

本冊子是統一對話政策의 研究를 爲한 資料로  
提供되는 것으로 收錄된 內容은 刊行處의 意見을  
반드시 反映하는 것은 아님.

## 蘇聯의 新 亞·太政策 檢討

— ‘고르바초프’, ‘블라디보스톡’ 宣言과 關聯 —

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## I. 序 言

- 오늘날 韓半島 周邊 4強의 對南北韓關係 關與 패턴은 이전의 兩極的·消極的인 틀에서 벗어나 이제는 韓半島 問題가 公公然히 舉論되므로써 顯在化, 具體化되고 있는 轉換期的 狀況임.
- 이러한 狀況에서 周邊國家中 蘇聯의 對東北亞 態度 및 韓半島 政策은 情勢變化의 重要變數로, 最近 蘇·北韓關係가 強化되는 時期에 ‘고르바초프’의 7·28 ‘블라디보스톡’ 宣言은 그의 就任이래 積極的인 關心을 보여온 亞·太地域에 대한 具體的이고도 包括的인 政策表明으로 21世紀 亞·太時代를 向한 蘇聯의 開幕宣言으로 볼 수 있음.
- 이번 ‘블라디보스톡’ 宣言은 ‘유럽安保會議’와 ‘헬싱키宣言’으로 유럽에서 戰後 處理를 일단 마무리 지은 蘇聯이 이제 아시아 重視政策을 標榜한 것으로, 아시아에 대한 蘇聯의 積極的인 外交攻勢는 向後 東北亞 및 韓半島 情勢에 상당한 影響을 미칠 것으로 보임.

- 本 研究報告書는 今般 ‘고르바초프’의 ‘블라디보스톡’ 宣言에 나타난 對아시아 및 韓半島 政策等에 대한 考察을 통해 韓半島 問題의 東北亞政治上의 座標를 살펴봄으로써 우리의 統一對話政策開發을 爲한 基礎研究資料로 活用하기 爲해 作成된 것임.



## II. 蘇聯의 對東北亞 戰略

### 1. 蘇聯의 世界戰略

- 美國에 대한 軍事力 優位 계속 確保·維持
- 美國 및 西方 陣營內 平和運動 (특히 反核運動) 을 利用, 同盟國間을 離間
- 美國의 戰略防衛計劃 (SDI) 과 核開發 牽制
- 蘇聯의 國際的 影響力 增大와 同時에 테랑뜨를 標榜, 平和的 이미지 浮刻
- 當面한 經濟難 克服과 시베리아 開發等を 爲해 西方側과의 經濟·文化的 協力 強化 및 經濟的 潛在力이 豊富한 아시아 重視.

### 2. 蘇聯의 對아시아 戰略

- 蘇聯은 世界戰略的 次元에서 美國과의 勢力均衡 體制를 維持해 나가면서도, 自體의 勢力圈 保存과 勢力擴張을 爲하여 美國과 角逐을 벌이고 있음.
- 따라서 蘇聯 戰略의 最優先 順位는 유럽地域이지

만, 헬싱키體制 및 NATO 등으로 인해 유럽에의 浸透가 사실상 不可能한데다, 國際政治的 秩序體系가 多元化되면서 아시아의 重要性이 浮刻되고 있기 때문에 蘇聯은 그들의 戰略目的을 達成하기 위하여 集團 安保體制를 갖추지 못한 아시아地域으로의 進出에 注力하고 있음.

- 또한 美·日의 ‘環太平洋地域 共同體 構想’ 등에 對應, 自國이 아시아國家임을 標榜, 亞·太地域에 대한 蘇聯의 影響力을 強化함과 同時에 새로운 太平洋時代의 到來에 對備하고 있음.
- 蘇聯의 아시아에 대한 戰略的 重要性이 增加함에 따라 極東地域이 戰略要衝地로 浮刻되고, 特히 極東은 美·日·中共의 強大國이 反蘇 聯合戰線을 形成하고 韓國 또한 이에 加擔하고 있다고 認識하고 있기 때문에, 蘇聯은 이를 瓦解하기 위해 極東에서 인도지나, 中東에 이르는 勢力圈 構築에 注力하고 있음.
- 아울러 自國의 極東地域 開發과 아시아·太平洋地域으로 進出하는데 있어 橋頭堡가 될 수 있고 中共과 日本을 同時에 威脅할 수 있는 韓半島에

대해 蘇聯이 새로운 戰略的 認識을 갖고 北韓과  
의 密着關係를 強化하고 있음.

### 3. 長・短期 戰略

- 蘇聯의 東北亞地域에서의 政策課題는 長期的으로는  
85・5 提議한 蘇聯이 主導하는 ‘全 아시아 安保  
會議’ 構想을 實現하는 것이며
- 短期的으로는 對日關係를 正常軌道에 올려 놓으며  
對中共 關係改善을 加速化하는데 있음.

### 4. 蘇聯의 極東戰力

- 2次大戰以後 끊임없이 增強되어온 蘇聯의 極東軍  
事力은 70年代 以後 深化되어온 美・日・中共의  
軍事協力 關係에 對應
  - 一 極東地域을 統合指揮하는 極東戰域 司令部 設置  
(1978)
  - 一 蘇聯 總兵力中 地上軍 1/3, 海軍力 1/4, 空軍  
力 1/3, 戰域核 1/3을 極東 配置
  - 一 1983年以後 太平洋艦隊가 4個艦隊中 1位浮上

- 캄차카半島, 오후츠크海, 쿠릴列島를 海·空軍 및 潛水艦, 미사일 前進基地로 開發해 왔음.
  - 蘇聯의 極東戰域司令部는
    - 57 個의 地上戰鬪師團
    - 4 百個의 航空基地에 配置된 最新型 미그-31 機를 包含한 2 千臺의 戰鬪機
    - 2 隻의 航空母艦과 40 隻의 核潛水艦을 包含한 3 百 85 隻의 太平洋 艦隊
    - KGB 所屬 國境警備隊 2 萬 5 千, 戰略로키트탄, 防空軍으로 構成, 完璧한 戰略體制를 構築하고 있으며
  - 今般 ‘고르바초프’의 積極적이고 攻擊적인 對亞·太政策宣言은 바로 이 戰略的 힘을 닫고 펼쳐진 것임.

### Ⅲ. 蘇聯의 對亞·太政策 展開過程

#### 1. ‘브레즈네프’ 時期

##### 1) 概 要

- 中共과의 武力衝突(1969)을 계기로 極東軍事力 增強, 中共 包圍作戰 展開
  - － 아시아 集團安保體制 構成 提議(1969. 6), 極東 信賴造成裝置(Confidence Building Measures) 提案(1981.2)
  - － 越南戰 終結(1975)後 인도지나半島에 대한 影 響力 確保와 軍事基地化
  - － 印度洋進出 橋頭堡인 아프카니스탄 侵攻(1979)

##### 2) ‘아시아 集團安全保障體制 構成’ 提議(69.9)

###### (1) 提議背景

- 中共과의 國境 武力衝突(1969. 3)
- 아시아 獨트린 : 蔣宣言(69.7), 닉슨 獨트린(70.2)發表

###### (2) 提議目的

- 아시아의 現 國境線 固定化, 日·中共과의 領 土紛爭 終熄

- 美國의 影響力 抑制와 東南亞 및 印度洋 周邊國의 親蘇化 誘導
- 中共 包圍戰線 構築
- 아시아·太平洋 國家로의 浮上을 통해 아시아 問題 介入試圖

### (3) 提議內容

- 1969年6月, 브레즈네프, 世界共產黨大會 演說
  - － 아시아에서도 集團安保體制創設問題를 提議할 狀況이 되었음.
- 1973年10月, 브레즈네프, 世界平和委員會 演說
  - － 아시아 軍事同盟體 解體, 武力不使用, 主權尊重, 領土不可侵
- 1981年2月, 브레즈네프, 蘇聯共產黨 第26次大會 演說
  - － 極東에서의 信賴強化措置(CBM)와 關聯하여 모든 關係國들과 具體的인 交渉 可能
- ‘브레즈네프’가 提案한 內容은 아시아地域에서의 軍事同盟關係 解體, 外國軍 撤收를 前提

條件으로 하면서 武力不使用, 主權尊重, 領土不可侵, 內政不干涉 등을 통해 2個國間 協力體制를 強化하고 最終적으로 多者間 安保體制를 構築하자는 것임.

- 그러나 ‘브레즈네프’提案은 中·蘇國境問題, 日本의 北方 4개 島嶼問題 등과 關聯하여 中 共·日本이 外面함으로써 別다른 進展을 보지 못했음.
- 특히 中共은 이를 中共을 包圍하기 위한 戰略의 一環으로 보고 美國에 接近, 오히려 ‘美·日·中 連帶’가 強化됨으로써 有名無實化되고 말았던 것임.

## 2 ‘고르바초프’時期

### 1) ‘고르바초프’外交體制의 特徵

#### (1) 外交政策의 基調

- 유럽에서 果敢한 軍縮 推進
- 對外經濟協力 關係의 增大
- 亞·太地域에 대한 積極 攻勢

## (2) 外交陣容

- ‘고르바초프’體制 出帆(85.3)以後 蘇聯은
  - 85.7 蘇聯最高會議 合同會議에서 ‘이코르리가초프’政治局員(이데올로기 擔當書記)이 最高會議 外交委員長에 選出되어 ‘크렘린’의 第2人者로 浮上되고 ‘그로미코’外相을 名目上の 職位인 最高會議 幹部會議 議長으로 昇進시키고 黨 出身인 ‘세바르드나제’를 外相으로 起用한데 이어, 黨의 組織 및 人事問題 專門家인 ‘니키포로프’를 副外相으로 任命
  - 지난 第27次 黨大會(2.25 ~ 3.6)時는 ‘프로미노프’黨 書記長 兼 國際部長을 退任시키고 ‘도브리닌’駐美大使를 後任으로 任命, 外交 部門의 最高責任者를 全面 交替했으며
  - ‘말체프’第1 副首相의 退任(86.1) ‘코르니엔코’ 第1 副外相의 國際部 第1 部長으로 轉補(86.5) ‘론초프’駐佛大使 및 ‘코바레프’副外相의 第1 副外相으로 昇進(86.5)等 最高 外交 實務陣容의 再編과 아울러
  - 美·日·英·西獨·中共等 主要國家 駐在大使



에 有能하고 實務經驗이 많은 少壯人物들을 起用하는등 ‘고르바초프’의 外交政策을 圓滿하게 遂行할 수 있도록 새로운 外交陣容을 갖추는 바 있음.

最近 蘇聯 外交部門 主要 人事改編 動向

職 責	前 任	新 任	更迭日
最高會議外交 委員長	‘고르바초프’(55)	‘리가초프’(66)	85.7
外 相	‘그로미코’(77)	‘세바르드나제’(58)	85.7
第 1 副外相	‘코르니엔코’(61) ‘말체프’(69)	‘보론초프’(56) ‘코바레프’(63)	86.5
國 際 部 長	‘포노마료프’(81)	‘도브리닌’(66)	86.3
國 際 部 第 1 副 部 長	—	‘고르니엔코’(66)	86.5
駐 UN 大使	‘트로야노프스키’ (66)	‘두버닌’(56)	86.3
駐 西 獨 大 使	‘세메노프’(75)	‘크버친스크’	86.3
駐 中 共 大 使	‘쉬체르바코프’(74)	‘트로야노프스키’ (66)	86.4
駐 英 大 使	‘포포프’(68)	‘자미아틴’(64)	86.4
駐스페인大使	‘두버닌’(56)	‘로마노프스키’(63)	86.4
駐 日 大 使	‘아브라시모프’(74)	‘솔로버예프’(54)	86.5
駐 美 大 使	‘도브리닌’(66)	‘두버닌’(56)	86.5

### (3) 多極外交

- ‘고르바초프’ 新指導體制의 出帆으로 過去 27 年間 堅持되어 왔던 對美重視 ‘그로미코’ 兩極外交는 止揚되고 이젠 同時 多發的으로 第 1 領域 ( 安保次元 ) 과 第 2 領域 ( 非安保次元 ) 을 連繫 · 癒着시키는, 이른바 多發的 性向이 浮刻됨으로써 蘇聯外交에 柔軟성과 彈力성을 불어 넣음.
- 이러한 次元에서 키신저등이 推進한 바 있었던 ‘多極構造論’ 을 援用하여 對美重視外交 一邊度에서 轉換, 西歐諸國, 中共, 日本 등과 Case by Case 로 協商하는 多極外交를 展開하고 있음.
- 最近 ‘고르바초프’ 指導體制가 東北亞 및 太平洋地域을 重視하는 것도 이러한 視角에서 理解될 수 있을 것임.

### (4) 經濟優先 路線과 아시아 積極政策

- 86. 5.23 ~ 24 日間 모스크바에서 열린 ‘外務省의 中央部署와 海外公館의 課題에 관한 會議’ 時 ‘고르바초프’ 는 基調演說에서



○ 요컨대 蘇聯 外交政策은 傳統的으로 創造的이고 一括的이기 보다는 反應的이고 機會的·現實바탕이 짙으며 다음과 같은 事例는 原則과 既得權을 撤低히 지켜나가면서 對西方 태양트를 摸索해 나가고 있음을 보여주고 있음.

— 美國과 軍縮協商

— 日本 軍國主義 復活을 警戒하면서 宥和政策 展開

— 中共과 關係正常化 摸索

— 北韓과 關係 緊密化

## 2) ‘고르바초프’의 ‘아시아 集團安保會議’構想

(85. 5)

\* 이 構想은 現在 蘇聯의 對아시아 政策의 根幹을 이루고 있음.

### (1) 提議內容

○ 85年5月21日 ‘고르바초프’ 蘇聯共産黨 書記長은 訪蘇中인 ‘라지브 간디’ 印度首相을 爲해 베퐁 晚餐席上에서 ‘全 아시아 安保會議’를 開催하자고 提議.

아시아는 平和 및 安保問題에 있어서 유럽 地域보다도 더 미묘하고 複雜하기 때문에 그

런 問題에 關係 建設的인 解決策을 摸索하고 意見을 交換하는 會議를 開催

- 一 歐洲의 데탕트를 實現시켰던 1975 年の 헬싱키 全歐洲 安保會議가 아시아會議의 모델이 될것이며, 아시아의 核保有國인 蘇聯, 中共과 非同盟運動의 議長國인 印度가 이 會議에서 中心的인 役割을 할 수 있음.

〈 ‘아시아 安保會議’ 構想의 7 項目 〉

- ① 2 國間, 多者間 交渉을 進行 最終的으로 全體會議에 올림 (戰後 現狀維持)
- ② 核先制 不使用의 要求 (對美겨냥, 中共은 核先制 不使用 闡明)
- ③ 非核國에는 核攻擊을 않겠음. 各國의 非核原則 固守 (駐韓 美軍 撤收)
- ④ 太平洋·印度洋의 非核化 (反核運動에 便乘 駐필리핀 美軍撤收)
- ⑤ SDI 不加擔
- ⑥ 新軍事同盟 形成 打破 [韓·美·日, 美·日·中 協力體制 PATO (太平洋 條約機構) 創設 憂慮]
- ⑦ 美國의 軍事基地 撤廢

## (2) 提議背景

- 유럽 國家인 同時에 아시아 國家인 蘇聯은 70年代 以後 東南亞 및 西太平洋地域에서의 急速한 軍事力 增強을 바탕으로 歐洲 安保問題에 있어서 蘇聯의 發言權과 影響力에 버금가는 ‘아시아 勢力’으로 아시아 安保問題에 關與하려고 企圖해 왔음. ‘고르바초프’의 아시아 安保會議 構想도 이러한 아시아 國家로서 蘇聯의 役割과 影響力 擴大를 겨냥한 蘇聯의 對 아시아 政策의 延長線上에서 把握될 수 있음.
- 특히 蘇聯은 아시아 國家로서 이 地域에서 莫大한 軍事力을 保有하고 있음에도 不拘하고, 中·蘇分爭, 日本의 北方列島 占領 및 軍事基地化, 베트남, 印支地域의 霸權 政策 支援, 아프카니스탄 侵攻 等 軍事力을 바탕으로 하는 ‘威脅 政策’ ( Intimidation Policy )으로 印度, 베트남, 北韓, 外蒙古 等 극히 少數 國家를 除外한 大部分의 아시아 國家들과 政治·外交 關係에서 疏遠化되었음.

