate.

The Maritime Dimensions of Northeast Asian Arms Control

Earlier, I mentioned certain important complicating effects following from the highly maritime nature (at least from a military planning point of view) of the Northeast Asian defense problem. To be certain, the crucial component of any future Korean conflict scenario would be the outcome of engaged ground forces formations. Similarly, the fate of maritime operations would be very important to the outcome of a major land war in Europe. But in relative terms, absolute sea control would be, in relative terms, a more immediate strategic-operational priority in the Korean theater than would be the case in a European conflict. This fact, however, in addition to the maritime balance in the region and certain geographical realities adds certain complex wrinkles to an overall regional arms control problem.

In essence, some of the leading issues are as follows.

- First, we need consider the proximity of major Soviet naval forces (including their strategic submarines), their geographic containment in the Seas of Japan and Okhotsk, and the relatively sparse communications system linking the Soviet Far East to distant European Russia.
- Second, the narrow, peninsular layout of the land theater means that sea power can play a much more direct role in the progress of the land battle (as was decisively shown in the 1950-53 War).
- Third, escalation dynamics of maritime warfare (in terms of both region and type of conflict) can be extraordinarily volatile, especially when the stakes are so high, as they are here.
- Fourth, given the comparatively small forward U.S. deployment in the Republic of Korea (compared with that now in Europe), and the economic interdependence of all nations in the region, control of sea lines of communication from the start of any conflict is a crucial priority.
- Fifth, given the great emphasis placed by the DPRK in their own ground forces (in terms of quantity and, gradually over time, their quality as well), the necessity of the Southern alliance

to rely on technological substitutes (sea and air power alike) to counterbalance the sheer numbers of DPRK troops is unarguable.

- Sixth, from an American strategic vantage point, the Korean theater falls within the bailiwick of the U.S. Pacific Command, a predominantly naval command structure. It so happens, fortunately, that the United States 7th Fleet, combined with the forces of friendly regional powers, continues to enjoy a substantial superiority over possible adversary forces, although with the steady improvement of those forces¹¹⁾ and with likely U.S. maritime force reductions in the offing (on account of resource realities), this lead could become more tenuous.

Accordingly, then, the Soviets and many of their allies have called for an extension of air-land force arms reduction talks to include maritime forces.¹²⁾ Thus, it is quite possible to imagine that as a part of a new initiative toward arms limitation discussions on traditional army and air force units in Korea, that the Communist government might insist--with Soviet encouragement--on inclusion of regional U.S. and other naval forces in talks. Failure to include these forces, they might argue, would be proof of our "insincerity" to explore peaceful avenues for negotiation. However, there are so many compelling reasons for not including naval forces in such arms control regimes--and for that matter of not addressing even in principle the general issue of naval arms limitation--that conflict over this point would be virtually inevitable. There are many reasons for this, which are largely beyond the scope of this paper.¹³⁾ But suffice it to say, that insistence on

¹¹The Soviets have announced numerical force cutbacks, but for the most part, these come as part of a general Soviet naval policy of emphasizing quality in a smaller number of units over large numbers of less sophisticated units. Indeed, many of these apparent "unilateral force reductions" are in reality nothing of the kind. Referring to Soviet assertions that they were demilitarizing their on naval forces in the area, Admiral Carlisle Trost characterized many of the Soviet ships as "hangar queens, many of which have not been underway for years, some of which had actually sunk at their piers, and others that were so unseaworthy that they sank enroute to the scrapping yard." Cited in "Limits on Navy or No More Treaties," *Defense Week*, 14 May 1990, p. 16.

¹²Marshall Akhromayev, a special advisor to President Gorbachev, told the U.S. Senate that "Sooner or later if we do not want to stop the negotiations on reduction of nuclear and conventional arms, naval forces negotiations are unavoidable." *Ibid.*, p. 15.

¹³They include, though: the relatively greater reliance on sea power by the United States as part of its overall strategic concept; the technological and personnel superiority of the U.S. Fleet; the imminent block obsolescence of large elements of the Soviet Fleet (which makes its limitation a true case of converting a necessity into a virtue); the difficulty in dealing with naval forces on anything other than a global basis; a quite different history of arms control experience; and much more besides.

inclusion of maritime forces in any regional arms limitation arrangement could immediately become an almost insurmountable obstacle to progress of any other kind. Indeed, the degree to which this issue is pressed by the DPRK or Soviets can almost be viewed as a litmus test of their real commitment to bringing about progress of any sort. This is another possible propaganda issue to which everyone must be very sensitive.

CONCLUSIONS: POLICY ISSUES FOR THE FUTURE

So far, I have a few points which, taken together, form a sort of set of basic issues to be considered prior to embarking on a new set of arms control initiatives in Korea (or in responding to any proposals emanating from the DPRK). I have based the discussion on historical experience in Europe, both the relatively promising events of the last year, and the less dramatic developments of preceding decades alike. I have suggested that the basic principles of conventional arms control which have been developed and applied to the arms limitation problem in other regions and functional areas apply equally well in Northeast Asia. But that is, perhaps, where the useful parallels end. The Northeast Asian strategic situation, its history, its military balance, its political and military relationships, and many other factors are quite different than they are in any other well-known case. I would suggest that such issues should be evaluated in thorough detail prior to the launching of any diplomatic initiative, since one runs the risk of doing ourselves more harm in the long run by launching into an ill-conceived scheme than one does in being vulnerable to accusations of obstinacy from Pyongyang. If we are really serious about meaningful arms reductions, in other words, we should proceed seriously, but cautiously.

Having recommended a cautious approach, let me note that, at present, the situation for orderly, tangible arms control among the parties involved in the Korean strategic balance do not seem to me to be good. As suggested earlier, however, we might consider our mission for the time being as one of preparing for possible future initiatives that might pay handsome dividends in the event that the strategic and diplomatic context in Northeast Asia changes rapidly. At first blush, this seems to be a prudent investment: it would appear that such preparations would cost us relatively little, while nonetheless representing a possibly sound investment in the future collective security scene in Northeast Asia.

The most important of these radical developments (to which I have not alluded inasmuch as other sessions no doubt will address it in detail) concerns the succession prospects in the North following the departure of Kim Il Sung from the scene. To a non-trivial degree, the historical climate of mistrust, enmity, and recalcitrance characterizing intercourse in Korean affairs bears Kim's personal signature. One wonders how his passing might lead to either opportunities to change this regrettable state of affairs (or, less optimistically, whether it might lead to instabilities that could actually increase the risks of conflict). I dare not make any predictions, but so far as arms

reduction options in the near term go, there seem to be three generic scenarios worth contemplating:

1. *Continuity of the Present Regime.* By definition, this would involve few modifications of one's overall arms limitation strategy, whatever that might be. However, experts note that it is unlikely that the younger Kim could play the same role as his father: except possibly in a symbolic, and probably temporary, fashion.¹⁴ Thus, we must be prepared for some kind of weather change in the situation. But of what kind?
2. *An Unstable Future.* One might see a period of considerable turbulence and disruption following the death of Kim Il Sung, during which the nation might seek to maintain itself by redoubled emphasis on the apparent external threat. Should this happen, failure by the democratic governments to be highly forthcoming on arms reductions would have great propaganda value, but such caution would be militarily most justified.
3. *Some Kind of Movement Toward North Korean 'Perestroika'.* In this, the most favorable scenario, the post-Kim government in the North would recognize the great burdens its military preparations and psychology had placed upon its society, and might seek to modify its behavior in desirable ways, possibly seeking to redirect military efforts into a program to imitate the economic miracle which South Korea has achieved. Under this scenario, arms limitation might indeed begin to follow the recent European model. To return to my initial observation, to the extent that the groundwork needed to exploit any such development had been laid, the prospects for rapid and mutually beneficial payoffs could be achieved.

I believe that each of the latter two scenarios needs to be balanced into a comprehensive policy for Korean arms limitation for the long run. But in the short run, to close, let me return to a few questions that need to be resolved independent of which of the preceding scenarios we think most likely. Regardless of what the future may hold, other factors need to be examined before we commit ourselves to any particular negotiating framework. Arms control for its own sake has been viewed by many as quite a good thing in its own right. Yet certain pitfalls lurk around which we must navigate, both to preserve the present admittedly costly military balance and to avoid undermining our joint political and strategic situations in other respects. Let us briefly mention three such issues before closing.

¹⁴See Kong Dan Oh, *Leadership Change in North Korean Politics: The Succession to Kim Il Sung*, RAND Report R-3697-RC, October 1988.

1. The Soviet Agenda in Northeast Asian Arms Control

A very important question we all must consider as we contemplate arms reduction options for Korea concerns the Soviet agenda in any such diplomatic forum. So far, concrete Soviet proposals in this area have been few and far between. But it is likely that the USSR would elect to play a more activist role in any future set of negotiations. This probability should be carefully anticipated. After all, the Soviets have, compared with Europe, a relatively minor stake in the progress of such negotiations. Combined with their various economic and other woes, the Soviets might have an incentive to get out in front of such talks and to try to expand their scope and accelerate their pace. Since the Soviets have much to gain and relatively little to lose (no matter how the talks would go), they might be tempted to push the pace of talks beyond what the more involved parties might be willing to consider--raising the specter of political difficulties at home. On the other hand, the Soviets must be fully encouraged to participate in such discussions, primarily in order to inhibit any possible recalcitrance in Pyongyang.

2. The Nature of the ROK-U.S. Military/Political Relationship

Over time, this relationship has proven both robust and flexible. Given current political and economic realities, further evolution in this relationship will undoubtedly occur. We have already seen the beginnings of this evolution: consideration of changing the command structure of ROK-U.S. forces, adoption of a lower profile of U.S. troops, shifting divisions of military labor, etc. Obviously, such considerations cannot be isolated from our overall arms control strategy. How these factors might be reconciled is beyond this paper, but I would only note that it is imperative to assure a sound linkage between arms control options and military choices. Arms control for its own sake may be desirable in principle, but to stand a chance for success and to accomplish its primary objective of enhancing security overall, the closest possible connection of these two vital matters must be assured.

3. The Domestic Issues Affiliated With Arms Control

Throughout this paper, I have noted the importance for any democratic government to balance the practical side of government-to-government dealings with the management of popular opinion at home. Though they are beyond the scope of the present treatment, several aspects of this question come to mind. They include a growing sense of dissatisfaction in the South with the residual "Cold War" aspects of the Korean standoff, the perceived heavy burdens of defense, the equitable sharing of burdens among the U.S. and Korea, the nature of U.S.-ROK command and other strategic relationships, various peripheral points (e.g., relating to trade balances), and so on. Other issues of interest in Washington and throughout America include sentiments relating to U.S. forward defense burdens in a "new age," the costs of such commitments,

U.S. Pacific strategy, the role of American military power in the modern age generally, and more.

Clearly, hopes for arms reductions can be enhanced or upset by such domestic perceptions. Since many important issues--for one, the future status of the command structure in Korea--may require revamping regardless of the existence of arms control talks, all the governments concerned would do well to craft their policies wisely, communicate them clearly, and do what they can to inform the public as to the most important technical, strategic, and other issues that must be addressed.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

In this paper, I have given a general survey of arms control methods and principles, and offered a few views in so doing on possible factors to be considered in light of the specific features of the Northeast Asian military balance. I believe that the approach followed so far by the government in Seoul--its emphasis on incremental progress, its expansion of political contacts through its "Northern Policy," and so forth--is the right one. I think it would be in everyone's interest, however, to take every opportunity to do two things. First, anything to do with arms control must be linked closely with other policy considerations, military and nonmilitary alike. There is an erroneous tendency held in some quarters that arms control can or even should proceed independently of such considerations. This I believe to be rather dangerous, and certainly not conducive to meaningful arms reductions able to stand the tests of time and real political stresses.

A second major conclusion that follows from this discussion concerns the nature of the U.S.-ROK military relationship, and the status of U.S. forces in South Korea. If Pyongyang were to have its way, this complicated question would be swiftly settled: the U.S. would withdraw from the picture, and all problems would go away. But putting aside the self-serving quality of this reasoning, there are enormous transitional and implementational questions raised by this prospect. Arms control is desirable, but not arms control at too high a price, or with too much risk. The U.S. presence in Korea might decline further in the next few years, but this will be for largely economic reasons that would tend to apply regardless of other developments. As we have seen at repeated points in post-1953 history--and especially in the wake of President Carter's 1977 decision to withdraw the second infantry division--U.S. forces deterrent forces play a very important deterrent role on the peninsula. With proper management, this role would not be diluted even with minor force cuts.

Other considerations (such as turning over the supreme theater command to the Korean military and attaining a lower overall U.S. "presence" in Korea) should be pursued with vigor. But again, these are issues that would exist independent of any arms control aspirations. In sum, I believe that the basic essence of the U.S.-Korean military relationship benefits both parties greatly, and its basic structure

should be maintained pending a meaningful and enduring condition of North-South political rapprochement. Since that would depend absolutely on a fundamental change in the world-view of Pyongyang, it is hard to predict when and how this development might play out. But as I suggest above, careful preparation--such as preliminary negotiations, even ones that were not invested with many hopes for success--might increase the options for effective exploitation of a Northerly political change when and if it comes.

In addition to maintaining the present deterrence equilibrium in Korea, I believe that it also makes good sense to not restrict arms reduction options to a Seoul-Pyongyang dialogue, but to do what is possible to introduce others to an ultimate negotiating forum--notably the Soviets. Pending a major shakeup in the government in the North that unlocks the door to speedy resolution of intra-Korean difficulties, it will be necessary to involve others (the Soviets especially, and perhaps also the PRC) with the aim of applying indirect influence to Pyongyang to behave in a more internationalist fashion. As I have noted, there are risks involved in such a scheme--for instance, that the Soviets might exploit such initiatives for political aims, or that certain intractable problems (e.g., those concerning naval arms control) might become major bones of contention. But in balance, with sufficient planning, these risks can be minimized.

THE SECOND INTERNATIONAL
CONFERENCE ON THE KOREAN WAR
JUNE 14~15, 1990
SEOUL, KOREA

**Superpower Security Policies and East Asia in the 1990s:
Implications for the Korean Peninsula**

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Continued improvement in bilateral relations between the United States and the Soviet Union over the past couple of years has dramatically reshaped the conduct of superpower relations and substantially altered the context of world politics. Although remaining differences are still substantial, and uncertainty about the future mark relations between Washington and Moscow, the two superpowers have managed to sustain forward momentum toward new agreements on bilateral and multilateral security issues. Overall prospects for talks aimed at reducing strategic weapons (START), Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE), an eventual treaty banning chemical weapons, and the proposal to allow unarmed NATO and Warsaw Pact aircraft to overfly each other's territory (Open Skies) appear relatively promising.¹⁾ Together with the ongoing political and economic transformation of Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union itself, East-West tensions have declined to a considerable extent.

At the same time, however, there has been in recent months growing concern about the prospects for a stable transition process in the Soviet Union and in Europe as a whole. Mounting internal problems in the Soviet Union, and the potential dangers these problems carry for a spillover into the larger European arena, now cloud earlier optimism about the emergence of a new European order. But if the Soviet Union's current problems are contained, and should the European peace process continue to proceed in a stable fashion, it is likely that the next phase of superpower detente in the 1990s will be directed to a follow-on tension reduction process for the Asian region. Although Soviet and American initiatives aimed at promoting region-wide confidence and security-building measures in Asia have so far been limited, there has been in recent years growing interest in both Washington and Moscow toward the possibility of implementing such measures on the Korean peninsula. Given the geopolitical importance of Northeast Asia and the Korean peninsula in particular, and also given the fact that the region has been the primary focus of Soviet-American tensions in East Asia, progress (or the lack of such) made here would necessarily condition any subsequent initiatives towards the Asian region as a whole.

¹ These and related bilateral items are expected to be on the agenda at the next summit meeting between Presidents George Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev scheduled for late May 1990.

The aim of this paper, accordingly, is first to examine the mix of domestic and external considerations that appear to be influencing the rethinking of overall security policy in both Washington and Moscow. The next is to see how this shift might be reflected in the two superpowers' actual policies towards East Asia, and evaluate the extent to which a more constructive regional approach by the superpowers could be expected to contribute to a lessening of tensions on the Korean peninsula. Clearly, greater Soviet-American cooperation in East Asia will provide a favorable climate for inter-Korean discussions. If China and Japan were to actively join this effort to promote peace and stability on the Korean peninsula, the picture would look even brighter. Nevertheless, as important as such measures are, lasting stability in Korea will very much depend on steps to be taken by the two Koreas themselves. Thus, the final part of the paper looks at the current interplay between the two Koreas in order to identify some likely responses that the two regimes will show with respect to the changing external and internal dimensions of their rivalry.

I. Transformation of Superpower Security Relations

Less than a year has passed since the Berlin Wall, long symbolic of postwar East-West conflict, came down in November 1989. But in the relatively short span of time since, Western attitude towards the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe has undergone a profound transformation. The United States and its NATO allies face at this time a much diminished security threat from the East; the Warsaw Pact as a military alliance is for practical purposes already an anachronism, and it is no longer realistic to envision a Soviet-led Pact military assault on Western Europe. Instead, the growing concern of Western, especially the American, strategists now is not so much how to deal with potential Soviet armed aggression, but how to ensure successful economic reform in the Soviet Union and keep it from falling apart.²⁾

Disturbing evidence of mounting internal political and economic unrest in the Soviet Union over the past several months has contributed to the United States' worries about the viability of the current Soviet regime, and forced American observers to contemplate the possibility of a post-Cold War Europe mired in chaotic, unstable

² See for example, Lewis Gaddis' proposal for Western economic assistance to Moscow; John Lewis Gaddis, "Coping with Victory", The Atlantic Monthly, May 1990, pp.49-60.

transition. Such a situation would clearly be a source of great apprehension; a disintegrating Soviet Union in the face of impending German unification could raise fears (justified or not) in other European countries, and quite possibly pose a new dilemma for European security and stability.³⁾ The centrifugal tendency shown by minority republics along the Soviet periphery has made the problem of political cohesion particularly acute in recent months. Thus, ironically, a desire not to make matters worse for Moscow is evident in Washington's policy towards its erstwhile adversary. The extent of this conciliatory turnabout was readily apparent, for instance, in the United States' handling of the recent events in Lithuania. Although Washington criticised Moscow's hardball tactics against Lithuania and expressed sympathy for the latter's political aspirations, it also took no steps that could undermine Moscow's position. Such response by the Bush administration is a fitting contrast to the hawkish attitude shown to Moscow in 1988 by the then U.S. Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger.⁴⁾

The weight of internal problems in the Soviet Union, as much if not more than changing Soviet perceptions of military security requirements, has led Moscow to reorder its external priorities as well. In order to stabilize the external environment and deal with its internal crisis, the present Soviet leadership has shown unprecedented willingness to accommodate Western interests. In fact, it is not the security threat from the West but the stagnant Soviet economy, and the contradictions of political and social arrangements in the Soviet Union today, that present the greatest long-term challenge to the survival of the Soviet system. This understanding is clearly behind Gorbachev's push for *perestroika*. Reform and restructuring in the economic sector will require extensive external assistance if it is to succeed, thus creating added incentive for continued Soviet cooperation with the outside world. In the domestic economic

³ For examples of such concerns see the editorial "Together Again?" in The Economist, 17 June 1989, p.13; and Charles Krauthammer's essay, "Return of the German Question", Time, 25 September 1989, p.88. A thoughtful German perspective on the problems of German unification is provided by Wolfgang Schauble, "Relations Between the Two States in Germany: Problems and Prospects", International Affairs (London), Vol.64, No.2, Spring 1988, pp.209-216.

⁴ Asking himself the rhetorical question, "Does he trust Mikhail Gorbachev?", Weinberger asserted that his answer was negative, and that it was dangerously naive to "believe that the USSR had ceased to be a threat because it is making some efforts to respond to its own internal economic difficulties..." Caspar Weinberger, "Arms Reductions and Deterrence", Foreign Affairs, Vol.66, No.4, Spring 1988, p.719.

context (much as in the United States) high hopes for economic returns are attached to a general reduction of military spending and to possible payoffs to be gained from converting military production facilities to the civilian economic sector.⁵⁾ In certain instances, Soviet expectations for defense conversion appear not to be limited to the domestic sector alone. For example, a number of high-ranking Soviet scientists recently lectured members of the U.S. Congress on the merits of purchasing advanced materials and technologies developed for Soviet space and military programs.⁶⁾ In another example of Soviet "creativity" in turning swords into plowshares, Moscow offered its SS-20 intermediate-range missiles (654 SS-20 missiles are to be destroyed under the 1987 INF Treaty), minus their nuclear warheads, as launch vehicles for foreign commercial satellites.⁷⁾ Such offers, of course, would have been unthinkable even a few years ago. In addition, leading Soviet economic planners have been busily shuttling back and forth between Western capitals providing assurance of Moscow's commitment to economic reform and seeking increased material assistance and cooperation in return.