- 따라서 새로 執權한 ‘고르바초프’는 親蘇政  
策을 취하고 있는 印度의 라지브 간디 首相  
의 訪蘇機會에 아시아勢力으로서 蘇聯의 아시  
아 安保問題에 대한 發言權과 影響力을 名實  
共히 擴大시키려는 長期構想으로써 同構想을  
밝힌 것으로 볼 수 있음.
- 한편 ‘고르바초프’가 同構想에서 對美 牽制를 主  
目的으로 하여 最近 制限된 範圍에서나마  
和解를 追求하고 있는 中共과 蘇聯이 아시아  
安保의 主軸勢力으로 役割을 할 것을 強調한  
事實(86.5)에 비추어, 70年代 後半 以後 表出된 美·  
日·中共 兩者間 베이스에 의한 對蘇 戰略的  
提携가 最近 中共의 獨自外交路線標榜(82.黨12  
全大會)으로 어느 정도 弛緩된 틈을 利用하여 中共을  
自國便으로 끌어 들이려는 懷柔政策의 一環으로  
同構想을 提議했을 可能性도 있음.

### (3) 提議 意圖

#### 가. 戰略的 要因

- 蘇聯은 大陸國家임과 同時에 海洋國家로서 大  
洋進出을 위하여 重要的 海峽支配, 海外基地確  
保 必要性 增大

- 헬싱키協定(全歐安保協力會議, 1975)締結과 유럽에서의 現狀凍結로 因하여 勢力擴張이 不可能하게 되자, 아시아, 太平洋地域으로의 進出方向 轉換
- 美·日·中共 協調體制登場을 反蘇聯合戰線으로 認識, 이를 瓦解시키기 위해 集團防衛體制가 未備된 地域을 集中 攻略, 美國의 防禦力 分散 企圖

#### 나. 長期的 意圖

- 上記한 바와 같이 安保會議 構想은 새로 執權한 ‘고르바초프’가 아시아國家로서 蘇聯이 아시아 安保問題에 대하여 過去의 消極的 姿勢에서 脫皮, 보다 積極的으로 關與하려는 意圖의 一端으로 볼 수 있음.
- 이러한 長期的인 對 아시아政策 構想에서 蘇聯이 過去 아시아에서의 美國과의 直接的인 ‘衝突과 對峙’를 회피하여 온 것과는 對照的으로 中共·印度 等 地域國家와 協力, 아시아 安保問題를 主導하겠다는 意圖가 엿보임.



#### 다. 短期的 意圖

- 現段階에서 中共・日本・ASEAN 國家등 大部分 아시아地域國家들이 自國과 政治・外交面에서 疏遠化되어 있음은 물론, 美國과 安保次元에서 直・間接으로 密接하게 連繫되어 있다는 事實을 認識하면서도 上記 構想을 提議하였다는 事實은, 對中共 懷柔政策은 물론, 아시아地域 安定과 平和에 대한 蘇聯의 至大한 關心을 誇示하기 위한 目的도 적어도 短期的 次元에서 勘案했을 것으로 推定됨.
- 아울러 同 構想을 밝히면서 ‘고르바초프’가 美國 레이건行政府의 軍事政策 및 第3世界國家의 內政干涉등 美國을 強烈하게 非難했다는 事實은 軍縮會談이 進行中이고 美・蘇 頂上會談의 開催를 앞두고 蘇聯의 平和이미지를 構築함과 同時에 美國이 國際緊張에 主責任이 있다는 點을 浮刻시키려는 意圖가 있었음.

#### (4) 主要特徵

- ‘고르바초프’는 아시아의 安保問題가 歐洲보다 더욱 複雜하고 미묘하다는 認識下에 兩者間 또는

多者間 協議 過程을 통해서 아시아國家間(美國은 除外됨) 아시아 安保問題 解決에 대한 總括的 接近方法으로 앞으로 아시아 安保會議를 開催할 수 있다고 言及, 아시아 安保會議 當面 課題로서가 아니라 아시아安保에 대한 蘇聯의 發言權과 影響力의 擴大를 겨냥한 長期的 外交 構想임을 暗示함.

- 또한 ‘고르바초프’는 아시아 安保會議 構想推進과 關聯, 過去에 提議된 몇가지 아시아에서의 地域 安保構想(주로 ‘브레즈네프’의 아시아 集團安保 構想을 意味한 것으로 보임)과 아울러 1975年 歐洲安保會議가 ‘準據의 틀’이 될수 있음을 밝힘.
- 작년 ‘고르바초프’의 아시아 安保會議 構想은 過去 ‘브레즈네프’의 아시아 集團安保體制 構想이 아시아에서의 中共의 影響力 牽制를 겨냥한 것과는 對照적으로 美國의 牽制를 主目的으로 하고 있으며 同 構想을 推進하는 데에 있어서 非同盟會議의 議長國인 印度와 아울러 蘇聯과 中共이 主導勢力이 되어야 함을 強調함.

(5) 分析 및 評價

- 지난해 ‘고르바초프’가 提議한 ‘아시아安保會議’은 ‘브레즈네프’의 ‘아시아集團安保體制’構想과 脈을 같이하는 것으로 蘇聯은 ‘브레즈네프’以後 機會있을 때마다 이와 비슷한 提案을 함.

〈過去 提案 事例〉

- 1969年 ‘브레즈네프’가 提案한 亞太國家間의 ‘平和友好 協力方案’
- 1983年 5月 ‘체르넨코’가 主張한 이른바 ‘나토 東邦支部’에 대한 對抗策
- 1984年 10月 ‘바담자글라이딘’ 蘇聯共産黨 中央委員이 日本 訪問中 東北亞 緊張緩和를 위한 多者間 軍縮協商 提議

- 한편 ‘全歐洲安保會議’은 蘇聯側이 戰後 歐洲 國境線의 固定化를 통해 東西 緊張緩和를 摸索하기 위해 提議된 것이며, 1973年 7月 헬싱키에서 美國 등 35個國(NATO 15個國, 바르샤바 條約 7個國, 中立非同盟 13個國)首腦들이 모여 헬

싱키 宣言에 署名함에 따라 이루어진 것임.

〈 헬싱키 宣言中 安全保障 10 個原則 〉

- 主權의 平等과 尊重
- 武力威脅 및 使用禁止
- 國境不可侵
- 領土保全
- 紛爭의 平和的 解決
- 內政不干涉
- 人權 및 基本的 自由尊重
- 諸民族의 平等權 및 自治權
- 國家間協力
- 國際法上 義務의 誠實한 履行

- 따라서 ‘고르바초프’의 ‘아시아 集團安保會議’提議도 아시아에서의 美國 影響力을 抑制시켜 對蘇封鎖網을 無力化시키고 더 나아가서는 蘇聯도 아시아·太平洋國家로 浮上하려는 意圖를 內包하고 있음. (美·日의 ‘太平洋地域 協力體’ 構想에 대한 對應策의 一環)
- 특히 蘇聯이 그러한 構想을 印度에게 提議한 것

은 親蘇國家인 印度를 부추겨 印度洋의 非軍事化를 이룩함으로써 北韓 - 越南 - 아프가니스탄 - 中東을 잇는 蘇聯勢力을 構築하려는 것으로 풀이 됨.

- 또한 歐洲安保會議를 통해 엘베강 以東의 歐洲地域이 蘇聯勢力權이라는 西方側의 政治的 認定을 받은 바와 같이 아시아의 現 國境線을 固定化시켜 日・中共 等과의 領土問題를 終熄시키는 한편, 韓・美・日 安保協力體制와 美・日・中共 協調體制를 無力化시켜 東南亞와 印度洋 周邊國들을 親蘇勢力으로 끌어들이려는 戰略이라 評價됨.

### 3) ‘全 아시아 太平洋地域 協力會議 開催’ 提議(86.4)

#### (1) 提議內容

- ‘86. 4.23 蘇聯은 政府聲明을 통해 亞・太地域의 安全과 蘇聯을 包含한 諸國間의 多角的인 協力關係를 構築하기 위한 全 아시아會議 開催를 提議함.

〈提議 要旨〉

- 美國, 日本 等の 所謂 太平洋共同體 構想은 새로운 軍事블력을 指向하고 있는 바, 軍事色을 避하고 各國間 民間레벨의 協力을 해야할 것임.
- 아시아의 相互 理解와 信賴關係를 構築키 위한 ‘全 아시아會議’의 開催를 提議함.
- 이의 準備를 위한 2國間 및 多國間的 長期 프로젝트 프로그램이 必要함.
- 蘇聯은 貿易, 經濟, 科學, 技術, 教育, 醫療, 環境保存, 自然保護 等 廣範한 分野에서 아시아 諸國과 協力할 用意가 있음
- 아시아·太平洋地域 國家들은 시베리아의 老大한 天然資源의 開發을 위해 蘇聯과 協力할 수 있음
- 또한 蘇聯은 太平洋에서의 海軍活動縮小와 같은 信賴造成措置, 亞·太地域에서의 非核地帶 創設 等を 提議함.

(2) 提議背景

- 蘇聯은 極東시베리아와 關聯, ‘아시아·太平洋勢

力'으로 自處해 왔으며 1974년부터 나호다에서 年次的으로 太平洋沿岸 協力에 대한 國際세미나를 開催함으로써 太平洋協力에 깊은 關心을 갖고 있음을 喚起시켜 왔음.

- 한편 蘇聯은 70年代末부터 美·日等 先進國을 中心으로 論議된 太平洋共同體 構想에 대하여 亞·太地域에서의 NATO 類型의 軍事블력화를 겨냥한 움직임이라고 非難해 왔음.
- 過去 69年 '브레즈네프'의 '아시아 集團安保體制 構想'이나 85年 '고르바초프'의 '아시아 安保會議'等 安保中心의 아시아 政策構想이 一部 아시아 共產國家들을 除外하고 亞·太地域 國家들의 支持를 받지 못하였음.
- 이러한 背景下에서 蘇聯은 美·日等 先進國을 中心으로 한 太平洋 共同體 構想은 亞·太地域의 軍事블력화 움직임이라는 自國의 非難이 ASEAN의 太平洋協力體制 構想에의 積極 參與를 躊躇케하는 主要 要因의 하나로 作用하고 있다고 看做해 왔음.
- 特히 時期的으로 東京 西方先進國 頂上會談에

앞서 열린 美·인도네시아間 頂上會談 및 레이건 美大統領의 ASEAN 外相들과의 會談(86.4.29 ~ 5.2)을 契機로 한 美·ASEAN間 關係 強化 움직임을 牽制하고 ASEAN 國家를 懷柔하기 위하여 同 提議를 한 것으로 보임. 이를 위해 貿易·經濟·技術·科學協力 및 시베리아 天然資源開發 等 非政治的 部門의 協力擴大를 미끼로 使用함.

### (3) 提議 意圖

- 蘇聯은 太平洋協力體 構想의 具現이 遲延되고 있는 主要 要因의 하나가 基本的으로 ASEAN 式 中立化 論理를 追求하고 있는 ASEAN의 參與躊躇 때문이라고 認識, 從來와는 달리 積極的으로 ASEAN을 懷柔되는데 主意圖가 있었음.
- 蘇聯은 從來 太平洋協力體 構想이 軍事 블럭化를 겨냥하고 있다는 單純한 非難의 次元에서 떠나 全 아시아·太平洋地域 協力會議를 提議하면서
  - 一 美·日 主導의 太平洋協力體 構想이 選別的 會員制를 前提로 하고 있어 閉鎖的인 블럭化가 不可避하다고 非難하고



- 모든 아시아·太平洋地域 國家들이 參與하여 對等한 協力' (Equitable Cooperation)을 할 수 있도록 開放主義를 採擇하여야 한다는 등
  - ASEAN 이 太平洋協力體 構想과 關聯, 憂慮하고 있는 要素들을 指摘함으로써 보다 積極的으로 ASEAN을 懷柔하려 했음.
- 特히 美國의 保護貿易主義政策 強化와 關聯, 泰國, 말레이지아 등 ASEAN 國家들이 蘇聯과의 交易擴大 기미를 보이자, 蘇聯은 이 機會를 利用, 對 ASEAN 諸國에 대한 外交攻勢를 強化하려고 함 (蘇聯 '카피차' 副外相은 지난 4月末 방콕 및 마닐라를 訪問했음은 물론, 1985年 4月에도 자카르타와 방콕을 訪問한 바 있음).
  - 또한 蘇聯은 베트남의 印支霸權政策 支援과 關聯, ASEAN 과 베트남間 強硬對立이 持續되고 있음은 물론, 自國의 對 ASEAN 關係가 疏遠化되어 있음을 勘案, 캄푸치아 事態와는 直接 關聯性이 없는 보다 廣域的인 이슈인 全 아시아·太平洋地域協力會議 開催를 提議함으로써 ASEAN 과의 關係改善을 摸索하고자 함.

- 요컨대 全 아시아·太平洋地域協力會議 開催 提議를 통한 蘇聯의 對外交攻勢 意圖는
  - 一 亞·太諸國에 대한 一連의 訪問 外交와 함께 政策的 懷柔를 통해 域內國家들의 積極的인 對蘇 接近을 誘導함과 同時에
  - 一 全 ‘아시아’會議를 目標로 아시아諸國과의 實質的인 協力關係를 段階的으로 增進, 對亞·太 影響力 擴大를 圖謀하려는 것으로 評價됨.

#### (4) 主要 特徵

- ‘全 아·太地域協力會議’는 ‘고르바초프’黨 書記長이 提議한 全 ‘아시아’安保會議 構想(85.5)을 非政治的인 經濟的 接近을 主軸으로 더욱 發展시킨 것으로
  - 一 同 地域諸國이 貿易, 經濟, 科學, 技術, 文化等 多方面에 걸쳐 相互平等을 基礎로 安定된 協力을 할 것을 主張하면서
  - 一 多國間的 長期 ‘프로그램’이 必要하다고 하여 UN의 下部機關인 ‘아시아’太平洋經濟社會委員會(ESCAP)의 利用 可能性을 밝히고 있으며
  - 一 ‘시베리아’資源開發에 대한 亞·太地域國家들

의 參與 可能性을 浮刻시키고 있는 등

- 全 亞·太地域協力會議가 非政治的 實質協力 強化에 中點을 두고 있음을 強調하고 있는 점이 特徵임.

#### 5) ASEAN의 反應 및 展望

- ASEAN이 主導하는 太平洋協力を 推進하고 있는 實情에 비추어 ASEAN은 蘇聯의 全 아시아·太平洋地域協力會議 提議에 否定的 또는 消極的 態度를 取함.
- 더우기 ASEAN 諸國은 對外的으로 ‘平和·自由·中立’ 政策을 바탕으로 ASEAN 式 中立化를 겨냥하고 있으나 內部的으로 철저한 反共路線追求 및 市場經濟體制를 維持하고 있음은 물론, 安保次元에서도 美·英·濠洲 等 西方側에 많이 依存하고 있기 때문에 前記한 蘇聯의 外交攻勢에 呼應할 수 없는 立場임.
- 무엇보다도 ASEAN은 蘇聯이 베트남의 印支霸權 政策을 繼續적으로 支援함으로써 캄푸치아 事態가 長期化되고 있다고 認識하고 있음.

- 이와 關聯, ASEAN 은 蘇聯이 ASEAN 과의 關係 改善을 條件으로 베트남 支援政策을 中止하도록 要求해 왔으나 蘇聯側의 拒否로 ASEAN 의 對蘇 疏遠化 關係가 持續되고 있기 때문에 蘇聯이 베트남 支援政策을 變更하지 않는 한 ASEAN 의 對蘇 硬直態度는 持續될 것으로 보임.
- 그러나 美·蘇 超強大國이 主導하는 太平洋協力體 보다는 中立을 標榜하는 ASEAN 이 主導하는 太平洋協力體가 太平洋地域의 平和와 繁營에 貢獻할 수 있다는 論理를 더 強化시킬 수 있을 것임.

#### IV. ‘블라디보스톡’ 亞·太 獨트린 宣言(86.7)

##### 1. 提議內容

- ‘고르바초프’ 蘇聯 共産黨 書記長은 蘇聯 海軍의 날(7.27) 47周年을 契機로 7.25~28間 블라디보스톡市에 대한 ‘레닌’ 勳章 授與式 演說에서 極東地域 開發問題 및 對아·太政策에 관한 包括적이고 具體적인 見解를 表明했는 바 그 內容은 다음과 같음.

〈海軍의 날 記念式 演說要旨〉

- 國防費의 現水準 維持
- 美國의 새로운 太平洋地域 軍事블럭 形成 企圖 沮止
- 美·日·中共 등 太平洋國家들과의 善隣關係 維持 必要

〈‘레닌’ 勳章 授與式 演說要旨〉

區 分	要 旨
極東地域 開 發	○ 下記 7個 方針에 依據 同地域 積極 開發

區 分	要 旨
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>— 海洋資源 開發 및 同地域으로의 漸進的 水産業 移轉</li> <li>— 金·銀 등 非鐵金屬과 林産資源 開發</li> <li>— 同地域 에너지 需要의 自給</li> <li>— 産業 下部構造의 優先的 建設</li> <li>— 同地域 開發에 必要한 最新 科學技術 提供</li> <li>— 輸出可能産業 最大活用, 太平洋 諸國과 의 經濟關係 增進 및 이를 위한 合作投資 推進</li> <li>— 住宅을 包含 社會與件 改善, 食品 自體 生産</li> <li>— 觀光客 誘致 增進</li> </ul>
對中共關係	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ 蘇聯 國民은 中國 共產黨이 내건 現代化의 目標, 즉 偉大한 國民에 어울리는 社會主義 社會를 建設한다는 目標에 理解와 敬意를 表함.</li> <li>○ 年內에 아프간駐屯 蘇聯軍 6個聯隊 (機甲 1, 機械化 2, 對空 3) 撤收</li> </ul>

區 分	要 旨
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ 政治的 妥結이 이루어질 境遇, 아프간駐屯 蘇聯軍의 完全 撤收</li> <li>○ 아프가니스탄 政府의 要請에 依據, 蘇聯軍의 本國 撤收 用意</li> <li>○ 中·蘇 國境駐屯軍의 減縮問題 論議 希望</li> <li>○ 몽고駐屯 蘇聯軍( 5 個師團 )의 大規模 撤收問題 論議中</li> <li>○ 中共과의 持續的인 關係改善 希望</li> <li>○ 對中共 善隣雰圍氣 造成을 위한 補完措置의 眞摯한 論議 檢討 用意, 何時라도 어떠한 水準의 交渉에 應할 수 있음.</li> <li>○ 中共·베트남間的 關係 正常化가 重要</li> </ul>
對日關係	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ 高位人士의 交換訪問과 首腦會談 早期 開催 希望</li> <li>○ 經濟技術協力 希望</li> <li>○ 日·蘇 近接地域에 合作企業 設立問題 討議 提議</li> </ul>

區 分	要 旨
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ 日・蘇間에는 關係改善 兆朕이 있는 바, 必要한 것은 過去에 關係없이 現實的인 基盤위에서 關係를 構築하여야 함.</li> </ul>
亞・太關係	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ 美國은 太平洋 問題에 關한 眞摯한 對話를 不考慮</li> <li>○ 美國은 韓・日 兩國에 核武器를 增強 配置하면서 韓・日에 對해 3角 軍事同盟 加擔 強要</li> <li>○ 亞・太 安保會議의 히로시마 開催 提議</li> <li>○ 駐比 美國基地가 撤去되면 蘇聯도 相應 措置</li> <li>○ 모든 亞・太諸國과의 關係增進 希望</li> <li>○ 美・蘇 雙方의 歐洲 中距離 미사일 破棄에 關한 蘇聯 提案은 蘇聯이 同 미사일을 其他 地域으로 移動시키지 않을 것이므로 亞洲諸國에도 利益이 됨.</li> </ul>



區 分	要 旨
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ 蘇聯은 아시아에서의 軍事力과 再來式 武器를 根源的으로 減縮하는데 重要性을 賦與</li> </ul>
韓半島關係	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ 韓半島에서의 危險한 緊張은 除去해야만 함. 그래야만 南北韓 全韓民族의 民族問題 解決에도 길이  열릴 可能性이 있음.</li> <li>○ 北韓의 韓半島 非核·平和地帶化 創設 提議는 韓半島 平和 定着에 寄與</li> <li>○ 北韓 提議 南北對話 提議는 韓半島 緊張 解消에 進展 <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>— 美國은 韓國과 日本에 對해 3者同盟에 參加토록 壓力을 加하고 있음.</li> </ul> </li> </ul>

## 2. 宣言背景

- ‘블라디보스톡’ 宣言은 蘇聯이 그동안 提議해 온 ‘아시아 安保會議’ 構想의 實質的이고 具體的인 布石으로 68年 ‘닉슨 독트린’ 以後 極東 蘇聯軍의 戰略的 重要性 增大에 副應하여 70年代 中半以後

增強해 온 極東 蘇聯軍의 戰力을 誇示하는 한편

- 蘇聯 極東地域의 落後된 實態를 把握, 對內外的인 對應策을 마련하는데 그 目的이 있는 것으로 보이며
  - 政治的 側面에서는 優先 ‘아시아 安保會議’ 構想을 推進하고
  - 經濟的인 側面에서 아시아 重視政策은 이 地域이 世界에서 가장 빠른 經濟成長을 보이고 있고 蘇聯의 經濟比重도 유럽地域에서 부터 漸次 아시아地域으로 옮겨가고 있어 亞·太地域이 未來의 經濟地域으로 浮上, 戰略的 重要性이 增大하는 것을 認識한데 따른 戰略的 對應이며
- 亞·太 獨트린의 戰略的 目標은 默示的으로 對蘇 牽制勢力으로 作用하고 있는 韓·美·日, 美·日·中 3角協力體制의 瓦解내지 弱화임. 이와 關聯 韓半島가 重要的 焦點이 되고 있음.
- 물론 平和攻勢라는 프로파간다라는 속셈도 看過할 수 없음.

### 3. 長・短期 目標

#### 1) 中・短期 目標

- 亞・太 獨트린은 亞・太 政策의 指針으로서 이 指針은 아시아의 兩 強國인 中共 및 日本과의 關係正常化를 中・短期的 目標로 하고 있음.

#### 2) 長期目標

- 아시아地域의 非核化와 美國勢力의 除去를 겨냥한 헬싱키式의 ‘아시아 安保會議’ 構想의 實現이 長期的 戰略目標임.

### 4. 分析 및 評價

- ‘고르바초프’의 이번 亞・太 獨트린은
  - 一 對內外的으로는 油價下落에 따른 外貨不足, 西方側과의 技術隔差 등 國內經濟事情을 勘案, 東西關係 改善을 통한 西方의 對蘇 經協 誘引與件을 造成하고 極東地域開發 7個指針을 提示, 燃料・에너지資源의 90%가 集中되어 있는 시베리아 極東地域의 産業發展을 促求함으로써 現政權에 對한 國民의 支持基盤을 擴大・強化하는 一方

- 對內外的으로는 아프간 駐屯軍의 具體的 撤軍計劃 發表, 蒙古 駐屯軍 減縮 및 對中共 關係改善 用意 表明등을 통해 中共이 提示한 3大 障礙問題 先 解決要求에 肯定的 反應을 보임으로써 踏步狀 態에 있는 對中共 關係 正常化 協商의 突破口를 摸索하고, 日・蘇關係 發展을 樂觀하고 對日 經協 必要性을 強調하면서 沿海洲 地域에 合作企業 設立을 提議하는 등 自國의 對日重視 및 好意的 姿勢를 示顯하는 한편
- 太平洋會議를 提唱, 太平洋 勢力的 一員으로서 同 地域 安保 協力基盤 構築을 위한 先導的 役割을 浮刻, 太平洋 本格 進出意圖를 表面化시키는 가운데 美・日・中共의 對蘇 牽制를 위한 3角協力體制 瓦解 및 亞・太諸國의 對蘇 好應 誘導를 企圖하고 있는 것으로 評價됨.
- 한편 ‘고르바초프’ 對外分野 演說에서 나타난 特徵은
  - ‘블라디보스톡’ 등의 開放을 통한 蘇聯 極東地域의 積極的인 開發意志를 表明하는 한편
  - 美國이 亞・太地域의 緊張을 造成하고 있다고 非難, 蘇聯의 平和 이미지를 浮刻시키면서

- 中共과의 關係改善을 위한 柔軟姿勢를 보임과 아울러 對日關係 改善에 意欲的인 姿勢를 誇示하고
  - 亞·太地域 諸國과의 關係改善 및 同地域에서의 美 核戰力 減縮을 통한 蘇聯의 軍事力 強化 및 發言權 挽回를 追求하고 있으며
  - 韓半島 情勢와 關聯, 北韓의 對南戰略을 公介的으로 支持하고 있는 點 등임.
- 이상과 같은 ‘고르바초프’의 對亞政策 關係 發言은
- 그 網羅範圍가 包括的이고도 具體的이라는 點에서 蘇聯이 지금까지 歐美에 焦點을 두었던 對外政策을 아시아로 轉換, 今後 아시아·太平洋國家로서 보다 積極的인 役割을 遂行할 것이며
  - 中共 및 日本과의 關係改善에 重點을 두어
    - 中·蘇 國境의 安定을 통한 防衛負擔 經減, 日本으로 부터의 經協獲得에 最優先的으로 盡力함으로써
    - 蘇聯經濟 再建을 效果的으로 推進함과 아울러 東北亞 地域에서의 蘇聯의 立場을 強化하고
    - 美·日·中共 3角 對蘇 牽制 體制를 瓦解시키며



## 5. 東北亞 諸國과의 關係 및 各國의 反應

### 1) 中 共

- 이번 蘇聯의 亞·太 獨트린에서 1次的으로 力點을 둔 것은 對中共關係로 蘇聯은 中共側이 내세우고 있는 關係正常化의 3個條件中 아프가니스탄 및 蒙古 駐屯軍 일부 撤收등 적어도 2個條件 解決에 同意할 用意가 있음을 示唆하는 외에 中共이 현재 追求하고 있는 ‘中共式 社會主義’ 建設을 위한 現代化 路線을 肯定的으로 評價, 蘇聯의 對中 姿勢와 接近方法에 있어 戰術的 轉換을 꾀하고 있음을 보여주고 있음.
- 最近 中·蘇關係는 82年以來 8次에 걸친 關係 正常化 會談을 通해 經濟·文化 등 非政治的 分野에서는 括目할 만한 改善을 이룩하여 왔으나
- 政治分野에서는
  - 中共이 關係正常化의 前提條件으로 所謂 ‘3大障礙’의 除去를 要求한데 대해 蘇聯은 이를 ‘第3國에 대한 內政干涉’이라는 理由로 拒否함으로써 進展이 이루어지지 않자

- 中共은 蘇聯이 3大 障礙問題를 당장 解決하기 困難하다면 ‘ 캄보디아駐屯 베트남軍 撤收 ’ 등 容易한것 부터 解決하면 좋을것 (85.8 鄧小平)이라고 對蘇 緩和 傾向을 보인데 대해
- 蘇聯도 ‘ 中·蘇 및 日·蘇 關係改善이 아시아 뿐만아니라 廣範圍한 地域의 平和에 關聯된다 ’고 主張 (85.8 ‘ 알리에프 ’ 副首相)하면서 ‘ 兩國間的 長期的인 基本原則 및 政治意思를 나타내는 등 雙務的 文書의 作成 ’ (85.9 ‘ 자미아틴 ’ 黨 國際情報部長)을 提議하는 등 政治關係 改善을 追求해 왔음.
- 中共은 ‘ 고르바초프 ’ 蘇聯 共産黨 書記長의 和解提議에 대해
  - 最近 同國이 3大 障礙問題의 一括 妥結이 困難할 境遇 部分解決도 受諾할 用意가 있다고 從來의 強硬態度를 緩和하는 趨勢를 보여온 事實을 勘案할 때
  - 蘇聯의 아프가니스탄 및 몽고駐屯 兵力 撤收 用意에 대해서는 多少 肯定的 側面에서 考慮하고 있는 것으로 보이나



- 和解提議 自體에 있어서는 霸權追求 與否에 關係 蘇聯側 底意를 信賴하지 않고 있기 때문에 向後 蘇聯의 對中共 趨移에 따라 漸進的으로 對應해 나가려는 意圖로 評價됨.

〈 中共의 公式反應 〉

- 8.4 吳學謙 外交部長
  - 蘇聯의 提議는 霸權主義 一環인지 世界戰略의 變更을 意味하는지의 與否가 不分明하기 때문에 向後 蘇聯의 趨移를 보아가면서 對 蘇戰略을 再檢討할 것이나
  - 3大 障礙問題로 中·蘇 關係가 正常化 되더라도 50年代와 같은 蜜月時代로까지는 復歸하지는 않을 것임.
- 8.5 鄧小平 黨顧問委 主任, 胡耀邦 黨 總書記
  - 現 時點에서 中共은 蘇聯의 中·蘇 關係의 完全 正常化 提議에 無條件 應하려고는 생각하지 않고 있으나
  - 同 提議에 肯定的인 要素가 包含되어 있어 本質을 慎重히 表明하는 것이 重要함.

- 蘇聯은 今般 ‘ 블라디보스톡 ’ 宣言을 契機로 中  
 共과 政治關係는 물론 國際問題 全般에 있어서  
 의 全般的인 中·蘇關係 改善을 통하여
  - 中共의 對美·西歐 接近을 牽制하고
  - 亞·太地域에서의 影響力 擴大를 圖謀하기 위  
 한 對中共 政治攻勢의 一環인 것으로
- 특히 蘇聯의 最近 一連의 對中共 攻勢에 대해

- 86. 1 不可侵條約締結 提議
- 86. 4 兩國 最高指導者 會談提議
- 86. 5 亞·太地域 平和努力에 中共의 積極  
 參與 促求 등

- 中共이 拒否態度를 表明한 狀況에서 以前보다  
 積極的인 對中共제스처에 對한 中共의 前記와  
 같은 反應은 中共側이 主張하고 있는 3大 障  
 碍의 解決이 兩國關係 正常化의 先決要件임을  
 確固히 함으로써 實利的 明分없이 兩國 和解  
 雰圍氣 印象을 浮刻시키려는 蘇聯側 意圖에 말  
 려들지 않으면서 蘇聯側의 態度變化를 誘導하  
 는 한편
- 對外的으로도 中·蘇 接近에 疑懼心を 갖고

있는 美國·西歐에 대하여 中共의 制限的 對  
蘇關係 維持 立場을 認識시키려는 意圖에서 비  
롯된 것으로 評價되나

- 一 8.9 蒙古와의 領事條約 締結, 高位代表團 相  
互訪問등 積極的 對蘇 協商態度는 對美·蘇 等  
距離 獨自外交路線을 그대로 보여주고 있음.

## 2) 日 本

### ○ 日·蘇 關係에서

- 一 日本은 戰後 蘇聯이 占領하고 있는 北方 4  
個 島嶼의 反換을 推進해야 하고
- 一 蘇聯은 ‘고르바초프’ 新體制의 國內 最大  
課題인 經濟活性化를 위해서 西方側 특히 日  
本の 經濟 및 技術協力을 重視하지 않을 수  
없는 形便임.

### ○ 86. 1 ‘세바르드나제’의 訪日에서 나온 日·

蘇 共同聲明에서 北方 領土問題에 관해

- 一 蘇聯은 ‘歷史的, 法律的 根據에 대한 蘇聯側  
의 了解는 從來 態度에서 조금도 바뀌지 않  
고 있다’고 言及, ‘領土問題는 이미 解決되  
었다’는 從來의 蘇聯 見解에 하등 變化가

없다고 強調했음.