The changed Soviet strategic outlook was also in evidence during Chinese Premier Li Peng's 23 April visit to Moscow. Li Peng's visit was particularly symbolic because it was the first such by a senior Chinese leader since Zhou Enlai last visited in 1964. The trip returned Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev's earlier visit to China in May 1989, at which time the two Communist powers agreed to set aside past differences and expand cooperative relations. But the rude greeting Li Peng received upon his arrival from hundreds of Russian students shouting "Li Peng go home" (and the fact that Soviet authorities allowed such demonstrations), reflected the different political paths being followed by the two countries at this juncture. Official discussions reportedly avoided potentially troublesome ideological issues, and concentrated instead on practical matters such as agreements on further troop cuts along the Sino-Soviet border, and exchange of Chinese consumer goods for Soviet credits to finance nuclear power plants for energy-starved China. Outside observers noted that the visit was at

⁵ Alexei Kireyev, Conversion: Goods Instead of Weapons (Moscow: Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, 1989).

⁶ John Holusha, "Soviets Sell Tech in U.S.", San Jose Mercury News, 6 May 1990.

⁷ This venture, however, may in fact be a contravention of the INF Treaty terms, see: William J. Broad, "Soviets Want to Sell Cold-War-Surplus Missiles", New York Times, 22 October 1989.

best "correct but cool".⁸⁾ Moreover, the Soviet leadership made no great effort to portray the talks as an important milestone in bilateral relations with China, and played down its potential strategic significance as a possible lever in dealings with the United States. Instead, both Moscow and Beijing sought to use the meeting as an opportunity to consolidate traditional state-to-state ties, and to expand the potential basis for future cooperation.⁹⁾

The new mood of mutual accommodation by the superpowers is clearly a positive and encouraging sign that the latest detente process will not collapse into disappointing failure as happened with the earlier one in the 1970s. But even broader structural trends in global relations provide additional reasons to believe that the current process will continue. The present thaw in Soviet-American relations comes against a background of profound, and probably irreversible, trends in the world political, military, and economic context. First, in the political dimension, the sustained trend towards multipolarity has accelerated the process of eroding the postwar bipolar structure of international relations. Japan's spectacular rise to global economic prominence and growing political power, the impending market integration of Europe in 1992, and the rise of newly industrialised countries, among other developments, have led to a redistribution of relative political power amongst states. While the United States and the Soviet Union retain their absolute positions as the two preeminent military powers, the functional value of this military might in the nuclear age has continued to decline. As the Vietnam and Afghanistan conflicts clearly demonstrated, the use of military power as an instrument of policy exacted great material and psychological costs on the superpowers but failed to produce outcomes that satisfied their political objectives.

The transfer of advanced armaments and diffusion of technology, in particular the diffusion of technological and industrial capability to make advanced military systems, has furthered the process of multipolarization. In the 1980s, many nations, including some in the poorest quartile among the world's economies, possess considerable military capabilities. A few, such as India, Israel, and Pakistan now possess, or are on the verge of acquiring, nuclear weapons of their own. As a result, the margin of absolute military

⁸ The Economist, 28 April 1990, p.34.

⁹ Sergei Goncharov, Hua Di and John Lewis, "The New State of Sino-Soviet Relations", unpublished paper prepared for internal seminar at the Stanford University Center for International Security and Arms Control, April 1990. Excerpts from the paper appeared as an article in the San Jose Mercury News, 3 May 1990.

superiority that the superpowers enjoyed at earlier times have been diminished quite considerably. Even in the area of conventional arms, the growing sophistication of modern day weapons has made them more precise, longer-range, and vastly more destructive. At the lower end of the technology scale, chemical weapons (and ballistic missile delivery capabilities as in the cases of Iraq, Libya, and Syria among others) have become a "poor man's nuclear option", and their production has become widespread.¹⁰⁾ The upshot has been to further blur the distinction between the nuclear and non-nuclear military powers. That such weapons now constitute the bulk of present-day trade and transfers in arms has had the paradoxical effect of making the world at once a more dangerous but also a more multipolar one. How far these trends will proceed into the next decade and beyond cannot be predicted. Nevertheless, it may be that the limits on the use of force will increase, not only for the superpowers but for others as well, if only because of the great destructiveness of modern weaponry and the diminishing political and economic returns to be gained from the exercise of military power.

While military power is becoming functionally less attractive as an instrument of policy, non-military sources of power are growing in importance. Thus, in the increasingly multipolar world of today, we have the example of Japan, with its enormous financial, technological and economic resources, emerging to rival the United States in world stature. Arguably, Japan's global economic power makes it more powerful in many respects than the Soviet Union in the contemporary world setting. With its mountain of trade and current-account surplus, and a ready reservoir of advanced technology and know-how, Japan has enormously useful levers of influence to shape international transactions. Overall economic health, industrial and financial capability, and possession of technological competence will continue to grow in importance in the power calculus amongst nations, and more likely than not decisively determine a nation's international position in the year to come.

Finally, along with these general trends, one further factor, the resurgence of domestic priorities in the foreign policies of the superpowers, has had a profound impact on both the United States' and the Soviet Union's outlook on the world. For much of the postwar period, it is fair to say that both superpowers concentrated the better part of their energies on trying to shape the flow of international events. This tendency was particularly noticeable during the height of the Cold War when foreign policy successes, or

¹⁰ Robert Shuey, Missile Proliferation: A Discussion of U.S. Objectives and Policy Options, CRS Report for Congress, 21 February 1990, p.56 ff.

failures, were seen to be directly tied to the survival of the system. Especially for the Soviet Union, loud proclamations of foreign policy successes have long substituted for domestic failures in providing sufficient food, shelter and welfare for its people. But political leaders cannot for long sustain such a policy without running the risk of fomenting deep resentments within the domestic polity. Thus, as much as the present Soviet leadership worries about the ultimate political consequences of adopting full-fledged market-oriented economic reforms, their adoption is now a virtual precondition to these same leaders' immediate political survival given that without these reforms the Soviet economy would almost certainly suffer paralyzing deterioration.¹¹⁾

But the primacy of domestic factors in external policy has not been limited to the Soviet Union. For the United States as well, domestic considerations have come to weigh much more heavily on foreign policy decisions. Washington's reluctance to become embroiled in regional conflicts, its desire to restructure its security commitments to its European and Asian allies, and its demands that West European nations and Japan assume a larger share of economic assistance to the developing countries, all stem from a new appreciation of fiscal constraints and the recognition that public opinion is against costly overseas entanglements. In an era of budgetary and trade deficits, American strategic thinking in the 1990s will increasingly pay attention not only to potential threats but also the material and political constraints to shaping policies designed to address such threats.¹²⁾ If anything, constraints on the Soviet Union's ability to determine global events will be even greater.

As a result of these and other considerations, disinclination by both superpowers to get involved in regional conflicts will probably grow in the coming years. A gradual "disengagement" of American and Soviet involvement from regional affairs will not necessarily lead to sudden power vacuums, nor to an equally sudden escalation of tensions. Nevertheless, as the Cold War conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union comes to an end, and as the two implement plans to further scale down their extensive network of security alliances world-wide, dangers of unexpected and unwanted conflict may indeed be present (and grow) in certain areas. Anticipating and preventing

¹¹ Ed A. Hewett, "Prognosis for Soviet Economy is Grave, but Improving", New York Times, 25 March 1990.

¹² Fred C. Ikle and Albert Wohlstetter, Discriminate Deterrence, Report of the Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy, January 1988, especially pp.5-22 and pp.57-62.

such developments will remain in the interest of the superpowers, and in the larger interest of world security and stability.

II. The East Asian Security Environment in the 1990s

If the superpowers were to find cause for continued concern about security in the years ahead, will will in no small part due to the potential for instability in East Asia. Unlike Europe, the security situation in the region is characterised by still simmering military conflicts and unresolved territorial issues. Some potential problem areas include Indochina, questions centering on Hong Kong's future after 1997 and how this may impact on Taiwan's relationship with Mainland China, and instability in the Philippines. But the greatest danger for military conflict resides on the Korean peninsula, where two of the world's largest armed forces, both heavily armed with modern weapons, confront each other across a fragile truce line. Of course, it is probably the case that global and regional trends in the 1990s reduce the probabilities for another major conflict in East Asia, but the possibility for such cannot be excluded.

The prospects for stability in the East Asian region over the next decade will depend as much, if not more, on the kinds of policies followed by Asia's remaining communist states as it will on changes in superpower policies toward the region. Reduced tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union have already led to an improved East Asian strategic environment, and long term prospects for continued Soviet-American cooperation on regional security issues appear for the most part positive. The most important set of remaining questions regarding future regional stability center on possible domestic and external policies to be followed by East Asia's communist states.

There are now essentially three East Asian communist regimes left; China, North Korea and Vietnam. In the wake of political and economic reforms in Eastern Europe, all three face the future with far less conviction, and much more shorn of international support than at any time in the past. Beijing, Pyongyang and Hanoi, moreover, are saddled with increasingly weak economies unable to generate sufficient growth to meet expected demands in the years to come. China's economic performance, which registered 9% average annual growth rates for much of the

1980s, is expected to show a sharp decline this year.¹³⁾ North Korea has not made public any useful information on its economy for some time. However, frequent exhortations for increased agricultural and industrial production by the Party paper, *Rodong Shinmun*, and calls for "speed campaigns" to raise output of various commodities, indicate considerable economic difficulties in North Korea.¹⁴⁾ Vietnam's circumstances are not much better, although Hanoi shows signs that it may be serious about its commitment to *Doi Moi* reforms.