- 一 그러나 領土問題를 包畵한 平和協商을 再開하기로 合意함으로써 日本에게 크게 讓步하였고 日本은 ‘領土問題를 包畵한 平和條約 交渉이 再開된 것은 今後의 日·蘇 關係發展의 重要한 第一步’라고 言及, 領土交渉을 끈기있게 追求하면서 經濟, 文化등 諸側面에서의 關係改善을 進展시킬 생각을 披瀝했음.
- 아무튼 政治對話의 길이 日本과 蘇聯間에 열렸다는 意味는 자못 큰 것이며 이번 ‘블라디보스톡’ 宣言에서 밝힌 바와같이 兩國 頂上의 相互訪問이 實現되면 兩國은 關係改善으로 安保負擔을 덜고 經濟的 實利를 얻으려는데 利害關係를 같이하고 있으므로 ‘고르바초프’의 表現대로 ‘兩國關係는 크게 好轉’될 것이며 ‘좋은 變化의 바람’이 불 것으로 보임.
- 한편 日本은 蘇聯에 앞서 지난 6.26 마닐라에서 開催된 ASEAN 擴大 外相會議에서 ‘아시아 重視 外交政策(一名: 아베 獨트린)을 闡明하면서 東北亞 뿐만 아니라 全 아시아 國家와의 協力關係를 強化해 나가겠다 는 意志를 밝힘.

〈 政 策 要 旨 〉

- 日本은 平和國家로서 아시아의 平和와 繁榮에 積極 貢獻
- 아시아 國家들과의 相互 理解增進 및 信賴 確立
- 變動하는 國際情勢에 効果的으로 對應키 위한 日本・ASEAN 協力關係 確立
- 圓借款의 擴充, 技術協力 促進등을 통해 ‘아시아’ 諸國의 經濟自立에 寄與

- ‘아베’ 外相의 ‘아시아’ 重視政策 闡明은 時期的으로 蘇聯의 亞・太 獨트린과 軌를 같이 한다는 點에서 注目되며
  - 日本이 美・日 關係를 基軸으로 比較的 安定된 對西方關係를 維持하고 있고
  - 그동안 冷却되어 온 日・蘇 關係도 外相會談 再開를 통해 相當히 進展되고 있는데 비해
  - 對 ‘아시아’ 諸國關係에서는 貿易 不均衡, 技術移轉등 經濟問題와 함께 教科書問題, 首相의 神社參拜 問題등으로 各國의 對日 不信이 높아지고 있는데 따라

- 一 日本과 ‘아시아’ 諸國間 不必要한 誤解의 素地를 拂拭시키고 同地域에서 日本의 影響力을 擴大해 나가려는 目的에서 이루어진 것으로 評價됨.
  - 한편 ‘블라디보스톡’ 宣言에 대한 日本의 反應을 보면
    - 一 大體로 訪日希望을 披瀝한 ‘고르바초프’의 演說을 歡迎하는 가운데 나카소네 首相이 7.29 ‘고르바초프’의 早期 訪日을 期待한다는 意向을 밝힌後 8.5 에는 來年 1月 ‘고르바초프’의 訪日을 公式提議하는 등 對蘇 關係改善에 積極적인 意欲을 보이고 있는 反面
    - 一 外務省의 니시야마·다케히고·구 아局長은 蘇聯大使를 召喚 北方領土問題의 解決없이는 어떠한 提案도 받아들일 수 없으며 이 問題 解決後에야 蘇聯과 相互 平和條約 問題를 論議할 立場이라고 闡明함.
  - 그러나 日本은 이미 日·蘇 外相會談을 契機로 對蘇 關係改善에 着手한 狀況으로 앞으로 日·蘇 緊張緩和 圖謀 및 北方外交를 加速化 해 나갈 것으로 보임.

### 3) 美 國

#### ○ 美國은

- 一 아프간 問題와 關聯 蘇聯이 過去에도 類似한 撤軍日程을 밝힌 바 있다고 指摘, 今般 6個 聯隊 1次撤軍 方針은 總兵力 規模 縮小가 아닌 定期的 兵力交替의 一環일 可能性이 있다고 一蹴하면서
- 一 아프간 問題의 唯一한 解決方法은 11萬 8,000 名의 蘇聯軍을 迅速히 完全 撤收시키는 것이 라는 立場을 表明(7.29 ‘칼브’ 國務省 代辯 人) 함.

### 4) 北 韓

- 北韓은 아시아安保會議 構想에 대해서는 積極的 支持를 삼가해 왔으나, 今年 1月 ‘세바르드나 제’의 訪北時 金永南이 “아세아·太平洋地域에 서 緊張緩和를 위하여 이 地域 나라들이 힘을 합쳐 共同으로 努力하는데 대한 蘇聯의 最近 發起를 支持한다” 라고 하여 肯定的 立場을 表明하였음(1月 20日, 歡迎宴會에서 金永南 演說).

- 今般 ‘ 블라디보스톡 ’ 宣言과 關聯하여 北韓은 勞動新聞 論評(8.3)을 통해
  - 同宣言은 熱核戰爭을 막고 나라들 사이의 平和的 協調를 增進시키기 위한 蘇聯의 平和愛好的 立場 遂行을 위한 積極的인 努力이며
  - 朝鮮半島 問題에 대하여 關心을 돌리고 美·日·南朝鮮 三角軍事同盟 操作 策動과 南朝鮮의 核前哨基地에 대하여 指摘
  - 朝鮮半島의 平和와 나라의 平和統一을 위한 朝鮮人民의 正當한 鬪爭을 評價하고 朝鮮半島에 非核 平和地帶를 創設할데 대한 우리 提案을 支持한 것은 커다란 고무라고 하여 積極的 立場을 表明함.
  
- 한편 北韓은 86.6.23 政府聲明을 통해 ‘ 韓半島 非核平和地帶 創設 ’ 을 提議한 바 있으며 7.21 ~ 23 모스크바에서 開催된 ‘ 科學技術·平和 國際科學會議 ’ 에 參席한 北韓 科學院 代表團長( 신문규 )의 모스크바 放送과의 인터뷰에서 ‘ 韓半島 非核 平和地帶 創設과 核實驗 中止 ’ 등을 主張함으로써 蘇聯의 平和攻勢에 立脚한 反戰·反核主張의 立場을 北韓이 強力히 代辯함으로써



蘇聯의 對極東戰略에 便乘, 韓半島에서의 美軍 및 核武器 撤收를 겨냥하는 한편, 平壤 開催 ‘韓半島 非核平和國際會議’ (9.6~8)를 통해 國際的 支持基盤을 擴大하려 할 것임.

## 5) ASEAN

- ‘고르바초프’ 蘇聯 共産黨 書記長의 지난 7.28 블라디보스톡 宣言과 關聯 ASEAN 各國의 反應에서 나타난 特徵은
  - ASEAN 各國 共히 蘇聯의 아프가니스탄 및 몽고駐屯軍 撤收 意思表明에 關心을 보이면서 이를 제스추어 내지는 兵力交替에 지나지 않는다고 一蹴하고 있고
  - 蘇聯의 對아시아 關係增進 意思를 肯定的으로 評價하면서도 이로 因한 蘇聯의 아시아地域에 대한 影響力 擴大 可能性에 憂慮를 나타내고 있으며
  - 캄보디아 問題와 蘇聯, ASEAN 諸國과의 協力を 통한 解決 必要性을 強調하고 있는 點 등임.

- ASEAN 各國이 蘇聯의 아프가니스탄 및 몽고 駐屯軍 撤收 意思表明에 큰 關心을 보인 것은
  - 蘇聯軍의 아프가니스탄 및 몽고 駐屯 事實을 베트남軍의 캄보디아 駐屯과 連繫시켜 國際的 關心을 再換起시킴과 아울러
  - ASEAN 側이 그동안 베트남의 數次에 걸친 캄보디아 駐屯軍 撤收 發表와 關聯, 이를 單純한 兵力交替에 不過한 것이라고 一蹴해 온 點을 勘案할때
  - 아프가니스탄 및 몽고 駐屯 蘇聯軍의 實質的 撤軍을 誘導함으로써 캄보디아 駐屯 베트남軍의 撤收도 實現시켜 보려는 意圖에서 비롯된 것으로 評價됨.

## 6. 蘇 ‘프라우다’ 紙 關聯 論評

- 프라우다紙는 8.3 ‘고르바초프’ 蘇聯 共産黨 書記長의 7.28 블라디보스톡 演說에서 闡明된 蘇聯의 아시아·太平洋 集團安保計劃 關聯 論評記事에서
  - ‘고르바초프’ 書記長이 블라디보스톡에서 밝힌 蘇聯의 亞·太 集團安保計劃은 同地域國家間的 雙務的 友好關係 發展·強化는 물론, 國際的 緊

張緩和 努力을 結集, 戰爭勃發 危險을 除去하는 데 主된 目的이 있음.

- 一 目標達成이 遼遠함에도 不拘, 蘇聯은 헬싱키 會議를 教訓삼아 核狂亂의 第1次 犠牲地 히로시마에서 開催될 수 있는 亞·太 諸國會議를 提議해 왔음.
- 一 同會議가 實現된다면 히로시마는 핀란드 首都로부터 平和傳達 바톤을 받아 아시아·太平洋의 헬싱키가 될 것임.
- 一 아시아·太平洋을 위한 蘇聯의 計劃은 緊迫한 問題로 取扱되어야만 할 餘他 實際的 措置들을 包括적으로 提示하고 있음.
- 一 同計劃은 1次的으로 캄보디아 關聯 政治的 熱情冷却, 中共·베트남關係 正常化, 印支·ASEAN 諸國間 相互受容關係 樹立, 모든 韓國民의 民族問題 解決에로의 進展을 이룩하기 위한 韓半島內의 危險스런 緊張除去 必要性등을 包舍, 同地域問題 解決에 焦點을 맞추고 있음.
- 一 同計劃의 또다른 主目標는 同地域에서의 核武器 擴散 및 增強에 대한 障壁을 設置하는 것임. 특히 이것은 南太平洋에 이미 宣布된 非核地帶 및 北韓이 提案한 韓半島 非核平和地帶化 그리

- 고 東南아시아에 그와 類似한 地帶를 設置하는 데 全面的 支持를 要求하고 있음.
- 一 結論的으로 蘇聯의 計劃은 太平洋內 海軍活動 減縮 및 印度洋의 平和地帶化 會談開催를 構想하고 있다고 力說함.
- 프라우다紙의 蘇聯의 亞·太 集團安保計劃 關聯 論評에서 浮刻된 特徵은
    - 一 同 構想의 目標를 地域國家間 雙務 友好關係 發展·強化, 國際的 緊張緩和 努力 結集을 통한 戰爭勃發 威脅 除去, 核武器 擴散·增強 防止裝置 講究로 壓縮시키고 있는 點.
    - 一 優先的 實踐事項으로 캄보디아問題, 中共·베트남 關係正常化, 印支·ASEAN 關係, 韓半島 緊張解消 등 亞·太地域 懸案을 具體的으로 列舉, 提示한 點.
    - 一 太平洋 海軍活動 減縮 會談 및 印度洋 平和地帶化 會談 開催 構想을 強調하고 있는 點 등으로 集約됨.
  - 今般 프라우다紙가 蘇聯의 亞·太 集團安保計劃에 關한 論評記事를 揭載한 것은

- 一 同紙가 蘇聯 共產黨 機關紙로서 蘇聯의 公式立場을 代辯하고 있다는 點에서 볼때
- 一 後屬措置의 一環에서 亞·太 集團安保構想의 趣旨 및 細部計劃을 敷衍 說明, 自國의 平和이미지 浮刻과 함께 關聯 當事國의 好應을 誘導, 同 演說 成果 擴大를 期하면서
- 一 同 亞·太 集團安保 構想 公表를 契機로 蘇聯이 亞·太地域 國家의 一員으로서 同 地域國家들과의 關係改善 및 發言權 強化를 圖謀해 나가려는 意志를 對外的으로 誇示하려는 것으로 評價됨.

## V. 蘇聯의 新 外交攻勢 ( ‘ 블라디보스톡 ’ 宣言 ) 가 韓半島에 미치는 影響

### 1. 蘇聯의 對韓半島 政策

#### 1) 對東北亞 戰略目標

- 美國의 政治的 · 軍事的 影響力 排除
- 中共의 美 · 日 接近에 의한 反蘇體制 構築을 牽制하기 위해 中共과의 正面對決 回避, 中立態度 ( 美 · 蘇 等距離政策 ) 誘導
- 日本과의 交流增大 및 日本의 再武裝沮止, 親蘇 政策 誘導
- 國際 戰略的 次元에서 極東地域에서는 韓半島와 필리핀 重視 ( 브레진스키, Game plan )

#### 2) 對韓半島 基本立場

- 現狀維持 및 長期的으로 中立地帶化 誘導
  - 駐韓美軍 撤收
  - 中 · 日에 대한 緩衝地帶로서의 役割期待
  - 北韓의 中共偏向 牽制

- 韓國의 美·日에의 密着 沮止
- 戰略的 要衝地 確保
  - 羅津港 使用權獲得 以後에도 元山, 南浦港 使用 交涉中
  - 太平洋·印度洋 進出要路인 大韓海峽通航權 保障 摸索
- 戰略的 카드로 利用
  - 中共의 韓國接近과 北韓의 中共接近 牽制
- 北韓의 統一政策은 支持하되, 3者會談등 蘇聯이 韓半島問題의 論議에서 排除되지 않도록 影響力 行使
- 特히 아시아·太平洋地域 進出에의 橋頭堡와 中·日을 同時 威脅할 수 있는 韓半島의 戰略的 價値增大

### 3) 蘇聯의 對韓半島 政策 展望

- 蘇聯은 美國과의 直接的인 衝突을 惹起시킬 可能性이 있기 때문에 韓半島 現狀打破를 위한 紛爭을 願치 않으며, 現狀維持를 基調로 하고 있음.

- 단지 韓·美·日安保協力體制가 蘇聯에 대해 極히 威脅的이라고 判斷될 때, 北韓을 侵攻, 完全 掌握·支配하려 하거나 北韓을 利用한 代理戰爭을 일으킬 可能性을 排除할 수 없음.
- 南進政策의 一環으로 東北亞基地 確保를 위해 蘇·北韓協力·紐帶強化 持續
- 韓國이 蘇聯의 安保利益을 侵害하지 않는다는 確固한 判斷이 설 境遇, 韓國의 對蘇接近意慾을 利用하여 蘇聯의 對韓接近試圖가 豫想됨.
  - 一 蘇聯 및 東歐圈의 '88 서울올림픽 參加를 契機로 새로운 韓·蘇關係形成 可能性이 있으며 韓國의 美國 一邊倒 牽制試圖
- 結局 蘇聯은 韓國에 依한 韓半島統一이 그들에게 利益이 없으며 北韓에 依한 共產化統一 역시 韓半島에 대한 影響力 減少가 憂慮되기 때문에 韓半島의 分斷狀況維持 希望
  - 一 現狀維持 위해 北韓에 軍援, 經援 繼續
  - 一 蘇聯은 “두개의 韓國”이라는 現狀을 認定하는 하나 北韓이 同意하지 않는 한 이의 公式化 내지 交叉承認도 反對하고 있음.