By the middle of this decade, if not earlier, all three of these regimes will probably also face serious internal instability stemming from changes in political leadership. China is under the control of an ineffectual octogenarian leadership headed by Deng Xiaoping. At 77, North Korea's Kim Il Sung is also nearing the winter of his life. Hanoi is ruled by the 74-year old Nguyen Van Linh who is reported to be seriously ill. These aging group of first-generation revolutionary leaders may be able to hold onto power until they pass from the scene, but their brand of leadership clearly will not assure sufficient flexibility for their respective countries to adjust to rapid changes in the international setting. This will be particularly true in the world economic context where frequent swings are the norm rather than the exception.

The problem of succession in these countries is made especially acute because the "designated" heirs to these elderly leaders--Jiang Zemin in China and Kim Jong Il in North Korea, for instance--have so far have shown little evidence that they are capable of leading once their mentors have passed away. Under such conditions, the likelihood of stable transition to the next generation of leadership will probably be remote. More likely, we may witness either of two equally undesirable outcomes: one is a chaotic fragmentation of these societies following a failed succession, which may well drag down the existing system of rule; the other is further tightening of central control by these regimes fearing exactly the possibility of the first scenario coming to pass. Of course, one way to avoid the above problems might lie in the potential successors casting themselves as reformers. But if the East European experience is any guide, this too would be difficult; no "reform communist party" leader in Hungary, Poland, or Czechoslovakia has managed to remain in power.

¹³ The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) Country Report: China, North Korea, No.3, 1989.

¹⁴ For example of such articles see; *Rodong Shinmun*, 24 April 1990, p.5.

Despite these problems, or perhaps because of them, these Asian communist states show little willingness to restructure their policies and provide outlets to release societal pressures before they reach critical proportions. Having watched the fates of communist leaders such as Erich Honecker in East Germany and Nicolae Ceaucescu in Romania, Deng Xiaping and Kim Il Sung are not likely to encourage reforms that could easily get out of control. Potential middle-of-the-road communist cadres in China and North Korea may not actively wish for reforms either if they are aware of the contempt experienced by their East European contemporaries today.

Still, in the final analysis, these East Asian communist states will not be able to swim against the tide for an indefinite period. In spite of their attempts to retain control pressures will grow, if only because they can no longer cut themselves off from the outside world as they once did. Of the three, Vietnam may be the most likely candidate to undertake significant reforms over the near term. Vietnam has little to gain from an alliance with China; Hanoi has historically been at odds with China, and does not model itself after Beijing. Moreover, the Vietnamese are not burdened by a dysfunctional political system which depends on cult worship of a particular leader as is the case in North Korea. And, at this juncture, Hanoi is less politically insecure, and therefore less stridently defensive, than either Beijing or Pyongyang. The Vietnamese leadership has also had ample opportunity to pay attention to the success of its ASEAN neighbours.

It is also not inconceivable that China could surprise the world by a sooner than expected return to reform. Tienanmen was a very close thing; the pro-democracy movement came very close to toppling the communist government. There can be no doubt that another popular uprising will come. The dissatisfied young people who challenged the Beijing regime are still there, and their ranks can only grow especially if the economic situation deteriorates. Deng's successor(s), who do not have his personal authority and power (if not ruthlessness), will probably fail if they order similar bloody suppression of the next democracy movement. Even if they managed to hold onto power by brutal means, this will almost surely destroy the regime's international image and irreparably discredit China's foreign policy and international standing. At least some in Beijing seem aware of this probability. As one Chinese official reportedly put it in an interview with foreign journalists, Beijing has no desire to join a "rejectionist front" of hard-line Leninist states who are "a club of nobodies".¹⁵⁾

North Korea is in an altogether different situation. North Korea has not experienced a meaningful period of reform as in China, and still shows great reluctance to accept the need for such. As a result, Pyongyang faces increasing isolation in the international community and, except for its potential to launch another war, is doomed to political and economic irrelevance. Suppression of political and human rights in North Korea have few parallels. North Korean citizens, for instance, are divided into separate categories according to their perceived loyalty to the cult leader Kim Il Sung; the category in which one belongs effectively determines occupational choice, dwelling, and access to material comforts (such as they are).¹⁶ North Korea, in fact, is said to be the country most on Chinese minds when they worry for their country's future.¹⁷ Pyongyang's unpredictable and often violent acts in the external arena, moreover, are probably as unsettling to Chinese leaders as they are to the West. The Soviet Union also shares these concerns but, increasingly more disaffected with the extremes of Kim Il Sung's rule, Soviet observers have been far less reticent than China in criticising North Korea.¹⁸ In other instances, objective Soviet Asian experts, among them Rafik Aliyev and George Kunadze at the Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO), have tried to offer impartial advice to North Korea to undertake, for its own sake, much needed internal reforms.¹⁹ Although Pyongyang is clearly unhappy with Moscow, it cannot afford to dismiss Soviet criticism lightly. North Korea, for instance, cannot resort to playing off Moscow against Beijing as it has done in the past. The Soviet Union, moreover, remains the largest supplier of modern weapons to Pyongyang, and North Korea has also become increasingly more dependent on

¹⁵ Robert Delfs, "European Chill: China Wary as Marxist dominoes Fall", Far Eastern Economic Review (FEER), 11 January 1990, p.17.

¹⁶ John McBeth, "Classified Conditions", FEER, 19 January 1989, pp.27-28.

¹⁷ Delf's, "European Chill...", p.17.

¹⁸ See, for example, Komsomolskaya Pravda, 29 June and 1 July 1989. Soviet travelers to North Korea, especially journalists, are now reported to be under strict surveillance.

¹⁹ For a sense of the growing Soviet reassessment of the situation in Korea and of the Asia-Pacific region, see: George Kunadze, "New Political Thinking as Practiced by the USSR in the Pacific", Unpublished Paper delivered at the International Conference on Northeast Asia, co-sponsored by George Washington University and Yomiuri Shimbun, 17-19 May 1990.

Moscow for trade and economic assistance. According to one Western estimate using Soviet data, Moscow's trade credits to North Korea amounted to \$554.9 million (Rb337.7 million) in the first half of 1988.²⁰⁾

The Soviet Union's disenchantment with Pyongyang today increasingly parallels the United States' long-standing disaffection for the Kim Il Sung regime. This shared perception of North Korea's obstinacy and unrealistic stance on regional and international issues was in evidence during a recent international conference on Northeast Asia, where American and Soviet participants reportedly expressed similar concerns about North Korea's internal and external policies.²¹⁾ The two superpowers now have a mutual interest in maintaining stability in the peninsula. For the United States, this objective has been an integral part of its postwar strategy of containment and reassurance of regional allies in East Asia including South Korea. Having accomplished the first objective, the remaining policy challenge before Washington is how to reduce its military presence in the region without one, unintentionally creating a destabilising power vacuum, and two, how to readjust its posture in the region appropriate to its current interests and consonant with standing commitments to its allies. In meeting these goals, America's task is made easier by the fact that its principal East Asian allies, Japan and South Korea, are now both more capable (if not yet quite ready psychologically) of assuming primary responsibility for their own security. As it transfers increasing security responsibilities to its regional allies, the United States will have to exercise due caution to legitimate concerns about Japan's growing military power, and not underestimate the potential for instability in Korea.²²⁾

For the Soviet Union, the challenges of regional policy in the 1990s are much more numerous and varied. First and foremost, it will have to resolve its outstanding differences with Japan. Its dispute with Tokyo over the Northern territories will have to be solved before substantial improvements will be

²⁰ EIU Country Report..., p.40.

²¹ Kim Jin Hyun, "Puk'han, Sso-Il Wonsaek-jok Bi'nan"[North Korea Harshly Critical of the Soviet Union and Japan], Dong-A Ilbo, 22 May 1990, p.14.

²² A recent Pentagon report to Congress on future U.S. security strategy in the Asia-Pacific region reflects appreciation of these concerns. See, U.S. Department of Defense, A Strategic Framework for the Asian Pacific Rim (Washington, D.C.: GPO, April 1990).

forthcoming in its relations with Japan. It is pertinent to note that the Japanese are pleased to see East-West changes, but so far seem unimpressed with Soviet policies in East Asia.²³⁾ Second, even after the recent Gorbachev-Li Peng talks in Moscow, the Soviet Union must be conscious of the latent potential for worsened relations with China. A number of possibilities, ranging from increased ideological differences to more traditional inter-state rivalries, could still undermine the present trend toward mutual accommodation. Ideological incompatibility could become acute if a democratic government replaces the present leadership in Moscow. The Soviet Union must also make a fundamental decision concerning its policy towards the Korean peninsula. It cannot long maintain its current approach, warming to Seoul while also giving assistance to North Korea. Ironically, at this juncture, residual Soviet influence on Pyongyang could be seen as something of a stabilising element. Nevertheless, the inherent contradictions in the current policy will make it difficult, if not impossible, for Moscow to be on friendly terms with both Koreas over the long term. ²⁴⁾ More prosaic, but no less important, issues such as the promotion of greater trade and economic interdependence with East Asian economies, creation of a viable infrastructure for the development of Soviet Far East, and more active participation in regional associations, will also determine how well the Soviet Union integrates into the post-Cold War East Asian setting.

Given its pressing internal problems, it is probably unrealistic to expect that the Soviet Union will be able to tackle these and other challenges in the near future. Over the foreseeable future, therefore, the United States and its regional allies will remain primarily responsible for taking the initiatives to reduce tensions in the region. Moscow, however, can help at a minimum by lending moral and political support to these efforts. It can also refrain from arms sales overseas to unpredictable regimes, at a time when the temptation to do so for purely financial reasons may in fact be quite high.²⁵⁾ Such restraint will be especially critical with respect to future

²³ Nobuaki Tanaka, The Impact of Historic Changes in East-West Relations on the Far East, International Institute for Global Peace (IIGP) Working Paper, Tokyo, 25 December 1989; also, Gerald Segal, "The New Soviet Maritime Strategy in the Pacific", Naval Forces, No.6, 1989, p.14ff.

²⁴ For more detailed discussion on this point, see: Kyongsoo Lho, "Seoul-Moscow Relations: Looking to the 1990s", Asian Survey, vol.29, No.12, December 1989, pp.1161-66.

arms shipments to North Korea, in particular advanced weapons systems that could seriously destabilize the regional military balance. Pyongyang is already a very grave military threat to the region with its arsenal of modified Scud-B (and possibly even extended range Scud-PII²⁶) missiles. There is already some evidence that these missiles may be armed with chemical warheads. North Korea's purported civilian nuclear program has also come under international suspicion.