## 2. 蘇聯의 對北韓 密着

### 1) 密着與件

- “고르바초프”登場 以後 蘇聯對外政策의 積極・能動化 趨勢
- 中共의 路線變化와 韓・中共關係 進展에 따른 北韓의 對中共失望 增大
- 北韓은 經濟難 克服과 軍事力 強化를 위해 蘇聯의 支援 渴望(武器體系上 中共의 支援 不可能)
- 韓・美・日 安保協力體制의 發展可能性에 대한 憂慮와 對應策 摸索

### 2) 蘇聯의 意圖

- 蘇聯의 對北韓 積極接近의 目的은 다음과 같이 4가지라고 생각됨.
  - 極東의 戰略的 重要地域으로서의 軍事的 必要性
  - 對韓國 接近의 名分提供
  - 蘇聯은 北韓에 대한 中共의 強力한 影響力을 줄이는 한편, 同時에 中・蘇 關係改善의 지렛대로 對北韓 緊密化를 利用

一 金正日 後繼體制的 親蘇化 誘導

- 蘇聯은 北韓이 中共方式에 따라 經濟開放에 成功할 경우, 中共에 더욱 偏向될 可能性이 높기 때문에 그러한 發展에 制動을 걸기 위하여 北韓이 經濟開放에 懷疑를 느끼고 있는 때를 捕捉하여 北韓을 蘇聯側에 誘導하려는 積極的인 努力을 기울이고 있음.
- 特히 金日成의 退進과 金正日 後繼體制的 登場이 確實시된 時點에서 金正日 執權體制的 親蘇化를 誘導하고 北韓의 權力 上層部, 特히 軍部內 親蘇勢力을 扶植시키려 企圖함.
- 그러나 蘇聯의 對北韓 關係 發展을 制約하는 要因으로
  - 一 蘇聯의 對韓半島 基本立場이 現狀維持와 緊張緩和인데 反해, 北韓은 冒險主義 敢行 所持 內在
  - 一 金日成에 대한 不信感과 効果的인 統制困難
    - 北韓의 對中·蘇 等距離外交 내지 中立態度에 不滿
    - 蘇聯은 北韓을 中共·루마니아, 유고 등과 같이 “社會主義國”으로 分類

(東獨, 베트남 등은 ‘社會主義共同體’로  
分類)

- 中共의 強力한 牽引 競合
- 蘇聯의 韓國과의 關係改善 意思등을 들 수  
있음.

### 3) 北韓의 對蘇傾斜 理由

- 北韓은 現國際政治 狀況에서 3者會談의 實現可  
能성이 稀薄하고 對外 經濟開放政策이 成果를  
거둘 展望이 크지 못하다는 것을 뒤늦게 認  
識, 韓·美·日에 보다 強硬한 對策을 追求하  
기 위한 準備로 蘇聯에 傾斜하고 있는 것으로  
보임.
- 北韓은 對中·蘇 等距離外交政策을 바탕으로 經  
濟沈滯에서 벗어나기 위하여 中共모델 뿐만 아  
니라 蘇聯이 勸獎하는 發展모델도 同時에 試驗  
해 봄으로써, 雙方으로부터 經濟援助를 確保하는  
것이 北韓에 보다 有益한 것으로 判斷했을 可  
能성이 큼.
- 北韓은 對中共關係에서나 周邊強大國들의 韓半島

緊張緩和 努力으로 보아 蘇·베트남·北韓 軍事協力體制에 積極 參與할 立場이 못되나 蘇聯의 軍事援助에 대한 代價로 北韓內에 蘇聯軍事基地 使用을 許諾했을 可能性이 높음.

- 北韓은 蘇聯에 接近하려는 態度를 誇示함으로써 美·日·中共으로 하여금 보다 積極的인 對北韓 接近努力을 기울이도록 誘導하고, 經濟交流 및 3者會談等の 推進에 있어서 協商條件을 強化시키려 할 것임.
- 또한 中共의 對韓國 交流增大에 대한 牽制나 不滿도 한 要因이 될 수 있을 것이며 特히 對南軍事優位를 繼續 確保·維持하고, 金正日 後 繼體制의 鞏固化를 위해 蘇聯의 諸支援이 切實한 狀況등이 對蘇 密着理由가 될 것임.

#### 4) 最近 蘇·北韓關係 動向分析

- 蘇·北의 密着은 '84.5 金日成의 訪蘇以後 急進展, 質量面에서 跳躍했으며 特히 軍事面에서 두드러지고 있음. ( 지난 7月 訪韓한 美國의 잭·앤더슨씨는 北韓이 이미 蘇聯의 抵當物이 된 狀態라고 評하고 있음 )

- 北韓에 미그-23機 50臺, 샘-3地對空, 스티저 미사일 提供등
  - 蘇聯에 TU-16北韓領空飛行, 블라디 보스톡-감란基地 連結航路 許容, 元山, 南浦港 使用등
  - '86.7 北·蘇 '友好協助'條約 25周年과 蘇聯의 '海軍의날'行事時 親善使節團 및 艦隊交換, 合同軍事訓練實施, 合同情報司令部 設置등
- 이러한 蘇聯의 對北韓 密着關係에 대해 專門家들의 一般的인 見解는 韓·美·日 3角 軍事協力體制나 美·中·日 反蘇協力體制에 대한 攻撃的 對應보다 防禦的 對應으로 解析하는 說이 多數임.
  - 그러나 蘇聯의 아·太戰略上 中·蘇 關係正常화와 對日 經濟協力이 對北韓 密着보다 훨씬 큰 利害關係가 걸려 있고 金日成 또한 主體思想을 屈節시키거나 中共을 疎外시킬 수도 없는 立場이어서 兩國關係의 密着에는 限界가 있고 蘇聯의 對北 軍事支援에도 制限을 둘 것으로 보임.
  - 따라서 雙方은 各者 自己側의 利益 ( National Interest )이라는 觀點에서 關係를 持續해 갈 可能性이 크며, 北韓은 더많은 支援을 蘇聯에

要請하고 蘇聯은 그 代價로 北韓을 政治적으로 더욱 強하게 掌握하는 方向으로 妥協해 나갈 可能性이 큼.

- 한편 中共은 最近 北韓에 대해 蘇聯 空軍機의 北韓領空通過를 中止시킬 것을 要求하고 蘇聯海軍 艦艇이 南捕港에 寄航할 때는 對應措置를 取할 수 밖에 없다는 強硬한 뜻을 傳한 것으로 알려짐.

## 5) 展 望

- 蘇·北韓間의 親密關係는 다음과 같은 理由로 앞으로 적어도 1-2年間 持續될 可能性이 있음.
  - 一 北韓은 中共을 통한 對西方接近速度가 緩慢하고 西方影響의 北韓 浸透는 北韓體制의 不安定을 惹起시킬 可能性이 클 것이므로 對西方接近에 確信을 가질때 까지 蘇聯과 關係를 改善시켜 各 分野에서 支援을 確保할 것임.
  - 一 北韓은 中共의 對美·日 密着과 對韓關係改善 努力으로 부터 적지 않은 不安을 느껴 왔는데, 그러한 不安을 解消하고 對西方接近에서

經濟的 利得을 얻는데 確信을 갖기까지는 적어도 1 - 2年이 걸릴 것임.

- “고르바초프 - 쉘 바르드나제 外交路線”은 對美競爭 및 協商次元에서 北韓의 戰略的 價値를 重要時하고 있으므로, 今後의 蘇·北韓關係는 그 協力の 度를 보다 더 強化할 것이며, 이는 곧 中·蘇關係의 改善方向과 同一 軌道에서 增幅되어 갈 것으로 看做됨.
- 그러나 北韓의 對蘇傾斜를 北韓의 對中共 疎遠과 連結짓는 “一回性的 思考”는 正確하지 않음. (브레진스키, 뉴스워크紙)

### 3. 南北韓問題에 대한 蘇聯의 態度

- 前記한 바와 같이 蘇聯의 對韓半島 政策의 基調는 現狀維持임.
- 그러나 '84年末 蘇聯 外務省當局은 美國務省의 “해리어드·아이숍” 韓國課長에게 “蘇聯은 韓半島問題 解決에 있어서 利害當事國”이라고 새삼 主張함으로써, 韓半島 問題에 대한 影響力 行使를 強化하려는 意志를 나타냈음.

- 이러한 立場에서 蘇聯은 蘇·北 密着關係가 보여 주듯이 北韓이 主張하는 韓半島 非核平和地帶化, 駐韓美軍撤收, 高麗民主聯邦共和國 創立方案과 停戰 協定을 平和協定으로 바꾸는데 대한 北韓의 提案 등에 대해 積極的 支持를 表明했으며, 南北韓 交叉承認 및 유엔 同時加入 試圖를 反對하고 있음.
- 반면, 北韓의 3者會談 提議에 대해서는 明確한 態度 表明을 하지 않고 있다가 이번 “블라디보스톡” 宣言에서 北韓이 提議하는 南北對話를 全적으로 支持한 것은 좀더 推移를 지켜봐야 할 事項이며, 지난 3月2日 蘇聯의 國際部 副部長의 交叉承認 示唆發言(“韓半島 問題解決은 4國의 交叉承認 밖에 길이 없다”)등을 통해서 볼때 南北韓 關係, 특히 적어도 統一對話問題에 對한 蘇聯의 影響力은 微力한 것으로 보임.  
(※ 이러한 事實은 中共의 韓半島 統一對話問題에 관한 態度(無關與)와 軌를 같이함).
- 그러나 蘇聯은 韓半島의 安定을 바라는 立場에서 南北韓 直接對話를 歡迎하고 있으며
- '88 올림픽問題와 關聯해서 中共이 參加意思를 分



明히 하고 있음에도 不拘, 不透明한 態度를 보이고 있고 北韓의 立場을 支持하면서도 妥協을 強調하고 있어 '88 올림픽에 대한 參加與否는 最終순간에 이루어질 것으로 評價됨.

- 結局 蘇聯이 南北韓 關係 當事者들 사이의 對話와 協商을 통한 解決을 支持한 것(1月23日, 日·蘇 共同코뮤니케) 등은 蘇聯이 韓半島 統一問題에 깊이 關與하지 않을 뜻을 反影한 것이라고도 볼 수 있으며, 蘇聯은 韓半島 問題에 있어 自身の 意思를 北韓에 强要하기 보다 北韓의 發展努力을 支援하고, 北韓으로부터 軍事基地提供 및 國際問題에 관한 支持를 獲得하고(蘇聯의 아시아 安保會議 構想을 支持하는 動向) 그를 통해 美國의 影響力增大를 間接적으로 排除하는 水準에 머무르려는 것으로 解析할 수 있음.

#### 4. 韓半島에 미칠 影響

- 이번 고르바초프의 블라디보스톡 宣言이 蘇聯의 對 아시아政策의 長期構想이라고 想定할 경우 韓半島에 다음과 같은 影響을 미칠 수 있음.

- 北韓이 이른바 3者會談提議에 대한 蘇聯의 否定的 態度 持續
  - 蘇聯은 韓半島問題와 關聯, 自國을 主要有關國으로 認識, 自國을 排除한 韓半島問題 接近을 默示的으로 反對하는 立場을 繼續 取할 것임.
  - 特히 ‘블라디보스톡’ 宣言의 根幹인 아시아安  
保會議 開催 構想이 美國을 除外한 아시아國家  
間 安保會議開催 構想이기 때문에 北韓이 美國  
을 相對로 한 3者會談 提議와는 蹉跎이 生길  
수 있음.
  - 反面 同構想 推進과 關聯, 北韓의 協助가 要請  
되고 安保會議 構想과 3者會談提議間의 蹉跎을  
調整할 必要가 있을 것이라는 點에 比추어 蘇  
聯은 對北韓 親密化에 더욱 努力하고 對北韓經  
濟·軍事援助를 增大할 可能性도 있음.
  - 駐韓美軍의 存在는 蘇聯의 아시아安  
保會議構想에 있어서 根本的으로 相衝되는 바, 이러한 蘇聯의  
對아시아政策의 長期構想은 我國의 對蘇關係 改  
善努力에 逆機能으로 作用할 可能性이 있음.
- 同 構想과 關聯 蘇·北韓 密着關係가 미치는 影  
響을 살펴보면

- 一 蘇聯은 北韓과의 親密關係를 持續시키기 위하여 最新 軍事裝備를 어느정도 提供할 것인 바, 北韓은 增強된 軍事力을 바탕으로 對外開放政策을 標榜하면서 僞裝平和攻勢를 強化하는 한편, 對南 武力挑發을 強化할 可能性과 蘇聯의 世界戰略 및 東南亞 戰略에 따른 韓半島에서 適用해야 할 戰術的 行動指針을 따를 可能性이 있음.
- 이는 '86 아시안게임, '88 서울올림픽 推進에 至 大한 影響을 줄 수 있을 것임.
- 一 中共은 開放政策에서 오는 北韓의 不安을 없애고 蘇聯의 軍事支援을 代置하는 方案으로 西方에서 導入한 最新 軍事裝備를 改造하여 北韓에 提供할 可能性도 있음.
- 一 美·日을 비롯한 西方諸國들은 北韓의 挑發性과 親蘇化를 막기 위해 對北韓 接近을 積極 試圖할 可能性이 있음.
- 一 蘇聯이 中共, 北韓 關係를 密着시키는 南北對話에 대하여 制動을 걸 可能性이 높아질 것임.
- 一 金正日 權力承繼는 強力한 蘇聯의 支援과 함께 比較的 安定된 方式으로 이미 이루어졌을 可能性이 크며 金正日是 보다 確固한 權力的 基盤 위에서 對南政策을 強力하게 追求하게 될 것임.

一 蘇聯은 韓半島에서의 緊張이 平壤에 대한 그들의 影響力을 높이는 것으로 判斷, 一定한 水準의 緊張을 維持하기 위하여 對北韓 軍事支援을 持續할 可能性이 있음.

## Ⅵ. 對策方向

- 앞서 살펴본 바와 같이 이번 ‘블라디보스톡’ 宣言에 나타난 蘇聯의 對韓半島 政策은 큰 變化가 없음.
- 그러나 蘇聯은 언제나 軍事力이 劣勢일 때는 對洪 政策을 取하다가 軍事力을 갖추게 되면 이를 背景으로 平和攻勢를 펴 왔다는 點에서 우리는 格外한 警戒心을 갖고 이에 對處해야 할 것임.
- 우리는 지난 第2期 南北對話에서 南北韓關係는 “韓半島問題의 韓半島化”라는 側面에서 보듯이 이제는 外部的 環境보다 內部的 條件에 의해 더 큰 影響을 받는다는 事實을 알 수 있었음.
  - 北韓의 態度는 中·蘇關係에 影響을 받지 않을 수 없지만 北韓은 中·蘇 等距離政策을 교묘히 利用, 中·蘇의 南北韓 關係에 대한 立場을 北韓의 政策에 同調하도록 할 수도 있다는 점.
  - 現在의 南北對話 狀態는 周邊國家의 意圖보다는 南北韓內 情勢와 意圖가 더 큰 影響變數로 作用하고 있다는 點.

- 따라서 蘇聯의 이번 아·태독트린이 北韓에 어떻게 投影될 것인가를 注視해야 할 것임.
- 蘇聯의 對韓國接近 政策은 中共보다 더 積極的이었으나 83年 KAL機 披擊事件으로 後退, 現在는 兩國 關係가 杜絕된 狀態이나 門戶가 完全히 閉鎖된 狀態는 아니며 앞으로 '88 올림픽은 對蘇關係에 새로운 突破口 役割을 할 수 있을 것임.
- 그러나 對蘇接近에는 美國의 制動으로 順坦하지는 않을 것이지만 韓國으로서는 韓半島의 勢力均衡維持를 爲해 蘇聯과 直接交流(非政治的 接觸, 시베리아 프로젝트 參加등) 方案을 摸索, 從來의 受動的 外交政策에서 積極的 對北方政策을 展開할 時點에 와 있다고 봄.
- 또한 對蘇接近은 테탕트 如何에 따라 影響을 받겠지만 테탕트가 上昇街道에 있고 蘇聯의 아·태독트린에 나타난 “아시아 安保計劃” 構想이 아시아 安保에 있어서 美國의 排除, 中共과의 共同役割 強調등 長期的인 視角에서 韓半島 安保問題에 심각한 影響을 미칠 수도 있으므로 我國은 激變하는 周邊情勢에 대한 對應策 마련은 물론, 長期的인 對北方戰略 樹立에 萬全을 기해야 할 것임.

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「고르바초프」의 「블라디보스톡」

## 演 說 文



※ 「고르바초프」의 「블라디보스톡」 演說文

GORBACHYOV - SPEECH

VLADIVOSTOK, JULY 28

I have long wanted to visit the far east. The Reason has been not only that one is drawn to places he has not yet been to and is prompted by a desire to see what one has not yet seen. It is also that one cannot have a complete idea of our homeland, Its history, its present day and its future without acquainting oneself with your vast, stern and yet beautiful country.

The far east always prompts one to think of the sublime immensity of the land of soviets, stretching from the Baltic and the Black Sea to the pacific, as well as of the courage, industry and fortitude of the people who have settled and defended this country, and of the novelty and imposing scope of today's work. It is with special warmth that Valdimirri lyich Lenin spoke of the city of Vladivostok, calling it one of ours.

The feat of valor accomplished by our compatriots, the pioneers who have blazed the trail to the pacific, will forever remain in the people's memory. The storming of Spassk and Volochayevka, the energetic development of the territory during the first five-year plans, and the soldierly exploits of the border-guards on these sacred frontiers will never be forgotten. The gallantry of the far eastern divisions and pacific seamen who fought at Moscow and Stalingrad and in the closing battles of the second world war in the east is imprinted forever on the nation's memory.

History is made by people. The history of the far east brings to mind the names of the intrepid pioneers Dezhnev, Khabarov and Nevelskoy. It is also associated with the glorious name of Lazo, Postyshev, Sukhanov, the Sibirtsev brothers, Bonivur, Chasovitin, Blyukher and Uborevich. I would like to mention among those leading the others by example today party member and civil war veteran Ivan Andreyevich Chuprynin, hero of Socialist labour Yuri Petrovich Yolko, captain of a pianno ship, hero of socialist labour Anatoly Andreyevich Belov who leads a hull-building team, Galina Vladimirovna Merkulova, a finishing team leader who is an alternate member of the CPSU central committee, and Nikolai Nikolayevich Dubinin, a man holding the honorary title of people's teacher of the USSR

The far eastern country, celebrated by Arsenyev and Fadeyev, has always been and will always remain dear to every soviet person. I am glad of this opportunity to visit the maritime territory, see how you live and work, and know what is being done here today and what will be done here tomorrow, the more so as the far east, as well as siberia, have been assigned a special place in the plans set by the 27th Party Congress.

I have had quite a few businesslike and interesting meetings both planned and impromptu, at factories, on ships, in institutes and, finally, simply in streets and squares these days. I should say these have been useful, frank and friendly meetings. The talking there has been blunt, as it should always be when discussing the business at hand, especially the current job of rebuilding.

This meeting of ours today is on a very special occasion; Vladivostok is being presented the order of Lenin. The city has been awarded this top distinction for the achievements of

its working people in economic and cultural advancement and for its big contribution to far eastern economic development.

Let me congratulate from the bottom of my heart you and all people of Vladivostok on the second order conferred on your city. The order of Lenin on its banner is a well-deserved award, farner for this beautiful city by its remarkable people sailors, ship-builders, fishermen, workers in mechanical engineering and the power industry, construction and transport personnel, scientists, physicians and teachers, veterans and the young alike -- through their dedicated and strenuous work. This honour is shared by right by the border-guards, the troops of the far eastern military district and the seamen of the red-banner pacific fleet. It crowns the fine accomplishments of the many generations who have done much to settle, protect and develop the country's pacific coast.

Vladivostok today is a modern industrial, cultural and scientific centre, a major port, the heart and soul of the soviet maritime territory and one of the finest cities in the country as a whole. Let the homeland's award give you fresh inspiration.

Please accept congratulations from the party's central committee, the presidium of the supreme soviet of the USSR and the soviet government and the wishes of success in your work and of further notable accomplishments in the life of the city, its worker collectives and every family.

Comrades,

It is now a little over a year since the April plenum of the central committee and close on five months since the 27th Party Congress. This time has been marked by a vigorous search for new approaches to solving the problems that have arisen in

soviet society and by principled assessments of both our achievements and our failures.

We now have a wide-ranging long-term program of action to expedite the country's social and economic progress, which takes into account both our own aspirations and the more important trends in world development. We also have more detailed guidelines for a shorter term -- the state plan for the 12th five-year planning period, which has been drawn up after an indepth analysis of the state of affairs and a review of reserves, ways and methods for ensuring dynamic development of soviet society.

/More/

Time has come to ask ourselves to account for how the plans are being fulfilled -- and do that strictly, without making any allowances for anybody. The results of national economic performance in the first half of the year have already been summed up. They show that the started positive change in the economy is gaining momentum, even if it isn't equally strong everywhere. We have been able to lend greater dynamism to economic processes and to raise production growth rates and labour productivity. Measures to improve the situation in mechnaical engineering, the fuel and power sector, agriculture and allied industries. Ferrous metallurgy, the chemical and petrochemical industries, and some other sectors have begun to tell.

Social tasks have also been tackled better, more housing has been built, along with more community facilities and amenities. Where the local authorities work resourcefully and energetically, the provision of the population with foodstuffs, manufactured goods and consumer services has improved. This kind of change can only be welcomed.



But let us be frank, Comrades: The gladdening and encouraging change has been mostly achieved as a result of measures to tighten labour, state and plan discipline. We have imposed higher standards on how the plans are made up and met, demanded better order in production, begun to work better and driven drunkenness back -- and positive results have been quick to show.

Though the results of the six-month period are generally good, growth rates in some sectors dropped last may and june and a number of ministries failed to cope with their plans. An irregular pace of production is still much of a problem, as is the not very efficient use of what we have. There has secured no visible change for the better in product quality, which is, and you know this, a common problem.

All this prompts this definite conclusion: A qualitative change which would really consolidate the trend for accelerated growth has not yet taken place. I think you understand and will agree that it could not have taken place either, considering the fact that the highly important economic, social, organisational, ideological and other measures are only just beginning to be put into practice and are, of course, unable to have an immediate effect. Consequently, the higher rates of national economic growth are not yet stable and, perhaps, they cannot yet, as I have already said, be stable.

This means that it is inadmissible now to run to any of the two extremes. It is naive, and harmful, to assume that, since economic indicators have improved, the effort to restyle our work has already been started in real earnest and is processing at full tilt everywhere. This is far from true yet. In a number of regions and economic sectors, they are only talking

about the work of rebuilding but not buckling down to it.

It is equally inadmissible, however, to give in to the difficulties and to the resistance or indifference of those accustomed to drifting by their own momentum and working in the old manner. It has been stressed rightly at the 27th Party Congress: We are Embarking on a difficult job and betting ourselves realistic but challenging goals which can only be attained if we learn from life constantly and ponder its experience, lessons and new developments all the time.

We are in effect only beginning this work, successfully in some areas and not so successfully in others. The further we go, the clearer it becomes how complex our task is and how great the workload to be handled, but we may not, and shall not, back out as we simply have no alternative to the speeded strategy. I already have said this on many occasions and I want to reiterate these words here in Vladivostok again.

This does not, of course, mean that we should, by either prodding or persuading people, impel them to act against the laws of social development or to try somehow in bypass and 'out-wit' these laws and objective conditions. By pursuing a policy of rebuilding, the party and its central committee proceed from a different premise -- the necessity of getting to know these laws more quickly and thoroughly and taking them fully into account in our activities, and the pressing need to remove all impediments and obstructions artificially created on this road.

The palpable, objective results of the first six months of the five-year period testify to the soviet people's support of the speedup policy, and the most valuable kind of support -- that by practical action -- At that. Here in Vladivostok, just like elsewhere, I have been doing also what may be called my new

duties and asking people the same question: Is everything clear to them about the policy worked out by the party and offered to the nation or are there any doubts about it? It has been gratifying to hear folk also here, on far eastern soil, speak out emphatically in support of the party's people-oriented policy, a policy followed in the interests of every soviet family and every soviet person, in the interests of the country's future. It is important to use this backing, this popular mood to grapple with the difficulties and eliminate them, to full effect and with the maximum return in order to fulfil the tasks set by the 27th Congress of the CPSU. It is in the issues of far eastern development and consult you, in continuation of the discussions I have been holding for the third day with you far eastern people, on how we can transform this region faster, put its riches at the service of the soviet people and supply the needs of those living here more fully.

The far east is by tradition called the country's outpost in the pacific. This is certainly so. But this view of the region is no longer broad enough. The maritime territory and the far east should be made into a highly-developed economic complex.

Real prerequisite conditions for this have been furnished by all that has been done in previous years. There have gone on stream modern factories representing all industries, and there have been built mines, electric power stations, new railroads, ferry crossings and ports. Thousands of hectares of land have been ameliorated. There has been set up a far eastern scientific centre of the academy of sciences of the USSR, with its network of institutes. There has also been trained a pool of modern qualified factory workers and specialists.

As a result, gross industrial output here has nearly trebled over the past two decades, with agricultural production going up more than 50 per cent. The far east today accounts for 40 per cent of the country's fish catches. Over the past four five-year plan periods, 62 million square metres of housing have been built, which has been tantamount to putting up about seven such cities as Vladivostok.

Although the accretion of manpower resources is still insufficient, the population has nevertheless grown 40 per cent over the past 20 years. In short, the country's economy now has an extensive base on the pacific coast.

Guided by the positions of the 27th Congress and the speed-up policy, we should, however, ask ourselves squarely: Do the pace of economic and social development, the standard of work by scientific institutions and the scope of research work in the far east today really correspond to its growing role and the new tasks put forward by the party? Is the potential amassed here really being used efficiently enough?

The strategy of accelerating social and economic advancement also demands a new regional policy. The party has assigned a prominent place in it to the priority development of eastern regions. This is why we should take a careful look also at economic prospects for the far east. This should be done promptly, considering the region's special significance.

This should be done without delay also because the far eastern economy has begun to show a slower growth than the national economy as a whole, though it would seem that this should be the other way round. As a result, the region's share in countrywide production, far from increasing, is, on the contrary diminishing. The lag in solving social problems, especially in

housing construction, has become more pronounced. In the streets I have heard quite a few remarks and suggestions on this score to the party's central committee and the soviet government, and the remarks have been justified.

It cannot be said that no attention has been paid to far eastern development. Over the past several years the central committee and the council of ministers of the USSR have adopted decisions specifying measures to be taken to advance the power industry, ferrous and non-ferrous metallurgy and coal mining, further develop fisheries, forestry the wood-working industry, transport and other economic sectors. Increase the production of rice and soya, update the way the things are in the countryside, and improve the state of affairs in the cultural field. Much of what has been planned has so far, alas, been executed badly.

This has reflected a failure to understand the role and significance of the far eastern economy and, in the final analysis, political short-sightedness on the part of some highly-placed officials at the state planning committee and the state committee for the supply of materials and equipment of the USSR, the ministries of non-ferrous metallurgy, coal mining, power development and electrification, and a number of other departments, Russian-federation and local-government agencies also bear a large part of the blame.

It is needed to mend the situation in a fundamental way, make certain that growth quickens rather than slows down, and change over from extensive development factors to all-out intensification through scientific and technological progress. It is essential to slash the time it takes to solve problems and sharply increase the far eastern contribution to the

country's economic potential. This will require above all a priority growth of the far eastern people's living standards. Substantial improvements in their working conditions and provision with housing, foodstuffs and manufactured goods, as well as the advancement of the entire social sphere. The latter is clearly lagging, though it is of key importance to having people settle down in the far east and has, in the final analysis, a bearing also on the pace of its development.

The task now is to work out a concert for long-term far eastern development under a uniform state regional policy. This concept should apparently be embodied in a comprehensive program. Its aim will be to create a high-efficiency economic complex in the far east, which will have a solid resource. Science and production base of its own, optimum economic makeup and well-developed social infrastructure and become an organic part of the system of countrywide and international division of labour. Much has been done in this respect in the process of drafting the five-year plan. It is strenuous and will require quite an effort to fulfil.

This, however, is just the beginning of the work to speed up the development of the entire region. Without telling in advance what should be analysed in detail by specialists with the participation of broad public, I shall dwell only on some of the most important trends of this work.

First, the very geographic position of the far east determines the course at setting up in the area a highly developed complex of the branches connected with the use of resources of the ocean. For many reasons the country's fisheries will be shifting increasingly to the far east. Large funds have been invested into the creation of a large capacity fishing fleet in

the area. Meanwhile, the equipment of on-shore services considerably lags behind. Mechanization of strenuous work is at a low level. As a result, a considerable part of expensive vessels is idle, is not used effectively. The capacities of the repair base, storages, fishing ports, processing enterprises are chronically lacking, in a word, serious comprehensive measures are needed for the development of the far eastern fishing industry. Special attention must be paid to the production of biologically active substances from sea products. This trend is developing in other countries and proved its high effectiveness.

Second, this is the question of a comprehensive use of the richest natural resources of the region. The attention of the ministry of non-ferrous metallurgy must be called to the potentialities of the far east. Geologists established that the region abounds in numerous large deposits of non-ferrous metals gold and silver, many other valuable elements and minerals. Their mining and processing can be widened substantially, if a matter is approached in a thrift hector's way. We must set down in earnest to the development of large non-ferrous metallurgy in the far east. Complete production cycles for manufacturing various finished products must be created here. The far east should no longer be regarded only as a raw materials base. I think that you should not put up with this. This should be well realized in the centre: I mean all-union and republican bodies. It is necessary to use the territory's huge raw material reserves for building here complete-cycle enterprises and produce at least semi-finished products, or better, finished products. What I said about non-ferrous metallurgy is applied in an even greater measure to the ministry of the timber, pulp-and-paper industry, which must decisively embark on intensive

processing of timber, tasks of large-scale economic development of the zone of the baikal-amur mainline are posed in this connection. A special decision of the central committee and the government on this matter is being drafted now. You face major undertakings in this area, too.

Third. A chronic lagging behind of the fuel and energy complex of the far east which restrains the development of other branches must be overcome within a short period of time. There is no way of living without looking to future. And expecting that assistance with fuel and energy will come from the centre anyway. You have huge resources of fuel and hydrocarbon raw material. However, there is talk for more than one decade, for instance, about the use of north-sakhalin gas, while practical work just started. The solution of the problems of the development of the oil and gas deposits of the sakhalin shelf has been delayed, too. Meanwhile, hundreds of trainloads of oil go to the far east from west siberia. We have to bring in to the far east millions of tons of oil from other parts of the country.

Measures for the development of the fuel and energy base in transbaikal and far eastern areas, set out in the past, are implemented much behind the schedules.

The far east can and must meet fully its energy needs through its own resources. People in the far east have the task of exerting effort to create a reliable base of energy construction, to speed up the construction of a complex of thermal and hydropower stations, form a large single power grid. It is necessary to proceed from the view that the far east, in perspective, must not only supply nearby areas with fuel and energy but must also become their large exporter.

Fourth, the line at the development of the production



infrastructure at a higher pace. This is, certainly, the problem not only for the far east. But it is, perhaps, particularly acute here. It is necessary to speed up the development of the modern building industry in your region. I would say that this is the basis of the plans which we are planning here. In the far east, large teams of railway builders, who laid out the Baikal-Amur mainline within a short period of time, now arrived in the far east. They can and must be employed, for instance, in the reconstruction of old railway lines that have a low carrying capacity now, or in the construction of highways and ports, or other necessary facilities.

The sea transport must also be used more effectively. Its infrastructure must be strengthened. The progressive forms of carriages should be developed. You have experience in this respect, only today I familiarized myself with the operation of Nakaodka's Vostochny-port. This is an excellent modern port. It can serve as an example for many. The ferry to Sakhalin, for instance, is operating well. Quicker measures should be taken also for enhancing the economic effect of the through navigation along the arctic route.

Fifth. The solution of questions of the regional scientific and technological policy, those of installing the latest equipment at enterprise with taking into account the conditions of their maintenance in the area, has specific character. It was seen there are many machine-building enterprises here, and many of them have highly-skilled personnel and a good fame.

But because of disconnection between departments a considerable part of the machinery manufactured in the far east goes to European part of the country, whence comes a stream of

equipment for the needs of the far east. These questions should be analysed promptly. Specialisation of machine-building plants should be decided with the emphasis being made on the creation here of large capacity, well-equipped facilities to turn out machinery for the needs of the region and for export.

Sixth. Possibilities for the export trend or the development of the far eastern economy should be utilised in full measure. The region's share in the country's export is now very low, far below its potentialities. Cardinal changes are needed in this sphere, new approaches, so as to invigorate both coastal and border trade, to use progressive forms of economic ties with foreign countries, including cooperation in production, and joint enterprises. It is necessary to create a specialised export base.

Seventh. The principle of allocating for the development of the social sphere whatever funds are left came under sharp criticism at the Party Congress. This is an old ailment. This practice has also become widespread in a number of eastern areas of the country, including the maritime territory. Some 7.7 million people inhabit the vast territory of the region. Nearly half of all food products is brought here. The per capita output of milk, potatoes and vegetables dropped in the far east in the past 25 years. Many leaders of territories, regions, districts and economies resigned themselves to low harvests, small yields of milk and slow weight gain of cattle and the supply of food from other areas. Even the proposals for the plans for 15-20 years ahead envisage the widening of the food supply of the far east through deliveries from other regions of the country.