All of these sorts of international efforts to enhance security in the region are of considerable importance. Ultimately, however, a lasting solution to the Korean problem will lie in the hands of the two Koreas themselves. Other regional actors, especially the superpowers, have a vested interest in maintaining peace and stability in the East Asian region. But without fundamental agreement to reduce tensions between the two governments in the North and the South of Korea, the problems stemming from their military confrontation will continue to cloud security prospects not only for the Korean peninsula but the whole region as well. The final part of this essay, therefore, looks at the current interplay between the two Koreas, their respective response to the changing external security environment, and evaluates prospects for tension-reduction and confidence-building measures on the Korean peninsula.

III. North-South Korean Confrontation and Prospects for Security

South Korea's apprehension of renewed North Korean aggression has dominated its security horizon for nearly four decades. Throughout this time the South Korean security policy has been develop internal and external sources of strength to offset North Korea's greater military capability and to deter war. A less visible component of South Korea's security strategy toward the North has been its willingness to wait for positive changes to take place in Pyongyang's domestic politics and in its relations with the outside world.

²⁵ Robert Pear, "Prospects of Arms Pacts Spurring Weapons Sales", New York Times, 25 March 1990, p.11.

²⁶ North Korea acquired its initial Scud-Bs from Egypt, probably in 1976, in return for assistance given to Cairo during the October 1973 war. See, Joseph S. Bermudez Jr. and W. Seth Carus, "The North Korean Scud-B Program", Jane's Soviet Intelligence Review, Vol.1, No.4, April 1989, pp.177-81.

The record of North Korea's aggressive behavior, however, scarcely encourages confidence in South Korea. Seoul's profound concern with the North Korean threat arises from two crucial and interrelated factors. First, this concern is founded in part on the sheer scale of North Korea's spending on arms, and the determination with which it has sought to develop an independent offensive military capability. This concern remains even though population in the North, at approximately 20 million, is roughly half that of South Korea, and also in full knowledge of the fact that the South Korean Gross National Product (GNP), at about \$160 billion in 1989, is nearly five times that of the North. Indeed, it may be more to the point to say that the concern remains precisely because of this extraordinary paradox in North Korea's policy toward the South; how could North Korea allocate vast sums to the military sector, at great and increasing costs to its deeply troubled economy, unless the Pyongyang leadership has a hidden agenda quite different from their stated desire for peaceful resolution of the Korean impasse?

The second important reason for South Korean reservations has to do with North Korea's unrealistic approach to the question of national reunification. At every discussion aimed at finding a workable pathway to create the framework for a mutually acceptable reunification plan, Pyongyang has insisted on a format of talks that seeks, either directly or indirectly, to diminish Seoul's legitimacy as the principal interlocutor of its political destiny. A standard North Korean tactic in this vein, for example, has been its insistence on talking to the United States first, then to South Korea, on matters relating to resolution of the Korean question. By taking this tack, Pyongyang hopes to create the impression that Seoul is somehow incapable of making its own political decisions and is under the direct control of the United States. Another standard North Korean tactic is to demand the unilateral withdrawal of U.S. forces in Korea, not mutual and balanced reductions of all forces opposite the demilitarised zone, as a precondition to their participation in political and arms control discussions. As one knowledgeable observer points out, North Korea's "seemingly conciliatory gestures" up to now have been little more than "attempts to refurbish its tarnished international image". 27)

²⁷ Han Sung-Joo, "Relations Between North Korea and the United States", unpublished paper delivered to the 4th ROK-US conference on North Korea co-sponsored by the Korean Association for Communist Studies and the Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, Berkeley, 8 August 1989.

This mindset is evident in nearly every North Korean proposal towards Seoul (and towards the United States as well), be they in the context of "peace", "non-aggression", or "cooperation". North Korea's fixation on ways to undermine the South Korean government's legitimacy and bargaining position prior to any real discussions underlines its insistence on a tripartite conference format, where North Korea deals with the United States and South Korea is allocated an observer's place. Moreover, for all their seemingly benign intent, North Korea's arms reduction proposals in the past two years also have not departed from past practice in any essential respect. ²⁸Pyongyang still insists on settling the Korean Armistice by way of the United States, rather than dealing with Seoul as an equal. North Korea still does not realise, or does not want to accept, that the very basis of its relationship with South Korea, and the world political and security environment, have undergone profound changes and will continue to evolve in a fashion that will leave them more and more in a strategic conundrum of their own making.

Thus it is on this overall assessment of North Korea's unyielding stance that South Korea has sought to strengthen its independent defence capability. In the 1950s and 1960s, Seoul's defence strategy entailed mainly investment in the modernisation of the armed forces commensurate with the level of North Korea's offensive military capability. Given Pyongyang across the board superiority in armaments, this meant that Seoul had to play catch-up for a substantial period of time (indeed, the catch-up process still continues today). A significant proportion of the national budget, therefore, was allocated to force modernisation and training when this sum could clearly have been invested in more productive endeavours. And because it was even more essential to *deter* war than be capable of defending against an attack, South Korea continues to see validity in its security ties with the United States. This alliance is maintained in full awareness of the political and propaganda mileage that Pyongyang derives from criticising the bilateral relationship. Under present conditions, it is difficult to fault the logic of deterrence based on the Seoul-Washington alliance, especially when this arrangement is maintained by Seoul at a political cost to itself. Alternative options, such as

²⁸ For instance, see: On All Inclusive Measures to Guarantee Peace for the Independent and Peaceful Reunification of the Country, Communique on a Joint Meeting of the Central People's Committee, the Standing Committee of the Supreme People's Assembly and the Administration Council of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Pyongyang, 7 November 1988, especially pp.6-8.

substantially increased defense expenditures by the South in lieu of U.S. security commitments, would not only be undesirable economically, but much more important, could touch off a seriously destabilising arms race in Korea. South Korea's current security policy ((together with American forces in Korea) provide an additional margin of deterrence and ensure military stability in Korea and in the region; the alliance has not been cause for, nor party to, destabilising military actions in the Korea peninsula.

South Korea's economic growth, however, has allowed Seoul to add an important new dimension to its security policy in recent years. Beginning with the 1970s, Seoul has sought to use its expanding international trade and economic ties to enhance its diplomatic campaign to establish itself as a legitimate and responsible member of the international community. In line with this strategy, South Korea undertook to contribute toward humanitarian and development-related activities of multilateral agencies such the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and the Asian Development Bank (ADB) among others. South Korea also began to provide bilateral aid in the 1980s to countries within the Asian region and, where its international aid budget allowed, to developing countries outside of the region as well. This effort continues apace into the present decade, with economic assistance flowing to Eastern Europe as well.²⁹ It is worthwhile at this juncture to remember that South Korea itself could still benefit greatly from the sums it provides for external economic cooperation. But here again, South Korea has decided to forego obvious immediate benefits in the interest of the longer term; South Korea wants to be, and wants to have itself recognised as, a responsible member of the international community.

South Korea's increased economic capability has clearly played an important role in bringing about an opening to Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union and China. For these countries, it has become clear that Seoul is much more than a mere "dependency" of the United States and Japan, a prominent theme in their evaluation of, and writings on, South Korea in earlier years. Although the goal of normalised relations with these countries was a consistent foreign policy goal for Seoul dating from the early 1970s, South Korea's diplomatic effort alone probably would not have been sufficient to bring about this change of view in Moscow or Beijing, in Budapest

²⁹ South Korea recently provided a second "soft" loan package to Hungary in addition to an earlier 1988 loan for \$125 million. "Bank Group to Loan Hungary \$40 Million", Korea Newsreview, 21 April 1990, p.22.

or Warsaw. Their reassessment of South Korea had much to do with Seoul's expanding regional and global economic importance and what this implied with respect to the North-South Korean dynamic.

What South Korea's activist diplomacy towards the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe has done is to accelerate the process of diplomatic normalisation. *Nordpolitik*, as Seoul's initiative toward these countries has come to be called, provided a formal policy context for Seoul's northward diplomacy and also allowed its intended audience to see the contents of this policy to be in their own best interests as well. That these interests were there, and that the Soviet Union and China for their own reasons also saw the opportunity for a new pattern of relations in Northeast Asia, was made evident by the rapid growth in economic and even political exchange that developed after 1988. It was fortunate that South Korea's drive to open ties with communist countries anticipated East-West relaxation. The evolution of Soviet and East European attitudes towards Korea from the late 1980s is a case where not so much the "correlation of forces", but rather the correspondence of mutual interests, effectively argued for greater accommodation and cooperation by all sides.³⁰) And it would not be overstating the case to say that the positive momentum generated by this cooperative thaw, should it continue in the direction it has so far, carries with it the potential to contribute significantly to an improved security environment in Northeast Asia.

But what more can be done by Seoul at this juncture to further promote the cause of tension reduction and peace in Korea and in Northeast Asia? With improved relations vis-a-vis Moscow and also with Beijing, isn't South Korea today potentially in a position to embrace a broader, more flexible, concept of security and to move towards the adoption of certain political as well as military measures to reduce tensions in Korea? Is it likely that such a step would, or could, be taken under the present circumstances?

When some observers of the Korean situation cite the reasons why South Korea should indeed move forward on this score, they frequently point out certain factors that, in their view, provide the necessary reassurances that Seoul would need in order to follow their recommendations. First cited is South Korea's own indigenous military capability and its productive industrial base. In their view, this alone is sufficient to allay Seoul's fears of being overcome by North Korea. Second,

³⁰ Lho, "Seoul-Moscow Relations...", p.1165.

they point to the improvements in Seoul's relations with Beijing and Moscow. They see improvements thus far as an "informal guarantee" that both China and the Soviet Union, separately and/or together, would provide some restraint on North Korea. To underscore this point, they note in North Korea a regime which, in spite of its self-conscious rhetoric about *Juche* [self-determination, self-reliance], remains heavily dependent on its two socialist patrons. Third, they also point to the resilience of Seoul's long-standing partnership with Washington. The argument is made that, even in the event of American troop reductions (or even complete withdrawal), the continued validity of the bilateral Seoul-Washington mutual defense treaty, together with the practical economic and political interests that the United States has in South Korea, would act as sufficient deterrents against another North Korean attack. Others have argued that there is really no danger of another conflict in Korea but, even if such dangers did exist, it is not in the United States' interest to become militarily involved.³¹ Taken together, these and similar arguments are intended to help Seoul "see" that it is under no great danger today.

What these critics are calling for is a fundamental review of the bilateral security relationship and, linked to this, for Seoul to undertake a basic reassessment of Pyongyang's intentions and capabilities. Unfortunately, these critics, for all their constructive intentions, are premature in believing that the security environment in Korea has undergone sufficient change at present to warrant fundamental, and potentially de-stabilising, changes to the existing framework of deterrence. In this observer's view, the time is right for an openness of mind, and for measured steps aimed at creating the bases for cooperative relations in Korea (and in Northeast Asia)--but the necessary preconditions to justify substantive steps toward changing the existing arrangement have not yet been met. Indeed, even the improvements thus far are conditional and by no means assured of continuity into the longer term.

In order for substantive transformation of the unhappy Korean situation to take place, the very foremost change in existing arrangements has to take place not in South Korea, but in North Korea. This change can come in one of two ways: either by Kim Il Sung and his old-guard revolutionary generation's passing from the political scene in Pyongyang, and their replacement by a more pragmatic group of leaders; or, unlikely as it may seem, through the present North Korean leadership's

³¹ Doug Bandow, "Leaving Korea", *Foreign Policy*, Number 77, Winter 1989-90, pp.77-93.

objective, non-ideological, reappraisal of the existing reality in Korea and in the world today. Whichever way change comes about in North Korea, unless and until Pyongyang accepts for itself, and clearly shows by word and deed that it is prepared to face the reality of a legitimate South Korean government that will not go away, regardless of what Pyongyang's own preferences may be, prospects for real dialogue and genuine accommodation between the two Koreas are at best dim.

What, then, are the possibilities that either one or the other of the two possible changes mentioned above could actually take place in North Korea? Again, in this observer's view, neither possibility is particularly promising for the near future. Given available evidence, Kim Il Sung is not under any immediate threat to his life despite his advanced age, and neither does he appear prepared to abandon his life-long revolutionary goals (nor allow others to revise his flawed vision). Results of North Korea's recent elections for the Supreme Peoples Assembly showed little significant personnel changes and few signs of changing doctrine.³²⁾

Over the longer term, however, the first of the two possibilities becomes a certainty: Kim Il Sung too will have to succumb to natural law. Kim's departure may or may not produce a battle for succession in Pyongyang as is endlessly speculated. But this, after all, is not the really important question. What matters is what sorts of policies the successor regime will adopt. And, in this connection, it would seem sensible to expect that whoever wins out in the grab for power after Kim will have to create a new, and different, basis for political legitimacy than that with which Kim ruled over a North Korea in decline. If Kim remains around much longer, and if we further assume that he maintains his current refusal to implement necessary economic and political reforms, the profound rot that will have set in in North Korea by the time he dies will be no small problem for his successors to overcome. If we agree that Mikhail Gorbachev's greatest challenge is to overcome the bankrupt economic and political legacy left by his predecessors, then we must ask why it would be any different for Kim Il Sung's eventual successor whoever he, or possibly they, may be. And, no more than the Soviet Union has been able to restructure its internal system without a more peaceful, more constructive relationship with the

³² *Rodong Shinmun*, 24 April 1990, carries the editorial "Juche sasang-ui ki'chirul nop'i deulgo u'ri-ui sahwae chu'ui chongkwon-eul to'uk k'anghwa haja"[Let us hold the banner of Juche high, and strengthen our socialist basis of power], author's translation.

outside world, North Korea too will have to open itself to the outside unless it is prepared to accept the consequences of its deterioration and decline.

There have been some tentative signs in recent years that North Korean leaders realise the bind that they have placed themselves in.³³⁾ Pyongyang's announcement of a joint venture law in 1984, seemingly designed to emulate post-reform China's policy of controlled economic interaction with the outside world, was one such example. Yet, apart from the provisions of the joint venture law which are at best vague, the lack of a viable market structure and with no indication that Pyongyang was planning to implement even the most basic market-oriented economic policies, few foreign investors were willing to take up North Korea's offer. North Korea has squandered its finances on erecting monuments to Kim Il Sung, and on building mammoth projects designed to impress. Most of these projects are in fact white elephants.³⁴⁾ The half-hearted joint-venture law revealed Pyongyang's insufficient understanding that substance is at least as important as form, in economic matters no less than in the political and security realms of policy. Pyongyang's grandiose gestures mean little without a visible commitment to carry out its promises. Unfortunately, the record of Pyongyang's commitment to repay loans to the international banking community is as discouraging as its promises to seek peaceful accommodation with the South. South Korean companies, in fact, are reported to have quietly retired nearly \$200 million of North Korea's debt.³⁵⁾

But is this unflattering portrayal of North Korea's record fair? Lest this assessment seem unforgiving toward North Korea, let us now for a moment turn to the South Korean record. South Korea too has made its share of mistakes in its competition with the North. Seoul is perhaps as much at fault as Pyongyang for not seeking out a more peaceful *modus vivendi* with the North at an earlier period in history. More, perhaps, could have been done by South Korea to see eye to eye with North Korea. But Seoul's most strident anti-communist, and therefore anti-North Korean, policies were shaped by the politics of the Cold War and pursued in a period devoid of East-West dialogue. With the arrival of detente in the early 1970s,

³³ Sheryl WuDunn, "Now, North Korea Would Like to Reach Out", New York Times, 9 July 1989, p.18.

³⁴ Urban C. Lehner, "North Korea is Attempting to Shroud Its Economic Ills with Showcase Projects", Asian Wall Street Journal Weekly, 17 July 1989, p.2.

³⁵ Ibid.

however, and particularly after Seoul put into place a reshaped foreign policy from 1973, it has not fundamentally deviated from a policy of accommodation with the North. Even the failure of detente at the end of the 1970s did not alter Seoul's awareness that, over the long term, accommodation and cooperation with North Korea, the Soviet Union, and China would be crucial to any peaceful settlement of the Korean problem.

It is in large part because of this commitment to a pragmatic foreign policy, and also the belief that China and Soviet Union would in time see the benefits of cooperation over conflict, that South Korea resisted the impulse to react to unfavourable events stemming from Chinese or Soviet actions. A useful illustration of this pragmatic approach can be seen in how Seoul resisted the impulse to vilify Moscow and abandon further peaceful overtures to Moscow after the latter's shooting down of a Korean passenger aircraft. That it did not do so meant that it had to swallow deep anguish. But the ultimate reward for patience and probity came in the summer of 1988 when Moscow's delegates to the Seoul Olympic Games arrived to witness with their own eyes that the reality of South Korea today differed vastly with their preconceived notions.

And much the same sort of prudence and pragmatism prevailed, and prevails still over South Korean responses to unfavourable North Korean actions. Pyongyang's attempts to assassinate South Korean political leaders, first in 1968 and the latest in 1983 in Rangoon (where several South Korean cabinet members were killed), were completely reprehensible acts. South Korea has shown restraint in other ways. One useful area for comparison with particular relevance to arms control is that of defence spending: what would the arms control prospects in Korea be, for example, if Seoul were to truly engage in a tit-for-tat arms race with the North? If the South, for instance, were to match the North's spending on defense in percentage of GNP terms, the race would quickly tilt in favor of the South unless Moscow and/or Beijing came to Pyongyang's immediate assistance. But this in the end would be a race for fools, and ultimately contrary to the aims of peace and stability. Thus, Seoul's security doctrine does not stress military superiority and concentrates instead on matching, but not exceeding, the North's military capability. But can we be so sure, should the circumstances be reversed, that the North Korean leadership would exercise similar self-restraint? Once again, the record of North Korea's past and current behavior does not allow much room for optimism on this score.

Conclusion: Toward Confidence-Building Measures in Korea

But if the assessment so far of the prospects in Korea seems rather gloomy, it is also well to remember that the one constant in history is change, and that in change lies the opportunity for betterment. If the opportunities provided by change were to remain unseized, the only course left is that of repeating past mistakes in perpetuity. The realisation and acceptance of this irrefutable truth may in time work to bring about a certain amount of rational thinking in North Korea. At the same time, it is of vital importance to South Korea to look beyond the record of past North Korean behaviour if it is to clearly recognise and respond in timely fashion to evidence of positive changes in North Korea, however small such evidence may be. At no other time since the end of the Korean War has this been more vitally important than now; and it is important precisely because we now know for sure that the most important leadership change in North Korean history must take place soon.

Have there been any signs over the past few years that South Korea already may have missed? Perhaps. And is Seoul still not seeing such signs for what they are? This too is possible. It is enormously difficult to know given the lack of useful information flowing out of North Korea, and also given the mountain of mistrust that has built up over the years. Nevertheless, it is in the long term interest of South Korea, and also in the interest of peaceful reunification, for Seoul to continue with its policy of restraint and take steps improved ties with Pyongyang--even if these steps seem dangerous unilateral concessions to an untrustworthy rival. In the past year or so, South Korean interest in confidence-building measures (CBMs) as an adjunct to the arms control process has grown significantly; the Seoul government has expressed its readiness to adapt the successful European experience at building CBMs to the Korean situation.³⁶) This is an encouraging development and one which is timely as well.

There are several reasons why Seoul might wish to promote CBMs with the North sooner rather than later. The first and foremost reason is that by doing so South Korea assures itself of having initiated the peacemaking process. By putting the ball squarely in North Korea's court, Seoul sets the tone and pace of all

³⁶ Lim Dong Won, Director, Institute for Foreign Affairs and National Security (IFANS), "*Pyung'hwa chungch'ak-eul wi'han daechollyak kusang*" [Conceptualising A Grand Strategy for Peace], author's translation. (Seoul: IFANS, June 1989).

subsequent bilateral discussions. It will be Pyongyang that will then have to take a matching step; its failure to do so would once and for all discredit its position toward South Korea. A second reason why Seoul may wish to take a step soon has to do with creating the basis for Moscow and Beijing, not to mention Washington, to apply greater pressure for reforms in Pyongyang. The third important reason has to do with the domestic political context in South Korea. The generation of young students who do not recollect any of the enormous hardships suffered during and immediately after the war, and who in their idealism and new-found sense of nationalism see reunification as *the* overriding goal of national policy, will not be persuaded by arguments aimed at prudence and caution no matter how valid these may be in reality. That the students will not do so has become painfully evident in recent months. Thus, if only to defuse the volatile student demands on this issue, South Korea should take the initiative even before any leadership transition in Pyongyang.