I think this is a shortsighted line. There is one way out: to create a highly developed agricultural base and food industry in the area. For these purposes it is necessary to develop vigorously on the basis of intensive technologies all the branches of the agroindustrial complex, specifically, fertilizer industry, to cooperate in the solution of agricultural tasks with neighbour countries.

A tense situation shaped in the region with housing construction and the construction of social and cultural amenities, which is a hindrance to settlement of these who arrive here for permanent residence. I think that the responsibility for such a state of affairs must be shared with the local bodies by appropriate ministries and departments, both all-union and republican.

I reproved the authorities of the territory mainly for the fact that what they are doing today for the development of the social sphere is insufficient. At any rate it falls short of the really existing necessity. But I think that a substantial part of this reproof should be addressed to moscow-based departments. Many of them are very lavish when it comes to the development of production facilities in very different spheres, but allocate funds for the development of the social sphere very sparingly. As a result the manufacturing capacities are set up, but there is no one to use the production potential in a really efficient way. This is one of those tricks that cost the state dearly. Such is the political appraisal of that phenomenon.

You have a wonderful land, beautiful sea, unique nature, rich mineral springs. As I was flying to Nakhodka today the fog faded, the clouds vanished and the sun appeared and I saw the picturesque country from midair. The hills, the golden

valley, and the ocean -- close by. This produces a great impression. It is really a wonderful land.

The far east must become one of the leading health resorts of the USSR. A major centre of domestic and international tourism, including oceanic and high latitude tourism. By the way, this would also replenish resources for speeding up the construction in cities and villages.

Yesterday on my way to a young pioneer camp I met with a group of holiday-makers. It turned out that the group included people from different parts of the country. And what is interesting for many of them it was not the first visit to this place. They came to love that land and its nature. Their unanimous advice was to promote the development of holiday facilities here.

The reason for the present situation is clear. Unsatisfactory construction of housing and social and cultural amenities is explained by the lack of the necessary basis, a lag in building equipment. The weakness of collectives of builders. This cannot be tolerated any longer. If facing social matters is vitally needed for the whole country. This is twice and thrice so for the far east.

What should be done to overcome the difficulties which accumulated over years? 30th central and local bodies are to blame for this. So, action is to be taken from above and from below simultaneously in order to remedy the situation. I can assure you that the CPSU central committee and the government will be urging the all-union and republican ministries to tackle the problems of eastern areas of the country, including your territory.

The soviet far east has the unforgettable past, and I am

sure, a glorious future. This is a territory of vast natural wealth, huge social and economic possibilities, great international prospects. It depends on you and, of course, on the attention of the centre, how we will run the affairs of that very important region of the country and what results we will achieve.

I understand that the remarks made and the acute way the problems were formulated, did not fit today's occasion too well. But such is the constructive Leninist tradition: To look into future while assessing what has been done. The most important thing now is not to lose the sense of perspective, to lay down the foundation for scaling new heights. The main thing now is to concentrate on your future tasks arising from the decisions of the 27th Congress. And I believe that even such a festive occasion as the presentation of a high award is suitable for such an approach, including a critical analysis.

Such are our common plans and concerns, comrades. They show the soviet union's true intentions better than any verbal subterfuges. However much the ruling forces of imperialism may try to present them in a distorted light, we have said openly and honestly and will continue telling all peoples and governments: Yes, we need peace, we again and again are issuing the call for putting an end to the arms race, stopping nuclear madness and eliminating nuclear weapons, for persistently searching for a political settlement of the regional conflicts.

We witness a phenomenon of paramount importance. The realization of the need of peace for all is forcefully grasping the minds of the peoples even in the countries where the governments continue believing that weapons and war are tools of politics. It is precisely for all, since a nuclear war would

be not a clash of only two blocs, two confronting forces. It will lead to a global disaster, in which human civilization will be

Our initiatives on nuclear disarmament, considerable cuts in the conventional weapons and armed forces, control, and creation of a healthier international atmosphere were met in different ways.

The friendly countries have expressed support for them. The countries of the socialist community view them with good reason as a component part of the general policy of socialism in the world arena. And not only because these initiatives have been coordinated with them, not only for principled internationalist considerations, but also because both us and them are engaged in a purely peaceful effort -- refinement of our societies. The salutary process of drawing closer is intensified on that basis, economic integration is filled with new contents, concrete steps are made to create joint plants and amalgamations active human contacts are broadened.

In a word, a progressive, mutually beneficial process deepening cooperation and fraternity among the peoples of the community is under way.

The developing world shows much interest in our plans and intentions -- both internal and international ones. We note that many developing countries wish to expand and deepen further economic, scientific and cultural cooperation with the soviet union. We are prepared for that.

It would be just to say that public at large and those representatives of the western business world, who have a realistic view of things, who do not suffer from anti-communist paranoia and do not associate themselves with profits from the

arms race, regard our plans seriously, with interest. They also stand for peace and cooperation, for the development of healthy economic, scientific and cultural ties with the soviet union. We welcome such an approach.

Yet in many capitalist countries the fashion is, as before, set by forces whose past and future are blinded by animosity towards socialism, by imperial ambitions or are geared fast to the war business. But the latter is known to be extremely voracious and ruthless. Yesterday it needed millions. Today it needs billions, and tomorrow it will need trillions. It will never start manufacturing, of its own free will, toys for children instead of missiles. Since this is in its nature.

The ruling circles of the USA and some countries allied to it are trying either to picture our peace initiatives as sheer propaganda or allege that only the soviet union stands to gain from them. Yes, we stand to gain from disarmament, even if this term is used, just as all peoples and governments who now spend billions on the arms race stand to gain from disarmament. Yet it is only a part of the truth.

I will even say, a smaller part of the truth. The main truth is that our initiatives stem from profound concern about mankind's destiny.

It is absurd and criminal to act in face of a nuclear threat according to an old, already dead scheme. What is good for the socialist countries, should be rejected. Clearly visible in that is the class narrow-mindedness, the primitive ideological mechanical approach, growing political influence of militarism. Yet I am not inclined to believe that the military-industrial complex is all-powerful. We see that world public ever more clearly realizes the danger of militarism. We see

that despite permanent chauvinistic engraving, realistic sentiments are growing in the United States, the realization is deepening that the source of the military threat to the USA are not the soviet people, not the socialist countries, not the peasants of Nicaragua, not, the far away Vietnames or Libyans, but its own arms manufacturers and irresponsible politicians serving them, the adventurist militarists.

We, certainly, understand that the arms race, which is gaining momentum, serves not only the aim of superprofit and preparations for war, but; not in the least, other immoral aims, whose essence is to exhaust the soviet union economically, to frustrate the-party's course for a further rise in the living standards of the people. Hamper the implementation of the social program. We also know precisely who continues cherishing the hope for a planned, methodical destruction of the USSR and of the socialist countries, using to that end economic. Moral-psychological, propaganda, political and military methods.

We can say that this task was always doomed to failure. So it is today. The time has come to reckon with the realities rather than to make policy on the basis of illusions and misconceptions.

If there are no treaties, this will not bring relief to the world, no tranquility will set in. Fear will not disappear until some rulers in the west give up the dangerous attempts, which are, perhaps, consoling for them, but fruitless, at putting the Soviet Union on its knees, splitting the socialist community, and hampering our forward march.

The time persistently demands a new understanding of the present stage in the development of civilization, of international relations, of the world. This is a controversial and complex



world, but it is objectively united by the bonds of interdependence. International relations under which, with all the differences and clashes of interest, one can no longer live under the millenia-old traditions of first law. A civilization demonstrating an unprecedented strength of human mind and labour and simultaneously -- its fragility, vulnerability on the part of the forces released by human genius, but placed at the service of destruction.

All that dictates the need for and makes urgent a radical breaking of many customary attitudes to foreign policy. A breaking of the traditions of political thinking, of views on problems of war and peace, on defence, security of individual states and international security. In that connection it is clear that our radical, global, in the full sense of the word, proposals such as the program for the elimination already in this century, of nuclear and other mass destruction weapons, a total ban on nuclear weapons testing, a ban on the chemical weapons, programs for cooperation in peaceful uses of outer space, and a whole number of others, concern the whole world, all countries.

The main problem confronting today humankind -- that of survival -- is equally acute and urgent for Europe, Africa, America and Asia. Yet in each part of the world it looks different. Therefore, while staying here, in Vladivostok, it is natural to look at international policy issues from the Asian-Pacific viewpoint.

Such an approach is justified for many reasons. Because, in the first place, east of the Urals, in Asia -- in Siberia, in the far East--lies a greater part of our country's territory. It is here that many national tasks put forward by the party

congress will be resolved. Hence the situation in the far east as a whole, in Asia and the ocean expanses washing it, where we are permanent inhabitants and seafarers of long standing, is to us' of a national, state interest.

Many major States, of the world, including the USSR the United States, India, China, Japan, Vietnam, Mexico and Indonesia are situated on the enormous expanses of this territory spreading over almost half of the earth. Here lie States, which are considered to be medium ones, but are rather big by European standards - Canada, the Phillipines, Australia and New Zealand, and along with them there are tens of comparatively smaller and tiny countries. Some of them have a history of millenia or many centuries, others have formed in modern times, and still others have formed quite recently.

Asia, which woke up to a new life in the 20th century, has enriched world progress with its diversified and unique experience of the fight for freedom and independence. This is not only history. This is a living legacy making one of the important fundamentals of the current political realities in this part of the world.

Every country has its own social and political system with all the thinkable tinges, its traditions, achievements and difficulties, its mode of life and its beliefs, convictions and prejudices, its own understanding of spiritual and material values. Each of them has something to be proud of and something to uphold in the treasure house of human civilization.

This impressive diversity, this colossal human and socio-political massif calls for art attention, study and respect. We know well from our own, Soviet, experience what an immense Creative force the revived sense of national dignity becomes,

what a constructive role is played by the national identity of a people in its organic interrelationship with other equal and free peoples. This process is on the rise in Asia and the Pacific now: Everything is in motion here, far from everything has settled. The new is mixing with the old, the way of life which seemed unshakeable only yesterday is giving way to the whirlwind of changes -- social, scientific and technical, and ideological. This is, I would say, yet another period of renaissance in world history, the period harbouring a huge potential of progress. And this is true not only with regard to Asia and Oceania.

Which way will socio-economic and political development take? What processes will prevail in inter-state relations? These issues will largely determine the destinies of the entire world.

Socialism is an inalienable factor of the large-scale and complex changes in this region. It gained firm positions in Asia as a result of the great October revolution and the victory over fascism and Japanese militarism, as a result of the great Chinese revolution, after the new social system consolidated in Mongolia, and on Korean land whose people displayed outstanding steadfastness in the struggle for the socialist future of their country, and then in Vietnam and Laos. But it is also in Asia where it was confronted with the most brutal and cynical counteraction. Vietnam is the most graphic example. Its heroic experience, the lessons of its victory over imperialism highlighted again the irresistible strength of the ideas of freedom and socialism.

This region, Asia, saw the formation of the concept of non-alignment, the movement which now includes more than a hundred nations. It is seeking to come up with its own response to the

challenge of the time, is actively working for overcoming the world's division into military blocs and is looking for ways to diminish the nuclear threat. In rejecting and condemning exploitation, the policy of aggression, and neocolonialism, the non-aligned movement is urging mankind for unity, for cooperation in combating hunger and the glaring poverty of hundreds of millions of people.

The great India, with its moral authority and traditional wisdom, with its specific political experience and huge economic potentialities, is the recognized leader of this movement. We highly assess its contribution to asserting standards of equitable co-existence and justice in the international community. Friendly relations between the USSR and India became a stabilizing factor on a world-wide scale.

Japan has turned into a power of front-rank importance. The country which became the first victim of American nuclear weapons covered a great path within a brief period, demonstrated striking accomplishments in industry, trade, education, science and technology. These successes are due not only to the self-control, discipline and energy of the Japanese people, but also due to their non-nuclear principles which officially underlie its international policy, although lately - and this must be emphasised -- they, as well as the peaceful provisions of Japan's constitution are being circumvented ever more openly.

But we also see many other things in Asia and Oceania. The peoples' dignity, insulted by colonialism, the legacy of poverty, illiteracy and backwardness, along with profound prejudices preserve conditions for mistrust and hostility between peoples, including those living within one state. Imperialism speculates on the difficulties and prejudices, which

bring about local conflicts, ethnic and religious strife, and political instability.

Wherever independence becomes a tangible international value and there emerges a threat to the exploiter interests of imperialism, it resorts to its favourite methods. Economic blackmail, intrigues and plots against. The leadership of the country in question, interference in internal problems, it maintains separatists, finances and even directly arms counter-revolution and terrorists. Punjab, the Tamil problem, with attempts being made to turn this one against India too, the undeclared wars on Kampuchea and Afghanistan, the annexation of Micronesia, interference in the Philippines, and pressure on New Zealand offer enough examples to see how the contemporary mechanism of imperialist intervention and diktat operates.

The experience of history, the laws of growing interdependence and the integration requirements of the economy call one to look for ways of unity, establishment of open ties between nations within the region and beyond it. These nations have tens, hundreds of arduous problems -- inherited from the colonial past and emerging out of contradictions of present-day development. And they are being dragged into blocs, the freedom of handling their own resources is being curtailed. They are being forced to inflate military budgets, swept into the arms race and the militarization of the economy and social life.

All this deforms the processes of internal development, generates tension and, naturally, stands in the way of normalizing relations between nationalities and states.

The soviet union is also an Asian and Pacific country. It realizes the complex problems of this vast region. It is directly contiguous to them. This is what determines the

balanced and overall view of the giant part of the world with a mass of diverse nations and peoples. Our approach to it is based on the recognition and understanding of the existing realities.

At the same time our interest is not a claim to privileges and special position, not egoistic attempts to strengthen our security at someone else's expense, not a search for benefit to the detriment of others. Our interest is in the pooling of efforts and in cooperation, with full respect for each people's right to live as they choose and resolve their problems on their own in conditions of peace.

We are in favour of building together new, fair relations in Asia and the Pacific.

Recently, I had many meetings with leaders of European nations, with various Political figures of European countries. involuntarily, I compare the situation in Asia with that in Europe.

The Pacific region has not as yet been militarized to the extent this has taken place in Europe. But the potentialities of its militarization are truly immense. And the consequences are extremely dangerous. A glance at the map will convince one of that. Major nuclear powers are situated here. powerful land armies, mighty navies and airforces have been established. The scientific, technological and industrial potential of many countries -- from the western to the eastern fringes of the ocean -- makes it possible to boost any arms race. The situation is being exacerbated by the preservation of conflict situations. Let us not forget. It is in Asia that American imperialism waged two biggest wars since 1945 -- in Korea and Indochina. One can hardly count even several years during the past four decades without flames of war blazing in

one or another part of the Asian and Pacific region.

In Europe, there operates -- well, or not well -- the Helsinki Process of dialogue, talks and agreements. This brings in certain stability and reduces the probability of armed conflicts. In the region in question, this is absent, or nearly absent. If something has been changing lately, this has not been for the better. Since the second half of the seventies, the U.S. has undertaken large-scale measures to build up armed forces in the Pacific ocean. The militarized Triangle of Washington, Tokyo and Seoul is being set up under its pressure. And although two out of three nuclear powers in the region - the people's republic of China and the USSR -- pledged not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, the United States and deployed nuclear weapon-delivery vehicles and nuclear warheads in of the zones of Crisis -- in the Korean Peninsula, and nuclear weapon-delivery vehicles on Japanese territory.

One has to state that militarization, the escalation of the threat of war in this part of the world are picking up dangerous speed. The Pacific ocean is turning into an arena of military political confrontation. This is what gives rise to growing concern among the peoples living here. This is alarming also for us from all viewpoints. Including for considerations of security in the Asian part of our country.