There are other less immediately evident merits as well to a more daring approach towards the North Korea problem. One is that a more forthcoming attitude in Seoul may go a long way toward helping the moderate and progressive elements in North Korea who wish to speed up the process of reform. Another is that if potentially risky openings towards the North are to be made at some point in time, then they may as well be taken while the presence of American troops in Korea still provide an additional margin of security. Undoubtedly, there will always be an element of risk involved for Seoul in accommodating any North Korean security demands. But given current favorable security trends in the region and in the world, it is also an opportune moment to try and erect a framework for CBMs that does not necessarily require North Korea to provide *a priori* evidence that it will behave. For all of the domestic and external factors outlined in the earlier discussion of North Korea's troubled situation, we can be reasonably safe in assuming that Pyongyang, due to its own pressing needs, may finally be ready to undertake some genuine steps to increase cooperative relations.

The European example held in mind by the South Korean government may indeed be a very viable way to get the North-South Korean confidence-building measures off the ground. The European process cannot be said to be generally applicable to the Asian region as a whole but, in Korea, where the confrontation is land-based as in Europe, there are close parallels. Applicable elements from the 1975 Helsinki Final Act, such as voluntary prenotification of large military exercises, and invitations to outside observers including North Korea, have already been

unilaterally adopted and implemented by South Korean and U.S. forces in Korea. Should North Korea also see benefit in these CBMs, future steps might include adoption of Stockholm-type accords including provisions for mandatory international observation of such activities, mutual exchange of annual calendars listing planned military activities, as well as procedures for on-site inspection of compliance with these measures.

In the end, the successful outcome of any confidence-building and arms reduction process in Korea will depend on North Korea's commitment to building a peaceful framework of North-South relations. Sadly, the course and outcome of dialogues so far between the two Korea still reflect Pyongyang's disinterest in achieving a meaningful agreement to reduce tensions. But irrespective of North Korea's stance, South Korea has a clear and present interest in making explicit its plans for an arms control process in Korea.³⁷ South Korea must show its readiness to allow political considerations to prevail over purely military or technical concerns. South Korea's development of a detailed proposal for confidence- and security-building measures applicable to the Korean peninsula will provide the opportunity for it to demonstrate in the clearest of terms its desire to reach a breakthrough with North Korea. And Seoul must persist with its efforts to induce Pyongyang's cooperation even if there are no visible results over the short term. The United States and the Soviet Union can help the Korean arms control process by working together to impress on Pyongyang that neither superpower will accept the threat or use of force as an agent of political change in the Korean peninsula, any more than they are prepared to do so in Europe. The start of a realistic and sustained confidence-building process by Seoul and Pyongyang, when it comes, will signal the beginning of an end to the embittered rivalry between the two Koreas and open the way to finally build a more durable framework for peace in East Asia.

³⁷ See the cogent argument for a forward-looking South Korean arms control policy advanced by Ha Youngsun, *Hanbando-eui Jeon'jaeng-gwa Pyong'wha: Kun'sa-jok Kin'jang-ui Kujo* [War and Peace in the Korean Peninsula: The Structure of Military Tension] author's translation, (Seoul: Chonggae Yeonguso, 1989).

THE SECOND INTERNATIONAL
CONFERENCE ON THE KOREAN WAR
JUNE 14~15, 1990
SEOUL, KOREA

The U.S.' Strategic Review Toward Korea and Arms Control

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I. A Linkage between Reduction of American Forces and
North-South Korean Arms Control

In light of the end of the Cold War and the momentous domestic changes emerging in the Soviet Union and East Europe and faced with twin deficits at home, the U.S. has undertaken a strategic review on its presence in Asia and Korea. As part of this endeavor, Washington is considering a three-stage plan for reduction of American forces in South Korea. But North Korea is still posing a military threat. Hence, there have been suggestions for linking the phase of American reduction to that of arms control and confidence-building measures that can be negotiated between the north and the south on the Korean peninsula where a cold war is still continuing mainly because the north refuses to change.

There has been a divergence between the global strategic trend toward detente and the Korean confrontation. This raises a difficult question of synchronizing the U.S.' global and regional strategy and South Korea's local strategy directed at North Korea. When Washington's regional interests diverged from Seoul's local interests, Korean-American relations turned strained as did when the Nixon administration pulled out the Seventh Division in the name of the Guam Doctrine and when the

Carter administration sought to withdraw the remaining Second Division, too, during the 1970's.

The Bush administration's attempt at troop reduction raises a similar question although the international and domestic situation has changed significantly. It is a central theme of this essay that any "adjustment" in the U.S. military presence should be made without undermining the deterrence that has kept the peace. To do so, it is necessary to make troop reduction conditional on the substantive changes in the attitude of the north for arms control with the south; otherwise, it may well give a wrong signal and as a result, damage deterrence and chances for constructive dialogues between the north and the south on which ultimate solution of the Korean question depends.

Thus, the U.S.' strategic review presents both challenges and chances for regional and Korean security. Four points are in order for these.

First, the review is prompting South Korea to "Koreanize" its defense so as to assume a leading role while the U.S. plays only a supporting role. As a result, it is becoming a catalyst for negotiation on arms control and confidence-building measures between the north and the south.

Second, making adjustments in the Korea-U.S. security relationship requires both sides to practice "decision-sharing" along with burden-sharing on important issues that concerns them. The method of doing so is as important as the contents of the result in sustaining a healthy partnership for peace, prosperity and stability.

Third, in achieving arms control in the Korean context it is important that political talks for confidence-building precede or parallel military talks because of the nature of North-South Korean relations which combines military and political struggles for security and legitimacy. Only after substantial agreements on "operational" arms control are reached can there be agreements on "structural" arms control in Korea.

Fourth, a long-term prospect for troop reduction and arms control in Korea is a gradual development to arms supply restraints as a result of crossrecognition, to North-South political talks for confidence-building and arms control measures culminating with a peace agreement, and to an international guarantee by the major powers with vital stakes in the Korean peninsula.

II. Adjustment in U.S. Forward Deployment and Koreanization of Korean Defense

In response to the Nunn-Warner amendment in the Fiscal 1990 Defense Authorization Act, the U.S. is carrying out "adjustment" in its forward deployment in Korea, which is prompting South Korea to "Koreanize Korean defense" so that it can play a leading role by the end of this century. According to the report that the Bush administration submitted to the Congress in April 1990, the role of the U.S. in Asia is to become a regional balancer; as for the role in Korea it envisages a supporting role by providing a three-stage reduction of American forces within this decade until South Korea assumes the leading role.

1. The U.S. as A Regional Balancer:

With ever improving relations with the Soviet Union the role of the U.S. in Asia is shifting from a hegemonic power containing Soviet expansion to a regional balancer assuring peace and stability. Since there is no other power which can fill the vacuum should the U.S. leave Asia and is acceptable to the other countries in the region, the U.S. has little choice but maintain a credible presence to protect its interests and to preserve a secure environment for democracy and free economies.

As Paul Worldfowitz, Undersecretary of Defence, explained the contents of the report to the Congress, many Asian countries expect the U.S. to play the role of "a regional balancer, honest broker and an ultimate security guarantor."³

For this purpose the U.S. is committed to sustaining a forward deployment in Asia. As part of adjustment it plans to reduce about 10 percent out of some 135,000 troops deployed in Korea, Japan and the Philippines by 1993. It is calling upon Korea and Japan to increase the amount of burden-sharing for maintaining American troops. But Washington has made it clear that the U.S. will maintain its security relationship with Japan not only for mutual interests but also for the purpose of keeping Japan from rearming beyond its security relationship with the U.S.

2. A Three-phase Adjustment in Korea:

During the 1990's the U.S. is going to implement a three-phase adjustment in its presence in Korea. Washington's objectives in so doing is to deter North Korean aggression, to reduce political and military tension by encouraging dialogue, and to transition U.S. forces from a leading to a supporting role.

In this review Defense Secretary Dick Cheney elaborated on⁴ three phases. In Phase I which may span the years of 1991-93 the

U.S. envisions a force reduction of about 7000 personnel including 2000 Air Force personnel and approximately 5000 ground force personnel. To help trigger direct military talks between the north and the south, Washington wants Seoul to appoint the chief delegate to the Military Armistice Commission at Panmunjom during this phase and also asking the Korean side to increase the amount of burden-sharing up to \$1.3 billion.

In Phase II which may last three to five years, Washington plans to reexamine the North Korean threat and to consider restructuring the Second Division into a lighter one, depending on improvement in North-South relations and in Seoul's military capabilities. It is suggested that Washington can transfer operational control over Korean land forces during peace time to Seoul during this period.

In Phase III which may last for 5 to 10 years, the U.S. hopes that South Korea should be ready to take the lead role in its defense so that it can station a minimum size of force necessary to maintain deterrence and to play a supporting role.

3. Koreanization of Korean Defense:

In order for South Korea to take the lead role as called for in the report, it should be indeed prepared to achieve the state

of self-sufficient defense. For this purpose Seoul needs to exercise autonomy in the command structure, surveillance capabilities, and arms control negotiation with Pyongyang.

The Korean armed forces need certain autonomous rights in military operation and intelligence before assuming operational control and the chief delegte function at Panmunjom. To do so requires South Korea and the U.S. to restructure the command structure under the CFC in such a way that the former can shape its deterrence and defense strategy independently. Partly for this reason the Korean armed forces are instituting an integrated commander for military strategy.

It is also essential for South Korea to increase its surveillance and intelligence capabilities. Given the short warning time which is said to be about 24 hours in contrast to some 70 days in Europe, the defender should be able to look into the potential attacker's military activities. But the South Korean side is currently lacking this capability and dependent on the U.S. A long-term plan for acquiring this is needed. For some time South Korea has to rely on the U.S. air and naval forces for surveillance and intelligence-collecting facilities.

3. Koreanization of the Armistice:

In preparation to an arms control negotiation and to make North Korea accept the existing reality along the DMZ, South Korea must represent the southern side at the Military Armistice Commission. Initially, appointing a Korean general as the chief delegate by the U.N. Commander can be a first step toward this goal, for doing so is legal. Even though the northern side will strongly protest against this action at the beginning, as time passes by, it will find this useful to develop access to the South Korean military if it is serious about arms control.

It should be clear that U.S. reduction of force, Korea's efforts to Koreanize defense, and arms control cannot be separated but treated in terms of their interaction.

III. Decision-sharing for Adjustment

Adjustment in the Korea-U.S. security relationship has to be conducted through close consultation and coordination. This is what we mean by "decision-sharing." To accomplish the objectives of maintaining deterrence, reducing tension and making a smooth transition, both sides must avoid taking any unilateral action but try a kind of collective decision making for the issues which directly affect the very security of their countries. Three

principles need to be observed for this purpose: consistency, feasibility, and consensus.

1.Consistency:

Adjustment must be consistent with the strategic objective of maintaining deterrence and lessening tension. More often than not, economics and politics have dictated military reviews in the U.S. and Korea may not be an exception to this rule. Yet taking such action without consistent and coherent strategies invariably results in defeating the very goal the reviews are seeking. It is crucial to building peace and stability that efforts at achieving detente be undertaken without damaging deterrence. Hence, there must be strategic consistency among Seoul's unification policy, Nordpolitik and security relations with Washington.

2.Feasibility:

Reduction of American forces must be based on a careful assessment of the existing reality. The primary role of American forces in Korea is to deter aggression and hence of political nature. Their abrupt withdrawal has much potential to destabilize the military balance. This is why whether it is feasible or not must be reassessed in terms of North-South Korean relations as the Depense Departament's report indicated.

3. Consensus:

Ideally, it is better to make adjustment through agreement. This is not to say that South Korea has a veto power over American foreign policy making. It is only to stress the importance of consultation and coordination, for the way in which Washington carries out policy adjustment may well determine its credibility not merely in Korea but throughout the entire region.

This principle applies equally to the Korean side. Building consensus on important issues among top leaders, working-level officials, experts and other concerned people is a best means of fostering partnership. It is in this spirit that the Korean Foreign and Defense ministers and American Ambassador and Commander in Seoul have formed an ongoing forum to discuss details of adjustment. Beyond this level there is a need for taking a joint action between the Korean National Assembly and the American Congress, passing a resolution on making further reduction of troops contingent upon the north's comparable response in concrete forms of either constructive dialogue or confidence-building measure.

IV. The Importance of Confidence-building Measures

Given the high degree of distrust and hostility that has existed between the north and the south, it will be difficult for the two Korean states to accomplish arms control agreement without taking some confidence-building measures. In other words, political dialogues must precede or simultaneously get under way along with arms control negotiation. This means that only after some "operational steps" are agreed upon can there be agreements on "structural steps" for arms control.

1. The Primacy of Political Dialogue:

As long as Kim Il Sung seeks to legitimate the political system under his rule by denying the very legitimacy of the South Korean system, there is little prospect for productive negotiation. This is why the south has consistently called for direct political talks between two authorities including summits in order to blunt the north's attempt at a united front strategy.

Therefore, it is essential that there be political talks between the existing regimes before other pending issues can be taken up. Should Pyongyang continuously refuse to recognize the South Korean government and instead advocate meetings of social groups along with government authorities, confidence can hardly

be built. Once the two governments resolve to probe each other's interests, they can easily find solution to the issues pending in their relationship.

2. Confidence-building Measures as "Operational Steps":

In Korea such operational steps as advance notification of military exercises, invitation of observers, exchange of data, and disengagement of forward deployment from the DMZ are necessary in order to prevent inadvertent accidents, surprise attack and other misjudgement. Seoul has made various proposals including most of these steps; since 1986 it has been scaling down the size of the annual Team Spirit exercises by notifying the other side and by inviting its observers.

In order for the north and the south to build military confidence, they need to exchange data transparently and to have on-site inspection openly. More importantly, disengaging their forces from the DMZ to a rear area is urgently needed as one Soviet arms control expert recently suggested. This takes on an urgency because 60 percent of the north's one million forces are deployed along the DMZ and Seoul is only 35 miles away from it.

Considering the fact that there has been little

communications and exchange between the north and the south, promoting exchange and cooperation in economic, humanitarian and cultural fields in itself becomes truly confidence-building measures. It is not feasible to accomplish reunification without going through the process of building peace and cooperation. In this sense, opening an era of negotiation amounts to the first operational step toward arms control.

3. Limiting Offensive Equipments and Forces as "Structural Steps":

Limiting offensive equipments and forces on both sides contributes to structural steps toward arms control. In Korea the north has been taking an offensive strategy and the south a defensive strategy. Moreover, the north has exceeded the south in the number of such offensive equipments as tanks, artillery, multiple rocket launchers, and commando-type special forces while the south has developed mostly light infantry divisions and high quality air forces.

The north has been proposing to cut both sides' forces to 100,000 within three years. Not only is this highly unrealistic but more importantly the north has been silent on its superiority in offensive equipments and forces which need to

addressed as a priority item than merely limiting the number of soldiers.

Given enormous differences in the strategic concepts, structure and deployment, it will be extremely difficult for the north and the south to take structural arms control steps. Certainly, it will take a long time before they agree to do so. Imagine that it took more than 15 years after the Helsinki treaty for the European states to have the CFE talk. Only after the north and the south complete the last stage of reductions to parity at a level they agree can all U.S. forces be withdrawn from South Korea.

What is important in Korea is to get some talks on confidence-building arms control issues, for doing so will serve as an impetus to improving political relations. Seen in this perspective, making adjustment in U.S. military deployment can be utilized as an effective card to attract the north into arms control talks for its own survival and coexistence especially in the prospect that the south's military capabilities may well outperform the north sometime in the 1990's.

V. Prospects: Crossrecognition, CBM and Arms Control,
Peace Agreement, and International Guarantee

Assuming that Korea and the U.S. carry out adjustment in their security relationship by linking the phase of force reduction to that of North-South Korean relations through decision-sharing, the U.S.' strategic review and South Korea's response to it are likely to contribute substantially to arms control in Korea. But their prospects are a gradual development of arms supply restraints by the major powers as a result of detente and crossrecognition, confidence-building and arms control agreements resulting from negotiation which will culminate in a peace agreement between the north and the south, and its international guarantee by the concerned powers.

1. Crossrecognition and Arms Supply Restraints:

The end of the Cold War in East Europe, and reforms in the Soviet Union, and South Korea's Nordpolitik have combined to transform the relationship between the two Koreas and the major powers from de facto to de jure crossrecognition. It is remarkable that the Soviet Union has come to decouple the Korean question from its global rivalry with the U.S. and even from its alliance with North Korea as so dramatically demonstrated by the

Roh-Gorbachev summit in San Francisco on June 4, 1990.

Now that Moscow's views on security have edged to Seoul's and Washington's, it is natural that the Soviets try to restrain their arms supply to North Korea just as the American have done so with regard to South Korea. Moscow's normalization of diplomatic relations with Seoul makes it easy for Beijing to follow suit, albeit slowly. Beijing has supported peace and stability on the Korean peninsula. In this sense that crossrecognition is building a positive atmosphere for the major powers to restrain their arms supply to their respective allies.

2. CBM, Arms Control, and a Peace Agreement:

The international environment and South Korea's success in its Nordpolitik have been exerting enormous pressures on North Korea to accommodate confidence-building and arms control, and even a peace agreement with South Korea. Most of Pyongyang's proposals on these issues have been propaganda thus far. Immediately after Seoul revealed its plan for the Roh-Gorbachev summit, however, Pyongyang issued a statement calling for arms control negotiation in which it expressed a willingness to have direct talks with
8
Seoul. Perhaps, this is an attempt to survive its self-imposed isolation.

Since President Roh clearly stated in his speech to the U.N. in October 1988 that he would discuss any topics including arms control and nonaggression pact, there is a real possibility of constructive dialogues on these issues should Pyongyang decide to do so. It should be repeated here, however, that any agreement on arms control and on the method of substituting the armistice for a new peace agreement has to be first negotiated directly between Seoul and Pyongyang.

Pyongyang is insisting on a tripartite talk for this purpose to drive a wedge between Seoul and Washington. Unless the bilateral talks between the north and the south have yielded substantial results to the extent that they can generate mutual trust, it is unlikely that either Seoul or Washington accept such a tripartite talk. But after producing verifiable agreements between themselves, they can invite Washington to their talks in certain aspects should Seoul and Washington share a common perspective for doing so. In similar vein, Moscow and Beijing also can be invited.

3. International Guarantee:

Solution of the issues in North-South relations must be Koreanized: they must be settled among the Koreans themselves

according to the self-determination principle. But such solution cannot be effective without an international guarantee by the U.S., China, the Soviet Union and Japan. It is incumbent upon these powers to urge the north and the south to resolve their pending issues peacefully through dialogue, and once certain agreements are reached, they have an obligation to guarantee their implementation.

When they sign the agreements concluded between the two Koreas, they can legally dispose of the legacy of the Korean War as well as the Cold War. In fact, reunification also must be accomplished by agreement between the two sides and the major powers can guarantee this by endorsing it. One hopes that a genuine movement toward this eventuality can come to the Korean peninsula, too, as early as possible as shown by the other divided nations in 1989-1990.

Notes:

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2. Byung-joon Ahn, "Decision-sharing in Korea-U.S. Relations," Korea and World Affairs, vol.14, no.1(Spring 1990), pp.5-15.

3. Far Eastern Economic Review, May 3, 1990, p.10.

4. A Strategic Framework for the Asian Pacific Rim: Looking toward the 21st Century, the report of the Defense Department to the Congress, April 1990, pp.15-17.

5. Byung-joon Ahn, "North-South Korean Relations and the Major Powers," in Robert A. Scalapino, Seizaburo Sato, Jusuf Wanandi, and Sung-joo Han (eds.), Asian Security Issues, Regional and Global (Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, Berkeley, 1988), pp.198-205.

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8. Korea Herald, June 2, 1990, p.1.

9. Korea Herald, October 19, 1988, p.1.