The Asian and Pacific direction in the Soviet Union's foreign policy is an integral part of the overall platform of the CPSU's international activity, worked out by the April plenary meeting and the 27th Party Congress, but a platform is not a chart that can be applied to any situation. It is, rather, a set of principles and a method relying on experience.

Proceeding from that, how will it be possible to perceive

the process of shaping international security and peaceful cooperation in this vast region?

First of all, in keeping with its principled policy, the Soviet Union will seek to lend dynamism to its bilateral relations with all countries situated here without exception. We shall strengthen in all ways friendship and invigorate multiform relations with the mongolian people's republic, the democratic people's republic of Korea, the socialist republic of Vietnam, the people's democratic republic of Laos and the people's republic of Kampuchea. We regard relations with our friends, built on the principles of equality and solidarity, as an integral part of overall Asian and pacific security.

At present, for instance, a question of withdrawing a substantial part of soviet troops from Mongolia is being examined jointly with the mongolian leadership.

We are prepared to expand ties with Indonesia, Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Burma, Sri-lanka, Nepal, Brunei, the republic of Maldives, and the youngest Independent participants in the region's political life. With some of the Fatter - Papua New Guinea, Western Samoa, the Kingdom of Tonga, Fiji, the republic of Kiribati, the republic of Nauru, Tuvalu and the republic of Vanuatu --we already maintain diplomatic relations.

Speaking in the city which is but a step from the people's republic of China, I would like to dwell on the most important issues in our relations. The relations are extremely important for several reasons, starting from the fact that we are neighbours. That we share the world's longest land border and that we, our children and grandchildren are destined to live near each other for ever and ever.



But the question is not, of course, reduced to that. History entrusted the Soviet and the Chinese peoples with an extremely responsible mission. Much in international development depends on these two major socialist nations.

A noticeable improvement occurred in our relations in the recent years. I would like to reaffirm: The Soviet Union is prepared -- any time, and at any level -- to discuss with China questions of additional measures for creating an atmosphere of good neighbourhood. We hope that the border dividing (I would prefer to say linking us) will become a line of peace and friendship in the near future.

The Soviet people's attitude to the objective advanced by the Communist Party of China -- to modernize the country and build in the future a socialist society worthy of the great people -- is that of understanding and respect.

As far as it is possible to judge, we have similar priorities with China -- those of accelerating social and economic development. Why not support each other, why not cooperate in implementing our plans wherever this will clearly benefit both sides? The better the relations, the more we shall be able to exchange our experience.

We note with satisfaction that a positive shift has become visible in economic ties. We are convinced that the historically established complementarity between the Soviet and the Chinese economies gives great opportunities for expanding these ties, including in the border regions. Some of the major problems of cooperation are literally knocking at the door. For instance, we do not want the border river of Amur to be viewed as a water obstacle. Let the basin of this mighty river unite the efforts of the Chinese and the Soviet peoples in using for mutual benefit the rich resources available there and for

building water-management projects. An inter-governmental agreement on this account is being jointly worked out. And the official border might pass along the main ship channel.

The soviet government is preparing a positive reply in respect to the issue of assistance in building a railway to connect the Xinuiang Uygur automonous region with Kazakhstan.

We suggested cooperation with the PRC in space exploration, which could include training of Chinese cosmonauts. There are great opportunities for mutually beneficial exchanges in the sphere of culture and education. We are prepared, and sincerely wish all that.

On relations with Japan. There are emerging signs of a turn for the better here as well. It would be good if the turn did take place. The objective position of our two countries in the world demands profound cooperation on a sound realistic basis, in a calm atmosphere free from problems of the past. A beginning was made this year. Foreign ministers exchanged visits. On the agenda is an exchange of top-level visits.

Economic cooperation is of mutual interest. The point at issue is, first of all, our coastal regions which already practise business contacts with Japanese firms. It is possible to discuss the question of establishing joint enterprises in adjacent and near-by regions of the USSR and Japan. Why not establish long-term cooperation in the investigation and all-round use of the ocean resources, why not link up the programmes of the peaceful study and use of outer space? The Japanese, it seems, have a method of making relations more dynamic called Economic diplomacy. Let it serve this time soviet-Japanese cooperation.

In the pacific region, the Soviet Union also shares the border with the United States. It is our next-door neighbour in the literal meaning of the word, with only seven kilometres dividing US -- the exact distance between the soviet island of big diomede and the American island of little diomede.

We clearly realize that the united states is a great pacific power, primarily because a considerable part of the U.S. Population lives on the shores of this ocean. And the western part of America, gravitating towards this area, is playing a growing part in the country's life, and features dynamism. Besides, the United States, undoubstedly has important economic and political interests in the region.

No doubt, without the U.S., without its participation, it is impossible to resolve the problem of security and cooperation in the pacific ocean in a way that would satisfy all. So far, regrettably, Washington has not shown interest in this, it is not even thinking of a serious talk on the pacific subject. If this subject is taken, it is led to the trodden path of the soviet threat and to sabre-rattling to corroborate the myth Our approach to relations with the U.S. Is well-known we stand for peaceful, goodneighbourly relations, for mutually beneficial cooperation which has, incidentally, considerable opportunities also in the far east, in the pacific.

Talking about the U.S., here are a few words about the most important thing in our relations for the present -- about termination of the arms race. After the Geneva meeting the Soviet Union has put forward many large-scale proposals on the entire range of problems of reducing and eliminating arms and of verifying the process. We did not see any movement to meet us half-way. We were treated in point of fact to the same stuff as prior to the Geneva Summit.

With a view to overcoming the marking of time, we went farther along the road towards the USA: New large-scale compromise proposals were put forward in my June letter to the president of the United States. When visiting here, I received a reply from president Reagan. The reply sets on thinking. We have begun to study it. We shall treat it with responsibility and attention. To us the most important thing is first of all the extent to which the proposals contained in the letter meet the principle of equal security and whether they make it possible to reach effective joint solutions in the field of ending the arms race and preventing its spreading over to outer space. We shall determine our further steps accordingly. As far as a new Soviet-U.S. summit meeting is concerned; I can repeat; We favour such a meeting. But we resolutely oppose the interpretation of the accords reached at the previous meeting in Geneva as reduced to the promise to have more meetings. No. The main thing on which we agreed last time with president Reagan and what we signed is the consent to strive for the normalisation of relations between the USSR and the USA and for the improvement of the international situation, and to speed up the course of talks on the reduction of armaments. A new summit meeting, too, is called upon to promote that.

We frequently hear from abroad all kinds of inventions to the effect that the Soviet Union is building up its military power in the east of the country. Let me state with all responsibility: We are not doing anything and shall not do anything over and above the level that corresponds to the minimal requirements of our defence, the defence of our friends and allies, especially in the light of the American military activity not far from our and their frontiers.

This applies in full measure to the medium-range missiles. Those who do not want to see world tensions lessening continue to argue that we allegedly will be able to move our SS-20 missiles from the West to the East and from the East to the West. This is why I emphasize one more time -- we suggest that both American and Soviet medium-range missiles in Europe be eliminated. Precisely eliminated, and not moved somewhere. It is quite clear that this promotes the interests of asian countries as well.

I would also like to state that the Soviet Union is a convinced advocate of dissanding the military groupings, renouncing the possession of military bases in Asia and the Pacific Ocean and withdrawing troops from the territories of other countries. The USSR is a member of the Warsaw Treaty, but it is the European Defensive Alliance and it operates strictly within the geographical framework determined by the treaty. In our turn we are strongly opposed to U.S. attempts at extending NATO'S competence to the entire world, including Asia and the Pacific Ocean.

Our views about the security in the Asian-pacific region have not come out of thin air. They take account of the experience of the past and the modern times. The principles of Pancia Shila and of Bandoong have not sunk into oblivion. The positive examples of the true in Korea, the 1954 Geneva meeting on Indochina, the Indo-Pakistani agreement in Tashkent live on in the diplomatic experience. Nowadays, too, we see the efforts of a number of states to solve in practice the common economic problems and attempts at settling conflicts in one or other way. There is a no small amount of positive in the activities of the Asean and in bilateral ties. After the plan for a pacific community had been rejected, the discussion of the idea of a

acific economic cooperation began. We approached it without bias and we are ready to join in the deliberations on possible foundations of such cooperation, of course, if it is conceived not following a bloc-oriented, anti-socialist pattern imposed by someone, but as a result of a free discussion without any discrimination whatsoever. A sufficiently vast arsenal of scientific and political ideas on the issue of establishing a new world economic order and the experience of integration in the West and the East could become a solid foundation for such discussions.

By way of an objective, no matter if it is a rather remote one, we would propose a conference, in the mold of the Helsinki Conference. To be attended by all the countries gravitating toward the ocean. When an agreement is reached on its convocation (If at all, of course) it will be possible to come to terms on the venue for it. One of the options is Hiroshima. Why should not that city, the first victim of nuclear evil, become the Helsinki of sorts for Asia and the Pacific Ocean?

Summing up, I would like to emphasize that we stand for integrating the Asian-Pacific region into the general process of establishing a comprehensive system of international security proposed at the 27th Congress of the CPSU.

How do we see it concretely?

First of all, the issues of regional settlement prompt themselves. I'll speak of Afghanistan separately. Now let me speak of south-east Asia and Kampuchea. The Kampuchean people sustained terrible losses. That country, its cities and villages came under American bombing raids more than once, with its suffering it has gained the right to choose friends and allies for itself. It is impossible to try and draw it

back into the tragic past. To decide the future of that state in the distant capitals or even in the united nations.

Here, like in other problems of south-east Asia, much depends on the normalization of Sino-Vietnamese relations. It is a sovereign matter of the governments and the leadership of both countries. We can only express our interest in seeing the border between these socialist states again becoming a border of peace and goodneighborly relations, in seeing comradely dialogue resumed and the unnecessary suspicion and mistrust removed. It seems that the moment is good and the whole of Asia needs that.

In our opinion, there are no insurmountable obstacles in the way of establishing mutually acceptable relations between the countries of Indochina and Asean. Given goodwill and on the condition of non-intervention from outside they could solve their problems which would benefit the cause of security in Asia.

There is a possibility not only for lessening dangerous tensions in the Korean peninsula but also for starting to move along the road of solving the national problem of the entire Korean people. Beyond what is far from the Korean interests there are no sensible reasons for evading a serious dialogue proposed by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

Second. We stand for putting up a barrier in the way of the proliferation and build-up of nuclear weapons in Asia and the Pacific Ocean.

As is known, the USSR pledged itself not to increase the number of medium-range nuclear missiles in the Asian part of the country.

The USSR supports proclaiming the southern part of the Pacific a nuclear-free zone and urges all nuclear powers to guarantee its status in a unilateral or multilateral way.

The implementation of the proposal of the DPRK for the creation of a nuclear-free zone in the Korean peninsula would be a serious contribution. The well-deserved attention was aroused by the idea of creating such a zone in south-east Asia.

Third. We propose to start talks on the reduction of the activity of fleets in the Pacific, above all nuclear-armed ships. Restriction of the rivalry in the sphere of anti-submarine weapons, specifically, the arrangement to keep from anti-submarine activity in certain zones of the Pacific would help strengthen stability. This could become a substantial Confidence-Building Measure. In general, I would like to say that if the United States gave up military presence, say, in the Philippines, we would not leave this step unanswered.

We remain strongly in favour of resuming the talks on turning the Indian Ocean into a peace zone.

Fourth. The Soviet Union attaches much importance to radical reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments in Asia to the limits of reasonable sufficiency. We realise that this problem should be tackled gradually, stage-by-stage, by starting from some one district, say, the Far East. In this context the USSR is prepared to discuss with the PRC concrete steps aimed at proportionate lowering of the level of land forces.

Certain progress has been achieved of late at the Arghan-Pakistani Talks held through the mediation of a representative of the United Nations Secretary General. As soon as a political settlement is finally worked out, the return of all Soviet troops



from Afghanistan can be speed up. Schedules for their stage-by-stage return have been agreed upon with the Afghan leadership.

But all who encourage and finance the undeclared war against Afghanistan and from whose territory it is waged, should know that if the intervention against the DRA continues, the Soviet Union will stand up for its neighbour. This stems from our internationalist solidarity with the Afghan people and from the interests of the Soviet Union's security.

We support the line of the present Afghan leadership after national reconciliation, at the widening of the social base of the April National-Democratic Revolution including the creation of a government with the participation in it of those political forces that found themselves: Beyond the country's boundaries but are prepared to participate sincerely in the nationwide process of the construction of new Afghanistan.

Comrades,

The present generations inherited many difficult, painful problems. In order to advance to their solution, it is necessary to get rid of the burden of the past, to seek new approaches, guiding oneself by the responsibility for the present and future.

The Soviet State calls on all Asian and Pacific Nations for cooperation for the sake of peace and security. Everyone who is striving for these goals, who hopes for a better future of their peoples, will find us to be benevolent interlocutors and honest partners.

Mankind is living through a difficult, dramatic time. But it has a reserve of strength, which allows it not simply to survive but also to learn to live in a new, civilized world, in other words, to live without the threat of war, in conditions of

freedom, when the benefit of man and the maximum development of the possibilities of a personality will be the highest criterion. But this requires a persistent struggle against the common enemy -- the threat of universal destruction.

Mobilization of the potential of common sense existing in the world, the partnership of reason, are now more important than ever to arrest the sliding to catastrophe. Our resolve to do our utmost for this remains unchanged. Peoples of all countries and states can be sure of this.

Fifth. The soviet union holds that time has long come to switch to practical plane the discussion of confidence-building measures and non-use of force in the region. The start could be made from the simpler measures, for instance, measures for security of sea lanes in the pacific, and for the prevention of international terrorism.

A conference to discuss and work out such measures could be held in one of the soviet maritime cities. By the way, the question could be solved with time of opening Vladivostok to visits by foreigners. If a change for the better in the situation in the Pacific is really achieved, Vladivostok could become one of the major international centres. A commercial and cultural centre, a city for festivals, sports events, congresses, scientific symposiums. We would like it to be our widely opened window on the East. And the words of our great Pushkin The ships of every flag and nation will hail our shores will then apply also to Vladivostok.

And in conclusion, about Afghanistan. It was declared from the Rostrum of the 27th Congress of the CPSU that we are ready to return home Soviet troops stationed in Afghanistan at the request of its government. As you known, the party now firmly

adheres to the principle that words should be confirmed by deeds.

Having thoroughly assessed the situation that is shaping and having held consultations with the government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, the Soviet leadership has adopted the decision which I officially announce today: Six regiments will be returned home from Afghanistan before the end of 1986 -- one armoured regiment, two motorised rifle regiments, and three anti-aircraft artillery regiments -- with their organic equipment and armaments. These units will be returned to the areas of their permanent deployment in the Soviet Union and in such a way that all those who take an interest in this could easily ascertain this.

Taking so serious a step of which we informed in advance the states concerned, including Pakistan, the Soviet Union is striving to speed up political settlement, to give it impetus. The Soviet Union also proceeds from the view that those who organise and implement the armed intervention against the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan will correctly understand and duly appreciate this unilateral step of ours. It must be answered by the curtailment of outside interference in the affairs of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.

Such is, in brief, the state of our affairs now, such is the general outline of the international situation in whose development the role of the Asian-Pacific part of the world will be ever growing. We must draw practical conclusions from all this so as to act with still greater energy, rebuilding our life for the better.

There are no direct analogies in history, but similar situations arise. Therefore, the fruitful experience of the

past is so valuable and instructive for US. In the article Fourth anniversary of the October Revolution V.I. Lenin wrote: We have already started the necessary changes in our economic policy and already have some successes to our credit. True, they are small and partial, but nonetheless, they are successes. In this new field of 'tuition' we are already finishing our preparatory class. By persistent and assiduous study, by making practical experience the test of every step we take, by not fearing to alter over and over again what we have already begun, by correcting our mistakes and most carefully analysing their significance, we shall pass to the higher classes. We shall go through the whole 'course'.

Here we have, comrades, Lenin's advice, Lenin's analysis with the depth, sobriety and self-opticism inherent in him. This is the advice as to how we should act in the present situation, how to make the restructuring so as to complete it successfully and take the country to a qualitatively new level. Our duty is to follow this wise and effective advice by Lenin in full measure.

Item ends.